Engaged audiences in the mediated disaster of Mount Merapi in Indonesia 2010.

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Engaged Audiences in the Mediated Disaster of Mount Merapi in Indonesia 2010

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Abstract

This thesis examines the audiences' involvement in the citizens' initiative of disaster relief efforts during the Mt. Merapi disaster in 2010. It focuses on the audiences' collective attention to different media outlets across platforms, their engagements with different forms of mediated collective action, and the processes that took place between the two. This study employs different methods, namely case study, process tracing, and network analysis, to analyse data gathered through a survey of 539 audience members, in-depth interviews with 64 audience members and 10 media persons, and various media archives.

It was found that audiences' collective attention to media outlets was fragmented across platforms. Nevertheless, the audiences could collectively concentrate their attention on the Mt. Merapi disaster, possibly because the structure and content of Indonesian mass media were biased toward Java – the island where Mt. Merapi was located – and because of the existence of Jalin Merapi, the people's crisis information network. The complexity of audiences' collective attention could be seen through their selection of objects of attention, their intentions in using the media, norms of paying attention, and competition between mainstream media and people's media. The collective actions performed by audiences were constituted through their interaction with the media, other audiences, and other related parties in their efforts to transcend private-public boundaries. From the audiences' viewpoints, the trajectory from collective attention to collective action consisted of efforts to overcome barriers to concentration of their attention, formulate the problem, imagine others, build resources, and cross private-public boundaries.

Focusing on audiences' engagement with disaster relief efforts is an attempt to go beyond 'contact with media' as the privileged moment to be investigated by audience study. In preference to a contact approach, the people's engagements with the others and the social world through media have been demonstrated to be a productive lens to understand media uses in disaster times.

Glossary

All of the words described here, unless noted otherwise, are Indonesian words, or acronyms of Indonesian words. Spelling of the words follows the *Ejaan Yang Disempurnakan* (EYD) established in 1972. For example, the vocal of 'u' in the old system was written 'oe', but in the EYD system is written 'u'. The glossary contains short explanations of organisations, media, and several local activities that are found to be important in my study.

Audiences, in the plural form, is an English word used here to underline its various activities, forms of affiliation, and media of preference. It can be interchanged with *media users* to emphasise the 'use' aspect of the concept. When dealing exclusively with the audience of newspapers, the word *readers* is used. When referring to other forms of collectivity (Pollini, 2000), which might involve media or not, but are clearly oriented toward a different concept, I use the word *publics* or *people*. The word *publics* refers to Dayan's (2001) concept of a collectivity which, among other characteristics, is aware of itself, presents itself in relation to other publics, and is capable of demanding (full discussion of the concept can be found in section 2.4. on page 63). The word *people* simply refers to a group of individuals, without further characterisation.

BPPTK (*Balai Penyelidikan dan Pengembangan Teknologi Kebencanaan Geologi* or the Board for the Research and Development of the Technology of Geological Hazard). Located in Yogyakarta, the organisation receives information from monitoring posts, sensors, and other instruments installed in the surroundings of Mt. Merapi. It produces and publishes reports about Mt. Merapi's activities. But it does not have the authority to declare changes in levels of emergency. During the crisis, control of the monitoring functions was in the hands of Surono, the head of PVMBG.

Combine (Community Based Information Network) **Resource Institute** is a non-governmental organisation that focuses on institutional development, development of information systems, and management of resources of local institutions. It became part of the Jalin Merapi network in 2006 and was responsible for the information system, including the website. In 2010, it coordinated the media centre, volunteers, and disaster relief initiatives on behalf of the Jalin Merapi network, while avoiding the spotlight of the media to the extent that in general people did not even know of the Combine's involvement in the effort.

Jalin Merapi was founded in 2006 to provide the people of Mt. Merapi with information appropriate to their local needs. It comprised three community radio stations on the slopes of Mt. Merapi, two community radio networks, and four local NGOs in cities surrounding Mt. Merapi. Now it has two additional community radio stations. Jalin Merapi is also the name of their website. In my study, I use the word 'Jalin Merapi' to refer to their website and its contents, while 'Jalin Merapi network' is used to refer to the organisation.

Kedaulatan Rakyat is the oldest (founded in 1945) and dominant local newspaper in the province of the Special District of Yogyakarta (*Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta*), with some distribution to other cities in the province of Central Java. In 2010, approximately 120 thousand copies of this newspaper were distributed. Since the 1950s it has been raising funds for disaster relief and other social causes.

Kompas is the most widely read national newspaper, with about half a million copies circulated every day. An online version of the paper was launched in 1995. Now 'kompas.com' has its own newsroom and not only publishes an online version of the print newspaper, but has also expanded the range of its contents. 'kompas.com' is the second most read Indonesian news site after detik.com.

Menyumbang means to donate or to contribute. Usually Indonesians give money and in kind donations directly to refugees or indirectly via the media, rather than to humanitarian organisations. Some humanitarian organisations, however, have started to be able to raise substantial amounts of money from the public for social causes, including disaster relief.

MetroTV is a national television channel that focuses on news programmes, along with entertainment programmes such as political parodies or talk shows. It is a free-to-air station and is the most popular news television channel.

Pengaduan means complaint. Under the New Order regime, the Indonesian public television network (TVRI) broadcast a special programme to discuss public complaints about the government in a self-restraining way. Today, national television channels do not explicitly discuss or entertain the public's complaints. Instead Indonesian audiences of broadcast media direct their complaints to the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI).

Pengungsi can be translated as refugee, evacuee, or internally displaced person.[1] In Indonesian, the word *pengungsi* does not imply an act of crossing national borders and does not imply passivity. Instead, it denotes the movement of a person or persons from their place of residence due to unwanted reasons. In order to emphasise the way they were viewed by Jalin Merapi's activists, I refer to them as survivors (*penyintas*).

Posko literally means coordinating post, a physical place, usually built as a temporary structure for a specific purpose, for example, to organise an event. In the Mt. Merapi disaster, many citizens' initiatives for disaster relief were organised in such *posko*.

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[1] Hull (2005), in his review of the words used in the press coverage of Katrina hurricane in the US, opines

PVMBG (*Pusat Vulkanologi dan Mitigasi Bencana Geologi* or Volcanology Survey Indonesia) is responsible for deciding the level of emergency on Mt. Merapi. In 2010, it was headed by Surono, who became known as *Mbah Rono* due to his apparent expertise in analysis and forecasting of Mt. Merapi's activities.

BNPB (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana or the National Agency for Disaster Management) is responsible for providing guidance and coordinating disaster management activities, including sheltering refugees. In each province, it has a local agency, called BPDB (the Local Agency for Disaster Management).

Silet is a gossip show on the RCTI television channel, which is known for the magniloquent language delivered by its now infamous host Feni Rose. This show is produced by Indigo, which mainly specialises in celebrity shows. In 2010, it was the most watched gossip show on television.

Sukarelawan means volunteer. During the relief response stage, there were roughly three types of volunteers working for the Jalin Merapi network: logistics volunteers in the field, information volunteers in the field, and media centre volunteers in the main office. Logistics volunteers and information volunteers could be the same persons, but some information volunteers worked exclusively on making reports.

TVOne is a national television channel that specialises in news and sports. Due to several critical mistakes it made in reporting the disaster, audiences nicknamed the channel *TV Oon*, which means stupid television.

Yogyakarta refers to both a city and the province, which comprises the city and the regency of Sleman, Kulon Progo, Bantul, and Gunung Kidul. As a province, it has a special status in that the king of Yogyakarta is automatically also the governor, due to the former king of Yogyakarta's support for the freedom of the Republic of Indonesia. Whenever necessary, the province will be described as the Special District of Yogyakarta to distinguish it from the city.

Notes on transcriptions and translations

Many of the transcriptions cited in this study are shortened from the original. This is indicated with the [...] sign, whereas the ... (without the brackets) indicates a long pause. The brackets ([]) are also used to insert notes to clarify the statements. When quoted, transcripts in Indonesian language will be printed in italic letters.

Twitter statuses quoted in this study are translated into English. I try to retain their conversational and informal style by copying the way in which the original updates used or abused capital letters, period signs, and slang. The original status updates are included in the footnotes.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

It was early evening and we were having dinner at an eatery on a busy road in the heart of Yogyakarta city when a friend, having received a short message from her friend, told us that Mt. Merapi had erupted. We stopped briefly to respond and then resumed eating. Rather oddly, I felt 'relieved', because it had finally erupted after so much waiting in anticipation. The next day, half of the front page of the most widely read national newspaper in Indonesia printed a picture of a victim, with both feet burned, being evacuated. In the following days, we received calls and suggestions telling us to evacuate, from our families and friends in other cities, even one in the US. But, to the contrary, friends from other cities came to donate aid to the refugees. (Personal recollection)

The news of the Mt. Merapi eruption on 26 October 2010 was, to some people who were familiar of the mountain, perhaps unremarkable, at least initially. Merapi, a Javanese word for fire, is located between several densely populated cities, with tens of thousands of people living on its slopes. It has been erupting for 10,000 years. The people of Yogyakarta accept the mountain as part of their reality to the extent that they orient their spatial awareness to an imaginary axis connecting the sea in the south (Indian Ocean) and Mt. Merapi, standing almost three thousand metres high on the north side. The eruption could have been an unremarkable event if it were not for the scale of its impact and the intensity of the media coverage that followed. The second series of eruptions started on 30 October 2010 and only receded after a big blast on 5 November 2010. It spewed volcanic ash hundreds of kilometres to the west of Java. The Yogyakarta airport was closed and the main road between Yogyakarta and Magelang, a city on the west side of the mountain, was rendered impassable by the mudflow. Many big universities, which hosted hundreds of thousands of students, ceased activities and were used for temporary shelters, not to mention numerous schools and public offices. Magelang, Boyolali, Klaten, and Yogyakarta were directly affected by the eruptions. More than three hundred lives were lost to this disaster.

Indonesia has seen numerous great natural disasters. The western part of the country sits on the perimeter of the 'Pacific Ring of Fire' (van Bemmellen, 1970 via Fiantis *et al.*, 2009), a dynamic tectonic plate that is prone to earthquakes and is home to 129 active volcanoes, amongst which Mt. Merapi on Java island is one the most active. Since the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions have stricken Indonesia and taken thousands of lives on the west side of the archipelago. To the majority of Indonesians who live far from the centre of event, and sometimes even to the locals, these disasters are largely mediated events that are responded to, in part, through media (Bintang, 2011; Birowo, 2010; Isbandiyah, 2008; Schiller *et al.*, 2008; Siegel, 2005). For this reason, Indonesia offers an ideal research setting for a study of differing forms of mediated engagement with disaster. The intensity of the Indonesian people's response to disaster suggests the role of media in the constitution of audiences' collective attention. One question that intrigues me is whether audiences' attention to disaster is fragmented, given the rapid pace of media expansion, commercialisation, and diversification in post-Suharto Indonesia. Furthermore, it would also be intriguing to know whether the Indonesian media lend themselves to particular forms of collective action in response to disaster.

Before I argue the importance of conducting this study, I will describe the nature of Indonesian, especially Javanese, society which serves as the context of my study. Java is one of the main islands of the Indonesian archipelago, a densely populated region which in 2010 accounted for 57% of Indonesia's population of 234 million. Java is central to Indonesia because it is where the central government, centres of economic activities, and centres of media industries are located. Mt. Merapi is located in the heart of Java, between the province of the Special District of Yogyakarta (*Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta*) and the province of central Java. Surrounding the mountain are the city of Magelang on the west side, Boyolali on the north side, Klaten on the east side, and Yogyakarta on the south side. Yogyakarta enjoys more advanced economic development than the other cities due to its popularity as a 'city of education' and a tourism destination, as exemplified by its population of more than two hundred thousand university students who come from other cities. Within this context, it is understandable that the prolonged eruption of Mt. Merapi incited the nation-wide intense media coverage and an influx of people and donations from other cities.

Disaster in Javanese society is interpreted using three different 'cosmological models': 'pre-Islamic tradition', 'Islam', and science (Wessing, 2010). Although they are different, in practice people use them alongside each other. People also see the behaviour of the volcano as an indication of what is happening or is going to happen in their everyday world, an alternative to the Western world's 'panopticon' (Dove, 2010). Thus, in the findings we will encounter the discourses of myths, religions, and sciences at the same time. However, these cosmologies and perspectives lie beyond the scope of my study. It suffices to note here that this interesting mix is an integral part of Javanese society.

My study argues that any attempt at understanding the Indonesian people's response to disaster has to take into account the people's media-related practices (Couldry, 2010; Hobart, 2010; Postill, 2010). Put differently, audience studies can learn from the specific context of Indonesian disaster, to understand in what ways the use of media in disaster is different usage from that in 'normal times'. Media consumption and media use are essential in this regard for three reasons. Firstly, in general the Indonesian people find out about a disaster through media. Secondly, the immensity of the Indonesian people's response to the Mt. Merapi disaster suggests that the media played a critical role. And thirdly, the Indonesian people responded to the disaster using media and through media, as exemplified by my own observation. Since the context is natural crisis, my study follows on from the observation made by previous researchers that to be an audience of mediated suffering rests on, and might indicate the formation of, a bigger collectivity (Boltanski, 2004; Chouliaraki, 2006; Höijer, 2008). Media audiences cannot merely rely on their immediate social connections, such as friends and families, to reach out to those affected by disaster. The media audiences have to network with other audiences, organise their efforts, and link with the local people of Merapi. In so doing, imaginations, certain ways of behaving, and certain values are defined, emphasised, constructed, and regulated.

This study builds on my personal involvement with the informally organised effort of raising and distributing donation for people affected by the Bantul earthquake in 2006. Following the relief effort, I was involved in the creation of a visual archive of two families affected by the earthquake, which allowed me to observe how the people and the community coped with the aftermath of disaster. I also saw first-hand the connection made between the community of survivors and outside helpers, who were strangers to each other. The connections were temporary, but essential. It triggered me to think about the role of media in disaster relief, which at the time comprised of both mass media and personal media, but with only a vague presence of community media and, almost negligible, 'new media'. But by 2010 the media landscape had changed and, perhaps, the people found new potentials in the use of these new media. My study is a formal attempt at understanding this phenomenon.

1.1. Significance of the Research

Sonia Livingstone and Ranjana Das (2013), in their reflection on the development of audience research, state that "three key insights" (p. 109) can be gained from the study of mass media (old media) audiences with regard to their authority, namely the audiences' authority on the making of meanings of media texts, the contextual nature of audiences' interpretation, and the audiences' agency in appropriation of media texts and technology (p. 4). Taking these lessons together and bringing them into the context of disaster and new media landscapes, my study attempts to explicate how audiences pay attention collectively across media platforms and use the various media to help them coordinate their actions in response to disaster. By orienting this project to audiences' role in disaster response, the notion of audiences' agency is expanded: from the realm of symbolic meaning-making to the realm of collective action.

The second import of this study lies in its focus on processes that connect the audiences' attention to their action. There have been studies about how audiences spread media contents (Green and Jenkins, 2011), cooperate online (Shirky, 2008; Sarcevic *et al.*, 2012; Starbird and Palen, 2011; Starbird, 2011), and coordinate offline (Rheingold, 2003; Drotner, 2005). However, studies of processes whereby audiences are transformed into collective actors, from the audiences' viewpoint, are still lacking. Furthermore, the fact that the people themselves are the first responders[2] to disaster underscores the significant role of media in networking people who otherwise remain separated (Fritz and William, 1957; Quarantelli, 1994, 2003). By seeing how the processes unfold, my study aims to reveal key moments and main processes that constitute such transformation.

This project looks at the use of various media by audiences in trying to understand how people engage with mediated others. In doing so, it anticipates complexities that the new media landscape has brought to audience research, such as how it enables or constrains participation (Bolin, 2012; Carpentier, 2011; Sundet and Ytreberg, 2009) or what theoretical approach is appropriate for studying this research area (Hermes, 2009; Livingstone, 2004). This project borrows and expands the concept of engagement to

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[2] In the field of disaster management, first responder usually refers to police officers, firefighters, and paramedics.

incorporate technological, textual, social, and referential dimensions of audiences' use of media (Goggin, 2011; Evans, 2011).

1.2. Theoretical Approach

The tradition of reception (Jensen, 2002; Jensen and Rosengren, 1990; Livingstone, 1998; Webster, 1998) within audience research views audiences as agents of meaning-making. Audiences make meaning[3] out of media text and through their everyday discourses. The model of text-audience has an unresolvable tension regarding whether the power of meaning-making lies with the text or lies with the audience or somewhere else; it also has problems in explaining whether the relationship between text and audience is stable and what causes it to change. This research will not attempt to resolve the problems of the text-audience model. It instead provides an alternative way to understand audiences beyond their immediate contact with the media.

At the conceptual level, my study frames the issue of media use from a practical perspective, that audiences do not create meaning for the sake of creating it. Audiences create meaning within the context of committing an intentional act. For example, rather than monitoring news to create meaning, it is more likely that the audiences are making an effort to ensure their own safety. Thus, it is through understanding the intentions, the reasons, for media use that we can understand audiences better. The framework needs to incorporate the moments before, during, and after the media contact because intentions link these separate moments as one act. This concept also implies that intent and action are not reducible to meaning and they are deemed to require separate conceptualisation. To put this in conceptual words, meaning is grounded in the audiences' intent and actions. Framed this way, the practical aspects of reaching a specific goal become more

[3] Here I follow Hall's (2010) framework to meaning, which understands meaning as a coded element of a sign-vehicle (p.117). Thus, an audience member creates the meaning of a media text by 'decoding' it using their socio-cultural training.

salient and have to be taken into account. With regard to audiences' collective action, this research will not only ask what the audiences mean when they collectively take an action, but it will also ask why they take an action and how they do it. Accordingly, in addition to abstracting fragmented discourses of the audiences, it will also pay attention to how audiences coordinate their action empirically, the logistics of their action, and the constraints they face.[4]

At the empirical level, the pervasiveness of media in all aspects of everyday life and the convergence of media technology and content make it now untenable to base audience research on a single media content (text) or single media institution. In the past, audiences were more sequestered (e.g. televisions in private homes) than now, when media devices are a constant presence, figuratively at any time in any place. The audience is increasingly in a less stable position created by media but in a fragmented yet constant state of being an audience, or 'audiencing', to borrow a concept from Fiske (1992). To complicate matters further, the fact that community media and social media, in which content is user-generated, play important roles in disaster response (Bruns *et al.*, 2012; Meier, 2012; Starbird and Palen, 2011; Starbird and Stamberger, 2010) makes a compelling case for modifying the reception tradition to include the concept of audiences' activity and to better define audiences' level of collective articulation (Carpentier, 2011). For example, we need to explore the possibilities of audiences' collective articulation beyond a product of aggregation of their responses, as conceived by Ang (1991) and Webster *et al.* (2006), or as a joint activity that shows a common purpose and the underlying organising efforts (Laurence, 2011).

1.3. Research Questions

To investigate the different ways in which the audiences engaged with the disaster

[4] A fuller discussion on current literature on audience studies and my approach can be found in section 2.1., page 29.

of Mt. Merapi, I select three moments of being audiences in the Indonesian disaster: paying attention, taking action, and transformation from the first state to the second state. Specifically, I investigate audiences who were involved in any one of the following three forms of collective actions: donating, volunteering, and complaining. It is hoped that these three forms of collective action can illuminate connections between collective attention and collective action because each of these collective actions involved different sets of media (Couldry *et al.*, 2007; Shirky, 2008; Rheingold, 2003). Following the aforementioned conceptual framework, this field study attempts to explore and to understand the following sets of questions:

1. How were audiences paying attention collectively to different media during the disaster? Does their collective attention show indications of fragmentation to many media outlets? What characterised the nature of the audiences' collective attention?
2. How did audiences donate money via mainstream media? How did audiences volunteer to the disaster relief efforts? How did audiences complain against television channels as an instance of collective speaking?
3. How were audiences transformed into collective actors of disaster relief effort? What processes and mechanisms were involved?

1.4. Scope of Investigation

Generally, only a limited number empirical studies on audiences in crisis have posited the agency of audience (Garner, 1996; Jeong, 2010; Kaplan, 2008; Palen, 2008; Starbird, 2011). In the context of Indonesian audience scholarship, there has also been a limited number of academic works, and even more limited are researches on Indonesian audience in crisis (Barker, 2008; Birowo, 2010; Hobart, 2000, 2006; Hughes-Freeland, 1998; Nilan, 2000; Schiller *et al.*, 2008). My study attempts to explore the potentials of audiences' agency during a disaster in Indonesia, focusing on the disaster of Mt. Merapi in 2010. This case can be illuminating because it is located in the heart of the island of

Java, where there are heavy concentrations of population, economic industries, and national media headquarters. In the weeks of the crisis, the national and local, new and old, media provided intense coverage of the event and there was an outpouring of response from different parts of the country.

Several directions are pursued in this study. First, to measure and to map the structure of audiences' attention to the mediated disaster across various media outlets, this research employs Ksiazek (2011) and Webster and Ksiazek's (2012) concept of cross-platform audience behaviour. This technique treats collective attention as an aggregate of media exposures. In addition, collective action is also investigated as an intentional social behaviour of paying attention (Laurence, 2011). Second, the unit of analysis is the individual participants in the collective actions. In addition to giving information about themselves, the individual participants can reveal information about their organisations, which can have important roles in the actions. Since this research is qualitative in nature, which means that the respondents of the survey are not randomly sampled, it cannot be generalised across audience populations.[5] Third, the objects of analysis of this study are audiences and media in three senses of the word: text, technology, and institution. How audiences actually use the media in disaster generally guides the study's decision on what media and which particular features (text, technology, institution) to focus on. Further discussion about data collection and data analysis is provided in section 3.2 (page 90).

The collectivity of collective behaviour can be conceptually problematic because some of its fundamental properties might not be present, such as common intention (Cripps, 2011), 'similar morphological characteristics in contiguity of time and space' (Melucci, 1996, p. 20), or norms (Turner, 2000). For example, some students might not have an intention to donate, or did not donate to *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, but the other

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[5] The issue of mixed methodology will be more extensively discussed in Chapter 3.

students and the teachers who donated acted on behalf of their school, which included the non-participants. In this case, the lack of intention complicates the collectivity of the donors. We can also see an indication of this problem in the case of 'disaster tourists', those who were more motivated by personal satisfaction to see the disaster for themselves, rather than to respond to the issues of shared concerns. The tourists might show the same behaviour (donating or helping in other way), but they followed a self-centred norm, rather than the other-centred norms, which were more dominant in the context of disaster. Here there is no single norm that regulates the behaviours of all of the participants. The differences and variations within a collectivity pose a question whether they are indeed an entity or a collection of separate entities.

My study aims to describe and understand the collective attention and collective action not as a monolithic category and a stable state to be explained, rather as a process in which the collectivity itself emerges (Melucci, 1996, p. 15). Divisions and differences within the collectivities, to an extent, will be described in this study (see further discussions about the collective dimension of collective attention in section 2.3 on page 54, the collective dimension of collective action in section 2.4 on page 63, and the conceptual framework of this study in Chapter 6, page 224). Hence, for example, the process in which collectivity of the donors emerged is examined. And why disaster volunteerism, rather than tourism, was the acceptable collective behaviour is examined by understanding the formation of collective attention.

1.5. Chapter Outline

This thesis is an exploration of how media audiences respond to a disaster, which requires the field of audience study to overlap with the study of collective action. The path this study treads starts with **Chapter 1**, which describes the core questions and personal and social contexts that shape these questions. It also outlines the theoretical approach that sets the boundaries of the exploration.

Chapter 2 reviews the academic literature of audience study as it pertains to the issue of how contemporary development of the media affects our understanding of audiences. Subsequently, it discusses different research perspectives on how people use media in disaster. Works on the two crucial moments of audience response to disaster, collective attention and collective action, are surveyed to lay a strong foundation for this research. Literature on the moment of transformation is separately discussed in Chapter 6.

Chapter 3 provides the rationale for using a mixed methods approach to audience response, which entails the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods for data collection and data analysis. Furthermore, the chapter explicates the analytical concepts of attention and action to provide the framework of this research. These analytical concepts require different types of data, such as numeric data and verbal statements, which are analysed using different methods, including network analysis, process tracing, and a case study approach. This chapter also documents the specific methodological problems of my study.

Chapters 4, **5**, and **6** describe the findings of my study. **Chapter 4** begins by describing the contemporary landscape of Indonesian media and audiences, especially how wide adoption of smartphones and the internet has changed audiences' behaviour in disasters. Through network analysis, the degree to which the audiences' collective attention is fragmented among or concentrated on media outlets is measured. Furthermore, the chapter argues that the audiences' exposures to media outlets themselves matter less than their purposive behaviours in using the media, which requires taking into account what they pay attention to, for what purposes, what norms regulate their behaviours, and how the 'public's attention' is competed for.

Chapter 5 expounds how the audiences' different forms of collective action, namely donating, volunteering, and complaining, unfold. It especially focuses on mechanisms the audiences use to break down the private-public boundaries in their action. It also considers how the audiences join the actions and how contemporary arrangements of both mainstream and the people's media constitute a new visibility for their collective action.

Chapter 6 traces the processes by which the audiences overcome barriers to moving from attention to action. From the audiences' perspective, these barriers are inherent in their engagements with the multitude of media, in the uncertain frames of the event, the stranger-relationship between the audiences themselves and with the suffering others, their lack of resources to act, and the decision to act itself. The chapter intimately engages temporal aspects of this transformation.

Chapter 7 draws from and discusses the findings of the Chapters 4, 5, and 6 in light of the contemporary literature on audience studies. It also highlights this study's contribution to the field of audience study, mediated collective action, and disaster communication. Finally, this chapter explores the generalisability of this research and the future research agenda.

Chapter 2. Literature Review

In this chapter, I review academic literature relevant to this study, especially the challenges and debates of audience studies. I start with the topic of audience itself to consider theoretical development during the past decades, especially to do with the ever-changing nature of media technology. Then I review the scholarship on audience in the specific context of disaster to learn what the empirical findings are and whether these empirical findings are in alignment with current scholarship. The two last sections, relating to collective attention of audiences and collective action of audiences, examine the conceptual grounds that inform the research question of this study. At the end of this chapter I will sketch important debates in audience research that are relevant to this study, to locate the gap in the literature, and to indicate the potential contribution of this study to scholarship.

2.1. Overview of Audience Studies

Several authors have proclaimed that the notion of mass audience is dying (Allor, 1988; Livingstone and Das, 2013). However, both academic and commercial interests are still putting a lot of energy into this field. For example, more than 280 researchers across Europe, as part of the COST programme, have been collaborating on studying transformation of audiences and societies during the past four years.[6] In addition, *Participations*, an online journal dedicated to the study of audiences, has focused on diverse issues relating to audiences during the past decade. And there is no lack of research initiatives in the field of advertising to measure audiences' use of various media (e.g., Pilotta *et al.*, 2004; Glenn and Kelly, 2010). Nevertheless, various problems face the study of media audiences that derive from its key constitutive elements, the

[6] Last accessed 1 May 2014 at: http://www.cost-transforming-audiences.eu/

media.

Media, as socio-economic institutions and as technological assemblages, have changed constantly over time. Although a glance at the media technology sections in popular publications suggests that the continual introduction of new media technology is the main interest, it is not so much the newness of the communication artefact itself that researchers view as important, but how the media realise new 'structures of communication' (Gitelman and Pingree, 2003). In my thesis, I am following Gitelman and Pingree's concept to define new media as media that allow a new structure of communication, distinguished by, among others, their more interactive, participatory, and abundant characteristics.

These three topics, namely interactivity, participatory potentials, and abundance, are the areas in which this study will overlap with the interests of other audience researchers. The interactivity of the new media is thought to allow greater agencies so that the concept of user is more appropriate to employ than the concept of audience (Livingstone, 1998). The fact that many of the social network sites, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, rely on their users for their content questions the idea that audiences are mere users; instead, it blurs the distinction between producers and users (Bruns, 2006). And the abundance of media outlets and communication devices erodes the idea that audience is a unitary entity, which emerges from the free-to-air television system (Webster, 1986). The following sections will elaborate on these issues and how the audience researchers investigate them. The goal of this overview is to map some of the relevant developments of audience studies and, in so doing, to develop a working definition of audience that fits this study.

Audiences or Users?

The conceptual blurring of audiences and users stems from the unprecedented capabilities that the 'new' media offer. New media offer unprecedented quality in terms of how they allow, or even necessitate, people to interact with them to realise their potential, such as in the case of engaging with a social network site, playing multi-user online games, or commenting on a forum thread. The image of 'couch potatoes' sitting in front of a stream of broadcast messages begins to turn into one of users capable of using different media devices. What captures the interest of audience researchers is this idea of interactivity of the new media, although its definition is not free from debate. One audience researcher, Klaus Bruhn Jensen (2005), conceptualises interactivity as a dimension of the relationship between agent, medium, and structure. He observes, '[...] the modern media are constitutive elements of social interaction [...]; on the other hand, especially digital media forms increasingly facilitate interactivity [...], as earlier media forms begin to converge, to a degree, on a single computer platform'. (p. 5). According to him, interactivity can be understood as a two-way relationship between agent and medium, medium and structure, and structure and agent, resulting in three types of interactivity. This model situates the interactivity of new media in the dual nature of structure as enabler and constraint of human agency.

If we delve deeper into the literature of interactivity, we find that the concept is neither well established nor accepted universally. Different theoretical angles result in different definitions that are not mutually compatible. Gane and Beer (2008) find three definitions of interactivity, focusing respectively on technical properties, social context and experience of the users, and the power relations that structure the interaction. Kiousis (2002) offers a similar concept, which focuses on properties of the technology, communication context, and users' perceptions, without the dimension of power relations. In another review of the literature of interactivity, Lister *et al.* (2009) reduce the complex meaning of interactivity to its 'instrumental level of meanings' (p. 22), which is more commonly used in relation to vernacular publications and allows them to limit themselves to the dimension of user-media. The main difference with new media is that they allow users 'to directly intervene in and change the images and texts that they access' (*ibid.*). Instead of surveying the breadth of the concept of interactivity, my intention here is simple enough, that is, to illustrate the diversity of the concept of interactivity. What is relevant to the aim of this review is how the growing importance of the concept has been responded to by audience studies.

In 2004 Sonia Livingstone asked, 'What is the audience researcher to do in the age of the internet?' (p. 75). She observed the emergence of new trends in communication, namely 'communication among peers' and the substitution of audiences by users (p. 75), and asked whether the text-reader metaphor of audience research could be brought forward to study users of 'new, converged, interactive media' (p. 78). The text of new media is 'often multimodal, hypertextual and ephemeral' (p. 81) and it is experienced in private space (p. 82), which the text creates methodological challenges for the researcher. Although she accepted the material dimension of the new media, she argued that a portable music player is not comparable to a washing machine in that the former hosts symbolic meaning that renders a study on its mere consumption inadequate (although see also Press and Livingstone, 2006). Consequently, she maintained, the metaphor of reader-text in audience research can still be carried over to the new media. Livingstone suggested that researchers should analyse the thinking and feelings of audiences through their physical use of new media, such as clicking, typing, designing, playing, and collecting favourite media.

Taking heed of Livingstone's suggestion to carry the metaphor of text-reader further into the territory of new media, Das (2011) explores the concept of interpretation in her study of Facebook users. She sees audience as an 'interface' concept that needs to straddle the tension between individual agency and social structure on the one hand, and textual determinism and social determinism on the other hand (Press and Livingstone, 2006). Das approaches audience as an issue of reception (of text), instead of consumption (of object), and focuses on the 'interpretative work' done by audiences (p. 23-25). She then operationalises this interpretative work to include the following tasks.

'Lateral referencing' is the task readers perform to identify a genre or convention based on their previous reading. 'Interruptions' are the tasks of tackling problems inherent in the texts. 'Critique' is a task that concerns how the readers resist, are sceptical of, or accept the texts. And finally, 'play, pleasure and connection' are tasks readers perform to engage with each other or represent themselves without collaboration. Furthermore, she uses her empirical findings to expand the legacies of reception theories, especially the concepts of gap-filling, horizons of expectation, and wandering viewpoints (p. 209). She maintains that gap-filling, which pertains to readers' responses to indeterminacy or unclearness in texts, translates well into issues of using social network sites, for example, 'hesitation in clicking on a hyperlink' (p. 213). She employs the concept of horizons of expectation to help her understand how the experience of using Facebook is related to the user's experience of using MySpace. However, the concept of wandering viewpoints poses some problems to her in that the basic unit upon which a reader bases their expectation is 'extremely difficult' to translate to the interface of social network sites (p. 221) and the uses of social network sites (gaming, chatting, etc.) are too diverse to explain.

We can see that the metaphor of reader-text can, to some extent, be expanded to account for the use of social network sites. However, I also see problems in transferring the concept of reception to the use of new media. To give an example, framing a user's difficulty in managing social network sites as an issue of 'gap' in a textual sense misses a key point (p. 199-201) in that it does not discriminate between different levels of the problem. The user's difficulties could be a result of information overcrowding on the website (cognitive level), or an issue of unclear navigation (interactive level), or a problem of visual design (perceptual level). It is not clear at what level the textual gap should be located and whether the inference made by the researcher is validated by the user's experience. In other words, the metaphor of reader-text reduces and transforms a problem that pertains to the specific modality of a technology into a problem of hermeneutics, and this does not do justice to the medium's modality or to the user's experience. Another issue with the reader-text model is that it cannot account for the simultaneous, co-present, and asynchronous yet collective experience that are key features of what is labelled as new media today (Jensen, 2008). To be able to carry the metaphor further, the reader-text metaphor needs to modify or to abandon the traditional model of reading as an individual and a linearly progressing activity.

Readers or Authors, Users or Producers?

The second issue posed to audience studies by the rise of 'new' media, in which the users produce most of the contents, concerns the position of audiences in the circulation of media meaning and content. A typical argument would be that the transition from static mass media to interactive media means the source and guarantor of the meaning is no longer the author of the text, but the audiences themselves.[7] The argument may, or may not, involve the interactivity of new media, but it diverges from the issue of audiences-users and takes a new direction toward the cultural process of making meaning. In the next paragraphs, I will now discuss a sample of the current literature on audience that explicitly deals with the participatory potential of the 'new' media. The authors are Rob Cover (2004), Nico Carpentier (2011), and Axel Bruns (2006).

Cover (2004) claims that the rise of interactivity has a long history in the development of media and that it is based on 'a strongly held and culturally based desire to participate in the creation and transformation of the text' (p. 174). He especially exemplifies level-editing in electronic games and the publication of programming code as a 'democratic push in the democratisation of textual participation' (p. 187). The drive

[7] Criticism against the sovereignty of the producers of message in the meaning-making process is already a long tradition (e.g., Hall, 1980), but it finds new vigour in the proliferation of the 'participative web' (Vickery and Wunsch-Vincent, 2007). My review is specifically oriented toward this context.

to democratise, he contends, does not result from the participatory characteristics of the medium, but the medium 'evidences the possibility of democracy as cultural demand' (p. 188). He does not elaborate, however, how editing a game level can be democratic or what makes a specific modification of a game a democratic exercise. Or, to use his own example, what makes a modification of a game more democratic than playing with Lego since both exemplify openness and participation? In other words, my point is that participation in game modification cannot be easily equated with a democratic exercise without further contextualisation of the power relations in the particular society.

Along the same line of criticism, Carpentier (2011) finds the conflation of interaction and participation causes a serious problem because interaction with media content is radically different from participation 'in' a media production and from participating with public life 'through' media (p. 519-520). This conflation, he continues, ignores the long existence of alternative and community media and their struggle to participate (p. 528), while the supposed 'rise of interaction' as evidenced by the wide use of digital media does not necessarily result in increased intensity of participation in media production (pp. 523-524). On the other hand, it also ignores the existing division of production and reception, at least in mainstream mass media, and its asymmetric power relations that are hard to challenge (p. 527). The powerful media industry, for example, can commodify audiences' taste (Jenkins, 2006 via Carpentier, 2011). Carpentier's criticism reminds us to situate the emergence of new media, along with its interactive and participatory offerings, in the wider context of old media. This valid criticism finds its limit in the case of a production system that is totally financially supported by the users, such as Wikipedia, and which is beyond the control of corporations. In the case of Wikipedia, articles are produced by regular members (Swartz, 2006) and the Wikipedia foundation and its staff have to accept the decisions of their volunteer editors (Shirky, 2008). The users can also, at least theoretically, break free from the old media of the print encyclopaedia, such as by relying on Wikipedia exclusively.

Another theoretical angle from which to view the transformation of audiences is offered by Axel Bruns (2006, see also Benkler, 2006; Shirky, 2008) who views the audiences' participation as going beyond using an interface, to actually creating media content. The collaborative environment made possible by the internet and new media technologies 'breaks down the boundaries between producers and consumers and instead enables all participants to be users as well as producers of information and knowledge' (p. 2). Such collaboration is continuous in nature and pursues further improvement. He calls audiences 'prod*us*ers' (a conflation of producers and users). The cases of open source software, Wikipedia and news curation, among others, exemplify a 'paradigm shift' whereby the linear flow of a message running through producers, distributors, and consumers is replaced by a 'collaborative, participatory environment' (p. 2). The paradigm shift 'is supported in part also by the rise of new media technologies' in that the new media affect 'our consciousness and understanding of the world around us, as well as our place within it' (p. 7).

Van Dijck (2009) criticises the idea that audiences' capacities are enabled by new media, contending that the concept is biased toward new media as if audiences of old media are passive, a notion which has also been under severe criticisms (by Hall, 1980; Morley, 1980; Blumler and Katz, 1974), whilst users of new media are active. The concept, he argues, also tends to lump together different users' affinities and relationships into a non-discriminating concept of community and it ignores the power of the commercial platform to control interactions they host (p. 43). Bird (2011) raises a more frontal criticism that participation in the production of media content is not the norm and, even if audiences participate in media production, participation in the larger context of everyday life is overlooked by the concept of 'produser' (Bruns, 2006). Furthermore, the concept retains too close a connection with new media so it loses sight of other mediated practices that are facilitated by other media platforms. Bird gives the example, amongst other, of weddings and amateur wrestling, which are widely practised and heavily influenced by media, but are overlooked by the concept, and hence are not considered to be instances of 'produsage'. In other words, Bird understands participation as diverse engagements with socio-cultural words through the use of various media.

To take account of the constant technological developments and changes to media structure, which complicate the issue of participation, my approach is to discriminate the origins of the concept and its application in different contexts. So, to take the case of Wikipedia as an example, the new communication technologies have enabled collaboration on an unprecedented scale which has resulted in a widely used product. The participation of 'produsers' is key in such projects. Swartz (2006) found that the majority of Wikipedia contributions, defined in terms of numbers of letters contributed, come from casual editors (who made fewer than 25 edits, but contributed more letters), not from heavy editors (who made thousands of edits, but contributed fewer letters for each edit). And Shirky (2008) argues that although Wikipedia contributors represent a very low percentage of its users, the idea that their contribution will be read by many is what makes it worth the effort. The standard argument, in short, is that the adoption of new communication technologies widens the participatory space (Bruns, 2006). However, participation in the form of editing a wiki is different from using it, which is also different from participation in legal efforts to legalise it (Lessig, 2005). The example of Wikipedia editors defines participation in the context of the use of a collaborative online platform. If we take the concept of participation from democratic theory, especially in its radical sense, and apply it in these contexts, then the victory of Wikipedia looks very limited since the majority of its users do not really write or edit an entry and the mechanism of decision-making does not meet the ideals of a deliberative process, which is an important element of democratic theory (Carpentier, 2011; Keegan and Gergle, 2010). The danger of applying an ill-defined concept of participation to audiences' activities is real, especially when new media are seen as providing unique opportunities to participate in the wider social life. It could result in failure to see the wider range of media, not only the 'new', that audiences use, and failure to see how these media are put to use. Regarding this particular issue, my study approaches the audiences' participation, or their collective action, *as audiences' collective effort in making observable contributions for those affected by the disaster through the use of media devices, or by collaborating with the media organisations.* Nevertheless, this is not an attempt to claim that media have an exclusive or the most important role in the process, only to make my study more sensitive to the different uses of media.

Fragmentary or Concentrated Audiences?

The other media development that is relevant to my study concerns the impact on audience aggregates of exposure to media. In this discourse, audiences are measured by their contact with media. Of course, measuring how many media, how frequently, and for how long people use them is a very rudimentary construct if we compare it to the complex cultural discourses that surround media use, or the domestic context of the reception. It also reminds us of Ang's (1991) criticism of market, public, and academic institution discourses that attempt to conquer audiences and turn them into subjects to be controlled, policed, and exploited. Despite these criticisms, I believe that to a certain extent, exposure to media is a valid and necessary construct to explain co-orientation of otherwise separate and dispersed individuals. The construct of media exposure is valid to the extent it measures the co-presence of media users and the media, without making assumptions on audiences' quality of attention. This form of measure is necessary, since without exposure, there would be no commonality of media use between people who use different media in different places during approximately the same time period. Furthermore, learning from these researches helps me to situate this project and to show both its continuation and its discontinuation in terms of previous scholarship, which I will reflect on at the end of the chapter.

In the United States of America, the emergence of cable television and VCRs in the 1980s was seen as a challenge to the existing idea of the television audience as a unitary entity, due to television programmes being 'uniform, uncorrelated with channels, and universally available' (Webster, 1986, p. 78). The once uniform exposure to a limited number of channels has now been transformed into fragmentary exposures divided on the basis of channels, time, and technologies. Cable viewers turned out to be younger and more affluent; they valued variety of programming, and their technology of preferences changed as well (interested in VCRs and computers) (Krugman, 1985). Furthermore, Webster found that some channels are more attended to by their audience than others. In the case of a particular Spanish-language channel, although its audience share was very small compared to the other channels, the amount of time allocated to it by its audience was greater than the time allocated by audiences to big stations such as ABC, CBS, and NBC (p. 87).

These studies indicate a new development in terms of audiences, namely the fragmentation of audiences. Fragmentation refers to the wide distribution of audiences across an ever-growing number of channels. Furthermore, fragmentation not only affects how stations structure their programming or how the advertisers target the market, but it also raises doubts as to whether the television message still strongly affects the audiences indifferently, whether television can still be the centre of public attention, or whether audiences live in their own separate worlds of media contents (Gitlin, 1998; Franklin, 2005, pp. 19-20; Katz, 1996).

Twenty years later, Webster (2005) found that the increase in the number of television channels to more than three hundred had reduced the total audience share of the three big networks (ABC, CBS, NBC), leaving each network with less than a 10% share. This decline was related to the segmentation of audiences based on content, a widespread occurence. Although segmented, the audiences consumed the television network 'omnivorously', which meant that loyal viewers of segmented networks spread their viewing time across other channels, just like audiences of general programming networks (p. 380). The thesis of audience fragmentation by structural factors has since been tested and confirmed in studies on, for example, content of political blogs (Lee, 2007), the television market in Guangzhou (Yuan, 2008), and Austrian news consumers (Kim and Webster, 2012; Trilling and Schoenbach, 2013).

My study needs to consider the issue of fragmentation carefully because the Indonesian audiences have experienced similar, yet different developments. The foremost media platform in Indonesia, in terms of penetration and advertising revenue, is television. The television industry in Indonesia offered 11 free-to-air national television channels in 2010, an increase from only one government channel in the eighties and five commercial channels in the late nineties. Following the fall of the authoritarian regime and the fast growth of media industries, cable television had less than a 3% market share in 2010.[8] Thus, although there has been some fragmentation of Indonesian television audiences, relative to the previous situation, they have yet to embrace the cable television platform. In addition, we need to take account of other media platforms as well, such as newspapers, radio, and websites, which saw fast growth following the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1998. This issue will be extensively discussed in Chapter 4 under the topic of introduction to Indonesian media in 2010 (page 118).

To recapitulate the preceding sections, I have reviewed a sample of literature on audience studies, especially with regard to the emergence of new media and the proliferation of media outlets that has followed this. I have focused on three specific

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[8] Fahmi, Ismail. (2013). *Televisi Berbayar: Pertumbuhan Pasar RI Paling Lambat di Asia* (*Paid Television: Indonesia's Market Growth Slowest in Asia*). Last accessed 6 May 2014 at: http://industri.bisnis.com/read/20130317/105/3899/televisi-berbayar-pertumbuhan-pasar-ri-paling-lambat-di-asia

aspects that have interested audience researchers and are relevant to this study, namely the new media's interactivity, audiences' participation, and fragmentation of audiences. The interactivity of new media has been reframed using the metaphor of text-reader to expand the scope of audiences' interpretation into the use of social network sites. However, this still fails to account for different levels of technical affordances, not to mention new media-enabled interaction with other users. The second aspect is to do with agency of audiences in creating media content. In several cases, such as that of Wikipedia, new media have enabled people to create their own content. However, we need to refrain from expanding the argument of participation too far, since in general people do not produce media and mainstream media platforms are generally still controlled by commercial corporations. The participatory potentials of new media have to be defined properly to avoid confusion of theoretical backgrounds. The last set of literature concerns how technology enables proliferation of media outlets and how it affects audiences' exposure to them, in aggregate. It has been found that audiences' exposure is fragmented across many media, which begs the question whether Indonesian audiences reflected the same trend in 2010. And, if so, how did it affect constitution of their collective attention to the disaster? The question of collective attention is discussed after the following section. In the following section, I review audiences' behaviour in disasters to give a more empirical overview of my field of study.

2.2. Audience in Disaster

Audience studies in the specific context of disasters are few and far between. During the search of online catalogues of journal articles, I inevitably needed to widen the scope and to include conceptually-related types of threats, namely risk and crisis, which produced a limited number of articles. Among those few studies, the majority of them concerned managerial aspects of a crisis and how to effectively communicate a crisis. Here I will group the literature into three topics based on the studies' approach toward audiences. The first, and the most common, approach views audiences as communicants in a communication process, or as receivers of transmitted messages. Empirical audiences are studied in a model of information transfer that is linear and disembedded from audiences' socio-cultural context. The second group comprises research that evaluates existing models of crisis communication from the perspective of audiences. In so doing, the focus shifts from 'how to communicate effectively' to 'how audiences understand empirically'. The second type of research also tries to restore some agency to audiences, rather than approaching them as mere targets of information campaigns. The third approach views audiences as actors of crisis communication who produce their own messages, in contrast to the professional-led crisis communication that has defined the field of crisis communication. At the end of this section I will connect literature on audiences in disaster with literature on disaster sociology to discuss and to compare findings about mediated communication with the larger context of human behaviour in disaster.

Audience as Communicant

The *audience-as-communicant* type of research sees audience as the receiving component of a message transfer and this is probably the most common approach to studying audience in disaster. This usually leads to a focus on how the audience interpret a message, whether in control of or being 'controlled' by the message.

Although we can group them in the same type of research, different scholars use different lenses and foci on different issues of audience in disaster. Garner (1996) focused on how audiences framed their interpretation of news of disaster and, conversely, how media informed the frame these audiences used in understanding news. It was found that 'readers evaluated the [...] stories and found the crash to be "typical" and what they "expected"' (p. 12). This shows the intimate connection between the media's supply of their audiences' common stock of knowledge about disaster and the audiences' consequent perceptions of the typicality of the media's coverage of disaster. Jeong (2010) conducted an experiment where differently attributed causes of damage in disaster were related to the audience's intent to donate and their feelings toward the victims. He found that '... the public may support the victims of uncontrollable events more than those of controllable events' (p. 328). Kaplan's study (2008), although focusing more on images of suffering rather than images of disaster, shed some light on how audiences theoretically would respond to them. She postulated different relationships that the audiences might develop with the images: audiences might be vicariously traumatised by the images, might develop empty empathy, or might become witnesses of the suffering.

Kueneman (1975) also views audiences as communicants, but he focuses his attention to how producers of mass media perceived the audience's response to disaster news and how these perceptions affected their work process. For example, the media tended to believe that the public might panic, which led to the situation where 'reports of disaster [...] tended to be more strictly checked than reports normally are' (p. 7) and led to them withholding information that was perceived to be sensitive. Put in this context, Perez-Lugo's (2004) study of audiences impacted by Hurricane Georges in Puerto Rico proposes a critical evaluation, namely not to see the media solely as conveyors of information. She argues that audiences impacted by the hurricane used media not only for its content, but also more for its 'latent functions', such as 'emotional support, companionship, and community ties, than for their need for official information' (p. 219). Media use during a disaster does not stop when the electricity goes off, but switches from television to radio and then newspapers when the battery runs out of power. The study reveals important insights regarding the use of media during disaster, but still leaves important questions unanswered, such as how audiences talk to each other and whether their interactions with each other produce new information as a common resource.

An interesting study was conducted by Kivikuru (2006) in which she mapped the Finnish media landscape directly after the 2004 tsunami struck South East Asia and how tension built up between senders and receivers of disaster information. On the one hand, the senders of the information were the old players, namely the government and the mass media. Both of these still clung to the one-way communication approach, which resulted in a sluggish response from the government and melodramatic and national-centric media reporting. On the other hand, audiences were agitated by the media's coverage and briefly crowded to the new media, but found themselves as a collection of individuals rather than a community of citizens. The tension between their eagerness to participate and the rigidity of the media's structure led the audience to expect 'the state to take care of all their needs', a carryover from their history as a welfare state (p. 509). Although this is an interesting insight, the author overlooks several instances where audiences can be seen as participating publics. Public participation can take the form of speaking, donating, and taking action (Boltanski, 2004). Put in the context of Finnish audiences, complaint letters from audiences to the government can illuminate their orientation toward citizenship; Finns' donation to the victims may reveal the motivation and discourse of the donors with regard to the disaster; and Finns in the affected areas who were actually taking action to inform Finnish audiences in their home country also constitute an indispensable subject of study.

The sample of literature reviewed here suggests that when audiences are seen as targets of crisis communication, those issue of audiences' capacity to participate in production of crisis information is overlooked, which is not a problem in itself. It becomes a problem when this viewpoint dominates the field to the extent that the new phenomenon of people-powered crisis communication does not receive enough attention.

Audience as Perspective

The second line of research can be termed as *audience-as-perspective* as this does not focus on an empirical audience, but focuses instead on crisis communication and crisis management from the perspective of audience. This approach is grounded in the idea that meaning-making is a pluralistic phenomenon. On the individual level, everyone has different experiential background that influences his or her idea of risk (Cannell and Otway, 1988, p. 521). On the collective level, the contemporary world is characterised by plural collective affiliations that influence our process of sense-making (Falkheimer and Heide, 2006; but see also Lee, 2004). By adopting the perspective of the audience, plurality of meanings and the various socio-cultural factors that influence the process are taken into consideration. In other words, since the process and the message itself are shown to be uncertain, this shifts our attention from 'how to inform the audiences' to 'how and what the audiences make of it'.

Cannell and Otway make the case for professional communicators putting less emphasis on controlling the message and more on serving "information needs perceived by their audience" (p. 524). This idea was not only driven by the fact that audiences are diverse, but also that every citizen in a democratic society has the right to know about risks to which they might be exposed. Falkheimer and Heide (2006), from different theoretical angles, view crisis as being 'a sense-making process [...] where reality is negotiated and constructed by in cultural contexts and situations' (p. 180). In the wider context of culture, organisation is only one actor in a society that interacts in the construction of an understanding of reality (p. 187). Based on this idea, they call for crisis communication research to be orientated toward the audience, among other research agendas. Unfortunately, this call has not been heeded. The only example I could find of empirical crisis communication research that adopts the same perspective will be discussed below.

Vihalemm *et al.* (2011) conducted focus groups with Estonian participants who had or had not experienced a flood and who were given simulated warnings of a crisis. One of the goals was to identify the audiences' strategies in response to the message about crisis. The researchers found three strategies were employed by the audiences: trusting the mass media, sourcing from their social networks, and a strategy of (non) action without checking the information. The interesting finding was that although Estonian audiences trusted the mass media, which were perceived to be 'reliable' and acting 'in the best interest of public' (p. 5), they also consulted their social networks, whom they perceived to be experts on this issue. Their strategy to source information from their social networks was partly to do with their lack of trust in the government. We can see here that ordinary people, not only specialists groups, have a role in crisis communication. The expanded model of crisis communication implied by the research reviewed here, which includes non-professional communicators, nevertheless fails to anticipate the possibility the possibility that people affected by disaster are themselves capable of developing their own communication system.

Audience as Communicator

In addition to the above two approaches, audience-as-perspective and audience-as-communicant, there is one further approach, namely *audience-as-communicator*. It sounds like a contradictory term. But it is contradictory only if we see the communicator and the communicant (audience) as separate entities, which means that one entity cannot at the same time become the other. But if we see both of these as positions, then it is possible for them to switch freely between the two positions.

Crisis communication 'occurs throughout the crisis management process' (Coombs, 2009, p. 99). Since crisis is defined by its 'impact on the organisation's performance', crisis communication concerns itself with organisational issues and its aim is to redress the harmful impact. This definition suffers from 'managerial bias' (Heath, 2010) since it sees the organisation as the main victim of the crisis and, in so doing, it forgets other social formations, including other publics (Waymer and Heath, 2007; Seeger, 2006). Furthermore, it prioritises organisations as the main actors in crisis management. Although he has struck on the core problem, Heath's criticism has not tackled the larger problem, which is disintegration of the dividing wall between professional communicators and engaged audiences in crisis communication. The professional-amateur division in crisis communication is eroded by the abundance and lowering cost of communication that have created amateur ad-hoc crisis communicators (Shirky, 2008). Communicators in contemporary crises are no longer media professionals and public relations managers alone, but engaged audiences as well (Kim and Dutta, 2009). Crisis communication, which reflects perspectives of professional communicators, now needs to incorporate the perspectives of audiences.

People in disaster situations communicated with each other before the invention of the internet and mobile phones. What makes the adoption of the internet and mobile phones matter is that it has allowed people to aggregate information from different places and simultaneously distribute it. Although the end result is not as polished as that produced by mainstream media, citizen-produced crisis communication has become the *de facto* information source for many people (Bruns *et al.*, 2012; Gillmor, 2004; Starbird and Palen, 2011). Citizens' initiatives in disaster communication range from disaster mapping (Meier, 2012), to being information operators (Starbird and Stamberger, 2010), to being information volunteers. Often first responders are people who are affected by the disaster or visitors from the surrounding areas (Fraustino *et al.*, 2012; Parr, 1969; Prince, 1920; Stallings and Quarantelli, 1985). Not only do they help to evacuate victims and to distribute aid relief, but these people also contribute information that can be vital in a disaster (Bruns *et al.*, 2012; Palen, 2008; Starbird and Stamberger, 2010). The next section will engage with emerging literature on citizens' initiatives in disaster communication.

Audiences as Disaster Communicators

Lang and Benbunan-Fich (2010) compare the use of social media in two disasters (the Virginia Tech shootings and the 2009 blizzard in Britain) using their own framework of public engagement. Although the authors did not see the people as audiences, but rather as 'members of the public', it is very reasonable to argue that people's actions were taken into account also in their capacity as audiences because both of the studied events (Virginia Tech shooting and UK blizzard) were highly covered by media and the media that people used (Facebook and Twitter) were highly integrated with other mass media. The conceptual framework proposed by Lang and Benbunan-Fich consists of four modules of e-participation: selection, facilitation, deliberation, and aggregation. It is a significant step in advancing our understanding of what audiences do in relation to participation in disaster communication. Nevertheless, in general, audience research on this topic is lacking.

Among many kinds of tasks undertaken by audiences, one pertinent activity is distributing information. Bruns and Burgess (2012) and Bruns *et al.* (2012) observed how information published on the micro-blogging service Twitter during the South East Queensland floods in Australia and the Christchurch earthquake in New Zealand reached wider audiences, within and outside the country, because it was reposted (re-tweeted) by Twitter users. Although the sources of original information are dominated by government agencies, local governments, and news organisations, the role of individual Twitter users in amplifying the message and focusing the public's attention cannot be overlooked, since it is critical to the distribution of crisis information. And we are starting to see deeper engagement by publics, such as tweaking of Twitter status updates related to disaster so that they are machine-readable (Starbird and Palen, 2011; Starbird and Stamberger, 2010), and translation of disaster-related messages from Creole into English (Meier and Munro, 2010), which I will describe in the following paragraphs.

During the earthquake in Haiti, the volunteers on Twitter helped to 'tweak' their own or other people's tweets by ordering the words in a particular sequence and by using preselected markers (known as hashtags) so that the tweets were machine-readable (Starbird and Palen, 2011; Starbird and Stamberger, 2010). In addition to translating regular tweets to tweaked syntax (translators), volunteers were observed remotely moving information from one source to another using various means (remote operators). These two functions can be performed remotely by anyone who has access to the internet and has the know-how to use its different services.

The disaster in Haiti has also prompted other groups of humanitarian technologists to build a system whereby the people of Haiti can report their emergency needs in Creole using short message service (SMS) while Haitian diaspora communities around the world translate the messages into English (Meier and Munro, 2010). The most urgent messages are then added to a live map to be read by emergency responders. The efficacy of this map was affirmed by the head of the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Association (FEMA), describing it as the most 'comprehensive and up-to-date' information (Meier, 2012, p. 93). This research shows that volunteers who help remotely using the internet need closer relationship with ground relief operations in order to achieve real impact on the ground.

The literature has clearly shown that audiences can play a role in disaster communication in particular and in disaster relief efforts in general. Their participation is important before, during, and after a disaster (Leigh and UN Volunteers, 2011). But, we have yet to see an explicit engagement with the questions of what communicative conditions foster such engagements and how audiences are transformed into actors of disaster relief efforts. My study attempts to contribute some answers to these questions.

Social Behaviour in Disaster

How people use their media in disaster cannot be separated from the larger context of social behaviour in emergencies. This argument is based on the premise that disaster does not rupture social behaviour or social structures (Dynes, 1994). People continue, or try to continue, their 'routine of organisational patterns', routine of language use, traffic, et cetera (p. 149-150). The previously discussed research by Vihalemm *et al.* (2011) indicates that people continue to communicate with their close circles, albeit more intensively. Jååsaari (2005, via Kivikuru, 2006) reported that older Finnish audiences got their news about the Asian tsunami from radio whereas the young audiences could not specify from what channel they received the news, echoing the traditional audience segmentation of media usage whereby older audiences used more 'traditional' media and younger audiences used various media platforms. It is within reason to believe that people's media use during a disaster retains continuity with their existing media practice (Postill, 2010). However, there is also more than ample evidence to suggest disruption of social behaviour, discontinuity of media practice. People put more hours into their work during a disaster, organisations extend their structure to cope with new tasks, and new groups emerge (Dynes, 1994). In the specific context of media use during disaster, Finnish audiences watched more television news and bought more newspapers, 25-40 per cent more than their previous daily media consumption (Kivikuru, 2006). Audiences who had personal contact with the area affected by the tsunami were more alert and more demanding toward the government and the media. The urgency and immediacy of disaster escape the notion of domesticated media use, which frames media use as a part of domestic routines (Barker, 2006; Silverstone and Hirsch, 1992). The routines and organisation of households may stand in contrast with the pull of disaster news to get audiences out of the house and help those who are affected.

The decision to focus on the extraordinariness, or conversely the routines, of media use during a disaster partly reflects the problem of viewing disaster as a process or an event, which constitutes one of the key problems in defining what a disaster is

(Bankoff, 2003; Oliver-Smith, 1999; Quarantelli, 2000). There is 'considerable agreement' among disaster researchers on viewing disasters as 'relatively sudden occasions' (Quarantelli, 2000, p. 682). This view situates disaster as an extraordinary event within limited time duration and distinct spatial boundaries, which allows the identification of stages prior to, during, and after a disaster and appropriate interventions in each stage (Bankoff, 2003, pp. 155-156). Viewing disaster as an extraordinary event also enables researchers to examine gaps between the pre-existing conditions and the disruption, and efforts to redress the imbalance. On the other hand, the process view frames disaster 'more as functions of ongoing social orders, human-environment relations, and historical structural processes' (Oliver-Smith, 1999, p. 22). By taking a wider perspective and a longer historical look at the social-environmental-cultural conditions, the view of process does not leave the normality of daily life unexamined (p. 23). Rather, it assumes that the 'forms and structures of ordinary life [...] accentuate the risk and the resulting disaster impact' (*ibid.*). In societies where disaster is a constant feature of normal life, like the Philippines and some parts of Indonesia, the very characteristics of the societies themselves are shaped by disaster (Bankoff, 2003, p. 3). For example, Bankoff shows that the indigenous architecture, local agricultural system, and coping mechanisms of Philippine society have adapted to the constant presence of disaster.

People who live on the slope of Mt. Merapi have adapted to not only its recurrent eruptions, but also to government's policies in response to its eruptions (Laksono, 1985; Dove and Hudayana, 2008). Following the eruption in 1961, the government transmigrated 4.517 people from Mt. Merapi to Sumatra (Kabupaten Magelang, 1976 via Laksono, 1985), but the transmigrants moved back to their previous village, a move which the government finally accepted. An eruption in 1994 forced the villagers of Turgo, 8 km from the summit, to live in refugee camps (Dove and Hudayana, 2008). Afterward, a 'decrease in population/land density and relative shortage of agricultural labor' (p. 741), among others, changed their economic system from a subsistent agriculture to a market-oriented agriculture. These examples show how disaster cannot just be understood as an extraordinary event, which is limited to a specific timeframe. Instead, adaptation to disaster is structured into the longer trajectory of daily life of those affected by it. The process view of disaster is more applicable to understand those who were directly affected by disaster, than those who came to help. The previous eruptions of Mt. Merapi in the 20th and 21st century 'were relatively small' (Surono *et al*, 2012, p. 122) that they did not affect larger areas. In contrast to them, the magnitude of Mt. Merapi eruptions in 2010 constitutes it as a 'hundred year eruption' (p. 121).

Based on the reason, this study adopts the view of disaster as an extraordinary event. Furthermore, my study focuses on the Indonesian audiences who did not live in the disaster-stricken areas, not on the communities who live on the flanks of Mt. Merapi. For Indonesian audiences, the Mt. Merapi disaster is not a constant presence; it surfaces to their attention only when the media cover it for them. However, this study is also aware of the complex relationship between different stakeholders of disaster management and the deep interrelationship between the people of Merapi and the mountain, so that, for example, the decision to focus on a certain time-period privileges certain interests while obscuring other interests (see discussion about temporal dynamics on page 115).

The studies being reviewed here specifically refer to the phase of crisis response, not the stage before the crisis (mitigation and preparedness) and not after the crisis (recovery). Quarantelli (2003) defines the response phase as 'crisis-relevant actions engaged in during and immediately after impact' (p. 3). Among many observations that the Disaster Research Center has made during its 50 years of research, several are relevant to this project. Quarantelli states that in response to a crisis, numerous existing organisations and emergent organisations will come together in the affected areas. In normal situations, these organisations may never meet each other, with some emerging specifically in response to disaster. The organisation's behaviour in disaster is characterised by consensus, which contrasts with behaviour manifested in social conflicts. On the individual level, people act rationally and tend to help each other, contradicting the myths of panic and looting in disaster (Quarantelli, 2000, 2003). If the disaster is greater in its scale and intensity, there will be more new organisational structures and functions. In principle, organisational responses to disaster can be grouped into four types: 1.) old organisations performing old functions; 2.) extension of old organisations to include new functions, 3.) expansion of old organisations to form a new structure for performing old functions; or 4.) emergence of wholly new organisations (Quarantelli, 2003).

