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State terrorism and multinational enterprises: understanding the links and why it matters

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Journal:	*Multinational Business Review*
Manuscript ID	MBR-02-2025-0057.R3
Manuscript Type:	Research Paper
Keywords:	State Terrorism, Multinationals, State Violence

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STATE TERRORISM AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: UNDERSTANDING THE LINKS AND WHY IT MATTERS

Introduction

In management research, as well as in popular culture, terrorism is typically portrayed as the domain of non-state actor groups (e.g., Suder, 2004; Czinkota *et al*., 2004; Czinkota *et al*., 2005; Czinkota *et al*., 2010; Liu and Li, 2020; Dimitrovia *et al*., 2022). However, national states (herein referred to as states) are the most prolific perpetrators of terrorism (Blakeley, 2009). State terrorism encompasses acts of terror carried out by a government against foreign states or its own citizens, impacting millions of people across countries such as Columbia, Palestine, Iraq, Chile, Rwanda, Indonesia, and Philippines (Stohl, 2006; Jackson and Turner, 2023). Yet states across the liberal and illiberal divide, including Russia, Iran, United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) have employed terrorism and other violent methods to achieve various political and economic objectives (Stohl, 2006; Blakeley, 2009). Because states possess superior resources, their terrorist activities cause greater damage than non-state terrorism (Jackson *et al*., 2011) and to this day, state terrorism is a major cause of human insecurity and human rights violations across the world (Jackson *et al*., 2011).

A neglected aspect of state terrorism is the complicity of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in both incentivising and enabling this terrorism (Owens and Johnson, 2024). Critical terrorism scholars researching state terrorism within international relations (IR) (Blakeley, 2009; Maher, 2015a; Maher 2015b; Jackson *et al*., 2011) and evidence from organizations like Global Witness and Amnesty International reveal clear connections between multinationals and state terrorism. Some MNCs have directly participated in these activities, as exemplified by Ford in Argentina, which provided vehicles for state-conducted kidnappings and permitted military use of their facilities to target union leaders (Klein, 2007). MNEs further exploit state terrorism when states violently suppress local opposition to investment plans (Maher, 2015a,

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2015b; Maher and Thomson, 2011; Owens and Johnson, 2024) or by looking the other way, refusing to condemn the violence.

We have limited understanding of state terrorism within management, and international business (IB) research (Harvey, 1993; Owens and Johnson, 2004). While specific terrorism research within IB, a sub-set of management research, has established terrorism as a major source of risk and uncertainty for MNEs (e.g., Suder, 2004; Czinkota *et al*., 2005, 2010; Dimitrovia *et al*., 2022; Jimenez and Lupton, 2021), this work exclusively focused on non-state terrorism which inadvertently led the field to equate terrorism primarily with non-state actors. Non-state terrorism typically represents an external and uncertain source of risk for MNEs (Liu and Li, 2020), leading to operational, financial, and security risks and barriers (see Czinkota *et al*., 2010). In contrast, state terrorism primarily poses ethical risks of collusion and complicity, as well as business benefits (Owens and Johnson, 2024). Focusing on non-state terrorism captures only a partial picture of how terrorism interacts with commerce, its actors, and related processes.

Another stream of IB research has examined how political violence affects MNEs in foreign markets (eg., Oetzel and Getz, 2012; Dai *et al*., 2013, 2017, 2022; Belhoste and Dimitrovia, 2025). Yet most research examines political violence in the context of political conflict. For MNEs, state terrorism represents a distinct form of political violence, different from political conflict in its nature, targets, and legitimacy (Blakeley, 2009). While it can occur during wars and conflicts, MNEs typically encounter state terrorism in non-conflict and relatively stable environments. Unlike war, for example, which creates an external shock for MNEs with clear disruption to institutions, infrastructure, and supply chains (Dai *et al*., 2013), state terrorism is more insidious and less visible. States can terrorize specific individuals or entire populations for political and social control - often covertly - while maintaining normal governance functions elsewhere (Stohl 2008). As a result, MNEs operate in these environments

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and unintentionally benefit from state terrorism and related human rights violations. More significantly, some MNEs intentionally collude with *acts* of state terrorism, either through working with the state to overcome investment obstacles by violence, or by providing products and services used in terror activities (which is considered criminal, illegal, and inhumane). What distinguishes state terrorism from other forms of political violence for MNEs, is precisely this potential for collusion with the actual violence and serious complicity in human rights violations.

In this perspective piece, I ask the following questions: *First, how are MNEs linked to state terrorism, and what are the consequences of these links for MNEs? Second, why and how do MNEs engage in collusion with state terrorism?* To answer these questions, I draw on research from critical terrorism scholars, IB theories and non-market strategy research to analyse the links between MNEs and state terrorism. Specifically, the research builds on institutional theory and resource dependency theory to explain how MNEs collude with state terrorism. Moreover, I utilise several carefully selected corporate examples to illuminate and explicate the multifaceted relationship between state terrorism and MNEs. Given the paper's primary aim of building new theoretical understanding of state terrorism within management research, I followed Eisenhardt's (2021) theoretical sampling method to select those specific examples of companies acting with or against state terrorism either within their domestic or foreign markets.

This paper makes two significant contributions: First, while most IB terrorism research focuses on how MNEs are impacted by terrorism from non-state terrorists (Suder, 2004; Czinkota et al, 2005; Czinkota et al, 2010), or how MNEs operate within zones of political conflict (e.g., Oetzel and Getz, 2012; Dai *et al*., 2013; Belhoste and Dimitrovia, 2025), my study uniquely examines state terrorism and its links with MNEs. It offers an analysis of the ways which MNEs are linked to different types of state terrorism (generalised and limited)

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and the implications for MNEs. Notably, there is not a single focused study on state terrorism within the IB literature. Second, this paper demonstrates how MNEs collude in state terrorism. Building on institutional theory and resource dependency theory, this paper uniquely identifies some of the regulatory, social and resource conditions enabling MNE collusion with state directed violence. This represents an important contribution by revealing how MNEs collude with political violence for their advantage, rather than being victims of political violence as traditionally portrayed in IB research (e.g, Oetzel and Getz, 2012; Dai *et al*., 2013).

This paper begins with a brief portrait of state terrorism. It then explores the central thrust of the paper by examining how state terrorism are linked with MNEs. Finally, the conclusion section summarizes the key arguments and outlines a plan for future IB scholarship in this area.

