An Unfortunate History:
Securitization and Historical Narratives in the Sino-Japanese Security Paradox

Lewis Eves

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of
Sheffield Hallam University
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Candidate Declaration

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1. I have not been enrolled for another award of the University, or other academic or professional organisation, whilst undertaking my research degree.
2. None of the material contained in the thesis has been used in any other submission for an academic award.
3. I am aware of and understand the University's policy on plagiarism and certify that this thesis is my own work. The use of all published or other sources of material consulted have been properly and fully acknowledged.
4. The work undertaken towards the thesis has been conducted in accordance with the SHU Principles of Integrity in Research and the SHU Research Ethics Policy.
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To the people of China and Japan, your millennia-long history of relations continues to inspire and fascinate me. I hope this thesis brings attention to the unsettled history of the Second Sino-Japanese War and, in doing so, can play some small part in helping to overcome the negative legacy of your ‘unfortunate history’.
Abstract

The history of Japan’s invasion of China during World War II has been credited with causing a prolonged deterioration in relations between the two countries. This deterioration coincides with increasing suspicion, leading to cyclical spirals of mutual insecurity. However, history is a contested space. China and Japan both have their own narratives of their shared wartime history and how these different narratives factor in the deteriorating Sino-Japanese relationship to contribute to their mutual insecurity is complex.

This thesis explores the intersection between history and security to better understand how historical narratives factor in securitization processes before then contributing to cyclical security paradoxes. This is done through the development of a unique analytical framework. This framework includes securitization theory, which pertains to the process of an issue coming to be perceived as a security threat. The second major theoretical component of the framework is Booth and Wheeler’s security dilemma/paradox concept, which analyses cyclical spirals of insecurity born of suspicion and uncertainty. The third element is drawn from historiography, utilising Carr’s basic facts historiography to provide a transparent discussion of historical narratives and facts in the case studies.

This is applied to two occurrences of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, a Sino-Japanese territorial dispute in the East China Sea. Doing so reveals both the impact that Sino-Japanese narratives of the war are having and the specific mechanics of how they have this impact.
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Introduction

History matters. This is true of any relationship but is particularly so in Sino-Japanese relations. Speaking during a formal visit to Japan in 2008, former Chinese president Hu Jintao explained that:

“Japan and China have more than 2,000 years of exchange and that in itself is remarkable. But in the modern era after Japan’s war of invasion against China, we’ve had an unfortunate history” (Hu Jintao cited in McLeod, 2008).

Studying how this ‘unfortunate history’ impacts Sino-Japanese relations is essential to understanding the choices that China and Japan face as major international actors. For its part, China’s rise is turning increasingly nationalistic, with much of this nationalist energy directed towards Japan on account of historic victimisation. Meanwhile, Japan demilitarised after its war with China but is facing growing calls to remilitarise in the face of China’s rise. These developments compound the issue of history, with the unsettled legacy of their shared wartime history factoring prominently in Sino-Japanese discourse.

In this thesis, the intersection of history and security in Sino-Japanese relations is explored with the benefit of a unique analytical framework. This framework integrates the security dilemma/paradox, securitization theory and Carr’s basic facts historiography and is applied to two instances of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. This endeavour reveals the impact of historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War on the Sino-Japanese security paradox. It also presents the specific mechanics of how these historical narratives factor via securitization processes to have their impact.

By achieving a better understanding of the intersection of history and security in Sino-Japanese relations, we can hope to prevent the ‘unfortunate history’ of China and Japan from dictating their future.
Sino-Japanese Relations (0.1)

Sino-Japanese relations are complicated. Economically, China and Japan, the world’s second and third largest economies respectively, cooperate to the extent that they are economically interdependent. China utilises Japanese capital to sustain its economic growth, including direct investments totalling $124 billion in 2018 alone (Chiang, 2019) and relies on Japanese technology for many of its infrastructure projects (Eves, 2020). Meanwhile, Japan’s stagnant economy relies on China for cheap labour and resources, and its government has been encouraging Chinese tourism to boost national income (McBride and Xu, 2019).

Notably, Sino-Japanese economic cooperation extends beyond their bilateral relationship. China and Japan also cooperate at a regional level. An example of this is the commitment of both countries to collaborate on the $26 trillion worth of infrastructure projects commencing in Asia during the 2020s, to mitigate competition for regional economic influence (Shimada, 2018). This indicates a concerted effort by the two countries to promote courteous relations and avoid an economic rivalry.

Additionally, the two nations have a long history of cultural exchange. Buddhism, one of Japan’s significant religions, spread to the country through interactions with Chinese merchants (Ebrey et al., 2009). Chinese characters have been used as the basis for the kanjis in Japan’s writing system from around 500AD (ibid.). In return, Japan has significantly impacted Chinese popular culture, especially in recent decades. Japanese television shows, video games and other media are exported to China’s growing entertainment market (Wu, 2021). Considering their economic cooperation and centuries of cultural exchange, assuming an amicable Sino-Japanese relationship would be forgivable.

However, the relationship between the two nations is deteriorating. This is evident in opinion polling within both countries. In 2021, 66.1% of Chinese people surveyed held a negative view of Japan, an increase of 13.1 percentage points compared to the previous year (Nippon, 2021). The percentage of Japanese people surveyed holding a negative view of China increased to 90.9% in 2021, continuing a trend of growing negativity towards China that has lasted nearly two decades.
The most cited reason for these negative views is found in contemporary Sino-Japanese history (Ibid.). More specifically, the history of the Second Sino-Japanese War, known in the West as the Chinese theatre of World War II (see Mitter, 2013, Nippon, 2021).

Details of the war are discussed throughout this thesis. However, in brief, the war began in 1937 following Japan’s invasion of China. During the next eight years, over 20 million Chinese and several million Japanese died (Mitter, 2013). The war is infamous for the various atrocities which were committed. This includes the Nanjing Massacre, which, according to some accounts, involved the murder of 350,000 civilians following the Japanese occupation of what was then China’s capital city (Edelsten, 2000). Another atrocity was the Chinese government’s intentional flooding of the Yellow River to slow the Japanese advance on the city of Wuhan. Tens of thousands of Chinese people drowned, millions were displaced, and the destruction of farmland resulted in a famine that killed many more in the following years (Mitter, 2013).

The current deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations could have significant ramifications should it result in conflict. China and Japan are both prominent international actors, regionally and globally. In addition to their significant economic influence, they also both have extensive military potential. China’s military, the world’s largest, is undergoing extensive modernisation, especially in terms of China’s capacity to project its military power beyond its borders (Larson, 2020). Japan, meanwhile, does not have a military with significant force projection capabilities on account of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which prevents Japan from using military force in its foreign policy (Gustafsson et al., 2018). However, Japan does possess a formidable and technologically advanced Self-Defence Force and the military backing of the USA (Kelly, 2020). Furthermore, there are growing calls from within Japan’s governing Liberal Democratic Party to remove Article 9’s restrictions on the Japanese armed forces (Suzuki, 2015). Both countries have nuclear capabilities, with China formally recognised as a nuclear weapon state and Japan holding the technology to quickly produce weapons-grade plutonium (Windrem, 2014).
With Sino-Japanese relations deteriorating and the potential for a confrontation growing, perhaps in the form of military conflict, it is paramount that we expand our understanding of how history is driving this deterioration. To contribute to this endeavour, this thesis answers the question: *how do historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War factor in the Sino-Japanese security paradox?*

As stated, Sino-Japanese relations are complex. So too is studying the intersection between history and security. To overcome these challenges, it was necessary to create an analytical framework which integrates securitization theory, the security dilemma/paradox concept and historiography, more specifically Carr’s basic facts historiography. This adds to the importance of this thesis as, in addition to garnering insights into an important bilateral relationship, it offers a new way of studying the intersection of history and security in International Relations.

**Thesis Outline (0.2)**

Chapter 1 presents a review of the literature on Sino-Japanese relations, explaining the literature’s pessimistic consensus that the relationship will continue to deteriorate. In doing so, the literature review discusses the two main categories that exist within this pessimistic consensus. The first introduces the idea of a Sino-Japanese security paradox, a paradoxically cyclical pattern in which two actors’ relationship is building in tension despite neither actor holding ill-intent towards the other. The second category focuses more on the history of Sino-Japanese relations, explaining that mutual animosity is being constructed through antagonistic historical narratives: the stories we tell about our past, with a clear sequential order that connects events in a meaningful way (Hagstrom and Gustafsson, 2019). In particular, this category emphasises historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War as detrimental to the relationship between China and Japan. Hence, this thesis bridges the gap between the two explanations of deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations, focussing on how historical narratives of the war contribute to the security paradox. This is in correspondence with the primary research question presented above.
Chapter 1 continues with a review of security studies literature, identifying Booth and Wheeler’s (2007) security dilemma/paradox and securitization theory as frameworks necessary to engage with to answer the primary research question. The final section of chapter 1 outlines the research methodology, accounting for its adoption of interpretivism within a cross-sectional case study design and the thesis’s choice of two case studies: the 2010 Trawler Incident and the 2012 Nationalisation Crisis. Both case studies are episodes of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, a territorial dispute over an island chain in the East China Sea administered by Japan but claimed by China. It also discusses several considerations made for the research project and where necessary the measures taken to mitigate potential barriers, such as the risk of western-centrism in the study of an East Asian bilateral relationship.

Chapter 2 outlines the unique analytical framework developed and applied for the first time in this thesis. It begins by detailing the security dilemma/paradox concept. More specifically, Booth and Wheeler’s (ibid.) concept of a cyclical security paradox consisting of sequential two-step security dilemmas. Discussed as well are the ontological logics as to how actors resolve their security dilemmas. Also detailed are the secondary concepts of the strategic challenge, security dilemma sensibility and the reassurance game. Presented next is the chosen security framework: securitization theory. This is followed by consideration of how to discuss and present history, leading to the adoption of Carr’s (2001) basic facts historiography to ground the discussion of historical narratives within established historiographical practise. Chapter 2 continues to discuss the nuances of the security dilemma/paradox concept, securitization theory and the basic facts historiography. The outcome of this discussion is the establishment of a unique and integrated analytical framework. The remainder of the chapter then presents the step-by-step method in which the analytical framework is applied to the case studies.

Chapter 3 outlines China and Japan’s respective historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The Chinese Nationalist Narrative is presented. This historical narrative focusses on Japan’s wartime victimisation of China, while emphasising national unity and vigilance against contemporary Japan. Two
Japanese historical narratives of the war are outlined. Firstly, the Traditional Narrative, which renounces militarism while promoting introspective reflection of Japan’s wartime history. Secondly the Revisionist Narrative, which considers the war to have been morally justified, albeit misguided, and presents Japan as one of the war’s victims. These historical narratives are discussed in detail, outlining their key specific themes for use in the analysis of the case studies. Information is also provided on the origins and domestic political connotations of each historical narrative.

Chapters 4 through 6 pertain to the 2010 Trawler Incident. This incident took place over a period of roughly three weeks, during which tensions spiked in Sino-Japanese relations after the Japanese Coast Guard arrested the crew of a Chinese trawler vessel in the territorial waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Chapters 7 through 9 concern the second case study: the Nationalisation Crisis. Japan’s nationalisation of the disputed islands sparked two years of dismal relations between China and Japan, with several flashpoints which risked escalating the dispute to outright hostility. Due to the prolonged nature of the Nationalisation Crisis and the detail-orientated disposition of the analytical framework, the case study focuses on the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis.

The first chapters for each case study identify the basic facts relevant to the case study and then maps these to the two-step security dilemma. The second chapters for each case study identify and outline any securitizations among the basic facts mapped to the security dilemma. The third chapters discuss the role that the historical narratives of the war had in the securitizations. The last part of the third chapters then presents a holistic overview of their respective case studies, drawing insights to answer the primary research question.

The conclusion presents the answers to the primary research question. It also offers reflections on the unique analytical framework, considering its successes and discussing ideas for future refinement. Furthermore, it presents the significance of various additional insights gained by applying the unique analytical framework to

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1 Referred to as the Senkaku islands by Japan and as the Diaoyu islands by China.
the case studies. Following this, the unique contributions to knowledge are re-iterated before considering the future of this line of research.

Unique Contribution (0.3)
In this study of Sino-Japanese relations, several unique contributions are made. Most obviously, in answering the question *how do historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War factor in the Sino-Japanese security paradox?* Two answers are provided based upon differing interpretations of the question.

The first answer considers the impact that historical narratives of the war have on the Sino-Japanese security paradox by way of securitization. This focuses upon whether their contribution to Sino-Japanese relations helps to propel or mitigate the security paradox. Based upon the case studies, it emerges that historical narratives can have either impact. Notably, both are observable in Sino-Japanese relations. Yet, historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War are generally propelling the Sino-Japanese security paradox, leading to greater mutual insecurity.

The second answer takes a different approach, considering instead the mechanics of how historical narratives of the war factor in the Sino-Japanese security paradox in order to have their impact. This discussion is born of a granular exploration of the case studies’ securitization mechanics. This enables insight into the specific ways in which historical narratives are invoked in securitizing moves and how these securitizing moves relate to the security paradox. This discussion reveals that historical narratives of the war predominately factor as facilitating conditions for securitizing moves, increasing, or decreasing their likelihood of success, and thus their capacity to shape the security paradox.

These answers align with the existing consensus that narratives of the war are important in the deteriorating Sino-Japanese relationship. Yet, their unique contribution is in determining how, both in terms of impact and mechanics, historical narratives of the war are so prominent in Sino-Japanese security discourse.

A significant unique contribution to knowledge is the analytical framework developed and employed to answer the primary research question. This is the first
known integration of the security dilemma/paradox concept, securitization theory and Carr’s basic facts historiography into a single framework. Moreover, the development of this framework required a thorough meta-theoretical discussion of these concepts and their ontological compatibility, which is not known to have occurred before. Additionally, the framework employs contemporary concepts of securitization theory, showcasing and advocating for their analytical potential in a holistic manner.

The third unique contribution is the additional insights that, while not directly relevant to answering the research question, represent potentially fruitful avenues for future research. The majority of these pertain to the constituent theories of the thesis’s analytical framework. For example, the possible existence of a protest strand of securitization, is discussed in section 8.2. Other insights relate to Sino-Japanese relations and domestic politics, such as the CCP’s declining monopoly over the Nationalist Narrative in the face of a popular Chinese nationalist movement. These additional insights represent a unique contribution as they have the potential to build upon existing debates which are areas of interest to the academic community.
Chapter 1 - Literature and Methodology

This chapter provides an overview of the relevant bodies of literature and outlines the methodology and research design of this thesis. Three distinct bodies of literature are consulted. The first body of literature concerns Sino-Japanese relations and reveals a pessimistic consensus. This pessimistic consensus considers the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations to a point of outward hostility and confrontation as a distinct possibility.

However, there is disagreement as to the cause of deterioration, with there being two main literary categories within the pessimistic consensus. The first consists of realist accounts, focussing on power politics and notions of security to account for the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations. Within these, a niche body of work exists that argues that the two countries are trapped in a security dilemma/paradox. The second category is socially-constructivist in nature. It focuses on how the recent history of Sino-Japanese relations, particularly the Second Sino-Japanese War, shapes the two nations’ contemporary relationship. Accounting for the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations through a security dilemma/paradox and as a consequence of history is not mutually exclusive. This henceforth necessitates exploration of the intersection between security and history to better understand Sino-Japanese relations.

The second body of literature consulted in this chapter pertains to concepts of the security dilemma/paradox more generally. This concept has evolved over the decades since its inception, making it necessary to consult the literature to ascertain the exact security dilemma/paradox concept to be employed. The outcome of which is the adoption of Booth and Wheeler’s (2007) two-step security dilemma and cyclical security paradox concept.
The third literary body consulted concerns security studies. It is necessary to determine which security framework should be adopted. The result of this discussion is the use of securitization theory. Securitization theory’s focus on the construction of security as a political process offers a specific conceptual space to study the interaction between history and security.

Following the literature review, there is a brief discussion on the thesis’s primary research question. This presents the rationale for the question, drawing holistically upon the three bodies of literature consulted.

The remainder of this chapter outlines the research methodology and design. The choice of an interpretivist research paradigm, cross-sectional case study design, and the selection of two instances of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute as case studies are accounted for. This is followed by a discussion of the considerations taken into account, including measures taken to mitigate the limitations of this research.

**Sino-Japanese Relations Literature (1.1)**

The literature on Sino-Japanese Relations is characterised by a pessimistic consensus that relations will continue to deteriorate (see Greve and Levy, 2017; Chang, 2018; Katagiri, 2019). However, this does not mean that all who study Sino-Japanese relations are entirely pessimistic. Yan (2017a) argues that the two nations could achieve sustained improvement in their relationships if their governments were more willing to make concessions. Others, meanwhile, point to Sino-Japanese economic interdependence as the first step to improved relations (Nikkei, 2018).

Nevertheless, the majority of the literature agrees with Hanssen (2018), that Sino-Japanese relations are a single flashpoint away from open hostility due to underlying political animosity between China and Japan. A sizeable number of observers argue that this underlying animosity has already impacted the otherwise cooperative Sino-Japanese economic relationship (Miyake, 2019; Sun et al., 2019). Wijaya and Osaki (2019) argue that Japanese withdrawal from the $6.9 billion Thai highspeed railway project, over which China and Japan were collaborating, is an example of this. Japan’s withdrawal in favour of working with India, a country
wearier of Chinese economic influence (Raghaven, 2019), to develop its highspeed rail network, shows political posturing to be affecting economic cooperation. Even Yan’s (2017a) optimism is tempered by pessimism in their explanation that China should pursue compromise from a position of strategic strength to ensure it can protect its national interests.

Yet, while the literature on Sino-Japanese relations presents a pessimistic consensus that the relationship will continue to deteriorate, there is less consensus as to why this is the case. Rather, the literature within the pessimistic consensus can generally be divided into two categories, each with its own theoretical underpinnings. The first is realist in nature, while the second is socially-constructivist.

The Realist Category (1.1.1)
Academic literature within the realist category attributes the declining Sino-Japanese relationship to the anarchic international system and traditional realist notions of the egoistic pursuit of military and economic power (Waltz, 2001; Mearshimer, 2003). Accordingly, in line with realist thinking, the works in this category of the pessimistic consensus emphasise the strategic and security components of the underlying political issues in Sino-Japanese relations. Katagiri (2019), for example, talks of Sino-Japanese relations in terms of great power politics. They predict that a shift in regional power dynamics, perhaps due to a dispute over Taiwan or a crisis on the Korean peninsula, will force military competition to the forefront of the relationship. This view portrays China and Japan as rivals for regional dominance, with the politics of said rivalry likely to outpace their economic interdependence.

Considering China and Japan as rivals is a recurring theme within this part of the literature. Although realism is not necessarily pre-disposed to such, many scholars within the realist literary category present Sino-Japanese conflict as inevitable due to the rules of power transition theory (see Greve and Levy, 2017; Fumagalli, 2018; Zhou, 2019; Kim and Gates, 2015). Power transition theory argues that ‘ascending powers’, such as China, ‘have always challenged the dominant power in the international system’, currently the USA, and that these challenges
have usually culminated in war (Clark 2011, p.19). While most would argue that China has already transitioned past Japan in terms of power at a regional level, Johnson (2019) observes that as China continues to pull ahead of Japan and enters into a power transition with the USA, 'any affinity in Sino-Japanese relations continues to erode'.

Contemplating Sino-Japanese relations through the lens of a power transition in Sino-US relations is particularly common in Chinese contributions to the literature. Despite their optimism for sustained cooperation, Yan (2017a) frames China settling its political disputes with Japan as a means to secure Chinese regional dominance in preparation for a future challenge to the US at the global level. Meanwhile, Chang (2018) points to Japanese involvement in US naval exercises in the East China Sea as an indicator that China must mitigate Japan’s potential as a regional ally to the US in any future power transition. Evidently, the mainstay of the realist category of the pessimistic consensus believes competition for regional dominance within the context of Sino-US relations to be the political driver of the deteriorating Sino-Japanese relationship.

While power transition theory saturates this literary category of the pessimistic consensus, there are niche examples of security dilemma thinking. Conceptualised initially by Herz (1950, p.157), the traditional notion of the security dilemma contends that, within the anarchic international structure, one state’s pursuit of security ‘renders others more insecure’. This insecurity compels other states to pursue their own security in a way that makes the first state feel insecure. The first state then takes further measures in the name of security in a cycle that can lead two states, with initially benign intentions towards one another, into conflict. Like power transition theory, the traditional security dilemma is rooted in realist thinking. This is apparent given that the security dilemma arises from the anarchic nature of the international system and that the self-interested use of military and economic power serves as the means to address the insecurity experienced by the actors involved.

A prominent contribution in this niche comes from Capistrano and Kurizaki (2016). They argue that Japan’s efforts to reduce the constitutional restraints on its
use of military force have triggered uncertainty and insecurity and thus countermeasures from China; a clear display of security dilemma dynamics. Similarly, Hovhannisyan (2016) proposes that uncertainty about China’s rise is causing Japanese insecurity, causing said efforts for constitutional reforms on the use of military force. These examples show an agreement that there are security dilemma dynamics in play that, if left unchecked, will continue to deteriorate Sino-Japanese relations.

Accounting for the deteriorating Sino-Japanese relationship through the lens of the security dilemma is more convincing than doing so through power transition theory. Even if you consider Sino-Japanese tensions because of a hypothetical Sino-US power transition, this infers that neither China nor Japan is directly motivated by a desire to cause insecurity in the other. Thus, either side’s actions causing insecurity in the other is an example of security dilemma mechanics, making the security dilemma more foundational in understanding the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations.

Consequently, this thesis builds upon the security dilemma niche within the realist category of the pessimistic consensus. However, situating this thesis within the realist category would be an uneasy fit for this research. Although power transition theory and the security dilemma are not intrinsically linked, there is an oversaturation of power transition thinking in the security dilemma niche of the realist literary category. In Capistrano and Kurizaki’s (2016) work, for example, they explain that the security dilemma mechanics are solely a consequence of shifting global and regional security dynamics. Meanwhile, Hovhanniysan (2016) explains that the sole reason that scholars are interested in the security dilemma mechanics within Sino-Japanese relations is because of the upcoming Chinese challenge to the USA. Accordingly, exploring the Sino-Japanese security dilemma from outside of the realist category, free of its oversaturation of power transition theory, is the best way to garner insights into Sino-Japanese relations.

Another way in which this thesis differs from the realist school of thought is that it does not utilise the traditional security dilemma concept. The works within the security dilemma niche almost entirely employ the traditional security dilemma
concept. Herz published the original concept in 1950 at the outset of the Cold War. Hence, it is a product of realist notions of structural conflict and state-centric security which were prevalent at the time. Significantly, concepts of security generally, and even the security dilemma specifically, have changed over the decades to be less state-centric and pre-orientated with the anarchic nature of the international system (Buzan and Hansen, 2010).

Evidently there is a gap in the literature that employing more contemporary reconceptualisations of the security dilemma to Sino-Japanese relations can help to fill. This is not to say that there have been no attempts to implement more recent conceptualisations. Brito (2019) engaged with more contemporary conceptualisations when arguing that there is a security paradox present in Sino-Japanese antagonism, borrowing terminology from the reconceptualisation of the security dilemma presented by Booth and Wheeler (2007). Brito's work, however, is a rare example within the already niche security dilemma thinking that exists within the realist category of literature on Sino-Japanese relations.

Furthermore, Brito's (2019) work is not free of the predominance of power transition theory. This is apparent based on their assumption that a rising China asserting its dominance in the Asia-Pacific region is the sole source of Japanese insecurity. This view echoes that of Havhanniysan (2016), whose work has already been identified as contextualised within power transition theory. Accordingly, the rarity of newer conceptualisations of the security dilemma in application to Sino-Japanese relations combined with the over-saturation of power transition theory within the security dilemma niche constitutes the specific literary gap that this thesis fills. Given engagement with security dilemma concepts and different ideas of security, their respective literatures are discussed in sections 1.2 and 1.3.

The Socially-Constructivist Category (1.1.2)
The second category of the pessimistic consensus is rooted in social constructivism. While realists argue that Sino-Japanese confrontation is inevitable based upon the self-interested pursuit of power within an anarchical international system, the scholars of this literary category believe that it is the interactions between China and Japan that shape their perceptions of, and policies towards, one another.
Social constructivism is founded on the premise that ‘the social world is of our making’ and that international actors can shape and reshape the nature of international relations through their actions and interactions, whether they be individuals, social groups, states or other kinds of actor (Theys. 2008). It posits that the way in which an actor responds to any given stimuli depends on their 'subjective understanding of the stimulus', not the reality of the physical environment (Uemura 2013, pp.95-6). This perspective aligns well with the security dilemma concept, as it focuses on each actor’s subjective interpretation of the other’s behaviour.

Smith (2014) argues that Sino-Japanese interactions have had a significant impact on each country's policies towards the other. They argue that Japan’s nationalisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, a disputed island chain in the East China Sea also claimed by China, was intended to ease domestic anxieties about anti-Japanese sentiment in China arising from the territorial dispute. This example shows that Japanese government policy was responding to domestic pressures informed by subjective interpretations of developments in China, and not an objective assessment of Chinese military capabilities and the strategic significance of the islands. Smith’s work exemplifies social constructivism’s emphasis on subjective response to stimuli. In this example, the anxieties of Japanese nationalists can be considered a subjective social construction resulting from the equally subjectively-constructed social phenomenon of anti-Japanese sentiment in China (Ibid.).

Although this literary category of the pessimistic consensus is smaller than the realist one, social constructivism offers more potential for new insights into Sino-Japanese relations. This is because it offers the opportunity to explore the social constructs that predicate the underlying political issues in Sino-Japanese relations. Remaining with Smith’s example of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, one can study the subjective social phenomena of Japanese nationalism and Chinese anti-Japanese sentiment to achieve a deeper understanding of the dispute.

If we accept that social interactions between international actors shape policy, it is logical that the historical interactions between two actors inform the social constructs through which each actor perceives the other. This socially-
constructivist literary category supports this conclusion. This is evident in Vogel's (2019) view that it would be impossible to gain perspective on Sino-Japanese relations without discussing history. Meanwhile, Uemura (2013, p.102), argues that Sino-Japanese relations are 'a function of a subjectively formed historical experience'.

In contrast to the realist literary category’s emphasis of power transition theory, Sino-Japanese history is routinely highlighted by works in this literary category as important in propelling the relationship’s underlying political issues. Moreover, both China and Japan admit to the significance of their history in undermining relations. As early as 1995, while on a state visit to China, Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama expressed regret over the 'irrefutable facts of history' (Tomiichi cited in Sim, 2018). Meanwhile, the Chinese Foreign Ministry website, on its profile on Japan, states that the two countries need to embrace 'the spirit of taking history as a mirror and looking forward to the future’ (MFAPRC, 2019).

The Second Sino-Japanese War is particularly emphasised in the literature as having a lasting impact on how contemporary China and Japan see one another (see Reilly, 2004, 2011a, 2011b; Mitter, 2013; Coble, 2007; Johnson, 2019). One reason given for this is the devastation of the war. China lost three million soldiers, eighteen million civilians, and saw one-hundred million people internally displaced (Vogel, 2019, p.282). Furthermore, China experienced atrocities such as the Nanjing Massacre and illegal human experimentation at the hands of Japan's Unit 731. Mitter (2013, p.384) considers such events to persist in China's communal consciousness, shaping the Chinese people's interpretation of Japan's behaviour on the international stage, as 'young people with no possible personal memory of the war' invoke its legacy when commenting on contemporary East Asian politics.

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2 Acknowledged by the Japanese government in the 1990s, Unit 731 was a part of the Japanese Imperial Army that experimented on Chinese soldiers and civilians. Unit 731’s experiments included infecting coerced test subjects with plague, anthrax, cholera and other diseases as part of a biochemical weapons programme (McCurry, 2018; Working, 2001; Kristof, 1995).
Another explanation arising from the literature is that both contemporary China and Japan were born out of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Vogel (2019, p.282) stresses that 'the war enabled the [Chinese] Communists to transform themselves from a small group of rebels into a large group of patriots poised to compete for the right to govern China'. Mitter (2013) supports this argument given that, while both China’s wartime Kuomintang government and the CCP fought the Japanese, the Kuomintang government’s forces bore the brunt of the fighting while the Communists were able to establish their military and ideological presence in the areas under their control (Mitter, 2013). Accordingly, once the Second Sino-Japanese War ended in 1945, the Communist Party (CCP) were able to defeat their Kuomintang rivals in the 1945-49 Chinese Civil War.3

Meanwhile, Vogel (2019, pp.284-5) argues that the Japanese considered the war a result of their exploitation by militaristic elites, leading to the decision 'that their country should give up on its militarism and follow a path of peace.' Resultantly, with the addition of pressure to do so from occupying US forces (ibid.), modern Japan renounced the use of force as a foreign policy tool, adopting pacifism in Article 9 of its constitution. This pacifism is so entrenched that Japan only sanctioned the use of its Self-Defence Force in UN peacekeeping missions in 1992, forty-seven years after the war ended.

There is a literary gap in terms of socially-constructivist applications of the security dilemma concept to Sino-Japanese relations. This thesis fills that gap by applying a conceptualisation of the security dilemma free of power transition theory and which considers the importance of Sino-Japanese history through a focus on the intersection between history and security. More specifically, by studying the role of each nation’s historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War on the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. Considering this, this thesis is best situated within the socially-constructivist literary category while acknowledging that it engages with a concept usually associated with the realist literature.

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3 The Chinese Civil War between the CCP and Kuomintang occurred in two phases. The first from 1927-37, follow by a pause in general hostilities during the Second Sino-Japanese War, followed by another phase from 1945-49.
As discussed in section 1.1.1, the existing literature on the Sino-Japanese security dilemma is based upon outdated conceptualisations and saturated with ideas of power transition theory. Accordingly, a focused review of security dilemma literature is necessary.

There are three categories of security dilemma literature, each of which has its own underlying logic rooted in international relations theory (Booth and Wheeler, 2007). The first of these categories is fatalist, with the logic that insecurity cannot be escaped. The second is mitigator, based on the belief that insecurity can be addressed for a time. The third category is transcender, which consists of scholars that argue that the security dilemma is not determined and can be overcome.

The fatalist logic is rooted in realism and emphasises 'the interrelationship between uncertainty, weapons and fear' (ibid., p.10). Fatalist logic dictates that uncertainty is born of the anarchic international system and fear is an egoistic motivation for power acquisition, for example through weapons development. Given this logic's realist roots, it is unsurprising that the security dilemma thinking present in the Sino-Japanese literature is informed by this logic. This claim is apparent when considering Chellaney's (2013) argument. Chellaney considers that Japan faces a security dilemma resulting from its fear of the uncertainty around China's rise, leading it to explore its own weapons capabilities. This example shows the three factors of fatalist logic at work in the existing security dilemma thinking in Sino-Japanese relations.

Having already concluded that a new conceptualisation of the security dilemma is needed, this work turns to the remaining two logics to find a security dilemma framework. The mitigator logic suggests that familiarity between two actors can deepen trust between societies and lessen uncertainty (Booth and Wheeler, 2007). This social interaction can be seen reflected in the schools of thought that employ this logic. Among these is defensive realism. Kydd (2000) suggests that where military capabilities are purely defensive, actors can reassure each other of the benign reality of any given weapon's existence. This social
interaction between actors would do away with the primary driver of the security dilemma: uncertainty (Tang, 2009).

The English School goes a step further than defensive realism. Bull (1977) argues that it is possible to build shared interests between actors. Through these shared interests, an international society with institutions that can mitigate the security dilemma through familiar behavioural norms that offset uncertainty can develop. Notably, social constructivism emerges from the mitigator logic of the English School. Wendt (1999) views the security dilemma as a phenomenon that can be mitigated if an actor entrenches consideration other’s welfare into their concept of self. Wendt’s view overlaps with Bull’s, as Bull’s mitigation of the security dilemma sees different social communities constructing shared ideals and identities. This emphasis on the construction of values and ideals aligns ontologically with the discussion in the previous section as to how history constructs the social lens through which China and Japan interpret their political issues.

Transcender approaches are associated with critical security studies and share two core themes: ‘the centrality of structures’ and ‘the conviction that a better world is possible’ (Booth and Wheeler, 2007, p.226). Included in this category are Feminist and Marxist approaches, given that each believes that if we transcend the established power structures that underpin the current international system, the patriarchy and capitalism respectively, we can as a global society overcome the uncertainty-fuelled fear of the security dilemma (see Tickner, 2011; Pal, 2018; Hansen, 2000). For example, Enloe (2004) argues that, while nations and empires come and go, the structures that privilege masculinity have remained constant. Accordingly, the feminist transcender logic is that if we replace patriarchal institutions, we can transcend the patriarchal power structures that underpin the security dilemma. This is a stark contrast to the fatalist and mitigator logics which accept the security dilemma as a constant in international relations.

With its links to critical security studies, the transcender logic offers new perspective on the security dilemma. One transcender approach, that of Booth and Wheeler, offers a reconceptualization of the security dilemma that this work can adopt for use in its analytical framework. Booth and Wheeler (2007) create more
space for critical analysis of decisions and decision-makers by reframing the security dilemma as a two-step process. First is the dilemma of interpretation, in which an actor must interpret the other’s actions as either threatening or benign. This is followed by the dilemma of response, wherein an actor must either respond aggressively or passively based upon its interpretation. If both actors interpret the other’s actions as threatening and respond aggressively when neither wants conflict, it creates a security paradox, ‘wherein policies calculated to promote security actually bring about the opposite’ (Ibid., p.8). This concept of the security paradox is a rebranding of the commonly understood security dilemma label which has traditionally been used to describe the cycle of insecurity rather than the dilemmas faced by the actors involved.

Booth and Wheeler’s reconceptualization has been criticised, particularly by fatalist scholars. Bluth (2011, pp.1362-3) argues that their work is trivial: that it only adds a thin layer of interpretation while removing the fixed definition of security that made Herz’s original concept a ‘powerful paradigm about the sources of insecurity in an anarchic international system’. However, Bluth’s trivialisation of Booth and Wheeler’s concept is incorrect. Applied within Sino-Japanese relations, the deconstruction of the security dilemma into the study of dilemmas of interpretation and response provides additional conceptual space in which to explore historical narratives and their role in the broader Sino-Japanese security paradox. Booth and Wheeler’s two-step conceptualisation also offers more room to think critically about the nature of security and how it operates within a Sino-Japanese context. Moreover, as was briefly discussed in section 1.1.1, detaching the security dilemma from traditional realist notions of security is beneficial for generating new insights into Sino-Japanese relations.

Moving away from the fatalist logic that underpins traditional realist understandings of the security dilemma, elements of both the mitigator and transcender logics are adopted in this thesis. The analytical framework shares the mitigator logic’s social constructivism, which aligns well with the socially-constructivist literary category and its emphasis on history shaping contemporary relations between actors. It also does not seek to uncover ways to overcome the
security dilemma, which aligns well with the mitigator logic’s view that it can only be temporarily mitigated. Meanwhile, the analytical framework adopts the structure of Booth and Wheeler’s security dilemma/paradox concept. Understanding the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations does not constitute transcendence of the security dilemma. Yet the transcender logic’s more detailed focus on the structure and mechanics of the security dilemma creates the conceptual space to better explore the intersection of history and security in Sino-Japanese relations.

The mechanics of the security dilemma/paradox concept are presented in section 2.1. For clarity, from this point onwards any mention of the security dilemma refers to Booth and Wheeler’s (2007) two-step process. The paradoxical cycle of building tensions is referred to as the security paradox. The term security dilemma/paradox is used to refer holistically to Booth and Wheeler’s concepts.

Security Studies Literature (1.3)
While Booth and Wheeler’s security dilemma/paradox concept offers part of an analytical framework, it is also necessary to adopt a security framework to fully define security and ascertain its implications. The following review of security studies literature leads to the adoption of the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory within this thesis.

The traditional security framework, used in the existing literature on the Sino-Japanese security dilemma/paradox, is rooted in realism and its focus on power, self-interest and international anarchy. A prominent proponent of the traditional framework, Walt (1991) explains that the state is the primary security actor, and that security pertains to the strategic use of military and economic power. Walt (1991) argues that any expansion beyond these parameters is damaging to the concept’s intellectual coherency. While this study’s topic of Sino-Japanese relations is state-centric, its socially-constructivist emphasis on history does not align well with the traditional security framework’s focus on power and self-interest. Moreover, adopting a realist security framework is less likely to offer new insights, which has been stated as an objective of employing a security
dilemma/paradox concept free of power transition theory. Accordingly, the traditional security framework is not adopted for this thesis’s analytical framework.

Since the end of the Cold War, Security Studies has experienced a normative turn, with calls for the implementation of the human security framework (Buzan and Hansen, 2010). The human security framework views the individual as the referent point of security, with an emphasis on the state providing individuals with protection from ‘want’ and ‘fear’ through education and addressing poverty (McCormack, 2008, p.116). In line with the parameters set by Article 9 of Japan’s constitution, Japanese foreign policy has been guided for decades by the human security framework (Magee, 2019). Japan is now considered a leading proponent of human security, advocating for its wider adoption by, for example, sponsoring a UN symposium to celebrate human security’s 25th anniversary in 2019 (ibid.).

There has also been the establishment of critical security studies. Critical security studies aligns closely with the security dilemma’s transcender logic by being critical of the power structures that maintain the traditional security framework at the expense of disempowered groups (Olivares, 2018). Notably, Booth (1991, 2007) has contributed significantly to critical security studies in the form of emancipatory security. A school of thought similar to the human security framework in that it considers security to come from empowerment of the individual, but which is far more critical of hierarchy and power structures. Critical security studies consists of many different approaches, but they share a tendency to critique traditional realist approaches and highlight the political implications of security (Browning and McDonald, 2011). Critical security studies is a broad church encompassing many different ideas of security. Many of the approaches can be considered, at least in part, constructivist in their consideration that the relationships that persist established power structures are socially constructed (see Manchanda, 2000; Trichkova, 2016), and that alternative structures could be constructed to address the insecurity caused by the status quo (Buzan et al, 1998).

However, neither human security nor critical security approaches serve as the security framework for this thesis’ analytical framework. This is due to both approaches presenting objective ideas of security. Even in the case of more
constructivist critical approaches, their fixation on power structures, and the normative notion that we should address these power structures to mitigate insecurity, fixes an objective de facto referent point of what security is. This objective referent point is difficult to reconcile with the study of subjective historical narratives and how they factor into socially-constructed perceptions within a bilateral relationship. A security framework is required that is compatible with the socially subjective constructs through which China and Japan are interpreting the other’s actions as threats to their security.

A suitable security framework comes from the Copenhagen School in the form of securitization theory. Securitization theory posits that security results from an intersubjective process in which social elites invoke a community’s subjective social values to frame issues as existential security threats (ibid). If successful, the issue becomes securitized, justifying exceptional measures to address what is now considered a security issue. This is significant as securitization theory thus provides a framework with which to study history’s role in the social construction of security by looking at how each nation discusses their history in the presentation of the other as a security threat. Additionally, by adopting a process-orientated security framework, it is possible to study both the role of historical narratives in Sino-Japanese security formulation in terms of both their impact and the mechanics of how they factored in the securitization process. In this regard, securitization theory can be used as Waever (2015, p.123) suggests: as a powerful tool with which to study security ‘empirically as a social phenomenon’.

A review of securitization theory literature reveals a wealth of sources and ideas. These will be discussed in more detail in section 2.2. These are separated into two generations of securitization theory literature. The first of these can itself be split into three categories: (1) The securitization process as outlined by its original proponents (Buzan et al., 1997; Waever, 2015), including some writing on the role of history in the securitization process (Coskun, 2010; Jutila, 2015) that this work can draw upon. (2) Critiques of securitization theory, particularly normative critiques from critical security theorists (see Williams, 2003; Hansen, 2000; Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2019; Lupovici, 2014). (3) Those who have refined
traditional securitization theory to consider alternative political cultures and contexts (see Gad and Petersen, 2011; Holbraad and Pedersen, 2012; Nyman and Zeng, 2016).

The second generation consists of practical expansions and applications of securitization theory based upon the ideas and discussion of the first generation. This includes the securitization dilemma (Watson, 2013; Olesker, 2019), macro- and microsecuritizations (see Buzan and Waever, 2009; Huysmans, 2011; Watson, 2013) and strands of securitization (Vuori, 2008, 2011). Using these ideas offers potential new insights into the role of history in Sino-Japanese relations. However, integrating these ideas with Booth and Wheeler’s security dilemma/paradox concept into a coherent analytical framework will require further discussion.

Securitization theory, its theoretical underpinnings and its various concepts are outlined in detail in section 2.2. The integration of securitization theory with the security dilemma/paradox concept into a single analytical framework and method of application to this thesis’s case studies is presented chapter 2.

The Research Question (1.4)
As discussed, the literature on Sino-Japanese relations presents a pessimistic consensus that the relationship will continue to deteriorate due to underlying political issues. Within this consensus are two literary categories with differing accounts as to the nature of the political issues in question. This thesis draws upon both categories to offer insights into Sino-Japanese relations. From the first, it recognises the presence of security dilemma/paradox mechanics in the relationship between China and Japan. From the second, it accepts the importance of Sino-Japanese history in constructing each nation’s subjective interpretations of the other, particularly the history of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

The literature review also engaged with the literature on the security dilemma/paradox concept and security studies. By doing so, it adopted Booth and Wheeler’s (2007) reconceptualisation of the security dilemma/paradox concept and employs securitization theory as its security framework.
The insights derived from review and discussion of the relevant bodies of literature culminate in the thesis’s primary research question: *how do historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War factor in the Sino-Japanese security paradox?*

This question appropriately engages with both categories of the pessimistic consensus. Yet, at the same time, it situates this thesis in the socially-constructivist literary category. This thesis can be categorised as socially-constructivist as the historical narratives subjectively constructed by, and in the social relationship between, China and Japan serve as the subject of this study while the Sino-Japanese security paradox is the object which the narrative constructs impact upon.

**Methodology and Research (1.5)**
This section outlines the research design of this thesis. It begins by presenting the rationale behind selecting an interpretivist paradigm before discussing the choice of a comparative research design utilising two cross-sectional case studies pertaining to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute.

**Research Paradigm (1.5.1)**
This thesis employs an interpretivist paradigm in its research for several reasons. Interpretivism seeks to understand meaning and intention (Prasad, 2018). The primary research question asks ‘*how*’, meaning that it seeks to understand the way history factors in Sino-Japanese relations through the lens of the security dilemma/paradox and securitization theory.

Additionally, interpretivism considers truth and knowledge to be subjective, with meaning derived from a people’s culture, history and identity (Ryan, 2018). As discussed, the socially-constructivist literary body explaining Sino-Japanese pessimism emphasises the subjective, historically rooted perspectives with which each nation views the other. An interpretivist approach is therefore suitable based on its focus on understanding, and emphasis on constructed identities and realities. These key elements of interpretivism align with the objectives of this thesis and its socially-constructivist position within the literature.
Interpretivism is usually associated with qualitative research (ibid.). This aligns well with securitization theory which employs qualitative techniques such as discourse analysis to study the social construction of security through endeavours such as speech acts (Buzan et al., 1998). This further supports interpretivism as a logical choice of research paradigm for this thesis. The specific discourse analysis method used in this thesis takes the form of a thematic analysis of securitizing moves. This is done to determine the securitizing moves’ alignment with the key themes of the historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War. How this method is used within the context of analytical framework is outlined in section 2.5, while a discussion of what is meant by narrative and theme can be found in section 3.1.

Plausibly, positivism, an objectivist paradigm well suited to quantitative data and establishing verifiable truths (Zan, 1983), could have been employed to quantify linguistic patterns in historical discourse and narrative structures. However, a problem arises as determining the significance of any findings would still need to be interpreted via a subjective understanding of the historical subject matter. The core of the issue with employing positivism is that it assumes an objective reality based upon its closer association with the natural rather than social sciences (Prasad, 201). In summary, positivism’s objectivism makes it less suitable than an interpretivist methodology is to research the socially-rooted topic of study that this thesis seeks to understand.

This thesis’s conclusions could serve as the basis for hypotheses for future positivist studies. These studies might seek to establish a definitive causal link between history, security dilemmas/paradoxes and the predicted return to confrontation in Sino-Japanese relations. However, within this study, interpretivism is be employed to undertake desk-based research with a focus on qualitative data.

**Design and Case Studies (1.5.2)**

Having defined the research paradigm, the next step of the research design was to establish a methodology. As stated in section 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, this thesis presents an integrated analytical framework. This is outlined in chapter 2. To
undertake its research, this framework was applied to Sino-Japanese relations in a comparative cross-sectional case study design.

A cross-sectional design was selected over a longitudinal one for two reasons. Firstly, a cross-sectional design allows for comparing many different variables simultaneously (Hilton and Patrick, 1970). This is beneficial as the possible ways in which historical narratives of the war may factor in Sino-Japanese relations have not been narrowed to a handful of variables to study over time in a longitudinal study.

Secondly, this research seeks to understand contemporary Sino-Japanese relations. Cross-sectional research is better suited to provide insights within a specific timeframe than longitudinal studies which, by their nature, span longer time periods (ibid.). Resultantly, using cross-sectional case studies better fulfils the objective of understanding how historical narratives factor in the contemporary security paradox between China and Japan.

Various potential case studies were considered. These include the Sino-Japanese textbook scandals, the brief Sino-Japanese détente in the late 2010s, and the aforementioned highspeed rail projects which China and Japan had agreed to lead on together. However, most of the textbook disputes occurred decades ago (Masaaki, 2008). Thus, they do not have the same potential for insights into contemporary Sino-Japanese relations. The Sino-Japanese détente was still ongoing during the commencement of this research project. While the selection of this case study would allow for contemporary insights, it also posed risks. For example, the potential for the case study to become unviable due to a sudden shift in Sino-Japanese relations or global context. This proved to be the case given the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which saw a short-term shift towards cooperative crisis management which, once concluded, marked the end of the détente (Boylan et al.).

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4 A dispute has emerged several times in Sino-Japanese relations with China protesting en masse revisions to Japanese school textbooks. The Chinese protesters claim that the revisions show the Japanese government to be downplaying the horrors and atrocities of Japan’s wartime aggression (Pollmann, 2015).

5 Alienated by a US trade war and uncertain security guarantees during Trump’s presidency, China and Japan respectively sought closer ties to mitigate the risks posed by US policy (Eves, 2020).
Concentrating on Sino-Japanese infrastructure projects would have meant applying great focus to the regional and economic aspects of the Sino-Japanese relationship, not on their bilateral and domestic political relationship. At the same time, an infrastructure case study would need to consider the trilateral relationship between China, Japan and the country receiving Sino-Japanese investment, risking scope creep.

The two cross-sectional case studies used within this thesis are the 2010 Trawler Incident and 2012 Nationalisation Crisis, both instances of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute concerns a chain of small uninhabited islands in the East China Sea, situated far from any other Chinese or Japanese territories. Japan claims it discovered the islands in the 1800s (Lee, 2011). China claims the islands are historic fishing grounds that were administered by Taiwan province, stolen by Japan when it annexed Taiwan and then not returned alongside Taiwan after the Second Sino-Japanese War (ibid.).

The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is an ideal space for case study selection as the dispute is considered symbolic of the broader Sino-Japanese relationship (Hafeez, 2015). It is multifaceted and its characteristics span both literary categories of the pessimistic consensus: realist and socially constructivist. In line with the realist literary category, there are two geopolitical elements to the dispute. The first is economic given that the islands’ territorial waters contain oil and gas fields considered essential to both nations’ energy security (Green et al., 2017a; 2017b). However, the dispute cannot be considered purely economic in nature as the oil and gas supplies are not extensive enough to justify hostilities, equating to only 16 days of Chinese energy use (Hall, 2019). Secondly, there is a strategic aspect to the dispute as the islands are well-situated to help prevent the spread of China’s military reach further into the Pacific (ibid.). Certainly, the islands form a longer island chain which could be militarised to create a barrier to China, but cost-benefit analyses indicate that operating such remote bases would be an inefficient use of resources (ibid.). Hence, while there is a strategic element to the dispute, the dispute is not definitively strategic in nature.
Concerning the socially-constructivist literary category, there is a clear link to the Second Sino-Japanese War. This is China’s claim that the islands should have been returned following the war. Yet, while mention of the war is to be expected, the specific disputes of the case studies are not directly over the war’s contested history. As is discussed in chapters 4 and 7, the Trawler Incident followed the arrest of a Chinese trawler crew by the Japanese coastguard and the Nationalisation Crisis followed the announcement of Japanese plans to nationalise the disputed islands. To this end, selecting case studies from the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute does not risk a confirmation bias in the same way that case studies directly related to the history of the war, like the textbook scandals, would. Thus, it provides a just representation of how historical narratives of the war factor in a prominent Sino-Japanese dispute.

The specific case studies, the 2010 Trawler Incident and 2012 Nationalisation Crisis, also warrant justification. There are other instances of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute which were considered for use as case studies, such as the 2008 Circumnavigation and the 2020 100-Day Push. However, the 2010 and 2012 disputes are routinely presented by the literature as significant moments for Sino-Japanese relations (see Chen and Hwang, 2015; Hafeez, 2015; Green et al., 2017a; 2017b). The Trawler Incident is often considered a watershed in Sino-Japanese relations, one which garnered mutual antagonism between the two nations (Hall, 2019). The Nationalisation Crisis, meanwhile, is considered the lowest point in Sino-Japanese relations since the war itself, with some observers believing the dispute almost escalated into open conflict between the two nations (Dan, 2018).

Moreover, these instances of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute were the most recent bar the 2020 100-Day Push. The 100-Day Push was not suitable as a case study as it began after the commencement of this thesis’s research. Accordingly, the Trawler Incident and Nationalisation Crisis were the most contemporary case studies available pertaining to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute at the time of the case study selection phase of this research.

6 The former refers to a circumnavigation of the islands ethnically Chinese Taiwanese activists escorted by the Chinese Coast Guard. The latter refers to 100 days of persistant Chinese patrols in the territorial waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
Admittedly, adopting two case studies pertaining to the same territorial dispute which occurred two years apart might be considered longitudinal rather than cross-sectional. However, this thesis is not studying the development of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute over time. Moreover, both case studies occurred in the early 2010s and only represent two data points. While this is not in line with longitudinal research design, it does offer data for cross-analysis in keeping with cross-sectional research.

