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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE ISLE OF MAN

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the Council for National Academic Awards degree of
Master of Philosophy.

Department of Political Studies

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ABSTRACT

Jacqueline M. Templeton

Public Administration in the Isle of Man

This thesis is a study of public administration in the Isle of Man and is therefore broad in scope. It covers the structures of the administrative machine and the personnel procedures within it. It closely analyses the values of the political actors within the system and the various influences which have led to its development. In particular it concentrates upon the predominant feature of the system, that it is a hybrid form displaying characteristics of both British central and local government and explains this by reference to the value system of the Manx political elite. It considers the extent to which these values are the result of imitation of British practice and explains why this imitation has occurred. In addition it examines the extent to which this pattern is analagous to that in the developing nations. Through its examination of the concept of hybridity, the thesis contributes to the general body of theory relating to public administration. It considers the concept's relevance to other systems and broadens the idea into a discussion of the relevance of eclecticism to other countries. This is found to be of general, broad significance in nations of any size or stage of development.

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
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MAP OF THE ISLE OF MAN SHOWING LOCAL GOVERNMENT DISTRICTS,

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GLOSSARY

Common Purse	Financial agreement with the UK.
Deemster	Isle of Man's equivalent of a British High Court Judge.
Executive Council (Exco)	Small body of Tynwald members with overall responsibility for government in the Island.
High Bailiff	Judge next lowest in court hierarchy to Deemsters.
House of Keys	The lower elected house of Tynwald.
Legislative Council	The upper house of Tynwald.
Lieutenant Governor	The Queen's representative in Mann.
Mann or Man	Alternative terms for the Isle of Man.
Manx	Adjective for the people and things of the Isle of Man.
MLP	Manx Labour Party
MNP	Manx National Party
Mec Vannin	Manx Nationalist Party
MHK	Member of the House of Keys
MLC	Member of the Legislative Council
Sheading	Ancient division of the Island now used with the towns as the basis for the constituencies for elections to the House of Keys.
Tynwald	The Manx parliament
Tynwald Fair Day	Open air assembly and ceremony of the Manx parliament held annually on the 5th July at the Tynwald fairfield, St. John's at which the laws are promulgated in Manx and English and petitions presented to the full sitting of Tynwald.

INTRODUCTION

The title of this thesis 'Public Administration in the Isle of Man' is broad and appropriate. In it the author describes and explains an entire system of public administration in miniature. It will consider the structure of the system and the attitudes and behaviour of its actors and will, in addition, attempt to explain the influences which have led to the development of that system and those patterns of behaviour. The thesis is not an attempt to analyse policy-making which would be beyond the scope of this work and which must, in any case, follow a description of the system itself. It is a new approach in two senses. Firstly, it looks at public administration whereas previous writers have concentrated upon the relationship with the UK and the political culture of the Island. It is therefore original in that it reveals new data on the Manx political system and on small community politics generally. In addition it provides a new contribution to public administration theory through the concept of hybridity.

The major work previously completed and published on the contemporary political system in the Island is that by Dr. D.G. Kermode of Liverpool Polytechnic who concentrated upon the Island's relationship with the UK and all its ramifications. He did not, however, consider the administrative structures or culture of the Island. Some very relevant and interesting work, in an as yet unpublished PhD thesis was completed by Dr. J. Richards, who compared the political cultures of three small independent communities; Malta, Faroe and Mann and provided useful leaders for the section in this thesis on the Manx administrative culture.

The thesis of the work is that the Manx administrative system is a hybrid form displaying features of two other systems, namely British central and local government. This concept of hybridity, its relevance to the IOM, the reasons why it has developed and the concept's applicability in other countries, will be considered in Chapter Five. This forms the major theoretical section of the work.

Prior to the consideration of public administration in the IOM itself, it is necessary to explain the choice of the IOM and to justify the study of the small communities in general. It is my conviction that the size of a political system has little to do with its importance as a subject for study. It is argued that small size means that the internal workings of a country are of little interest to outsiders and that its size will make comparison with larger nation-states difficult if not impossible. Alternatively, the actions of governments, however small and however few are the people it governs, can cause reactions in the outside world. The interest elsewhere is related far more to the actions of the government than to how many people they affect by those actions. Hence the British media's interest in the almost dictatorial behaviour of Malta's Dom Mintoff, despite the fact that the population of the Maltese Islands is a mere 300,000.

That comparisons cannot be made between very small communities and larger nation-states can be countered by this argument. Following this view it would be equally useless to compare the system and behaviour of Britain with that of the USA, an activity which is frequently undertaken by public administration writers.

The justification for studying the IOM in particular rather than small communities in general are many, not least the international implications of the Manx Government's activities. These international implications are largely a result of three things. Firstly, the Island's tax haven status is beginning to make a significant impact on the British economy since it has drawn much investment and has been a convenient, legal outlet for tax avoiders from Britain. Secondly, the Island's relationship with the UK is of importance to Britain and elsewhere since the British government has certain duties and responsibilities with relation to the Island and must be constantly in contact with it as a result of its constitutional commitments. Thirdly, the internal activities of the Manx government are of interest to Britain's partners in Europe. Significant examples are the appearance of the UK government at the European Court of Human Rights on behalf of the IOM to hear their decision on the question of judicial corporal punishment in the Island. The issue of the birch is one which raises fierce emotions in more places than just the IOM. Another example is that of fishing rights in the Irish Sea to which the Island is making its claim despite EEC directives to the contrary.

Further, it is unfortunate that British social science largely ignores almost complete political systems right on its doorstep. This is true not only of the IOM but also of the Channel Islands, Eire and even Scotland. This in itself could be said to be adequate justification for the study of the IOM, in order to develop a better and fuller understanding of the political nature of this group of Islands.

Finally the very size of the IOM makes it a particularly easy system to study. The same functions as in any country must be performed and enshrined in some kind of institution or behaviour pattern. The very fact that these exist in miniature means that the relationships between bodies and the actual working of those bodies can be examined with considerable precision. Study may be complicated by the fact that in a small community a few institutions may carry out many functions but the numbers of people involved is still very small and the various relationships between people can be readily discovered.

In leading to its conclusions, the thesis will be presented in the following manner. Chapter One outlines some very important structures and values in British central and local government and places the emphasis upon the differences between them rather than their similarities. These include local and central governments' different approaches to co-ordination, professionalism, anonymity and impartiality, and efficiency.

In Chapter Two the focus changes to the IOM itself with a study of the Manx administrative culture i.e. the social, political and geographical factors which form the background to administrative form and action in the Island. It considers the perceptions Manx civil servants have of British public administration, the subsequent 'imitation syndrome', the impact of the smallness of the community and the political attitudes of Manx senior civil servants.

Chapter Three describes and explains the structure of the Manx administrative system looking, therefore at the supra-national tiers of government, the Island's own political institutions, its civil service, its local government and finally the bodies and mechanisms, part of whose responsibilities it is to co-ordinate the whole machine. Chapter Four, the second of the descriptive chapters, is entitled 'The Public Service' and deals in the main with the characteristics of the Manx Civil Service, recruitment to it, promotion and training within it and pay and conditions under which civil servants in the Island work.

As explained above Chapter Five puts the whole of this information into the context of the concept of hybridity. The major conclusion reached is that the IOM has a hybrid form of administration which has developed as a result of factors relating to its size, its relationship with and perception of the UK, and the necessity for an entirely autonomous reaction to needs and problems. The conclusion on the work explains more general points arising from this study and makes some tentative suggestions for improvement in the Manx administrative system to bring it to a position where it will be more able to cope with the pressure of a modern day existence as part of a complex and demanding world economy.

CHAPTER ONE

STRUCTURES AND VALUES IN BRITISH CENTRAL AND LOCAL

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INTRODUCTION

In this chapter it is intended to review existing, well-developed ideas and practices in British administration on a selective basis which relates best to the IOM. The resultant brief discussion will provide a useful backcloth for the analysis of methods and behaviour in the Manx administrative system. The chapter is not designed to debate theories at length, nor is it meant to break new ground on the value of those theories for the study of public administration. Rather it is to be hoped that by selecting the most discussed and most obvious factors, a basis can be found for the study of the Manx system of public administration which has, as yet, been starved of academic analysis. The approach, therefore, will be to discuss certain values and structures in their organisational context in order that they may provide a background for the more descriptive elements of the work. The Chapter will not, therefore, discuss the features as they occur in the IOM.

That values and structures relating to organisation and methods in public administrative systems exist is obvious. They can be observed with ease by the most casual student of any system simply by the way the organisation deals with the outside world. The values it holds will become evident through the image it presents to public and press. On a deeper level, the internal workings of an organisation develop through a long process of precedence

and change which results in an intricate system of beliefs, values and traditions.

Underlying the above is the assumption that particular trends can be associated closely with particular organisations or systems. Is this a sound assumption? Inevitably, all bureaucracies have features in common which are an automatic result of their being bureaucracies and all public bureaucracies will be yet more likely to be similar given the requirement for accountability that being public implies. So, can we say that certain features are inextricably identified with certain organisations? There is considerable evidence to suggest that this is the case and that the system of traditions and values assists its members and those outside to recognise and make better sense of the organisation as a whole. As features become associated with an organisation they become absorbed into its character and persist by processes of socialization and image-presentation to the extent that they become so deeply embedded that they are almost impossible to dispel. The importance of these factors in association with particular administrative systems must, therefore, be considered prior to any examination of those systems' relevance to Manx administration.

In administrative systems no less than in the political system generally, British influence on Mann, both conscious and unconscious, has been imported on a major scale. This will become very evident in later descriptive chapters and will explain the choice of characteristics in this first section.

Both central and local bureaucracies seem to conform quite closely to Weber's ideal type of pure bureaucracy in which the whole administrative staff under a supreme authority consists of individual officials who are appointed and function under certain criteria. They are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal official obligations. They are arranged in a hierarchy of officers and are appointed on the basis of technical qualifications to posts for which they are remunerated according to rank. The office is treated as the sole, or at least primary, occupation of the incumbent and it constitutes a career within which promotion is dependent on the judgement of supervisors.¹

Weber argued that experience shows this monocratic form of bureaucracy is, from a technical point of view,

"capable of the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings."²

The fact that it is an ideal type makes it practically impossible to achieve. On the whole, however, central and local government in Britain have adhered to these principles to a roughly similar extent and the Manx system is also based upon them. However, as later descriptive evidence shows, the influence of more traditional conceptions of the appropriation of office are still strong and can to some extent be explained through Weber's 'traditional' type. This describes a situation where the bases of order are precedent and usage. The rights and expectations of various groups are

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1. Max Weber, "The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation" Oxford University Press, Inc. 1947. P. 33.
 2. Ibid. P. 336.

established in terms of taking as sacred what has always happened; the great arbiter of such a system is custom.

Weber's third type of administrative organisation he describes as 'charismatic' where an individual exercises authority on the basis of his personal qualities which set him apart from ordinary men.

In terms of Weber's three types the Manx bureaucracy, though superficially comparing well with British central and local systems in its adherence to the Weberian ideal type, displays features also of the traditional one but not to his charismatic model. This will become evident in later chapters on the Manx administrative culture, machinery of government and personnel practices.

Hence rather than concentrating upon the obvious similarities between systems, it is beneficial to consider features which are characteristic only of particular systems and this is what Chapter 1 intends to do.

The criteria for selection of factors for study in this backcloth have been the prevalence of material on the topic in the body of literature on public administration; the applicability of the topic for a small system of public administration; and the relevance of the characteristic to the central thesis of the work - that the Manx administrative system is a hybrid form of the municipal and central systems in Great Britain.

The first criterion above may require some further explanation. Whilst it is important for new theoretical points to be made this is not the appropriate place in which to do it. The examination of the Manx system of administration has, to date been rudimentary, and it is first necessary to make up the time lost before a more original approach can begin.

The applicability of the topic to a small system of administration is equally important in that there is little relevance to the central thesis in looking at problems of excessively large hierarchies, long chains of command, excesses of specialization and so on. Any work must have its parameters and here they are imposed by the unusual restrictions of studying a small community.

In confining features studied to those which are relevant to the central thesis of the work it is to be hoped that better linkages can be made between one section and another and a fuller examination of the major idea can be effected.

The features which will be examined have been associated closely with either British local authorities, or British central government and in some cases both, though to different degrees and in different ways. This is not to deny that these features may be present, and very significant in the administrative systems of other countries, but their interpretation in Britain has been chosen because of that country's considerable influence on Mann over many centuries.

The features will be considered under a series of headings though these are not intended to be absolutely exclusive categories. The dangers of compartmentalisation are particularly evident in a project of this breadth and care must be taken to inter-relate the parts in a comprehensive manner. However, for ease of presentation the following subject headings have been chosen and they have been divided into structures and values (again overlapping but the distinction is of use). Under the headings 'structures' the aspects of 'committee/ministerial systems'; 'co-ordinative structures' and 'consultative structures' will be considered. Under 'values' will come 'professionalism', 'anonymity and impartiality' and 'efficiency'.

These headings give no indication of the association with particular administrative systems and are not designed to restrain the material too specifically. They are merely intended to act as a means of grouping information in a manageable form. Each topic will be examined in turn and consideration given to the extent to which it exists and the way it occurs in each organisation.

VALUES

In speaking of values in this section the term will apply in a very broad sense and will include matters which could better be called beliefs or traditions. These terms, values, beliefs, traditions, have many meanings and have been the subject of lengthy academic argument.¹ In the following analysis the terms will be used in the following senses. By 'values' is meant a set of principles which the members of the organisation and those who interact closely with it, hold in high esteem. They may be of varying significance and may be conscious, unconscious or sub-conscious. They may be inherent in the personalities of the members or acquired after joining the organisation, but it will be assumed that the majority of members identify with the concepts and, through them, contribute to the overall value system of the organisation.

A 'belief', according to the Chambers' Twentieth Century Dictionary definition is a "persuasion of the truth" of something. It is "an opinion or doctrine believed". This concept is not unrelated to that of 'value' and the two cannot be seen as mutually exclusive. A 'belief' does, however, imply a positive commitment to a particular concept whereas a value is almost instinctive and involuntary.

'Tradition' can be defined as "a tale, belief or practice handed down from generation to generation". In the organisational

1. Amongst others see G. Vickers, "Value systems and social processes" Tavistock. 1968.

context it is anything bound up with, or continuing in the life of, an administrative system. In this sense traditions can be used as a generic term for all those factors to be examined later but the word implies a long-standing reliance which may not be present and it is possible for newly-held ideas to be equally significant in an organisational context.

Professionalism

By professionalism is meant not only that groups of staff holding certain qualifications and sharing common ethics, training and experience exist but that these persons hold particular positions in the managerial levels in administrative organisations. In the British Civil Service the generalist administrators hold the most senior posts supported by professional advisers.¹ The generalist in the elite corps of the British Civil Service "does not regard himself as a specialist in anything save his understanding of the machinery of government and his awareness of ministerial responsibility"².

The reasons for the British Civil Service reliance upon the generalist are primarily historical and are a result of their methods of recruitment. These have produced a disproportionately high number of public school, Oxbridge and arts degree recruits³ and more have origins in the upper and middle classes than is seen

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1. Fulton Committee on "The Civil Service". H.M.S.O. 1968.
 2. P. Self, "Administrative Theories and Politics". George Allen and Unwin. 1972.P. 163.
 3. Peta Sherrif, "Career Patterns in the Higher Civil Service" H.M.S.O. 1976.

in the population at large. This has produced a potent self-perpetuating tradition of common beliefs, attitudes and ethics. The development of a powerful and permanent elite has significant consequences for civil service/ministerial relations, both in terms of the relative power they possess and the methods used to achieve their aims.

Conversely, it is a deep-rooted convention that departmental heads in local government should be selected for their professional expertise rather than any managerial ability they may possess.¹ The historical reason for this is that local government has developed as an amalgam of specialist services and for each specialised task authorities have appointed (largely under statutory compulsion) a professional specialist to advise on and execute work.² The administrator in local government has typically worked as the subordinate of the specialist and advice on policy has been regarded as part and parcel of the professional advice provided by professional chief officers.

That certain types of degrees and social background are, perhaps falsely, identified in the British Civil Service with the 'best people to govern the country' is in direct contrast with local government's encouragement of professionalism with all its consequences for efficiency, standards, divided loyalties

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1. J. Stanyer, "Understanding Local Government" Fontana. 1976 P. 183.
 2. K. P. Poole, "The Local Government Service" New Local Government Series. George Allen and Unwin. 1978. P.38.

and so on.¹ This marked difference in the evaluation of the role of specialists in administrative organisations is evidenced in many reports on both local and central government.² The comparative advantages and disadvantages centre around the loyalties which membership of a professional association requires. These cause an improvement in standards, an introduction of new ideas and applications and provide a planned career basis (through the qualifications themselves). They can simultaneously result in a division of loyalties between profession and employing organisation and can also cause inter-profession rivalry within the organisation. Though these are not the primary reasons for the non-emergence of professionalism at the central level, the problems can largely be avoided. The benefits, however, are also absent and central government style has been affected accordingly.³

Anonymity and Impartiality

By convention, the British Civil Service is expected to be an anonymous, impartial bureaucracy. The inextricable association of this concept with that of ministerial responsibility is not to be underestimated and, indeed, it underlies our whole understanding of legislative-executive relations. The conventional constitutional theory is that in British government the minister is responsible to parliament for every activity and decision made

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1. For a fuller discussion of the value of the professional and the generalist/specialist debate see Stanyer, Op Cit P.120; Poole Op Cit, P.39; Stanyer and Smith, "Administering Britain". Fontana.1976.P.252.M.J. Hill, "The Sociology of Public Administration". Weidenfield & Nicholson. 1972.CH.4.
 2. Bains "The New Local Authorities: Management & Structure" HMSO 1972. Maud "Report on the Management of Local Government" HMSO 1967. Mallaby Report on "Staffing in Local Government" HMSO 1967. Fulton Report. Op Cit. etc.
 3. Fulton. Op Cit.

in his department or ministry. Civil servants are not personally responsible for their decisions and should therefore not be public figures, known by name in the press or parliament. Impartiality, an associated concept, is by convention again, said to be complete. This has, however, been challenged by both academics and politicians.¹ Civil servants are certainly protected and largely free from political intrusion and their lives are, to a large extent untouched by the transience of politics. However, through their control of information they can influence decision-making.² In practice, though civil servants prepare programmes appropriate to the party in power, they have significant control over them and can include in them elements based on their departmental and ideological preferences. Neither is the principle of ministerial responsibility strictly adhered to, as seen in the Ferranti case when excessive profits were made on the Bloodhound missile contract and in the Vehicle and General Insurance Case of 1972.³ These caused a reinterpretation of the whole concept and a tendency to hold civil servants more accountable in the management sense.

In local government the role of officers has not been so closely associated with the concepts of anonymity and impartiality primarily because the services it provides are seen as

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1. B. Smith "Policy-Making In British Government" Martin Robertson. 1976. Chapter 2.
 2. Hall, Land, Parker and Webb "Change, Choice and Conflict in Social Policy" Heinemann 1975. P. 69.
 3. Gunn LA "Ministers and Civil Servants: Changes in Whitehall Public Administration" (Sydney) 26,1,1967

uncontentious, well-established and straightforward to implement.¹ Chief officers are increasingly becoming foci for local press but on the whole, local government officers answer internally for their actions and councillors are responsible for the decisions made.

Throughout both local and central level systems, maintenance of the elected body's control of administration is a fundamental aim. The advantages of an anonymous, apolitical bureaucracy to advise and implement are that expertise can be developed in a stable environment, protected from the need to placate voters and civil servants, and officers can do as they feel they should without the prospect of criticism and scrutiny from outside. However, the extensive, some say excessive, powers of the bureaucracy can seriously undermine the effectiveness of a democratic form of government. Without counter-staffs to provide an alternative source of information the politician can be swamped by the tide of data and advice given resulting in ignorance of exactly what is happening and lack of control over decision-making.² The complex relationship between civil servant and minister and between local government officers and councillors has been extensively documented and need not be repeated here.³ It suffices to say that there is a significant difference between what is ideal constitutional theory and what is the reality of the situation at both central and local government levels.

1. L.J. Sharp "Theories and Values of Local Government". Political Studies, Vol 18, 1968.

2. B. Guy Peters. "The Politics of Bureaucracy: A Comparative Perspective" Longman. 1978. p.192.

3. R. Crossman "The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister" Hamilton and Cape 1975

Efficiency

This term is one which almost defies definition and certainly defies measurement but yet is considered generally desirable and is highly valued. A dictionary definition states that efficiency is "the power to produce the result intended". In terms of physics it is "the ratio of a machine's output of energy to input". Applying this to government one could say it is "the maximum output for the least cost", in other words the best use of available resources. This would distinguish efficiency from other related concepts such as effectiveness which has more to do with the quality of a government agency's performance in meeting societal 'needs'. The achievement of objectives is, however, also part of efficiency and hence comes the problem of defining the word despite the fact that it is in common use.

Assuming, for our purposes that efficiency has both the element of achieving objectives and achieving the maximum output for the least cost, it would seem safe to assume that it is an aim of both central and local government. Thus, prescriptively, organisational structure and method should be designed to achieve maximum efficiency. Chester Barnard suggested that the way to do this was to break down the very general and imprecise goals of a large organisation into a series of sub-goals. These would then be met by an organisational pattern specialised at every level in those ways which will best realise a hierarchy of goals.¹ However, orderly goal-setting presents great difficulties in government since goals must reflect numerous, possibly conflicting

1. C. Barnard. "The Functions of the Executive" Cambridge, Mass. 1964. Ch.10.

pressures from both within and outside government itself.¹ The achievement of organisational efficiency is, therefore, done in practice on far less rational grounds and even where attempts are made e.g. to allocate functions according to rationally identified criteria, often these criteria are the product of much adjustment and compromise.

In order to relate the discussion of efficiency to the concept of hybridity, it will be useful to consider the relationship of the optimum size of units for administration to the efficiency of the organisation. The relationship of size to efficiency is further discussed in Chapter 2 but it is appropriate here to consider what has been said on the subject regarding local and central government in Britain.

The Redcliffe-Maud Report, 1969, examined the size of population needed for the efficient provision of various public services at the local level and combining these found that

"the minimum size for all main services is, desirably a population of some 250,000"²

Despite the fact that they found that size did not have a greater bearing on performance than the environmental characteristics of local authorities³, their overall conclusion was that larger local authorities offer advantages of specialisation in staff and

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1. P. Self "Administrative Theories and Politics" Op Cit pp 64-72
 2. "Royal Commission on Local Government in England. 1966-69" Vol. 1 HMSO 1969. Cmnd 4040. p.28
 3. Ibid. p.58

institutions and a more rational distribution of resources. In addition a larger authority could "spread the administrative load more evenly and, therefore, it can draw on greater resources, it can offer a wider range of policy choices". All these benefits can lead to greater efficiency, defined as above, and should, Redcliffe-Maud declared, be borne in mind in recommending a reorganisation of local government. Their proposals were duly formulated to balance the requirement for efficiency with that for local democracy. The subsequent debate on the report included the issue of the relationship between size and efficiency and it was later a factor in the re-organisation of local government into the form we see it today. This is evidenced by the fact that very many of the small authorities were combined to form larger district councils and the two tiers of the system were allocated functions on a generally less fragmented basis.

The units of organisation within central government are ministries and departments and the size of these bears an important relationship to efficiency. The problem of managerial control in very large departments must be balanced with the economies of scale which large size may bring. In addition, as P. Self says,

"The existence of a large number of departments may be managerially satisfactory for each department, but impedes central co-ordination and planning ... Managerial co-ordination requires, ideally, a systematic grouping of functions in roughly equal blocks, while functional considerations are intrinsically resistant to such tidy patterns"¹

1. P. Self. Op Cit. p.83.

If efficiency is the optimum use of resources then the right balance of all these factors must be found in order to achieve efficiency. If efficiency is the realisation of objectives it will be aided by having manageable units of organisation though this must be combined with a rational process of goal identification, planning, implementation and review.

The measurement of efficiency in government has always been problematic since there is such a wide range of outputs affecting a complex environment with the externalities and unexpected consequences all coming into play. Additionally, the relationship between inputs and outputs is difficult since the inputs are on the whole political and the outputs technical.

It is, therefore, impossible to say whether central or local government is the more efficient. Arguably, local government services can be compared, authority with authority, but this will not take into account the unique socio-economic and geographic factors of each authority and the differing pressures at play. At both levels the design of suitable organisational structures and methods is plagued by the fact that what is optimum for one service may not be for another and the criteria used are inevitably arbitrary.

STRUCTURES

By the term structures in this context is meant the arrangements and manner of organisation in central and local administration in Britain. At both levels the development of these structures has been piecemeal and incremental.¹ The proliferation of new government activities (for example economic and energy planning) and the disappearance of old ones (for example India) resulted in frequent addition and abolition of new ministries and departments with a corresponding, though smaller development of service departments. Similarly at local level functions have changed and structures have altered accordingly, for example the introduction of employment policy units to cope with increasingly difficult problems of the local economy. By a continuous process of fission, fusion and transfer the apparatus of government has developed to its present state and is still in a constant state of flux.² The development of new needs does not necessarily result in a new department as it could be grouped with existing departments or other government agencies already providing a similar function. The criteria for development of a new department are far more likely to be that the function, or group of functions, has become of sufficient importance and complexity to require a new department with direct responsibility to Parliament, through a Minister or to Council through a committee.

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1. This is not necessarily an indictment according to Lindblom's prescriptive theory of incrementalism. D. Braybrooke & C. Lindblom "A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process". London Free Press. 1963.
 2. Hanson and Walles "Governing Britain" Fontana. 1975. Ch.6.

Committee/Ministerial Patterns

At central level the greater and most important part of administration is covered by the Ministerial system whereby government is organised into departments each responsible to Parliament through its ministerial chief. The reasons for the development of this as opposed to a committee system are first, that it facilitates a focus for accountability to what is a large parliament (especially when compared with a local council) and to the cabinet where it was necessary to have truly responsible figures represented. Second, the relatively early development of parties at central level necessitated finding for the major party's most senior members, posts commensurate with their ability and standing. In local government (and indeed in the IOM at the present time) parties were relatively inactive when the committee system was established and this more consensual approach to decision-making required the sharing of power over particular functions in the larger body i.e. a committee. Since there was no small executive body performing in a similar manner to a cabinet, it was all that was required for the committee's chairman to act as its spokesman to the full council.

At the local level horizontal proliferation of committees has characterised the development of local, elected government. Local authority committees developed out of the boards that were established in a piecemeal fashion to tackle the problems of urban and industrial society during the nineteenth century. The considerable development and extension of local authority

committee structures was largely a result of central government's imposition of new functions. Often, a professional trained officer was required under statute (for example to implement public health legislation) and it became a tradition for a committee to be established with a specialist officer heading the department beneath it. This vertical system of committees and departments facilitated the incorporation of new functions by the simple creation of a new committee and the introduction of a new profession and led Mr. John Maud's Committee in 1967 to comment that there should be a considerable reduction in the number of committees in local government.¹

The influences acting upon the central and local systems in Britain were somewhat different and led to a different pattern of allocation of responsibility. It will later be seen that the influences applying to the IOM bore most resemblance, in this respect, to those applying to British municipal administration.

Quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations

The 'ad hoc' or 'statutory authorities for special purposes' are characterised by specialisation of function, varying degrees of autonomy and whole or partial exemption from the normal processes of accountability to parliament, through Ministers.² A body may need to be free from the accountability process for several reasons.

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1. Maud "Report on the Management of Local Government" Cmnd. 4040. HMSO 1967.
 2. Hanson and Wallis. Op Cit. Ch. 8.

The most prominent are first that it is commercial in nature and hence requires considerable financial autonomy (as in the case of the nationalised industries). Second, it may have judicial or quasi-judicial functions requiring impartiality from the political process. Third it may provide a service of a personal or cultural kind which can be distorted by political influences. Or finally it may be best to regulate professions, such as medicine and law, by means of bodies subject only to slight political supervision.

The agencies concerned form a sprawling mass of irregular administrative institutions which defy classification, and even description, and this has caused the structure of the administrative system to depart considerably from the principles set out by the Haldane Committee in 1918.¹ The considerable dangers of the development of a series of quasi-autonomous, non-governmental organisations for the democratic process are comparable only to the dangers of the lack of co-ordination which results from their creation. Successive governments have, however, seen fit to create new ad hoc bodies and even following the present Government's early-office purge, their numbers are considerable though not precisely known.

It is impractical to compare central and local practice in this section since the creation of quangos is primarily the responsibility of central government. Local authorities do, however have their

1. Haldane "Report of the Committee on the Machinery of Government". Cmnd. 9230. 1918.

connections with quangos through their membership of health service committees and connections with water, electricity and gas suppliers in their areas. They also create bodies of a similar kind to quangos; a recent example is the setting up of private companies limited by guarantee to aid local industrial development and these are partly funded and partly controlled by local authority members.

Co-ordinative Mechanisms

As a result of the proliferation of functions and departments at both local and national levels, problems of the coherent development of services and their overall co-ordination become increasingly severe. The attempt to overcome these problems by fusing departments, particularly after the Second World War, revealed considerable diseconomies. The benefits of concentrating related functions under one roof were outweighed by its disadvantages and a process of disaggregation followed. The many subsequent turns of the tide were associated not only with the administrative advantages of large scale organisation but with the necessity for adequate responsibility to Cabinet and Parliament. Cabinet needs to balance its own size (for meaningful discussion and decision-making) with individual ministers' ability to deal with huge conglomerate departments. The 'super-ministries', 'overlords'¹ and other such similar mechanisms illustrate the dilemma, and the problem is as yet, effectively unresolved. Successive governments to the present

1. H. Morrison "Government and Parliament" Oxford U.P.
3rd. Ed. 1965:

day have resorted to marginal change to suit political issues and personalities,

"for it often happens that a ministry is created for a particular politician rather than a politician being found for a particular ministry."¹

In local government the solutions have been different though the problem was substantially the same. In the larger authorities especially, the size of certain departments, especially education and social services, became unwieldy and services in general, unco-ordinated. During and before the reorganisation debate, inter-departmental co-ordination had been seen as a considerable problem as the number of functions and corresponding departments grew. Bains' solution², both at the structural and theoretical levels was welcomed, though on the whole only the former has been implemented. Many authorities have used the corporate management principles embodied in Bains as a basis for the development of their own unique systems of management (as indeed Bains encouraged them to do)³. However, problems still remain and to date few authorities are entirely satisfied that their functions dovetail adequately. It has usually been found that departmental loyalties are too strong to allow positive co-ordination to develop.