Emergent Citizen Groups

A major focus in terms of my study is the formation of volunteer groups (type 4) that did not exist prior to the disaster and often do not survive long after the recovery phase, or so called 'emergent groups'. Stallings and Quarantelli (1985, p. 94) characterise an emergent group as 'private citizens who work together in pursuit of collective goals relevant to actual or potential disasters but whose organisation has not yet become institutionalised'.

The group is emergent in two respects: the structural relationship between its members is new and the functions its members perform are new. The main reason for the birth of emergent groups is the perceived gap between what is immediately needed in a disaster and its lack of fulfilment. Based on the cases studied by the Disaster Research Center, Quarantelli identifies the following general characteristics of emergent citizens groups:

- small number of core members,
- it usually does not have a name,
- a member's involvement is affected by situational factors and the individual's

capacities,

- flat hierarchy,

- labour is divided but roles are not highly specialised,

- lack of symbols,

- lack of inter-organisational relationship,

- group structure is tied to the tasks it performs,

- lack of administrative activities,

- prioritising resources to the frontline activities,

- lack of job training,

- lack of inventory,

- policies are produced by *ad hoc* decision rather than strategic decision,

- tends to continue existing if it receives recognition from other organisations.

Following their field observations of numerous cases of disaster, Stallings and Quarantelli conclude that emergent citizens groups are 'inevitable, natural, neither dysfunctional nor conflictive, and cannot be eliminated by planning' (p. 98).

The literature on emergent citizens' groups shows that organisational characteristics of such 'spontaneous' initiatives are important in understanding the phenomenon. For example, how the members are recruited and what organisational resources are employed in their efforts is related to how the initiative is organised. More importantly, the literature points out that other, non-mediated, factors are also important in understanding the continuity of audiences' actions with larger social practices, as in the case of donating and volunteering.

2.3. Audiences and Collective Attention

Media audiences simultaneously incorporate notions of separation and concurrence. Individuals who are spatially separated can be conceptualised as having a commonality because of their use of media (Hartley, 2004; Dohle, 2008). By watching the same television channel, or observing the same issue on various television channels, or even following the news from different media, people share something in common. Arguments have been made that the commonality of audiences' diverse and dispersed media use is shared attention (Huberman and Wu, 2008; Dayan and Katz, 1994; Webster, 2011). By paying attention to a widely covered event, audiences are taking part in the ritual of recalling and reiterating 'basic values of the society' (Dayan and Katz, p. 28). Attention is also the critical point where, for example, the government decides what is important to their publics (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005), whilst the press, on the other hand, decides what is worth printing (White, 1950). Here audiences' attention becomes the point of struggle between various elements of society. The 'economic perspective' reflects that despite the apparent abundance of media outlets, what individual and collective media users have in common is their limited capacity to attend to media contents (Falkinger, 2007; Huberman and Wu, 2008). Consequently, media compete for audiences' attention while audiences devise strategies to maximise the values they expect. Shared attention can also be seen, simply, as aggregated moments of audiences' exposure to media content (Webster, 2011; Webster and Ksiazek, 2012). However, the convergence of media platforms, rise of mobile media, and convergence of media contents have complicated measurement of such exposure. The following section will survey and discuss scholarship on audiences' collective attention that is relevant to this study, paying particular attention to its conceptualisation. The discussion will be organised around three topics: collective attention as a resource, collective attention as exposure, and collective attention as politics. These three topics are not mutually exclusive and in practice authors situate their concepts in the overlaps between these topics. But we can still distinguish differences between each topic, thus separate discussion of each helps to clarify its use and discursive direction. At the end of the section, I will draw connections between these concepts of attention and my study.

Collective Attention as a Resource

On the individual level, human mental capacity to attend to an activity or an object has been theorised to be limited (Moray, 1967 via Kahnemann 1973). An individual has to select an object of attention, among other objects, and regulate the intensity they give to it. It is worth noting that defining the unit of measurement of mental capacity is hard, if not impossible. On the meso-level, the behaviour of organisations can be explained by how they 'channel and distribute the attention of their decision-makers' (Ocasio, 1997). The attention of decision-makers is structured by their organisation's 'rules, resources, and social relationships' (p. 188). The government can also be seen as an information processing system that prioritises the attention of its policy-makers in relation to uncertain and ambiguous signals (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). What these ideas illustrate is that attention is a resource that is limited in quantity and can be distributed to meet a certain goal.

Recently, authors have been developing a framework of attention economy (Davenport and Beck, 2001; Goldhaber, 1997; Huberman and Wu, 2008). They argue that because of the development of technology and economy, information is produced almost infinitely and distributed 'almost without' cost and, in turn, what becomes scarce is attention itself. It is scarce because we cannot pay attention to many things at the same time and because information, which aims at getting our attention, is constantly increasing. Individuals or organisations that accumulate a lot of attention can distribute that attention to other parties, e.g. to advertisers, in exchange for money or other valuable resources. When accumulated, however, audiences' attention does not necessarily bring value to the audiences. Their attention can be turned into a commodity by purveyors of data to advertisers, leaving audiences unrewarded (Smythe, 2006; but also Caraway, 2011). More and more records of audiences' online activities are accumulated to signal varieties of attributes desirable to advertisers, such as taste, sentiment, buying intentions, and many others.

In times of disaster, audiences' common response is to look for information in the media (Kivikuru, 2006; Quarantelli, 1993 via Helsloot and Ruitenberg, 2004). Such information is not only important to those who are directly affected by the disaster, but also to those who are related to the affected people or have personal experience of the place, or even to the mass media audience in general. When a disaster strikes, these different parties pay attention immediately. This combined surge of attention can overwhelm the relevant governmental agencies, but can also be seen as a big opportunity by those who can capitalise on such intense attention. Public officials, potential candidates, political parties are keen on presenting themselves as effective problem solvers during disasters. Commercial interests see major opportunities to advertise their products and services in the media, in the affected areas, and to the affected people themselves. Audiences' fascination with the media's portrayal of a natural force and its impact can result in a desire to visit and experience the reality of it in the aftermath (Van Hoving *et al.*, 2010). In these examples, attention can be seen as an economic resource.

Collective Attention as Exposure

The discourses of collective attention as a resource and collective attention as exposure are based on the same unit of analysis, namely the individual. The need to group individuals who are otherwise unrelated in interpersonal, social, and spatial terms, limits measurement of the individual's attention to a very specific dimension. The individual's idiosyncratic uses of media are stripped off, the spatial context of media consumption is erased, temporal continuity of personal interpretation is strictly limited, and the individual's social interaction based on media content is ignored. What transforms an individual who watches television into an audience member is 'people's shared orientation toward some focal point – a centre of transmission, a centre of attraction' (Ang, 1991, p. 29). Furthermore, Ang argues that this results in the reduction of individuals to serialised and interchangeable units, measured regularly at the moment of exposure to media content, or a 'taxonomic collective' (p. 27). A taxonomic collective is an aggregation comprising nothing other than taxonomic similarities between members, as in the normal application of statistics. In other words, the collective is 'not reflection of a given reality, but a discursive construct which can only be known and encountered in and through discursive representations such as [...] the statistical figure' (p. 28). The audiences' collective attention becomes visible due to their regular exposure to media content, a point of contact that is regularly monitored by market research companies and media organisations.

The difference between seeing attention as exposure and attention as a resource lies in the orientation. The resource perspective is more explicitly orientated toward the economic aspects of aggregated attention. Meanwhile, the exposure perspective is not necessarily linked to economic arguments, as it can also be used in policy arguments, for example, to promote a type of programming for the general public. In the latter case, aggregated individuals can easily be translated into a public with certain demographics and other characteristics, such as programming for working young women with modern outlook (Ang, p. 29).

The exposure perspective focuses on the point of contact between an individual and a medium. There are two common measurements of exposure, namely one-time measurement and repeated measurement, which covers a range of time (Webster *et al.*, 2006, pp. 175-179). Neither type of measurement can go further than the contact itself, which is defined differently for each medium and according to the purpose of analysis. So, for example, if each person fills in a diary with 80 quarter hour slots per day for seven consecutive days to record the television channels they watch, the data still cannot tell us whether they pay attention to the programmes, or whether they do something else that occupies their mind, or whether they can recall what they watch. Hence, in a substantive way, when aggregated as numbers, audiences' contact with a medium cannot readily be translated into collective attention. Two problems arise from the transformation of measurement of individuals into collective attention: a collective problem and an attention problem

The collective problem arises due to the aggregation logic itself. Here I will draw mainly from James Webster's (2011) essay on public attention. Webster defines public attention as 'the extent to which multiple individuals (i.e. agents) are exposed to cultural products across space and/or time' (p. 45). Exposure itself is defined as 'coming into contact with those cultural products' (*ibid.*). Meanwhile, the contact is strictly limited to the physical sense of the term, without implying any relationship with quality of message reception, forms of engagement, or its impact. Thanks to this limited definition, exposure of different individuals to media content can be aggregated across time and space (*ibid.*). However, aggregation of separate individuals through quantitative measurement disregards their actual sociality, such as in the case of fans (Jenkins, 1992). Separate individuals come to be seen as a group through a mechanism consisting of two types of 'public measures', namely the 'market information regimes' and 'user information regime' (Webster, 2011). Market information regime is employed by media producers and market participants to monitor each other and their world, whereas user information regime is designed to enable users to access media offerings, including systems for searching, recommendation, history of preference, etc. Audiences exercise their 'agency' in two forms, through media selection in their personal consumption and through aggregation of their media usage behaviour.

Webster's model of public attention can account for the broad picture of media systems where public measures are administered extensively and regularly. However, we can also think of a system where a hybrid system of commercial, public, and citizens' media operate without reference to public measures and/or audiences can interact with the media system not only as aggregates. As mere aggregates, audiences lack awareness and intention. They are a collection of people, but not a collective. The model denies the group sociality, which might enable them to exercise their agency. Hence, referring to an aggregate of media exposures as a public disregards other critical attributes of the concept of public, such as sociality, discursive engagements, shared concerns, and reflexivity (Butsch, 2008; Couldry *et al.*, 2007; Livingstone, 2005).

The second problem concerns measurement of attention. Although the idea of collective attention necessarily involves exposure to media, exposure itself cannot be readily equated with attention because the quality of attention is 'extremely difficult' to measure (Webster *et al.*, 2006, p. 128). The most common measures of exposure are attendance (someone is present when recorded) and choice (someone tunes in to one channel in preference to other channels, when recorded). Whether the record is made by the audience themselves (through diary) or created automatically by a machine attached to the media device, what is essentially recorded is the co-presence of the media and the person. Co-presence itself can be defined loosely, as in being present for fifteen minutes in one day, or sensitive enough to record the person's presence every fifteen minutes, but it can never be established whether the audience really pays attention to the medium.

Another difficulty in the attention measurement concerns usage of many media devices by the audience or use of one medium to consume many media outlets simultaneously (Mamoria and Taneja, 2012). A unit of measurement of one medium can be rendered meaningless if applied to other media. Consider the example of using length of time, which is a common unit of measurement of television consumption. Fifteen minutes of tune-in to one channel can be defined as watching; yet fifteen minutes of leaving one website open is meaningless. What matters to online media channels is the activity of their users, such as searching, reading, browsing, making status, and many others. Hence, a website can stay idle in the user's browser for days without being attended to.

The problem of aggregation and the problem of attention measurement do not mean that they do not constitute collective attention. On the contrary, both are necessary, but they are not sufficient. I am proposing to incorporate sociality and intention into the concept of collective attention. This means that in addition to involving many people, collective attention needs to take into account communicative and social relationships among audiences and it needs to attribute intention to them as well (Anscombe, 2000). Hence, to use the example of fragmentation discussed previously, in which the public's collective attention is fragmented across many media outlets, fragmentation or concentration of collective attention matters less in itself unless we know what collective attention is all about, who the publics are, and what their intentions toward the objects of their collective attention. This takes us beyond the point of contact between an individual and media, and to locate actual groups of audiences who pay attention to issues of their concern. In my study, audiences' collective attention to mediated disaster is explored both *as exposure* and *as intentional orientation toward shared issues on different media*. The exposure element is necessary to establish whether their collective attention is fragmented across numerous media or concentrated on selected media. In addition, exploration of audiences' social relationships and their intentions in following the disaster through media will paint a clearer picture of what constitutes the collectiveness of collective attention. This approach entails a mix of ontological statuses among the subjects of my study (Höijer, 2008). To be specific, the subjects of my study represent their culture, which to a certain degree implies a cultural homogeneity, and, on the other hand, I will conduct a simple statistical study under the assumption of normal distribution (p. 287). Strategy of mixed ontologies requires explicit connection between selected ontologies and methodologies (p. 288). This subject will be more extensively addressed in the mixed method methodology section in Chapter 3.

Collective Attention as Politics

In mediated societies, audiences' collective attention is critical to the process of decision making on problems of shared concern, as it confers legitimacy on decision makers who act on behalf of the public. Government itself can be seen as an organisation whose core task is to allocate attention to prioritised problems (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). But in this review, instead of concentrating on the information producer's perspective, I want to focus on audiences' perspectives of the issue as facilitated by media. I will draw mainly from Dayan's (2009, 2013) conceptual exploration of media's role in conferring visibility on an event or people worthy of public attention and emergence of new constitutive forces in the field.

Modifying his earlier position that saw widely televised public ceremonies as performing functions of connecting the audiences to the centre of society and maintaining the functional system (Dayan and Katz, 1994), Dayan (2009) has introduced new digital media into the national media landscape. New digital media dissolve the rigid division between central public spheres and peripheral public spheres in a national media system. On the other hand, television industries have evolved from its original, centralistic model to now include televisions that serve world audiences and televisions that serve the diaspora. Hence, the old model of one national centre that commands the attention of the periphery is changing to a mix of models where centre-periphery and no-centre exist simultaneously (p. 20). In terms of temporality, televisions of the centre manage collective attention through scheduled, looped, and live programming which, Dayan argues, provides more than technical simultaneity, namely, sharedness. In the context of my study, *sharedness* can also be interpreted as individual members of audiences' feeling of being connected to the larger whole. In fact, the political dimension of collective attention results from audiences' awareness that other audiences are watching and that they might have different opinions.

The sharedness of collective attention is only one dimension of the concept; the other is the media's role in conferring visibility. Media do not inform; they show (Dayan, 2009, 2013). And by showing, they 'produce, cater to, and manage public attention' (2009, p. 25; see also Warner, 2002). In this system of visibility conferral, new media have to work with media of the centre (television), both as suppliers of early material for public attention and as responders to the mass media coverage. Dayan (2013) proposes that the narrative of audiences-as-victims has seen the rise of the narrative of audiences that view themselves as visibility-deprived. Audiences in the new narrative see visibility as a right and, thus, a political issue worth struggling for, sometimes to extremes as in the case of terrorism (p. 139). The dynamics of mass media and new media are shaped by the audiences' struggle to be visible. In other words, collective attention via media becomes a politics in itself.

Drawing from the previous studies on collective attention as a resource, exposure, and politics, I will attempt to describe a general picture of audiences' collective attention through measurement of their exposure to media across platforms. In addition, to incorporate sociality, intentions, and politics into the concept, I borrow and expand Couldry *et al.*'s (2007) definition of collective attention. Here I define collective attention as *an orientation of two or more people to an issue presented in media that is aware of itself and can be contested by other parties.* The definition specifies audiences' exposure to an issue, rather than their mere exposure to media. It also takes into account their efforts to orientate themselves (intentionality) and their awareness of sharing the attention (sociality), and situates this in the context of a struggle for visibility.

2.4. Audiences and Collective Action

When we venture out of the realm of media, when we leave the television set behind and slide our smartphones into our pockets, do we stop being an audience member? Unless we define the world itself as media, technically the end of media exposure means the end of our moment of being an audience member. But, what if we keep thinking about the mediated issues? Or engage in a conversation about them? When exactly are we totally free from exposure to omnipresent media? Blurred as the division is between people's engagement with media and reality, it is analytically possible to distinguish forms of collectivity facilitated by media other than audience. One type of collectivity that is seen as a productive conceptual framework by communication and audience researchers is public (Dahlgren and Sparks, 1991; Dayan, 2001, 2009; Couldry *et al.*, 2007; Livingstone, 2005). Researchers put different emphases on what kind of participation is necessary to be a member of the public. For example, Warner (2002) argues that public is born of attention to an address via text, images or speech. Couldry *et al.* (2007) assume that public is an orientation to a world of shared concerns. And Dayan (2001) proposes a stronger model of public based on such elements as taking a position, sharing values, and transforming 'tastes into demands' (p. 746). Following is a review of a subset of literature on publics to draw the conceptual tools of my study. Then, discussion moves on to the context of Indonesia and confronting the concept of public with the local political and cultural context.

Forms of Collectivity: Audiences, Publics, *Warga*

The literature on publics and audiences reveals two problems with these concepts, their normative burden and their discursive nature. The normative burden of the term 'public' is inevitable (Butsch, 2008; Couldry *et al.*, 2007; Livingstone, 2005). It means that to define what a public is, one necessarily must construct a set of criteria against which any social formation will be measured. If a social formation meets the criteria, it is a public. However, by doing so, any attempt at defining a public is not solely founded on the observable reality, but also on what a public is supposed to look like. Although it is a problem that emerges in almost every attempt at defining the social, it is worth remembering so that our definition is not too 'stringent' (Livingstone, 2005).

The second problem at hand concerns the discursive nature of publics and audiences. An audience is not a person or a group of people that is permanently out there and whose existence can be independently verified by a disinterested observer. In the very attempt to define it, an author is constructing it. As has been emphasised by, among others, Allor (1988), Ang (1991), and Butsch (2008), an audience is constructed through the acts of speaking about it, surveying it, making regulations, writing a criticism, engaging in a daily conversation, et cetera. These authors highlight different dimensions of the discourse. Ang locates the discourse of audience in the institutions of the media production and market survey, to which Butsch, while suggesting the same line of thought, adds government and moral authorities as originators of discourse of audience, and Allor examines scholars' analytical approaches to audiences. The issue necessitates that researchers clarify their theoretical position and, accordingly, define their 'attitude' toward this discourse (McKee, 2005).

I employ the concept of publics because of its normative dimension, as the public's participation in disaster relief efforts involves a lot more than just being an audience member. Their actions signal a different kind of relationship between themselves and those mediated others, who were affected by the disasters. Furthermore, the collectivity of audiences requires me, as a researcher, to clarify my own discourse. I will mainly speak about audiences in terms of the qualitative tradition of audience studies, which means that I aim to give rich and contextualised descriptions of audiences based on their own words. Numeric data are used only for description of the aggregative nature of the audience.

What is the publicness of audience?

In the specific context of television audiences, Dayan (2001) suggests that what best characterises a public is not its basis of grouping, but its 'style of performance' (p. 744). In performing its publicness, the audience must see themselves as a public and they also need to be seen as such. In short, Dayan's criteria are: sociability, internal debate, capacity to perform, loyalty to values, capacity to demand, and reflexivity (p.746). In defining the criteria, Dayan ultimately sets a normative category that will only fit a section of the audience. After dismissing audience market research as an enterprise of erasing 'the collective dimension of viewing' (p. 747) and an effort of creating an 'artificial sociability' by making the audience act as if they are a public, Dayan argues that there are four types of audience that may meet the criteria. They are: fans, public of ceremonial television, '*publicum in fabula*', and incidental publics. All of these categories are fraught with problems. Fans create real relationships among themselves, but the world of fans is considered to be 'only' a game even by the fans themselves, not the real world itself (Jenkins, 1992). The publics of televised ceremonies last only as long as the media event itself. Meanwhile, '*publicum in fabula*' is the public chosen to represent the wider public and to voice the public's concern in a television studio, hence allowing them only a very short existence. And the last category concerns publics who emerged elsewhere, oftentimes consuming other media to maintain their sociality, and consuming television only incidentally. In other words, opportunities for emergence of a public who can 'turn tastes into demand' are limited.

Couldry *et al.* (2007) define publicness of audience as 'an orientation to a public world where matters of shared concern are, or at least should be, addressed' (p. 3). They call this orientation 'public connection', and it needs to be sustained by a convergence in media consumption, otherwise the connection will amount only to a very thin string of attention. The authors are deliberately casting a loose conceptual net to catch any audience's mediated orientation toward 'any of those issues affecting how we live together that require common resolution' (p. 6). After collecting weekly diaries of their 37 subjects and conducting individual interviews and focus groups, in addition to administering a survey of 1000 respondents, Couldry *et al.* found two types of mediated engagement with public issues: media-centric and public-centric engagement. The former relies solely on media to engage with public issues, whereas the later engages with public issues through media and other social associations. Although Couldry *et al.* claimed that they found solid support for the media's role in public connections, audiences expressed that they were not able to engage themselves in a public deliberation and a public action with regard to the mediated public issue. In other words, public connections are real, but their efficacy has yet to materialise. The audiences might be thinking that their talk/action was not efficacious or that they did not have the context to talk/take action.

Similar to the concept of orientation, Dahlgren (1991) wrote that to understand the structure of public spheres we need to consider audiences' 'processes and conditions of sense-making' (p. 15). In the processes of sense-making, media play an important role in creating the basis for shared interpretation between audiences. This, in turn, may lead to emergence of a public. Warner (2002) distils the constitutive element further to 'mere attention' (p. 419). Members and non-members are distinguished by whether attention is given or not, regardless of the quality of attention. For example, readers might do something else on their computer, or television viewers might be 'vacuuming the carpet' while watching, but they become members of a public because they pay attention, however minimal.

These different conceptions of publicness, in my view, can be categorised into minimalist and maximalist positions. The minimalist position is concerned with drawing lines between members and non-members, whereas the maximalist position focuses on the question of what the public can do. Here Warner takes the minimalist position, as opposed to Dayan who takes the maximalist position, while Couldry *et al.* are somewhere in the middle. Another word of caution must be given here regarding these authors' use of the words 'sense', 'debate', 'reflexivity', and 'deliberation' used by these authors since we are led to assume that publicness of an audience is first and foremost characterised by rational communication among its members. It is true that none of the authors above make a strong assumption of the rational character of audiences' engagement with media contents and between themselves. However, amongst these authors we can see a different degree of leaning toward the rational communication between audiences. This is what I call the normative characteristics of the discourse of publicness.

When do audiences act as a public?

According to Dayan, 'publics emerge around the very act of taking a position' (p. 745). However, the act of taking a position on a certain issue still needs to meet other criteria. This position needs to be taken in front of other publics; it needs to adhere to a shared value; it should be adopted through a certain type of discussion; and the other people taking the same position need to recognise the act. These apparently stringent criteria, Dayan claims, are necessary to distinguish the audiences' actual style of performance as a public from merely claiming to be such.

Couldry *et al.* (2007) distinguish orientation from mere attention. Giving attention is a necessary precondition for orientation, but orientation is much more than attention. Orientating one's media consumption toward a public issue needs to be sustained through consumption of other media and consumption of various contents of the same media. And, following Dayan, they propose three contexts that may stabilise the audience's orientation to public issues, namely values applied by the audience in interpreting mediated events, contexts used to talk about the issues, and actions they perform as a public (p. 111). Furthermore, the dissociation between being concerned about public issues and actually talking about it or taking action on it may be related to separation of the public domain, mediated issues, and social milieu. If at least two of these three contexts overlap, a real public deliberation/action may result.

The question of pinpointing the exact moment or the necessary preconditions when media audiences act as publics becomes more important when we are looking at the audience's response to a mediated natural disaster. The temporal dimension of a crisis is characteristically different from that of other 'normal' mediated events, due to factors such as unpredictability of the future and decisiveness of each moment in someone's life.

Where and how do audiences become a public?

In a sense, the answer is obvious, namely, this happens in the public sphere, which refers to a discursive site and not a physical place (Warner, 2002; Varnelis and Friedberg, 2008). In their physically private homes, audiences can engage in a mediated public sphere. Furthermore, new information and communication technologies have opened up a way for audiences to engage in an issue of public concern while 'on the move' (Drotner, 2005). Accordingly, a study of audiences' publicness must not only focus on finding a specific place where audiences form a public, but also focus on looking at their 'communicative practice' which spans different places and times (p. 200). If a public is not bounded to a physical setting, then how does it emerge? Under what conditions?

In the context of disaster response, social media were used to spread information about the eruption, its impact, and the needs of the refugees, partly, thanks to the persistence of audiences' traces of online presence and the searchability of their archived messages (boyd, 2011). In other words, an asynchronous two-way communication between many-to-many is made possible. Furthermore, the replicability of the content makes it easy to be distributed widely, expressly, and identically. The easy archival, recall, and distribution of digital texts in the context of participatory disaster communication accentuate the problems of truth verification and rumour distribution. Information requiring verification comes from many sources simultaneously and rumours are quickly and easily spread.

The problems of truth verification and rumour spread are especially important to audiences who anticipate escalation of volcanic eruptions and to audiences who watch television programmes that spread rumours of impending catastrophe. My study will examine these cases and attempt to identify the mechanisms through which audiences become a public through their interaction with different media, namely newspapers, television, and the internet.

Indonesian Warga, *Qualifying the Concepts*

Discussion of audiences' engagement with issues of shared concern, rather than with their personal preferences and leisure, according to Livingstone (2005), is based on the observation that publics are becoming more reliant on media and audiences are becoming less limited to private experience of consumption. Livingstone introduces 'civic' as an intermediate term between audiences and public to refer to 'context-dependent yet under-determined, plural and hybrid identities, understandings, practices and relationships that [...] shape people's engagement with others' (p. 31-32). In other words, civic culture is the source of public engagement. It is, then, important to situate audiences' engagement with others in the national context of Indonesia. Previous conceptualisations of collectivity need to be considered in relation to the structural conditions of Indonesian media and existing social relationships between different groups in Indonesian society.

Here I turn to an Indonesian word, namely *warga*. '*Warga*' is a social collectivity that usually is based on commonality of region (Antlov, 2003; Connor and Vickers, 2003). It can be used to refer to members of a small region such as a village (*warga desa*) or a larger region such as a province (*warga Jawa Barat*, the people of West Java). When articulated in the national context, the concept of *warga*, in the Republic of Indonesia, implies legal rights that must be protected by the state, a dimension that does not necessarily present at lower-levels of collectivity. Further, the context of natural disaster provides boundaries where the collective identity of the *warga* is confronted with the uncontrollable forces of nature. The media's coverage of the Mt. Merapi disaster has opened a space where people of different regions can respond from their place and/or come to help. The place dimension of social collectivity is important to qualify the notion of publics, which, based on the literature I have reviewed, implies an open, equal, and somewhat less material social belonging.

Indonesian publics, in the strong normative sense, did not fully emerge until around 1998, when the authoritarian regime of Suharto was toppled (see Kitley, 2000). Following the 'reform' period, mass media flourished, although public service media and community media have not yet gained enough presence in the public's consciousness, while ownership of commercial media is concentrated in 12 groups and their contents are biased toward Javanese culture and Jakarta-centrism (Gazali, 2003; Nugroho *et al.*, 2012; Nugroho *et al.*, 2013). Furthermore, journalists, as an extension of the Indonesian public's eyes, are educated but relatively timid and see their primary role as disseminators of neutral information (Hanitzsch, 2005). Centralisation of media in Java and journalists' questionable stance toward the public pose certain problems in viewing Indonesian audiences as publics.

The problem of centralisation can be partly attributed to Indonesia's uneven economic development, with Java being far more developed than the rest of the country. In colonial times, it was not the media that connected Java with the rest of the country, but the people (Klinken, 2013). Hence, structural conditions within the media, which are not equally available to everyone, modify the idea of public as being open to everyone (Garnham, 2006). Furthermore, Javanese Indonesians view eastern Indonesian people as lesser Indonesians, similar to Indonesians' view of Sino-Indonesians (Siegel, 1998, 2005). It will therefore be intriguing to observe the kind of publicness that audiences of Java-centric media aspire to in disaster. It is also important to remember Klinken's observation that mediators are people who are versed in their culture, but are not deeply embedded with the local people. In other words, '*warga*', as the Indonesian way of distinguishing membership in the socio-cultural system, is important to understanding the relationship between local people, local NGOs, and volunteers at the time of Merapi's eruption.

Forms of Collective Action

The framework of this section is mainly inspired by Boltanski's (2004) work on mediation of suffering. He proposes two feasible forms of action toward mediated suffering, namely paying and speaking, but he dismisses direct action since 'no one ever suggests [...] the spectator should drop everything and take himself to the unfortunate's side' (p. 17). Boltanksi here refers to inter-national relationships between media spectators living in one country and the suffering others living in another country. Within a national context, spectators do actually leave their homes and meet the unfortunates (Drabek and McEntire, 2003). Hence, in addition to giving of money and raising of voices about mediated sufferings, volunteering is another prominent form of engaging with disaster (UN Volunteers, 2011). Although in reality there are other forms of collective action toward mediated disaster, such as disaster-related tourism, this will not be included in my study as it is oriented toward personal satisfaction rather than issues of shared concern (Ahimsa-Putra, 2012; Raine, 2013; Van Hoving *et al.*, 2010).[9] My study focuses on efforts that involve two or more people, during the disaster relief period, that concern shared issues and are observable by others. However, disaster tourism is a real phenomenon and, based on my own observation, can be beneficial to survivors of disaster.

Donating

One common response to disaster by media audiences is to give monetary and/or in kind donation. Donors can be individuals and institutions, which are driven by

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[9] The literature on 'dark tourism' shows that it is still a nascent field (Biran and Hyde, 2013; Stone 2013). The field is, Stone argues, important to the study of social science since it provides, '[...] a powerful lens through which contemporary life and death may be witnessed and relationships with broader society and culture discerned' (p. 311). My study does not include disaster tourism because of the radically different characteristics that I have argued above.

different motives. Individual donors are shown to be driven by psychological factors, such as self-efficacy, trust in the fund raisers, and moral obligation (Cheung and Chan, 2000), and also their familiarity with the affected area (Zagefka *et al.*, 2012b). Furthermore, another study has found that giving is also influenced by the donor's perception of survivors' needs, impact of donation, and lack of donation from others (Zagefka *et al.*, 2012a). Donors' exposure to news and images about survivors also affects their intention to donate (Oosterhof *et al.*, 2009). Simon (1997) provided evidence that magnitude of disaster (as measured by number of deaths) strongly correlates with intensity of media coverage (as measured by duration of prime time television coverage), which, in turn, correlates with volume of donation (as measured by amount of money given by the American Red Cross to officials in the affected regions). And Bennett and Kottasz (2000) found that pitiful images of victims in newspapers or on TV were a strong motivator for private donors.

Among institutional donors, a term which usually refers to business firms, charity is motivated by rational economic considerations and institutional pressure (Gao, 2011). Economic motive concerns the firm's reputation in front of the consumers, whereas institutional pressure concerns the firm's relationship with interest groups, public opinion, professional associations, and the state. Gao finds that size of firm correlates with propensity to donate. Citing Brammer and Millington (2006), Gao reasons that the more visible the firm the more institutional pressure is exerted on it. The visibility of a firm is measured by its presence in news media stories (Brammer and Millington, 2006). In addition to visibility, geographical proximity of the firm's headquarters and business operations to the public is related to its propensity to donate (Muller and Whiteman, 2009).

Missing in the still limited study field of donation to disaster are the empirical studies of the donors themselves. Studying actual donors might better capture the complexity of defining categories of donors, which, literature shows, are limited currently to personal and corporate donors. It may also contribute insights into how media construct donor visibility and how cultural values organise the practice of donation. A study of actual donors, possibly, could allow deeper understanding beyond aggregation of numbers and reveal collectivities that underpin institutions and how they are manifested. This study aims to contribute to filling these research gaps.

Speaking

As a response to mediated disaster, audiences are able to speak about it. Although not necessarily relating to disaster but more to human-induced suffering, Boltanski (2004) identified two types of speech in response to mediated suffering: public opinion and demonstration. Public opinion is mobilised to put pressure on the government to intervene on behalf of the public, which necessarily involves many other political process in between (pp. 17-18). Public opinion, as surveyed by pollsters, is primarily an aggregate of personal opinions in private (Converse, 1987; Frankel and Frankel, 1987). Demonstration, on the other hand, acquires its force from the solidarity of its members and the singularity of its voice, which requires a lot of preparation in itself. I would propose another form of speech that might be enacted in response to mediated suffering, namely complaint. Collective complaint resembles public opinion in its private and aggregate characteristics, but it is not solicited and does not result from a response to predetermined questions. Collective complaint differs from demonstration in its reliance on the symbolic dimension, whereas demonstration entails an intrinsic embodiment aspect. But collective complaint overlaps with demonstration through its antagonistic characteristics and its awareness of its own collectivity.

Complaint usually involves a communication between two parties about a violation or transgression by one party in relation to another. DeCapua (1988 via Bonito and Wolksi, 2002) identifies two core elements of message of complaint: announcement of problem and solicitation of remediation. Bonito and Wolski conducted an experiment in which they found evidence that what people say is related to whether the message was directed to one recipient (the target only) or to multiple recipients, such as the use of elaboration and face-maintaining strategy. In fact, complaints are oftentimes expressed socially as a strategy of solidarity-making between people of the same ethnicity (Grancea, 2010) and rapport building between strangers and close friends (Boxer, 1993). This type of social complaint is categorised as indirect complaint because the receiver of the complaint is not the offender.

The mechanism by which individual opinions are transformed into collective complaints and the roles that the media (especially the social media) play in the process, amongst others, are two key topics that my study will examine. My initial observation on the case of Indonesian audiences' collective complaints suggests that the complainers were mostly not the Merapi people themselves, which raises questions about the relationship between the complainers, the people of Mt. Merapi, and the wider audiences.

Volunteering

Volunteerism, according to Musick and Wilson (2007), is characterised by its formal, public, and unpaid characteristics. Volunteering work should be relatively organised, theoretically benefiting people who have no pre-existing relationship with volunteers, and should be unpaid work. However, the reality may not perfectly correspond with the ideal type. For example, a volunteer may receive money to cover expenses. Such payments can be difficult to categorise in terms of whether they were mere compensation or a salary, because this is dependent on local values of appropriateness and their regularity. According to Haski-Leventhal (2009) the problem is partly caused by the word 'volunteer' itself that shares its meaning with 'voluntary', both deriving from the Latin root word *voluns* which means 'choose'. The free decision meaning of the word clashes with the widely adopted notion of self-interest in the

Western world to the extent that it is now hard to believe in true volunteerism, which does not benefit the volunteer in any way (p. 273). Haski-Leventhal suggests that the paradigm is, partly, responsible for the dominant view in the literature on volunteerism, which is more or less preoccupied with the question of 'why', which implies motives, rather than 'how', which implies the process. Hustinx *et al.* (2010) understand this as a problem of theory as explanation, rather than theory as narrative.

My own approach to volunteerism is to consider the 'how' of volunteerism, which entails focusing on manifested behaviour and how it is socially regulated, rather than exploring psychological motivations and philosophical questions of true self-interest. I have given examples of the 'what' of disaster volunteers in the previous section on 'audience as disaster communicator'. The following section focuses on the 'how' aspect of volunteerism, although the 'why' will be initially considered.

With regard to causes of volunteerism, Einolf and Chambré (2011) summarise literature on volunteerism from different theoretical disciplines and identify five factors that drive people to volunteer: context (emergencies or salient social issues), integration (involvement with other social activities), roles (other social roles that help or hinder), individual characteristics (motivation, values, personality), and resources (education and free time). These five factors can work independently in influencing the decision to volunteer or they can work in combination. Development of volunteering theory that addresses its multidimensional character, they note, is still in its infancy.

In disaster, volunteerism is a common occurrence and has been widely studied, for example by the Disaster Research Center under the concept of 'emergent citizen group', as I have previously mentioned in section 2.2. (page 53). One relevant observation from this scholarship is that emergent citizen groups can be found across disasters, times, and nationalities. Thus, it is relevant to draw connections between these observations and the study of audience, specifically in how the use of media is related to inception and sustainment of emergent citizen groups. Two concrete questions are how people from different places and social background can come together and work collaboratively and what role media use has in this process. From a management point of view, such convergence of people and collaboration can be viewed as an issue of recruitment (Ranse and Carter, 2010; Aitken, 2000).

Beyerlein and Sikkink (2008) present their findings about volunteerism during the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. Their study frames volunteerism as a cultural response to an attack on a national symbol. Hence, factors such as identification with symbols, emotions, and involvement with commemorative events that strengthen such identification play key roles in the decision to volunteer. They, too, found that proximity and personal relationship with the victims or potential victims predict volunteerism. Their research goes beyond identifying causes and attempts to build a model that explains the mechanism from identification to joining volunteerism, including such as emotion and ritual involvement. However, each of the key moments is treated as a binary category, leaving no room for detours, leaving off, returning, etc. Volunteerism itself is seen as a state, rather than a process. A similar call to investigate the process has been made by McAdam (2003), although he referred to collective political action. The recruitment process postulated by McAdam operates at the individual level, starting from the contact between recruit and recruiting agent. His model highlights subjective factors relating to recruits (such as 'linkage' between the action and the recruit's identity (p. 287)) and their social ties in influencing the decision to participate in a collective action. I want to expand McAdam's model to include the role of media in the recruitment process. Media may act as recruiting agent since such recruitment takes place through the media and the media replace the interaction between recruiting agent and recruit. Furthermore, my study takes heed of the aforementioned authors in treating recruitment as an analogous process, rather than a binary state.

2.5. Conclusion

Audience studies literature has examined several dimensions of the development of media, such as interactivity of media, audiences' participation in producing media contents, and fragmentation of audiences caused by the abundance of media outlets. The development of media drives us to question our old understandings and categories because media now have to be used, rather than received; audiences produce and use, rather than merely use; and their collective attention is fragmented across many media outlets. These insights lead me to approach Indonesian audiences' responses to the disaster of Mt. Merapi in 2010 by going beyond the model of text-reader, or meaning-making, and viewing them as actors in the wider 'field' of disaster relief efforts (Postill, forthcoming).

Research on the role of audiences in disaster and/or crisis communication can be grouped based on its approach, namely research that sees audiences as communicants, as a theoretical perspective, and as disaster communicators. The view of audiences-as-communicants focuses on how audiences interpret a message about disaster and factors that play roles in message reception. Research that views audiences as a perspective highlights the variability of meaning that audiences may ascribe to message about disaster and uses this insight to create an alternative model of crisis communication. Lastly, audiences as actors of disaster communication is a growing field of study that documents the roles audiences play in communicating a disaster to other audiences. I prioritise viewing audiences as communicators to highlight two aspects, their agencies in disaster relief efforts and possibilities enabled by the existence of new media and the people's media. However, audiences' interpretations of the communicative landscape of the disaster will be accounted for as well to understand the reasons for their actions, not to evaluate the efficacy of the message of crisis.

Framing of audiences as actors of disaster relief efforts requires exploration and development of two crucial concepts which provide the foundation of this research, namely collective attention and collective action. Transformation of individual, dispersed media users into members of publics is possible if audiences' attention is focused on the disaster and that attention is then transformed into actions. When conceptualised merely as a resource, or according to exposure, audiences who pay collective attention lack self-awareness and are devoid of intentions. Therefore, I expand the limited model of collective attention by incorporating the sociality of audiences and their intentions in the context of disaster.

Audiences and publics are two forms of collectivity that have their own normative and discursive characteristics. These normative and discursive characteristics are identified in audience studies literature, namely what makes audiences publics, when they become publics, where, and how. What makes them publics can be mere attention or capacity to demand. Audiences become publics when they take a position on some shared issues or orient their media use toward certain public issues. And they become publics by *using* media and *on* social media they use. The context of Indonesia provides a further dimension to normative characteristics of publics, which is epitomised by the word *warga*. Recently, the *warga* of Java island have been historically enjoying greater access to media and an increase in content oriented towards them. On the other hand, some of these people view *warga* of the outer islands as lesser Indonesians.

Three forms of engagement with mediated disasters, donating, complaining, volunteering, are chosen to illuminate different trajectories that audiences travel and mechanisms by which they become publics. The literature shows how donors' institutions affect how donation is made. Furthermore, we have learnt how collective complaints, as a specific type of speech, are reliant on their discursive articulation and the platform of their manifestation. And, lastly, the literature on volunteering is concerned more with the motivation of volunteers, who are assumed to be self-interested, rather than with how they join collective volunteerism. Insights and understandings derived from the literature inform the design of my research.

Chapter 3. Methodology

Before laying out the design of my study, I intend to situate this research's approach within the larger field of audience studies. The questions I attempt to answer require me to mix different concepts, which draw from different research traditions. For example, in this study I attempt to understand the collective use of media that is spatially distributed on the one hand, whilst on the other hand I also want to explore the subjective reasoning of the actors. Lack of a clear and strong design would result in confused analyses and underdeveloped research findings. For these reasons, I will clarify the theoretical leanings of my study and how the approaches I use are connected with each other, while also being individually distinct from one another.

In communication studies, Jensen and Rosengren (1990) suggest that there are five general traditions of audience research that have been developed within the communication field or borrowed from other social science and humanities fields. These five traditions are: effects, uses and gratifications, literary criticism, cultural studies, and reception analysis. Effects is concerned with what media do to their audiences, uses and gratification asks what audiences get from media, literary criticism extrapolates how audiences are constructed in discourse to general audiences, cultural studies research how audiences create meaning through their daily practice as they are shaped by the structure of the industry, and reception analysis focuses on media content as well as audiences' interpretations.

My study falls largely within the category of reception studies since it focuses on how audiences receive mediated disaster and, although to a lesser extent, examines a sample of actual media content. However, my study ventures beyond the tradition of reception in an attempt to pursue the question of audiences' collective action and its connection with collective attention. Collective attention, I argue, does not *cause* collective action, as the relationship between the two is not necessary. Collective attention provides the conditions needed for collective action in a mediated event, but collective attention itself does not necessarily lead to collective action. A framework of collective attention and collective action is proposed to account for involvement of media audiences in collective actions responding to a disaster.



Figure 1. Basic Models of Audience (adapted from Webster, 1998).

Another way of conceiving the diverse approaches to audiences is offered by Webster (1998) who groups them into three circles based on how the approach views audience (Figure 1). The three circles represent audiences as mass, outcome, and agent. This seemingly simple mapping method is actually powerful enough to encompass the major approaches of audience research. It also clarifies the similarities and differences between the three approaches and overlaps between them. Audience as mass is based on the idea of common exposure to media (see also section 2.3. on page 56 about attention as a resource), audience as outcome views audience as being acted upon by the media, and audience as agent explores how audiences use the media. If interpreted using this lens, my study is located in the overlap between the mass and agent circles, as indicated by the arrow. The mass view is inevitable in accounting for the dispersion of audiences across time and space, while the agent's view is necessary in explaining audiences' collective action in disaster relief efforts. In analysing audiences' exposure to the media using the network approach, I treated them as 'a large collection of people scattered across time and space who act autonomously and have little or no immediate knowledge of one another' (p. 192). On the other hand, to examine how the audiences joined in collective action, I viewed them as agents who chose which medium to use, how to interpret it, and what they did with it.

In the following section I will detail the rationale of my research approach, including how to operationalise the key analytical concepts, namely collective attention and collective action. I will subsequently present my methods of data collection and data analysis. Data collection for this study consisted of survey, in-depth interviews, photo elicitation, unstructured observation, and archival research, whilst data analysis included network analysis, case study approach, and process tracing method. Finally, methodological challenges inherent in the present research design will be discussed, including bias of sample selection, non-response of survey participants, and temporal dynamics of the event.

3.1. Rationales

In the following paragraphs, I will discuss and justify my strategy of using both a quantitative and qualitative approach. The quantitative approach applied in this research consisted of using survey as a data collection method and network analysis as a method of data analysis. The qualitative approach consisted of collecting data through in-depth interviews, photo elicitation, and unstructured observation. The various data were analysed using a case study approach, especially process tracing methods. The quantitative approach allowed a view of the larger picture, due to the larger number of participants, while the qualitative approach facilitated capture of the dynamics of the event and rich descriptions of the participants' experiences.

Arguments for Mixed Methods

One particular issue faced in the current study is the large number of participants in each of the collective actions selected, on the one hand, and variability in the individual participants' behaviour, reasoning, and motives. In other words, the totality and particularity of audiences who participated in the collective action need to be taken into account. Webster (1998) offered a similar suggestion to "consider audiences as collectivities as well as individuals" (p. 200). I believe that Webster's call to study both of these dimensions of audiences is still relevant today because of two reasons. First, collectivities of audiences in disaster are under-studied (Vihalemm *et al.*, 2011); for example, we do not know enough about how audiences use different media platforms during a disaster. Second, audiences' subjective experiences in joining collective actions have never been studied.

My study uses mixed methods to account for both, audience-as-mass and audience-as-agent. The view of audience-as-mass usually involves survey of audiences who are dispersed in time and space. This research surveys only theoretical samples[10] of audiences and does not attempt to generalise findings to other groups of audiences or audiences from contexts other than disaster. To understand audiences' agency in a disaster this research employs in-depth interview, which allows audiences to describe their intentions and strategies behind their actions. Another reason for using mixed methods was that a large-scale survey would allow me to describe the general picture with some confidence, and not to be too attached to particularities (Denscombe, 2008). Thus, survey findings provide a broader base, for example, if compared to interviews with a few selected participants, to situate the particular cases. The following account will detail the justification and process of using mixed methods.

[10] Theoretical samples are the samples that are selected based on a 'theory'. In my study, the theoretical concept is drawn from Boltanski's (2004) concept of audiences' response to mediated suffering, namely to speak, to pay, and to donate.

Collective attention beyond numbers

I have previously argued, in section 2.3. (page 54), that the concept of collective attention merely an aggregate of individuals' exposure to media fails to consider object of attention, intention, and sociality. Couldry *et al.* (2007), however, operationalise the collective attention concept by incorporating an element of object of attention, namely shared issues. In my study, the shared issue are the disaster itself and the well-being of the people impacted by it. In addition to shared issues, the mode with which audiences sustain their collective attention is also important. Their collective attention is sustained through their use of various media, such as watching television and monitoring Twitter for real-time updates from the local people. Another aspect of collective attention that the authors argue to be important to observe is the categories of *public* and *private*. Initially it is individuals in their private spaces who pay attention to an issue of shared concern, but when the domain of experience shifts from private spaces to interpersonal, civic, professional, and other forms of association, an audience member moves a step closer to becoming a member of a 'public' (see Bimber *et al.*, 2005 for boundary-crossing). One major problem regarding the emergence of audiences' collective action is highlighted by Couldry *et al.*, who underline the disconnection between audiences' orientation towards common issues and the context that translates that into action.

The other aspect of collective attention that cannot be accounted for numerically is audiences' awareness that there are other audiences who are paying attention as well (Dayan, 2009). This kind of awareness is normally not captured in audience surveys, which treats audiences as isolated individuals. Furthermore, my initial observation showed that relationship between audiences acts as a context where they converse about the issue and such interaction can modulate their attention toward certain aspects of the mediated disaster. As my study will describe later, audiences' awareness of a collective attention is important in understanding their response. My study will show cases where citizen-audiences have access to the general public's attention, but their agendas differ from those of the mass media, which puts the two groups in competition with one another.

The last aspect of collective attention that this study will examine is its regulation. When collective attention becomes more than an aggregate of individual response, such as audience ratings, and begins to be intensely covered by new and conventional media social and cultural values will, to some extent, guide the appropriate way of expressing ideas in public (Lee, 2011). The public will closely scrutinise the way media cover and represent the event and the ways people express their opinions using media. In light of these theoretical backgrounds, following and modifying Couldry *et al.*'s definition (2005), I define *collective attention as an orientation of two or more people to an issue presented in media that is aware of itself and can be contested by other parties*.

Audiences in action

When examining audiences' collective action, I faced two problems: the sheer numbers and variability involved. The smallest number of participants in any of the selected collective actions was almost one thousand (those who filed complaints to KPI). Quantitative analysis helped to reduce the mass of data into a simpler description of the phenomena of interest. On the other hand, the various behaviours and the dynamics of the event itself were more amenable to a descriptive approach. Consequently, quantitative survey of participants in the selected cases of collective action was employed to reveal the bigger picture beyond the interviewees, and to avoid research as an exercise in highlighting particularities. Meanwhile, in order to illuminate the audiences' actions from their individual perspectives, interviewees were selected in light of relevant demographics. Hence, although selection was purposive, it was informed by the larger picture.

Three cases of collective action were selected for this study: donating, complaining, and volunteering (Boltanski, 2004). The three cases were selected based on several criteria. First, they were carried out collectively. Second, they were carried out in response to the disaster. Third, media were used or helped realisation of the actions. These criteria ensured that the actions were cases of *mediated collective action*, enabling both media and audiences to be clearly seen, including how the two were interrelated. The relevant theoretical literature was discussed in section 2.4. (page 72) and details of sample construction can be found in section 3.2. (page 91).

In addition to producing statistical descriptions of participants in the selected mediated collective actions, my study considers their perspectives in order to understand the decisions they made, their intentions, strategies, and meanings ascribed to their actions. In other words, the design of my study was aimed towards obtaining a general picture of the audiences (their demographics, media use, and collective attention) and describing particular cases of audiences' collective action in detail through the accounts of individual members, thereby employing quantitative and qualitative methods complementarily.

Since survey sample was conveniently chosen, instead of randomly selected, the findings of this study cannot be generalised to other groups of audiences or other cases of collective action in disaster (Lewin, 2005). Further information on selection of the sample can be found in the section on data collection (page 91).

Analytical Concepts

Collective attention

Quantitative analysis of collective attention in this study largely follows Webster and Ksiazek's (2012) framework of analysis. Network analysis allows this study to measure concentration and fragmentation of audiences and to map structural relationships between media outlets based on their structural similarities. This form of analysis provides insights into the meso-level of audiences' mediated engagement, that is, aggregates of collective attention. Webster and Ksiazek categorise measures of audience fragmentation into three groups: media-centric, user-centric, and audience-centric fragmentation.

Media-centric measures of audience fragmentation calculate audiences' 'total attendance across outlets or products' (Webster and Ksiazek, 2012, p. 39). Usually they measure the ratio of time spent on one media outlet or media product compared to the total time spent on all media outlets or media products, expressed in percentages (Webster, 2005). Audiences are fragmented when no one medium commands a disproportionate amount of all time spent viewing, relative to the other media outlets (for example, two times more than the others).

User-centric fragmentation measures the size of media repertoires that users create to cope with the abundance of media (Yuan and Webster, 2006). When audiences attend to a limited selection of media outlets, with composition differing greatly among audiences, this means their media use is fragmented.

Audience-centric fragmentation complements view the above two concepts, in that it brings the media-centric and user-centric approaches together, by measuring the extent to which audiences duplicate across media outlets (Webster and Ksiazek, 2012). It uses network analytics to measure how many links one media outlet has with other media outlets. In network terms, linkage of media outlets is referred to as degree.

This study uses the third (audience-centric) measure of audience fragmentation, because of its several advantages. First, it accounts for media outlets of various platforms (*ibid.*), whereas media-centric measurement of audience fragmentation usually only computes media outlets of the same platform, such as television channels. Second, it shows how audiences' attention 'moves' across media, which means we know the other media outlets with which one media outlet shares its audience and, at a network level, whether the audiences are fragmented across media outlets. Further description of the data analysis is provided in section 3.3. (page 105).

Collective action

In order to explore audiences' agency, beyond the realm of meaning-making, I followed not only how audiences used media and how they interpreted media, but also what they did in response to mediated disaster. However, I did not attempt to study collective action as a complete process of recruitment of individuals, mobilisation of social groups, and scale shift of the action (McAdam, 2003). This study looks only at the moments where audiences (individuals and groups) join collective action, which roughly falls within the recruitment stage of McAdam's model. This study follows how individuals and groups decided to join, and quit, and maybe re-join collective action, with special emphasis on their relationship with media, both as an interpersonal communication tool and as an information-producing entity. As an entity that produces information, specifically news, media are understood not only as technical devices to contain and distribute messages, but also as organisations, which operate in a particular way and develop relationships with other social groups (Lacey, 2002).[11] My study pays particular attention to audiences in their interaction with mainstream media and the 'people's media', which I define simply as non-commercial, founded and operated by the people, without making any assumption about their ideology and political cause (in contrast with alternative media, see Atton, 2002 and Bailey *et al.*, 2007). Examples of the 'people's media' in my study are community radio stations, handheld communication radios used by radio enthusiasts, disaster news services run by student-

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[11] The organisational aspect of the definition particularly applies to *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, a newspaper that organised disaster fundraising activities, and Jalin Merapi network, a group of community media that was initiated by the people of Mt. Merapi. The other media organisations did not interact directly with the participants in the present study, which made their organisational aspects less relevant. Social network sites here, i.e. Facebook and Twitter, are not addressed as institutions because they did not produce their own information, although they promoted certain features and interactions (Ellison and boyd, 2013; boyd, 2011).

journalists, and an online information portal about Mt. Merapi operated by local NGO and information volunteers.

Following Flanagin *et al.* (2006), collective action here is defined to highlight its communicative nature as '*efforts by people to cross boundaries by expressing or acting on an individual (i.e., private) interest in a way that is observable to others (i.e., public)*' (p. 32). Flanagin *et al.* argue that problems faced by individuals in deciding whether they want to join collective action or to 'free-ride' (to benefit from the efforts of other people without contributing back to the efforts) do not always apply to contemporary collective action. This is because advances in information and communication technology have made the 'cost' of joining so low that such a decision can be irrelevant. Organisation, as a means to overcome the problem of free-riding, is also no longer necessary. However, my study does not focus on the organisation of collective action, but on audiences' process of joining collective action and its relation with media use. Hence, it will be more sensitive to the process of crossing borders between private and public (Couldry *et al.*, 2007).

Audiences' crossing of private-public boundaries happens as a response to a mediated disaster, as has been argued by Boltanski (2004). He argued that while people are able to decide not to care about the suffering involved, the expected response to mediated suffering is action. This study focuses only on audiences who took part, in various forms of action and in different degree, in relief efforts toward survivors of Mt. Merapi eruption in 2010. Participation here does not refer to technical or textual aspects of media, but to participation in relief efforts, however vicarious. Several modalities of specific media relevant to audiences' experience of participating in collective action will be accounted for. As studying only those who participated can lead to bias, I do not attempt to generalise the findings to other cases of mediated disaster.

The other aspect of private-public boundary crossing is visibility (Dayan, 2009, 2013). Participating in collective action means being visible to others; not only in the theoretical sense, but also in a performative sense (Dayan, 2001, 2005, 2013). Audiences, regardless of their motivation, have to perform in front of other audiences. This performance can be delivered using textual discourse, visual signs, or physical presence, among others. Accordingly, in addition to their prevalent presence in the aftermath of disaster, the selected collective actions were intended to account for the range of audiences' use of media, from verbal texts in the case of complaint, to photographs in the case of donation, and physical presence in the case of volunteerism.

3.2. Methods of Data Collection

The following table simplifies the design of my study by connecting the research questions with the data collection and data analysis techniques employed. Data were collected by means of survey (print and online), interviews, and archival research. The table below shows how each method of data collection was aligned to a particular question, but this is not to suggest exclusivity of these methods. The actual analysis drew data from various sources to explore and understand the event, as is characteristic with case study (Stark and Torrance, 2005).

Research Question	Data Collection	Data Analysis	Presentation of Findings
How were audiences paying attention collectively to different media during the disaster? Were there repertoires of media outlets attended to by the audiences?	Survey, partly interview	Network analysis of audience duplication; descriptive statistics of media use behaviour; qualitative analysis	Chapter 4
How did audiences donate money via mainstream media? How did audiences volunteer to the disaster relief efforts? With less intensity, this study also asks: How did audiences complain against a television channel?	In-depth interviews, archival documents	Qualitative analysis	Chapter 5
How were audiences transformed into collective actors of disaster relief effort? What processes and mechanisms were involved?	In-depth interviews	Qualitative analysis	Chapter 6

Table 1. Table of Research Design.

Construction of Samples

The participants in this survey were identified through three archives: list of online applicants to become Jalin Merapi volunteers (n = 2690), list of complainers to Indonesia Broadcasting Commission (n = 866), and list of donors printed in *Kedaulatan Rakyat* newspaper (n = 152). The lists were clear of repeat and incomplete entries. In the case of donors via *Kedaulatan Rakyat* newspaper, I only included donors who were photographed and printed in *Kedaulatan Rakyat* during the period of 26 October 2010 to 26 November 2010 (for further justification on the time period, see section 3.4., temporal dynamics, on page 115). The sample is a non-probability sample, which means not all members of the population have the same chance of inclusion. Consequently, the results cannot represent the population as a whole.

The interviewees were identified using snowball method, based on information given by other interviewees and responses to the questionnaire. This process resulted in 74 audience-interviewees. Interviewees were selected to maximise diversity of data. For example, the interviewees represented various roles performed in the collective actions, such as organisers and recruits. A second criterion was to include diversity of experiences of joining collective actions, such as early and late recruits, 'dropout' volunteers, initiators of the photo-sessions, and one-time and repeat donors. Lastly, interviewees were selected to represent diversity of demographic background, such as diversity of age and place of residence.

With regard to the geographical scope of the survey, online surveys (to the volunteer applicants and the complainers) were delivered to respondents regardless of where they lived. Surveys for donors were mainly distributed directly to the respondents, who lived in the province of Yogyakarta, which consists of four municipalities: Sleman, Bantul, Kulon Progo, and Gunung Kidul, and the city of Yogyakarta. Interviews reflected the geographical distribution of participants in the collective actions, with high concentrations in Yogyakarta and the surrounding cities.

Survey

Questionnaire surveys are characterised by standardised questions (Axinn and Pearce, 2006). This is a highly structured method of obtaining data that requires the researcher to define what they are going to measure and how they are going to measure it. The data needed for answering questions relating to collective attention, especially regarding the exposure component of the concept as described in my study, can only be gathered through the use of standardised data collection. In addition, further information can be obtained about actors of the collective action, such as an age demographic breakdown. A survey is a cost-effective way to obtain a general picture of a large number of individuals (Lewin, 2005). However, more complex understanding about participants' understanding of an event, their intentions, and the process they undertake to achieve their goals are better revealed by interviews (Seidman, 2013). In my study, interviewees and survey respondents were drawn from the same group and, to a large extent, consisted of the same people.

The general section of the survey contained two main questions (see the attached questionnaire in Appendix I, page 297), asking about demographic characteristics and media outlets they had consumed during the crisis. Demographic characteristics included name, sex, age, latest education level, occupation, and city of residence. This information concerns respondents' 'biographical constraints', which are important in understanding why they chose one path of action, instead of another. For example, students are less constrained to commit to a long, financially unrewarded project than older adults (McAdam, 1992). The media consumption section provided pre-selected choices, which were compiled from different sources to reflect their popularity/non-popularity, variety, and geographic distribution in the context of news consumption.

Media selection included television, radio, newspapers, online news sites, and social media because of their daily cycle of news production and distribution, which became an important factor because of the unpredictability of the disaster, whereas magazines and tabloids followed weekly cycles and, consequently, were not included. The list of television channels reflected both national (Indonesia) and local (Yogyakarta) terrestrial television, since at the time of data collection terrestrial television was still the most popular television form in Indonesia and cable television channels in general carried entertainment programmes, rather than news. Local terrestrial television channels in cities other than Yogyakarta were not included, to prevent burdening respondent with too many choices, whilst cable television channels were not included due to their low subscription figures (<3% nationally) and lack of news channels. Selection of local radio stations was based on their market share (>3%), while selection of national newspapers was based on circulation, i.e. whether they were available in Yogyakarta. All Yogyakartan newspapers were included. Finally, internet news sites were selected based on popularity and they were listed separately from social media because news sites were content producers whereas social media tended to be news sharing sites.

It is worthy of note here that the media outlets included in the survey are not equally available to all audiences. Terrestrial television channels can be physically obstructed by hills, rendering some of them unavailable by default to some audiences (personal interview; see also Olken, 2009). The same constraints apply to radio channels. Newspapers' availability is limited by their networks of distribution. Furthermore, internet sites can only be accessed by audiences who have the necessary technical equipment and know-how to connect to the internet. Various constraints, from physical barriers to behavioural constraints, prevented me from creating a baseline of media outlets. Nevertheless, general availability of media outlets is not a necessary requirement of this survey of audience fragmentation since it aims to show the 'how' of the issue, rather than to answer the question of 'why'. Hence, this study seeks to determine the levels of audience fragmentation, not what makes them fragmented.

Since the questions referred to the circumstances of 2010, respondents were reminded at the beginning of the questionnaire to specifically remember that time period. In addition, respondents were prompted to remember the time period for each relevant question. In the pilot phase of the survey, it was found that the respondents did not experience any difficulties in answering the questions. To avoid inaccuracies, the survey only asked binary questions about whether they consumed the media outlets or not. It did not ask about the intensity of respondents' media consumption, such as duration or frequency.

The general section of the questionnaire was followed by a section of specific questions that were slightly modified for each group of audiences. However, the core of the questions was the same. For example, questions specifically for donors asked about the medium from which they found out about the call for donations and questions specifically for volunteers asked about the medium from which they found out about the appeal for volunteers. The second section asked how the respondents had accessed information and how informants had shared information with regard to their action. This section included a question to check if the flow of information that was relevant to their action ran directly from mass media to audiences or ran through any other persons, thus confirming the two-step flow hypothesis, which posits that information does not flow directly from mass media to the audience, but through opinion leaders (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955). This question is relevant to understanding how social relationships (Putnam, 2000) provide resources for audiences to act. Finally, this section asked respondents about their motivation to act. It was an open-ended question because understanding the audiences' motivation through their own narratives provided a glimpse into the context of their action.

In-depth Interview, Group Interview, and Photo Elicitation

Three interrelated interview techniques are grouped in this section. They are all manifestations of the same method of obtaining verbal information from human participants in a study, through a conversation. Each of these techniques will be described in the following paragraphs, starting from a general description of the interviews for this study, followed by descriptions of the specific forms of interview: in-depth, group interview, and photo elicitation.

Interviews were conducted with members of the different audiences that had been directly involved in the selected collective actions, in order understand these event in the audiences' own terms (Seidman, 2013). For example, audience members could describe the process through which they volunteered for disaster relief efforts (see attached interview guide in Appendix II on page 309). Audiences' points of view were important to finding out about how their depth of involvement varied over time. I also used interviews to 'reconstruct' how the collective action events unfolded. Factual statements provided by the interviewees were triangulated with statements from independent interviewees and independent documents whenever possible, to check the accuracy, for example, of information concerning persons, dates, places, and quantity (Bryman and Burgess, 1994; Denzin, 2012). Some interviews were conducted in Indonesian and others partly in Javanese language, depending on the particular circumstances and preference of the interviewee.