Considerations (1.6)
There were several barriers for this research to overcome. A selection of these are presented below.

First is the risk of western-centrism arising from a western study of an East Asian bilateral relationship. In particular, securitization theory has been criticised for being too western-centric in its presentation of politics and security as distinctive social phenomena (Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2019). Certainly, securitization theory was initially developed by the study of Western liberal-democratic societies (Waever, 2015). However, as Nyman and Zeng (2016) argue, while the dynamics of securitization may differ outside of a western context, the process of securitization still occurs. Vuori (2011) argues that securitization theory can be refined to suit the context of any case study. Moreover, there are Chinese and Japanese scholars engaging with securitization theory in their research, such as Song’s (2015, p.165) poststructuralist expansion based upon ‘abstraction, representation and interpretation.’ Accordingly, although it is correct to acknowledge the risk of western-centrism arising from the use of securitization theory, it would be wrong to assume western-centrism in its use.

Linked to risk of western-centrism is the matter of positionality. A study undertaken by a western scholar on an East Asian bilateral relationship risks coloniality. Additionally, there is generally an anti-China media bias in the West (see Windrem, 2014; BBC News 2020a; CGTN, 2020). Therefore, there is a risk that this anti-China bias be subconsciously incorporated into this research, predisposing its conclusion to present China less favourably than Japan. Exercising reflexivity by expressing positionality serves to help transition unconscious biases to being
conscious biases and through a concerted effort, conscious biases can be, at least in part, mitigated (Massoud, 2022).

The language barrier presents another obstacle to this research as it increased the likelihood of difficulty accessing primary sources. However, this was not a major barrier to the research. Akin to Vuori’s (2011, p.20) work on Chinese securitizations, this research ‘does not seek new translations or documentary evidence’. Rather, its contribution lies in developing a new framework and applying it to previously discussed data to offer new insight into the intersection of history and security in Sino-Japanese relations. To this end, existing translations and sources were adequate for the purposes of this research.

Another challenge comes from the use, or rather potential misuse of history. When discussing history, it is important to do so without making moral and political assumptions about the past (Steele, 2015). Here this challenge is compounded as this study discusses history directly in the form of the case studies and indirectly in consideration of historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Resultantly, it is necessary to engage historiography, incorporating it into the analytical framework to mitigate the risk of poor practice in the presentation and discussion of history. Further detail on this engagement with historiography is outlined in chapter 2.

**Summary (1.7)**

There exists a pessimistic consensus in the literature that Sino-Japanese relations will continue to deteriorate. This literary consensus can be split into two categories. The first consists of realist views that the relationship is deteriorating due to the competitive power politics of Sino-Japanese-US relations, though some in this category make a convincing case for the deterioration as a result of the presence of security dilemma/paradox mechanics. The second category is socially-constructivist in nature, emphasising the role of Sino-Japanese history in shaping a mutually antagonistic relationship, particularly the history of the Second Sino-Japanese War. This thesis situates itself in the socially-constructivist literary category but draws upon both categories to explore the intersection of security and history.
Discussion of the literature on the security dilemma/paradox results in the adoption of Booth and Wheeler’s security paradox concept. This is due to its logic being compatible with a socially-constructivist study, while its two-step security dilemma concept allows the conceptual space to explore the intersection of history and security. Similarly, the discussion of security studies literature led to the conclusion that securitization theory is the most applicable security framework of this thesis. This is because of its social constructivism and emphasis on security as a social process. Following situation within the literature and definition of corresponding frameworks, the primary research question was established: *how do historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War factor in the Sino-Japanese security paradox?*

Following these key aspects, the thesis’s research methodology and design was considered. This discussion presented a rationale for adopting an interpretivist paradigm in a library-based study employing a cross-sectional case study design. This included justification of the selected case studies, the 2010 Trawler Incident and the 2012 Nationalisation Crisis. Both case studies pertain to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute which is considered symbolic of Sino-Japanese relations more generally.

In the final section, some of the considerations taken into account during the research design phase of the thesis were outlined. Namely, the risk of western-centrism, particularly in using securitization theory, the language barrier, and the risk of misrepresenting history. The first two risks were concluded to be minimal, while the history issue is addressed through the integration of historiography into the thesis’ analytical framework.
Chapter 2 – Analytical Framework

This chapter outlines the analytical framework, which engages with the security dilemma/paradox concept, securitization theory and established historiographical practice. The chapter begins by exploring the core and secondary concepts of the security dilemma/paradox. Namely, the two-step security dilemma, the cyclical security paradox, the strategic challenge, security dilemma sensibility, and the reassurance game. Following this, the first and second generations of securitization theory are discussed. An outline of how ideas from both generations can be used to study historical narratives and the Sino-Japanese security paradox is presented. Different historiographical approaches considered for the analytical framework are then discussed and the adoption of Carr’s (2001) basic facts historiography is outlined.

With the constituent theories of the analytical framework presented, the second half of this chapter concerns the nuances of their interplay and outlines the step-by-step approach taken to apply the framework to the case studies. The role of the basic facts historiography in this work, presenting the historical events of the case studies and their causal links in a transparent manner, is outlined in section 2.5.1. A greater challenge faced within this thesis was integrating the overlapping concepts and mechanics of the security dilemma/paradox concept and securitization theory. Accordingly, a discussion of how securitization theory can be applied within the parameters of the security dilemma/paradox is offered. Additionally, conceptual synergies between the two theories and the benefits of integration into a single unique analytical framework are presented in section 2.4.1.

The remainder of this chapter presents the step-by-step approach used to apply the analytical framework to the case studies. This approach begins with the
identification of relevant basic facts, mapping these to the security dilemma/paradox and identifying securitization mechanics, discussing how historical narratives of the war factored in the case study, and finally linking the findings back to the primary research question.

The Security Dilemma/Paradox (2.1)
As outlined in section 1.2, Booth and Wheeler’s security dilemma/paradox consists of two core concepts: the dilemma of interpretation and the dilemma of response. However, it also offers several secondary concepts that aid this thesis in studying the Sino-Japanese security paradox. Each concept is outlined below with supporting examples. Fatalist critiques of the security dilemma/paradox are presented and countered throughout this section to emphasise how this framework’s security dilemma/paradox concept differs from that of those that are most commonly found in the pre-existing literature on Sino-Japanese relations.

The Two-Step Security Dilemma (2.1.1)
As already discussed, the two-step security dilemma consists of a dilemma of interpretation followed by a dilemma of response. Booth and Wheeler (2007) define the dilemma of interpretation as the need to decide upon the other’s intention. Accurately interpreting the other’s intention makes an appropriate policy response more likely. Meanwhile, misinterpreting the other’s actions could mean wasting resources or escalating tensions if benign intentions were considered malicious, or being left vulnerable if malicious intentions were considered benign.

The dilemma of interpretation can be observed in the prelude to World War I, a traditional example of the security dilemma/paradox (Booth and Wheeler, 2007). The UK faced a dilemma of interpretation regarding Germany’s naval build-up. The dilemma was determining whether Germany’s naval build-up was intended as a challenge to the UK’s naval supremacy (Wolf, 2014). Ultimately, the UK resolved its dilemma by interpreting Germany’s behaviour as malicious, resulting in the UK developing the formidable dreadnought class battleship as a counter to growing German naval prowess (Ross, 2010).

Proponents of the fatalist logic, outlined in section 1.2, dismiss the dilemma of interpretation. Mearshimer (1994) argues that certainty over the other’s actions
is impossible. This makes the dilemma of interpretation redundant as the only rational course of action would be to assume the worst and respond accordingly. Herz’s (1950) original outlining of the security dilemma seems to support this. Herz (1950, p.157) states that ‘whether man is by nature peaceful and cooperative, or domineering and aggressive, is not the question’. In line with this fatalist thinking, the UK was wise to interpret German Intentions as hostile as there was no other rational interpretation.

However, Herz discusses the interpretation of human nature as a whole, not the specific intentions behind any particular action. As such, the interpretation of specific intent remains in scope for security dilemma scholars. Proponents of the mitigator and transcender logics thus discuss interpretation. Jervis (1976, 1978) argues that international actors can communicate intent by distinguishing between offensive and defensive capabilities. Wolf (2014) explains that Germany’s naval expansion was undertaken in pursuit of national prestige, not by any direct desire to challenge the UK. If we accept Wolf’s view, the UK misinterpreted Germany’s intentions. Wolf (ibid.) continues that if Germany had better communicated its motivations, it might have eased the UK’s anxieties, facilitating a benign interpretation of German motivations. Evidently, interpretation is a significant component of the security dilemma, the importance of which is correctly emphasised as part of the two-step security dilemma.

Following interpretation is the dilemma of response, in which actors must decide how they respond based on their interpretation of the other’s actions. This can range from preparing a material response, such as readying a military deterrence, to providing reassurance to mitigate insecurity (Booth and Wheeler, 2007). If no threat is perceived from the other’s actions, or if the other’s actions are considered to be a consequence of one’s own actions, the response will be different compared to if the other’s actions are interpreted as inherently malicious. As explained above, the UK interpreted Germany’s naval build-up as a threat and responded by further developing its own naval capabilities. Alternatively, if they had interpreted Germany’s intentions as more benign, the UK may have been
comfortable responding in a way less likely to antagonise German, such as by providing or seeking reassurances of benign intention.

From a fatalist perspective, there can be no dilemma of response as the only rational course of action is the pursuit of power to ensure your own security (Schmah, 2012). Fatalists would therefore argue that, regardless of their interpretation, the UK was correct to respond to Germany by expanding its own naval capabilities. However, the mitigator and transcender logics challenge this. Booth and Wheeler (2007, p.297) consider uncertainty as a certainty; one that can only be overcome by risking trusting the other and that ‘the risks of embedding trust are the path to peace and security’. Accordingly, although such a response would have carried risk, the UK could have sought reassurances from Germany. This could have been the first step in building the trust necessary to overcome the excesses of uncertainty that underpin the security dilemma/paradox.

Considered together, the dilemma of interpretation and the dilemma of response form the two-step security dilemma. As visualised in fig.1, the security dilemma is triggered by the input of the other’s action, then ‘the challenge is to both judge the other’s actions accurately and to operationalise an effective response’ (Ibid., p.34). This response constitutes the output of the two-step security dilemma. By breaking down the security dilemma into constituent steps, the two-step security dilemma provides conceptual space to explore how historical narratives factor in decision-making within the security dilemma and broader security paradox.

Fig.1 – The Two-Step Security Dilemma
The Security Paradox (2.1.2)
How one actor chooses to resolve its security dilemma can trigger a security dilemma in another. This second actor’s interpretation and response in their security dilemma may then lead to a new security dilemma for the first actor in a cyclical spiral (see Fig. 2). Booth and Wheeler (ibid.) identify this phenomenon as the security paradox. Continuing with the example used above, this dynamic can be observed during the Anglo-German naval arms race. Following the UK’s launch of the dreadnought class warship, Germany ordered the construction of additional warships, leading the UK to increase its naval budget and Germany, in turn, to accelerate its naval modernisation efforts (Maurer, 1997).

The security paradox only occurs when neither side initially desired hostility with the other (Booth and Wheeler, 2007). Accordingly, when determining the presence of a security paradox it is necessary to establish that neither side was motivated by hostility, a feat which is possible with the benefit of hindsight (Butterfield, 1951). Returning to the Anglo-German naval arms race, as discussed, Germany’s naval build up is now considered as in pursuit of national prestige, not to challenge the UK’s naval supremacy. At the same time, the UK’s response was motivated by insecurity rather than a desire to threaten Germany (Wolf, 2014). Hence Anglo-German relations in this period demonstrate a security paradox, both in terms of the cyclical spiral of escalating tensions, and in the initial absence of any desire for hostility by either party.

The cyclical security paradox concept is beneficial for the analytical framework of this thesis. This is because it separates the cycle of insecurity posited by traditional security dilemma concepts from the decision-making dilemmas of international actors. Considering the security paradox as an associated but distinct...
phenomenon from the two-step security dilemma allows more space for analysis within each of these core concepts, while still providing a structure in how constituent security dilemmas contribute to spiralling tensions.

**Secondary Concepts (2.1.3)**

Booth and Wheeler’s (2007) security dilemma/paradox includes a number of secondary concepts which help to understand and navigate the security dilemma and security paradox. Most notably, concepts regarding how they can be resolved, either through hostile or peaceful means. The secondary concepts discussed here are the strategic challenge, security dilemma sensibility and the reassurance game. These are mapped to the two-step security dilemma in fig.3.

*Fig.3 - The Two-Step Security Dilemma including Secondary Concepts*

The **Strategic Challenge**

The strategic challenge refers to one party deciding that the other represents an outright threat which requires no further interpretation. Rather, the actor proceeds directly to the dilemma of response in retaliation to the other’s actions with no consideration of their motivations or alternative intentions (ibid.) This ends the security paradox as the cycle of building tensions is replaced with outright hostility. For example, if the UK had decided that Germany’s naval build-up was an inherent threat underpinned by malicious intent, it could have responded by attacking German dockyards. This would have reduced Germany’s naval capacity, thereby addressing the source of the UK’s insecurity. However, such action could have provoked further hostility and potentially open warfare between the UK and Germany.
The term strategic challenge suggests that this concept is limited to discussing military security. However, the strategic challenge concept can be applied more broadly to other kinds of security issues. One actor might consider the other’s economic policies intentionally malicious if they undermine their economic interests. Alternatively, a growing social movement in one country might be considered a threat to the values and ideals of another. Correspondingly, the actor may respond economically or socially, enacting protectionist policies, or may ban and/or condemn the social movement without further consideration of its motivations. These actions would constitute a response to a perceived strategic challenge.

Security Dilemma Sensibility

Security dilemma sensibility occurs within the dilemma of interpretation. It is the understanding and appreciation of uncertainty-fuelled-fear within a relationship and ‘crucially, the role that one’s own actions play in provoking that fear’ (Booth and Wheeler, 2007, p. 7). Wolf (2014) argues that the Anglo-German naval arms race could have been averted if Germany better communicated its benign intentions. Such an action may be considered an expression of security dilemma sensibility if it resulted from an awareness that Germany’s naval build-up was triggering the UK’s insecurity. Additionally, the UK could have exercised security dilemma sensibility by acknowledging that its development of the dreadnought class battleship could trigger German insecurity. In either case, the exercise of security dilemma sensibility would have been a necessary precursor for either side to take action to resolve the security paradox peacefully.

The fatalist logic is dismissive of security dilemma sensibility for the same reason it is dismissive of the dilemma of interpretation, that one can never truly know the other’s motivation and intentions (Booth and Wheeler, 2007). However, actors need not have certainty over the other’s intentions in order to exercise security dilemma sensibility. As is discussed below concerning the reassurance game, for an actor to escape the security paradox requires them to take a risk that forces the other to reconsider the actor’s intentions. The exercise of security dilemma sensibility poses a significant risk because of the inevitable uncertainty of
the other’s intentions. Ultimately, security dilemma sensibility is relevant in any discussion regarding peaceful resolution of the security paradox.

The Reassurance Game

Actors who exercise security dilemma sensibility can engage in a reassurance game to resolve the security paradox peacefully (Booth and Wheeler, 2007). The decision to participate in a reassurance game is taken in the dilemma of response, with reassurance efforts manifesting in an actor’s security dilemma outputs. Kydd (2000) explains that for a reassurance game to succeed, international actors attempt to reassure the other of benign intentions through cost signalling. These are reassuring gestures that are so costly that they appear irrational. This forces the second actor to reinterpret their understanding of the first actor as the cost signal can only be rationalised if the initial actor’s intentions were benign. The cost incurred through cost signalling can be material, in the form of strategic or economic assets, or metaphorical, in terms of prestige or symbolic risk. Booth and Wheeler (2007) point to the USSR’s unilateral withdrawal from Eastern Europe in the late-1980s as an example of a cost signalling reassurance game. The cost of this withdrawal was the loss of Soviet control over Eastern Europe and its readiness to counter western forces in the region. One outcome of this was an easing of tensions between the USSR and USA ahead of the collapse of the Soviet Bloc (ibid.). Returning to the Anglo-German naval arms race, the UK might have cost signalled by ending its development dreadnought class battleship, or Germany might set a lower target for its total number of vessels.

The reassurance game and cost signalling exposes actors to risk with no guarantee of a peaceful resolution of the security paradox. For this reason, the reassurance game is considered irrational by fatalists, who consider an actor increasing their risk exposure as a means to resolve what fatalists believe is an inescapable cycle of insecurity to be inherently counterintuitive (Booth and Wheeler, 2007). This fatalist conclusion is incorrect on two accounts. Firstly, if an actor has already exercised security dilemma sensibility in their dilemma of interpretation, it would be irrational not to engage in a reassurance game in the dilemma of response. Surely, attempting to mitigate the security paradox
peacefully, even at risk to oneself, poses less risk than knowingly escalating tensions to the point of hostility. Secondly, if cost signalling is to be successful, there needs to be a cost which the other can only rationalise by concluding the signaller’s benign intentions to be sincere. To this end, the greater the risk the actor exposes themselves to in their cost signal, the stronger their reassurance game will be. Accordingly, engaging in a reassurance game should be considered rational in pursuit of one’s own security, in spite of the risks involved.

Securitization Theory (2.2)
With the security dilemma/paradox outlined, the next step is to present this thesis’s chosen Security Studies framework. This section outlines securitization theory’s core concepts and the two generations of securitization theory literature with the benefit of various illustrative examples. The first generation consists of traditional discussions around the securitization process, its normative critiques and its applicability to different political cultures. Discussion of these provides precedent and considerations for the use of securitization theory. The second-generation literature regards applied securitization concepts for use in the thesis’ analytical framework.

Securitization Theory’s Core Concepts (2.2.1)
Securitization theory posits that security results from an intersubjective securitization process in which a community subjectively interprets an issue in accordance with its subjective values and ideals (Buzan et al., 1998). This process is conducted through securitizing moves, in which securitizing actors invoke a community’s subjective social values to frame an issue as an existential security threat. These securitizing actors are usually social elites including, but not limited to, community leaders, politicians, and the media.

Securitizing moves are made before an audience from the community in question and can take a variety of forms, for example, images or actions (see Wilkinson, 2007; Hansen, 2011; Kearns, 2017). However, securitization theory traditionally focuses on speech acts in which the speaker’s rhetoric calls upon others to act (Austin, 2005). Within the context of securitization, the speaker’s
rhetoric is calling upon the audience to accept that the stated issue is a threat to the community’s security.

The securitizing move can either be accepted or rejected by the audience. If it is accepted, the issue becomes securitized and is considered an existential security threat to the referent object, the thing to be protected (Buzan et al. 1998). Accordingly, the issue is raised above the restrictions of day-to-day politics, allowing for exceptional measures to be taken in its address (ibid.). These measures include, but are not limited to, imposing economic sanctions, severing diplomatic contact, and declaring war.

A successful securitizing move in the form of a speech act comes from former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, when he called for war with Iraq (Roe, 2008). In a 2003 speech act to the UK’s parliament, Blair securitized Iraq’s Ba’athist regime by framing the behaviour of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein as a ‘fundamental assault on our [British] way of life’ (Tony Blair cited in The Guardian, 2003). Blair’s securitizing move was followed by a vote of 412-149 in favour of war against Iraq (The Public Whip, n.d.). In this securitizing move Blair served as the securitizing actor, the British way of life as the referent object, and Parliament as the audience.

Securitization theory is multisectoral, meaning that it considers a diverse array of issues as capable of being securitized. There are five security sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental (Buzan et al., 1998). Potential security threats can be framed within one or more of these sectors, as can the referent object (ibid.). For example, when speaking before the UN, Greta Thunberg (2019) framed climate change as both an environmental and societal threat. Thunberg (2019) invoked fears of societal loss and further environmental degradation as consequences of climate change, stating that: ‘People are suffering. People are dying. Entire ecosystems are collapsing’. In this speech act, climate change is framed as an environmental threat to ecosystems and a societal threat to the people that collectively constitute societies. In this example, Thunberg was the securitizing actor, the international community present at the UN were the audience and the environment and people most impacted by climate change were the referent object.
Additionally, securitization theory considers security to exist at various levels of analysis (Buzan et al., 1998). These levels are:

- **International Systems** – concerning the international system, or issues of a global nature
- **International Subsystems** – concerning particular regions, or threats to a part of the international system
- **Units** – concerning particular actors such as nation states or transnational corporations
- **Subunits** – concerning particular communities within units, such as: specific demographics, political parties or government departments
- **Individuals** – concerning singular or small groups of people

Using Thunberg’s (2019) U.N. speech as an example, the move to securitize climate change can be categorised within the international systems level. Climate change is a worldwide phenomenon, likely to cause global upheaval and significant stresses on the international system due to factors such as soil-erosion, rising sea levels and water shortages (I.P.C.C., 2019). Given the nature of this challenge, climate change requires the broad cooperation of international actors in its address, reaffirming its categorisation within the international systems level of analysis.

As with multisectoral security, however, neither an issue nor securitization is restricted to a single level of analysis. Returning to Blair’s securitizing move, Blair’s (2003) speech resulted in a declaration of war by the British state, an actor at the unit level, while the audience for his securitizing move was the British parliament, a grouping within the subunit level. Meanwhile, at the time of Blair’s speech act, there were large anti-war protests and opinion polls showed that 63% of the British public opposed the war (Jeffrey 2003; Ipsos MORI, 2003). This indicates that support for the war was contested, leaning towards opposition, suggesting that a unit-level securitization would not have achieved the desired result. This observation aligns with Roe’s (2008) view that the formal support of empowered subunits is more important for securitization than the general support of the unit. This is significant as it shows that securitization at the subunit level can lead to action at the unit level, even if this is juxtaposed to the wishes of the unit level audiences.
First Generation Literature (2.2.2)

First-generation securitization theory literature can be split into three groups, each with its own theoretical focus: process, normative critiques, and political culture. These groups are discussed below.

The Securitization Process

The process-orientated literature discusses and details the mechanics of the securitization process (see Buzan et al. 1998; Lupovici, 2014; Waever, 2015; Balzacq, 2015). Within this grouping exists a small number of works that explore the relationship between history and securitization (see Coskun 2010; De Graaf and Zwierlein, 2013; Jutila, 2015). Jutila (2015) analyses this relationship and outlines the mechanics regarding how historical narratives may factor in the securitization process:

- As a facilitating condition, historical narratives shaping societal values or legitimating the authority of the securitizing actor to make a securitization’s success more likely
- As anecdotal evidence, the historical narrative being invoked during a securitizing move as evidence of the perceived threat
- As the referent object, the historical narrative itself being the thing that is threatened
- As the perceived threat, the other’s historical narrative being considered a threat to the community in question

As discussed in section 1.1.2, a shared history in a bilateral relationship informs how two actors understand one another. Thus, it is logistical that historical narratives could be invoked as facilitating conditions and anecdotal evidence, utilising one community’s historically-informed understanding of the other in a securitizing move. Less obvious is how history can be the perceived threat, or how history is an object that can be threatened. However, if a particular historical narrative forms the foundation for a society’s identity, a competing historical narrative has the potential to threaten the society’s concept of self. In this scenario, a historical narrative could be a threat or referent object situated in the societal sector. Jutila’s work is a strong foundation for exploring the intersection between history and security by way of securitization. The ways in which this Jutila’s work is embedded into the analytical framework is outlined in section 2.5.4.
**Normative Critiques**

The second grouping of the literature focuses on normative critiques of securitization theory. One critique, presented by Hansen (2000), is that securitization theory’s focus on societal elites serving as securitizing actors overlooks disempowered peoples, such as women and minoritised ethnic groups. Moreover, there is extensive literature on the role of the audience in securitization and the extent to which it needs to be representative of the broader unit-level community (Bertrand, 2018; Côté, 2018). Those in positions of power have a disproportionate influence on the security agenda, even securitizing issues without the consent of the broader unit-level community. Returning to Blair’s securitization of Iraq, his securitizing move was conducted and accepted by Parliament while large anti-war protests occurred just outside in Parliament Square (The Guardian, 2003). This privilege of social elites is important to acknowledge and is discussed in the case studies with regards to the privilege conferred to the CCP’s security interests. However, securitization theory explores a socially-rooted processes of security, meaning an overemphasis on social elites is more a reflection of society rather than an inherent flaw of securitization theory.

William (2003) presents a further normative critique, that securitization theory places too much emphasis on speech acts and ought to better consider the significance of securitizing images. Similarly, Wilkinson (2007) explains that physical acts such as protesting can constitute securitizing moves. Taking this into consideration, this thesis benefits from taking a broad view of what can constitute a securitizing move. This is apparent in the case study discussions on anti-Japanese protests and the significance of their depictions of Mao Zedong in chapters 4 through 9.

Securitization theory has been criticised for its western-centrism (see Ibrahim, 2005). Some go as far as to accuse securitization theory of being racist due to its inference that desecuritized western-style politics is superior to other political cultures which have a greater blurring between politics and security (see Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2019). This claim of racism has been heavily debated in securitization theory’s literature (see Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2019; Waever
and Buzan, 2020a, 2020b; Hansen, 2020). However, even if the original proponents' preference for desecuritized solutions is problematic, securitization theory as an analytical tool itself embeds no such preference. That said, these critiques are acknowledged and accounted for the analytical framework in two ways. Firstly, this thesis acknowledges that different political cultures have different mechanisms and connotations for security. This is discussed further below regarding models of securitization. A second mitigation measure employed is the use of second-generation applied securitization concepts. In particular, the strands concept, outlined in section 2.2.3, aids in identifying the culturally- and politically- subjective nuances in the mechanics of securitizing moves between political cultures.

**Political Culture and Securitization Models**

The third category concerns political cultures. It is a continuation of the process-orientated literary grouping, combined with attempts to overcome securitization theory’s normative critiques: particularly western-centrism. This is achieved by acknowledging that the model of securitization can differ according to the political culture of the community in question. For example, Holbraad and Pedersen (2012) present the *revolutionary securitization model* to study the mechanics of securitization in single-party states. In this model, security is an extension of day-to-day politics as a tool of governance rather than a distinct phenomenon.

This is significant as it suggests that China’s and Japan’s securitization models are likely to differ from that outlined in traditional securitization theory. However, this thesis only requires the identification of historical narratives and their role in securitization processes within their models, rather than a detailed understanding of each country’s securitization models in their entirety. Though, it still will be important to highlight and explain where the securitization process differs, if it impacts a mechanic of historical narratives factoring in the Sino-Japanese security paradox by way of securitization.
Second Generation Literature (2.2.3)
Second-generation securitization literature consists of several applied conceptual evolutions of securitization theory. These are not usually discussed holistically, but together they offer an advanced analytical toolkit for new insights into securitization, offering a deeper understanding of Sino-Japanese securitizations for this thesis. The concepts discussed are strands of securitization, the securitization dilemma, and macro- and microsecuritization.

Strands of Securitization

Developed through the study of Chinese securitizations, Vuori (2008, 2011) presents the strands concept. According to this concept, there are at least five strands of securitization with their own illocutionary logic and every political culture favours some strands over others in their securitizations. Traditional securitization theory, Vuori (2008) argues, only considers the strand favoured in western liberal-democracies. This limits securitization theory as it predisposes it to the study of a western-centric form of securitization.

Accordingly, adopting the strands concept aids in overcoming the western-centrism of securitization theory discussed in section 2.2.2. Its holistic application in this thesis allows greater sensitivity to China’s and Japan’s respective securitization preferences. As both strands and models of securitization are rooted in political culture, employing the strands concept also allows for greater sensitivity to each nation’s respective securitization model, even if said model is not identified and established in its entirety.

The five securitization strands identified by Vuori (2008, 2011) are:

- **Securitizing future acts** – This is the strand favoured in western liberal-democracies. It sees securitizing actors conduct securitizing moves before any extraordinary measures are taken. Its illocutionary logic is ‘accept that $X$ is done in order to repel threat $Y$’ (Vuori, 2008 p.80).
  An example of this is Blair’s securitization of Saddam’s Iraq in which Blair explained the UK needed to ‘stand up for what we know to be right’, accept $X$, in order to ‘confront the tyrannies and dictatorships that put our way of life at risk’, threat $Y$ (Blair, 2003).

- **Securitizing past acts or persisting an existing securitization** – This strand is used to justify extraordinary measures after the act, or to maintain an
existing securitization should extraordinary measures still be required. The logic exercised within this strand is that ‘we did X to secure Z’ (Vuori 2008, p.85).

An example of this illocutionary logic can be found in speech acts conducted on behalf of the UK government to persist the COVID-19 lockdowns in 2020, when the government stated, ‘we have directed people to stay at home…’, we did X, ‘to protect the NHS and save lives’, secure Z (Eves and Thedham, 2020).

- **Securitizing to raise the saliency of an issue** - This strand concerns increasing the perceived importance of an issue within a society by attempting to assign to it the priority that comes with being securitized. Its illocutionary logic is ‘do X in order to repel threat Y’, which is similar to the future acts strand. However, the presentation of this logic differs as it is represented as a moral imperative while being vaguer in the measures to be taken (Vuori, 2008, p.77).

An example of this logic comes from China in 1989, when the politician Hu Yaobang implored the CCP to act against student protesters in Tiananmen Square. Hu explained ‘we’ve got to do something…’, do X, ‘these students are in rebellion’, threat Y (ibid., p.79). This strand blurs the distinction between politics and security as an actor may invoke security to promote a political agenda. In Hu’s case, invoking security to counter political protests; ultimately leading to the infamous military crackdown on the Tiananmen Square protests (Brook, 1998).

- **Securitizing as a deterrence** – This strand seeks to present the source of a perceived threat with a warning against continuing any threatening actions or behaviour. Its logic is similar to that of the securitization of future acts strand, in the form of ‘accept that X is done in order to repel threat Y’. In this case, the audience for the securitizing move is the source of the perceived threat, in the hope that the possibility of extraordinary measures is enough to mitigate this (Vuori, 2008 pp.80-1).

An example of this strand can be found in Serbia’s COVID-19 response when President Vučić sought to deter breaches of lockdown measures. Vučić declared that the Serbian people needed to accept the lockdown measures under threat of imprisonment, accept that X is done, to stop the virus from spreading, repel threat Y (Eves and Thedham, 2020).

- **Securitizing for control** – This strand is used as a means of political control. Its illocutionary logic is ‘do X and desist from doing Q in order to repel threat Y’ (Vuori, 2008, pp.88-9).

Serbia also offers an example of this strand when President Vučić called for the public to adhere to restrictions, do X, and cease unnecessary social interactions, desist from doing Q, threatening that ‘otherwise Serbia’s graveyards would be too small to bury the number of dead’, repel threat Y (Vučić cited in Eves and Thedham, 2020). Invoking securitization as a means of exerting political control also blurs the distinction between politics and security.

*The Securitization Dilemma*
The securitization dilemma is thematically similar to the security dilemma in that it accounts for how the pursuit of greater security can tragically cause greater insecurity. Watson (2013) and Olesker (2014) define the securitization dilemma as when the securitization of one issue negatively impacts the securitization of another issue. An example of this can be found in World War II. Canada’s securitization of Nazi Germany justified a US troop presence in the country, but this troop presence undermined the pre-existing securitization of the USA as a political threat to Canada’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (ibid.).

This concept is clearly beneficial as a tool for this thesis’ analytical framework as it offers a discussion of competing security priorities. As discussed in section 1.1, China and Japan are balancing underlying political tensions with their economic interdependence. This creates a scenario in which the securitization dilemma can aid in understanding how movement in one of these areas impacts the other.

**Macro- and Microsecuritization**

Buzan and Waever (2009) present macrosecuritizations as higher-order securitizations, within the parameters of which lower-order securitizations are contextualised. Returning to the example of Canada during World War II, Canada was able to resolve its securitization dilemma by accepting that US troops were a lesser threat than Nazi Germany (Watson, 2013), indicating that the threat of Nazi Germany was macrosecuritized over any US threat to Canadian sovereignty. This concept is evident in the fact that, once the war was over and the macrosecuritization subsided, questions over the threat posed to Canadian sovereignty by a US troop presence re-emerged (ibid.).

Macrosecuritization is also an important analytical tool as it allows for a greater understanding of the overarching context of any given securitization in the case studies. It also creates a conceptual space to consider the role of historical narratives in establishing and/or changing the overarching security context.

Microsecuritizations are lower-order securitizations which reflect broader security trends and occur at the sub-unit and individual levels of analysis. For
example, Bigo (2002) explains that the perception of migrants as a security threat results from the constant re-iteration of migration as perceived threat by far-right individuals and groups. Building on this, Huysmans (2011, p.372) explains that microsecuritizations are ‘little security nothings; very minor securitizing moves that alone are insignificant, but which occur so frequently that they can collectively gain traction to the point that they may securitize an issue. For example, the microsecuritization in the West has influenced government policy, doing so through the for stricter border controls and increased competition for jobs perpetuated by right-wing media and political movements (ibid).

Microsecuritization is incorporated into the analytical framework of this thesis as it supports the study of sub-unit and individual security actors who promote securitization at the unit level. This is useful for studying the role of, for example, Chinese nationalists campaigning against Japan, or the role of political groups in Japan associated with its two historical narratives of the war. The incorporation of this and the other second-generation concepts into the analytical framework is outlined in section 2.5.2.

Carr’s Basic Facts (2.3)
Sino-Japanese history is not the primary subject of this research, but this thesis’s exploration of historical narratives requires the historical events of the case studies to themselves be interpreted and presented. The issue, as mentioned in section 1.6, is that it is difficult to avoid making moral and political judgments on history without engaging with established historiographical practice.

Considering this, this thesis’ analytical framework adopts Carr’s basic facts historiography. Carr (2001) argues that history is subjectively interpreted by those who study it, and that the significance of historical events is distorted by the importance the observer places upon them to suit their own agenda and identity and that of their community. This constitutes socially-constructivist historiography, which aligns well with the positioning of this thesis in the socially-constructivist literature on Sino-Japanese relations.
The basic facts historiography suggests that history be studied as a series of empirically provable basic facts. Carr uses the example of Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon in 49BC and the fall of the Roman Republic in 27BC (ibid.). We can know that these events occurred, establishing them as basic facts of history. It is then possible to study the linkages and significance of these events without readily accepting pre-existing accounts of the significance of Caesar’s crossing and its causal role in the later fall of the Roman Empire. This does not remove bias in the presentation of the links between the basic facts. However, by breaking history down into basic facts, it is possible to present their linkages transparently, empowering discussion of any assumptions and biases as necessary.

Alternative historiographies were considered for the analytical framework but were deemed less suitable. The Annales School employs an interdisciplinary and tripartite approach viewing historical events as determined by social structures, which are themselves determined by geography (Harsgor, 1978; Lewkowicz, 2011). However, this historiography is better applied to macro-history and the study of changing social systems and geographies over centuries (Lewkowicz, 2011). As the case studies selected for this research span mere weeks and the wartime events referred to in each nation’s historical narratives are not systemic or geographic in nature, the Annales School is not an appropriate historiographical framework for use in this thesis.

Subaltern Studies was also considered as an alternative historiography. This postcolonial historiography encourages a particular reading of history favouring disempowered groups usually omitted from historical narratives (Prakash, 1994; Chaturvedi, 2000). By extension, this practice raises important questions about who historical narratives were written by and for (Chaturvedi, 2000), which could provide additional information for analysis of the role of historical narratives of the war in Sino-Japanese relations. However, this thesis’ analytical framework is not intended to study the unheard voices of history and adopting Subaltern Studies is not a prerequisite for questioning the ‘who’ and ‘why’ of a historical narrative. Hence the selection of Carr’s basic facts historiography due to its socially-
constructivist ontology and its emphasis on transparency in the causal links between empirically verifiable historical events.

Identifying Basic Facts (2.3.1)

Having outlined the basic facts historiography, it is essential to discuss how this thesis will identify the empirically provable basic facts of the case studies. Historiographical practice points to two kinds of empirically verifiable evidence. The first is directly verifiable evidence that an event, constituting a basic fact, occurred (Davis, 2004). This evidence includes primary sources such as documentary evidence, forensic evidence, or archeological evidence (Ibid.). For example, we can empirically conclude that a historical battle took place by military accounts of the battle, ecological damage consistent with large-scale conflict, and uncovering the remains of combatants and other combat paraphernalia. In the case studies, this takes the form of video footage of the trawler collision that sparked the Trawler Incident, or media coverage of Japan’s announcement that it will nationalise the disputed islands at the outset of the Nationalisation Crisis.

The second kind of evidence is indirectly verifiable, consisting of secondary accounts of the events which constitute basic facts (Jenkins and Munslow, 2004). Returning to the example of a historical battle, we might have evidence that the battle occurred in the form of folk songs, calendar customs, or academic scholarship. Regarding the case studies, there is extensive scholarship of both incidents which detail events which can be used as basic facts for analysis in this thesis (see Hafeez, 2015; Suzuki, 2015; Green et al. 2017a, 2017b).

Carr (2001) explained that both direct and indirect accounts can be purposely misleading for any number of reasons, for example to reflect the biases of the author of said accounts. However, when determining the simple fact of whether something happened or not, sources can be cross-referenced to corroborate their accounts (Ibid.). Through such efforts, it is possible to verify the basic facts of history through both ‘indirect knowledge...’ and ‘the physical remains of the past’ (Davies, 2003, p.28).
These two kinds of empirically verifiable evidence are used to identify basic facts pertaining to the case studies. However, not all identified basic facts can be presented in this thesis as there are too many to allow for a focused analysis of the case studies. Thus, it is necessary to filter the case studies’ basic facts to prioritise those which are most relevant for analysis. Section 2.5.1 outlines this process, which provides a manageable number of the most relevant basic facts to be presented. Initially, this filtering process seems contrary to the stated objective of transparency in this thesis’s use of history. However, as Donnelly and Steele (2019) argue, history is often filtered to present a particular explanation of the past. In this thesis, the process and objectives of this filtering are presented transparently and the rationale for a basic fact’s inclusion is discussed openly. This is done with the hope of serving as an example of good historiographical practice in International Relations.

Securitization Theory within the Security Dilemma/Paradox (2.4)

The three constituent theories which form the three pillars of the analytical framework have been presented: the security dilemma/paradox, securitization theory and Carr’s basic facts historiography. This section discusses the theoretical nuances of these constituent theories, examining barriers to their integration, and highlighting synergies. This discussion focuses heavily on the security dilemma/paradox concept and securitization theory rather than the basic facts historiography as these are theories pertaining to security and thus have more theoretical overlap to explore.

The security dilemma/paradox and securitization theory are both ontologically compatible with a multisectoral and socially-constructed idea of security across different levels of analysis. For securitization theory, this is clear in its core concepts, discussed in section 2.2. This is less obvious for the security dilemma/paradox given that the traditional fatalist logic is pre-orientated towards state-centric military and economic security.

However, the mitigator and transcender logics are more closely aligned with securitization theory. Wendt (1992), who shares the constructivism of the mitigator logic, explains that the security dilemma is socially rooted and intersubjective, with
each actor having a subjective threat perception of the other’s subjectively motivated actions. This intersubjective interpretation is, in line with securitization theory, not limited to military-economic issues nor to the nation-state (Buzan et al., 1998). An example of the security dilemma/paradox in relation to a less traditional security issue can be found in the Indian subcontinent. Tripathi (2011) argues that a security paradox has emerged between India and Pakistan (unit-level actors). This paradox is based on the efforts of regional governments (sub-unit actors) on either side of the border to secure their shared water supply. Both sides interpret the other’s efforts as an environmental-societal threat to local ecology and the social groups that depend on the water (ibid.). Accordingly, both securitization theory and the security dilemma/paradox are compatible with multisectoral, socially-constructed security across levels of analysis. This indicates a high degree of ontological compatibility between the two theories.

However, the two theories differ in their focus. Securitization theory studies intra-societal threat perception with its focus on the securitization process, while the security dilemma/paradox concept concerns inter-societal threat perception between actors. This is not an issue, however, as each theory has been deliberately incorporated into this thesis’ analytical framework through a design which supports their respective strengths. This process involves mapping relevant case study basic facts, identified using Carr’s basic facts historiography, to the security dilemma/paradox. This is explained further in section 2.5.2. Following this mapping, securitization theory is used to identify the role of historical narratives of the war and how they factor in any securitization mechanics. In doing so, the security dilemma/paradox concept is employed to analyse Sino-Japanese relations while securitization theory is used to explore internal security processes that fuel the Sino-Japanese security paradox.

**Aligning Theoretical Concepts (2.4.1)**
In addition to ontological compatibility, there are conceptual nuances and synergies between securitization theory and the security dilemma/paradox. A prominent example of each is outlined below.

*Securitization Strand and the Constituent Dilemmas*
Superficially, the securitization processes align neatly with the dilemma of interpretation given that both concern an actor’s interpretation of a perceived threat. However, the strands concept complicates this otherwise logical alignment as some strands identified by Vuori (2008, 2011) better align to the dilemma of response. For example, securitizing as a deterrence logically maps to the dilemma of response as it is an act directed at the source of the perceived threat.

Yet, due to securitization theory’s inter-level approach, mapping the securitization process to the dilemmas of interpretation and response is not as easy as categorising particular strands within the two dilemmas. A saliency securitization would logically be a response to a perceived threat and thus be a dilemma of response output. However, if a subunit group, for example, a political party, conducted a saliency securitization it may form part of the unit level’s dilemma of interpretation. Depending on whether the sub-unit or unit-level actor is the subject of study, a saliency securitization could be mapped to either the dilemma of interpretation or response.

Accordingly, the analytical framework makes two considerations. First, strands of securitization and the constituent dilemmas of the two-step security dilemma are mapped on a case-by-case basis. This prevents pre-conceived notions of which constituent dilemma a securitization should be mapped to based on its strand being applied within the analysis of the case studies. Secondly, the framework orientates itself at the unit level of analysis. This provides a point of reference when mapping securitizations invoking the illocutionary logic of different strands across multiple levels of analysis.

Macrosecuritization and the Strategic Challenge

The macrosecuritization and strategic challenge concepts appear to map directly to one another as both represent an escalation of tensions and/or an issue. Moreover, one actor coming to consider the other to pose a strategic challenge can itself be considered a macrosecuritization. This is because a strategic challenge presents an overarching security priority compatible with the macrosecuritization concept. This explains why there is no need for further interpretation in the face of a strategic
challenge, as all developments are securitized, and exceptional measures are warranted, within the context of the macrosecuritization represented by the strategic challenge. Understanding this conceptual synergy is beneficial for the analytical framework. The framework therefore provides a space with which to explore likely macrosecuritization mechanics, if a strategic challenge is identified in the analytical framing of the case study.

A Step-by-Step Application (2.5)

Following discussion of the alignment of the three constituent theories, it is essential to outline precisely how these are applied to the case studies as an integrated analytical framework. A step-by-step approach was designed for their application. The formulaic nature of this approach ensures transparency in the framework’s application, enabling scrutiny of both how Sino-Japanese history and historical narratives are discussed and how the framework could be refined for future use. A systematic step-by-step approach is also well-precedented in relation to securitization theory, being employed in the later chapters of the Copenhagen School’s seminal monograph on securitization theory, *Security: A New Analytical Framework* (Buzan et al., 1998). Furthermore, a step-by-step approach is a hallmark of thematic analysis, employed in the later steps, as it provides an audit trail for the thematic conclusion being made (Nowell et al., 2017).

A necessary pre-step for the step-by-step approach is to outline the historical narratives being discussed. This includes a clear outlining of their key themes to enable identification of if the historical narratives’ themes are invoked in the case studies. This is completed for Sino-Japanese historical narratives of the war in chapter 3, which additionally presents the approach to thematic analysis employed in this pre-step.

The step-by-step approach employed in this thesis is:

1. Identify Basic Facts and Causal Links
2. Map Basic Facts to the Security Dilemma/Paradox
3. Detail Case Study Securitizations
4. Outline Historical Narratives in Case Study Securitizations
5. Holistic Analysis of Steps 1-4
Each of these steps is explained below. After the five steps are successfully applied to the case studies, the findings of both case studies are explored together in a post-step to yield answers to the primary research question. These answers are presented in the conclusion.

**Step 1 – Identify Basic Facts and Causal Narratives (2.5.1)**

Step 1 presents the basic facts of the case study determined relevant for later discussion. The criteria employed to determine which of the case studies’ basic facts are presented is rooted in the historiographical discussion in section 2.3. The criteria are:

- **Self-evident/Logical** – A basic fact is relevant if it is integral to the case study. For example, if it is an instigating or a concluding event, meaning its inclusion is necessary to understand the case study.

- **Emphasised by Observers** – A basic fact is relevant if it was considered important by those present at the time. For example, if it was considered important by commentators, media or officials at the time the case study took place. This criterion draws upon the idea of directly verifiable evidence in the form of documentary evidence from the time of the event.

- **Emphasised by Scholars** – A basic fact is considered relevant if it has been emphasised by scholars in the academic literature pertaining to the case study. This criterion draws upon the idea of indirectly verifiable evidence in the form of academic scholarship.

With the relevant basic facts established, the causal link between these basic facts is then presented in accordance with Carr’s basic facts historiography. This explicit presentation of the narrative links the basic facts at the time of analysis. It may, for example, link two basic facts where one appears to be a response to the other, thus representing a causal link. This is done to outline transparently what would otherwise be an assumed causal narrative linking the basic facts, presented as given without discussion of why the basic facts are or are not linked in the analysis.

It is necessary to note that the basic facts and causal narratives presented in this step are only one possible interpretation of the case studies’ history. Another scholar may employ different criteria and favour different causal links between the basic facts they consider relevant. This is not an issue, rather it is reflective of the inherent nature of historical interpretation in academia. This step is significant as it
entrenches transparency in the use of history by presenting the history of the case studies in accordance with consistent criteria and in line with established historiography.

Additionally, it is necessary to note and accept that there were likely backchannels and confidential information which, if publicly disclosed, would impact the selection of basic facts and understanding of the associated causal narrative. Resultantly, the basic facts and causal links presented in this step are based solely on the information readily available and inferences that can be made about behind-the-scenes development at the time the research was being undertaken.

**Step 2 – Map the Security Paradox and Identify Secondary Concepts (2.5.2)**

This step consists of determining the number of security paradox cycles pertaining to the case studies, and then mapping the basic facts to the case studies’ dilemmas of interpretation and response.

As discussed in section 2.1, the security paradox results from one actor’s security dilemma triggering a security dilemma in another actor in a cyclical manner. If the causal narrative linking the basic facts outlined in step 1 follows this pattern, it is possible to identify whether there is a security paradox present and how many cycles occurred during the case study. This is achieved by tracing the causal narrative and aligning the security dilemma to points in the causal narrative where one actor’s action is followed by a response action from the other actor. Continuing this process until the concluding basic fact is reached will indicate the number of constituent security dilemmas and thus the number of security paradox cycles present.

During this process, basic facts can be mapped to the dilemmas of interpretation and response of the actors’ respective security dilemmas. A basic fact can be mapped to a security dilemma’s dilemma of interpretation if it is something that appears to be informing the unit level’s understanding of the other actor involved. Meanwhile, a basic fact can be mapped to the dilemma of response if it
concerns an action which either follows an actor’s own dilemma of response or triggers a dilemma of interpretation in the other actor.

The final part of this step concerns the secondary security dilemma/paradox concepts. This involves identifying and explaining any evidence of the strategic challenge, security dilemma sensibility, and the reassurance game. This is done to establish a fuller understanding of the security dilemma/paradox mechanics present in the case study. They are identified in accordance with their mechanics presented in section 2.1.3.

Step 3 – Case Study Securitizations (2.5.3)
This step identifies any securitizations present among the basic facts which have been mapped to the dilemmas of interpretation and response in the previous step. A securitization is considered evident if the basic fact itself can be considered a securitizing move, or component of a securitizing move. The way that this can be identified depends on the format of the securitizing move.

A securitizing speech act can be identified if its rhetoric follows the illocutionary logic of one or more securitization strands. For example, a speech act claiming that China needs to deploy its navy to challenge Japan’s presence in the East China Sea. This speech act invokes the illocutionary logic of the future act strand, ‘accept that X is done in order to repel threat Y’ (Vuori, 2008 p.80).

Identifying securitizations in the form of images and actions requires a different approach. Although they still employ the illocutionary logic of the different strands, the strands concept has only been explored in detail for speech acts (Vuori, 2011). Wilkinson (2007) states that visual and action-orientated securitizing moves follow a period of build-up of the securitizing actor’s legitimacy as an authority on the issue being securitized. Accordingly, where a basic fact is under consideration in relation to a securitizing image or action, a prior legitimisation of the actor’s authority can be used as an indicator of a securitizing move. Wilkinson (ibid.) explains that, during the prelude to the 2010 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, opposition parties grew in legitimacy as increasing government censorship validated the opposition’s claims of government authoritarianism. In a case such as this, the
rhetoric, actions or images of a securitizing actor during the build-up of their legitimacy is used to determine the relevant securitization strand.

The Copenhagen School explains that each sector can be identified by inherent characteristics/topics present in the securitizing move (Buzan et al., 1998). These characteristics are as follows:

- Military – ‘forceful coercion’
- Economic – ‘trade, production and finance’
- Political – ‘authority, governing status, and recognition’
- Societal – ‘collective identity’
- Environmental – ‘human activity and the planetary biosphere’

Considering which of these characteristics is present allows for categorisation in a security sector. As stated in section 2.2.1, securitization may be multisectoral, in which case evidence of more than one characteristic should be expected.

Securitizations can also be inter-level, spanning multiple levels of analysis. If inter-level dynamics are present in a case study securitization, they can be identified by considering the securitizing actor. For example, considering if the securitizing actor is conducting a securitizing move on behalf of a unit-level actor, such as the nation-state, or if they represent a sub-unit grouping such as a political party. This is more difficult in the case of a party-state system like China as party officials may also be considered representatives of the state or governing party and vice-versa. In instances such as this, determining whether the securitizing actor represents the unit or sub-unit level is decided on a case-by-case basis considering the context in which the securitizing move is conducted.

It is also necessary to apply second-generation securitization concepts to the case studies. If microsecuritizations are present in the case study, they can be identified by the presence of multiple symbolic acts undertaken over time, rather than in a single securitizing move (Huysmans, 2011). An example of this would be the repeated framing of an issue as a perceived threat by sub-unit actors calling for the issue to be securitized at the unit level.