The need to forge better links with local branches of ad hoc bodies providing local services, e.g. Electricity and Gas

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1. Hanson and Waller Op Cit. P.121.
 2. Bains Report Op Cit.
 3. Royston Greenwood, C.R. Hinings, Stewart Ronson and Kieren Walsh. "In Pursuit of Corporate Rationality: Organisational Developments in the Post-Reorganisation Period." Inlogov P.177.

authorities, is an additional problem of co-ordination.

Internally the absence of a central management body of a reasonable size¹ (full council being too concerned with political debate and rubber-stamping to be able to cope with requirements for speed in decision-making) led Bains to recommend many changes to improve co-ordination. In order to concern itself with the "overall economic, cultural and physical well being of the community" the traditional departmental attitudes had to give way to a wider-ranging corporate outlook. To achieve this it recommended the establishment of a corporate management structure and gave detailed suggestions as to its membership and the inter-relationship of its constituent parts. The following diagram summarises the structure and mentions the names of the new bodies it proposed should be set up.




Diagram 1 (a) Outline Committee Structure.




Diagram 1 (b) Outline Departmental Structure.²

1. R.S.B. Knowles Op Cit. P.37.
2. Bains Report Op Cit. Ch.9. P.99.

The above outline gives only a very brief picture of the Bains proposals as permitted by the restrictions of space, and any more complete understanding requires a much more detailed analysis of the report. The implementation of corporate management structures in British local authorities since re-organisation has been widespread though fragmented. Every authority's approach to corporate management is different and each has had a different degree of success. The high ideals of the corporate approach are fading because local authorities are a confederation of competing interests. The main achievement (and this has been patchy to say the least) has been in getting people together to create a corporate, forward looking attitude. Practicality dictates that the ruling party in local government will lead whatever corporate approach develops.

In any administrative or policy-making system uncertainty will accrue about other areas of policy-making which impinge on the problem under consideration. It is precisely this uncertainty which leads to perpetual demands for co-ordination in government and a widespread belief in its value. The particular approach to co-ordination which is adopted will depend upon the nature of the current allocation of responsibilities but both central and local level administration in Britain have seen the need for a common approach and have made attempts to achieve it.

Consultative Arrangements

Up to now the themes and traditions considered have been concerned mainly with internal workings and relationships.

It would be a serious omission not to point out that distinctive patterns of dealing with the outside world; pressure groups and public, exist and are identified with particular administrative systems.

In both British central and local government, political power is derived from a democratic system. Though those systems are not identical they resemble one another closely enough that we can say that the formal relationship between governor and governed is similar. Both administratively and politically local and national elections are fought in a similar manner¹ and do not, in the main, involve the bureaucracies connected with them.

The electoral system, however, provides only a limited means for the public to influence policy and both individuals and groups seek to put pressure not only on politicians but on the bureaucracy itself. It has been said that where successful pressure groups seek to influence government is often the place where the power lies within the system.² The bulk of activity in the British governmental system is directed not at the political parties or parliament but at the administration

"and there is considerable institutionalisation of groups within the British governmental framework."³

This is illustrated by the plethora of advisory committees which provide links between the government and the various producers' groups and professional associations.

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1. K. Newton "Second City Politics" Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1976. Ch.2.
 2. S.E. Finer "The Anonymous Empire" Pall Mall. 1966.
 3. Hanson and Walles Op Cit. P.154.

The symbiotic relationship between governments seeking consultation and information for successful planning, and groups seeking access to decision-making and decision-execution led Blondel to say that

"the distinction between 'administrative decisions' and 'decisions taken by private individuals' is more and more useless to make."¹

At the local level pressure groups and voluntary bodies are usually organised on a local authority basis, so recognising the spatial as well as the functional distribution of power. Delegation of decision-making powers to local government officers, for example planning permissions, focuses the attention of environmental and other pressure groups upon them. The local activity is, however, different in one important respect from central government pressure. In central government groups are concerned far more with general rules and the frameworks within which the organisations live. Local groups are concerned far more with the specific, with individual cases and decisions concerning a particular piece of land, an individual or an individual organisation.² It could be argued that this results in greater pressure upon the administration as individual decisions are of relatively minor political importance. However, the close involvement of councillors with the minutiae of day-to-day administration, which has been criticised for so long, may result in groups applying pressure on them, in the knowledge that they can, and do, take up individual cases.

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1. J. Blondel "Voters, Parties and Leaders" Pelican. 1963.P.224.
 2. J. Stanyer. Op Cit. P.84.

Administrative systems are in contact not only with groups but with individuals primarily as the receivers of their services though not exclusively in that role. The weakness of the individual citizen in a modern democracy is compensated by

"the right and ability of all freely to organise groups and associations for political action".¹

It is most often in a situation of grievance that an individual seeks to contact the administration and obtain redress. At both central and local levels individuals have recourse to the courts, administrative tribunals and to the ombudsmen. The success of these is very difficult to measure but in terms of the number of applications and number of decisions in favour of applicants success is similar nationally to locally. This is despite the fact that the civil service is seen as a greatly more monolithic organisation. Its relationship with individual citizens bears a close similarity with that at the local authority level.

1. B. Smith Op Cit. P.178.

CONCLUSION

This Chapter has raised some issues which must be borne in mind in the later consideration of the Manx system of public administration. It has looked at values, in particular those of professionalism and of anonymity and impartiality, and it has looked at certain significant structures which show marked differences between British central and local administration. Though the differences between the latter two systems are often a consequence of history and tradition, they may also be concerned with the relative sizes of the two organisations and the values held by their members. The similarities are indeed great, though and common principles do apply.

The Manx bureaucracy shows many marked similarities with both British central and local government and this is illustrated by all three types adhering quite closely to Weber's ideal type rational bureaucracy. However, in making any comparison, it is necessary to stress that particular organisations will develop characteristics which are peculiar only to them. It will be the task of this thesis to explain what these characteristics are in the Manx administrative system and why they have developed there. This will be illustrated in the following three chapters on the Manx Administrative Culture; Machinery of Government; and Public Service.

CHAPTER TWO

THE MANX ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE

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THE MANX ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will be concerned with those social, political and geographical features which form the background to administrative form and action in the Isle of Man. My interpretation of the term 'administrative culture' is a broad one relating to the environment which shapes a bureaucracy and takes into account the many variables existing in a bureaucracy. These are both cause and effect of the complexities of the services it provides, and the traditions and history which lie behind them. The chapter will, therefore, take a line different from some of the writers on administrative culture whose ideas will nevertheless be briefly described as they are in some senses defective and irrelevant to a consideration of the Manx situation. They tend not to raise the points most relevant there and have been used only as guides and stimuli to thought.

The administrative sub-culture has been described in a wider context by Peters¹ who saw culture as existing at three distinct levels: societal, political and administrative. The shared psychological orientations of citizens to both government and administration create the boundaries for their respective spheres of action. However, the "orientation of the society towards administration is a component not only of the general social culture but also of the political culture: that is some

1. B. Guy Peters. "The Politics of Bureaucracy: A Comparative Perspective". Longman Inc. 1978. P.40.

general social values either support or potentially undermine the effectiveness of administrative structures."¹

Professor F.F. Ridley groups these societal influences together forming what he calls the 'external influences' which make up a "generalised model of the influences on a bureaucratic system".²

"The constitutional order, national history, the structure of social power and the educational system, prevailing economic factors (and) the impact of current politics" make up the external influences, whereas internal influences include "organisational forms, formal rules and policy procedures".³

Though this chapter will not rely on such a simple dichotomy to classify the various influences on the bureaucratic culture in Mann, it is a useful distinction to make because it illustrates that pressures are exerted from many angles. The problem of this approach is that the arbitrariness of a simple dichotomy between internal and external factors can distort the analysis as many factors can come under either heading.

"The primary distinction between external and internal forces is not easily maintained; thus, historical (external) influences gradually become part of (internal) public service rules".⁴

This chapter will, therefore, take a more individual line by looking at elements in the administrative culture in Mann which have emerged from discussions with participants in public

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1. Peters. Op Cit. P.41.
 2. F.F. Ridley. "Preliminary Proposals for a European Consortium for Political Research Workshop on Comparative Administration." 1972.
 3. G. Smith "A Model of the Bureaucratic Culture" Political Studies. March 1974. P.31.
 4. Ibid. P.32.

administration in Mann and from wider reading of the politics of small communities. Thus the unique and distinctive nature of the Manx administrative sub-culture can be highlighted and illustrated in later chapters.

The consequences of these cultural influences are discussed in tandem with the influences themselves in order to make the linkages between them more evident. Though writers often concentrate on the degree of involvement of civil servants in politics when discussing the consequences of the administrative culture¹ their approach tends to be somewhat limited for a study of this kind. It is intended here to consider, in addition, other equally important consequences: in particular what may be termed the 'imitation syndrome' and its consequences for bureaucratic form and structure; and secondly the consequences of smallness for the bureaucratic system. Other elements will become evident as the descriptive material unfolds and be put alongside (in importance) a careful analysis of the political attitudes of civil servants, their role in policy-making and their attitudes towards politicians. So, in conjunction with the first chapter this section provides a dual backcloth against which the administrative system can be displayed.

Demography

As a prelude to this analysis it may be useful to describe

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1. (a) R.D. Putnam. "The Political Attitudes of Senior Civil Servants in Britain, Germany and Italy" in Mattei Dogan "The Mandarins of Western Europe: the Political Role of Top Civil Servants". Wiley. 1975.
 - (b) G. Smith. Op Cit.
 - (c) Rosamund Thomas "The British Philosophy of Administration". Longman. 1978.
 - (d) B. Guy Peters Op Cit.

certain significant demographic features of the Isle of Man. This will help to explain many of the attitudes discussed in later sections and to further illustrate the very close links with the U.K. The population which is currently estimated to be between 65,000 and 66,000 has risen considerably since the mid-1960's reflecting government success in attracting new residents to the Island through a policy of low taxation. Of the latest accurate figures for the total resident population (60,496 in April 1976), 18,473, were new residents who had arrived since 1966¹. An unknown percentage of this figure were Manx persons returning as economic conditions improved in the Island. The majority (90%) of the total number of new residents originated in the UK and the rest were fairly evenly split between British Commonwealth and other countries.²

20.5% of the resident population are 65 or over³ and this heavily skewed age distribution is often seen as problematic. During the 1960's the Island's depressed economy resulted in the emmigration of "those willing and able to take advantage of Britain's post-war boom". However, "the economic boom of the 1970's attracted young and talented individuals and the information shows that the greatest proportion of new residents was in this group".⁴

1. See Appendix 1 p.(i).

2. " p.(ii).

3. " p.(iii).

4. Commentary on Population Section of the I.O.M. Digest of Economic and Social Statistics. 1980. P.33.

During the year the population is considerably swelled by tourist arrivals for whom services and facilities have to be provided. . During the peak months of July and August the Island's public services must cope with an additional population of between 150,000 and 165,000, ¹ 86% of whom have travelled from the UK, 8% from Eire and 6% from other parts of the world.² As a result of recent promotional campaigns the proportion of visitors from Eire is increasing.

The effects of population growth and immigration have been recognised as of considerable importance to such a small community and this recently prompted Tynwald to set up a Select Committee to consider and report on the subject.³ Its recommendations concerned the monitoring of population change and its effects on the Island and recommended that "a population ceiling of 75,000 be accepted as appropriate for present circumstances but should not be regarded as applicable in perpetuity."⁴

Many of the Island's new residents are in the relatively high income brackets which benefit most from the policy of non-progressive low taxation and there are certainly many very wealthy individuals in the community. However, the general level of incomes received is below that of the UK and these great differences in wealth have caused much resentment and calls for reduced immigration. In other respects the socio-economic

1. See Appendix 1 p(v)

2. " p(vi)

3. "Report of the Select Committee on Population Growth and Immigration", printed (by authority) IOM Government Reprographic Department 25 March 1980.

4. Ibid. p.8.

distribution of the Island's population is comparable with that obtaining in the UK. Certain occupational groups do, however, show considerable differences, e.g. 13.2% of Manx employees are involved in the construction industry as compared with only 5.2% in the UK.¹ This is presumably to cope with extensive house and office building programs as a result of the economic boom. The manufacturing industries employ a considerably lower proportion of workers than in England though the decline in employment in the traditional areas, agriculture and tourism, has been offset to some extent by some growth in manufacturing and the professions.

Although this chapter is intended to provide a viewpoint of civil servants' attitudes it is vital to consider the political environment of administration and to examine the culture within which it proceeds. In other words, to use Peters's terminology we must examine the societal culture which frames the boundaries for administrative decision-making.

Little attention has been paid to classifying the orientations of citizens to the institutions of government and therefore our knowledge of popular conceptions of administration is even weaker than our knowledge of people's feelings concerning legislatures, the political executive and perhaps even the courts.² Almond and Verba have analysed the perceptions of

1. See Appendix 1 p (iv)

2. B. Guy Peters. Op Cit P.46.

administrative competence of citizens in five states including Great Britain.¹ Others have produced conflicting evidence concerning the levels of trust in members of the upper levels of the government service. In general, though individual officials are respected and highly regarded, the public administration system as a whole is seen in a negative manner.² This is particularly the case in under-developed countries.³

The conception of the administrative system which the public holds is, in many countries, at variance with its view of itself. This is no less true in the I.O.M. where the small size of the community appears not to have resulted in any greater congruence of attitude between public and official concerning his role. In the Isle of Man the dynamic and complex constitutional relationship with the UK results in suggestions that the Manx civil service is powerless, along with the Manx Government, in having any significant impact on the Manx way of life. This powerlessness, the public feels, is not confined to administrators, but is a consequence of the close political, economic and social involvement with the UK. The people recognise and virtually accept that considerable power rests in the hands of minor officials in the Home Office. Thus misconceptions develop concerning the role of Manx civil servants who are under-rated

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1. G.A. Almond and S. Verba. "The Civic Culture Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations." Princeton University Press 1963.
 2. M.K. Jennings, F.P. Kilpatrick and M.C. Cummings. "Trusted Leaders: Perception and appointed federal officials". Public Opinion Quarterly. 30 Fall 1966. Also S.J. Levy "The Public Image of Government Agencies" Public Administration Review 23 March 1963.
 3. Almond and Verba. Op Cit. On Mexico.

as compared with British officials.

This popular conception of inefficacy amongst Manx civil servants is used by press and public alike as a justification for the claim that civil servants are overpaid, under-worked pen-pushers and, as elsewhere, pay increases are described as gigantic and unnecessary.¹ Allegations of over-manning are accompanied by calls for greater speed and efficiency in the processing of applications and provision of services. Reduced expenditure and the elimination of work are demanded. High and rising inflation, extortionate fuel costs and the additional costs imposed by the necessity to import have resulted in calls for an I.O.M. allowance in salaries, for increased pensions and for lower fares to and from the Island. The public is unlikely, however, to encourage the extra staff that would be needed to tackle these problems.

The loss of many educated, ambitious young people of the Island is seen as an issue upon which the Manx Government should act² but to take them into employment themselves would be seen as a superfluous empire-building exercise. Manx residents often charge that the civil service employs too high a percentage of non-Manx professionals in their senior ranks which would be better filled by persons with an intimate knowledge of the locality

1. For an example see:

- (a) "Too Many Civil Servants Plea" I.O.M. Courier 15.12.80
- (b) "Government pay bill up by £11 million". I.O.M. Examiner. 20.3.81.
- (c) "Pruning the Public Secror". Scrutator. I.O.M. Examiner. 9.4.80.
- (d) "Gross Extravagance by Government Claim". I.O.M. Examiner 17.4.81.

2. "Mec Vannin Slam Civil Service Appointments". Manx Star.25.1.80.

and the distinctive characteristics of its people. Long-term planning, the forecasting of employment trends and the training of Manx people, would be necessary prerequisites to Manx persons acquiring such posts, but the inevitable need for staff in such planning exercises would to a large degree be unacceptable to both Tynwald and the Manx public.

The incompatibility of public claims on government is no new phenomenon but in Mann it is complicated by an advanced inferiority complex, and subservience to UK pressure balancing precariously with a fierce sense of separate identity. In addition conservative and reactionary outlooks explain much of the Manx people's attitude not only to public administration but to politics in general. This can be traced to the earliest English influence on Mann and even earlier as the philosophy of the Manx people has been conditioned by centuries of bowing to the wishes of invading nations.

One feature which is evident in Britain in the relationship of public to official and which is of less importance in Mann, is the anonymity of the civil service. The intimacy of the Manx community makes anonymity an impractical concept to apply, and as a result the Manx see senior civil servants as people just like themselves who happen to have done particularly well in their careers. The mystique and unapproachability of senior civil servants complained of in Britain is incompatible with the size of the Manx civil service and its closeness to the community it serves.

The next two sections of this chapter will examine the orientations of participants in public administration in Mann in order to illustrate that government actors are not necessarily in accordance with the general public in their outlook. This will throw further light on the concept of administrative culture as a whole as it applies in Mann. Thus it will be concerned with those elements Peters has termed the political sub-culture and it will include both external and internal influences in approximate balance. The material will be divided into a discussion of what can be termed the 'imitation syndrome' and an attempt to apply others' work on small communities to explain the Manx administrative culture.

The Imitation Syndrome

There exists amongst Manx civil servants (and in particular the more long-serving, less well-educated employees) a belief that 'who says British says Best'. They claim that 'the British civil service is the best in the world'¹ and displays all the honesty and integrity that is to be expected of a service to politician and public alike. Though the Manx people will criticise British administration on the grounds that its size has become unmanageable resulting in inefficiency and inaccessibility they would never doubt its superiority over any other civil service the world over.

1. As declared by a senior civil servant in discussion with the author.

The possible inaccuracy of this view is not considered. Though integrity and a genuine desire to serve are rarely questioned, the impartiality, competence and organisation of the British Civil Service has been subject to intensive scrutiny. International opinion formerly held the British diplomatic service in remarkably high esteem but today both it and the Home Service are accused of a lack of professional knowledge and an inability to implement their well-developed research findings.¹

The Manx government has confined its attention in the perusal of administrative systems to one only, the British Civil Service. They have donned their blinkers and fixed their eyes, seemingly permanently, on Whitehall and can see no justification for a more open outlook and a more comparative approach. It is impossible to say whether this blinkered outlook is the cause or the result of the absence of any conscious study but the two are inextricably linked. As Allbutt says:

"The man of affairs without science is like the physician who has fallen out of the anatomy and physiology he may once have known; within limits he may be a shrewder and abler practitioner than an academic professor; but this he will be at the cost of being stationary To principles, sooner or later, the subtlest craftsman has to bow his head; for, even while his hand is on his tools, by theory contingencies and complications are being detected² and eliminated, the process shortened and economized.

In order to administer a body of people the administrator must develop skills of administration:

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1. Mr. G. Saunders. Former UN employee speaking at the Annual Conference of the Manx Association of Scientists Artists and Writers (MASAW) 1980.
 2. T.E. Allbutt "On professional education" in R.A. Chapman and A. Dunsire (eds) "Style in Administration Readings in British Public Administration" Allen and Unwin 1971: P.21.

"It is a practical art, and practice is essential to make it perfect - much practice. But practice wholly divorced from study is as likely to be limited in its results as study undisciplined by practice is likely to prove sterile and misleading."¹

These long-held beliefs so ably described by analogy with the medical profession seem obvious to any student of administration but to the practitioner and in particular to Manx administrators they seem alien. Certainly the conceptual frameworks within which administration is pursued and the principles on which it is founded elsewhere are rarely examined by any Manx civil servant and what knowledge they possess of how government works in practice is derived solely from experience and socialisation. There is a lack of knowledge concerning how the same functions are performed elsewhere (except occasionally and on a superficial level in the UK) and concerning the analysis of administration by others (both practitioners and academics) about how administration ought to be practiced. Even the 'gifted amateurs' of the British civil service are sent to be schooled at the civil service college in the principles of government, to study some elements of the political and economic environment of their work and to learn something of decision-making theory. The resultant more informed decision-making and general awareness of roles might well increase certainty and improve effectiveness.

The absence of study is based upon the argument that the functions under Manx government control are not of a nature suited to study; what grand theories and concepts are needed to run a

1. L. Urwick. "The Elements of Administration"
Pitman. 1943.

harbour or railway line? It is the argument that was (and occasionally still is) applied to British local government; why theorise about sewers and street lighting?¹ As W.J.M. MacKenzie states, the subject of local government

"has seldom been treated with elegance and precision, and if you scan the textbooks of political thought you will find no accounts, or very shoddy accounts, of theories about local government. An odd thing, because there has certainly been in Britain in the last 150 years endless discussion about it; not theory perhaps, but certainly talk, certainly ideas."²

This reinforces C.H. Wilson's earlier comment:

"Although there is a great number of meritorious works on local government, and many extensive treatments of the functions and powers of authorities, and their history, a great majority of these works do indeed assume that the subject is worth writing about, and make no attempt themselves to inquire wherein that worth consists."³

There is also this lack of attention to theory in the Isle of Man, where the government has developed piecemeal from a very ancient parliament through a system of independent boards to its present form. Even incremental development, however, can be improved by rigorous study, and the attention to theory which has been virtually absent to date could have important effects on an administration which is at present without conceptual foundations. Though this absence of conceptual foundations to administrative practice exists to some extent in the British Civil Service, there it is at least tempered by a common code of ethics and principles which are long-established and derived from the gradual development of the services. For example one very

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1. L.J. Sharpe "Theories and Values of Local Government" Political Studies Vol xviii 1968 pp. 153-74.
 2. W.J.M. MacKenzie. "Theories of Local Government" Greater London Papers No. 2 London School of Economics and Political Science 1961.
 3. C.H. Wilson "The Foundations of Local Government" in "Essays in Local Government" C.H. Wilson (ed) Basil Blackwell 1948.

important quality of the British Civil Service, namely its non-political character, received its main imprint in the eighteenth century in the desire to prevent corruption by patronage followed by the definition of the number of ministerial offices which could be held by MPs.

"As the Civil Service got into its stride, there has built up in every Department a store of knowledge and experience in the subjects handled, something which eventually takes shape as a practical philosophy, or may merit the title of a departmental point of view."¹

This common code of ethics and principles is relatively absent at the local level.

The persistence of British ideas in Mann is hardly surprising given its record as a large exporter of a particular form of democracy. Political cultures the Commonwealth over have absorbed a great deal of the British democratic tradition. Yet differing social, economic and historical factors have caused some countries to retain their individual characteristics better than others. However, the close proximity of Mann to the UK results in greater influence still and the relative homogeneity of their two peoples and the duplication of societal influences such as the media and language, cause yet further influence.

What Chubb says with relation to Ireland can be applied without alteration to Mann:

"The British influence on Ireland arises from the small size of Ireland in the geographical context of nearness, the historical context of political dominion and social and economic dominance and the intellectual context of similarity of language and cultural blanketing"²

It has recently been argued that the IOM displays many of the

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1. Sir Edward Bridges "Portrait of a Profession" Cambridge University Press. 1950.
 2. B. Chubb "The Government and Politics of Ireland" Stanford University Press. 1971 2nd Edition. p. 313.

features of the old style colonial administration which was so common until the 1960's and is now very rare¹ and though it has not undergone precisely the same processes and transitions seen in the British Commonwealth, it shows many of the characteristics of the neo-colonialist state. Jack Woddis explains the old system and the reasons for the transition to neo-colonialism:

"While colonialism meant the direct political and economic domination of one country by another, on the basis of state power being in the hands of the colonial power, it was never solely a question of foreign rule but rather that of foreign rule allied with certain economic and political strata of the indigenous people which had an interest in supporting colonialism. Thus colonialism was in reality an alliance - an alliance between the occupying power and the internal forces of conservatism and tradition."²

This old style of colonialism is vanishing as a result of the coming together of three main forces on the international scene -

"the socialist countries, the national liberation movements themselves and the working class, democratic and peace movements in the metropolitan countries."³

The colonial powers granted formal independence to more and more of their former colonies, whilst ensuring their complete dependence on them economically, financially and militarily. Thus the characteristic of neo-colonialism became pressurisation by the coloniser on the colonised in order to guide them into channels constructive to Western ideological, economic, educational and military aims. So an essential feature of neo-colonialism becomes the fostering and encouragement of capitalist forces to prevent a turn to the road of socialism.⁴ The neo-colonialism of former imperialist powers was imitated by new ones, the USA,

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1. G. Saunders MASAW Annual Conference 1980.
 2. J. Woddis "Introduction to Neo-Colonialism: The New Imperialism in Asia, Africa and Latin America" International Publishers, New York, 1967, p.24.
 3. J. Woddis. Ibid. p.28.
 4. J. Woddis. Ibid. p.52.

W. Germany and Israel, and economic exploitation continued.

In the IOM can be seen some of the essential features of neo-colonialism, the fostering of capitalist forces, the obtaining of allies in nationalist movements and the political, religious, ideological and cultural domination of the people in a subtle and highly acceptable manner. "Polite obstructionism"¹ in the Home Office prevents radical change in Mann and ensures that the general development of Mann is not a different direction ~~from~~ that in Britain.

Taking the concept of alienation as evolved by Marx, Frantz Fanon applies its arguments to the colonial situation and primarily considers the phenomenon of alienation caused by racism. Though the black/white relationship is of fundamental importance to this thesis the point appropriate to Mann is that the colonised turn towards the coloniser and emancipation cannot be achieved. The psychology of dependence becomes so deeply engrained that it is welcomed and perpetuated.² This is no less true in the economic field concentrated upon in neo-colonialism.

The colonial argument may not appear relevant in the geographical context of Mann but even within the boundaries of one nation colonialism can occur as shown by Michael Hechter.³ He takes the examples of Ireland, Scotland and Wales to examine the

1. R. Watterson MHK MASAW Conference 1980.

2. Renate Zahar. "Frantz Fanon: Colonialism and Alienation" Monthly Review Press. 1974. Ch. 4.

3. M. Hechter. "Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966" Routledge and Keegan Paul 1975.

suggestion that ethnic attachments within a society become less important as industrialization and hence contact with the core society proceeds. Refuting this, Hechter comes to the conclusion that contact with other groups may actually heighten ethnic conflict as the peripheral groups become exploitees. Their land and resources are used for the good of the core and their people for the wars in which the core becomes involved. Hence a form of internal colonialism develops which is not inapplicable to the semi-independent community in Mann.

If this neo-colonial pattern can be said to be the true one with relation to Mann then it will do much to explain the attitudes of Manx government officials. Its most important result in the field of public administration is what may be termed the 'imitation syndrome'. There is a literal imitation of many statutes passed by Parliament in Westminster which can then proceed through Tynwald virtually unchanged. Indeed considerable quantities of UK legislation and subordinate legislation apply directly to Mann. This applies also to methods and attitudes as much as to issues and legislation.

Imitation is, almost unfailingly, of British central administration. There is a definite 'civil service mentality' despite the many similarities with local government. In interviews with senior civil servants and politicians¹ comparisons were never made with

1. Board Secretaries and Members of Tynwald were interviewed over a period of a year from November 1979.

local government though continual references to British Civil Service practices were made e.g. the specialist/generalist debate.

This attitude ties in closely to the royalist/loyalist attitudes prevalent in both government and public in the Island. In keeping with Civil Service tradition, Manx public servants see themselves as servants of Queen and country. This is a product in senior civil servants of national service in the British armed forces being their only period of absence from the Island.¹

The neo-colonial system of Manx government has produced what Michael Manley sees in Jamaica as a "psychology of dependence"

"If man is denied both responsibility and power long enough he will lose the ability to respond to the challenge of the first and to grasp the opportunity of the second".²

The psychological dependence can otherwise be seen as an inferiority complex which manifests itself particularly strongly in relations with the UK. Nationalists now argue that the low level of contact between the Manx government and the UK Home Office illustrates the whole perception of political position which the two participants have. A second result of the inferiority complex is the importation of professional staffs to the Departmental Classes of the Manx Civil Service at the most senior levels. Some argue that Manx people should be trained to perform the tasks at present performed by outsiders.³

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1. Survey of the career patterns of senior civil servants by the author. 1980.
 2. M. Manley "The Politics of Change: A Jamaican Testament" Andre Deutsch 1974 p.21.
 3. Dominic Delaney MHK in personal conversation with the author 2/4/1980.

However, the most important effect of the Manx inferiority complex is to produce imitation of UK policies and methods, often without adequate consideration of local needs. Despite considerable similarities of socio-economic make-up, it is not necessarily the case that that which suits Britain suits the IOM. It is an integral part of the complex of beliefs relating to Manx government that what Britain does today, Mann does tomorrow. This is, however, a myth perpetuated by the political elite to justify policies based on other more controversial reasoning, in particular right-wing ideological views. If we analyse this claim of imitation only a little more closely it soon becomes evident that far from imitation being blind and complete it is, in reality, highly selective. Even on major legislative issues, especially those relating to social reform, imitation has been incomplete e.g. Equal Pay and Sex Discrimination Acts, Abortion Law, Breathyliser Testing and certain factories legislation have not been followed. Though general reciprocity is the case with most social benefits, the IOM sets its own rates for certain services and charges its own level of fees for others e.g. issue of personal records, agricultural services, issue of licences etc. In addition, of course, the Manx Government levies its own type and levels of taxation and rates and has abolished many taxes in accordance with its low taxation policy e.g. death duties, corporation tax etc. So the government uses imitation as a justification for reactionary changes and the apathy and ignorance of the population ensures that questions rarely occur concerning those policies that have not been adopted.

