

## **Terror and trafficking in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India: a routine activity approach**

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# Organized Crime and Terrorism in South Asia: Reconciling a Routine Activity Framework with Social, Political and Economic Factors

## Introduction

This chapter demonstrates the value of criminological theory in understanding key crime events in a number of South Asian countries. Although we can study issues of crime and justice in South Asia as we might do in any other region or country of the world, the processes and threats associated with terrorism and organised crime are especially prominent in this region. In particular, the illicit trades in drugs and people - trafficking - are noteworthy. Such activities evolve, and in doing so they present problems for domestic law and order and indeed wider security matters. Afghanistan, Pakistan and India are focal points within the chapter. They exhibit many of the problems associated with fostering a secure law and order environment, and they have been closely associated with trafficking and terrorist activities in recent years.

A number of possible theoretical lenses are available as a means through which to explore, and ultimately understand those crime events. *Traditional* criminological theories continue to prove to be a valuable reference point, or a tool for understanding crime on some level, as well as a platform upon which more recent theories have been able to build-on; filling in explanatory gaps or responding to critique of those original theories. Theory often builds on theory after-all. In this context, the chapter utilizes a re-working of traditional criminological theory - classicism - through the focus on routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979), and builds on this further by reconciling it with dimensions ordinarily associated with other theoretical models. In essence, the chapter demonstrates how it is possible to move beyond the conceptual constraints of a theory and apply it to contexts beyond those ordinarily associated with the theory. Thus here, routine activity theory is used to better understand terrorism and trafficking. In order to do this, the foundational principles of the routine activity framework are interrogated and then subsequently treated in a more expansive manner. At the outset, the nature of the threats in the case study countries is outlined.

## Terrorism in South Asia

The UK Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism as:


The use or threat of action designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public, or a section of the public; made for the purposes of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause; and it involves or causes:

- serious violence against a person;
- serious damage to a property;
- a threat to a person's life;
- a serious risk to the health and safety of the public; or
- serious interference with or disruption to an electronic system (MI5, 2014)

This is one amongst many possible definitions, others emphasise the threat to 'non-combatants'. Yet arguably, we need to expand our thinking beyond just 'non-combatants' given the actual nature of modern day terrorism. Thus, the UK definition is helpful. However, what the above and other definitions share is the emphasis on the use of violence and the fostering of fear in pursuit of a wider goal. Whether that goal is religious, political or ideological in nature is really a question of semantics; after all, each of those domains over-laps. Religious terrorism is viewed by many however, as representing the prevailing and future threat (Martin, 2014; Whittaker, 2012).

Beyond this, it is possible to understand terrorism in a number of competing ways; different types of terrorism are discernable, whilst the goals behind a set of actions and indeed the characteristics of the individuals and groups involved, adds further complexity to the issue. In Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the disputed territories between India and Pakistan, terrorism can be viewed in a critical manner; defining acts as being 'terrorism' in nature is dependent upon one's political perspective. Furthermore, drawing a line between legitimate combatant behaviour and terrorist activities can be difficult. However, what is not contestable is the fact that there have been, and there continues to be acts of extreme violence borne out of political and religious differences, inflicted upon both civilians and foreign and domestic combatants - for example, civilians, international troops within ISAF and Afghani security forces have all been targets within Afghanistan. Terrorism in this region also extends to actions connected to the disputed ownership and governance of lands, specifically in the context of India and Pakistan since independence from Britain in 1947. Religious and cultural intolerances have seemingly been strong drivers for violence and in the instance of Afghanistan in particular, and to a lesser extent Pakistan, we also see opposition to foreigners and other nation-men who are part of the *war on terror* since 9/11, sitting on the other side of a bloody ideological divide. As we can see in Figure 1, there has been a noticeable increase in events defined as being 'terrorism' in nature in recent years in the region.