Background to State Terrorism

State terrorism is a distinct form of political violence that serves as both a foreign policy instrument and internal governance mechanism for many states (Jackson *et al*., 2011). State terrorism refers to *when state agents or their proxies intentionally use or threaten violence to intimidate groups and individuals* (Jackson *et al*., 2011). A defining feature of state terrorism, which separates this from other forms of state violence is that it involves the illegal targeting of individuals that the state has a duty to protect with the aim of installing fear in a target audience beyond the direct victim (Blakeley, 2012, p.1). States employ terrorism for ideological, political, economic, and political purposes. This includes controlling populations, deterring enemies, protecting economic interests, and securing resources for corporate elites (Stohl, 2006; Jackson *et al*., 2011).

Considering most IB research on political violence examines the broader phenomenon of violent conflict (e.g., Oetzel and Getz, 2012; Oh and Oetzel, 2017), an important question arises: Is state terrorism equivalent to political conflict? Violent conflict is defined as the

organized and sustained use of physical force that results in injury or death to persons and/or damage or destruction to property (Oetzel and Getz, 2012). Oh and Oetzel (2017, pp.715-716) identified three types of conflict: armed, one-sided, and non-state. But state terrorism (as with non-state terrorism) is a *method of political violence*; it is not necessarily the same as a conventional political conflict such as war. Whilst state terrorism can occur within armed conflicts and one-sided conflicts, it also occurs in relatively peaceful settings. Furthermore, the primary objective of terrorism (whether state or non-state) is psychological intimidation of a wider audience beyond the immediate victim, rather than to injure or destroy (Finn and Momani, 2017). Unlike organised conflict such as war, therefore, state terrorism is primarily about political communication, fear, and intimidation. State actions such as kidnapping, torture, disappearances and rendition send a clear message that the state is all-powerful and will not tolerate dissent. Table I provides a summary of the differences between political conflict and state terrorism for MNEs.

-Insert Table I here-

Another way to explain state terrorism is to briefly compare state terrorism with non-state terrorism and state genocide. Figure 1 illustrates state terrorism, non-state terrorism, and state genocide along a violence spectrum based on three key dimensions: target, perpetrator, and scale. The left side represents anti-state/non-state terrorism, where perpetrators are typically non-state actors targeting civilians and businesses (Czinkota *et al*., 2010). Near the right end is state terrorism, which, like non-state terrorism, targets opponents both inside and outside of state borders. The perpetrators are either state agencies such as the military or police, or their proxies such as non-state terrorist groups. The use of proxies, known as state-sponsored terrorism, represents just one method of state terrorism. As Figure 1 indicates, the scale of state terrorist violence is typically much greater than non-state terrorism (Stohl, 2006; Jackson *et al*., 2011). At the extreme end of the spectrum is state genocide. While state terrorism aims to

induce extreme fear in a target audience to force behavioural change (Blakeley, 2009, p.1), state genocide is about destruction of a people. Though state terrorism may coexist with other forms of state violence, it remains conceptually distinct.

-Insert Figure 1 here-

Types of State Terrorism

Based on critical terrorism scholarship of Chomsky (1991) and Blakeley (2009), state terrorism can be classified into two broad forms: generalized and limited. These are now briefly discussed. *Generalized state terrorism*, or what Chomsky (1991) terms "wholesale terrorism", occurs when a state seeks to intimidate an entire society, major sectors of society, or another state (Jackson et al., 2011). Wholesale state terrorism employs multiple actions and actors working in concert to coerce and intimidate large populations. Methods of such terrorism include aerial bombardments, mass detention and interrogation (Blakeley, 2009).

States have used terrorism to suppress independence and resistance movements (Blakeley, 2009) and to combat non-state terrorists (Jackson *et al*., 2011). For example, (other examples abound), state terrorism was a major coercive tool for the South African government during the apartheid era of the 1980s. The state created a police unit known as Vlakplaas to instil terror in targeted audiences and allay fears of the white electorate. Their methods included abductions, detentions, torture, bombings, and killings; tactics typically associated with state terrorism (Taylor, 2023). The British government colluded with loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland during their counter-insurgency campaign. State terrorism has occurred in warfare between nations as evident during World War II, when the British and German states used terror bombing and rocket attacks against civilian populations to demoralize them and disrupt enemy industrial capacity (Blakeley, 2009). More recently, Russia has been accused of deploying terror tactics in the war in Ukraine. Russia has relied on air attacks in the form of

missiles and other high-velocity projectiles, which induce fear and panic in the targeted population (Rekawek, 2024).

Israel, in addition to other means of warfare, has employed large scale generalised state terrorism within its 2023 campaign within Gaza (Jackson and Turner, 2023). Following the terrorist group Hamas's October 7th, 2023, brutal attack that killed 1,200 Israelis and took 240 hostages, Israel's military response through bombardment and ground operations resulted in 33,000 civilian casualties by April 2024, predominantly women and children (United Nations, 20th June 2024). By January 2025, Israel's offensive has killed more than 46,000 people, according to Palestinian officials, including both civilians and combatants (Financial Times, 2005a). Beyond the death and material destruction in Gaza, aerial bombardments created widespread fear among civilians. This exemplifies terror in action. IR scholars Jackson and Turner (2023) have argued that Israel's actions constitute state terrorism:

> *"Israeli officials have openly stated that its targeting of civilians of deliberate. It is intended to damage civil society, and it is ultimately designed to force the people of Gaza to turn against Hamas. In other words, it is deliberately killing civilians and destroying civil society to send a message to Palestinians in Gaza that they should stop supporting Hamas. The important point is that this clearly fits the established definition of terrorism. It is essentially the same strategy of al Qaeda employed on 9/11 and the 7/7 bombers employed in London. In each of these casts, acts of violence were committed to frighten and intimidate a society into changing its behaviour".*

Limited state terrorism operates on a smaller scale than generalized state terrorism, focusing on highly targeted acts of state terror. It typically consists of one-off operations aimed at achieving specific outcomes (Jackson *et al*., 2011). Unlike generalized terrorism, limited state terrorism often operates covertly or "under the radar" (Stohl 2006, p.7). Limited state terrorism can involve bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings targeting political opponents and civilians. For example, the Nicaraguan government have been carried selective assassinations on their opponents, often in other countries (New York Times, 2025). These actions may be carried out directly by state military or police forces, or through proxy actors

like private individuals, pro-state militias, other states, and non-state terrorist groups (Jackson *et al.,* 2011). For example, Iran sponsors terrorism, working with an array of violent substate groups that use terrorism among other tactics (Byman, 2015).