In the field of methods of public administration imitation too has been selective. Take, for example, attitudes to professionalism. As will be described later, the dominance of the generalist administrators is in direct imitation of British Civil Service practice but in isolated pockets of the service professionalism is creeping in a manner not unlike its beginnings in British local government. Training methods have not followed British Civil Service or local government practice on the grounds that the service is too small to support the long absence required to give training to senior staff. Recruitment patterns, too, imitate only in the sense that generalists are favoured. There has not been imitation of the socio-cultural and educational backgrounds of the senior officials. These points will be picked up later in the section on the public service.

These brief illustrations of selective imitation will be borne out in later discussions of methods and organisation in the Manx administrative system. It is sufficient here to say that though Manx administrators (and politicians) claim to practice imitation, asserting that it is a means of learning by others' mistakes, it remains selective imitation in accordance with preconceived political values and also remains confined to only one country and one level, the centre, in that one country. No attempts are made to imitate possibly longer-running and more appropriate experiments in other countries of the world.

The Small Community

J. Richards in examining those features of small communities which, he contends enable them to constitute "a specific form of polity" has elucidated several factors which are of relevance to the administrative culture in Mann. The very fact of smallness results in more homogeneity in society and this is not accidental; "it follows from the economic circumstances of small independent communities and is then accentuated by their social characteristics."¹ This, he says, has two important consequences; firstly it produces a close relationship between state and society with linkages taking place "through individuals and personalities rather than through impersonal organisational bureaucracies representing the state."² This leads to greater feelings of identity and community, less feeling of alienation than is usual for citizens of the average sized polity and hence a greater comprehension of the state. This does not, however, lead to greater participation as this may involve dissent: "pressures and imperatives for homogeneity and solidarity"³ and 'getting along well with others' are fierce so that when divisions do occur they are correspondingly deeper.

Secondly, the outside world looms larger to a small polity than to the larger sized nation state because it threatens traditional ways and local identity by introducing 'alien' values and concepts. The problem becomes how to retain a distinctive self-conscious identity and political independence whilst at the same time

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1. J. Richards "Politics in small independent communities" Unpublished PhD thesis, Leicester University, 1980. Contains three case studies, IOM, Malta and the Faroes.
 2. Ibid Part 3.
 3. Ibid Part 3.

making the necessary accommodation with the outside world. Ferdinand Tonnies' typology of societies into Gemeinschaft (essentially small scale communal society based on family and traditional ties) and Gesellschaft (modernised, non-communal society based on contractual ties, in large scale, impersonal relationships) Richards argues is particularly relevant.

How do these factors relate to the administrative culture in Mann?

In a chapter on political style and institutional development in small independent communities Richards suggests that

"Formal constitutional guidelines may well not operate always in practice in societies where great importance is placed upon informal relationships and traditional ties."¹

This point is the key to the recognition and understanding of administrative as much as political behaviour in general. If we apply the idea that small states are inevitably more homogeneous, we can see this very clearly in Mann. There is less division of labour in the economy, a reduced variety of occupations and interests and consequently a reduced variety of opinions and attitudes. Shared beliefs and values are reinforced by a consensus approach to government (the lack of a well-developed party system illustrates this) which abhors dramatic change and encourages its abhorrence in the community. Conservatism and dedication to the status quo are not features only of the bureaucracy (as in larger states) but of the whole society. Resistance to change has, however, to be accommodated with the

1. Richards Op Cit Part 3.

universalistic principles imposed by the outside world and in a quasi-colonial set-up the small community will be expected to make concessions to those principles. Thus when, in 1956, the British Home Secretary authorised the Lieutenant Governor by letter to appoint an Executive Council of seven members of Tynwald in an attempt to promote Cabinet government, this was done. It failed, however, due to the absence of a viable political party system.

The very close state/society relationship in small communities presents some problems for government staff. They must balance universalistic and bureaucratic norms intended by constitution makers (and occasionally learned in training abroad) with the particularistic norms of the society.¹ This makes impartiality difficult. Overlapping of roles and repeated personal encounters on un-related issues lead to difficulties in implementing policies. Anonymity is virtually unattainable and, therefore it is almost impossible to maintain an impersonal and impartial civil service.

Amongst the general public also this close state/society relationship has important consequences. Waiting for acceptable behaviour to be established on issues is a common cause of apathy and it takes much for a member of the public to speak out in opposition to a particular measure. Certain areas of politics have established credibility as subjects for criticism. These are mainly concerned with freedom of action and right wing

1. C. Perrow, "Complex Organisations. A Critical Essay"
Scott Foresman. 1972. p .8.

policies e.g. judicial corporal punishment. To illustrate the point certain recent issues can be described upon which feelings were particularly strong. First, in July 1980, it was decided by the Island's Treasurer that overpaid sums on one form of tax could be offset against tax which was unpaid on another form e.g. instead of refunding overpayments on company tax the Treasury would simply credit the amount to income tax. This caused considerable unrest and was soon tempered by the assurance that it would not be forced but requested. Secondly, there was opposition to a call for the introduction of a register of Manx residents primarily for statistical purposes. Though the facts to be recorded on the register were already in existence in other government departments, the Manx people accused the government of 'big brother' tactics and duplication of records. The register was not immediately compiled.

These issues are, however, exceptions to a common rule of 'keep your head down and you'll be alright'. The Manx public, though generally very enthusiastic 'joiners' of clubs and societies¹, rarely aggregate to put pressure on government and as one civil servant pointed out, this makes things very much easier for them and increases the importance of what is called the 'bluff factor'; "without pressure groups to argue, civil servants are the only experts involved in the decision-making environment and their influence is correspondingly increased".²

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1. See IOM Examiner Annual for a list of Associations and Clubs. Evidence of their extensive activity can be seen in any issue of any Island paper.
 2. Interview with senior civil servant July 1980.

However, where pressure groups have formed, for example in farming, this has changed the whole complexion of that area of government decision-making. Though agricultural interests complain of civil service bias against them and in favour of UK importers, their pressure group activity has brought them considerable subsidies to compensate for high land prices and costs of fuel and imported feedstuffs and machinery.¹

The smallness of the bureaucracy itself has important consequences for organisation and behaviour. Having said this, we must question whether the Manx bureaucracy is a small one relative to the population it serves. A considerable proportion of the national income of small states is taken up by administrative costs and it has been calculated that in the IOM 25% of the population is involved in government in either an elected or an appointed capacity.² The ubiquity of government and the combination of what would be termed local and central government activities in England in the Manx Government (with only a residual local government system) makes the bureaucracy appear over-sized. In fact the Manx administrative system is not smaller because it deals with a small population. On the contrary, it needs a larger bureaucracy to cope with the range and intricacy of the functions it performs. However, in relative terms to the civil services of large nation states it is obviously on a minute scale.

1. IOM Examiner 28th December 1980 p.7.

2. "An Economic Appreciation For the Government of the IOM"
P.A. International Management Consultants Ltd. 1971.

The way in which smallness will affect efficiency will be illustrated thoroughly in later chapters. Assuming that the comments made in the Redcliffe-Maud Report and quoted in Chapter 1 are equally relevant here, it could be argued that the balance between democracy and efficiency in the IOM is somewhat weighed in favour of the first and at the expense of the second: Redcliffe-Maud proposed that the minimum size at which an authority could adequately perform all its functions was at a population of 250,000. Since the Manx Government provides central and local government functions to a population of only 64,000 there may well be serious consequences of reduced specialisation, shortage of resources and low training levels. However, the benefits of a small size in terms of speed of communication within and between departments may partially outweigh this.

The allocation of functions specifically within the Manx Government may also militate against efficiency if the comments of P. Self are to be accepted. As will be described later the Manx Civil Service consists of a large number of very small departments which Self argues, whilst facilitating effective management within departments, damages comprehensive co-ordination and planning of the organisation as a whole.

The degree of efficiency in a small community is no easier to measure than in a large one but its measurement is probably hampered by the fact that this particular organisation has not, generally, set goals against which performance could even attempt to be compared.

Political Attitudes of Senior Manx Civil Servants

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the degree of political involvement of senior civil servants has occupied the minds of political scientists and is considered the most important consequence of the various cultural influences in play. It is important therefore to consider and apply these debates on the political attitudes of civil servants to the Manx case and isolate some of the influences working there.

Rosamund Thomas discusses British and American doctrines concerning whether administration is a science or an art based on certain ethics and used this as the basis for the way in which civil servants act in policy-making. She lists the traditional American doctrines as follows:

"Development 1

1. Government consists of two separate processes; namely politics and administration.
2. Administration can be made into a science. Indeed, the science of administration necessitates its independence from politics.
3. The scientific study of administration leads to the discovery of principles analogous to the principles or laws of the physical sciences.
4. The principles of administration determine the way in which the goals of economy and efficiency can be realised.

Development 2

5. The human element in administration is as important as the science of administration!"¹

On the other hand she sees the alternative British doctrines in the following way:

- "1. In the process of government, the two functions of politics and administration are fused rather than independent.

1. Rosamund Thomas "The British Philosophy of Administration: A Comparison of British and American ideas. 1900-1939" Longman 1978. p.6.

2. Administration cannot be reduced to a science alone. It is based on science and ethics and this combination constitutes a philosophy of administration.
3. The philosophical study of administration leads to the discovery not only of scientific principles but also of ethical ideals.
4. Being a matter of both science and ethics, the goal of efficiency assumes a qualitative rather than a quantitative nature."¹

Whether or not this dichotomy still exists in practice is not proven but it does represent two extreme alternatives which can help to explain reality. Richard Chapman's more applied approach helps our understanding of the political attitudes of the British Civil Servant. He describes him as a person not actively engaged in party politics without seeing this as a constraint on his private life. He is adept and sensitive to the game of internal politics and prefers to concentrate his attention on this rather than to engage in the party political wrangling of his elected colleagues.

"However favourable to one party a civil servant is in his early years, because he works so closely with politicians, he soon becomes aware of the ineptitude of any party. After a time, it seems, he learns to think more in terms of policies and their workability, he focuses his political interests on the merits and demerits of particular policies, and since all political parties tend to have a mixture of policies, the parties as such are seen in a distinctly neutral light."²

To apply this to Mann and to suggest that there is a philosophy of administration of Manx civil servants is to assume they have even contemplated the issue. Whether or not they have, they have certainly not expressed it and this must now be attempted here. We inevitably expect the British pattern to be most pertinent to the Manx situation and this would not be an erroneous assumption.

1. Thomas Ibid. P.22.

2. R. Chapman. "The Higher Civil Service in Britain"
Constable 1970. P.120.

Here again, however imitation is selective and the relative absence of parties and complete absence of government and opposition in the British sense makes a direct comparison difficult.

Chapman describes the British civil servants' considerable adaptability in the preparation of programmes prior to a general election and points out that their enthusiasm for the opposition policy may be equal to that of the programmes in the development of which they have played a part. Chapman remarks that this is a phenomenon which is not to be found in most comparable 'Western' countries and this is true also of Mann where issue by issue choices are made by both politicians and civil servants. There too, civil servants are concerned with the internal politics of the Civil Service rather than the declared politics of the politicians but perhaps politicians too are drawn into this in Mann since they do not have the backing of a well-developed, economically based package of views provided and enforced by a political party.

The absence of study, as mentioned earlier, leads once more to a close similarity with the British reliance on ethics. In Mann, however, this is not combined with the study and application of scientific principles. This is changing with the increased importance of specialists in the Manx bureaucracy. Professional groups and more especially, individuals, are increasing their influence, and the introduction of professional methods in fields related to administrative science e.g. management services, economics, computing may spread to other areas in the future.

Their knowledge of the detailed requirements in each subject area is rudimentary and civil servants see their function as advisory whilst maintaining democratic responsibility for decision-making.

Gordon Smith's model of the bureaucratic culture relies on the interaction of two major dimensions affecting the 'political propensity' of civil servants.¹ The first is the dimension of bureaucratic distinctiveness - the degree to which the elite element of the bureaucracy constitutes a separate group in society and not just a separate category. In other words the degree of 'sub-system autonomy'² is a factor determining the level of control over the decision-making environment and this they called the 'capability function'. The emergence of a distinctive sub-culture depends upon the place of the bureaucracy in the society: chiefly links with the educational system and any social bias of recruitment. Internal and external socialisation may result in a 'special bureaucratic ethos'. Smith places this at one end of the spectrum of bureaucratic distinctiveness and places the 'class-related ethos' at the other recognising that inter-mixing will occur between them. Their significance is that they have political relevance "and even if a bureaucracy lacks special qualities, their absence will still be of importance for political expression".³

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1. G. Smith "A Model of the Bureaucratic Culture" in Mattei Dogan (Ed) Op Cit.
 2. As Almond and Powell called it in "Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach" Little Brown 1966. P.310.
 3. G. Smith Op Cit. P.35.

Secondly, Smith considers the level of political involvement; constituting both subjective perspectives - the bureaucrat's own view of his part in the political process, and objective perspectives - the actual chances of political decision-making. In order to decide the relevance of this theory to the Manx bureaucracy it is useful to try to understand the behaviour of the civil servants (though it is extremely difficult to gauge). The range of variables involved and the individual variation in their importance makes comparative analysis difficult. Although Manx civil servants pay lip service to the concept of impartiality and they are almost exclusively unassociated with political parties, they will nevertheless hold views on policies which are not solely related to their implementation. These views may be conditioned by class-related socialisation. Indeed this constitutes an almost classic case of the 'class-related ethos'. Other factors forming bureaucrats' political views are the psychology of dependence upon the UK, and feelings that in small communities most issues are apolitical. As Smith says there is a "possibility of divergence between attitudes and behaviour"¹ which may explain occasional overt anti-system sentiments. On the whole, however, Manx civil servants do not see the initiation of policy as their role and therefore the politicisation level of the Manx bureaucrat is very low, though his power to make political decisions can be very great. High levels of trust and mutual confidence between the Boards and the Civil Service results in unquestioned decision-making on both sides. This is one of the concomitants of small community consensus politics.

1. G. Smith Op Cit. P.36.

To develop this point; it is argued that

"in the presence of a weak political sector, one in which the decision-making process is stalemated as the result of sharply divergent interest group conflicts, the public bureaucracy will govern the country by default."¹

Presumably the converse is also true, that where consensus politics is the general pattern, the public bureaucracy will play a relatively less active political role. This generally can be discerned in Mann where any actual involvement in policy-making is not overtly partisan and there exist formal and informal barriers to active participation in politics. Diament talks of a 'weak political sector' but this may not only be the product of excessive interest group conflict. In the Manx case the political sector is weak in the sense that it does not provide effective party political leadership and this may result in a further increase in the political power of the bureaucracy. Significantly, (to develop the consensus/conflict argument) there are instances where civil servants have taken the initiative to quash issues before they can be decided upon, especially if they are highly controversial. As Richards says, in small communities where conflicts are relatively rare, they are correspondingly deeper. In these cases the Civil Service often takes action to solve or postpone the problem. To use Diament's words they "govern the country by default".

To what extent this occurs should be easy to discover because of the controversiality of the decisions in question and their

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1. A. Diament "Tradition and Innovation in French Administration" *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 1 (2) July 1968.

consequent reporting in the press. Often the decision is annulled by civil servants by referring to regulations directives, and so on; in other words, matters beyond the official's control. For example, there was a request recently to place advertising material on the seaside of a prominent miniature castle on an island in Douglas Bay, the Tower of Refuge¹. This created much opposition from environmentalists. The Harbour Board simply defused the controversy by ruling that it was against shipping regulations as illuminations in that position would conflict with the standard lights showing the entrance to Douglas Harbour. Thus the controversy was deflated without the Civil Service appearing to take a line on the issue. They treated it as a purely administrative, non-political matter.

This attitude is probably most closely allied to Putnam's concept of the 'classical bureaucrat'. Though questions put in interviews with Manx civil servants were geared only to certain elements in Putnam's work, the general leaning towards that end of his classical/political spectrum of attitudes is discernable. The 'classical bureaucrat' operates on the assumption that problems can be solved purely objectively without reference to socio-political considerations.

1. IOM Examiner 4/4/1981.

"This presumption leads naturally to the belief that, because the bureaucrat himself is 'non-partisan', his judgement is 'impartial' and 'objective'. Consequently, the classical bureaucrat distrusts or rejects the institutions of politics, such as parliaments, parties and pressure groups. To the classical bureaucrat the noisy, incompetent, partisan practices of politicians seem at best senseless, at worst positively inimical to the permanent interests of the state."

"The opposite polar type consists of what we can call the political bureaucrat. He is ... both more aware of the 'political realities' and more willing to treat political influences on policy-making as legitimate He is 'problem-oriented' or 'program-oriented' ... The political bureaucrat understands and accepts the role of such institutions as parties and pressure groups."¹

Between these two extremes lie an infinite number of middle points displaying certain of the characteristics of both extremes. The Manx bureaucrats' attitudes are unlikely to include an overtly antagonistic approach to politics and he would certainly not consider them dangerous. He may, however, regard them as an irritant to the smooth-running simplicity of administration. He can therefore be placed near to the classical end of Putnam's spectrum. The lack of bureaucratic distinctiveness does not militate against this, as Smith would suggest, as the consensus politics mirrors the consensus administration. The bureaucrats come to see the politicians role as duplicating or simply legitimising their decisions. Politicians become very involved in day-to-day administration so that the difference between politician and senior administrator becomes very blurred. In a consensus situation they really are much nearer to becoming one and the same thing. Conflict and its resolution are the stuff of politics and where it is relatively absent decision-making becomes much more a matter of practicality than it would otherwise be.

1. R.D. Putnam Op Cit. P.89.

The Manx bureaucrat will, therefore, tend towards the classical end of the spectrum but for rather different reasons than is the case in Putnam's major example of this, Italy. There, the instability of the political system has caused the emergence of a stable genocracy displaying all the features of the classical bureaucrat. In the IOM, however, the stable political system produces the same effects without the conflict of elites. Social backgrounds, education and experience are similar in both politicians and bureaucrats and therefore bureaucratic distinctiveness is not evident.¹ The civil servant can still, however, consider himself non-partisan, apolitical, objective and so on and "turn all problems of politics into problems of administration"² in the true classical fashion.

1. See Chapter 3.

2. Karl Manheim "Ideology and Utopia" Harcourt Brace 1946. P.105.

Conclusion

To summarise the points that have been made in this chapter, we began with a general introduction to the administrative culture of the Island and proceeded to explain it in terms of the influences upon it of British attitudes and practice in the context of the quasi-colonial relationship; the unwillingness to examine its own behaviour in any academic or rational manner; the tradition of selective imitation and its conscious continuance; the inferiority complex which underpins this; the consequences for smallness for administrative culture which at first appear the most obvious to the observer; and finally, the political attitudes of senior civil servants.

The combination of all these factors creates what can only be described as a unique administrative culture. This is not to say that uniqueness is a quality confined to administration in Mann as every system has different influences and values. It does, however, show interesting traits of small communities which are in perpetual conflict and contrast with the more general features of larger states. The balancing act invoked to ensure the continuance of these values is reinforced by a homogeneous, conservative society whose remarkable capacity for coping with these conflicting values has resulted in a very stable environment for administrative action.

These first two chapters are intended to provide a backcloth for the following descriptive passages which will be divided as follows. The first part will concern the machinery of government

and will examine the allocation of functions to central government, local government and state-sponsored bodies. This will be followed by a description of the Public Service itself.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT

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CHAPTER THREE:

THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT

INTRODUCTION

The next two chapters are a description of the formal institutions and personnel of the Manx administrative system. This formal approach will provide only the skeleton of the subject in the same way that a diagram cannot illustrate organisational behaviour without an adequate discursive text. The descriptive approach has, however, never been attempted for the Manx system and is essential as a prerequisite to further analysis.

Chapter 3 explains the machinery of Manx public administration in terms of the allocation of functions to the different levels and bodies and will also describe the various offices and institutions which are intended to co-ordinate the activity. It will begin with a brief explanation of the UK/IOM relationship concentrating particularly on the requirements imposed by UK central government departments on Manx civil servants. This will be followed by a description of the Manx administrative system at the 'central' level - Tynwald, the Board system and the Civil Service. Secondly state sponsored bodies will be explained and finally, government at the local level will be examined.

Certain aspects of the Manx administrative system have undergone a process of dramatic change during the 1960's and 1970's as the gradual devolution of power to the Island has continued. The most recent example is the transfer of the administration of customs

and excise from the British to the Manx Civil Service. However in other respects there appears to be no evidence of a willingness to change and to incorporate ideas implemented in Britain, especially those changes seen in British local authority management structures.

The diagram below shows the basic pattern of central government in the Island and can be used as reference throughout this chapter.

SUPRA-NATIONAL TIERS OF GOVERNMENT

The tiers of government can best be described in descending order of size. As is the case with the UK, the IOM has membership of and affiliations with several supra-national bodies including the Commonwealth and the United Nations though on the whole foreign affairs and defence are handled by the UK Government on the Island's behalf. This includes representations to supra-national institutions and, indeed, legal action, e.g. the UK Government was charged in the European Court of Human Rights on the question of judicial corporal punishment in the IOM.¹

The relationship with the EEC is governed by Protocol 3 of the Treaty of Rome as agreed prior to UK entry in 1971. Under these terms both the Channel Islands and the IOM are

"included in the EEC only for the purpose of free movement of industrial and agricultural products and to that end are required to apply the common external tariff, the agricultural levies on imports from third countries and certain parts of the Common Agricultural Policy. Other provisions of the Treaty of Rome do not apply to the Islands"²

Controversial issues have arisen concerning this very favourable position and problems have occurred concerning the "potential incompatibility between the Island's formal constitutional status and the forces of European integration."³ Monetary Compensation Amounts, standardization of indirect taxation levels and now the movement towards a common fisheries policy have all caused conflicts of interest on a scale which may endanger the IOM's vital economic relationship with both the UK and the EEC.

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1. For a detailed description of the case see D.G.Kermode. Op. Cit. P.111.
 2. Ibid. P.9.
 3. Ibid. P.163.

In a more direct administrative sense the impact of the association with the EEC has been considerable. A "Common Market Officer" has been appointed in Government Office and serves as Secretary to the Common Market Committee which now has the function of scrutinizing

"legislation emanating from the European Communities to determine what should be applied to the Island, and its general effects, until the end of the life of the present House of Keys"¹

The huge mass of directives and regulations emanating from the Eurocracy have required handling within the service and the compliance with EEC directives has caused much debate in Tynwald. The extra work involved for officials has not, in general resulted in the appointment of new staff but has increased the general work load of some Boards quite considerably e.g. the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries and Government Office (part of whose responsibilities it is to deal with foreign affairs). Reactions of officials to EEC information have been mixed though some have taken the classic 'droit administratif' line of filing directives and politely omitting to implement them. On the whole Tynwald has tried, where possible, to negotiate a special position for the Island where an EEC policy particularly affects them e.g. in the present attempts to introduce a fisheries policy.

The IOM'S relationship with the UK has been much documented and is the subject of one of the few contemporary politics books on the Island: "Devolution at Work - A Case Study in the IOM" by D.G. Kermode. To put the relationship concisely is difficult

1. The Tynwald Companion. 1980. P.24.

as it is a complex and dynamic one and relies to a considerable extent upon convention. However this will be attempted with reference to Kermode's much more extensive work.

The Island is neither a part of the UK nor an overseas dominion. It is a Crown Dependency which enjoys a special relationship with the UK. This relationship assumed its modern constitutional form in 1866 with the passage by the UK parliament of the IOM Customs, Harbours and Public Purposes Act which separated Manx revenues from those of the UK and gave Tynwald a limited measure of control over insular expenditure. Since 1866 the degree of control has been relaxed to a relationship of almost complete freedom over purely domestic matters.

The UK parliament retains the power to legislate for the IOM in any sphere but in practice there has been an increasing tendency for the Island to be allowed to legislate for itself. It is normally only in the spheres of defence and international relations that Parliament has used its powers to legislate for the Island and then only with consultation and (usually) the consent of the Manx Government.¹ All measures passed by Tynwald require the Royal Assent and, while this is usually forthcoming, it is not a mere formality, occasionally being refused on grounds of incompatibility with 'good government' or because

1. D.G. Kermode "Devolution at Work: A Case Study of the Isle of Man" Saxon House 1979. P.108. Kermode discusses the exceptions to this pattern at length. A major example, however, is the Marine etc. Broadcasting (Offences) Act which was the consequence of an international treaty signed by the UK on the Island's behalf.

the legislation concerns matters which 'transcend the frontiers of the Isle of Man'.¹ A recent example is the Wireless Telegraphy (IOM) Act, 1962 concerning commercial broadcasting to which Royal Assent was refused on the grounds of incompatibility with international broadcasting obligations made by the UK. Another was the considerable delay of Royal Assent for the Usuary (Amdt) Act 1974 which was designed to raise the Manx interest rate ceiling to 12½%. Kermode concludes that "it would be wrong to attach too much weight to these cases as they were exceptional".²

The influence of the UK central government departments on a day-to-day basis is important. The requirement to submit statistics similar to those received from the local authorities in England and Wales is one example. This affects educational institutions, agricultural production, industry and catering as well as the Manx government departments themselves. Two examples of central government departments in the UK having an influence over Manx affairs were reported in the press. One concerns the arrival of telegraphy inspectors to investigate the use of citizens band radio sets in the Island. Though the Government Secretary was said to know nothing of the visit, protesters said that the officials had claimed they were

"authorised to come to the Island as they were working under the auspices of a UK Ministry."³

Citizen Band radio is a volatile issue in the Island at the moment and local residents claimed that the investigators intimidated

1. Kermode. Op Cit. P.142.

2. Ibid. P.146.

3. "Protests over Home Office raids" IOM Examiner.12/12/80.

them without even knowing that Manx laws on the matter were different.

The second example is the accusation by R. Watterson MHK of phone tapping by UK tax authorities without the knowledge of Manx officials. The Lieutenant Governor, clarifying the position stated that

"The authority for the interception of telephone communications to or from or within the Isle of Man resides with the Secretary of State It has been the practice of successive Secretaries of State not to answer questions about the detailed operation of these procedures or about the occasions on which they might be used."¹

Contact with low level Whitehall staff is frequent even in political negotiation. As former MHK Mr. Peter Craine said, Government representatives were "fobbed off with civil servants, and did not see anyone at the head."² Roger Watterson (also a former MHK) and members of the Manx National Party argue that too much power rests with minor officials in the Home Office and the politicians of Mann should speak with their equivalents in Britain. This situation has led to calls for a Manx Foreign Office and Department of Trade which would ensure the effective representation of the Island's interests at an international level.³

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1. "MHK warns on UK phone-tapping". IOM Examiner. 21/3/80.
 2. "Time to set up a Manx Foreign Office". IOM Examiner. 29/8/80.
 3. Ibid.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

The Lieutenant Governor

The position of the Lieutenant Governor in the IOM constitutes the link with the British Crown by whom he is appointed for what is normally a five year term of office.¹ In practice there has been little interference by the Home Office in his authority though officially he is subject to the directions of the Home Secretary in his capacity as Privy Councillor. Under the terms of the Constitution (Legislative Council) (Amdt) Act 1980 the Governor ceases to be Chairman of the Legislative Council or to attend its meetings. The Council now elects a chairman from amongst its number, who is then known as the President of the Council. Since this occurred the Lieutenant Governor's role in the legislative process has been reduced to that of giving his signature to legislation and recommending it for Royal Assent, presiding over meetings of Tynwald and chairing meetings of the Executive Council.

In 1976 the main financial powers of the Governor were transferred to the Finance Board and his concurrence on the introduction of proposals involving public expenditure is no longer required. Thus, though executive authority is formally vested in the Governor, the practice in recent years has been to gradually withdraw functions from him in favour of other elements of Manx

1. This was extended in the case of the last Governor, Sir John Warburton Paul in order to take in the Millennium celebrations in 1979. The present Governor is Sir Oswald Nigel Cecil appointed in September 1980. The Governors have usually had backgrounds in the British armed forces and then governorships in the former colonies.

Government. He now acts increasingly on the advice of the Executive Council, the Finance Board and other bodies responsible to Tynwald. Thus, his is not purely a ceremonial role (though he does perform that function as the representative of the Lord of Mann, the Queen) but it is increasingly becoming less influential as the principle of self-determination by the Manx Legislature becomes established and as power is redistributed within the internal structures.

Tynwald

Tynwald consists of the Lieutenant Governor, an upper house of Legislative Council and the lower house or House of Keys. Two of the ten members of the Council are ex-officio, the Lord Bishop of Sodor and Mann and the Attorney-General. The latter has no vote. The Keys appoint all eight other members normally promoting members from their own house though they have power to select whomsoever they please. This position has been reached through a gradual purge of the ex-officio element over a period of approximately sixty years.¹

The House of Keys consists of twenty-four popularly elected members on an electoral base of thirteen one, two and three seat constituencies with a simple-plurality system of voting. The members do not in general identify with political parties and those who stand on party tickets at election time behave as independents once they take up their position in the House.

1. J. Templeton and J. Richards "Elections in a Small Community: The Isle of Man" Parliamentary Affairs. Vol. xxxiv No.3 Summer 1981 p.324.

There are three political parties active in electoral terms in the Island though only two have representatives in Tynwald. The Manx Labour Party (MLP) has three MHK's and the Manx National Party (MNP), a nationalist group formed in 1978, has one. The latter member was elected on the party ticket of an older nationalist grouping Mec Vannin (meaning Sons of Mann) and he joined the newer party (a faction from Mec Vannin) at its formation.

Though the Labour Party members have been elected on a common platform, the general practice is for them to vote according to their own conscience in Tynwald and they frequently cancel out each others votes. The other members, all elected on an Independent ticket, behave in practice as a conservative majority though without the formal organisation of a political party or whip system to force their choice.

The prime function of the House of Keys and Legislative Council when sitting separately is the consideration of primary legislation. At the drafting stage the bills are submitted to the Home Office for observations and bills requiring public expenditure must gain the approval of Tynwald's Finance Board before they can be introduced. The Governor decides in which Branch of Tynwald a Bill shall first be proceeded with and from there it must complete three readings in both the House of Keys and the Legislative Council.

The House of Keys has the ultimate right to over-ride the Council where there is disagreement and since 1978 the Legislative Council has been able to delay the passage of a bill by one session only, in practice six months.