**Figure 1: terrorism incidents over time in South Asia**



*Adapted from Global Terrorism Database (2014)*

That noted, we must seek to understand the conditions that have made such parts of the world conducive to the development of terrorist organizations, the

conditions which have drawn-in foreign terrorist organizations - for example Al-Qaeda - and insurgencies, and the drivers of recruitment in to those organizations at individual and group levels. What is it about parts of South Asia that has enabled insurgent and terrorist organizations to take a foothold? Can we attribute this to the failed or weak state narrative; are such places suffering from acute economic and political inequalities which have created antagonism and conflict; can we point to cultural characteristics of places such as Afghanistan and connecting regions; or perhaps we can cite the presence of extremist religious doctrines? Credibly, all of these dynamics have been of influence.

Martin (2014) attempts to distinguish between the different *causes* of terrorism, and in doing so, he cites processes at both individual and group levels. At the individual level he notes how it is possible to consider rational, psychological, and cultural origins, whilst, at a group level attention is brought to political activism as a genesis for action. Whittaker (2012) offers a similar type of analysis. Martin notes that regardless of the *precipitating cause* of a particular terrorist's behaviour, there are common motives, and these include the responses to perceived injustices, a strategic choice, and moral influences (from the perspective of the terrorist or terrorist group). Intuitively, this mirrors what we have seen in Afghanistan in recent years. There, terrorist acts can be viewed as a part of a strategy to drive out and inflict defeat on enemy forces who occupy an alternative ideological position, and this occurs in the context of a conflict driven by a skewed understanding of injustice - on the part of the *jihadists* - and a sense of moral duty, again influenced by a warped interpretation of religion. Here, we see the impact of an ideological doctrine which requires self-sacrifice in defence of the religion, whilst, simultaneously reassuring a would-be terrorist that they are to be rewarded in the afterlife should they die fighting for the cause (see Laqueur, 1998).

Naturally, criminological theories that focus on structural dynamics within societies can also be brought in to the account. In this context, we can see how within those regions experiencing economic problems and military crises, or where policies alienate or antagonise groups there is a heightened vulnerability to insurgent forces and thus terrorist activities (Goldstone, 1986, within Martin, 2014, p. 47). Quite clearly we see this in events in Afghanistan - through the rise of the Taliban in the early 1990s, and their relationship with Al-Qaeda. Notably also, international influences, *vis-à-vis* religious ideology, are also vital to consider. The terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan can be attributed in most part to religious differences and a world view borne out of it, spread by an international jihadi agenda that has manifested itself in political action, and ultimately, violence.

Martin (2014) argues, in accordance with Whittaker (2012), that political violence is common in some social and political contexts - we can see this in Afghanistan; the country has a long tradition of conflict and a pervasive warrior culture. In modern times the conflict with Russia exemplifies this. That conflict, according to Martin (2014, p. 151), played a key role in spreading jihadist ideology throughout the Muslim world as the *Mujahideen* ("holy warriors") effectively pushed out a foreign superpower aggressor. Such cultural characteristics have seemingly been exacerbated through the role of extremist religious positions and insurgencies which serve to channel and inflame that trait. Further still, terrorists may view themselves as

an 'elite vanguard', who are not content with discussion but who instead see action (and violent action) as a necessary process in achieving their political goals (Martin, 2014). Thus, what we have seen in some parts of Afghanistan is a warrior culture influenced by extreme versions of Islam, with a sense of moral or religious duty to defeat an enemy who is depicted as diametrically opposed to their belief system, and where political violence is a strategic choice to achieve their stated goals.

Whittaker (2012) also develops an account of how cultural legacies of violence and modern cultural relationships with violence can play a role in determining such behaviours. The insurgencies which have brought foreign Al-Qaeda operatives in to the theatre of conflict in Afghanistan found a natural home. We can see the development and prominence of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan as being in no small part a result of the Taliban seizing power from a weak central government in Kabul in the early 1990s. The Taliban shared an extremist interpretation of Islam, and ruled through violence. It is no wonder then that a more global terrorist organization with compatible world views felt welcome there and took Afghanistan as their base (Whittaker, 2006, within Whittaker, 2012)

Interestingly, Martin (2014) and Grabosky and Stohl (2010) have noted how the targets of terrorist actions become 'depersonalized' and they have symbolic labels attached to them owing to the ideological divide which develops. Thus, they become desirable targets. It is easy to recognise this within the conflict in Afghanistan and the accompanying propaganda materials, and indeed in related conflicts in Iraq and Syria - a brief YouTube search demonstrates this.