If a basic fact’s securitizing move is a macrosecuritizing move, it can be identified by the way in which it presents other perceived threats within the context
of the issue being securitized/macrosecuritized (Eves and Thedham, 2020).

However, even if no basic fact itself represents a macrosecuritization, the case studies’ securitizations will still have occurred within a broader security context, within the parameters of a pre-existing macrosecuritization. Therefore, the pre-existing macrosecuritization may be identified by references to a larger threat in the case studies’ securitizing moves.

The securitization dilemma can be identified in one of two ways. The first is when macrosecuritization occurs. This is because raising one securitization to be higher on a community’s security agenda requires it to supplant the pre-existing macrosecuritization, constituting a securitization dilemma (Eves and Thedham, 2020). The second means of identifying a securitization dilemma concerns the sub-unit level. A macrosecuritization at the unit level likely follows the political debate at the sub-unit level between proponents of the new and pre-existing macrosecuritizations, informing the unit-level dilemma of interpretation. Resultantly, any prolonged debate about competing security concerns at the sub-unit level relating to a unit-level securitization in the case study can be used as an indicator of the securitization dilemma.

With the conclusion of step 3, a full picture of the case studies’ basic facts, how they map to the security dilemma/paradox and their securitisations will have been presented. This enables the following steps to focus on how historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War factor in these mechanics.

Step 4 – Historical Narratives and Securitization (2.5.4)
In this step, the securitizations identified in step 3 are considered for evidence of the four ways that historical narratives factor in securitization as outlined by Jutila (2015). The potential identification techniques for each of these ways is presented below.

Facilitating Condition

If a historical narrative factors as a facilitating condition, it connects with and draws upon the audience’s historical consciousness to make the securitizing move more palatable (ibid.). There are two methods to identify historical narratives factoring as
facilitating conditions. The first is by determining whether the securitizing move invokes the themes of the historical narrative. Given that history shapes identity (Wendt, 1999), thematic alignment with an established historical narrative likely means a strong alignment with a community’s values and ideals that underpin the community’s identity. Resultantly, invocation of a historical narrative’s themes in, for example, the rhetoric of a securitizing speech act, constitutes an invocation of the historical narrative as a facilitating condition for the success of the securitizing move.

The second method to identify historical narratives factoring as facilitating conditions is by considering its impact on the legitimacy of the securitizing actor. A securitizing actor may derive their legitimacy from being considered as an authority on a particular historical narrative, meaning that the historical narrative helped to facilitate the social status necessary for the securitizing actor to conduct a securitizing move. As is apparent in both case studies, examples of this include Chinese securitizing actors who are well-known anti-Japanese activists, associated with educational outreach work regarding the Second Sino-Japanese War. As is discussed in chapters 5 and 8, this made audience members more inclined to consider their claims of Japan posing a security threat to China. In cases such as this, the historical narrative can be considered a facilitating condition for the legitimacy of the securitizing actor, by extension helping to facilitate the success for their securitizing move.

Anecdotal Evidence

Historical narratives serve as anecdotal evidence if specific reference is made to events prominent in the historical narrative during the securitizing move. This is done to provide evidence supporting the securitizing move in the form of establishing historical precedent (Jutila, 2015). Accordingly, a historical narrative can be seen to be anecdotal evidence if such references to specific historical events prominent in the narratives are present.

This is easier regarding speech acts, which may include overt references in their rhetoric. When considering visual and physical acts, it is necessary to reflect on
the symbolism invoked and its relationship to historical events. For example, if a securitizing move includes images of a prominent historical figure, it may be a reference to a historical narrative in which the figure factors prominently. In these cases, the symbolism of the image and/or action and how it relates to the community’s historical narratives of the war will be discussed.

Admittedly, a reference to a historical event does not necessarily mean a reference to a particular historical narrative. However, any references can be aligned with a historical narrative if the reference is presented in a way that aligns with a specific historical narrative’s themes.

Referent Object

Given that history informs social identity, it is possible that a challenge to the established historical narrative of a community is considered a threat to the community’s identity. In such cases, a historical narrative itself may serve as the referent object of a securitizing move. Step 3 identifies the referent object of case study securitizations, meaning that a historical narrative serving as a referent object will have already been identified by this point in the step-by-step approach.

Jutila (ibid.) explains that popular and/or academic support for a securitization usually coincides with a historical narrative factoring as a referent object. This can thus be used as a means of identifying a historical narrative which factors in this manner.

Perceived Threat

Jutila (ibid.) argues that securitizing a historical narrative as a perceived threat is rare but can be done indirectly through the securitization of a closely associated issue. For example, by securitizing a legacy issue pertaining to the events of the historical narrative in question. In these instances, the perceived threat of a historical narrative forms only a part of the perceived threat of the actual issue.

7 Jutila (2015) explains that a historical narrative can be so embedded is a society’s culture and politics that it requires academics to emphasise the value of the narrative as something worth protecting, or it can be so fundamental to a society’s identity that the thought of the historical narrative changing is paramount to an erosion of communal identity.
being securitized but is still itself something that the community in question feels constitutes a threat to their shared values.

Identifying a historical narrative that factors in a securitizing move as a component of the perceived threat is difficult. This is because the securitizing actor will be subjectively interpreting the other actor’s subjective historical narrative in their threat perception. Any reference to the other actor’s historical narrative is not expected to align with the actual themes of the historical narrative which is considered a perceived threat. Rather, the other’s historical narrative will have been interpreted through the lens of the securitizing actor’s own historical narrative.

Fortunately, this inter-subjectivity offers a means to identify a historical narrative factoring as part of the perceived threat. In cases where a historical narrative forms part of the perceived threat, there will be a blurring of historical narratives in the presentation of the other’s historical narrative. For example, if Japan’s Revisionist Narrative is considered a perceived threat, it should be distorted in line with the themes of China’s Nationalist Narrative and vice-versa. Accordingly, the inter-subjective blurring of historical narratives’ key specific themes serves to demarcate historical narrative factoring as part of a perceived threat.

Step 5 – Holistic Analysis of Findings (2.5.5)
The final step draws together the findings of the previous four steps to provide the case studies’ contribution to answering the primary research question. This makes it difficult to outline in abstract the discussion and the analysis included in this step without the specifics of a case study.

However, the step 5 discussion for both case studies in this thesis follows a similar format. This includes a discussion of how historical narratives of the war propel and, to a lesser extent, mitigate the Sino-Japanese security paradox as pertains to the case studies. This is followed by a discussion of other findings from the case studies which, while not directly relevant to answering the primary research question, warrant some consideration of their implications and potential as avenues for future research.
The format taken in step 5 of this thesis does not have to, nor is expected to, mirror the format of other studies. Applying the analytical framework to a different bilateral relationship, different case studies, or its use by a different scholar will result in different findings being inputted into the discussion of step 5. Hence, it is expected that the structure, content, and focus of step 5’s discussion will vary when used in other studies.

Summary (2.6)
This chapter has presented more detail on the constituent theories of the unique analytical framework. Regarding the security dilemma/paradox concept, this involved outlining the two-step security dilemma, the cyclical security paradox, and the secondary concepts of the strategic challenge, security dilemma sensibility, and the reassurance game. The core concepts of securitization theory were then outlined. Next, a discussion of the two generations of securitization theory literature was presented. The first considered discussions of the securitization process, normative critiques, and models of securitization. The second discussion involved outlining a number of applied securitization concepts which have been incorporated as tools in the analytical framework. The final component of the analytical framework discussed was the basic facts historiography. This historiography is socially-constructivist, aligning ontologically with this thesis’s positioning in the literature on Sino-Japanese relations. Adopting this historiography serves to help mitigate the issues that can arise from the presentation of history in International Relations.

The chapter then outlined how securitization theory has been employed within the parameters of the security dilemma/paradox concept. This was followed by a consideration of how the securitization process aligns with the constituent dilemmas of interpretation and response. The conclusions drawn from this discussion was that the mapping of securitizations to the constituent dilemmas is best made on a case-by-case basis. The synergy between the concepts of the strategic challenge and macrosecuritization were also discussed, with an outline presented regarding how a strategic challenge is indicative of macrosecuritization.
After this, the step-by-step approach was outlined. Step 1 involves identifying the relevant basic facts of the case study and their causal links in accordance with Carr’s basic facts historiography. Step 2 identifies security dilemma/paradox mechanics in the case studies and maps the basic facts to the dilemmas of interpretation and response. Step 3 presents the securitization mechanics among the basic facts mapped in the previous step. Step 4 considers the role of historical narratives in the case study securitizations. Finally, step 5 draws upon the findings of the earlier step to produce insights with which to answer the primary research question.

The analytical framework outlined draws together historiography, securitization theory, and the securitization dilemma/paradox concept in a way which has not occurred previously. The framework designed and employed in this thesis therefore offers a unique contribution to knowledge. The following chapters present how this framework is applied to two case studies to garner new insights into Sino-Japanese relations. The case studies also constitute a test for this new framework. Reflections on this framework’s application are discussed in the conclusion.
Chapter 3 - Historical Narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War

Thematic analysis is a prominent analytical tool in step 4 of the analytical framework for identifying historical narratives in the case study securitizations. This requires the explicit definition and presentation of the historical narratives’ themes, which are outlined in this chapter.

This chapter begins with the consideration of narrative and theme, including outlining the approach to theme identification and analysis. Each of the theme’s presented are ones which are most presented in the literature, and which meet the criteria as a key specific theme, outlined in section 3.1. Plausibly, another scholar may identify different themes using another method. This is not an issue. Rather, it is in keeping with the transparent engagement with history promoted in this thesis.

This chapter then proceeds to explore China’s historical narratives of the war. The original Maoist Narrative of the war is briefly discussed before a detailed study of the more anti-Japanese Nationalist Narrative. The focus of the chapter then shifts to explore the key specific themes of the Nationalist Narrative for use in the analytical framework. These themes are: Japanese victimisation of China; national unity in resisting Japan; and public participation in preventing Japanese aggression.

Japan’s historical narratives of the war are then outlined. This examination begins with an overview of the politicised nature of wartime history between the left- and right-wings of Japanese politics before presenting the key specific themes of both the Traditional and Revisionist Narratives. The Traditional Narrative is characterised by themes of the renunciation of militarism and introspection. Meanwhile, the themes presented within the Revisionist Narrative are moral justification of the war and Japanese victimhood.
Exploring Narrative and Theme (3.1)
Narratives are a type of discourse with a clear sequential order that connects events in a meaningful way (Hagstrom and Gustafsson, 2019). They are social constructs assigning subjective links and significance to empirically verifiable events which both shape and are shaped by the communities that use them. Narrative discourses are exemplified through a story-telling structure which presents themes in the how, who, what, where and when of the narrative’s plot (ibid.).

Narrative construction is a collaborative process, achieved through the re-telling of stories until their plot entrenches the narrative’s themes within social structures (Hyland, 2019). Narratives and their meaning, however, can be interpreted differently with time and occasion, leading to divergent narratives with differently evolving themes (ibid.). This is more common when the narratives are less controlled in the absence of an official narrative (Lim and Leong, 2020). An example of this is presented in section 3.3 in Japan’s competing narratives of the war. Meanwhile, influential social actors, such as state governments, may encourage an official narrative of events, providing top-down pressure to mitigate narrative divergence (ibid.). This is discussed in section 3.2 regarding how China’s Nationalist Narrative of the war encourages narrative homogeneity through the incorporation of local variance within acceptable thematic parameters.

When defining the themes of China’s and Japan’s historical narratives, it is important to distinguish between general themes related to Second Sino-Japanese War and the specific themes of each country’s wartime historical narratives. The general themes are not necessarily specific to China’s and Japan’s narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War. For example, China’s Nationalist Narrative has been applied to large swathes of Chinese history (Modongal, 2016), of which the war is just a part. This means that anti-Japanese sentiment, as a theme of contemporary Chinese nationalism (Chong, 2014), is not specific to the Nationalist Narrative’s discourse regarding the Second Sino-Japanese War. This is due to the multitude of events in Sino-Japanese history that could serve as the basis of this sentiment,
including the First Sino-Japanese War\(^8\) or Japan’s Twenty-One Demands\(^9\). As such, general themes of China’s and Japan’s narratives are of little use in thematic analysis as they are not necessarily directly derived from the topic of study (Nowell et al., 2017).

Specific themes are more, although not necessarily entirely, unique to the topic being discussed (Ibid.). For example, an emphasis on Japan’s wartime atrocities is more specific to China’s Nationalist Narrative of the war than the general theme of anti-Japanese sentiment. Accordingly, any alignment with this specific theme provides a more convincing case for arguing that the Nationalist Narrative of the Second Sino-Japanese War is a factor in case study securitisations. Hence the themes presented and defined in this chapter are those considered key specific themes of China’s and Japan’s historical narratives of the war.

**China’s Historical Narrative (3.2)**

Scholarship and public education concerning the history of the war in China is tightly controlled by the CCP (see Reilly, 2004; Hafeez, 2015). The CCP’s legitimacy as China’s ruling faction is ‘inextricably intertwined with the Chinese resistance to Japan’s invasion’ (Reilly, 2004, p.276). In order to defeat its Kuomintang\(^{10}\) rivals in the Chinese civil war that followed the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP won hearts and minds by presenting itself as the leader of China’s resistance to Japan (Mitter, 2020). This associated the CCP’s regime legitimacy during its establishment of the People’s Republic with the historical narratives of its role in the Second Sino-Japanese War.

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\(^8\) The First Sino-Japanese War saw Imperial Japan inflict a series of defeats on China’s Qing dynasty from 1894-5. China’s defeat meant Korea’s release from its tributary system into Japan’s sphere of influence, as well as the ceding of Taiwan to Japan. From China’s perspective the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were ceded with Taiwan but not returned with Taiwan in 1945 after Japan’s defeat in the Second Sino-Japanese War (Chong, 2014).

\(^9\) The Twenty-One Demands was a 1915 Japanese ultimatum demanding concessions from China. These included transferring of territory to Japan, acceptance of expanding Japanese influence in the region, and providing Japan de facto control over Chinese policing and financial policy. This was particularly controversial given that China and Japan were allies in World War I at the time (Huang, 2015).

\(^{10}\) The Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, were the governing party of mainland China from 1928 until 1949. After their defeat in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, they still retained control over the island of Taiwan and continue to claim to be the legitimate government of all China.
China’s state-sponsored official historical narrative of the war has changed alongside the evolving brand of the CCP. China has had two distinct official historical narratives of the war, one after the other. The first of these, dominant from 1949 until the reforms of Deng Xiaoping in the late-1970s/early-1980s, is referred to as the Maoist Narrative (see Reilly 2004, 2011b; Coble, 2007).

Deeply ideological, the Maoist Narrative framed the war as a class struggle. Notably, the Japanese people were considered fellow victims of a militaristic bourgeois class that dominated pre-war Japanese politics and led Japan to war (Coble, 2007). At the same time, the CCP’s Kuomintang rivals were presented as complicit in China’s suffering, being framed as weak in the face of Japan’s invasion due to being too concerned with their bourgeois self-interests and committing their own atrocities against the Chinese people (ibid.; Baum, 2021). By directing blame away from the Japanese as a people, the Maoist Narrative eased post-war tensions in Sino-Japanese relations (Mitter, 2013). Even within the context of growing Japanese nationalism and war crime denial in the early 1970s, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai gave a toast to his Japanese counterpart, explaining that the war caused ‘deep suffering to the Japanese people’ (Zhou cited in Reilly, 2011b, p.464).

By the time of Mao’s death in 1976, the war was largely absent from the discourse of Sino-Japanese relations (Reilly, 2004). However, from 1978 China’s new leader, Deng Xiaoping, enacted liberal economic reforms. These reforms introduced capitalistic elements into the Chinese economy, which contradicted the communist ideology which underpinned CCP legitimacy through the Maoist Narrative (Kopf and Lahiri, 2018). CCP legitimacy has since relied upon the ‘twin pillars of nationalism and economic prosperity’ (Reilly, 2004, p.283).

Legitimacy through economic prosperity has been self-perpetuating because of the success of Deng’s economic reforms. These reforms have raised 800 million

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11 The most common wartime example of a Kuomintang atrocity is the aforementioned flooding of the Yellow River, which delayed Japan’s advance on Wuhan at great cost to the Chinese people. Kuomintang atrocities against the Chinese people committed before and after the war are usually collectively referred to as White Terrors. The most prominent example of a Kuomintang White Terror occurred in 1927, when the Kuomintang murdered over ten-thousand Chinese peasants alleged to be communist sympathisers (Baum, 2021).
Chinese people out of poverty and per capita income has risen 2500%, resulting in popular support for the CCP’s economic stewardship (Denmark, 2018). On the other hand, protecting their legitimacy regarding nationalism and historical narratives of the war required the CCP to create the Nationalist Narrative of Chinese history. This Nationalist Narrative replaced Maoist historical accounts with ‘the story of the nation’ (Coble, 2007, p.87). Through the opening of new museums, public memorials, and the introduction of new school curricula, the Nationalist Narrative’s accounts of the war were well established by the 1990s (ibid.). This narrative remains China’s official historical narrative of the Second Sino-Japanese war. As such, its key specific themes of Japanese victimisation, national unity, and public participation are explored in the following sections.

Nationalist Narrative: Japanese Victimisation of China (3.2.1)
The key specific theme of Japanese victimisation is communicated by the Nationalist Narrative through two means. The first is through stories of Japan’s wartime atrocities, such as the Nanjing Massacre, Unit 731, and the comfort women system¹² (Coble, 2007). These stories are propagated through new museums which have opened since the Nationalist Narrative’s founding (Mitter, 2014). For example, 1987 saw the opening of the Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. Additionally, schools and universities teach wartime atrocities through the study of detailed historical records. These include committing to memory police reports such as Case 141, which details how Wang San, a 60-year-old farmer, was bayoneted by a Japanese soldier on September 17th, 1937 (ibid.).

The theme of Japanese victimisation is also communicated through stories of collective national suffering at the hands of Japan. The material wartime experience of Japanese victimisation varied both geographically and temporally (Chong, 2014). The Japanese victimisation experienced by those in Nanjing during the massacre differed from that of Chinese people who arrived in the city during the following occupation, whose experiences differed from those who lived in

¹² ‘Comfort Women’ were women conscripted by the Japanese military to provide sexual services to soldiers. It is generally accepted that the majority of ‘Comfort Women’ were coerced into sexual slavery. Women were conscripted from throughout Japan’s imperial territories during World War II, but most were Korean or Chinese (Ward and Lay, 2018).
Chongqing, a city in central China which the Japanese advance never reached (Mitter, 2014). This variability therefore results in diverging historical narratives of the war, which poses a challenge to establishing a homogenous Nationalist Narrative that legitimises the CCP’s regime.

To mitigate this, the parameters for stories of collective Japanese victimisation were broadened holistically to accommodate local stories of Japanese-caused suffering (Chong, 2014). The CCP encouraged local research projects to produce archival material on the contribution of different localities to the war effort, and their suffering during this period. The findings of these research projects resulted in the historical accounts studied in Chinese schools (Reilly, 2011b). These research outputs have since been construed into a narrative of collective suffering (Mitter, 2013). This narrative communicates that, however your hometown suffered during the war, it is part of a national story of collective suffering due to Japanese victimisation of China (ibid.). Resultantly, anti-Japanese sentiment is common throughout China, even in areas of China far from the frontlines during the war, legitimating the CCP as the supposed vanguard of Chinese resistance during the war (Coble, 2007).

Japanese victimisation of China might be considered part of the general theme of victimisation that characterises the broader Nationalist Narrative, rather than as a key specific theme of the Nationalist Narrative as pertains to the Second Sino-Japanese War. Certainly, it forms part of the ‘Century of Humiliation’13, a prominent story of the Nationalist Narrative. Moreover, other examples of Japanese victimisation are offered in the Nationalist Narrative’s accounts of Sino-Japanese history, such as the First Sino-Japanese War (Szczepanski, 2019).

However, Japanese victimisation of China should be considered a key specific theme of the Nationalist Narrative as it applies specifically to the Second Sino-Japanese War. Although this narrative theme feeds into broader notions of

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13 The ‘Century of Humiliation’ refers to roughly a period of a century which starts with the First Opium War in 1839 and ends with the conclusion of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the ascension of the CCP in the 1940s. According to Chinese nationalists, this century represents a period of national humiliation and victimisation in the form of foreign dominance of China that should be neither forgotten nor repeated (Chong, 2014).
foreign victimisation, Chinese nationalists consider the Second Sino-Japanese War as the definitive example of Japanese victimisation of China (Mitter, 2013). Tao (2014) suggests that this is because, unlike the previous war with Japan which was mostly fought on the periphery of Chinese territory, the Second Sino-Japanese War occurred in the Chinese heartland. Therefore, the Second Sino-Japanese War is particularly emphasised as an example of Japanese victimisation of China. This in turn serves as a key specific theme of the Nationalist Narrative as it pertains to the war.

An example of this key specific theme being invoked by a member of the Chinese social elite is found in a speech on Sino-Japanese relations made by Chinese President Xi in 2015:

By winning the war, China ‘crushed the plot of the Japanese militarists to colonize and enslave China’ (Xi cited in Gady, 2015)

In this example, Xi makes reference to the wartime suffering of the Chinese people and assigns blame for this suffering to Japanese militarism. Notably Xi does not reference foreign militarism generally, nor specifically the militarism of social elites within Japanese society.

Nationalist Narrative: National Unity in Resisting Japan (3.2.2)
In shifting China’s economy from a collectivist to an individualist ethos, Deng Xiaoping’s capitalistic reforms risked social unrest arising from regional, gender, and income inequalities (Denmark, 2018). The CCP countered this by promoting notions of national unity in resisting Japan as part of the Nationalist Narrative (Mitter, 2014).

This theme is communicated through stories framing the CCP and their Kuomintang rivals as having put aside their differences to resist Japan and protect the Chinese nation (Coble, 2007). The war is presented as having consisted of two interdependent fronts, with the Kuomintang holding the frontline while the CCP fought a guerrilla war in occupied territory (ibid.). In these stories, the Kuomintang’s atrocities committed against the Chinese people are downplayed, while its successes are commemorated. The cultural prominence of the Battle of Taierzhuang, the only Chinese victory in the early years of the war and fought by
Kuomintang forces, has changed from being almost forgotten to being celebrated (Coble, 2007). For the battle’s 70th anniversary in 2008, the stagnating town of Taierzhuang was redeveloped and in 2020 hosted 43,900 tourists despite COVID-19 travel restrictions (Xinhua, 2020b).

This is a significant shift from the Maoist Narrative’s ideological portrayal of the Kuomintang as bourgeois oppressors complicit in the success of Japan’s invasion (Coble, 2007). Nevertheless, in keeping with its purpose of legitimating the CCP’s regime, the Nationalist Narrative presents the Kuomintang as the lesser partner in China’s united front against Japan. For example, the Kuomintang’s failure to hold major cities like Nanjing and Wuhan is taught alongside stories of the CCP’s Eight Route Army, the Chinese communist force commanded personally by Mao Zedong, successfully disrupting Japan’s occupation (Mitter, 2013). This is despite military records available outside of China noting that CCP forces only contributed to 1 battle and 200 skirmishes out of a total of the 23 battles and 40,000 skirmishes that occurred during the war (Kreck, 2014). Evidently, although the Nationalist Narrative’s promotion of national unity acknowledges the Kuomintang’s contribution, the National Narrative’s purpose of legitimating the CCP’s regime keeps the Kuomintang’s portrayal to that of a flawed junior partner.

The transition of the Kuomintang from an antagonist in the Maoist Narrative to a secondary protagonist in the Nationalist Narrative has implications for Sino-Japanese relations. This adjustment renders Japan as the antagonistic focal point of the official Chinese narrative of the war. He (2007) argues that this accounts for the deep-rooted anti-Japanese sentiment in contemporary China and, by extension, the nationalistic tensions that exist in Sino-Japanese relations. As discussed in section 1.1.2, bilateral relations are shaped by the history of interactions between the actors involved. Casting Japan as the sole antagonist of a major event in Sino-Japanese relations logically results in anti-Japanese sentiment in China being a prominent characteristic in Sino-Japanese relations.

National unity is usually a general theme of nationalistic narratives perpetuated by nationalist movements (Bieber, 2018). However, the theme being discussed here is national unity in resisting Japan specifically. Moreover, as
discussed above, this theme manifests in the portrayal of a CCP-Kuomintang partnership, which is specific to the Second Sino-Japanese War. Prior to the war, the CCP and Kuomintang were in open conflict and, almost immediately after Japan’s defeat, China returned to a state of civil war between these factions. Thus, the theme must be considered a key specific theme of the Nationalist Narrative pertaining to the Second Sino-Japanese War as the war serves as the only example of the two political factions fighting a common enemy rather than each other.

An example of a Chinese social elite invoking the theme of national unity in resisting Japan is provided by President Xi speaking at the war’s 75th anniversary:

‘the Chinese nation as a whole fought with great spirits of patriotism and heroism, which is invaluable today and can motivate people to overcome all difficulties and obstacles to achieve national rejuvenation’ (CGTN, 2020)

In this example Xi is invoking the theme of national unity in resisting Japan as an example of how national unity can overcome contemporary hardships. This echoes the theme’s origins to mitigate the potential socio-political and economic hardships of Deng’s capitalistic reforms.

**Nationalist Narrative: Public Participation (3.2.3)**

The theme of public participation concerns remembering historic Japanese aggression. It is through this theme that local research projects discussed in the above sections were encouraged. The theme also promotes contemporary vigilance against Japan. This vigilance is premised upon stories of the war which are presented as cautionary tales of victimisation from renewed Japanese aggression (Mitter, 2013). Through encouraging vigilance against Japan, the theme of public participation both promotes remembering of China’s historic resistance of Japan and embeds the notion that the CCP remains relevant against the hypothetical threat of future Japanese aggression towards China. This builds an ongoing role for the CCP into the Nationalist Narrative, serving to maintain the CCP’s legitimacy overtime.
The theme of public participation has also resulted in the emergence of grass-roots history activists. These activists are Chinese nationalists who see it as their duty to disseminate cautionary accounts of wartime Japanese aggression and are quick to condemn contemporary Japan for any provocation (Reilly, 2004). Their dissemination efforts include raising funds for the renovation of a wartime watchtower into a ‘patriotic education centre’ and opening a private museum in a former comfort woman station, commemorating Japan’s atrocities against Chinese women (ibid., p.474).

The emergence of history activists has significant implications for Sino-Japanese relations and the CCP’s regime legitimacy. History activists have begun to act independently of the Chinese state against Japanese interests (Eves, 2022). In 2000, the nationalist website 9-18\textsuperscript{14} called for an ‘online war of resistance’ against Japanese revisionism (Reilly, 2011b, p.474). In 2005, a grass-roots campaign presented a petition with over twenty-two million signatures which called upon the CCP to use China’s veto to block Japan from gaining a seat on the United Nations Security Council (The New York Times, 2005). In August 2012, activists attempted a landing on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. This led to their arrest and heightened tensions in Sino-Japanese relations, which remained tense going into the Nationalisation Crisis that triggered the following month (BBC News, 2012).

The prevalence of this activism regarding China’s relationship with Japan constrains the Chinese leadership both domestically and internationally (Eves, 2022). To adhere to its brand as the vanguard against Japanese aggression, the CCP must support its history activists in their endeavours against Japan. However, this limits China’s manoeuvrability within Sino-Japanese relations. On the other hand, if the CCP limited or repressed history activism to protect China’s relationship with Japan, this could undermine its nationalistic credentials and thus its regime’s legitimacy. Plausibly, should history activists provoke Japan, the CCP would face a securitization dilemma between protecting its regime and protecting China’s foreign

\textsuperscript{14} 9-18 is a reference to the Mukden Incident which occurred on September 18\textsuperscript{th} 1931. The Mukden Incident was a Japanese false flag exercise used to establish the pretext for the invasion of Manchuria in North-East China.
relations, in particular China’s aforementioned close economic relationship with Japan.

Arguably, public participation is a general theme of the Nationalist Narrative of Chinese history as there is popular public participation in commemorating other events of Chinese history. For example, the Opium Wars are presented as cautionary tales of foreign intervention in Chinese affairs (Harper, 2019). In particular, the second Opium War evokes mass public participation. Accounts of this became a particularly popular event to commemorate due to 1980s dramatisations of the burning of Yuanmingyuan, the Qing Emperor’s summer palace, by Anglo-French forces in 1860 (Leonard, 2008).

However, the theme of public participation is a key specific theme of the Nationalist Narrative of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Serving as the definitive example of both Japanese victimisation of China and national unity in resisting Japan, the war is central to cautionary tales of Japanese aggression. Public participation in this narrative is evident in the hugely popular participation in the consumption of stories set during the war in Chinese media. In 2012, the genre of cautionary anti-Japanese productions set during the war held a 70% market share of Chinese film and television, with over 100 films and TV shows released that year (Steinfeld, 2015).

Additionally, the war was still in living memory at the establishment of the Nationalist Narrative. Accordingly, in the 1980s there was an emphasis on participation among those who experienced the war first-hand sharing their personal experiences of Japanese victimisation (Coble, 2007). This placed the war at the forefront of the Nationalist Narrative (ibid.). Considering the popular consumption of cautionary anti-Japanese media and the participation of survivors in

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15 The Opium Wars were a series of conflicts in the mid-1800s between Imperial China’s Qing dynasty and predominantly the UK, although France was also involved. The UK illegally supplied Opium to China to balance their trade deficits with the country, causing a drug epidemic. The Qing administration responded to cease the illegal Opium trade, triggering a military response from the Western powers. China was forced to cede land and make other political and economic concessions in the ‘Unequal Treaties’, marking the beginning of what China refers to as its ‘Century of Humiliation’ (Harper, 2019). These defeats aided in the destabilisation of the Qing dynasty in the prelude to the Taiping Rebellion, a civil war against initially western-backed Christian rebels in which tens of millions of Chinese people died (ibid.)
establishing the Nationalist Narrative, public participation of remembering and preventing Japanese aggression is included as a key specific theme.

Xi also offers an invocation of the theme of public participation in remembering and preventing Japanese aggression. In 2014, Xi stated that:

‘Forgetting history is a betrayal, and denying a crime is to repeat a crime... nobody at any time should forget the severe crimes of the invaders.’ (The Japan Times, 2014)

In this statement, Xi invokes notions of a duty to participate in remembering the war. Xi implicitly warns that failing in this endeavour could lead to the repeat of the past atrocities suffered by China at the hands of Japan. In doing so, legitimating the CCP as the actor which the Nationalist Narrative presents as having resisted the historical crimes to which Xi refers.

Japan’s Historical Narratives (3.3)
Japan’s history of the Second Sino-Japanese war is heavily politicised, having diverged into competing historical narratives following the adoption of the post-war constitution in 1947 (Gustafsson et al., 2018). This divergence arose from the debate over Japan’s post-war national identity, which is still ongoing (Kolmas, 2019). Article 9, the constitutional rejection of force as a tool of foreign policy which was imposed upon Japan after the war, is a prominent point of contention (Jager and Mitter, 2007). Japan has numerous narratives of the war, but these can be categorised into two overarching and competing historical narratives based on their position on Article 9 (Gustafsson et al., 2018). These are the Traditional Narrative and the Revisionist Narrative.

The Traditional Narrative is today associated with the left-wing of Japanese politics (Suzuki, 2015). Its proponents consider pacifism to be a distinctive part of modern Japanese national identity, one which makes it unique and special (Shibata, 2019). This narrative is, and has been, broadly popular with the older Japanese public (Yu, 2020), though has proven less popular among Japanese political parties. Currently, the most prominent party supportive of the Traditional Narrative is the Constitutional Democratic Party, Japan’s largest opposition party with 19% of the
seats in the Diet (parliament) as of October 2022. The Constitutional Democratic Party was formed in 2017 specifically to oppose Article 9 reform (Johnston, 2020).

The Revisionist Narrative challenges the dominance of the Traditional Narrative and is associated with right-wing politics (Suzuki, 2015). Revisionists argue that pacifism was imposed upon Japan and that Article 9 infringes on its sovereign right to wield military force in its foreign affairs (Shibata, 2019). The Revisionist Narrative has significant traction within the Liberal Democratic Party, which has promoted variations of the narrative since the party’s founding in 195516 (Nippon, 2016).

Given their common origin in the immediate post-war period, the Traditional and Revisionist Narratives share a prominent general theme. This theme is the militaristic victimisation of Japan, derived from the 1946 Tokyo War Crime Tribunal which ruled that the Japanese people were not to blame for the war but rather the militaristic social elites that led Imperial Japan (Young, 1999). This theme is foundational in both the Traditional and Revisionist Narratives of the war. Each narrative’s key specific themes are built upon differing interpretations of this general theme.

A review of the literature on the Traditional Narrative reveals two key specific themes, the renunciation of militarism and introspection (Hicks, 2004; Suzuki, 2015; Gattig, 2015). Meanwhile, the literature pertaining to the Revisionist Narrative highlights the key specific themes of moral justification of the war and Japanese victimhood (Ryall, 2015; Suzuki, 2015; Symonds, 2015; Vogel, 2019).

Traditional Narrative: The Renunciation of Militarism (3.3.1)
The renunciation of militarism as a theme of the Traditional Narrative dates to the USA’s post-war occupation of Japan. American lustration of post-war Japanese society included the introduction of peace education in Japanese schools (Suzuki, 2015). In this US-backed curriculum, Japanese students were taught stories of how

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16 Except for brief periods from 1993-4 and 2009-12, the Liberal Democratic Party has been the governing party of Japan since its formation in 1955. Despite this near-continuous control of Japan’s government, the Liberal Democratic Party has never had the two-thirds majority necessary to achieve its policy of Article 9 reform.
both Japan and China suffered due to militaristic aggression, with an emphasis on
the right of all peoples to live in peace (Toshio, 2009; Gibson, 2011).

Peace education stopped with the onset of the Cold War and the end of the US occupation in 1952 (Toshio, 2009). In the Cold War context, Japanese rearmament was considered a counterbalance to the USSR and China, while the US withdrawal transferred control over education to Japanese authorities (ibid.). Given the political dominance of the revisionist Liberal Democratic Party since 1955, top-down governmental pressure to renounce militarism ceased (Nippon, 2006). Peace education was replaced with discussions of students’ personal stories of wartime suffering, emphasising Japanese victimhood without necessarily framing Japan’s victimisation as a consequence of militarism (Gibson, 2011).

In the absence of top-down support for the renunciation of militarism, this key specific theme of the Traditional Narrative has survived with the grass-roots support of the Japanese people and their vigilance against militarism. This vigilance is evident in repeated campaigns against the perceived encroachment of militarism upon Japanese society. An early example of this is in 1956, when an estimated 500,000 people participated in strikes which protested government bans on textbooks that were considered too critical of Japan’s war with China (Cai, 2008). A more recent example is from 2007, when over 100,000 people protested government instructions to omit textbook references to the military’s practise of coerced suicide during the war\(^\text{17}\) (Masaaki, 2008). Clearly, despite decades of a revisionist government with desire for Article 9 reform, the Japanese people have continued to adhere to the Traditional Narrative’s renunciation of militarism, which still galvanises vigilance decades after the cessation of peace education.

An implication of the ongoing vigilance against militarism in Japanese society is a convergence with China’s Nationalist Narrative and its vigilance against Japanese aggression. Japanese traditionalists and Chinese nationalists have

\(^\text{17}\) Roughly half of Okinawa’s population of 300,000 died or went missing during the Battle of Okinawa. Evidence indicates that a mass suicide order was given by the Japanese military, though revisionists argue that any forced suicides were the result of fanatics and not ordered by the military (Masaaki, 2008).
concurrently opposed Japanese government policies associated with a return to Japanese militarism, culminating in considerable pressure to retain the status quo. In 2017, Japan’s Liberal Democratic government, with the support of the centre-right Komeito Party, had a two-thirds majority to revoke Article 9 and announced plans for a referendum on the matter (Sieg, 2017). However, citing concerns over both domestic political pressure and potential international backlash, the Komeito Party refused to support the referendum (Sieg, 2019; Komas, 2019). Certainly, the thematic convergence between the Traditional and Nationalist Narratives has impacted the ongoing debate in Japan over Article 9 reform.

The renunciation of militarism is included as a key specific theme of the Traditional Narrative. It represents the Traditional Narrative’s specific manifestation of the general theme of militaristic victimisation which is embedded across Japan’s historical narratives of the war. The Traditional Narrative considers wartime suffering of China and Japan’s other neighbours at the hands of the Japanese people, even if not responsible for the war themselves, as a cautionary tale against the return of militarism in Japanese society (Cai, 2008). This has and continues to motivate opposition against the perceived encroachment of militarism upon Japanese society. Accordingly, the renunciation of militarism serves as a key specific theme of the Traditional Narrative for analysis of the case studies.

An example of the renunciation of militarism in political discourse comes from former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, whose speech on the war stated:

‘Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries... I am determined not to allow the lessons of that horrible war to erode, and to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world without ever again waging a war.’ (Koizumi, 2005)

In this statement Koizumi renews the promise of Article 9, renouncing war as a tool of Japanese foreign policy, in keeping with the Traditional Narrative’s renunciation of militarism.
Traditional Narrative: Introspection (3.3.2)
The theme of introspection manifests itself within Japan’s traditionalist community with the appearance of historical amnesia. Historical amnesia, or selective historical memory, is a phenomenon observed in numerous societies. Examples of this phenomena include the British forgetting to include the atrocities of colonialism in their historical record, such as the systemic abuse of the Mau Mau in Kenya (Gopal, 2012). The USA has also omitted its persecution of indigenous Americans in atrocities such as the Sand Creek Massacre (Horowitz, 2014). Japanese revisionists also suffer from historical amnesia, as evident in Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s (2015) omission of Japanese atrocities when speaking at the 70th anniversary of the war’s conclusion.

Traditionalist historical amnesia is distinctive, however, given its basis in introspection. Unlike the examples previously discussed, the Traditional Narrative encourages stories of both Japanese and Chinese suffering during the war. Doing so is part of the narrative’s renunciation of militarism, as discussed in section 3.3.1. However, consideration of these stories and of the lessons of the war is a matter for private contemplation and not public discourse (Gattig, 2015). Simply, the Traditional Narrative appears amnesic in remembering the war, but only because traditionalists generally do not speak of the war in public settings. Even traditionalist politicians usually only speak of the war with reference to the importance of reflecting on its suffering and remembering the importance of peace. This remains the case even when the war is directly politically relevant. For example, the founding leader of the traditionalist Constitutional Democratic Party, Edano Yukoi (2017), announced the party’s formation to oppose Article 9 reform without any mention of wartime events.

Thematic introspection is the product of the Traditional Narrative’s establishment in the post-war period. Domestically, the general theme of militaristic victimisation left little need to discuss the specifics of the war as responsibility was placed on militaristic elites who were removed from office by occupying forces (Suzuki, 2015). Meanwhile, in China, the Maoist Narrative also placed blame for the war on militaristic elites. This meant that, at the formation of
the Traditional Narrative, there was little internal or external pressure to engage in extended discourse over the war. At the same time, peace education encouraged solemn reflection upon Japan’s wartime atrocities, encouraging introspection alongside vigilance against militarism (ibid.).

An exception to traditionalists’ introspective amnesia is found during political flashpoints pertaining to the perceived imminent encroachment of militarism upon Japanese society. During times of particularly intense political debate related to the war’s legacy, survivors of the war become extrospective in vocalising reflections on their wartime experience (ibid.). A prominent example is the 2007 protests over the removal of references to coerced suicide in school textbooks. Rev. Shigeaki Kinjo, a soldier during the war, warned against omitting the atrocities of Japanese militarism by sharing his story of killing his mother and siblings on the orders of his superior officers (Onishi, 2007). Evidently, the Traditional Narrative’s renunciation of militarism can overcome the narrative’s introspective amnesia should the two themes come to contradict one another during a political flashpoint.

In the absence of continued peace education and without extensive traditionalist discussion of the war in public discourse, the responsibility for privately communicating stories and reflections about the war, and emphasising the importance of rejecting militarism, was placed on a dwindling number of survivors (Gatting, 2015). However, younger generations today who have no living relatives who can pass on these messages have little-to-no personal link to the suffering of the war. These generations question why Japan should continue to be constrained because of its wartime history and increasingly consider a Japanese military to be justified in the face of a rising China (Cai, 2015).

Introspection is a key specific theme of the Traditional Narrative given its distinctive appearance within historical amnesia. As discussed, this is a different form of historical amnesia from that of the Revisionist Narrative, which omits or downplays wartime atrocities rather than internalising them. Accordingly, it was appropriate to use introspection as a key specific theme of Traditional Narrative in the thematic analysis of the case studies.
Thematic introspection conferred traditionalist Japanese with no cultural, emotional, nor rhetorical tools with which to counterargue accusations of contemporary Japanese militarism made by China (Gattig, 2015). Resultantly, the theme can be identified in case study securitizations if, in response to such accusations of contemporary Japanese militarism, an introspective emphasis on reflection and the lessons of the war are demonstrated. An example of this is the way in which Asahi Shibum, a leading centre-left newspaper, responded to accusations of Japanese militarism from Xiaoping in the 1980s during the emergence of the Nationalist Narrative:

‘perhaps we need to ask ourselves whether or not we are too insensitive towards the pain still felt by those we victimised’ (Hagstrom, 2015, p.105).

Aligning with the theme of introspection, the Asahi Shibum made no reference to specific wartime events, instead emphasising introspective reflection and the suffering felt by those victimised by Japan’s wartime militarism.

Revisionist Narrative: Moral Justification (3.3.3)

The Revisionist Narrative’s manifestation of militaristic victimisation through the themes of moral justification and Japanese victimhood contrasts with the manifestation of this theme within the Traditionalist Narrative.

Revisionist accounts of the war’s causes present it as a morally justifiable effort to liberate East Asia from western imperialists, a noble goal corrupted by militaristic elites such as Okawa Shumei18 (Aydin, 2008). These stories emphasise a sense of injustice felt by the Japanese people over western imperialists’ exploitation of East Asia (Ebrey et al., 2009). They explain that the war was intended to liberate China by bringing it under the protection of the Japanese Empire (Young, 1999). Consequently, revisionists reiterate the notion of the Second Sino-Japanese war as a moral endeavour, with former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2015) describing it as

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18 Okawa Shumei was a Japanese academic who advocated for the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. A Japanese-led pan-Asian civilisation state, Japanese-led based on notions of racial superiority. He considered an inter-civilisational war between a Japanese-led Asia and a US-led West inevitable in order to liberate Asia from western imperialism. Of the twenty-eight people indicted for Class-A war crimes at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, he was the only individual who was neither a military nor government official (Aydin, 2008).
part of the global movement for national self-determination. Notably, there is evidence that expanding Japanese influence into the Chinese province of Manchuria was presented as a moral imperative for the Japanese people during the prelude to the war and which benefitted from popular support at home (Taylor, 2013).

Revisionists’ efforts to present the war as morally justifiable antagonises both Japanese traditionalists and Chinese nationalists. Presenting the war as morally defensible can be interpreted as justifying wartime atrocities as a means to an end. This interpretation therefore contradicts both the Traditional Narrative’s renunciation of militarism and the Nationalist Narrative’s emphasis on the Japanese victimisation of China. Far-right revisionist groups have gone as far as to deny wartime atrocities, arguing that Japanese forces would not have committed any atrocities given their noble motivations (Vogel, 2019). Revisionist academics, for example, organise conferences to refute evidence of atrocities (Edelsten, 2000). These include The Verification of the Rape of Nanjing: The Biggest Lie of the 20th Century conference in 2000 (ibid.). Japanese traditionalists and Chinese nationalists demonstrated outside of the venue together, demanding recognition of the suffering caused during the Nanjing Massacre (ibid.). This serves as another example of Traditional/Nationalist Narrative convergence in their opposition to the Japanese Revisionist Narrative.

Moral justification is a key specific theme of the Revisionist Narrative as it is distinctive that the defeated invading force presents their war as morally justifiable in their historical narrative. This is more common in victorious communities, with the Allied forces of World War II often presenting the war as a moral endeavour against totalitarian fascism (Mitter, 2020). However, it is unusual in the history of warfare for a defeated party to do so (Fujiwara, 2006). Certainly, it is a stark contrast to the Traditional Narrative’s introspection and renunciation of militarism.

While moral justification is an unusual stance for a defeated party to adopt, it can be understood considering the general theme that both the Traditional and Revisionist Narratives share, the militaristic victimisation of Japan (Fujiwara, 2006). The moral justification of the war serves to highlight a way in which proponents of the Revisionist Narrative believe Japan was victimised by militaristic elites, who
corrupted the Japanese people’s otherwise noble intentions. To this end, the moral justification of the war is considered a key specific theme of the Revisionist Narrative for use in case study analysis.

This theme can be identified in the case studies by references to the moral nature of Japan’s motivations for war, such as opposing western imperialism. This is evident in Abe’s (2015) speech at the 70th anniversary of the war’s conclusion:

‘With their [western imperialist’s] overwhelming supremacy in technology, waves of colonial rule surged toward Asia. There is no doubt that the resultant sense of crisis drove Japan forward’.

Revisionist Narrative: Japanese Victimhood (3.3.4)

The Revisionist Narrative engages with notions of Japanese victimhood beyond militaristic victimisation, specifically considering the Japanese to be one of the predominant victim groups of the war (Nadeua, 2019). This emerges in three ways. Firstly, the Revisionist Narrative presents Japan as a victim of western imperialism, communicated through stories of an isolationist feudal Japan being forced to open its borders and to develop socio-economically in accordance with western models of industrialisation and imperialism (Taylor, 2013). These stories present the West’s role in Japan’s modernisation as connected to its wartime history, framing Japanese militarism and wartime atrocities as a consequence of western tutelage (Hoshino and Satoh, 2012). This viewpoint was expressed as early as the 1946 Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal when General Kanji, one of the militaristic elites blamed for the war, argued in their defence:

‘[Japan] took your country [the USA] as its teacher and set about learning how to be aggressive. You might say we became your disciples.’

The second element of the theme of Japanese victimhood is the suffering and personal loss experienced by the Japanese people during the war (Vogel, 2019). Abe (2015), while speaking at the 70th-anniversary event, referred to the sacrifice of

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19 In 1854 Japan ended over two centuries of official isolationism after American ships entered Tokyo Bay (then Edo Bay) in an aggressive show of western technological supremacy. The following decades saw rapid Japanese modernisation and societal change overseen by American, French and British advisors. This included the end of the feudalistic shogunal system and the centralisation of political power and imperial authority in the Meiji Restoration (Aydin, 2008).
millions of Japanese men fighting for their homeland. Meanwhile, considering the
context of World War II more generally, some revisionists describe Japan as a victim
of a holocaust\textsuperscript{20} (Selden, 2007). These claims are based on the atomic bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki\textsuperscript{21}, as well as the firebombing of Tokyo\textsuperscript{22} (Ryall, 2015).

The third aspect considers post-war Japan as a victim of its wartime history,
presenting the Japanese people as held hostage to a war in which they themselves
were victimised. This is expressed through temporal othering in revisionist stories of
the war (Wang, 2020). This temporal othering is exhibited through the argument
that modern Japanese culture and identity are vastly different from the culture and
identity that existed before and during the war, and therefore it is unfair to hold
today’s Japanese responsible for wartime events. This perspective makes
reconciliation between Japan and China over wartime issues more difficult as
revisionists tend to reject demands to apologise to, or compensate, survivors
victimised by a historic Japan they do not identify with (Young et al., 2021).

Discussions of victimhood are prevalent in Sino-Japanese discourse due to a
tendency for Japanese revisionists and Chinese nationalists to argue over which side
was the greater victim of the war (Nadeau, 2019). A prevalent example is the
unending debate over the number of Chinese civilians who died in the Nanjing
Massacre. Chinese estimates assert that over 300,000 civilians were killed, while
Japanese revisionists argue that it was 10,000-50,000, a lower number than died in
the firebombing of Tokyo (Ryall, 2015; Han, 2017). Debates such as this feed into
the Chinese Nationalist Narrative’s theme of public participation. Chinese
nationalists hold Japan to account over the downplaying of atrocities by revisionists,
which in turn fuels revisionist claims that Japan is being unfairly held hostage to its
history.

\textsuperscript{20} A holocaust victim in keeping with the general definition of the word: mass suffering and
devastation, particularly by fire and nuclear devastation (Selden, 2007).
\textsuperscript{21} Roughly 200,000 Japanese people died in the atomic blasts and the weeks thereafter, many more
suffered in the coming decades from the affects of radiation poisoning and birth defects (Ryall,
2015).
\textsuperscript{22} Most buildings in Tokyo were wooden and extremely susceptible to fire when the USA dropped
incendiary bombs on the city, resulting in over 100,000 deaths and causing millions to be homeless
(Ryall, 2015). The victims of the firebombing were buried in mass graves beneath what are now
Tokyo’s famous cherry blossom parks.
One of the three elements of this theme is not specific to the Second Sino-Japanese War. This is because the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the firebombing of Tokyo, were actions undertaken by the USA as part of the Pacific War\(^{23}\), another constituent war of World War II. However, the Second Sino-Japanese War ended with Japan’s surrender following the USA’s use of atomic weapons. Although claims of Japanese victimhood refer to events which were technically part of another war, these events are still relevant to the discussion of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The relevance is further demonstrated by the invocation of these events in Sino-Japanese discourse by proponents of the Revisionist Narrative. Hence, Japanese victimhood is considered to be a key specific theme of the Revisionist Narrative of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

An example is again found in Abe’s (2015) anniversary speech, in which he stated:

‘We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologise’.

In this quote, Abe invoked the third element of the theme, that modern Japan is being unfairly held to account over its wartime history. Emphasising how, with each successive generation, contemporary Japan is distinct from the evermore temporally distant Japan that instigated the war.