Limited terrorism can be outsourced to a third party, such as pro-state paramilitaries and private security contractors (Jackson *et al*., 2011, pp.191-192). In some countries, paramilitary forces are the main perpetuators of state terrorism (Maher and Thomson, 2011; McKeown, 2011). States often obscure limited terrorism via non-state armed actors such as paramilitaries. This is intentional, to dissociate this kind of terrorism from the political sphere and by default, any related business actors. Additionally, this allows the state to maintain some legitimacy in the eyes of the masses and to manage pressure from the international community towards human rights principles.

In sum, state terrorism is a distinctive form of political violence perpetuated by state agents for economic, ideological, religious, and political purposes. Having identified its two types—limited and generalized—we now can examine the implications of each type of state terrorism for MNEs, and how they become involved with state terrorism.

State Terrorism and Multinational Enterprises: Linkages, Collusion and Resistance

Linkages between MNEs and state terrorism

Due to limited research on state terrorism within the management discipline, we lack an in-depth understanding into the MNE-state terrorism relationship. Although I am not attempting to provide an exhaustive treatment here, this paper aims to presents a preliminary picture of how MNEs and state terrorism are interlinked. Towards this aim, this section outlines the key linkages between state terrorism and MNEs, and related firm-level implications of these linkages. Then, I examine how MNEs collude and resist state terrorism.

While MNEs are not the only business firms or economic entities interacting with state terrorism, their size and importance to states makes them the most prominent business actors linked to state terrorism. The previous framing of state terrorism into two sub-sets– limited and generalised – remains useful because it suggests each state terrorism type impacts the MNE differently. This means I explain these linkages and implications for each type of state terrorism. Table II provides an overview of the firm-level benefits and liabilities associated with state terrorism and related examples.

-Insert Table II here-

When discussing how the MNE is linked to state terrorism, I remain sensitive to MNE intentionality on the links between state terrorism and business. This refers to the conscious and purposeful intention of the MNE. This is important for the following reasons. First, MNE intent is a key component driving MNEs interaction with political violence (Oetzel and Getz, 2012; Dai *et al*., 2013). MNEs may or may not exercise rational choice to engage (or disengage) violent environments, actors, and methods of political violence (Dai *et al*., 2013). Second, MNE intent also determines, in part, the degree of MNE ethical exposure, and nature of complicity with state terrorism (Wettsetin, 2010). Third, and closely related, through MNE intent, we can understand the mechanisms that enable MNE involvement with state terrorism (e.g, collusion). Thus, this section proposes two broad MNE positions with respect to involvement with state terrorism: intentional and unintentional. First, MNEs are intentionally working with state terrorism, whereby they are knowingly involved with state terrorism. This is termed "intentional involvement". Second, MNEs unknowingly benefiting from state terrorism. This is termed "unintentional involvement". I now discuss the links between MNEs and state terrorism.

Linkages between generalised state terrorism and MNEs

Unlike limited act state terrorism, generalised terrorism involves targeting greater numbers of people at one time such as through aerial bombardment, mass detention and interrogation (Blakeley, 2009, p.47). This section proposes three MNE links to generalised state terrorism:

(i) MNEs resource and profit from generalized state terrorism through the provision of products or services that implement such violence.

(ii) MNEs exploit state displacement and intimidation of major populations of people to clear land for investment projects.

(iii) MNEs exploit and profit from state terrorism by operating in countries or regions with repressive governments that employ terrorist tactics against their citizens.

MNEs resourcing generalised terrorism. MNEs provide resources for generalised state terrorism. This resourcing includes supplying surveillance systems, weapons, vehicles, and other materials specifically used in state terror operations (Jackson *et al*., 2011). As Green and Ward (2004) demonstrate, states often have accomplices in perpetrating crime and terrorism. Many MNEs operating in the military-industrial complex are suppling products and services involved in the terrorisation of civilians. This is a lucrative market for MNEs and industries that supply these specialised military services and technologies. However, it may also involve conventional products or services. For example, Naomi Klein (2017) details how, in Argentina, Ford's local subsidiary provided cars to the military - notably the Ford Falcon sedan - which was used in thousands of kidnappings and disappearances.

Generalised state terrorism typically necessitates an increase in state expenditure on security and surveillance (Jackson *et al*., 2011). Historical evidence shows companies have been known to resource state terror. In Mary Fulbrook's (2018, p.27) *Reckonings,* which

examines the legacy of Nazi persecution, she describes how German banks, financial institutions, and industrial enterprises jointly financed the construction of Nazi concentration camps responsible for the murder of millions of Jews. In contemporary times, US MNEs have profited from generalised state terrorism, and the "war on terror" (McCullough, 2017). The US and other Western states utilize private sector enterprises to support military campaigns, counter-terrorism operations, and crime-fighting efforts. For example, the technology company Cisco between November 2023 and January 2024, sold the Israeli military over 2 million worth of Cisco servers and associated professional services.

MNEs are often tasked by national governments with national security issues, including terrorism, climate change, and organized crime. US private sector firms have resourced government rendition and torture practices (Raphael *et al*., 2015). Rendition, a US government term, describes the covert detention of individuals by US agencies in foreign states and their secret removal from those locations. Since the mid-1990s, the US rendition program (with support from other states) relied on planes from legitimate private companies (Amnesty International, 2009). In support, Raphael *et al*.'s (2015) study revealed the CIA's extensive use of private corporate infrastructure for its rendition and torture program. This practice has been highly profitable for some MNEs. For example, in 2002, US MNE Kellogg, Brown & Root was paid $16 million to build a 408-person prison for captured Taliban fighters at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, under a contract with the U.S. Navy (Chatterjee, 2002). Yet rendition practices violate international law by circumventing legal procedures like extradition, deportation, and judicial remedy.

MNEs may maintain business relationships with states engaged in mass terror and atrocities, continuing operations to exploit financial opportunities and benefits that result from these relationships. However, such MNEs likely face some employee and civil society pressure to end involvement with mass terror and related human rights violations (Oetzel and Getz,

2012). Cisco's experience with its Israel business provides a useful example. Employees of the US technology company submitted an internal petition with 1,700 signatures requesting the cancellation of contracts with Israel due to its actions in Gaza. Reportedly, 32 Cisco workers lost 288 family members in Israel's attacks. However, the company allegedly blocked this petition, claiming it violated internal polices (Wired, 2024). Consequently, Cisco maintained its contractual obligations with the Israeli government and preserved its deep connections to the Israeli state, while also protecting its relationship with the US home government.