Logically, we can view much of this discussion in the context of strain theories, associated initially with Merton (1938), and subsequently developed by a range of other experts, including Passas (2000). In this narrative, crime, in this instance terrorism, can be viewed as being somehow a response to inequalities and lack of opportunities for some groups in regions of South Asia. It is a fairly intuitive step to view the traditional cultural and religious divisions of Afghanistan as manifesting themselves within inequitable relationships of power. This might stem from local or regional processes, and also interactions at an international level - inequalities resultant from processes of globalisation, or political and economic sanctions imposed by strong international communities: the United Nations; World Bank; International Monetary Fund and so on. One outcome of such processes are feelings of alienation and anger towards other groups, those perceived to be fostering injustice - other nations, other religious or cultural groups, or power elites in a given country. Strain theories dictate that Individuals and groups can respond to such strains or injustices (perceived or real) in a retaliatory or rebellious way. Extreme religious doctrine then gives such anger and alienation a focus, and it brings in to view a common enemy. The use of violence and instilling fear in the *enemy* then becomes a rational or at least strategic route towards achieving stated goals, which are often political in nature - driving out Western influences and defeating the *infidels*.

### **Trafficking in South Asia**

Recent estimates suggest that the majority of the world's illegal opiates are grown in Afghanistan, for the year 2009 this was thought to be approximately 90% of

the global supply (UNODC, 2014). Furthermore, the impacts of the trade are telling; It is clear to see that the

...boom in opium production in Afghanistan echoes loudly through the political and social fabric of the region (UNODC, 2014).

How do we begin to understand the prominence of trafficking operations in South Asia? Well, the market is king. Individuals and groups operating in illegal markets, including the trade in people and drugs, are motivated by the financial rewards that are possible. Those actors are driven by the market - illicit markets meeting demands that are not catered for within licit economies. Peter Reuter famously considered the role of market principles in the regulation of illegal industries in the USA and he explored the role of violence within this (Reuter, 1983). Violence and organized crime seemingly go hand-in-hand wherever illicit markets are there to be tapped. And such markets are vast. Experts such as Castles and Miller have described how the movements of people have become an industry in itself - the 'migration industry' (for example, see Castles & Miller, 2003). The 'migration industry' worldwide is now thought to have exceeded in size the international illicit drugs trade (Aas, 2013, p. 37). However, as one might expect, understanding the true scale of such activities is problematic owing to a lack of disclosure, unknown illegal operations and law enforcement difficulties.

Naturally, much of the activity within that *industry* reflects a desire on the part of those being transported to seek a better life in the given country of destination. This can be broadly labelled as 'people smuggling'. Often this involves movement to Europe or North America, and the journey can be treacherous, and often fatal. Undoubtedly this type of movement of people is prolific in South Asia, typically with those countries being the point of origin for would-be migrants. Yet the focus in this chapter is around the forced trafficking of individuals. Here the process is against the will of the person, and usually the purpose of trafficking is for labour, or more commonly to fuel the sex-trade. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) published a report in 2012 and demonstrated that 79% of human trafficking is related to sexual exploitation, and the vast majority of the victims are women and girls (UNODC, 2012). Sometimes, those trafficked - to other countries or to other regions within the same country - are duped in to the process. They may agree to go with traffickers under false pretences, and the promise of work seems to be a common deception.