**Summary (3.4)**

Thematic analysis requires a clear establishment of the themes being employed prior to the analysis being undertaken. This chapter has thus presented the key specific themes of both China’s and Japan’s historical narratives of the war. The chapter began with a discussion of narrative and theme, defining narrative as a story-telling discourse, with themes communicated in the plots of these stories. Additionally, this section highlighted the importance of identifying key specific themes rather than general themes. The historical narratives contain general themes pertaining to Sino-Japanese history. This renders it important to recognise key specific themes pertaining to the narratives’ account of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

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\(^{23}\) The Pacific War refers to the conflict that took place in the Pacific Ocean, mostly between Japan and the USA.
Japanese War that can be used to provide a stronger evidence base for case study analysis.

Next, China’s historical narratives of the war were outlined. This included a brief discussion of the initial Maoist Narrative of the war, an ideological telling of China’s wartime history alleviating the Japanese people of blame. This served as China’s official historical narrative of the war from the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 until the late-1970s/early-1980s. This was replaced by the Nationalist Narrative which continues to serve as China’s official historical narrative of the war. Its key specific themes are: the Japanese victimisation of China, national unity in resisting Japan, and public participation in remembering the war.

Japan has two historical narratives of the war: the Traditional Narrative, and the Revisionist Narrative. These historical narratives are heavily politicised. The older Traditional Narrative, associated with the left wing of Japanese politics, is characterised by key specific themes of the renunciation of militarism and an introspection which has the appearance of historical amnesia. Meanwhile, the Revisionist Narrative, which is associated with right-wing Japanese politics and the politically dominant Liberal Democratic Party, has the key specific themes of moral justification and Japanese victimhood.

With the prominent Chinese and Japanese historical narratives of the war presented, the following chapters identify their key specific themes in the securitization and security dilemma/paradox mechanics of the case studies.
The Trawler Incident began on September 7th 2010, after a Chinese fishing trawler collided with two Japanese Coast Guard vessels patrolling the territorial waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. This led to the arrest of the trawler’s crew. The resulting dispute lasted until September 24th, when Japan released the trawler’s captain after deciding against indictment. Sino-Japanese relations soured over these seventeen days, with developments within the dispute including the first regular Chinese patrols in the East China Sea since the 1970s. Tensions remained high after the Trawler Incident, persisting into the 2012 Nationalisation Crisis.

This chapter presents steps 1 and 2 of the analytical framework’s application to the Trawler Incident case study. Step 1 identifies fourteen basic facts relevant to the case study and a causal narrative linking these. Step 2 maps the basic facts to the security dilemma/paradox concept. This reveals a single security paradox cycle in the case study, consisting of a Chinese and then a Japanese security dilemma. Additionally, several observations are presented, including the possibility of a sub-unit strategic challenge in China’s security dilemma and sub-unit infighting within Japan’s security dilemma.

**Step 1 – Basic Facts and Causal Links (4.1)**

Using the criteria established in section 2.5.1, fourteen basic facts considered relevant to the case study are presented below. The rationale for their inclusion and their causal links to the other basic facts are included in the discussion. A timeline of the basic facts is provided in fig.4, while a visualisation of the case study’s causal narrative is provided in fig.5.
Fig. 4 - Timeline of the Trawler Incident’s Basic Facts
Fig. 5 - Visualisation of the Trawler Incident’s Causal Narrative
**September 7th, the Trawler Incident**

The crew of a Chinese fishing trawler were detained after their boat collided with two Japanese coast guard vessels (BBC News, 2010). The Japanese decision to arrest the Chinese trawler crew breached a 2004 agreement which stated that China would discourage fishing in the territorial waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands if Japan did not punish any fishing activity that did occur (Hafeez, 2015).

This basic fact is included because it was the triggering event for the period of Sino-Japanese tensions that was the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, known as the Trawler Incident. As the triggering event of the Trawler Incident, this basic fact serves as the starting point of the case study’s causal narrative.

**September 8th, China’s Initial Response**

China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu presented China’s initial response to the Trawler Incident, criticising Japan, and condemning:

"so-called law enforcement activities or any actions that would jeopardise Chinese fishing boats or Chinese people". (Yu cited in BBC News, 2010)

This basic fact is included as it is logical to include China’s initial reaction to the triggering event of the case study. Causally, this basic fact is linked to the trawler incident the previous day, given that it is a response to said incident. It is also linked to the height of China’s anti-Japanese protests on September 18th given how the protesters criticised the weakness of China’s initial response (Lim, 2010).

**September 8th, China’s Anti-Japanese Protests Begin**

Anti-Japanese protesters gathered outside the Japanese embassy in Beijing, as well as in other Chinese cities, waving the Chinese flag and singing the Chinese national anthem (The Observers, 2010).

This basic fact is included because the anti-Japanese protests were emphasised by observers at the time, being widely reported in the international press (see BBC News, 2010; McCurry, 2010; The Observers, 2010). Furthermore, the protests feature prominently in the academic literature on the Trawler Incident as a prominent factor during the dispute (see Reilly, 2011a, 2011b; Tiezzi, 2014; Singh, 2017; Taffer, 2020).
These protests are a causal result of the trawler incident the previous day. This is evidenced as the protesters referred to the incident as their motivation for protesting (The Observers, 2010). It is also causally linked to the naval deployments on September 9th, the suspension of joint-energy exploration talks on September 11th, and the height of the anti-Japanese protests on September 18th. The link to the naval deployments is based on proximity, the announcement occurring only a day after the start of the anti-Japanese protests, and the references that were made during the announcement to a spike in anti-Japanese sentiment in China (People’s Daily, 2010). The suspension of joint-energy exploration is linked as it is presented in the literature as a reaction to domestic pressure to take a tougher stance against Japan (see Green et al., 2017a). Meanwhile, the fact of the protest’s height is clearly a continuation and escalation of the fact of the protest’s commencement.

**September 9th, China Announces Deployments to the Disputed Area**

Speaking at a press briefing, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang described Japan’s behaviour as ‘absurd, illegal and invalid’ (People’s Daily). Jiang announced the deployment of naval vessels to the disputed region, threatening that:

"Japan should release the crew and vessel immediately and unconditionally so as to avoid an escalation of the incident" (Jiang cited in People’s Daily, 2010.)

Jiang explained that the deployments were, at least in part, because:

"Japan's illegal detention of the Chinese fishing boat and crew has sparked strong reactions from the Chinese people" (ibid.)

This basic fact is included as China’s first regular naval patrols in the region for decades were a result of the active dispute triggered in the area two days earlier. Additionally, Jiang’s announcement was widely reported in the international press and thus emphasised by observers at the time (see BBC News, 2010; Johnson, 2010; McCurry, 2010). Furthermore, scholars have highlighted the significance of this announcement and the subsequent naval deployments as the start of Chinese incursions into the territorial waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands that persist to this day (see Green et al, 2017a; Hadano and Miyasaka, 2020; Taffer, 2020).
This basic fact links causally to the reassurances Japan received from the USA on September 22nd. The USA’s reassurances were that the islands were covered by the US-Japan alliance in the case of Chinese attack. As the naval deployments were the only military aspect of China’s response, it is consistent that this basic fact put into motion the chain of events leading to US reassurances.

September 11th, China Suspends Talks on Joint Energy Exploration

China and Japan had been negotiating joint exploration of the oil and gas reserves in the East China Sea. However, China suspended its dialogue with Japan in favour of unilateral energy exploration based upon claims of Chinese sovereignty over the area, with rumours of China shipping drilling equipment to the region (Green et al., 2017a). This basic fact is included because it was emphasised by observers at the time, both in the media and by the Japanese government (see The Diplomat, 2010b; Kubota, 2010a).

This basic fact links to Japan’s threat of retaliation over Chinese unilateral energy exploration on September 19th. Japanese concern over unilateral exploration follows the cessation of multilateral exploration on September 11th.

September 13th, Japan Releases the Trawler Crew

Japan released the trawler’s crew and the trawler itself but continued to detain the trawler’s captain. This was consistent with Japanese law, which holds the captain of a vessel responsible for a ship’s actions (Gupta, 2010). A Japanese government spokesperson explained that the trawler and crew were only being held while the incident was being investigated (Rushworth, 2010). The spokesperson also specified that the trawler’s captain would be detained until Japanese authorities could conclude whether indictment was necessary (ibid.).

This basic fact was emphasised at the time, and by scholars since, as a trigger for escalating anti-Japanese protests in China due to the continued detention of the trawler’s captain (see Al Jazeera, 2010a; Lim, 2010; Brautigam and Rithmire, 2021). This basic fact is linked causally to the triggering trawler incident on September 7th as the crew had to have been arrested to then later be released. It is also linked to the height of the anti-Japanese
protests on September 18th, given the emphasis placed on the continued detention of the trawler’s captain in compounding anti-Japanese sentiment in China.

**September 17th, Japanese Cabinet Reshuffle**

The popularity of Japan’s Democratic Party\(^{24}\) government had been declining, supposedly due to its failure to deliver its election pledge to renegotiate US military bases in Okinawa (The Diplomat, 2010a). Japan’s Prime Minister, Naoto Kan, had also only narrowly defeated a leadership challenge from within his party in the days leading up to the Trawler Incident (Fackler, 2010). Consequently, Kan reshuffled his cabinet, reinforcing his government’s viability by bringing his political rivals within the party into his cabinet (ibid.). This included the appointment of Seiji Maehara, a known ‘China hawk’ popular among Japanese nationalists and revisionists, to the position of Foreign Minister (The Diplomat, 2010a).

This basic fact is relevant because Maehara’s appointment was considered controversial by observers at the time (see Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States, 2010; Global Times, 2010b). Additionally, the reshuffle is usually presented in the literature as a key example of the internal weakness of the Japanese government during the Trawler Incident (see Taffer, 2020).

This basic fact does not link causally to any earlier basic facts pertaining to the Trawler Incident, instead resulting from the domestic political factors discussed above. However, it does link causally to the September 19th Japanese threat of retaliation over unilateral energy exploration, given that it was Maehara, in their new position as foreign minister, who made this threat.

Admittedly, this might not be considered a basic fact of the case study itself, rather a basic fact of Japanese domestic politics that occurred during the Trawler Incident. Regardless, it is an important basic fact to present as it contextualises the political risk taken by Kan’s government in countering Maehara’s threat or retaliation on September 19th. This is explored further in section 4.2.2 and in chapter 5.

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\(^{24}\) The Democratic Party was the predecessor of the modern Constitutional Democratic Party. It was a centrist party consisting of both traditionalists and revisionists. It eventually fractured over the issue of Article 9 reform and dissolved in 2016. Its traditionalist members formed the centre-left Constitutional Democratic Party in 2017. Revisionists, including Seiji Maehara, formed the centre-right Democratic Party for the People in 2018 which was itself dissolved in 2020 in favour of the Constitutional Democratic Party. (Macarthur Bosack, 2020).
September 18th, The Height of China’s Anti-Japanese Protests

Large-scale protests and demonstrations occurred in cities throughout China on the anniversary of the Mukden Incident25. The largest protests were seen in Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong (Lee, 2011). Protesters’ motivations for protesting include reference to Sino-Japanese history and the desire for a hard-line response to Japan’s affront to China:

‘I want our government to be stronger. They shouldn’t let the Japanese bully us on our own soil. The Diaoyu Islands have always been ours. Young Chinese people shouldn’t forget the humiliations of history, and shouldn’t allow history to repeat itself.’ (cited in Lim, 2010).

The protests on September 18th were emphasised by observers at the time (see Lim, 2010; The Observers, 2010). They are also a consistent inclusion in academic literature on the Trawler Incident (see Reilly, 2011a, 2011b; Tiezzi, 2014; Singh, 2017; Taffer, 2020). This basic fact follows causally from the start of the anti-Japanese protests on September 8th. It then links to the subsequent basic facts of China’s suspension of ministerial contacts, the suspension of rare earth exports, and Wen’s threat to Japan at the UN. The suspensions of ministerial contacts and rare earth exports are causally linked to the anti-Japanese protests because these actions were taken almost immediately after the height of the protests. These actions also align with the notion that the CCP’s response to the Trawler Incident became more adversarial as public pressure mounted.

Meanwhile, Wen’s threat to Japan at the UN is linked to the protests as international coverage of Wen’s speech was minimal. Instead, the threat was made before an almost entirely Chinese audience and broadcast in Chinese media (Al Jazeera, 2010b; Lim, 2010). This indicates that Wen’s threat to Japan was for the Chinese people whose displeasure towards Japan was recently made clear in the scale of the anti-Japanese protests on September 18th.

September 19th, China Suspends Ministerial and Provincial Contact with Japan

25 A false flag operation, the Mukden Incident was orchestrated by the Imperial Japanese Army to establish pretext for an invasion of Manchuria in North-East China in 1931. This is broadly considered a major event in the prelude to the Second Sino-Japanese War, but is also considered by some to mark the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War (Aydin, 2008; Mitter, 2013).
China suspended all contacts with Japan at the ministerial level and below (Branigan, 2010). This negatively impacted numerous Sino-Japanese projects, including the expansion of air travel between the countries and the purchase of coal for Japanese energy plants (Brautigam and Rithmire, 2021).

This basic fact is included as the consequences of this action are prominent in the academic literature on the Trawler Incident. Many of the dialogues between China and Japan severed in this decision were not restored for years, leaving a longer-term impact on Sino-Japanese relations at an operational level (Eves, 2020). In terms of the case study’s causal narrative, this basic fact follows the height of the anti-Japanese protests on September 18th. It does not, however, lead to any subsequent basic facts in the case study. This basic fact represents a longer-term impact of the Trawler Incident rather than a trigger for short-term developments within the dispute.

**September 19th, Maehara Threatens Retaliation Over Unilateral Energy Exploration**

Based on rumours of drilling equipment being shipped to the region, Japan’s National Resources and Energy Agency reported that China had begun drilling operations in gas fields within the territorial waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (Kubota, 2010a). Maehara, Japan’s newly appointed Foreign Minister, responded to the report with a threat of retaliation against China:

‘If we can find proof, our country will take appropriate measures’ (Maehara cited in Fackler and Johnson, 2010a).

Later the same day, a spokesperson for Prime Minister Kan released a statement concerning Maehara’s threat:

‘what is needed is to respond calmly without becoming emotional’ (cited in Brautigam and Rithmire, 2021).
This basic fact is included because Maehara’s threat of retaliation was highlighted as significant by observers at the time as evidence of Japan’s new cabinet taking a hard-line stance towards China (see Fackler and Johnson, 2010a; Kubota, 2010a).

As mentioned previously, this basic fact follows on from China’s suspension of joint-energy exploration. Meanwhile, it does not link causally to any following basic facts in the case study as there is no clear Chinese response to, nor Japanese actions which logically follow on from, Maehara’s threat of retaliation. This is considered a result of Kan’s counterstatement, which is discussed further in section 5.4.

**September 21st, China Suspends Rare Earth Exports**

Chinese customs officials blocked rare earth exports to Japan, minerals essential to Japan’s manufacturing sector (NATO Strategic Communications, 2018). In the first half of 2010, China exported 22,283 tons to Japan, compared to 7,976 tons in the second half (Green et al., 2017a).

The relevance of this basic fact is not obvious without further discussion. China never disclosed that it suspended exports due to the Trawler Incident; rather it informed Japan in August that it would be reducing rare earth exports and explained that the suspension occurring during the dispute was merely coincidental (King and Armstrong, 2013). However, many in Japan believed that the suspension began during the dispute as an effort to apply economic pressure on Japan to release the trawler’s captain (ibid.). Accordingly, even if the timing of the suspension of rare earth exports was coincidental, it could still have been a factor in Japan’s dilemma of interpretation.

China’s suspension of rare earth exports follows the height of the anti-Japanese protests. It also links to Japan’s release of the trawler captain on September 24th. It does so due to Japan’s explanation that it released the captain to prevent lasting damage to Japan’s relationship with China, which includes its economic relationship (Fackler and Johnson, 2010b).

**September 21st, Wen Jiabao Threatens Japan**

While in New York for a UN conference, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao threatened Japan in a speech made before an audience of Chinese nationals and
Chinese Americans. International media were not present for the speech, and China has not released the speech in its entirety. However, China’s foreign ministry confirmed limited excerpts:

“I strongly urge the Japanese side to release the skipper immediately and unconditionally” (Wen cited in FMPRC, 2010).

“If Japan clings to its mistake, China will take further actions and the Japanese side shall bear all the consequences that arise” (Wen cited in ibid.).

This basic fact is included as Wen’s threat was an ultimatum over the detention of the trawler’s captain. Although it is vague, observers at the time believed that, should Japan fail to release the captain, China would increase its naval patrols and enact economic sanctions (see Al Jazeera, 2010; Johnson, 2010; Xinhua, 2010; Tehran Times, 2010). Additionally, scholarship of the Trawler Incident often points to Wen’s threat as evidence of Chinese readiness to escalate the dispute with Japan, often citing the seriousness with which Japan and its US allies took Wen’s threat (see Suzuki, 2015; Green et al., 2017a; NATO Strategic Communications, 2018).

Given its limited audience and the curation of Wen’s speech, it should be considered political theatre, made for domestic Chinese audiences. However, the threat was made in the USA against a US ally. Hence, it is likely to have factored in the decisions of Japan to seek reassurances, and the USA to provide reassurances, as occurred on September 23rd.

**September 23rd, The USA Reassures Japan**

In earlier Sino-Japanese disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, Japan sought reassurances from the USA that their alliance covered the disputed islands, conferring a full and accurate understanding of Japan’s strategic position in the East China Sea (Hafeez, 2015). The Trawler Incident was no different, with Maehara stating on this date that US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton confirmed that the islands were covered by the US-Japan security alliance (NATO Strategic Communications, 2018).

This basic fact is included because the academic literature emphasises this as providing Japan with the necessary security guarantees to release the trawler captain (see Green et al., 2017a; NATO Strategic Communications, 2018). Thus, this basic fact was important in Japan’s dilemma of interpretation.
The USA’s reassurances causally follow China’s naval deployments and Wen’s threat to Japan, events which represent the military/strategic potential of the dispute. Additionally, the literary consensus is that these reassurances link directly to Japan’s release of the trawler crew, as this decision was made with the benefit of US security guarantees (see Green et al., 2017a).

**September 24th, Japan Releases the Trawler Captain**

Japan released the trawler captain and returned him to China, ending the Trawler Incident as a potential flashpoint in Sino-Japanese relations. However, the increased tensions resulting from the dispute persisted beyond its conclusion. China demanded compensation from Japan for the damaged trawler, while the popular consensus in Japan was that Kan’s government had submitted to Chinese political and economic pressure, strengthening right-wing criticism of Kan’s government (Tiezzi, 2014). Tensions remained high between the two countries, who did not resume their joint energy exploration project and who only began reinstating some of their suspended diplomatic channels in the late 2010s (Eves, 2020).

This basic fact is included because, although the broader Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute persisted, the specific contention of this dispute, Japan’s arrest of the trawler crew, concluded with the trawler captain’s release. As the concluding event of the Trawler Incident, this basic fact’s inclusion in the case study is essential as the endpoint of the case study’s causal narrative.

**Honourable Mentions**

Some basic facts associated with the Trawler Incident did not meet the conditions for inclusion as key events in the case study’s timeline. Two ‘honourable mentions’ are briefly discussed below for transparency.

**September 13th, Vice Chairmen Li Jianguo of China’s Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress**

*26 cancels a trip to Japan*

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26 The Standing Committee of the National People’s Committee, China’s state legislature, oversees the conduct of the Chinese state and is responsible for the Chinese constitution. It is a separate entity from the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which consists of the leaders of the CCP.
While this is an example of a senior politician imposing a diplomatic sanction on Japan, it was not widely reported or referenced by observers at the time. The Trawler Incident was not given as the reason for Li’s cancellation, while Japan was seemingly indifferent to the cancellation (The Japan Times, 2010). This is apparent as the response from senior Japanese politicians, such as Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku, was merely to re-iterate Japan’s desire to discuss the Trawler Incident with China (ibid.).

Furthermore, Li’s visit was at the request of Japanese legislators, not the Japanese state. This means that it is an example of a sub-unit diplomatic sanction. This may explain why Li’s cancelled visit is usually only a footnote in Trawler Incident scholarship (Green et al., 2017a), seemingly overshadowed by formal diplomatic sanctions enacted at the unit level by the Chinese state. Namely, the suspension of talks on joint energy exploration announced two days earlier and the suspension of ministerial and provincial contact announced five days later.

**September 19th, China detains Japanese nationals on suspicion of espionage**

The fact that China detained Japanese nationals during a dispute with Japan over the detention of a Chinese national seems logically linked. Observers at the time, however, emphasised a distinction between this basic fact and the Trawler Incident. China denied accusations that it unlawfully detained Japanese nationals to pressure Japan, while Japan’s Prime Minister stressed that his government was not treating the two matters as related (Kubota, 2010b). Some of the Japanese nationals detained admitted to accidentally entering a military zone while conducting their jobs disposing of chemical weapons abandoned in China by the Japanese army after the Second Sino-Japanese War (VOA News, 2010). This basic fact is occasionally included in the study of the Trawler Incident, but is often omitted (see Hirano, 2014; Green et al., 2017a; Taffer, 2020). When it is included, some scholars admit that the link is circumstantial at best (see Rose and Sykora, 2017).

**Step 2 – Map the Security Paradox and Identify Secondary Concepts (4.2)**

For the security dilemma/paradox concept to apply, neither party can truly desire to pose a security threat to the other (Booth and Wheeler, 2007). This was the case for both China and Japan during the Trawler Incident. Examining Japan’s actions during the dispute, it is evident that at no point did Japan enact any assertive or malicious policy towards China. The
closest Japan came to doing so was on September 19th, when Foreign Minister Maehara threatened China over unilateral energy exploration. Yet, this threat was tempered by Prime Minister Kan’s calls for a calm resolution to the dispute.

China did engage in activity that many considered an attempt to challenge and threaten Japan (Hafeez, 2015; Taffer, 2020). However, many of China’s more assertive and challenging actions were also tempered. For example, Wen’s threat to Japan being made before a very limited audience indicates a reluctance to publicly and outrightly challenge Japan. Furthermore, after the trawler captain’s release, the CCP took steps to restore Sino-Japanese relations, such as discouraging further anti-Japanese protests in their rhetoric (Global Times, 2010a). Accordingly, it is concluded that neither side truly desired to threaten the other, meaning that the security dilemma/paradox concept is applicable.

Mapping the basic facts identified in step 1 to the security dilemma/paradox concept identifies one security paradox cycle. In the causal narrative presented in step 1, Japanese actions towards the end of the dispute resulted from Chinese actions towards the beginning. For example, Seiji Maehara’s threat against China resulted from China’s announcement of unilateral energy exploration. Additionally, Japan’s seeking of US reassurances resulted from Chinese naval deployments. Basic facts late in the dispute are causally linked to basic facts early in the dispute. This indicates one security paradox cycle as Japan’s security dilemma was still responding to the early outputs of China’s security dilemma.

Within this cycle, there is considerable overlap between an initial Chinese security dilemma and the following Japanese security dilemma. A visualisation of this is provided in fig.6. These security dilemmas are discussed in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.
Fig. 6 – Constituent Security Dilemmas of the Trawler Incident’s Security Paradox Cycle
China’s Security Dilemma (4.2.1)
China’s security dilemma lasted from September 7th until September 21st. A security dilemma is triggered when an actor must interpret the motivations of the other before themselves acting, and the arrest of the Chinese trawler crew forced this interpretation. Japan’s arrest of the trawler crew on the 7th was the only basic fact representing any Japanese actions within the context of the dispute prior to Chinese counteractions in the following days. Hence, China’s security dilemma was triggered by the arrest of the trawler crew on the 7th.

Meanwhile, September 21st represented the end of China’s security dilemma as it was the last date in which a basic fact in the case study’s causal narrative pertained to a Chinese action. Thus, it was the date on which China enacted the final output of its security dilemma pertaining to the dispute. The resolution of China’s security dilemma could not have been later than the 21st because, as is presented in section 4.2.2, Japan resolved its security dilemma in the following days. While security dilemmas within a security paradox can overlap, they are sequential (Acharya, 2007). For Japan to resolve its security dilemma on the 24th, China must have already resolved its own security dilemma.

China’s Dilemma of Interpretation

As the first security dilemma in the security paradox cycle pertaining to the Trawler Incident, China’s dilemma of interpretation began on September 7th. It then continued until it was resolved on, or shortly after, the height of China’s anti-Japanese protests on September 18th. This is evident as the protests on September 18th are the latest possible basic fact that plausibly inputs into China’s dilemma of interpretation as no subsequent basic facts are causally linked to any Chinese actions in the dispute.

This raises a question of how the anti-Japanese protests, a basic fact concerning sub-unit Chinese actors, can input into China’s unit-level dilemma of interpretation in a Sino-Japanese dispute. The traditional security dilemma concept assumes that security dilemma inputs in a bilateral relationship come from the other unit-level actor (Buzan and Hansen, 2010). Meanwhile, socially-constructivist accounts of the security dilemma place greater emphasis on the domestic and inter-level development of foreign policy (Huysmans, 2002).
It is therefore valid that a unit-level actor’s dilemma of interpretation can be informed, at least in part, by domestic, sub-unit developments.

Considering this, China’s dilemma of interpretation was informed by two domestic inputs from the sub-unit level. The first input occurred on September 8th, with the start of the anti-Japanese protests which called upon the CCP to adopt stronger policies towards Japan in response to the Trawler Incident. It is notable that prior to the protests, also on September 8th, Spokesperson Jiang Yu lodged diplomatic protests. Yet after the protests began, Jiang announced naval deployments to the East China Sea. Significantly, this change in policy occurred without any interceding basic facts pertaining to Japanese actions in the dispute, leading to the conclusion that China amended its response to Japan due to domestic sub-unit pressure from anti-Japanese protestors.

The second domestic sub-unit input was the height of the anti-Japanese protests on September 18th. China made no further amendments to its response in the week prior to September 18th, even after Japan released the trawler and its crew on September 13th while continuing to detain the trawler’s captain. However, the day after the height of the anti-Japanese protests, China suspended ministerial contacts with Japan and, in the following days, suspended rare earth exports and Wen issued a threat to Japan in a UN speech. Maehara’s threat of retaliation over unilateral Chinese energy exploration, the only interceding basic fact pertaining to a Japanese action at this point in the dispute, was not causally linked to any of China’s actions. Thus, it can be concluded that the height of the anti-Japanese protests informed China’s dilemma of interpretation, resulting in additional policy responses.

Accounting for this, it was discussed in chapter 3 that the CCP, as a sub-unit actor responsible for China’s unit-level decision-making, relies on its nationalist credentials for its domestic political legitimacy. The CCP has proven reluctant to undermine its nationalist credentials by ignoring the demands of Chinese nationalists (Abbott, 2016). Accordingly, in attempting to resolve China’s unit-level dilemma of interpretation, the CCP were influenced by the desire to placate domestic nationalist criticism of its handling of the dispute.

Considering the above discussion, three basic facts are mapped to China’s dilemma of interpretation during the Trawler Incident:
China’s Dilemma of Response

China’s dilemma of response began on September 8th. September 8th saw China’s initial response to the Trawler Incident, which was China’s first dilemma of response output. For China to have responded, even if only an initial response, its dilemma of response must have begun. China’s dilemma of response concluded on September 21st, with the last basic facts pertaining to a Chinese response to the Trawler Incident, and thus the last dilemma of response outputs, occurring on this day.

There are three distinct phases to China’s dilemma of response, relating to China’s progression in its dilemma of interpretation at the time the outputs were produced. The first phase consisted of only one basic fact, China’s initial response publicly criticising the arrests of the trawler crew. This is the only Chinese output which solely causally follows a Japanese action, an input into China’s security dilemma. Occurring the same day as the start of the anti-Japanese protests, China’s response had not yet been influenced by domestic sub-unit pressures. This resulted in a benign phase of China’s dilemma of response, denoted by Jiang’s diplomatic protestations, which cannot be considered an exceptional measure beyond the realms of day-to-day politics.

The second phase began on September 9th, after the start of China’s anti-Japanese protests, with the announcement of naval deployments in the East China Sea. The second phase also includes the suspension of joint energy exploration on September 11th. In line with the demands of the Chinese nationalists participating in the anti-Japanese protests, these outputs are markedly more assertive than China’s initial response to the Trawler Incident. China’s actions in this phase are assertive to the degree that they input into Japan’s dilemma of interpretation, as discussed in section 4.2.2.

Significantly, the outputs of this phase of China’s dilemma of response lack the nuance of those undertaken in phase 3. Occurring only shortly after the first domestic sub-unit input into China’s dilemma of interpretation, the CCP reacted instinctively to protect its nationalist credentials from criticism. The CCP acquiesced to domestic nationalist pressures, quickly enacting responses to the Trawler Incident with only a partial understanding of the
interplay between the Trawler Incident and domestic pressures. Responding instinctively without pause for interpretation is a phenomenon usually observed in the case of a strategic challenge (Booth and Wheeler, 2007). This observation is discussed further in section 4.2.3.

The third phase consisted of Chinese outputs towards the end of its security dilemma, after its dilemma of interpretation was resolved on September 18th. This includes the suspension of ministerial contacts, the suspension of rare earth exports, and Wen’s threat to Japan. While still assertive in line with nationalist demands, these outputs are more nuanced than those within phase 2. This is apparent as each action was more diplomatically manageable in the mitigation of lasting damage to Sino-Japanese relations. Ministerial contacts could be restored at any time, and neither China nor Japan evicted the other’s embassies and consulates, meaning that Sino-Japanese diplomatic channels remained open.

The suspension of rare earth exports may have been, as some suggest, an attempt to apply economic pressure on Japan (see Green et al., 2017a; NATO Strategic Communications, 2018). However, as previously discussed, China had informed Japan of plans to reduce rare earth exports a month earlier. This advance notice allowed Japanese preparation and lessened the economic impact of the suspension, which itself was reversed shortly after the dispute, with China exporting 14,446 tons of rare earth to Japan in early 2011 (Green et al., 2017a). Meanwhile, as explained in section 4.1, Wen’s threat was made before an audience of Chinese nationals and Chinese Americans, with only limited excerpts being made available to the international press, lessening the risk of Wen’s speech provoking Japan.

The nuance of China’s phase 3 security dilemma outputs is to be expected. In contrast to phase 2 when China was reacting instinctively to events before it had processed its dilemma of interpretation, by September 19th China had the benefit of a resolved dilemma of interpretation. Hence the outputs of phase 3 met the demands of nationalists participating in the anti-Japanese protests and could be managed to mitigate against lasting damage to Sino-Japanese relations.

Accordingly, the phases of China’s dilemma of response and the basic facts pertaining to each of its phases are:
Phase 1 – Benign Output

- September 8\textsuperscript{th} – China’s Initial Response

Phase 2 – Instinctive Outputs

- September 9\textsuperscript{th} – China Announces Deployment to the Disputed Area
- September 11\textsuperscript{th} – China Suspends Talks on Joint Energy Security

Phase 3 – Nuanced Outputs

- September 19\textsuperscript{th} – China Suspends Ministerial and Provincial Contact with Japan
- September 21\textsuperscript{st} – China Suspends Rare Earth Exports
- September 21\textsuperscript{st} – Foreign Minister Wen Jiabao Threatens Japan

Japan’s Security Dilemma (4.2.2)

Japan’s security dilemma lasted 16 days from September 9\textsuperscript{th} until September 24\textsuperscript{th}, overlapping with China’s security dilemma by 12 days. China’s announcement of naval deployments on September 9\textsuperscript{th} was the earliest Chinese response to causally link to further Japanese action in the dispute. Meanwhile, the resolution of Japan’s security dilemma on the 24\textsuperscript{th} is apparent as the release of the trawler captain on this date represents the final action, and thus the final security dilemma output, from Japan within the context of the Trawler Incident.

Japan’s Dilemma of Interpretation

Japan’s dilemma of interpretation began on September 9\textsuperscript{th}, the same day that Japan’s security dilemma began. It was resolved on September 23\textsuperscript{rd} when the USA provided Japan with reassurances. These reassurances served as the last possible input into Japan’s dilemma of interpretation before its security dilemma was resolved the following day. Additionally, it is precedent that Japan would await US reassurances before resolving its dilemma of interpretation, as was the case during both the 2004 and 2008 Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes (Hafeez, 2015).

This leads to the question of how a US action can input into a Japanese dilemma of interpretation in a security dilemma within the Sino-Japanese security paradox. However, no bilateral relationship exists within a vacuum. Given Japan’s security alliance with the USA, Sino-Japanese relations are often considered within the trilateral US-China-Japan relationship (Liu and Wang, 2013). This accounts for Japan seeking reassurances from the USA and why, once China’s behaviour had become appropriately assertive towards the end
of the dispute, the USA fulfilled Japan’s request. In doing so, Japan was provided with a better perspective of its geostrategic position on September 23rd, enabling it to resolve its dilemma of interpretation.

In addition to the announcement of naval deployments on the 9th and US reassurances on September 23rd, there were three further basic facts which input into Japan’s dilemma of interpretation. The first of these was China’s suspension of talks on joint-energy exploration on September 11th. This is evident as this suspension led to Maehara’s threat of retaliation over unilateral energy exploration on September 19th, as outlined in section 4.1.1. The second basic fact which input into Japan’s dilemma of interpretation was China’s suspension of rare earth exports. This was an input as the abruptness of the suspension was considered by Japan to pose a significant risk to its economy and thus likely factored in Japan’s decision to release the trawler captain (Fackler and Johnson, 2010b). The third is Wen’s threat to Japan which, despite efforts to mitigate its impact on Sino-Japanese relations, must have input into Japan’s dilemma of interpretation due to its causal link to the release of the trawler captain.

Accordingly, the following basic facts are mapped as inputs for Japan’s dilemma of interpretation during the Trawler Incident:

- September 9th – China Announces Deployments to the Disputed Area
- September 11th – China Suspends Talks on Joint Energy Exploration
- September 21st – China Suspends Rare Earth Exports
- September 21st – Wen Jiabao Threatens Japan
- September 23rd – The USA Reassures Japan

**Japan’s Dilemma of Response**

Japan’s dilemma of response must have begun by September 19th at the latest. The first dilemma of response output, Maehara’s threat of retaliation, occurred on this day. Japan’s dilemma of response could have begun days before September 19th if Japan’s pursuit of US reassurances is considered as an output of its dilemma of response. However, seeking reassurance in US-Japanese relations is not intuitively a security dilemma output in the Sino-Japanese security paradox. Rather, the pursuit of reassurances should be considered a fact-finding mission in Japan’s dilemma of interpretation. Considering this as a security dilemma output would result in an impossible causal narrative in which Japan’s security dilemma
output directly triggered an input of the same security dilemma. Resultantly, considering the basic facts presented, it is only possible to conclude that Japan’s dilemma of response must have begun by September 19th.

As foreign minister, Maehara’s threat of retaliation should be considered a unit-level output of Japan’s dilemma of response. However, the conflicting statement released by Kan’s spokesperson alludes to a sub-unit disagreement as to how Japan should resolve its dilemma of response. This disagreement resulted from different political perspectives aligned with Japan’s divide in historical narratives and Article 9. Being a part of the right-wing, revisionist faction of the Democratic Party (Global Times 2010b), Maehara favoured a more assertive response to China. Kan, on the other hand, was more of a traditionalist and therefore favoured a diplomatic response (Harris, 2010). Accordingly, during the 2010 Trawler Incident, Japan’s foreign ministry was led by a revisionist within a government that was led by a traditionalist, each of whom had their own views on how Japan should resolve its dilemma of response. This culminated in the contradictive output on the 19th, where Maehara threatened retaliation while Kan called for conciliation. This is discussed further in section 4.2.3 regarding the reassurance game and cost signalling.

Maehara’s threat served as the earliest basic fact constituting a Japanese output of its dilemma of response. The only remaining basic fact that could have served as a Japanese output was the trawler captain’s release on September 24th. Accordingly, the mapping of basic facts to Japan’s dilemma of response are:

- September 19th – Seiji Maehara Threatens Retaliation Over Unilateral Energy Exploration
- September 24th – Japan Releases the Trawler Captain

Secondary Concepts (4.2.3)
It is necessary to determine the applicability of secondary security dilemma/paradox concepts to this case study to gain a fuller understanding of the mechanics at play in the Trawler Incident. Each secondary concept’s applicability is discussed below.

*Strategic Challenge*
No strategic challenge occurred between China and Japan during the Trawler Incident. Neither China nor Japan responded to one another’s actions without interpretation. China only responded directly to a Japanese action at the start of the dispute, doing so with its benign initial response of diplomatic protestation. Meanwhile, except for Maehara’s stifled threat of retaliation, Japan waited for US reassurances before resolving its dilemma of interpretation.

It would be wrong, however, to conclude that there were no strategic challenge mechanics present during the Trawler Incident. As discussed above, phase 2 of China’s dilemma of response saw China respond more instinctively to Japan. Their response in this phase was more assertive than their response in phase 1, while less nuanced than their phase 3 response. This aligns with the strategic challenge’s skipping of the dilemma of interpretation in favour of an immediate response to a perceived threat.

It is possible that China experienced a sub-unit strategic challenge associated with the Trawler Incident which bled into China’s unit level security dilemma. It is established in the study of Chinese politics that the CCP has concerns about the increasing limitations of its social controls over China’s nationalist movement (Coble, 2007; Reilly, 2011b). Additionally, it is noted that the protests, while primarily anti-Japanese in nature, were used by pro-democracy groups as a cover to also demonstrate against the CCP’s authoritarian regime (Johnson, 2010). Plausibly, the CCP felt a political threat arising from the protests and thus responded instinctively without interpretation to appease the protesters. This would account for the impulsiveness in phase 2 of China’s dilemma of response in the absence of any Japanese actions triggering a strategic challenge.

This inter-level strategic challenge phenomenon warrants future study. It offers a potential case study on the interplay between sub-unit security dilemma mechanics and bilateral relations at the unit level. However, as discussed in section 2.4, this thesis primarily orientates itself at the unit level. Accordingly, a more in-depth exploration of this phenomenon would be too great a tangent for the purposes of this thesis. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, it is concluded that although neither China nor Japan considered the other to pose a strategic challenge, China experienced a sub-unit strategic challenge from the anti-Japanese protesters which informed its unit-level security dilemma in its dispute with Japan.
Security Dilemma Sensibility

There is evidence of security dilemma sensibility in China’s and Japan’s security dilemmas. For China, it is present in the nuance of phase 3 of its dilemma of response. In contrast to the instinctive and assertive actions of phase 2, China’s outputs in phase 3 were tempered by being reversible, already expected, or political theatre aimed at domestic audiences. For China to have enacted policies with this nuance, it must have had an appreciation of how its policies could trigger Japanese insecurity.

It’s also necessary to recognise the limitations of China’s security dilemma sensibility. Specifically, how, despite security dilemma sensibility informing its dilemma of response, China did not engage in a reassurance game to try and escape the security paradox. This is the phenomenon of knowing your actions will trigger insecurity in the other but not fully committing to mitigating this insecurity. China’s non-engagement with the reassurance game reinforces the earlier conclusion that the CCP was influenced in its foreign policy decisions by domestic political pressures. Logically, a CCP exercising security dilemma sensibility would decide against engaging China in a reassurance game if it risked compounding domestic criticism of the CCP’s regime and undermining its legitimacy. This resulted in the nuances of phase 3 of China’s dilemma of response falling short of a reassurance game.

For Japan, security dilemma sensibility is observed in Kan’s spokesperson’s statement following Maehara’s threat of retaliation over unilateral energy exploration. By contradicting his own Foreign Minister, Kan showed an awareness that threatening China would only worsen the situation. Additionally, Japan’s release of the trawler’s captain, despite enough evidence for indictment under Japanese law (Gupta, 2010), indicates an awareness that holding the captain for trial would further escalate Sino-Japanese tensions (Fackler and Johnson, 2010b).

Reassurance Game

If an actor practices security dilemma sensibility, it might be expected that they engage in a reassurance game, such as cost signalling, to escape the security paradox (Kydd, 2000; Booth and Wheeler, 2007). China did not engage in a reassurance game with Japan during the Trawler Incident. As discussed above, the nuances of phase 3 of China’s dilemma of
response allude to some manifestation of China’s security dilemma sensitivity in their security dilemma outputs. However, suspending exports, suspending diplomatic channels, and making threats at the UN cannot be considered reassuring behaviour. Rather, the nuances of China’s actions towards the end of the dispute are better-considered attempts at risk aversion. These can be considered an effort to placate domestic protesters while limiting long-term damage to Sino-Japanese relations.

Japan, on the other hand, did engage in a reassurance game at two points. The first was on September 19th, when Kan’s spokesperson released their conciliatory statement contradicting Maehara’s threat over unilateral energy exploration. This can be considered a cost signalling gesture because, as discussed in section 4.1, Maehara was made foreign minister to boost support for the government. Accordingly, publicly contradicting Maehara to reassure China of Japan’s desire for a diplomatic solution constituted a political risk, or potential cost, for the Japanese government.

Similarly, the release of the trawler captain on September 24th was a cost signal. As discussed, the release of the trawler captain was an exercise of security dilemma sensibility, showing an awareness that putting the captain on trial would further antagonise China. The cost on the part of the Japanese government was again the political risk of the decision to release the trawler’s captain. Kan’s government garnered extensive criticism over its handling of the dispute (Fackler and Johnson, 2010). Many in Japan believed that Kan’s government lost during the country’s ‘first confrontation’ with a rising China, and that the government circumvented legal proceedings to return the trawler’s captain (ibid.). Thus, while China did not engage in a reassurance game, the Japanese government undertook two cost-signalling gestures to try and reassure China.

Summary (4.3)
This chapter presented the first two steps of the analytical framework in application to the Trawler Incident. First, it outlined fourteen basic facts that are relevant to the case study, defining the rationale for each basic fact’s inclusion and their place in the case study’s causal narrative. These basic facts were then mapped to the security dilemma/paradox concept. This revealed one security paradox cycle pertaining to the Trawler Incident, consisting of a Chinese and a Japanese security dilemma. These security dilemmas, while sequential, overlapped significantly.
China’s dilemma of interpretation primarily experienced inputs from the sub-unit level, arising from the anti-Japanese protests and the nationalist criticism levied against the CCP. China’s dilemma of response, meanwhile, was split into three distinct phases. Phase 1 represented a relatively benign response to the Trawler Incident. Phase 2 was instinctively assertive in a way reminiscent of an actor facing a strategic challenge. In this case, posed by the anti-Japanese protesters to the CCP. Phase 3 was nuanced in balancing assertiveness to appease protesters and mitigate long-term damage to Sino-Japanese relations.

Japan’s dilemma of interpretation began with China’s announcement of naval deployments on September 8th and culminated with the provision of US reassurances on the 23rd. Japan’s dilemma of response began by September 19th. This is because Maehara’s threat of retaliation, by being itself a dilemma of response output, means that Japan must have begun deliberating an appropriate response. Japan’s dilemma of response, and security dilemma, then concluded with the final basic of the case study, the release of the trawler’s captain.

The discussion concluded with a consideration of the secondary security paradox/dilemma concepts. It was concluded that China experienced a sub-unit strategic challenge which informed its unit-level dilemma of interpretation. This is based upon the perceived threat to the CCP’s regime arising from the protests and its impact upon the CCP’s foreign policy decision-making processes. There is evidence of security dilemma sensibility in China’s and Japan’s security dilemmas. However, while Japan used this to engage in reassurance games with China, China’s security dilemma sensitivity only extended as far as the nuances found in phase 3 of its dilemma of response.
Chapter 5 – The Trawler Incident – Step 3

This chapter presents step 3 of the analytical framework’s application to the Trawler Incident. This step focuses on securitization theory, outlining four basic facts mapped to the Trawler Incident’s security paradox cycle which contain securitization mechanics. For each of these basic facts, whether they constitute or contain a securitizing move is discussed and determined. This process includes consideration of the securitization’s strand and illocutionary logic, audience, securitizing actor, referent object and sector, and any inter-level dynamics at play. Also, the second-generation securitization concepts presented in section 2.2 are discussed where they have been determined applicable and/or garner additional insights.

Of the basic facts mapped to China’s security dilemma, three are presented as having securitization mechanics. The first to be discussed is the anti-Japanese protests, strictly two basic facts as outlined in the previous chapter but considered holistically from this point onwards to avoid repetition. Second is China’s announcement of naval deployments, followed by Wen’s threat to Japan. Regarding Japan, a single basic fact contained securitizing mechanics. This is Maehara’s threat of retaliation over unilateral energy exploration. Meanwhile, the subsequent statement made on behalf of Kan constitutes a desecuritizing move.

China’s Anti-Japanese Protests (5.1)
China’s anti-Japanese protests constituted a saliency securitization at the sub-unit level with the CCP as its primary audience. As explained in section 2.2.3, a saliency securitization is one in which the securitizing actor attempts to assign greater priority to an issue.

It is evident that the anti-Japanese protests constituted a saliency securitization due to the securitizing mechanics at play in the speech acts, images, and actions of the protesters. The protests concerned Japanese behaviour, hence the predominance of anti-
Japanese language used by the protesters, for example, referring to the ‘Japanese devils’ (Al Jazeera, 2010a). However, the focus of protester rhetoric changed when communicating speech acts. Rather than merely vocalising anti-Japanese slurs, the protester’s speech acts employed the saliency strand logic, imploring the CCP to do X in order to repel threat Y. For example, one protester speaking outside of the Japanese embassy in Beijing stated:

‘I want our government to be stronger. They shouldn’t let the Japanese bully us on our own soil. The Diaoyu Islands have always been ours. Young Chinese people shouldn’t forget the humiliations of history, and shouldn’t allow history to repeat itself.’ (cited in Lim, 2010).

In this example, imploring the CCP to respond to Japan in a way that is ‘stronger’ fulfils the do x component, while stating that Japan should not be allowed to bully China fulfils the prevent threat Y aspect. Similarly, a protester attending anti-Japanese demonstrations in Shanghai espoused:

“We came here to appeal for fairness and for the right to ask for our captain back. We regret the government’s weakness in diplomacy’ (cited in Al Jazeera, 2010a).

This speech act is also compliant with the saliency logic. In this case, the logic is expressed as to prevent unfairness, prevent threat Y, the CCP ought to be less weak, do X. This does not exactly match the saliency strand’s logic as outlined by Vuori (2008). However, this example merely expresses the saliency strand’s illocutionary logic in a different order. Both we should do X to prevent Y, and to prevent Y we should do X are expressions of the saliency strand’s logic. Evidently, the existence of securitization strand logic in the protester’s speech acts indicates the presence of securitizing moves.

As discussed in section 2.2, images and actions can also constitute securitizing moves. Both securitizing images and actions can be observed in the anti-Japanese protests. Anti-Japanese protesters carried depictions of Mao Zedong during the dispute, including the Shanghai protester cited above who wore a t-shirt depicting Mao (McDonald, 2010). Hansen (2011) argues that a securitizing image invokes security in line with the ways in which the image is constituted in discourse. Within the context of Sino-Japanese relations, the discourse surrounding Mao presents him, as per the Nationalist Narrative, as a strong leader who protected China from Japan (Mitter, 2013). An example of this protection might be Mao’s command of the Eighth Route Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War.
Noted during the protests was the prominence of depictions of Mao as a critique of the CCP’s handling of the dispute (Huang, 2012; Wallace et al., 2015). This, along with the discourse surrounding Mao within the context of Sino-Japanese relations, supports the conclusion that the anti-Japanese protests constituted a saliency securitization. In addition to speech acts critical of the CCP’s response to the Trawler Incident, imploring the CCP to take a stronger stance against Japan, the protesters literally carried images of the kind of strong leader they desired. To this end, the depictions of Mao carried by the protesters are considered securitizing images, supporting the saliency securitization espoused in the protesters’ speech acts.

The very act of protesting can itself be considered a securitizing move meant to communicate the perceived seriousness of the dispute and prioritise it on the CCP’s agenda. As concluded in section 2.4, securitizing moves in the form of actions are preceded by a build-up in the securitizing actor’s legitimacy. This phenomenon is observable with respect to the anti-Japanese protesters, given that many of the leading protesters were also history activists, grass-roots historians of the war who promote vigilance against renewed Japanese militarism against China (Reilly, 2011b). The protester’s promoted Nationalist Narrative accounts of Sino-Japanese relations, a prominent characteristic of history activism, as discussed in section 3.2.3. One protester explained the need for the CCP to take a stronger stance against Japan by stating:

"The Japanese killed, raped and massacred the Chinese people... the Japanese government has never recognised the harm inflicted on the Chinese people. On the contrary, they continue to deny it.” (The Observers, 2010)

This is significant because history activists had been establishing themselves as legitimate experts on Japanese militarism through, for example, organising commemorations of Japanese atrocities, and circulating petitions against Japanese foreign policies (Reilly, 2011b). These activities were particularly prominent since the 2005 anti-Japanese protests, when Japanese historical revisionism in school textbooks seemingly validated the cautionary warnings of China’s history activists, leading to the growth of history activist groups in major Chinese cities (Gries et al., 2016).
Being established history activists provided the basis of legitimacy for these protesters to be securitizing actors. Their legitimacy was strengthened from the validation that the Trawler Incident provided to their prior warnings about Japan. For example, a worker in Shanghai explained that ‘Japan’s disregard for international law and justice through its aggressive conduct’ had proven the protesters’ warnings correct (cited in Buckley, 2010). Hence, the protesters experienced a boost in legitimacy, establishing them as potential legitimate securitizing actors during the Trawler Incident. This is therefore consistent with academic literature regarding the act of protesting being a securitizing move.

Although a saliency securitization occurred, the role of securitizing actor cannot be assigned to individual protesters. In line with traditional securitization theory, as outlined in chapter 2, securitizing actors are understood to be social elites. These social elites are defined as individuals with the legitimacy, authority, and platform from which to securitize an issue (Buzan et al., 1998). Individual protesters and groups of protesters, even if considered legitimate experts on Japanese militarism, lacked the formal authority and platform to securitize an issue at the unit level, the level of analysis serving as this thesis’s primary focus.

However, individual and groups of protesters can be assigned the role of microsecuritizing actors. As discussed in chapter 2, microsecuritizations are ‘little security nothings’, small acts which serve as minor securitizing moves at lower levels of analysis (Huysmans, 2011, p.372). These securitizing moves work collectively to securitize an issue at higher levels (ibid.). Certainly, the microsecuritization concept fits well with the basic fact of China’s anti-Japanese protests.