Despite the short-term gains when MNEs prioritise the relationship with the state terrorist, prolonged complicity may damage corporate legitimacy and may eventually influence companies to seek an exit from the violent state. MNEs should understand that generalised state terrorism typically draws public and international media attention as it can develop into a political and humanitarian crisis. Generalised state terrorism severely damages a country's citizens, institutions, and infrastructure, leading to loss of livelihoods, displacement, poor health, and food insecurity. Indeed, the severity and scale of mass killing, and/or displacement, make it difficult for states to conceal their actions and allow a global audience to witness the violence. This can galvanise protests and social movements, to pressurise MNEs to act or speak out (Owens, 2023).

MNEs exploiting forced displaced populations of local people. Another link between MNEs and generalised state terrorism occurs when states forcibly displace large populations through terror tactics to clear territories, thereby creating opportunities for resource exploitation by both domestic and foreign firms (Maher, 2015a). As Blakeley (2009, p.160) argued, state terrorism is a significant tool to achieve accumulation by dispossession. For example, Filipino conglomerate San Miguel Corporation was approved by the Philippine government in 2019 to construct a new international airport. However, according to Global Witness (2023a), around

700 families were displaced from the homes in the region of Bulacan, north of Manila, amidst a significant military presence in the area. Armed military personnel reportedly visited residents' homes as part of a consultation process ahead of construction of the airport, alongside representatives of San Miguel Corporation. Community members described to Global Witness feeling pressured to take the compensation offers and feelings of being terrified following threats made by soldiers (Global Witness, 2023a). Another example involves Sudan's oil sector, whereby government forces and government-supported militias terrorized civilians and displaced hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese to enable oil exploration and exploitation by foreign companies (Christian Aid, 2001). Given the geographical fixity of extractive operations, states may militarise specific regions which can lead to confrontation with local communities and their displacement.

MNEs exploiting the business terrain of state terrorism. MNEs exploit and profit from generalised state terrorism more indirectly. MNEs locate in foreign markets where generalised (and limited) state terrorism prevails. Indeed, MNEs are not averse to working with repressive governments or countries considered high risk market locations to MNEs. MNEs can willingly to enter such regions to capitalise on low-cost labour, relaxed market regulation and preferential government treatment (Cuervo-Cazurra *et al*., 2021). Although not directly linked to either the terrorism itself or the state perpetrators, such MNEs may intentionally or unintentionally exploit location advantages partly created through state terror and other means of state repression (Maher and Thomson, 2011).

While violence and conflict typically inhibit economic development (Collier, 1999), large scale and sustained acts of state terrorism in developing countries like Columbia and the Philippines can enhance economic growth by creating favourable business conditions for inward FDI (Maher, 2015a; Maher, 2015b; Maher and Thomson, 2011). Drawing on the

important work of scholar, David Maher, the pressure to attract and retain foreign investment through favourable domestic business conditions motivates states to suppress labour activism and social movements through terror tactics (Maher, 2015a; Maher, 2015b). When workers or communities organize against exploitative labour practices, states may resort to violence to maintain a "business-friendly" environment (Holden, 2011). Maher and Thompson (2011) argue this violent strategy against civil groups, for example, has improved the investment climate for home and foreign firms by maintaining low wages and poor working conditions. Maher (2015b, p.230) notes that forced displacement creates a desperate labour pool, leading to lower labour rates. For example, despite China's systematic terrorisation of the ethnic Uighurs in North-Western China, including detention, surveillance, and allegations of forced labour, many MNEs have either supply chain linkages or have direct operations within this area (Global Rights Compliance, 2025).

As mentioned above, this indirect link to generalised state terrorism may be intentional or unintentional. MNEs may intentionally exploit the locational advantages derived from the state repression and terrorism to their advantage. Such behaviour often mirrors other firms' stances towards the state's repressive system. As Soule *et al.,* (2014) noted in the context of MNEs in Burma, firms frequently monitor and emulate each other's behaviour. However, other MNEs may unintentionally operate in such environments without knowing the extent of the state's terror. MNCs sometimes enter foreign markets without comprehensively understanding the political system. With this knowledge gap, MNEs may unknowingly form relationships with government agencies, private security specialists with ties to state actors, or pro-state militias involved in terror activities (Owens and Johnson, 2024). Moreover, state terror creates a pervasive atmosphere of fear within society that suppresses civil society and public protests, reducing crucial sources of information for MNEs.

Although some MNEs may learn about state terrorism within the market, they can continue to exploit the state terrorism to their advantage. MNEs may be unwilling to disengage from the state. Having committed significant resources to operations in these markets, MNEs may extol dependency on the country of the state terrorist and opt to remain. This leads firms to rationalize or downplay the situation to protect their investments (Kobrin, 1979). These MNEs may believe they have to actively contain or conceal their involvement (Rodgers *et al*., 2002; Jia *et al*., 2023). Such MNEs may implement measures to contain the residual effects (e.g, reputational risk) of their links to state terror activities. For instance, MNEs may mitigate public pressures through media engagement, community engagement initiatives or by launching advocacy campaigns for social issues. At the same time, MNEs may conceal their involvement with state terrorists by employing intermediary organizations such as legal firms and private security specialists (Jia *et al*., 2023).

Linkages between limited state terrorism and MNEs

MNEs resourcing limited state terrorism. Like their involvement with generalised state terrorism, MNEs provide products and services that states use to target specific individuals or small groups. Given how such individuals could subsequently be subjected to state terrorism practices of rendition and torture, companies and their executives can face criminal prosecution for complicity in human rights violations (Wettstein, 2010). For example, four executives from French surveillance companies Amesys and Nexa Technologies were indicted by the French Judicial Court's crimes against humanity and war crimes unit. The companies allegedly provided surveillance technology to Libyan and Egyptian governments, used to track down political opponents who were subsequently arrested and tortured (Amnesty International, 2021).