Conducting, transcribing, and analysing interviews, especially in-depth interviews, require a substantial amount of time, which limits the number of respondents that a single person study such as this can include. To illustrate, interviews with the 74 individuals in this study took up almost 65 hours of digital audio recording. Transcription then took about three times longer than the length of the audio record. Thus, although it is crucial in understanding the actors' views of their involvements and the processes that took them there, because of time constraints, it was important to select interviewees who could provide the best opportunities to learn about issues identified using the theoretical framework, which can lead to a certain bias (Davis, 2008).

The initial interviews were conducted in October 2010, during the crisis itself, and the months following the event. The initial interviews provided contacts with key persons from different groups and media organisations that were involved in citizen-led disaster relief efforts. The substantive part of the interviews was conducted during the period between November 2012 and May 2013. This time-lag meant that some interviewees had forgotten certain facts about their experience, which to an extent can be remedied by consulting other interviewees or written documents.

The interviews followed a semi-structured procedure, whereby I directed the conversation according to my pre-constructed interview guide while at the same time attempting to maintain a natural flow (Mason, 2002). Since the interviewees had different roles in the collective actions and some of them were selected based on previous interviews (snowball method), a complete and standardised interview guide could not be fully prepared beforehand. Therefore, I designed a guide that I could change according to data I gathered from interviewees, media archive, and my own analysis. This interview guide covered four aspects of engagement, namely media technology, media contents, connection with other audiences, and connections with the disaster being mediated. Participants from more distant cities were interviewed face-to-face in Jakarta or in their hometown when possible. Only 2 of the 74 interviewees were interviewed exclusively by phone, whilst 2 others were interviewed by phone after a face-to-face meeting.

A group interview is an interview conducted with more than one person at the same time. A particular characteristic of group interviews is that 'individuals within groups react to the views of others' (Barbour and Schostak, 2005, p. 42). This dynamic can elicit some aspects of the group that might otherwise be hidden, such as values, meanings, and interpretations. I conducted several interviews with donor groups in order to ascertain whether there was any disagreement about the value of anonymity in donating. I also interviewed a group of volunteers to elicit their different responses to their same experience as a group.

The technique of photo elicitation was used in this study to interview audiences who had donated through a newspaper and who had been photographed by the newspaper. The nature of the engagement itself, being photographed and published in a newspaper, lent itself to photo elicitation method. It needs to be noted, however, that although not all of the people who donated through media were photographed their entanglement with the media merited specific examination to understand the specificity of audiences in Indonesia's mediascape. Photo elicitation uses archived photographs to 'invoke comments, memory, and discussion' (Banks, 2001). Individual interviewees or a group of interviewees were shown pictures of themselves taken from the newspaper through which they donated. Then I asked them to tell me how they collected the money, how the money was donated, how the picture was taken, what it signified, and asked them to comment on the issue of mediated donation itself. The benefit of using a photograph is that it elicits what is otherwise unspoken, e.g. details of cloting or a place which might be forgotten because it is considered to be insignificant by the interviewee (Beilin, 2005; Felstead *et al.*, 2004). By evoking an interviewee's memory and enabling them to relive their experience, a photograph shifts the authority of meaning production from the researcher's interpretation to the interviewee and opens that photograph to many interpretations (Harper, 2002). The experiences recalled by the interviewees were not traumatic experiences. In fact, the interviewees remembered them fondly since they were meaningful and extraordinary, but did not affect them negatively.

Harper (2002) provides two insights into the design photo elicitation technique. A chosen photograph needs to facilitate 'breaking of frame', which means inviting the interviewee to see the event from a new angle (pp. 20-21). The second suggestion concerns boundaries and what represents an indicator of cultural boundaries. Thus, questions need to be asked not only about what can be seen, but also what is being left out (pp. 21-22). The absence of a figure or behaviour may indicate cultural assumptions of normalcy and appropriateness.

The interviewees responded enthusiastically to the photographs that I always brought with me and they told stories of their donation, and the disaster in general, without being prompted. The photographs served as objects of conversation between researcher and interviewee, and copies were given to respondents as a small token of my gratitude for their time and involvement with this study.

These three methods of interview were used in response to specific aspects of the interviewees' experiences. In-depth interview was particularly suitable to solicit thosse elements of an individual's experiences and values which it was particularly important to understand, for example, private-public boundaries in each type of action. Meanwhile, my preliminary observation had suggested that some audiences took action as a group, rather than as individuals. Hence, these audiences were interviewed as a group, rather than individually. In this study, photo elicitation was specifically employed when interviewing donors because photographs of them had appeared in a newspaper. The photo opportunity itself is a process of mediation that needs unpicking.

Unstructured Observation

Observation essentially means 'being present in a situation and making a record of one's impressions of what takes place' (Jones and Somekh, 2004, p. 138). Since the researcher's presence is always selective, spatially and temporally, both where and when the researcher observes affect the data collected. In the larger perspective, my being there at the time of the crisis and my belonging to the Javanese culture provided me with opportunities and interpretive tools to understand the event through the participants' eyes (Goldbart and Hustler, 2004). While conducting this research I followed a group of young people from Jakarta (capital of Indonesia) who gave in kind donations to survivors of Mt. Merapi at the peak of the crisis in November 2010. I also attended social gatherings of Jalin Merapi volunteers about 9 months after the crisis. During the second fieldwork session in 2013, I observed a photographer from *Kedaulatan Rakyat* at work taking pictures of a regular donation-making event. And last but not least, I drew on my own experience of living in close proximity to the crisis throughout the event. These were all unstructured observations, in that I was 'guided by prior knowledge and experience and 'sees' [...] socio-culturally constructed values' (Jones and Somekh, 2004, p. 138). Notes were taken and interviews with participants of the observed events were recorded.

The field notes were used to inform the topics of my subsequent interviews. For example, based on my observation on how donors shopped in a supermarket during the crisis, I realised the importance of donors' imagination about how survivors were living to their decision on what to give. The topic of imagination was then imported to other types of donation and/or volunteering, for example cooking food for survivors, to understand how they decided on the food menu. Imagination is important in the stranger-relationship between audiences and the suffering others (Boltanski, 2004). In other examples, observation of an actual donation-giving event sensitised me to the issue of private donors' visual practice as opposed to that of mass-mediated donors. These observations will be elaborated further in the findings chapters.

Archival Research

Four types of archive became main sources of data for the present study. These comprised an archive of complaints obtained from the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission, an archive from *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, Twitter updates containing the keyword 'Merapi', and various blog posts and the archive from Kaskus, an online discussion forum.

The complaint archive contained 998 entries in the form of an electronic file. It provided the subjects and dates of complaints, e-mail addresses of the complainers, the names of complainers, their sex, age, level of education, city of residence, and descriptions of the complaints. In various publications, the KPI claimed to have received more than one thousand complaints (KPI, 2010; KPI, 2012), but after I had cleaned out the redundant entries, the number was 998. The KPI did not explain where the archive originated from. Inferring from its standard form of record, its precise time stamps (to the minute), and contents of complaint that had been copied from other blogs, I concluded that the archive was a full record of online complaints submitted to the KPI's website. The archive contains, among other information, demographic data, temporal data, and verbal data on complaint that could be used to characterise how the process of complaints developed, who the complainers were, and what the complaints were about. Furthermore, availability of e-mail addresses allowed me to contact the complainers to request them to fill in the online survey and agree to a follow-up interview.

The *Kedaulatan Rakyat* archive consists of newspaper print editions from the period of 26 October 2010-26 November 2010. This period covers the start of the eruption and ends at the point when national media coverage had decreased to a low level and there was a consistent declining trend in the number of donors. From the newspaper, I derived two types of data: photographs showing donation events and lists of donors. The photographs of donations (n= 202) were accompanied by captions giving the donors' identity and their addresses. I derived a random sample of survey participants (n = 152) from the photograph archive using the SPSS software package. The list of donors started from 27 October 2010 (one day after the first eruptions). It contained 2,826 entries on donors, with details of date of donation, donors' names, and amount donated. The date referred to when the newspaper was issued, not the actual date of donation. Usually, the list was printed on day following the donation. But, there were occasions when a donor's name was printed two days after, due to space constraints.

Twitter data were collected using a third party service called Twapperkeeper (http://twapperkeeper.com/index.html). Fist, I used 'Merapi' as a keyword and this resulted in 166,205 tweets covering the period between 11.00 am on 07 November 2010 and 23.00 pm on 09 November 2010. Further, the archives were filtered using the keywords '*Silet*' (and possible written variations) and '*pengaduan*' (indicating calls to complain). The messages distributed by robots[12] were removed as well. This resulted in 1,026 posts that might indicate a call to complain on Twitter (see the Appendix for the

[12] Software robots are a software that automates tasks performed by machine, such as searches for messages that meet certain parameters on Twitter, and re-posts them. In the Twitter archive that I collected, the majority of automated posts on Twitter were handled by a free internet service called Twitter Feed (twitterfeed.com).

detailed description). To identify the context of status updates, I used the Topsy search service (http://www.topsy.com), which hosted a larger Twitter archive and provided several parameters in its search function to identify a specific tweet.

Finally, I used an archive obtained from the Kaskus online forum and two blogging platforms: Blogspot and Kompasiana. Kaskus is the most active online forum in Indonesia, covering very diverse topics from software, fashion, gardening, to politics. I recorded two threads of discussion that resulted from the *Silet* show, both were started on 7 November 2010 by members with the online handles of baradhs and marvell707. Blogspot posts were connected with cases of complaint since their content was copied many times on the KPI file. Meanwhile, Kompasiana blogs showed audiences' responses to an inaccurate report made by a national news television channel.

Ethics

There are two aspects of ethics I want to discuss here, namely expectation of confidentiality and anonymity when using online and offline media and intrusion of privacy. Both are closely connected, but I will discuss them separately for reasons of clarity. Potential participants in the survey were identified through three kinds of archive: online complaints to the Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia (KPI, Indonesian Broadcasting Commission) website, online applications to the Jalin Merapi website (local NGO), and a list of donors from *Kedaulatan Rakyat* (local Yogyakarta newspaper). These three media are publicly accessible. These complaints could be likened to 'letters to the editors' since the name and content of each complaint were displayed on the website. Based on the AOIR Guide to Internet Research (Markham and Buchanan, 2012) that the 'expectation of autonomy, privacy' in an internet venue needs to be established individually for each case (p. 2, pp. 4-6), I could not find any indication on the KPI's website of protection of the anonymity and privacy of the complainers. Both the complaint and the complainer's name were clearly and intentionally displayed. In fact, Indonesian audiences were even able to ask the KPI to send them the complaints file. The same argument applies to the list of donors at the *Kedaulatan Rakyat* newspaper, which is printed daily as a measure of accountability on the newspaper's part. The expectation of confidentiality in the case of volunteers' applications to Jalin Merapi was unclear. Hence, the invitation to participate in the online survey was distributed by Jalin Merapi.

The second aspect of ethics concerned intrusion into a subject's private space. It is an issue worth careful consideration since e-mail is a private form of communication, and unsolicited invitation e-mail can be likened to spam. Hence, measures of open call were taken, entailing such as asking Jalin Merapi's leaders to repost survey invitations on Twitter and putting ads simultaneously in almost all of the local newspapers. Both resulted in minimal response (1.4%, n = 2690 in the case of Twitter open call and zero valid response in the case of newspaper ads). Hence, although these were preferable methods, clearly they did not give workable results. Furthermore, personal visits were not possible as addresses were not provided. Hence, e-mail was the only means of contacting JM volunteers and those who complained to KPI. As data collection progressed, through cooperation with Jalin Merapi and personal visits to *Kedaulatan Rakyat* donors, I formed a general impression that the participants had not minded at all being contacted. Volunteers to Jalin Merapi returned 319 responses (11.8%, n = 2690) and *Kedaulatan Rakyat* donors gave 120 responses (78.9%, n = 152). Some people were even eager to be heard since we shared the same interest in the event. Hence, when the two surveys gave clear indication of sufficient interest from potential participants, I sent invitations to the complainers, which resulted in 60 responses (6.9%, n = 866).

Archives of online materials analysed here were seen as public documents, not only because they were publicly accessible, but also because they were intended to be examples of public speech. For example, use of textual resources (keywords, hash-tags, language style) in the tweet archive indicated that Twitter users understood that they were speaking in public and they wanted to be identified and recognised as such. In fact, the tweets that contained the keywords 'complaint' and 'Indonesian Broadcasting Commission' were a clear example of online collective action, which was public in character. These Twitter users would more appropriately be conceptualised as 'authors' of public speech and 'agents' who wanted to change the circumstances, rather than 'human subjects' who needed external protection. In the words of the AOIR Guide to Internet Research, these audiences can be seen as 'authors intending for their work to be public' (p. 7). The same argument can be made in the case of letters of complaint to the KPI. Complainers wrote these letters knowing that they would be published on the website. The consent forms issued to survey participants and interviewees, both in Indonesian and its translations in English, are appended to this thesis (page 306).

With regard to the issue of trauma, the interviewees were mostly outsiders, and not people from Mt. Merapi. Two people from Mt. Merapi who were interviewed were Jalin Merapi activists, but they were not physically hurt and neither their houses destroyed. The interviewees were involved in disaster relief efforts, rather than search and rescue operations. Thus, they were not in direct contact with those who were physically harmed by the disaster. In contrast, these interviewees indicated that they considered their experiences as positive and meaningful. Furthermore, there are exaggerated concerns about the traumatising effect of disaster. The literature shows there is only limited evidence to support the existence of 'disaster syndrome', which is characterised by 'a state of apathy or shock leading to a regression in normal cognitive processes' (Quarantelli, 1960, p. 73). It 'is confined to the post impact period, and is of short duration' (*ibid*). Because the interviews were conducted with those who were not directly affected and more than one year after the event, they should not be of any concern about their possible harmful effects. Meanwhile, the survey, at the beginning, clearly provided the option not to participate in this study.

As a side note, there was a discrepancy between the duration stated in the consent form (90 minutes) and an interview itself that lasted longer, which was the result of a repeat interview with the same interviewee that was then recorded as a single interview.

3.3. Methods of Data Analysis

Process Tracing and Case Study

Process tracing is an analytical method used to explain development of events in case study research. It is therefore relevant to my study due to the critical importance of temporal dynamics in how the disaster event developed. Process tracing is 'a procedure for identifying steps in a causal process leading to the outcome of a given dependent variable of a particular case in a particular historical context' (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 176). Process tracing can reveal not only the causal process, but the constitutive process as well (p. 234). The above definition is used here, but it is modified to loosen its strong positivist tendency towards phenomena (emphasising the causal connection between determinants and outcomes) and to incorporate more interpretive dimensions of those phenomena (emphasising the actors' understanding of the event) (Vennesson, 2008). Accordingly, the actors' motives and reasoning become critical to understanding why they did what they did. Actors' characterisation of the event and their theories of action are interconnected and can only be revealed through intensive and open-ended interviews (p. 234).

According to George and Bennett (2005), process tracing can vary from very theoretical-driven to atheoretical analysis. Historical chronology is an example of detailed process analysis, but it tends not to have an explicitly proposed theoretical framework. Process analysis can also use both a narrative component and explicit causal hypotheses. Or the researcher can decide to put aside detailed observation in order to focusing on the analytic explanation of the case. The last variety of process tracing shifts the level of analysis to a more general abstraction. This study uses a combination of an explicit theoretical framework with detailed narrative since this mode of analysis and presentation allows expression of participants' narratives and viewpoints without ignoring their relevance to the theoretical framework.

The procedure of process analysis starts with identifying the initial condition. In my study, the initial condition is the audiences' collective attention. The theoretical framework adopted in my study suggests that collective attention aspects include aggregates, objects, intentions, sociality, and competition. These aspects of the initial condition were explored using different data sets, from survey, interviews, and data archive. The second step is to identify outcomes, namely the audiences' collective actions. The three potential outcomes in this study were: collective donation, collective volunteering, and collective complaint. I interviewed audience members who had taken part in collective actions to understand their crossing of private-public boundaries from their perspectives.

The third, and critical, step is to identify the mechanisms by which the initial condition is transformed into outcomes. To establish by which mechanism that took place, I interviewed different actors who were directly involved in the collective actions in different capacities so that their different experiences could be taken into consideration. Further, I also consulted different documents (e.g., media archives, reports) to describe the context of the event. For example, collective donation from *Kedaulatan Rakyat* readers involved several sequences, from resource pooling to the actual 'hand over'. Each sequence operated using different mechanisms and its actors considered different factors. Thus, each sequence was analysed and described separately. This enabled me to describe in a more detailed and qualified narrative how the media factor was involved in the process. The media archives and reports contextualise the narrative within the larger context of Indonesian media landscape and/or society.

Process tracing is especially important in my study also because many aspects of this study are to some extent reconstructions of a past event. For example, when I started to collect data and talked with the actors, I learnt about an instance of rumour spreading by the television show *Silet*. I did not watch the show and I only found out about it after it had already disappeared from daily conversation, on the internet and in my social circles. Therefore, the best way to identify the actors, how processes unfolded, and what the key mechanisms were, is through drawing up a chronology. The exact time order of when an action or an event took place becomes critical, such as when the outcry of the complainers died down, when the television station issued an apology, and when the KPI issued a sanction. Without understanding the chronology, it is impossible to establish causal relationship between these events. Not all sequences involve causation. A causal relationship requires covariance of the existing conditions and the outcomes, or that a change in the existing conditions modifies the outcomes (Héritier, 2008).

A wider approach used in analysis is case study. According to Pascal Vennesson (2008), case study is

> [...] a research strategy based on the in-depth empirical investigation of one, or a small number, of phenomena in order to explore the configuration of each case, and to elucidate features of a larger class of (similar) phenomena, by developing and evaluating theoretical explanations (p. 226).

The delimitation of a case, or a small number of cases, in the study generally has to be based on theoretical conceptualisation, which frames what 'class of events' that the case instantiates (George and Bennett, 2005). In other words, cases and what defines them are the result of active construction by a researcher, following an explicit theoretical framework. I selected volunteering, donating, and complaining based on, with some modification, Luc Boltanski's (2004) model of audiences' engagement with mediated suffering. Another framework was borrowed from a strand of audience studies which explores overlaps between audiences and publics to understand what constitutes mediation of publics (Dayan, 2009; Couldry *et al.*, 2007). And lastly, a framework of collective action was employed to explain the transformation of audiences' collective attention to collective action (Bimber *et al.*, 2006).

The case study approach taken in my study falls within the category of interpretive case study, which emphasises the use of a 'theoretical framework to provide an explanation of particular cases', rather than generating hypotheses, or evaluating theories, although to some extent it also aims to provide description, which is a separate category (Vennesson, 2008, pp. 227-228). My study does not stop at using existing theoretical frameworks, but also attempts to develop them further. Existing theories are rarely perfectly suited to explaining the cases at hand, which tend to be particular and contextual (*ibid.*). The differences between the cases allow me to analyse them and to use analysis to infer causal patterns that give rise to such differences and similarities and thereby to develop the theoretical frameworks borrowed in this study.

The strength of the case study approach lies in its focus only on one case, or a small number of cases, and its use of 'multiple methods and data sources to explore it and interrogate it' (Stark and Torrance, 2005, p. 33). Multiple methods of data collection and multiple data sources are also important because the exclusive use of one method, especially interview, will lead only to the 'the "here-and-now" of participants' perceptions' (*ibid.*, p. 35). Use of a combination of methods reveals both the insights of participants and an outsider's view of the phenomena.

<u>Network Analysis</u>

Network analysis as applied in my study mainly follows the work of Thomas Ksiazek (2011; Webster and Ksiazek, 2012). He argues for the use of network analysis of audiences across media platforms, which he formulates as:

> an approach that defines a media network as a set of media outlets (or content items, more broadly) both within and across platforms along with the audiences that overlap among them (Ksiazek, 2011, p. 238).

Network analysis is used by Ksiazek to examine, among other aspects, audience fragmentation, which builds on Webster's work on audience fragmentation that I have discussed earlier in sections 2.1. (page 38) and 3.1. (page 86). Different from the traditional approach to audience fragmentation that calculates the total of time audiences spend on media outlets, network analysis measures general characteristics of audiences 'by the other media they use' (Webster and Ksiazek, 2012, p. 45). Where the traditional measure only shows the percentage of audiences' time allocated to each media outlet, the network measure shows how audiences duplicate across media platforms.

In network terms, media outlets are treated as nodes and audience duplication is represented by the links between them. Two nodes (media outlets) are linked when they share audiences with each other, or when there is audience duplication. The concept of audience duplication used here follows Ksiazek's (2011) operationalisation of primary deviation-from-random duplication. The primary deviation-from-random duplication is derived from primary duplication, which is defined as 'the percentage of the audience of one outlet that is also exposed to a second outlet' (p. 239). For example, outlet MetroTV is watched by 389 people and outlet Indosiar is watched by 101 people. The actual number of audience members that duplicate across the two platforms is 78. Primary duplication shows that 20.1% of MetroTV audiences also watched Indosiar (see Table 2, green cell), but 77.2% of Indosiar audiences also watched MetroTV (see Table 2, yellow cell). Note that the percentage differs, depending on which media outlet is treated first. Primary deviation-from-random duplication was devised to eliminate the possibility of duplication between media outlets being the result of random chance. Furthermore, the measure 'indicates the degree to which the observed percentage of the audience of outlet *i* that is also exposed to *j* (i.e., Primary Duplication) diverges from the degree to which the entire audience is exposed to *j*' (p. 241).

	ANTV	GlobalTV	Indosiar	JogjaTV	MetroTV	TPI
ANTV	100.0	68.8	58.6	33.6	85.9	47.7
GlobalTV	68.8	100.0	57.0	33.6	90.6	52.3
Indosiar	74.3	72.3	100.0	33.7	77.2	54.5
JogjaTV	43.9	43.9	34.7	100.0	82.7	31.6
MetroTV	28.3	29.8	20.1	20.8	100.0	19.5
TPI	76.3	83.8	68.8	38.8	95.0	100.0

Table 2. Sample of Primary Duplication Matrix (in per cent). (Adapted from Ksiazek, 2011).

The reach (R) of a media outlet is measured as the sum of audience that one media outlet has divided by the total audience, expressed in percentage. For example, the sum of audience of outlet i (MetroTV) is 389 and the total audience is 539. The reach of outlet i (Ri) is 389 divided by 539, which equals 72.2%. And the reach of outlet j (Rj) is 101 (the sum of audience of Indosiar) divided by 539 (the total audience) equals 18.7%. When computed using the formula, the deviation-from-random duplication score is 58.5.

The formula to compute the expected primary duplication is:

Variable	*MetroTV-Indosiar (ij)*
Observed Primary Duplication	77.2
Expected Primary Duplication	$\frac{\left(\frac{Ri\ Rj}{100}\right)}{Ri} \text{ x } 100$ $\frac{\left(\frac{72.2 \text{ x } 18.7}{100}\right)}{72.2} \text{ x } 100 = 18.7$
Deviation-from-Random Duplication	(Observed-Expected) 77.2 – 18.7 = 58.5

Table 3. Formula to Calculate Primary Deviation-from-Random Duplication

***Note:* Formula adopted from Ksiazek (2011) with examples taken from my own study.**

The next step is to reduce the value of primary deviation-from-random duplication into 0 (for any value ≤0) or 1 (for any value >0), where 0 indicates no link between two given media outlets and 1 indicates a link between two given media outlets. The score of the network as a whole is computed using the Freeman degree score (Freeman, 1979) with UCINET (Borgatti *et al.*, 2006). The score ranges from 0% to 100%, with higher score meaning more concentration. The threshold between concentration and fragmentation is actually arbitrary. Ksiazek (2010) defines it as nearing 50% or more. Because the network analysis method of measuring audience fragmentation was only published in 2012, it has not yet been adopted widely, and at the moment there is no consensus on the threshold of concentration. In my view, with 0% representing fully fragmented and 100% fully concentrated, a score should be assessed in terms of how close they are to either one of these to percentages. Further exploration is conducted to assess the spread of audiences' collective attention across media outlets by comparing in-degree distribution of media outlets with their reach using bar charts. *In-degree* is defined as the number of links that a given node receives from other nodes. The in-degree score is derived from the primary deviation-from-random duplication measurement. The result of each media outlet will then be presented in a sequence of higher to lower order.

Regarding data collection for this study, audiences were asked to select what media they used to monitor the eruption of Mt. Merapi or whether they did not use media at all. Since it was a self-reporting questionnaire of a past event, the risk of error was high when asking about intensity, such as how frequently or for how long they consumed media (Prior, 2009). Hence, questions merely offered a binary choice of use or non-use. Answers were then tabulated in rows of individuals and columns of media outlets, which then were transformed into relational data with rows and columns of media outlets (see Table 2 and Appendix A.4. on page 321).

3.4. Methodological Issues

I identified three main challenges in the process of conducting this study: bias, non-response, and temporal dynamics. Bias could results from focusing only on those who joined the collective actions, while disregarding those who did not join, which could make up the majority. The problem of non-response relates to low response to the survey invitation, which might be due to the typical low response rates of surveys (Curtis, 2009) and the time-lag between the event and the survey. Finally, temporal dynamics concerns how the period and stages of crisis were conceptualised and experienced differently by different groups. These three problems will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Bias

This study is aware of selection bias where a researcher limits their 'attention to cases where [...] outcomes occur or analyse a narrow range of variation' (Collier and Mahoney, 1996, p. 57). Even though researchers may not be seeking to generalise their findings, limiting attention to cases that show only expected outcomes (especially in term of high level outcomes, or allowing no variation) will still pose a problem, namely relative weakening of the effect of explanatory variables on the dependent variable. Collier and Mahoney show that causal effects are strong in a research design that includes cases from the entire range of outcomes, but they are systematically weaker in a design that includes only cases of limited value. Furthermore, although selection bias is conceptually different, it can be practically connected to cognitive bias (Vennesson, 2008). The kind of bias that is pertinent, although not exclusively, to case study is confirmation bias, in both its positive and negative sense. In its positive sense, a researcher only seeks information that confirms their belief, whereas in its negative sense they ignore negative evidence.

My study focuses on cases of mediated collective action. Hence, an awareness of selection bias warns me against focusing on extreme cases of collective action, such as the case of field volunteering only, which actually is very diverse in its degree of involvement. I selected cases entailing different degrees of involvement with mediated disaster, such as different roles in money donation and writing complaints, which consisted of moderate and lesser degrees of involvement respectively. They can nevertheless still be seen as positive cases of involvement, excluding cases of inaction (negative evidences). In the latter regard, I pursued cases of dropping out to learn what causes an audience member to stop participating, and conducted a minor comparison with other cases of people's unsuccessful efforts at disaster relief.

The most substantial justifications of cases in this study are twofold. One, very few empirical studies on audience in disaster have been conducted and therefore very little knowledge has been accumulated. Hence, following Collier and Mahoney, the researcher's familiarity with the phenomenon is not sufficient to build conceptualisation and measurement (p. 74). Two, this research is more interested in how the process from collective attention to collective action took place and was perceived by the audience, rather than pinpointing explanatory variables of the collective action (Vennesson, 2008). In other words, process-tracing as employed in my study adopts an interpretive approach toward event and human behaviour, thereby taking into consideration the subject's understanding, motivation, and values in reconstruction of the process.

Non-Response

The rate of participants' response to the survey differed among the three cases of collective action, based on the method of recruitment. The researcher's method of sending personal e-mails to the complainers to the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission resulted in 6.9% of the 866 invited participants completing the survey. The same method of e-mailing, but sent by Jalin Merapi to their volunteers, resulted in

11.8% of the 2690 invited participants completing the survey. The highest response rate came from a face-to-face meeting with donors to *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, which drew responses from 78.9% of the 152 potential participants. In addition to the method of recruitment, general issues that hindered recruitment were incomplete contact information and the time lag between the event and the survey. The information that was used to contact the participants was, oftentimes, incomplete, such as lack of e-mail address, wrongly typed e-mail address, or incomplete off-line address. Furthermore, the time difference between the disaster event itself and the survey was more than one year, meaning that many of the e-mail addresses were already inactive and many people had simply lost interest in the issue. Although the online survey was designed so that participants could finish it in less than 10 minutes, the dropout rate was still high, namely about 30% both for online surveys sent to volunteers and those sent to complainers. This rate is normal in web surveys (Galesic, 2006). The actual reason for these dropouts is hard to identify because the survey was not designed to include evaluation by respondents, but it might be due to a combination of lack of interest and cognitive burden (Galesic, 2006).

The high non-participation and incompletion rates posed a problem to this study (Curtis, 2009). Although my study does not aim to generalise its findings beyond the participants of my study, I still need to justify that the participants of my study were typical of their group. Demographically, I can make comparisons between the responses and the population, especially in the case of the volunteers and the complainers because the initial list included information about their age and gender. But, other than taking into account this basic demographic information, the design of my survey did not anticipate the possibility of bias among the participants who completed the survey. To compensate for this potential bias, the interviews were explicitly analysed to represent the variety of experiences and engagements with the mediated disaster.

Temporal Dynamics

My initial observation on the rate of volunteer applications during the crisis revealed that the number of applicants rose in proportion to the scale of the crisis, as indicated by the volcano's seismic-amplitude (Surono, 2010). The audiences were able to monitor the volcano's activities because updates from the government agency (PVMBG, which stands for *Pusat Vulkanologi dan Mitigasi Bencana Geologi*, or Volcanology Survey Indonesia) were relayed by national television channels. In addition, people also talked with each other and monitored their physical surroundings to gauge the level of the crisis. In short, the natural dynamics of the crisis, as it unfolded through time, constituted important circumstances which were responded to by the audiences, as I will show in my analysis.

The problem this posed to my analysis was that the duration of the crisis was not easily defined. The duration, defined as 'the temporal length of an event', of the Mt. Merapi crisis was based on a government agency decision, the physical phenomena themselves, and subjective perceptions of those who were impacted by the crisis (Gryzmala-Busse, 2011). Taking an example from the start of the crisis, the PVMBG decreed the status of Mt. Merapi as being at Level III (one level below the highest danger level, which meant evacuation) on 22 October 2010. However, the people who lived on Mt. Merapi had seen regular eruptions every four to five years so they stayed at their homes and doing their daily chores. Only after the status of Mt. Merapi was raised to Level IV (the highest) did people start to evacuate, one day before the actual eruption on 26 October 2010. After this first eruption, the people of Merapi still went back to their fields and pens to tend their crops and livestock. On the media side of the event, after the status had been raised to Level III, MetroTV, a news channel with national reach, started to cover the crisis and aired it on their prime time programmes for one day and then moved it to quieter hours on the following day. National print media covered the preparations by the local government in their local pages, but only printed news of the event on the first page following the first eruption.

We can see that temporal parameters were seen differently and were decided on various grounds by these groups. The government relied on their technical apparatus and their concern for the public when they decided to raise and time the sequence of the hazard level. The people of Merapi responded differently based on their previous experience and their concern for their economic livelihood, whereas the media considered the news value of the event in deciding to allocate their resources. We can see here that defining the duration based on 'actor perceptions' alone is hard enough, let alone trying also to consider 'theoretical expectations' and 'empirical comparisons' (*ibid.*, p. 1274). Hard as it is, duration is important to define because duration, which means 'how much time elapses between the start and end of an action or event' (p. 1277), allows us to select what states will be included in the sequences we are focusing on. Duration also influences which mechanisms we focus on; for example, a longer duration allows mechanisms of learning and institutionalisation, whereas a shorter duration only allows mechanisms of imitation and temporary organisation.

In my study, I define the duration of the crisis based on interaction between the audiences and the media. Hence, the start of the crisis was set at 26 October 2010 (the first eruption) and the end of the crisis was at 26 November 2010 (three weeks after the second eruption), when the rate of audience donations through media declined and the media had reduced their coverage to a minimum level. Hence, the crisis covered about a one month period. It is worth noting that this one month period prioritised the perspective of audiences and the media. The other consideration was that the PVMBG downgraded the hazard level on Mt. Merapi by one level on 19 November 2010, but refugees stayed on in the camps until a few weeks later. Volunteers working for Jalin Merapi were officially released from their stations on 5 December 2010, when the organisation considered there was not much left for them to do and financial support had become a burden.

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter has described the theoretical rationale, methods of data collection, and methods of data analysis I used in this study. A mixed approach of quantitative and qualitative analysis is adopted, with qualitative analysis being the primary approach. The use of these two approaches permits better understand the audiences' collective actions, which have two essential characteristics, namely they are at the same time a mass phenomenon and a subjective experience. Thus, I need to account at the same time the broadness of the phenomenon and the depth of the involved individuals' experiences. My research design is an attempt at bringing these two dimensions together.

Network analysis is used to analyse the mass dimension of collective attention and process tracing and case study approach are used to examine collective experience. Each type of analysis involves different types of data, namely numerical data for network analysis and verbal statements and media contents for process tracing and case studies. Several methodological issues faced by this study have been considered, namely bias of positive cases, non-response by potential survey participants, and the temporal dynamics of the event.

Chapter 4. Collective Attention

4.1. Short Introduction to Indonesian Media in 2010

In this introduction I will describe the media context in which this study took place. My description starts in 1998, which marked a turning point for the Indonesian media as in that year the authoritarian Suharto regime was replaced by relatively more democratic regimes. The loosening of authoritarian control of the media resulted in media growth, in both commercial and non-commercial media sector (public and community media) (Baker, 2007). To provide an overview of the media context, I will refer to official publications of the relevant organisations and peer-reviewed literature. However, in the absence of authoritative literature, I will refer to unpublished papers of researchers of the relevant field and reports from relevant organisations (e.g., non-governmental organisations). Several of the studies I cite were published after 2010, when Mt. Merapi erupted, but their descriptions either refer to the realities of 2010 or the realities of 2010 do not differ from those that pertained on the date of publication. The introduction covers availability of media, commercial and non-commercial, and behaviours of audiences of Indonesian media. These two structural factors are relevant in situating our understanding of Indonesian audiences' collective attention in disaster in that they allow certain possibilities to these audiences, while excluding them from others.

Mass Media and People's Media

After the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesian media began to regain the press freedom that they had lost for more than three decades. The ministry of information that functioned to control the press was liquidated and the government was no longer able to use media licences to censor the press. Furthermore, commercial media outlets began to burgeon. The number of free-to-air, commercial national television channels grew from five to ten, in addition to the tens of local terrestrial regional television channels, satellite television channels, and subscription-based television channels. Numbers of commercial radio stations and newspapers grew rapidly as well (Nadjib, 2013; Sudibyo and Faisol, 2004). In the non-commercial sector of the media, the number of community radio stations increased from zero to about four hundred in 2009 (Nugroho *et al.*, 2012). However, media professionals and academics have commented that rapid commercialisation of media in Indonesia has brought about a less desirable effect, namely concentration of ownership.

In the case of the Indonesian television industry, concentration of ownership was challenged by the introduction of the Broadcasting Bill in 2002 (Armando, 2014). The bill stipulated that national television stations must develop their own network of local television stations in order to be permitted to broadcast to national audiences. But the bill has been met with obstruction by television stations, ranging from rallying public opinion to attempts at revoking it through a judicial review (p. 402-403). The year of 2007, which should mark the end of the transition period to the network system, passed without any of the stipulations materialising. In 2010, the national audience's 'centre of attention' was still gravitating towards the national television channels.

Several authors observe that ownership of Indonesian media has become more concentrated (Haryanto, 2010; Cahyadi, 2011; Nugroho *et al.*, 2012). The authors state that the present conglomerations of media 'control a significant number of broadcasting companies and print media businesses' (Nugroho *et al.*, p. 48).[13] The conglomerate groups that control the Indonesian media are reported to range in number from 9 to 12. The difference in number might reflect slightly different realities, since different studies refer to different times. The criteria used by the authors to group media companies into

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[13] It is noteworthy that the authors create slightly different lists in terms of which conglomerates are included and how many they are.

a particular conglomeration are not altogether clear.[14] A similar view of this concentration of media ownership is shared by the media professionals themselves (Manan, 2010). Media professionals view concentration of ownership as worrying because it puts more power in the hands of media owners in terms of control the newsroom and shrinkage of diversity of perspectives.

Intervention in the newsroom's independence can be exerted through different mechanisms. The owners directly control their editors, or they can indirectly control the newsroom through the management or through the cultivation of self-censorship among the editors and the journalists. Nugroho *et al.* (2012) reported an interview in which the informant said that the media owner directly intervenes in the newsrooms by summoning editors of the media group to set their agenda (p. 77). Meanwhile, Tapsell's (2012) study of journalists at 16 newspapers in Indonesia found that whilst media owners did not directly interfere with newsroom operations, they imposed control through the mechanism of directing their editor and through journalists' own self-censorship.

Regarding shrinkage of diversity of perspectives, Nugroho *et al.* (2013) proceeded by investigating content in the Indonesian media. They found that in the cases of 10 Indonesian terrestrial television networks, which command the largest share of audiences' collective attention, content was heavily orientated to Java island, Islamic religion, and Javanese ethnicities. This finding indicates imposition of majority issues and perspectives over those of the minority (p. 55).[15] The sameness of media content, the authors argue, is the result of competition within the media that is solely driven by the rating system (pp. 42-44, 55). In such a competitive market, competitors have to avoid risk in order to survive (p. 37). In short, we see that Indonesian media have

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[14] Nugroho *et al.* (2012), although not explicit about the criteria of conglomeration, argue that the drivers of conglomeration are business expansion and technological developments (p. 46-47).

[15] 57.8% of Indonesia's total population lives in Java (BPS, 2010).

become concentrated into approximately twelve groups and media content produced by these conglomerations revolves around the island of Java.

Not only did the fall of the authoritarian regime trigger proliferation of commercial print and electronic media outlets, it also allowed growth of community media, albeit hampered by regulations and issues of sustainability. For example, community radio stations are constrained to limit their reach to 2.5 km and their transmission power to 50 watts, which causes problems to university-community radio stations and community radio stations in sparsely occupied areas (Birowo, 2010). Community radio stations on the flanks of Mt. Merapi use low-power transmitters as well. In fact, one of these, MMC FM, was unable to broadcast its programmes when a commercial radio station decided to install a relay transmitter that used the same frequency but was twenty times more powerful (Wijoyono, 2009). Fortunately, the organisers of MMC FM survived the challenge by distributing their reports in the form of simple fliers and on a website that published their articles and those of two other community radio stations on the other side of Mt. Merapi.

The contents of community media revolve around the needs of the community, and these are defined by the specific context. Birowo's (2010) study reports that community radio in Timbulharjo, Bantul discusses issues relating to village administrations. Meanwhile, community radio in Minomartani, Sleman, produces programmes about local cultural activities. One organiser of community radio on the slopes of Mt. Merapi told me that in general the radio station plays popular music, announces the village's agenda, and informs villagers about the condition of Mt. Merapi. These specific issues and concerns of community media are not relevant to general audiences, only to members of the local community. To summarise, legal constraints and the particular contents of community media preclude them from going beyond their own specific context.

During the eruption of Mt. Merapi 2010, the community media were transformed into the people's media, which changed the content of their communication, their source of information, and the geographical distribution of their audience. The community radio stations on the flanks of Mt. Merapi had to evacuate and could no longer broadcast their programmes. What they did was to collaborate with information volunteers who were recruited from other cities to report their voices and their needs. This fundamental transformation of community media occurred because the disaster affected people in surrounding cities, not only the communities of Mt. Merapi. Accordingly, the media began to address not only members of their own communities, but also the audience in general. Since community radio activists were thoroughly occupied with daily chores of life in evacuation shelters, the contents were contributed by people of different social and geographical backgrounds. This swift and radical change transformed community radio into the people's media. Certain conditions needed to be in place to allow this to happen. First, other groups or individuals needed to support the technical infrastructure to produce and publish information using different technological platforms and to provide organisational resources to manage the information contributors. Second, the people had to have the devices and skills both to contribute information and to access the information that was produced. In 2010 these two conditions were met.

In the following section I will compare media availability and communication practices of audiences during the disaster of 2006 with the respective situation in 2010. In 2006, a big earthquake, whose epicentre was in the Indian Ocean, southern of Yogyakarta, killed more than five thousand people who lived in the surrounding areas. Four years after, the people of Yogyakarta had access to different communication devices and media, and developed different communicative practices when anticipating the eruption of Mt. Merapi.

Media Use of the Indonesian Audiences

I remember clearly that during the aftermath of the earthquake that struck Bantul in 2006 the people did not immediately grasp the overall situation. The earthquake struck at almost six in the morning, when many people were still sleeping.[16] Two hours later, the aftershocks struck and rumours of a tsunami started to circulate. The people in northern Yogyakarta, about 60 km from the epicentre, came out of their homes and began to crowd the streets. No one knew if a tsunami had occurred. I saw someone holding a portable radio, trying to piece the information together but to no avail. Several hundred metres from the crowd near my house, the main streets were full of people on their motorcycles evacuating from the rumoured tsunami. There was no tsunami, but people only found this out belatedly. The information was so sparse that not until late in the afternoon was the scope of the damage fully understood by the general audience: the loss of almost 5,200 lives and total destruction of about 17,500 houses in nine cities.[17]

In 2006, there was the same scarcity of information about the survivors' needs. The survivors' needs were recorded by organisations during their relief efforts, but they did not pool their data or make them available to the general audience. The audiences who were driven to help and give aid contacted their personal networks through phone calls or short messages. The internet was not used widely and daily, and certainly there was no publication of survivors' needs on the internet. People did not have personal internet connections and internet kiosks were still popular.

By 2010 media usage had changed. Indonesian internet users numbered 20 million in 2006 and this number had grown to 42 million, approximately 18% of the total

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[16] Suryanto, Eko (2006). *Berita Gempabumi* (*Earthquake News*). Last accessed 24 December 2013 at: http://inatews.bmkg.go.id/beritagempa.php?catid=494

[17] NN (2010). *Data Sementara Korban Gempa Teknonik DI Yogyakarta dan Jawa Tengah* (*Provisional Data on the Victims of Tectonic Eartquake in the Special Province of Yogyakarta and Central Java*). Last accessed 16 July 2014 at: http://www.kemsos.go.id/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=213

population by 2010.[18] The largest number (70%) of internet users lived in Java, because Java had the most developed internet infrastructure compared to outer Java, and Java also had the highest population density.[19] Yet, the most impressive growth lay somewhere else. The number of cellular phone users grew from 65 million in 2006 to 211 million in 2010.[20] In 2010 it was more common for people to connect to the internet using a cellular phone or using an internet dongle sold by cellular phone providers. In fact, a major proportion of Indonesian internet users were connected through their cellular phones (Nielsen, 2011; APJII, 2012). By 2010, Indonesian people, especially the young people, had become familiar with 'smart phones' (especially Blackberry) and were accessing social network sites (especially Facebook and Twitter) in their daily lives from their cellular phones (Dewi *et al.*, 2010).

Through their use of internet, from their personal computers and especially their cellular phones, audiences learnt how to use Facebook and Twitter, visit and converse on Kaskus online forum, blog on Kompasiana, and watch YouTube when missing a television show.[21] These internet users knew how to navigate between 'traditional' mass media and newer forms. Terrestrial television channels were still watched daily and had the highest penetration of all media (Nielsen, 2011). But some audiences, especially the young and the urban Javanese, used their internet-enabled cellular phones in their daily lives as well.

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[18] APJII (2012a). *Indonesia Internet Users*. Last accessed 24 December 2013 at: http://www.apjii.or.id/v2/index.php/read/page/halaman-data/9/statistik.html

[19] Kominfo (2010a). *Komunikasi dan Informatika Indonesia: Whitepaper 2010* (*Communication and Informatics: Whitepaper 2010*), Jakarta, Ministry of Communication and Informatics: 2010.

[20] Kominfo (2010b), *Perkembangan Jumlah Pelanggan Telepon Seluler Bergerak 2006-2010* (*The Growth of Mobile Cellular Phone Users 2006-2010*). Last accessed 24 December 2013 at: http://statistik.kominfo.go.id/site/data?idtree=221&iddoc=560&data-data_page=3

[21] These types of use are extrapolated from the ten most visited internet sites based on Alexa data on 23 November 2010, cited from Kominfo, 2010a.

The three developments I described in the previous section (concentration of mass media, emergence of the people's media, adoption of 'smart phones' and social media) characterise the media landscape of audiences' engagement with the Mt. Merapi disaster in 2010. They allowed some additional opportunities for audiences, while constraining others. In the following section, I will present my findings about Indonesian audiences' collective attention in disaster, which in part was shaped by these three factors. However, further interactions between audiences and these factors will be clearly seen in Chapter 5, which discusses the audiences' collective actions.

4.2. Collective Attention in Disaster Times

The structure of mass media ownership that is concentrated to twelve groups and the strong bias of Indonesia's media content toward Java are two conditions suggesting that the Indonesian media can harness Indonesian audiences' attention without too much effort. However, this argument ignores audiences' agency in the constitution of collective attention. Audiences, after all, have the power to decide whether or not to use media, and what media to use, and how they use the media. Their personal decisions will, in turn, result in an aggregate of attention. However, I have argued in section 2.3. (page 57) that the concept of collective attention needs to go beyond mere aggregation of exposure, to also be aware of the object of audiences' collective attention. Further, the collective dimension needs to incorporate audiences' intentions and inter-relationships, to better account for collective agency as practised in the cases I studied. Thus, this section will start by discussing measurement of aggregates of audiences' collective attention and continue with exploration of their objects, intentions, sociality, and competition over their collective attention.

Audience studies (Webster, 1986; 2005) have found that proliferation of media outlets brings about fragmentation of audiences due to the sheer fact that there are too many media outlets to attend to within the limited time available. My study provides insights into the Indonesian media landscape, particularly from the audiences' perspective and in the specific context of disaster. The context of disaster needs to be emphasised because the ways audiences use media in disaster can be different from those that apply in normal times. For example, Nielsen's (2010b) study found that television news channels commanded more attention than in normal times. It also showed that audiences spent more hours per month watching news on television and news stations reduced their regular news time to allocate more time to disaster-related news. We still do not know, however, whether these audiences' attention was fragmented or concentrated, or which media outlets were most attended to.

	Volunteers (n = 359)	**Complainers** (n = 60)	**Donors** (n = 120)
1	MetroTV	MetroTV	Kedaulatan Rakyat
2	TVOne	TVOne	TVOne
3	Facebook	RCTI	MetroTV
4	Twitter	Facebook	RCTI
5	Jalin Merapi	Detik	SCTV
6	RCTI	Twitter	TVRI
7	SCTV	Jalin Merapi	ANTV

Table 4. The Seven Most Attended to Media Outlets

Legend: blue = television channels; red = internet sites; green = newspaper.

My study found that, in general, audiences (n = 539, median = 7) who were involved in different ways with disaster relief attended to seven media outlets in their daily lives during the crisis.[22] Table 4 shows that the seven media outlets most attended to by those who complained and by those who volunteered were very similar. In the two

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[22] The measure of central tendency used here is *median* instead of *mean* because the data distribution is skewed to the right, making the *mean* higher than the *mode.*

top positions were national news television channels (MetroTV and TVOne), which could also be found in second and third position in the media repertoires of the donors. If we go further and look at their media outlets of choice, the three groups of audiences in general did not use radio to monitor the crisis. However, the donors' first choice of medium was *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, which suggests that those who donated through *Kedaulatan Rakyat* were also readers of that newspaper. In addition to these similarities, there were two differences. First, newspaper appeared only in the donors' media repertoires.[23] And second, donors were the only group which in general did not monitor the crisis through the internet. Differences in the media outlets used were also reflected in data about audiences' media platforms. As can be seen in table 4, the number of donors who used the internet was very low, in contrast to internet use by volunteers and complainers. On the other hand, the majority of donors were newspaper readers, more than twice as many as among the volunteers and the donors.

	Television	**Newspaper**	**Radio**	**Internet**	**Cell phone**
Volunteers (n = 359)	68,0%	39,6%	26,7%	83,8%	96,1%
Complainers (n = 60)	68,3%	41,7%	21,7%	98,3%	91,7%
Donors (n = 120)	86,7%	86,7%	25,0%	22,5%	88,3%

Table 5. Media Platforms Used by the Participants during the Crisis.
Each cell shows the percentage of the audience who used the media platform divided by the total number in each group.

These two differences can partly be attributed to age differences among the different groups. Use of the internet was inversely correlated with age (Pearson's r = -

[23] The term 'media repertoires' here is used loosely to describe the various media outlets used by the audiences during the eruption of Mt. Merapi. Since media repertoires are not the focus of this research, data relating specifically to that were not obtained. For further conceptual definition of media repertoires, see Hasebrink and Domeyer (2012) and Yuan (2011).

0.39), whereas newspaper tended to be read by older audiences (Pearson's r = 0.37). In general, donors were older than volunteers or complainers. The donors' average age (in 2010) was 44, as opposed to an average age of 26 among the volunteers and complainers. One possible explanation is that older audiences usually had more access than young people to a subscription-based medium, i.e. a newspaper, whether using their own money to subscribe or through their workplace's subscription. On the other hand, means of access (smartphone and computer) to the internet were not widely adopted by older audiences. Age difference is not only related to media use, but also related to the audiences' predisposition to a certain form of action. For example, young audiences were more predisposed toward collective volunteerism and online complaints than older audiences, as we will see later in terms of how they joined collective volunteerism (page 189) and made collective complaints (page 216). Older audiences were more involved in donation through media, as opposed to the other forms of action. In the next chapter I will explore how the different groups of audiences made use of, were constrained by, and attempted to find alternatives to the existing media to respond to the disaster.

Network Analysis on Audience Fragmentation

My study followed Ksiazek's network approach (2011) to analysing audience duplication. Two measures were used in this study to show audience fragmentation during the crisis: centralisation score and distribution of in-degree score. The two measures were intended to measure distribution of the audiences' collective attention to different media outlets (see section 3.3. on page 108). The centralisation score shows the overall rate at which audiences' collective attention was focused on a few media outlets, or dispersed widely across outlets (Webster and Ksiazek, 2012). The in-degree score shows how each media outlet shares an audience with the others, which indicates the fluidity of audiences' collective attention. Description of both measures is provided in the following paragraphs.

First, **centralisation score** was used to indicate 'the degree to which audiences tend to duplicate evenly across the network (fragmentation), or duplicate disproportionately with a small number of media outlets (concentration)' (Ksiazek, 2011, p. 245). When audiences are fragmented, each media outlet has an equal chance of being attended to by these audiences. When audiences are concentrated, disproportionate attention is enjoyed by just a few media outlets. This score is achieved by computing variability in scores for nodes' in-going ties, compared to a perfectly concentrated (theoretical) network (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). A perfectly concentrated network would have a score of 100% while a fully fragmented network would have a score of 0%. Meanwhile, a moderately concentrated network is one with a score of 50% or more (Ksiazek, 2011).

Second, **distribution of in-degree score** across media outlets was measured. In-degree scores measured the number of in-going ties one media outlet received from other media outlets. This meant that each time a media outlet shared its audience with another media outlet beyond random chance, it scored 1. Since the number of media outlets included in the analysis was 47, the maximum score to indicate that one media outlet shared its audience with all of the other media outlets was 46 (n – 1), since it could not duplicate with itself. The lower the score a media outlet achieved, the less it shared its audience with other media outlets, indicating the existence of enclaves of media audiences.

My study produced a centralisation score of **38.2%** for centralisation of the networks' audience duplication. This score can be interpreted as relatively fragmented.[24] In network terms, it means that there is a fair degree of probability that

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[24] For a comparison, Ksiazek's (2011) network centralisation score for US' audiences was 17.08%, which he interpreted as a 'fairly low score', indicating a decentralised network (p. 246).

each media outlet had an equivalent number of ties (audience duplication). In audience terms, their collective attention was distributed across many media outlets. Further, the score suggests that the audiences' collective attention tended to move from one media outlet to another, to a certain extent. This can also be interpreted as implying that if the issue of disaster was not covered by all of the media outlets, then the audiences' collective attention would not have been concentrated on it.

Centralisation score alone cannot describe the complete picture of audiences' collective attention in disaster. For example, we know which media outlets were popular with which audience groups, but we do not know whether those who paid attention to popular media outlets also paid attention to other media outlets or vice versa. Hence, the in-degree distribution across networks was then measured to illustrate duplication of audiences across the media outlets, visualised as a bar chart (Figure 3, page 133). Following Ksiazek (2011), I compared this score with the more familiar visualisation of audience fragmentation, i.e. the long tail of media's reach. The aim is to show that in there are cases where the reach of many outlets is low, but this does not necessarily indicate isolation since these audiences are duplicated with other media outlets.

The chart below (Figure 2, page 132) shows the reach of each media outlet included in the analysis (R>3%), expressed as a percentage. If a media outlet has 100% reach this means that the particular media outlet reaches all audiences. We can see that there are two outlets that reach more than half of the total audience, namely TVOne and MetroTV, the national news television channels. The next three media outlets in terms of reach: *RCTI* (national general-content television channel), *Facebook* (social network site), and *Kedaulatan Rakyat* (local newspaper), scored below fifty per cent. More than two-thirds of the media outlets sit below thirty per cent. In other words, no one medium commands the whole audience's attention. If outlets that had less than three per cent reach were included, the 'tail' would be longer. This suggests that whilst the two dominant media outlets could, perhaps, gain the attention of large audiences, for the other media, the audiences' collective attention is spread along a long tail of media outlets. This results concur with the score for network centralisation, which means that the right conditions for emergence of collective action cannot be guaranteed.



Figure 2. Cross-Platforms Reach of Media Outlets (n = 47)



Figure 3. In-Degree of Media Outlets across Platforms (n = 47)

The above graph (Figure 2, page 132), however, shows the audience of each media outlet separately and does not show whether audiences duplicate across the media platforms and, if so, what the pattern of such duplication looks like. Figure 3 provides additional insight into this issue by showing the number of duplications that each media outlet had with other media outlets. We can see in Figure 3 that scores drop gradually across the chart. The two most popular national news television channels shared their audiences with almost all other outlets. In other words, their audiences consumed other media outlets as well. And more than half of the media outlets shared their audiences with more than half of all media outlets. This is further evidence of fragmentation, but clearly not isolation, where the audiences as an aggregate distribute their attention to a wide array of media outlets across platforms. While the reach chart highlights the most popular media (those with high scores on the left), the in-degree chart shows the spread and interconnection of the audiences' collective attention.

We now know that the audiences' attention was relatively fragmented across many media outlets, although we also know that national news television channels were still largely popular with the audiences in this study. Since determining the audiences' intensity (e.g. duration) of media use through self-reporting of past events was impossible, due to proneness to error of recall, we do not know the share of each media outlet. This information is essential for measuring the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Herfindahl, 1950; Hirschman, 1945), a widely used measure of market concentration.

Exploring the issue further, if the audiences' attended to many media outlets, and the aggregate of audiences' attention was relatively fragmented, what enabled the formation of supposedly 'focused' collective attention? My short answer is that although attention was spread across many media outlets, all media outlets covered the same issue (section 6.1, page 229; Nielsen, 2010c).[25] Thus, although they did not focus on a few media outlets, the media outlets themselves focused on the issue. As a result, the audiences focused their collective attention on Mt. Merapi crisis.

This answer implies that the focusing of media coverage around the issue of Mt. Merapi crisis was not a result of concentration of media ownership (Nugroho *et al.*, 2012). The reporter from *Kompas*[26] and the chief editor of *Vivanews*[27] that I interviewed said that the newsroom of their media were independent from the newsroom of other media outlets of the same media group (see also Manan, 2010). Further studies are

[25] See also Noviani's (2012) study on the narrative of MetroTV during the disaster.
[26] Personal interview on 17 December 2012. Transcript no. 41, p.13.
[27] Personal interview on 11 December 2012. Transcript no. 36, pp. 12-13.

needed to assess the depth of convergence among Indonesian media, both in terms of technological platforms and content production-distribution. Based on my limited data on the phenomenon, my hypotheses are that the structural factor (Java-centric media industries), competition and cooperation among media outlets and journalists, and organisational factor (*e.g.*, newsworthiness) play important roles in focusing media coverage (Franklin *et al.*, 2005). However, it is beyond the scope of my study to test these hypotheses.

Having found that the audiences' collective attention was relatively fragmented across many media outlets but that these media outlets focused on the disaster, further questions are raised about the audiences' collective attention, as highlighted earlier. I argue that we need to know the objects of audiences' collective attention, what their intentions were, and how their connections with each other shaped their collective attention. Subsequently, I will show how the people's media competed with mainstream media to win and orient the audiences' collective attention. Where the previous analysis illustrated the pattern of media use, the following analysis will show media use as an intentional act of paying attention (Anscombe, 2000).

Objects of Audiences' Collective Attention

Before audiences pay attention to an issue, the media select it first. Many considerations are at play when news departments decide what they are going to publish or broadcast. One of the most familiar considerations is newsworthiness or news values, which include the magnitude of an event, its extraordinariness, and many others.[28] In the context of the Indonesian media landscape, whose contents are strongly biased toward Java, the newsworthiness of a disaster is understandably Java-centric. With Mt. Merapi sitting in the midst of Java island and having a record of active explosions, it is reasonable that the media were interested in covering it. It must be noted, though, that this line of thinking does not preclude the possibility of wide and intense coverage by the Java-centric media on the outer islands of Indonesia, such as in the case of Aceh, on the north of Sumatra island, during the tsunami crisis in 2004. The following illustration provides a better understanding of how the media's selection of disaster event works.

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[28] Franklin *et al.* (2005) show that newsworthiness has been defined differently by different organisations. Quoting Harcup and O'Neill (2001, p. 261), we can identify the 'ground rules' in the 'daily practice and in knowledge gained on the job'.

I interviewed a journalist who had been working at *Kompas* newspaper for 9 years at the time of the interview.[29] He was sent to Sikakap, the capital town of Mentawai Islands Regency (*Kabupaten Kepulauan Mentawai*), on the northern side of Sumatra. The Mentawai islands were hit by a tsunami created by a 7.7 Richter scale earthquake on the southern side of the islands (Cedillos and Alexander, 2010). The earthquake struck Mentawai on 25 October 2010, the very day when the status of Mt. Merapi was raised to the highest level of danger (Level IV). At the time, journalists from national and local media had been closely following the development of the Mt. Merapi crisis, since its status had been raised one step below the highest level on 20 October 2010. Because of the tsunami, the journalist said, the focus of *Kompas* shifted to Mentawai. He was sent to Mentawai for a short trip, but he decided to stay because there were very few journalists from his newspaper covering the event. Unexpectedly, Mt. Merapi erupted on 26 October 2010 and erratically grew stronger and erupted continuously from 1-5 November 2010, paralysing several cities in two provinces. *Kompas* shifted its attention again to Mt. Merapi and 'abandoned' Mentawai islands.

The journalist recalled:

> What happened was the population [of Mentawai] was 70, or let's say 100 thousand. [Whereas] The evacuees of Merapi were one million, Mas (brother). So, that's that. When Merapi erupted, suddenly all of the coverage was about Merapi. We didn't even get a call [from the editors], Mas. We weren't looked for, even if we didn't send any news. Our news went from the headline on the front page to becoming just an update.[30]

He said he was frustrated by the decision, but he basically understood it. Mt. Merapi has always been important because of its long history of explosion and its location in the heart of Java. His story echoes the larger issue which I have discussed previously, namely the concentration of media industries in Java. The journalist understood that *Kompas* covered the Mentawai tsunami not because the newspaper was read there, but because of its status as national media. On the other hand, *Kompas* covered the Mt. Merapi eruption not only because it was a newsworthy event, but also because it was read there.

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[29] Personal interview with a journalist of *Kompas* on 17 December 2012. Transcript no. 41.

[30] *Tapi yang terjadi adalah ini, penduduknya 70, anggap saja 100 ribu. Merapi itu pengungsinya saja satu juta, Mas. Ya, sudah. Seketika, ketika Merapi Erupsi, maka seluruh pemberitaan itu [tentang] Merapi. Bahkan kami pun bisa tidak ditelpon, Mas. Kami nggak ngirim berita [pun] sudah tidak dicari. Maka berita kami yang kemarin itu HL [*headline*] halaman satu, tiba-tiba menjadi berita perkembangan saja. Ibid.* p. 10.

The selection of disaster events as disaster news does not stop at the question of which disaster event to cover, but also what to cover. When the media's attention shifted to Mt. Merapi, the disaster event did not automatically present itself as news, as news reporters have to select their object of attention. The following is an illustration of how a national news television channel selected its object of attention. When the status of Mt. Merapi was raised to Level III, or one step below the highest level, *MetroTV*, a national news television channel, started to cover the event. The development of the crisis was told through the rising trend of volcanic and seismic activity scores and how wild animals were moving down the mountain because of the volcanic activities. On the day when the status was raised to the highest level, the television reported the preparations for evacuation. Thirty-six hours later Mt. Merapi erupted and *MetroTV* reported live from the evacuation site about the heavy rain of volcanic dust and the evacuation traffic while the camera depicted the evacuation site and close-ups of elderly people. The reporter used the words'panic' (*panik*), 'unexpected' (*tiba-tiba*), 'rush' (*tergesa-gesa*), and 'save their life' (*menyelamatkan diri*) to describe the crowd of people standing by and the steady flow of traffic. Between her rushing breaths which were clearly picked-up by the microphone, she reported how heavy the rain of volcanic dust was and how she felt anxious over whether the place was safe. The place was 15 kilometres away from the volcano top and the safe zone was declared by the government agency to begin at 10 kilometres from the top. The reporter's anxiety matched her urgent style of reporting, but misjudged the reality.

When Mt. Merapi erupted on 26 October 2010, many of the mainstream media were occupied with speculation over whether Mbah Maridjan, a spiritual guardian of Mt. Merapi, was alive or not. Mbah Maridjan had also been a centre of media attention in the Mt. Merapi explosion of 2006 because he had disobeyed the instruction of the governor-cum-king of Yogyakarta, the Sultan HB of X, to evacuate. After the eruption in 2010, many big online news sites reported that he was alive, based on one informant's story who had not witnessed this himself, only to be proven wrong in the morning when the search and rescue team found him buried by volcanic material in his home.[31] All the media that issued false reports were online media, whereas the media whose cycles of news production were slower reported the event accurately.

[31] The online media which reported incorrectly were *Kompas online*, *Detik, Antara, Tribun News, Republika*, and *Jawa Pos News Network*, 2010. Last accessed 29 November 2013 at:
http://regional.kompas.com/read/2010/10/27/0053250/Rumahnya.Hancur..Mbah.Maridjan.Selamat-3
http://news.detik.com/read/2010/10/27/000510/1476062/10/
http://www.antaranews.com/berita/230362/mbah-maridjan-selamat

These stories illustrate aspects of the disaster event that were selected by the mainstream media as objects of attention. Among others, the two recurring themes in many media were *people-as-victims* and *volcano-as-threat*.[32] These two themes centred on the viewpoints of media audiences who mainly lived outside of the Mt. Merapi's danger zone. In the *people-as-victims* (*korban*) theme, the people of Merapi existed in the media because they were affected by the volcano. By such logic, their vulnerabilities and dependence to the external agent were essential to their media portrayals.[33] Accordingly, the figures that perfectly represented them were older people, women, and children. The theme of *volcano-as-threats* focused on the potential and actual force of the volcano to destroy the areas within its reach. The physical expressions of these threats were followed intensely, such as the spread of volcanic ash, development of the crater, and flow of the cold lava. The two themes were not the only themes being exploited by the mass media, but they formed the dominant themes in the triadic-relationship relationship between the media, the audiences, and the affected people. The two themes were based on a simple and limited model of relationship between the three parties. The media and the audiences were outsiders and the agents, whereas the affected people were the receivers of the outsiders' help. In the following paragraphs, I will describe how the object of attention is actually varied.