The United Nations defines human trafficking in relation to the following:

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of positions of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitations, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. (UNODC, 2012, p.16)

Although significantly wordy, the definition captures the complex nature of trafficking. Unfortunately, South Asia is a significant player in this industry. UNODC

data (UNODC, 2012) paints a picture of a worryingly high level of trafficking in South Asia, and India is a notable case study (see Kiley, 2005). Yet, the problem is certainly not restricted to any one country, and the international dynamics of trafficking further complicate the matter. Most worrying perhaps, is the heavy burden of victimisation which falls on the shoulders of children in this region. For example, Figure 2 demonstrates how poorly South Asia (as part of a wider region of South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific) ranks in relation to this, although not quite as poorly as Africa and the Middle East.

**Figure 2: victims of trafficking**



*Adapted from UNODC 2012, p.10*

Aas (2013) has made the link between the development processes within 'poor' countries and the security environment in the West. That is, international inequalities and restricted development create an environment conducive to the development of organized crime activities. In a similar vein to terrorist activities, this creates challenges for the security of countries on the other side of the world. And indeed law enforcement challenges within the origin countries. Whilst again, akin to accounts of structural conditions or *strains* influencing the terrorism landscape in regions of South Asia, we see similar processes at work here in the context trafficking. In light of what Passas (2000) terms 'global anomie', we can recognise some processes of international inequalities *vis-à-vis* legitimate opportunities and pathways to success as shaping the desires of would-be organized crime groups. Countries such as Pakistan, India and Afghanistan are exposed to hegemonic cultural aspirations in a modern globalised, capitalist and consumerist world, but the stark reality of the extreme inequalities within those countries dictates that innovative means of acquisition are logical outcomes for many. Whilst, the violent rejection of those ideas, and the subsequent

adoption of alternative ideas that challenge such hegemony is another possible outcome *vis-à-vis* terrorism.

Again, echoing what we see in relation to the development and harbouring of terrorism, weak states, that is where states are unable to maintain conventional processes of governance over their lands, are vulnerable to criminal networks (Aas, 2013). Such territories are attractive to criminals on the basis of the scope they offer them to operate unmolested and without disruption. Such environments are further enhanced by the possibility of a 'state-crime nexus', where tangible informal networks or connections can exist between political and civil state actors and criminal drugs enterprises (Aas, 2013). 'Selective law enforcement' is one outcome of this (Muller, 2012, with Aas, 2013). Muller explored this in the context of Mexico, but quite clearly we can identify comparable processes in parts of Asia, and Chin (2009) explores this in detail. Relatedly, an investigative report for Channel 4 News in Britain demonstrated some of these issues in relation to people trafficking. Law enforcement complicity and corruption were seemingly apparent in the operations of the child sex industry within Indian cities (Kiley, 2005). Similarly in Afghanistan, evidence of such corruption continues to be found (see Swarts, 2014).

The issues of competencies and resources are also important in developing an understanding of those illicit trades. This is clear to see in the major policy responses to the drugs trade in the region. For example, the UNDOC's programme for Pakistan (2010-2014) has focused around promoting the rule of law, to

'...enhance the legislative regimes, increase the knowledge and capacity of drug enforcement officials and improve interdiction capabilities'. (UNODC, 2014).

Similar programmes elsewhere also focus on the capabilities of law enforcement to disrupt and prosecute traffickers.


Trafficking, whether relating to drugs or people, can be broken down in to three discrete steps. Initially, this involves the production of drugs or recruitment, including the forceful taking of people. Production of opiates for example, requires poor or ineffective governance structures in order that operations are not interfered with. Corruption or state complicity improves the situation further still. Whilst, in order to recruit those who are to be trafficked there is often have a strong motivation to want to go - as a result of their economic situation - and those people are thus vulnerable to being duped by a trafficking gang. Or, the poor law enforcement landscapes enable gangs to snatch people against their will and offer little in terms of investigatory follow-up, especially in rural areas (Kiley, 2005). This might be a result of acute shortages in resources, or competencies, but also complicity or 'selective law enforcement'.