Council and Keys sitting together under the presidency of the Lieutenant Governor constitute the Tynwald Court whose legislative function is confined to consenting to, amending or rejecting bills passed separately by the two Branches, Council and Keys. Tynwald has, however, more diverse functions than the passing of legislation. It makes policy decisions within the framework of existing law particularly with regard to finance; it ratifies subordinate legislation; and it scrutinises government business. The voting procedure is designed to ensure a number of checks on the process of policy with the Branches voting separately and together on different occasions.¹ Where the two Branches disagree provision is made for them to meet and confer.

The formal initiation of policy can come from Executive Council, Tynwald Committees, Boards of Tynwald or individual members. The role of each body or group of bodies will be examined in turn along with an outline of their structure, selection processes, etc.

Executive Council

Executive Council (or Exco as it has become known) was set up in 1946 in an attempt to

"combine in one body the responsibility for good order and government, the responsibility for initiating taxation and expenditure, the control of the executive and the police services and end the current duality of interest and responsibility"²

It was reconstituted and put on a statutory footing in 1961,³ though since then certain changes in its membership have occurred.

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1. Kermode. Op Cit. P.147.
 2. Ibid. P.46.
 3. IOM Constitution Act. 1961

It now consists of five members nominated from the Keys and two from the Council, which nominations are ratified by Tynwald voting as a body. The Chairman of the Finance Board remains an ex-officio member, but constitutes one of the representatives of the branch of which he is a member.¹

The role of Exco in the initiation of policy is a significant one in that much legislation first arises there and is then introduced to Tynwald. It is therefore a major though not the only source of policy. As Kermode says it

"remains the Island's most important executive committee" but his argument that it is equivalent to the British Cabinet is true in only the most superficial sense. The Haldane Committee set up in 1918 to review the machinery of government in Britain officially described the functions of the Cabinet as:

1. The final determination of policy to be submitted to Parliament.
2. The supreme control of the national executive in accordance with the policy prescribed by Parliament.
3. The continuous co-ordination and delimitation of the activities of the several Departments of State.²

In no sense can the IOM's Executive Council be said to have supreme control in practice though it may have been intended for this to develop. The important decisions of government though often begun there are rarely entirely made there and the degree

1. IOM Constitution Act. 1968.

2. Haldane "Report of the Machinery of Government Committee". Cmnd. 9230.1918.

of secrecy surrounding the British Cabinet does not apply.¹

There is a convention that Exco members should be the chairman of the principal Boards and, in the absence of party discipline, departmental loyalties have proved too strong to enable the development of effective cabinet government.

The success of Exco in the initiation of policy is greater than that of individual members in that much legislation originates there. In that sense it provides the kind of direction associated with executive government but its effectiveness as a central co-ordinating committee is limited by its unrepresentative nature in the sense that only the most senior members of Tynwald with major Board responsibilities are members.

Tynwald Committees

Tynwald Committees are created on an ad hoc basis to investigate particular problems and controversies. This often produces reports of an influential nature. Their number and diversity is considerable and these bodies have certain important powers in many fields. Committees of Tynwald include Standing Committees which remain in being notwithstanding a dissolution of the House of Keys and Select Committees appointed "to enquire into matters specifically referred to them."² Joint Committees are "Committees of the Council and Keys when sitting separately"³ (of which there are at present three). The numbers and titles of

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1. Members of Tynwald are circularised with the minutes of Exco meetings and often debate them in private.
 2. Standing Order 173 Section 2.
 3. Ibid.

Tynwald Committees are shown in Appendix 2 along with the position of the Speaker of the House of Keys regarding them. The total number of Committees of the Legislature which functioned during the life of the 1976-1981 House of Keys is forty-one and each contains between three and nine members, the average being five members.

The membership of these Committees is drawn almost exclusively from Tynwald though the Government Secretary is present at the Tynwald Ceremony Arrangements Committee;¹ a standing committee of Tynwald. The Speaker of the House of Keys plays a very important role in this committee system, being a chairman of eleven and a member of a further six. The present holder of the post has acquired such authority because of his well developed political abilities and statesmanship though it is also a result of the fact that the Speaker is barred from membership of the Boards and is therefore relatively free to take up places on committees. As a result of his many positions on Tynwald Committees, the Speaker has quite an important role in the initiation of legislation though again his opinion is respected largely because of his lengthy experience and personal qualities, rather than because of his formal positions.

The Committees are set up to investigate and report on matters of particular controversy or interest and standing committees deal with matters of long term interest or requiring management e.g.

1. The Tynwald Ceremony is an annual open air meeting of Tynwald on (or near) 5th July designed to perpetuate the traditions and to promulgate the laws in Manx and English to the people.

Standing Orders Committee, Tynwald Ceremony Arrangements Committee, Population Control and Immigration, the Selection Committee etc. Their power to influence policy making is important in that recommendations are considered seriously as policy initiatives though they do not formally initiate legislation. Reports presented to Tynwald by the Committees provide the basis for major debates and for legislation. Often, policy decisions flow from assumptions and perceptions developed during the debates of committee recommendations. In other words their comments add to the stock of knowledge, impressions and values of members.

The Board System

"The Boards of Tynwald are established by Acts which have previously been passed by the branches and they are instruments of political control over the policy and administration of the various public services."

Boards of Tynwald can initiate policy either by dealing with issues in their own meetings or by raising them in Tynwald. Their success in this is significant as they have major responsibility for decisions made in their own fields. Their control over large areas of decision-making is therefore considerable. Decisions of the Board need not be ratified by Tynwald unless it involves expenditure over a certain amount or involves the making of by-laws or subordinate legislation. This autonomy is the result of the development of the system which had its beginnings in 1734 when it was enacted that

"harbour dues should be imposed on shipping and applied for the repair and maintenance of the harbours and that with the permission of the Lord, the anchorage dues should also be applied to the same purpose."¹

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1. A.W. Moore "A History of the IOM" T. Fisher Unwin 1900. Reprinted Manx Museum and National Trust. 1979.

Supervisors of the Harbours were appointed, who were chosen annually by the Governor, Council and Keys. Hence the Harbour Board was the first Board of Tynwald though it was first known as the Harbour Commissioners.

The Highway Board (now the IOM Highway and Transport Board) was in its early life also a committee of five persons, being set up in 1776 to supervise and inspect the roads. The Boards created next were the Asylums Committee, the Board of Trade and the Local Government Commissioners, all formed between the middle and the end of the nineteenth century. The next bulge in the expansion of the system came in the post Second World War period when there was some rationalisation and amalgamation of the Board system. This belatedly followed the report of the 'Committee appointed to consider the Question of the Establishment and Pay of Members of the Civil Service' 1920 which recommended certain changes in the organisation and the amalgamation of certain boards.

In the late 1960's and early 1970's some new bodies were created such as the Broadcasting Commission in 1965, the Consumer Council in 1972 and the Industrial Advisory Council in 1961. Further expansion and consolidation is still proceeding.

The policy-making made within the framework of existing law is largely the responsibility of the Boards acting in their own functional area. Considerable amounts of subordinate legislation emanate from the Boards in the form of regulations, by-laws and rules and these are usually laid on the table before Tynwald for ratification.

Board Chairmen represent figures of considerable influence in Tynwald but due to the small size of the legislature almost all members have a chairmanship of one sort or another. In the hierarchy of positions, members are accorded varying degrees of power and prestige according to their experience and ability by being selected for important positions or important Boards.

The selection of Board members lies in the hands of the Selection Committee of Tynwald which is appointed by Tynwald immediately after the General Election every five years and consists of five members of the House of Keys and three of the Legislative Council. After considerable internal deliberation and discussion with other members the Committee recommends members and chairmen of Boards and other executive agencies to the December sitting of Tynwald after the November election. It also proposes new appointments when vacancies occur due to by-elections, promotions to the Council etc. All members except the Speaker and the Attorney General are provided with executive roles on at least one Board for a period of three years after which changes are often made by the Committee (with the approval of Tynwald), to last until the following General Election.¹ The importance of the fact that all members of Tynwald are members, in effect, of the 'Government' cannot be underestimated as it results in the virtual absence of an effective institutional opposition. Though the Speaker could be said to constitute a one-man opposition he is but one man and cannot, therefore be completely effective in the role. Moreover, by virtue of the present incumbents considerable political ability and experience he has been appointed to many

1. For a discussion of the powers of the Selection Committee see D.G. Kermode. Op Cit. PP.95-97.

Tynwald Committees¹ and is thus never far from the arena of policy-making.

Certain of the Boards also have members co-opted onto them on the grounds of specific expertise and of special business acumen. This practice appears to exist very much on an ad hoc basis and is dependent upon the interest shown by the prospective members and the existence of appropriate individuals in the community, (or the Board's awareness of them). Often co-opted members are appointed for life and their value is variable though rarely questioned.

Some examples of Boards containing co-opted members and the relevant knowledge and experience of these members are as follows. Firstly, the IOM Forestry, Mines and Lands Board contains four non-Tynwald members one of whom is an arborist, two are farmers, and another in commerce. Secondly, the Gaming Board of Control has an ex-superintendent of police, and two ex-bankers co-opted onto it with an additional adviser from a private firm of accountants. The Airports Board has a former Flight-Lieutenant in the Royal Air Force co-opted onto it.

In the case of ad-hoc advisory bodies which have few executive powers, co-option arrangements are often made to provide a wide range of representatives from different community organisations. For example the Consumer Council (soon to be transformed into a Board with two Tynwald members and four non-Tynwald) contains

1. See Appendix 2.

representatives of agricultural interests, hotel and guest house associations, the industrial advisory council, etc. Similarly the IOM Sports Council contains persons having connections with athletics, football, golf, rugby and yachting.

The IOM Board of Education has twenty-four directly elected members, the constituency base being the same as that for the Keys. In addition five Members of Tynwald sit on the Board of Education and are the means of accountability to Tynwald which votes the Board's finance.

The Board system has its roots in the entirely autonomous individual bodies created in a piecemeal manner to meet new need and responsibilities of government in the Island and was only rationalised at a recent date with the unification of the Civil Service in 1962.¹ Though it has many disadvantages it has been retained in its present form for partly political and partly administrative reasons. The MacDermott Commission on the IOM Constitution in 1959 listed its disadvantages as follows:

"It tends to hinder responsible central government by creating competing loyalties in Tynwald; it immerses too many of the legislature in the detailed work of administration on a narrow front; it makes heavy demands on the time of members; and it impedes the formation of a unified civil service for the Island".²

It declared, however, that its popularity and advantages (including sharing power very widely in Tynwald) overcame all this and hence, recommended its retention.

1. IOM Civil Service Act 1962.

2. "Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution".
Printed (by authority) Norris Modern Press. March 1959.
Vol. 1. P.34.

For the purpose of the Payment of Members Expenses Act 1975,¹ executive bodies are divided into 'Boards of Tynwald' corresponding to UK Ministries, and 'Statutory Boards' corresponding to the various forms of public ownership in the UK. Diagram 1 at the beginning of this chapter lists the Boards under their respective headings.

Quasi-autonomous Non-governmental Organisations

The list of government bodies includes many functions which are the responsibility of state-sponsored bodies in Britain and this begs the question do these exist in Manx life?




Diagram 2.

The above diagram displays all the bodies which have some independence from Tynwald and yet provide services partially financed and controlled by them. They are ranged on a continuum according to their degree of independence from Tynwald.

The distinction between commercial and other Boards has long been recognised but the concept of state-sponsored bodies goes further than this. A small number of agencies play a similar role to that of a nationalised industry. In particular there is IOM National Transport whose position with relation to government control has changed repeatedly in recent years to its present one

1. Tynwald Companion 1980. P.49. Payment of Members Expenses Act. 1975.

as a limited company owned by the government with its Board of Directors consisting entirely of Tynwald members. This is also the position for Laxey Flour Mills and there are various sub-committees running semi-commercial concerns such as a Wild Life Park run by a committee of the Board of Agriculture. In addition the situation regarding broadcasting is an interesting one that has been the subject of much change in the 1960's and 1970's. Its present position is that Manx Radio (a commercial station) is a limited company owned by government and operated by a private Board of Directors. They must submit estimates to the Finance Board in the normal way. The Broadcasting Commission - a statutory board consisting of two Tynwald and three non-Tynwald members is responsible for the overall supervision of broadcasting and the negotiation of frequencies and so on with the UK Home Office.¹

So although the state-sponsored bodies, with differing degrees of autonomy from government do exist, they are small in number. Many of the functions allocated to different agencies in Britain are vested in various forms of Board in the IOM. The commercial Boards are assured greater autonomy over decision-making provided they remain self-financing to an extent which is acceptable to the Manx government. Similarly, the limited companies owned by the government are generally free to operate as they wish though with the final sanction of government through their financial subsidies.

1. The Broadcasting Commission has, for example attempted to establish with the Home Office an entitlement to a reduction in licence fees for Manx residents as Manx Radio is not financed through the licence. (IOM Examiner, Leader. (9/1/1981). A second example is that the Commission has also been involved in the controversy over the importation and use of citizen's band radio. (IOM Examiner. 23/1/1981).

Central Government Finance

There are three sources of finance available to Tynwald in order that it may carry out its statutory, voted¹ and miscellaneous services. These are direct taxation, customs and excise and general receipts. The table below shows the revenue receipts and payments over the period 1970-1980. Sources of finance from direct taxation include resident and non-resident Income Tax, Company Registration Tax and Land Speculation Tax. The rates of these taxes are decided entirely by Tynwald through the Finance Board and hence Tynwald has control over a considerable proportion of its revenue. (See diagram 3).

Customs and excise, until recently, was much less under Tynwald's control since they were subject to an almost total customs union (the Common Purse Agreement) with the UK in which the Island received a share of net customs and value added tax revenue (paid into the UK). The Island share was apportioned to them on the basis of the consumption patterns of the resident population plus a fiscal equivalent for the tourist population. With the increase in VAT to 15% in the UK budget there has been a very considerable increase in yield from that source and from inflation. From the 1st April 1980 the Manx Government took over the running of the Customs and Excise service and the staff now employed locally are employees of the IOM Government instead of the UK Government as hitherto. The Manx Government still maintains a customs agreement with the UK which requires them to keep in line with the majority of the rates of indirect taxation.

1. Meaning services provided with money voted annually by Tynwald.

Diagram 3.

SUMMARY OF REVENUE RECEIPTS AND PAYMENTS 1970-80

£ Thousands (ii)

	1970-71	1975-76	1976-77	1977-78	(iii) 1978-79	1979-80
Customs and Excise	5,136	12,132	13,883	15,553	17,645	20,000
Income Tax:						
Residents	3,299	8,282	10,541	13,930	15,764	19,000
Non-Residents	355	652	825	911	908	1,100
Company Registration Tax	-	129	144	117	133	220
Land Speculation Tax	-	97	119	125	183	180
Post Office (Philatelic Bureau)	-	517	428	609	602	800
Bureau on Investments	351	868	1,118	780	1,232	1,200
Other general receipts (i)	514	676	871	1,903	1,026	1,223
Total Receipts	9,654	23,353	27,929	33,928	37,493	43,723
Statutory services	684	652	719	801	495	568
Voted Services	7,309	20,893	23,672	27,077	32,279	41,623
Payment for National Health Services	232	384	476	529	590	650
Transfer to Net Revenue of excess of Receipts over Payments	1,429	1,424	3,062	5,522	4,129	882
Total Payments	9,654	23,353	27,929	33,928	37,493	43,723

(i) Includes refund unexpended advances, Gaming and Lotteries (casin Act (net) (prior 1978-79, after w Gaming Board of receipts are cla fied under Voted Services), Betti Duty, repayment family allowance Continental Shel Agreement and Miscellaneous.

(ii) To nearest thous
(iii) Probable
(iv) Estimate

Source: IOM Digest
Economic and
Social
Statistics.

It may, however, give three months notice that it wishes to change duties and subject to the agreement of both territories this could be done. Either party may also give six months notice to terminate the agreement, hence creating a customs barrier between the two territories.

The third source of revenue is 'general receipts' including fees and charges, National Insurance contributions, fines, interest on investments, betting duties, philatelic revenues and the proceeds of the Continental Shelf Agreement.¹

Hence although the Island has great and increasing autonomy concerning the raising of revenue, it is still constrained by its own agreements with the UK Treasury. Their relative freedom from control is a considerable boon since until the development of the Common Purse Agreement beginning in 1890 and to some extent up until 1957 when the agreement was widened to become almost total, the Island struggled for want of finances and suffered at the hand of the UK Treasury's "penny-pinching control".²

As to the expenditure side of the financial account the Island has almost total control of its spending subject only to the agreement that it will make an annual contribution of its share

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1. This is an agreement regarding the distribution of revenue derived from oil and gas exploitation in UK waters. The Island receives a share determined by its resident population, of the licence fees and royalties collected by the UK in respect of this exploitation.
 2. D.G. Kermode. Op Cit. P.113.

of the Common Purse to the UK exchequer for defence and other common services. There are some spheres in which the Island keeps in line, through voluntary agreement with the UK including social services expenditure, and part of the expenditure on agriculture, the police, airports and civil defence. These items, with the annual contribution, account for 60% of Manx expenditure. The minority portion has, of course increased considerably in real terms and the Island is free to decide how all these services shall be administered and to make variations that are possible without endangering reciprocal arrangements.

The size of the overall Manx budget has increased enormously during the last decade and the scale of government activities continues to increase with it though a large proportion of the increase is a direct result of inflation and UK Government policy. The Finance Board is the body responsible, since 1961, for the collection and allocation of resources and though the Lieutenant Governor has still, formally, a veto on expenditure, it would be a brave Governor who would exercise it.

The Civil Service

The Civil Service in the Island began as a small number of privileged officers appointed through the Crown to the Governor. Earlier the Lord of Man's minions had performed similar functions.¹ In 1826 the service consisted of a handful of court positions,

1. A. W. Moore "A History of the IOM". Op Cit.

e.g. the High Bailiff's¹, a gaoler and turnkey of Castle Rushen² and the Chief Constables with only the very rudiments of a clerical staff. There were no clerical staff attached to most of these offices and there was much duplication of tasks for each person. As the numbers of Boards increased some were appropriated clerical staff. There was considerable expansion as a result of this during the middle and towards the end of the nineteenth century. The increase in legislation concerning weights and measures and building standards boosted this further. The next bulge in the expansion of the service came in the post-war period when there was some reorganisation of staff and a boost in the number of Boards. Over the 1960's and 1970's the numbers have again rapidly increased. This time it is a result of the rapidly growing population and the ramifications of the policy of low taxation.

The Boards of Tynwald now form the core of the Civil Service in the IOM. Each has its own permanent executive staff of officers and technical experts and in most instances they are said to work for the Board rather than the Service as a whole. Although the connection between the Boards and the Service for organisational purposes is very strong, there are some departments which have no Board directly controlling them. These have been established for various reasons but are often the residue of old Crown appointments e.g. Clerk of Tynwald Office staff, public analyst's and

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1. Equivalent today of an English Crown Court judge.
 2. A Norman castle in the former capital, Castletown.

weights and measures department and clerical staff for legal appointments e.g. the High Bailiff, Magistrates, and the Attorney General. A small number of very senior officials remain outside the purview of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the Lieutenant Governor is responsible for their appointment. This applies to both the Treasurer and the Government Secretary. Other posts e.g. the Attorney General, the Deemsters and the Lieutenant Governor are appointed to the Crown.

The central department of the Civil Service is ^AGovernment Office which is headed by the Government Secretary (the head of the Civil Service) and is divided according to several types of function. In this body were vested many of the miscellaneous functions which were not the responsibility of the early Boards and these functions have been gradually decentralised as new Boards were created. Government Office officially administers all government functions but in practice it is now concerned only with 'External Affairs' (treaties, conventions, nationality, immigration, etc.) which is the responsibility of 'C' Division, miscellaneous aspects of 'Internal Affairs' ('A' Division) and Economic and Social Affairs ('B' Division). Appendix 3 shows the functions for which Government Office is officially responsible, many of which are effectively administered by other Boards.

The large number and often irrational organisation of Boards has long been the object of criticism. In 1920 a Committee ¹ recommended:

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1. Report of the Committee appointed to consider the question of the Establishment and Pay of Members of the Civil Service 1920.

"that the clerical staffs of various Boards of Tynwald should as occasion arises be amalgamated as follows:-

- (a) the Harbour Commissioners and the Highway Board;
- (b) the Local Government Board (LGB) and the Asylums and Assessment Board;
- (c) the Board of Agriculture, the Tree Planting Board and the Fisheries Board;
- (d) the Labour Exchange and the Old Age Pension and National Insurance Board."

Some of the changes were implemented, especially (d) but still today the allocation of functions seems random and piecemeal e.g. criticism is often levelled at the fact that the Health Services Board, the LGB, the Board of Social Security and some of the local authorities all run old people's homes of various kinds and occupancy depends on the degree of care required. This makes administration difficult and leads to considerable confusion for clients.

Changes are at present being made in the Board system and hence in Civil Service organisation. As mentioned earlier the IOM Civil Service has taken over the responsibility for Customs and Excise administration from the British Civil Service. Secondly, legislation is being enacted to make the IOM Consumer Council and the Industrial Advisory Council into statutory Boards.¹ As part of this process the Weights and Measures and Public Analyst's Departments will be incorporated under the new Board of Consumer Affairs. Two new advisory panels are in the process of creation; firstly in the Tourist Board to act as a 'think-tank' to boost the declining tourist industry, and secondly an advisory group

1a "Consumer Council to become a Board" IOM Examiner 29/11/80.

b "Council into Board" IOM Examiner 19/12/80.

containing representatives of conservation groups to comment on planning matters to the LGB's Planning Committee. A merger of all the transport boards is also being planned along with a take-over of the responsibility for roads in the urban areas from appropriate local authorities. A Home Affairs Board Bill has been introduced to Tynwald which is intended to take some of the functions of the Governor, the Civil Defence Commission, the Police Board, Broadcasting Commission and the LGB and combine them in the new body.¹

These changes are preceeding a wider move to rationalise the whole structure and in accordance with this a Select Committee has been set up to report on the responsibilities of all Government Boards² with a view to reallocating some of their functions. This was prompted by one member's desire to dismantle the LGB which is relatively large and multi-functional. This was widened to include all Boards after comments such as that the public were

"bewitched, bothered and bewildered by this amazing ramshackle system"³.

Many thought that the Board system should exploit the advantages of 'small is beautiful' rather than build up multi-functional and relatively large scale departments. Since the process of change continues unabated as evidenced by the above examples, the formation of a committee to enquire into this may be a delaying tactic which may not produce the reform which is its ostensible purpose.

1. "Political Control of police goes ahead" IOM Examiner 5/6/81.

2. "Probe into Government Boards" IOM Examiner 21/11/80.

3. Mr. T.E. Kermeen. MHK Tynwald Debates. 19/11/80.

The Manx administrative system is a result of the piecemeal allocation of functions over two and a half centuries and it is not surprising that anomalies remain when there has been no radical review of the system as a whole since its instigation. Several reports have dealt with the administrative elements of government in several aspects and their recommendations have often been implemented. For instance both the MacDermott Commission¹ and the Marshall Report² recommended the creation of a Finance Board and the separation of the treasury function from Government Office into a new department. These changes were implemented in 1961. The MacDermott Report also recommended the unification of the Civil Service and the establishment of a permanent Civil Service Commission to be responsible for

"recruitment, appointments and promotions and all the questions arising from time to time after the present establishment needs have been settled".³

A Civil Service Commission was appointed in 1962 under the IOM Civil Service Act which also unified the Civil Service.

"The Civil Service shall comprise all persons appointed by the Governor for whole-time service with any department of the Government or any Board, which service is wholly or mainly administrative, professional, technical or clerical."⁴

On the whole the recommendations of the Marshall Report were also implemented but those that were not constituted very important reforms and those which were implemented do not constitute what could be called radical change.⁵

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1. MacDermott "Report of the Commission on the IOM Constitution", Printed (by authority) Norris Modern Press . 1959.Vol.1,P.44.
 2. Marshall "Report on Administrative Organisation of the IOM Government". Printed (by authority) Norris Modern Press. 1959.
 3. MacDermott Report. Op Cit. P.45.
 4. Statutes Vol. XLX. PP.66-74.
 5. See Appendix 4.

The Ombudsman

There is at present no Commissioner for Administration operating in the IOM but as its introduction was at one time under consideration it seems appropriate to consider its relevance to the Manx administrative system. The proposal embodied in the Tynwald Commissioner for Administration Bill, 1981, had a mixed response and the local authorities in general opposed it. Some misunderstandings appear to exist as to the precise operation of the Parliamentary Commissioner in Britain. For example one member of Castletown Commissioners who opposed the idea said

"that there was one ombudsman for 50 million people in Britain, while the Island was considering one for 60,000 people."¹

Most objections were on the grounds of cost or the classic objection given by another Castletown Commissioner who

"wondered why suddenly we should need an ombudsman when the Island had managed previously without one."²

Others have claimed that the 24 Keys provided 24 ombudsmen in effect and that a separate appointment was simply an empire-building exercise. Presumably the arguments offered in favour of ombudsmen in Britain apply equally to Mann thus the suggestion of reference through MHK's. It is unlikely that the arguments in detail were familiar to the MHK's. In Britain it was decided that the institution was worth trying despite its practical limitations and Gregory and Hutchesson concluded that

"on the evidence of the first six years or so, what the work of the Commissioner and his associated Select Committee has demonstrated is that -properly used - the Parliamentary Commissioner scheme is capable of making parliamentary control over administrative action very nearly as effective as its inherent limitations will ever allow it to be."³

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1. "Town supports ombudsman plan". IOM Examiner 9/1/81.
 2. Ibid.
 3. R. Gregory and P.Hutchesson "The Parliamentary Ombudsman: A Study in the Control of Administrative Action" G.Allen and Unwin.1975.

In the IOM the measure was unsuccessful due more to lack of understanding and absence of informed debate than any real objection to its value.

CO-ORDINATION

There are several bodies part of whose role it is to assist the co-ordination of government services, either at political or Civil Service level. The most obvious example is Tynwald itself which has overall control of policy in the long term through legislation and the ratification of financial decisions. This is despite the fact that in the short term the Boards have a considerable degree of autonomy from Tynwald. In addition, it contains the chairmen of all the Boards and indeed all the elected members of the Boards (with the exception of the directly elected members of the Board of Education).

The Executive Council was also created originally with the intention of providing an overall co-ordinating body with responsibility to Tynwald and there is some possibility of gradually acquiring a more important role. In no way, however, can it be said to make decisions in every field of policy and instead it tends to be a place where decisions are made which are not thought to be the responsibility of any Board. As an initiator of legislation it is important, but it has little influence upon the other Boards or, for that matter, on Tynwald. It does not, however, have a specific remit for long-term co-ordination and planning though it is perhaps the most appropriate body to take that role.

One very vital and increasingly influential co-ordinating body is the Finance Board whose power to reject and amend estimates of all

other Boards and Departments is considerable. Though its decisions in this field are ratified by Tynwald, final conclusions are rarely outvoted. The presentation of estimates to Tynwald is seen more as a chance to debate the priorities established and to express departmental loyalties than as an opportunity to overturn their decisions. Similarly the budget as a whole as prepared by Finance Board and presented by its Chairman is usually unchanged after its passage through Tynwald. This kind of financial control provides an obvious means to keep Government spending in the various departments in line with overall economic and political priorities. The members of the Finance Board cannot serve on any other Board (unlike all other members who serve on at least two) and do not therefore have particular Board loyalties though they may have personal axes to grind.

The Civil Service Commission could be seen as a co-ordinating body in that it controls the common resource of staff, therefore affecting all Boards and Departments. In this sense it aims to ensure that staffing levels are sufficient for requirements and in accordance with the policy on the size of the public sector. The unification of the Civil Service and the creation of the Civil Service Commission did much to improve co-operation between the departments and the inter-change of personnel has aided the inter-change of ideas.

At the officer level several departments play a part in assisting co-ordination. The Clerk of Tynwald's Department tries to

co-ordinate the legislative program of activities and keep members informed of the decisions of other Boards etc. On the executive side the Government Secretary is the overall co-ordinator as head of the Civil Service. He and his department are nominally in control of virtually all government activity and often receive enquiries in all fields which are then redirected to the appropriate Board or Department. Since the centralisation of departments in one building and the development of a centralised postal service, this has been less true. The Government Secretary is still, however, seen as the overall co-ordinator and is an ex-officio attender at all Board meetings, either to give advice or simply to observe.

Despite the fact that these co-ordinative mechanisms do exist, the vast majority of co-ordination is achieved through purely informal means. As one civil servant said

"the politicians tend to set up a committee to deal with matters relating to several Boards but there is no real need. I just pick up the 'phone and I achieve much more that way. They would rather use a sledge-hammer to crack a nut".¹

Another said:

"it is just a question of knowing who deals with what. In a small community our colleagues on the same level are personal friends; people we went to school with. There is often no need for a formal meeting."²

This informality is accepted by many as adequate but there are others who suggest that the degree of real co-ordination is low and is very 'patchy' simply because it relies on personalities.

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1. This quotation perhaps tells as much about civil servants attitudes to politicians as it does about informal communication channels. Interview with the author. 9 April 1980.
 2. Interview with the author. 1 April 1980.

Others suggest it is a dangerous pattern which reinforces narrow cliques in policy-making.

In discussion with politicians and civil servants it was noted that on the whole feelings were mixed as to whether co-ordination was good or poor though on the whole civil servants were more satisfied than politicians with the present system. This is presumably a factor of their permanence and their full-time involvement. Of those who felt changes should be made, many confined their proposals to amalgamation of certain Boards (though some expected problems of size with this), centralisation of equipment and more frequent inter-departmental or joint Board meetings. In general, advocates of change prefer it to be slow and piecemeal. This is connected with a primary aim of the Manx government which is to present an image of stability to the outside world. This affects not only economic policies and law and order, but also attitudes towards constitutional and administrative reform. It has gradually become ingrained that it is better to retain existing methods than to suffer the unwelcome upheaval of change. It is not considered that the possible benefits of a radical review of the allocation of functions along with the introduction of effective co-ordinative structures and methods, may enhance rather than damage stability.