The anti-Japanese protests align well with this concept because microsecuritizing moves are often more subtle and are only effective in securitizing an issue when their impact is combined with many other microsecuritizing moves. The protesters’ speech acts and images are consistent with this. One individual in Shanghai expressing a desire for the CCP to be stronger while showing an image of Mao is benign, thus a security nothing, but similar sentiments and images being reiterated in quick succession in cities throughout China creates a security something. In short, the protesters’ speech acts, images, and actions collectively culminated in a saliency securitization represented by the anti-Japanese protests as a whole.
This conclusion is validated by its consistency with the inter-level conclusions of step 2. As stated in section 5.2.1, China’s unit level dilemma of interpretation was heavily informed by the sub-unit protests. The microsecuritizations concept aligns with this conclusion while providing extra details on the inter-level dynamics of this bottom-up phenomenon. The application of the microsecuritization concept to the protests highlights the role of microsecuritizing actors, the anti-Japanese protestors, at the individual and group levels collectively presenting a sub-unit securitization which, via its saliency strand logic, intended to input into China’s unit level dilemma of interpretation. Accordingly, the protestors should be considered microsecuritizing actors who, as a collective, presented a securitization to the CCP in attempt to raise the saliency of the dispute and achieve a stronger response to Japan.

The referent object of the anti-Japanese protests’ securitization was the Chinese nation. This is evident as the protesters’ microsecuritizing moves routinely presented both Japan and the CCP’s perceived weakness in responding to Japan as threats to Chinese national identity. For example, the Beijing protester quoted above stated ‘They shouldn’t let the Japanese bully us’ (Lim, 2010). In this statement both the CCP and Japan are presented as an aspect of the threat to ‘us’. That this ‘us’ was the Chinese nation is apparent given that the speech act proceeded to refer to Chinese heritage and history. Both heritage and history are essential elements in the formation of Chinese national identity (Kramer, 1997).

As a referent object, the Chinese nation falls within the societal security sector. As outlined in section 2.2.1, the societal sector concerns threats to a community’s identity and values. Given the references to heritage and history, the perceived threat was logically societal in nature. This view is supported by the other microsecuritizations. For example, the Shanghai protester’s appeal for ‘fairness’ (Al Jazeera, 2010a) was a subjective invocation of a subjective social value in a microsecuritizing speech act.

In terms of the macrosecuritization concept, the anti-Japanese protests is the basic fact best positioned to have also been a macrosecuritizing move. The anti-Japanese protesters employed the saliency strand and were actively trying to move the perceived threat of Japan higher up on the agenda at the unit level. This is evidence of a macrosecuritizing move as, by advocating the issue to be higher on the agenda, the
protestors were also advocating for its macrosecuritization over other issues on the unit level security agenda.

Yet, the anti-Japanese protests do not offer an example of macrosecuritization due to the relationship between macro- and microsecuritizations. Research on the interplay between these concepts is in its infancy, but Bigo (2002) argues that microsecuritizations are expressions of institutionalised security concerns. In other words, macrosecuritizations. This viewpoint is supported by Huysmans (2011, p.372), who argues microsecuritizations are ‘diffuse and associative’ securitizing acts adherent to broader trends. Hence, it is more likely that the protesters’ collective securitization of Japan reflected a pre-existing macrosecuritization.

This would not have been a pre-existing macrosecuritization of Japan specifically. China’s willingness to cooperate with Japan over energy exploration prior to the dispute, and thus collaborate in efforts to address China’s own energy insecurities (Manicom, 2009), is not consistent with seeing Japan as an overarching threat to the Chinese nation. It is probable that foreign interference in Chinese affairs more generally was already macrosecuritized. This would explain why a specific example of perceived foreign interference, such as Japan’s arrest of the trawler crew, could trigger microsecuritizations to the extent that they constitute a collective securitizing move.

In summary, the anti-Japanese protests which occurred during the Trawler Incident posed a saliency securitizing move comprised of a collection of microsecuritizations with the CCP as their audience. These microsecuritizations were communicated through speech acts, images, and actions and collectively sought to raise the saliency of the perceived threat posed by Japan to the Chinese nation. While not a macrosecuritizing move in its own right, the collective securitizing move made by the anti-Japanese protests indicates a pre-existing macrosecuritization of external threats to China.

China’s Announcement of Naval Deployments (5.2)
Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s announcement of naval deployments on September 9th constituted a past act securitization. As outlined by Vuori (2008, p.85), past act securitizations follow the logic ‘we did X to secure Z’. This logic was present in Jiang Yu’s explanation that China deployed ships:
‘...in accordance with Chinese law and aims at maintaining fishing and protecting the lives and property of Chinese fishermen in the waters’ (Jiang Yu cited in People’s Daily, 2010)

In this statement, the deployment of naval patrols ‘in accordance with Chinese law’ represents the *we did X* aspect of the logic, with Jiang Yu’s explanation of the deployments protecting lives and property fulfilling the *secure Z* element. This indicates that China’s government was seeking to retroactively justify their naval deployments to the Chinese public.

Notably, Jiang’s statement also employed the *control strand’s* logic of ‘do X and desist from doing Q in order to repel threat Y’ (Vuori, 2008, pp.88-9). This is evident in Jiang’s demand that:

‘Japan should release the crew and vessel immediately and unconditionally so as to avoid escalation of the incident’ (Jiang Yu cited in People’s Daily, 2010)

The *do X* aspect is fulfilled by the demand that ‘Japan should release the crew and vessel immediately’. The requirement that this demand be met unconditionally fulfils the *desist from doing Q* aspect of the logic. Jiang described Japan’s behaviour as ‘absurd, illegal and invalid’ (ibid.), meaning the request for unconditionality can also be interpreted as an instruction that Japan desist from its ‘absurd, illegal and invalid’ behaviour. The final element of the logic is the clearest as Jiang Yu threatened ‘escalation of the incident’ (ibid.), representing the *threat Y* to be repelled by *doing X* and *desisting from doing Q*.

Control securitizations are intended for domestic audiences (Vuori, 2011). Jiang’s speech act appears to have been directed at Japan to deter further Japanese actions. In this respect, although consistent with the control strand’s logic, Jiang’s speech act seemingly should have employed the logic of the deterrence strand. The deterrence strand is the only strand identified by Vuori (2008, 2011) for which the intended audience is the source of the perceived threat, not the community which feels threatened.

However, the control strand element of Jiang’s speech was for domestic audiences. As concluded in step 2, the anti-Japanese protests input into China’s dilemma of interpretation as the CCP attempted to placate nationalist criticism of their handling of the dispute. In line with this, the CCP sought to establish control over the protesters, hence the control strand dynamics, but could not assert its control directly over the protesters. This is
because suppressing nationalist sentiment would have contradicted the nationalist credentials that the CCP relies upon for legitimacy. Rather, the CCP attempted to appease the anti-Japanese protesters by presenting itself to domestic audiences as in control, using a control strand securitization nominally aimed at Japan.

This view is reinforced by the fact that the announcement was heavily reported on by the People’s Daily. As the CCP’s own media outlet, the People’s Daily is known to be a means for the CCP to communicate with the Chinese people, especially within the context of public criticism of the CCP (Gitter and Gang, 2018). Furthermore, for the CCP to pursue control by using rhetoric nominally aimed at Japan is consistent with the political theatre of Wen’s speech act on September 21st, as outlined in section 4.1. Hence, it is concluded that Jiang incorporated the control strand into their securitizing move alongside the past act strand.

The multi-strand nature of Jiang’s securitizing move demonstrates a limitation of traditional securitization theory’s overemphasis of the future act strand. By incorporating the second-generation strands concept within this thesis’s analytical framework, the multi-strand nature of Jiang’s securitizing move has been drawn out. Multi-strand securitization is not a concept discussed in the literature. Detailed exploration of this phenomenon is warranted but is beyond the scope of this thesis.

By being communicated through a speech, the format of the securitizing move was a speech act. Its audience was the Chinese people. This is apparent given the securitizing move’s logic, it being intended to justify the naval deployments to the Chinese people, as per the past act strand, and being for domestic audiences to assuage the protestors, in accordance with the control strand.

The securitizing move’s referent object varied between the two logics it employed. For the past act component, the referent object was explicitly stated as ‘the lives and property of Chinese fishermen’ (People’s Daily, 2010). This stated referent object relates to Japan’s arrest of Chinese fishermen during the dispute, and is also symbolic given that part of China’s claim to the islands is their historic role as ancient Chinese fishing grounds (Lee, 2011). In this respect, the referent object meets the protesters’ demands of the CCP to protect China in response to Japan’s arrest of the trawler crew in what they consider
Chinese territorial waters. This symbolic referent object fits within the societal sector given that it concerns the territorial integrity of the Chinese nation. However, in a more literal sense, Jiang’s referent object concerned the economic security of Chinese fishing communities, a far more limited security issue situated within the economic sector.

The second referent object, pertaining to the securitizing move’s control strand elements, was more implicit. For the CCP to directly respond to the anti-Japanese protests by pursuing control over them through securitization suggests that the CCP felt threatened by the protests. This is consistent with the CCP’s reliance on nationalism for its legitimacy, and the potential challenge that criticism of the CCP’s leadership which arose from the anti-Japanese protests posed to this. As mentioned in section 4.2.3, the anti-Japanese protests included pro-democracy elements. Additionally, the 2005 anti-Japanese protests became more overtly critical of the CCP’s nationalist credentials as they progressed (Kato, 2013). Thus, the CCP’s securitizing moves sought to establish control to secure its regime considering the potential risks associated with escalating protests. The referent object is therefore situated in the political sector.

Jiang’s securitizing move is inherently inter-level in its dynamics. Most significantly because the CCP, as a sub-unit actor, used its control of the unit level mechanisms of the Chinese state to conduct a securitizing move aimed at domestic sub-unit audiences. The securitizing actor being a spokesperson for an institution of the Chinese state, not directly for the CCP, shows how a sub-unit actor can leverage unit level influence to fulfil their security agenda. Additionally, as a spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry, Jiang’s securitizing move is evidence that the sub-unit anti-Japanese protesters were successful in their objective of raising the saliency of the perceived threat of Japan at the unit level.

The announcement of naval deployments cannot be considered a macrosecuritizing move. There was no evidence in Jiang’s speech act of advocating for the perceived threat of Japan to be higher on the security agenda. Yet, the announcement does indicate a pre-existing macrosecuritization in its use of the control strand. As step 2 discussed, the securitization of Japan, by way of appeasing the protesters and mitigating their criticism, was in service to the CCP’s regime security. To be used as a tool of control for the CCP’s regime security indicates that the securitization of Japan during the dispute was subservient to a macrosecuritization of threats to the CCP’s regime security.
An issue with considering threats to the CCP’s regime to be macrosecuritized is that it seems too focused on the CCP, a sub-unit actor, rather than concerning China as a whole, the unit level actor. However, as the sub-unit actor operating the mechanisms of the Chinese state, the CCP can privilege its personal security agenda at the unit level. This phenomenon is not discussed in the literature on securitization theory but is possible given Buzan and Waever’s (2009) explanation of macrosecuritization in exclusionary political cultures, such as that of China’s party-state system. Although this warrants further study, determining the exact mechanics of this phenomenon is beyond this thesis’s remit. Notable however, is that the CCP’s application of its sub-unit macrosecuritization at the unit level accounts for the presence of two strands of securitization in Jiang’s securitizing move. One concerning the nominal Japanese threat to China arising from the Trawler Incident and the other concerning the pre-existing macrosecuritization of threats to the CCP’s regime.

To summarise, China’s announcement of naval deployments was a multi-strand securitizing move employing the logics of the past act and control strands. The securitizing move took the form of a speech act by Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu, the securitizing actor, and was aimed at domestic Chinese audiences. The referent object differed for each strand invoked, being the Chinese nation by way of the symbolism of Chinese fishing communities for the past act aspects and the CCP’s regime for the control strand elements. The latter indicates a pre-existing macrosecuritization of threats to the CCP’s regime.

Wen Jiabao’s Threat to Japan (5.3)
The threat made by Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao on September 21st constituted a securitizing move. This is evident as Wen’s speech invoked the logic of the future strand, ‘accept that X is done in order to repel threat Y’ (Vuori, 2008, p.80).

‘If Japan clings to its mistake, China will take further actions and the Japanese side shall bear all the consequences that arise’ (FMPRC, 2010b).

In this example, Japan’s ‘mistake’ of arresting the trawler crew represents the threat Y to be repelled, while the accept X aspect is represented by the potential of future Chinese actions.

Upon first examination, Wen’s speech act appears to have invoked the deterrence strand. While the future act and deterrence strands have identical illocutionary logic, the
deterrence strand is directed at the external source of the perceived threat. Certainly, being a threat made against Japan, Wen’s speech seemingly fulfils the deterrence strand’s criteria.

However, concluding that Wen’s speech act was a deterrence securitizing move would be incorrect. As discussed in sections 4.1 and 4.2, Wen’s threat was political theatre. It was intended as a display of strength for domestic audiences and was made before a limited audience to avoid further escalation of the dispute. Accordingly, Wen’s threat, although nominally intended for Japan, was made for domestic Chinese audiences. This means that the mechanics of Wen’s securitizing move aligns with the future act strand.

The format of Wen’s securitizing move was a speech act in which the Chinese people were the intended audience. Regarding the referent object, the available excerpts of Wen’s speech do not make any clear indications regarding what exactly was threatened by Japan’s ‘mistake’ (ibid). It is probable, however, that Japan’s ‘mistake’ was presented as a threat to the referent object of the Chinese nation (ibid.). It is likely to have presented in this way in accordance with the saliency securitization of the anti-Japanese protests. This conclusion is reached based upon the precedent set by spokesperson Jiang Yu’s securitizing move, with the CCP seeking to securitize Japan’s actions to mitigate criticism of their handling of the dispute.

Understanding the Chinese nation to be the referent object with the aim of securing the CCP’s regime, raises a question as to why Wen’s speech act did not invoke the control strand in the same way that Jiang’s securitizing move did. Surely, if the CCP desired to reassert their control over the Chinese people to mitigate criticism and social unrest, evidence of the control strand would again be present, with the CCP’s regime serving as the referent object.

However, Wen’s securitizing move occurred in phase 3 of China’s dilemma of response. The basic facts mapped to this phase, as presented in section 4.2, were more nuanced than those mapped to phase 2. It can be concluded that the presence of control strand mechanics in Jiang’s securitizing move was a reflection of phase 2’s reactive and instinctive nature. The impact of this was that the CCP’s attempt to assert control via securitization was more overt. The greater nuance of phase 3 meant that Wen’s securitizing
move was more refined, presenting a securitization of Japan’s ‘mistake’ without alluding to the motive of securing the CCP’s regime.

This viewpoint is reinforced considering the interwoven structures of the CCP and the Chinese state. Holbraad and Pedersen (2012) argue that as they do not require the notional consent of those they govern to securitize, future act securitizations within party-state systems are governance tools. More specifically, tools used to generate legitimacy for the party-state by presenting the party-state as necessary for security (ibid.). Considering this, Wen’s future act securitizing move is all that would have been necessary for the CCP to leverage securitization to protect the CCP’s legitimacy. Therefore, the presence of control strand mechanics in Jiang’s speech act can be considered the consequence of insecure, instinctive decision-making during phase 2 of China’s dilemma of response.

As with the other two Chinese securitizations identified during the Trawler Incident, Wen’s securitizing move was inherently inter-level in its dynamics. This is the case as Wen’s speech act was motivated by the anti-Japanese protesters’ sub-unit saliency securitization, with these sub-unit actors intended as the audience.

Wen’s threat to Japan cannot be considered a macrosecuritizing move. His speech act was a response to sub-unit calls for an increase in the saliency of the perceived threat of Japan, not itself an attempt to increase the saliency of the perceived threat. What Wen’s threat speech does, however, is reinforce the earlier evidence of pre-existing macrosecuritizations of external threats to China and threats to the CCP’s regime security. The confluence of these two macrosecuritizations accounts for the political theatre and furtive nature of Wen’s securitizing move. This is apparent considering that Wen’s speech incorporated the protesters’ securitization of Japan. This acquiescence adheres to the pre-existing macrosecuritization of threats to the CCP. Meanwhile, China’s prime minister publicly speaking out against Japan would have contradicted China’s pre-existing macrosecuritization of external threats to China by risking provocation. Hence, Wen’s securitizing move was made before a limited audience and broadcast only on Chinese media, with only select excerpts made available for the international press. Considering this, both pre-existing macrosecuritizations can be observed in Wen’s securitizing move.
Moreover, Wen’s securitizing move indicates a securitization dilemma between the two pre-existing macrosecuritizations. On one hand, Wen could lean further into securitizing Japan to reinforce the CCP’s nationalist credentials at the risk of further antagonising Japan. On the other, Wen could have made efforts to reassure Japan and ease tensions to avoid creating an external threat to the Chinese nation, but in doing so, risk provoking greater criticism of the CCP’s regime from the protesters.

This securitization dilemma is evident in the balanced rhetoric of Wen’s speech act, particularly in Wen’s description of Japan’s behaviour as a ‘mistake’, as mistakes are not deliberate. While Wen framed Japan’s behaviour during the dispute as a threat to China, thus acquiescing to the protesters, the language used in this speech act implied that there were still opportunities for corrective action, and the easing of Sino-Japanese tensions. Wen’s decision to securitize Japan in acquiescence to the anti-Japanese protests indicates the securitization dilemma’s resolution in favour of the pre-existing macrosecuritization of threats to the CCP’s regime. However, the furtive nature of Wen’s speech act and the use of forgiving language indicates an awareness that this securitizing move could negatively impact the pre-existing macrosecuritization of external threats to China.

In summary, Wen’s threat to Japan was a future strand securitizing move with the Chinese nation as the audience. The securitizing move took the form of a speech act, and its referent object was the Chinese nation. Yet, the CCP’s motivation for conducting the securitizing move was to protect its regime’s legitimacy through acquiescence to the anti-Japanese protests. Inter-level dynamics were inherent in the securitizing move and there is evidence of a securitization dilemma between the pre-existing macrosecuritizations of external threats to China and threats to the CCP’s regime security.

Maehara’s Threat of Retaliation (5.4)
There are two basic facts mapped to Japan’s dilemma of response. Of these, only Maehara’s threat of retaliation over unilateral energy exploration contains any securitization mechanics. As foreign minister, Maehara was an authoritative unit-level securitizing actor with a national platform, whose legitimacy was supported by his sub-unit role as a prominent revisionist in the Japanese government. The illocutionary logic of the future strand is found in his statement:
‘If we can find proof [of unilateral Chinese energy exploration], our country will take appropriate measures’ (Maehara cited in Fackler and Johnson, 2010a).

While vague on detail and contingent on the condition of proof, this statement espouses that ‘appropriate measures’, X, will be necessary to counter unilateral Chinese energy exploration, threat Y. This securitizing move should be considered a weak attempt at securitization. Attaching a qualifying condition to what should be presented as an existential threat is contrary to said threat being existential in nature. Either the perceived threat warrants immediate and exceptional action to address, or it does not.

A potential explanation for the weakness of Maehara’s securitizing move is that it was contrary to how prime minister Kan wanted to manage the dispute. As a revisionist, Maehara was more open to the use of force and/or coercion in Japan’s foreign policy than Kan, and as foreign minister would have been able to shape Japan’s response accordingly. However, Maehara was still overseen by a traditionalist prime minister which likely tempered the rhetoric of his securitizing move.

Moreover, these sub-unit dynamics also account for the failure of Maehara’s securitizing move. The statement released on Kan’s behalf was a desecuritizing move. Desecuritization is an understudied phenomenon relating to the transition of an issue from the realm of security back into day-to-day politics (Buzan et al., 1998). It can also apply to actions taken to prevent securitization, such as countering a securitizing move (Bourbeau and Vuori, 2015). Hansen (2012) explains that one form of counteraction is rearticulation desecuritization, when a social elite reiterates the need for a political solution to an issue to prevent the pursuit of exceptional measures through securitization. The statement released on Kan’s behalf fits this description:

‘...what is needed is to respond calmly without becoming emotional’ (cited in Brautigam and Rithmire, 2021).

This statement rearticulated the need for a desecuritized solution to Japan’s dispute with China in response to Maehara’s threat made earlier the same day. This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, because for a desecuritizing move to have been made there must have been a real belief at the time that Maehara was conducting a securitizing move that had a possibility of success. Secondly, it accounts for the failure of Maehara’s
Securitizing move, as the result of the sub-unit disagreement over how to handle Japan’s dispute with China was resolved in favour of traditionalists in the Japanese government.

Securitization is often presented as an all or nothing (see Buzan et al., 1998), with securitizing actors either making their best case for an issue’s securitization or not at all. Maehara’s unsuccessful securitization suggests an alternative understanding. This alternate interpretation is that a securitizing actor, perhaps constrained by political circumstance as Maehara was, might conduct a weaker securitizing move than they would otherwise. This weaker securitizing move, while not particularly likely to result in securitization, may still lead others to fear the repercussions of the securitizing move’s potential impact.

The format of Maehara’s securitizing move was a speech act, having been articulated in a statement before Japanese media (Fackler and Johnson, 2010a). Given in front of the national media, it is reasonable to conclude that the primary audience of the speech act was the Japanese people.

There was no explicit expression of what the referent object of Maehara’s securitizing move was. As with Wen’s referent object in his speech act made on September 21st, this makes it impossible to conclude what Maehara’s referent object was with absolute certainty. However, given that Maehara’s threat was a response to Chinese unilateral energy exploration, it is probable that the referent object was Japan’s energy security. Given its over-reliance on OPEC oil reaching Japan through strategic bottlenecks, such as the Hormuz and Malacca Straits, energy security was high on Japan’s security agenda (Manicom, 2009). Additionally, following the 2008 recession, Japan’s economic recovery plans relied on cheap energy to boost manufacturing (OPEC, 2010), increasing the importance of securing and expanding Japan’s energy supplies. It is thus reasonable that rumors of Chinese energy exploration in what Japan considered its territorial waters was considered a threat to Japan’s energy security and, by extension, its economy. As such, the probable referent object of Japanese energy security is situated in the economic security sector.

As with China’s securitizations, Japan’s was inherently inter-level in nature. This is evident in the role that the sub-unit political divide between traditionalists and revisionists
had in the weak nature of Maehara’s unit-level securitizing move, and the securitization-desecuritization phenomenon outlined above.

Maehara’s securitizing move was not a macrosecuritizing move as it did not privilege threats to Japanese energy security over any other issues. Meanwhile, the securitization-desecuritization dynamics do not constitute a securitization dilemma as securitizing China as a threat to Japanese energy security did not appear to undermine any other unit-level securitizations. Arguably, at the sub-unit level, traditionalists and revisionists were enacting competing securitizations which caused the securitization-desecuritization phenomenon. This does not constitute a securitization dilemma however, rather highlighting the differing interpretations of Japan’s security interests between traditionalists and revisionists. The significance of sub-unit debate over differing interpretations of the unit-level security agenda is beyond the remit of this thesis but warrants further study in the future.

To conclude, Maehara’s threat of retaliation was a weak future act securitizing move. It was weakened, and ultimately unsuccessful, due to Maehara’s position as a revisionist in a traditionalist administration. This is most evident in the subsequent desecuritizing move represented by the statement released on Kan’s behalf. Maehara’s securitizing move took the form of a speech act and was conducted with the Japanese people as the intended audience. The probable referent object was Japan’s energy security, a referent object within the economic sector. While not constituting a macrosecuritization itself, Maehara’s unsuccessful securitizing move indicates a pre-existing macrosecuritization, probably of threats to Japanese national interests. The securitizing move was inherently inter-level in nature, with sub-unit political divisions fuelling the securitization-desecuritization phenomenon that can be observed.

Summary (5.5)
This chapter presented the application of step 3 of the analytical framework to the Trawler Incident. In doing so, it identified securitization mechanics among several of the basic facts which were mapped to the case study’s security dilemmas in step 2.

There were three Chinese securitizing moves. The first of these was the anti-Japanese protests. These protests were a collection of microsecuritizing moves which together represented a sub-unit saliency securitizing move. These microsecuritizing moves
sought to inform China’s unit-level decision-making. The format of the microsecuritization included securitizing speech acts, images, and actions, and its referent object was the Chinese nation. The protesters’ legitimacy as microsecuritizing actors drew upon their experience as history activists and the Trawler Incident’s validation of their warnings of Japanese militarism and aggression. The saliency securitizing move can also be considered a macrosecuritizing move, while at the same time indicating a pre-existing macrosecuritization of external threats to China.

The second Chinese securitizing move was the announcement of naval deployments. Spokesperson Jiang’s speech act was a multi-strand securitization, employing elements of both the past act and control strands of securitization. For the past act component of the securitizing move, the referent object was the Chinese nation. For the control component, the referent object was the CCP’s regime. The latter indicates a pre-existing macrosecuritization of threats to the CCP’s regime security.

China’s third securitizing move was Wen’s threat to Japan. Wen’s speech act constituted a future strand securitization, with the CCP’s legitimacy serving as the referent object and the Chinese people serving as the audience. This securitization also contains a securitization dilemma between the pre-existing macrosecuritizations of external threats to China and threats to the CCP’s regime security. This is apparent in the performative, furtive nature of Wen’s securitizing move. Yet even the occurrence of Wen’s securitizing move implies the resolution of the securitization dilemma in favour of the CCP’s regime security.

There was only one Japanese securitizing move during the Trawler Incident. This was Maehara’s threat of retaliation over unilateral energy exploration. Taking the format of a speech act, the referent object of this future act securitizing move was Japan’s energy security. Maehara’s securitizing move was weak and ultimately unsuccessful due to sub-unit political divisions over how to handle the dispute with China. Significantly, these disagreements resulted in a desecuritizing move on behalf of Kan to counter Maehara’s securitizing move.

The details uncovered about China and Japan’s securitizing moves during the Trawler Incident highlight this thesis’s contribution to knowledge in the form of its unique analytical framework. The framework has enabled the identification of the securitization mechanics at
play in the security dilemmas within the Sino-Japanese security paradox cycle pertaining to the Trawler Incident. The following steps will use this information to provide answers to the primary research question.

It is also important to note that the granular exploration of the Trawler Incident for securitization mechanics is itself a unique contribution. Additionally, several other phenomena were identified as part of the framework’s application that warrant further study outside of this thesis. These include desecuritization, multi-strand securitizations, sub-unit macrosecuritizations influencing unit-level securitizations, and the significance of sub-unit political interpretation informing unit-level securitization.
Chapter 6 – The Trawler Incident – Steps 4 and 5

This chapter focuses on the way in which historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War factored in the case study’s securitizing moves. It then takes a holistic view of steps 1-4, presenting how the historical narratives of the war affected the Sino-Japanese security paradox.

Step 4 employs Jutila’s (2015) insights into the ways in which historical narratives may factor in securitizations. This revealed that China’s Nationalist Narrative factored in the securitizing moves represented by the anti-Japanese protests and Wen’s threat to Japan. Meanwhile, historical narratives of the war did not factor in Maehara’s securitizing move, but Japan’s Traditional Narrative can be observed in the subsequent desecuritizing move made on behalf of prime minister Kan.

Step 5 concludes that the historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War both helped to propel and mitigate the Sino-Japanese security paradox during the Trawler Incident. The Nationalist Narrative was particularly prominent in propelling the security paradox, with the Revisionist Narrative also contributing in this manner to a lesser degree. On the other hand, the Traditional Narrative encouraged Japanese security dilemma sensibility and engagement in reassurance games. Additionally, step 5 presents some reflections on the other insights achieved through the application of the thesis’s unique analytical framework and considerations as to how the framework could be improved.

Step 4 - Historical Narratives and Securitization (6.1)
This step presents how historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War factored in the case study’s securitizing moves. The historical narratives in question, China’s Nationalist Narrative and Japan’s Traditional and Revisionist Narratives, were outlined in chapter 3. The four ways in which historical narratives may factor in the securitization were presented in section 2.5.4. They are briefly re-introduced below.
A historical narrative may factor as a facilitating condition if it connects with and draws upon the audience’s historical consciousness, increasing the securitization’s chance of success. This can take two forms. Firstly, through thematic engagement with a historical narrative’s key specific themes. Secondly, by using a historical narrative as the foundation of the securitizing actor’s legitimacy. For example, by being considered a historical expert regarding the issue being presented as a threat.

A historical narrative may also serve as anecdotal evidence in a securitizing move, evident in specific reference to historical events in line with the historical narratives’ key specific themes. In speech acts this is relatively easy to identify in the securitizing actor’s rhetoric. Concerning securitizing images and actions, a historical narrative serving as anecdotal evidence can be found in the securitizing move’s symbolism.

A historical narrative may factor as a referent object if it is presented as the thing which is being threatened. Referent objects were identified in step 3, though if a historical narrative informed, or forms a part of, the referent object, it will be discussed in this step. Jutila (ibid.) argues that if a historical narrative forms part of a referent object, there is usually academic and/or popular support for the securitization of the issue at hand. This can be used as a means of identifying historical narratives within the referent objects presented in step 3.

A historical narrative may factor in a securitization as the perceived threat. This occurs if the other’s historical interpretation is considered a threat to a community’s ideals and values. Jutila (ibid.) explains that the securitization of a historical narrative is likely indirect through the securitization of a related issue. However, if a historical narrative serves as an aspect of a perceived threat, there will be a blurring of historical narratives’ themes. This occurs because one community will be interpreting the other’s historical narrative through the lens of their own historical understanding of the history in question.

China’s Anti-Japanese Protests (6.1.1)
China’s Nationalist Narrative served as a facilitating condition in the anti-Japanese protesters’ saliency securitization. The arrest of Chinese fishermen, in what the Chinese consider their territory, easily aligns with the Nationalist Narrative’s key specific theme of Japanese victimisation of China. The arrests were considered an example of perceived
injustice perpetuated by Japan against the Chinese nation, whose claim to sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is based upon fishing. Certainly, the anti-Japanese protesters drew upon this alignment with the theme of Japanese victimisation in their rhetoric. This accounts for descriptions of ‘the Japanese bully’ (Lim, 2010), casting Japan as the victimiser and China as the victim in the dispute.

In this scenario, the anti-Japanese protesters invoked the Nationalist Narrative’s key specific theme of Japanese victimisation of China to resonate with the historical consciousness of the CCP, the securitizing move’s primary audience. Jutila (2015) argues that historical narratives draw upon an audience’s historical consciousness via the community’s historically rooted subjective values and ideals. In this instance, it appears the CCP was instead conscious that the historical narrative being invoked was the one upon which the CCP premised its regime legitimacy. This is apparent given that the CCP resolved its securitization dilemma between the pre-existing macrosecuritizations of external threats to China and threats to its regime legitimacy in favour of the latter in phases 2 and 3 of its dilemma of response. This resolution indicates that the anti-Japanese protesters’ invocation of the Nationalist Narrative resonated with the CCP’s conscious need to adhere to its legitimating historical narrative. Resultantly, this facilitated the success of the anti-Japanese protesters’ saliency securitization, causing the CCP to act against Japan in subsequent basic facts.

The Nationalist Narrative also facilitated the legitimacy of the anti-Japanese protesters. This view is based upon section 5.1’s discussion concerning the protesters’ links to history activism. The protesters had established themselves as experts on historic Japanese victimisation of China and as advocates for vigilance against the return of Japanese militarism, in accordance with the key specific themes of the Nationalist Narrative. Once Japan arrested the trawler crew in what China considers its territory, the history activists among the anti-Japanese protesters were further legitimated. In this regard, the Nationalist Narrative also indirectly facilitated the success of the anti-Japanese protesters’ saliency securitization, by helping to legitimate the anti-Japanese protesters as securitizing actors.

Despite vague references to wartime atrocities by the anti-Japanese protesters, such as the murder and rape of Chinese nationals (The Observers, 2010), the Nationalist Narrative did not factor in this securitization as anecdotal evidence. These references lacked
the specificity to be considered anecdotal. Similarly, the securitizing images of Mao carried by the anti-Japanese protesters lacked the necessary specificity to invoke the Nationalist Narrative as anecdotal evidence. Records of the exact depictions of Mao carried in 2010 are limited, but the use of depictions of Mao in the 2005 and 2012 anti-Japanese protests (Watts, 2005; N.D., 2012; Huang, 2012) makes it possible to extrapolate likely depictions used during the Trawler Incident.

Public discourse concerning Mao is that of a strong leader, hence the use of Mao as a securitizing image in a saliency securitization calling upon the CCP for a stronger response to Japan. Yet, the depictions most used by anti-Japanese protesters are of an older Mao. Predominately versions of his state portrait that is hung in Tiananmen Square (N.D., 2012; Huang, 2012). Significantly, this means that the images focus on Mao as a strong leader generally, rather than as anecdotal evidence of his being a strong wartime leader in opposing Japan specifically. If the latter were the anti-Japanese protesters’ intention, they might have carried depictions of Mao in his wartime uniform or leading his Eighth Route Army troops into battle against Japan.

This raises questions as to why anti-Japanese protesters chose to use Mao’s state portrait given the depiction’s symbolic significance. This discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis but warrants further consideration elsewhere. Plausibly, stately depictions of Mao are considered comforting during times of perceived crisis. This aligns with Van Rythoven’s (2015) work on the emotional underpinnings of securitization, which could serve to underpin a future avenue of research.

The date on which the height of the anti-Japanese protests occurred warrants discussion. September 18th is the anniversary of the Mukden Incident, usually considered the start of the prelude to the Second Sino-Japanese War (Mitter, 2013). The fact that the anti-Japanese protests reached their height on this anniversary is significant. The symbolism that the act of protesting on this date invokes could be argued as constituting the Nationalist Narrative factoring as anecdotal evidence.

The anniversary of the Mukden Incident would have symbolically served as evidence in support of the anti-Japanese protesters’ securitizing move. However, this symbolism does not factor in the protesters’ rhetoric, making invocation of the Nationalist Narrative by way
of the Mukden Incident’s anniversary incidental at best. It is more likely that the anniversary compounded the scale of the anti-Japanese protests by commemorating historic Japanese victimisation. In doing so, it tacitly promoted public participation in opposition to Japan’s arrest of the trawler crew and the perceived weakness of the CCP’s response. In this sense, the Mukden Incident’s anniversary provided further means for the Nationalist Narrative to indirectly factor as a facilitating condition for the success of the protester’s saliency securitization, rather than factoring directly as anecdotal evidence.

Step 3 concluded that the referent object of the protesters’ saliency securitizing move was the Chinese nation. Plausibly, the Nationalist Narrative may have factored as a component of this referent object. This aligns with Jutila’s (2015) explanation that a historical narrative factoring as part of a referent object often correlates with popular public support for a securitizing move, as seen in the popular support of the protests during the Trawler Incident (Buckley, 2010). Yet, this popular support could also derive from the narrative’s facilitation of the anti-Japanese’s protesters’ legitimacy as securitizing actors. It could also result from the incidental gravitas that the Mukden incident provided to the securitization. With popular support accountable through other means and in the absence of further evidence, the Nationalist Narrative is concluded not to have factored in the securitization’s referent object.

Neither Japan’s Traditional nor Revisionist Narrative were the perceived threat of the anti-Japanese protester’s securitizing move. However, the Revisionist Narrative likely factored in the protesters’ perception of Japan as a threat to China. If a historical narrative factored as part of a perceived threat, it is observed through the securitization of an associated issue (Jutila, 2015). Anti-Japanese protesters concerned by the Revisionist Narrative would have been more inclined to protest against Japan during the Trawler Incident. The precedent for this is provided by the 2005 textbook protests, during which Chinese nationalists directly protested the teaching of the Revisionist Narrative in Japanese textbooks (Watts, 2005). Clearly, although the Revisionist Narrative itself was not the perceived threat, Japanese revisionism was a likely component in the anti-Japanese protesters’ perception of Japan as a threat at the time of the Trawler Incident.

To summarise, the Nationalist Narrative factored prominently in the anti-Japanese protesters’ saliency securitization as a facilitating condition. It did so in two ways, by
resonating with the CCP’s historical consciousness, and by facilitating the legitimacy of the anti-Japanese protesters as securitizing actors. The Nationalist Narrative did not factor as anecdotal evidence, nor did it factor as part of the referent object. Meanwhile, the Revisionist Narrative factored implicitly in the perceived threat of the securitization.

China’s Announcement of Naval Deployments (6.1.2)
In contrast, the Nationalist Narrative did not factor as a facilitating condition in the past act/control strand securitization represented by China’s announcement of naval deployments. This is evident as Spokeswoman Jiang did not invoke the narrative’s key specific themes. Initially, this appears illogical. As discussed in section 4.2.1, the announcement of naval deployments occurred in phase 2 of China’s dilemma of response, with the CCP responding instinctively to the anti-Japanese protests by acting more assertively towards Japan. Given this, it would be rational to assume that the CCP would invoke its legitimating historical narrative to counter the nationalistic criticism arising from the anti-Japanese protests.

However, as presented in section 5.2, the CCP sought to use Jiang’s securitizing move to assert control over the anti-Japanese protests. Considering this, the absence of the Nationalist Narrative is understandable as invoking the narrative’s key specific themes would have been counterproductive to asserting control. Plausibly, a CCP official invoking the Nationalist Narrative could have further legitimated the history activists among the anti-Japanese protesters, in turn strengthening the indirect way the Nationalist Narrative facilitated the success of the protesters’ saliency securitization. Thereby creating more pressure on the CCP to act against Japan. Invoking the Nationalist Narrative would also have likely increased anti-Japanese sentiment in China and made it more difficult for the CCP to assert control of the situation.

This explanation for the absence of the Nationalist Narrative in Jiang’s securitizing move is reinforced considering the pre-existing macrosecuritizations discussed in chapter 5. Asserting control in a way that would not fuel greater anti-Japanese sentiment, thus decreasing the likelihood of provoking Japan and its allies, adheres to both pre-existing macrosecuritizations of external threats to China and threats to the CCP’s regime. Meanwhile, by invoking the Nationalist Narrative while pressuring the CCP to act more assertively towards Japan, the anti-Japanese protesters were deviating from the CCP’s
macrosecuritization of its regime legitimacy. This therefore required a *control strand* securitization to address what the CCP likely perceived as a potential threat to its regime legitimacy. Invoking the Nationalist Narrative in Jiang’s securitizing move might have conferred the CCP’s regime legitimacy a short-term boost. Yet, it would have likely persisted the anti-Japanese protests and thus sustained the perceived threat to the CCP’s regime in the medium term.

The Nationalist Narrative did not factor as anecdotal evidence in Jiang’s securitizing move. Although there was some specific symbolism pertaining to China’s territorial claim being based upon fishing, this symbolism does not align with the key specific themes of the Nationalist Narrative, nor is fishing associated with the Second Sino-Japanese War.

Step 3 identified two referent objects for Jiang’s securitizing move, one for each of the securitization strands employed. The *past act strand*’s referent object was symbolically the Chinese nation but was nominally ‘the lives and property of Chinese fishermen’ (People’s Daily, 2010). An economic referent object unrelated to the Nationalist Narrative. Regarding the *control strand* component of the securitizing move, the referent object was the CCP’s regime. Arguably, the Nationalist Narrative formed part of this referent object as the CCP sought to protect its regime by way of upholding the regime legitimacy it gained from the Nationalist Narrative. However, seeking to secure the political implications of a historical narrative does not equate to the thematic invocation of said narrative. Accordingly, the Nationalist Narrative did not factor in either referent object of Jiang’s securitizing move.

There is a causal thread linking the Revisionist Narrative to the perceived threat of Japan in Jiang’s securitizing move. The announcement of naval deployments was an acquiescence to the protesters’ demands which, as discussed in section 6.1.1, were informed in part by concern over Japanese revisionism. Yet, while this causal link between Japan’s Revisionist Narrative and the perceived threat of Jiang’s securitizing move existed, it does not mean that the Revisionist Narrative factored in the perceived threat in a meaningful way. Jiang made no reference to Japan’s wartime historical narratives in their rhetoric, instead focussing on the legality of arresting Chinese nationals in what China considers its territory (People’s Daily, 2010). This cannot be considered framing the Revisionist Narrative as a threat.
No historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War factored in Jiang’s securitizing move in the ways outlined by Jutila. Yet, insights were still gained. The absence of the Nationalist Narrative as a facilitating condition of anecdotal evidence was accounted for. Additionally, it was clarified that while the Nationalist Narrative and Revisionist Narratives can be associated with the referent object and perceived threat of Jiang’s securitizing move, neither factored in these components in a meaningful way.

Wen Jiabao’s threat to Japan (6.1.3)
As a facilitating condition, Wen did not require the Nationalist Narrative to confer their legitimacy as a securitizing actor. Rather, as China’s Prime Minister, Wen held a position which, as per traditional Securitization Theory (Buzan et al., 1998), demarcated him as a social elite necessarily authoritative to securitize an issue at the unit level. The Nationalist Narrative did, however, help to facilitate the success of Wen’s securitizing move.

However, this is not due to Wen invoking the narrative explicitly. In the available excerpts of Wen’s speech there is no outright accusation of Japanese victimisation of China, no rallying cry for national unity in resisting Japan, nor calls for further public participation in anti-Japanese protests (FMPRC, 2010). As discussed in section 6.1.2, a CCP official overtly invoking the Nationalist Narrative in such a manner could risk escalating the anti-Japanese protests, which, by the time of Wen’s speech, had just reached their height.

Rather, the act of a senior CCP official conducting a securitizing move framing Japan’s ‘mistake’ as a threat to China is an implicit alignment with the key specific theme of national unity in resisting Japan. Threatening Japan was an example of the Chinese resistance to an outside power and the kind of strong response sought by the anti-Japanese protesters in their saliency securitization. Given that the anti-Japanese protesters’ desire for a strong response to Japan was rooted in the Nationalist Narrative, and that the protests declined in scale after Wen’s speech, indicates that Wen’s securitizing move resonated with its audience. The Chinese people’s expectations of the CCP, rooted in their historical consciousness, having been met. In this manner, the Nationalist Narrative factored as a facilitating condition for the success of this securitization due to Wen’s adherence to one of the narrative’s key specific themes.
As with Jiang’s speech act, Wen’s speech lacked anecdotal evidence drawn from the events of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Plausibly, Wen’s act of threatening Japan could itself be a reference to a wartime threat by Chinese leadership, thus invoking the Nationalist Narrative anecdotally in a symbolic sense. Yet, there are no clear parallels between Wen’s threat and the rhetoric of China’s wartime leaders. There were no comparable wartime threats made against Japan by China. Rather, at the outset of hostilities, Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-Shek infamously spoke about the limits of China’s ability to fight Japan (Taiwan Review, 1987). Meanwhile, the CCP, being militarily and economically weaker than the Kuomintang at the start of the war, were in no position to make open threats against the Japanese (Mitter, 2013).

The referent object of Wen’s securitizing move was the Chinese nation, to be protected from Japan’s ‘mistake’. In this, the Nationalist Narrative was not the referent object. Nor did it factor as part of this referent object. This is for the same reason that it did not factor in Jiang’s securitizing move. The CCP attempting to adhere to the Nationalist Narrative to uphold its regime legitimacy, even if this legitimacy is premised on the narrative, does not constitute an effort to secure the narrative itself. Consequently, the Nationalist Narrative did not factor in the referent object of Wen’s securitizing move.

Neither the Traditional Narrative nor Revisionist Narrative factored in Wen’s securitizing move as part of the perceived threat. This is apparent as Wen did not engage with either narratives’ key specific themes. Although, given that Wen’s securitizing move follows in the case study’s causal narrative from the height of the anti-Japanese protests, it has the same causal link to the Revisionist Narrative that Jiang’s securitizing move had.

Unlike Jiang’s securitizing move, the Nationalist Narrative did factor in Wen’s securitizing move as a facilitating condition. Wen’s threat to Japan resonated with the Chinese people’s historically rooted expectations of the CCP, established by the Nationalist Narrative. Beyond this, no other means in which historical narratives factored in this securitizing move in the ways outlined by Jutila. Although there was again a causal link tracing back to the Revisionist Narrative by way of the anti-Japanese protests.
Maehara’s Threat of Retaliation (6.1.4)
The Revisionist Narrative factored in Maehara’s securitizing move by establishing the circumstances in which the securitizing move occurred. As outlined in section 4.1, Maehara was appointed as foreign minister due to having support among revisionists at a time that the Democratic Party sought to garner greater support for its government. Additionally, as discussed in section 3.3, the political connotations of the Revisionist Narrative include a more assertive foreign policy. Hence, the Revisionist Narrative factored in Maehara’s appointment as foreign minister, and his revisionist leanings predisposed him to conducting his securitizing move.

However, this does not constitute the Revisionist Narrative factoring in Maehara’s securitizing move as a facilitating condition. Maehara’s legitimacy as a securitizing actor came from his authority as Foreign Minister. For the Revisionist Narrative to facilitate further legitimacy for Maehara as a securitizing actor would have been redundant. Also, given that there are competing Japanese historical narratives of the war, if Maehara attempted to legitimate himself via the Revisionist Narrative it would likely have lessened his legitimacy among traditionalists. This puts into question the extent to which the Revisionist Narrative could have facilitated Maehara’s legitimacy at the unit level if it were necessary.

In terms of facilitating success, Maehara did not invoke the Revisionist Narrative to increase his securitizing move’s prospects of success. This is apparent as Maehara’s speech act failed to engage with its key specific themes of moral justification and Japanese victimhood. Rather, Maehara focussed sternly on the matter at hand without deviation (Fackler and Johnson, 2010a). This absence of historical narratives is again likely due to the contested nature of Japan’s wartime history, invoking one narrative at the unit level, facilitating the securitizing move’s successful acceptance with one part of the audience lessening its chance of success with the other part. Resultantly, it is concluded that the Revisionist Narrative did not factor in Maehara’s securitizing move as a facilitating condition.

The Revisionist Narrative did not factor in Maehara’s securitizing move as anecdotal evidence either. This is by virtue of the absence of any references to the war or the Revisionist Narrative. If invoking the Revisionist Narrative generally risked alienating a large
proportion of the securitizing move’s audience, specific anecdotal references would have incurred even greater risk, undermining the securitizing move’s chances of success rather than supporting them.

Notably, the Traditional Narrative did factor as a facilitating condition in the subsequent desecuritizing move conducted on behalf of prime minister Kan. The desecuritizing move invoked the key specific theme of introspection, evident in its call for reflective contemplation and emphasis on the need to ‘respond calmly without becoming emotional’ (cited in Brautigam and Rithmire, 2021).

Although the Revisionist Narrative was growing in popularity, the Traditional Narrative was still the more dominant narrative at the time (Suzuki, 2015). It was particularly so among the more politically active older generations (ibid.). By invoking the key specific theme of introspection, the desecuritizing move resonated with the historical consciousness of what was the more prominent part of Japanese society. Given that it was concluded earlier that Maehara avoided reference to the Revisionist Narrative and its key specific themes as part of his audience were traditionalists, it is logical that invoking the Traditionalist Narrative in this way facilitated the success of the desecuritizing move. This would have further undermined Maehara’s chances of gaining support from a demographic already predisposed to oppose his securitizing move. Clearly, the Traditionalist Narrative factored in the success of the desecuritizing move and, by extension, the failure of Maehara’s securitizing move.

Despite factoring as a facilitating condition, the Traditional Narrative did not factor in the desecuritizing move as anecdotal evidence. While the statement released by Kan’s Office called for introspection, this was limited to reflection of the Trawler Incident itself. Kan’s Office could have referred to historic Japanese militarism to guide traditionalists in their reflections of the Trawler Incident, supporting the desecuritizing move with anecdotal evidence of when Japan last practised international politics through threats and aggression. Yet, this did not occur, perhaps due to fear that specific reference to Japan’s wartime history would escalate Japan’s political debate between traditionalists and revisionists. This outcome could have fractured the Democratic Party’s waning support base as a party of both traditionalists and revisionists. Also, if revisionists became more vocal in advocating the Revisionist Narrative in reaction to traditionalists making specific reference to wartime
events, this would have likely further antagonised China. It is also important to remember that traditionalist introspection manifests with the appearance of historical amnesia in public discourse, discussed in section 3.3.2. This would also explain the absence of specific references to wartime events in the desecuritizing move.

Neither of Japan’s historical narratives factored in Maehara’s securitizing move. As discussed in section 5.4, the securitizing move’s referent object was likely Japan’s energy security. This was an economic sector referent object unrelated to either the Traditional or Revisionist Narrative. As Jutila (2015) argues, popular and/or academic support for a securitizing move is an indicator that a historical narrative factors more generally in a securitizing move. However, Maehara’s securitizing move was unsuccessful, indicating a lack of popular support. Meanwhile, although revisionism had some mainstream academic support in 2010 (Vogel, 2019), there is no evidence of academic support for Maehara’s securitizing move specifically. This indicates that Japan’s historical narratives neither factored as the referent object nor as an aspect of the referent object.

In terms of perceived threat, it could be argued that the Nationalist Narrative factored indirectly in Maehara’s securitizing move. China’s unilateral energy exploration hypothetically being securitized in association with the Nationalist Narrative as per Jutila’s (2015) explanation of how historical narratives are securitized indirectly via associated issues. This is unlikely, however. While Maehara may have been concerned about Chinese nationalism and its expression in the form of anti-Japanese protests rooted in the Nationalist Narrative, energy exploration is not inherently linked to Chinese nationalism. This makes an association between China’s unilateral energy exploration and the Nationalist Narrative illogical without evidence to the contrary. Moreover, it has already been established that Japan’s energy insecurity was rooted in its post-2008 economic recovery. Thus, it is more likely that Maehara considered China’s unilateral energy security a threat because of its implications for Japan’s economy, rather than due to links with the Nationalist Narrative. This demonstrates that historical narratives did not factor in the perceived threat of Maehara’s securitizing move.

Japan’s historical narratives did not factor in Maehara’s securitizing move as facilitating conditions. However, the Traditional Narrative did factor in the subsequent desecuritizing move through engagement with the key specific theme of introspection. To
this end, the Traditional Narrative indirectly facilitated the failure of Maehara’s securitizing move. Additionally, neither narrative factored in Maehara’s securitizing move as anecdotal evidence or as part of the referent object. Meanwhile, the Nationalist Narrative did not factor in the perceived threat of Maehara’s securitizing move.