The next stage involves the movement or trafficking itself, and again lax law enforcement structures and corruption allow drugs and people to be moved in an unsolicited manner. From Afghanistan, drugs are moved to neighbouring countries through porous borders, and much of this is then moved into Europe and Russia via Turkey and the Balkans (UNODC, 2010) - see Figure 3. People who are trafficked from within India may be moved internationally, but much of the movement is internal - to the major cities for the purpose of forced prostitution (UNODC, 2012). The final stage, consumption of the drugs or those trafficked, which is shaped by




market forces, then takes place both domestically and further a field internationally. In the context of Afghanistan, the heroin consumption on the streets of Europe, Russia, Central Asia, Oceania and the USA helps to fuel the trade - see Figure 4.

Figure 3: Global flows of Asian heroin



*Adapted from UNODC (2010, p. 45)*

Figure 4: The demand for heroin



Adapted from (UNODC 2010, p.21)

### Routine activity theory

Routine activity theory is founded upon *classical* criminological reasoning, which in short, views the offender as a rational and calculating actor. Routine activity theory is one of several perspectives owing its existence to earlier *classical* criminology, or *classicism* (Newburn, 2013). Classicism is associated with thinkers of the enlightenment period in Europe. Particularly, ideas attributed to Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham have been used to depict the offender as an unremarkable character in the pursuit of self-utility, who can be deterred from offending through appropriately determined laws and penal structures (Newburn, 2013). Routine activity theory can be viewed within the same tradition as earlier classicism owing to the sharing of the same basic principles, that is, crime is a rational process given the associated circumstances of the offender and the event. Earlier classicism adopted a fairly philosophical route to understanding and explaining crime, but it also enabled an awareness of the crime event in the context of how offending decisions are made. Understanding the immediate environment or circumstances of the crime event is a natural continuation of this, and one avenue of analysis developed by subsequent *neo-classical* frameworks, including routine activity theory. In its most basic form, routine activity theory requires that we understand the incidence of crime as determined by three immediate factors. Those elements include

- the existence of a motivated offender
- the existence of a suitable or vulnerable target

- the absence of capable guardianship (that is, the absence of a means to successfully prevent a crime, or respond to a crime in situ) (Cohen and Felson, 1979).

Quite clearly, such elements assume something of the immediate circumstances or environment of the crime event. The framework was initially focused around contact and predatory crimes. However, thinking around routine activity theory has been subsequently developed, notably by Marcus Felson (for example see Felson and Boba, 2010), and with this the framework became more adaptable. Felson referred to the 'chemistry for crime' as a means of understanding the interplay between the various nodes of routine activity framework, and the model was applied to other types of crime. However, and crucially, it remained focused around a rational actor model of crime, and continued, largely, to ignore the actual dynamics of the offender.

Such theories have continued to be widely taught in criminology and criminal justice studies, and they can be fairly successful in allowing us to understand crime on some level. This theory in particular has proved to be popular. However, like all theories or frameworks in criminology, routine activity theory is premised on a series of assumptions which make it susceptible to critique. In this instance, as an explanatory platform, it inherently omits, or at least appears to omit, a range of factors that we might intuitively associate with crime beyond the immediate crime event. Wider social and macro level dynamics are missing. So too is an exploration of potential determinants within an individual which may increase their propensity to offending - the ignorance of such circumstances is problematic. However, this need not necessarily be the case. We might indeed explore the notion of a 'motivated offender' via a range of influencing factors on behaviour beyond the immediate environment. This could include individual determinants and wider societal level determinants. More fundamentally perhaps, it is possible to utilize the framework more expansively still, and move beyond immediate environment factors to think about broader social, cultural, political and economic factors influencing the other two nodes of the framework, here in relation to the creation of 'targets' and also the lack of 'capable guardianship'. We might even consider such dynamics over time. Thus, we are able to move each of the three routine activity theory explanatory nodes beyond the context of their initial usage. That is, we can move them beyond the immediate context of the crime and thus apply the model in a more expansive manner in order to understand terrorism and trafficking in South Asia.