In interviews certain civil servants were prepared to consider the concept of corporate management as practiced in many British local authorities and thought that the matter should be examined to determine its relevance to the Manx administrative system.

"I would personally support the implementation of corporate management. It should exist as there are certainly gaps in co-ordination. It hasn't happened because strong departmental loyalties and a lack of political will have prevented a thorough consideration of the idea."¹

In a system of Boards which shows considerable similarity to local authority committee systems² but with, if anything greater autonomy for its constituent parts, the application of corporate planning techniques would appear particularly appropriate. The Bains recommendations are directly appropriate to the Manx case. Corporate management involves a restructuring of internal organisation both at member and officer level in order that a more rational process of decision-making with comprehensive review of progress could take place. Bains recommended new structures which aid the overall development of the Island in accordance with prearranged policies rather than the present piecemeal, incremental system.³

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1. Interview with the author. 7/4/80.
 2. See Chapter 5.
 3. M.A. Bains. "The New Local Authorities: Management and Structure" HMSO 1972.

a) Description

There are at present twenty-six local authorities in the Island; they are of varying size, power and effectiveness. There are four town districts, five village districts and seventeen parish districts.¹ These form one tier below central government level though they do not and cannot perform equivalent functions to one another as they are of unequal size and resources. Many are so small that their functions are either performed jointly with other authorities or have been taken over by central government in the shape of the Local Government Board (LGB). This system compares closely with that obtaining in England and Wales toward the end of the last century, prior to the formation of the Rural District Councils, Urban District Councils, County Boroughs and County Councils in 1894. In other words when the British authorities were small, separate, minimally active and without inter-locking responsibilities.² Towards the end of the nineteenth century there was some central financing of local government and that at present is the position in the IOM.

Each authority has existed in its present form for at least sixty years, the towns being constituted by separate acts - Douglas in 1860, Ramsey in 1865 and Castletown and Peel in 1883.³ The position of the village and parish districts was formalised with

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1. See Appendix 6 for the population and names of districts.
 2. P.G. Richards, "The Reformed Local Government System" George Allen and Unwin Revised 3rd Edition. 1978.
 3. The Douglas Town Act 1860 created the Douglas Town Commissioners and this was created a Municipal Borough under the Municipal Corporation Act 1895. The Ramsey Town Act 1865, the Castletown Act 1883 and the Peel Town Act 1883 created the other three.

TOWNS

Town	Highways	Public Lighting	Public Health	Attractions and Amenities	Housing	Transport	Libraries
Castletown	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Douglas	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Peel	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ramsey	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

In addition to the services indicated, Douglas Corporation also administers the cemeteries, markets and electricity services.

VILLAGE DISTRICTS

Village	Highways	Public Lighting	Public Health	Attractions and Amenities	Housing	Transport	Libraries
Laxey		x	x	x			
Michael		x	x				
Onchan		x	x	x	x		x
Port Erin	x	x	x	x	x		x
Port St. Mary	x	x	x	x	x		x

PARISH DISTRICTS

Parish	Public Health (Minimal)	Refuse	Street Lighting	Housing	Public Conven.	Sports Fields etc.	Drainage
Andreas		x	x			x	
Arbory	x	x	x			x	
Ballaugh	x	x	x		x	x	
Braddan		x	x	x		x	x
Bride		x	x		x		
German	x	x	x		x	x	
Jurby	x	x	x				
Lezayre	x	x	x			x	
Lonan		x	x			x	x
Malew	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Marown	x	x	x		x	x	
Maughold		x	x		x	x	
Michael		x	x			x	
Onchan		x	x			x	
Patrick	x	x	x			x	
Rushen		x	x		x	x	
Santon	x	x	x			x	

the Local Government Consolidation Act in 1916 which is still the principal Act dealing with Local Government in the IOM.


The functions of the various authorities are in practice very complex and for ease of presentation they are displayed in Diagram 4. Diagram 5 shows the local government-like functions that are performed by central government bodies. Only one function is performed by all the local authorities and that is street lighting. Others such as building bye-law inspection, environmental health, refuse collection, public conveniences, amenities and attractions, decorative lighting and highways are provided by the larger authorities only (though the latter is in the process of centralisation to the Highway and Transport Boards¹). Others are provided by Douglas Corporation only, the LGB and other central bodies serving the rest of the Island e.g. cemeteries, public health inspectors, seasonal entertainment, rodent disinfestation, electricity and transport. Joint Boards are in operation to provide swimming pools with the assistance of the LGB. The latter also assist with old people's homes. In the case of housing, the LGB is the supervising authority for the whole Island and the functioning authority in areas other than Douglas, Ramsey, Castletown, Peel, Port Erin, Port St. Mary, Onchan Village and Braddan Parish. In addition the Board deals with drainage, public health and safety, cleanliness of water and milk supplies; it hears and determines applications for finance by local authorities. It is the fire authority for

1. "Better roads after Tynwald take-over?" IOM Examiner. 30/1/81. The take over is enshrined in the Highways (Transfer) Act 1981.

Diagram 5.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ISLE OF MAN

TYNWALD



FUNCTIONS & DUTIES CARRIED OUT BY THE BOARD IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT DISTRICTS

<u>PLANNING</u>	<u>BUILDING BYELAWS</u>	<u>FIRE</u>	<u>PUBLIC HEALTH INSPECTORATE</u>	<u>M.O.H.</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Island Wide Service	Byelaw Authority for All Parish Districts & Inspectors act for All Areas Except Douglas, Peel & Ramsey	Island Wide Service Including Fire Prevention	Inspectors act for All Areas Except Douglas & Peel	The Isle of Man M.O.H. has Jurisdiction Throughout the Island	Factories & San Food & Drug San Meat Inspection Theatres Advertisement C Sea & Port Heal Rodent Control Burial Grounds Mechanical Cont Milk & Dairies Infectious Disee Refuse Disposal Child Life Prot Foster Homes; A Development Sch Etc. Etc.
<u>SEWERAGE & SEWAGE DISPOSAL</u>					
Drainage Authority in 14 Parishes & 1 Village					
<u>PLANNING</u>					
Island Wide Service					
<u>SEWERAGE & SEWAGE DISPOSAL</u>					
Drainage Authority in 14 Parishes & 1 Village					

the Island, though a fire rate is levied at present this is to be abolished.¹

The increasing centralisation of power and resources has led to considerable disillusionment with the service as a whole and has discouraged possible candidates from standing for election as the Commissioners in their area. There is often no contest at elections and sometimes there are not enough nominations to fill vacancies.

"Town and parish commissioners' jobs are not worth having any more due to the relentless march of centralisation and the taking away of more and more of their duties, rights, powers and functions."²

Controversy abounds as to how the problem can be rectified whilst in the mean time finances and functions of local authorities are gradually eroded. A radical change is required but unlikely. This leads to an examination of the financing of local authorities for without adequate funds their future is extremely uncertain.

b) Finance

Appendix 6 gives some statistical details on local government finance.

Not only do the local authorities themselves raise rates in the IOM but the Government also levies them for the traditional local government services it provides e.g. fire and water. The rate demands received by householders will vary according to the

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1. Local Government (Fire Services) Bill. "Fire rate to go" IOM Examiner. 7/11/80. See Appendix 5 for a summary of the functions of the LGB.
 2. "Jobs are not worth having" IOM Examiner. 7/11/80. Referring to a comment made by R. MacDonald MLC 4/11/80.

district in which they live not only because each authority fixes a different rate poundage and rateable values but also because they provide different services and therefore levy different rates. Central government levies a fire services rate and highways rate (though these are now being abolished), a water rate, burial ground rate and agriculture rate, and Special Drainage rate.¹ These are all collected by the IOM Assessment Board which is also responsible for the determination and review of rateable values. A separate demand is received from the local authority itself. No rate rebate system exists at present in the Island.

Central Government (through the LGB) provides rate support grants to local authorities to the value of £1,048,161 in 1978/79 which is about 50% of the total monies raised by way of rates by the various local authorities for the same period. This is made up of deficiency payments for road maintenance and housing, grants for various development schemes and various other forms of rate support. In addition local authorities must petition the LGB for permission to borrow sums up to £20,000 for purchase of land or to sell land or premises up to that value. For items over £20,000 the Board sits as a Committee of Tynwald to hear petitions and report to Tynwald. Local authorities have a small amount of income from fees and charges to supplement their grants and their own rates.

1. There are 32 Special Drainage Districts which are used by the LGB for determination of the level of this rate.

c) The System's Problems

There are several major problems with this system of finance which have led to calls for its abolition and reform.¹ These problems can be grouped as follows into those concerned with disparity, complexity, inefficiency, revaluation and the division between the payment and provision of services. These will be examined in turn.

There is a wide disparity between local authority general rates. For instance, the Douglas rate in 1978/79 was 88 pence in the pound and that of Santon 5 pence in the pound. Of the total rate levied (local authority and government combined) the Douglas ratepayers contribute 50% (£1,576,934) the next largest sum being that of Ramsey (£327,776). The lowest total is Santon (£5,440). The disparity between most local authorities and Douglas is considerable. This results in important problems for the larger towns. They provide services which are of benefit to the Island as a whole and in such a small area this is even more marked. Those areas immediately adjoining Douglas pay considerably lower rates with relatively easy access to the services provided there. Douglas and to some extent the other towns provide tourist facilities which are not primarily of benefit to the towns residents though the costs are borne by them.

The second problem is that of complexity. The confusion at rate collection times is great especially as householders receive two separate rate demands - one from their local authority and one from

1. "Ability to Pay - New Rates Plan." IOM Courier 29/2/80.
Also "A Decision Now on Rates Abolition" IOM Examiner Leader.
6/6/80.

the Assessment Board corresponding to the local authority and the central government rates respectively. In addition the local authorities themselves are caught up in a complex system of reallocation of monies not collected by them. They are involved in a competition for rate support grants with which they are not equipped to cope. Staffing levels are very low in the vast majority of authorities and inevitably the larger authorities will win in this competitive process. The sheer number of authorities and the considerable variation in the services they provide can prove perplexing for the client. Standards vary considerably throughout the Island e.g. in Douglas collections of refuse are weekly whereas in some country districts collection is rather less frequent. This is the inevitable result of any unevenness of development anywhere, but in the IOM it is compounded by the inefficient nature of the local authorities involved.

This problem is related to the fact that the local government units are of such small size as to suffer from diseconomies of scale. The value of the essentially local outlook is lost when authorities have not the resources to cater for the needs of the area. As central government takes up the functions in default, the value of local representation is weakened. It is said that Michael parish district is the smallest local authority in Europe, having a population of only 437 people (in 1976). Its staff is part-time and shared with other authorities in the area. It employs no professional staff and services of a specialised nature are provided by the LGB. All twenty-six authorities have the same powers as Douglas Corporation but they often do not know this and have not the technical ability to employ them anyway. The small

size of the units makes it virtually impossible to obtain suitably qualified staff to carry out the increasingly complex tasks of modern administration. Authorities even share staff e.g. Patrick and German Commissioners share a clerk as do Andreas, Ballaugh and Jurby. The arguments for retaining these small authorities are the same as those in Britain in the nineteenth century where, as C.H.Wilson pointed out,

"it was anticipated by enthusiasts that the vital force would beat most strongly in the smallest 'cell' of democracy. But the small parish was powerless to support any important functions of government."¹

A further problem is that the larger local authorities (again in particular the Douglas Corporation) undertake services in their districts which are provided wholly or partly by government in other districts. In these instances the residents of the former districts are paying twice for such services, firstly by way of rates and secondly as taxpayers. Included in this category are environmental health, building bye-law inspections and other technical work and in Douglas, rodent disinfestation. It will be noted that in 1978/79, the Douglas Corporation received a 1 pence in the £ rate grant (£14,300) in respect of their environmental health services which cost approximately £50,000. Similarly, the Highway authorities (of which there are seven including the Highway and Transport Board) have claimed in the past that the exercise of these functions in their respective districts costs more than the 2 pence rate levied by the Government for highways administered by the Highway and Transport Board.

1. C.H. Wilson. "The Foundations of Local Government" in C.H. Wilson (ed) "Essays in Local Government" Basil Blackwell 1948. P.22.

There are several examples of local government providing services where central government pays and vice versa. The LCB provides a refuse disposal service throughout the Island for which local authorities contribute to the cost on a ration basis. An example of the reverse is that local authorities provide specific road improvement schemes which are paid for by specific grants from the LGB. Some see this situation of one authority performing a function and another 'picking up the bill' as intolerable and as an irresponsible expenditure of resources.¹

There have been calls for a total revaluation of properties in the Island. It is known that there are significant variations in some existing valuations for similar properties throughout the Island. There is a need for property valuations to correspond otherwise a basic unfairness is perpetuated. At present the rating assessments do not reflect the distances persons have to travel to centres of employment, shops etc. The Interim Report of the Select Committee on Rating of Domestic Property, November 1979, pointed out that

"inequalities in valuation have inevitably arisen in the piecemeal valuations carried out over nearly a century, such as the lower valuation applied to agricultural dwelling houses."

A problem which can be said to apply to the IOM as much as Britain is that the method of assessing rates is unfair in that it takes no account of ability to pay.³ Householders are assessed and not the individuals within them resulting, some argue, in

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1. "Local Government Finance" Talking about Tynwald. IOM Examiner 29/2/80.
 2. First Interim Report of the Select Committee on the Rating of Domestic Property. Printed (by authority) IOM Government Reprographic Department. November 1979.
 3. "Ability to Pay - New Rates Plan" The Manx National Party proposed a change to a local income tax in Feb. 1980. Also "Step towards de-rating". Talking about Tynwald. IOM Examiner. 17/10/80.

"a totally outdated and unfair system which all too often hurts the weakest and lowest paid of our community".¹

Finally a problem associated with the present rating system and to large extent the result of it is the size and complexity of the LGB. Its functions are numerous and very mixed. It has grown as the ability of the local authorities to perform their functions adequately has fallen. Its committee structure is complex in order to decentralise significant power in certain fields which are normally the responsibility of local authorities (e.g. the Fire Committee, Planning Committee and Housing Advisory Committee). The LGB is certainly large in comparison with most other Boards though both the Board of Social Security and Treasury are larger.

An important question is whether the multi-functional nature of the LGB has made it so large as to be unwieldy. Compared with local authorities in Britain the LGB is small but it does have a role different from these bodies. Grounds for redistribution of some of their functions to other Boards and (in the event of a reorganisation of local government) to local authorities are evident.

d) Reform Attempts

The tendency towards centralisation in Manx Government affairs can, on the evidence above, be said to be a result of small size, inertia and general inefficiency on the part of local authorities. Though attempts have been made to change this, as yet the system remains fundamentally unaltered.

1. Peter Craine MHK "Ability to Pay" Op Cit.

There has been a long series of unsuccessful attempts to reform Manx local government during the post-war period. There were four different reports, set up by the Manx government through ad hoc Tynwald Committees, recommending changes in the allocation of functions between 1949 and 1966. On each occasion recommendations for a reduction in the number of local authorities were rejected in Tynwald on the grounds that it was an erosion of local democracy.

The most concerted effort to date on the matter was the Committee on Rating and taxation which reported in 1967.¹ They concluded that:

"The present system of local government finance in the Island is highly defective and in urgent need of drastic reform. A complete breakdown has been prevented only by a series of expedients which have merely papered over the cracks without remedying the underlying defects. We are convinced that the time has come when radical change must be introduced without delay if local government in the Island is to survive, to be revitalised in terms of its democratic spirit, and to be transformed into an effective instrument₂ for providing a wide range of municipal services."

The Report recommended drastic reform of the local government system with the creation of a new single local authority and the consequent relinquishment of many functions from the central government level. Amendments to the system of assessing and collecting rates and the introduction of rate rebates were also proposed. The Committee considered very carefully, proposals for retention of the existing local government system, total centralisation, a two-tier system and either four or five district authorities but came to the conclusion that:

1. See Appendix 7.

2. "Report of the Commission on Rating and Taxation". Printed (by authority) Norris Modern Press 9/3/1957. para.203.

"none of them would provide an adequate solution to the problems facing the Island."¹

They claimed the change to a single local authority was

"perhaps the only solution which will provide the Island with a system of local government likely to endure for many decades."

Since then very few of their recommendations have been implemented.

Changes have been confined to the method of collecting rates - instalment payments, partial rating of properties vacant for more than six months etc. but twenty-six local authorities remain, a rate rebate scheme has not been introduced and few changes have been made in the assessment of rates. Local authority opposition to change was fierce. The Report commented on this saying:

"There is, no doubt, much complacency and resistance to new ideas among many of the witnesses with whom we discussed the problems involved in our inquiry. This did not surprise us. It is, indeed, a universally observed fact that the urge for local government reform invariably comes from above, never from the local authorities themselves."²

This resistance was encountered also in later attempts at reform - not least from rural MHK's who see change as either a loss of local autonomy or an increase in rates for their constituents (e.g. if rate equalisation proposals were to be implemented). A Private Members Bill introduced in the Legislative Council for the purpose of constituting an independent local government commission

"to do for the IOM what the Redcliffe-Maud and Wheatley Commissions had been asked to do for Britain."³

This was rejected in 1969. Just over two years later a LGB motion to replace the Island's twenty-six local authorities with five

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1. Ibid. Para. 155.
 2. Ibid. Para. 203.
 3. D.G. Kermode. Op Cit. P.137.

new authorities was decisively rejected by both branches of Tynwald, while an attempt in 1976 to have a commission of inquiry established was similarly rejected by both branches of Tynwald.

"In matters relating to local government, members of both chambers are clearly concerned lest they upset the local communities on whose support they depend or formerly depended for election."¹

Recently, new attempts at reform have been made with the establishment of the Select Committee on the Rating of Domestic Property in December 1978. Its First Interim Report in 1979 was a compromise view between members of the committee who favoured total abolition of domestic rates and those concerned to protect the interests of rural constituents. Newspaper comment suggested that the report was

"a bland compromise of extreme views"²

It recommended minor changes in the rating system e.g. removal of certain rating exemptions; a comprehensive revaluation and the abolition of the fire and highway rates. Its Chairman, Victor Kneale MLC, immediately tabled a motion recommending a straightforward abolition of domestic rates in his capacity not as Chairman of the Committee but as an individual member. Though Tynwald accepted the motion it then referred the matter back to the Committee. Hence action was again averted.

Meanwhile the furore in the local authorities was building up as they saw the move as a

"major erosion of their authority and probably the first step towards doing away with them altogether."³

They argued that small authorities preserved community spirit, that

1. Ibid. P.138.

2. "Steps towards de-rating" Tynwald Commentator.IOM Examiner 17/10/80.

3. "Authorities oppose rates abolition" IOM Examiner 18/7/80.

central financing would dispose of the incentive to keep spending down and that larger authorities would not necessarily mean greater efficiency.

As one senior civil servant explained,

"It is utopian to suggest radical change because of the political reaction. There is however an unquestionable need for local authority reform and the present trend of gradual attrition is useless and haphazard."

1. Interview with the author. 23/5/80.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter the object has been to provide a description of the various tiers and aspects of the Manx administrative system from the level of supra-national bodies to that of local government. In the discussion, problems, attempts to solve them and the implementation of the solutions have been described.

The system is the product of a gradual evolution over a period of centuries and no radical review has really been made of it. The process of change in the system has, however, quickened during the past twenty years and is still continuing. These changes have mainly been on the side of expansion though calls are beginning to be made for reductions in the staffing levels and committees.

The weaknesses of the Manx administrative system are arguable but can perhaps be summarised as follows. First, it is resistant to radical change which could be said to mean that it is stagnant and antiquated, though some may say it is stable and enduring.

Secondly, some would argue it is in need of better co-ordination but others say it is better to rely on the close and informal relationships in the small community. Thirdly, its size creates problems of its own in that it cannot cope with large research or specialist units (this will be further examined in Chapter 4) and it does not present itself to the outside world as a viable, national system of government.

Despite all these competing features the system has succeeded in its own terms as it has retained its precious stability. The reasons for its development are less easily ascertained and these will be

considered in the chapter on hybridity (Chapter 5). There it will be shown which features are closest to British local government and which to central government along with some analysis of why this is the case.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE PUBLIC SERVICE

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INTRODUCTION

This chapter is concerned with the public servants of the IOM. It will include reference to the characteristics of the public service; its career structure; pay and conditions of service; and the constraints on public servants for example, secrecy.

The term public service tends not to be in common use in the analysis of British public administration since it implies homogeneity throughout the administrative system. There, the almost discreet entities of the civil service, the local government service, the health service and other public sector organisations, are considered separately.¹ In the IOM the large proportion of government services and functions are combined at one level and in one organisation - the Manx Government and the functions are implemented through an integrated body of officials - the Civil Service. The term the 'public service' is hence a more appropriate term to use since the homogeneity it implies does in fact exist in Mann. Thus the focus will be primarily upon the personnel of the Manx Civil Service. This means the:

"persons appointed by the Civil Service Commission on behalf of the Government for wholetime service with any Department or any Board which service is wholly or mainly administrative, professional, technical or clerical"²

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1. Stanyer and Smith Op Cit. P.176.
 2. IOM Civil Service Regulations. Introduction.

It therefore includes the employees of the following Boards:

Agriculture and Fisheries	Highway and Transport
Airports	Local Government
Assessment	Museum
Civil Defence	Police
Education	Social Security
Electricity	Tourist
Forestry Mines and Lands	War Pensions
Harbour	Water and Gas
Health Services	

and Departments,

Government Office	Clerk to the Justices
Treasury	Income Tax
Industrial Office	Public Analyst
General Registry	Clerk of Tynwald
Attorney General	Probation and After Care
High Bailiff	Consumer Council

Thus bodies such as local authorities, certain of the commercial boards, the postal authority and private companies financed partly by Tynwald will not be considered in the main body of this chapter. They will, however, be discussed in a separate section at the end. The position of those in the direct employment of the Boards or government departments i.e manual workers and some professional employees such as teachers will also be explained. The information in this and the other early chapters will then provide the base for the analysis of the extent of hybridity of the Manx system in Chapter Five.

Size

In 1979 the IOM Civil Service employed 756 people in its administrative, technical and clerical grades as listed in the introduction to this chapter. This does not include the employees of specific Boards or other public servants, for example, medical staff, local government officers etc. It is constantly asserted that all efforts must be concentrated into containing the size of the Civil Service. This is the stated aim of both politicians and civil servants. The Civil Service Commission Annual Report for 1978 stated that

"before agreeing to any increase in staff, the Commission satisfies itself that the extra work generated by the adoption of new measures or by a growth in the duties of a Board or Department, is incapable of being absorbed by the existing staff."

Despite efforts in this direction spurred on by the desire to control public expenditure, the greater participation of government in the affairs of a growing community has exercised, and will continue to exercise, an influence on the numbers of officers employed.

The growth of the service since its inception on the 11th April, 1962 has indeed been considerable. From 419 listed in the establishment of the Civil Service in the 1963 Report of the Commission there has been a rise to the figure in 1979 of 756 - quite a considerable increase.

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1. Sixteenth Annual Report of the IOM Civil Service Commission for the year ended 31st December 1978.

Structure

The nature of the Service has also changed markedly since its unification in 1962 with the development of professionalism and the increasing specialisation of functions as the years have passed.

The members of the Service are divided into those employed in the 'General Service Classes', that is, administrative and clerical posts, and those in the 'Departmental Classes' with technical or specialist tasks to perform. Some examples of the latter are engineers, architects, veterinary officers and educational advisers. Though these are often senior positions, this is not exclusively the case and such positions as telephonists, a proof reader and store keepers are included amongst the Departmental Classes. They range throughout all Boards and Departments and all levels in the Service. Indeed the most senior generalist post in the Service, that of Government Secretary, is a Departmental Class post. This enables the salary constraints of the General Service Class posts to be avoided in the case of the most senior officers.

Grading in the General Service Classes is as follows:

- Principal
- Administrative Officer, Grade 1
- Administrative Officer, Grade 2
- Executive Officer, Grade 1
- Executive Officer, Grade 2
- Senior Personal Secretaries
- Female Officer, Grade 1
- Clerical Officer
- Personal Assistants
- Shorthand Typists
- Clerical Assistants
- Unestablished Officer

A restructuring of the salary scales relating to these posts has recently been agreed and the changes will eliminate overlapping

scales and the Female Officer, Grade 1 scale (which is a remnant from a former structure and of which there are only two individuals in the Service).

The Administrative Class, consisting of the Principal, Administrative Officer 1 and Administrative Officer 2 grades is seen as the elite of the Service. It is

"mainly responsible for advising Boards of Tynwald on policy, i.e. on problems which arise in deciding the general lines on which governmental decisions are to be taken; on new proposals which need to be put before Tynwald on how best to give effect to Tynwald's wishes. It is responsible also for dealing with difficulties which arise in carrying out existing policy and for forecasting the probable effects of new measures. In addition it has to assist Members of Tynwald in their parliamentary duties by the preparation of briefs and answers to parliamentary questions"¹

One person who is often, though not necessarily, a General Service Class Officer, is designated Chief Executive Officer for each Board or Department. He is also considered the Head of that Department. The Executive Class Officers have primarily supervisory functions and often head small sections and are the person to whom front-line administrators, the Clerical Officers and Clerical Assistants, are responsible.

Grading in the Departmental Classes is much less structured, each Board having different requirements and wishing to remunerate staff in accordance with their qualifications, experience and responsibilities. Thus there is not necessarily any similarity between, for example the engineers in the Water and Gas Authority and those in the Harbour Board.

1. IOM Civil Service Regulations.

Certain individual officers at the very most senior levels have similarities with officers in central and local government in Britain. The Government Treasurer, for example, is similar in function, status and pay to the local government Treasurers from whose ranks he is usually recruited. Similarly the Government Secretary as Head of the paid Civil Service and with important influence on senior appointments is in a position comparable with that of the Head of the Civil Service in Britain. Since the Government Secretary is not the major legal advisor nor head of a corporate planning team he cannot reasonably be compared with either the old-style local authority town clerk or the newer chief executive role.

These posts exist outside the normal grading structure partly in order to free them from the salary restraints of the grades and partly in order to attribute status commensurate with the responsibilities of the positions.

The body centrally responsible for the operation of the public service and the general personnel activities is the IOM Civil Service Commission (CSC). This was constituted by the IOM Civil Service Act 1962 which also unified the Civil Service. The Act authorises the Civil Service Commission to make appointments, transfers and promotions in consultation with the Boards and Departments concerned. The CSC consists of a Chairman who is a Member of Tynwald and elected by Tynwald; two members of Tynwald, elected by Tynwald; one person appointed by the Governor; and the Government Secretary.

The duties of the Commission are recruitment, training, the setting of establishment levels, consultation with Boards and with the Governor on personnel matters and anything else which Tynwald may direct. The Commission employs a secretariat of seven people including two Organisations and Methods Officers and persons responsible for pensions administration.

People in the Service

The sex distribution in the various grades of the Service is seen in the table below (as at January, 1981).

	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>
Principal	7	0
Administrative Officer 1	9	0
Administrative Officer 2	18	0
Executive Officer 1	37	5
Executive Officer 2	60	12
Senior Personal Secretaries	0	5
Female Officer, 1	0	2
Clerical Officer	88	108
Personal Assistant	0	6
Shorthand Typist	0	50
Clerical Assistant	11	40
Unestablished Officer	1	4
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	231	232

The upper tiers of the Service are, therefore dominated by males and the lower tiers fairly evenly divided with traditional women's jobs such as shorthand/typist posts being solely filled by women. There are at present no women in post above Executive Officer level in the General Service Classes and in the Departmental Classes none of the senior posts is held by a woman. Since the Administrative Class is entirely male and given the definition of the functions of the Administrative Class described above, it follows that there are no female officers influencing policy in the Manx central government machinery.

A second, and probably more important division is between the professional and technical personnel of the service. Professional individuals (rather than groups of people in the same profession) are now becoming increasingly evident in the Service and are playing an increasingly important part in its operation. The extent to which professionalism exists has grown and there are now members of the Departmental Classes in virtually every department. Their numbers vary from Board to Board e.g. the Board of Social Security (BOSS) which has functions in social work, employs no qualified social workers and has only one member of the Departmental Classes, a recently appointed 'Training Officer'. In the Airports Board on the other hand there are forty-nine members of the Departmental Classes ranging from Air Traffic Controllers to Weather Forecasters. The differences in the extent of professionalism in Boards is due not only to the degree of technicality of the services provided but to the perception the Department has of its work, the prestige of the relevant professions and the extent to which pressure is applied for qualified staff to be appointed. In the BOSS for example one senior civil servant said that their

"social workers wouldn't do a better job than they do now just because they were trained"¹

At the other end of the scale there are some Departments where the Chief Executive Officer and therefore Head of Department has been the most senior Departmental Class officer e.g. the Director of the Airports Board, the Water Engineer at the Water and Gas Authority etc. It is still, however, the usual practice to designate the

1. Interview with senior civil servant 27th May 1980.

most senior General Service Class officer as the Chief Executive Officer and this is usually the Board Secretary. He is then advised by and works in partnership with specialists who are often more highly paid than he is.

The generalist domination seen in the British Civil Service is reflected here, therefore, though the backgrounds and education of the generalists is markedly different. The Public School, Oxbridge classics or history degree backgrounds of the British stereo-type, challengeable though this may be, is in stark contrast to the educational backgrounds of Manx civil servants. Of the seventeen Administrative Class Officers questioned¹, three had no qualifications whatsoever, eight had GCE 'O' Levels in five or more subjects, one had a degree and four had completed some form of professional qualification. They had usually entered the service young and often straight from school. The average age of entry to the General Service Classes of the seventeen respondents was twenty years old. This figure is slightly higher than would be expected as it includes some who entered in the Departmental Classes and had transferred to the General Service later in their careers. The Administrative Class personnel have usually been born in the Island (fourteen out of the seventeen in the sample had been) and have usually lived there most of their lives perhaps with a short period of national service being their only time away.