Step 5 – Holistic Analysis of Findings (6.2)
This step draws together the findings of steps 1-4, presenting the conclusions drawn from the Trawler Incident case study in contribution to answering this thesis’s primary research question: how do historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War factor in the Sino-Japanese security paradox? Following this, several other insights gained are re-iterated. These, while not necessarily beneficial to answering the primary research question, warrant further research. Additionally, throughout this step, reflections are offered regarding this thesis’s unique analytical framework.

Propelling the Security Paradox (6.2.1)
Historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War helped to propel the security paradox pertaining to the Trawler Incident. Most prominently, the Nationalist Narrative, which was significant in propelling the Sino-Japanese Security paradox via two securitizing moves, the anti-Japanese protesters’ saliency securitization and Wen’s future act securitization.
Concerning the anti-Japanese protests, the narrative helped to facilitate the legitimacy of the protesters as microsecuritizing actors and the success of their collective saliency securitization by resonating with the CCP’s historical consciousness. This is key as, in step 2, it was concluded that the anti-Japanese protests were an input for China’s dilemma of interpretation, encouraging a more malicious interpretation of Japan’s behaviour in the Trawler Incident. This links the Nationalist Narrative to the Sino-Japanese security paradox, it factored substantially in the anti-Japanese protests which in turn propelled the security paradox.

Furthermore, step 1 concluded that the height of the anti-Japanese protests on September 18th marked the end of China’s dilemma of interpretation. Not any basic fact representing a Japanese action. Accordingly, the view that the Nationalist Narrative was significant in propelling the security paradox is reinforced. The Nationalist Narrative not only factored in the securitization process of a basic fact which input into China’s dilemma of
interpretation but in the basic fact that concluded China’s interpretation of the Trawler Incident and thus informed its assertiveness in its dilemma of response.

The Nationalist Narrative’s role in the anti-Japanese protests was also significant in China’s dilemma of response. This is because, as presented in step 2, China’s dilemma of response proceeded through three phases. The first was largely benign, the second was reactive and the third was relatively nuanced in terms of outputs produced. What is notable is that the basic fact of the anti-Japanese protests beginning on September 8th and their height on the 18th demarcate the transition between these phases.

As outlined in section 2.1.2, the way in which the dilemma of interpretation is resolved informs the way in which the dilemma of response is resolved. Thus, that the anti-Japanese protests demarcate the phases of China’s response shows the significance of the anti-Japanese protests. The protests’ saliency securitization facilitated by the Nationalist Narrative being so significant in informing China’s dilemma of interpretation that there was an almost immediate, observable change in the outputs produced in China’s dilemma of response.

This significance alludes to the success of the anti-Japanese protesters’ sub-unit saliency securitization in influencing a unit level security dilemma. Given that, as concluded in step 4 in section 6.1.1, the Nationalist Narrative facilitated the success of the saliency securitization by resonating with its audience’s historical consciousness, it becomes clear that the Nationalist Narrative factored in the Sino-Japanese security paradox. Predisposing China to respond the Trawler Incident in the way that it did, triggering a subsequent Japanese security dilemma and thus further propelling the Sino-Japanese security paradox.

It is possible to delve deeper and gain an understanding as to how exactly the Nationalist Narrative predisposed China to propel the Sino-Japanese security paradox rather than mitigate it. This is done through a discussion of the secondary security dilemma/paradox concepts. Step 2 highlighted evidence of security dilemma sensibility in China’s security dilemma, an awareness that how China responds could provoke Japan and thus propel the security paradox. This conclusion was made based upon the nuances in phase 3 of China’s response, the political theatre of Wen’s securitizing move and the efforts taken to hide Wen’s speech from Japan. It is reinforced by step 3’s discussion of framing
Japan’s behaviour as ‘mistake’, this language being another example of nuance indicative of security dilemma sensibility.

Some security dilemma sensibility is observed in phase 2 of China’s dilemma of response. This is in Jiang’s choice of symbolic referent object, Chinese fishing communities. As discussed in step 4, in section 6.1.2, this would have helped appease the anti-Japanese protesters given the symbolism of fishing as the basis of China’s claim to the disputed islands. At the same time, the nominal referent object of Jiang’s speech act would also have helped mitigate the risk of provoking Japan as the prosperity of fishing communities was not a contentious issue in Sino-Japanese relations. This example shows Chinese security dilemma sensibility to have been present early on in China’s security dilemma.

However, despite the presence of security dilemma sensibility, China did not engage in a reassurance game to mitigate the security paradox. An observation noted in step 2, in section 4.2.3. The Nationalist Narrative can account for this by way of the securitization dilemma between the pre-existing macrosecuritizations of external threats to China and threats to the CCP’s regime legitimacy. Engaging in a reassurance game in the dispute with Japan in accordance with the macrosecuritization of external threats risked undermining the CCP’s nationalist credentials and undermining the macrosecuritization of threats to the CCP’s regime legitimacy. Meanwhile, for the CCP to lean into its nationalist credentials to adhere to the macrosecuritization of threats to the CCP risked alienating Japan and thus was non-compliant with the macrosecuritization of external threats to China. It was concluded in step 3 that the CCP resolved its securitization dilemma in favour of regime legitimacy. Step 4 discussed that this was, at least in part, because of the CCP’s need to meet the nationalistic standards set for itself in the Nationalist Narrative to appease the protesters. Accordingly, the Nationalist Narrative’s role in the CCP’s resolution of its securitization dilemma in favour of its regime legitimacy actively worked against the effective expression of security dilemma sensibility in the form of a reassurance game.

This viewpoint is supported by how the Nationalist Narrative was invoked as a facilitating condition in Wen’s securitizing move. It is logical that if the Nationalist Narrative was a significant factor in pressuring the CCP to resolve its securitization dilemma in favour of its regime legitimacy, the Nationalist Narrative be invoked to facilitate the success of the CCP’s securitizing move in the later phase of its dilemma of response. Accordingly, the
Nationalist Narrative helped to propel the Sino-Japanese security paradox by facilitating the success of the saliency securitization which informed China’s dilemma of interpretation. Doing so to the extent that there was an immediate change in the outputs of China’s dilemma of response and that the CCP resolved its securitization dilemma in a way that predisposed China against exercising security dilemma sensibility to mitigate the security paradox.

Meanwhile, Japan’s Revisionist Narrative also propelled the security paradox, albeit in a much less significant way than the Nationalist Narrative. This is by virtue of factoring indirectly as an aspect of the perceived threat in the anti-Japanese protesters’ saliency securitization. In this sense, the Revisionist Narrative propelled the security paradox by motivating the anti-Japanese protesters to conduct their securitizing move in which the Nationalist Narrative factored more prominently.

Mitigating the Security Paradox (6.2.3)
Historical narratives can also help to mitigate security paradoxes. More specifically, the Traditional Narrative facilitated the success of the desecuritizing move made on Kan’s behalf. Although it is uncertain whether Maehara’s securitizing move would have been successful if not for the desecuritizing move, if it were successful then the security paradox may have continued for another cycle. As discussed during step 2 in chapter 4, Japan exercised security dilemma sensibility in its dilemma of interpretation and then engaged in a reassurance game in its dilemma of response. Resulting in the release of the trawler captain as the cost signal that concluded the Trawler Incident. If Maehara’s securitizing move were successful, it might have surpassed Japan’s security dilemma sensibility. Hypothetically, this might have led Japan to take a course of action which might have escalated tensions and triggered a subsequent Chinese security dilemma in another cycle of the security paradox. For example, deploying Japan’s Self-Defence Force to the East China Sea or landing personnel on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

Even if Maehara’s securitizing move was unsuccessful regardless of Kan’s Office’s desecuritizing move, the Traditional Narrative factoring in the final basic fact pertaining to Japan’s dilemma of interpretation is still significant. This is because, as presented in step 3, the statement is an example of a rearticulation desecuritization, intended to reiterate the need for a political solution to an issue. Successfully advocating for a political response in a
statement which resonated with the pacifistic historical consciousness of the larger part of Japanese society would have made a political solution more palatable. Thereby increasing the acceptability of exercising security dilemma sensibility in a cost signalling reassurance game in Japan’s dilemma of response.

The above findings raise an issue with the analytical framework. The significance of the Traditional Narrative is based upon a causal narrative linking the basic fact of Kan’s desecuritizing move as a causal factor in the basic fact of Japan’s release of the trawler captain. This was not a causal link made in step 1. Moreover, the desecuritizing move was not presented as a separate basic fact in step 1. Evidently, the desecuritizing move should have been presented as its own basic fact located in the causal narrative between the basic facts of Maehara’s threat of retaliation and Japan’s release of the trawler captain.

This leads to two reflections. Firstly, the significance of engaging in transparent historiographical practises. Although a significant basic fact was underemphasised and its causal links not presented in step 1, by adopting Carr’s basic facts historiography it is possible to identify and discuss this within the parameters of the analytical framework. Transparently acknowledging the omission made in the early stages of research in accordance with historiographical best practise. The alternative being to either retcon step 1’s presentation of the case study, misrepresenting the historical basis of analysis in steps 1-4, or to omit the error and proceed with a conclusion contradictory to the history presented in step 1. In this respect, although the underemphasis of a basic fact later identified as pivotal to answering the primary research question was erroneous, that it can be discussed transparently and openly here validates the incorporation of historiography in the analytical framework.

The second reflection is that the analytical framework needs to be refined to better accommodate desecuritization alongside securitization. As the analytical framework was designed to identify how historical narratives factor in the security paradox by way of securitizations, little consideration was given to how historical narratives may factor by way of desecuritization. Consequentially, the analytical framework is less well equipped to identify and analyse desecuritizing moves. One potential reason for this is the understudied nature of desecuritization in the literature. Certainly, more has been published concerning securitization than desecuritization (Hansen, 2012), and this literary bias towards
securitization likely filtered through into this thesis’s analytical framework. Consequentially, when refining the analytical framework in the future it should adopt desecuritization theory as an equal counterpart to securitization theory.

Other Insights and Considerations (6.2.4)
Applying this thesis’s analytical framework in a step-by-step approach has offered several other insights which do not directly contribute to answer the primary research question. First among these is the compatibility of the security dilemma/paradox concept and securitization theory. Chapters 2 and 3 explained how these two ontologies are theoretically compatible. However, applying it to a case study and drawing insights which contribute to answering the primary research question shows the compatibility of these ontologies in practise. This is not to say that the framework is perfect or that refinement is unnecessary. Section 6.2.2 outlined how it could be improved by better considering desecuritization, for example. Yet, it must be noted that the analytical framework has successfully identified the role of historical narratives in the Sino-Japanese security paradox during the Trawler Incident.

Significantly, the framework identified and detailed the securitization mechanics of the basic facts pertaining to the Trawler Incident within the parameters of the Sino-Japanese security paradox. While historical narratives did not factor in every securitization in the ways outlined by Jutila, there is still value in creating a detailed account of these securitizations. For example, by uncovering the different illocutionary logics employed by the securitizing actors involved, or China’s and Japan’s respective pre-existing macrosecuritizations. This constitutes a unique contribution to knowledge as a by-product of the thesis’s application of its theoretical framework.

Another consideration is the evident utility of the applied secondary concepts of securitization theory. These concepts provided much needed detail and context which benefited this thesis’s consideration of the case study. For example, aiding our understanding of how the Nationalist Narrative factored in China’s anti-Japanese protests. Said protests being a sub-unit saliency securitization adhering to the pre-existing macrosecuritization of external threats to China which triggered the CCP’s securitization dilemma. Accordingly, Securitization Theory’s secondary concepts are validated through their utility in studying the Trawler Incident.
Furthermore, the following points were raised in the case study:

- **The significance of differing sub-unit interpretations**
  - Discussed in step 2 concerning Maehara’s revisionism and Kan’s traditionalism

- **Sub-unit strategic challenges at a community’s own unit level**
  - Discussed in step 2 regarding the CCP’s potential interpretation of the anti-Japanese protesters as a threat to their regime legitimacy

- **Multi-strand securitizations**
  - Discussed in step 2 regarding the CCP’s potential interpretation of the anti-Japanese protesters as a threat to their regime legitimacy informing China’s unit level securitizing moves

- **Sub-unit macrosecuritizations informing unit level securitization**
  - Discussed in step 2 regarding the CCP’s potential interpretation of the anti-Japanese protesters as a threat to their regime legitimacy informing China’s unit level securitizing moves

- **The significance of competing securitizations and desecuritization**
  - Discussed in steps 3 and 4 regarding Maehara’s securitizing move and Kan’s Office’s desecuritizing move

- **The significance of historical narratives in securitization beyond the ways identified by Jutila**
  - Discussed in step 4 concerning informing the CCP’s choice of referent object in Jiang’s and Wen’s securitizing moves

These findings are by-products of the unique analytical framework’s granular exploration of the Trawler Incident. Further exploration of these here is not relevant to answering this thesis’s primary research question, but each could offer insights into either the security dilemma/paradox concept or securitization theory in another study. For example, Vuori’s (2008, 2011) work on the illocutionary strands of securitization could be advanced through developing a rigorous multi-strand framework. This hypothetical framework might, for example, outline whether there is a primary and secondary strand, or whether the presence of multiple illocutionary logics constitutes a new, ‘combo-strand’ with specific securitizing connotations. Hence, these points for further consideration are another unique contribution to knowledge made by this thesis.

**Summary (6.3)**

In this chapter, steps 4 and 5 of this thesis’s analytical framework were applied to the Trawler Incident case study. Step 4 outlined how the historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War factored in the case study’s securitizations. Regarding the anti-Japanese protesters’ saliency securitization, the Nationalist Narrative factored as facilitating condition. This is apparent in how the narrative both resonated with the historical consciousness of the securitizing move’s audience and in the role the narrative had in
facilitating the legitimacy of the anti-Japanese protesters, aiding in the success of their collective saliency securitization. Meanwhile, the Revisionist Narrative factored implicitly in the perceived threat posed by Japan.

In Jiang’s securitizing move, the announcement of Chinese naval deployments, historical narratives did not factor in the ways outlined by Jutila. While the invocation of the Nationalist Narrative would have been logical, to do so would have contradicted the CCP’s desire to exert control over the anti-Japanese protesters while avoiding escalation of the Trawler Incident. Unlike Jiang’s securitizing move, the Nationalist Narrative did factor in Wen’s securitizing move. It did so as a facilitating condition through Wen’s invocation of the key specific theme of national unity, which resonated with the historical consciousness of the securitizing move’s audience.

Concerning Maehara’s securitizing move, there is no evidence historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War factoring in the ways outlined by Jutila. However, the subsequent desecuritizing move did invoke the Traditional Narrative. It drew upon the key specific theme of introspection, which connected with the historical consciousness of Japan’s majority traditionalist population. This helped to facilitate the success of the desecuritizing move and, by extension, the failure of Maehara’s securitizing move.

Step 5 considered holistically the findings of steps 1-4. Presenting overall conclusions from the Trawler Incident case study to answer how historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War factored in the Sino-Japanese security paradox. This revealed that historical narratives of the war both helped to propel and mitigate the security paradox cycle pertaining to the Trawler Incident. The Nationalist Narrative in particular served to propel the Sino-Japanese security paradox, aided to a lesser extent by the Revisionist Narrative. Meanwhile, the Traditional Narrative helped to mitigate the security paradox, increasing the palatability of a Japanese desecuritizing move and thus the chances of a political solution to the dispute. This conclusion aides in answering the primary research question, but also highlights the need to refine the analytical framework through the incorporation of desecuritization theory.

This step also presented a number of additional findings which emerged from the application of the unique analytical framework to the Trawler Incident. These, while not
relevant enough to warrant further exploration here, offer interesting avenues of future research into the security dilemma/paradox and securitization theory.
Chapter 7 - The Nationalisation Crisis – Steps 1 and 2

On September 11th 2012, the Japanese government announced its intention to nationalise three of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. This triggered a dispute known as the Nationalisation Crisis. It consisted of numerous potential flashpoints for Sino-Japanese relations. These included Japan scrambling fighter jets, a Chinese frigate targeting the Japanese Coast Guard, deployment of a Chinese aircraft carrier, the establishment of a Chinese Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, US infringement of said ADIZ and Chinese threats to shoot down American planes (BBC News 2013; Onasanya, 2013; Congressional Research Service 2021). Mutual Sino-Japanese antagonism spread beyond the confines of this dispute, with provocation becoming a standard of Sino-Japanese diplomacy (Hall, 2019). The Nationalisation Crisis concluded in November 2014, when China and Japan agreed to de-escalate tensions in the East China Sea (Green et al. 2017b).

Given the detailed orientation of the analytical framework developed for this thesis, it is not possible to apply said framework to the entire two years of the Nationalisation Crisis. This is not an issue, however, as a complete understanding of the Nationalisation Crisis is not necessary to garner insights that can be used to answer the primary research question. Hence, the Nationalisation Crisis case study will focus on the initial phase of the dispute, starting with Japan’s nationalisation announcement and concluding fifteen days later when Japanese prime minister Noda Yoshihiko spoke about the dispute at the UN (Reuters, 2012). This endpoint is selected due to a consensus that Noda’s speech roughly demarcates the close of the dispute’s initial phase (see Rapp-Hooper, 2012; Grieger, 2021).

This chapter briefly offers context on Sino-Japanese relations in the prelude to the Nationalisation Crisis. Then, steps 1 and 2 of this thesis’s analytical framework are applied to the Nationalisation Crisis case study. Step 1 reveals 11 basic facts relevant to the case study and the causal narrative linking these facts together. Step 2 maps these basic facts to the security dilemma/paradox concept. Showing that the initial phase of the Nationalisation
Crisis consisted of one security paradox cycle. It also establishes the start and end dates of China’s and Japan’s security dilemmas, their respective constituent dilemmas and the applicability of secondary security dilemma/paradox concepts.

The Prelude to the Nationalisation Crisis (7.1)
Sino-Japanese relations differed in 2012 compared to 2010. Accordingly, this section contextualises the case study in Sino-Japanese relations following the Trawler Incident. A loose causal narrative is employed for the purpose of presentation. This causal narrative implies that lingering tensions from the Trawler Incident and domestic political issues generated Sino-Japanese tensions in the Nationalisation Crisis’s prelude.

After the Trawler Incident, the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute became a focal point for tensions in Sino-Japanese relations (Hall, 2019). The dispute became more militarised, with both countries increasing their naval presence in the East China Sea (Green et al., 2017b). Also, both nations’ people viewed each other with increased suspicion. Anti-Japanese sentiment grew in China as activists practised greater vigilance against perceived Japanese aggression (Chen, 2014). Meanwhile, 84% of Japanese citizens believed China to be untrustworthy, compared to 64% that thought China to be trustworthy in 2009 (Rose and Sykora, 2017).

Yet, both governments sought to prevent another incident. The prelude to the Nationalisation Crisis began in April 2012 when Tokyo’s nationalistic right-wing Governor, Shintaro Ishihara, announced plans to purchase and develop three of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Hirano, 2014). In May, Japanese and Chinese officials met to discuss the matter. Since the Japanese government had already been leasing the privately owned islands to prevent their development, they proposed nationalising them to maintain the status quo (Green et al., 2017b). On July 7th27 Noda announced that Japan was considering nationalisation and later explained to US officials that Japan had the Chinese government’s understanding on the matter (Wallace, 2015).

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27 July 7th 2012 was the 75th anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the event which sparked the Second Sino-Japanese War. While no notable anti-Japanese protests occurred as a result, Chinese nationalists considered this coincidence an example of Japanese indifference regarding the historical victimisation of China (Hall, 2019).
2012 saw a Chinese leadership contest to replace President Hu Jintao as the paramount leader of China\(^\text{28}\), generating internal divisions and a sense of vulnerability for the CCP as its factions vied for control of the Party (Hall, 2019). These vulnerabilities were compounded in July when Bo Xilai, a leadership candidate from Hu’s own political faction, garnered criticism of the CCP for his involvement in embezzlement, corruption, and murder scandals (Wines, 2012). Plausibly, the CCP’s leadership felt unable to suppress nationalistic anti-Japanese sentiment and thus contradict their legitimating nationalist credentials at a time of relative vulnerability. This is discussed in the following sections. In any case, in the days prior to Japan’s nationalisation announcement on September 11\(^\text{th}\), Hu warned the Japanese government that he would struggle to contain anti-Japanese sentiment, explaining that this was likely to be aggravated by his nationalistic vice-president and probable successor as paramount leader, Xi Jinping\(^\text{29}\) (Ibid.).

The Trawler Incident was considered a defeat for Japan’s governing Democratic Party, whose already limited popularity continued to wane (Suzuki, 2015). This corresponded with a growth in the popularity of right-wing politics in Japan. More specifically, support for the Revisionist Narrative and Article 9 reform to secure Japan militarily against any Chinese military challenge (Ibid.). By September 2012, Ishihara had raised ¥1.4 billion in public donations to purchase the islands (Hall, 2019). Government inaction risked further declines in its domestic support and, if Ishihara purchased the islands first, it would damage Sino-Japanese relations. Hence, despite Hu’s warning, Noda announced his government’s intention to nationalise the islands on September 11\(^\text{th}\).

\(^{28}\) The term paramount leader refers to China’s de facto leader. The paramount leader usually serves concurrently as General Secretary of the Communist Party and as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, positions in the CCP which put them in charge of party appointments and the military.

\(^{29}\) Xi ascended as China’s paramount leader in November 2012, after being named General Secretary of the Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. The following year he replaced Hu as China’s president.
Step 1 – Basic Facts and Causal Links (7.2)
The events listed below are the basic facts relevant to the Nationalisation Crisis as per the
criteria established in section 2.5. The rationalisation for each basic fact’s inclusion and
place in the case study’s causal narrative is presented, and a chronological visualisation of
these is shown in fig.7. A visual representation of the case study’s causal narrative is given in
fig.8.
Fig. 7 - Timeline of the Nationalisation Crisis's Basic Facts
Fig. 8 - Visualisation of the Nationalisation Crisis's Causal Narrative

11th - China Deploys Ships to Press Its Claim

11th - Japan Announces Nationalisation

15th - China's Anti-Japanese Protests Begin

13th - China Submits nautical charts to the UN

16th - China Announces intent to request recognition of continental shelf and EEZ

18th - The Height of China's Anti-Japanese Protests

19th - Xi condemns Japan's behaviour

19th - Japan's Embassy explains that the Protests Should be Over

20th - Noda speaks about the dispute at the UN

Basic Facts on the Japanese Side

Basic Facts with both Chinese and Japanese Involvement

Basic Facts on the Chinese Side

17th - Japan's Foreign Minister Asks for and Receives US Reassurances
September 11th, Japan Announces its Intention to Nationalise three of the islands

In his morning press briefing, Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura, Japan’s most senior civil servant, made the following closing remarks:

‘I have one more item to report. In today's Cabinet meeting the use of funds from the general account budget amounting to 2.05 billion yen was approved for the purpose of the purchase of the islands of Uotsuri-Jima, Kita-Kojima and Minami-Kojima, which are part of the Senkaku Islands. These funds are considered to be necessary expenses for the peaceful and stable maintenance and management of the Senkaku Islands.’ (Fujimura, 2012)

As the case study’s triggering event, this basic fact serves as the start point of the case study’s causal narrative. It links to China’s and Japan’s deployments to the region immediately following the announcement. Also, this basic fact links to the start of China’s anti-Japanese protests on September 15th which were, at least nominally, protesting Japan’s announcement.

September 11th, China Sends Ships to Press its Claim

Following Fujimura’s announcement, China deployed two patrol ships to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands to press its claim (Green et al., 2017b). In the following months, the number of ships involved in these patrols would increase in number and include warships, but during the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis the deployments remained few in number and consisted of small patrol boats (Ibid.).

CCP officials did not formally announce these deployments. There was a general lack of comments by senior CCP officials during this early phase of the dispute (Buckley, 2012). Instead, the deployments were reported by the Xinhua state-media company (Takenaka, 2012) as a response to Japan having ‘thrown bilateral relations into a scalding pot’ (Xinhua cited in Dickie and Hille, 2012). Lower-ranked officials commented on Japan’s nationalisation announcement concurrently with Xinhua’s report on China using naval deployments to press its claim. Geng Yansheng, the spokesperson for the Defense Ministry, stated:

‘The Chinese government and military are unwavering in their determination and will to defend national territorial sovereignty. We are closely following developments, and reserve the power to adopt corresponding measures.’ (Geng cited in Takenaka, 2012)
Meanwhile, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei (2012) commented that:

‘China will never tolerate any acts that may infringe upon its national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Chinese government is resolute and determined in safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Japanese side’s so-called "purchase" of the Diaoyu Islands is totally illegal and invalid. It does not change, not even in the slightest way, the fact that the Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands belong to China, nor will it alter the fact of Japan's illegal occupation of China’s Diaoyu Islands. We demand the Japanese side to immediately stop all acts that may infringe upon China’s territorial sovereignty. Japan should truly come back to the very understanding and common ground reached between the two sides, and should return to the track of negotiated settlement of the Diaoyu Islands issue...

...The recent wrong actions by the Japanese side aroused indignation of the Chinese people at home and abroad. We also maintain that the public express their patriotic passion in a rational and lawful manner.’

This basic fact is included because the deployment of ships to press China’s claim was emphasised by observers at the time (see Dickie and Hille, 2012; Takenaka and Wee, 2012) and has been routinely used by scholars since as evidence for the militarisation of the territorial dispute (see Green et al., 2017b; Taffer, 2020; Congressional Research Service, 2021). This basic fact links to China’s submission of nautical charts on September 13th. Logically, deploying ships to press China’s claim is associated with submitting evidence to support said claim two days later. It also links to Japan’s increased coast guard deployments, which, as discussed below, were a response to China’s increased naval presence. Lastly, it links to Japan’s pursuit of US reassurances; logically, China’s military presence in the East China Sea motivated Japan to seek reassurances from its primary military ally.

**September 11th-17th, Japan deploys half of its Coast Guard to the East China Sea**

Japan significantly increased the presence of its Coast Guard in the East China Sea. By September 17th, half of the Japanese Coast Guard was deployed to patrol the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Green et al., 2017b). This was an unsustainable level of deployment, severely overstretching the Coast Guard’s resources (Hayashi, 2012).

Prime Minister Noda is reported to have considered deploying Japan’s Self-Defence Force once the Coast Guard reached its operational capacity on September 17th (Green et al., 2017b). However, Noda decided against doing so and ordered that the Coast Guard only
observe and not engage Chinese vessels entering the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands’ territorial waters (Ibid.).

This basic fact is included as, like with China’s deployments to the region, observers emphasised Japan’s deployments at the time (Branigan, 2012). It is routinely included in the Nationalisation Crisis’s scholarship. Usually, as evidence of pseudo-militarisation in Japan’s response to China’s deployments (Green et al., 2017b; Taffer, 2020).

This basic fact links to Japan’s request for reassurances from the USA on September 17th. This is because, given the Coast Guard’s overstretch and Noda’s reluctance to deploy Japan’s Self-Defence Force, it is logical that Japan felt it necessary to turn to its closest ally for support. Furthermore, the dates of these basic facts align neatly. Japan’s request for reassurances occurred the same day that the redeployment of half of Japan’s Coast Guard to the disputed region concluded.

**September 13th, China Submits Nautical Charts to the UN**

China submitted nautical charts to the UN to support its claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (Dickie and Hille, 2012). These showed the geographic basis of China’s territorial claim, emphasising the disputed islands’ situation on China’s side of the Okinawa Trough, a geographic feature of the seafloor between the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and Japan’s Okinawa prefecture. One consideration made by the UN when arbitrating maritime territorial disputes is whether the area in question shares a continental shelf with either party’s sovereign territory (United Nations, 1982). To this end, China’s submissions of nautical charts reflect an effort to strengthen its geographic claim ahead of any potential UN arbitration on the issue.

China considers the Okinawa Trough a fault line between two continental plates. This would mean that Japan’s closest territory does not share a continental shelf with the disputed islands, strengthening China’s claim. On the other hand, Japan considers the Okinawa Trough merely a deep recession of the seafloor, not a fault line (Hall, 2019), meaning that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands share a continental shelf with Japan’s Okinawa prefecture.
This basic fact is included because it features prominently in the literature of the Nationalisation Crisis as an example of China’s diplomatic efforts to press its claim during the dispute (Green et al., 2017b; Hall, 2019). In terms of the case study’s causal narrative, it links to China’s September 16th announcement that it will formally request recognition of its continental shelf extending to the Okinawa Trough. An announcement which was made on the back of China’s submission of evidence.

**September 15th, China’s Anti-Japanese Protests Begin**

Some small-scale anti-Japanese protests had been occurring before this date (Hong, 2012), but it was on this day that large protests erupted throughout China. Of the 208 cities which saw protests, 64 saw protests with over 1,000 participants, while Beijing and Shenzhen experienced several concurrent protests numbering several thousand participants each (Wallace et al., 2015).

As with the anti-Japanese protests in 2010, pro-democracy activists used the opportunity to protest the CCP’s regime (Buckley, 2012). Meanwhile, others used the protests as an opportunity to express their frustrations over other issues. For example, in Shenzhen, a nominally anti-Japanese protest attacked government offices, demanding unpaid wages (Wallace et al., 2015).

This basic fact is included because the anti-Japanese protests were widely reported at the time (see Branigan, 2012; Buckley, 2012) and emphasised by Chinese and Japanese officials during this phase of the Nationalisation Crisis (Hong, 2012; Wallace et al., 2015). The protests are also a mainstay in the scholarship of the Nationalisation Crisis. Often included as evidence of deep-rooted anti-Japanese sentiment (see Greet et al., 2017b) and the CCP’s supposed ability to manipulate said sentiment (see Taffer, 2020).

This basic fact is causally linked to the height of the anti-Japanese protests on September 18th, the protests’ height being a result of their having started. It also links to China’s announcement on September 16th that it will request an extension to its Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone. This is due to the proximity of this event. As China has only just submitted its evidence to the UN, which had not yet had the opportunity to review said evidence, announcing a request for formal recognition would have been premature. As
the only interceding basic fact, it is logical that the anti-Japanese protests factored in the decision to make the announcement.

**September 16th, China Announces Intent to Request Recognition of an Extension to its Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone**

Again reported by Xinhua News, it was announced that China would formally request recognition of its territorial claim as per the evidence it submitted to the UN three days earlier (Green et al., 2017b). Recognition that China’s continental shelf extends to the Okinawa Trough and thus that China’s Exclusive Economic Zone is projected from the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, conferring China exclusive access to the resources in that region of the East China Sea.

This basic fact is logically included because it was part of China’s efforts to press its claim. This follows China’s submission of evidence concerning its continental shelf to the UN on September 13th. This basic fact does not directly link to any following basic facts in the case study’s causal narrative. This is because none of the remaining basic facts pertain to China requesting said recognition of its claim, taking other actions to support it, or attempting a similarly diplomatic solution to the dispute.

**September 17th, Japan’s Foreign Minister Seeks and Receives US Reassurances**

US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta was visiting Japan as part of a tour of East Asia to promote the USA’s *Pivot to Asia* policy. During this visit, Japan’s Foreign Minister, Koichiro Genba, met with Panetta to request reassurances that the US would support Japan if the Nationalisation Crisis sparked a conflict with China (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2012). Reassurances of US support were provided and openly referred to by Japanese officials over the following days (Hirano, 2014). However, the USA did not publicly state its support until a later incident of the Nationalisation Crisis in November 2012 (Green et al., 2017b).  

This basic fact is included because Japanese officials emphasised it (see Hirano, 2014). Additionally, scholars regularly discuss the nuances of the USA providing

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30 The incident in question was reports of a Chinese reconnaissance plane in the Senkaku/Diaoyu’s airspace followed by the scrambling of Japanese fighter jets. This is usually considered one of the several events that almost triggered outright conflict between China and Japan during the Nationalisation Crisis (Onasanya, 2013).
reassurances to Japan yet not announcing this support for another two months (see Onasanya, 2013; Green et al., 2017b). As discussed above, this basic fact follows from China’s earlier deployments to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. However, it is not causally linked to any following basic facts in the case study. For China’s part, it did not appear to respond to the USA’s reassurances during this phase of the dispute, likely because the USA had not yet publicly confirmed said reassurances.

For Japan, as during the Trawler Incident, the USA’s reassurances would have factored in its security dilemma, clarifying Japan’s strategic position and factoring in decision-making concerning the Nationalisation Crisis. Yet, it is difficult to directly link the USA’s reassurances with the remaining basic facts concerning Japanese actions during this early phase of the Nationalisation Crisis. Hence, although a key event in the Nationalisation Crisis, it does not play a causal role for any of the following basic facts of the case study.

**September 18th, The Height of China’s Anti-Japanese Protests**

On the anniversary of the Mukden Incident, China’s anti-Japanese protests reached their height, with tens-of-thousands of protesters participating in concurrent protests across 128 cities (Wallace et al., 2015). The largest demonstration was outside of the Japanese and US embassies in Beijing, where protesters accosted embassy workers (Green et al., 2017b). One incident involved a group of roughly 50 protesters attacking the US Ambassador’s car, preventing them from entering the US embassy (Ibid.).

Interviews with these protesters offer insight into their motivation. One of the lead protesters in Beijing explained that:

“We think that the government is too soft and we want to show what we think... China should make its own demands as a great power. I feel disappointed in the government. It’s not democratic enough and doesn’t heed our voice. I hope our leaders can catch up. There’s no conflict between democracy and patriotism.”
(cited in Buckley, 2012)

Protesters routinely pointed to Mao as an example of a leader they thought better suited to handle the dispute. In Beijing, a protester stated that:

‘Mao was new China’s first leader and he knew how to be tough on foreigners. If he were still alive we would be at war by now. Hu Jintao and those people are useless and impotent before Japan’s provocations.” (Ibid.)
This sentiment was common. Another protester, from China’s Manchuria region, equally exclaimed:

“Mao is our hero because he fought the Japanese and won... Our leaders today talk only of peaceful diplomacy and look what happened. They are giving away our land.” (Ibid.)

This basic fact is included for several reasons. Firstly, because the start of China’s anti-Japanese protests is included, meaning it is reasonable to include the height of the protests. Second, the September 18th protests were also emphasised by observers at the time. Featuring as a mainstay in the coverage of the early Nationalisation Crisis by the international press (Buckley, 2012; Branigan, 2012). Third, scholars have emphasised the September 18th protests, most often discussing events from that day’s protests rather than the preceding and subsequent anti-Japanese protests that occurred in China at that time (see Hirano, 2014; Green et al., 2017b).

This basic fact links to three others in the case study’s causal narrative. The first is Xi’s condemnation of Japan on September 19th. Logically, a statement by China’s incoming leader following public criticism of their predecessor for not showing strength in condemning Japan would be linked. Especially given that Xi’s condemnation of Japan occurred only one day after the height of the anti-Japanese protests. The second link is with the Japanese embassy’s announcement on the 19th that the protests were over. Again, it is logical that the protests’ height is followed causally by a statement about their cessation. Finally, this basic fact links to Noda’s speech on September 26th given that Noda comments on the scale of anti-Japanese sentiment sparked by Japan’s nationalisation of the disputed islands (Rapp-Hooper, 2012).

**September 19th, Xi Condemns Japan’s Behaviours**

Then Vice-President and assumed successor to President Hu as China’s Paramount Leader, Xi Jinping was the first senior CCP official to openly condemn Japan. The full transcript of Xi’s statement is unavailable, but it is known that Xi condemned Japan’s nationalisation of the disputed islands and subsequent actions as ‘wrongful behaviours’ (Xi cited Branigan, 2012). This basic fact is included as the first instance of a senior CCP official condemning Japan during the dispute. Furthermore, the significance of Xi commenting on the dispute was emphasised as a risk to Sino-Japanese relations by observers even prior to the outbreak of
the Nationalisation Crisis. Evidenced by the concerns expressed by President Hu as presented in section 7.1.

Xi’s condemnation of Japan links to Noda’s speech on September 26th. This is because Noda’s speech referred to rejecting coercion in maritime disputes (Noda, 2012). Other than China’s naval deployments, which began over two weeks prior to Noda’s speech, Xi’s condemnation of Japan is the only action by a representative of the Chinese state which, if interpreted as a threat, could be considered a coercive action by China against Japan. That Xi’s condemnation was interpreted as such is likely given that Noda made no public comment about coercion due to its naval deployments prior to Xi’s condemnation of Japan’s behaviour.

September 19th, Japan’s Embassy Explains the Protests Should be Over

The Japanese Embassy in Beijing emailed Japanese citizens in China explaining that the worst of the protests has passed. Notably, the Embassy explains that the Beijing police were beginning to more actively police the protests, ‘urging people not to protest in the embassy district’ (Branigan, 2012). This indicates that, as of September 19th, the CCP were more actively managing the protests than in preceding days. Notably, the protests from this point onwards were smaller in scale, less variable concerning matters of local grievance and focussed more on being anti-Japanese than critical of the CCP (Wallace et al., 2015).

This basic fact is logical to include because the Japanese embassy’s email seemingly demarcates a shift in how the CCP was handling the anti-Japanese protests pertaining to the Nationalisation Crisis. In terms of the case study’s causal narrative, this basic fact does not link to any other basic facts. Occurring, as it does, near to the end of the case study’s causal narrative and not intuitively linking as a causal factor in Noda’s UN speech, the only basic fact following this one chronologically.

September 26th, Noda Speaks about the Dispute at the UN

Addressing the UN General Assembly, Prime Minister Noda spoke about the situation facing Japan. His speech covered a variety of topics, including Japan’s structural economic issues, global democracy, nuclear disarmament, and climate change (Noda, 2012). Not speaking specifically about the Nationalisation Crisis, Noda spoke at length about the importance of
the rule of international law and the importance of rejecting the use of force to settle grievances, especially in maritime disputes:

‘It is a philosophy of the Charter of United Nations as a shared principle in the international community to settle disputes in a peaceful manner based on international law... I call for the Nations to recognise the compulsory jurisdiction and for non-member countries of the Law of the Sea’ [sic] (Ibid.)

Given Japan’s active maritime territorial dispute with China at the time of this speech, it can be considered a passive-aggressive commentary on China’s behaviour during the Nationalisation Crisis. Meanwhile, the reference to non-member states extends the target of Noda’s passive aggression to include Taiwan, Taiwan being a non-member state also in dispute with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as mentioned below.

Additionally, while not done directly before the UN General Assembly, Noda is reported to have offered his reflections to other world leaders in discussion of the Nationalisation Crisis. Notably, Noda admitted that he had underestimated anti-Japanese sentiment in China and that, while some protests were expected, they were much greater than anticipated (Wallace et al., 2015).

This basic fact’s inclusion is logical as it presents an official, public statement by Japan at the close of this phase of the Nationalisation Crisis. Although not emphasised particularly at the time, Noda’s speech was considered an indicator that the dispute was subsiding (Rapp-Hooper, 2012). In fact, the dispute continued for another two years but scholars have since used Noda’s speech to demarcate the close of the Nationalisation Crisis’s initial phase (see Wallace et al., 2015; Griefer, 2021). Consequentially, Noda’s speech is included as the concluding basic fact of this case study.

**Honourable Mentions**

Some basic facts associated with the first phase of the Nationalisation Crisis did not meet the conditions for inclusion as key events in the case study’s timeline. For transparency, a selection are discussed below.

*Specific Acts of Anti-Japanese/Anti-Chinese Sentiment*

The antagonism between the Chinese and Japanese people manifested in various incidents. Many were overlooked by observers at the time of the Nationalisation Crisis and are only
rarely included in the case study’s literature. However, they do speak to the tensions in Sino-Japanese relations during the dispute. Examples include:

- **September 17th – The Japanese School** in Beijing cancels its classes to protect its students from anti-Japanese protesters (Branigan, 2012)
- **September 18th – A Japanese counterprotest is held in Tokyo with roughly 50 participants. Some were waving the rising sun flag of the Japanese Empire.** (Wallace et al., 2015.)
- **September 18th – Arson on the grounds of a Chinese school in Japan’s Kobe province. The Police link the incident to the tensions arising from the Nationalisation Crisis.** (Branigan, 2012)

**September 19th, The US Secretary of Defence visits a Chinese Navy Base**

As mentioned, US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta was touring East Asia to promote the Obama Administration’s *Pivot to Asia* policy. After departing Japan, Panetta spent several days in China. On September 19th, the same day Xi condemned Japan’s behaviour in the Nationalisation Crisis, Panetta visited a Chinese naval base to speak with cadets about the importance of US-China relations (Congressional Research Service 2021).

This visit might account for why the USA did not publicly state its support for Japan in the dispute, perhaps fearing that doing so risked Panetta’s visit to China. However, observers at the time did not emphasise Panetta’s visit, instead focussing on Xi’s condemnation of Japan which occurred on the same day (Hall, 2019). Scholarship occasionally mentions Panetta’s visit to China (see Green et al., 2017b), but usually only to establish the context concerning the USA’s *Pivot to Asia* policy.

**September 25th – A Taiwanese Flotilla Enters the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands’ Territorial Waters**

The Japanese Coast Guard engaged a flotilla of Taiwanese activists in the vicinity of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The two sides sprayed each other with water cannons, though the leader of the flotilla had previously suggested that they were carrying and willing to use firearms (Staff Writer, 2012). Taiwan claims sovereignty over the islands by way of their once being administered by Taiwan’s provincial government under China’s Qing dynasty, prior to Japan’s annexation of Taiwan following the First Sino-Japanese War (Onasanya, 2013). Given the Chinese heritage of a large share of Taiwan’s population and Taiwan’s complex relationship with the Chinese mainland (Albert, 2020), this basic fact speaks to the
anti-Japanese sentiment and nationalistic activism among Chinese communities outside of the People’s Republic.

This basic fact was omitted as it mainly relates to Taiwanese-Japanese relations rather than Sino-Japanese relations. It was reported by observers at the time but was downplayed compared to developments in the Sino-Japanese dispute (Willacy, 2012). Scholars do routinely include the flotilla in their discussion of the Nationalisation Crisis, but as an example in a passing mention of Taiwan’s claim to the disputed territory (see William et al., 2015; Green et al, 2017b).

Step 2 – Map the Security Paradox and Identify Secondary Concepts (7.3)
As outlined in section 2.1.2, the security dilemma/paradox only applies when neither party desires to threaten the other. Such was the case during the Nationalisation Crisis. This is evident in how China and Japan were cooperating in favour of a diplomatic solution to Ishihara’s provocative plans to purchase the islands during the prelude to the dispute. It is also evident in the actions of both countries in their conduct during the dispute. Concerning China, this is apparent in how, except for its initial naval deployments, China’s response to Japan’s nationalisation of the islands was diplomatic in nature. If China were truly motivated by a desire to threaten Japan, it likely would not have sought UN intervention while its political leadership would have been more proactive in condemning Japan and escalating tensions. Even China’s naval deployments can be considered relatively benign given the routine nature of Chinese patrols in the East China Sea since the Trawler Incident (Green et al., 2017b).

While the deployment of its coast guard is considered pseudo-militarisation of the dispute on Japan’s part (Ibid.), Noda’s choice not to deploy Japan’s Self-Defence Force indicates a defensive posture. This stance is inconsistent with a proactive effort to threaten China, but consistent with securing Japan following a misguided attempt to protect Sino-Japanese relations from the hypothetical repercussions of Ishihara’s plans to develop the islands.

Mapping the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis to the security paradox indicates that it consisted of one security paradox cycle. As with the Trawler Incident’s single security paradox cycle, discussed in section 4.2, this is apparent in the case study’s causal
narrative. The later basic facts in the causal narrative pertaining to either Chinese or Japanese actions during the dispute follow on from the other’s actions towards the beginning of the causal narrative. If there were multiple security paradox cycles it would be expected, for example, that China responded directly to Japan’s coast guard deployments. However, as established in section 7.2, the later basic facts pertaining to Chinese actions trace back in the case study’s causal narrative to Japan’s nationalisation announcement, not its coast guard deployments.

This single security paradox cycle consisted of a Chinese security dilemma followed by a Japanese security dilemma. There was significant overlap between each nation’s security dilemma, with both starting on September 11th. A visualisation of this is presented in fig.9 and the specifics of China’s and Japan’s constituent security dilemmas are discussed in sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 respectively.
Fig. 9 – Constituent Security Dilemmas of the Nationalisation Crisis’s Security Paradox Cycle
China’s Security Dilemma (7.3.1)

China’s security dilemma lasted from September 11th until September 19th. That it began on September 11th is self-evident. This is because Japan’s nationalisation announcement on September 11th was the only basic fact representing a Japanese action prior to the first Chinese counteraction, its naval deployments, which occurred later the same day. Hence, China’s security dilemma, of which its naval deployments is an output, must have been triggered by Japan’s announcement on the 11th.

September 19th represented the end of China’s security dilemma as it saw the last basic fact in the case study’s causal narrative representing a Chinese action, Xi’s condemnation of China. The only following basic fact, Noda’s speech, does not pertain to a Chinese action and thus cannot be considered an output of China’s security dilemma. Additionally, as discussed in section 7.3.2, Noda’s speech represented the end of Japan’s security dilemma. Security dilemmas can overlap but ultimately are sequential (Acharya, 2007). Hence, for Noda’s speech to demarcate the end of Japan’s security dilemma, Xi’s condemnation of Japan as the preceding basic fact is the latest possible endpoint of China’s security dilemma.

Of course, China’s security dilemma could have ended earlier than September 19th. However, as Xi was a senior CCP official and representative of the Chinese state as China’s Vice-President, Xi’s statement should be considered part of China’s response. As the final basic fact representing a Chinese response within the context of the case study’s causal narrative, it thus demarcates the end of China’s dilemma of response. Given that the dilemma of response is the latter of the constituent security dilemmas, it was also the conclusion of China’s security dilemma.

China’s Dilemma of Interpretation

Being first in the two-step security dilemma, China’s dilemma of interpretation must have begun at the same time as its security dilemma, on September 11th. It then continued until it was resolved on September 18th. This is evident in how the protests on the 18th represent the final basic fact in the case study’s causal
narrative that could have input into China’s dilemma of interpretation. This is because no later basic fact in the case study’s causal narrative provides a causal link to a Chinese action to indicate any input into China’s dilemma of interpretation.

Like the Trawler Incident, China’s unit-level dilemma of interpretation during the opening phase of the Nationalisation Crisis was heavily informed by sub-unit level inputs. This is apparent in the case study’s causal narrative. Basic facts about activity at the Chinese sub-unit level causally link to China’s unit-level security dilemma outputs. More specifically, the start of China’s anti-Japanese protests on September 15th and the height of China’s anti-Japanese protests on the 18th.

That China’s anti-Japanese protests factored in its dilemma of interpretation is due to the CCP’s reliance on nationalism to maintain its regime’s legitimacy. As stated in section 7.2, the anti-Japanese protests were also critical of the CCP, consisting of pro-democratic elements and, in Shenzen, going as far as to attack CCP offices. This was occurring at a time of relative vulnerability for the CCP due to its leadership contest and the Bo Xilai scandal. Hence, the CCP would have been particularly sensitive to its need to appear strong in response to Japan to uphold its nationalist credentials and protect its regime’s legitimacy.

This accounts for China’s announcement that it would request recognition of its territorial claim only three days after submitting its evidence to the UN. Given the short timeframe, the announcement of China’s intentions is premature as the UN would not have had time to review the evidence. Furthermore, given that Japan refuses to formally acknowledge that any territorial dispute exists (Chen and Hwang, 2015), the likelihood of any UN ruling on sovereignty was improbable in any case.

Accordingly, China’s announcement was largely inconsequential, diplomatically speaking. Hence, it must have been made to serve domestic purposes. Pressing the issue diplomatically via the UN, even if futile, would have shown the CCP to be pursuing China’s claim to the Islands in a significant forum of international governance. This would have adhered to the CCP’s nationalist credentials in a manner that would not escalate the dispute by provoking Japan and
its allies through coercive measures. Thus, the anti-Japanese protests must have input into China’s dilemma of interpretation, motivating the CCP’s September 16th announcement that it would request recognition of China’s territorial claim.

The height of China’s anti-Japanese protests also input into China’s dilemma of interpretation. This is apparent for two reasons. Firstly, because it is consistent for it to have done so. The height of China’s anti-Japanese protests during the Trawler Incident input into China’s dilemma of interpretation. This makes the height of the anti-Japanese protests in 2012 a likely candidate to have input into China’s dilemma of interpretation during the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis. Xi’s condemnation of Japan on the 19th, which as discussed marks the close of China’s security dilemma, follows causally from the height of China’s anti-Japanese protests and not from, for example, Japan’s increased coast guard deployments. This is similar to during the Trawler Incident, when China’s response to Japan causally followed the height of the anti-Japanese protests and not Japan’s release of the trawler crew.

Secondly, as described in the September 19th email from the Japanese embassy, the CCP’s management of the anti-Japanese protests changed following their height on September 18th. This is significant because, except for Xi commenting on the dispute, China’s outward approach to the Nationalisation Crisis remained unchanged. This is evident in the absence of any new measures in response to Japan’s nationalisation of the disputed islands. Yet, the CCP responded internally to the protests by being more proactive in their management (Wallace et al., 2015). This shows that the anti-Japanese protests did influence Chinese actions during the dispute, meaning they must have factored in the CCP’s decision-making. Resultantly, the height of China’s anti-Japanese protests is concluded to have input into China’s dilemma of interpretation.

Considering the above discussion, three basic facts are mapped to China’s security dilemma as inputs for its dilemma of interpretation:

- September 11th - Japan’s Nationalisation Announcement
- September 15th – China’s Anti-Japanese Protests Begin
- September 18th - The Height of China’s Anti-Japanese Protests
China’s Dilemma of Response

China’s dilemma of response began on September 11th. This is evident in how this date saw the first Chinese response to Japan’s nationalisation announcement, deploying ships to press its claim to the disputed islands. China’s dilemma of response then ended on September 19th. This is because, as discussed above, China’s security dilemma concluded on the 19th. As the last of the two constituent security dilemmas, the dilemma of response must have ended at the time of China’s final security dilemma output on the day China’s overarching security dilemma ended.

From September 11th to 19th, China produced four outputs from its dilemma of response, which can be categorised into two phases. The first started with China’s naval deployments, which were diplomatic and relatively benign. To describe naval deployments as benign seems illogical, especially given that naval deployments during the Trawler Incident were concluded to have been a reactionary and assertive output of China’s dilemma of response. However, China had been routinely patrolling the East China Sea since the Trawler Incident, meaning that the presence of Chinese ships was relatively normalised by the time of the Nationalisation Crisis (Green et al., 2017b). Yet, despite their routine nature, the deployments on September 11th were stated as an effort to press China’s claim (Green et al., 2017b). Thus, they should be included as an output of China’s dilemma of response as a symbolic act, not a concerted Chinese effort to intimidate Japan.

