Ethics for things

ADAM, Alison (2008). Ethics for things. Ethics and Information Technology, 10 (2-3), 149-154.

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Abstract

This paper considers the ways that Information Ethics (IE) treats things. A number of critics have focused on IE’s move away from anthropocentrism to include non-humans on an equal basis in moral thinking. I enlist Actor Network Theory, Dennett’s views on ‘as if’ intentionality and Magnani’s characterization of ‘moral mediators’. Although they demonstrate different philosophical pedigrees, I argue that these three theories can be pressed into service in defence of IE’s treatment of things. Indeed the support they lend to the extension of moral status to non-human objects can be seen as part of a trend towards the accommodation of non-humans into our moral and social networks. A number of parallels are drawn between philosophical arguments over artificial intelligence and information ethics.

Item Type:	Article
Research Institute, Centre or Group - Does NOT include content added after October 2018:	Cultural Communication and Computing Research Institute > Communication and Computing Research Centre
Identification Number:	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9169-3
Page Range:	149-154
Depositing User:	Justine Gavin
Date Deposited:	08 Oct 2018 12:02
Last Modified:	18 Mar 2021 10:45
URI:	https://shura.shu.ac.uk/id/eprint/22834

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