Concern over safety is paramount in a disaster.[34] THis was especially so in the province of the Special Region of Yogyakarta because it hosted more than two hundred thousand university students from other cities, whose parents became anxious when they heard the news or eruptions. The student-volunteers that I interviewed expressed how their parents were concerned about their safety (15 out of 17). The organisers of the volunteers told similar stories about students from other cities being asked to go back to their hometowns, and some did go home.[35] The same feeling of anxiety was also expressed by the relatives of the people of Yogyakarta, who relied on the mass media and information from Jalin Merapi to monitor the crisis. The feeling of concern between

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http://www.tribunnews.com/regional/2010/10/27/alhamdulillah-mbah-maridjan-selamat
http://www.republika.co.id/berita/breaking-news/nasional/10/10/27/142698-mbah-maridjan-selamat-10-meninggal-termasuk-wartawan-vivanews/
http://www.jpnn.com/read/2010/10/27/75573/Sempat-Hilang,-Mbah-Marijan-Selamat-

[32] For other content analyses of the Indonesian media's coverage of disaster, see also Nazaruddin (2007) and Noviani (2012). Regarding the media's theme of disaster news, I second Couldry's (2008) argument that the media are not monolithic entities, nor they follow a single logic in their operations.

[33] Christie, N. 1994 via B. Höijer, 2008.

[34] The traffic of telecommunication, which indicated personal communication using cellular phone, rose between 40-63% on the first eruption. Chandrataruna, Muhammad (29 October 2010). *Merapi Meletus, Trafik Selular Naik 63% (Merapi Erupts, Cell-phone Traffic Raises 63%)*. Last accessed 2 December 2013 at: http://us.teknologi.news.viva.co.id/news/read/185621-merapi-meletus--trafik-selular-naik-63-

[35] Personal interview with a volunteer organiser on 1 April 2013. Transcript no. 58, p. 6, 17.

parents and children was directed to a specific individual/individuals and it concerned a particular issue.

In addition to being close to several large universities, Mt. Merapi was also home to almost one hundred thousand people whose main livelihoods were agriculture and, to a limited extent, sand extraction (Donovan, 2010; Dove, 2008; LAURA, 2012). To the people of Merapi, the mountain was their only source of income and the axis of their socio-cultural life (Dove, 2008). When the mountain erupted, their concerns were their homes, their cattle, and their crops, which they continued to visit every day from their evacuation tents although the areas had been marked as off-limits. We can see here that the objects of collective attention were varied, depending on the relationship between the attention-givers and the objects of their attention. The diverse relationships that the people had with the mountain influenced how they perceived Mt. Merapi as an object of attention.

The audiences could also have a particular, rather than general, relationship with Mt. Merapi. Those people who had visited the mountain, which included many Indonesians – since Mt. Merapi and Yogyakarta were quite well known as tourist destinations –might have created fond memories of it. An audience member[36] who had a friend who lived at the bottom of Mt. Merapi remembered:

> Days before [the eruption] he casually said, "Mr. Awesome starts to stretch [its body]. We're gonna have fireworks. Let's go [photo] hunting."
> I replied, "Hold on, I still have a job out of the city."
> "Okay."
> And then, when it was getting closer, after the first eruption, "I can't stand it anymore. I have to go there.[37] [translations by the researcher]

In introducing Mt. Merapi as a topic of conversation, the friend named it 'Mr. Awesome' and proposed it as an object of photo-hunting. They had visited the mountain many times with their other traveller friends. To many people who had visited, Mt. Merapi was an object of fascination, not only a source of threats, even during the eruption.

These limited examples show how varied the relationship was between outsiders and Mt. Merapi. Mt. Merapi could be the birthplace of people who now live elsewhere, a memorable place for visitors, and a source of threats for media audiences. It must be

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[36] Personal interview with a donor on 6 November 2010. Transcript no. 1.

[37] *Dari jauh hari sebelumnya, biasa, "Ini si ganteng mulai menggeliat. Bakal ada pesta kembang api. Yuk, hunting." 'Gitu kan. Terus aku bilang, "Entar dulu, masih tugas ke luar kota." "Ya wis." Nah, pas makin mendekat, udah bener erupsi yang pertama itu, "Nggak bisa deh. Aku harus ke sana." Ibid.* p. 4.

noted here that these relationships are not totally independent of each other. Hence, a person can have more than one kind of relationship with the mountain. They may have memorable experiences of the mountain and at the same time feel threatened when watching television. The outsiders' relationships with the place are further complicated by their multifarious social relationships with the people of Mt. Merapi. Going back to the issue of object of attention, this complex relationship can be hard to navigate and can involve different judgements. Consider the experience of one audience member[38] who saw the first report on *MetroTV* about the eruption, which I described previously. He was a third-year university student from Yogyakarta, studying mass communication. I quote his description below at length:

> That afternoon, [I] watched TV. I watched TV while being online on Twitter. [...] I put the MetroTV on. [...] Then, was it on the 26th? It erupted in the afternoon. On the TV the reporter wore a mask, the spotlight fell on her. The dust could not be missed. The dust was noticeable, wasn't it? It was done on purpose. ... People ran in the background. ... Since I was a media person [sic] myself, I know what's going on. "Wow, it looked really chaotic." But it was different from those on Twitter. [...] On Twitter, based on the report from the field, [from] those who updated from the field, it was not that bad. [...] I wanted to tweet something about Merapi. But what could I do? I was only staying in my dorm.[39]

He was watching the national news television channel, which he kept turned on, when he learnt that Mt. Merapi erupted. He could not help but notice the mask, the volcanic dust, the crowds, and the media portrayal of 'chaos'. He, like the other audience members, perceived the object of attention that the mainstream media selected for him and the others. But he also had access to another medium, namely Twitter, which selected its own object of attention. The updates from the community radio organisers on the slope of Mt. Merapi and amateur radio enthusiasts, which were published on Twitter, consisted of their observation of the visual signs on top of the mountain and the evacuation process. The audience member felt that there was a big

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[38] Group interview with two volunteers on 11 July 2011. Transcript no. 9.

[39] The transcription is shortened, indicated by the [...] sign, for efficiency while keeping the narrative flow of the interviewee.
Sorenya itu [aku] lihat TV. Lihat TV sambil online, aku di Twitter. [...] Aku panteng MetroTV terus. [...] Kemudian tanggal 26 ya? Meletusnya sore. Di TV reporternya pakai masker, kemudian ditembak lampu kan. Abu-abunya itu kelihatan banget, 'kan? Memang sengaja. ... Orang-orang di belakang mereka pas berlarian ... Karena aku juga orang media ya, soalnya. Aku juga ngerti tentang itu. "Wah, ini kayaknya chaos *banget gitu," Tapi di, berbeda dengan di Twitter itu lho. [...] Di Twitter dengan informasi yang ada dari lapangan gitu, yang langsung* update *dari lapangan, tidak separah seperti apa yang dilihat di TV. [...] Pingin nge-*tweet *tentang Merapi, tapi bisa apa. Cuma dari kos, kok. Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

gap in terms of the sense of urgency between the two media outlets. In the following hours, the coordinator of Jalin Merapi volunteers offered him the chance to survey the evacuation camps and to make reports about them. He immediately agreed to go because he felt the 'itch' (*gatal*) and 'compelled' (*geregetan*) to set the record straight.

> Then I contacted my friend.
>
> "Let's go up."
>
> "What for?"
>
> "We're going to take a walk."
>
> So, that's it. He agreed. But, at the time, it was not purely, what's the word, not purely driven by a desire to help. I had my side motives. Since I was into photography ... and my friend was into video, I brought my camera, he brought his video camera. We went up carrying a big bag of cameras. [...] In the morning, on the 27th we went around, and around, and around. The two cameras weren't taken out of the bag. We didn't take them out because [...] We didn't have the heart. I mean ... I'll let it go. I thought to let the journalists do their job. That's the job of journalists. I told my friend, "We are not ... It is a disaster, not a [visual] moment." That's it. That's it.[40]

We see in the illustration a complex mix of relationships with Mt. Merapi. First, as a member of MetroTV's audience, he saw the chaos of the aftermath. He accepted the object of attention and how it was supposed to be seen, although not without his own critical view on it. Second, as part of the audience of Jalin Merapi's Twitter account, he was offered different objects of attention, which were less chaotic than those of MetroTV.[41] The second objects provided a vantage point for him to assess the first media outlet. Third, he had his own object of attention he wanted to focus on, the photographic moments of disaster. The three relationships with the mountain were pulling him in different directions and finally he had to decide which course of action to

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[40] *"Ayo naik".*
"Ngapain?"
"Jalan-jalan."
Ya udah, langsung dia mau, tapi waktu itu, nggak murni. Nggak murni atas apa ya, nggak murni pingin membantu. Ada embel-embelnya, karena aku juga hobi fotografi. ... My friend [anonymised] itu video. Aku bawa kamera, dia bawa kamera video. Bawa tas gedhe itu naik ke atas. [...] paginya tanggal 27, keliling-keliling-keliling. Kamera, dua kamera itu nggak bisa keluar. ... Istilahnya nggak tega gitu. Maksudnya ... ya sudahlah. Aku mikir biarlah jurnalis yang kerja. Itu kerjanya jurnalis itu. Ini, aku bilang sama ... [anonymised], "Kita bukan ... Ini bencana, bukan momen." Ya udah, itu aja. Saya udah. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

[41] In my view, the first day report of the Jalin Merapi's Twitter account does not differ too much from the television's report, focusing on the theme of *people-as-victims* and *mountain-as-threat*. However, the textual character of the medium does not convey the indexical presence of the event that becomes the dominant character of live television reports (Katz and Liebes, 2007).

take. What seemed to be settling his difficult judgement was his relative detachment from the event. In other words, he had yet to develop a relationship with the refugees and the other audiences on social media. It was his first night of being a volunteer and he, in my view, had not fully adopted the mediating role of a volunteer. It was a challenge for him to navigate through the different relationships with the mountain and its people.

The problem of deciding objects of collective attention not only challenged individuals, it was also a collective challenge. The previous paragraphs of this section showed evidence how *Kompas*, a national newspaper, selected this particular disaster, instead of another disaster. *Kompas* needed to cover the tsunami in Mentawai because its readers were Indonesian publics, but Mt. Merapi was in the heart of Java, where its actual subscribers lived. I believe the ethical issues involved in the decision to prioritise one disaster over another also confronts other journalists of other media companies. A challenge was also found to face student-volunteers regarding their parents in their hometowns since their parents mostly saw the people of Yogyakarta as being threatened by the disaster whereas the volunteers saw themselves as agents who could help the refugees in coping with the crisis. A student-volunteer suggested his parents turned off the television because it was 'exaggerating and [because of that] upsetting' (*berlebihan dan menyebalkan*).[42]

Intentions of Collective Attention

Intention is important in the examination of collective attention if we are to ascribe agency to audiences. This is because audiences' agency is not limited to their being aggregated by market researchers and data purveyors (Webster and Phalen, 1997) whose collective 'taste' is a force to influence media producers, but we can also treat the audiences here as agents of the formation of collective attention as well. To investigate this, I am borrowing from Anscombe's (2000) work on intention to find another route to conceptualising the intentions of audiences' collective attention.

The inclusion of intentions into the concept of collective attention merits clarification. To say that audiences have intentions means that their attention is applicable to the question why (Anscombe, p. 11). In other words, they have a reason in doing so; it is not just a product of habit or incidental behaviour. The reason for their behaviour can be found in the audiences' minds. Although intention can be a purely

[42] *Berlebih-lebihan dan menyebalkan*. Transcript no. 9, p. 26.

interior thing, it is intimately connected with action. The context of disaster is important to understanding the audiences' use of media since they might use media differently in the context of normal daily use. In my study, I connect the audiences' verbal account with their action, which in this case is the wide range of activities of using media.[43]

The audiences' activities can be seen as collective not only because there were many audiences doing them, but also because the audiences were monitoring other audiences' knowledge and sharing information with each other. This results in a collectively shared bigger picture of the crisis (Vieweg *et al.*, 2010). Furthermore, this also creates a sharedness, the audiences' feeling of being connected to the larger whole (based on Dayan, 2009). This kind of activity is not recorded and aggregated by market research firms; hence its potentials are hidden from the view of mass media audience researchers.

From the viewpoint of audiences, the eruption of Mt. Merapi in 2010 was characterised by its wide impact and unpredictable explosions. When the mountain first erupted, its safe zone was set by the PVMBG (*Pusat Vulkanologi dan Mitigasi Bencana Geologi* or Volcanology Survey Indonesia) at 10 km from the top. The people of the cities surrounding Mt. Merapi, which were situated approximately 30 km away from the top, were still not perceiving the magnitude of the eruption, not to mention the general Indonesian media audiences. The refugee camps were still located outside the cities and the media's coverage of the event was not particularly intense. In the following days, the crisis did not show any sign of stopping and the government agency (PVMBG) informed the public that the mountain still contained a high level of unvented energy. The previous eruption was only releasing a small amount of energy due to its short duration (*Kompas*, 28 October 2010). In other words, another eruption or explosion was expected, although no one knew what type of explosion or how big it would be, or whether it would be a single or series of events. The second explosion was expected, although unpredictable.

In that specific context of how the crisis unfolded we need to situate the audiences' use of media. The dominant intention of the audiences was **to stay safe**. Since how the crisis would unfold was largely unknown, the audiences, especially those who lived in relatively close proximity to the mountain, were in great need of information on the

[43] We can see activities as an action because paying attention together itself can be interpreted as collective action. However, since my study is interested in collective action in the 'thick' sense of the word (Laurence, 2011), which involves being coordinated as one and the same action, the instance of paying attention together as collective action is examined separately in chapter 5.

disaster. The audiences who lived outside of the reach of the disaster hazard did not need this information to stay safe.

One audience member who lived approximately 25 km away from the mountain's top felt she needed to pay closer attention to the media because she had a 2 month-old nephew. 'To keep the family safe' (*melindungi keluarga*) was her reason to monitor information on the media, especially the handheld transceiver channel for the Merapi local community that was live-streamed on the Jalin Merapi website and Jalin Merapi's Twitter account itself.[44] She paid most attention to the physical signs of the mountain such as volcanic ash, sulphuric smell, wind direction, and thunderous sound, which she perceived to be signals of threats or no threats. So, for example, on the day of the first explosion she tweeted, 'Although BMKG[45] [sic] said Merapi will sleep tight tonight, [I am] still getting paranoid. [I] feel nervous to sleep..not to mention that the ash has reached seturan'..[46] Her other tweets showed what she paid attention to to keep her and her family safe:

> This was the first time I saw volcanic dust this thick, living in jogja for 7 years, and I can still smell the sulphur #Merapi #prayforindonesia.[47]
>
> [t]he sound of passing car can still surprise me[.] was that an earthquake or merapi..??[48]

Fear was also the reason why she stayed up late through the night. Her family actually wanted to evacuate, but the information from those two sources convinced her that they were safe enough. For this particular audience member and other audiences, who lived within physical reach of the volcanic hazard, monitoring the physical signs of the volcano was important. The information provided by fellow audiences and the people of Merapi lent her some measure of control, to stay or to evacuate, in the midst of the crisis.

Another audience member[49] who lived not too far from her also used the media more than usual to keep herself updated about the latest development. She was

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[44] Amateur volcanic observers, known as 'Balerante headquarters' (*pos induk Balerante*), were different from the group of community radio stations that founded Jalin Merapi. Jalin Merapi here acted only to relay the monitoring activities of Balerante volunteers using their website. Without Jalin Merapi's website, the 'Balerante headquarters' would not have been widely known about by the audiences because to listen to it required a handheld transceiver.

[45] BMKG is Badan Meteorologi, Klimatotologi, dan Geofisika, or the Government Agency on Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysics. I think what she really meant was PVMBG.

[46] *Walaupun BMKG bilang Merapi akan tidur nyenyk mlm ini tapi ttp aja parno mau tidur jg was2..mana ktnya hujn abu uda nympk seturan.* Retrieved from: https://twitter.com/_yen_yen/status/28811835479

[47] *Baru kali ini setelah 7 taun dijogja ngeliat ujan abu setebal ini dan bau belerang masih kecium #Merapi #prayforindonesia.* Last accessed 11 December 2013 at: https://twitter.com/_yen_yen/status/29143370249

[48] *padhl kdng bunyi mobil lewat aja masih kaget mikir sejenak itu suara apa gempa kah atau merapi..??* Last accessed 11 December 2013 at: https://twitter.com/_yen_yen/status/29288945983

compelled to watch the television for fear of 'missing out' (*terlewatkan*) on critical information. In addition, she kept her phone with her all the time and refreshed the Twitter timeline as often as she wanted to. I get the impression that she categorised the media based on their cycle of updates. Thus, television was slower than Twitter, which updated its 'news' in seconds. In her words, 'To be honest, I relied on Twitter. I refreshed it all the time. If anything showed up, it was faster. Because it is a *secondly* news' [italic by the researcher].[50] Although Twitter was faster and it allowed her to curate her own source of information, television was indispensable. She kept the news channel on all the time in the other room as background. She had mixed feelings toward television. On the one hand, she did not want to miss out and she still believed in the accuracy of the reports from *MetroTV*. On the other hand, she said, 'When I watched [television], I was gripped by fear, instead of [getting] safe protection'.[51]

The difficulty that these audiences, who were potentially affected by the disaster, faced in curating their source of information during a disaster was, partly, caused by the gap between two conditions. First, timely information was unavailable. While audiences thought that information from the PVMBG was reliable, in the sense that it was accurate, and the head of the agency was even addressed as '*Mbah*' (grandfather/grandmother), an honourable and respectful form of address to someone who is older or more knowledgeable,[52] the problems lay with the timely transmission of this information. PVMBG released its analysis every day when the mountain's status was at the highest level and increased the frequency to every 6 hours during the most critical times.[53] Yet, the information did not necessarily find its way to the audiences in a timely manner since it depended on the media's news cycle and work flows and on whether audiences were already attuned to the media. Although PVMBG had its own website, many audiences I spoke with did not mention the PVMBG website as their source of information. In short, there was a gap between the audiences' need for information based on their perception of the ever-changing threats and the delivery of information.

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[49] Personal interview with an audience member/personal donor on 5 December 2012. Transcript no. 34, p. 5.

[50] '*Jujur aja sih saya, pertama 'tu, saya ngandalin Twitter. Twitter malah tiap kali selalu refresh-refresh. Kalau ada apa-apa kan lebih cepet kan. Beritanya detikan kan soalnya'*. *Ibid*, p. 1.

[51] '*Aku nek nonton ki yang saya dapatkan malah rasa mencekam. Bukan rasa perlindungan yang aman gitu*'. *Ibid*, p. 5.

[52] *Mbah* Surono, the head of PVMBG, was seen by many audiences as having the same level of authority on the Merapi volcano as *Mbah* Maridjan, although Surono always spoke with empirical and scientific data. The address of '*Mbah*' was transferred from the late *Mbah* Maridjan, who was the mystical guardian of Mt. Merapi.

[53] Personal interview with an officer at the BPPTKG on 9 April 2013. Transcript no. 59, p. 2.

The second difficulty for the audiences in curating their sources of information concerned how actionable the information was. The information from the government provided general guidance regarding where the boundary of the safe zone was and at what level the mountain's status was at that moment. Yet, the audiences who lived in the surrounding cities needed more specific information regarding street traffic, direction and intensity of the volcanic ash, rain intensity and the resulting cold lava, and many other issues.[54] 'Tactical information' was not readily provided by the government agency. Although the news television channels provided live reports on the event, their national coverage did not allow them to address the practical concerns of local audiences. Reports from the Merapi communities and reports from other audiences through short messages, phone calls, Twitter, and the portal of Jalin Merapi became key information sources for the audiences in piecing together their big picture of the environment. Although mainstream media, especially television channels, were attended to, there was also widespread cynicism and resentment toward a television channel whose reporters showed particular incompetence in reporting the disaster.[55]

The other dominant intention of the audiences was **to help others**. The intention of helping the refugees was the reason why people from other cities looked for information regarding where the refugee camps were and what they specifically needed. The mass media provided information about the main refugee camps, which hosted thousands of people. The audiences, in response, donated money through the media to help the refugees. Furthermore, some of the audiences[56] knew from previous experience that these well-reported, main refugee camps were receiving enough resources, such as food, water, clothes, blankets, et cetera. Or, at least, they had access to these resources. The audiences also knew that there were many other smaller and less visible refugee camps, which hosted only few hundred people but had far fewer resources or access to them. These refugee camps were covered much less prominently by the mainstream media. The portal of Jalin Merapi produced and aggregated information that, in large

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[54] Regarding the need for tactical information in disaster and the potential of social media, see Palen (2008).

[55] There are many instances where television reporters used incorrect terms, insensitive, and inarticulate reporting. The most memorable instance was when TVOne, another national news television channel, reported that the pyroclastic flow (*awan panas*) had reached within 6 kilometres of Kaliurang street (30 km from the top), the main connection between Yogyakarta and Mt. Merapi. In reality, it was only volcanic dust (*debu* or *abu*) and the pyroclastic flow only reached 6 km from the top. See Prenanto, Tisna (2010). *Penjelasan Saya atas Postingan TV one* (*My Explanation about My Post on TV One*). Last accessed 27 May 2014 at: http://muda.kompasiana.com/2010/10/30/penjelasaan-saya-atas-postingan-boikot-tv-one-308792.html

[56] Personal interview with the coordinator of citizen journalists on 11 June 2013. Transcript no. 63, pp 6, 12. Personal interview with the coordinator of the media centre on 16 June 2013. Transcript no. 65, pp. 1-2.

part, focused on these less visible refugee camps or groups of refugees who did not live in official camps. Thus, we see two different forms of donation here, donation through the (mainstream) media and direct donation with the help of (the people's) media.

I followed a group of travel enthusiasts from Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, who went to Kemalang in Klaten to deliver aid. They had learnt about the place from Jalin Merapi. The place of destination used to be a fully functioning primary school before the disaster. All of the classrooms were converted into sleeping places, crowded with refugees. The refugee camp was actually illegal because it was located within the danger zone. When PVMBG expanded the danger zone, for the last time, to areas within 20 km of the top of the mountain, these refugees refused to move. The reason was that they had only just moved there and that moving further down to the city would make it harder to visit their homes and attend to their crops and cattle, a very common reason and practice for the people of Merapi. The consequence of their decision was that they could not get food supplies from the disaster agencies. Hence, Jalin Merapi played a crucial role in making this refugee shelter, and the other less visible shelters, visible by making efforts to visit them and taking notes of their daily or weekly needs. On the other hand, these particular travel enthusiasts and many other donors like them deliberately sought out evacuation shelters that were neglected or isolated. They assumed two conditions to be in place. First, the government did not have the capacity to support refugee camps that were not directly within its control. Second, my interviews with volunteers, journalists, and donors suggested that the people in general would not prioritise refugees in less visible refugee camps.

These invisible refugee camps were not isolated cases. After the second series of eruptions had forced more than four hundred thousand people to evacuate, the official refugee camps could not handle them. Those who lived in the refugee camps and those who now lived in the danger zone were evacuating to new places. In effect, in Gunung Kidul alone more than ten thousand people took refuge in the private houses of relatives, friends, or simply strangers. Gunung Kidul was located in a hilly area of eastern Yogyakarta, about 60 km from Mt. Merapi and was not designated to host refugee camps. Paying attention merely to television channels, especially during the days of the second series of eruptions, would not have informed audiences about the scope of refugees' dispersion. The audiences needed to deliberately seek information about refugees who were in great need through their personal contacts and through Jalin Merapi.

Sociality of Collective Attention

There is one more aspect of collective attention that I have not discussed, namely sociality of collective attention. Sociality of collective attention refers to the quality of our being connected to each other and how it relates to formation of collective attention. I will show in the following paragraphs that our connection with other people is relevant to understanding collective attention. The two aspects of sociality that I will describe are how information flows through our social connection (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955) and how our collective attention is socially regulated through norms (Adut, 2012).[57] Findings on the flow of information through social connection are derived from the audience survey and from the audience interviews I conducted. The norms of collective attention are derived from interviews and observations of news and user generated content on various online media.

I asked the audiences how they first gained information about volunteering, giving donation, and complaining. The majority of the audiences, or 62% (n = 534), said that they learnt this information directly from the media themselves. This means that donor knew from the *Kedaulatan Rakyat* newspaper itself, volunteers got the information directly from the Jalin Merapi website, and the complainers watched the *Silet* incident on the *RCTI* channel. In addition, 12% of the audiences received this information from other mass media, not from the media directly involved in the case. All in all, this gives us a strong impression that the audiences received their information from the mass media. Yet, another 17% of the audiences received the information from other people. When grouped based on their social proximity to the information source, these sources consisted friends (69%) and acquaintances (20%). What this shows is the flow of information, and it does not necessarily mean that social networks influence audiences' decision-making processes.[58]

When attention becomes collective, *i.e.*, encompassing different groups of people, and members of the collective know that the other members are paying attention, there emerges a notion of 'sharedness' among members (Dayan, 2009). It is partly an effect

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[57] For a full discussion on the visibility and publicity dimension of public sphere, see Adut (2012), especially on page 251-257.

[58] The question of influence cannot be answered using survey method (Katz, 1957), which abstracts individuals from their social context and therefore cannot really do justice to the complexity of social relationships. Furthermore, my survey was not constructed to reveal the audiences' social networks and how personal influences worked. The actual process of participating in collective action will be analysed in the next chapter. The figures given here show that the audiences who joined the collective action had direct access to the media, in addition to the seven media outlets that the audiences used on average. In a context where media are less available, we might find more people who rely on their social connection to get information about ways to participate.

of the media in that audiences vicariously 'experience' fragments of the social world while knowing that somewhere there are other people who also 'experience' the same social world. In this shared mediated world, there are norms that subject the members of the collective to behaving in a certain way. Paying attention and behaving in the midst of collective attention are guided by certain norms.[59] Since these norms are not explicitly coded and institutionalised, they tend not to be enforced firmly. Rather, such norms are enforced through the interactions themselves. The following discusses norms that I observed to have been guiding the audiences' collective attention.

The first norm concerns *sightseeing*. To show its continuity, I will go back to the previous disaster. When Bantul, a regency of the province of Yogyakarta, was hit by an earthquake that cost thousands of local people's lives in 2006, the disaster brought the survivors into the media spotlight. People from other cities started to stream in to see the wreckage first hand, as the roads and airport were fully functioning. Although Yogyakarta is a tourism destination, the touristic gaze upon the wreckage and the wretched was seen to be improper. *Suara Merdeka*, a newspaper distributed to cities in Central Java, wrote, 'It is a disaster, not a spectacle!' on its special page that covered the province of Yogyakarta.[60] The journalist reported that on the third day after the earthquake, the traffic was dense and slow due to the influx of sightseers who moved slowly. He wrote how the sightseers' gaze transformed the locals (*penduduk setempat*) into spectacle objects (*objek tontonan*). One blogger who volunteered to relief efforts in the aftermath of the disaster witnessed the same situation where traffic to Bantul was clogged up with expensive cars from Jakarta.[61] The survivors were so fed up with the sightseers that they put a banner saying 'we are not a spectacle' (*kami bukan tontonan*) in front of their refugee camp, offering itself to be seen by the sightseers. In addition to being an object of spectacle, they felt that they were little more than a backdrop for sightseers' picture. The refusal to submit to the touristic gaze was also written on the wall of a survivor's home.[62]

In 2010, when the status of Mt. Merapi's eruption was lowered and people started to visit the place, in its Sunday edition *Kompas* printed a big news photograph depicting

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[59] I do not imply that the norms I observe here are exhaustive and all-encompassing, but that interviews, personal expressions on the internet, and media coverage operate according to these norms.

[60] Agung (2006). *Ini Bencana, Bukan Tontonan!* (*It's a Disaster, Not a Spectacle!*). Last accessed 18 December 2013 at: www.suaramerdeka.com/harian/0605/31/ked03.htm

[61] Epoy, Abah (2012). *Narsis di Lokasi Bencana , Sungguh Tidak Sopan!* (*Acting Narcissistic in the Disaster Area Is Very Inappropriate!*). Last accessed 18 December 2013 at: http://sosbud.kompasiana.com/2012/03/14/narsis-di-lokasi-bencana-sungguh-tidak-sopan-446920.html

[62] Muhammad, Irfan (2009). *27 Mei* (*27 May*). Last accessed 18 December 2013 at: https://irfanmuhamad.wordpress.com/2009/05/27/27-mei/

many visitors sitting on their motorbikes or sightseeing in what used to be Mbah Maridjan's village.[63] It was a bird's-eye angled picture showing a barren landscape covered with volcanic dust and crowds of visitors. The picture and its caption did not suggest anything extraordinary. The title, however, was unusual. It wrote *(Hopefully) Not a Usual Vacation*. In using the word '*hopefully*' the journalist showed that although he could not know the motives of the tourists but he hoped that it was not a usual vacation, in which the private pleasure of the tourists was the main motive. In the same week, *MetroTV* reported the same issue by interviewing a middle-aged couple who visited the place.[64] The reporter wanted to ascertain if the couple had come for a 'picnic' (*wisata*), which was denied by the male interviewee. The interviewee said he had come to 'look around' (*tinjau*), which omitted the implied pleasure in the word of picnic. When the interview ended, the reporter, inappropriately, waved them goodbye by saying, 'Have a good disaster picnic' (*Selamat berwisata bencana*). Unexpectedly, the female interviewee responded to the greeting by saying that they came to pay respect to the God who caused all of this. The reply overturned the reporter's suspicion and her moralising inquiry, and made all of them objects of God's gaze. In this disagreement, we can see how the norm of sightseeing is adopted by both parties.

We can see another example in an online communication from Jalin Merapi's Twitter account. On its Twitter account, Jalin Merapi reposted a statement made by a volunteer during the first week of the crisis, 'please, refugee camp is not an object of tourism'.[65] This person continued that there were many volunteers who did not know what to do. The volunteers, he said, just passed the time without doing anything.[66] In other words, the touristic gaze was not adopted only by tourists; it could be adopted by anyone, including volunteers. This gaze can be construed as a particular disposition toward external objects, including people and places, with individual pleasure as the main criterion of evaluation.

The touristic gaze itself is not a problem, as long as it is performed under certain circumstances. An audience member can entertain his wonderment and fascination with the destruction of disaster in their private domain. Although ethical issues can be raised by taking pleasure out of other people's misery, this is a personal problem. But when

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[63] Prabowo, Wawan (2010). *(Semoga) Bukan Wisata Biasa* (*(Hopefully) Not a Usual Vacation*), *Kompas*, 12 December 2010.
[64] Field note, 16 December 2010.
[65] *tolong donk,posko pengungsian jgn dijadikan objek wisata*. Last accessed 18 December 2013 at: https://twitter.com/jalinmerapi/statuses/29257160824?tw_i=29257160824&tw_e=details&tw_p=archive
[66] Last accessed 18 December 2013 at: https://twitter.com/jalinmerapi/statuses/29256774264?tw_i=29256774264&tw_e=details&tw_p=archive

physically present before those who are affected by the disaster, one enters into a reciprocal relationship with other people, where personal motives matter. Both parties are bound by each other's expectations and scrutinies, which are shaped by the context of disaster. And the expectation is that the observer is a helper or, at least, an other-oriented observer, not a self-interested one. Disaster tourists violate the expectation of survivors by taking pleasure openly, while making no commitment to the particular people or particular place, moving easily from one attraction to another.

The touristic gaze is also not a problem when the crisis has passed. Several months after the eruption, the village of Mbah Maridjan had fully become a tourist attraction. A parking system had been put in place, whereby visitors had to leave their vehicles far below the destination and pay parking fee. Immediately after leaving the parking place, visitors had to pay an entrance fee and at that time the locals would offer their vehicles to transport the visitors for a fee. If visitors did not take up their offer, they had to walk up the mountain slope for about twenty minutes. At the remains of Mbah Maridjan's home, visitors could see where his house was located and the burnt car of Mbah Maridjan's friends who had come to pick him up. When visitors were ready to go home, they could buy souvenirs in the form of t-shirts displaying images of the event or information related to the disaster. These visitors did not feel any guilt in satisfying their curiosity and their motives were not questioned because the crisis was over. Furthermore, the local people got full benefit from this tourism by providing a service. This is a crucial point to note since their previous sources of income had collapsed.

The touristic gaze becomes a problem when it breaches the supposedly reciprocal definition of the situation: disaster tourists operate under their own principles, without acknowledging the expectation of the others while sharing the same physical space. In a nutshell, the touristic gaze violates the 'sharedness' (Dayan, 2009) of a social world in disaster.

Disaster tourism is not only practised by casual visitors (Robbie, 2008), but also by professional medics (Van Hoving *et al.*, 2010). In other words, it is not an anomaly, nor a rare occurrence. However, tourism as a collective action toward disaster is socially reproachable, especially because it is self-interested, rather than others-interested, and when it is practised in the midst of crisis. Thus, the issue of motivation and timing are the bases upon which the 'restrictions' are established. Based on these two reasons, incorrect motivation and timing, I decided to exclude disaster tourism from the category of collective action, which is also consistent with my definition of audiences' participation in the disaster response efforts (see section 2.1 on page 39). When disaster tourism is oriented toward the survivors, it becomes integral to the disaster relief efforts and, therefore, merits further study.

The second norm concerns *marketing*. When collective attention converges upon a distinct object, the object attracts the attention of those who can profit from it. In the case of Mt. Merapi disaster, my personal observation and that of another (Isbandiyah, 2008) indicated that some commercial marketers and political parties exploited collective attention. They planted bamboo poles to hold vertical flags displaying their brand on roadsides near the refugee areas. The poles were planted in close proximity with one another so that in long rows they resembled a welcome gate. They welcomed the helpers with brands of 'cell phones, motorcycles, and varieties of snacks and drinks or political parties'.[67] This blatant exploitation of collective attention in disaster was abhorred by the volunteers and the local government. Eventually, the governor of the Special District of Yogyakarta instructed to take the flags down. The governor said that the only proper flag to erect was the national flag.[68]

To put the incident into perspective, we can learn from Isbandiyah's (2008) study on the banners of the earthquake disaster in 2006. The majority of the earthquake banners consisted of messages of encouragement, solidarity, and religious sayings. There were banners bearing messages critical of the government as well, but the numbers were small. These earthquake banners were installed on the site of the disaster and on the main streets as well as at the intersections, implying their attempt to draw indexical connection with the disaster and to get the most visibility. The message-producers identified themselves as mass organisations, mostly religion-based, loosely-affiliated social organisations, corporations, and political parties. Although the message-senders were easily identified, their motives were not as readily identifiable as their identities because the banners were designed to convey messages rather than brands.

The comparison between these two cases reveals that flags bearing brands appropriated the heightened level of attention for their own benefit. This appropriation was realised by physically marking the access to the refugee area with commercial and political brands. These brands participated in the aid relief efforts by donating to refugees, but refugees were not their important targets. The brands target people coming

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[67] *Kompas* (2010), *Spanduk-Spanduk Pun Diturunkan* (*The Standing Flags Taken Down*). Last accessed 27 December 2013 at: http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2010/11/02/1539013/function.session-start

[68] *Kompas* (2010), *Turunkan Spanduk di Kawasan Bencana!* (*Remove the Flags from the Disaster Area!*). Last accessed 27 December 2013 at: http://regional.kompas.com/read/2010/11/01/1911422/Turunkan.Spanduk.di.Kawasan.Bencana

to the refugee area, more than anything else, as potential buyers of a product or potential voters for a political party. The collective intent to help is ignored.

Competition over Collective Attention

If competition between television channels is about who gets the first picture of an attention-grabbing story,[69] competition between the people's media and the mainstream media is different. The mainstream media did not necessarily see themselves as competing with the people's media because the people's media were not using the same platform and were not supported by advertisements. By not having to earn money from advertisements, the people's media did not have to think about getting a good score on the rating system or getting the most hits from web users. Yet, for the activists within the people's media, the competition was real.[70] Based on their previous experience of the Mt. Merapi crisis in 2006, Jalin Merapi predicted from the beginning that the attention of the media would focus on the southern flank of Mt. Merapi. This was a reasonable strategy on the part of the media since the history of Mt. Merapi's explosions and the current direction of the crater's opening indicated that the southern side of Mt. Merapi faced the highest risk. Furthermore, Jalin Merapi knew that relief aid would be unequally distributed, especially to the less visible areas. Thus, Jalin Merapi made strategic efforts to draw the attention of mainstream media's audiences to the less visible areas and less visible issues.

The Jalin Merapi activists believed they could not rely on the mainstream media to voice their true concerns. Referring to the 2006 crisis one of the founders recalled, '... the media quoted the local government's public relations. It might be due to their laziness, or due to them not knowing whom to talk to, that they did not go higher to the people's place. They only went to the official refugee camps'.[71] In addition, the local government's disaster management was so weak that, for example, the people of Merapi had to find their own trucks to evacuate. Learning from the 2006 crisis, Jalin Merapi

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[69] A volunteer who evacuated Mbah Maridjan recalled the competition between two news television channels to be the first to publish the story. Pey, Si (2013), *Menjemput Mbah Maridjan (Picking Up Mbah Maridjan)*. Last accessed 27 December 2013 at: https://www.facebook.com/notes/si-pey/menjemput-mbah-maridjan/10150362195549455

[70] Personal interview with the coordinator of the citizen journalists on 19 December 2010. Transcripts no. 3, pp. 12-14. Personal interview with the coordinator of Jalin Merapi's media centre on 13 April 2011. Transcript no. 6, pp. 2-3. Group interview with the citizen journalists on 28 June 2011. Transcript no. 7, pp. 2-3, 9.

[71] *'Lha yang dikutip di media itu statement-nya si Humas [Pemkab] Pemkab, gitu lho. Bisa jadi karena kemalasan si wartawan, karena mereka hanya, nggak naik sampai ke lokasi, tetapi mung neng posko-posko resmi itu ta'*. Personal interview with the coordinator of Jalin Merapi's media centre on 16 June 2013. Transcript no. 65, p. 2.

stationed the field information volunteers at or close to refugee camps that were strategically selected to avoid those that had been well exposed by media. The volunteers were instructed to go to other refugee camps in the surrounding area and to report their needs. Along with bringing information from the less exposed areas, Jalin Merapi actively posted messages on Twitter urging donors to bring their aid to Muntilan and Magelang, not to the city of Yogyakarta which became the centre of attention. When a community living on the north-eastern side of the Mountain did not want to evacuate and, consequently, they became isolated from the relief aid due to the police blockade, the information volunteers worked their way around this isolation and went back with a report. In another case, the public's eyes were focused on refugee camps in the surrounding cities, whereas in fact tens of thousands of survivors took refuge in private houses. In Gunung Kidul alone, 70 kilometres from the disaster area, there were more than ten thousand survivors in private homes. The citizen journalists of Jalin Merapi continuously reported stories of 'private houses turned refugee camps' on the website, wrote and distributed situational reports to the key national actors of the relief efforts, and drew the media's and the public's attention toward them.

The mass media, especially national television channels, concentrated more on the main refugee shelters, as indicated by their use of them as locations of their live reports and according to observations by citizen journalists. Presumably, the big shelters and bigger groups of refugees provided 'better' images for television. However, we should not assume that mass media journalists, especially local ones, did not attempt to make extra efforts to highlight 'isolated' refugee camps.[72] They also wanted to draw the audience's attention to the particular problems they saw in the field. Thus, the difference in focus between the mass media and the people's media is not clear-cut. Taking everything into consideration, the people's media are more responsive to the refugees' needs because they have close and constant connection with the aid distribution volunteers on the ground.

Citizen journalists were required by their coordinators, during the induction process and through their daily evaluations, to pay attention to problems that were important to the survivors.[73] Consequently, in the daily meeting they were encouraged to listen to survivors' problems, although these may have seemed trivial to outsiders. Furthermore, articles were not written to get a certain number of hits but to bring the

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[72] Group interview with photojournalists working for local and national newspapers, and an online news site on 5 January 2011. Transcript no. 4, p. 4.
[73] Personal interview with the coordinator of citizen journalists on 19 December 2010. Transcript no. 3, p. 19.

survivors' concerns to light. In the same spirit, the Twitter channel was used to raise funds for the 'pillow for Merapi' (*bantal untuk Merapi*) project where people could donate IDR10,000 (approx. £0.5) for material that would be made into a pillow by volunteers. The news section of the website covered the refugees' need for trash bins and paper wrap for food. The common interest of Jalin Merapi's diverse media channels was their focus on the survivors' immediate needs according to their own assessments.

The competition between mainstream media and the people's media is less about the economic value of the collective attention, but more to do with definition of the problem. It is more about the relationship between the audiences and the people affected by the disaster and the roles of the different media in mediating the two parties. And, finally, yet importantly, this competition is about an attempt to lend some agency to the audiences in 'conferring' visibility to themselves and to the survivors (Dayan, 2009).

4.3. Conclusion

In this chapter I have described the landscape of contemporary Indonesian media, which as characterised by concentration of media ownership into approximately twelve groups of corporations. The content of television channels, regardless of genre and programme, was also biased toward Java. On the other hand, whilst community radio stations flourished, their broadcasting power was very limited. Difficulty in getting media coverage of their problems in the 2006 disaster led Jalin Merapi to immediately build an organisational network linking community radio stations on the slopes of Mt. Merapi with non-governmental organisations in Yogyakarta.

The second noteworthy aspect of the 2010 Indonesian media landscape is that audiences had easier access to the internet, especially from internet-enabled phones. In addition to allowing them to access different sources of information, more importantly, the internet allowed them to produce and distribute information to the wider society. Collaboration between community media and audiences created what I call the people's media, characterised by its non-commercial nature and audiences' participation in the operation. It is different from community media because it is not operated and does not serve a community with specific geographical boundaries, but instead, wider audiences.

My survey on audiences' media use during the crisis found that a newspaper was read by a high percentage of donors, but not by volunteers and complainers. The difference in the choice of media platform was indicated to be generational. Generally, donors were older and did not use the internet, whereas volunteers and complainers were younger and did use the internet. Corroborating this indication, online news sites were popular among volunteers and complainers, but not among donors. The commonality between these three groups of audiences was that they watched television, establishing the importance of national news television channels in the constitution of audiences' collective attention.

Network analysis revealed that the audiences' collective attention was relatively fragmented amongst media outlets. In addition to the aspect of collective exposure, collective attention includes objects of collective attention, intentions, sociality, and competition between the mainstream media and the people's media.

The objects of collective attention in the Mt. Merapi disaster were *people-as-victims* and *volcano-as-threat*. These were the two prevalent themes dominating the discourse in the triadic-relationship between the media, audiences, and the affected people. For audiences who took action in relation to the media they used, their use of media was intentional. Their intention when monitoring a range of the media was *to stay safe*, which included their friends and families, and they attended to particular segments of the media *to help others*, such as by locating the less visible refugees.

Audiences in general got their information about the opportunities to act directly from the media, both the mainstream and the people's media. But my study found that 17% of the audiences got such information from their friends and acquaintances, whether through direct conversation or using communication devices. How social relationship shaped collective attention was also evidenced by the norms regulating it, exemplified in the case of sightseeing and advertising in disaster areas. Although both of these norms regulated the contemporary mediated environment, the core ideas were founded on basic ethical values of compassion and respect. Audiences were expected to not be self-centred, as personified by the tourist-visitors. The other norm concerned respect for the unfortunates, by not taking advantage of collective attention through advertisement. Regarding the issue of competition, the difference in focus between mainstream media and the people's media brought about the people's media efforts to win audiences' attention to less visible areas and less visible issues. Audiences who participated in the people's media not only received the issue selected for them, but took part in winning and orienting the collective attention.

So far I have attempted to complement the narrative of collective attention as an aggregate of audience's exposure to media (see section 2.3. on page 57). I expanded the previous notion to include objects, intentions, sociality, and competition in collective attention to better capture the complexity of media audiences' behaviour in the dynamics of new-traditional media and mainstream-people's media relationship.

Complex and dynamic though collective attention is, I want to present it as a snapshot, to allow its conceptual separation from collective action, which is more processual in nature. In the next chapter, I will provide more detailed description about different forms of collective engagement, including donating, volunteering, and complaining, with the mediated disaster of Mt. Merapi in 2010.

Chapter 5. Collective Actions

In this chapter I will examine three forms of audiences' collective action: donating, volunteering, and complaining. Donating and volunteering are prevalent actions during disaster (Stallings and Quarantelli, 1985), but the literature shows that complaining is not characteristic of disaster response behaviour. I chose complaining because it is a manifestation of speech in response to mediated suffering (Boltanski, 2004). In addition, its 'locus' of action on the online platform allows effective comparison regarding the communicative dimension of collective action. The audiences' complaints were largely a symbolic action in that they were written communication, whereas donation required face-to-face meeting to organise and required physical delivery, and volunteering required going to the impacted areas. Complaining underlines different problems of collective action that need to be solved by the audiences. The audiences needed to present a strong case of offence to the broadcasting commission, yet they might not have had complete knowledge of how it impacted the other audiences and that what they experienced might not be shared with the others.

I employ several concepts to analyse the three forms of collective action. The main concept was borrowed from Bimber *et al.* (2005) who defined collective action as 'a set of communication processes involving the crossing of boundaries between private and public life'. (p. 367). The boundaries in each collective action will be analysed to understand what the existing constraints were and how the audiences attempted to overcome them. The second concept was taken from McAdam and Paulsen (1993) to illuminate the process of joining a collective action, especially the social ties that pulled the audiences into joining. The last concept was adopted from Dayan's discussion on the nature of visibility in the interface of audiences and publics (2001, 2013). Dayan stated that being public involves seeing and being seen. It is a productive lens to consider how the socio-technological arrangement of media shapes the visibility of the actors involved in the collective action.

I analysed the collective actions by coding the transcripts of the interviews according to the framework I have identified, namely the crossing of private-public boundaries (Bimber *et al.*, 2005), recruitment process (McAdam, 1986, 2003), and aspects of visibility (Dayan, 2001, 2013). Excerpts of interview transcripts that had been coded were then compared with each other and understood in the context of individuals, organisations, and larger context of the events. When relevant, other documents (mass media and social media archive) were consulted to ascertain the accuracy of my interpretation. I also sought confirmation from the participants in my study when I faced ambiguities in the interviews. The findings are presented in a narrative which, frequently, makes use of mini-stories, or vignettes (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The mini-stories are constructed of an individual's story, or a composite of several individuals, which will be noted as such. The mini-stories were selected to represent the larger pattern of behaviours or discourses (p. 81); in other words, they have to be typical. In practical terms, when a theme was echoed by the stories of different, unrelated participants, the chance of it being typical was higher. The typicality of the mini-stories was also compared to the findings of the survey. For example, the content-analysis of the donors' name, the statistics of donation, and my survey found that the majority of the donors had institutional characters. Accordingly, I used a mini-story to illustrate how the donation was collected, which revealed a similar pattern across different interviewees.

Each collective action is written in one subchapter. The subchapters look at three issues of collective action, namely the issue of private-public boundaries, how the audiences joined the collective action, and how the mediation of collective action shapes the visibility of the actors. It starts from the audiences who donated through *Kedaulatan Rakyat* newspaper, then it moves to the audiences who volunteered to Jalin Merapi, and ends with the audiences who complained to KPI (Indonesian Broadcasting Commission).

5.1. Donating

One defining characteristic of the Indonesian media's role in raising funds for the disaster survivors is their deep involvement in the collection and spending of funds. Whereas it is more common in other countries for the media to help only in drawing audiences' attention to fund raising but not in the actual relief effort itself, Indonesian media that engage in humanitarian fund-raising also collect the money and spend it (Abidin and Kurniawati, 2004; Heychael and Thaniago, 2013). The media's involvement in the disaster relief effort raises questions about confusion of media's role as independent information provider and as fund-raiser in a general sense, and confusion of news and business departments in terms of the way media organisations are structured. Although similar practices might be found in other countries,[74] such as in the United States of America and the United Kingdom media worlds, maintaining

[74] Personal communication with a Malaysian student of media production.

independence of the media the separation between the newsroom and business departments is considered to be good practice.

From the audiences' viewpoint, the media's involvement in humanitarian fund-raising efforts provides new opportunities to participate in disaster relief efforts and changes their practice of donation. The media allow audiences to extend their reach to help people who are unknown to them and live in a far location. Furthermore, the media make donors visible to other audiences through their reports and coverage of donors' activities, as an effort to maintain the donors' trust. In this study, I selected the audiences of *Kedaulatan Rakyat* and their collective donation that was organised by the newspaper. In particular, I surveyed (n =120) and interviewed (n = 9) member of audiences who donated and had their photograph printed in the newspaper. I also interviewed donors (n = 7) who donated directly to the refugees. This does not mean that the latter donors did not consume mass media, but that they used the people's media, rather than mainstream media. This will give us additional insights into the aspect of mediation. However, the dominant part of this subchapter is about the audiences of *Kedaulatan Rakyat*.

What is important for this study is not the media themselves, but the audiences' collective donation as enabled by the media. Accordingly, the structure of this subchapter will be built upon following the elements of audiences' collective action: the boundaries of private-public, the process of joining a collective donation, and the media's role in the action. Following Bimber *et al.*'s (2005) formulation of collective action as the crossing of private-public boundaries, I describe the boundaries of Indonesian audiences, how they moved from the private domain to the public domain, what the transitions were, and how the audiences used communication media in the process. Before going into the details of the collective action, I draw some context of fund-raising by the Indonesian media in general and *Kedaulatan Rakyat* in particular.

Mass-Mediated Donation in Indonesia

Kedaulatan Rakyat is the oldest and most dominant local newspaper in the province of the Special District of Yogyakarta (*Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta*), with some distribution to the other cities in the province of Central Java. In 2010 approximately 120.000 copies of newspaper were circulated (Epriliantly, 2009).[75] The

[75] Eprilianty, Lidwina Chometa Halley (2009), Framing Opini Masyarakat tentang Polemik Jabatan Gubernur DIY dalam Koran Lokal DIY: Analisis Framing Media atas Opini Narasumber sebagai Representasi Masyarakat tentang Polemik Pengisian Jabatan Gubernur Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta

readership could be four times bigger than the circulation figures indicated, since its subscribers included schools, local government offices, corporations, other institutional settings, and households where it was read collectively.[76] With the population of the Special District of Yogyakarta amounting to almost three and a half million people,[77] it reached almost thirteen per cent of the population.

For a long time the newspaper had been running its regular column *migunani* (to be of service), where it published the story of an ill individual and invited readers' to donate.[78] It had also been gathering funds for various social causes, from the war of independence to disaster relief.[79] It saw disaster fund-raising as an extension of the same role, namely to help people in great need, which coincided with one of its marketing taglines, 'to be of service to others' (*migunani tumraping liyan*). In the words of the chief editor,[80] it was part of their 'social responsibility' (*tanggung jawab sosial*), being a member of Indonesian society. However, this dual role resulted in the confusion between news and business departments, which could be seen as harming *Kedaulatan Rakyat* newsroom's independence. Fund-raising efforts were usually managed by a committee comprising both news and business departments. Further, advertisers were allowed access to the newsroom through cooperation between the two departments.

This phenomenon is actually typical of the larger Indonesian media world. Abidin and Kurniawati (2004) found that the media had been raising funds incidentally for disasters since the 1980s. According to these authors, the practice became more common after 1997 when the economic crisis hit, making basic needs unaffordable to the poor, and when the government orchestrated a national fund-raising campaign that involved all of the national media. Their study on 31 media that raised funds in eleven provinces of Indonesia found that the operations were event-based (mainly in response to disasters), motivated by their social responsibility, run from start to finish by the

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Periode 2008-2013 dalam SKH Kedaulatan Rakyat dan SKH Bernas Jogja (The Framing of the Public's Opinion about the Governorship of DIY on DIY Local Newspapers: Media Frame Analysis on the Sources' Opinion as a Representation of the Society's Opinion about the Polemic of the Governorship of the Special Region of Yogyakarta 2008-2013 on Kedaulatan Rakyat and Bernas Jogja Newspapers). Last accessed 15 January 2014 at: http://e-journal.uajy.ac.id/2955/2/1KOM02490.pdf

[76] Personal interview with the chief editor of *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 14 January 2013. Transcript no. 42, p. 5.

[77] BPS (2013), *Statistik Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta* (*The Statistics of the Special Region of Yogyakarta*). Last accessed 15 January 2014 at: http://yogyakarta.bps.go.id/index.php?r=arc/view_flipbook&id=9#/18/

[78] Personal observation and interview with the executive editor of the newspaper, 14 January 2013. Transcript no. 42, pp. 10-11.

[79] Baskoro, H. (2009), *9 Februari Hari Pers Nasional: Solidaritas Pembaca, Jurnalisme Kasih Sayang*. It is an online blog post of the same article that was published on *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 7 February 2009. Last accessed 24 February 2014 at: http://harihariperingatan.wordpress.com/2009/12/03/b-februari/

[80] Transcript no. 42, pp. 10-11.

media themselves in the form of an ad hoc committee, and targeted audiences and the media's advertisers as potential donors.

One particular finding reported by the authors was that more than half of the media that raised funds did not keep a database of donors. One of the common reasons offered by the media was that because the donors wanted to remain private and did not reveal their identity that keeping such a record was impossible. The authors attributed this behaviour to the Indonesian culture of charity that tended to be secretive (p. 89). I observed the same behaviour in *Kedaulatan Rakyat* donors, although to a much lesser extent. My results showed that only seven per cent of the sample (n = 2819) did not disclose their identities, whilst a disproportionately large percentage (93%) of donors of *Kedaulatan Rakyat* did reveal their identity. Since the aforementioned authors' data were based on self-reporting by the fund-raisers, not on the data from actual donors, we cannot establish the actual proportion of the secretive donors. Furthermore, I disagree with the authors' implication that the Indonesian 'culture of charity' is generally secretive. Such secretive behaviour applies only to certain relationships in certain social contexts. For example, a personal donor with altruistic motives may act more secretively than a representative of commercial firm that donates to maintain the corporation's good social standing. However, the personal donor may behave less secretively when making a donation in a less public context, such as when donating to a known individual or known organisations in need. It is the media, I intend to argue, that change the boundaries between what can remain private in terms of the donors through their publication of the donation and the donors as well.

In this study, I relied on *Kedaulatan Rakyat*'s publication. I drew up two sets of purposive sample, one drawn from the list of donors and the other from the photographs of donors. The name list was necessary to gain a holistic view of the donors, whereas the photographs were used specifically to understand the interaction between the donors and the newspaper. The name list was printed in *Kedaulatan Rakyat* during the period of 27 October 2010-26 November 2010, consisting of 2819 entries. There were 203 photographs of donors' in *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, from which I drew a random sample of 152 items using the SPSS statistical package. I managed to gather 120 completed responses from persons who were in the picture or, if this was not possible, from persons who were directly involved in the donation. Every photograph was recorded in one response although there was more than one person in the photograph. The holistic name list was used to ascertain whether the donors' tended to be individual or collective, and to identify any patterns in their amounts of donation. The survey gave me a general understanding of donors' demographic characteristics and, more importantly, an interview opportunity with 9 donors to better understand their motives and mechanisms of donation collection.

Based on my survey of the donors (n = 120, see the questionnaire in Appendix 1 on page 295) whose photographs were published by *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, we know that the percentages of male and female donors did not differ too much, although clearly the majority of donors were male (male = 57%, female = 43%). Their average age was 44 years (SD = 13.5), while their level of education was predominantly university level. They lived mainly in the city of Yogyakarta (42%) and to a lesser proportion in Sleman (23%) and Bantul (24%).[81] Part of Sleman lies on the southern flank of Mt. Merapi. The donors' occupations were teachers (47%), employers of private corporations (12%), public servants (8%), and, in smaller proportions, private entrepreneurs, pensioners, university lecturers, and students. Donating to a disaster relief effort was not the first experience for the majority of the donors (78%), as previously they had donated for survivors of Bantul earthquake in 2006 and/or Aceh tsunami in 2004.

The demographics here describe who the donors were, in terms of their social location. They came from various professional backgrounds, were older than the volunteers and complainers, lived relatively close to each other, and had a higher educational background. Their age and professional backgrounds enabled them to join different social associations, which could accumulate money for donation purposes. This money was, in turn, crucial in their collective action and, when accumulated, resulted in much larger quantity than that raised by the other groups, for example the volunteers.

Private-Public Boundaries in Donation

My analysis of the collective donation starts with private-public boundaries (Bimber *et al.*, 2005). From the audiences' viewpoint, the act of donation through mass media involved accentuation of group identities, the surrender of their private property to become public property, and promotion of public good. The audiences acted collectively, rather than individually, and they presented themselves to the media as groups, rather than individuals. The donation transformed what used to be in the possession of individual into publicly accessible resources. And the objective of the audiences and the newspaper was the creation of public good. These boundaries were,

[81] Several questionnaires were mailed to donors who lived outside of the province of the Special District of Yogyakarta, but they were not returned.

to be sure, not clearly separated and trespasses abound. Consequently, a nuanced description is required to account for their complexity, such as the blurring of private-public interests when the newspaper allowed itself to be used as a platform to promote the donors' good image.

Private and public identity

Following the eruption of Mt. Merapi on 26 October 2010, on the next day Kedaulatan Rakyat created a fund-raising programme called '*Dompet KR Peduli Korban Merapi*' (Kedaulatan Rakyat's Wallet to Care for the Victims of Merapi).[82] The first name to appear on list was '*keluarga HM Romli*' (the family of HM Romli), who was the president commissioner of Kedaulatan Rakyat media group. The decision to start with the president commissioner, according to the member of the fundraising committee,[83] was a deliberate attempt by the fund-raising committee to 'entice' (*memancing*) potential donors to donate. When we look at the name itself closely, it actually indicated a larger pattern of self-identification by the donors. The donor identified himself with a larger group; in this case it was his family.

I designed a content analysis procedure to count the frequency of individual and collective donors and whether the collective donors were relatively institutionalised or not. A basic criterion of institutionalisation is that the structure would survive changes in its individual membership (Seumas, 2012). The structure consists of 'roles and their relations to one another' (*ibid.*). The more formal a social institution is, the more organised the roles and the relations between them. The followings are examples of institutions that can be found in the list of donors: families (*keluarga*), extended families (*trah*), Qur'an recital groups (*kelompok pengajian*), community groups, groups of employees, schools, and mass organisations. In other words, the institution could be formally or informally organised. The other group was coded as collections of individuals, such as a collection of individual names (e.g., 'A, B, and C') and the customers of a retail store. A residual category was allocated for those who did not want to be identified or were unidentified. An independent coder was asked to repeat the analysis and the score of agreement was measured (α Krippendorf = 0.93). It was found

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[82] The use of word 'wallet' (*dompet*) and 'care' (*peduli*) was typical of the larger trend in the fund-raising effort by media (Abidin and Kurniawati, 2004).
[83] Personal interview with the coordinator of the fundraising effort on 18 January 2013. Transcript no. 44, p. 2.

that 67% of the donors (n = 2819) were collective donors and 24% were individual donors.[84] Almost all of the collective donors were institutional in structure.

It is revealing that the majority of collective donors were institutional donors. Many of them were institutions in a vernacular sense of the word, with a definite organisational structure and a physical office. But the institutions could also be based on loose organisation of regular gatherings as their main activity. Self-identification as groups, rather than individuals, by the donors indicated that the audiences perceived the fund-raising effort by media as a public issue, rather than a private one. I believe the reason was that public issues, in essence, were issues that concerned groups of strangers and that these issues needed a response by audiences in their publicly appropriate identities. As an individual, an audience member might have a personal relationship with a survivor and have helped this particular individual, but the mass media could only connect the audiences with the survivors at the level of generality, as strangers. Expressed in a different way, to be donors to mass media relief efforts meant to lose the ability to act based on existing personal connections, because they 'could not' personally identify themselves and the beneficiaries. They identified themselves more as institutions and the recipients, in theory, could be anyone.

What I am describing here is a cultural logic, in which the presentation of group identity to the public was a question of cultural appropriateness, not an obligation. In reality, in addition to donating through *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, many of the audiences went to distribute their donation directly to survivors with whom they had a relationship. Thus, the argument does not mean that private persons can only relate to a known survivor, or that a public identity as a group can only respond to strangers. The more important issue in this revelation was that in general groups controlled, or could summon, larger resources than an individual.

Release of ownership

The boundaries between private and public can be clearly seen in how the donors collected their donation. Money, the most common form of disaster donation through the mass media, flowed from individual members of a group to the group. The money was released from its individual owner to the group and, thereby, the right to decide on its use was released too. The same release of right occurred when the group donated its money through the media; it was the media that would decide how and when to use it.

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[84] 9% of the donors were unknown, either because the data were unavailable or because they did not want to be identified, and were only recorded as 'no name' or 'servant of God ' (*hamba Allah*).

The donors I interviewed likened the 'chain of passing-around' of money to a mandate (*amanat*)[85] in that all of the intermediaries functioned as trusted messengers, not the final destination. The separation of roles was understood clearly across groups of audiences that I interviewed.[86] The messenger could only deliver the money, without reimbursing their costs from the donation. Two newspaper editors I interviewed claimed that their media organisations did not take any money from the donation to cover their operating costs.[87]

In many cases, directly before it was donated to the newspaper the money was raised through direct solicitations to members of organisations/communities, private contributions of key initiators, and, in few cases, by holding a festival. In many other cases, the release of private rights of property to an organisation happened much earlier than the disaster. Many of the organisations I surveyed had allocated a 'social fund' (*dana sosial*) to be used when a member fell sick or a close relation of a member passed away. Many of the institutional donors donated to such reserved funds. The decision regarding the use of the cash was made through institutional mechanisms, such as during a regular meeting or informal and open conversation between key members. This is similar in character to the concept of *communality* (Fulk *et al.*, 1996 via Bimber *et al.*, 2005), but public good was not derived from information. Instead, public good was derived from privately raised funds within institutional contexts that could readily be transferred to a public fund.

In terms of size of contribution, I found that institutional donors contributed 82% of the total amount donated. Here I used the same list of donors published by *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, which included their name and amount of donation (n = 2819). Since the amount of donation varied greatly, from IDR10,000 (£0.5) to IDR25 million (£1,250), and the distribution of the data was not normal, the mean of each category of donors did not represent the data accurately. Instead, I propose to describe the pattern of donations by separating big donations from small donations. Based on the interviewees'

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[85] The word *amanat* is borrowed from the same word in Arabic language, which means the entrusted property, or message, that has to be delivered to the rightful receiver or returned to the rightful owner. The trust relationship is declared, imaginarily, in the presence of god. When Indonesians use this Arabic word in their daily conversation, the word conveys a sacredness connotation because the Arabic language is equated with Islam in Indonesia.