The other benign output of China’s dilemma of response was the submission of nautical charts to the UN. This was benign for two reasons. Firstly, because pursuing a diplomatic response to the Nationalisation Crisis would not escalate Sino-Japanese tensions. Nor would it be likely to trigger insecurity on Japan’s part and thus perpetuate the security paradox. Secondly because, as mentioned above, the UN would not arbitrate the dispute without Japanese consent. Therefore, the submission of evidence was a benign symbolic gesture in which China could press its claim without provoking Japan and its allies.
The second phase of China’s dilemma of response differs from the first by being more reactionary, characterised by responding to Japan in a way meant to mitigate domestic criticism of the CCP. It has already been discussed that China’s announcement of intent to request recognition of its territorial claim was a response to the anti-Japanese protests. An effort to show the CCP raising the dispute in international governance forums to uphold its domestic nationalist credentials.

The other mitigatory output of China’s dilemma of response was Xi’s condemnation of Japan. This is evident in how it directly follows the height of China’s anti-Japanese protests in the case study’s causal narrative and not any Japanese act. If Xi were truly responding directly to Japan, he might have made a statement condemning Japan’s behaviour immediately after the nationalisation announcement, or as Japan increased its coast guard deployments. This was not the case, indicating that Xi’s condemnation of Japan was motivated by a desire to mitigate the protesters’ criticism of the CCP and not a desire to oppose Japan.

This conclusion is reinforced considering the other basic fact from September 19th. The Japanese embassy alluded to the CCP being more proactive in managing the anti-Japanese protests after September 18th. While these efforts cannot be considered a response to Japan, they showcase the CCP’s efforts to mitigate the anti-Japanese protests’ criticism of their regime.

That these efforts coincided with the first public condemnation of Japan’s behaviour is too convenient to have been a coincidence. Especially considering that Xi, a senior CCP official with known nationalistic tendencies, was likely well placed as the public face of the CCP at a time in which it needed to appear nationalistic to mitigate criticism of its regime. Hence, Xi’s condemnation of Japan is considered an output of China’s dilemma of response, nominally directed towards Japan, but intended to mitigate domestic criticism of the CCP.

Based on this discussion, the following basic facts have been mapped to China’s dilemma of response:

Phase 1 – Diplomatic/Benign Outputs
• September 11th – China Deploys Ships to Press its Claim
• September 13th – China Submits Nautical Charts to the UN

Phase 2 – Mitigatory Outputs
• September 16th – China Announces its Intent to Request Recognition of Continental Shelf and EEZ
• September 19th – Xi Condemns Japan’s Behaviour

Japan’s Security Dilemma (7.3.2)
Japan’s security dilemma began on September 11th and concluded on September 26th, overlapping with China’s security dilemma by 8 days. The 11th saw the first Chinese action which could have triggered Japan’s security dilemma, China’s naval deployments. As stated, Chinese patrols in the East China Sea were relatively routine by 2012, meaning that China’s announcement of naval deployments would not have necessarily triggered a Japanese security dilemma.

However, September 11th also saw Japan’s first dilemma of response output in the form of its increased coast guard deployments. For Japan to have produced a security dilemma output, its security dilemma must have already begun. Within the context of the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis, China’s announcement served as the only basic fact which could have triggered a Japanese security dilemma. Thus, Japan’s security dilemma must have begun on September 11th.

Japan’s security dilemma concluded on September 26th. That this was the case is self-evident. This is because Noda’s speech represents the final action by Japan during the initial phase of this phase of the Nationalisation Crisis. Hence, it also represents the final basic fact which represented a security dilemma output by Japan, demarcating the conclusion of Japan’s security dilemma.

Dilemma of Interpretation

Japan’s dilemma of interpretation started on September 11th and continued for eight days until September 19th. That Japan’s dilemma of interpretation began on the 11th is apparent given that, as discussed above, Japan’s security dilemma began on September 11th. That it ended on the 19th is evident in how Xi’s condemnation of
Japan is the last basic fact which linked causally to a basic fact representing a Japanese action in this initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis.

Three basic facts input into Japan’s dilemma of interpretation. The first was China’s announcement of naval deployments on September 11\textsuperscript{th}, which, as stated, triggered Japan’s security dilemma. As mentioned in section 7.3.1, Chinese patrols in the East China Sea were relatively normal by 2012, raising a question as to why this would trigger a Japanese security dilemma. The explanation for this is found in the security dilemma/paradox’s basis in the inherent uncertainty of international relations. Even if the deployments were intended as benign, Japan could not be certain of such and thus defaulted to a worst-case interpretation to pursue its own security. This is consistent with security dilemma/paradox’s fatalist logic outlined in section 1.2. Hence, China’s deployments, while themselves a relatively benign Chinese response to Japan’s nationalisation announcement, was also a trigger of Japanese insecurity, which input into Japan’s dilemma of interpretation.

The second input into Japan’s dilemma of interpretation was the height of China’s anti-Japanese protests on September 18\textsuperscript{th}. This is apparent given the causal link between this basic fact and Noda’s speech on the 26\textsuperscript{th}. After his speech, Noda reportedly explained to his peers that ‘the scope of the anti-Japanese protests in China had been greater than expected’ (Noda cited in Wallace et al., 2015). This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it shows that Japan’s leadership was cognizant of China’s anti-Japanese protests, indicating that they input into Japan’s dilemma of interpretation. As stated, Noda implied that some level of anti-Japanese protest was expected, so the basic fact of the protests beginning on the 15\textsuperscript{th} would not have garnered Japanese insecurity. However, the unanticipated scale of the protests, represented by their height on the 18\textsuperscript{th}, would have. Thus, the height of China’s anti-Japanese protests input into Japan’s dilemma of interpretation while the mere fact of there being anti-Japanese protests did not.

The final input was Xi’s condemnation of Japan on September 19\textsuperscript{th}. This was China’s final output of its dilemma of response and thus the last basic fact which could possibly have input into Japan’s dilemma of interpretation. That it did input is
evident in the case study’s causal narrative given that it links to Noda’s speech on the 26th.

In summary, the basic facts which input into Japan’s dilemma of interpretation include:

- September 11th – China Deploy Ships to Press its Claim
- September 18th – The Height of China’s Anti-Japanese Protests
- September 19th – Xi Condemns Japan’s Behaviour

**Dilemma of Response**

Japan’s dilemma of response began on September 11th, evident in how Japan began to increase the presence of its coast guard in the East China Sea on this day. This was done in response to China’s naval deployments, which immediately preceded Japan’s deployments in the case study’s causal narrative. Japan’s dilemma of response then continued for 15 days. Concluding with Japan’s final response to China during the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis, Noda’s speech at the UN on September 26th. That this was a response to China is evident in Noda’s implicit reference to the dispute, as discussed in section 7.2.

Notably, these two basic facts were the only ones which formed outputs of Japan’s dilemma of response during the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis. There were two other basic facts pertaining to Japanese actions in the case study: Japan’s nationalisation announcement and its pursuit of US reassurances. The former was the triggering event of the Nationalisation Crisis, meaning it could not have been a dilemma of response output during said crisis. The latter, as during the Trawler Incident, should be considered a factor of Japan’s dilemma of interpretation. Providing Japan with a fuller understanding of the strategic context of the dispute rather than itself being a response output of Japan’s security dilemma.

Resultantly, only two basic facts can be mapped to Japan’s security dilemma as outputs of its dilemma of response:

- September 11th–17th – Half of Japan’s Coast Guard are Deployed to the East China Sea
• September 26\textsuperscript{th} – Noda speaks about the dispute at the UN

\textit{Secondary Concepts (7.3.3)}

The final component of step 2 is the identification of any of the secondary security dilemma/paradox concepts in the basic facts mapped to China’s and Japan’s respective security dilemmas. Each secondary concept is discussed below in turn. The definitions of each secondary concept can be found in section 2.1.3.

\textit{Strategic Challenge}

During the Trawler Incident, strategic challenge mechanics emerged from the Chinese sub-unit level, when the anti-Japanese protests informed the unit-level dilemma of interpretation. A similar mechanic can be observed in the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis. As discussed in section 7.3.1, China’s response to Japan changed following the outbreak of anti-Japanese protests critical of the CCP. This indicates that the same inter-level strategic challenge phenomenon witnessed in 2010 was also at play in 2012.

Notably, the change in China’s response to Japan in the 2012 dispute was much less reactive than in 2010. Instead of severing diplomatic channels, it involved efforts to mitigate the sub-unit pressures on the CCP. As to why this was the case warrants further study but is beyond the scope of this thesis. For the purposes of this study, neither China nor Japan perceived the other to pose a strategic challenge. Yet, mechanics associated with the strategic challenge can again be observed in the interaction between the Chinese sub-unit and unit levels.

\textit{Security Dilemma Sensibility}

Both China and Japan practised security dilemma sensibility during the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis. As discussed in section 7.3.1, China’s dilemma of response can be split into two phases, the first being benign and the second being mitigatory in nature. This shift occurred, as discussed, due to mounting domestic pressure on the CCP arising from the anti-Japanese protests. In 2010, anti-Japanese protesters were similarly critical of the CCP, meaning that some criticism should have been expected if China’s initial response to the announcement was not in line with the expectations of Chinese nationalists.
Moreover, given its self-perceived vulnerability due to its leadership contest and the Bo Xilai scandal, the CCP might have been expected to avoid any nationalistic criticism by immediately responding in line with nationalists’ expectations. For example, by escalating China’s naval presence in the East China Sea from routine patrols to an active military presence. Alternatively, the CCP could have demanded immediate UN recognition of China’s territorial claim instead of merely submitting evidence for consideration. That China’s leadership did not respond in such provocative ways, despite the risk of domestic criticism of the CCP’s regime, speaks to a desire to avoid provoking Japanese insecurity and thus damaging Sino-Japanese relations.

Even after the shift in China’s dilemma of response, security dilemma sensibility can still be observed. This is because even though the CCP began channelling anti-Japanese sentiment to mitigate criticism of their regime (Wallace, 2015), their actions directed demonstrations away from Japanese people and institutions. This is evident in the email from the Japanese embassy which pointed to a ban on protests outside of the embassy as an example of intervention by Chinese authorities to protect Japanese citizens residing in China (Branigan, 2012). Directing the anti-Japanese protests away from Japanese citizens in China speaks to an awareness that stoking anti-Japanese sentiment to mitigate criticism of the CCP risked antagonising Japan. Hence, security dilemma sensibility can be observed in China’s security dilemma during both phases of its dilemma of response.

Concerning Japan, its exercise in security dilemma sensibility focuses on Noda’s decision not to deploy the Self-Defence Force once the coast guard reached its operational capacity in the East China Sea on September 17th. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution prohibits the use of military force as a tool of foreign policy but does allow for a military for the purposes of self-defence (Kolmas, 2019). As Japanese-administered territory, deploying the Self-Defence Force in the territorial waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands would not have breached Article 9. This means that it would have been permissible, constitutionally speaking, for Noda to deploy the self-defence force. A move that China, or at the very least Chinese nationalists, would have found provocative and thus escalated tensions.
Plausibly, Noda might have been a staunch traditionalist, fundamentally opposed to using the Self-Defence Force in a dispute with another nation even if legally permissible. In this case, Noda’s decision would be ideologically rooted rather than an expression of security dilemma sensibility. However, Noda was known to hold revisionist sympathies, apparent in his view that Japan’s wartime generals should not be considered war criminals and that re-armament is necessary to mitigate China’s growing military strength (Economy, 2011). Thus, Noda’s decision not to deploy Japan’s Self-Defence Force was not based in any traditionalist aversion to the use of force and could have been an expression of security dilemma sensibility.

That it was in fact an expression of security dilemma sensibility is clarified by the USA’s provision of reassurances on the 17th. The same day that Japan’s coast guard reached its operational capacity and Noda was faced with the decision as to whether it was necessary to deploy the Self-Defence Force. Reassurances that Japan had US military support in the case of a Chinese attack would have lessened the need for a Japanese military presence in the territorial waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Within this context, Noda’s decision not to deploy the Self-Defence Force should be considered a realisation that the risk of Japan’s action causing Chinese insecurity and thus escalating the dispute outweighed the benefits. Accordingly, there is evidence of security dilemma sensibility in both China’s and Japan’s security dilemmas.

**Reassurance Game**

Despite both practising security dilemma sensibility during the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis, neither China nor Japan undertook a reassurance game. Certainly, neither pursued a policy of cost signalling, the practice of communicating reassurance by taking costly self-detrimental actions that force the other to conclude benign intentions (Ibid.). If either side in the Nationalisation Crisis were to pursue a cost-signalling policy, then the CCP might have cracked down on the anti-Japanese protests immediately despite the risks to its regime security. Meanwhile, Japan might have unilaterally returned its coast guard deployments in the East China Sea to their regular level after receiving US reassurances.
Arguably, the relatively benign nature of China’s naval deployments could have represented a kind of subtle reassurance. Doing so as a de facto non-escalation of the dispute while performatively adhering to domestic, nationalistic Chinese pressure regarding how to respond to Japan’s nationalisation announcement. However, even if this was an attempt at subtle reassurance, it does not constitute a true reassurance game. This is because a reassurance game requires overt gestures, like cost signalling, to force a benign interpretation of an actor’s intentions. Something that implicit nuance in an actor’s policy response is too understated to achieve. Hence, it is concluded that neither China nor Japan engaged in a reassurance game.

Summary (7.4)
This chapter has presented the conclusions made by applying steps 1 and 2 of the unique analytical framework to the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis. Step 1 identified 11 basic facts considered relevant to the case study and presented each basic fact’s role in the case study’s causal narrative. Following this, step 2 mapped these basic facts to the security dilemma/paradox concept, revealing a single security paradox cycle pertaining to the case study. This consisted of a Chinese security dilemma followed by a Japanese security dilemma, albeit with significant overlap between the two.

Regarding the constituent dilemmas of each nations’ security dilemma, it was also revealed that China’s dilemma of interpretation was heavily influenced by domestic sub-unit inputs. China’s dilemma of response consisted of two distinct phases. Phase 1 was characterised by relatively benign outputs in response to Japan. Phase 2 was characterised by efforts to mitigate domestic criticism of the CCP arising from the anti-Japanese protests sparked by the Nationalisation Crisis. Japan’s dilemma of interpretation received inputs from China’s naval deployments, anti-Japanese protests, and Xi’s condemnation of Japan. It’s dilemma of response consisted of its coast guard deployments and Noda’s UN speech.

Step 2 then concluded by considering secondary security dilemma/paradox concepts. Neither China nor Japan perceived the other to pose a strategic challenge. Nor did either country engage in a reassurance game during the initial
phase of the Nationalisation Crisis. However, both practised security dilemma sensibility, clear in the relatively benign outputs of phase 1 of China’s dilemma of response and in Noda’s decision not to deploy Japan’s Self-Defence Force.
Chapter 8 - The Nationalisation Crisis – Step 3

This chapter presents step 3 of the analytical framework’s application to the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis. As such, it outlines whether any securitization mechanics were present among the basic facts mapped to China’s and Japan’s respective security dilemmas in step 2. Where securitization mechanics are evident, the following will be identified: the strand and illocutionary logic, the securitizing actor, the referent object and security sector, any inter-level dynamics, and the applicability of any second-generation securitization concepts.

There were two securitizations among the Chinese basic facts. The first was in China’s deployment of ships to press their claim to the disputed islands, which represented a control securitization on behalf of the CCP over Chinese nationalists. The second was China’s anti-Japanese protests, the basic facts of which are again considered holistically to avoid repetition. As during the Trawler Incident, the protests represented a culmination of microsecuritizations. However, this time they were more overtly critical of the CCP, framing the CCP’s response to Japan’s nationalisation announcement as weak and, thus, a threat to the Chinese nation. This chapter concludes with a discussion considering the absence of any further securitization mechanics in the case study.

China Deploys Ships to Press its Claim (8.1)
Securitization mechanics were present alongside China’s deployment of ships to press its claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. These are not found in a single formal announcement by the Chinese government, as was the case during the Trawler Incident. As explained, there was no formal announcement of these deployments. Nor are securitization mechanics found in the act of deploying ships, given the relatively routine nature of China’s patrols in the East China Sea by 2012.
However, while the patrols were relatively routine, it was unusual for government spokespeople to comment on them (Green et al., 2017b). It is the speech acts conducted by spokespeople for government ministries in which securitization mechanics can be found. For brevity, and because their statement offers the most content for analysis, the following discussion will focus on Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s speech act. This also provides consistency as it was Hong’s predecessor as Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Jiang Yu, whose announcement of naval deployments was discussed as a securitizing move in the Trawler Incident case study.

Hong’s statement concerning China’s deployments can be identified as a securitizing speech act due to its control strand illocutionary logic. Hong (2012) espoused that:

‘We demand the Japanese side to immediately stop all acts that may infringe upon China's territorial sovereignty. Japan should truly come back to the very understanding and common ground reached between the two sides, and should return to the track of negotiated settlement of the Diaoyu Islands issue...

...the recent wrong actions by the Japanese side aroused indignation of the Chinese people at home and abroad...’

The illocutionary logic of the control strand is do X and desist from doing Q to prevent threat Z (Vuori, 2008). In this excerpt, Hong explained that Japan should stop infringing upon China’s territorial sovereignty, fulfilling the desist Q aspect. Hong continued to state that Japan should pursue a diplomatic settlement, do X, or risk Chinese indignation, threat Y. Albeit with the X and Y elements inverted in their order, Hong’s statement invoked the illocutionary logic of the control strand and thus should be considered a control strand securitizing move. One in which Hong, as a CCP official and the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, was the securitizing actor, and the securitizing move’s format was a speech act.

The audience of Hong’s securitizing speech act was the Chinese people, and specifically Chinese nationalists likely to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations. At first glance, this conclusion seems unlikely, as Hong’s rhetoric was directed at Japan. However, rather than the deterrence strand characterised by
the other serving as the intended audience, Hong employed the illocutionary logic of the control strand. This is associated with the securitizing move being intended for domestic audiences, over which the securitizing actor seeks to establish control (Ibid.).

That Hong’s securitizing move was intended for Chinese nationalists is reinforced by precedent. During the Trawler Incident, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s control securitizing move was also rhetorically directed at Japan. Yet, as presented in section 5.2, it sought to exert control over nationalistic, anti-Japanese protesters in a way that also upheld the CCP’s nationalist credentials. Hong’s control securitization should be considered a continuation of the same practice. In this case, it manifested in a CCP effort to exert control over Chinese nationalists before the outbreak of anti-Japanese protests potentially critical of the CCP’s nationalist credentials. This is evident in how, in the concluding sentence of Hong’s (2012) speech act, Chinese nationalists were addressed directly:

‘We also maintain that the public express their patriotic passion in a rational and lawful manner.’

Hence, the audience of Hong’s control strand securitizing speech act was the Chinese people. Specifically, Chinese nationalists that the CCP wanted to exert control over to uphold their nationalist credentials.

Based solely on rhetoric, the referent object of Hong’s securitizing move might be China’s territorial integrity. Indeed, Hong referred to China’s territorial sovereignty in their speech act. Yet, Hong’s choice of words is significant. Security threats are external, existential and warrant exceptional action beyond day-to-day politics to address (Buzan et al., 1998). By framing Japan’s nationalisation as an action that ‘may’ infringe upon Chinese territory, Hong was not presenting Japan as an inherently existential threat to Chinese territory. Thus, China’s territorial integrity could not have truly been the referent object of Hong’s speech act.

Rather, the referent object was the CCP’s regime. A referent object situated firmly within the political sector given the CCP’s institutionalisation within Chinese politics (Chong, 2014). This explains Hong’s use of the control strand to establish
control over the nationalist movement upon which the CCP relies for legitimacy. Moreover, Hong (Ibid.) presented the ‘indignation of the Chinese people’ as the perceived threat. Given that the Chinese people cannot pose an external threat to themselves, this further points to the CCP’s regime as Hong’s referent object. As, by way of being a control strand securitizing move intended for Chinese nationalists, Hong’s speech act reveals that the true objective was to secure the CCP’s regime from nationalistic criticism, a regime that already perceived itself to be vulnerable due to its leadership contest and the Bo Xilai scandal.

Hong was a unit-level securitizing actor, apparent in how their position as Foreign Ministry Spokesperson privileged them to speak on behalf of the Chinese state before a national audience. However, Hong’s speech act was inherently inter-level in nature. This is because, as evident in the above discussion of the securitizing move’s mechanics, Hong, a representative of the unit-level, indicated that Chinese nationalists, a sub-unit grouping, were a perceived threat to the CCP, a second sub-unit grouping. Albeit one closely intertwined with the Chinese state.

In terms of second-generation securitization mechanics, the strands concept is evidently applicable given Hong’s employment of the control strand’s illocutionary logic. Meanwhile, the microsecuritization concept is not applicable. True, Hong’s speech act was only one of multiple statements made on behalf of Chinese government ministries on September 11th. However, individual microsecuritizing moves are benign (Huysmans, 2011). The same cannot be said of a speech act conducted by the spokesperson representing a ministry of the Chinese state, privileged with a platform in which they can address the entire Chinese nation. Hence, despite existing within a plurality, Hong’s speech act was a securitizing move, not a microsecuritizing move.

Hong’s securitizing move cannot itself be considered a macrosecuritizing move as it did not attempt to raise one perceived security threat above another in China’s security agenda. However, it did evidence the persistence of a pre-existing macrosecuritization. Namely, the macrosecuritization of threats to the CCP’s regime discussed regarding the Trawler Incident in section 5.2. This is apparent in how Hong nominally presented Japan as a threat to China’s territorial integrity but, as
discussed, was attempting to exert control over Chinese nationalists, whose nationalism the CCP’s regime relies upon for legitimacy.

Hong’s speech act does not indicate the existence of a securitization dilemma. As outlined in section 2.2.3, a securitization dilemma might be expected alongside a macrosecuritizing move and/or evident when a securitizing actor’s rhetoric frames one issue as a threat with reference to another securitised issue. Neither condition was met in Hong’s securitizing move, thus the securitization dilemma concept is not applicable.

Summarily, the securitizing mechanics associated with China’s naval deployments can be found in the statements released by the spokespeople of Chinese government ministries. Best exemplified by the speech act conducted by the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Hong Lei. Hong speech act was a control strand securitizing move, in which Hong was the securitizing actor and the Chinese nation, particularly Chinese nationalists, served as the audience. The referent object was the CCP’s regime. As a unit-level securitizing actor attempting to exert control over one sub-unit group to secure another, Hong’s securitizing move was inherently inter-level in its dynamics. In terms of second-generation concepts, the microsecuritization and the securitization dilemma concepts are not applicable to Hong’s speech act. However, the strands concept is applicable by way of Hong’s control strand logic. Also, while not a macrosecuritizing move itself, Hong’s securitizing move indicates the persistence of the pre-existing macrosecuritization of threats to the CCP’s regime.

China’s Anti-Japanese Protests (8.2)

China’s anti-Japanese protests also represented a securitization during the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis. One in which the CCP’s supposedly weak leadership in the face of Japanese provocation was considered a threat to the Chinese nation. This is evident in the protesters’ speech acts, which incorporated illocutionary logic consistent with that of a securitizing move. However, they did so in a manner that warrants focused discussion and is thus presented later in this section once the core securitization mechanics are outlined.
The anti-Japanese protesters’ securitizing move was also communicated through images and actions. Similar to the Trawler Incident, depictions of Mao featured prominently in the anti-Japanese protests (N.D., 2012; Huang, 2012). As established, the significance of securitizing images is found in the discourse surrounding the image depicted. The discourse surrounding Mao in 2012, similar to 2010, concerned Mao as a strong Chinese leader who led the country against Japan during the Second Sino-Japanese War (Green et al., 2017b).

However, this discourse factored more prominently in the protesters’ rhetoric in 2012 compared to 2010. While the protesters in 2010 focussed their rhetoric on the Trawler Incident alongside carrying depictions of Mao, the protesters in 2012 were more explicit in stating their desire for the CCP to be more like Mao in their leadership style. For example, exclaiming that:

‘Mao was new China’s first leader and he knew how to be tough on foreigners... Hu Jintao and those people are useless and impotent before Japan’s provocations.” (Buckley, 2012)

As the depictions of Mao were considered securitizing images during the Trawler Incident, they should also be considered as such during the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis. These highlight the anti-Japanese protesters’ now more explicit calls for a change in the CCP’s leadership in favour of Mao’s leadership style, as presented in the discourse surrounding Mao Zedong.

As discussed in section 2.2.1, securitizing actions can be identified by an observable increase in the legitimacy of the securitizing actor prior to their securitizing move. To this end, the mere act of protesting should be considered a securitizing move conducted by the anti-Japanese protesters. This is because the protesters had been particularly active in the prelude to the Nationalisation Crisis, legitimating themselves alongside building Sino-Japanese tensions in their role as history activists. They acted as the primary opposition to Japan’s nationalisation plans following the CCP’s purported provision of consent to Japan’s plans in meetings with officials from Noda’s government in May 2012 (Green et al., 2017b). These efforts included regular smaller-scale anti-Japanese protests following Governor Ishihara’s announced intention to purchase the islands in April through to
Japan’s nationalisation announcement in September (Ibid.). History activists also attempted landings on the disputed islands in the absence of any specific Chinese policy to press China’s claim to the islands (Ibid.).

The protesters continued their history activism in the anti-Japanese protests, with banners exclaiming ‘Don’t Forget the National Humiliation’ (Ogura and Mullen, 2012) being carried alongside the protesters’ securitizing images of Mao. Remembering the ‘century of humiliation’ is a core tenet of Chinese history activism (Reilly, 2004). Thus, by invoking such a phrase, the history activists among the anti-Japanese protests were drawing upon their legitimacy as Japan ‘experts’ who had been active in countering a perceived Japanese affront to the Chinese nation that the CCP had seemingly left unchallenged. Considering this, the act of protesting should itself be considered a securitizing move.

Yet, assigning the role of securitizing actor to the anti-Japanese protesters is not possible. This is because, despite being considered legitimate for the purposes of securitization, the anti-Japanese protests were not a single securitizing move but many in number and individually were mostly relatively benign. The above example of a protester criticising Hu’s government for not being enough like Mao is insignificant. Yet, combined with countless other examples of criticism aimed at the CCP against a backdrop of demonstrations with tens of thousands of participants, the speech acts, images, and actions of the protesters would have been more significant. Thus, as during the Trawler Incident, the anti-Japanese protests are better understood as microsecuritizing actors who, collectively, conducted a securitizing move.

The audience of the securitizing move was the CCP. This is apparent given the protesters’ rhetoric and their calls for the CCP to show stronger leadership in opposing Japan’s nationalisation of the disputed islands. Meanwhile, the referent object was the Chinese nation generally and its territorial integrity specifically. A referent object situated within the societal sector. This is evident in the protesters’ references to the CCP ‘giving our [the Chinese peoples’] land away’ (Buckley, 2012). It is also apparent considering the aforementioned banners making reference to the ‘Century of Humiliation’. As outlined in section 3.2, this was a period which the
Nationalist Narrative presents as a time of suffering for the Chinese nation and thus is a logical reference to make when presenting the Chinese nation as the referent object of a securitizing move.

Discussion now turns to focus on the applicability of securitization theory’s second-generation concepts. The applicability of the microsecuritization concept has already been discussed with regard to the status of the anti-Japanese protesters as microsecuritizing actors. Meanwhile, the anti-Japanese protests cannot be considered a macrosecuritizing move. This is because there is no evidence that the anti-Japanese protesters were seeking to establish a new overarching security context. Rather, presenting the CCP as weak in response to Japan adheres to the same pre-existing macrosecuritization of external threats to China which was present during the Trawler Incident. This conclusion is drawn because the success of microsecuritizing moves in the manner observed during the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis suggests adherence to a long-established macrosecuritization. A macrosecuritization which justifies said microsecuritization and facilitates its acceptance.

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the protesters’ speech acts presented an illocutionary logic as per the strands concept. However, the illocutionary logic of the protesters’ securitizing move does not fit nicely with that of any of the five strands outlined by Vuori (2008, 2011). This is apparent in the speech acts of both protesters who called for the CCP to adopt Mao’s leadership style and also pro-democracy groups. To exemplify the more common pro-Mao speech acts:

“Mao is our hero because he fought the Japanese and won... Our leaders today talk only of peaceful diplomacy and look what happened. They are giving away our land.” (cited in Buckley, 2012.)

Meanwhile, a typical example of the pro-democracy speech acts:

“We think that the government is too soft and we want to show what we think... China should make its own demands as a great power. I feel disappointed in the government. It’s not democratic enough and doesn’t heed our voice. I hope our leaders can catch up. There’s no conflict between democracy and patriotism.” (Ibid.)
In the first example, the illocutionary logic was *be like Mao and fight the Japanese, do X, our leaders’ diplomacy is failing, threat Y, due to which China is losing its land, warning Q*. In the latter example, it was *our leadership is too weak, threat Y, it needs to listen to the people, do X, otherwise democracy, warning Q*.

While this illocutionary logic does not align with any of the pre-established strands, there is an overlap between the strand present in these speech acts and three pre-existing strands in terms of securitizing mechanics. The saliency, deterrence, and control strands. The overlap with the saliency strand is straightforward, the protesters sought to raise the saliency of their concerns about their country’s leadership. Hence the calls upon the CCP to be more like Mao. The overlap with the deterrence strand is found in how the audience of the speech acts was the CCP, the source of the perceived threat of weak leadership and how the protesters were attempting to deter further weakness. The overlap with the control strand is found in the $Q$ element of the illocutionary logic. Of all the pre-established strands, only the control strand issues a warning to desist from $Q$. However, the protesters’ speech acts evidently issued a warning.

When presenting their strands concept, Vuori (2011) explained that there were almost certainly more strands of securitization than those they had identified. Plausibly, the mechanics identified here belong to a strand previously unidentified in securitization theory’s literature. One which is conceptually situated in the space between the strand, deterrence, and control strands. For the purposes of this thesis, this strand will be referred to as the *protest strand*. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to establish this strand and its mechanics, it certainly warrants further research, concretely determining the strand’s existence and contributing to the development of securitization theory.

To recap, the anti-Japanese protests during the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis presented a securitizing move. The securitizing move was itself a collection of microsecuritizations conducted by individuals and groups of anti-Japanese protesters who served as microsecuritizing actors. These microsecuritizing actors framed what they considered to be a weak response to Japan by the CCP as a threat to the Chinese nation and their audience was the CCP
itself. The anti-Japanese protests’ securitization mechanics do not include a macrosecuritizing move nor a securitization dilemma but do indicate a pre-existing macrosecuritization of external threats to China. Additionally, there is evidence of a securitization strand with a unique illocutionary logic, provisionally referred to as the protest strand.

**The Absence of Securitization Mechanics (8.3)**

The Trawler Incident case study offered a collection of four securitizing moves to study, three concerning China and one concerning Japan. Meanwhile, the Nationalisation Crisis only presented two, both concerning China. This is likely due to the nature of the case studies. The former covered an entire potential flashpoint in Sino-Japanese relations, which was compact in nature, while the latter is only the initial phase of a much more drawn-out dispute. Hence, there was a lower concentration of basic facts and securitization mechanics available for discussion.

In the absence of more securitizations mechanics to discuss, the remainder of this step presents honourable mentions. Basic facts which were considered likely candidates for securitization mechanics, but cannot be considered securitizations for the purposes of this thesis.

**Xi’s Condemnation of Japan**

It is difficult to discuss Xi’s speech act in which he condemned Japanese actions given the lacking information on the specifics of what it was Xi said. However, it was initially considered a likely candidate as a securitizing move in the same way that Wen’s UN speech was during the Trawler Incident. Namely, that Xi might have invoked securitization mechanics as a way to acquiesce to the anti-Japanese protesters’ demands for a stronger response. Certainly, it was around the time of Xi’s condemnation of Japan that the CCP began to actively manage the anti-Japanese protests, emphasising their anti-Japanese sentiment and subduing nationalist criticism of the CCP.

Yet, while similar in that the CCP more actively managed the protests following both Wen’s speech act during the Trawler Incident and Xi’s speech act during the Nationalisation Crisis, the manner in which this management occurred
differed. Following Wen’s speech act, the CCP began to actively discourage anti-Japanese protests, especially after Japan’s release of the trawler captain (Global Times, 2010). After Xi’s speech, the CCP did not discourage the anti-Japanese protests, but rather co-opted them, emphasising their anti-Japanese sentiment to direct focus away from criticism of the CCP (Branigan, 2012). In this, the CCP leaned into its nationalist credentials to protect its regime legitimacy, a practice it had engaged with since the establishment of the Nationalist Narrative in the 1980s. Considering this, the outcome of Xi’s speech act was the continuation of day-to-day politics, not the enactment of extraordinary measures against a securitized threat.

Plausibly, the CCP was only able to co-opt major anti-Japanese protests critical of the CCP through securitization. This is in line with Holbraad and Pedersen’s (2012) revolutionary securitization model in which governing is done through a blurring of day-to-day and security politics. However, without access to more information concerning Xi’s speech act to analyse its hypothetical securitizing mechanics, this cannot be conclusively established. Hence, for the purposes of this thesis, Xi’s condemnation of Japan is not presented as a securitization.

_Japan deploys half of its Coast Guard to the East China Sea_

Another basic fact in which securitization mechanics were considered likely is Japan’s increase in its Coast Guard deployments between September 11th and 17th. This is because it is often considered to represent Japanese pseudo-militarisation of the dispute (see Green et al., 2017b; Taffer, 2020). For a constitutionally demilitarised society like Japan, this could be thought of as an extraordinary measure indicative of securitization.

For Japan’s deployments to be a security measure, there would have had to have been a securitizing move. Perhaps the discourse surrounding the protests and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands could have been such that depictions of these constituted securitizing images. Certainly, polling at the time indicated that 80% of Japanese people were worried about Chinese posturing (Johnson, 2012) and images of Chinese protesters would likely have fed into this worry. However, discourse over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, and thus the protests sparked by said dispute,
varied between Japanese Traditionalists and Revisionists. While both groups generally consider the islands Japanese territory, the former mostly expressed regret over the unsettled nature of the dispute and its association with historical Japanese militarism while the latter usually pointed to Chinese posturing as a justification for Japan’s remilitarisation (Suzuki, 2015). Within this heterogenous discoursal context, the images circulating in Japan during the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis may have fuelled anti-Chinese anxieties spanning the Traditionalist-Revisionist divide but would have been unlikely to facilitate a unit-level securitization of China.

Hypothetically, the act of increasing coast guard deployments was itself a securitizing action. This was not the case, however. The Japanese Coast Guard was already tasked with patrolling the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the surrounding region of the East China Sea before the Nationalisation Crisis. To this end, although the scale of deployments increased, the mere act of deploying Coast Guard ships to the region was itself unextraordinary and not likely to securitize China’s patrols in the disputed region. Hence, in line with this and the above reasons, Japan’s increased coast guard deployments cannot be considered a securitizing move.

**Noda Speaks about the dispute at the UN**

Noda’s speech at the UN was considered a likely securitizing move. This was because of Wen’s securitizing move at the UN during the Trawler Incident. It is plausible that Noda would also use the spectacle afforded to him by attending the UN to help facilitate a securitizing move in the way that Wen did during the Trawler Incident.

However, there are key differences between Wen’s and Noda’s respective UN speeches. First, while Wen spoke at a separate event before Chinese media which happened to be at the UN, Noda spoke before the UN General Assembly. In this respect, Wen’s speech act was made to the community in which he was a social elite while Noda’s speech act was made to his peers, fellow representatives, and leaders of UN member states. Considering Noda’s audience, it is difficult to
conclude that his speech act was intended primarily for Japanese audiences as a way to securitize China as a threat to Japan.

Of course, Noda’s audience consisting of UN delegates could mean that he sought to securitize China as a threat to the international community. Achieving this by convincing his peers that immediate and exceptional action was necessary to resist a Chinese threat to the international system. Yet, Noda made no overt reference to China, instead discussing the dispute implicitly through reference to the importance of international law and diplomacy in settling disputes (Noda, 2012). To this end, Noda’s speech act offers no clear securitizing mechanics for discussion. This is understandable considering Noda’s earlier decision not to deploy Japan’s Self-Defence Force, which indicates that Japan’s leadership had already committed to settling the dispute diplomatically. Thus, they would not have sought to securitize China as a threat to either Japan or the international community in a speech at the UN.

**Summary (8.4)**

This chapter has presented step 3 of the unique analytical framework’s application to the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis. Two securitizing moves have been outlined, providing the basis of analysis in the following chapter on the role of historical narratives in the Sino-Japanese security paradox as pertains to the case study.

Both securitizing moves concerned China. The first of these was China’s deployment of ships to the East China Sea to press its claim to the nationalised islands. This was a unit-level securitization presented by a plurality of junior CCP officials, nominally framing Japan’s nationalisation of the disputed islands as a threat to the Chinese nation’s territorial integrity. The audience was the Chinese nation, specifically Chinese nationalists. However, as seen in Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong’s speech act, these invoked the illocutionary logic of the control strand. This indicates that the CCP sought to exert control over Chinese nationalists through a performative securitization of Japan. All the while, only initially deploying what was a relatively routine, and thus benign, patrol to the East China Sea
intended to mitigate nationalists’ allegations of CCP weakness in the face of a Japanese affront to the Chinese nation.

The second securitizing move was China’s anti-Japanese protests. As during the Trawler Incident, the protests constituted a sub-unit securitization consisting of microsecuritizations conducted by individuals and groups of protesters. These securitizing moves were varied, taking the form of speech acts, images, and actions. Unlike the Trawler Incident’s anti-Japanese protests, which sought to raise the saliency of Japan’s actions as a threat to the Chinese nation, the protests which occurred during the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis were more overtly critical of the CCP. Framing the CCP’s weakness in dealing with Japan, and not Japanese actions directly, as the threat to China. This is apparent considering the role of the CCP as the audience of the protesters’ microsecuritizing moves, the illocutionary logic of the protesters’ rhetoric, the symbolism of Mao’s image carried by many protesters and protesters’ actions such as storming CCP offices in Shenzen. By challenging the CCP for its supposed weakness in dealing with Japan, the anti-Japanese protesters also indicate the persistence of a pre-existing macrosecuritization which was also present during the Trawler Incident. Namely, the pre-existing macrosecuritization of external threats to China.

The final section of this chapter discussed the absence of securitization mechanics, presenting three basic facts where securitization mechanics were considered likely and explaining how there were none to be found. The absence of more securitization mechanics should not be considered a failure of this research, nor this thesis’s analytical framework. Rather, acknowledging and discussing the absence of securitization mechanics is an extension of the analytical framework’s adherence to transparent historiographical practice. Additionally, it still constitutes a unique contribution to knowledge, as containing no securitization mechanics where some might be expected is itself a notable finding.

Another notable finding presented in this chapter concerns the anti-Japanese protests’ securitization strand. As discussed, its illocutionary logic does not align with the illocutionary logic of the already established strands of securitization. Rather, it draws elements from the saliency, deterrence and control
strands. This suggests the existence of a yet unestablished strand within the conceptual space between these three established strands. Provisionally named the protest strand, this finding constitutes an avenue of future research which could further develop securitization theory.
Chapter 9 - The Nationalisation Crisis – Steps 4 and 5

This is the final chapter focusing on the initial phase of the 2012 Nationalisation Crisis. It builds upon the previous steps of the case study to examine how China’s and Japan’s narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War factored in the dispute’s securitizations. Then, this chapter takes a holistic view of steps 1 through 4. This considers how the historical narratives, by their role in the case study’s securitizations, affected the Sino-Japanese security paradox.

Step 4 reveals that China’s Nationalist Narrative factored significantly in the case study’s securitizations. Serving to facilitate the failure of Hong’s securitizing move while aiding the success of the anti-Japanese protesters’ securitization. This is done through a contradictory invocation of the narrative’s key specific themes and by resonating with the CCP’s historical consciousness, respectively.

Step 5 concludes that the Nationalist Narrative helped to propel the Sino-Japanese security paradox as it pertained to the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis. Additionally, step 5 presents some reflections on the other insights achieved by applying the thesis’s analytical framework to the case study and reflects on how the framework could be improved.

Step 4 – Historical Narratives and Securitization (9.1)
This step identifies the role of historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War in the securitizations that occurred during the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis. As outlined in chapter 3, China’s historical narrative is the Nationalist Narrative. It is characterised by key specific themes of Japanese victimisation of China, national unity in resisting Japan and public participation. Meanwhile, Japan’s historical narratives are the Traditional and Revisionist Narratives. The former is characterised by key specific themes of the renunciation of militarism and
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introspection. The latter is characterised by key specific themes of moral justification and Japanese victimhood.

China deploys ships to press its claim (9.1.1) Hong’s control strand securitizing move was a failure, apparent in section 8.1’s discussion which concluded that Hong sought to exert control over Chinese nationalists to prevent widespread protests, yet large-scale anti-Japanese protests began regardless in the following days. This is despite Hong invoking two of the Nationalist Narratives’ key specific themes: Japanese victimisation of China and national unity in resisting Japan.

Hong’s invocation of the key specific theme of Japanese victimisation is apparent in the securitizing mechanics of his speech act. The perceived threat of Japanese victimisation to the nominal referent object of the Chinese nation, specifically its territorial integrity and sovereignty, aligns thematically with historical victimisation taught by the Nationalist Narrative. For example, victimisation in the theft of Chinese land during the war’s prelude as part of Japan’s territorial expansion following the 1931 Mukden Incident (Mitter, 2013). Meanwhile, the key specific theme of national unity in resisting Japan was invoked in references to a homogenous national outrage following Japan’s nationalisation announcement (Hong, 2012). This constitutes a generalising statement reminiscent of the Nationalist Narrative’s presentation of the Second Sino-Japanese War as having impacted all of China’s people regardless of geographical and temporal context, as outlined in chapter 3 (Chong, 2014).

Despite Hong’s invocation of two key specific themes of the Nationalist Narrative, his control securitization failed. Given the emphasis on historical narratives facilitating the success of securitizing moves, one might conclude that the Nationalist Narrative could not have factored as a facilitating condition. However, the Nationalist Narrative did serve as a facilitating condition, aiding in the failure of Hong’s securitizing move. This conclusion is reached considering Hong’s attempt to subdue the Nationalist Narrative’s third key specific theme, public participation.
It is already established that Hong’s securitizing move sought control over Chinese nationalists, attempting to prevent large-scale demonstrations by requesting that the ‘public express their patriotic passion in a rational and lawful manner’ (Hong, 2012). At the same time, Hong invoked the key specific themes of Japanese victimisation of China and national unity in resisting Japan. To gather these emotive themes of the Nationalist Narrative while also discouraging the public from participating in expressing said themes is a contradiction. On the one hand, the CCP was attempting to invoke the Nationalist Narrative to exert its control. On the other hand, it was attempting to prevent a potential loss of control by suppressing a core tenet of the Nationalist Narrative.

The failure of Hong’s securitizing move suggests that the Chinese public’s historical consciousness, based upon the Nationalist Narrative, was stronger in fuelling public participation in the protests than the CCP’s ability to leverage the narrative as a tool of societal control. This viewpoint is reinforced considering a more recent incident. In 2020 a group of nationalist hacktivists rejected the CCP’s calls for calm and hacked into a Chinese embassy’s Twitter profile, posting anti-western images in protest of western condemnation of China’s crackdown on Hong Kong31 (Keyzer, 2020). Incidents such as this show that the nationalism fostered by the Nationalist Narrative has been escaping the CCP’s societal controls, with nationalist groups pursing their agenda despite, and even in spite of, pressure to the contrary from the CCP (Eves, 2022).

To this end, the Nationalist Narrative helped to facilitate the failure of Hong’s securitizing move. Hong’s invocation of the Nationalist Narrative failed to gain support for their securitizing move. This is despite framing Japan in accordance with the Nationalist Narrative, which would have likely resonated with the historical consciousness of nationalists in such a way that galvanised their participation in the anti-Japanese protests. It should be noted that Hong’s contradictory invocation of

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31 Nationalist hacktivists posted an image on the Twitter profile of the Chinese Embassy in Paris. The image showed the USA as the personification of death, trailing blood from Afghanistan and Iraq in the direction of Hong Kong (Keyzer, 2020). The CCP quickly issued public apologies to the USA and France, behaviour consistent with a CCP struggling to control China’s nationalist movement rather than a CCP actively seeking to antagonise the USA or France (Eves, 2022).
the Nationalist Narrative would not have been the sole factor in their securitization’s failure. As discussed in section 7.1, the protests were nominally anti-Japanese, but were also directed towards the CCP following the Bo Xilai scandal and its ongoing leadership contest. Thus, even if the Nationalist Narrative had aided rather than hindered Hong’s securitizing move, there would still have probably been some degree of protest. Accordingly, although it cannot be considered the definitive reason for the failure of Hong’s securitizing move, the Nationalist Narrative factored as a facilitating condition which made the failure of Hong’s securitizing move more likely.

Jutila (2015) only spoke of historical narratives facilitating the success of securitizing moves. As an example of a historical narrative facilitating the failure of a securitizing move, Hong’s failed securitizing move builds upon Jutila’s work. It highlights how historical narratives can have both a positive and negative impact as a facilitating condition for securitizations. Identifying additional examples of historical narratives facilitating the failure of securitizing moves would offer more insight into this topic.

Hong’s speech act did not invoke the Nationalist Narrative as anecdotal evidence. This is apparent in the absence of any specific references to historical events from the Second Sino-Japanese War in their rhetoric. If Hong wanted to provide anecdotal evidence, they might have mentioned the Mukden Incident which, as discussed above, is an example of Japanese expansion into Chinese territory from the prelude of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Alternatively, Hong might have included mention of the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the inciting incident of the war (Mitter, 2013), to frame Japan’s nationalisation announcement as a particularly inflammatory incident in Sino-Japanese relations.

That Hong omitted such references is logical, however. This is because invoking specific parallels with historical examples of Japanese victimisation of China would not have served Hong’s objective to exert control over Chinese nationalists. If, as discussed above, an implicit invocation of notions of wartime Japanese victimisation and national unity in resisting Japan were contradictory to
Hong’s objective, specific examples would have further undermined the securitizing move. Thus, Hong did not invoke the Nationalist Narrative as anecdotal evidence.

As outlined in section 8.1, the nominal referent object of Hong’s securitizing move was the Chinese nation. However, upon closer inspection, it was truly the CCP’s legitimacy, which was to be protected from nationalistic criticism in accordance with the pre-existing macrosecuritization of threats to the CCP’s regime legitimacy. While this means that the nationalist narrative was not explicitly the referent object of Hong’s securitizing move, it is possible that the narrative constituted a component of the referent object. The basis of this reasoning is founded upon how presenting Japanese actions as a threat to the Chinese nation to secure the CCP’s regime security aligns with the original purpose of the Nationalist Narrative as a source of CCP legitimacy.

Yet, while this alignment may help to understand Hong’s choice of referent object within the context of a pre-existing macrosecuritization, this does not constitute referent object status for the Nationalist Narrative or any of its key specific themes. This conclusion is similar to that of section 6.1.3’s, where there was thematic alignment between the Nationalist Narrative and Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s referent object. In that instance, an alignment with the Nationalist Narrative was concluded not to constitute any part of the referent object. This provides a precedent for the conclusion that an alignment of purpose in Hong’s speech act also did not constitute any part of the referent object.

The final point of discussion is whether a historical narrative factored in Hong’s securitizing move as the perceived threat. As established in section 8.1, Japan’s nationalisation announcement was presented as a perceived threat to Chinese territorial sovereignty, Hong’s nominal referent object. As explained in section 2.5.4, a historical narrative itself is rarely securitized as the perceived threat but is through the securitization of associated issues. Additionally, this phenomenon can be identified by the blurring of key specific themes as the Other’s historical narrative is interpreted through the lens of a community’s own historical narrative. Notably, Hong (2012) made no mention of Japanese historical narratives,
indicating that they did not factor in the perceived threat of Hong’s securitizing move.

Notably, Hong (2012) did make an inference to the Nationalist Narrative’s key specific theme of public participation in their request ‘that the public express their patriotic passion in a rational and lawful manner’. This was, as mentioned, a downplay of one key specific theme of the Nationalist Narrative as part of Hong’s attempt to exert control via their securitizing move. In this regard, a key specific theme of the Nationalist Narrative, public participation, was interpreted by the CCP through the lens of the Nationalist Narrative’s original purpose, securing the CCP’s regime. In this case, being interpreted as a barrier to said purpose and thus a theme to be discouraged. It should also be noted that the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, by way of being a lingering territorial dispute left unsettled after the Second Sino-Japanese War, is an issue associated with the Nationalist Narrative. Thus serving as an example of lingering Chinese victimisation at the hands of Japan. This means that the Nationalist Narrative fulfils the two criteria outlined for a historical narrative to factor as a component of a securitization’s perceived threat. This shaped the CCP’s interpretation of events in such a way that Japan’s announcement caused the CCP to feel threatened by the prospect of anti-Japanese protests.

In summary, the Nationalist Narrative factored in Hong’s securitizing move as a facilitating condition, albeit facilitating the securitizing move’s failure rather than its success. Meanwhile, historical narratives of the war did not factor as anecdotal evidence or as a referent object. Yet, the Nationalist Narrative did factor as a component of the perceived threat of Hong’s securitizing move.

**The Anti-Japanese Protests (9.1.2)**

The Nationalist Narrative factored as a facilitating condition in the anti-Japanese protesters’ securitizing move, facilitating its success by resonating with the historical consciousness of the CCP. The themes of national unity and public participation were represented in the protesters’ calls for the CCP to embrace the patriotism of the Chinese people and claims that it was the will of the Chinese people that China resist Japan.
Yet, the most notable key specific theme invoked was Japanese victimisation of China. That this theme was invoked is not immediately obvious in the anti-Japanese protesters’ rhetoric. However, the protesters’ criticism of the CCP is levied in such a way that it should be considered a manifestation of the key specific theme of Japanese victimisation of China. This is because the protesters’ criticism of the CCP framed it as complicit in contemporary China’s victimisation. For example, when it was claimed that the CCP ‘are impotent before Japan’s provocations’ (ibid.), or that ‘our leaders… are giving way our land’ (ibid.). This is significant because it would have pressured the CCP to adhere to the demands of Chinese nationalists in determining China’s response to Japan’s nationalisation announcement. In effect, the protesters were using the Nationalist Narrative against the CCP.

