Ethics for things

ADAM, Alison (2008). Ethics for things. Ethics and Information Technology, 10 (2-3), 149-154.

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Official URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10676-0...
Link to published version:: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9169-3

Abstract

This paper considers the ways that Information Ethics (IE) treats things. A number of critics have focused on IE’s move away from anthropocentrism to include non-humans on an equal basis in moral thinking. I enlist Actor Network Theory, Dennett’s views on ‘as if’ intentionality and Magnani’s characterization of ‘moral mediators’. Although they demonstrate different philosophical pedigrees, I argue that these three theories can be pressed into service in defence of IE’s treatment of things. Indeed the support they lend to the extension of moral status to non-human objects can be seen as part of a trend towards the accommodation of non-humans into our moral and social networks. A number of parallels are drawn between philosophical arguments over artificial intelligence and information ethics.

Item Type: Article
Research Institute, Centre or Group: Cultural Communication and Computing Research Institute > Communication and Computing Research Centre
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9169-3
Depositing User: Justine Gavin
Date Deposited: 08 Oct 2018 12:02
Last Modified: 08 Oct 2018 12:02
URI: http://shura.shu.ac.uk/id/eprint/22834

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