[86] Personal interview with the donors on 6 November 2011. Transcript no. 1, p. 3, 5. Personal interview with the coordinator of donors on 26 October 2012. Transcript no. 19, p. 15. Personal interview with a local people of Boyolali who coordinated the relief aid on 29 November 2012. Transcript no. 32, p. 4. Group interview with donors from Jakarta on 13 December 2012. Transcript no. 38, p. 32. Group interview with the fundraisers on 18 October 2013. Transcript no. 44, p. 4.

[87] Personal interview with a coordinator of a fundraising effort by media on 25 March 2012. Transcript no. 17, p. 14. Personal interview with the executive editor of *Kedaulatan Rakyat* on 14 January 2013. Transcript no. 42, pp. 14, 16.

and media person's notions of appropriateness,[88] I propose IDR1 million (£50) as the threshold to distinguish big donors from small donors.[89] The data showed that 57% of institutional donors were big donors; and their contribution comprised 60% of the total donation. For comparison, only 11% of anonymous donors, 15% of individuals, and 25% of group of individuals donated IDR1 million or more. We can clearly see from this account of the data that the majority of the donors were institutional donors and they tended to give a larger amount of money. In total, institutional donors gave more money than the anonymous, individual, and non-institutional donors combined.

Donating money is a particularly suitable way to cross private-public boundaries because it does not have to anticipate the variability of refugees' needs. As such, it can be accumulated from anyone in small and big quantities and be converted to specific items at the very end of the process. Its standard form of measurement makes it easier to be accounted for and its relatively small size makes for easy storage, compared to in kind donation. Hence, mass media in general preferred to receive monetary donation rather than in-kind donation (Abidin and Kurniawati, 2004). *Kedaulatan Rakyat* accepted several items of in-kind donation (such as food stocks), while rejecting other items (such as used clothes). *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, like other media, focused on monetary donations.

Orientation to the public good

The third private-public boundary that audiences crossed in their collective action was via orientation of their action. This is the key element of collective action, namely the creation of public good. The previous section described how the audiences released their right of property to the media so that the money became accessible to the public. Yet, the release of right itself did not guarantee that the money promoted the public good. It was the actual use of the donation that determined whether it promoted public good or not. In this regard, the audiences of *Kedaulatan Rakyat* could not follow the donation through to ascertain it promoted the public good because the distribution of donation was decided solely by the newspaper. 66% of the donors of *Kedaulatan Rakyat* (n = 120) did not know where the money went, although 77% of them read the newspaper's daily list of donors and coverage of the distribution of donation. There was

[88] Group interview with donors who raised money from their students on 22 November 2012. Transcript no. 23, p. 1. Personal interview with the photographer of donor on 8 November 2012. Transcript no. 45, pp. 3, 6. Personal interview with the pensioner-donors on 31 January 2013. Transcript no. 50, p. 18.
[89] IDR 1 million was generally perceived to be a substantial donation. For a comparison, it was 1.34 times the minimum regional salary in the province of the Special District of Yogyakarta in 2010. Using the 2014 exchange rate of IDR20,000 = £1, it is equivalent to £50.

a gap between their orientation to the public good and their actual ability to ensure its creation.

As a side note, media which conducted disaster fundraising normally reported what they earned and how they spent the funds raised. While doing the fieldwork, I attended the release of the Ethical Code of Media Philanthropy (*Kode Etik Filantropi Media Massa*) which was written by representatives of the media and the Indonesian Press Council (*Dewan Pers Indonesia*). The ethical code instructed media organisations to report on their programmes and to audit financial statements of fundraising efforts, among others. However, it did not mandate the inclusion of audiences in programme design and evaluation. It remains to be seen how well the ethical code regulates the media, although an early report seems not to show promising results (Heychael and Thaniago, 2013).

We can read the audiences' orientation to the public good from their statements about motivation, which I recorded in my survey. What motivated the donors most was their feeling for their 'fellow humans' (*sesama manusia*) (59%). To position themselves as being equivalent to the survivors, donors to *Kedaulatan Rakyat* framed themselves and the refugees as members of larger social entities. Donors and survivors were members of the same humanity as 'fellow humans' (*sesama manusia*), of the same state as 'fellow citizens' (*sesama warga negara*), of the same religion as 'fellow believers' (*sesama umat beragama*) or 'fellow Muslims' (*sesama Muslim*) (4%), and the same regional population as 'fellow Yogyakartans' (*sesama warga Yogyakarta*) (3%). The categories of fellow humans and fellow citizens were conflated because the words '*sesama manusia*' included fellow citizens and historically the fundraising efforts were addressing national disasters, rather than international disasters (Abidin and Kurniawati, 2004). Sameness of religion and city of residence were only minor considerations. And religious motivation was often found together with humanity concerns. These were the forms of publicness that the audiences intended to support by contributing their money. Their donation might not meet the strictest criterion of public good: that no one could be excluded from the use of it, but it certainly crossed over from private orientation of the audiences and entered the public domain.

The problem was that audiences could not follow through their orientation to creation of the public good. The normal sequence of action roughly took place in the following order. The audiences talked with other audiences about the disaster and decided to raise money. They collected the money from members of the social group they belonged to, such as village community, hobby group, school, local government office, or store employee group. Then members of the groups went to the *Kedaulatan Rakyat* office to give the donation. The donation was received at the reception desk and a receipt was given to them. In some cases, a photographer standing at the reception desk would take their picture and ask for some information that would be included in the caption to their photograph. On the following day, their donation was published on the donors' list in the newspaper and, if selected, their photograph would be printed. The audiences lost control of the money once they gave the money to the receptionist. They receded from being donors to being newspaper readers who interacted with the media in the form of printed words and pictures. The connection provided by the newspaper meant disconnection at the same time.

The connection that was created through verbal and visual portrayal, when reading news about the survivors, was followed by donating money. However, the audience-donors could decide on the use of the money. Some donors actually thought that making sure how the donation was spent and to whom the donation was given were such important issues that they went directly to the refugee camps.[90] A member of one blogger community from Surabaya told me that what he liked about Jalin Merapi was that it enabled him and his blogger community to make a direct connection with the volunteers in the field and even the refugees themselves. This connection mattered because it helped them avoid problems of oversupply or giving the wrong aid. *Kedaulatan Rakyat* did not connect their donors with the survivors.

Joining in Collective Donation

Almost all of the donors knew of the existence of the fund-raising effort directly from the newspaper itself, indicating an almost complete overlap between the two categories (donors and readers). Only a few of them learnt about the fund-raising effort from friends. Although the knowledge came directly from a mass medium, the previous content analysis on the donors' names and my interviews showed that the readers acted as a group (not as an individual with a mass medium) with varying forms of institutional structure. Accordingly, the mechanism by which the audiences joined the collective action was largely determined by how the institutions operated. Here is an example where a teacher of a primary school recounted this process:

> Well, it was all of us [who decided it]. Because we read about it and then, "How about soliciting donation from the students?" "That's okay." We were talking

[90] 7 out of 11 groups of donors that I interviewed gave their donation directly.

during the lunch hour. And then we asked the students from year one to year six. Then when we had it collected, "It's still too small." We will collect again tomorrow. [A student asked] "Sir, we don't have the money today. Can we do it tomorrow?" "Yes, of course." The day after we had the donation ready.[91]

The initiators of the donation were the teachers, who had the authority to collect money from the students. They informally discussed the plan during a break in school hours. Subsequently, they solicited donations from the students of all classes. Because the plan was spontaneous, they felt that the amount of money raised was too small. They planned to redo the fund-raising, which the students themselves asked for. On the following day, the money was raised and they casually decided to donate it through *Kedaulatan Rakyat* because they saw it as more direct (*langsung*).

In the example, the only actual *Kedaulatan Rakyat* readers were the teachers, but the chain of donation expanded along the reach of their institutional affiliations to include all of the students. The students joined the collective donation spontaneously, using their pocket money, because they belonged to the school. In another case, a teacher at a senior high school announced the fund-raising effort to the students and, at the same time, contacted the head of the parent group directly to solicit donations.[92] Hence, the chain of solicitation branched out further to include the parents. Eventually, the total donation included donations by teachers, the teachers' reserved fund, students' donations, and parents' donations, both monetary and in-kind donations. In the institutions where the members could meet daily, the arrangement could be 'spontaneous'. But in other institutions where the members met weekly or monthly, the response to the disaster relief effort was not immediate.

The caretaker[93] of a big mosque on one of the main streets in Yogyakarta told me that they raised the money at a Friday prayer, which attracted more people than daily prayers. The leaders of the mosque held a meeting beforehand to decide on this and, after the donation was raised, the secretary and the caretaker took it to *Kedaulatan*

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[91] *Oh ya teman-teman semua. Karena kita baca-baca ini. Terus, "Yuk, gimana kalau anak-anak dimintain, sumbangan?? "Oh, ya nggak apa-apa." Kalau kita kan jadi ngomong-ngomong cuma pas istirahat gitu, 'kan. Oh ya terus kan anak-anak disinggung itu, tentang bencana gimana. Dari kelas satu sampai kelas enam. Terus sudah ngumpul, "Kok baru sedikit?" Diulangi lagi besok. "Pak, saya belum bawa kalau sekarang. Besok boleh?" "Oh, iya nggak apa-apa." Hari berikutnya udah ngumpul.* Group interview with the donors who raised money from their students on 22 November 2012. Transcript no. 23, p. 1.

[92] Personal interview with a teacher who coordinated the donation on 5 December 2012. Transcript no. 33, pp. 6-7.

[93] Personal interview with the caretaker of the mosque who donated through *Kedaulatan Rakyat* on 22 November 2012. Transcript no. 24, p. 1.

Rakyat. For some groups, such as an alumni group[94] and the pensioner organisation[95] that I interviewed, meetings took place monthly. They did not schedule a special meeting in response to the disaster; it was just discussed at a regular meeting. Attendees met at a time and a place which had been scheduled beforehand. The institutions structured the people into some forms of relationship and the time-place into scheduled meetings that enabled the fundraising to be organised. The money itself had often been allocated in anticipation of such an event. The audiences joined the collective donation based on their membership of the institutions. But, it was not the only possibility for the audiences to join collective action. They could use their personal networks to identify shared interests in the donation and to organise the action.

Differing from institutional donors who met at their scheduled times, personal donors gave a more immediate response. Those who lived close to the affected areas could immediately react to the collective donation effort. A university student[96] who lived several kilometres outside of the danger zone told me how she joined the effort. She initially knew from Twitter that a nearby donation centre needed certain items. She shared the news with her friend through short messages and both of them decided to buy the items using their own money. They brought the items to the donation centre, run by another Twitter user. This led them to think that they could solicit donations from their friends. She identified potential donors only from her phone's contact list. Short messages were sent and they offered to pick up the aid. They managed to collect used clothes and baby foods, among other items. A friend of theirs was even inspired to open a donation centre with a priest of their church. Thus, the collective donation replicated itself.

Consider another example, donors[97] who lived far from the affected areas. Three members of a group of travel enthusiasts in Jakarta (approx. 600 km) chatted on the Blackberry messenger system about their plan to send aid to the refugees. One of them suggested that they opened a 'wallet' (*dompet*), which was agreed by the others as long as it stayed within their group circle, for fear of having to be accountable to too many people. The conversation was moved to an e-mail thread of their group, allowing a chronological record of their effort and a contextualised view of e-mail updates and

[94] Personal interview with a member of an alumni group on 23 November 2012. Transcript no. 26, p. 1.
[95] Personal interview with a member of the pensioner group who donated on 31 January 2013. Transcript no. 50, p. 18.
[96] Personal interview with a student who donated and volunteered on 5 December 2012. Transcript no. 34.
[97] Personal interview with donors from Jakarta on 6 November 2010. Transcript no. 1. And group interview with more members of the same group on 13 December 2012. Transcript no. 38.

reports. Although intended to be within their group only, the collective donation eventually grew to include their work colleagues. Due to the earnest response of their work colleagues, they travelled several times to Yogyakarta at weekends. Here we see the differences between private donors who lived in nearby and faraway areas. Those who lived far from the affected areas could not respond as immediately as those who lived in the closer areas. But it is more important to see the similarities between the two. Both of the personal donors operated outside of institutional settings, which meant they relied on their personal network to find a shared interest in the donation, used their private means of communication to organise the plan, and had to use their personal days off to transport the aid. The institutional donors, who were the majority of the media's donors, without difficulty found a shared interest in their institutions, used their organisational means of communication to discuss and decide the plan, and used their institutional time to raise and deliver the donation.

The two types of donors, institutional and personal, were analytical constructs that were abstracted from the more varied and overlapping instances of collective donation. These analytical constructs, which were mainly driven by the data I observed during my fieldwork, allow us to see the contrast in the ways the audiences joined a collective donation, namely how the individuals were differently enabled by their social organisations/networks. In reality, personal donors could entrust their money to an institution, which further entrusted the aid to the media, or conversely institutions could donate their money to a group of individuals who were not organised formally. Furthermore, the individual audiences themselves could join their institution's initiative and personally contribute outside of their institution at the same time.

Visible Donors

One of the key points at which we can see continuation and discontinuation of the cultural practice of donation (*menyumbang*) is when audiences donated through the media and the media made the donor and the donation known to the general audience. In the case I studied, audience-donors could be identified from the donor lists and the photographs that were printed daily in *Kedaulatan Rakyat.* The donation list consisted of a sequential number, name of the donors, address, and amount of donation. Since there could be almost two hundred individual records of donation during the peak days, the list could be very long. Whereas a single entry of donor occupied only one or two rows of space in one column, a photograph and its caption took up around seventeen rows of one column. The photographs allowed donors to be visually present and identifiable in the valued space of mass medium. This continued the cultural practice of letting oneself or one's group be known by the donation recipient. Discontinuation occurred because the mass medium expanded the boundaries of who could know about the donation by making the donation public. In effect, some of the donors found it hard to reconcile their cultural practices of donation and the logic of publication. Key in the discord was the visibility afforded by the mass medium. To be able to understand the continuation and discontinuation of mediated collective donation, as exemplified by the visibility of the donors, I will begin by describing the Javanese cultural practice of donation, with which the majority of donors were affiliated.

Nyumbang:[98] *The cultural context of donation*

Allow me to describe the case of inter-personal donation, a familiar practice in Javanese culture called '*nyumbang*' (or '*menyumbang*' in Indonesian, which means 'to donate'). It basically refers to the voluntary act of giving an object of value to other people/groups of people who need it. Key to this concept is its voluntary character and the external need of the donation recipient. Thus, a friend may *nyumbang* a sick friend or a family *nyumbang* the wedding of a neighbour. Internal voluntariness is essential in this scenario, since even if one feels an ethical imperative to give a donation to those who need it, one still has to move to act on it. External force applies to tax or duty, but donation is the domain of internal willingness. In addition to feeling voluntariness, the donor needs to perceive the external need for donation. In daily social life, the perception of need is usually immediate, or relayed by the donor's social networks, and it concerns a definite individual or group. For example, a neighbour tells me that one household in the neighbourhood is having a baby, thus we are expected to pay a visit and give a donation. In *nyumbang*, the donor is taking action as a member of a group, not merely giving a valuable belonging to someone else, such as giving money to a beggar (which is called *memberi* (to give), rather than *menyumbang*). In general, it is more social in character, rather than a personal act.

Since the perception of need almost always results from an estimation, one can never be sure if the donation measures up to the need (see the previous example of school teachers). To complicate matters further, although it is considered to be inappropriate if the money one is donating is seen glaringly in public, the receiver will

[98] *Nyumbang* is a Javanese word for *menyumbang* in Indonesian or to donate in English. The social character means that doing it affirms the actor's knowledge and affiliation to the culture, rather than the result of a personal motivation. Therefore, a failure to *nyumbang* is related to the actor's standing in the social circle, whereas failure to give money to a beggar might be attributed to the individual's character.

eventually know what was given. And because the donor and the receiver know each other, the donation needs to reflect both the social standing of the donor and his respect for the receiver's social status and need. An example may clarify the intricacy of Javanese ways of donating. The most typical occasion at which people are expected to donate is a wedding ceremony. In a rural context, the family holds the ceremony at home and since the host family cooks everything at the same house, they receive in kind donation from their neighbours, such as sugar, tea, rice, coconut, and other objects of practical use. In an urban context, where the ceremony is held at a rented place, the guests donate money by covertly inserting the envelope that contains the money into a donation box at the reception table. Afterward, the host will open the box, open the envelope, read the giver's name, and count the money. Some people may actually make a note of each guest's donation so that in the future they know how much they need to donate to the person on their list in return.

In the cultural practice of donation I previously described, people donate in a social setting where the other attendants and the donation recipient know the person who gives the donation. In other words, the practice is based on recognition. The donors participate because they want to be recognised as members of the community. When the practice of donation carries over to the media, the logic of recognition is married with the logic of publication. The logic of publication does not operate under the assumption of mutual recognition that operates in the inter-personal donation, but is based on the media's capacity to make the act of donating known to society. The recipient is no longer a specific individual or group, but this expands to include all the affected people. And the act will no longer be recognised by a known community, but will anticipate the unknown audiences. In short, the media change the visibility of donors and the audience's conceptualisation of membership of a community.

Mediated nyumbang*: Between recognition and publication*[99]

When the practice of donation enters into the mass media, it adheres to the way mass media operate, to a certain extent. When *Kedaulatan Rakyat* decided to run a disaster fundraising campaign, it needed to address two issues: trust keeping and resource allocation. *Kedaulatan Rakyat* maintained the trust of the donors by printing daily records of donors and reporting how they spent the money, although only partially.

[99] The local, cultural practice of *menyumbang* as a framework to show how mediation alters cultural practice cannot be extended to other forms of collective action. This is because empirically the audiences themselves saw that media-related volunteerism and mediated complaint did not have their equivalent counterparts in their daily life.

Partly to gain the donors' trust and partly to promote its initiative, the newspaper printed donors' photographs in its daily issues. The fundraising operation cost the newspaper a substantial amount of money since it was not paid for from the raised donation and the newspaper still had to pay additional costs, such as overtime fees for its employees and lost revenue space. Hence, the decision to make donors visible was not only motivated by accountability concern, but it also took into account of how its space was allocated, or an economic concern. From the newspaper's viewpoint, the two concerns, accountability and resource allocation, shaped how the fundraising campaign was organised.

I will focus on how the donors were made visible by the newspaper because visibility became the point where accountability and resource allocation met. Further, it was in the process of making donors visible that the logics of recognition and publication married. The processes of making the donors visible involved three stages. **The first** was the reception stage. The receptionist made the record which would be printed as a donor list. All donors were listed, but only some of them were photographed. **The second stage** concerned the decision of the photographer. He described the decision: 'In my opinion, the groups [which we considered] were offices and ... organisations. We didn't take pictures of the individuals'.[100] He dismissed all of the individual donors, but prioritised institutional donors, based on a cultural reason we will learn shortly. Having been selected among the donors, the institutional donors were selected further based on the amount of their donation. While the first selection was a strategy to deal with the quantity of the donors, the second selection dealt with the cultural logic of *appropriateness* (pantas). He said that the institutional donors had a chance to be photographed if they donated more than one million IDR (approximately £50), which was considered to be an appropriate amount of donation. Appropriateness here referred to the social standing of the donor and indicated the worthiness of the cause.

The third selection, the composition stage, concerned how the photographers, and in some cases the donors too, visually selected what to include in the photograph. The typical scenario was that the photographer at *Kedaulatan Rakyat* took a close up picture of the donors while they put forward the envelope containing the money or a sample of the donated items to the receptionist. The face and body of the donor could be clearly seen, but the envelope or donation parcel was too small for any written message

[100] Personal interview with the photographer of donors on 18 January 2013. Transcript no. 45, pp. 3-4.

on it to be legible. The picture usually portrayed the donors and the newspaper's receptionists, but in some rare cases the donors were received by people from top of the hierarchy. For example, the donation of one local politician was received by the president commissioner[101] and a donation from the association of general insurance was received by the chief editor.[102] In both cases, the photograph caption broke from the common practice by identifying the title of the receivers, whereas in all of the other photographs the receiver was not specifically identified. This indicates two things. First, it shows the intimate, or even blurred, relationship between the news and the business department. Second, the newspaper considers the worthiness of the donors, perhaps, in relation to their social standing in the local community or the media's institutional affiliations with them (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996).[103]

In the three stages of visibility, we see a mix of recognisability and publication. The selection made by the media professionals was based on how the newspaper published a donation campaign, or the logic of publication. The logic of publication aimed to provide some measure of accountability and to filter the donors due to the constraints of space. On the other hand, the newspaper provided a new type of recognisability by allowing the person and the act of donation to be recognised by the larger audience. The photograph propped donors' recognisability; it was more visible than the donor list which served as a record of accountability. When the donation was given, there was a chance to meet and be recognised by media persons, such as the president commissioner or the chief editor, if the donors were important to them. When the newspaper was printed, the donors on the list recognised themselves, then other members of the donor groups recognised their group in the photograph, and an unknown number of other readers would potentially recognise them. It was the mix of the two logics, recognisability and publicity, that created ambiguous feelings in the audiences. The readers who donated generally did not mind putting their names on the list, but the photographs created a distinct uneasiness for them.

The anticipation of being seen widely was intimately connected to the audiences' idea of appropriateness (*pantas*), with regard to the amount of donation. The primary school teachers' decided to redo the money collection from the students because they

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[101] *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 1 November 2010.
[102] *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 5 November 2010.
[103] Chapter 7 of the literature discusses different groups that can influence the content of media. Three groups relevant to my study are 'target audience' (pp. 182-188), 'community relations', and 'institutional affiliations' (pp. 203-206).

saw that their donation was still too little.[104] The pensioner group allocated their existing social fund, but the members decided to add to the fund because the amount already collected was not *appropriate* enough.[105] In contrast to *Kedaulatan Rakyat's* institutional donors, personal donors who gave directly to the refugee camps or to privately run donation centres did not feel the anxiety of giving too little. When the donation was made through media, the social standing of the donors before the unknown audience felt more intense.

Anxiety was also related to the social expectation of altruistic giving. A leader of a public servant pensioners' organisation with about three hundred members told me:

> If possible, we wouldn't donate by way of KR [Kedaulatan Rakyat]. It would've been better to just slip it into their [refugees'] hands, wouldn't it? It would be better if we weren't on the news. We earned the pahala [religious reward], so it said. [She laughed.][106]

She thought that the donation should not even have the donor's name on it because, 'the left hand should not know what the right hand is doing' (*tangan kanan memberikan, tangan kiri jangan tahu*). The same sentiment was echoed by one village chief in Bantul.[107] Their claim of altruism was supported by the fact that they did not plan or seek to be photographed. It was the photographer who decided that they were to be photographed. Yet, the audiences did not want to be seen as wanting to be seen, or seeking fame for themselves. An ulterior motive should not be present behind the donation. They wanted to show that they 'cared about' (*peduli*) the sufferings. However, the question of ulterior motive is ultimately decided on what can be seen by others.

While some donors viewed the photo opportunity as problematic, some others felt that the publicity effect was acceptable. For example, the members of an alumni organisation saw that the photo opportunity was a normal thing to do.[108] It was even seen by one interviewee as a good thing to do since the picture showed to the people of Yogyakarta that her organisation supported the campaign, considering that her organisation was affiliated with the palace of Yogyakarta. In addition, a teacher at a senior high school in Bantul, a southern part of Yogyakarta, invited *Kedaulatan Rakyat*

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[104] Group interview with school teachers who donated on 22 November 2012. Transcript no. 23, p. 1.

[105] Personal interview with an organiser of the pensioner group on 1 January 2013. Transcript no. 50, p. 18.

[106] *Mung nek isa niku malah ora sah jane metu KR. Nek isa langsung tlesepke dhewe. Ngaten nggih, Mas? Tidak masuk berita 'kan lebih afdal pahalanya, jarene. [Tertawa]. Ibid*, p. 15.

[107] Personal interview with a chief village on 23 November 2012. Transcript no. 25, pp. 3-4.

[108] Personal interview with a member of an alumni organisation on 23 November 2012. Transcript no. 26, p. 1.

reporter to photograph the donation campaign at his school.[109] As the public relation officer of the school, the teacher strategically selected *Kedaulatan Rakyat* amongst other local newspapers in Yogyakarta because it provided his school with good and fair coverage. We can also see on the photographs themselves that some donors had anticipated the photo opportunity to the extent that they had printed a large sign on the donation box,[110] brought a banner with them,[111] or dressed in the organisation's uniform.[112] Such behaviour was not only a carryover from the culture of donation, where recognition by other donors was expected, but it was also enabled by the structure of the media organisation, which did not clearly separate the newsroom and the business department.

In the US and UK media worlds, there is an ideal of separation between newsroom and business department, as is often implied by the customary metaphor of firewall (for example, Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2014). By maintaining the independence of its newsroom, a media institution conserves its credibility before the audiences' eyes. If the newsroom's voice is sponsored by a commercial party, then, the logic states, the impartiality which defines its core professional ethics is eroded. In Indonesia, this is not the case. The wall is not made of fire; it is porous enough for the two departments to make connections. My interview with six journalists from local and national print media[113] and donors to *Kedaulatan Rakyat* confirmed the fact that the paper's business department had access to the newsroom. However, the extent of porosity differed. At *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, the disaster donation campaign was run both by the business and news department. Advertisers contributed to the campaign and this was printed, covered as news, and published in advertorials. On the other hand, *KOMPAS*, the most prominent national newspaper in Indonesia, separated their philanthropic operations into a private foundation that had no relationship with the newspaper. However, there was still an overlap when the foundation held a donation campaign and was covered by the newspaper, and the director of the foundation was an active reporter at that time.[114]

The tension between the newsroom's ideal to serve the public and the management's ideal to serve the advertisers was perceived by journalists to entail no

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[109] Personal interview with a public relation officer of a high school on 5 December 2012. Transcript no. 33, p. 8.
[110] *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 9 November 2010.
[111] *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 31 October 2010.
[112] *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 5 November 2010.
[113] Group interview with photojournalists of national and local newspapers and an online news site on 5 January 2011. Transcript no. 4, pp. 5-6.
[114] *Kompas*, 5 November 2010, 7 November 2010.

conflict of interest. When I asked an executive editor of a local newspaper if fundraising belonged to the domain of journalism, he answered 'No'.[115] To him, it was a spontaneous thing to do and it was an ethical thing to raise funds for the refugees. Also, he said that disaster fundraising was a good opportunity for advertisers to be seen by the wider audience. As long as the financial report was available to the public, accountable, and the media did not take advantage of the collected funds, then it was acceptable. He gave an example of the ethical handling of such funds where he always ate and bought petrol from his daily allowance as an employee instead of using public funds. The point here is not to present media's fundraising efforts as an ethical issue, although it is clearly a legitimate issue. My point is to show that the confusion of roles and responsibility among the news and business departments of these media, and Indonesian media in general (Abidin and Kurniawati, 2004), opens up the opportunity for the audience to participate in disaster relief response.

Let me dwell upon this issue a little bit more. Although media are commercial institutions, in a fundraising campaign media workers and donors tend to de-emphasise the media's commercial interests and, conversely, emphasise its public role. The newspaper executive editor I interviewed saw that what enabled the role of media as fundraiser was the public's trust in it. The survey cited in this study (Abidin and Kurniawati, 2004) also showed that fundraising media saw themselves as being trusted by donors. Here, I am referring to trust in media as organisations, rather than the veracity of their information products. Regarding an interview with a donor, *Kedaulatan Rakyat* (2 November 2010) wrote that this donor to its fundraising campaign trusted it because the media had had experience of raising funds and distributing them in the past years. In fact, *Kedaulatan Rakyat* started to raise funds for disaster in 1947.[116] It was also trust that made entertainers willing to take part in a charity night without charge. But, more importantly, trust alone did not guarantee willingness. The humanitarian context of disaster over-arched the moral framework upon which members of the public based their collective response. In this respect, the recurring word that encapsulated the right response was *nyumbang*. Mass media, in the context of the public's response to disaster, played the role of mediator between members of the public that did not know each other. At the same time, media's economic imperative shaped the realisation of such a role as evidenced in how the newspaper's limited and valuable space was

[115] Personal interview with an executive editor of a local newspaper on 25 March 2012. Transcript no. 17, pp. 5, 9.
[116] NN, 1998.

allocated to serve different purposes: proof of accountability, platform of publicity, and means of maintaining good relationships with advertisers and other social groups.

The next section will present and discuss the case of audiences who volunteered to Jalin Merapi. The volunteers came from different cities in Indonesia, but mainly from the Java island. It will focus on the stage when the audiences joined a collective action, what boundaries were crossed in the process, and how the media were used and shaped the action.

5.2. Volunteering

Volunteerism has three distinctive characteristics that set it apart from other altruistic actions, namely its formal, public, and unpaid attributes (Musick and Wilson, 2007). The case I am investigating in this section is the disaster volunteerism initiated by Jalin Merapi. Jalin Merapi recruited volunteers openly using an online form, established some formal relationship with the volunteers, and operated the relief effort on an unpaid basis. There were many organisations that recruited disaster volunteers at the time, ranging from university student organisations, NGOs, search and rescue groups, religious organisations, and mass organisations. Among these other initiatives, Jalin Merapi stood out because in addition to organising a disaster relief operation it provided what used to be the exclusive domain of the government authority and the mass media, namely crisis information. And it produced this information with the participation of volunteers, the people of Mt. Merapi, and media users.

Based on my interviews with the coordinator of volunteers,[117] coordinator of media, [118] recruitment officer,[119] and some of the volunteers themselves,[120] along with some documents found on their website, I will describe what Jalin Merapi was and how it operated during the disaster. Jalin Merapi was founded in 2006 as a coalition of three community radio stations on the slopes of Mt. Merapi, two networks of community radio, and four local NGOs in the cities surrounding Mt. Merapi. This coalition was

[117] Personal interview with the coordinator of the volunteers on 5 July 2011. Transcript no. 8.

[118] Personal interview with the coordinator of media centre on 13 April 2011. Transcript no. 6. And on 16 June 2012. Transcript no. 65.

[119] Personal interview with the recruitment officer on 4 February 2013. Transcript no. 51.

[120] Personal interview with the coordinator of citizen journalists on 19 December 2010. Transcript no. 3. Group interview with the citizen journalists on 28 June 2011. Transcript no. 7. Group interview with two early recruits of Jalin Merapi on 11 July 2011. Transcript no. 9. Personal interview with a volunteer of the media centre on 15 July 2011. Transcript no. 11. Personal interview with an ex-auditor who 'verified' the aid requests on 26 August 2011. Transcript no. 13. Personal interview with a volunteer who was transferred to another organisation on 29 November 2012. Transcript no. 31. Personal interview with the 'public relation officer' of Jalin Merapi on 23 January 2013. Transcript no. 47. Personal interview with a volunteer who dropped out and moved to another relief organisation on 20 February 2013. Transcript no. 55.

initiated after their realisation that during Mt. Merapi's eruption in 2006 the people of Merapi needed to communicate more between themselves and that they could not rely on the mainstream media to voice their real concerns to the public because the media listened to local government more than them. In 2010, Jalin Merapi recruited and assigned approximately 700 volunteers in total during a period of about one month and a half, to gather information about the refugees' needs, operate an information centre, and help distribute the relief aid. The volunteers were not only assigned their own posts, but, to a limited extent, also to other relief initiatives that needed them. My interviews suggest that Jalin Merapi's role in providing information about the refugees' needs was seen as very helpful by personal donors, friends and relatives of the people of Merapi, civil society organisations, and even the journalists themselves.

In response to Mt. Merapi's eruption, Jalin Merapi established several posts where the volunteers would be stationed, which they decided on at a meeting two days before the eruption. The number of posts kept rose steadily to eleven in response to the expansion of the danger zone and the widespread evacuation that followed. The volunteers' job at the posts was to record the needs of the refugees at the refugee camps in the surrounding areas, to report these needs back to the main office, and to receive and distribute in kind donations. Although the volunteers were required to provide information about the refugees' needs, there were other volunteers who were specifically recruited to deal with information. They were called 'information volunteers' (*relawan informasi*), and consisted of information centre operators and citizen journalists. The information centre operators respectively received, organised, published, and verified the information. They received information from volunteers, donors, and from the people of Mt. Merapi themselves through different kinds of media, consolidated it with other reports, and published it on Google Docs and Twitter updates, verifying it as they went along. These various digital tools were selected because they were 'free', served the purpose, and had already been adopted by users. The citizen journalists wrote daily news articles about the refugees and other articles, such as tips on becoming volunteers, summaries of volunteer meetings, 'transcriptions' of live observations of the mountain, and lists of aid received and needed. Rough role divisions were planned and decided one day before the eruption, whereas the specifics of each role and cooperation between division were dealt with 'on the fly'.

Jalin Merapi, in effect, created a platform where the people, using different media devices, could participate in the production of crisis information. Media users participated by becoming volunteers or by giving and receiving information via handheld transceiver, short messages, phone calls, social media updates, and other internet services. In the following section, I will focus on volunteers who were recruited by Jalin Merapi.

Jalin Merapi Volunteers

The key activists of Jalin Merapi met on the day when the mountain's status was raised to the highest level. The decision taken at that meeting was to recruit volunteers and station them immediately at several posts. In response to the escalation of the disaster, they kept on recruiting volunteers over a period of two months. The volunteers were recruited through personal networks and using online forms. My survey targeted online applicants (n = 2771), including only those who had left their e-mail address on the system (n = 2690). Of those e-mail invitations, 302 failed to reach the destination due to the address being no longer registered. I received 353 complete responses from volunteer-applicants, a relatively low response rate of 14.7%.

The majority of the applicants to be Jalin Merapi volunteers were male (69.7%); their average age in 2010 was 27 years (SD = 7.3). They had diploma degrees (48%) and bachelor's degrees (44%). The majority of them lived in the affected cities (59%), and other cities in Java (35%). They learnt about the opportunities to volunteer directly from Jalin Merapi's website or its Twitter account (52%), from other media (13%), or from other people (23%). When they heard from other people, their information sources were either friends (68%) or acquaintances (23%). I consulted on these findings with the recruitment officer, who confirmed that the profile was similar to what he saw in his daily volunteering activity.

The findings revealed that the volunteers who participated in this study tended to be male, young, educated, and lived close to the affected sites. In this data, and in my previous findings about the audiences' use of media platform, we know that they used the internet regularly, in addition to using cell phones and watching television, but did not read newspapers or listen to the radio. These characteristics, especially their use of internet, put them in a better position to join volunteerism, as organised by Jalin Merapi, because the main method of recruitment was by online form (a feature of Google Documents). However, as I will show later, this was not the only method of recruitment and the Jalin Merapi recruiter was the person who decided who to recruit. Practical consideration by the recruiters and the dynamics of the disaster ultimately determined the recruitment process. I could not make a claim regarding the variables that caused them to join, because the data when these variables were controlled were not available.

My exploration focused on the 'how' of the recruitment, rather than the 'why'. But I will present the cases of dropping out of volunteerism to show how demographic factors allowed them to volunteer, and constrained them at other times.

Private-Public Boundaries in Volunteerism

This section consists of three subtopics to describe volunteerism as a collective action, defined by Bimber *et al.* (2005) as a communicative process to cross private-public boundaries. To investigate the audiences' collective action empirically, I draw from the actors' own understanding of their action. They saw volunteering to be different from donating in that volunteering revolves around *doing* rather than *giving*. Donation could be relayed, but volunteerism could not. Whereas in *giving* what mattered was the donation, *doing* involved committing oneself to the collective aim. Audiences who became volunteers committed their labour, time, and, more often than not, physical presence to the relief effort. Essentially they temporarily committed themselves to the lives of others. Since what they essentially gave was themselves, in volunteerism the giver was bound with the gift.

Because the value lay not in the object, but in the act, a volunteer did not have to give objects of material value, except his time, or attention, or labour. If the act was done regularly and over a long span of time, there was a general perception among the volunteers that it made them a more genuine volunteer than those with less action. In the words of one of the early volunteers, 'There were the true volunteers, [but] those who stayed for an hour or two were aplenty as well'.[121] In fact, at one volunteer gathering that I attended months after the crisis, I observed that telling each other how much trouble they had to go through during their service was a common and jovial conversation topic. In this conversation, each type of volunteer covertly distinguished themselves from another type based on how much sacrifice they made. Despite this, camaraderie was found across genders, perhaps resulting from their experiences in the field.

I identified three boundaries that were crossed by the audiences when they became volunteers. First, to be a volunteer at Jalin Merapi meant being affiliated with and adopting the traits of volunteerism in general, and the unwritten rules of Jalin Merapi in particular. Internally, this identity worked to create cohesion among its members and, externally, it distinguished them from other groups. Second, to be a

[121] *Ana sing bener-bener, ming sak jam teka njur lunga, kuwi ya akeh.* Personal interview with a volunteer at the media centre on 15 July 2011. Transcript no. 11, p. 16.

volunteer involved physically moving and, in many cases, living in a new, quasi-public, place. Third, this volunteering work was dedicated to creating information good for the public. I will present each point in the following paragraphs respectively.

Private-public identity

Differing from donors to *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, which in general consisted of institutions in the broad sense of the word, Jalin Merapi's online application was responded to by private individuals. They learned about this recruitment directly from either Jalin Merapi's website or its Twitter account, and then applied. Most of them (76%, n = 300) applied for themselves, and only 24% of the applicants applied with someone else. It must be noted, though, that although the applicants acted individually, some of them, especially the early recruits, had had pre-existing connection with the volunteers' coordinator. This point will be discussed further in the section on recruitment.

The next question was what kind of individuals did they become? Different from donating which revolved around an object, volunteering revolved around a certain trait, not a specific activity. Hence, volunteerism could take many forms as long as they embodied the traits of volunteers. This is related to Musick and Wilson's (2007) key characteristics of volunteerism, namely unpaid activity. Volunteering activities could include collecting and distributing aid, operating information centres, doing citizen journalism, cooking food, telling the child stories, feeding cattle, cutting hair, and many others. In these different activities, the essential trait, according to the volunteers, was *selflessness* or *sincerity* (*rela*, *ikhlas*). The word '*rela*' means driven by self-decision and altruistic at the same time.[122]

I use the term trait not to refer to the interior aspect of a subject's experience, but to their manifest behaviours and discourses, which can be observed by the others. In being observable, the trait is also open to criticism by the others. In fact, some people did not show the 'correct' traits of volunteers and received criticism from observers.[123] In using the volunteers' own stories about their involvements, my analysis focuses on what regulates their behaviour and expression in front of others. In other words, the

[122] The volunteers themselves used the term *relawan* (an abbreviated version) more often than the word *sukarelawan*. But the two words mean the same thing in the every day use of the volunteers.
[123] Personal interview with a local person, one of the founders of Jalin Merapi on 17 July 2011. Transcript no. 12, p. 4. Personal interview with a 'public relations officer' for Jalin Merapi on 23 January 2013. Transcript no. 47, pp. 38-43.

selflessness, or sincerity, is less about the good character of the volunteers, but more about the regulation of behaviour in front of others.

Jalin Merapi as an organisation took deliberate measures to convey the image of sincerity through their minimal use of symbols. The coordinator of the volunteers said that whereas some organisations conspicuously branded their uniform, banners, vehicles, and tents, Jalin Merapi identified their volunteers only using small identity cards.[124] Some of their information posts did have some forms of identification sign, but some did not. They did not have uniforms either. It was a strategic move to avoid alienating themselves from the people of Merapi and the other personal volunteers and donors. Trust was a critical issue for volunteers, and for the fundraising media like *Kedaulatan Rakyat* as well, so they took extra measures to ensure they would be trusted.

The reasons for the extra measures was that the volunteers sensed an underlying distrust among different groups of volunteers and refugees toward those who took advantage of the event, most notably the political parties.[125] Political parties were perceived to use the event to brand themselves conspicuously. Thus, Jalin Merapi volunteers' wanted to distinguish themselves from those who had ulterior motives by using fewer symbols of organisation. The effort to present the sincerity of the volunteers sometimes failed, because there were complaints directed to Jalin Merapi. For example, the founder of Jalin Merapi complained that some volunteers spent their time accessing the internet rather than helping the refugees.[126]

The last example shows that 'regulation' extended beyond symbols of organisation to include everyday behaviours. The volunteers felt they had to protect the good name of volunteers in general and Jalin Merapi in particular. One female volunteer came to work for about two weeks[127] and stayed with a local family, whose house was used as their information and logistics post. She was a smoker. Generally, a female smoker was viewed in unfavourable light, especially in village societies. Realising she might cause a problem, the volunteer asked permission from Jalin Merapi volunteer coordinator first before smoking. She was afraid that her smoking badly reflected on Jalin Merapi's reputation. Yet, she was given permission and the family did not mind at all. In an opposite case, a female volunteer created a major stir among Jalin Merapi

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124 Personal interview with the coordinator of volunteers on 5 July 2011. Transcript no. 8, p. 2.

125 Group interview with a group of donors on 13 December 2012. Transcript no. 38, pp. 49-50. Personal interview with a volunteer on 8 June 2013. Transcript no. 61, p. 23.

126 Personal interview with a local person, one of the founders of Jalin Merapi on 17 July 2011. Transcript no. 12, p. 4.

127 Personal interview with a volunteer on 11 December 2012. Transcript no. 37.

volunteers and some of the Merapi people because, among others things, she smoked and wore inappropriately short pants.[128] Smoking and dress code were not the real issues here, but instead, it was an issue of the adoption of, or the failure to adopt, the traits that volunteers were supposed to have. Being a volunteer meant leaving aside one's private identity to, temporarily, adopt a public identity as a volunteer.

Physical location

Volunteering to Jalin Merapi, to many people, meant moving to another place. Several of the volunteers were actually local people who were recruited by the founders of Jalin Merapi network, but most of the volunteers were outsiders. Based on my survey of applicants (n = 353), I found that the majority of them (59%) lived in cities affected by the disaster, and the rest of them came from other cities in Java (35%). Only 6% of the applicants were from outer Java. They had to leave their homes to volunteer. Even those who lived in Yogyakarta had to drive for about an hour to get to their volunteering site. Some travelled daily and many others chose to stay at the sites.

Volunteering sites, such as refugee camps or disaster-stricken areas, were what the volunteers had in mind when applying. In my interviews, I came across many expressions that showed their anticipation and impression of their site of work, such as 'adventure' (*petualangan*)[129] and 'challenge' (*tantangan*)[130] among others. It is within reason that one volunteer prepared his outdoor clothes and knives when he applied to Jalin Merapi, just in case he needed them.[131] It turned out that he was assigned to the information centre, which was a bit of let-down for him. Another university student at the same department as him had also expected to be assigned in the field, only to be disappointed.[132] Both of them spent most of their time volunteering in an office, entering the needs in the central record, and maintaining the newness of the information.

The female volunteer I previously described came from Bali to stay in Magelang, Central Java for about two weeks.[133] She brought a large carrier with her, containing sleeping bag, kitchen utensils, and other personal items. She did not mind having to use a less comfortable bathroom; she said, 'The difference was, frankly, the standard of the facility. Well, I didn't complain about the facilities, but it's more like ummm ... more

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[128] Personal interview with the public relation officer of Jalin Merapi on 23 January 2013. Transcript no. 47, p. 39.
[129] Group interview with the citizen journalists on 28 June 2011. Transcript no. 7, pp. 18, 29.
[130] Personal interview with a volunteer on 26 November 2012. Transcript no. 28, p. 14.
[131] *Ibid.*
[132] Personal interview with a volunteer on 10 June 2013. Transcript no. 62, p. 9.
[133] Personal interview with a volunteer on 11 December 2012. Transcript no. 37.

natural, such as the bathroom'.[134] I also met several other volunteers who lived in Magelang, moving several times to new places due to the expansion of the danger zone. They spent about two months in the field, going back to their place in the city only a few times. At their posts, the volunteers lived with other volunteers, who they had not known before.

The second private-public boundary crossed by the volunteers was physical distance that set them apart from the other volunteers and the refugees. In actual terms, to become a volunteer often meant sharing one quasi-public place with other people, where it also functioned to accept the flow of donations sometimes 24 hours per day.

Orientation to public good

The volunteers of Jalin Merapi, especially the information volunteers, had a distinct idea about the publics of disaster and the kind of information they produced for them.[135] Because of the key activists' own experience in the eruption of Mt. Merapi in 2006 in which they were unable to voice their real concerns to the wider society and their observations that the media relied on official sources, Jalin Merapi decided to provide their own information. The key activists then recruited and gave a short training course for the information volunteers so that they made reports that addressed the real concerns of the local people and so that no people would be left out of their coverage, at least in theory.[136] The ideas of inclusive publics and information as aid in disaster were translated in several actions.

First, the information posts they established were strategically located to avoid areas where the mass media focused their attention. Usually the mass media focused on Yogyakarta, which faced the opening of the mountain's crater. Although the newspapers' photographers focused on the crater,[137] what really mattered was not the visual dimension of the disaster; it was the fact that the southern side was the area with much higher risk of receiving volcanic materials. Jalin Merapi, in response, established their first information posts on the other sides of Mt. Merapi: Magelang, Klaten, and

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[134] *Ibid.*, p. 4.
[135] Personal interview with the coordinator of volunteers on 5 July 2011. Transcript no 8, pp. 2-3. Personal interview with the coordinator of media centre on 13 April 2011. Transcript no. 6, pp. 2-3. Personal interview with the coordinator of citizen journalists on 19 December 2010. Transcript no 3, p14. Group interview with the citizen journalists on 28 June 2011. Transcript no. 7, pp. 2-5.
[136] What to include as local people became harder to define when the perimeter of the danger zone was extended and it created big waves of evacuation. The information volunteers, then, adjusted the subject of their coverage to include everyone who was affected (*mereka yang terdampak*).
[137] Personal interview with a photojournalist from a national newspaper on 5 January 2011. Transcript no. 5, pp. 1-4.

Boyolali. The volunteers were instructed to go to other refugee camps in their area and to report their needs. Along with bringing information from the less exposed area, Jalin Merapi actively posted messages on Twitter urging the donors to bring their aid to Muntilan and Magelang, not to the city of Yogyakarta.[138] I have discussed this issue previously in Chapter 4 (page 153), in which I showed how the information volunteers strategically chose the areas that the mass media had overlooked.

Second, citizen journalists were required to focus on problems that were important to the survivors. Consequently, in the daily meeting they were encouraged to listen to the survivors' problems, although they may have seemed trivial to outsiders.[139] Articles were not written to get a certain number of hits but to bring the survivors' concerns to light. In the same spirit, their Twitter account was used to raise funds for the 'pillow for Merapi' (*bantal untuk Merapi*) project whereby the public could donate IDR10,000 (approx. £0.5) for material that would be made into a pillow by volunteers.[140] The news section of the website covered the refugees' need for trash bins and paper wrap for food.[141] The common interest of Jalin Merapi's diverse media channels was its focus on the survivors' immediate needs according to the survivors themselves.

Third, the information was made available to as many people as possible. The head of the information centre likened their operation to a central station where information could come using any vehicle and continued its journey using all kinds of vehicles.[142] Thus, he continued, their job was to connect the villagers who could only send text messages using their own or through their neighbour's low-end cellular phones with city donors who used Twitter on their smartphones. The information about refugees' needs was collected and published on a live Google spreadsheet file and it was reformatted for the Twitter platform. Text message reports from villagers were also reformatted and published on the Google spreadsheet and Twitter. The cell-phone numbers of the refugee coordinators were published on these different channels to enable direct communication. The coordinator said that the decision to publish these cell

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[138] The followings are a sample of the Twitter statuses posted by volunteers from Jalin Merapi from 30-31 October 2010, urging the people to direct their donations to Magelang. Last accessed 29 May 2014 at:
https://twitter.com/jalinmerapi/statuses/29194796125,
https://twitter.com/jalinmerapi/statuses/29237452308,
https://twitter.com/jalinmerapi/statuses/29255861340,
https://twitter.com/jalinmerapi/statuses/29255966358,
https://twitter.com/jalinmerapi/statuses/29271123650.

[139] Personal interview with the coordinator of citizen journalists on 19 December 2010. Transcript no. 3, pp. 17-19.

[140] Last accessed 29 May 2014 at: https://twitter.com/jalinmerapi/statuses/774076192788480.

[141] Last accessed 29 May 2014 at: http://merapi.combine.or.id/baca/5609/posko-dodiklatpur-klaten-butuh-kertas-minyak-pembungkus-nasi.html

[142] Personal interview with the coordinator of media centre on 13 April 2011. Transcript no. 6, p. 1.

phone numbers, which were considered to be private, was not made lightly. What finally made them take this option was that it created a direct, fast, connection with the refugees, or someone at the refugee camps, thereby outweighing their privacy concerns.

Joining Collective Volunteerism

The recruitment process for Jalin Merapi's volunteers could be categorised into two models, network recruitment and open recruitment.[143] Network recruitment occurred earlier than open recruitment. The volunteer coordinator at Jalin Merapi contacted people in his network: university students where he lectured and community radio activists on the flanks of Mt. Merapi. Open recruitment happened not long after network recruitment due to his realisation that the area being covered by the information volunteers surpassed their capacity. Open recruitment was announced on Jalin Merapi's website, Twitter account, and using e-mail. This open recruitment received such overwhelming response that, said the coordinator, 'My phone was hung up because I was flooded with questions, phone calls, on that day, the 27th [October]. [Then] the next morning I got the message, "I am ready. I am ready."'[144] They received about one thousand applications within the first week of recruitment.

The first recruits, through the personal network, became the key people in each information-logistics post. The 'weekend volunteers' (*relawan* weekend) could come and go, but the key volunteers stayed. They were responsible for briefing new recruits about the job. They could also ask the central office of Jalin Merapi for additional volunteers, which the recruitment officer would then respond to by assigning applicants form the waiting list. When an applicant was put on the waiting list, they could turn away and join other relief organisations or wait. Some applicants inquired of Jalin Merapi as to why they did not get the call. The recruiter, in response, would decide to recruit them, although not all of them, because he did not want these 'good intentions' (*niat baik*) to go unrecognised.[145] They could also be assigned to other relief initiatives that needed additional forces.

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[143] Personal interview with the coordinator of volunteers on 5 July 2011. Transcript no. 8, p. 1. Personal interview with the recruitment officer on 4 February 2013. Transcript no. 51. Personal interview with a volunteer recruited through social network on 15 January 2013. Transcript no. 43, pp. 1-4.
[144] Personal interview with the coordinator of volunteers on 5 July 2011. Transcript no. 8, p. 1.
[145] Personal interview with the recruitment officer on 4 February 2013. Transcript no. 51 p. 17.

	Applicants	Acceptance (n = 353)		Recruits (n = 150)
		Accepted	Rejected	
Surrounding Cities	60%	51%	49%	71%
Cities in Java	35%	31%	69%	25%
Other Islands of Indonesia	6%	25%	75%	3%

Table 6. Distribution of Jalin Merapi's Applicants Based on City of Residence.[146]

The survey I distributed to the open recruitment applicants showed that people who lived in nearby areas participated more than those who lived further away (see Table 6). Previously I described that the applicants mainly (60%) came from places surrounding Mt. Merapi and, to a smaller degree (35%), from other places on the island of Java. The leaning toward those who lived closer to the mountain was strengthened by the recruiter's decision to prioritise them. The ratio of recruited applicants to those who were not recruited showed a clear decline according to how far they lived from Mt. Merapi. Based on my survey (n = 353), 51% of applicants who lived close to Mt. Merapi were recruited. But only 31% of applicants from other cities on the island of Java were recruited and this descended further to only 25% of applicants from outer Java being recruited. When we look at the composition of those who were recruited (n = 150 out of the 353 survey respondents), the picture is clear: 71% were from the surrounding areas, 25% from other cities in Java, and 3% from the islands of outer Java.

We need to understand the actor's reasoning on the decision to prioritise the closest applicants. The recruitment officer explained,

> I tried to look for the closest to JM's [Jalin Merapi] post. Let's say, it's Solo, [then] I directed the volunteers to Klaten. That's a simple illustration. If [they're from] Temanggung, then Magelang. [...]
>
> Why the closest? [...] Because I didn't want them to stop [quickly], which was a frequent case, [because] "I can only do it Saturday to Sunday."[147]

His practical reason was that the volunteers who lived close to Jalin Merapi's posts could immediately travel if they were needed and commute if they had to. No complete figure could be obtained about 'weekend volunteers' (*relawan* weekend), but the

[146] The sum of the applicants column and recruits column is not 100% because of rounding error.

[147] *Aku mencoba mencari lokasi terdekat dengan lokasi JM. Jadi kalau misalkan Solo, saya arahkan ke Klaten. Gitu misalkan kalau gampangannya. Kalau Temanggung ya ke arah Magelang..*
Nah, kenapa yang dekat? Saya berharap mereka tidak berhenti hanya, rata-rata misalkan, "Saya bisanya hanya Sabtu Minggu." Ibid. p. 13.

recruitment officer claimed that there were many of them, for example those who came from Jakarta and Bandung.[148] The same approach was taken by the volunteer coordinator who recruited people from his personal network, not only because they were close to him, but also because they lived in Yogyakarta or because they were local people.

Dropping out of volunteerism

The process of joining collective action can also be illuminated by the opposite, how participants dropped out of the action. McAdam (1986) helped us to understand what predicted the participation of the 'Freedom Summer Project' volunteers, where they would be working to register black voters in Mississippi in 1964. He wrote that, among others, attitudinal affinity and strong ties to the activist were important factors of participation. My study was not designed to identify the causal factors of participation in collective action, but as I interviewed the participants I found cases of 'dropping out' that allowed me to understand the process of participation. Dropping out in my study was different from 'withdrawal' in McAdam's study in that dropping-out occurred after participation, whereas withdrawal happened after application but before participation.

Many of the volunteers had a set timeframe in their mind for their participation. I have mentioned previously about 'weekend volunteers'. There were also volunteers who took leave from their office or were free from their obligations because of the city's shutdown due to the disaster. Both types had a specific duration, by the end of which they had to go back to their occupation. But there were also other volunteers who were relatively free from the temporal arrangements of their institutions. These volunteers were university students in the later stages of their studies.

Three students at a private university in Yogyakarta were contacted by their lecturer to help deliver donations to a local NGO that temporarily operated as a donation centre.[149] A day after, they were introduced to the volunteer coordinator at Jalin Merapi, who immediately assigned them work. Two volunteers were posted in Klaten to collect data about refugees' needs, because one of them had been a Klaten resident. The other student worked at the main office of Jalin Merapi, writing news and helping the information centre. They were the first information volunteers.

[148] *Ibid.* p. 22-23.

[149] Personal interview with an early recruit of Jalin Merapi on 15 January 2013. Transcript no. 43. And another early recruit on 20 February 2013. Transcript no. 55.

One of the volunteers explained that she visited the refugee camps from morning to afternoon, but did not stay at night, because she did not want her mother to know about her activities. When the mountain had the second series of eruptions, which were much bigger than the first series, her family decided to evacuate to a city about 80 km east of Yogyakarta. 'Yeah, but Mum kept asking me to evacuate to Solo, because our extended family had gone there', said the volunteer.[150] She had reasoned with her mother that they were still in the safe zone, but her mother thought they were too close to the threshold of the danger zone. She wanted to evacuate from their home to the city of Yogyakarta and stay with a friend, but her mother would not allow it. She gave in and stopped volunteering at Jalin Merapi. The volunteer who partnered with her was also made to evacuate to another city by her parents. I also met another volunteer who was prevented from going to Yogyakarta during the biggest eruptions.

These first three recruits already had strong ties to the volunteer organisation that 'pulled' them to join it. Furthermore, they were university students in late stages of their studies, when they had few credits left, or had finished their course and only needed to write their dissertation. In other words, the volunteers' network with the organisation and their 'biographical availability' (McAdam, 1986) enabled them to join the collective action. However, the other dimension of their biographical availability, namely their family, was also a factor that made them drop out of volunteering. The difference between these volunteers and the other volunteers who managed to disobey their family's request to evacuate was that these volunteers lived with their parents, which made it harder for them to resist their requests. In other words, the volunteers who lived with their parents were less available than those who lived independently of their parents, although both groups were more available than those who were not recruited because of their location.

When the volunteers who dropped out were away from the field, they still maintained a working relationship with Jalin Merapi by receiving information from the field and forwarding it to Jalin Merapi. Interestingly, when the intensity of the explosion subsided, they returned to Yogyakarta but they did not go back to Jalin Merapi. Responding to an offer by their friend, they worked for another relief organisation that provided health services to the *diffables* for about one month.[151] At the new organisation their work was financially rewarded and formally managed. Their dropping out of Jalin

[150] Transcript no. 43, p. 9.

[151] 'Diffable' is a term coined by Mansour Fakih (via Purwanta, 2004), an Indonesian social activist, to sever its connection with disability by articulating the concept of 'difference' and 'ability'. Hence, a *diffable* is an individual who is just as competent as 'normal people', only in a different way.

Merapi did not hurt the relief operation since what they did was replicated by other volunteers who came after them. The loose organisation of volunteerism, replicable nature of their work, and enthusiasm of the new applicants allowed them to join and drop out without disrupting the operation.

Visibility by Volunteers

The visibility afforded by Jalin Merapi was different from the visibility created by *Kedaulatan Rakyat,* which made their donors more visible than unmediated donors and a specific group of mediated donors more visible than the others. The way *Kedaulatan Rakyat* operated not only connected reader-donors with refugees, but also disconnected reader-donors from their money before the money reached the refugees. This was because the media acted simultaneously as relief effort organiser. In other words, instead of helping publics to donate directly, *Kedaulatan Rakyat* acted as the intermediary to whom people donated their money without being connected to the receiver. *Kedaulatan Rakyat* was not a unique case of a news organisation acting as a relief effort organiser, but a typical case of a larger trend (see Abidin and Kurniawati, 2004; Heychael and Taniago, 2013). In contrast with the larger trend of mediated donation, Jalin Merapi provided information that could be acted upon by the audiences and avoided standing in the way between the audiences and the refugees (Dewi and Nasir, 2012).

By reporting and distributing aid at the same time, the media-cum-disaster-relief-organiser operated as if saying to geographically distant audiences, 'Here is the problem and I am your solution'. Taking a different strategy, Jalin Merapi made the connection visible and opened an action space to distant audiences, as if saying, 'Here is the problem and you can be a solution'.[152] From the first day of the eruption, they started to publish the names and cell phone numbers of field contacts who could receive donations, ranging from emergency volunteers, village officers, to NGO workers. The field contact information was provided on the website, published on Twitter, in the news articles, and on the online spreadsheet of refugees' needs. Although he knew that publishing personal phone number was problematic, the media centre coordinator emphasised that concerns over privacy were superseded by a more important objective, namely to enable swift response by cutting out intermediaries.

[152] It is worth noting that the contrast here looks more clear-cut than it actually was. In reality, in addition to its news and other information service Jalin Merapi distributed relief aid as well. The disaster relief work consumed a major part of its organisational resources too. What distinguished it from other media-cum-disaster-relief-organiser was its deliberate attempt to connect the donors with the refugees.

Requests for donations were received through different channels and methods. The short messages gateway received the messages and automatically published them on the website. The Twitter account received requests using the mention (a message that contained the name of Jalin Merapi's account) and a direct message feature. Any Twitter users could mention Jalin Merapi, whereas direct messages could only be accessed by Jalin Merapi's field volunteers. The other channel, although it at later stages did not include personal contact, was news articles produced by citizen journalists. Two methods were used by Jalin Merapi to receive donation requests, passive and active. The passive method was to open the short message gateway and Twitter channels to the larger audiences, while in the active method volunteers visited the refugee camps and solicited information from camp coordinators.

The publication of private cell phone numbers of refugees or organisers or volunteers at the refugee camp enabled donors to spend their budget effectively because they could consult with the donee first. And after delivering the aid, donors were able to keep themselves updated by maintaining a connection with the refugees. When the refugees moved to other places, the donors knew how to reach them. My interviews suggested that there were two kinds of donors: one-off donors (eight groups) and repeat donors (four groups).[153] Both kinds of donors, in most cases, 'relayed' donations both from their personal and professional networks. However, the repeat donors felt a stronger need to contact the survivors directly since they would have to relay aid from their social network many times. Thus, direct contact with the survivors helped them to distribute the aid.

Furthermore, Jalin Merapi did not give special treatment to their donors. Their names were published on an online spreadsheet, but their address was not written. All of the donors were treated equally, only their names were recorded. The delivery of their donation was not written as a news article. No picture of the donors was taken and the donation was stripped of the identity of the donor. Their donations were meticulously entered into the table when they were received as well as when they were distributed. The amount of work put into the process and the way the information was presented gave the impression that the donation was more important than the donors.

[153] The categories were identified in interview data with 12 groups of donors. Distribution of interviewees ranged from one to several members in each group.

Balerante observation post and Twitter transcribers

One interesting development that was somewhat peripheral to the core mission of Jalin Merapi, yet recognised widely and perceived as beneficial by the audiences, was radio streaming.[154] Balerante monitoring post, a group fully independent from Jalin Merapi, brought observations from different sides of Mt. Merapi together and was run by its volunteers. Furthermore, the compiled observations were live-streamed on the website of Jalin Merapi. Through streaming of these observations on the internet, their work gained audibility among larger audience, thus making their citizens' volcanic observations more visible (audible).

Balerante monitoring post was founded in 2006 by the local people of Balerante village, on the south-eastern slope of Mt. Merapi, and several groups of university students.[155] It was not part of the Jalin Merapi network, but widely perceived to be such. They mainly made visual observations from different sides of the mountain and communicated with each other using a two-way radio system on 149.070 MHz frequency channel. They reported the direction of the wind, also the existence and direction of lava flow, volcanic ash, rain, and resulting cold lava flow. They interpreted auditory signals transmitted by government agency sensors planted on the mountain to the audiences. They reported almost twenty-four hours a day during the crisis.

Because it was live-streamed on the internet, Balerante's radio communication reached new and wider audiences. The people of Yogyakarta and everyone in any place with an internet connection who had particular interest in the event and in the people of Merapi could listen to it. Jalin Merapi volunteers who were in the field, especially those on the southern side of the mountain, followed it to get a sense of the mountain's latest developments. Due to its popularity and the burden of data requests that ensued, the internet server to live-stream on the radio went down several times, although it was already relayed on three other servers. One software developer company created a free Blackberry application for listening to the radio.[156] A problem emerged, nevertheless. The real time mode of radio communication required constant monitoring and important bits of information were spread throughout a long span of time, which was dominated

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[154] Personal interview with a member of a group from Jakarta on 6 November 2010. Transcript no. 1, p. 1. Personal interview with the coordinator of citizen journalists on 19 December 2010. Transcript no. 3, p. 13.