Senior Departmental Class officers on the other hand show much more variable characteristics. Some respondents had transferred

1. In a questionnaire sent by the author to 50 senior civil servants in both General Service and Departmental Classes.

to the Departmental Classes from the General Service sector as a result of promotion to very senior generalist posts such as Director of Tourism. Excluding these twenty-eight senior Departmental Class officers were questioned. Their qualifications were as follows:

Degree plus professional qualifications	8
Degree	3
GCEs plus professional qualifications	10
GCE 'O' Levels only	2
No qualifications	1

Departmental Class personnel generally entered the service older (on average thirty-one years of age) after either some years in full-time education or in employment in the UK or both.

Though some Departmental Class officers were born in the Island, the majority are recruited from outside (nineteen out of twenty-eight questioned).

The difference between the backgrounds and education of General Service and Departmental Class officers appears not to have caused severe problems to the Service in terms of inter-personal relations. There are enough exceptions to the general pattern, e.g. transfer cases, for there to be an understanding of the role of each group.

THE CIVIL SERVICE AS A CAREER

The factors acting as an incentive for people to join the Civil Service are variable according to personality and the aims of taking up such employment. It provides a stable and well-remunerated working environment and compared with other fields of employment in the IOM, it provides a relatively well-developed career structure with opportunities, though restricted, for advancement.¹ The Civil Service provides these incentives to all recruits but to the Departmental Classes there are further attractions. A professional officer working, for example, in local government in the UK may be attracted to the IOM for its low taxation and pleasant social and physical environment and to the IOM Civil Service for the chance to make an impression on a small organisation. They are likely, in other words, to be big fish in a small pond. Other employees have a simple desire to remain in or return to the Island as their home and are prepared to accept the reduced career opportunities this may imply.

It is asserted that the attractions for women are somewhat different, which perhaps explains their different treatment for promotion purposes. The majority of them, it is argued,

"are not looking for a career but for a means to supplement their husband's earnings."²

If this is the case it may explain their absence from the senior grades as they do not see their employment as a career. This has not been proved, however, and indeed no work has been done to

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1. Interviews with 15 senior civil servants between January and October 1980.
 2. Interview with senior civil servant. 8th April 1980.

ascertain the motives of either sex in taking up employment in the service.

Work on the employment of women in the British Civil Service shows a similarly low level of promotion though efforts are being slowly made to develop the potential of women employees to the full. This work does show, however, that married women's perceptions of their role at work balanced with their role at home creates considerable pressures not faced by married men or single men and women. It is impossible to prove either in the British or the Manx Civil Service whether the relative absence of women in the senior grades is due to the smaller number of women applicants but it is very evident that neither service is making the optimal use of the talents and services of their women members.¹

The climate in which the individual civil servant works varies from Department to Department according to the size, leadership, degree of professionalism and nature of the work being performed. Each Department appears to develop a personality and since the Boards are still relatively autonomous, these characteristics are perpetuated e.g. the BOSS has a reputation as an unpleasant place to work being housed in cramped offices, requiring work with unpleasant aspects of government duties e.g. sickness and invalidity benefits, being restrained by rules and the requirement to treat

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1. (a) M. Foggarty, A.J. Allen, Isobel Allen and Patricia Walters "Women in Top Jobs: Four Studies in Achievement" Part II - Women in the Administrative Class in the Civil Service. Heinemann Educational Books. London 1981.
 - (b) See also Elizabeth Brimelow - "Women in the Civil Service". Public Administration. Autumn 1981. Vol. 59. P.313.

members of the public equally under often difficult circumstances. The Department has, as a result, an austere and restrained atmosphere. The Treasury, on the other hand gives the impression of being dynamic with the rapid development of computer usage, large numbers of professional personnel and an aura of being central to the decision-making process.

RECRUITMENT

Recruitment to the General Service Classes is to the Clerical grades only. No provision is made for entry to the higher classes irrespective of the qualifications of the candidate. For appointment to an Established post a male or female candidate must

- "(a) be between 16 and 29 years of age (both ages inclusive) on the day of appointment;
- (b) have passed the GCE examination in English Language and four other acceptable subjects at the 'O' (or 'A') level in not more than two examinations.
- (c) be a natural born or naturalised British subject;
- (d) must pass a medical examination."¹

There is an additional requirement for recruits to be either in possession of a work permit or to be exempt from needing one in accordance with the Control of Employment Acts.

The requirement to be under twenty-nine causes problems for those who leave the service and wish to return after the age of twenty-nine. The rule, strictly applied, means they may only be recruited into the Clerical Assistant Class from which they may not then be promoted. It was argued that this discriminated against women who left the service to have a family and wished to return at the same grade and continue their careers. The regulations have been recently amended to permit this at the Commission's direction:

"Provided that the age limit of 29 years shall not apply to a former female officer who voluntarily resigned from the service for family or domestic reasons acceptable to the Civil Service Commission."²

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1. IOM Civil Service Regulations. Section B1.
 2. IOM Civil Service Regulations Amendment to S.B1.

The qualifications for entry to the Clerical Assistant Class are to be between 16 and 59 years of age plus GCE 'O' (or 'A') level in English Language. For Unestablished Officers no qualifications are required. These people have no real security in the organisation and are often taken on for temporary work. Some, however, join as an Unestablished Officer and progress by examination into the Established grades.

The policy of recruiting only to the clerical grades prevents older and better qualified candidates from applying. Thus the inability to enter at more senior levels deters graduates from entering at all since they feel their education to have been wasted. They could in fact have achieved more rapid promotion by joining at 16 years of age with 5 'O' level passes. The rationale behind the policy is to protect the promotion prospects of the staff recruited straight from school and to ensure that there is an incentive for those people to join. In addition, over-qualification for posts is undesirable and can lead to discontent: graduates employed on work which makes insufficient demands on them and gives no prospect for rapid advancement may soon look for employment elsewhere. In a small service with only 435 General Service Class posts, it is generally felt that the organisation cannot 'carry' graduates in senior grades. In fact, senior officers are often worried at being challenged by young graduates for promotion.

Recruitment to the Departmental Classes is by public advertisement to specific posts. Those appointed can only serve in one Board or Department and cannot move within the Service unless they

transfer to the General Service Classes. Where transfers do occur, decisions are made as to their allowability on a purely ad hoc basis and no conditions govern the moves. By advertising in the UK the Commission has generally found no problem in recruiting to its Departmental Class posts.

"No problems arose in the appointment of professional and technical officers, indeed the response to advertisements has been greater than in recent years which has resulted in the exercise of a wider choice."¹

The recruitment of staff to the Departmental Classes from outside the Island has unpopular political connotations but the qualifications and training of those available for work in the IOM is not adequate to meet the increasingly complex needs of government.

The CSC has responsibility for all recruitment of civil servants whether clerical or professional though the Boards and Departments advise the Commission of their requirements in some detail. A Recruitment Sub-Committee consisting of the Chairman; the person appointed by the Governor and the Government Secretary, is responsible for interviewing and (subject to confirmation by the Commission) approving appointments to minor clerical, secretarial and technical posts. Other staff who are not members of the Civil Service are recruited by the Boards or Departments in question though with written permission from the Commission.

The trends in recruitment over the years since the creation of the CSC have varied according to the economic fortunes of the Island. In the early 1960's some difficulties were experienced in recruiting young people to the basic grades as the opportunities for further education in the UK grew and as the diversification of the

1. Sixteenth Annual Report of the IOM Civil Service Commission for the year ended 31 December 1978.

Manx economy provided opportunities for jobs in other fields. Later in the 60's these difficulties were mainly confined to problems in recruiting qualified shorthand typists. Today there are always fewer vacancies than there are qualified applicants in all types of post.

The recruitment policies of the Manx Civil Service are based upon the necessity to ensure that Boards and Departments are adequately staffed in numbers and in grades. They try also to ensure that the opportunities for promotion in the service are not so bleak as to deter applicants. They are therefore practical and pragmatic policies. In the early 60's when there were problems in recruitment, consideration was given to lowering the qualifications needed to apply and in 1971 a restructuring of the basic grades was made to ensure that shorthand typists could be recruited without their having to be qualified for the clerical classes, and to in addition ensure that

"men and women who possess the same academic standards and who are employed in the same kind of work should enjoy the same rates of pay and the same opportunities for promotion"¹

There is in theory a policy of non-discrimination in recruitment between male and female candidates although in practice it is rare for males to be recruited to shorthand typist posts or for females to be recruited to technical posts. All such sex differences are a result as much of women's perceptions of their role in society as of the Commission's recruitment policies.

1. Ninth Annual Report of the IOM CSC for the year ended 31st December 1971. Para. 4.

TRAINING

The history of training in the Manx Civil Service is simple to relate as it is and has always been minimal. Naturally, some members of the Departmental Classes are professionally trained but the vast majority acquired their qualifications prior to entry. The main procedure is for a new recruit or individual transferred to a new post, to receive 'on the job' training or 'sitting next to Nellie' and its advocates believe that the only way to learn how to do civil service work is by doing it. This is also, to a large extent, the pattern in both British central and local government. In the IOM it is still unquestioned as an efficient means of imparting the skills and information appropriate to the post. It is also an efficient way of socialising the individual into the behaviour expected of a civil servant.

There was some training activity during the mid-60's but since then even that has been discontinued. The first training through the CSC was in 1966 when courses were arranged in conjunction with UK professional bodies to run at the IOM College of Further Education leading to an ONC in engineering. This has continued virtually unbroken since that date. In 1967 mention was made in the CSC's report that

"Through interviewing applicants the Commission is conscious that young people generally have only slight knowledge of the Island's system of Government and how it operates, and that information on the subject is not imparted through the educational system."

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1. Fourth Annual Report of the IOM Civil Service Commission for the year ended 31st December 1967. Para. 3.

That year the Organisation and Methods Officer employed by the CSC was designated the Civil Service Training Officer with a view to organising suitable courses for new recruits and more senior officers. As a result, three-day induction courses for newly recruited staff were begun and were continued in the following two years. They were

"directed towards explaining the constitution of the IOM, the function of Government as a whole and the responsibilities of the various Boards and Departments and the role of the Civil Service."¹

These courses were

"deemed to serve a useful purpose and to show promise for development in the future."²

Since 1969, however, no induction courses have been held and courses have not been introduced for more senior officers. A pilot scheme was discussed for decision-making courses for Executive Officers but these never came to fruition.

The present position is that officers can go to the UK on short courses e.g. for architectural technicians, Organisations and Methods Officers, superannuation administrators etc. In addition special leave can be granted for revision before examinations and grants and subsistence can be provided for certain approved courses. The onus is, however, very much upon the individual officer to request leave of absence, day release etc. for study. This is especially the case in the General Service Classes. Two General Service Class Officers have now gained permission to

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1. Fifth Annual Report of the IOM CSC for the year ended 31st December 1968 Para.8.
 2. Fourth Annual Report. 1967.

take block release for study in the UK. These were for courses leading to the qualifications of the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators.

In the lower General Service grades there exist several qualifying examinations for progression on a scale, for transfer from Unestablished to Established posts and for progression from Clerical Assistant to Clerical Officer classes. These consist of a written examination set by the UK Civil Service Commission and an interview with the IOM CSC. This gives opportunities for those entering without any qualifications to progress through the ranks. Clerical Officers must pass the Executive Officers examination in order to become eligible for the Executive Class. This examination is also in two parts as for the qualifying examinations in the lower grades. Certain qualifications are regarded as the equivalent to this and therefore their holders are exempt:

- Association of Chartered Accountants
- Corporation of Secretaries
- Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators
- Institute of Chartered Accountants
- Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants
- Degree of a British University
- Diploma in Public Administration of a British University or University College
- Institute of Travel Agents

The numbers of officers taking the Executive Officer examination each year averages at approximately thirty-one with roughly even numbers of male and female candidates. The following table shows pass rates. The pass mark was raised from 50% to 55% prior to the 1976 examination which may partly account for the reduced numbers of successful candidates. Officers may resit the examination twice provided they obtain at least 40%.

Executive Class Examination

Year	Male candidates	Female candidates	Total candidates	Male passes	Female passes	Total passes
1969	26	4	30	13	3	16
1970	28	2	30	15	2	17
1971	20	4	24	11	2	13
1972	17	8	25	10	1	11
1973	18	11	29	13	4	17
1974	21	23	44	8	9	17
1975	19	16	35	13	9	22
1976	16	14	30	1	4	5
1977	17	16	33	5	3	8
1978	16	16	32	1	2	3
TOTAL	198	114	312	90	39	130
Average per year	19.8	11.4	31.2	9.0	3.9	13.0

Source: IOM CSC Annual Reports 1963-1978.

The qualifying examination has changed (in 1980) to a test of psychological aptitude and capability.

As yet the CSC has not seen its role as being very much to do with training and has seen fit to place other items higher on their priority list. This is despite their claim that

"The Commission is satisfied that their policy in encouraging civil servants to improve their educational and professional qualifications brings benefit not only to the individual concerned but to the service as a whole."¹

With the present small staff of seven the Commission would have difficulty in expanding this activity without an increase in their own establishment. Hence the onus remains very much upon the individual to campaign for the opportunity to study for further

1. Seventeenth Annual Report of the IOM CSC for the year ended 31st December 1979.

examinations and indeed for their recognition within the service.

The feeling amongst politicians and civil servants on the question of training is that at present it is generally inadequate and further attention should be paid to teaching basic accounting language and procedure in the lower grades and an awareness of management practices in the senior grades. One civil servant argued that seminars attended by middle and senior level officials would help morale and boost the officers' sense of identity with the organisation. Most do not feel that there should be a bias towards the study of the Manx system of government since

"clerical work is the same the world over and everyone in the IOM is so near the seat of Government that they¹ know what is going on far more than in a big country."

There is a general feeling, however that training is of importance and that higher standards of education help to broaden minds and develop better understanding of the system's ramifications.

The present widely prevalent method of 'desk training' could be improved with a wider use of full job descriptions explaining the responsibilities commensurate with the post. This, combined with an appreciation of the value of high educational standards and due regard for reaching those standards, would make the Civil Service both more attractive to well-qualified people and a more efficient organisation in itself. In the present economic climate Manx graduates are often forced to accept low grade posts whether or not they return to their home. They may therefore be more willing to return, as they have little to lose, in terms of career prospects by doing so.

1. Mr. Kewley. Isle of Man Government Officers Association.

On the other hand a small organisation such as this has not the capacity to facilitate the absence from work of too many staff at one time and feels also that it cannot 'carry' graduates with no work experience in senior positions. A compromise must be achieved to a problem which has faced many of the smaller local authorities in Britain for many years. Without the professional impetus for change, any development is likely to be slow and piecemeal. A reflection of the inadequacy of the present system is the fact that the CSC holds no complete record of the qualifications held by its staff. Presumably it cannot, therefore, fully utilise their capabilities nor build upon them for future training.

PROMOTION

"Nothing makes for staff unhappiness more than incompetence and unfairness in making promotions".¹

In addition to this equity aspect, an organisation should try to ensure that the most appropriate personnel are appointed to each level and this is in accord with the aims of the CSC to ensure that Boards and Departments are adequately staffed in numbers and in grades.

The basic criteria for promotion in the Manx Civil Service are said to be 'efficiency with seniority'. In an attempt to assess the first of these elements, the CSC on its creation, instigated a system of Annual Reports. These were to be called for from all Secretaries of Boards on all officers in the Civil Service under their authority. These were to be written on a prescribed form by officers immediately superior to those with whom the report was concerned. Any adverse report was to be communicated to the person concerned who would have an opportunity to comment upon it. The reports would be used in connection with promotion interviews along with a list of officers whom Secretaries of Boards and other Heads of Department recommended for early promotion.

The annual report system provides the only opportunity for review of performance which is in any way formalised. It is heavily reliant upon personal and subjective views though this may be unavoidable whatever the criteria for promotion used.

1. K.P. Poole "The Local Government Service in England and Wales". New Local Government Series. Allen and Unwin. 1978. P.61.

The reports are not the only factor in the promotion 'game', however, and seniority does have a part to play. Credit is given to those who have many years service and obvious staying power. Young, disillusioned cynics in the Service often suggest that promotion is a reward for waiting for your turn in the queue and many keep their own records of the staff they know on the same level and their years of service and then predict the outcome of particular interviews. They are often successful in their predictions. This is perhaps particularly true of the promotion from Clerical to Executive Classes. Here the average time an ambitious Clerical Officer can expect to wait for an EO 2 post is approximately nine years. After this grade the length of stay in a particular grade shortens and promotion can come in just two or three years. The same criteria for promotion are employed in these senior grades though since these officers are better known to the Service, personality may become a more significant factor.

The degree of importance attached to seniority is almost impossible to assess. Some argue that it only becomes important when all other factors are equal, and others deny that it has anything like this degree of importance. The status accruing from long service is considered appropriate by many and in a good officer it will have led to a better understanding of the system itself.

A more sensitive suggestion is that criteria such as merit and seniority may take second place to personal relationships and family ties. As Poole says:

"Equity in promoting staff is difficult to achieve: those whose work brings them into contact with, and are attentive to, influential members and senior officers may find themselves at an advantage by comparison with colleagues who are reticent or whose work does not bring them into prominence."¹

In addition to prominence at work, there is the factor, exacerbated by the intimacy of small communities, of personal and family relationships outside the organisation. Should the parents of a candidate be recognised as well-known 'pillars of the community' that candidate's acceptability to a panel may be increased. Family background can also work to a candidate's disadvantage. Allegations still occur that candidates from certain areas of Douglas are discriminated against whilst others with more salubrious addresses are more keenly favoured. In a small community, particularistic norms are more likely to prevail than in a large one where ignorance of the family backgrounds of candidates for promotion protects against bias. Obviously, the comment 'it's not what you know but who you know' is not irrelevant in the British context but its comparative importance in Mann is inevitably greater due to isolation and smallness. This must apply also to the politicians' choices in promotion in the civil service. The extent to which this is akin to the pattern in, for example, Italy where politicians seek to build up support in the bureaucracy by appointing persons sharing their political beliefs or likely to work toward them, is very uncertain. Since the party system is undeveloped in the Island, and politics works on an issue by issue basis, it is difficult to predict the view of either politician or bureaucrat. Hence, it is more likely that

1. K.P. Poole Op Cit. P.61.

politicians on the committee will promote those fitting closest to their stereotype of a good senior civil servant, rather than those with specific political views. In making these points on the criteria of promotion it may seem to be implied that merit and ability is not the primary one. It may partly be the case that the 'Peter Principle', to do with the promotion of an individual to the level of his own incompetence has a part to play here.¹

Having considered the criteria for promotions we should look next at the actual process by which promotion procedure is conducted. The process is centralised in the Civil Service Commission for a very large proportion of the promotion decisions in the Service. The Commission has complete responsibility for first appointments but the appropriate Board or Department is invited to send a representative or information as to their requirements. In the case of Departmental Class promotions the relevant Board has slightly more autonomy, particularly at the highest levels where professional competence must be assessed.

There is some question over the process of promotion by interview at the CSC. Some argue that the latter is acquiring too much power on these lines and that Boards should retain effective responsibility for their own staff appointments.² This may, of course be prompted by feelings of departmental loyalty. On the other hand the obvious importance of ensuring that a Board can assess the candidates' suitability must not be undermined. The centralisation of promotions provides uniformity and protects

1. L.J. Peter and R.Hull "The Peter Principle" Souvenir Press. 1969.

2. A view expressed by, amongst others, former MHK Peter Craine.

against unfair or unequal treatment by different Boards but it must be balanced with a Board's desire to meet its own needs. The Commission's consciousness of the doubt surrounding their role is perhaps reflected in their frequent acknowledgement of the co-operation of the Boards who still see the personnel function as their own responsibility.

The characteristics of the Service which result from the promotions policy can be said to be the following. The senior grades are dominated by reliable steady males who have completed lengthy service without causing embarrassment or concern to the organisation and who generally have middle-class backgrounds and no record of political or 'unacceptable' personal behaviour.

The total absence of women in the senior grades could be due to many reasons such as their unwillingness to apply for the posts, their unsuitability for them in particular cases, or their shorter service due to breaks during the child-bearing years. This relates also, however, to the policy of not promoting persons who entered or re-entered the service after the age of twenty-nine. This inevitably affects women who leave to have children and may not return until their early thirties. It does not, however explain why from a picture of Clerical Officer posts divided into 88 held by men and 108 held by women there is such a dramatic change to one of 60 men to 12 women at the next more senior grade. Nor does it explain the absence of women in the Administrative Class. This is obviously more to do with attitudes of both men and women in the Service to women's role at work, in the family and in society. The intricacies of this issue could, however,

constitute a whole book and it is, perhaps, best to leave it here.

Finally, the point must be made that movement does not only take place from one grade to another higher one but also on the same level. This sideways transfer is not discouraged in the Service and the Commission tries to consider the wishes of individuals who indicate a desire to serve on the staff of a particular Board or Department. Despite accusations that this is simply a means of avoiding the more tedious aspects of government work, it does provide opportunities for variety for the staff involved. Thus by ensuring that the staff are in jobs to which they are well suited, greater efficiency may be attained.

On the whole the method of promoting staff within the IOM Civil Service is considered a satisfactory one by the members of the organisation. Many are convinced that the system of annual reports ensures that merit is the most important criterion for advancement. Professional administration qualifications may come to play a more important part in this process as time goes by but as pointed out in the section on training the initiation to do this remains in the hands of the officers concerned.

PAY AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

The system of negotiation of pay and conditions of service in the IOM aims to achieve harmony through the Whitley process - centralised collective bargaining between representatives of employers and employees. The 'Official' or Employers Side of the IOM Whitley Council for the Public Services is made up of

- 1) A Chairman being a Member of Tynwald, appointed by the Governor
- 2) One MLC elected by Tynwald
- 3) Three MHK's elected by Tynwald
- 4) Two members without voting power: The Government Secretary and the Government Treasurer.

The Chairman and Secretary of the Official Side of the Whitley Council are common with those of the CSC with whom there is much overlap of functions.

The 'Staff' or Employees Side of the Whitley Council is entirely nominated by the IOM Government Officers Association (IOMGOA) which is the sole union for non-industrial civil servants and the Chairman and three Vice-Chairman always sit at Whitley Council meetings. In addition IOMGOA appoints two further members from its Executive according to the nature of the work in hand. The Whitley Council deals with all matters concerning pay and conditions in existing posts and the regrading of posts.

The IOMGOA was formed, under a different name, in 1920 and has remained in existence in some form till today. It is the recognised trade union for all members of the Civil Service in both General Service and Departmental Classes. It has a broad

Executive of seventeen members drawn from its total membership of approximately 600 people. It is the only recognised negotiating union for the members of the Civil Service though some professional employees retain links with their appropriate unions and professional bodies in the UK.

The IOMGOA is not affiliated to any particular union in the UK but maintains connections with many. There is no formal statement of IOMGOA's policy but it is broadly to achieve and maintain equivalent pay and conditions with British civil servants.

Hence, the substance of pay and conditions is largely the same as in the British Civil Service. For example, pension arrangements are exactly equivalent.

There must, however, be a conscious decision to implement UK agreements e.g. on pay increases and this is not a foregone conclusion. In practice, however, the Whitley Council always agrees to increases in pay and have never seen fit to set higher or lower pay increases. They prefer to follow the lead taken by the UK.

This linkage to British practices is embodied in terms of pay in the system of analogues tying IOM Civil Service grades to equivalent posts in Britain for pay purposes.

"The Official and Staff Sides of the Whitley Council have agreed in principle the desirability of equating posts in the IOM Civil Service with posts of comparable responsibility and scope in the UK."

1. IOM Civil Service Regulations. Part 9.

Joint National Council for the Administrative, Professional, Technical and Clerical grades are adopted. Similarly in the case of persons employed outside the Civil Service or local government in Britain e.g. Air Traffic Controllers, the Whitley Council adopts the scales used by the appropriate negotiating body e.g. in that case the Civil Aviation Authority. Again these are negotiable and the point on the scale or scales depends on the responsibilities of the post. In general, though, they are adopted without much question.

In the case of new posts the CSC decides upon the appropriate grades and analogue for the position and need not consult with the Whitley Council or the IOMGOA who are concerned only with existing posts and existing personnel respectively.

The Whitley Council also has a role in the amendment of the Civil Service Regulations. These are only changed in accordance with agreements reached in Whitley Council. The Civil Service Regulations were consolidated in 1968 from a mass of circulars relating to the structure and conditions operating in the Civil Service. They apply only to members of the Civil Service itself and not to any staff employed by the Boards themselves or any other public servants. They cover such matters as the structure of the Civil Service and the functions of the grades; recruitment; training; behaviour of civil servants; negotiation of pay and conditions etc.

The negotiations between the two sides of the Whitley Council aim to ensure that these items are broadly acceptable to the employees of the organisation and to incorporate suggestions for modification from either side. There are also occasional general discussions between the IOMGOA and the CSC e.g. in 1973

"A very useful meeting was held with Staff Side representatives at which was discussed such matters as promotion prospects, in service training, recruitment, circularisation of vacancies, appointments to vacant posts and early retirement."¹

In conclusion, it can be said that the system of negotiating pay and conditions of service is fairly simple and straightforward and this is reflected in the speed of decision-making. This is of course aided by the wholesale adoption of British salary levels, a considerably simpler exercise than the negotiation of entirely separate scales.

1. Eleventh Annual Report of the IOM CSC for the year ended 31st December 1973 Para. 9.

CONSTRAINTS ON CIVIL SERVANTS

There are certain constraints acting upon civil servants in both their public and private lives as a result of employment in the government Service. There are three aspects to this, the first being that civil servants are required to sign a declaration to abide by the Official Secrets Acts.¹ The effect of this is that all information learned by civil servants in the course of their jobs cannot be discussed in any circumstance outside their job. This is exactly the position obtaining in the British Civil Service and indeed it is the British Official Secrets legislation which applies to the IOM since it is a matter which is considered to 'transcend the frontiers of the IOM'.

The impacts of secrecy are manifold including having implications for the anonymity of the Service. Many civil servants are unlikely to be accused in the press of particular actions since anonymity is preserved to some extent by secrecy but if any criticism is made, a civil servant is unable by the same token to defend his or her actions.

A second aspect of the constraints imposed on civil servants is embodied in the Civil Service Regulations. This is the requirement to be of general good behaviour in both public and private life.² In addition there are strict rules concerning interests in contracts with Government Departments and taking up part-time employment or other profitable ventures.

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1. Appendix 8 for both the declaration and the relevant section of the Official Secrets Acts 1911 and 1920.
 2. See Appendix 9.

A further constraint also imposed by the Civil Service Regulations is that upon political activity.¹ Civil servants may take part only in local and not national political activity and may not therefore, be involved in or stand for elections to the House of Keys but only for local commissioners.

The constraints are therefore quite considerable and the disciplinary action open to the authorities is likewise severe. The official position with relation to discipline is laid down in the rules of the CSC as follows:

"Any action requiring in the opinion of the Board or Officer in charge of the Department stronger disciplinary action than reprimand, shall be reported to the Commission who shall take such action as they deem necessary."²

The Commission's scope for action is broad and includes the following:

- (a) Interviewing officers after an unsatisfactory annual report in order to request better performance in the future,
- (b) forfeiture of an increment,
- (c) reverting an officer to a lower grade on grounds of inefficiency,
- (d) suspension whilst accused of a criminal charge,
- (e) dismissal for conviction of criminal charges whether connected or unconnected with work for the Service,
- (f) non-continuance of probationary posts,
- (g) 'premature retirement in the public interest'.

1. For details see Appendix 10.

2. First Annual Report of the IOM CSC for the year ended 31st December 1963.

Examples of all these types of disciplinary action have been reported (without names) in the Commission's Annual Reports but they are, on the whole, isolated cases. The Reports do, however show that the Commission has the power (and uses it) to dismiss or take similar action where it considers this to be appropriate.

OTHER ORGANISATIONS

There are approximately 4,000 public servants in the IOM the vast majority of whom agree to pay and conditions obtaining in their equivalent organisations in the UK. This is the case, for example, with police officers, firemen, nurses and many more.

There are slight variations in the methods of negotiation within the Island depending upon their degree of autonomy from government, the history of the service and the degree of unionisation amongst the employees.

Some organisations such as the local authorities come under the aegis of the Whitley Council for purposes of pay and conditions. In the larger local authorities employees can be members of the National and Local Government Officers Association (NALGO) since this union negotiates on behalf of their equivalents in the UK. Once again rates of pay are linked, therefore, to UK scales. Similarly many hospital workers in the Island are members of the Confederation of Health Service Employees (COHSE) which is one of the fastest growing unions in the Island.

In the case of the commercial Boards, the Whitley Council also operates and maintains links with the appropriate UK unions. Some Boards have very low unionisation levels and pay and conditions of service have not generally required a complex structure or lengthy processes of negotiation.

Public organisations often benefit very much from UK links and a particularly obvious example of this is the IOM Postal Authority. The majority of post office workers are members of the Transport

and General Workers Union (TGWU) which is probably the most active of Manx unions, with the possible exception of the Manx National Farmers Union which has more the characteristics of an employers' association. The postal authority rarely suffers industrial action since its employees accept agreements made in England and they are implemented without disruption.

The major benefit of links to the UK machinery is that strike action is greatly reduced since many employees are prepared to wait for and accept agreements made in the UK. The IOM had, therefore, until very recently, a remarkably low strike record and even in recent years, activity has been relatively rare.

A response to the recent increase in union activity has been the creation of a Committee of the Board of Social Security to concern itself with matters of industrial relations. They have duties such as recognising trade disputes (in both public and private organisations) and appointing an arbitrator in the case of severe disputes.

The IOM National Transport dispute of 1980 displayed many of the features of the negotiating system and highlighted the problems with it. The low level of union activity has left the authorities unprepared when disputes do occur. Disruption to public services as witnessed in the National Transport dispute may in future result in the development of more complex negotiating machinery.

