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SERBERA, Jean-Philippe and FRY, John (2019). Takeover deterrents and cross partial ownership: The case of golden shares. Managerial and decision economics, 40 (3), 243-250.
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Abstract
We analyse takeovers in an industry with bilateral capital‐linked firms in cross partial ownership (CPO). Before merger, CPO reduces the profitability of involved firms, confirming the “outsider effect.” However, the impact of CPO upon merger profitability is two‐sided in a Cournot setting. CPO, by cointegrating profits, increases output collusion leading to anticompetitive effects with facilitated mergers in most cases. Nonetheless, a protective threshold exists for which CPO arrangements can reduce the incentives for hostile takeovers. This has potentially significant regulatory implications. An illustrative example showcases the potential relevance of CPO as a defence against hostile takeovers across different industries.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | ** Article version: VoR ** From Crossref via Jisc Publications Router **Journal IDs: pissn 0143-6570 **History: published 28-01-2019 **License for this article: starting on 28-01-2019, , http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Management of Technology and Innovation, Management Science and Operations Research, Strategy and Management, Business and International Management |
| Identification Number: | https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2998 |
| Page Range: | 243-250 |
| SWORD Depositor: | Louise Beirne |
| Depositing User: | Louise Beirne |
| Date Deposited: | 08 Feb 2019 10:23 |
| Last Modified: | 17 Mar 2021 16:00 |
| URI: | https://shura.shu.ac.uk/id/eprint/23979 |
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