[155] Duwel, Elo (2011). *Kado Ultah Induk Balerante: Selayang Pandang Kehadiran Induk Balerante* (*Birthday Gift to Balerante: An Overview of the Existence of Balerante Hub*). Last accessed 11 February 2014 at indukbalerante.blogspot.com/2011/04/kado-ultah-induk-balerante.html

[156] 7langit (2010), Jalin Merapi *on Blackberry*. Last accessed 12 February 2014 at: http://jalinmerapi.7langit.com/

by conversations. Furthermore, reports given by these amateur observers contained a lot of technical jargon regarding the signals of the government agency's sensors. Hence, the audiences who did not have a lot of time and patience could not easily make sense of it.

Some of the audiences found a solution involving listening closely to the live-streamed radio and transcribing the information into a long series of Twitter status updates. I interviewed three Twitter users, out of about ten, who actively posted these transcriptions. One of them was an undergraduate student of communication at a private university in Yogyakarta, who was at that moment finishing her dissertation on marketing communication on Facebook.[157] She spent a long time in front of her computer working on her thesis, which she neglected during the crisis. She had been actively using Twitter since April 2010, posting 20-40 updates a day. When the mountain erupted she monitored the mainstream media. Then on 29 October 2010, three days after the first series of eruptions, she posted an update on her Twitter account, 'TV One --> Stupid TV !! Don't believe the news on TV ONE! Its news about Merapi is inaccurate..damn!'[158] A friend told her to check Jalin Merapi's website. She did and she started monitoring it continually. For example, on 29 October 2010 she tweeted, 'stand by ... will monitor #merapi again via http://merapi.combine.or.id/ rather than from TV that sometimes spreads hoax and exaggerated news'.[159] She had adopted the hashtag '#merapi'[160] from early on and started to adopt the 'via 149.070' sign to refer to her source of information, the radio frequency. Later on, about one week after, she added a time stamp at the beginning of her updates after she realised that the internet was too slow and that there was a time lag between her updating and the time it was actually published.

She mainly tweeted what she thought was critical information about the mountain (seismograph signals, wind direction, lava flow, volcanic ash, etc.) and people seemed to appreciate her, indicated by the increase in number of her Twitter followers from less than 200 to more than 600 in about a two month period. She scoured the web to find knowledgeable sources and educated herself about the technical jargon of monitoring

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[157] Personal interview with an unaffiliated volunteer on 15 September 2011. Transcript no. 15, p. 11.
[158] *TV ONE --> TV O'ON !! Jangan percaya berita di TV ONE! berita ttg merapi bnyk yg ngacooo..kamprettt!* Last accessed 12 February 2014 at: https://twitter.com/retrotikaa/status/29119344430
[159] *siap siaga lagi...ntar pantau #merapi lagi ahh via http://merapi.combine.or.id/ drpd via TV yang kadang hoax dan lebay nyebarin berita.* Last accessed 12 February 2014 at: https://twitter.com/retrotikaa/status/29176941008
[160] I did not have the necessary data to compare whether the #merapi hashtag was the most popular. However, the coordinator of Jalin Merapi used it frequently and suggested the other volunteers used it.

information. Using this knowledge, she could explain, for example, what 'dense signal' (*sinyal rapat*) meant. However, she did not know to whom she was broadcasting her messages, but in her mind she imagined that her followers were her student friends, fellow volunteers, and the general audience. Actually, she had wanted to join the field volunteers, but the field volunteers themselves asked her to keep tweeting because they could not monitor the audio stream due to the bad signal. While sharing information, she worked with other online volunteers who would stand in for each other during bad connection or sleep times.

Another Twitter user, the admin of @JogjaUpdate, felt it was part of his normal routine to update his followers on the current affairs of Yogyakarta, including news on Merapi.[161] Since he was also a radio enthusiast, he monitored three channels of communication radio on Merapi. He also collected information from the @jalinmerapi Twitter account, the Twitter account of Jalin Merapi volunteers, and the government's agency through the internet and published the information on his personal and commercial accounts. @JogjaUpdate, the commercial account, worked differently from his personal account. Using group tweet, @JogjaUpdate's followers could send a direct message (DM) to it and the message would be published automatically on @JogjaUpdate's timeline. Since it had a large number of followers, @JogjaUpdate's timeline moved fast. The followers were the source of JM's information. The administrator of the account could only remove a post within 5 seconds of its posting. It surprised him that during the crisis he saw no spam messages. During peak times, the account posted more than 300 updates per hour so that it exceeded its quota and was suspended for about an hour by Twitter. A post, whether it was important or not, would always be immediately buried by other posts. He tackled this problem by keeping a personal 'database' of key information that might be asked about by followers.

These two transcribers, and about 5 other Twitter users, were deeply committed to their activities throughout the crisis response. They spent long hours on monitoring the event and posting updates on Twitter. And both volunteers mainly dealt with information about the mountain, rather than with the relief effort. What they did resembled Starbird's (2011) concept of 'remote operators', which refers to the persons who move information from many sources using various tools. This included the Twitter user I reported earlier who wanted to keep herself safe by monitoring Twitter. When the mountain activities declined, these volunteers had an off-air meeting with the

[161] Personal interview with the founder of @JogjaUpdate on 3 January 2011. Transcript no. 16, p. 3-4.

others. As a result, they agreed to use #twitmerapi as their common hashtag and hatched a plan to raise funds. However, their plan to raise funds to plant banana trees in the affected areas did not materialise.

They identified themselves as volunteers, although they were not formally affiliated with any organisation. The reason was that the work they did helped the people of Yogyakarta to get the most current and relevant information about the eruption. This type of volunteering falls beyond the characterisation proposed by Musick and Wilson (2007) that volunteerism is characterised by a formal affiliation to an organisation. These volunteers show how the new media (Twitter, online audio-stream) can be used to participate, temporarily, in a collective action, where a media user can act in an 'entrepreneurial' way and does not have to know their audiences and beneficiaries of their actions (Flanagin *et al.*, 2006)

The next case concerns an incident that was infamously known as the *Silet* incident (*kejadian Silet*), where the most watched television gossip show spread a rumour about an impending Merapi catastrophe and received a quick and strong backlash from the audiences.

5.3. Complaining

On Sunday, 7 November 2010 from 11-12am, a day that saw an increase of television viewership due to it being a holiday and the current volcanic crisis (Nielsen, 2010c), one of the most popular celebrity gossip shows on Indonesian national television aired a special edition on Mt. Merapi. The programme was structured around a very simple premise, that Mt. Merapi was predicted to have its biggest explosion on 8 November 2010, or in the next 24 hours. However, a deeper look into the show and the audience's response will show us that the issues of meaning-making in times of disaster and the audiences' collective response to it were not as simple as the story's premise.

The show received an unprecedentedly strong negative response from the audiences. In a matter of six hours, 500 complaints were filed through their online system, in contrast to the average number of 300 complaints per month received. Digital traces of the audiences' conversation could be gleaned on Twitter, Facebook, blogs, and internet fora. The Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia (then on KPI, The Indonesian Broadcasting Commission) ordered the cessation of the programme until the mountain's status was lowered, which the television channel obeyed only for one week, resulting in a prolonged legal battle between them.

I investigated the issue using different sources of information. The first sources were the online complaints (n = 988) received by the KPI. The files give us an overview of the temporal dynamics of the event, the complainers' demographics, and the main themes of the complaints.[162] The second source was the survey I conducted on these complainers (n = 60) to understand their media use and their collective action. The third source was my interviews with several complainers and several initiators of complaints to the KPI, to understand the mechanism of the collective action. Two KPI commissioners were also interviewed to understand the event from their perspective. The last source of information was a Twitter archive (n = 4495) that contained the words 'Merapi' and '*Silet*', collected on the dates 7-9 November 2010, to understand how the audiences responded to the television programme as it happened. I will pay more attention to the discursive aspect of the event, since the show, complaints, and penalties all entailed the use of language (Matheson, 2005). What I specifically mean by discursive aspect is that the collective action taken by the complainers involved filling in an online form on a website. Hence, the physical aspect of it is, to some extent, mostly irrelevant, except for the complainers' locations, which indicated noticeable differences amongst them.

The whole event resembled a condensed episode of 'moral panic' (Cohen, 2011) in that the issue was based entirely on audiences who were so 'consensually' 'concerned' about the imagined threat that this created 'hostility' toward certain actors (p. xxvi). And the reaction was 'disproportionate' and 'volatile' (p. xxvii). But it differed from the definition because it was more *about* or *against* the media, rather than *on* the media, and the claims derived mostly from one group, which claimed to be on the side of the 'victims'. Hence, the scope of the issue was fairly limited to the relationship between the audiences and the television channel and the KPI as the regulator/mediator. The power dynamic was simple in that it involved two parties and one mediator, much less complex than the typical case of moral panic that involves claim-making by many parties. Furthermore, the life cycle of the event in front of the public was very short, about two days, from when the show was broadcast until the temporary discontinuation of the show. The audiences soon moved away from the issue and their responses were more about being listened to than promoting an issue.

The report will start by describing a short history of the genre of the television programme, followed by a description of the programme, what private-public

[162] The term complainer is used to simply refer to those who complain, regardless of the frequency and its implied character of the person (Boxer, 1993; Vasquez, 2011).

boundaries were crossed by the audiences, the mechanism of recruitment, and the issue of visibility in this form of collective action. Let us start with the larger context, *infotainmen* in Indonesian media.

Infotainmen in Indonesia

In Indonesia, this genre of show is called *infotainmen* [sic].[163] The word is a combination of 'information' and 'entertainment', retaining its foreign origin while being adapted to the local tongue. Suggestive as it is, this term should not trick us into thinking that it is a genre of journalism that covers the entertainment industry. It is not. The show does not follow the procedure of news reporting which is based on the principle of verification. Mulharnety Tyas (Sianipar, Mahbub, Kristanti, 2010; KPI, 2012) in her empirical research on this genre, concluded that it is not a product of journalism because it does not follow the code of journalism. It has been common knowledge to audiences that *infotainmen* shows are of lower quality.[164] Tyas' study showed that they were mostly made by production houses that create non-factual programmes; this genre employed people without journalistic training; it secretly promoted a new show by doctoring a rumour; and it did not serve any public interests. It had come a long way to become what it was.

In the 1980s, a television show about the entertainment world covered the movie world and provided a weekly movie review on state television. In the 1990s, when Indonesia saw private television channels flourish, it continued to exist and to follow the old pattern, which was journalistic coverage of the entertainment world. It was not until the political reform in 1998 that news about the entertainment world was redefined radically. Old players of the print media published more gossip tabloids because the government's stranglehold on the press was gone. These publishers and also other investors without previous press business credentials created new television shows that would eventually be called *infotainmen*: a television show that generally reported the tidbits of celebrities' lives. It drew enough viewers' attention that more programmes were created. In 2007 *Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia* (then on KPI, The Indonesian Broadcasting Commission) categorised *infotainmen* as a non-factual programme, thus putting it under the power of censorship. Through a campaign of an senior journalist

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[163] It was 'wrongly' written without 't' at the end of the word. In Indonesian pronunciation, the 't' does not make any difference. Hence, it was a casual adoption of the English word.

[164] In response to the prevalence of gossip shows on television, the Indonesian Board of Moslem Clerics (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) declared that the content that was usually found in the show was haram (forbidden/non-islamic) (MUI, 2010). It was not the format itself that was declared haram, but the content.

who now sits on the board of the Association of Indonesian Journalists (PWI, Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia), *infotainmen* workers were accepted as members of the press. In the same year, 2009, the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission revised its Broadcasting Code and included *infotainmen* in the factual category, granting it press' privilege. Press' privilege benefits *infotainmen* shows in a very favourable way since it frees them from censorship, it frees their workers from litigation, it makes the interviewee feel obliged to answer and to not ask for money, and it gives such shows the right to conceal its sources (Laksono, 2010). However, another prominent Indonesian association of journalists, AJI (*Aliansi Jurnalis Independen*, The Alliance of Independent Journalists), refused to acknowledge *infotainmen* as journalistic work. In 2010, the House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*), the press council (*Dewan Pers*), and the Indonesian broadcasting commission (KPI) declared that *infotainmen* belonged to the domain of non-factual programming, which led to *infotainmen* losing its privileges.

Economically speaking, *infotainmen* in general is a lucrative business. It pays its workers less than professional journalists, it employs small numbers of people whose only qualification is the skill to operate a video camera and a microphone, and it has good ratings that translate into good advertising deals. Seeing that this genre made a lot of money with so little investment, in the early 2000s, television channels started to produce their own version of *infotainmen* that could earn up to 1200% profit (Laksono, 2010). This economic opportunity lured more producers to create more *infotainmen* that eventually resulted in the explosion of *infotainmen* on every national television channel, except public television.

The *infotainmen* we are about to discuss here is called *Silet*. *Silet* is an Indonesian word that literally means razor, the local pronunciation of Gillette. It is also an acronym of '*Sisi Lain Selebritis*' (the other side of celebrities). Since its creation in 2002, *Silet* has been gossiping about minutiae of celebrity life: divorces, love affairs, legal bickering, and so on. *Silet* leads the pack in terms of ratings and market share (Nielsen, 2010b). It even has better ratings than news programmes. In this report, I am going to specifically examine an edition of *Silet* on 7 November 2010, when it spread rumours that led to its temporary cessation by the KPI due to sudden and strong audience pressure.

Merapi Edition of *Silet*: Ingredients of Rumour

The programme opened with fast-changing images of pyroclastic flows, people fleeing on foot or using their vehicles, and body bags being brought into hospitals. After a short montage of these images with synthesizer music and skin percussion to effect a tense feeling of anticipation, the host recapped the last week's events in typically magniloquent phrases to describe Merapi as 'a ghost that blows roaring dust to everything it sees. [It is] hot and lethal'.[165] The host then told the audiences how hundreds of souls had been devoured by the army of pyroclastic flow and how Mt. Merapi spread horror and, more importantly, showed no sign of ending. The host then asked a series of questions for the viewers: whether the phenomenon was related to the sighting of *Mbah Petruk*[166] in the form of volcanic cloud, whether the explosion followed what had been prophesied by Jayabaya,[167] and whether Jayabaya's prophesies coincided with a rumour currently circulating that 'a team of world volcanologists predicted that on 8 November 2010 there would be an even bigger explosion'.[168] This rumour show would attempt to answer these questions, not by examining the claims and comparing documents, but by asking people who it saw to be of relevance, but who were not necessarily authorities on the issue.

Through interviews with 'experts', *Silet* effectively blurred its gossipy claim of factuality because the presence of 'experts' lent credibility to *Silet*'s wild 'theory' of doomsday. Throughout the show, *Silet* wove a bizarre mix of folk legends, rumours, 'expert' interviews, and celebrity interviews. Initially it tried to confirm a rumour that had been reported on different national media one week before regarding a photograph of a volcanic cloud that resembled *Mbah Petruk*. Many people talked about it and thought that it signalled a big eruption, *Silet* told the viewers. After characterising Mt. Merapi as 'ghost' (*hantu*), 'sacred' (*keramat*), and 'vicious' (*ganas*), *Silet* then asked a person who it assumed to be knowledgeable about Javanese culture about what the picture of *Mbah Petruk* meant. Sujiwo Tedjo, a shadow puppet master, explained that to the people of Merapi, the eruption was not a disaster, but nature's warning to them. Furthermore, to Sujiwo Tedjo, the sighting of *Mbah Petruk* cloud meant that Merapi was acting uncharacteristically and that it was related to the prophecy of Jayabaya about doomsday in Java. Surprisingly, right after the cultural explanation of a mythical figure, *Silet* shifted gear to an interview with a geophysicist who stated that all these explosions were just the beginning. Merapi still retained the capacity to produce a bigger explosion.

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165 *... hantu yang terus menyembur segala yang dijumpai dengan debu yang menderu. Panas sekaligus mematikan.*

166 A mythical figure of Mt. Merapi based on a character in Javanese shadow puppet shows.

167 A very well-known old-time Javanese oracle whose prophesies are considered to be accurate.

168 *Menurut penelitian ahli vulkanologi dunia, akan ada letusan yang lebih besar antara hari ini hingga 8 November nanti.*

He did not know, however, when exactly it was going to explode. In the background, tense music was running continuously. This statement was followed by interviews with celebrities about what they made of the phenomenon.

The rest of the programme followed this style of mix and match. Another 'expert' from the LAPAN (National Agency of Aeronautics and Space) was interviewed and he explained that the four biggest Indonesian volcanic explosions in the past 2 centuries coincided with full moon. This statement sparked *Silet's* further speculation about whether on 8 November 2010 Merapi would produce an even bigger explosion, because that day was the day of full moon. It tied in nicely with a rumour it helped propagate widely and wildly that a team of world volcanologists predicted that the peak explosion of Merapi would happen on 8 November. *Silet* did not check the source of the rumour, or questioned its factuality, or bother to question the right person to comment on the issue. For example, the head of PVMBG (Volcanology Survey Indonesia) was not interviewed although he was the highest authority in this issue and he had released a statement to the media in his attempt to debunk this speculation. In fact, the whole show was just a serious pretence to gossip about a newsworthy event, not a work of journalism in any meaningful sense of the word.

In addition to blurring rumours with experts' statements, *Silet* also deliberately mixed the traditional domain of hard news with its original domain: entertainment and entertainer. For example, in addition to what the celebrities made of Mt. Merapi explosion and their comments on the prediction, *Silet* interviewed two emerging singers from Yogyakarta about their own experience of it. One of the singers told how she could not sleep because she worried about what might happen to her families in Yogyakarta and a soap opera star said she had just come back from Yogyakarta. *Silet* also featured a singer whose song, *Yogyakarta*, had been regarded as a classic pop song about the city since 1990s. In this section the singer also introduced his new song about Merapi. Then a clip of his classic song was played as a link to the end of the programme. These various interviews with celebrities and the video clip of *Yogyakarta* altered the show's topic from doomsday prediction to celebrities' meaningful connections with Yogyakarta. At the end of the show, the host's closing statement abandoned the question she had asked in the first place, a premise upon which the whole doomsday story had been built. Feni Rose, the now infamous host of *Silet*, closed the show by saying:

> Eventually, understanding Merapi only from one side is impossible. There is a shrouding myth and mysterious academic facts. When will the saddening dust go

away? Will Merapi still be a nightmare that stirs our hearts up? In our deepest cry, let us hope that the turmoil that has overturned [the life of] all the residents of Merapi subsides.[169]

In the show, we can see what Wessing (2010) has identified in the Javanese people's view of calamity, namely the 'pre-Islam' and modern science views, although the 'Islamic' view was somewhat less visible.[170] Pre-Islamic and technological views were, curiously, used together to support *Silet*'s false predictions. However, I will restrain myself from examining people's cosmological views of disaster in more detail. Rather, the next paragraphs will focus on what outraged the audiences and how they moved to complain.

Audiences' responses

How did the audiences respond to the show? To get a glimpse of what the audiences' responses were to the show, I used Twitter archives containing the words 'Merapi' and '*Silet*', which enabled me to go back in time and to situate the audiences' responses at their exact temporal context. The sampling procedure is described in the appendix (Twitter data collection) and the archive is used mainly to understand the audiences' different reactions toward the programme as it was happening. The time concurrence of their responses with the programme suggests which aspects of the programme were perceived as offensive. I focus on how the audiences responded to offensive aspects of the programme and attempt to make intertextual connections between the programme, the Twitter status updates, and my research interviewee's response.

When the programme was running, the audiences started to respond on Twitter to *Silet*'s claim that the volcanic cloud of Mbah Petruk and the prophecy of Jayabaya signalled the coming of a big explosion. Almost no one on Twitter seemed to believe these evidences, or the connection. For example, one person wrote, 'Seriously, Silet? Why connect Merapi's explosion with Petruk?!'[171] And some people underlined the lack of believability of such logic. However, a few people seemed to buy into the claim,

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[169] *Pada akhirnya memahami Merapi tidak bisa hanya dari satu sisi saja. Ada mitos yang membalut, selain fakta-fakta akademik yang penuh misteri. Akan sampai kapankah debu-debu yang membuat pilu ini akan berlalu? Masihkah Merapi menjadi mimpi ngeri yang mengaduk hati? Dalam isak yang paling serak, mari kita memohon agar prahara yang telah membuat kocar-kacir seluruh penghuni Merapi segera mereda.*

[170] The pre-Islam view was one of animism, which believed in the existence of spirits that inhabited living beings and inanimate objects, whereas the Islamic view accepted the power of one God over the universe.

[171] *Apaan sih silet? Masa merapi meletus terus di sangkut pautin sama Petruk?!* Last accessed 14 February 2014 at: https://twitter.com/salsabilarw/status/1119892585586689

saying, '[when it emerged] they said the image of petruk was heresy, yet it happened. Now they curse SILET about #merapi? Let's c... [Let's see]'.[172] The 'let's see' phrase signalled some reservations, but not outright rejection, of the claim.

Although the sign of *Mbah Petruk* and Jayabaya's prophecy did not inspire much belief in the audience on Twitter, it did not mean that audiences dismiss the speculation as mere rumour. Some of them did dismiss it, but many did not. Many people were genuinely afraid, or anxious, that the speculation might prove right. We can see this from the word that the Twitter users used to categorise the type of information they were dealing with, namely 'news' (*berita*). By calling *Silet* news, not merely gossip, some people assigned it some of the credibility associated with journalistic work. Another possible interpretation was that '*berita*' was simply used to refer to meaningful information about the external world. Both of these interpretations stood in contrast with the meaning of the word 'gossip' (*gosip*) which some of the audiences used to refer to its lack of credibility. Hence, the word '*berita*' was not as easily dismissed as '*gosip*'.

The two interpretations echoed the mix of rumours and experts' statements which I described earlier. What, in part, made anxiety possible was the context of the eruption. The day of broadcast was only two days after a series of the biggest eruptions. In addition, the government authority had not lowered the status of the mountain. Within this context, the 'expert source', the image clips borrowed from other programmes, and the very fact of being broadcasted on national television could cause some people to wonder whether there would be more explosions in the future. It caused fear (*seram*) to some of the audiences. Many of the audiences expressed their fear, through such as 'Watching Silet craaaazy Merapi is very scary.. gosh :'('[173] Or that their families were deeply anxious about their safety because of the show. For example, one person tweeted, 'mom hysterically called me to tell me to move out from the hotel #becauseSilet said that merapi will explode and burn yogya down..grrrr'.[174]

When the show was still running, complaints started to trickle into the KPI system, starting from five complaints at 11 am. In the first hour, the number of complaints more than tripled to sixteen complaints. And it rose to the sixties, eighties, and peaked at

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[172] *dulu org nyalahin gambar petruk di #merapi katanya klenik trnyata benar kejadian. skrg ngumpat SILET ttg #merapi so ? Let's c...* Personal archive of Twitter status updates. The online archive could not be found.

[173] *'Nonton Siletgilaaa serem banget merapi..astagaa :'('*
Last accessed 17 February 2014 at: https://twitter.com/diahkusumo/status/1130257444765697

[174] *'mama nelpon histeris nyuruh pindah hotel #gara2SILET bilang merapi bakal meletus dan membumihanguskan jogja..grrrr'* Last accessed at 17 February 2014 at: https://twitter.com/kcharenina/status/1262134776303616

almost one hundred complaints between 3 and 4 pm. In twenty-four hours, 862 complaints were filed, in addition to phone calls and short messages, which were not properly documented. This number stood out since the monthly average of complaints to KPI was 300 (KPI, 2010). The audiences' response resembled a burst that lasted a relatively short period of two days. On 9 November 2010, the show was cancelled for one day, only to be revived two days after with different title.[175] One week later, it was fully revived.



Figure 4. Number of Complaints Filed to the KPI through Its Online System.

Based on the archive of complaints itself, what offended audiences was its style of presentation, its confusion of factual and non-factual genres, its selection of issue, its disparagement of Yogyakarta, its lack of empathy, and its panic-inducing content. The show used a hyperbolical narrative, which the audiences called '*lebay*' (a slang derived from the word of *lebih*, which literally means 'more'). Actually the host's magniloquent way of telling a narrative was one of *Silet*'s characteristics. During normal times, this magniloquence might only raise a smirk for being frivolous. In a crisis, such a grandiose manner of presenting unfounded prediction caused anxiety, as claimed by many complainers. The show was also seen as presenting a non-factual story while pretending to do otherwise. It was offensive to many complainers that *Silet* pretended to be factual while it presented centuries-old prophecy and mixed it with statements of 'experts'. I found only two complainers who saw that the 'experts' interviewed by the show as 'incompetent' (*tidak kompeten*). Almost all of the other complainers saw no problem or,

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[175] KPI (2012). *Kasus Silet: Kemenangan bagi Publik* (*Silet Case: Victory for the Public*). KPI: Jakarta.

otherwise, accepted the authority of the 'experts'. Consequently, the complainers felt offended and/or confused.

In the same archive, the other offending element of the show was its choice of an unfit subject for such degrading treatment. Such overdramatic style of speaking, image choice, and sound illustration were seen as the domain of triviality and rumours. Hence, by choosing Merapi as its subject, *Silet* broke down imaginary boundaries created by itself in the past and that had been expected by the audiences. The last offending element was its labelling of Yogyakarta as 'city of catastrophe' (*kota malapetaka*). Actually what *Silet*'s host said was, 'Will Yogyakarta that is beautifully depicted in these songs be transformed into [a city that is] full of catastrophe?' I only saw the original expression in one e-mail list where one member attempted to dissect the components of the show for other members who did not or were not able to see it. The original expression was lost and spread as a new, concise, and offensive expression: 'city of catastrophe'.

Aside from the previous reasons, the audiences' major complaints against *Silet* were based on its lack of empathy and what the audiences viewed as an inducement of panic. One day after the show, the television channel apologised in the form of a running text, but the audiences did not think it was enough. In the complaints, they demanded that the host talk directly, apologise, and, some even suggested, donate her own money to the refugees. Some complainers stated bluntly that the show's main concern was ratings and money. The last major reason of complaint was that the show was perceived to cause panic and anxiety. The audiences saw that the show caused, or might cause, panic (*panik*) and anxiety (*resah, cemas*). What people meant by panic was different from the clinical definition of the word where the symptoms included uncontrollable physical behaviour. What the people seemed to mean by '*panik*' was deep anxiety that, sometimes, was related to a rush to evacuate. In addition to this anxiety, which was real and wide-spread, reports of rushed evacuation after the *Silet* show were given by online media citing statements of a volunteer. In the online complaints I found self-reports of rushed evacuation due to the show, although this was not too common. For example, a 23 year old female fled to Solo (about 70 km far) with her family.

Turning to who the complainers were, rather than what the complaints were about, I made use of the archives of complaints to the KPI (n = 988). I found that the majority of them were male (77.6%), aged 19-35 years (87.6%), were enrolled in or had finished university education (85.4%), and were living in Java (93.7%), predominantly in

Yogyakarta (64.5%). Put in the larger context, we see an interesting finding that the characteristics of the complainers did not match the traditional composition of infotainment audience where there were more female audiences than male audiences (Nielsen, 2010b). Several indicators give the impression that these demographics overlapped largely with those of internet users, namely they were male and young (Nielsen, 2011). Furthermore, the archives show that those who complained were internet literates. I found evidence that many of the complaints contained the word 'hoax' [sic] that indicated users' familiarity with the internet culture since this word was primarily used in relation to the disputed originality of online news items about celebrities, public figures, or a newsworthy event. Further evidence that supported the overlap was the use of 'copy and paste' technique to compose the text of complaints. I saw many complaints containing excerpts of articles from a blog or excerpts of an e-mail list's thread that were setup specifically to galvanise the audience into filing complaints.[176] These various anecdotal evidences indicate that the channel of complaint (the internet) determine the type of audiences that can complain, namely those who have access to the relevant device and are sufficiently familiar with it to be able to use it.

The following investigation focuses on the texts of the complaints since complaining itself was largely a textual activity. I will look at the KPI's complaint archive and my survey, especially at how the audiences saw themselves in front of the imaginary complaint receiver and categorised themselves when they imaginarily allied themselves with the bigger collectivities. The complainers' perspective of the action was sought through conducting in-depth interviews with them.

Private-Public Boundaries

As suggested by scholars in discourse analysis (Boxer, 1993; Vasquez, 2011), the complaints we saw in the online complaints to KPI can be categorised into two types: direct and indirect. The majority of online complaints filed through KPI's website were indirect (98.4%, n = 988) because the receiver of the complaint was not the instigator of the event that brought about the complaint. The complainers directed their complaints to KPI because they understood that it was KPI who had the authority to act on their

[176] The message that was copied many times and in some cases was referred to explicitly by the complainers was posted by a user by the handle of 'baradhs'. The user replied to my attempt to contact, but further inquiry was not responded to. Last accessed 18 February 2014 at: http://archive.kaskus.co.id/thread/5848212. Another page that was copied by the complainers was written anonymously on blogspot, last accessed 18 February 2014 at: http://hujatansilet.blogspot.co.uk/

behalf. It must be noted, though, that both types of complaint can be found within the online complaint archives.

Below I quote a sample from the archives to illustrate a complaint:

> dear sir/madam board of KPI. please take action against the silet programme on RCTI that always makes us, the people of yogya, anxious. silet showed that yogyakarta would perish from merapi. in addition, there are many more programmes that lack educational value, [they are like] grubbing for news. thank you for your attention.[177]

This gives just a taste of the archives, which were very diverse. For example, offences cited by complainers were, in order of importance: the problem of factuality, lack of scientific evidence, exaggerated delivery of the programme, and its metaphysical claims. The impacts that the complainers worried about were that it might cause panic (*panik*), anxiety (*resah*), and fear (*takut*) among the refugees, the families of students, the people of Yogyakarta, or tourists.[178] The complainers demanded from the KPI: admonition to the station, its suspension, full discontinuation, a formal apology from the presenter, and a formal apology from the television station. The description I provided cannot exhaust the complainers' rich perspectives, observations, and uses of language. The volume of the complaints itself adds to complexity of this issue. However, the sample illustrated the key points I want to argue, namely how complainers move from being private individuals to being part of the larger public.

To study the boundaries of the complainers' identity and their effort to cross its private-public dimensions, I pay close attention to the way these complainers presented themselves and how they represented others. The technological and linguistic arrangements for complaining allowed complainers to use only text to express their intentions. Accordingly, the complainers used discursive sources such as pronouns and a language of representation to indicate whether the complainers acted in their own interests or in the interests of others.

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[177] *bapak/ibu dewan KPI yang terhormat. mohon ditindak penayangan acara silet di RCTI yang selalu meresahkan kami warga yogya. silet menayangkan bahwa yogyakarta akan musnah oleh merapi. selain itu banyak sekali tayangan2 yang tidak mendidik, seperti mencari2 berita. mohon perhatiannya. terima kasih.* Complaint no. 3.

[178] The incident is far more limited than the phenomenon of moral panic (Cohen, 2011). Whereas moral panic results from exaggerated reactions by social elements to an event, behaviour, risk that is external to media, the case I study is 'internal' to media, since the 'folk devil' is the media itself and the panic concerned a television show. It was less about a perceived social problem, than it was about misbehaviour.

Private-public identities of complainers

In the texts below we can see that the complainers use a singular pronoun '*saya*' that means 'I' and a plural pronoun '*kami*' that means 'we'. When presenting themselves as an individual, complainers substantiated their report by referring to their own experience. For example, an evacuee wrote in his complaint to KPI:

> KPI please reprimand RCTI's show "silet" which exaggeratedly reported about Mount Merapi that the people of Yogya become anxious and worried. I, as a people of Yogya, was impacted by it, some of my family members became upset and asked to evacuate although we live 40 kms from the Mount of Merapi.[179]

Here the complainer was impacted directly by the show when his family requested evacuation. His being impacted by the incident was critical in laying the foundation of the complaint. The complaint, in other words, was an effort to assert his private interest. Yet, we see that the 'I' in the quotation did not go alone. There was a further qualifying phrase 'as a people of Yogya' (*warga Yogya*) as well.

The qualifying phrase was an instance of the profuse use of 'we' by the complainers. The complainers used a plural pronoun 'we' to present themselves as a part of bigger collectivity.[180] The most common collectivity being referred to by the complainers was the 'people of Yogyakarta' (*warga Yogyakarta*) and, to a lesser extent, 'Indonesian citizens' (*warga negara Indonesia*). 'People of Yogyakarta' was obviously a very small unit compared to 'Indonesian citizens'. Nevertheless, the psychological impact of the disaster was not limited to the people of Yogyakarta, but included those who had relationship with the people of Yogyakarta. Furthermore, the broadcast reach of the television channel was national. When a complainer used the term, they were taking the part of either the collectivity of people who were impacted by the disaster or the people who watched the programme, or both.

Regardless of how the complainer presented himself, as an individual or a collectivity, he almost always represented the collective interest, rather than his private interest. But, how could an individual represent the collective's interest? The complainers used language to put them in the position where they could claim that they represented not only their self-interest. In a process called identification, the social actors, which in this case are the complainers, recognise themselves as a part of 'unified

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[179] *Kepada KPI tolong menegur acara RCTI "silet" yang memberitakan tentang gunung merapi secara berlebuhan [sic] sehingga membuat warga yogya semakin resah dan khawatir. Saya sebagai warga yogya juga mengalami dampak itu, beberapa keluarga rewel mengajak mengungsi padagal jarak dari gunung merapi adalah 40km.* Complaint no. 22.

[180] For the collective 'we' in collective action, see Melucci (1996), Chapter 4, especially pp. 68-73.

and delimited subjects' (Melucci, 1996, p. 72). Their recognition of their collective identity is based on their ability to position themselves 'within a system of relations' (p. 73). In other words, their collective identity can only be understood within its relations with other identities, such as those of refugees and the government agency.

I developed a procedure to identify acts of representation, using the question: how did the complainer claim connection with the larger collectivities? The goal was to identify positions (van Langenhove and Harre, 2003), which were adopted by a complainer to claim that he or she represented the interest of a larger group. Position was defined as, 'the discursive construction of personal stories that make a person's actions intelligible and relatively determinate as social acts and within which the members of the conversation have specific locations' (p. 16). The positions were discursive, which means being actualised through language, and, thus, their adoption could be temporary. Further, a subject could adopt several positions simultaneously. In the case of complaints to KPI, the position that was adopted by the audiences was defined by its relations with other positions.

There were four parties involved in the texts of complaints: the 'instigator', the complainer, KPI, and the 'affected class'. The structure of the texts of complaint consisted of *the complainer* who expressed his opinion on behalf of the *affected class* to *KPI* about the offence committed by *the instigator*. The instigator, according to the file of complaints, could be the show itself (*Silet*), the host of the show (Fenny Rose), its producers, or the television station (RCTI). The complainer was the individual who filed the complaint to KPI. And the affected class was the group of people that the audiences claimed to have been affected by the show. The complainer could oneself be a part of the affected class, but could also be independent of it. The complaint was indirect, because it was not addressed to the instigator of the offence, but to a third party. Knowing that the third party was a public office, the general tone of the complaints tended to be formal and relatively polite. This was evidenced in the prevalent use of the word 'please' (*mohon/tolong*) when opening the complaint and 'thank you' (*terima kasih*) when closing the complaint.

Indicators of such acts of representation were found in the use of pronouns, descriptors of these pronouns, and phrases of what I would call 'claim of connection'. The pronouns included 'I' (*saya*), 'she/he' (*dia*), 'we' (*kami*), and 'they' (*mereka*). Their descriptors could be diverse, ranging from 'viewers' (*pemirsa*), 'people of Yogya' (*warga Yogya*), to 'citizens of Indonesia' (*warga negara Indonesia*). 'Claim of connection' could be found in the relationship between the figure of complainer and the affected class. The procedure, however, was not a 'standard' content analysis procedure because these categories were not mutually exclusive (Krippendorf, 2004). It was not designed to describe the whole corpus through describing the frequency of variables' occurrence or to show the main pattern. The aim was only to identify the subjects' positions.

I identified four positions that complainers adopted discursively to represent the collective: **witness, victim, expert**, and **fellow**. *Witness* could represent the collective because of his co-presence with or a direct knowledge of the impacts the show had on the affected class. For example, a resident of Yogyakarta wrote that an acquaintance of his from Palembang, Sumatera, had left the city, and several students in his neighbourhood left as well. This validated his allegation that the television show 'could psychologically affect' those who lived in Yogyakarta. The second position was that of *victim*, which legitimated the complainer's connection with the larger collectivity through sharing the same fate. Not only did it have the element of co-presence with the affected class, the complainer had a causal connection with the show by being affected by it. The complainer who I quoted at length in the previous example adopted this position when he said that he was 'impacted by it'. Regarding the adoption of two positions at the same time, we can see this in another case where a refugee witnessed the other refugees in the same camp with him 'panic' because of the show and, thus, he himself was sharing the same experience.

The third position was that of *expert*, which was adopted through some form of abstract knowledge. The claim to knowledge could result from a formal affiliation with an academic institution, such as a complainer who wrote that he as a communication student knew that the 'news was better not to be broadcasted' because it could 'trigger public panic'. Another claim to knowledge could result from a difference that complainers paint between themselves and the others, such as complainers who spoke on behalf of those audiences who 'did not filter' the show's content, or were 'naïve'. The last position was that of *fellow*, who did not share the impact, but felt an empathy with the others. Hence *fellow* represented the others based on the assumption that 'I feel what they feel', because of their membership of the same society in the present or in the past.

Orientation to public good

The largely symbolic act of complaint needed symbolic commons from where the complainers drew and contributed resources. These symbolic commons were scattered across different websites, such as Kaskus internet forum, blogs (among others, Blogspot and Kompasiana), and social network sites (Twitter and Facebook, among others), which I will explain in the next paragraph. One commonality among all of the websites was that these symbolic commons were located online and the complaints themselves were filed through online systems, making the commons more available to the complainers. They became a space where people sharing the same concern met and shared their voice. Some people quoted parts of the television show that offended the most and these were copied and pasted to the KPI's online system. The address of KPI's complaint system was posted and it made complaining one step easier. The spread of the call to complain on the internet and how audiences participated in the collective complaint to KPI will be described in the next section, titled 'Joining the Collective Complaints'. The following paragraphs discuss of the online fora which audiences visited to learn about the incident, to vent their angers, to learn about the experience of other audiences, to converse, and to copy materials for their statements of complaint.

One of the important fora where people posted messages about *Silet* was Kaskus. It was the most popular Indonesian open forum where people conversed about topics of their interest and also current affairs. In 2010 it had close to 2 million users. Within less than one hour after the show ended, a user posted a thread with the title, 'SILET RCTI, where is your brain?'[181] The user wrote that he unintentionally watched the programme and he contrasted the current disaster in Yogyakarta with three quotes from the show containing the rumour of the impending catastrophe. He then cursed and asked whether it considered the feelings of the refugees and Yogyakartans who were away from the city. The thread was quickly responded to by other people, resulting in approximately 650 replies on the thread on the same day alone. The thread-starter facilitated the conversation by lifting messages which the thread-starter thought important to the first page, otherwise they would have been buried by hundreds of responses. The first message was a witness account of 'friends, neighbours, and my wife made noises about evacuating ... ugh ... made [me] panic [...]' And the second message, culled from deep in the pages, was a call to complain, complete with the address, phone number, fax, e-mail of the television station and link to the KPI online complaints system. The thread-starter provided the space to vent anger, to hear each other's voice, and to facilitate a way to take further action if they wanted to.

[181] baradhs (2010), *SILET RCTI, punya otak nggak sih?* Last accessed 19 February 2014 at: http://archive.kaskus.co.id/thread/5848212/

The same forum could be found on Facebook, which had close to 12 million Indonesian users in 2010 (Dewi *et al.*, 2010). There was a page dedicated to voicing audiences' complaints and rejection of *Silet*.[182] The creator was a freelance website designer and administrator who, during the crisis, volunteered to a church-related organisation. The Facebook page had a *Silet* logo with a big red cross on it. As the creator recalled in an interview with me,[183] he had started to spread the word through his volunteer friends and by putting a link on the web pages he administered. In a matter of two to three days the page was liked by more than 10,000 people. The first post inviting other users to express their opinion was responded to by almost four hundred people within two days. Further, Facebook users commented vigorously on any post with uncensored words and raw emotions. In about two weeks, the administrator's access was suspended by Facebook and he could no longer administer the page, which he thought was caused by its rapid success. He did not pursue the case with Facebook, thinking that he had better focus his energy on volunteering, in which he had been participating. During its short life, the Facebook page became a place for the people to vent their anger. The people ignored a reminder to use appropriate words and voiced their feelings in unrestrained language. On this page, Facebook users posted a web address for KPI for filing complaints.

The third website used by the complainers was Twitter, which was used by 8 million Indonesians in 2010.[184] The users started to post their messages when the show aired. There was no specific hashtag (#) associated with the incident. Some users began to draw connection between the issue and KPI.[185] And one user included the web address of KPI while saying that whoever felt upset by the programme could file complaint. But these comments did not prompt a message chain. It was not until a guitarist in a pop music band, who at the time was followed by about 2,000 users, tweeted to go to KPI's website to file complaints that the message started to reach many

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[182] Last accessed 19 February 2014 at: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Say-no-to-Silet-RCTI/163801770319743

[183] Personal interview with the creator of 'Say No To Silet' Facebook page on 1 April 2013. Transcript no. 58.

[184] Comscore, 2010. *Indonesia, Brazil and Venezuela Lead Global Surge in Twitter Surge.* Last accessed 30 May 2014 at: http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press_Releases/2010/8/Indonesia_Brazil_and_Venezuela_Lead_Global_Surge_in_Twitter_Usage. The estimation was calculated by multiplying the reach of Twitter in Indonesia (20.8%), defined as logging in at least once within 30 days leading to the data collection, with the estimation of internet users (approx. 42 million users).

[185] There were some examples of this. Last accessed 19 February 2014 at: https://twitter.com/seftianhari/status/1133256657338368, https://twitter.com/blandinaVALENT/status/1134224107110400

people.[186] He amended his Twitter to contain more information: the KPI's Twitter account, fax number, and short message number. The popular account @JogjaUpdate[187] reposted the message and it spread further. A volunteer from Jalin Merapi added the number of the local office of KPI to the message and posted this to Twitter using the account of @JalinMerapi, which was already popular.[188] The amended message was reposted many times, but one user reported that the short message number did not work.[189] Other Twitter users suggested the online form to Jalin Merapi, which it then reposted.[190] Through continual amendment by many users, the channels of complaint became more resourceful. This does not imply that Twitter was the only one route of distribution, but it was one of the key distribution channels.

We have seen how Kaskus, Facebook, and Twitter were used to provide a place where audiences of *Silet* could express their opinions and feelings about the show. More importantly, the users of these websites contributed information about the channels of complaint that other users could use. Thus, what had been the individual's knowledge of no longer stayed with the individual, but become a common resource when published. Not only information about channels of complaint, but private observations, feelings, and opinion became written texts which other audiences could copy and used in their complaints.

The language style on Kaskus, Facebook, and Twitter was different from that in complaints filed to KPI. The key difference was that on these online sites, audiences used profane words more frequently, whereas in complaints to KPI audiences in general wrote more polite complaints. It is possible that the receiver of the complaint was taken into consideration by the audiences. Possibly, the communication with KPI was seen as a formal communication with the authorities,[191] whereas users of social media wrote their angry and profane words to an undifferentiated audience. Age difference can be eliminated from the explanatory factors, because the average age of the internet users, regardless of the web service, was the same, namely young (under 34).[192] This raises a question as to whether the harsh and aggressive message, outside of the authorised

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[186] Last accessed 19 February 2014 at: https://twitter.com/PatubMbel/status/1151180549918720

[187] @JogjaUpdate publishes information about various events (such as exhibitions, music shows, workshops, and conferences), job vacancies, restaurant guides, and light 'news' reported by Twitter users. Before the eruption, it had slightly above 10,000 followers. After the eruption, it had about 17,000 followers. Personal interview with the founder of @JogjaUpdate, 3 October 2011.

[188] Last accessed 19 February 2014 at: https://twitter.com/jalinmerapi/status/1187232060809216.

[189] Last accessed 19 February 2014 at: https://twitter.com/novialuciana/status/1189533689319424.

[190] Last accessed 19 February 2014 at: https://twitter.com/danuisnan/status/1163559987838976.

[191] This is indicated by how the complainers addressed their letters of complaint, which often started with '*Dear Sir/Madam*' (*Bapak/Ibu yang terhormat*) and used '*please*' (*mohon*).

[192] APJII, 2012; Nielsen, 2011.

channel of complaint, helped, hurt, or was unrelated to their cause to demand redress from the instigator. I will attempt to answer this later, by examining the mechanism by which the complaint was made and processed. Before that, I will describe how the audiences participated in the collective complaint.

Joining the Collective Complaints

The complainers knew about this particular edition of *Silet* mainly through watching it (64%, n = 59) and from reading other news websites (27%). Almost half of the complainers (43%, n = 58) let others know about the show, while the other half did not. When they decided to tell other people about the show, they used Twitter (32%), Facebook (26%), and Kaskus (13%). Did they act individually or collectively? Half of the complainers asked others or were asked by the others, mainly friends, to file the complaint. Regarding social influence, we did not know the efficacy of other people's influence on the complainers, or vice versa. Unlike the *Kedaulatan Rakyat* donors, who were mainly collective, and some of those Jalin Merapi volunteers who applied as a group or recruited based on existing social relationships, it seemed to me that the complainers mainly acted as separate individuals. In my interviews with some of the complainers (4 persons), they did ask people to complain, through social media or interpersonal communication, but there was no deliberate organising effort. They did not know whether their friends or other people on social media filed complaints as well. Further, I did not find any person who played a central role or recruited the other complainers. What I found was a new category of action that was important but different from complaining to KPI, namely 'enabling'. It was an action to enable other audiences to complain, through the creation of a forum thread or Facebook page or a Twitter status that contained information about complaining, although they themselves did not complain. The data to assess the social importance of the enablers could not be obtained, but based on my interviews with complainers and with enablers they did not mention any key or important figures in their decision to complain or to raise their voices about the issue. It seemed that these decisions were relatively made individually, rather than as the outcome of opinion leaders (Katz, 1957).

I understand that I cannot generalise my findings based on my non-random sample. Yet, based on the KPI's complaint archive and archives of online communication we now know the different ways that audiences travelled to join these collective complaints. This pattern could contribute to the future study on complaint as collective action. My study found that there were three routes to complaining to KPI.

The first route was directly from watching the television show to action. The second route was from social media to action. And the last was from social circle to action. I should emphasise here that the three starting points (TV, social media, social circles) did not have to be independent of each other; they overlapped. There were those who only watched television, only found out from social media, or only found out from the family, and then filed the complaint. Yet there were also complainers who watched the television show and used social media, or watched and spoke with family, or used social media and talked with family, or even di all three, and then took an action. Through knowing the audiences' main routes to collective action, the following stories can properly illustrate these routes.

The first story concerned a university student. She lived in a dormitory that at the time had been left by 18 out of 20 student tenants because of the explosion. She did not watch the show when it aired, but learnt from Facebook about people being outraged (*marah-marah*) at *Silet*. She then watched the show on YouTube and became angry as well. She said:

> [...] in my opinion Silet reported the news that made [people] anxious. ... and I as a Yogya[karta] people at the time [thought], "Why in such way?" ... People out of Yogya would be more apprehensive ... the journalism should have been more constructive.[193]

She recalled that it was a tense moment. Her mother, aunt, and uncle called her to tell her to go home. Her friends' families did the same thing. And the Facebook page gave her a sense of how the show was perceived by the general audience. It also showed her how to respond by filing a complaint to KPI. In daily life she rarely watched television, let alone gossip shows. She had never filed a complaint to KPI before and never after. She did not fear the eruption as she regularly monitored the website of Jalin Merapi and its radio live-stream. She trusted them more because they were directly observing the event from the field (*langsung*).

The second story is about a guitarist in a national pop band. He watched the show in between tending his child. What upset him the most was the rumour about impending disaster that 'provoked' the people of Yogyakarta. He started to ask his two thousand or so followers on Twitter about the account of the television station.[194] After finding the

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[193] '[...] *Silet menyiarkan berita dengan apa ya, meresahkan ... dan aku sebagai orang Jogja saat itu, "Kok gini caranya gitu?" ... Orang luar jadi makin berprasangka yang gimana ... Seharusnya sebagai jurnalisme kan bisa membuat sesuatu yang lebih membangun gitu lho'*. Personal interview with one complainer on 22 March 2013. Transcript no. 57, p. 6.
[194] Last accessed 20 February 2014 at: https://twitter.com/PatubMbel/status/1133046069723136

account, he asked the television station to broadcast calming information rather than the infamous episode. Then he wrote, 'Let's report @rctitv to @KPI_Pusat regarding the provocative SILET!!' when the show was about to finish.[195] About an hour later, after several tweets more about the show, he posted the call to complain, complete with the Twitter account, fax and short message number. It spread so widely in the next three hours that his Blackberry phone could not function due to the high rate of notifications. However, other than his message to the Twitter account of KPI, he did not file the online complaint himself. He helped spread the call to complain and provided the channels to complain, which other Twitter users amended with the link to the complaint page.

The complainers did not have a plan in mind, only an impression that a lot of people were upset about the show and the call to protest was found on many websites. No one orchestrated the call to complain. The majority of them (80%, n = 54) had never complained before and never complained after this. The complainers seemed to somewhat appreciate that the television channel ran a text apologising to them. What they did not know was that four penalties had been issued by KPI to the television channel and the television channel only obeyed the first penalty half-heartedly. The audiences did not follow the development of the case. It was a burst of protest, rather than a calculated action.

My limited survey sample revealed that Twitter was the communication technology most used by complainers to recruit other complainers. Half of the complainers asked others to join and the tools they used were Twitter, e-mail, Facebook, and Kaskus, in order of popularity. The whole stream of complaints peaked within four hours after the show. The centripetal force of attention came from different starting points: direct, social media, social relationship. The event was like an 'attention implosion' (Lee, 2011) that converged on KPI.

Visibility of Complaints/Complainers

I identified three stages in the process of collective complaint, namely the writing process used by complainers, aggregation by the computer system, and the KPI's treatment and follow-up of the complaints. Each stage of the process afforded different visibility to the actors and related parties. I call the first stage of this mechanism **representation**; the second stage **aggregation**, and the third stage **exemplification**. At

[195] *Laporkan @rctitv ke @KPI_Pusat utk SILET yg provokatif yo!!* Last accessed 20 February 2014 at: https://twitter.com/PatubMbel/status/1135812951416832

the stage of representation the complainers represented the larger publics through their writing. At the stage of aggregation the technical system aggregated the personal data of the complainers and the complaints. In the last stage, KPI received complaints from various sources and conducted its own investigation to turn the complaint into an example of its ideals. I will describe each of these stages in the following paragraphs.

When the audiences watched the show, or learnt about it from other media, or other people, and they decided to file a complaint to KPI, the majority of complainers *represented* the bigger group. There were some complainers who acted and spoke from their own self-interest, but they were the minority. The majority of complainers spoke on behalf of the larger collectivity, whether they were their families or, most likely, the people of Yogyakarta and the people of Indonesia. Although a few of them expressed their fear and experienced 'panic' themselves, many of the complainers worried about panic among other people. Who those people were was never clear. The people of Merapi in general did not watch television because they lived in refugee tents where television was sparsely available. It is true that there were Merapi people who watched television and that the rumours spread further than the actual broadcasting of the programme itself. And actually I read a complaint from a refugee that they as a group were affected by the rumour. The complainer wrote:

> [...] please the authorities reprimand the television station, especially RCTI, because this afternoon the Silet show disseminated the news that on 8 Nov there will be a catastrophe in Jogja.. as a result, the other refugees at my camp, about 750 people, became panicked [...][196]

However, I have also heard from volunteers and the people of Merapi themselves that they did not watch the show or hear the rumour. Compared to the people of Merapi, it was more probable that people of Yogyakarta who did not live in the refugee centres had access to and watched television and became disturbed and offended by it. They also had more access to internet to file the complaint than the refugees had. Hence, it was an act of representation of the people of Yogyakarta by the people of Yogyakarta and, to a lesser extent, by the people of Java island.

When the audiences used the online complaint system, they faced a page where they had to fill in the title of the complaint, their personal data (name, gender, age, education, province of residence, and e-mail address), and the content of their complaint.

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[196] *[...] memohon kepada pihak berwenang untuk menegur stasiun TV khususnya RCTI bahwa tadi siang acara silet menyiaberitaan tsbrkan klu tgl 8 nov akan terjadi bencana besar di jogja..krn itu warga pengungsian 1 barak sama saya sekita 750 orang menjadi panik [...].* Complaint no. 80.

When issuing survey invitations, I managed to send invitations to 73% of the complainers, indicating that they had given an active e-mail address. Furthermore, their ages and education levels correlated. The system *aggregated* online complaints and presented them in a tabular format. It was not until the next day that KPI commissioners received information about the online complaints. On the same day as the show (7 November 2010), they received complaints mainly from phone calls and short messages.[197] By the afternoon of 8 November 2010, the commissioners had received an aggregate of 1,128 complaints.[198] This number was extraordinary since KPI usually only received an average of 300 complaints per month. KPI did not break down the aggregate but presented its analysis based on this trove of voices. This was cited time and again as 'the 1,128 complaints'.

The last mechanism that transformed the visibility of the complainers, and the people they represented, was how KPI handled the complaints. KPI acted swiftly when they saw the unprecedentedly high volume of complaints. Nevertheless, KPI could not act based on the volume of complaint. They could only act if the object of complaint violated Broadcasting Guidance on Standard of Programme (called P3 SPS). KPI instructed a team of analysts to evaluate whether the programme in question had committed a violation. In so doing, the formal analysis was independent of the complaint that triggered it. The formal analysis concerned the programme itself. When they found that it had violated the guidelines, KPI commissioners went to Yogyakarta to meet the governor of the Special Region of Yogyakarta and the 'victims' (*korban*). There were two 'victims', a university student in Yogyakarta who was frightened by the show and fled the city and another student who wanted to go back to Yogyakarta but was too afraid to do so. These two 'witnesses of fact' (*saksi fakta*) were key complainers in the ensuing legal battle between KPI and the television station. By the said two commissioners of KPI, the issue was seen as an opportunity to secure the public's trust since the KPI itself was only 8 years old at the time and in the past audiences had been used to taking issues with a broadcasting company into their own hands.[199] KPI selected two victims amongst the hundreds of complainers and fought a

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[197] KPI (2012). *Kasus Silet: Kemenangan bagi Publik* (*Silet Case: The Victory for the Public*). KPI: Jakarta, pp. 19-20.

[198] I obtained the same archive from KPI and when I cleaned it to exclude redundant entries, the archives on two days of complaint contained only 998 complaints. However, a false number had been cited on the media and by KPI itself in its 'white book' on the case (KPI, 2012).

[199] Personal interviews with two commissioners of KPI on 14 December 2012. Transcript no. 39, p. 1. Transcript no. 40, p. 1.

legal battle, to exemplify the destructive impact of television and its role as the guardian of public interest.

The three stages of collective complaint (representation, aggregation, and exemplification) changed the visibility of the complainers and the people they represented. At the representation stage, a society that was purportedly 'in panic' was personified by complainers using discursive figures such as witnesses, victims, experts, and fellow members. At the aggregation level the complainers were turned by the technology of complaint into a mass of singular demand. And at the exemplification level KPI mobilised the evidences to exemplify its regulatory power.

The complaints produced two types of result: short-term and long-term. The short-term result was that two days after the show, *Silet* was not aired. KPI instructed RCTI to stop broadcasting *Silet* until the danger level of Mt. Merapi had been lowered. But they did not comply with the other penalties, namely to issue apologies on print media and RCTI's own television channel. On the fourth day, RCTI broadcast a new rumour show that closely resembled *Silet*, called *Intens*. It violated the penalty from KPI. One week later, *Silet* had returned to its normal schedule. Two days later KPI made a report to the police that RCTI had violated the broadcasting law. This started two years of legal battle between the regulatory body and the television station. In 2012, KPI won the case at the High Court (*Mahkamah Agung*), but the television station practically has never complied with the penalties until now, except for on the few days it did not broadcast *Silet*.

5.4. Conclusion

Here I want to recapitulate the previous subchapters on the three forms of collective action taken by the audiences in response to the Mt. Merapi disaster, starting from the donation. The readers who donated through *Kedaulatan Rakyat* in general had an institutional background. The majority of the money came from them and handling of the money was organised through institutional ways, such as regular meetings. The findings about empirical mechanisms of donation add to the literature of institutional donors (Gao, 2011; Muller and Whiteman, 2009). Donors' orientation to the public good could not be followed through since control was handed over to the newspaper. Private donors felt more comfortable about presenting themselves before the general readers as institutions. This point was also related with how the newspaper changed the visibility of the donors by focusing on institutional and big donors, rather than on personal or small donors. The cultural logic of *pantes* regulated their action.

Furthermore, when the donation was made through a mass medium, what once was done to be recognised as a member of the society now became an opportunity for 'free' public relations work (see Muller and Kraussl, 2011, for comparison). This caused confusion between the newsroom and the business department on the medium's side and, on the audiences' side, it created a 'stage anxiety' and a challenge to their value of altruistic giving.

Volunteerism was characterised by the volunteers mainly by its trait of selflessness, as a social construct rather than by its psychological characters (Haski-Leventhal, 2009). The first boundary crossed by the audiences in becoming volunteers concerned how to show the trait in public. The second boundary crossed was their physical mobilisation from their home to the affected areas. The strategy of Jalin Merapi's volunteers was to focus on making available the needs of the under-represented refugees on their own terms and to make them available on different platforms to reach the widest number of people possible. This somewhat contradicted *Kedaulatan Rakyat*'s strategy, which made donors visible and the refugees' needs disconnected from the donors. With regard to the recruitment of volunteers, Jalin Merapi prioritised those who lived closer to the affected areas. Therefore, the physical proximity and availability of potential volunteers influenced the recruiters' decision. From the perspective of the audiences, their commitment to collective action was contested by their commitment to their close social circle, namely their family. These physical proximity and social network factors agree with Einolf and Chambre's (2011) factors that drive people to volunteer. However, my study focuses more on the 'how' of volunteerism, rather than 'why' (Haski-Leventhal, 2009). Accordingly, we saw how the volunteers dropped out of volunteering to temporarily evacuate the city with their families. Dropping out of volunteering was seen as normal and, since many people were willing to replace them, less consequential.

The Merapi edition of *Silet* spread a mix of rumours and 'expert' statements that, in the critical context of disaster, created widespread anxiety among audiences. In a burst-like response to the programme, they complained to the KPI. The individual and separated audience crossed the boundary of their private identity by adopting the roles that could speak on behalf of many people, such as witnesses, victims, experts, and fellows. Not only adopting a public identity, the audiences created an information commons (Bimber *et al.*, 2005) in the forms of Kaskus threads, Facebook page, and Twitter posts that brought the audiences' voices together and helped move people to file complaints. The common routes taken by the audiences were from watching television to visiting the website of KPI, from social media to the KPI's website, and from their social circles to KPI. The stages of complaint followed different mechanism that affected the audiences' visibility. When writing to the KPI, the audiences represented the people of Yogyakarta and Indonesia using discursive figures. The complaints, then, were aggregated into a mass of single voice by the KPI. Lastly, the KPI responded to the complaint by making an example of it to assert its institutional role in regulating the broadcasting media. The three mechanisms revealed in my study show the important role of media in the development of specific types of collective action (Bimber *et al.*, 2005; McAdam, 2003).

I have shown through this chapter that the three main concepts (boundaries of private-public, process of recruitment, and mediated visibility) can be used productively to organise and interpret my research data. They also help me answer my question about the collective action of audiences, especially from communication and media perspectives. Analysis of collective action could create the impression this is no longer a study about audiences, because they have become participants in collective action whose activities fall beyond the interface of individuals and media. However, it is precisely for this reason that I want to extend the study of audience into the domain of collective action. The next chapter is my attempt to identify and model sequences and transitions from paying attention to taking action, or from being audiences to being publics.

Chapter 6. Processes of Transformation

This chapter, in essence, connects the two chapters that have gone before. While what I have been attempting to do in this study is to understand the phenomenon of audiences who took action in response to the Mt. Merapi disaster, collective attention and collective action at the moment are separated. I have analysed the starting point, namely collective attention. And I have examined the end point, collective actions. Hence, my final task in this study is to identify what happened between the initial states and the outcomes, and to 'reconstruct' the trajectories between the two states through an abstraction of the empirical evidence. This abstraction surely does not reflect the uniqueness of individual experiences, such as the meanings that individuals constructed and incorporated into their particular life stories. Rather, such abstraction contains common elements of the collective phenomena. Furthermore, the stages represent conceptual reconstruction of the actual event, which does not necessarily progress in a linear fashion or have a distinct order. In this sense, we can call the abstraction an 'ideal type' (Weber *et al.*, 1949; also in della Porta *et al.*, 2008).

An ideal type 'is not a *description* of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a description' (Weber, p. 90).[200] It accentuates 'one or more points of view by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent *concrete individual* phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified *analytical* construct' (p. 90).[201] The model I attempt to construct functions to delineate the viewpoint of audiences because my study aims to understand the agency that the audiences exercised in their collective action, as it is understood by the actors. Here, I want to recall the observation of disaster sociologists that the people themselves are the first helpers in many occasions of disaster (Fritz and William, 1957; Quarantelli, 1994, 2003). Hence, understanding the efforts to change a circumstance, including its specific challenges and constraints, from the audiences' viewpoint warrants a closer examination, rather than understanding agency as an aggregate of individual choices of audience members (Webster and Phalen, 1997). Furthermore, the viewpoint I am taking is not that of a concrete single audience, but an abstraction of the collective experience of multiple media users.

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[200] Italic in original text.
[201] Italic in original text.

The *collective* experience of media use here refers to the commonality and social sense rather than the aggregative sense, of the word 'collective' (see Table 7 below). The aggregative sense assumes that individual processes taken together are collective because each process contains attributes that are universal, for example how the consumers move in seven stages from not knowing the product to eventually buying it (Lavidge and Steiner, 1961). In the aggregative sense, individual purchases taken together can be called collective purchase although the individual buyers are not aware of each other's action. In contrast with the aggregative sense, the commonality and social sense of collective process assume that the subject is not only aware of his own experience but also aware of other people who share that experience. The subjects, in other words, know that by taking an action they are participating in the pursuit of a common goal. The common goal is not necessarily all-inclusive and singular. In fact, conflicts over whose goal should be pursued together are normally present in an episode of collective action. The model that I construct for my study is an abstraction of certain stages that do not necessarily exist in an individual's experience but characterise the whole collective process. The following is a tabular presentation of the difference between the two meanings of the concept of collective experience.

