Detecting Return-to-libc Buffer Overflow Attacks Using Network Intrusion Detection Systems.

DAY, David, ZHAO, Zhengxu and MA, Minhua (2010). Detecting Return-to-libc Buffer Overflow Attacks Using Network Intrusion Detection Systems. In: Digital Society , 2010 . ICDS '10 . Fourth International Conference on. IEEE Computer Society.

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

There has been a significant amount of research recently into methods of protecting systems from buffer overflow attacks by detecting stack injected shell code. The majority of the research focuses on developing algorithms or signatures for detecting polymorphic and metamorphic payloads. However much of this problem has already been solved through the mainstream use of host based protection mechanisms e.g. Data Execution Prevention (DEP) and Address Space Randomization (ASLR). Many hackers are now using the more inventive attack methods e.g., return-tolibc, which do not inject shell code onto the stack and thus evade DEP and common shell code detection mechanisms. The purpose of this work is to propose a series of generic signatures that could be used to detect network born returnto- libc attacks. To this end we outline how we performed a return-to-libc network based attack, which bypasses DEP and common IDS signatures, before suggesting an efficient signature for detection of similar return-to-libc attacks.

Item Type:	Book Section
Research Institute, Centre or Group - Does NOT include content added after October 2018:	Cultural Communication and Computing Research Institute > Communication and Computing Research Centre
Departments - Does NOT include content added after October 2018:	Faculty of Science, Technology and Arts > Department of Computing
Identification Number:	https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDS.2010.37
Depositing User:	David Day
Date Deposited:	31 May 2012 09:31
Last Modified:	18 Mar 2021 22:30
URI:	https://shura.shu.ac.uk/id/eprint/5240

Actions (login required)

View Item

Downloads

Publication Metrics