MNEs may become involved with limited state terrorism despite having no intention to collude or exploit it. MNEs suppling products and services used in terrorising individuals may not recognize how deeply state terror and repression are embedded in the political and economic system of their state client. State terrorism, especially when limited, is less visible than other forms of political violence. And states deliberately obscure it by outsourcing violence to external groups (Maher, 2015a) or through strategic communication. As Finn and Momani (2017, p.389) aptly explain:

> *"State actors engaged in systematic forms of terror, intimidation and coercive leveraging over victims, manage their communication from their foreign and domestic policy branding and by gate-keeping information transfers to media outlets".*

States are acting in a highly deviant manner, often breaking widely accepted norms (Green and Ward, 2004, p.107). This motivates state denial or concealment, integral parts of state terror (Green and Ward, 2004). States, as Wilson (2013) argues, learn discretion. They avoid obvious mass casualties and instead flood social media with counterexamples of insurgent activity. This dissociates the terrorism from the political sphere, and by extension, from related business actors. Thus, MNEs that supply products or services for counter-terrorism activities may inadvertently enable state terror, as counterterrorism and counter-insurgency operations can evolve into state terrorism (Blakeley 2009).

MNEs exploiting state terrorisation of local opposition to MNE operations. Another prominent link between limited state terrorism and MNEs involves states targeting and terrorising individuals and groups opposing foreign direct investment projects (FDI). Local citizens, affected by the FDI operation, often protest the MNE subsidiary. This is often due to concerns about environmental degradation, health impacts, loss of livehood and forced relocation. Studies on MNE-communty conflicts show how formal regulatory gaps or unfair regulation within foreign markets often underpin local grievances against both the state and MNEs,

especially regarding land rights and environmental issues (Calvano, 2008; Rodgers *et al*., 2022). For example, in Indonesia, where state violence against local activists and communities is prolific, the legal framework around land rights and acquisition tends to privilege the interests of companies over communities (Berenschot *et al*., 2022). This is fertile context for organised local opposition against MNEs, which can encourage state intimidation and violence.

This conflict between MNEs and local communities can eventually induce state forces to target specific opponents and send an important message that opposition to investment plans will not be tolerated. Because states may perceive opposition to MNE operations as threats to national economic interests, justifying repressive responses. Perhaps this is why MNE mining operations have often exploited the intervention of state forces and pro-state paramilitarily groups when faced with local opposition to their operations. For example, Bartilow (2019), in the context of Peru and Columbia, details how in response to indigenous opposition or resistance to corporate appropriation of ancestral lands, resource-seeking MNEs colluded with state agencies, private security firms and paramilitary organisations to repress and eliminate indigenous resistance. This complicity with state terrorism exposes MNEs to potential prosecution under international law and criticism from both primary and secondary stakeholders regarding social and environmental harm along their value chain (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011).

MNE collusion and resistance with state terrorism

In this section, I explore further how MNEs exploit state terrorism. To shed light on how MNEs intentionally exploit state terrorism, I suggest MNEs practice collusion with the state (or related agents) at the expense of citizens. This section further argues how some MNEs will not exploit state terrorism.

MNE collusion with state terrorism

Some MNEs are not passive beneficiaries of state terrorism, they actively facilitate their involvement with the terrorism through collusion. My use of the collusion concept is influenced by the political science literature (Bartolini, 1999; McGovern, 2015). This research typically identifies collusion as a negative term that refers to a form of co-operation or coordination between political state actors and interest groups (Bartolini, 1999), such as MNEs. Business-state collusion typically advances narrow shared interests between political and economic elites at the expense of citizens and society (David-Barrett, 2023). Although why and how MNEs collude with terrorism is undoubtedly complex, resource dependency can be viewed as one major firm-level condition motivating MNEs to collude with state terrorism, which in turn, is enabled through an institutional context.

Resource dependency theory (RDT) offers a powerful lens to understand why MNEs and states collude in leveraging terrorism to their mutual advantage. MNEs may recognise that host market state violence, even selective, protects corporate assets, and facilitates access to valuable resources such as land and natural resources (Maher and Thomson, 2021). The imperative of local resource acquisition may cause such MNEs to intentionally collude with state terrorism through active collusive behaviours. Resource dependency theory (RDT) emphasises MNEs do not operate in isolation but rather exist within complex networks of interdependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Jiang *et al.,* 2023). According to RDT, organizations depend critically on external resources within the host market for their survival and must manage relationships with the entities that control these resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Following RDT, states and MNEs develop a mutual resource dependency which provides powerful resource incentives for MNEs to actively collude with state terrorism. However, the state's resource dependency critically supports this MNE collusion with state terrorism. States are dependent on resource flows to finance a functioning state. Many states

are dependent on resource investments for economic growth (Boddewyn and Brewer (1994, p.134). Similarly, MNEs depend on governments and other stakeholders for critical resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). States are powerful actors for MNEs within their non-market environment. Specific methods of host market state terror, such as displacement, murder, disappearance, intimidation, and unlawful arrest can work to suppress disruption to extractive or natural resource seeking operations and secure the subsidiary access to critical resource inputs, infrastructure, and transportation routes essential for FDI operations. This sector's dependency on immobile resources can lead to the incentive for both host states and MNEs to intentionally initiate and tolerate violence to sustain access to these resources.

Drawing on McGovern's (2015) conceptualisation of collusion within the political science literature, MNE collusion with state terrorism involves three primary actions: influencing, collaborating, and connivance/silence. Depending on circumstances, MNEs may adopt one or all these collusive behaviours. MNE collusion with state terrorism is not operating in a regulatory and social vacuum. Using new institutional economics (NIE), I argue formal institutions, formal rules (laws, regulations) and informal norms (cultural expectations, unwritten practices are facilitating this collusion between MNEs and states (North, 1990). Thus, powerful background rules and norms provide the incentives and/or mechanisms for states to inflict terror and to permit MNEs to access resources through state violence. Thus, remaining sensitive to both resource dependency theory and new institutional economics, I now briefly explain the different ways in which MNEs collude with state terrorism.

MNE collusion with state terrorism: influencing states to inflict terror. When local resistance threatens MNE access to resources, MNEs may influence state leaders or officials to use coercive measures. These measures can secure access to resources or control over contested areas, such as forcing people from their homes or pressuring activists (Asuncion *et al.*, 2022).

Research on corporate political activity (CPA) demonstrates that MNEs can influence governments to implement preferred policies and behaviours (Rodgers *et al.,* 2019). In this context, influence tactics may include illicit payments or bribes to government officials (Rodgers *et al.,* 2019) or exerting political pressure on states to deploy violence (Asuncion et al. 2022). For example, the Swedish MNE, Lundin Energy, allegedly influenced the Sudanese government to secure a potential oilfield, knowing this would involve controlling the area through force and terror (Reuters, 2021).