	Aggregative Sense	**Commonality Sense**
Unit	Individuals	Individuals and Groups
Relationship between Units	Irrelevant	Important, both the real and imaginary relationships
Attributes of the Individuals	Uniform	Diverse
Collective Goal	Irrelevant	Important

Table 7. Aggregative and Commonality Senses of the Concept of Collective

The model I am going to present is constructed to understand the path from collective attention to collective action from the perspective of audiences. The model only accounts for people who use media and take part in collective actions. People who do not use media are not accounted for and neither are those who use media but do not take part in the collective action. Furthermore, I selected cases of collective actions that clearly show the media's role, such as donating through newspaper, volunteering to a 'crisis information centre', and complaining about a television programme through an online system. The selection of 'positive cases' was meant to understand how some conditions led to the fruition of certain outcomes (Vennesson, 2008; see 3.4). Thus, the 'bias' to positive results is inherent in the approach. The selection of positive cases should not blind us from seeing that in reality, for example, donations were made in many ways, of which media-led fundraising efforts were just one. The ratio between mediated and direct donation is unavailable, but I can say that donation through media contributed substantially to the whole disaster fundraising efforts (Abidin and Kurniawati, 2004). Volunteerism also varied greatly in its forms and purposes and a lot of the Mt. Merapi disaster volunteers did not know what Jalin Merapi was. Among the different forms of disaster volunteerism, Jalin Merapi was outstanding. My interviews with people from diverse backgrounds and involvements with the disaster relief suggested that the works of Jalin Merapi were seen as very beneficial by the media audiences, especially the young and internet users, in Yogyakarta and in other cities.[202] Lastly, complaints about how the local governments managed the relief efforts and about the media's coverage were aplenty, but the particular case of complaints I am focusing on drew a lot of attention and brought media, regulators, and audiences together in the same field of action (Postill, forthcoming). From the perspective of media users, the course from collective attention to collective action started with their use of media and ended with their action, although in reality collective actions could start from many points and much media use did not end with collective action.

Although in my study I identified several motives that drove the audiences to donate, to volunteer, and to complain (see Chapter 5), this should not lead us to infer that the audience members who did not participate lacked such motivations.[203] My study was designed to illuminate the 'how' questions, namely processes and mechanisms, rather than the 'why', or causal factors. To identify causal factors, those who did not participate should be included in the survey, which would involve a randomised sample. To identify the mechanisms, my study traces processes that lead to the realisation of a collective action.

The trajectory from media use to collective action can exist in many scenarios, from buying a product to a protest. This study focuses on an episode of disaster due to a

[202] As I have identified previously, this was partially attributed to the marriage between 'old media' (handheld transceiver) and 'new media' (website, online radio stream, Twitter) and their use in connecting the refugees' needs with potential helpers.
[203] For further discussion on the relations between attitudinal factors and participation in collective action, see McAdam (1986).

gap in research on this topic (Dutta-Bergman, 2006; Fraustino *et al.*, 2012; Lang and Benbunan-Fich, 2010), the importance that audiences attributed to the event, and its highly mediated nature. It was a highly mediated event since the people on the slopes of Mt. Merapi themselves tapped into the government agency's volcanic sensors and their own network of citizen observers for information about the volcano, not to mention the television coverage of the event. People who lived in the vicinity could not monitor the mountain using only direct observation. They had to rely on different media, both mainstream and people's media. But they still had physical connection with the event through feeling the tremors, hearing the rumbles, and touching the volcanic dust. The further the people lived from the mountain, the more they relied on various media to paint the picture in their head and to orient themselves. These reasons underline the need to study the use of media in a disaster response.

The model I am attempting to develop anticipates several issues that have been identified by different scholars, such as fragmentation of media use (Webster, 1986; 2002; 2005), action at a distance (Boltanski, 2004), audiences' relationship with the suffering others (Chouliaraki, 2006), and mediated orientation to public issues (Couldry *et al.*, 2007). These issues are relevant to the audiences' collective experience because their mediated relationship with the disaster created specific sets of problems. I want to clarify the problem in the following paragraphs.

First, proliferation of media devices and media outlets has fragmented the use of media into separate clusters of use based on habits and/or preferences. When audiences spread their attention to many media outlets through different media devices, they pay attention to different issues chosen by different media, making collective action harder to materialise. Different choice of issues, segments of audience markets, and cycles of information production can prevent audiences from having an overlap of interests.

Second, the audiences are physically separated from each other and from the people affected by disaster. They cannot immediately act on the problem depicted in the media, do not know who among them are interested in taking an action or how to do it. Thus, the physical separation amongst audiences and between audiences and the mediated others needs to be overcome. Each socio-technological solution that is used to overcome the problem entails its own specific problems. For example, the relay of money from audiences through a newspaper organisation creates its own problems of accountability and confusion of interests, among others.

Third, generally speaking, the audiences and the survivors of disaster are strangers to each other. Here we are not talking about the relationship between an individual audience member and an individual survivor, but between both collectivities. Mainstream mass media are not designed to maintain connection among their audiences on a regular basis. Social media are used exactly to connect with each other. However, these connections revolve around persons and personalities (boyd, 2011), rather than public issues (Adams, 2012). Further, social media are generally used to maintain connection between families and friends, rather than to forge connections among strangers (Adams, 2012).

Fourth, orientation to public issues through the use of media is not necessarily followed by public action. Links and opportunities to connect the starting point, engaging public issues through media, with effective deliberation or action do not sufficiently exist. These can be values that bridge private-public worlds or the right social context for talking about the issues, as identified by Couldry *et al.* (2007), or an extraordinary event such as a disaster that provides the impetus to act.

The model I am developing results from approaching the trajectories from attention to action as a series of barriers that confront the audiences. In other words, they become barriers only for a specific social behaviour, namely the use of media. For example, attention fragmentation is only an obstacle when we consider how people are collectively exposed to increasingly abundant media outlets. These issues do not exist in a period or in a society where media outlets are short in supply. In this perspective, the barriers that media users confronted were:

1. audiences' attention did not naturally focus on the Mt. Merapi disaster,
2. salient features of the disaster were differently formulated,
3. audiences' mental picture of the affected people and their relationship to them were not obvious,
4. resources needed to take action were not necessarily available,
5. boundaries between private and public domain presented specific challenges to each form of action.

By viewing the transformation of attention to action as efforts to overcome these barriers, I can conceptualise the processes in the diagram below (Figure 5). The diagram shows collective attention and collective action as being separate. The processes to move from attention to action, or to overcome the barriers, are represented using arrows. Rather than arranging the arrows sequentially to show a linear progression, I stack them on top of each other to show that each process builds on top of the other processes although each process progresses independently. It also indicates that one process does not end when the other process starts. Each process will be described and discussed in a separate section.



Figure 5. Processes of Transformation from Collective Attention to Collective Action

6.1. Concentrating the Attention

Fragmentation and concentration of media use are usually investigated under the assumption of normal use of media in the hope of revealing patterns the daily use of media (Webster *et al.*, 2006; Webster and Ksiazek, 2012). The use of media is seen as being embedded in audiences' regular hourly, daily, and seasonal cycle (Webster *et al. 2006*, pp. 25-30). Through taking this view, study findings can be generalised into a near past and future, assuming regularity and predictable trends of media use. My study contributes a different dimension to the study of fragmentation, namely fragmentation in a disaster context, or non-normal use of media.

This study found that audiences' collective attention to various media outlets across platforms was relatively fragmented. Yet, this finding is disconnected from the observation that people from different places came to help after knowing the disaster, partly, from media. How was it possible that those who consumed different media outlets on different platforms could attend to the same issue? One strong possibility was that the information flowed through interpersonal networks. This is a plausible and well-supported explanation (Kivikuru, 2006 ; Vihalemm *et al.*, 2011; Chandrataruna, 2010). People want to know the well-being of those who are connected to them and, on the other hand, the affected people contact their families and friends to inform them.[204] However, this does not explain the apparent synchronicity between the rise of the disaster threat and spike in volunteer applications; or between threat and donation; or between spreading of rumours and inflow of complaints. Let us look at the Figure 6 on the following page and pay particular attention to the dates of 26 October 2010 (the first set of explosions) and 5 November 2010 (the second set of explosions). Both of these dates correlated with spikes in volunteer applications to Jalin Merapi. Furthermore, the broadcast of *Silet*'s edition on Mt. Merapi on 7 November 2010 was responded to by a spike in complaints. Donation through *Kedaulatan Rakyat* was clearly rising from the first set of explosions to the second, although it was not very sensitive to the dynamics of the disaster. We see clearly from the three cases of engagement that hundreds of audience members responded to the mediated event synchronically. Furthermore, we learned from the survey that the majority of applicants to Jalin Merapi knew about the recruitment directly (52%, n = 353), the same applied to the majority of complainers to KPI who watched the show directly (64%, n = 59) rather than being told about it by a friend. Based on the data, we can infer that their synchronised responses were due to their attending to the media (mainstream and the people's), rather than from a deliberate coordination between individuals and groups. It is more likely that the people knew, and even monitored, the day-to-day development of the disaster through media (see also Nielsen, 2010c).

If people knew about the disaster from the media and their collective attention was relatively fragmented to several media outlets, then a more plausible reason for their apparently synchronised response was that these diverse media attended to the same issue. The Indonesian media's concentration on the same disaster could not be assumed to happen naturally, because of three factors. One, the media outlets served different group of audiences. The relevance of Mt. Merapi's disaster to media that served audiences in places far from it was understandably lower than to Yogyakartan audiences. For example, we can expect a difference when we compare two local newspapers, which serve Yogyakartan audiences and Bandung, West Java audiences, respectively.

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[204] These personal networks are different from the temporary connections created by audiences and survivors through different forms of collective actions. The basic difference is that in collective actions the audiences are acting as parts of publics, which were based on 'relation among strangers' (Warner, 2002).



Figure 6. Dynamics of Three Forms of Engagement with Mediated Disaster.

Two, there was another disaster in the same period as Mt. Merapi's eruption. Tsunami in Mentawai occurred several days before Mt. Merapi's eruption and it took the lives of hundreds of people, more than at Mt. Merapi. In terms of the event's magnitude, it was not less important. However, Mentawai was a small collection of islands on the northern side of Sumatra, occupied by far fewer people, and far from Java. The tsunami did not affect Java as much as Mt. Merapi's eruption did.

Three, the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) declared that the status of the Mt. Merapi disaster was local, which meant that the local government had the capacity to handle the impacts. Only after 5 November 2010, the second series of eruptions, was coordination of disaster response centralised to the national agency. In other words, national media did not have to focus on Mt. Merapi disaster continuously because it was a 'local' event. These reasons could have resulted in the media paying attention to diverse issues. It turned out that Mt. Merapi became the central issue in the national media for at least several weeks.[205]

The concentration of media's coverage on the Mt. Merapi's disaster was, possibly, enabled by the concentration of Indonesian media ownership and contents that were biased toward Java (Nugroho *et al.*, 2012; 2013). A disaster in Java has a higher probability of being covered by the national media than a disaster outside Java.

To investigate the concentration of different national media on the issue of the Mt. Merapi disaster, I chose *Kompas* and *MetroTV* as simple proxies for the national media. *Kompas* was the most read national newspaper in Indonesia[206] and *MetroTV* was the most watched national news television channel (Nielsen, 2010a), both by the general audience and by audiences who participated in my study. The two light colours, grey and pink, are used to represent the level of coverage given by *Kompas* (pink) and *MetroTV* (grey) (see Figure 7 on the next page). The dark colours represent the coverage given by the media in their most valuable space, the front page of the *Kompas* newspaper and prime time on *MetroTV*.[207] The graph shows that the Mt. Merapi disaster was always on the national media (the light colours), and was clearly present in the most valuable space of each medium throughout the crisis, although the frequency was variable. On both media the trend of coverage was clearly rising, reflecting the rising trend of Mt. Merapi's volcanic activities from 26 October-5 November 2010 (Surono *et*

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[205] Personal interview with the executive editor of *Vivanews* news portal on 11 December 2012. Transcript no. 36, p. 10. Personal interview with a reporter of *Kompas* newspaper on 17 December 2010. Transcript no. 41, pp. 10-11.
[206] Last accessed 10 June 2014 at: http://www.kompasiklan.com/kenapa
[207] Further description of the data collection can be found in the Appendix ...

al., 2012). In this sense, the media were not independent from physical reality; it followed the dynamics of the eruptions.



Figure 7. Number of daily reports about Mt. Merapi in *Kompas* newspaper and on *MetroTV* channel.[208]

But the media's concentration on the disaster could only be effective if it was reciprocated by the audiences. Although collectively the audiences' attention was relatively fragmented to many media outlets, my interviews revealed audiences' specific behaviour towards media outlets in disaster. In general, television channels were among the most popular source of information about disaster. The audiences relied on their existing knowledge that the two television channels, *MetroTV* and *TV One*, provided 'actual' (*aktual*) information. Specifically, some audiences gave more trust to *MetroTV* than *TV One* because they perceived that its reporting was more 'accurate' (*benar*) and, accordingly, they 'trusted' (*percaya*) it more.[209]

What I am trying to argue here is that concentration of collective attention, as a necessary precondition to collective action, was not only a function of audiences and media outlets, but also of an issue. Thus, although the audiences' attention was spread across many media outlets, it was still concentrated, because the media outlets of different platforms, to a certain degree, focused on one issue. This does not mean that there was consensus of perspectives or arguments, but that different perspectives and arguments confirmed the factuality and importance of the issue (Dayan, 2009, p. 23). In

[208] The data on MetroTV's coverage were only available until 8 November 2010.

[209] *TV One* received a backlash from some of the audiences because of its inaccurate report when its journalist reported about pyroclastic flow reaching the city, although some other audiences still relied on it. We can see the audiences' reaction to the inaccurate report on the Kaskus online forum and Kompasiana blog platform. Last accessed 12 March 2014 at: http://archive.kaskus.co.id/thread/5755806/0#14, also http://muda.kompasiana.com/2010/10/30/penjelasaan-saya-atas-postingan-boikot-tv-one-308792.html

this case, the issue was the disaster of Mt. Merapi. And we can see how the issue kept recurring on the first page of *Kompas* and on prime time *MetroTV*.

Dayan (2009) nicely summarised the critical aspect of collective attention using the concept of 'sharedness'. One of the key dimensions of sharedness is its temporality, whether it is coordinated using a schedule, or played in a loop, or reported live as in the case of national television (p. 22). Audiences of Indonesian media could follow the disaster daily in the newspapers, such as in *Kedaulatan Rakyat* (local newspaper in Yogyakarta), *Kompas* (national newspaper), and *Pikiran Rakyat* (local newspaper in West Java).[210] The audiences could also watch the report on *MetroTV*, the national news television channel. During the height of the crisis, *MetroTV* broadcast its reports every hour, from 8 am to 8 pm. Furthermore, it was not only the constant presence of media coverage of the disaster that focused the audiences' attention to it, but this was partly also because the media facilitated audiences' physical connection to it. Various media: television, news portals, and newspapers, monitored the spread of the volcanic ash thrown by Mt. Merapi.[211] The ash was blown by the wind to West Java cities, such as Bandung and Ciamis, thus creating a feeling of living in the same physical space. The audiences themselves were letting each other know about the spread of volcanic ash on Twitter.[212]

A suggestive story concerning the spread of volcanic ash and the people's reaction to it was told by the coordinator of citizen journalists at Jalin Merapi.[213] During the first week of the eruption he commuted from his university on lower slopes of Mt. Merapi to the city of Yogyakarta, about 17 km to the south. He observed that the behaviour of his friend in the city of Yogyakarta and the people on the street did not change in the first week. Traffic and activities at the city's consumer centres were running regularly. He slept at his friend's house every night and recalled that they did not speak about the eruption beyond what the television reported. It was not until on the night of 30 October 2010 when the eruption threw volcanic ash into the skies of Yogyakarta city that he observed people on the street starting to take pictures of themselves in the midst of grey

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[210] I archived every photograph of the three newspapers that was relevant to the Mt. Merapi disaster. The archives were used very lightly here, only to examine whether photographs related to the disaster were printed daily, which was found to be supported.
[211] Last accessed 12 March 2014 at:
http://regional.kompas.com/read/2010/11/05/11440922/Debu.Merapi.Dirasakan.di.Bandung,
http://www.antaranews.com/news/230384/debu-merapi-sampai-ciamis-selatan,
http://news.liputan6.com/read/305056/debu-vulkanik-sudah-sampai-di-bandung
[212] Last accessed 12 March 2014 at: https://twitter.com/infopangandaran/status/28804658696 and https://twitter.com/tegargupeta/status/28793042254
[213] Personal interview with the coordinator of citizen journalist on 3 January 2013.

surroundings. His friend in the city were surprised to see him covered with the ash and checked his own roofs. Then the friend asked, 'How's everyone up in the north?' The question, he perceived, ended the separation between the media reports and his friend's own reality. The friend realised that he was connected to the disaster physically. Perhaps, this kind of connection with the reality of disaster was also facilitated by media and Twitter users' reports of the spread of the volcanic ash. The media, in this case, functioned more than as just a window through which an audience member could see the world, but also as a means to reconnect their own experience with the experiences of others.

To summarise, audiences' collective attention as a precondition for collective action is characterised by focusing of media across platforms, both mainstream and the people's media, on one issue that created sharedness among the media users. The regularity of the issue's presence in central places of different national media enabled its identification as a relevant issue. Furthermore, some of the audience had a physical connection with the disaster that further strengthened their perception of it.

6.2. Formulating the Problem

I have argued that the collective attention of Indonesian audiences was concentrated on an event. Without this concentration, the audience could not have made an inference that many other people out there were thinking about the same thing. It was a necessary precondition, but not sufficient for the birth of collective action. The subsequent process that needed to take place was characterisation of the event as a problem. It was a critical stage because a disaster event, especially to the audiences who lived too far from it to be affected directly, could be seen as many things or even 'nothing'. For example, Lilie Chouliaraki (2006) typified news about suffering as 'adventure', which merely registered facts, distanced the audiences from the space-time of the event, and 'suppressed the possibility of action' (p. 98). Media could also represent suffering as 'emergency', which was more complicated visually and verbally, had a specific-concrete space-time, and invited the audiences to ask for external intervention. The third category was 'ecstatic news', which usually used live footage, situated the suffering in the lived time and space' of the audiences, and depicted the sufferers as sovereign agents that brought about the audiences' reflexive identification with them.

Fine and White (2002) identified four processes that enabled a human interest story to establish a public, in the sense of collectively focused attention on an event.

First, media competed with each other to win readers' attention and made an effort to secure their professional interest. Second, media depicted the scene and personae that audiences could identify with. Third, the narrative revealed conflicts and different outcomes to keep audiences interested. And fourth, the story created a moral that audiences could adapt to their own lives and, in so doing, participated in the construction of a public. Chouliaraki's and Fine and White's models of news and human interest stories respectively point to the importance of transformation of an event in the external reality to a construction by the media in the constitution of audiences' responses. Faced with the depiction of the other's suffering, one possible response was to frame it as an ethical issue (Boltanski, 2004). The media's depiction of suffering cannot be easily dismissed because indifference is an unethical response (p. 20). I would emphasise here that mediated suffering becomes an ethical issue because it could be changed, because there is an opportunity to alter the circumstances.

The audiences saw disaster as an ethical problem. I heard many times the words '*empathy*' (*empati*) and '*fellow feeling*' (*merasa senasib*) used by the audiences in my interviews and in the survey. It was an ethical problem, because the audiences felt they should do something because it was a good thing to do. They employed an implicit framework of what were good and bad things to do in the circumstances. Some audience members framed their ethical judgement usage as a religious imperative, and some others associated their values with secular ideas of humanity. For example, while one donor felt his religion 'taught us to help each other in a good cause',[214] another donor explained that it was our 'duty to help each other, especially those in a hardship', without referring it to his religion.[215]

It was the very act of making certain features of an event salient and of drawing the connection between what had happened and what its impacts were that made disaster a problem. It was the moment when the audience member who checked the volcanic ash on his rooftop asked, 'How's everyone?' after about a week of following the news. At that particular moment, the event was not only intruding his physical space, which prompted him to check his rooftop, but also brought him to the question of how it impacted 'everyone'. Needless to say, not everyone responded the same way. And, more importantly, it was a collective moment for the audiences not only because the separate audiences responded simultaneously, but also because there was a collective

214 [...] *dianjurkan utk saling tolong-menolong dlm kebaikan*. Survey response no. 49.
215 [...] *kewajiban kita untuk saling tolong-menolong, apalagi terhadap saudara yang terkena musibah*. Survey response no. 37.

effort to construct the problem. To construct the problem meant making certain features salient and, in so doing, the audiences saw that their intervention was needed, possible, and would make a difference.

The construction of problem took place on an individual level, as I have described in the previous paragraphs, and on the organisational level as well. The individual and organisational levels were connected and informed each other. Let me recall the case of the Jalin Merapi volunteer who felt an itch when seeing the discrepancy between the dramatic television report and the calm report made by the local people. He identified the problem of overdramatised reporting, but he did not know what to do. Not until he joined Jalin Merapi did he learn about connecting the local people with audience-donors directly.

On the organisational level, the key organisers of Jalin Merapi started to identify the problem two days before the first eruption. On 25 October 2010 they met and discussed the impending eruption of Mt. Merapi.[216] What they identified, based on their previous experience of operating a community-based initiative of disaster communication was that there was a disconnection between the needs of the local community and the potential helpers from the outside. The mass media could not help them because they were interested in their own issues and trusted the officials of government agencies more than the local people to get an overview of the circumstances. The contrast between how the people's media formulated the problem and that of the mainstream media can be seen in the early days of the eruption. On the day of the eruption, Jalin Merapi's website published a news article titled 'The refugees need masks and blankets'. The news article contained description of the problem and the contact details (cellular phone numbers) of local people on three sides of the mountain, Klaten, Magelang, Boyolali, excluding Sleman, which was already well-covered by the mainstream media. On the other hand, *MetroTV* was more interested in the explosion itself, live coverage of the evacuation and the refugee camps (without mentioning their immediate and particular needs, but more about their safety), and their great interest in whether Mbah Maridjan was killed and, later, identification of the alleged body of Mbah Maridjan.[217] We can see here that different organisations formulated the problem differently. Jalin Merapi formulated it as a practical problem of

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[216] Personal interview the coordinator of Jalin Merapi on 5 July 2011. Transcript no. 8. And personal interview with the coordinator of Jalin Merapi's media centre on 13 April 2011. Transcript no. 6.
[217] This does not mean that Jalin Merapi did not pay any attention to the issue of Mbah Maridjan. However, it did not pay too much attention. Only 43 out of 2592 (1.7%) Twitter updates on the account of @jalinmerapi during the month of October 2010 account were related to him.

disconnection and localised information, whereas *MetroTV* formulated it as a threat to the local people, which at the time was just a story to the national audience.

Similar efforts to formulate the problem were made by the coordinator of Jalin Merapi volunteers when he recruited information volunteers who would be writing reports about the local people. The recruiters gave them a long brief about the current state of disaster reporting, especially by national television channels, about its sensationalistic character, and how they were going to provide an alternative to that. In my interview, the recruits said that the difference lay in perspective. Their perspective was that of 'the people' (*warga*). So, for example, rather than focusing on description of the evacuation process, which was often characterised by the national television using the word 'panic', they focused on what the refugees actually needed and whether the needs had been met. In short, the volunteers of Jalin Merapi collectively formulated the problem of relief efforts as a problem of lack of specific and people-centred information on needs and of disconnection between potential helpers and the survivors.

The process of formulating the problem demonstrated by complainers was different from that carried out by volunteers in that complainers did not deliberate as a collective. My interviews with complainers revealed that the process of problem formulation took place within a private context. Usually it started with complainers knowing about the *Silet* show, directly from the television or from other sources, then they looked for more information about it, and then they complained. They did refer to other audiences' observations, as can be seen in the copy-paste content of their complaints and in the Kaskus discussion threads and Facebook page. However, it was less of a discussion than that of a collective outcry. There was almost no exchange of arguments and evidences. I found one thread in the mail-list of media professionals discussing the topic, but it only started on 1 December 2010, or more than three weeks after the incident. It is clear that formulation of problems occurred privately in the case of complainers. And, accordingly, there were diverse views as to what the problem was and what intervention was needed, and by whom.

Donors to *Kedaulatan Rakyat* did discuss the disaster. Let me remind you of the interview I did with a group of primary school teachers in the city of Yogyakarta. The teachers had an informal talk during the lunch hour. The idea about soliciting donations from their students emerged because they 'read about it [the disaster]', most likely they read about it in *Kedaulatan Rakyat*. Pensioners on the western side of Yogyakarta said, interestingly, that they could donate to *Kedaulatan Rakyat* but they could not donate to *Indosiar*, a national television channel that raised funds for the medical treatment of sick individuals, because they did not have enough funds to participate. In these two cases the donors not only received how the media made an aspect of the event salient, but that there was a great need for funds and aid regardless of the particularities of the individual and group needs, and they also accepted the media's role of intervention in the problem. In contrast, the volunteers formulated the problem of relief effort not only as a great need for aid and funds, but there was specification of the need and, more importantly, the disconnection between the donors and the donees. Donors who donated directly and not through media institutions greatly appreciated what Jalin Merapi did in providing specific, daily updated news on needs and local contacts of the refugees. In other words, the problems of localised needs and disconnection were overlooked when the donors accepted formulation of problem by *Kedaulatan Rakyat*.

The complainers formulated the problem in a much less concerted way. My interviews with the complainers show that they felt angry when watching the show or learning about it from other sources. They felt angry for different reasons, from blasphemy to inaccuracy. They assessed their own perceptions with those of the others through the media by browsing through Facebook statuses, Twitter updates, and Kaskus threads and through face-to-face interaction and, in the process, learned about KPI. The complainers were angered for different reasons, but their 'assessment' of other people's reactions made them think that the wider audiences would panic.

To summarise, the efforts to make some features of the event more salient and to open a space for audiences' intervention existed in the three forms of collective action, although they differed in their level of organisation.

6.3. Imagining the Others

To illustrate the stage of imagining the others, I will use a donation process I participated in. On 6 November 2010, one day after the biggest explosion that killed more than 300 people, I followed a group of people in their thirties from Jakarta who visited Yogyakarta to donate directly to the refugees. It was their second trip to donate. Using two cars, we went to a large wholesale store located on the north-east side of Yogyakarta ring road. The store was quite busy, probably because it was Saturday, the day when people had more time to shop. What was a bit unusual was that I saw people loading a pile of disposable diapers, towels, pillows, and biscuits into an already big shopping trolley.[218] At the check-out till, when we paid, I learnt that baby food had sold

[218] Field note, 6 November 2010.

out. I also saw customers who wore masks, either disposable or industrial masks. Based on the quantity and kind of products the customers bought, I had the impression that these customers were buying not for themselves, but for the refugees. In one of the alleys between two product-shelves that stood about five metres high, I observed a group of young people, perhaps students, having a small squabble over their purchase. To be specific, they were arguing over a pack of tea bags. The male customer spoke to the female customer in a dialect that clearly was not that of the Yogyakarta people, 'Isn't it for the refugees? [They are] unlike us'.[219] The male customer was hesitant over whether tea bags were the right choice to give to refugees. Maybe he was thinking that villagers of Mt. Merapi consumed different types of tea products, or that tea bags were impractical, or created more waste. Whatever his thoughts were, the questions could only be answered by imagining what it was like to be a refugee.

Similar imagination was also required in cooking for the refugees. The coordinator of a 'soup kitchen' that provided food for refugees said in an interview that she imagined that meals at the refugee camp were oftentimes boring. About the menu, she said, 'If not egg, [then it would be] tempeh. Egg, tempeh, egg, tempeh. How [I could] make it more varied, so that they didn't get bored'. It was based on her own observation when she worked for the refugee kitchen during the earthquake in 2006. To avoid this, she changed the menu as often as she could, sometimes using other volunteers' favourite recipes, as long as she could cook it fast enough to produce up to 600 rice packages per day. In addition to imagining what the refugees' preferences were, she also used her own taste, 'If I won't eat it myself, I won't cook it'. She aimed for the 'middle range' of taste, not too salty, or too sweet, or too hot. Regarding how many rice packages and the target of delivery, she relied, partly, on Jalin Merapi's daily updates. But she had to continually solve menu problems by using her imagination.

The barriers to connecting with the suffering other through imagination were, perhaps, higher for schoolchildren. This can be gleaned from my survey, which showed that many teachers (n = 19) invited their students to donate. Their reason was 'to instil empathy' (*menanamkan rasa peduli*) or 'to instil social spirit' (*menanamkan jiwa sosial*) into the students. It is clear that their role as a teacher positioned them to see their role as an agent of moral education. Correspondingly, the disaster donation was intended to 'train' (*melatih*) schoolchildren to construct imaginary relationship with the suffering others. In the media, as I have previously mentioned, vulnerable people were

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[219] *Ini 'kan untuk pengungsi. [Mereka] tidak seperti kita. Ibid.*

often pictured more prominently, through close-ups, to inspire compassion.[220] Instead of using visual discourse, Jalin Merapi used words to report on '*vulnerable groups*' (*kelompok rentan*) and to emphasise their special needs. I interviewed a teacher at an international school in Jakarta who invited her students to donate to the children-refugees; they did not donate their aid through *Kedaulatan Rakyat*. She started by showing them newspaper clippings that portrayed what the refugees' circumstances looked like. She then asked them to '*express*' their thoughts. For instance, a student drew two lumps of cloud that were connected by a bright rainbow, decorated with two bright heart signs on the right side of the frame. Underneath the picture, the student wrote, 'I am sorry [for] what happend [sic] to your house and your things. Love, [the student's name]'. Their pictures and their donation (foods, crayons, and other school stationery) were given to the children-refugees, who were then asked to return the message with a drawing. Whereas the Jakartan children's message consisted of love and empathy, the children-refugees' picture depicted their current reality: big mountain with lava flowing down from the top.

It was the audiences' separation from the refugees that made them imagine the refugees' circumstances and preferences. If they cooked at the refugee camp, they could easily ask what the refugees wanted. For example, a private donor who repeatedly went to the refugee camp to relay donations from her network said that one of the favourite menus of the refugees was fried instant noodles. This 'was easy to make' and 'did not go bad easily' so it could be eaten later if it was not all eaten in one service because, it was dry and oily. She added that the refugees loved fried food, so she bought gallons of cooking oil, whereas the soup kitchen cook that I described previously avoided frying food because it took a lot of time. The direct connection with the refugees allowed for easier decisions regarding ingredients and menus, as can be seen in the case of the donor of fried instant noodles and cooking oil. On the other hand, without specific information from the refugees, the kitchen soup cook relied on her imagination and experience.

This specific kind of imagination work was not required from the donors of *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, because of two reasons: they donated through an intermediary and they donated money. The existence of the intermediary made the work of specifying the object of donation the intermediary's responsibility. Furthermore, money was perceived to be convertible to meet a wide range of needs, or 'flexible' (*luwes*) in the words of the

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[220] Group interview with the photographers of national and local newspapers and a news website on 5 January 2011. Transcript no. 4, p. 4.

chief editor of the newspaper, so that imagining the needs of refugees was not necessary. Money was more related to how they reflected the good standing of the donors and the donor's perception of the general need of the refugees. This does not mean that the money donors did not imagine or did not have the capacity to imagine the refugees; this just means that the money donors did not have to imagine the details of the refugees' daily life to be able to donate effectively. *Kedaulatan Rakyat* only needed to imagine the refugees in general terms since the money they gave was going to be converted into goods by the fundraisers. Words that were oftentimes used in the donors' survey were 'pity' (*kasihan*) for their 'sufferings' (*penderitaan*). The two words lack specifics. In contrast, donating physical objects, such as foods or other basic necessities, required more information than just the object's quantity or the targets of delivery. Even when Jalin Merapi listed, for example, the needs for tea for refugees at camp A, donors would still have to decide the tea type, flavour, and size of package. The donors were worried, and rightfully so, that their donations went to waste when they did not meet the refugees' needs.

The previous illustrations show how physical distance, that oftentimes means disconnection, creates a barrier of communication for donors and how donors use their imagination to overcome their distance from refugees. More importantly, it is social distance, rather than physical distance, that requires audiences to imagine the survivors. For example, when an audience member read a newspaper or opened the timeline of Jalin Merapi's Twitter account, they encountered messages that were created to address 'indefinite strangers' (Warner, 2002). Accordingly, news articles, requests for aid, observations of the volcano, and many other aspects, relied on social imagination to connect audiences with the others (survivors in this case). This social imagination might result from, among other factors, previous experience, media representation, and a deliberate effort to construct new imagination about refugees (as capable survivors).

We can see that complainers needed to imagine the others as well. Some of the complainers had first-hand information about how audiences had reacted to the particular *Silet* show, either because they knew 'victims' (as *witness*) or because they themselves were 'victims'. But the majority of the complainers imagined the reactions of the other people that they represented using their abstract knowledge (*expert*) or their emotions (*fellow*).

The volunteers did a more conceptual imagining of the others by reframing the victims as survivors. The mainstream media used the more common term 'victims' (*korban*) to identify the people who were impacted by disaster. The Jalin Merapi activists saw that the word was imprecise since it did not distinguish the degree of impact. They distinguished the dead and those who survived. Thus, whereas the word 'victims' was associated with death and passivity, the word 'survivor' (*penyintas*) put an emphasis on the capacity of those who were affected to cope with the aftermath.[221] The word survivor, then, not only helped volunteers to view them as having the capacity to cope with the calamity, but it conceptually reframed their relationship with them (Hull, 2005; see further discussion in the glossary).

In the briefing workshop before the citizen journalists of Jalin Merapi were assigned, one volunteer asked, 'Why do we work for the Internet? Isn't it better for us to distribute instant noodles and foods?'[222] The volunteers understandably viewed the urgency of the refugees' needs and the roles of the larger society in helping them as the first priority. But Jalin Merapi activists viewed it a little bit differently. First, they viewed the role of media not as a vehicle to inform the general audience, but as a specific tool to connect the helpers and the survivors. Rather than trying to use the mainstream media, which had disappointed them in the previous crisis, they created their own media for their own specific purpose. Second, through their choice of topic and through providing direct connection with the refugees, they hoped to establish an equal partnership between the helpers and the survivors, rather than an asymmetrical, and sometimes patronising, relationship between givers-recipients. When interviewing the refugees, the citizen journalists did not just walk about and ask questions; rather they helped the refugees to distribute aid or clean the place and asked questions while doing it. The citizen journalists realised that they had entered into a reciprocal relationship where they received information and were expected to return it with aid through their report.

It was still very early days in the whole context of disaster relief effort to assess whether the reimagining of the others (survivors) by Jalin Merapi made any difference to the relationship between survivors and other actors, such as volunteers, donors, and local governments. The challenge of imagining the others can be practical, as in the case of choosing the type of tea. It can also be 'theoretical', evidenced by institutional donors who accepted the media's construction of other and, in contrast, by Jalin Merapi's effort to reformulate equal relationship with the others.

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[221] The word 'survivor' is not adopted in the Disaster Management Act (*Undang-Undang Nomor 24 Tahun 2007*). The activists of Jalin Merapi learned the word and entailed concept from their contacts with international disaster workers. Although they could not define its precise meaning, they used it strategically to avoid the helplessness and passivity connoted by the word of 'victim'.

[222] Personal interview with the coordinator of the citizen journalists on 19 December 2012. Transcript no. 3, p. 25.

6.4. Building Resources

At this stage, we are closer to the domain of collective action, which concerns the creation of common goods, more than the field of audience study, which concerns the use of media. Before proceeding, I would make a disclaimer here that the word 'resources' is not used as an analytical framework and does not imply an affiliation with theories of collective action, particularly Olson's (1971) theory of collective action and McCarthy and Zald's (1977) theory of resource mobilisation. I will not analyse audiences' collective action as an effort that mostly concerns the creation of public good, although this is obviously a real issue. The problem I set out to study was the trajectory, or course, that media users took to respond to the mediated issue through some form of collective action. From this perspective, I viewed that the audiences were faced with a series of barriers that prevented them from easily moving from paying attention to an issue in the media to taking action. It started from structural factors of being separated from each other and having to select from numerous media outlets. Then audiences needed to highlight certain features of the event as their collective problem that opened ways for them to intervene. In the problems that they constructed, they needed to imagine the recipient or the beneficiaries of their action to be able to specify their aid or to claim solidarity with them. Now I will describe the stage where the audiences faced a barrier regarding resources.

It was a practical and real hindrance for the audiences, although the levels of difficulty were different for each type of action. The claim that '[T]he need to accumulate resources [...] diminished substantially under certain circumstances by the availability of new technologies' (Bimber *et al.*, 2005, p. 374) was not supported in several instances. In the case of complaints to the KPI, we can see that this was not the case. On a surface level, we can see support for the 'no accumulation' hypothesis. For example, there was no concerted effort to organise the collective complaint, no financial burden incurred to the participants, and the episode lasted only two days. These suggest that the resources were already there to support the collective action. But under closer scrutiny, we see that the profiles of the complainers (dominantly male) differed from the viewers of *Silet* (dominantly female). It can be interpreted that the antagonistic and public nature of the complaints did not lend themselves to the female gender in Indonesia, who are expected to behave restrainedly (Wieringa, 1994). Yet, the 'witnesses of fact' (*saksi fakta*) that were selected by the KPI to testify before the trial, which was a public act, were female. This decision could have been based on their fit with the demography of *Silet*'s audience, but it could also be seen to imply that the female viewers were *the* victims. I argue that the demographics (male, young, Javanese) of the complainers were, partly, attributable to the technological factor, namely the KPI's choice to use an online system of complaint. Males, the young, and Javanese people enjoyed better access to the internet. If this was the case, then this discrepancy means that resources, tools and skills to access the internet, were not evenly distributed. In other words, access to resources was a barrier to the audiences.

The barrier in terms of resources that complainers faced was a problem of technological means and skills to use the KPI's online system. The channel that was most used by the audiences was an online form on the KPI's website. The KPI did have other channels of complaint, such as a phone line and short message service (SMS). Further, the KPI did receive complaints from the short message service, yet in KPI's (2012) dossier on the case SMS and online complaints were combined to represent '[...] complaints of the people [...] that numbered more than 1,000 [...]'. The 'more than 1,000' offered as evidence in the trial consisted of entries from the KPI's online system.[223] In other words, although phone line and SMS were more popular and people in general had the devices and skills to use them, they were not selected. Phone calls were not reported in the KPI's dossier on the case and I did not hear it mentioned in my interviews with complainers. Short messages were briefly noted in the KPI's report, without any indication about their quantity. There was a report on Twitter by an audience member that the short message service did not work. Regardless of the cause of this discrepancy between availability of channels of complaint and their actual use, internet-connected device was the channel that was singularly chosen by audiences. Despite being less popular (18% of the Indonesian population) with the audiences and its higher skill requirements (skills to connect to the internet, to locate the web address, and fill in the form), the online form became *the* key channel. To put it in a nutshell, at the individual level the resource needed to fill in the online complaint form was a barrier the audiences had to tackle. The audience had to have a computer or smartphone, since without them there was no access to the online form. The physical device hence becomes a critical barrier for individuals. And because individuals were acting individually, they could not share or pool resources with other individuals who did not

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[223] The full archive of complaints cannot be collected. The only archive that was given to me by the KPI was the one collected from the online complaint system, which was not properly accounted for, such as in the case of redundancy that I have noted previously.

have the required resources. Thus individual resourcefulness becomes the determining variable.

At the collective level, the barrier became more difficult. Audiences did not have any organisational support to facilitate their communication. They used only what they could find or had already used before, such as Facebook page, Twitter, and Kaskus forum. Let us focus on the Facebook page. The creator and administrator of the Facebook page that was dedicated to facilitating audiences' outcry against *Silet* did not have the necessary means to regulate other audiences' comments on the page. He knew that he could delete the rude comments manually, one by one, but it was hard work considering the volume of comments. There was no feature on the Facebook page that enabled the creator to moderate these comments easily. What he did was to appeal the other audiences to use polite words, which did not work. The hardest barrier, however, was that the Facebook page creator did not have control of his own page. He was banned from administering his own page by Facebook, without prior notification or venue to appeal the decision. Thus, the barrier of resources had to be overcome when audiences moved toward taking collective action.

The same obstacle was also faced by the activists of Jalin Merapi. When they started, the activists asked the board of the Combine Resource Institute, a member of the Jalin Merapi network that coordinated the disaster relief effort, to fund the initiative. The money to fund the whole relief effort came from the Combine Resource Institute and they avoided asking disaster donors or reimbursing the cost from donations. At the end of December the coordinator stopped the operation because they ran out of money, although some volunteers were still enthusiastic about their work and the threat of lahar was still real. The money was, essentially, spent to run the two divisions of their 'crisis information centre', the media centre and information volunteers in the field. In addition to money, labour was also an issue. Although at the peak of the crisis the need for volunteers was easily met through open recruitment, when the threat had subsided and the universities in Yogyakarta returned to their daily activities, many student-volunteers left their posts while refugees were still staying at the camps.[224] When the cycle of social life returned, gradually, to its previous state, students faced a conflict in commitment with their studies. This shows how resources were a barrier at the individual and collective level.

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[224] Dewi, A. S. (2010). *Posko JM Butuh Relawan* (*Jalin Merapi Posts Need Volunteers*), last accessed 22 March 2014 at: http://merapi.combine.or.id/baca/10892/posko-jm-butuh-relawan.html

With regard to the case of donors, they faced less difficult issues of resource collection. Their institutions might already have a *social fund*, or they could facilitate collection of resources by soliciting members of their organisation. In both cases, their barriers were relatively lower, but they still had to seek official authorisation from their institutions to use the *social fund* or to solicit money from other members.

6.5. Taking Action

It finally comes to the critical question of *to cross* or *not to cross* these boundaries. When resources have met the minimal requirement to support collective action, then audiences are ready to cross private-public boundaries. Not all of the audiences crossed the boundaries, or not as easily. I have reported how the schoolteachers redid their fund collection because the resources they collected were not enough. And I interviewed audiences who were upset by the *Silet* show, and even created a Facebook page against the show, but did not file complaints to the KPI because they thought it was 'too complicated' (*ribet*). The complaints on the Facebook page and on Twitter posts were public because they were done in front of the other audiences and could be read by anyone, but these complainers were not the publics that the KPI addressed because the complaints were not formally filed through official channels. At the individual level, the reasons for not taking the action were varied and could not be accounted for as this study focuses on the 'positive cases'. The approach did not allow me to make comparison between those who did and those who did not, and what caused the difference. Instead of learning from negative cases of individuals, I focus on the specific mechanism of each collective action: giving, doing, and speaking, which the following paragraphs will examine.

Bimber *et al.* (2005) have rightly argued that the decision to join a collective action is no longer a discrete, or binary, situation where there are only two options: to contribute or to free-ride. They argue that communication and information technology have enabled some forms of interaction in which the participants do not act to seek a common goal, but their interactions result in information resources that can be critical to the emergence of future collective action, as can be seen in the information contributed by users of various online services (p. 371-2). In the words of the authors:

> Individuals can now contribute to information repositories with no or only partial knowledge of other participants or contributors and without a clear intention or knowledge of contributing to communal information with public goods properties. (p. 372)

The argument is supported by the case of the IBM workers' union, which was started by a worker's e-mail to the CEO and run using their internal online discussion groups (pp. 378-379). The existence of the online discussion group eliminated the need to find interested individuals, how to communicate to a large group of people, and how to coordinate chapters of worker unions all over the world. The example provides a clear and convincing example of the irrelevance of the problem of free-ride.

I found a rather similar mechanism at work in the case of the donors. I have demonstrated that *Kedaulatan Rakyat* donors were mostly institutional in nature. As institutions, they collected resources from members at their regular gatherings. There was one common allocation in the budget of these different institutions, namely the 'social fund' (*dana sosial*). Although it was set aside for members of the group who were ill or had a death in the family, the social fund was not fully private. The fund was under the control of the institution. The institutional nature of the group and the purpose of allocation put the social fund in an intermediary zone between private and public. When a need for disaster relief presented itself, it did not take a hard push to convert the 'social fund' to become a publicly accessible fund. It must be noted, though, that it was still not fully a *public fund* because the newspaper was a private entity and the funds raised were managed exclusively by their committee, without participation of donors. The people who were impacted by the disaster could propose to use the money, but the decision belonged to the relief effort organisers, who were staff of the newspaper. The lack of public oversight and control over the Indonesia mass media-led disaster fundraising did not diminish the importance of the initiative because it was, and has been, prevalent and able to raise a large amount of money (Abidin and Kurniawati, 2004). And the 'blurring' of the private and public boundaries in the mass media-raised disaster fund shows precisely that the specific nature of collective action, namely *conversion of ownership*, is critical in understanding the processes from collective attention to collective action.

The dominant mechanism that was at work in mass medium-led donation was conversion. Ownership was converted from 'private-' (institutions) to 'public' (on behalf of which the newspaper acted). The money was not earned through commerce or work, which relatively took more time than donation. There were some efforts made by donors, such as soliciting from neighbours, people on the street, visitors of a store, or audiences of a fundraising show. But these did not make up the major part of the contribution and, more importantly, the money was not given in exchange for their work. This point is important to note since the urgency of disaster relief requires quick response. Furthermore, conversion was not only a question of availability, that the society has enough money to survive the disaster, but also a complex web of cultural values and social relationships that allowed such an easy conversion.

I have previously argued the relevance of the cultural practice of *nyumbang* (see section 5.1. on page 173) in the Javanese people's predisposition to donate. When audiences feel they share the same collectivity with the refugees, *nyumbang* becomes their natural response. To raise enough funds that reflect their social standing in the community would not be as easy without the existence of a social fund (*dana social*) in many organisations. The cultural value of appropriateness (*pantas*), which is intimately related to being seen as a member of the community, is carried over to the new context where the media constitute different visibility, creating uneasiness to some donors. Hence, the cultural values and the social relationship between audiences, the media, and the larger community create a complex web that affects how easy or difficult the conversion of ownership will be.

Whereas the nature of donation is conversion of ownership, or crossing of boundaries between private-public ownership, the case of volunteerism revolves around *doing*, rather than *giving*. The 'doing' of volunteerism, in the Mt. Merapi disaster, generally requires physical movement. The volunteers travelled from the neighbouring cities of the impacted areas and, to a lesser extent, from farther areas or even outer Java. Many of them stayed only for the two nights of the weekend, but many others stayed for several weeks, and even months. Physical mobility was also the key consideration of the recruiters: whether they would be assigned or not, and to which posts they would be assigned.

Not all of the volunteers moved physically though. I reported the Twitter users who transcribed volcano observations made by citizens to Twitter updates from their homes. They volunteered not by moving to another place, but by making these observations available to people on other channels of communication. What they did resembled the works of 'voluntweeters' (Starbird and Palen, 2011) and 'crisis mapping' (Meier, 2012; Meier and Munro, 2010) where those who had better access to the communication and information technology helped those in the field to communicate with other stakeholders or the wider society. Some of the Jalin Merapi volunteers themselves worked from their media centre to pool and distribute information using various channels of communication. However, what made Jalin Merapi work and secured the trust of the wider audiences was its close connection with volunteers on the ground. Volunteers at the media centre themselves felt they had to go to the site to really feel their work was meaningful, which they did. Thus, volunteers who did not go to the site were also considered to be volunteering, but collectively the audience needed to go to the affected areas to volunteer. Furthermore, volunteers themselves generally equated volunteering with giving help in the impacted areas.

Collective complaint was different from collective donation and volunteerism in that it did not concern a physical object or going to another place; it was about message *transmission*. Audiences complained on any channel they felt familiar with: Kaskus, Facebook, Twitter, face-to-face conversations, personal phone calls, and many others. And these were meaningful expressions for both complainers and those who were exposed to them. Yet, only complaints that were sent to KPI, and more specifically, those transmitted through their official channels were recognised and acted on. To be recognised by the regulator, complaints had to be transmitted to their system. For example, the KPI has an official Twitter account, but complaints through this channel were not recognised because it was not the designated channel. Because of this, the KPI's technologies of choice constituted a barrier for the audiences when they took collective action. It was not only an issue of having the device, or the skills to operate the device, but also the know-how of filing the complaint form. Audiences had to know which sections were mandatory (name, sex, e-mail address, and verification code) and which sections were optional (e.g., topic of complaint, age, education level, etc.). The content of the complaints was important, but it did not matter too much to KPI since the complaint section of the form itself was optional and the KPI conducted its own investigation when a complaint was received. To the audiences, their ability to transmit their private feelings and thoughts to the KPI was the critical move in their effort to complain as a public.

6.6. Conclusion

Throughout the chapter, I have shown the processes that took place when Indonesian audiences collectively moved from paying attention to taking actions. These processes were reconstructed from the empirical cases of the Indonesian audiences' collective actions. From the Indonesian audiences' viewpoint, there were several barriers that needed to be overcome when making the move toward collective action. These audiences might not have been aware of the barriers, but the barriers were immanent in the three-party relationship between audience-media-other. The word barriers here was used to sensitise us to audiences' agency in overcoming them but also to the complex arrangement of structural and technical factors that constrain realisation of collective action. Collective actions, seen from this perspective, have to be intentional acts (Laurence, 2011) rather a result of random collective behaviours. Accordingly, we can see that complaints were the least successful collective action due to their difficulty in overcoming the barriers of problem formulation and technological resources. And volunteerism at Jalin Merapi was the most successful collective action in overcoming the barriers. It is important to note here, too, that the existing capacities of the actors and socio-cultural practices are factors in the success in overcoming barriers of collective action.

To be specific, these barriers resulted from structural factors in the Indonesian media, the mediated relationship with the event and the people of Merapi, and the complex social relationships and protocols. Structural factors in the Indonesian media comprised proliferation of media outlets and concentration of media in Java that could fragment and/or concentrate audiences' collective attention (Sudibyo and Faisol, 2004). In addition, uneven distribution of access to the internet was also a structural condition that needed to be tackled the audiences (Nugroho *et al.* 2012; 2013). The mediated relationship with the event allowed audiences to see some of the problems, while obscuring the others. And the mediated relationship with the people of Merapi required audiences to imagine them (Boltanski, 2004). The strangers relationship (Warner, 2002), enabled by the media, created a problem that did not exist in other types of relationship, such as kinship or friendship. Lastly, the complex social relationship and protocol that constituted private-public boundaries needed careful navigation, such as in the case of converting private money to a publicly accessible fund, moving from private homes to public or semi-public areas, and transmitting personal complaints to be recognised as a public voice.

The processes were laid out sequentially as an ideal type. This means that in reality the sequences could manifest in different order or could be incomplete. The distinctions between each stage were not clear-cut, but resembled over-lapping waves of movement. Conceptualised as such, the first stage did not necessarily end when the second stage started. The process could be stunted before reaching the end or restart from the previous stage. This process was also not intended to prescribe what a successful transformation from attention to action looked like. It works to 'sensitise' (Blumer, 1954) researchers about 'directions', but they still need to specify and distinguish how it manifests differently in other contexts.

The first barrier to be overcome by audiences was fragmentation of their attention to many media outlets across platforms. The large part of these efforts was not a deliberate effort on the audiences' part. Rather, it was attributable to the larger structure of an Indonesian media industry that was concentrated and biased toward Java. The national media, electronic and print, allocated their most valuable resources, the front page of a newspaper and prime time on television channels, to coverage of the disaster. Despite its local status as a disaster, the existence of another disaster in Mentawai, and segmentation of media contents, the Mt. Merapi eruption enjoyed fairly continual coverage from the mainstream media. Mt. Merapi was situated in the heart of the most developed and populated island and it played key role in the long histories of Java's kingdoms (Newhall *et al.*, 2000). The disaster itself 'facilitated' the audiences' connection to it through the spread of volcanic ash throughout several parts of central and west Java, which the media covered and the audiences' monitored as evidenced in their Twitter updates.

When the concentration of attention, as a necessary precondition, had been achieved, the next stage was the delineation of the event. One dominant framework used by the audiences was the ethical framework, to see the other's suffering as connected to them and to view it as a good thing to intervene, although they were strangers to each other. In order to intervene, they needed to specify the problem and what could be changed. The volunteers of Jalin Merapi formulated the problem of disaster relief as the lack of local, up-to-date, and actionable information about refugees' needs among potential helpers (see Palen, 2008). Such formulation of the problems opened an action space for them to produce the required information and distribute it. On the other hand, donors to *Kedaulatan Rakyat* accepted the media's formulation, which was more general and less actionable. This demonstrates the difference of approach between the mainstream media and the people's media, including social imagination about the refugees (as passive recipients versus active partners) (Kim and Dutta, 2009). With regard to complainers, they individually formed an impression of the wider audiences' reaction to the TV show and, based on this, concluded that it could make people panic. Although they acted together and their action was identical, the reasons for and purposes of the complaint might be individually different.

The imagination of other became an issue for the audiences because they were disconnected physically from the refugees and did not communicate directly with them. Young donors were 'trained' to imagine the refugees so that they learned to empathise. Those who gave donations needed to imagine what the refugees' preferences were and how to be in their position so that their donation did not go to waste, as exemplified by the case of donors at the wholesale store and the case of the soup kitchen cook.

Volunteers to Jalin Merapi made more strategic efforts to imagine and rearrange a new relationship with the refugees as equal partners, rather than passive receivers. Currently, the issue of audience's imagination has not received a lot of attention. Rather, more attention has been paid to solving the technical issues of enabling them to participate (among others, Meier and Munro, 2010; Meier, 2012; Starbird and Stamberger, 2010; Starbird, 2011).

The resources for collective action were still a barrier for the audiences (Bimber *et al.* 2005). Only some of the complainers could get access to the internet to submit their complaints to KPI's online system. KPI did have phone lines and short message service channels to receive complaints, but the data showed that they were not widely used although they were far more accessible to the audiences. In addition, the complainers as a collective did not have a dedicated platform of communication so that when the administrator was banned from the Facebook page, the 'group' was left abandoned. Jalin Merapi did not allocate funds for the relief effort beforehand, so that they had to reallocate the money from other programmes. They ran out of volunteers when the universities in Yogyakarta were re-opened and they had to end their relief effort when the operational fund had been exhausted. Resources were a barrier from the first days of its operation, in the midst, and at the end of it. But the donors had fewer issues with resources. What they had to do was to seek authorisation to use the *social fund* or to solicit from the other members. This somewhat qualifies the formulation of Bimber *et al.* (2005) that even in the less material type of action lack of access to media devices can hinder audiences from joining a collective action.

Each collective action studied here followed a specific mechanism in accord to the nature of action. The nature of donation was about an exchange of ownership. Accordingly, donors to *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, in general, did not have to exert a lot of energy to convert ownership of the money they wanted to give because the money was already in the intermediary zone between the private and public domains. The private-public boundaries that were crossed by the volunteers were concerned more with physical location because volunteering in disaster generally required being in the impacted areas. The complainers crossed the private-public boundaries through the act of transmitting their complaints to the KPI's official channel. The processual view to understanding the transitions that audiences go through can shed a light on what mechanisms are at work and how these audiences exert their agency in crossing the boundaries (Livingstone, 2004; Das, 2011; Couldry *et al.*, 2007).

This concludes the chapter that answers the last research question of this thesis. In the next chapter I will distil the insights of my study and discuss them in the wider context of audience study. I will attempt to make explicit my contribution to the field of audience study and discuss its connection with future works.

Chapter 7. Conclusions

This chapter discusses the insights developed in the previous chapters in light of my data and findings and in relation to contemporary literature in different fields of research, as identified in Chapter 2. I will structure the discussion in this chapter into three sections, each of which discusses a specific topic. The presentation of this chapter is structured to emphasise the importance of the finding by starting from the most important topic. The first topic is about the processes that the audiences go through to act collectively, which builds on the findings of Chapter 6. In this section I will specifically draw from contemporary literature on how unprecedented development of the media has allowed for new possibilities of action. The second topic concerns collective actions taken by Indonesian audiences, which draws on Chapter 5. This section will engage with the issue of mediated collective actions and the constitution of publics. The last section will discuss the audiences' collective attention. It will critically reflect the findings of Chapter 4 in light of our changing conceptions of the relationship between people and media, including the way we may conceptualise the collective nature of audiences.

7.1. Discussion

Processes of Participation

The following section discusses the findings of research question three (see page 23), "How were audiences transformed into collective actors of disaster relief effort?" and "What processes and mechanisms were involved?" This section explores processes and mechanisms of transformation as an issue of participation in public life, which in this case is participation in various relief efforts (Livingstone, 2013). Particular attention will be given to how media users' participation is facilitated, or hindered, by the larger communicative environment, such as the structure of media industry, the access to the internet-enabled devices, and the existence of the people's media among others.

The participation of media audiences or users – or how the media are used by the people to participate – in disaster relief efforts has started to receive attention from researchers (among others, Farinosi and Trere, 2011; Meier and Munro, 2010; Palen and Liu, 2007; Starbird and Palen, 2011). These studies of the empirical cases of innovative uses of various media in disaster relief efforts show the potentials of media, old and new, to facilitate the people to recruit and organise volunteers, to seek and distribute donations, and to collect and broadcast crisis information. However, a processual view whereby the people who previously did not know about the disaster decide to join collective action in response to a disaster is lacking. The audience perspective of the processes of participation is particularly useful here for empirical and theoretical reasons. Empirically, the aforementioned studies confirm that people who were otherwise unconnected used media in a joint effort in response to disaster. Further, the wide adoption of smartphones and other internet-enabled devices in recent years adds to the importance of media use in disaster relief. Theoretically, the processual approach can shed a light to the problem of 'ever more mediated' participation, where participation and mediation become more difficult to untangle (Livingstone, 2013, p. 25).

By focusing on how audiences' engagement is transformed from paying attention to taking action (see Figure 5 on page 229), I uncover the processes that constitute the transformation. These are *concentration of attention*, *formulation of problem*, *imagination of others*, *accumulation of resources*, and, finally, *action*. These collective processes are necessary measures taken by audiences to overcome inherent barriers to collective action, which result from the structural conditions of media. These barriers are: fragmentation of attention across many media outlets (Webster, 1986, 2005; Krugman, 1985), indeterminate relevance of a mediated suffering (Chouliaraki, 2006), the stranger-relationship between audiences and the suffering others (Boltanski, 2004), lack of resources (see Bimber *et al*, 2005 for contrast), and the separation of private-public domains (Bimber *et al.*, 2005).

The formulation of these processes has not been attempted before from the audiences' perspective.[225] By adopting the audience perspective, the formulation does not prioritise some media over the others based on their supposedly 'new' qualities,[226] but it pays equal attention to the variety of media that are actually used by audiences. Therefore, the local media landscape, in terms of ownership, professional practices, and institutional interests, shapes the media's interaction with audiences. What distinguishes the 'tactic' that audiences use to overcome their collective barriers from other tactics is not the particular modality of media per se, but the different practices of the media institution itself that the audiences need to deal with. For example, there is nothing in the form and content of a newspaper (supposedly 'old' media) that prevents it from identifying the local needs of the refugees and from facilitating readers' direct

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[225] Other perspectives have been proposed, such as narrative perspective (Fine and White, 2002; Torronen, 2000; Yell, 2012) and communication technology perspective (Rheingold, 2003; Shirky, 2008).
[226] Among others, Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; but also Carpentier, 2011.

connection with the refugees. Or, on the contrary, Jalin Merapi could have used its media such as *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, although it uses media that have radically different modalities. The argument that some media could serve one function better than another is beside the point, since the main issue is that a medium's form does not determine its power to mediate different social groups. Rather, it was the practice of the two media institutions (Jalin Merapi and Kedaulatan Rakyat) that created specific barriers that the audiences needed to deal with.

The processual approach also provides an alternative to seeing audiences as discrete categories of audience-users (Livingstone, 2004; Das, 2011), readers-authors (Carpentier, 2011), consumer-producer (Bruns, 2006), or audiences-publics (Couldry *et al.*, 2007; Livingstone, 2005) by showing the series of transitions between the two states and mechanisms of each transition. Each of the processes can involve different social actors (groups, organisations, media institutions) in specific relationship (Postill, forthcoming) and use media for their particular goals. For example, when collective attention was still being concentrated, mainstream mass media took the leading role. But, when the general audiences had concentrated on the issue, the people's media were able to gain some attention from the young audiences and, to some extent, influence the issues being covered by mainstream mass media. In the specific case of *Kedaulatan Rakyat* donors, the institutions played key roles in the whole process and the existence of people's media was very limited. Without an explicit examination of the processes of transformation, these institutions, media, and their interactions can be easily overlooked.

The mechanisms involved can also shed a light on particular experiences and viewpoints of audiences, rather than subsume them under the effects of 'low costs' that the new communication technologies give rise to (Rheingold, 2003; Shirky, 2008) or a function of the specific narrative of human suffering (Fine and White, 2002; Torronen, 2000; Yell, 2012). The lowering cost effect produced by the omnipresence of new, especially mobile, media might be identified in the case of the Jalin Merapi volunteers, but it was not present in the case of donors to *Kedaulatan Rakyat* since readers read it in print form, although both of these audiences face similar problems in moving from attention to action. Thus, the presence of old and new media allows for wider participation by audiences. The narrative model of transformation is also too limited in taking into account of the dynamics of the disaster relief 'field' (Postill, forthcoming) and the different media that are used. The narrative model focuses on the elements and features of the media narratives that move people to participate, without taking into account the empirical challenges faced by the audiences when they make the effort to participate. In addition, the narrative model can only explain why the collective action takes place, not explain what can obstruct it, whereas in the processual model I develop the transformation is seen as inherently problematic.

The processual model I develop is a deliberate attempt to shift the focus of audience study from its preoccupation with meaning-making activities (Jensen and Rosengren, 1990; Jensen, 2002; Webster, 1998), although certainly the issue is still important, to 'participation in the public life' (Livingstone, 2013). In the context of disaster participation, the issue of participation is particularly important due to the widespread observation that the helpers come from the people in the surrounding areas (Prince, 1920; Stallings and Quarantelli, 1985; Parr, 1969; Fraustino *et al.*, 2012). Helping, as an intentional behaviour (Anscombe, 2000), is different from making meaning out of media texts. On the pragmatic level, the motives and the goals are different. Accordingly, the question of 'participation in what' (Livingstone, p. 24) refers to the kinds of helps that the audiences want to give, which forms the basis of my analytical groupings: donating, volunteering, and complaining. The processual model I am adopting here is bound to the perspectives of the audiences, which vary from one group of audiences to another. Accordingly, it has not been able to produce a common timeframe of the audiences' transformation, which constitutes the limitation of this model.

The implication of adopting the audiences' perspective is that the model incorporates plurality of audiences. This means that the analysis should distinguish the transformations that take place within different groups of audiences (e.g. the audiences of newspaper and the users of internet), which makes it more descriptive, than predictive. Whether the transformations will eventually develop into a collective action, and how effectual they are, really depends on many interacting variables and it depends on the dynamics of the disaster event itself as well.

Engagements with Mediated Disaster

My second research question asked how audiences engaged in different forms of collective action (donating, volunteering, complaining) in response to the mediated disaster of Mt. Merapi. The following section highlights and discusses how public-private boundaries were crossed in each collective action, the characteristics of audiences' collectivity, and the structure of production of crisis communication (for further information, see Chapter 5).

