Information defaults in repeated public good provision

LIU, Jia, SONNTAG, Axel and ZIZZO, Daniel John (2022). Information defaults in repeated public good provision. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 197, 356-369.

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Abstract

We study an unexplored type of defaults - information defaults - in a repeated public good provision setting. In our treatments, we vary the default of having or not having contribution information as well as whether the information comes with a positive, zero or negative financial incentive. We find that almost all subjects have the information when this is cost-free or financially beneficial, but around a third have the information even when this is costly. Moreover, a default of not having information leads to a slower unraveling of cooperation which is matched by the beliefs about others’ contributions in these treatments. We also find a secondary informational default effect, challenging previous findings on how defaults work: when the default is no information, subjects do not seek information more often, but they tend to believe that more other subjects seek information.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Economics; 1401 Economic Theory; 1402 Applied Economics; 1403 Econometrics
Identification Number:	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2022.03.001
Page Range:	356-369
SWORD Depositor:	Symplectic Elements
Depositing User:	Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited:	29 Mar 2022 14:52
Last Modified:	29 Mar 2022 15:00
URI:	https://shura.shu.ac.uk/id/eprint/30006

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