MNE collusion with state terrorism likely occurs within an informal institutional context. Notably, non-state actors in the informal institutional environment—citizens, families, community groups, informal entrepreneurs, and activists are common victims of state terrorism. Social networks and community bonds provide the infrastructure for communities to mount coordinated resistance to MNE operations (Calvano, 2008; Rodgers *et al.,* 2022). But local organized resistance makes leaders, their support networks, and families visible. This visibility allows states or pro-state paramilitaries to track and monitor these leaders. When states target activist leaders and community groups who oppose MNE agendas, they aim to weaken the coordinated resistance against MNEs. Selective assassinations, disappearances, or general intimidation of community leaders and activists generates enormous fear and change behaviour, leading to social fragmentation within those entities. This works in MNEs' favour because it weakens local collective action against both the state and the MNE.

MNE influence over the state's coercive resources and their methodologies often occurs in the context of wider collusive informal ties among companies, government, military, and police forces (Boerzel *et al*., 2012). MNEs may use these institutional and social connections to collude and influence the state to employ violence when necessary. MNE collusion with state terror may reflect entrenched informal norms of behaviour. Influencing and colluding with state agencies to manage or contain local opposition through coercion may be accepted

practice within the industry or region, 'the way we do things around here'. While MNEs can reject local norms of behaviour, MNEs may comply to overcome obstacles.

MNE collusion with state terrorism: collaborating with states to inflict terror. MNEs may intentionally *collaborate* with the state to assist the terror. This resonates with Wettsein's (2010: 35) argument of companies acting as accomplices to human rights violations. Faced with local community opposition to subsidiary operations, for example, companies may aid and abet the state to supress or contain the opposition. This includes providing intelligence and information about activists or protest organisers, logistical support, including transportation and communication resources. A notable example is ExxonMobil in Indonesia, where the company allegedly entered into an agreement with General Suharto in the late 1990s and early 2000s to protect its facilities. Human rights investigations later revealed the military units protecting these facilities—using logistical support from the company—engaged in widespread murder, torture, and terror (The Nation, 2002). When victims alleged that ExxonMobil knew about these atrocities, the company settled the case before trial.

Institutional conditions support this collusion with state terrorism. Formal regulation such as anti-protest laws and broad definitions of "public disorder" grant government authorities' discretionary power to suppress legitimate opposition through violence. As Hristov and Spring (2021, p.56) argue, security related legislation legitimises violence aimed at removing obstacles to investment. MNE facilities are sometimes designated as "critical infrastructure" thereby justifies heightened security measures. Moreover, some countries criminalize activists through the sinister tactic known as "red-tagging" - used to terrorize, defame, vilify legitimate activists for their work, and locks local activists into costly legal battles (Global Witness, 2023b). Furthermore, such collusive behaviour will be supported through informal institutions. Collusion and collaboration between members of state agencies

and MNE executives typically requires trust and social networks (Nyberg, 2021). Informal networks between the MNE and the state can be used to discreetly share intelligence on specific activists. Additionally, informal norms often emerge to facilitate this collusion, such as the use of non-incriminating language, and conventions regarding illicit payments and meeting locations. Fear and threats of violence can ensure compliance with these norms (Minbaeva *et al*., 2023).

MNE collusion with state terrorism – silent response to state terrorism. MNE collusion with state terrorism involves a deliberate corporate policy of connivance or silence. Although MNEs may (or may not) privately object to governments murdering and displacing civilians, MNEs react to the state's behaviour through a self-interest policy of silence. This behaviour colludes with terror through, looking the other way, or not challenging the state on its violence. Drawing on the concept of "silence" in organisational studies (Vakola and Bouradas, 2005; Al-Abrrow, 2022), there are three types of silence: acquiescent silence, defensive silence, and pro-social silence.

Defensive silence is described as a deliberate omission of speaking out based on fear of reprisal. MNEs may believe that challenging states on their terrorism and other repressive methods will likely provoke host state anger without changing state behaviour (Doh *et al*., 2003). While state terrorism may dismay some executives, they may remain silent out of fear of adverse formal institutional responses from the terror state, such as asset expropriation and regulatory harassment (Alon and Herbret 2009; Yasuda and Kotabe, 2021).

Moreover, from an RDT perspective, maintaining silence allows the MNE to control their access to vital state resources (e.g policies, subsidies, information) and protect ongoing non-market strategies such as political relationship building, lobbying and campaign donations (Rodgers *et al*., 2019). The country of the state terrorist could be strategically vital for the

MNE, a strong location for their resource development. Given the resource dependency on the location, the subsidiary operating within the terror state may be already deeply embedded within the MNE's global structure (Garcia-Pont *et al.,* 2009; Yamin and Andersson, 2011). Because of the high level of interdependence, the subsidiary has greater pressure to secure host country resources that may be critical for the effective functioning of the MNC (Shirodkar *et al*., 2018). Consequently, the MNE sustains a silent response to the state terrorist to protect the MNE overall.

But MNE silent response to state terrorism leaves MNEs vulnerable to criticism and complicity in human rights violations. MNEs face competing demands from institutional stakeholders including employees, civil society, and NGOs (Winkler and Krzeminska, 2024). Institutional stakeholders typically assign MNEs a moral responsibility to protect human rights by pressuring host governments involved in abuses (Wettstein, 2012). As Wettstein (2012, p.40) argues, "knowingly looking the other way while the most basic rights of human beings are trampled underfoot by a home or host government can constitute not merely indifference, but actual support." Consequently, MNEs may buffer their silence response to the state terrorist with non-market initiatives such as providing humanitarian aid to the victims of violence (Winkler and Krzeminska, 2024). *Acquiescent silence* is described as intentionally passive silent behaviour. This is based on the premise that MNEs cannot expect to influence the government over its political violence, so why bother? However, this passive attitude may signal to internal and external stakeholders an MNE attitude of moral indifference or moral support for the state perpetrator of terrorism (Wettstein, 2010). *Prosocial silence* is withholding speaking out for the benefit of others, including the organization (Al-Abrrow, 2022). When MNEs avoid speaking out against state terrorism, they attempt to avoid creating "suspect communities" within their organization by not publicly condemning a state's violent actions.

However, this approach risks overlooking the "victim community" - employees with national, ethnic, or family ties to people targeted by the state terrorism.

In sum, MNEs may intentionally exploit state terrorism through deliberate collusive behaviours: influence, collaboration, and silence. However, it is possible other MNEs will seek to resist state terrorism. This is now discussed.