This study owes its conceptual tools to view audiences' engagement with mediated disaster from Warner (2002), Dayan (2001, 2005), Livingstone (2005), and Couldry *et al.* (2007). These authors consider the affinities between the use of media and the constitution of publics. Nevertheless, these authors differ on what is required to become members of these publics, ranging from mere attention to taking a position publicly. In my view, collective attention is still unrealised publicness, since the attention is given separately, unknown to each other, and the audiences do not respond to the issues publicly. The further audiences move from attention to action, the more publicness we can clearly see from the process. Disaster is particularly fitting as a case study of audiences' publicness because in disaster the physical and imaginary boundaries between private and public domain are being temporarily transgressed or redrawn. Refugees evacuated their homes, whereas volunteers visited new areas. The private homes of the refugees were left, whereas public buildings and private homes in the city hosted the refugees. The *warga* (members) of one kampong were grouped with previously unrelated kampongs in a new and temporary relationship. In addition to the crossing of private-public boundaries, the intense media coverage on the one side and the audiences' attention that reciprocates them on the other side brought about the problem of visibility (Dayan, 2013). Some issues and places were over-exposed, whereas some other issues were unexposed, thus driving the people's media to compete for their agenda and audiences to assert their rights to be visible.

This study contributes empirical descriptions to Bimber *et al.*'s (2005) analytical framework of collective action as the crossing of private-public domain. I identified the private-public boundaries in each form of collective action. The donors to *Kedaulatan Rakyat* choose to display their group identity and ownership of the money is transferred private individuals to the semiprivate social fund of institutions to the disaster fund of the newspaper. The volunteers leave their private homes to visit the affected areas or other relief centres and adopt the values and appropriate conducts of volunteers. The complainers use different discursive positions to speak on behalf of the others when putting their private opinion into a publicly accessible system of complaint. The concept of private-public boundaries is able to sensitise this research to the barriers that the audiences faced in each of their acts of crossing them.

This study found that the audiences who joined the collective actions tended to have a common geographic background, namely the cities surrounding Mt. Merapi. They constituted the majority of those who applied to volunteer, donate money, and file complaints. Volunteering and donating may have a natural affinity with the local character of these actions because volunteering requires moving to other places and donation is organised by a local newspaper, which puts local people in a better position to join. But complaining can be done, theoretically, by any Indonesian audience. Yet, the majority of the complainers are Yogyakartans. Hence, the publicness of the audiences of my research seems to suggest that it has a characteristic of *warga*, membership of a socio-cultural group, which is commonly regionally-based. Because of this, the variable of 'geographic proximity' of the audiences, I believe, is worth researching in the future to establish its relationship with audiences' decision to join different forms of collective action (see also Sampson *et al.*, 1997).

My study also revealed that crisis information is not only produced by commercial media (Wenger, 1985, 1989; Quarantelli, 1990) or government agencies (Heath, 2010), but also by the people themselves. It adds to the growing body of literature on the phenomenon (Bruns and Burgess, 2012; Bruns *et al.*, 2012; Lang and Benbunan-Fich, 2010; Meier and Munro, 2010; Perez-Lugo, 2004; Starbird and Stamberger 2010; Starbird, 2011; Vihalemm *et al.*, 2011). The people can become a good partner in disaster communication, if rightly supported. The view of audiences as partners, not merely targets, in disaster communication is in contrast with the current paradigm of crisis communication, which is more top-down and, in some cases, militaristic (Palen and Liu, 2007; Palen *et al.*, 2010). The participatory paradigm has been proposed due to the observation that the people have the power to cope with the disaster and they are collectively intelligent. The three-party system (mainstream media, government agencies, engaged audiences) opens two research paths for audience study. The first path is communication between mainstream media and engaged audiences, the path that my study has taken. The first path can include the people's media as an overlap between engaged audiences and mainstream mass media. The second path is communication between government agencies and engaged audiences, which contrasts with the command and control approach commonly used by government agency on disaster (Palen *et al.*, 2010).

In my study, I find some indications of cooperation between the BPPTK (Volcanic Technology Development and Research Centre), the local people, and civil society organisations in creating an effective socio-technological system of disaster communication during and after the disaster. During the disaster, Yogyakarta public radio (RRI Yogyakarta) collaborated with information volunteers to give live reports about the areas they covered. Further, the BPPTKG, the Yogyakarta public radio, the national agency for disaster management (BNPB), the local chapter of Indonesian

Broadcasting Commission (KPID), the network of Yogyakarta community radio, and the association of internet service providers (APJII) collaborated to create temporary FM radio stations specifically for disaster communication (Masduki, 2011). And finally, after the crisis the BPPTKG cooperated with the activists of Jalin Merapi to set up an SMS gateway which allows BPPTKG to send warnings directly to the cellular phones of thousands of local people of Merapi. All of these 'organic' and ad-hoc developments can signal emergence of a participatory model of disaster communication, a new direction of research that has important implications to the realm of policy-making and decision-making.

<u>Collective Attention to Disaster</u>

Research question number one (page 23) asked whether the audiences' collective attention was concentrated or fragmented during the disaster and what the characteristics of this collective attention were. The following paragraphs summarise the findings and highlight my contribution to the study of collective attention.

The socio-technological developments of 'new' media, as evidenced in the wide use of internet and the participatory web, are viewed by audience researchers to concern several important issues. The issues are whether abundance of media devices and outlets creates disintegrated audiences (Krugman, 1985; Webster, 1986; Webster 2005), whether interactivity of 'new' media allows for a new structure of communication (Livingstone, 2004; Press and Livingstone, 2006; Das, 2011), and whether participatory potentials of the 'new' media provide new opportunity for audiences to become the authors of their own meaning or to produce their own message (Bird, 2011; Bruns; 2006; Carpentier, 2011). With regard to these issues, I will discuss the contribution of this research to the study of audience fragmentation first and subsequently turn to the issue of interactivity and participation.

Indonesian media audiences in disaster that participated in this study were relatively fragmented across many media outlets. Since the participants in my study were drawn only from those who took action in response to the disaster, it cannot be generalised to include those who did not take action, or the wider population of Indonesian audiences. What enabled the apparently synchronised actions of otherwise dispersed and separate audiences was the focus by media, national and local, across platforms on the Mt. Merapi disaster. As to what caused the media focus, my study is not designed to answer that question. But the literature (Nugroho *et al.*, 2012, 2013) shows that there is a strong tendency to prioritise issues in Java over those in other areas of Indonesia. Thus, although the audiences' collective attention was spread across many media outlets, what they found were the same reports on other media outlets. In normal times, the different media outlets cover different issues to serve different segments of audiences and create fragmentation of public issues and attention. In the future, it is worth examining whether in disaster times the presence of the same issue on various media outlets can have the opposite effect, namely convincing the audiences about the importance of the issue.

This study explored the contours of the audiences' collective attention through identifying their **objects of attention**, their **intentions** in using the media in particular ways, the **social norms** that governed their behaviours when they shared the same social world under the intense mediated attention, and how 'people's media' **competed** with mainstream media for their agenda. The objects of mainstream media attention were *people-as-victims* and *volcano-as-threat*, based on a simple model of the media and audiences as outsiders and agents and the local people of Mt. Merapi as receivers. However, the audiences' actual relationship with the place and the local people varied and it affected what they chose as, and how they behaved towards, their objects of attention. Furthermore, what characterises the audiences' collective attention in disaster was their *intentions* (Anscombe, 2000) in using media to stay safe and to help others. To serve their intentions to stay safe and to help others, several features of the media were seen as beneficial, such as, among others, being timely, locally sourced, relevant, and trustworthy.

I expand the concept of collective attention by incorporating the objects of attention, intentions, sociality, and competition between media of different institutional nature to sensitise my study to the behaviours of the audiences. Using these concepts, my study produces some findings that can shed a light on academic discourse about interactivity, which attempts to account for the use of new media. Interactivity, especially when limited only to interaction with textual and technological properties of the media, could not fully capture how audiences used the media. Rather, I would propose viewing the audiences' interaction with media, old and new, through their interaction *with the social world through media* (Gane and Beer, 2008; Jensen, 2008; Kiousis, 2002). The interactivity of media, then, can be connected to the institutional aspect of the media, such as how media institutions facilitate or hinder audiences' engagement with the disaster according to the media's interests, including both mainstream and the 'people's' media. This conceptualisation of interaction is broad enough to include different media-related activities, such as collective donations and volunteering (see also Postill, 2010). However, the concept might be less sensitive in identifying the specific interactive quality of each medium, such as what distinguishes the interactivity of social media (Twitter) from the interactivity of newspaper (*Kedaulatan Rakyat*). Rather, the interactivity of each medium was seen through the relationship that the audiences built with media institutions, Jalin Merapi and the company that published the newspaper, or the kind of actions that were allowed by these institutions.

The other characteristic of the audiences' collective attention is that high intensity of coverage from local and national media creates a sense that every Indonesian audience is sharing the same social world. This sharedness is regulated by specific norms, most evidently norms that concern how to see and be seen, as evidenced in my analysis of the audiences' act of sightseeing and commercial and political marketing in disaster-affected sites. Lastly, the emergence of disaster information centre, which is powered by the people themselves, brings a new dynamic to how the audiences' collective attention is shaped. The people's media make strategic moves to cover areas and problems that are least attended to by the mainstream media. Their operation is not only complementary to that of the mainstream media, but they also compete against the mainstream media to promote their agenda to national audiences. From the viewpoint of national audiences, national television stations are still located in the centre, whereas social media are located in the periphery (Dayan, 2009). Social media, possibly, can win the attention of young audiences, but the resulting collective attention will be more limited and less sustainable than that promoted by national television stations.

To recapitulate, my study explores a conceptual approach to view audiences beyond their contact with media devices and texts (Press and Livingstone, 2006; Livingstone, 2013; Livingstone and Das, 2013). Thus, audiences were viewed through their different forms of engagements and through the social arrangements that structure relationship between the social actors (see also Lievrouw and Livingstone, 2006). Audiences' collective engagements start with paying attention. I have demonstrated in my study that audiences' collective attention goes beyond the concept of 'attention economy' (Davenport and Beck, 2001; Goldhaber, 1997; Huberman and Wu, 2008) or 'exposure' (Webster *et al.*, 2006; Webster, 2011), which aggregates audiences' mere contacts with media. Collective attention includes audiences' sociality and, presumably, the struggle between media to win their collective attention.

My study is also the first to document the particular elements of the Indonesian media landscape that play critical roles in the dynamics of the constitution of collective attention. The particular characteristics of the Indonesian media are:

One, the media play noticeable and widely accepted roles in raising disaster relief funds. Both mainstream mass media (exemplified by *Kedaulatan Rakyat*) and people's media (exemplified by Jalin Merapi network) were involved in fundraising, although Jalin Merapi does not prioritise monetary donation and opens more access for donation requests. By playing the dual role of 'messengers' and fundraisers at the same time, these media connect audiences' attention to some forms of engagement.

Two, in the previous case of disaster in Indonesia, the people created their own media, with limited success (Nasir *et al.*, 2009; Birowo, 2010). This study shows a different case where the media that the people created were received widely, used extensively, and appreciated greatly by many actors of disaster relief, as exemplified by Jalin Merapi's cooperation with RRI (the Radio of the Republic of Indonesia) and BPPTKG (Volcanic Technology Development and Research Centre) to run a special radio station during the crisis. It was not unprecedented but cannot be expected to manifest in the future in another event. These two particular elements shaped the 'mediation of participation' (Livingstone, 2013) in a specific way that might not be found in an international (or even local) context. Hence, some of the conceptual insights in this study could benefit from comparison with audiences' participation in disaster relief in other national contexts to assess their usefulness.

7.2. Concluding Notes

The image of people using information and communication devices effectively in disaster can be a powerful narrative, whether to show the power of new media or the clever uses of them. Not long after the second eruption of Mt. Merapi, stories of 'providence of rice packages' started to appear on national and international media.[227] In this story, one Twitter update could summon hundreds, or even thousands, of rice packages for refugees in a matter of hours. The problem with this type of story is not its almost magical quality or its factuality, but its deceptively simple-structure and its misleading connoted meaning. In reality, many groups of people, small and large, had been making and delivering rice packages at that time. Furthermore, the earthquake

[227] Last accessed 14 April 2014 at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/11/16/after-merapi-young-guns-give-hope-and-help.html, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/22/us-indonesia-volcano-twitter-idUSTRE6AL1Q820101122, and http://www.fastcompany.com/1704521/twitter-enables-diy-disaster-relief-indonesia.

disaster in 2006 had taught the people of Yogyakarta how to provide meals for refugees. Without Twitter, the meals would still be made and delivered. Obviously, Twitter did not make the meals. There were people who grouped based on different kinds of affiliation to make meals and deliver them. What moved them at first? Certainly not Twitter. Did Twitter have a distinct capability to synchronise the supply and demand? Maybe, but not exclusively, because there were many other communication channels used at the time, such as phone calls, short message services, and handheld radio communications. When evaluated critically, Twitter loses its purported ability to create smartness out of the crowd.

The story of providence of rice packages is exactly the kind of story that I have been trying to investigate, without submitting to the framework of technological determinism, social implementation, or cultural values. The contemporary Indonesian media landscape introduces the problem of fragmentation of attention on the one side and concentration of ownership and content on the other side. New media (e.g. social media and online news portals) and new communication technologies (e.g. smartphones) enter and interact with the existing media (e.g. television and newspapers). Furthermore, the earlier change in political regime altered the landscape of Indonesian media by opening new opportunities, however limited, for community media to network among themselves and communicate with national audiences. Add the large presence of young Yogyakartan students, the people's adaptation to the 'almost regular' eruptions of Mt. Merapi, and their previous experience with the earthquake in 2006 to the picture, and we have a complex problem of media and audience in disaster. A simple story is no longer enough.

To account for the complex interactions, I have employed different data sets, methods of analysis, and theoretical concepts borrowed from communication studies of collective attention, sociology of collective action, and audience studies. The aim is to embrace the wider range of media platforms that were actually used by the audiences and different forms of collective action within a relatively short period and a specific field of disaster relief response. I have explored and demonstrated how these complex interactions were happening, starting from how general audiences paid collective attention to the disaster to how they joined forms of collective action in response to the event. The processes that took place in between the two were traced, identified, and connected. What made the adult newspaper readers and young internet users move to act was that they felt connected to the event, although they were strangers to the people of Merapi and did not necessarily live in the vicinity. Social and physical distances, which were mediated through media, created specific communicative, social, imaginary, and material barriers that audiences needed to overcome. These barriers were overcome within the constraints of structure of media industry, technological capability, economic resources, cultural values, and social identities. This investigation has led me to a more complex story of Indonesian, especially 'Javanese', media audiences.

The view of 'people as audiences' is still a useful lens since the critical problems in moving from paying attention to taking action, which I have identified previously, are still present even despite the growing acceptance of new media devices and outlets. In the near future, Indonesians will generally still view the national terrestrial television channels as one of the 'centres' (Dayan and Katz, 1994) of our collective attention about issues of our national concern. This is partly because 'decentralisation' of the national television industry through forcing them to network with local television stations has not happened since the broadcasting act was signed on 2002 (Armando, 2014). Furthermore, although adoption of the internet and smartphones has been growing rapidly, and online user data purveyor industry and the value of online advertisement are growing, new media have been largely used as an extension of old media. It will be interesting to see whether future developments of media technologies and institutions will constitute radical change to collectivity of audiences' attention and action.

Since 2010, several disasters have struck Indonesia. In late 2012, Jakarta the capital city of Indonesia was paralysed by floods; in early 2014 Mt. Sinabung in Sumatera exploded and tens of thousands of people were evacuated; and in February 2014 Mt. Kelud in Java erupted. In these three disasters, we can see collective acts of volunteerism and donation from the people. However, we do not see massive and participatory disaster relief response and disaster communication, despite efforts by Jalin Merapi and other activists to mobilise similar collective action. The Jakarta flood was widely covered by national television channels, but the disaster did not create a sense of urgency among audiences in other areas, possibly because the disaster was seen as a case of bad city planning rather than a humanitarian issue. The Mt. Sinabung explosion was reported with less intensity and there was some donation raised. The people of Yogyakarta gave a lukewarm response to fund solicitation from Karo students (a city near the mountain) who studied there. And the flow of donation to the people of Mt. Kelud died along with its disappearance from the news on national television channels. In these three unsuccessful attempts at mobilising audiences, the different elements that could potentially produce the audiences' collective action were present, although to a varying degree. These elements were national media coverage, large number of audiences who identified with the suffering others, use of various social media, and efforts on the ground to mobilise. Yet, only one or two of the different barriers that hindered audiences were overcome successfully, while the others remained in place.

Indonesia, due to its location on the tectonic plate, will always face disaster in the future. On the other hand, the media industry will keep growing and mobile devices will be adopted ever more widely. Identifying key communicative capacities that can bolster resilience among the affected communities is an endeavour worth undertaking.

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Appendices

A.1. Survey

Survey Design

This survey was designed to capture biographical information of the participants, their daily use of media platforms during disaster, specific media outlets they used, social relationships relevant to their communication behaviour, their other involvement in the same type of action, and their other involvement in other types of action.

The target population was identified through three lists, which then were cleaned from repeat and unidentifiable entries. The first was the list of volunteer applicants to Jalin Merapi during the period of October-December 2010 (n = 2690). The second list contained those who complained through KPI's online system (n = 866). The third list was recorded from the lists of *Kedaulatan Rakyat* donors whose photographs were printed on the newspaper during the period of 27 October 2010-26 November 2010.

To pilot the online questionnaire I contacted the participants whom I know personally. I constructed online questionnaire using the free trial service named Smart Survey. I sent e-mails to 14 potential respondents. 2 e-mails did not reach the addressee due to the e-mail being inexistent. Out of the 12 e-mails, 6 (50%) respondents completed the questionnaire. All of them finished the questionnaire in 15 minutes or less. The respondents thought that the questions were easy to understand and that the multiple choice answers fitly corresponded to the questions. Several respondents left suggestions regarding directions of this research, which was followed up in the interview phase.

The survey was distributed online and in print. The online version of the survey was created and managed using Surveymonkey (https://www.surveymonkey.com/) and the print version was distributed, mainly, via face-to-face meeting. A survey assistant was recruited to help with distributing the print survey. He was trained first by observing what the researcher did in two days. When the assistant administered the print survey, I made evaluation every two weeks. Out of 203 photographs of *Kedaulatan Rakyat* donors, 152 were selected randomly using SPSS software. This resulted in 120 complete responses.

The online distribution aimed to invite volunteers and complainers. I worked with Jalin Merapi to distribute an invitation. Jalin Merapi included several questions that were of relevance with their organisation. The involvement of Jalin Merapi helped the survey to get the volunteers' attention. There were 3,150 applications to Jalin Merapi during the period of 27 October-30 December 2010. After omitting redundant applicants, there were 2,770 volunteers. I filtered applicants who did not leave their e-mail address and it yielded 2,690. 302 invitations failed to reach their target because the e-mail addresses were no longer registered. Out of 2,388 successful invitations, I received 353 (14.7%) complete responses from volunteer-applicants.

The list of complainers contained 1,003 entries, which left 990 unique complaints after redundant entries were taken out. Out of this population, 865 complainers left e-mail address. 142 invitations did not reach the complainers. 60 complete responses were received (8.2% of 723).

Administration of Survey

Below is an invitation to participate in the survey via e-mail.

From: **Jalin Merapi** jalinmerapi@gmail.com
Subject: Undangan Survei Relawan
Date: 22 January 2013 03:36
To: Kurniawan.A.Saputro@student.shu.ac.uk

Undangan Survei Relawan

Kepada Yth:

Kurniawan A. Saputro

Jalin Merapi bekerja sama dengan Kurniawan Adi Saputro (mahasiswa S3 Universitas Sheffiel
Hallam) mengadakan pengumpulan data mengenai orang-orang yang pernah melamar menjadi sukarelawan Jali
Merapi, yaitu Anda.

Pendataan ini bertujuan memahami bagaimana relawan terlibat dalam upaya tanggap bencan
Merapi 2010 dan untuk mencatat Anda yang bersedia terlibat lagi. Pengetahuan ini diharapkan berguna bag
pengetahuan bencana di masa depan.

Silakan klik tautan ini dan Anda akan membuka kuesioner yang bisa diisi dalam waktu kira-kir
10-15 menit.Jika ada yang ingin Anda ketahui lebih jauh, silakan hubungi mart@combine.or.id ata
Kurniawan.A.Saputro@student.shu.ac.uk.

Terima kasih banyak telah mendukung kami.

Salam kerelawanan

Jalin Merap

Kurniawan Adi Saputr

Nb: jika tautan di atas gagal, silakan langsung menuju alamat ini

https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/Q8YY6HQ

The English translation of the invitation is in the following.

Dear [participant's name],

Jalin Merapi collaborates with Kurniawan Adi Saputro (a PhD student at Sheffield Hallam University) to survey the volunteers that we have worked with, namely you.

The survey aims to understand how the volunteers participated in the Mt. Merapi disaster relief responses in 2010 and to record your intention for future participation. The knowledge is hoped to contribute to the development of disaster knowledge in the future.

Please click this link and you will be taken to the questionnaire that is going to take 10-15 minutes to fill in. If you have any questions, please contact mart@combine.or.id or Kurniawan.A.Saputro@student.shu.ac.uk

Volunteerism greetings,
Jalin Merapi
Kurniawan Adi Saputro
Nb: If the link did not work, please go directly to this address
https://www.surveymonkey.com/Q8YY6HQ

Survey Templates

There were three designs of the survey for each group of participants: donors, volunteers, and complainers. Each survey was somewhat modified in its wordings to fit the context. The content of the questions was the same. In addition, the online questionnaire incorporated a feature that allowed me to ask conditional questions, which meant that a participant was automatically taken to a specific question based on the response they gave. For example, if a participant answered yes, they would be automatically taken to the question about the specifics of their involvement, whereas a 'no' answer took them to the next question. The following is the questionnaire for donors.

MOHON DIBACA. Seluruh pertanyaan ini berkenaan dengan peristiwa letusan Gunung Merapi 2010. Sekedar mengingatkan, letusan besar Gunung Merapi terjadi dua kali, pada 26 Oktober dan 5 November 2010. Oleh karena itu, harap memberi jawaban dengan merujuk pada kenyataan Anda di tahun 2010, bukan sekarang.

1. Data Diri

Pertanyaan ini bertujuan mengetahui beberapa keterangan mengenai diri Anda dan kebiasaan menggunakan media

1.1. Nama : ______________________

1.2. Jenis kelamin : ______________________

1.3. Umur (th. 2010) : ______________________

1.4. Pendidikan terakhir (th. 2010) : ______________________

1.5. Pekerjaan (th. 2010) : ______________________

1.6. Kota tempat tinggal (th. 2010) : ______________________

2. Penggunaan media sehari-hari. (Beri tanda silang pada jawaban Anda.)

	Ya	**Tidak**	**Lupa**
2.1. Apakah Anda menonton televisi setiap hari pada bulan Oktober-November 2010?			
2.2. Apakah Anda membaca suratkabar setiap hari pada bulan Oktober-November 2010?			
2.3. Apakah Anda mendengar radio setiap hari pada bulan Oktober-November 2010?			
2.4. Apakah Anda menggunakan internet setiap hari pada bulan Oktober-November 2010?			
2.5. Apakah Anda menggunakan telepon seluler pada bulan Oktober-November 2010?			

3. Penggunaan media di saat bencana (Oktober-November 2010)

3.1. Media apa sajakah yang Anda gunakan untuk memantau perkembangan letusan Gunung Merapi? (Silakan pilih sebanyak yang Anda gunakan.)

Televisi		**Radio**		**Situs Internet**	
AdiTV		Female Radio		Situs Antara	
ANTV		I Radio		Situs BeritaSatu	
GlobalTV		Q Radio		Situs Detik	
Indosiar		Radio Balerante		Situs Inilah	
JogjaTV		Radio Best		Situs Jalin Merapi	
MetroTV		Radio EMC		Situs KapanLagi	
RBTV		Radio GCD		Situs Kompas	
RCTI		Radio Geronimo		Situs LintasBerita	
SCTV		Radio Kompag Merapi		Situs Okezone	
TPI		Radio Konco Tani		Situs Tempo Interaktif	
TATV		Radio Kota Perak		Situs TribunNews	
Trans7		Radio MBS		Situs Vivanews	
TransTV		Radio Medari		Situs Yahoo! Indonesia	
TVOne		Radio Persatuan Bantul		Facebook	
TVRI		Radio POP		Twitter	
		Radio Prambors		Kaskus	
Suratkabar		Radio Rakosa			
Suratkabar Bernas		Radio Retjo Buntung		**Lain-lain**	
Suratkabar Harian Jogja (Harjo)		Radio Sonora		**Tidak Menggunakan**	
Suratkabar Jawa Pos		Radio Swaragama			
Suratkabar Kedaulatan Rakyat		Radio Unisi			
Suratkabar Kompas		Radio Yasika			
Suratkabar Koran Tempo		Radio RDI			
Suratkabar Media Indonesia		RRI Pro1			
Suratkabar Merapi		RRI Pro2			
Suratkabar Meteor		RRI Pro3			
Suratkabar Pikiran Rakyat					
Suratkabar Pos Kota					
Suratkabar Radar Jogja					
Suratkabar Republika					
Suratkabar Sindo					
Suratkabar Suara Merdeka					
Suratkabar Suara Pembaruan					

4. Hubungan Sosial

4.1. Dari manakah Anda tahu mengenai "Dompet KR Peduli Korban Merapi"?
□ Dari KR langsung □ Media Massa lain □ Dari seseorang □ Lupa

4.2. Jika Anda mengetahui dari media massa, media apakah itu?
□ Televisi □ Radio □ Suratkabar □ Situs Berita □ Lain-lain
□ Lupa

4.3. Jika Anda mengetahui dari seseorang, apakah hubungan Anda dengan dia?
□ Saudara □ Teman □ Kenalan
□ Bukan siapa-siapa □ Lupa

4.4. Dengan sarana apakah orang tersebut memberitahu Anda?
□ Telepon □ SMS □ Surat Elektronik (E-mail) □ Facebook □ Twitter □ Kaskus
□Blog □ Lain-lain

4.5. Dana siapakah yang Anda sumbangkan?
□ Pribadi saja □ Sumbangan Bersama

4.6. Jika dana sumbangan bersama, dana siapakah yang turut Anda sumbangkan?
□ Keluarga □ Teman □ Orang Asing □ Lain-lain

4.7. Dengan sarana apakah Anda mengajak orang lain menyumbang?
□ Langsung □ Telepon □ SMS □ Surat Elektronik □ Situs pertemanan □ Lupa

4.8. Bersama siapakah Anda datang ke kantor KR?
□ Keluarga □ Teman □ Kenalan □ Bukan siapa-siapa □ Lupa

5. Sumbangan

5.1. Apa alasan yang mendorong Anda menyumbang? Tolong jelaskan. (50-100 kata)

	Ya	Tidak
5.2. Selain sumbangan peduli Merapi ini, apakah sebelumnya Anda pernah menyumbang untuk bencana lain?		
5.3. Jika ya, untuk bencana apa?		
5.4. Sesudah ini, apakah Anda pernah menyumbang untuk bencana lain?		

4

5.5. Jika ya, untuk apa? ____________

5.6. Apakah Anda tahu sumbangan Anda disumbangkan ke mana?		
5.7. Apakah Anda membaca laporan keuanganan "Dompet KR Peduli Korban Merapi"?		

6. Keterlibatan

	Ya	Tidak
6.1. Apakah Anda ikut terlibat dalam kegiatan sukarelawan Merapi?		
6.2. Apakah Anda ikut memasukkan pengaduan acara Silet ke KPI?		
6.3. Apakah Anda memiliki keterlibatan lain dengan kegiatan tanggap bencana Merapi 2010?		

6.4. Jika ya , tolong jelaskan keterlibatan Anda secara terperinci. (50-100 kata)

And the following is an English translation of the questionnaire.

Questionnaire of the Public's Engagement with the Merapi Disaster Relief Responses in 2010

PLEASE READ. All of the following questions are related to the explosion of Mt. Merapi in 2010. I would like to remind you that the big explosions occured twice, on 26 October and 5 November 2010. Accordingly, please refer to your state of reality in 2010, not the current reality.

1. Biographical Information
The followings are descriptions of you and your use of media

1.1. Name : ____________________
1.2. Sex : ____________________
1.3. Age (in 2010) : ____________________
1.4. Latest Education (in 2010) : ____________________
1.5. Occupation (in 2010) : ____________________
1.6. City of Residence (in 2010) : ____________________

2. Media Use (Put a cross on your answer.)

	Yes	**No**	**Don't remember**
2.1. Did you watch television on a daily basis in October-November 2010?			
2.2. Did you read newspaper on a daily basis in October-November 2010?			
2.3. Did you listen to radio on a daily basis in October-November 2010?			
2.4. Did you use internet on a daily basis in October-November 2010?			
2.5. Did you use cell phone on a daily basis in October-November 2010?			

2

3. Media Use in Disaster (October-November 2010)

What media outlets did you use to monitor the development of Mt. Merapi explosion? (Select as many as they are relevant to you.)

Televisi		**Radio**		**Internet Sites**	
AdiTV		Female Radio		Antara	
ANTV		I Radio		BeritaSatu	
GlobalTV		Q Radio		Detik	
Indosiar		Radio Balerante		Inilah	
JogjaTV		Radio Best		Jalin Merapi	
MetroTV		Radio EMC		KapanLagi	
RBTV		Radio GCD		Kompas	
RCTI		Radio Geronimo		LintasBerita	
SCTV		Radio Kompag Merapi		Okezone	
TPI		Radio Konco Tani		Tempo Interaktif	
TATV		Radio Kota Perak		TribunNews	
Trans7		Radio MBS		Vivanews	
TransTV		Radio Medari		Yahoo! Indonesia	
TVOne		Radio Persatuan Bantul		Facebook	
TVRI		Radio POP		Twitter	
		Radio Prambors		Kaskus	
Newspaper		Radio Rakosa			
Bernas		Radio Retjo Buntung		**Other**	
Harian Jogja (Harjo)		Radio Sonora		**Did not use**	
Jawa Pos		Radio Swaragama			
Kedaulatan Rakyat		Radio Unisi			
Kompas		Radio Yasika			
Koran Tempo		Radio RDI			
Media Indonesia		RRI Pro1			
Merapi		RRI Pro2			
Meteor		RRI Pro3			
Pikiran Rakyat					
Pos Kota					
Radar Jogja					
Republika					
Sindo					
Suara Merdeka					
Suara Pembaruan					

4. Social Relations

4.1. Where did you learn the "Dompet KR Peduli Korban Merapi" from?
□ Directly from KR □ From other Mass Media □ From Someone □ Don't remember

4.2. If you learn from other media, what medium was that?
□ Television □ Radio □ Newspaper □ News Site □ Other
□ Don't remember

4.3. If you knew from someone, what was your relationship with him/her?
□ Family □ Friends □ Acquaintance
□ Strangers □ Don't remember

4.4. What did he/she use to let you know?
□ Telephone □ SMS □ E-mail
□ Facebook □ Twitter □ Kaskus
□ Blog □ Others

4.5. Whose funds did you donate?
□ Personal □ Collective

4.6. If it was collective funds, where did it come from?
□ Families □ Friends □ Strangers □ Others

4.7. How did you invite others to donate?
□ Face-to-face □ Telephone □ SMS □ E-mail □ Social Media □ Don't remember

4.8. With whom did you go to the office of *Kedaulatan Rakyat*?
□ Families □ Friends □ Acquaintances □ Strangers □ Don't remember

5. Donation

5.1. What motivated you to donate? Please explain. (50-100 words)

	Yes	No
5.2. Other than this, have you ever donated for other disaster?		
5.3. If yes, which disaster?		
5.4. After this, did you donate for other disaster?		
5.5. If yes, which disaster?		
5.6. Did you know to whom the donation was distributed?		

4

5.7. Did you read the financial report of "Dompet KR Peduli Korban Merapi"?

6. Other Engagements

	Yes	No
6.1. Did you volunteer with Jalin Merapi?		
6.2. Did you file complaints about Silet to KPI?		
6.3. Were you involved in other Mt. Merapi disaster relief efforts in 2010?		

6.4. If yes, please explain in details. (50-100 words)

Example of the Survey Monkey Online Questionnaire


Relawan Jalin Merapi

Data Diri

* Nama

* Jenis Kelamin

Perempuan

Laki-laki

Tidak Menjawab

* Umur (pada tahun 2010, tulis dalam angka)

* Pendidikan Terakhir (pada tahun 2010)

Sekolah Dasar/Setara

Sekolah Menengah Pertama/Setara

Sekolah Menengah Atas/Setara

Sarjana

PascaSarjana

* Pekerjaan (pada tahun 2010)

Pendapatan per bulan (pada tahun 2010. Mohon tulis dalam angka. Anda boleh tidak menjawab.)

* Kota Tempat Tinggal (pada tahun 2010)

Kembali Lanjut

Consent Form

Each of survey participants and interviewees was presented with a consent form, which had been reviewed by the ethics committee of Sheffield Hallam University. The following is the consent form, in English and in Indonesian (participants and interviewees were presented only with the Indonesian form).

PERNYATAAN KESEDIAAN

Saya dengan bebas dan sukarela, tanpa kekerasan dan paksaan, bersedia mengisi kuesioner mengenai Peran Warga dalam Tanggap Bencana Letusan Merapi 2010.

Penelitian ini dilakukan oleh Kurniawan Adi Saputro, mahasiswa Sheffield-Hallam University. Saya mengerti bahwa tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk memahami secara lebih baik bagaimana publik berperan serta dalam kegiatan komunikasi di masa krisis letusan Merapi 2010. Saya mengerti bahwa jika saya mengikuti penelitian ini, maka saya akan dimintai pendapat perihal sumbangan yang saya berikan melalui suratkabar *Kedaulatan Rakyat*.

Saya mengerti bahwa saya keseluruhan waktu yang diminta adalah tidak lebih dari setengah jam. Saya mengerti bahwa keikutsertaan saya bersifat sepenuhnya sukarela dan saya bisa berhenti ikut serta kapan saja. Saya mengerti bahwa kuesioner ini hanya akan digunakan oleh peneliti untuk tujuan penelitian ini dan tidak akan disebarluaskan kepada siapa saja sejauh dibenarkan oleh hukum. Jika akan digunakan untuk kepentingan selain penelitian ini, saya akan dihubungi terlebih dahulu dan dimintai persetujuan. Saya mengerti bahwa jawaban saya bisa dikutip, tetapi nama saya tidak akan disebut dalam laporan akhir hasil penelitian.

Saya mengerti bahwa kesediaan saya bisa saya hentikan kapan saja tanpa prasangka atau hukuman apa pun. Saya telah diberi kesempatan untuk bertanya dan menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan menyangkut penelitian ini.

Saya telah membaca dan menyetujui surat kesediaan ini.

Tempat/Tanggal :

Tanda tangan :

1

LETTER OF CONSENT

I voluntarily and without any pressure and any force agree to be interviewed on the topic of "Audiences Role in the Crisis of Mt. Merapi in 2010."

This study is conducted by Kurniawan Adi Saputro, a Phd student at Sheffield-Hallam University to obtain his doctoral degree. I understand that the aim of this study is to understand how the audience participate in the crisis response of Mt. Merapi in 2010. I understand that my participation in this study involves being interviewed regarding my capacity as a volunteer of Jalin Merapi.

I understand that the amount of time needed will not exceed 90 (ninety) minutes. I understand that my participation is fully voluntary and I am fully free to stop at any time. I understand that the interview will be recorded and the audio record will be transcribed. The information from me will only be used by the researcher for the purpose of this study. It will not be distributed or shared with anyone else as long as it is still complying to the law. If the information will be used for any interest other than this study, I will be informed first and my consent will be sought first. I understand that my answer can be quoted, but my name will be written as pseudonym in the final report.

I understand that my consent can be terminated at any time without any prejudice or any sanction. I have been given opportunity to ask questions pertinent to this study.

I have read and I have consented to participate in this study.

Name of the city, day month year

Signature : ____________________________

Name :

A.2. Interview

Interview Design

The interviews were conducted in two phases. In the preliminary stage, covering the period of October 2010-August 2011, the researcher met with key activists of Jalin Merapi and some of the information volunteers. The interviewees gave the researcher more contacts and deeper insights about disaster relief responses. The second interview took place in November 2012-June 2013. In total, 74 participants were interviewed. They were actively involved in the donation, volunteerism, and complaints. Interviews were also conducted with media professionals (12 persons) to understand mainstream media's perspectives, as opposed to those of the people's media.

The interview consisted of questions about how audiences used media technology, about textual modalities of the media, their relationships with other audiences, and event itself. An interview guide was tested with two interviewees to check whether the wordings and the categories had been fully understood. It turned out that the interviews really served as a guide to a more fluid conversation, which covered many topics and interests, rather than a strict means of data collection.

Administration of Interview

Below is the interview guide (in English, however all of the interviews were conducted in Indonesian) that the researcher used in interviews. During the development of fieldwork, the questions had been expanded to probe deeper insights and seek further comparisons between cases.

Interview Guide

Technology Engagement	**Probing Questions**
What media did you use to monitor the eruption? Why?	Tell me how you use media along the course of the day. Was that a typical usage? What was its difference from previous usage?
What media did you use during your action? Why?	How many communication tools did you use? Did you use them at the same time? Did you move from one place to another? What communication tools did you carry everywhere?
What benefits did you get from the media?	What did you like about the technology? What feature benefited you the most? How did it help you?
What hindrances, if any, did you feel when using the media?	Did it concern with its physical aspect? Did it concern with its ease of use?
How did you cope with the abundance of news?	What did you do to deal with alternatives of information sources?
Text Engagement	

What did the media tell you about the event?	How did it predict the eruption? How vast was the affected area? How dangerous was the eruption?
What made you think that?	Who were the figures who had decisive roles? How was the events portrayed? What auditory elements did you remember the most?
Did you feel a sense of urgency? How and why?	What was the strongest signal of urgency? What was your reaction?
Did you believe about what the media reported?	Did you believe one media outlets over another? Why? Who were your credible sources of information? Why? How did you measure credibility?
What did you think of media's coverage of the refugees and eruption?	How did you feel toward the refugees? Whom did you feel for the most? Were you thinking you got enough information? What was lacking?
Did you see something that was not covered by media? How?	
Audience Engagement	
What did you think of other people who saw the same news?	How did you know what other people were thinking? Did you think they had similar/different thought with your thought?
What was other people's response?	How did you know? Was that something you considered to be important?
How did you share your opinion or news you consumed about the event?	Using what communication tools? What kind of news did you share? What was the response?
How did you join the collective action?	Did you join by yourself or with other people? Did you know who the other people were?
What motivated you to do that?	What was your personal motivation? External motivation?
Whom did you ask or tell about the eruption?	Who were they? How was your relationship with them after the crisis?
Event Engagement	
Did you feel the urge to see the refugees in person? Did you want to see the eruption?	What was your feeling? Any particular reason?
Why did you feel that you have to do it yourself?	
Were you afraid of the eruption? How did you cope with it?	What part of the eruption that scared you the most? Why?
At what stage did you decide to act? Why?	What were the stages of eruption? Which part did you consider to be critical?
What parts of the event that you monitored the most? How?	
Did you go to see Merapi after the eruption?	Where to? What were the reasons?

List of Interviewees

The interviewees below have been anonymised to protect their privacy. The list is ordered based on date of interview. The total duration of the interviews is approximately 4079 minutes. All interviews were recorded digitally and saved in the format of MP3 file.

Name	Date (dd/mm/yy)	Sex (F = female, M = Male)	Engagement in Disaster	Duration (min)	Method
S1	6/11/10	F	Personal Donor	21	Face to face
S2	24/6/11	M	Volunteer	80	Face to face
S3	19/12/10, 30/1/13	M	Volunteer	310	Face to face, Phone
S4	5/1/11	M	Reporter	100	Face to face
S5	5/1/11	M	Reporter		Face to face
S6	5/1/11	M	Reporter		Face to face
S7	5/1/11	M	Reporter		Face to face
S8	5/1/11	M	Reporter		Face to face
S9	5/1/11	M	Reporter		Face to face
S10	13/4/2011, 16/6/2013	M	Volunteer	140	Face to face
S11	6/7/11	M	Reporter	36	Face to face
S12	5/7/11, 19/11/12	M	Volunteer	210	Face to face
S13	28/6/11	M	Volunteer	96	Face to face
S14	28/6/11	F	Volunteer		Face to face
S15	28/6/11	M	Volunteer		Face to face
S16	28/6/11	M	Volunteer		Face to face
S17	28/6/11	F	Volunteer		Face to face
S18	28/6/11	M	Volunteer		Face to face
S19	28/6/11	M	Volunteer		Face to face
S20	28/6/11	M	Volunteer		Face to face
S21	11/7/11	F	Volunteer	106	Face to face
S22	12/7/11	M	Volunteer	10	Face to face
S23	15/7/11	F	Volunteer	89	Face to face
S24	17/7/11	M	Local People	119	Face to face
S25	28/7/11	M	Volunteer	108	Face to face
S26	26/8/11	F	Volunteer	87	Face to face
S27	27/8/11	M	Local People	88	Face to face
S28	15/9/11	F	Volunteer	61	Face to face
S29	3/1/11	M	Volunteer	78	Face to face
S30	25/3/11	M	Reporter	47	Face to face, Phone
S31	5/4/12	F	Reporter	34	Phone
S32	26/10/12	M	Personal Donor	57	Phone
S33	19/11/12	M	Volunteer	73	Face to face
S34	22/11/12	F	Donor	12	Face to face

S35	22/11/12	M	Donor		Face to face
S36	22/11/12	M	Donor		Face to face
S37	22/11/12	M	Donor	18	Face to face
S38	22/11/12	M	Donor	37	Face to face
S39	23/11/12	F	Donor	34	Face to face
S40	23/11/12	F	Donor	15	Face to face
S41	26/11/12	M	Volunteer	218	Face to face
S42	27/11/12	M	Volunteer	62	Face to face
S43	29/11/12	M	Local People	5	Face to face
S44	29/11/12	M	Volunteer	55	Face to face
S45	29/11/12	M	Local People/Volunteer	50	Face to face
S46	5/12/12	M	Donor	59	Face to face
S47	5/12/12	F	Personal Donor	60	Face to face
S48	10/12/12	M	Media People	28	Face to face
S49	11/12/12	F	Volunteer	84	Face to face
S50	11/12/12	M	Media People	85	Face to face
S51	13/12/12	F	Personal Donor	79	Face to face
S52	13/12/12	F	Personal Donor		Face to face
S53	14/12/12	F	Regulator	30	Face to face
S54	14/12/12	M	Regulator	51	Face to face
S55	17/12/12	M	Reporter	117	Face to face
S56	14/1/13	M	Reporter	40	Face to face
S57	15/1/13	F	Volunteer	115	Face to face
S58	18/1/13	M	Reporter	45	Face to face
S59	18/1/13	M	Reporter	33	Face to face
S60	23/1/13	F	Volunteer	60	Face to face
S61	28/1/13	F	Personal Donor	25	Face to face
S62	31/1/13	F	Donor	21	Face to face
S63	4/2/13	M	Volunteer	57	Face to face
S64	5/2/13	F	Donor/Volunteer	46	Face to face
S65	6/2/13	M	Complainer	64	Face to face
S66	20/2/13	F	Volunteer/Complainer	66	Face to face
S67	28/2/13	M	Volunteer	40	Face to face
S68	19/3/13	M	Local People	73	Face to face
S69	22/3/13	F	Complainer	43	Face to face
S70	1/4/13	M	Complainer	61	Face to face
S71	9/4/13	M	Regulator	52	Face to face
S72	8/6/13	M	Volunteer	68	Face to face
S73	10/6/13	F	Volunteer	71	Face to face
S74	12/6/13	F	Personal Donor	50	Face to face
			Total duration	4079	

Interview Recording

The records of the interviews were kept by the researcher to protect the privacy of the interviewees. Should any one be interested in listening to the interview or obtaining a copy of the file, the researcher will contact the interviewee first to seek permission.

Interview Transcripts

The interview records, except five of them due to their relative lack of relevance, had been transcribed by the researcher himself and by two assistants. The assistants received training, a guideline, and regular evaluation to ensure the consistency and the eligibility of transcripts. The guide covered the formatting (e.g., the use of heading style to enable automatic coding of names, dates), punctuations, nonverbal expressions, and abbreviations and names. All of the transcripts were saved in Microsoft Word format (.doc and .docx).

Codes of Analysis

Collective Attention

Objects of collective attention: themes that draw diverse characters and events into a narrative shared by different media outlets.

Intentions of collective attention: reasons why the audiences pay attention to specific issue on the media.

Sociality of collective attention: how the social norms shape the behaviours by which audiences pay attention to the disaster and/or the suffering others.

Competition over collective attention: competition between the people's media and mass media in winning general audience's attention to issues of their choice.

Collective Actions

Donating: giving something of value, especially money, to those affected by the disaster.

Volunteering: committing time and self to the disaster relief initiatives.

Complaining: submitting written expressions of grievance with regard to an offending media programme.

Private-public boundaries: limits or thresholds that separate private spheres and public spheres of lives, e.g. in the case of identities, physical location, and ownership.

Mechanism of recruitment: how audiences joined the collective action, through their social networks or through an independent effort.

Issues of Visibility: mechanisms that operate in between media (institutions and technologies) and audiences, which shape the way certain parties are made more prominent and/or obscure.

Processes of Transformations

Concentrating the attention: a stage when different media outlets, especially national mass media, decide to focus on an issue/disaster over another issue/disaster.

Formulating the problem: how audiences frame the disaster collectively, through their deliberate and spontaneous efforts, both organised and unorganised.

Imagining the others: efforts to overcome social distance between audiences and the suffering others.

Building resources: efforts to use, collect, or claim valuable things to be used in collective actions.

Taking Action: act of crossing the private-public boundaries.

A.3. Archive

Several sets of media archive were collected for this study. They comprised three kinds of archive: mass media, complaints to KPI, and social media archive. Below is their description.

<u>Mass Media Archive</u>

Print copies of *Kedaulatan Rakyat* during the period of 26 October-26 November 2010 were collected. From the collection, two types of materials were recorded: photographs of donors and list of donors. There were 202 photographs of donors. From the list of donors, there were 2,826 entries of donation. Each entry contained donors' names, addresses, and their amount of donation.

Print copies of *Kompas* were collected from the same period. Photographs about the disaster were collected and coded whether they were printed in the first page or in other pages. There were 17 photographs in the first page, whereas in other pages there were 189 photographs.

MetroTV news were collected from the website of *MetroTV* (http://www.metrotvnews.com) by manually sifting the digital video files stored during the period between 23 October-8 November 2010 on the station's website. The digital video files containing news about the disaster were downloaded. Subsequently, the digital video files were coded in two phases. On the first phase, each video record was coded to count its news segment. A news segment was defined as a separate unit of news that contained a topic different from other adjacent news segments and usually opened with a greeting (e.g., '*pemirsa*' or viewers) and ended with an attribution to the author of the news (e.g., '*tim liputan MetroTV*' or the *MetroTV* news team). Then, the news segments were coded based on their airtime, whether they belonged to the prime time or the regular time. Prime time was defined as the time between 18.00 to 22.00 of the local time (Western Indonesia Time) because it was the time of the highest exposure (*Cakram*, 2008).[228]

KR-Sukro Riyadi

SMAN 1 SEWON GALANG DANA : SMAN 1 Sewon Bantul menggalang dana. Kepala SMAN 1 Sewon Drs Sartono MPd menyatakan, penggalangan dana dilakukan setiap kali ada bencana alam. Setelah dana terkumpul dibelanjakan sesuai kebutuhan. Sedangkan, Ketua OSIS SMAN 1 Sewon, Wahyu fitrian menyatakan, bantuan yang diberikan berupa susu, pembalut, pampers dan genset.

A picture of the donors on *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 6 November 2010.

Complaints to Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia

There were 1,003 entries of complaints filed to Indonesian Broadcasting Commission via its online system. Further examination shows that there were many redundant complaints. After the redundant complaints (13 items) were removed, 990

[228] http://www.agbnielsen.com/Uploads/Indonesia/Artikel2aJan.pdf

unique complaints were recorded. Each entry contains information about complainer's name, e-mail address, sex, age, level of education, city of residence, and description of the complaints. All of the complaints were stored as a table, saved in an Excel file (.xls).

Social Media Archive

Two sets of social media archives were collected for this study. One set was Twitter status updates and the other consisted of discussion threads on an online forum called *Kaskus* and two blogging platforms, namely *Kompasiana* and *Blogspot.* The followings are procedures I developed to collect and select the archive.

Twitter data collection

1. Twitter status updates were searched and crawled using Twitter's API (Application Programming Interface) by a third party service called Twapperkeeper (http://twapperkeeper.com/index.html) using keyword 'Merapi', covering a period between 11.00 am on 07 November 2010 to 23.00 pm on 09 November 2010. It resulted in 166,205 tweets.
2. To meet the criteria of relevancy, only messages that contained the word '*Silet*' (the title of the show), including its many variations, were collected (see the keyword analysis below), which resulted in 4,364 tweets. The variations were due to a typographic error (became 'sILEt'), a deliberate word play ('Silet' became silit which literally means ass), a self-censorship (became Sil*t), or other variations.
3. To meet criteria of authenticity, several indicators were used to filter the messages, namely clients used to send the posts, twitter username, and account's interaction with other accounts. Almost all of the 63 accounts which sent messages using Twitterfeed client were robots. Only one of them was not robot (@earthquaketest), indicated by its interaction with other accounts that shows that its post was not generated automatically using software. Furthermore, the name of these robot accounts often showed its institutional background, which made it clearer that it was not an individual's voice. After the messages produced by robot were filtered out, there were 4,302 tweets left.
4. To ascertain that the chatters on Twitter about 'Silet' indicated the audiences' disagreement to it and public's understanding of the mechanism of protest, I used another keyword to further filter the data, namely 'KPI'. In the case of KPI keyword, there were variations in the use of capital and regular letter. Of 4,302 posts that contained the word '*Silet*' and 2,881 posts that contained the word 'KPI', there were

1,027 posts resulted from the overlap of both keywords. If a message contained only Silet, it might be a just a joke between friends without any intention to complain. On the other hand, if it only contained 'KPI', it might be related to other television programmes. Thus, there were 1,026 posts that might indicate a call to complain on Twitter.

Forum and blogs

Two threads on Kaskus forum were relevant to the case of Silet, created by the users with the handle baradhs and marvell707. The threads URL addresses were http://archive.kaskus.co.id/thread/5848212 and http://archive.kaskus.co.id/thread/5856914. The thread baradhs created contained textual materials that were borrowed by the complainers.



A screen capture of the Kaskus thread about the *Silet* programme. Last accessed 12 August 2014 at: http://archive.kaskus.co.id/thread/5848212

The Blogspot post whose content was copied and referred to by the complainers can be read at http://hujatansilet.blogspot.co.uk/ The Kompasiana blog post which sparked online discussions about the effect of inaccurate news report made by TVOne can be read at http://regional.kompasiana.com/2010/10/30/boikiot-tv-one-segera-angkat-kaki-dari-bumi-jogja-308136.html.

KITA HUJAT TAYANGAN SILET TENTANG GUNUNG MERAPI

Minggu, 07 November 2010

" Laporkan RCTI dan Silet ke Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia "

Info, bagi teman-teman yang mendukung blog ini dan diharap dengan sangat ikut melaporkan RCTI dan Silet akan Penyiaran acara Silet 7 November 2010 (Tadi siang) ke Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia (KPI) melalui http://www.kpi.go.id/index.php.

Terimakasih.

Diposkan oleh KITA HUJAT TAYANGAN SILET di 06.19 3 komentar

" Kami Telah Mengirimkan Pesan Kepada Pihak RCTI Melalui Web " www.rcti.tv "Tentang Keresahan Kita Terhadap Berita dari Acara " Silet " Tadi Siang "

Teman-teman sebangsa dan setanah air, kami sudah mengirimkan pesan kepada RCTI melalui pesan web RCTI.tv. Semoga mereka yang disana mau menarik kembali berita tersebut dan meminta maaf kepada kita dan saudara-saudara kita yang berada di Yogyakarta atas berita KONYOL yang disiarkan tadi siang pada acara " SILET ". Sebenarnya bukan apa-apa, karena kita sedang dalam masalah yang tidak mudah tetapi ini musibah bencana alam yang luar biasa. Diharapkan dengan sangat jangan menambah keresahan lagi dalam hidup kami warga Yogyakarta. Karena kami sudah sangat menderita atas musibah ini. Berikanlah kami dukungan materi dan moral agar kami warga Yogyakarta kembali bersemangat dan tabah untuk menghadapi musibah-musibah yang terjadi.

Diharapkan pihak RCTI mengerti akan hal itu.
Terimakasih.

Diposkan oleh KITA HUJAT TAYANGAN SILET di 04.00 6 komentar

Pengikut

Arsip Blog

- ▼ 2010 (3)
  - ▼ November (3)
    - " Laporkan RCTI dan Silet ke Komisi Penyiaran Indo...
    - " Kami Telah Mengirimkan Pesan Kepada Pihak RCTI M...

Mengenai Saya

KITA HUJAT TAYANGAN SILET

A screen capture of the Blogspot page. Last accessed 15 March 2012 at http://hujatansilet.blogspot.co.uk/

Screenshots of Jalin Merapi Site



One page of Jalin Merapi site prominently showing different channels to engage with the relief efforts (join as volunteers, donate). Last accessed 11 November 2010 at: http://merapi.combine.or.id

INFO MERAPI

21 Feb 2013 Administrator

Karawitan dan Wayang Kulit di Radio Lintas Merapi

... selengkapnya

31 Dec 2012 Administrator

Tips: Merayakan Pergantian Tahun di Puncak Merapi

Malam ini, ratusan orang akan mendaki Gunungapi Merapi untuk merayakan pergantian tahun 2012. Bagi pendaki pemula, ini sejumlah tips untuk bersiap diri: ... selengkapnya

8 Dec 2012 Administrator

Menikmati Matahari Terbit di Lereng Merapi

Salah satu tempat yang menarik dikunjungi untuk melihat matahari terbit adalah lereng tenggara Merapi. Lereng yang masuk di wilayah Desa Sidorejo, Kemalang, Klaten, Jawa Tengah ini cukup sepi. Situasi yang nyaman untuk menikmati terbitnya matahari. Namun, matahari tak terbit dari arah punggung gunung, melainkan dari depan gunung. Jadi, wajah gunung akan tampak sangat jelas jika matahari sudah sedikit naik. Selain matahari, pada beberapa musim, biasanya juga akan tampak bulan yang perlahan tenggelam. ... selengkapnya

27 Jul 2012 Rakom Lintas Merapi

Kekeringan Melanda Deles

12.00 Sudah lebih sebulan ini warga deles dan sekitarnya mulai membeli air seperti tahun-tahun sebelumnya, hal ini di perparah beberapa pengusaha Tangki air sudah tidak mengoperasikan tangkinya atau di lepas dig anti bak Truk, alasan pengusaha karena jumlah konsumen yang sudah tidak banyak lagi, sehingga bisnis air tidak akan menguntungkan lagi,para pengusaha memilih kembali mengangkut pasir,ini juga sebagai akibat mereka melihat air Bebeng Cangkingan sudah mengalir ke Desa Sidorejo,Balerante, sedangkan untuk Desa kendalsari,Bumiharjo,TangkilTlogowatu sudah di bangun Pompa sumur Dalam, Tegalmulyo dengan pompa dari sumber air Jeromah,Sapu angin,Krasak, Desa sidorejo memang sudah teraliri air tetapi hanya untuk warga di bawah atau,yang bisa memanfaatkan air dari grafitasi Bebeng,sedangkan 1000 jiwa lebih (350 KK) masih seperti tahun sebelumnya membeli air. ... selengkapnya

One page of Jalin Merapi site showing a channel of citizen journalists' reports. Last accessed 11 August 2014 at http://merapi.combine.or.id

A.4. Network Analysis of Audience Duplication

The following paragraphs consist of treatments of questionnaire data to measure audience duplication using network analysis. There were five stages of transformation: record of raw data, measurement of absolute duplication, measurement of primary duplication, measurement of deviation-from-random duplication, and reduction of value.

Raw Data

Below is a sample of tabulation of questionnaires, containing 10 out 539 respondents, and 14 out of 73 media outlets. Each questionnaire was recorded in one entry (row), containing respondents' name (anonymised) and media outlets they attended to. Numeric data inputted in each media outlets were sequential numbers, but their real value was only yes (number) and no (empty). Maximal total value of each media outlet was equal to the total of participants, namely 539. Reach (R) was computed as the ratio of total audiences of one media outlet to the total number of audiences in percentage.

Name	AdiTV	ANTV	GlobalTV	Indosiar	JogjaTV	MetroTV	TPI	RBTV	RCTI	SCTV	TATV	Trans7	TransTV	TVOne
S001														
S002						6								14
S003						6								14
S004		2	3	4	5	6	7		9	10		12	13	14
S005														
S006			3			6			9				13	14
S007		2	3	4	5	6	7		9	10		12	13	14
S008		2	3	4		6	7		9	10		12	13	14
S009														
S010		2				6								14
Total	6	128	128	101	98	389	80	17	261	209	10	175	181	345
Reach (%)	1.1	23.7	23.7	18.7	18.2	72.2	14.8	3.2	48.4	38.8	1.9	32.5	33.6	64.0

Measurement of Absolute Duplication

Duplication was measured as the number of audiences that marked yes for two media outlets, for example the number of audiences who marked MetroTV and Indosiar (n = 78). The measurement was presented in the table below.

	ANTV	GlobalTV	Indosiar	JogjaTV	MetroTV	TPI	RBTV	RCTI	SCTV	Trans7	TransTV	TVOne	TVRI	Bernas
ANTV	128	88	75	43	110	61	10	111	102	93	90	112	42	7
GlobalTV	88	128	73	43	116	67	11	110	106	95	99	112	39	9
Indosiar	75	73	101	34	78	55	10	92	82	77	69	82	36	6
JogjaTV	43	43	34	98	81	31	12	66	57	51	47	77	46	8
MetroTV	110	116	78	81	389	76	13	206	178	150	163	287	71	14
TPI	61	67	55	31	76	80	8	75	72	67	70	73	26	1
RBTV	10	11	10	12	13	8	17	14	12	12	11	12	11	2
RCTI	111	110	92	66	206	75	14	261	192	143	146	207	62	15
SCTV	102	106	82	57	178	72	12	192	209	136	135	176	50	10
Trans7	93	95	77	51	150	67	12	143	136	175	142	147	47	7
TransTV	90	99	69	47	163	70	11	146	135	142	181	155	51	9
TVOne	112	112	82	77	287	73	12	207	176	147	155	345	75	11

Measurement of Primary Duplication

Primary duplication was computed as the ratio of absolute duplication to the total audience of each media outlet in question. Which media outlet treated first determined the value of the primary duplication. For example, the absolute duplication of MetroTV and Indosiar was 78. Primary duplication of MetroTV-Indosiar was 78/389 = 20.1% (yellow cell), whereas primary duplication of Indosiar-MetroTV was 78/101 = 77.2% (green cell).

	ANTV	GlobalTV	Indosiar	JogjaTV	MetroTV	TPI	RBTV	RCTI	SCTV	Trans7	TransTV	TVOne
ANTV	100.0	68.8	58.6	33.6	85.9	47.7	7.8	86.7	79.7	72.7	70.3	87.5
GlobalTV	68.8	100.0	57.0	33.6	90.6	52.3	8.6	85.9	82.8	74.2	77.3	87.5
Indosiar	74.3	72.3	100.0	33.7	77.2	54.5	9.9	91.1	81.2	76.2	68.3	81.2
JogjaTV	43.9	43.9	34.7	100.0	82.7	31.6	12.2	67.3	58.2	52.0	48.0	78.6
MetroTV	28.3	29.8	20.1	20.8	100.0	19.5	3.3	53.0	45.8	38.6	41.9	73.8
TPI	76.3	83.8	68.8	38.8	95.0	100.0	10.0	93.8	90.0	83.8	87.5	91.3
RBTV	58.8	64.7	58.8	70.6	76.5	47.1	100.0	82.4	70.6	70.6	64.7	70.6
RCTI	42.5	42.1	35.2	25.3	78.9	28.7	5.4	100.0	73.6	54.8	55.9	79.3
SCTV	48.8	50.7	39.2	27.3	85.2	34.4	5.7	91.9	100.0	65.1	64.6	84.2
Trans7	53.1	54.3	44.0	29.1	85.7	38.3	6.9	81.7	77.7	100.0	81.1	84.0
TransTV	49.7	54.7	38.1	26.0	90.1	38.7	6.1	80.7	74.6	78.5	100.0	85.6
TVOne	32.5	32.5	23.8	22.3	83.2	21.2	3.5	60.0	51.0	42.6	44.9	100.0

Deviation from Random Duplication

Deviation from random duplication value was computed by substracting the reach (R) of media outlet from primary duplication.

	ANTV	GlobalTV	Indosiar	JogjaTV	MetroTV	TPI	RBTV	RCTI	SCTV	Trans7	TransTV	TVOne
ANTV		45.0	55.5	25.7	-43.9	61.4	55.7	-5.9	10.0	20.7	16.1	-31.5
GlobalTV	45.0		53.5	25.7	-42.4	68.9	61.6	-6.3	11.9	21.8	21.1	-31.5
Indosiar	34.8	33.3		16.5	-52.1	53.9	55.7	-13.2	0.5	11.5	4.5	-40.2
JogjaTV	9.8	9.8	14.9		-51.3	23.9	67.4	-23.1	-11.5	-3.3	-7.6	-41.7
MetroTV	62.2	66.9	58.5	64.5		80.2	73.3	30.5	46.4	53.2	56.5	19.2
TPI	23.9	28.6	35.7	13.5	-52.6		43.9	-19.7	-4.3	5.8	5.1	-42.8
RBTV	-15.9	-15.2	-8.8	-5.9	-68.8	-4.8		-43.1	-33.0	-25.6	-27.5	-60.5
RCTI	63.0	62.2	72.4	49.2	-19.2	78.9	79.2		53.1	49.2	47.1	-4.0
SCTV	55.9	59.1	62.4	40.0	-26.4	75.2	67.4	25.1		45.2	41.0	-13.0
Trans7	48.9	50.5	57.5	33.9	-33.6	68.9	67.4	6.4	26.3		44.9	-21.4

TransTV	46.6	53.6	49.6	29.8	-30.3	72.7	61.6	7.5	25.8	48.7		-19.1
TVOne	63.8	63.8	62.4	60.4	1.6	76.4	67.4	30.9	45.4	51.5	52.1	

Network of Audience Duplication

When the value of a cell exceeds zero (>0), it means that duplication of the two media was not a random occurrence. The value of each cell was then transformed into 1 (for any value above 0) and 0 (for the zero and below). It resulted in the following table of the network of audience duplication. Measure of centralisation and the in-degree of media outlets used this data.

	ANTV	GlobalTV	Indosiar	JogjaTV	MetroTV	TPI	RBTV	RCTI	SCTV	Trans7	TransTV	TVOne
ANTV	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0
GlobalTV	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0
Indosiar	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0
JogjaTV	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
MetroTV	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
TPI	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0
RBTV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RCTI	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0
SCTV	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
Trans7	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
TransTV	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
TVOne	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0