This leads to the question as to why the key specific theme of Japanese victimisation manifested in this way. One possible explanation is that it is a mechanic of the protest strand, the unique securitization strand identified in section 8.2. This cannot be established with certainty here. However, perhaps protest strand securitization seeks to raise the saliency of an issue by being critical of the audience, challenging them to treat the issue as a security threat. If so, this would be distinctive from the mechanics of any already established securitization strands and thus a phenomenon worth further study.

Another possible explanation is that the Nationalist Narrative was evolving. As discussed in sections 1.1.2, 2.3 and in chapter 3, history is not a fixed reality and our understanding of it changes over time. Plausibly, if the CCP’s societal controls over nationalism were failing, then its monopoly over China’s wartime history, and by extension the Nationalist Narrative, was also faltering. This would mean that the protesters were freer to reshape the narrative to reflect their socio-political requirements. In this case, holding China’s leadership to account for perceived inaction in preventing renewed Japanese victimisation of China.

This manifestation of the key specific theme of Japanese victimisation is notable for its similarities with the earlier Maoist Narrative, outlined in section 3.2. This is because the Maoist Narrative condemned China’s wartime Kuomintang government for being complicit in China’s victimisation in a way thematically similar
to the sentiment evident among the anti-Japanese protests during the Nationalisation Crisis. This is significant as it indicates that the CCP’s monopoly over the Nationalist Narrative was indeed faltering. The CCP constructed the Nationalist Narrative to legitimise its regime and would not have allowed the narrative to evolve in a way that undermined its regime’s legitimacy. It is also possible that the anti-CCP sentiment present at the time due to the leadership contest and Bo Xilai scandal merely influenced the protesters’ invocation of the Nationalist Narrative. Resulting in a manifestation of the key specific theme of Japanese victimisation of China directed towards Japan that was only temporarily characterised by anti-CCP sentiment.

Most likely, both explanations are relevant to understanding the protester’s anti-CCP invocation of the key specific theme of Japanese victimisation of China. While anti-CCP sentiment resulted in framing the CCP as complicit in Japanese victimisation, doing so also constituted a retelling of the Nationalist Narrative with contemporary political implications. A retelling which recasts the CCP from being China’s wartime vanguard to the role of a secondary antagonist during the Nationalisation Crisis, tacitly complicit in Japanese victimisation of China.

This is important in understanding how the anti-Japanese protesters’ invoked the Nationalist Narrative as a facilitating condition. This is because, similar to during the Trawler Incident as outlined in section 6.1.1, this would have resonated with the CCP’s historical consciousness. Or at least would have made it hyper-conscious that its legitimating historical narrative was being invoked in a way that undermined its regime legitimacy. This conclusion is supported by considering the pre-existing macrosecuritization of threats to the CCP’s regime and the CCP’s actions following the height of the protests on September 18th. Logically, the CCP decided that, given the precarious position of protesters using their legitimating narrative against them, it was better to actively participate in and manage the protests. Evident in how the CCP was able to refocus the protesters, and thus the Nationalist Narrative, on being anti-Japanese with the CCP at the helm of the movement (Wallace et al., 2015). This can be considered an extraordinary measure as it represented a major shift in the CCP’s handling of the dispute and protests.
literally overnight. One which can be explained by the CCP responding rapidly to the protesters’ invocation of the Nationalist Narrative facilitating the success of their protest securitization to mitigate any greater potential threat to their regime’s legitimacy.

In terms of anecdotal evidence, the protesters failed to invoke the Nationalist Narrative. In their rhetoric, while they do refer to Mao as a strong wartime leader (Buckely, 2012), there is no mention of specific examples of Mao’s wartime leadership. For example, his command of the Eighth Route Army. Similar to during the Trawler Incident, the protesters carried depictions of Mao and the height of the protests occurred on September 18th, the anniversary of the Mukden Incident. The symbolic evidence of these could be considered anecdotal evidence and thus warrant discussion.

However, as with the Trawler Incident, neither the images of Mao nor the act of protesting on September 18th constitute an invocation of the Nationalist Narrative as anecdotal evidence in the protesters’ securitization. Concerning the depictions of Mao, the most common image was his Tiananmen Square portrait (N.D., 2012; Huang, 2012). As concluded in section 6.1.1, the discourse surrounding this image of Mao concerns strong leadership generally and not strong wartime leadership against Japan specifically. Meanwhile, as also concluded in section 6.1.1, in absence of references to the Mukden Incident, the symbolic significance of September 18th is better considered a facilitating condition for the height of the anti-Japanese protests and not the invocation of a historical event associated with the Nationalist Narrative as anecdotal evidence of Japanese victimisation. Consequentially, the Nationalist Narrative did not factor as anecdotal evidence in the protesters’ securitization.

As established in section 8.2, the referent object of the anti-Japanese protesters’ securitization was the Chinese nation, specifically its territorial sovereignty and integrity. To this extent, the Nationalist Narrative did not factor explicitly as the referent object, but it is necessary to consider whether the narrative factored in some aspect of this referent object. This would be evident, as Jutila (2015) argues, if there was popular support for the securitization. Certainly,
there was popular support for the anti-Japanese protests given their scale in cities throughout China, suggesting popular support for the protesters’ securitization. However, this popular support cannot be specifically assigned to either the protesters’ securitization or be accounted for by way of the Nationalist Narrative. This is because the popular support for the protests could be explained as a consequence of the anti-CCP sentiment that existed in 2012, hence the CCP-critical nature of the anti-Japanese protests. Given that the popular support for the protests cannot be confirmed as evidence of the Nationalist Narrative factoring in the protesters’ referent object, and that this popular support for the protests cannot be confirmed as popular support for the securitization specifically, the Nationalist Narrative is concluded not to factor within the referent object of the protesters’ securitization.

The final matter to discuss here is whether a historical narrative factored in the perceived threat of the anti-Japanese protesters’ securitization. Neither of Japan’s historical narratives of the war factored in the securitization in this way. This is apparent in how the protesters’ rhetoric did not present any of the key specific themes of either the Traditional or Revisionist narratives through the lens of the Nationalist Narrative. Concerning the protesters’ securitizing images, if the Revisionist Narrative factored as part of the perceived threat the protesters might have carried depictions of wartime atrocities like the Nanjing Massacre. Such atrocities are usually downplayed by the Revisionist Narrative (Selden, 2007) as part of its theme of moral justification for the war. Thus, if the Revisionist Narrative was considered an aspect of the perceived threat, then depictions of wartime atrocities as examples of historic victimisation associated with a contemporary affront to the Chinese nation would be more logical than depictions of Mao. Meanwhile, the act of protesting is itself too vague to be linked to a Japanese historical narrative.

While it has been concluded that the CCP was conscious of the Nationalist Narrative’s invocation by the anti-Japanese protesters, this does not constitute the

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32 Nanjing, the pre-war capital of China, was occupied by Japan early in the war. Chinese sources claim that as many as 350,000 civilians were murdered in the months following the occupation months (Mitter, 2013). Japanese sources often claim a much lower number while some Revisionists deny that the massacre occurred at all (Selden, 2007).
Nationalist Narrative factoring as part of the perceived threat of the protester’s securitization. This is because a historical narrative resonating with an audience’s historical consciousness, even in a way that might generate insecurity within the audience, does not inherently constitute said narrative factoring as part of the securitization’s perceived threat. Plausibly, within the internal politics of the CCP, there were securitizing moves conducted by party officials presenting the protesters’ invocation of the Nationalist Narrative as a perceived threat to the CCP’s regime. However, this hypothetical internal-CCP securitization is not the subject of this discussion. Hence, although it factored prominently in other ways, the Nationalist Narrative did not factor in the anti-Japanese protesters’ securitization as an aspect of the perceived threat.

To recap, the Nationalist Narrative factored as a facilitating condition in the anti-Japanese protesters’ securitization. Doing so in a way that is indicative of the hypothetical mechanics of the protest strand and which also suggests that the CCP’s monopoly over the Nationalist Narrative was weakened. The Nationalist Narrative was not invoked as anecdotal evidence in the protesters’ rhetoric, images, or actions. Nor did it factor as a component of the referent object. Neither of Japan’s historical narratives of the war factored in the securitization’s perceived threat. Meanwhile, although its invocation may have resonated with the CCP in such a way that generated regime insecurity, the Nationalist Narrative also did not factor within the perceived threat of the protesters’ securitization.

Step 5 – Holistic Analysis of Findings (9.2)
This step draws upon the conclusions from this case study to contribute answers to the primary research question: *how do historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War factor in the Sino-Japanese security paradox?* This discussion centres on the Nationalist Narrative and how it propelled the security paradox pertaining to the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis.

Also, this section re-iterates other insights gained by applying this thesis’s unique analytical framework to the case study. These findings, while not directly relevant to answering the primary research question, warrant further research as additional contributions to knowledge. Additionally, reflections on the application
of this thesis’s analytical framework are offered, considering both its utility and ways in which it might be improved.

**Propelling the Security Paradox (9.2.1)**

The Nationalist Narrative helped to propel the Sino-Japanese security paradox in two instances. The first was in Hong’s securitizing move following China’s naval deployments. This is because the Nationalist Narrative helped to facilitate the failure of Hong’s control strand securitization.

As discussed in step 2, China’s dilemma of response consisted of two distinct phases. The first was more diplomatic in nature while the second was characterised by a desire to mitigate nationalist criticism of the CCP. In section 7.3.3 the diplomatic phase was determined to be the result of Chinese security dilemma sensibility, the realisation that Chinese actions may antagonise Japan and further escalate tensions. Hong’s securitizing move occurred during the first phase, suggesting that while it attempted to mitigate nationalistic criticism of the CCP, it was also intended to ease hostilities with Japan. Certainly, has Hong succeeded in alleviating nationalistic pressure on the CCP to respond more assertively, the CCP would have been freer to continue pursuing a diplomatic solution. Plausibly, this could have led to a Chinese reassurance game had nationalistic pressure been overcome. Thus, by helping to facilitate the failure of Hong’s securitizing move, the Nationalist Narrative propelled the Sino-Japanese security paradox.

Arguably, this fails to acknowledge anti-CCP sentiment and the CCP’s declining societal controls over China’s nationalist movement. Both of which were highlighted as variables in the concern that the protests caused the CCP. Potentially these factors were significant enough that the CCP could not have established control even via securitization, meaning that the Nationalist Narrative’s role in facilitating the securitization’s failure was redundant. By extension, lessening the significance of its role in propelling the security paradox.

The context of anti-CCP sentiment and declining societal control is important to acknowledge. However, the way in which the Nationalist Narrative was invoked, promoting some key specific themes while suppressing others, is still
significant. This is because, as established in section 9.1.2, this resonated with the securitization’s audience in a way that contradicted the securitization’s objective of asserting societal control. Even if the securitization was unlikely to succeed due to other factors, this still would have reduced the securitization’s chances of success. Hence, while the Nationalist Narrative cannot be considered the definitive factor in the failure of Hong’s control strand securitization, it is recognised as a factor in its failure which, by extension, helped to propel the Sino-Japanese security paradox.

The other instance in which the Nationalist Narrative propelled the security paradox is in its facilitation of the success of the protesters’ protest strand securitization. As established in step 2, it was the anti-Japanese protests inputting into China’s dilemma of interpretation that caused the subsequent shift from diplomatic to mitigatory outputs in China’s dilemma of response. To this end, it is significant that the Nationalist Narrative factored as a facilitating condition in the securitization which caused this shift in China’s dilemma of response outputs. Helping the protesters’ demands to overcome the CCP’s security dilemma sensibility and thus propel the security paradox.

Notably, it was concluded in section 7.3.3 that even in the mitigatory phase of its dilemma of response that the CCP was still exercising some degree of security dilemma sensibility. Evident in how, although the CCP was more involved in the protests and thus propelling the security paradox, they were also constraining the protests. Avoiding damage to Japanese property, harm to Japanese nationals and directing the protests away from Japanese government buildings such as the embassy in Beijing. This suggests that the protests, aided by the Nationalist Narrative, did not completely overcome China’s security dilemma sensibility.

However, the significance of the Nationalist Narrative in China’s shift away from a diplomatic response cannot be overlooked. Firstly, because the presence of security dilemma responsibility does not equate to its employment in an actor’s outputs. As established in step 2, while China did not engage in a reassurance game, its initial response to Japan was better informed by security dilemma sensibility. Hence China’s later mitigatory outputs, even if tempered by security dilemma sensibility, still constitute a shift towards more antagonistic response
outputs following the success of the anti-Japanese protests in informing China’s dilemma of interpretation. A shift facilitated at least in part by the Nationalist Narrative.

Second, the protesters’ invocation of the Nationalist Narrative should be considered a major factor in the success of their protest strand securitization and, by extension, the policies that propelled the security paradox. This is because the CCP, having already suffered the scandals and internal divisions of its leadership contest, still sought a diplomatic solution but this changed literally overnight following the height of the anti-Japanese protests on September 18th, evident in mitigatory policies being enacted on September 19th. Indicating the significance of the protests in informing China’s security dilemma, thereby impacting its dilemma of response.

Such a sudden change is policy should be considered a result of securitization. As explained by the Copenhagen School, security status allows for decisive decision-making regarding and faster policy implementation, free of the constraints of day-to-day politics (Buzan et al., 1998). Hence, the sudden nature of China’s shift in its dilemma of response indicates that the anti-Japanese protesters were successful in their securitization, in which the Nationalist Narrative served prominently as a facilitating condition as established in step 4.

That the Nationalist Narrative was particularly significant in the success of the protesters’ securitization is because it allowed for the confluence of China’s two pre-existing macrosecuritizations. As discussed in step 3, in section 8.2, the anti-Japanese protesters engaged with both the pre-existing macrosecuritizations of external threats to China and threats to the CCP’s regime. The anti-Japanese protesters’ use of the Nationalist Narrative constituted a critique of the CCP’s nationalist credentials within the context of a perceived external threat to China. Moreover, it was established that the CCP’s monopoly over its legitimating Nationalist Narrative was slipping as the protesters incorporated criticism of the CCP into the key specific theme of Japanese victimisation of China. This would have amounted to significant pressure to act against Japan on the CCP’s part, or otherwise risk losing further control of the historical narrative upon which its
regime’s legitimacy is premised. Thus, the CCP enacted a more assertive response towards Japan, in doing so acting in accordance with both pre-existing macrosecuritizations: directing the protests away from the Japanese embassy in Beijing while also preventing further invocation of the Nationalist Narrative as a means of criticism.

Neither Japan’s Traditional nor Revisionist Narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War have been discussed in this case study. This is not to say that these historical narratives are irrelevant to the case study. However, this thesis’s analytical framework is centred around Securitization Theory and identifies the role the narratives play by way of securitizations. As China’s securitizing move engaged heavily with the National Narrative and no securitizations were identified on Japan’s part, there was no need to discuss Japan’s historical narratives.

Despite not being a securitizing move, a more in-depth discussion of Noda’s revisionist leanings and his decision not to deploy the Self-Defence Force may have offered some insight into the role that Japan’s historical narratives played in the dispute. Plausibly, there was domestic traditionalist pressure which informed Noda’s decision, but which is omitted from the case study’s literature due to a scholarly tendency to focus on China and the anti-Japanese protests. Reflecting on this, the thesis’s analytical framework could be improved by allowing more flexibility to explore the role of historical narratives outside of securitizing moves which, in this instance, might have accounted for the absence of Japanese securitizations in the case study.

Other Insights and Considerations (9.2.3)
Applying the analytical framework to the Nationalisation Crisis case study has offered insights which do not contribute directly to answering the primary research question. As was concluded in section 6.2.3 with regards to the Trawler Incident, the Nationalisation Crisis case study has shown the compatibility of the security dilemma/paradox and securitization theory in practice. Evidently, it is possible to explore a security paradox cycle by looking at the securitizations in its constituent security dilemmas and, in doing so, furthering our understanding of said security paradox. In this case, successfully identifying how the Nationalist Narrative factored
in propelling the Sino-Japanese security paradox. Albeit with the caveat that more flexibility to discuss historical narratives outside the parameters of securitization would also be beneficial.

Another consideration, again consistent with the findings of the Trawler Incident case study, is the utility of securitization theory’s applied second-generation concepts. The strands, macro- and microsecuritization and securitization dilemma concepts have provided greater analytical depth to this case study. Enabling discussion of the Nationalist Narrative’s invocation factoring in a confluence of pre-existing macrosecuritizations, for example. Such evidence of their utility serves to further validate these concepts as analytical tools of securitization theory.

The following points of interest were also raised during the Nationalisation Crisis case study:

- The potential existence of a protest securitization strand
  - The existence of this securitization strand and its hypothetical mechanics were discussed in steps 3 and 4
- That the CCP’s monopoly over the Nationalist Narrative is declining
  - Discussed in step 4 concerning the anti-Japanese protesters’ invocation of the Nationalist Narrative
- That historical narratives can serve as a facilitating condition for the failure of a securitizing move, not just its success
  - Identified in step 4 concerning Hong’s control strand securitization and the contradictory invocation of the Nationalist Narrative’s key specific themes

These by-products of this thesis’s granular exploration of the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis could serve as the basis of future research. Expanding the strands concept, offering insights into domestic Chinese politics and building upon Jutila’s work, respectively. Accordingly, although not relevant for the purposes of answering the primary research question, they serve as preliminary insights into potential future avenues of research and thus form part of this thesis’s unique contribution to knowledge.
Summary (9.3)
This chapter presented steps 4 and 5 in application to the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis. Step 4 outlined how the historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War factored in the case study’s securitzations. Concerning China’s naval deployments, the Nationalist Narrative facilitated the failure of spokesperson Hong’s control strand securitization. Doing so because of Hong’s contradictory invocation of the narrative, attempting to engage the key specific themes of Japanese victimisation of China and national unity while suppressing the theme of public participation.

For the anti-Japanese protesters’ securitization, the Nationalist Narrative also factored as a facilitating condition for the securitizing move’s success. This was achieved by invoking the Nationalist Narrative in such a way that it resonated with the CCP’s historical consciousness, or rather would have caused them to be conscious that they were being held to account over their legitimating historical narrative.

In step 5, the findings of steps 1-4 were considered holistically. Presenting overall conclusions from the Nationalisation Crisis case study to answer how historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War factored in the Sino-Japanese security paradox. This revealed that the Nationalist Narrative helped to propel the security paradox. This is because it was a variable in the failure of Hong’s control strand securitization. If Hong’s securitizing move were successful in exerting control over China’s nationalist movement, it may have alleviated political pressure on the CCP to respond nationalistically. Thereby allowing more time for the CCP to exercise its security dilemma sensibility in the form of a reassurance game which could have mitigated the security paradox.

However, Hong’s securitizing move failed, and the anti-Japanese protests informed China’s dilemma of interpretation in such a way that its dilemma of response outputs was more likely to persist the security paradox. This took the form of efforts to mitigate criticism of the CCP even to the detriment of Sino-Japanese relations. The Nationalist Narrative factored prominently in this chain of events. Doing so by being invoked within a confluence of pre-existing
macrosecuritizations which placed considerable pressure on the CCP to resolve China’s security dilemma in the way it did.

In closing for the Nationalisation Crisis case study, this exploration has provided further evidence of how historical narratives can propel a security paradox. Contributing to answering this thesis’s primary research question. Additionally, it has produced other insights which, while not relevant for extensive discussion in this thesis, warrant further consideration in other research projects.
Conclusion

As outlined in chapter 1, the literature presents a pessimistic consensus, agreeing that Sino-Japanese relations are inevitably sliding into a period of hostility. This literature generally falls into two categories. Most observers view Sino-Japanese relations through the lens of realism, explaining the return of tensions as a consequence of an imminent power transition with China challenging the USA as the dominant world power. China’s rise results in increased tensions with Japan, a close ally of the USA. Yet, a considerable minority of works within the realist categorisation assign more agency to Japan, accounting for Sino-Japanese tensions through the presence of security dilemma/paradox mechanics.

The second literary category contributing to the pessimistic consensus consists of socially-constructivist contributions. While works within this category agree that Sino-Japanese tensions are returning, they focus on Sino-Japanese history. They explain that both nations’ perceptions of the other, and thus their contemporary relationship, are informed by their respective narratives of their shared history. More specifically, the history of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

The presence of security dilemma/paradox mechanics and the significance of historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War as drivers of tensions between China and Japan are not mutually exclusive. Yet, the literature on Sino-Japanese relations lacks any exploration of the intersection between security and history. This is a gap that this thesis has worked to fill as part of its unique contribution to knowledge. It does so by answering the question: How do historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War factor in the Sino-Japanese security paradox?
To answer this question, it was necessary to develop a new analytical framework; the second unique contribution of this thesis. This framework incorporates the security dilemma/paradox concept while engaging with security studies theory and grounding itself in established historiographical practice. This new analytical framework integrates the security dilemma/paradox concept with securitization theory, while also engaging with Carr’s socially-constructivist basic facts historiography. This design, applied in a step-by-step approach, results in a framework with which to study how historical narratives factor in security paradoxes.

The analytical framework constitutes the most significant unique contribution to knowledge made by this thesis. It enables a new way to study the intersection between history and security. When applied to this research topic, it produces an answer to the primary research question and provides additional insights for future research.

The analytical framework was applied to two case studies, both pertaining to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute was selected as the security paradox pertaining to this dispute is indicative of the broader Sino-Japanese security paradox. This is due to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute being understood as a symbolic dispute spanning several contentious issues in Sino-Japanese relations. This includes but is not limited to: energy security given the islands’ oil and gas reserves, the militarisation of the East China Sea, and China’s belief that the islands should have been returned to their control alongside other territories after the Second Sino-Japanese War. The first case study explored in this thesis was the 2010 Trawler Incident. The second case study examined was the Nationalisation Crisis, which marked the lowest point in Sino-Japanese relations since the war itself.

This concluding chapter begins by focussing on the primary research question. In doing so, it presents this thesis’s explanation of how historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War factor in the Sino-Japanese security paradox. The second section centres on a review of the analytical framework. This includes consideration of the framework’s successes and how, based on reflections
on its use in this thesis, the analytical framework could be improved. The next section summarises this thesis’s third unique contribution to knowledge, the additional insights gained throughout the thesis as a product of its unique analytical framework. While doing so, the significance of each finding and its potential as an avenue of future research is briefly discussed.

The penultimate section provides a holistic discussion of this thesis’s unique contribution to knowledge. The final section then focuses on the contribution made by this thesis to Sino-Japanese studies and the broader field of International Relations, with an emphasis on recommendations for the future of research in this area.

The answer to the primary research question is split into two parts. The first part discusses each of the three historical narratives outlined in chapter 3 and their impact on the Sino-Japanese security paradox cycles as presented in the case studies. The remainder of this section then takes a different approach to answering the question, considering the mechanics of how they had this impact.

Factoring through Impact (10.1.1)
The most common impact that historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War had in the case studies was in propelling the security paradox. This was predominately the case regarding China’s Nationalist Narrative. Of the six securitizations discussed in the case studies, the Nationalist Narrative factored in four of them in a way which made the continuance of the security paradox more likely. In both case studies, the Nationalist Narrative was invoked during anti-Japanese protests which pressured the CCP into interpreting Japan’s actions as malicious and thus responding accordingly. This is evident as in each case study the CCP’s response outputs became more anti-Japanese in nature, apparent in China’s naval deployments and Wen’s speech during the Trawler Incident. It was also apparent in the CCP’s active effort to emphasise the anti-Japanese aspects of the protests and Xi’s condemnation of Japan in the Nationalisation Crisis case study.
This is significant, as in both case studies there was evidence of the CCP practising security dilemma sensibility in their dilemma of response outputs prior to mounting nationalist pressure. Plausibly, without nationalistic pressure from the anti-Japanese protests, compounded by their invocation of the Nationalist Narrative, the CCP would have acted differently. This may have involved engaging China in a reassurance game, or preventing response outputs that were likely to trigger Japanese insecurity and persist the security paradox.

Evidence to support this perspective can be found in section 7.2, in the CCP’s management of the anti-Japanese protests after their height during the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis. Despite their emphasis on anti-Japanese sentiment to mitigate criticism of their regime, the CCP did direct the protests away from Japanese property and communities in China. This tempering shows security dilemma sensibility to have informed Chinese policy towards Japan, but be subsumed by pressure to respond nationally to Japan to protect the CCP’s legitimating nationalist credentials. Hence, it is concluded that the Nationalist Narrative factors significantly in the Sino-Japanese security paradox. Its impact is that it propels the security paradox, building tensions and increasing the likelihood of conflict in Sino-Japanese relations.

The impact of Japan’s Revisionist Narrative was also to propel the security paradox, although it was less prominent in doing so than the Nationalist Narrative. It only implicitly factored in one of the six securitizations in the case studies in this way. Specifically, in the anti-Japanese protests during the Trawler Incident, as discussed in section 6.1.1.

A historical narrative’s impact can also help mitigate the security paradox. This might be by presenting a barrier to antagonistic response outputs, encouraging security dilemma responsibility, or leading an actor to cost signal or undertake other forms of reassurance game. The evidence for mitigating the security paradox is more limited than the evidence for historical narratives propelling the security paradox. Only one instance of a historical narrative mitigating the security paradox was observed in the case studies. This was during the Trawler Incident, when Kan’s government countered Foreign Secretary Maehara’s securitizing move through a
desecuritizing move. This desecuritizing move invoked the Traditional Narrative’s key specific theme of introspection and was linked in the case study’s causal narrative to Japan’s subsequent cost signal, which was the release of the trawler captain.

However, the fact that there was only one instance of this in the case studies does not mean that historical narratives are always more significant in propelling than mitigating security paradoxes. Within the socio-political context of the case studies and the context of contemporary Sino-Japanese historiography, the collective historical narratives’ mitigatory potential was outweighed by their propulsion of the security paradox. With this in mind, the following answer to the primary research question is given:

Historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War propel the Sino-Japanese security paradox. While the Traditional Narrative works to mitigate the security paradox, this is outweighed by the propellatory contribution of both the Nationalist and Revisionist Narratives.

The Mechanics of How the Historical Narratives Factored (10.1.2)
To fully answer the question of how historical narratives factor in the security paradox requires a discussion of how they factor in a mechanical sense. This discussion focuses less on the impact of the historical narratives, rather on an explanation of the social phenomena which enabled their impact. This thesis’s analytical framework adopted securitization theory as its security framework. Once the securitization mechanics of the case studies were identified, the discussion utilised Jutila’s (2015) work on how historical narratives can factor in securitizations. This analysis identified how the historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese war factored in the security paradox by way of their role in the case studies’ securitizations.

The most common way in which the historical narratives factored in the case studies’ securitizations was as a facilitating condition. A historical narrative served this role in at least four of the six case study securitizations. This number rises to five if you include the Traditional Narrative’s role as a facilitating condition
in Kan’s desecuritizing move to have facilitated the failure of Maehara’s securitizing move.

Through use of the unique analytical framework, insights have been gained into the nature of how the historical narratives which served as facilitating conditions were able to do so. For example, in both case studies, the key specific themes of the Nationalist Narrative were invoked by the anti-Japanese protesters in a way that made the CCP more likely to accept their securitization. In this, the anti-Japanese protesters pressured on the CCP to accept the protesters’ securitization through triggering concerns regarding the CCP’s regime legitimacy its roots in the nationalist credentials conferred by the Nationalist Narrative. To reject the protesters’ securitization after they had invoked the key specific themes of the Nationalist Narrative would have risked a loss in regime legitimacy by contradicting the historical narrative which the CCP had spent three decades promoting.

Only two instances of a historical narrative factoring in the case study securitizations in any of the other ways outlined by Jutila were identified. The first regards the Revisionist Narrative, which factored in the anti-Japanese protesters’ saliency securitization during the Trawler Incident. The second instance relates to the Nationalist Narrative, which factored as part of the perceived threat in Hong’s control strand securitization during the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis, due to anticipation of nationalist pressure on the CCP.

In both examples, the role the historical narrative played was relatively minor. In the former, the role of the Revisionist Narrative was implicit; a cause for concern which contextualised Japan’s behaviour which the protesters considered threatening. In the latter, the fear of the Nationalist Narrative’s potential to pressure the CCP into a course of action was a facilitating condition that factored in Hong’s securitizing move. It is therefore correct to describe the Nationalist Narrative as an aspect of the perceived threat, albeit on account of the potential of the Nationalist Narrative as a facilitating condition.

Thus, while it is correct to say that historical narratives of the war factored in the case study securitizations as part of the perceived threat, emphasis should be
placed on the greater role that they played as facilitating conditions. This is not to say that historical narratives cannot factor in the other ways outlined by Jutila (2015), or that there is a general tendency towards factoring as a facilitating condition for historical narratives in all instances of securitization. Rather, the observations made in this thesis’s case studies are specific to Sino-Japanese relations.

This is demonstrated by the CCP’s complex relations with China’s nationalist movement due to its construction of Chinese nationalism through the Nationalist Narrative. This creates a scenario in which the securitizing actor might want to invoke the narrative to facilitate its success, but not offer anecdotal evidence. This is done to engage Chinese nationalists but not to encourage their anti-Japanese sentiment to the extent that it would surpass the CCP’s societal controls. Meanwhile, for Japan, the Traditional Narrative’s key specific theme of introspection makes the presentation of wartime anecdotes unlikely. Hence, the historical narratives of the war factoring predominately as facilitating conditions is likely a manifestation of the historical narratives’ themes and their political connotations in China and Japan respectively.

As a result of these findings, the following answer to the primary research question is presented:

Historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War predominately factor in the Sino-Japanese security paradox as facilitating conditions in the relationship’s securitizations.

Reviewing the Analytical Framework (10.2)
There is no known pre-existing integrated analytical framework which includes the security dilemma/paradox concept, securitization theory, and historiography. This necessitated the creation of a new analytical framework for exploring the intersection of security and history, constituting a unique contribution to knowledge. This section offers reflections on this framework, considering what it was able to achieve and thoughts on how it could be improved in the future.

The most obvious measure of success for any tool, analytical or otherwise, is whether it fulfils its purpose. The analytical framework was created to study the
intersection of history and security and provide an answer to the primary research question. This thesis has offered two answers to the primary research question, meaning that the analytical framework successfully fulfilled its purpose. Moreover, with its detail-orientated and step-by-step application, it has also offered a variety of additional insights into the theories it incorporates. These are discussed further in section 10.3 and generally pertain to avenues of further research. An example of one of these insights is the potential existence of a protest strand of securitization and the macrosecuritization of issues across levels of analysis. While these insights were not anticipated or directly relevant to answering the primary research question, they add to the unique contribution of this thesis. It is therefore clear that the analytical framework exceeded expectations.

This thesis’s analytical framework employed Carr’s basic facts historiography, detailing which basic facts were included, why they were included and how they are understood to connect to one another. This ensured good historiographical practice in a study that deals with both historical case studies and subjective historical narratives. Eradicating historical bias entirely is likely impossible. However, the history used in this work has been presented transparently to empower scholars to challenge any historical assumptions. It is likely that another scholar employing the same analytical framework would achieve a different interpretation of the case studies. This is not a flaw of the analytical framework, it is an advantage. It is only through ongoing discussion and debate of differing interpretations that we can challenge bias while continuing to build our collective knowledge.

While successful for the purpose of this thesis, the application of the analytical framework to the case studies also revealed ways in which it can be improved. One avenue for improvement is incorporating desecuritization theory into the analytical framework. The literature on securitization theory has left the concept of desecuritization comparatively underexplored. This was not accounted for during the development of the analytical framework, resulting in the framework being under-prepared for discussion of historical narratives factoring in desecuritizing moves.
This realisation arose in section 6.1.1, where it emerged that Japan’s Traditional Narrative was invoked in a desecuritizing move. This desecuritizing move was discussed with the benefit of Hansen’s (2012) work on the different formats of desecuritizing moves. Evidently, incorporating available insights on desecuritization into the framework more formally would be beneficial. This would reflect both the importance of, and need for, a desecuritization theory that runs parallel with securitization theory in the analytical framework.

Another realisation is that the analytical framework is currently too prescriptive in its focus on securitization. While adopting a security studies theory is necessary and, as outlined in chapter 1, securitization theory is appropriate, it is also necessary to consider the case studies beyond securitization. The inclusion of desecuritization theory will assist in this. Yet, it is also necessary to consider how historical narratives may factor in security paradoxes outside the parameters of securitization and desecuritization. This was evident in regard to the Nationalisation Crisis in section 8.3. This section discussed how other variables, such as the routine political debate between traditionalists and revisionists, likely factored in Noda’s decision not to deploy Japan’s Self-Defence Force. Space for this consideration could be incorporated in the step-by-step approach of the framework’s application. Hypothetically, this could be achieved by adding an additional step after step 3 to present other considerations observed in the case study before proceeding to discuss the presence of historical narratives in step 4.

The final consideration arose from the Nationalisation Crisis case study. This is due to the Nationalisation Crisis being a longer dispute than was possible to discuss in this thesis, lasting for roughly two years. A benefit of the analytical framework is that it explores the subject matter at a granular level of detail, which successfully produced the answers to the primary research questions presented above and the additional findings which are discussed in the following section. Yet, this granular emphasis means that the case study had to focus on the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis, potentially missing out on other significant insights that could have been gained by studying the Nationalisation Crisis in its entirety.
Upon reflection, there is a solution to this issue. This solution is not in redesigning the analytical framework, as this would risk losing the evident benefits of its granular focus. Rather, the solution can be found in how the analytical framework is incorporated into the research project design. Whereas the analytical framework was too granular for a larger case study in this thesis’s cross-sectional design, it could be utilised in a single longitudinal case study. For example, it could be applied to the initial phase, one of the mid-Crisis incidents, and then to the closing phase of the Nationalisation Crisis. This would keep the granular benefits of the analytical framework while gaining a more holistic view of the case study. Researchers should keep this in mind when considering this framework for future research projects, adopting it in either cross-sectional projects with multiple small case studies, or longitudinal research applied to a single case study with multiple points of analysis.

The analytical framework developed for this thesis has room for improvement. However, it has proven itself as an insightful tool with which to explore the intersection between history and security. It thus stands as a major component of this thesis’s unique contribution to knowledge, one which can only improve through continued refinement.

Additional Insights (10.3)
Nine additional insights were gained which, while not relevant to answering the primary research question, constitute part of the unique contribution made by this thesis. These were discussed preliminarily in the case studies, in sections 6.2.3 and 9.2.3. Each insight represents a development, phenomenon or mechanic which has not before been discussed in the various bodies of academic literature that this thesis has consulted. The insights are organised thematically below by which theoretical element of the analytical framework they pertain to: the security dilemma/paradox, securitisation theory, or historiography.

Security Dilemma/Paradox Insights (10.3.1)
The Significance of Differing Sub-Unit Interpretation

Differing sub-unit interpretations were observed in the Trawler Incident case study, in which Japan’s traditionalist and revisionist communities had juxtaposed ideas of
the nature of the posed threat. This was evident in revisionist Maehara’s attempted securitization of China as a threat to Japanese energy security, and traditionalist Kan’s desecuritization of this threat.

This insight is significant because it challenges the top-down, elitist, and depoliticised view of security and securitization presented by the Copenhagen School (see Buzan et al., 1998). In this case, a sub-unit political division resulted in two social elites competing through securitization and desecuritizing moves over what Japan’s unit-level interpretation should be. This indicates that, by way of considering sub-unit politics, security may be a more contested and politicised phenomenon than securitization theory allows for. The implications of this sub-unit contestation for the unit level’s resolution of the dilemma of interpretation could be a fruitful avenue of future research.

*Sub-unit Strategic Challenges to a Community’s Own Unit Level*

This was observed in both case studies with regard to the CCP’s interpretation of the anti-Japanese protests as an inherent threat to the CCP’s regime legitimacy. This resulted in a notable change in the CCP’s approach when responding to Japan. This is significant because Booth and Wheeler’s (2007) original concept presents external actors as posing a strategic challenge, not sub-unit communities within unit-level actors. This warrants further study to reconcile the internal security dynamics involved during what is usually considered an externally orientated phenomenon.

*Securitization Theory Insights (10.3.2)*

*Multi-strand Securitizations*

Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s speech act during the Trawler Incident was identified as a multi-strand securitization, invoking the illocutionary logics of both the *past act* and *control* strands at different points in their speech act. Vuori’s (2009, 2011) strands of securitization concept is underapplied in the literature on securitization theory, meaning that the concept has not been significantly expanded upon since its inception. Exploring the significance of multi-strand securitizations is one such route through which the concept could be developed. This could be done by
seeking to answer questions as to the commonality of multi-strand securitizations or determining how strand combinations affect effectiveness in securitizations.

**Sub-unit Macrosecuritizations Informing Unit Level Securitization**

Sub-unit macrosecuritizations informing unit level securitizations were observed in both case studies. This is because the sub-unit CCP’s macrosecuritization of threats to its regime legitimacy was upheld at the unit level in China’s security and foreign policies.

Plausibly, this phenomenon is reserved for party-state systems given the integration of the CCP with the institutions of the Chinese state. Alternatively, perhaps a governing political party in any political culture, as the sub-unit community responsible for operating unit-level governance, imposes their sub-unit security priorities on the unit level. In doing so, they privilege their sub-unit concerns over those of other sub-unit communities. Research on this topic thus offers insights into the blurring of security across levels of analysis and whether this is specific to certain political cultures or a universal characteristic of security.

**The Significance of Competing Securitizations and Desecuritizations**

As mentioned, Kan's office conducted a desecuritizing move to counter Maehara’s securitizing move. There are likely other examples in which securitization has been countered through desecuritization. There are also likely examples in which desecuritization efforts were countered through securitizing moves. Research to identify further examples of this will help to understand the relationship between securitization and desecuritization and contribute to the development of desecuritization theory.

**The Significance of Historical Narratives in Securitization beyond the Ways Identified by Jutila**

In the Trawler Incident case study, it was concluded that the Nationalist Narrative informed the CCP’s choice of referent object. Informing an actor’s choices was not a means identified by Jutila (2015) regarding the ways in which historical narratives factor in securitizations. The four ways identified by Jutila were never a definitive
list, but the identification of another warrants further research. This would build upon Jutila’s work, enabling greater understanding of the relationship between historical narratives and securitization.

The Potential Existence of a Protest Strand

Vuori (2009, 2011) explained that there were more strands of securitization than the five that they identified. Observed in the Nationalisation Crisis case study with regard to the anti-Japanese protests, was a securitization with a single illocutionary logic drawing upon the mechanics of the saliency, deterrence, and control strands. This was provisionally referred to in this thesis as the protest strand. This finding is significant as it contributes to the development of the strands concept. Future research should seek to confirm and fully establish the protest strand, identifying its mechanics and other examples of its use.

Historical Narratives can Facilitate the Failure of a Securitizing move

This finding emerged from Hong’s speech act during the initial phase of the Nationalisation Crisis. It was concluded that Hong invoked the specific key themes of the Nationalist Narrative in a contradictory manner, thereby resonating with the audience’s historical consciousness in a way that made Hong’s securitizing move less likely to succeed. This is significant because it emphasises the need to critically consider Jutila’s (2015) work. This shows that our understanding of securitization can be developed by further exploring the ways in which historical narratives may factor in securitizations. Not only through breadth but by identifying new ways for them to do so. This finding is also significant as it shows that historical narratives are not simple tools for use in a securitizing move. Rather, they need to be invoked in a particular way to support the actor’s intentions. Uncovering the nature of this particularity will require further research.

Historiographical Insights (10.3.3)

The CCP’s monopoly over the Nationalist Narrative is Declining

As discussed in the Nationalisation Crisis case study, the declining nature of the CCP’s monopoly over the Nationalist Narrative is significant for both Chinese politics and Sino-Japanese relations. The CCP relies on its nationalist credentials, as
established by the Nationalist Narrative, to secure its regime’s legitimacy. If it loses control over the narrative, its regime legitimacy is at risk. Understanding how the CCP manages this will be important in understanding Chinese policy in the coming years. Based on the CCP’s acquiescence to nationalists in the case studies, it seems likely that the CCP will increasingly lean into its nationalist credentials and attempt to maintain control of the narrative by pursuing increasingly nationalistic policies. This may be to the detriment of China’s foreign relations.

Unique Contributions to Knowledge (10.4)

Claims have been made as to a unique contribution throughout this thesis. These claims consist of the answers to the primary research question, the creation of a new analytical framework, and the additional insights gained through application of this to the case studies. This section explicitly discusses these, validating them as unique contributions to knowledge.

The Answers to the Primary Research Question

The claim that historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War are negatively impacting Sino-Japanese relations is not a novel contribution. Such viewpoints are common to the extent that in this thesis’s literature review, they were presented as a major categorisation of the literature on Sino-Japanese relations.

However, the primary research question was chosen as it bridges the realist and socially-constructivist categories of Sino-Japanese literature. It engages with the realist consensus by framing Sino-Japanese relations within the parameters of the security dilemma/paradox but does so in a socially-constructivist way by focusing on subjective historical narratives. Consequentially, this thesis’s answers provide a unique contribution in both determining historical narratives’ impact on the Sino-Japanese security paradox and accounting for the socially-rooted mechanics of how this impact occurs.

The Unique Analytical Framework

The most significant single contribution of this thesis is its unique analytical framework. This is for several reasons. Firstly, because it is a new analytical tool, tested in application to Sino-Japanese relations, with which other scholars can
study the intersection between history and security. Secondly, the framework delivers a unique contribution through its novel integration of theoretical constructs. Namely, this is the first known integration of Booth and Wheeler’s security dilemma/paradox concept, securitization theory and established historiography, using Carr’s basic facts. The unique contribution of the analytical framework is the novelty of its creation.

More than this, however, integrating the constituent theories into a single analytical framework necessitated extended meta-theoretical discussion in chapter 2. This required in-depth engagement with the ontological underpinnings of the theories and the relationships between them. This included, for example, identifying which security dilemma logics were compatible with the socially constructivist securitization theory and basic facts historiography. Accordingly, in addition to being a novel, functional analytical tool, this framework broke new ground in the meta-theoretical discussion concerning the relationship between its constituent ideas and concepts.

The third unique contribution of the analytical framework is its advocacy of second-generation securitization theory concepts. Outlined in section 2.2.3, securitization theory’s second-generation literature consists of applied securitization concepts which enable the study of securitizations in more detail. These include the strands concept, macro- and microsecuritization, and the securitization dilemma. These applied concepts are underutilised in the study of securitization theory, yet each has proven utility as shown in this thesis. Particular attention is given to Vuori’s (2008, 2011) strands of securitization concept which was used extensively as an analytical tool in the discussion of all six securitizations in the case studies. This is despite the strands concept being particularly absent in the mainstream debate on securitization theory.

Certainly, each of the second-generation concepts have individually been advocated for before by various proponents (Vuori, 2008; Buzan and Waever, 2009; 2011; Huysmans, 2011; Watson, 2013; Olesker, 2014). However, there is only one known example of these concepts being advocated for collectively (see Eves and Thedham, 2020), and no known examples which advocate for them through
extensive use in a comprehensive study, such as this thesis. Consequentially, advocacy for securitization theory’s applied second-generation concepts is another unique contribution to knowledge stemming from this thesis’s analytical framework.

A fourth contribution made by the analytical framework is its ability to produce a granular, detail-orientated focus. As discussed, the answers to the primary research questions and the additional insights achieved by this thesis constitute unique contributions. However, it is appropriate to identify these contributions as products of the analytical framework. At the outset of this research project, it sought an answer as to the impact of historical narratives. Yet, the journey taken to uncover the historical narratives’ impact by way of the analytical framework also offered a detailed account of the mechanics of how this impact was achieved.

Concerning the additional insights, most of these pertain to the constituent theories of the analytical framework, not to the primary research question. This means that their contribution would not have been possible without the framework. Resultantly, some credit for the unique contribution of the answers to the primary research question and the additional insights should be assigned to the analytical framework.

Additional Insights

The additional insights were each discussed with regards to their significance in section 10.3. To briefly reiterate, their unique contribution to knowledge is found in their potential as future avenues of research. Many of these insights are not known to have been discussed before in the academic literature. Research into these findings will therefore offer new understandings of the topics covered in this thesis. This thesis has made the unique contribution of highlighting the potential of these insights. It will be the work of future research projects to fulfil this potential.

The Future of this Research (10.5)
The Sino-Japanese security paradox continues to cycle, with the relationship between China and Japan slowly deteriorating. As this thesis has concluded,
historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War are important to understand as they are factors propelling the security paradox. Following this conclusion, several avenues of future research are possible. One possibility is to take a deeper look at either China or Japan respectively to determine the domestic political factors associated with the historical narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War. For example, uncovering in greater detail the exact relationship between the CCP, China’s nationalist movement, and the Nationalist Narrative. Or, by examining the shifting balance between Japanese traditionalists and revisionists to determine Japan’s direction of travel concerning its wartime history and handling of contentious political issues like Article 9 reform. The insights from these endeavours could then be used to unlock further understandings of how the domestic politics of the historical narratives impact the Sino-Japanese relationship.

Alternatively, this thesis applied an interpretivist approach to its research. Another possible avenue of research would be to use the insights provided by this thesis as the basis of a positivist research project on how historical narratives factor in the Sino-Japanese security paradox. This could verify and validate the findings of this thesis while offering additional insights by approaching the question from the perspective of a different research paradigm.

The most significant avenue of future research, and the one to be recommended, is to explore the intersection between history and security elsewhere. Certainly, the future of this research is not limited to Sino-Japanese relations. Communities around the world are invoking historical narratives to promote political ideologies and identities. Some are divisive and promote exclusionary ideas of history. For example, Brexiteers’ presentation of UK-EU relations (McTague, 2019), or the various historical narratives invoked by Russia’s government to justify its war in Ukraine (Schwirtz et al., 2022). Meanwhile, others are more conciliatory, emphasising shared values and collaboration. An example of this is the narrative presented by NATO when, in 2014, it chose to commemorate World War I’s Christmas Truce by hosting a football game between British and German soldiers in Kabul (DW News, 2014). The study of history and security within these topics could be done with the benefit of this thesis’s analytical framework.
which, in turn, would allow the refinement and iterative improvement of the framework through further testing.

By studying cases such as these, it will be possible to build a body of academic literature on the intersection between history and security which draws upon diverse data points. This could serve as a foundation for more in-depth studies and the development of theories concerning how history and security interact. Once this literature is developed enough, it may be possible to determine patterns in the themes of our historical narratives which encourage hostility or promote cooperation. History is not an objective reality, meaning we can be critical of historical narratives which promote division and endorse those which promote conciliation. We can choose the stories of our past which offer a better future.
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Appendix – List of Publications and Presentations

- **Eves, L. and J. Thedham (2020, May 14th).** *Applying Securitization’s Second Generation To COVID-19*, E-International Relations. [https://www.e-ir.info/2020/05/14/applying-securitizations-second-generation-to-covid-19/](https://www.e-ir.info/2020/05/14/applying-securitizations-second-generation-to-covid-19/)

  This article was a collaboration with a fellow postgraduate research student who specialises in Serbian security politics. The article explores the utility of second-generation applied securitization concepts in understanding decision-making by political leaders in the UK and Serbia during the COVID-19 pandemic. It uncovers the strands invoked in the securitizing speech acts of the UK’s prime minister and Serbia’s president. It also establishes the existence of a securitization dilemma between the new macrosecuritization of COVID-19 as a threat to public health and the pre-existing macrosecuritization of threats to the economy.

  This article has been well received. It has been broadly cited in security studies literature on COVID-19 and has been cited in a UN report by the International Organisation for Migration on how COVID-19 security measures impacted the migration crisis.


  This article was inspired by the idea of a pessimistic consensus of Sino-Japanese relations, as established in the literature review of my thesis. It explores the ‘optimistic case’ that Sino-Japanese relations might improve based upon developments from the Sino-Japanese détente that occurred in the late 2010s. It then counters these points in a ‘pessimistic rebuttal’. This rebuttal explains why the signs of improvement will be short-lived, presenting evidence such as the declining familiarity between China’s and Japan’s political leadership, a shifting global political context, and underlying historical issues.

  Time appears to have proven my pessimistic rebuttal to be correct. The Sino-Japanese détente concluded following the COVID-19 pandemic and Sino-Japanese relations have continued to deteriorate.
• **Eves, L. (2022, January 13th). Legitimacy and Nationalism: China’s Motivations and the Dangers of Assumptions, E-International Relations.**


This article was inspired by my research on the Chinese Communist Party’s reliance on the Nationalist Narrative for its regime legitimacy and how the Party is restricted in its foreign policy decision-making by a need to acquiesce to China’s nationalist movement.


  [https://sway.office.com/K6oDCN3CGqBOyJVk](https://sway.office.com/K6oDCN3CGqBOyJVk)

This presentation examined the historiographical asymmetry in how China and Japan consider their shared history of the Sino-Japanese War. It provided an overview of each nations’ historical narratives of the war and discussed how asymmetrical historiography is a source of tension between China and Japan. My peers praised my research and I was given an award for the best research presentation.

• **Eves, L. (TBC) Antagonistic Symbiosis: The Social Construction of Chinese Foreign Policy, Asia-Pacific Viewpoint.**

This article has recently passed the peer review stage with the journal Asia-Pacific Viewpoint. Its publication is forthcoming, pending minor amendments to the manuscript to be completed after submission of my thesis.

  This article explores the social construction of Chinese foreign policy in the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and China’s nationalist movement. Moreover, it presents this relationship as an example of antagonistic symbiosis. A phenomenon in which two organisms cooperate for mutual benefit, but in the long term this cooperation is detrimental to one or both parties involved. In this case, the Party benefits from the support of Chinese nationalists while China’s nationalist movement benefits from the Party’s promotion of nationalism. However, as China’s nationalist movement becomes increasingly free of the Party’s societal control, the Communist Party is becoming restricted in its ability to conduct China’s foreign affairs, weakening the long-term autonomy of the Communist Party’s regime.