MNE resistance to state terrorism

State terrorism raises public scrutiny and disapproval from MNEs, governments, non-government organisations and other stakeholders. Unlike corruption, state terrorism occurs in social spaces not easily fortified from public scrutiny (Lasslett, 2012). The characteristics of state terrorism - public deniability and the outsourcing of the violence – indicates states are sensitive to external reactions to their behaviour, including MNEs, international institutions, and other governments. While many MNEs will disapprove and not act against the terrorism, others will adopt some type of resistance. I use the term "resist" broadly to encompass MNE behaviours such as avoidance, exit and opposition.

Evading active complicity in crimes of states can be viewed as form of resistance (Fredericks, 2009). Thus, MNEs can avoid being involved in state terrorism or avoid operating in terror states. MNEs likely have instrumental or self-interested motives to resist state terrorism in this way. MNEs understand perceived links to terrorism and related human rights violations can damage MNE legitimacy, and harm stakeholder relationships (Stevens *et al*,. 2016). Thus, MNEs may avoid countries governed heavily through terror, or exit such markets when already established there. For example, following Saudi Arabia's brutal killing of Saudi journalist, Jamal Kashoggi, in 2018, while some MNEs remained silent over the killing, some European and US MNEs severed ties with Saudi Arabia (Business Insider, October 2018). Microsoft terminated some services to Israel's military when realising Israel was using its

products to surveil Palestinian civilians during Israel's state terrorism (and genocide) campaign. The company faced a wave of public and employee criticism over its relationship with Israel (Financial Times 2025b). MNEs may exit from terror states due to reputational pressures created through non-government actor public shaming measures. For example, the pressure group Burma/Myanmar Campaign UK published a "dirty list" of 49 companies from the US, Europe, India, and China that were doing business with the military of this terror state. Such NGO pressure did cause *some* companies to terminate their involvement in Burma. Moreover, MNEs linked to highly repressive host market states/governments may create home government political risk, "if the "taint" of that government is perceived to rub off onto a firm" (Stevens *et al*., 2016, p.955). While a home government may support another's state terrorism campaign (Stohl, 2006, p.7), home governments may impose economic sanctions against repressive regimes.

MNEs may oppose state terrorism for the social good. MNEs can believe they share collective responsibility for achieving a better society for all citizens. MNE moral values and obligations to stakeholders can prompt then, either on their own or collectively, to speak out against the state's actions. Such MNEs may co-operate with home governments and NGOs to persuade states to end their terror campaigns and shift towards more democratic politics and governance. As Oetzel and Miklian (2017) argue, NGOs are likely important partners to MNEs when mitigating violence, considering their unique skill sets and their knowledge of the violent environment. In response to external pressure, states may exercise restraint in their terror practices, or unfortunately, act more covertly (Stohl, 2006). Stohl (2006, p.15) argues states pay close attention to how others respond to their governance methods. States weigh the costs of terrorism against the external support and tacit approval they receive from international actors (Jackson *et al.,* 2011, p.193), including MNEs. However, context matters. State terrorism operates within specific contexts shaped by power capabilities, cultural factors, historical

circumstances, and institutional arrangements (Jackson *et al.,* 2011, p.188). This context suggests that powerful states may be able to absorb the pressures imposed by MNEs and their stakeholders.

Conclusions and moving forward.

Conclusion

This perspective piece aimed to shed light on the linkages between state terrorism and MNEs and show why state terrorism matters for management research. Despite over twenty years of research on terrorism within IB, a sub-domain of management research (e.g, Suder, 2004; Czinkota *et al.,* 2010; Liu and Li, 2020; Li *et al.,* 2022), IB terrorism research evolved without examining how the state, the most prolific perpetrator of terrorism, intersects with business firms. This paper addresses this gap by shedding light on several MNE linkages with state terrorism, including their implications and contextual conditions. This represents a novel contribution to management scholarship, which has primarily focused on how non-state terrorism and armed conflicts affect MNEs in foreign markets.

In conclusion, MNEs are linked to state terrorism to their benefit, particularly when facing local opposition to FDI operations. MNEs also intersect with state terrorism in other ways, by supplying products and services used in state terror, and by exploiting favourable business environments that have been partly shaped through state terror. This means terrorism benefits MNCs, as well as causing risk. But MNEs may have instrumental or moral incentives to avoid terror states, or to co-operate with other segments of society to steer states away from terror-based governance.

IB research largely frames political violence as a visible and legitimate armed conflict between external groups operating independently from MNEs. This perspective portrays political violence primarily as an external risk creating financial, operational, and socio-

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political barriers for MNEs and FDI (Oetzel and Getz, 2012; Dai *et al.,* 2013, 2017, 2022; Oh and Oetzel, 2017; Owens, 2023). However, MNEs interact with political violence outside of conflict zones and they exploit political violence for financial and strategic advantage. This exploitation does not necessarily involve capitalising on conflict-torn environments' instability, but capitalising on state policies and actions causing intimidation, violence, and widespread fear. MNE collusion with state murder, intimidation, and coercion of civilians is something we cannot ignore. Management scholars must catch up with civil society and journalism, which consistently documents corporate complicity in state-directed violence, including terror and genocide.

Future research avenues

Future research should investigate corporate linkages with state terrorism. Why and how do MNEs become linked or involved with state terrorism? What other economic, social, and political actors within the MNE network facilitate corporate collusion with state terrorism? While I have taken a largely single-actor-centric perspective, it is possible a network of colluders or facilitators are involved, including home governments and legal firms. What consequences result from MNE linkages to state terrorism? These consequences likely manifest at organizational and executive levels, including reduced organisational legitimacy, criminal prosecution, and moral stigmatization. Broader societal effects may include public distrust in companies and their CSR initiatives, intergenerational trauma, and community fragmentation.

RDT appears a valuable framework for understanding why companies become involved in state terrorism. Given the resource benefits at stake, future research should clarify the relationship between resource dependencies and the two types of state terrorism. Studies may examine those contextual factors shaping the resource dependencies on state terror. For instance, corporate strategy of the MNE may influence MNE links with state terror. MNEs

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focused on global integration or operational efficiency may rely heavily on subsidiaries in terror states for maintaining international competitiveness. In such cases, MNEs might collude with violent regimes to protect their strategic resource interests. The specific relationship between MNEs and their home governments offers another avenue. Companies often depend on home governments for diplomatic support, market access, and protection of foreign investments (Li *et al.,* 2022). This dependency may influence home governments to use violence to defend their national companies abroad. Future studies should investigate how MNE-home government interdependence influences complicity with state terrorism.