CONCLUSION

There are two major points which emerge from this chapter which help to explain the whole process of negotiation and indeed the substance of pay and conditions both within and outside the Civil Service in the IOM. The first is that there is a very low level of interest and activity with relation to all these matters. Thus union membership is low outside the Civil Service and the majority of employees are prepared to accept the pay and conditions negotiated in the UK on their behalf. This is associated in the Civil Service case with the idea that the British Civil Service is 'the best in the world' and therefore imitation will ensure the best for Mann too.

This leads generally to an unquestioning attitude and explains why possible anomalies such as whether grades in the UK are equivalent in terms of responsibilities and duties, are not investigated. Another example is the matter of secrecy. Certainly the more 'successful' civil servants accept the Official Secrets requirements as almost second nature. They do not see them as a constraint upon their work or upon their lives.

There is one aspect of personnel policy which is not a result of this imitation of the UK and that is the particularism of recruitment and promotion policy. This is far more to do with the influence of smallness as discussed in Chapter 2.

Second, both of the above features; unquestioning imitation of British practice and unquestioning reliance on particularism, are a result of a low level of education in politics, public

administration and the social sciences generally and the particular absence of any study of the Manx system of Government in the light of those disciplines. It could be suggested that this is a deliberate policy which prevents the questioning of decisions since a lack of understanding makes criticism difficult. This would be reinforced by the virtual absence of graduates from the Service or of people educated in political concepts or practices through any other means. These people may disturb long-held beliefs and damage the easy stability of the Service. They may, in other words, 'rock the boat' or at least be dissatisfied with their own position in it.

The extent to which policies are a result of either motive is immeasurable but both elements certainly exist in different degrees of importance amongst senior civil servants and politicians.

This and the previous chapter have tried to prepare the ground for a careful analysis of whether and why the Manx administrative system is a hybrid of British central and local administration which will form the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

HYBRIDITY

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HYBRIDITY

INTRODUCTION

Prior to discussing both the concept of hybridity, and the manifestations, it is necessary to develop the logic which precedes the concept. The progression of thought which leads to this idea has its roots in the writing on comparative administration and development administration (to the extent that these can be seen as separate disciplines). These grew in their turn out of discussions of political development by Pye¹, Huntington², Almond and Coleman³, Apter⁴ and many more.

The first point in the argument is that it is very difficult to impose administrative structures without taking account of pre-existing conditions. The social, economic, demographic and cultural characteristics of "developing", "transitional" or "prismatic" societies are adopted and incorporated within new structures. Riggs⁵ (who uses the term "prismatic") writes;

"It is easier to adopt by fiat or law a formal organisational structure with manifest administrative function than it is to institute corresponding social behaviour"⁶

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1. Lucien Pye. "Aspects of Political Development" Little, Brown Series in Comparative Politics 1966
 2. Samuel Huntington. "Political Order in Changing Societies" Yale University Press 1968.
 3. Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (eds) "The Politics of Developing Areas" Princeton University Press 1970.
 4. David Apter "The Politics of Modernization" Phoenix Books Chicago University Press, 1967.
 5. Fred Riggs "Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of the Prismatic Society". Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston 1964.
 6. Ibid. P.34.

Though the terms "under-developed", "non-Western" and "third world" cannot correspond to the economic or even the political situation in the Isle of Man, certain features of what have been termed "transitional" societies are not inappropriate in the Manx context. A major feature of transitional societies is the mixture of old and new practices, of modern ideas superimposed upon traditional ones and the evidence of preceeding chapters substantially proves this to be the case in Mann. These show traditional traits of particularism, parochialism and resistance to change, overlaid by modern ideas of progression by merit, democratic accountability, universality in the treatment of clients etc. Hence the following comments pertaining to transitional societies can be seen as relevant in Mann and must not be ignored simply because they were intended to relate to societies of a far less complex economic order.

"there can be no reason for supposingthat a principle of public administration has equal validity in every nation-state, or that successful public administration practices in one country will necessarily prove successful in a different social, economic and political environment. A particular nation-state embodies the results of many historical episodes, traumas, failures and successes which have in turn created peculiar habits, mores, institutionalised patterns of behaviour, Weltanchaungen and even 'national' psychologies'. One cannot assume that public administration can escape the effects of this conditioning; or that it is somehow independent of and isolated from the culture or social setting in which it develops".¹

Thus it is pointless to assume that principles which have come to be accepted in British public administration, either at local or central level, are either 'right' or universally appropriate and hence appropriate to the Isle of Man.

1. Robert A. Dahl. "The Science of Public Administration" Public Administration Review, Winter, 1947 PP. 7-8.

Since this premise is so relevant, the subsequent discussion by the comparative administration authors formerly cited is also relevant; that is that as a result of the significance of the environment of an administrative system, the study of public administration must be interdisciplinary. It must either learn from the works of economists, historians, anthropologists and sociologists or seek to have a less institution oriented and more ecological approach¹ to the understanding of public administration. Thus chapters 2,3 and 4 of this work have aimed to provide a broad profile of the bureaucracy covering as they do the administrative institutions themselves, effective patterns of personnel management, value systems of administrators, decision-making processes, and communications. This, combined with other work on the Manx political culture² in general serves to give a more complete understanding of this particular administrative structure in its environmental context.

Thus our understanding of the totality of the Manx system enables us to explain why it is not a mirror image of the British one. It is, in practice, a hybrid form of administration, the term being borrowed from the biological discipline of genetics and meaning "the offspring of parents of two different species". Thus a hybrid form of administration could be said to be a new form having characteristics of both of two other forms and therefore displaying a combination of features unique to that system.

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1. Since ecology is the study of life in its environment, an ecological approach to public administration examines the environmental influences upon the bureaucracy.
 2. Dr. J. Richards "Politics in Small Independent Communities; Isle of Man, Malta and Faroe". Unpublished PhD thesis. 1979.

The characteristics of hybridity then could be said to be the existence of features seen in two other systems; conscious or unconscious imitation of the two other systems; and a constantly altering combination of features from the two systems and from internal responses to problems. It may be a descriptive or prescriptive concept though in the Manx sense since selective imitation is usually considered to be of central government, then it is more likely to be descriptive. The model is certainly not propounded as a way to tackle new problems. In other words both central and local government in Britain are not rationally considered to see which is the most relevant to a particular problem.

The Manx system displays a unique combination of features from central and local government in Britain and its own response to need. So it is not simply that features of both systems are present that is important but that the way they are combined within a different socio-cultural environment has produced a divergent and unique expression of the principles existing in the two parent systems.

HOW IS HYBRIDITY DISPLAYED IN MANN?

Hybridity is displayed in numerous ways throughout the Manx system and always it is affected by the conflict between traditional and modern values in the society. Many examples of this can be seen in the preceding chapters and there are more that have not been covered there. It is, however, possible to identify three major headings under which illustrations can be placed. These are firstly, the allocation of functions in the system; secondly, the attitudes of the actors in the processes of making and implementing policy; and thirdly the procedure adopted for the making and implementing of policy.

Allocation of Functions

The present allocation of functions has developed on a piecemeal basis and has features of both central and local systems in Britain¹. Looking at the local authority similarities first, we can see that there is much more similarity between the Manx Board system and a local authority committee system than to the central ministerial pattern². The traditional vertical pattern of an elected body heading an appointed department is seen in both systems though there is the difference that a Tynwald Board has considerably more autonomy.

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1. For detailed descriptions of these features in the IOM please see references to Chapters 3 and 4.
 2. See Chapter 3 P.90.

Secondly as in British local authorities the supreme body, in the Manx case Tynwald, does not confine itself to the rule-making function. It in fact makes executive decisions though it is primarily a legislature and is responsible for the overall financial control and direction of government policy.¹

Thirdly, all members of Tynwald are members of at least one Board (therefore every member forms part of the government)². Similarly all members of local authorities are members of one or more Committee. As a result, when they are not speaking on behalf of their Board or Committee, both Tynwald members and Councillors perform a similar 'backbench' role. They act as a form of opposition to the Board/Committee under scrutiny and this is similar to some UK authorities where parties are not present. The development of political parties in British local government has inevitably changed the basis of voting allegiance from issue-by-issue decisions to party loyalty. On the whole, however, the similarity of the Manx system is greater with local authorities than with Westminster where most members hold no government office at all.

Fourthly the role of the Chairman of a local authority committee is similar to that of a Board Chairman.³ He is a focus for the questions to full body through which process the Board or Committee he represents is made accountable. He has similar powers relating to his control over the subordinate body itself and a similar degree of latitude for individual action between

1. See Chapter 3. P. 86.

2. See Chapter 3.P. 84.

3. See Chapter 3 P. 85.

meetings. In some senses though, the role is different. The Boards of Tynwald, as has been mentioned, have greater autonomy from the parent body than do local authority committees. Thus the Chairman's power is to a degree correspondingly greater also. In addition as the number of Boards grows, and yet the body of Members of Tynwald does not, it has become necessary for most members to sit on several Boards and to share their time between them. As a result the Chairman tends to acquire greater power since he is most au fait with all the matters facing the Board. His role, therefore, is becoming somewhat more ministerial.

At the officer level, that is in the Manx Civil Service, similarities exist to the officer hierarchy of a British local authority. For example, the degree of specialism and differentiation of functions in a small local authority is likely to be very similar to that in the Manx Civil Service. In other words, it is unlikely that an officer in either place would be responsible for a very specific area of policy implementation. He is more likely to have a wide range of responsibilities governed by several different pieces of legislation and policy direction depending largely upon the particular field in which he works.

A second similarity at officer level is that the allocation of functions to newly introduced professional personnel in the IOM is following patterns set up in British local government.¹

Though these have been introduced later and in a somewhat different order, their functions are now similar and becoming increasingly so.

1. See Chapter 4. P.136.

On the other hand, there are many functions performed through Tynwald and the Boards, i.e. at the central level of Manx public administration, which are also performed at the central level in Britain.¹ In this sense Tynwald constitutes a central government. The most obvious examples of overtly central functions performed by Tynwald are the collection and distribution of taxes and the monitoring and control of the economy. In addition, external relations, plainly a central government role, is performed by Tynwald.

There is a further way in which the two central governments are similar and that is in the names and titles given to various offices in the IOM which are thought to perform a similar function. In many cases, the actual functions have been gradually changed in either country, e.g. the Speaker of the House of Keys.² Other examples are to be found amongst the names of the Boards which are often the same as those of former ministries in the British government e.g. Social Security, Health and Local Government. At the Civil Service level the grades also bear similar titles i.e. Clerical, Executive, Administrative and Principal grades and are divided similarly into General Service and Departmental Classes.³

So, there is a unique combination of features; a hybrid combination, which results in such divergent factors as the performance of functions associated with local government in Britain by central government whilst an inefficient and antiquated system of

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1. See Chapter 3 . P. 77.
 2. See Chapter 3. P. 88
 3. See Chapter 4. P. 134.

local government persists by its side. In addition, the small size of the Island and its population results in functions performed by quangos in Britain being a part of Tynwald's responsibilities. On the whole this unique hybrid form bears more resemblance to local authorities than to central government in the UK but as will be seen in the second aspect of hybridity, the attitudes of the actors in the process, there are other ways in which the Manx system bears a greater resemblance to central government.

Attitudes of the actors in the process

In Chapter 2 much was said of the 'civil service mentality'¹ prevailing amongst Manx officials but this central government emphasis is not a feature only of the Civil Service. Both politicians and officials involved in Manx public administration through Tynwald, its Boards and the Civil Service, are very conscious of the importance of presenting to the 'outside world' the image of a 'national' government. Some admittedly, are more aware of this than others, in particular those calling themselves nationalists, but if any Manx politician or official is asked to compare Mann with Britain he will always look straight to Westminster and Whitehall before he speaks of similarities at the local level.² In recent years this has resulted in active membership of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association which is concerned with the promotion of understanding between members of the national legislatures of commonwealth countries. Overtly, at

1. See Chapter 2. P. 46.

2. Evidence from interviews with Manx politicians and senior civil servants.

least, there is a much greater affinity with central than with local government in Britain.

This desire to portray the image of a national government conflicts with the inferiority complex explained in Chapter 2,¹ which leads to an acceptance of low level contact with the UK government on matters affecting both or affecting the relationship between them and, perhaps more importantly, an imitation of central government methods.

On more specific items, however, certain attitudes prevalent in British local government are present in Mann and with the changes that are gradually being made to bring the Manx system more up-to-date these are increasing. The first concerns the attitudes of members. As in local government, the elected members in Tynwald are often concerned with the detail of administration rather than with the broad issues of policy. This is a result of the same underestimation of elected members by both officers and the society at large. In addition it is a result of the members' perception of themselves as managers rather than politicians.

Secondly, it is noticeable that with the growth of the professions in the IOM Civil Service attitudes are gradually being absorbed from British local government.² Inevitably as recruitment to professional posts is from UK local government due to the local authority-like nature of the functions to be performed, the personnel will bring professional loyalties and conditioning with them. They will begin to influence Manx affairs along the lines

1. See Chapter 2. P. 47.

2. See Chapter 4. P. 138 - 182 -

they have learnt in local government in the UK and their attitudes to their own function, to their place in the organisation and to the organisation in general will have been imported from their former place of employment.

Apart from this small (though increasing) number of personnel, however, the attitudes of civil servants and politicians to their work have their roots in their understanding of the way the British central government system works. This explains their attitude to the anonymity of the Civil Service (though they accept its inpracticality in a small community), secrecy in government, the relationship between appointed officials and elected members and many more attitudes they hold.

It is an over-simplification to say that all participants in the policy process have the above attitudes but there is a remarkable degree of homogeneity as discussed in the Chapter on the Manx administrative culture.¹

Procedure

It is in this area that wholesale imitation of British practice is likely to be difficult since the procedure adopted will depend upon the principles by which the system operates. These principles conflict greatly in Mann due to the persistence of traditional values whilst modern ones become accepted. Thus the general methods of operation of the Manx system are a miscellany of old and new. There is still some reliance on the treatment of

1. See Chapter 2. P.58 .

the individual according to who he is rather than treating every case according to a set of strictly defined rules from which the official rarely deviates. This is, of course, a generalisation and allegations are often made of partiality in both British central and local government. The point to be made here is that in a small community the degree of interlinking between people is greater and hence impartiality is more difficult to maintain. Due to the small number of clients handled cases are not always determined by precedent. For example in discretionary social services benefits, there may be very few applicants and each case is then decided on its merits. Similarly the Local Government Board's system of allocation of housing is based upon a fairly irrational set of criteria whereas in a large British local authority handling many properties and applicants, points systems have been developed to cope with the data and ensure fairer treatment.

Thus, each case must be considered individually. Even in the administration of government policies which affect virtually the whole population, there is a prevalence of personalised value premises. Even today after large scale immigration, there is a considerable inter-linking of the population through family and business ties. This will influence the civil servants (since they are members of that network of linkages), in the treatment of, for example, tax repayment cases. This is also the case in the personnel methods of the Civil Service as was explained in Chapter 4.¹ Precedent alone will not ensure universalism, nor does individual consideration necessarily imply particularism but it is

1. See Chapter 4 sections on recruitment and promotion.

likely that these factors are linked. Without citing particular cases and naming names (a job for an ombudsman, perhaps) it is impossible to substantiate the allegations anyway.

Due to the absence of procedural safeguards, the role of the individual participant in the administrative process becomes significantly greater. Individual civil servants' attitudes at even the lowest levels become very important, especially for the member of public on the receiving end of their decisions. Where procedural complexity does exist it can be a device for increasing the autonomy of officers. Those who know the system can work it to their advantage whilst those who don't must accept the verdict of those who do. It has been said that those who implement policy are the real policy-makers since through their interpretation of directions from further up the hierarchy, they determine the effectiveness of policies in achieving their original intentions.¹ In a small hierarchy such as that of the IOM Civil Service, the degree of delegation to the lowest possible levels is maximised and thus lower ranking officials have even greater influence on policy through their interpretation and implementation of it.

It is easier for a society to adopt a formal law or structure than it is to institutionalise corresponding social behaviour. In the IOM where change has been gradual and voluntary, institutions have often been accepted but without the associated commitment to their effectiveness. This could be said, for example, of the Executive Council.² The Manx have had time to absorb the new structure and

1. M.J. Hill "Front-Line Administrators: Policy Implementors or the Real Policy Makers?" Paper given to the Royal Institute of Public Administration Conference, Brighton, April, 1981.

2. See Chapter 3. P. 86.

to be selective in their adoption of them. Thus they have been able to retain their former value systems relatively unchallenged. As a result, though formally the structure has progressed, the procedure for its operation remains personalised, rule-free, and particularistic in its implementation.

Hybridity is, therefore displayed most in the allocation of functions (where there are strong similarities with British local government) and in the attitudes of politicians and senior civil servants (where the similarities to and affinity with central government is stronger than with local). Hybridity is somewhat less relevant to the aspect of procedure although methods have been adopted from both systems. It has more to do with the consequence of small size and the consequent particularism of the treatment of members of the public.

WHY HYBRIDITY?

Given that the Manx administrative system is not an exact mirror image of either local or central government in the UK, it is important to ask why? Why has it developed this unique hybrid combination? It is possible to identify three major influences on the development of the hybrid system: firstly size; secondly, British practice; and thirdly the historical development of Tynwald.

The size of the Island and its population has many ramifications which have led to the development of a hybrid form of administration. The most obvious is that inefficiency would result were many of the traditionally local government functions performed through local units. At the central level smallness is also important as one Board will deal with a wide range of functions and the specialisation of personnel's roles is of a low order.¹ Thus there develops a hybrid situation where many functions both central and local are performed by the same organisation but with a unique solution to the problems of efficiency that are posed by size.

The second influence, that of British practice is all pervading but can be summarised in the phrase selective-imitation. Thus features are borrowed from both levels in the UK. The reasons for this have been explained in full in Chapter 2.

They can, however, be summarised by the following. Due to the regard in which the British Civil Service is held, there has

1. See Chapter 1, P.20 and Chapter 2, P.56.

developed both a psychology of dependence and a habit, as a result, of selective imitation of their structure and practices. Due, however, to the inevitable similarities in size and function with British local government, the Service has been forced to borrow aspects of their behaviour especially through the importation of professionals from the local authorities.

This is, however, tempered by the need to meet specific requirements which may arise at a different time, on a smaller scale and in a different form than they do in Britain. The Manx system must then develop entirely distinctive solutions suited to the capabilities of its personnel and the resources available to solve the problems. Thus as Tynwald's historical development progressed, new Boards and Departments and new associated procedures were developed to meet those local needs. One example of such an autonomous attempt to solve problem facing the system is the growth of the Treasury in the Island as the tax haven policy came into operation and grew in significance. This had impacts all throughout the economy which produced an immediate response by the creation of the Treasury, the establishment of new units within it, such as a Policy Unit, Economics and Statistics Department, and a Computer Unit to handle the increased income and administration of that income in the newly prosperous climate. This in its turn led to the creation of an Industries Board capable of offering very desirable incentives for investment in the Island. Thus the Island could, as a result of entirely internal factors, create new structures and policies without imitation of British practice.

It seems pertinent to discuss the comments made by F.W. Riggs in this context in relation to what he calls 'prismatic societies',¹ He distinguishes between the processes of innovation and adoption. Those societies which transform themselves largely through innovation motivated from within or through endogenous forces could be said to be endo-prismatic and those changing in response to external pressure as exo-prismatic. Riggs argues that most prismatic societies are exo-prismatic though there is here a certain question of degree. Between these two extremes is a continuum upon which each society lies. In the case of the IOM, an adoptive society, this place would be towards the exo-prismatic extreme. However, since the imitation has been selective, one could argue that the endogenous forces are strong. Thus the IOM has been able to respond to the challenges of the British example by transforming its own structures enough to enable it to maintain its political independence, that is, to permit its own elite to guide the processes of change. Thus there has been the selection of some local and central features which have been internalised to the existing structure of relatively traditional beliefs.

That the system as a whole appears hybrid is very evident and explicable as a combination of the three factors of size, selective imitation of British practice, and autonomous responses to needs. On a more specific level, however, different aspects of the system are hybrid in themselves (as shown in Part 2 of this Chapter) and this may be for a different reason in each case. To take

1. F.W. Riggs. Op Cit. P.38.

three examples; first the Board system began as an entirely autonomous response to a desire to share power in Tynwald but as time went on and pressure grew a more ministerial pattern began to emerge. This was not a conscious choice but sub-consciously, Tynwald members and the public now identify the Chairman of a Board as the person responsible for that function in the same way as British ministers personify their department.¹ Hence this aspect of the allocation of functions can be seen as having similarities with both the central and local levels in the UK, but it is an entirely autonomous response to needs which has produced this feature.

A second example of certain aspects of the system being hybrid in themselves is that of the use of specialists in the service. The Manx Civil Service imitated the British one in this respect and generalists dominated senior posts. However, as functions increased and services became increasingly complex and technical, it was found necessary to import professionals from British local government. Hence the system now appears to have elements of both British central and local government but here it is the result of conscious selective imitation.

Finally a third aspect which displays hybridity is in the distribution of functions. In this case the obvious reason is size but it is combined with the inefficiency of the small local authorities so that central government has had to take on many of the functions simply by default. So this hybrid feature has developed as a

1. (a) "Square peg in a round hole" IOM Times 22/1/80.

(b) "Who's the Manx King Solomon?" IOM Examiner. 7/8/81.

combination of the size factor and an autonomous response to need.

So, from these three examples it is evident that not only is the system as a whole a hybrid but also specific aspects of it are hybrid and for any of the three reasons identified. It is important to note, however, that this reading of the situation from a social scientist's point of view looking in on the system from outside, differs entirely from the participants' own perceptions. Even the selective-imitation itself is not an entirely conscious act and the way the Manx system has developed has been as a delicate and complex balancing of competing influences over a long period. Though many are aware that Manx public administration is a bit like local government and a bit like central government and each person places a different emphasis on one or the other, they do not see the process as a deliberate attempt to acquire the best from both systems. They have simply, through piecemeal, incremental development, produced a system best suited to the needs of the moment within the limitations of political possibility. Similarly, like all systems, it displays many of the characteristics of the Weberian ideal-type bureaucracy but is not consciously aiming to achieve it. Its actors may well be unaware that it is the more traditional beliefs still existant there which are resulting in departures from the model and in the development of a hybrid pattern.

HYBRIDITY: A TRANSFERABLE CONCEPT?

The concept of hybridity as described in relation to the IOM would be a useful one to bear in mind in the study of the administrative and political systems of other societies. For it to have any real relevance, however, there must be at least some conditions prevailing which have a similarity to those in Mann.

The first of these characteristics must be smallness. Since this will almost inevitably produce a situation where what are normally considered (at least in Britain) to be local functions tend in practice to be performed by central institutions. It is possible, however, that a larger central government could be a hybrid of two other systems whilst local government existed alongside it. In other words, hybridity could be displayed in other ways than by the allocation of functions to central institutions. It could, therefore, apply to both large and small states.

There is, however, a further condition which is vital to the relevance of the concept of hybridity to the administrative systems of other countries and that is the existence of two other systems having a close association with the society in question. This need not necessarily be a local and a central system as is the case in the IOM but may be the central systems of two entirely separate countries. This could, for example, be the case in Andorra (having also the small size factor) with its dual co-lords of France and Spain.¹

1. "Opening Pandora's Box in the Pyrennees" Eve-Ann Prentice, The Guardian. 21/4/81. P.9.

Hybridity may be a feature not only of whole administrative systems but of elements of systems. For example a society could adopt a combination of the features of two other systems in the way it decentralises power. It is conceivable that attitudes are a combination of several influences, blended in a unique form to accord with the particular cultural environment of that society.

Therefore, although certain conditions must prevail in order for hybridity to be a transferable concept, it is evident that its applications could be numerous. On the whole, however, hybridity has emerged in the Manx case in unusual circumstances and the likelihood of these being repeated in other systems in all their complexity is remote or even impossible.

ECLECTICISM: A UNIVERSAL CONCEPT?

To make the idea of hybridity a lot broader may make its application to other systems more relevant. The pertinence of the suggestion that system builders are eclectic in their approach is at first sight greatest in the developing or transitional societies and there has been much written on this applying to various different countries. Many third world countries have borrowed freely from countries in the West to build up a unique blend of characteristics suited to their own political system. James Mosel on Thai administrative behaviour provides one example:

"Its administrative system is an unusual blend of self-selected adaptations from the West and a long-standing indigenous tradition, which in turn contains numerous adaptations from ancient Indian and Khmer (Cambodian) sources".¹

This concept has its relevance also for the more advanced administrative systems of the Western world. A most obvious example is Britain's imitation of the Scandinavian ombudsman. Another is the USA's development of freedom of information legislation from the same source. Even these two major Western imperial nations are open to influences from other countries.

Not only is this concept universally relevant in a descriptive sense but it could also be presented as a prescription for administrative development in all nations. When problems in the implementation of government policy, or in its formation, became evident, structure builders could benefit from the example of other countries where solutions to similar problems have been successfully implemented. Lepawsky recommended this most strongly in

1. James N. Mosel "Thai Administrative Behaviour" in "Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration" Ed. W.J. Siffin Indiana University Press. 1957.

his work on Bolivia:

"International and foreign administrative models may be of the greatest service to Bolivian reconstruction. Although administrative institutions for the achievement of public responsibility and accountability must be rooted in the native capacities of a country's own culture, careful grafting of suitable strains from abroad can work small wonders."¹

Thus eclecticism can be recommended to both developing and developed nations as a means of learning the greatest possible amount from the experiences of others. The methods considered must of course be rationally chosen and implemented to ensure that they are compatible with their new environment but they are more likely to be successful than a blind acceptance of the institutions of one particular system as has been the case in societies subject to colonial rule.

For the IOM, the concept of eclecticism should also be considered in its prescriptive sense since their selective imitation to date has been entirely from Britain. This is true at the moment with their consideration of the ombudsman idea which they intend, if it is adopted at all, to be implemented on the same system of access through elected members as occurs in the UK.² The IOM would perhaps do better to look more widely and even follow examples set in other countries. It would be appropriate for them to consider, for example, the modes of operation existing in other small independent communities where similar problems of inefficiency relating to size have be-devilled administrative developers for centuries.

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1. Albert Lepawsky "Revolution and Reform in Bolivia: A Study in the Root and Branch of Public Administration in a Developing Nation" in Siffin (ed) Ibid. P.244.
 2. See Chapter 2. P.106.

Secondly, they could learn much from other places where tax haven status has been established. Imitation of Jersey's financial policies (or at least regular comparison with them) and lately with their energy policy¹ already takes place and this ought perhaps to be extended to the administrative practices adopted to implement their similar financial policies. There is a vast number of small independent states all of which bear some similarity in terms of public administration to the Manx system simply as a result of their size. Comparative work not only with small states nearby such as the Channel Islands but with the Carribean Islands, Falkland Islands and small European states such as Lichenstein and Monaco may produce beneficial results.

Thirdly, the IOM could learn much from other nations who have experienced specifically British influence in a similar close geographical proximity, for example Ireland. Ireland and more distant countries have learned since their independence to establish separate and more appropriate structures suited to their needs.

1. "Jersey link-upon energy problems" IOM Examiner. 7/8/81.

CONCLUSION

This Chapter has sought to explain the relevance of the concept of hybridity to both the IOM (giving examples) and to other countries. Summarily, this is that the IOM displays features of both central and local administrative systems in Britain. In terms of the allocation of functions there appears to be a stronger resemblance to local government though the attitudes of the participants in public administration are derived mainly from their perceptions of the central government ethos. In terms of procedure, though they pay lip service to well-established principles of both central and local government in the UK, the IOM has retained much of the traditional personalised, rule-free procedure through into the present day performance of functions.

The reasons for this development of a hybrid system are its small size and the intermixing of the imitation of British practice with entirely autonomous attempts at problem solving.

This Chapter ended with some discussion of the relevance of hybridity and the much broader concepts of eclecticism in the development of administrative systems. It was suggested that the latter concept is more appropriate to be used in comparative administration since it does not require the presence of certain conditions such as size, or two very dominant systems to be imitated. It was also proposed that eclecticism is not only a descriptive but a prescriptive concept of relevance universally in the development of administrative structures.

C O N C L U S I O N

On a final view, this thesis has attempted a comprehensive analysis of the structure, values and behaviour in an entire administrative system of an almost completely independent nature, all be it in miniature. In this sense it provides a useful case study and contributes comment of relevance to other systems of public administration both large and small through the concept of hybridity and its concomitant, eclecticism.

To summarise, this work has attempted to describe the Manx administrative machine (Chapters 3 and 4) in the light of both the structures and values of local and central government in Britain (Chapter 1) and the administrative values inherent in the Manx system itself.

The major conclusion of Chapter One is that though the bureaucracies of both British central and local government adhere quite closely to Weber's ideal type bureaucracy, each level does have characteristics peculiar to it. This is illustrated by the stress on the values of impartiality and anonymity in the British Civil Service; the relatively great importance of professionalism at the local level; the difference of response to the calls for efficiency especially in relation to size of functional units.

Chapter Two discovers the Manx administrative culture to be a product of the quasi-colonial relationship with Britain; the unwillingness to examine administrative behaviour in any rational manner; the inferiority complex of the Island as a whole and of many members of its government which is a consequence of the final

factor; the political nature of a small community. The major implication of all these things for the thesis is that it results in an imitation of British practice which is selective and which sub-consciously has produced a hybrid system of public administration.

The Chapter on the machinery of government makes many descriptive points but overall it identifies the following features. The system is the product of a gradual evolution over a period of centuries and this has resulted in a fragmented, poorly co-ordinated system which has both the advantages and disadvantages of being small. A further weakness of the system is that it does not present itself to the outside world as a viable, national system of government. Despite this the system has succeeded in its own terms as it has retained its stability which a highly valued aspect of Manx government.

Two principle conclusions come from Chapter Four. The first is that there is a very low level of interest and activity with relation to personnel and public service issues which results in a low degree of union activity and a generally unquestioning approach to organisational behaviour. This does nothing to change the particularistic nature of recruitment and promotion policy. The second point is that this unquestioning attitude is a result of a low level of education in politics, public administration and the social sciences and a particular absence of the study of Manx government in the light of these disciplines.