Future research should verify and expand upon this study's arguments about how formal and informal institutional structures enable state terrorism in a business context. Research should investigate how institutional conditions at international, national, and local levels shape business links with state terrorism. Various institutional rules and norms likely explain business links with state terrorism. For example, international agreements or bilateral inter-state relations influence some states to terrorize indigenous groups who oppose these policies with support from permissive local regulations (Maher, 2015a). Future research may focus on the institutional mechanisms that enable MNE collusion with state-directed violence, including terrorism. Public-private partnerships, legal contracts, and network ties between government, military, and private sector actors (e.g,, revolving door) likely facilitate this collusion.

Finally, future research should investigate how MNE involvement with state terrorism evolves over time, and how MNEs respond to state terrorism risks. Initial intentional complicity possibly endures in the long-run due to path dependencies through high exit costs, institutionalized behaviours, and increasing co-dependency between the state and MNE. Thus, future research should investigate the specific mechanisms and conditions that "lock" MNEs into continued involvement with state terror. Research should also investigate the corporate

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responses to managing involvement with state terrorism, and the contextual factors that trigger such responses. For example, increasing international pressure and the availability of political resources within the company may lead to a calculated containment strategy (Jia *et al.,* 2023).

Data and Methods

Future conceptual, theoretical, and empirical research is required for this area. There is more scope for conceptual or theoretical work at this stage, albeit accounting for the diversity of state terrorism in terms of perpetuators, locations, and types of state terrorism. For instance, we should avoid focusing solely on state terrorism being enacted from developing or emerging market states. Both developing and developed states have perpetuated state terrorism historically and presently to the benefit of MNEs.

Future research on this subject, albeit within this early phase of development, should continue to examine the MNE as an analytical focus. This is not because the MNE matters more than those of state terrorism victims, but rather stems from the necessity to explain how businesses exploits state terrorism, and to hold the MNE accountable for involvement in state terrorism.

Regarding empirical methods, both quantitative and qualitative approaches are needed. Given the scarcity of existing databases on state terrorism, researchers should consider inductive qualitative methods such as case studies or interviews. This research could help towards a more grounded and intimate understanding of the subject – useful to build testable hypothesises for quantitative studies. While qualitative data collection presents challenges and potential dangers, with state and corporate actors typically reluctant to participate researchers can gather significant evidence through interviews with legal firms, journalists, NGOs, and victims of state terrorism (Owens and Johnson, 2024). Finally, we should with work other disciplines to further explain the links between state terrorism and business.

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Table I: Comparing State Terrorism with Politically Violent Conflict.

Feature	Political Conflict	State Terrorism
Nature	Organised and sustained use of physical force causing harm, injury and destruction of property. E.g, war, insurgency campaigns Involves aims such as military victory, territorial gains, regime change.	When state agents or their proxies intentionally use or threaten violence to intimidate groups and individuals. Social and behavioural control - aims to induce extreme fear in a target audience to force behavioural change.
Typical characteristics	Large scale military operations between organised armed forces Clear aims and specific duration Structured and organised use of force	A wide range of operations such as kidnapping, torture, rendition, murder, criminalisation etc. No clear start or end date Clandestine use of force and actively denied or concealed by state.
MNE role	Primarily a victim of the conflict	Can be a victim, beneficiary, or complicit partner
Primary risks to MNEs	Financial, operational, security and supply chain risks.	Criminal prosecution Ethical risks of complicity, and reputational risks. Stakeholder criticism

Source: Author's research

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Table II The Links and Implications of State Terrorism for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs)

Type of State Terrorism (and related methods)	Examples of State Terrorism	Business Links	Gains for MNEs	Liabilities for MNEs	Corporate Examples
Generalised/examples Mass enforced people displacement and disappearances Systematic mass bombing and murder campaign Mass arbitrary rendition and detention Blockage of vital human necessities Extensive surveillance and monitoring system	Nazi Germany between 1935 and 1945. Argentina campaign of murder against domestic opponents between 1976 and 1983. Israel's campaign within Gaza (Palestine) Chinese terrorisation of the Uighurs within Xinjiang (North-western China)	Direct – resourcing through products or services. Operating within states employing terror base governance. Influencing and collaborating with involved state actors or agencies.	Profits from the supply of products and services Access to land-based resources. Capitalising on beneficial structural conditions linked to state terror and repression. Secure access to non-market resources and political capital through collusion.	Internal and external stakeholder criticism from perceived complicity with state terror and repression. Negative publicity and legitimacy issues. Legal prosecution for complicity in criminality and human rights violations.	Chiquita Brands International making payments to paramilitary groups in Columbia. Ford Motors collaboration with Argentinian military Cisco Inc (supplying Israel) Caterpillar supplying Israel San Miguel Corporation in the Philippines.
Limited/examples Selective enforced disappearances. Limited extra-judicial murder or intimidation Disinformation campaigns on selected individuals or groups. Support for proxy groups.	Nicaragua targeting human rights activists. US support of Contra Rebels within Nicaragua Lebanon supporting Hezbollah. British covert operations within	Resourcing the involved state agencies through products or services. E.g, allowing corporate facilities to be used to detain opponents. Colluding with state terrorism to supress conflict	Profit from supply of products and services Secure access to non-market resources and political capital through collusion. Reduced civil society opposition to business agendas. Securing access to land-based resources	Internal and external stakeholder criticism from perceived complicity with state terror and repression. Negative publicity and legitimacy issues. Legal prosecution for criminality and complicity in human rights violations.	French surveillance companies Amesys and Nexa Technologies *allegedly* provided surveillance technology to Libyan and Egyptian governments.

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	Northern Ireland, including collusion with loyalist paramilitaries.	with local communities and activists. For example, providing information on activists for state targeting.	Supressing negative publicity on the MNE and/or partners from journalists and civil society actors.		

Source: Author's research

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Figure 1: The spectrum of political violence

Direction of Violence	***Anti-state***				***State***
Magnitude	***Micro***				***Macro***
Type	Individual terrorism	Domestic non-state terrorism	Transnational non-state terrorism	State terrorism against domestic and international opponents	State Genocide
Perpetrators	Assassins bombers	Ethnic nationalists Religious militants Ideological radicals Hybrid organisations	Transnational terrorist organisations and states	Secret police Special forces Military Paramilitary Other state sponsored forces	Secret police Special military forces Paramilitary Other state sponsored forces

Source: Dekmejian (2007)

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