Chapter Five describes both the concept of hybridity and its relevance in Mann and elsewhere. The concept revolves around

the idea that a system which displays hybridity is one which has aspects of two other systems either as a result of conscious or unconscious imitation. This is illustrated in Mann in many ways which can be summarised under the headings the Allocation of Functions, the Attitudes of the Actors in the Process and finally the Procedure used in the Organisation. In terms of the first the IOM displays many features which bear a great similarity to British local government. In terms of the second, the attitudes of the actors derive from and are often similar to those in the British Civil Service. On the final aspect of procedure, although there is a superficial resemblance to both central and local government, the behaviour is most influenced by the traditionalism inherent in Manx society resulting in highly personalised application and development of rules.

The reasons for the development of the hybrid system as Chapter Five goes on to explain are the small size of the Island and of the Manx government in particular; the selective imitation of British practices and finally the entirely autonomous responses that are made to many problems without reference to any other pattern elsewhere.

Chapter Five also concluded that the concepts of hybridity and wider, eclecticism were relevant outside Mann and could provide useful tools of analysis in comparative administration.

It is to be hoped that this thesis has challenged some of the popular assumptions of Manx political actors and commentators. In particular the suggestion that the IOM adopts British central government structures and practices without question is analysed

and found to be false. The process of imitation is far more subtle and complex than this bland statement suggests. Its many facets include imitation of not only central but of local government practice (hence the term hybridity); a degree of unconsciousness about the act; a considerable reliance on traditional beliefs and values on the Island community itself; and an unwillingness to consider the administrative methods of other political systems.

As a result of this long and deep look at the Manx system and an equally close connection with it through working in the Manx Civil Service itself, it is possible for the author to draw some conclusions as to its overall value as a system. Any social scientist studying a political phenomenon must bring a series of value judgements which may cloud the analysis. However, if we look at a system on its own terms, that is according to the value system pertaining to it, it is possible to consider to what extent it measures up to its own standards.

Above all the Island values its independence and with this its small size. Though it is debateable whether smallness is concomitant with greater democracy or efficiency it is certainly highly regarded in the Isle of Man as a means of keeping in check corruption and the dysfunctions of excessively large bureaucracies. Is smallness, however, incompatible with the Island's other aim (which we can only assume) of efficiency in service provision? This too is debateable though most commentators would agree that the local government system forfeits its efficiency through its excessive parochialism. At the central level there are ways of rationalising services whilst still retaining the relatively small

size of the body as a whole. Since the amalgamation of Boards is fiercely resisted, the smallness of individual units is somewhat dysfunctional and this could be combatted through the combination of certain functions in larger Boards.

Another overall point to make about the Manx administrative system is that it relies heavily on past practices and is very reluctant to consider change. This is associated with the Island's much vaunted stability but there is a danger that where resistance to new ideas is vehement, on the grounds that 'we have always done it this way so why should we change now', so both good and bad, relevant and irrelevant will be discarded together. This unwillingness to consider new approaches to problems is closely associated with a general unwillingness to examine and analyse methods.

In short the actors in Manx government must decide, after due consideration and analysis, what they are aiming for in the administrative system and the best ways in which to achieve these goals. In doing so it would be of great benefit to them to be eclectic in their approach and to consider the examples set by other small, independent communities or larger countries of a similar political make-up. By this means, the Island could make the most of its considerable advantages, such as, growing economic prosperity, a stable and peaceful society, and a supportive, integrated community.

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POPULATION 1821-1976 WITH INTERCENSAL VARIATIONS

DATE OF CENSUS	POPULATION			INTERCENSAL INCREASE OR DECREASE (-)	
	Persons	Males	Females	Amount	% per year
1821 - May 27/28 (i)	40,081	19,158	20,923		
1831 - May 29/30 (i)	41,000	19,560	21,440	919	0.23
1841 - June 6/7 (ii)	47,975	23,011	24,964	6,975	1.60
1851 - March 30/31 (iii)	52,387	24,915	27,472	4,412	0.91
1861 - April 7/8	52,469	24,727	27,742	82	0.02
1871-April 2/3 (iv)	54,042	25,914	28,128	1,573	0.30
1881-April 3/4	53,558	25,760	27,798	-484	-0.09
1891 - April 5/6	55,608	26,329	29,279	2,050	0.38
1901 - March 31/April 1	54,752	25,496	29,256	-856	-0.15
1911 - April 2/3	52,016	23,937	28,079	-2,736	-0.48
1921 - June 19/20	60,284	27,329	32,955	8,268	1.20
1931 - April 26/27 (v)	49,308	22,443	26,865	-10,976	-1.70
1939 - Mid-year estimate	52,029	23,675	28,354	2,721	0.69
1951 - April 8/9	55,253	25,774	29,479	3,224	0.50
1961 - April 23/24	48,133	22,034	26,099	-7,120	-1.20
1966 - April 24/25	50,423	23,226	27,197	2,290	0.95
1971 - April 25/26	54,581	25,528	29,053	4,158	1.60
1976 - April 4/5	61,723	29,343	32,380	7,142	2.50

- (i) Excluding armed forces and seamen.
- (ii) Including armed forces and seamen ashore (from 1841 to 1976).
- (iii) Including persons on vessels in port on Census night and arriving the following day (from 1851 to 1921).
- (iv) Including fishermen absent at sea engaged in the Irish Mackerel Fishery (from 1871 to 1911); their numbers were: (1871) 1,151, (1881) 2,022, (1891) 1,264, (1901) 577, (1911) 160.
- (v) Including persons on board vessels in island waters, or on a coastwise or fishing voyage, at census mid-night (from 1931 to 1976).

Source: Isle of Man Census 1976 Report.

NEW RESIDENTS BY QUINARY AGE AND AREA OF ORIGIN

	TOTALS			United Kingdom	British common-wealth	Other countries
	Persons	Males	Females			
0 - 4	570	284	286	528	18	24
5 - 9	796	422	374	742	30	24
10 - 14	701	363	338	638	45	18
15 - 19	677	305	372	590	43	44
20 - 24	955	445	510	863	28	64
25 - 29	1,017	520	497	933	33	51
30 - 34	717	393	324	662	29	26
35 - 39	613	314	299	567	29	17
40 - 44	514	259	255	454	33	27
45 - 49	554	258	296	488	44	22
50 - 54	656	299	357	563	57	36
55 - 59	644	280	364	552	49	43
60 - 64	790	407	383	690	57	43
65 - 69	703	396	307	600	69	34
70 - 74	365	177	188	306	39	20
75 - 79	166	81	85	143	11	12
80 - 84	78	24	54	73	2	3
85 - 89	38	12	26	36	2	-
90 - 94	9	5	4	8	-	1
All ages	10,563	5,244	5,319	9,436	618	509

Source: Isle of Man Census 1976 Report

AGE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION AT 4/5 APRIL 1976 (i)

Age last birthday	Persons	Males	Females	Age last birthday	Persons	Males	Females
All Ages	60,496	28,735	31,761	35 - 39	3,112	1,598	1,514
0 - 14	12,387	6,407	5,980	40 - 44	2,975	1,480	1,495
15 - 64	35,707	17,247	18,460	45 - 49	3,228	1,501	1,727
65 & Over	12,402	5,081	7,321	50 - 54	3,652	1,647	2,005
Under 5	3,740	1,906	1,834	55 - 59	3,579	1,626	1,953
5 - 9	4,221	2,206	2,015	60 - 64	4,286	1,941	2,345
10 - 14	4,426	2,295	2,131	65 - 69	4,367	2,022	2,345
15 - 19	3,879	1,919	1,960	70 - 74	3,598	1,517	2,081
20 - 24	3,538	1,779	1,759	75 - 79	2,351	897	1,454
25 - 29	4,111	2,087	2,024	80 - 84	1,308	414	894
30 - 34	3,347	1,669	1,678	85 & Over	778	231	547

(i) Resident Population

Source: Isle of Man Census 1976 Report, Treasury.

SECTOR DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES IN EMPLOYMENT:

UNITED KINGDOM AND ISLE OF MAN

SECTOR	United Kingdom ⁽ⁱ⁾		Isle of Man ⁽ⁱⁱ⁾	
	No. Employees (000's)	% of Total	No. Employees ^(iv)	% of Total
1	395	1.8	702	3.5
2	714	3.2	538	2.7
3	3,269	14.5	1,255	6.2
4	934	4.1	385	1.9
5	2,681	11.9	678	3.3
6	1,308	5.8	2,679	13.2
7	353	1.6	529	2.6
8	1,475	6.5	1,988	9.8
9	840	3.7	864	4.3
10	1,883	8.4	2,167	10.7
11	1,103	4.9	1,097	5.4
12	3,654	16.2	3,202	15.8
13	266	1.2	765	3.8
14	879	3.9	763	3.8
15	1,154	5.1	1,589	7.8
16	1,627 ⁽ⁱⁱⁱ⁾	7.2	1,067	5.3
n.e.c.	4	-	(9)	-
Total	22,539	100.0	20,259	100.0

For definition of sector numbers, see page vi .

(i) June 1976

(ii) April 1976

(iii) Excluding Armed Forces

(iv) Figures obtained by deducting self-employed persons from the total economically active population (see later tables); there are nine self-employed persons not classified by industrial sector.

Source: Isle of Man Census 1976 Further Report,, Treasury.

PASSENGER ARRIVALS BY AIR AND SEA 1974-79: MONTHLY TOTALS

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
January	10,065	11,027	11,023	10,920	11,354	11,352
February	9,689	9,964	9,795	10,481	10,101	10,654
March	12,925	20,000	12,760	13,555	21,671	15,323
April	27,524	18,317	26,356	24,288	17,989	32,479
May	56,945	73,917	52,668	35,563	62,623	105,673
June	95,705	99,233	111,517	110,349	112,894	122,147
July	138,206	156,923	157,084	150,784	145,278	164,310
August	141,378	162,196	142,541	123,361	136,427	157,408
September	65,997	72,342	69,201	65,371	73,674	85,078
October	19,778	22,529	17,677	19,109	20,832	27,296
November	12,138	11,584	11,849	11,462	13,882	14,980
December	13,791	13,538	13,183	13,658	15,445	16,445
Annual Total	604,141	671,570	635,654	588,901	642,170	763,145

Source: Isle of Man Steam Packet Co. Ltd., Airports Board,
Tourist Board, Harbour Board, Treasury.

AREA OF ORIGIN OF STAYING TOURISTS% OF TOURISTS BY SEA AND AIR

	Sea	Air
United Kingdom	86	85
Eire	10	5
Europe, U.S.A., Canada, other	3	9

Source: Manx Tourism '77 report

Isle of Man Industrial Sectors

1. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing.
2. Manufacturing: food and drink.
3. Manufacturing: engineering.
4. Manufacturing: textiles, clothing and footwear.
5. Manufacturing: other; mining and quarrying.
6. Construction.
7. Gas, electricity and water.
8. Transport and communication.
9. Wholesale distribution.
10. Retail distribution.
11. Insurance, banking, finance and business services.
12. Professional, educational, medical and scientific services.
13. Tourist accommodation.
14. Other catering and entertainment.
15. Miscellaneous services.
16. Public administration and defence.

APPENDIX 2

COMMITTEES OF THE LEGISLATURE

which functioned during the life of the 1976-1981 House of Keys, a total of 41.

A. Committees of Tynwald (25)

	Type	No.	Titles	Member-ship	Position of Speaker
(1)	Standing	9	a. Constitutional Issues Ctte.	7	Chmn.
			b. Ecclesiastical Ctte.	7	-
			c. Members Pension Scheme Management Ctte.	5	Member
			d. Population Growth and Control of Immigration Committee.	6	-
			e. Printing Ctte.	3	-
			f. Declaration of Members' Interests Ctte.	5	Chmn.
			g. Selection Committee	9	Member
			h. Standing Orders Committee	3	Chmn.
			i. Tynwald Ceremony Arrangements Committee	5	Member
(2)	Select	13	a. Advocates' Fees Committee	5	Chmn.
			b. Committee on the Chronically Sick and Disabled	5	-
			c. Common Market Committee	4	Chmn.
			d. Common Purse Committee	5	-
			e. Constitution of the Board of Education Committee	5	-
			f. Energy Committee	4	Chmn.
			g. Governor's Powers & Duties Ctte.	6	Chmn.
			h. Millennium Committee	5	Member
			i. Petition of Redress of G.F. Crowe and others (Betting Shop Hours) Committee	5	-
			j. Petition of Redress of M.J. Irving & Others (European Convention on Human Rights) Committee	6	Chmn.
			k. Rating Committee	6	-
			l. St. Mary's Castletown Committee	5	Member
			m. Steering Committee on Transport	5	-
(3)	Joint Committees	3	a. Administration of Justice Bill Joint Committee.	9	-
			b. Joint Committee on the Remuneration of Crown Officers etc.	10	Member
			c. Management Committee of the Clerk of Tynwald's Department.	3	Chmn.

B. Committees of the Legislative Council

(1)	Standing	1	a. Standing Orders Ctte.	4	-
(2)	Select	1	a. Administration of Justice Committee	4	-

C. Committees of the House of Keys

(1)	Standing	2	a. Consultative Committee	7	Chmn.
			b. Standing Orders Committee	5	Chmn.
(2)	Select	12	a. Administration of Justice Bill Committee	5	-
			b. Control of Employment (Amdt) Bill Committee	6	-
			c. Criminal Law Bill Committee	5	-
			d. Income Tax Bill Committee	5	-
			e. Jury Bill Committee	4	-
			f. Licencing Law Committee	5	-
			g. Manx Citizenship and Nationality	5	-
			h. Misrepresentation and Unfair Contract Terms Bill Committee	5	-
			i. Pre-Revestment Written Laws (Ascertainment) Bill Ctte.	5	-
			j. Statute Law Revision Bill Committee.	5	-
			k. Unemployment Ctte.	6	Chmn.

N.B. Though all these committees had functioned during the 1976-1981 House of Keys, 16 of the Select Committees were Functus Officio at the time of completion of this table.

Source: The Tynwald Companion. 1980.

Government Office Organisation of Duties

Government Secretary

Policy - Executive Council
Co-ordination of business
Statutory Functions
Communication with H.M. Government
Complaints

'A' Division - Internal Affairs

Constitutional matters
Legislative matters -
 Tynwald
 Legislative Council
 Progress of Legislation
Royal and State Occasions
Church Affairs
Defence and Civil Emergencies -
 Emergency Powers
 Armed Forces
 Official Secrets
 Terrorism
Administration of Justice -
 Police
 Magistrates and High Bailiff
 Probation Service
 Prison
 Coroners
 Inquests of Death
 Jury Acts
 Rules of Court
 Community Home (Remand Home)
 Children Acts
 Advocates
 Maintenance Orders
 Fines and Punishments
 Tribunals
Public Safety -
 Firearms
 Dangerous Goods
 Explosives
 Rifle Ranges
 Fire Precautions
 Security

'B' Division - Economic and Social Affairs

Transport -
 Aviation
 Shipping
 Highways
 Railways

Communications -
 Posts, telephones and telegraphs
 Education
 Finance - - -
 Exchange Control
 Currency and Coinage
 Health - - -
 Hospitals and Nursing Homes
 Drink and Drugs
 Poisons
 Burial Acts
 Cremations
 Gaming, Betting and Lotteries
 Tourism
 Environment -
 Local Government
 Cruelty to Animals
 Game Acts
 Wild Life Protection
 Lands, Mines and Quarries
 Footpaths
 Government Property
 Housing
 Landlord and Tenant
 Refuse Disposal
 Control of Advertisements
 Coast Erosion
 Allotments
 National Trust
 Sporting and Cultural Affairs -
 Arts Council
 Sports Council
 Museum
 Consumer Affairs -
 Consumer Council
 Weights and Measures
 Public Analyst
 Gas
 Water
 Electricity
 Shop Hours
 Bank Holidays
 Summer Time
 Postcard Censorship
 Charities, Blind Welfare and Disabled Persons
 Population - -
 Register General
 Census
 Marriage
 Printing and Stationary
 Trade, Industry and Commerce
 Social Security
 Employment and Unemployment

'C' Division - External Affairs

European Economic Community

Customs and Excise

Agriculture -

Marketing

Price Controls

Diseases of Animals

Meat Grading

Agricultural Holdings Acts

Fisheries

Horticulture

International Affairs -

Treaties

Conventions

Diplomatic Privileges

United Nations

Aliens and Immigration

Passports and Emigration

Nationality and Naturalisation

Domicile

Public Relations

Secretarial and clerical support to numerous miscellaneous committees and trusts.

Taken from Government Circular No. 7/76

Government Office Reference No. c1205/1/2/7.

APPENDIX 4

Summary of Marshall Report Recommendations

	<u>Implemented</u>
1. There should be a Finance Board	Yes.
2. A Chief Financial Officer should be responsible for the whole of the financial administration.	Yes. Treasurer appointed.
3. Financial administration should be concentrated in a single finance department	Yes. The Treasury formed from the Finance Division of Government Office.
4. The form of annual estimates should be standardised.	Yes.
5. The process of examination and approval of estimates should be revised.	Yes.
6. Boards should be authorised to incur expenditure up to a limit of the budget provision under each head of account. Savings should not be at the disposal of Boards to meet expenditure on unapproved purposes. The hypothecation of specific revenues should cease.	Yes.
7. All payments should be made by the finance department. The Boards should not maintain separate funds.	Yes, (on the whole).
8. The finance department should be equipped with accounting machinery.	Yes. Computer.
9. The form of public accounts should be recast.	Yes.
10. The Finance Department should include a section specialising in the collection of income. The collection of rates should be concentrated. The number of collecting authorities should be reduced.	Only partially due to opposition from local authorities.
11. An internal audit section should be formed	Yes.
12. Consideration should be given to the consolidation of public loans.	Yes.
13. A code of financial regulations should be adopted.	No.
14. The salary of the Chief Financial Officer should be not less than £2,500 p.a.	Most definitely.
15. A plan should be made for the centralisation of officers in one building. A single body should become responsible for the provision and administration of all public buildings and offices.	Yes, to first. Second questionable.

16.	All officers of Government and Boards should be civil servants. A Chief Secretary should be appointed to be head of the civil service and principal adviser of all departments and Boards.	Yes to first. Government Secretary's duties extended
17.	There should be an organisation and methods investigation of the administration other than financial administration.	Small O & M unit set up in the CSC to do this but as yet no comprehensive investigation.
18.	There should be a review of the pay of senior officers.	Yes.
19.	Consideration should be given to the drafting of a training scheme for civil servants.	Very rudimentary.
20.	The establishment problem cannot be solved until the future form of administration has been decided.	No.
21.	Consideration should be given to some rearrangement of the functions of the Boards.	No.
22.	The system of local government should be reviewed with the object of reducing the number of authorities.	Review 1967. No changes.
23.	Insurances against fire and other risks should be consolidated.	Yes.
24.	Efforts should be made to economise in the use of stationary. Purchasing section should be set up.	First questionable. Second yes.
25.	The Income Tax Assessment Division should be strengthened.	Yes.
26.	A rearrangement of the responsibilities of the external auditors would be advantageous.	Yes.

Taken from the Report on Administrative Organisation of the IOM Government, 16th October, 1959.

Isle of Man Local Government Board - General List of Duties

1. Public Health and the Environment including Refuse Disposal and Sewage Disposal.
2. Public Authority Housing - supervision, building and encouragement to build.
3. Private Sector building control and Improvement and Energy Conservation.
4. Fire Services including Fire Prevention.
5. Safety, Health and Welfare in Factories and other places of work.
6. Child Life Protection, Adoptions, Day Nurseries and Child-Minders.
7. Planning control, Building and Advertisement Byelaws.
8. General local authority supervisory powers.
9. Registration of Council Builders and Workmen.
10. Development Schemes.

Source: Information document produced by the I.O.M. Local Government Board on its functions, members, officers and finance. 1980/1981.

Local Government Rating Statistics

Figs. for 1978/79

<u>Town Districts,</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>General Rate</u>	<u>Rateable Values</u>	<u>Total Rates collected</u>	<u>Average Rate of Head of Population</u>
					£'s
Douglas	19,987	88	1,517,012	1,576,934	78.90
Castletown	2,788	61	158,583	124,726	44.74
Peel	3,295	42	182,299	114,210	43.66
Ramsey	5,372	58	430,969	327,776	61.02
<u>Village Districts</u>					
Laxey	1,242	34	66,933	36,914	29.72
Michael	437	6	24,251	10,908	24.96
Onchan	6,395	28	448,945	211,229	33.03
Port Erin	2,356	50	180,682	122,773	52.11
Port St. Mary	1,525	44	90,263	55,918	36.67
<u>Parish Districts</u>					
Andreas	949	7.5	41,012	17,273	18.20
Arbory	1,414	13	83,247	33,835	23.93
Ballaugh	655	4	35,922	12,982	19.82
Braddan	2,095	5	151,438	57,253	27.33
Bride	428	10	17,438	5,663	13.23
German	866	5	43,981	17,633	20.36
Jurby	640	6	30,524	11,784	18.41
Lezayre	1,339	4.75	79,876	27,199	20.31
Lonan	1,129	3	59,547	20,092	17.80
Malew	2,116	5	147,419	54,538	25.77
Marown	1,230	3.5	72,094	22,055	20.37
Maughold	763	8	52,866	16,140	21.15
Michael Parish	402	8.5	20,305	6,851	17.04
Onchan Parish	414	6	24,157	6,233	15.06
Patrick	1,078	6	34,354	14,626	13.57
Rushen	1,274	13	70,000	28,445	22.33
Santon	397	5	20,013	5,440	13.70
	60,586			2,939,430	

Summary of the Recommendations of the Committee on Rating and Taxation 1967 - those pertaining to local government only.

Para. 72

The present duality of rating should cease.

Para 95

An immediate revaluation of all properties should be made and revaluations should take place every five years.

Para. 96 (1)

Agricultural properties should be de-rated.

Para. 96 (2)

Where a property becomes vacant after full rates have been paid, a proportion of the rates should be refunded.

Para. 96 (3)

The system of rate discounts should be abolished.

Para. 96 (4)

Consideration should be given to the partial de-rating of properties vacant for more than six months.

Para. 97

A simplified system of rate rebates to be operated in conjunction with the Board of Social Services should be considered.

Para. 98

The payment of rates by instalments should be allowed.

Para. 99

Differential rating as between domestic property and all other types of property should be examined.

Para. 100

The exemption from rating of "Crown" properties should be abolished.

Para. 156

A new single local authority for the whole of the Island should be created with the responsibility for carrying out the full functions of a normal local authority and with financial resources to match.

Para. 159

The Assessment Board should relinquish all its functions to the new Local Authority and cease to exist.

Para. 159 (b)

The Education Authority should cease to exist and its functions be transferred to the new Local Authority.

Para. 159 (c)

The Highways Board should relinquish and transfer:-

- 1) its functions relating to highways and land drainage to the new Local Authority;
- 2) the collection of motor vehicle taxation to the Government Treasurer.

Para. 159 (d)

The responsibility for the provision and maintenance of public glens should be transferred from the Forestry, Mines and Lands Board to the new Local Authority.

Para. 159 (e)

The Health Services Board should transfer to the new Local Authority functions relating to: (1) ambulance services, (2) handicapped children, (3) home help services, (4) infant welfare and nursery service, and (5) vaccination and immunisation.

Para. 159 (f)

The Board of Social Services should relinquish and transfer to the new Local Authority responsibility for services in respect of the welfare of old people and handicapped persons.

Para. 159 (g)

The Local Government Board should be reorganised.

Para. 159 (h)

The Medical Officer of Health should be an officer of the new Local Authority.

Para. 159 (i)

The Water Board should cease to exist and its functions be transferred to the new Local Authority.

Para. 160

The new Local Authority should have 50 elected members.

Paras. 161 & 162

Five district committees should be set up to act as channels of communication between the new Local Authority and the local communities.

Para. 164

Concerning the new Local Authority:-

- (a) Members should serve for three years and retire simultaneously;

- (b) There should be no Aldermen and no Mayor;
- (c) There should be a Chairman elected annually, being eligible for re-election;
- (d) A minimum number of standing committees should be formed;
- (e) Sessional payments should be made to members;
- (f) Provision should be made for compensation for loss of office.

Para.184

A proportion of income tax should be assigned to the new Local Authority.

Para.200

There should be no systems of differential rating as between areas when the new Local Authority is formed.

Para. 201

The Passenger Transport Undertaking in the Island should be operated by the new Local Authority.

OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS

Declaration

Declaration to be signed by civil servants on appointment and, when desirable, by non-civil servants on first being given access to Government information.

My attention has been drawn to the provisions of the Official Secrets Acts, which are set out on the back of this document, and I am fully aware of the serious consequences which may follow any breach of these provisions.

I understand that the sections of the Official Secrets Acts, set out on the back of this document, cover material published in a speech, lecture, or radio or television broadcast, or in the Press or in book form. I am aware that I should not divulge any information gained by me as a result of my appointment to any unauthorised person, either orally or in writing, without the previous official sanction in writing of the Department appointing me, to which written application should be made and two copies of the proposed publication be forwarded. I understand also that I am liable to be prosecuted if I publish without official sanction any information I may acquire in the course of my tenure of an official appointment (unless it has already officially been made public) or retain without official sanction any sketch, plan, model, article, note or official documents which are no longer needed for my official duties, and that these provisions apply not only during the period of my appointment but also after my appointment has ceased.

Signed

Date

EXTRACTS FROM THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS, 1911 and 1920

Section 1 of the Official Secrets Act, 1911, as amended by the Official Secrets Act, 1920, provides as follows:-

- "2. (1) If any person having in his possession or control any secret official code word, or password, or any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information which relates to or issued in a prohibited place or anything in such a place, or which has been made or obtained in contravention of this Act, or which has been entrusted in confidence to him by any person holding office under Her Majesty, or which he has obtained or to which he has had access owing to his position as a person who holds or has held office under Her Majesty, or as a person who holds or has held a contract made on behalf of Her Majesty, or as a person who is or has been employed under a person who holds or has held such an office or contract -
- (a) communicates the code word, pass word, sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information to any person, other than a person to whom he is authorised to communicate it, or a person to whom it is in the interests of the State his duty to communicate it or
 - (aa) uses the information in his possession for the benefit of any foreign power or in any other manner prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State:
 - (b) retains the sketch, plan, model, article, note, or document in his possession or control when he has no right to retain it or when it is contrary to his duty to retain it or fails to comply with all directions issued by lawful authority with regard to the return or disposal thereof: or
 - (c) fails to take reasonable care of, or so conducts himself as to endanger the safety of the sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, secret official code or pass word or information

that person shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.

(1a) If any person having in his possession or control any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information which relates to munitions of war, communicates it directly or indirectly to any foreign power, or in any other manner prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, that person shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.

(2) If any person receives any secret official code word, or pass word, or sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information, knowing, or having reasonable ground to believe, at the time when he receives it, that the code word, pass word, sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information is communicated to him in contravention of this Act, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, unless he proves that the communication to him of the code word, pass word, sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information was contrary to his desire."

Section 1 (2) of the Official Secrets Act, 1920, provides as follows:-

"(2) If any person -

- (a) retains for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State any official document, whether or not completed or issued for use, when he has no right to retain it, or when it is contrary to his duty to retain it, or fails to comply with any directions issued by a Government Department or any person authorised by such department with regard to the return or disposal thereof: or
- (b) allows any other person to have possession of any official document issued for his use alone, or communicate any secret official code word or pass word so issued, or, without lawful authority or excuse, has in his possession any official document or secret official code word or pass word issued for the use of some person other than himself, or on obtaining possession of any official document by finding or otherwise, neglects or fails to restore it to the person or authority by whom or for whose use it was issued, or to a police constable; or
- (c) without lawful authority or excuse, manufactures or sells, or has in his possession for sale any such die, seal or stamp as aforesaid

he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour."

General Conduct of Civil Servants

The following general principles apply to all members of the Civil Service:-

- (a) The first duty of a civil servant is to give his undivided allegiance to the State at all times and on all occasions when the State has a claim on his services.
- (b) A civil servant must not subordinate his duty to his private interests, neither is he to put himself in a position where his duty and his private interests conflict and he must not make use of his official position to further those interests.
- (c) Though the State is in general not concerned with its servants' private activities, they must not be such as might bring discredit on the Service - for example, heavy gambling and speculation are to be avoided, particularly in departments which have access to information which could be turned to private gain.
- (d) It is grossly improper for a civil servant to attempt to procure the intervention of Members of the Legislature or a member of the Civil Service Commission who is not a Member of the Legislature, in the matter of promotion or otherwise with reference to his position in the Civil Service.

Source: I.O.M. Civil Service Regulations.

Limitations on Political Activity

- (a) In general civil servants are completely barred from engaging in the activities defined as national political activities at (b) below but may with the approval of the Board or Department concerned and the Government Secretary, engage in the activities defined at (c) below as local political activities.

Approval when granted is subject to the condition that the civil servants to whom it is granted will act with moderation and discretion and will not involve themselves in matters of political controversy which are of national, rather than local significance.

- (b) National political activities include:-
- i) holding, in a party political organisation, an office impinging wholly or mainly on party politics in the national field;
 - ii) speaking in public on matters of national political controversy;
 - iii) expressing views on such matters in letters to the press, in radio and television broadcasts and in books, articles, pamphlets or leaflets;
 - iv) canvassing on behalf of a parliamentary candidate or political party;
 - v) membership of the IOM Board of Education.

- (c) Local political activities include:-
- i) candidature for, or co-option to, local authorities;
 - ii) holding, in a party political or other organisation, an office impinging wholly or mainly on party politics in the local field.
 - iii) speaking in public on matters of local political controversy;
 - iv) expressing views on such matters in letters to the press, in radio and television broadcasts, and in books, articles, pamphlets or leaflets;

v) canvassing on behalf of candidates for election to local political or other organisation;

- (d) A civil servant seeking a seat in the House of Keys must resign his post as soon as he issues his address to the electors or in any other manner publicly announces himself, or allows himself to be publicly announced as a candidate.

An officer who resigns his post for such reason has no right of re-instatement in the Civil Service but he may be re-instated with the approval of the CSC.

Source: I.O.M. Civil Service Regulations.