On a broad level, neo-classical perspectives such as routine activity theory are normally viewed as competing with a body of theorising, crudely labelled *positivism*. That body of work is unified by a series of assumptions which ultimately views the offender as being influenced by internal or external forces; in some way mentally, culturally or socially constrained, where crime is viewed as an outcome of this (see Lilly *et al.*, 2011). In short, this body of work is ordinarily viewed as a counter-position to classicist inspired frameworks (see Newburn, 2013 for an overview). However, this chapter demonstrates how theoretical models can be viewed as just that, models, or heuristic tools. For some, it is possible to understand competing theories as representing rigid templates, or a fixed position and an unnegotiable way of viewing crime and the offender. Yet, we can move beyond this. Utilizing aspects of a number

of theoretical models together can allow for a more sophisticated application of knowledge, and thus a better understanding of criminal behaviours. We are able to fill-in gaps or respond to glaring critique.

Although routine activity theory is at its core a perspective based on neo-classical thinking, based on the rational actor model, it is possible to reconcile this with many of the issues or explanatory devices ordinarily associated with other theoretical models. This might include external influences on behaviours, such as the social, cultural, political and economic determinants that were explored earlier in the chapter; normally the preserve of *positivist* theories, including those pertaining to structure, and some critical perspectives.

Indeed, research by Anderson (1999), Sampson and Wilson (1995), Wilson (1987; 1996) and Wright and Decker (1994) has explored the extent to which the rational actor model of offending, which routine activity theory is premised upon, holds true. They explored the wider cultural and structural context of offending (all within Lilly *et al.*, 2011). In those studies, the authors demonstrate the wider influences on offending, and so work such as this intuitively raises questions about the absolute value of viewing routine activity theory purely in terms of the rational actor model. Naturally, we can also interrogate the use of the other elements of the theory in a similar way, asking broader questions of them.

Yet, rather than dismissing the framework out of hand as a result, we can instead modify it and extend the utility of it in to other contexts - different crimes, beyond those normally considered by the theory; from robbery, thefts, burglary and so on, to trafficking and terrorism. In short, the three nodes of analysis are certainly helpful, but they need not be treated as restrictively as the initial formulation of the model might suggest. As a result then, we must also consider the very notion of 'routine activity' itself and opt to use this idea loosely within such a revised understanding of routine activity theory.

### **Outline of a revised routine activity model**

In light of what we have explored in this chapter, it is possible to understand the dynamics of trafficking and terrorism in parts of South Asia in a broader theoretical manner. Clearly, such activities are widespread and we can identify a number of drivers, connected to the social, cultural, political and economic conditions, and routine activity theory allows us to put such influences in to a logical framework. Thus, by utilizing the three nodes of analysis we can make sense of the activities, despite the necessity here to move the framework beyond its intended usage. And so, by utilizing the model we can identify the following:

- i. The motivations for individuals and groups to become involved in terrorism and trafficking are located in the social, cultural, political and economic conditions and events within the countries of the region. We see this in the role of the markets, and accounts of *strain*, the vulnerability of such places to extreme ideologies and insurgencies, and the conditions conducive to conducting illegal operations in an unchallenged manner.
- ii. Suitable targets are prevalent as a result of those wider social, cultural, political and economic dimensions within the region. The conditions required for the existence of groups of vulnerable peoples at the mercy of the *people trade* - the

most vulnerable being women, young girls, and the economically deprived - are brought about by gross income inequalities, desperation, and inequalities in power and security. Similarly, occupying foreign troops (for example ISAF) and opposing domestic factions represent vulnerable targets. They are vulnerable in the sense that they are visible and they are not fully in control of the territories within which they operate. They are also highly suitable targets owing to their symbolic importance. The weak state narrative and the cultural dynamics of Afghanistan accounts for the presence of those targets and their vulnerability. The ideological and political landscape is telling.

- iii. An absence of capable guardianship is evident in many parts of South Asia resultant from law and order and governance vacuums. A failure in terms in resources or competencies, and even 'selective law enforcement', creates the opportunities for traffickers and terrorists to operate without harassment. Thus state corruption, acute inequalities, and the conditions of war or quasi-war over many recent years have created challenges for governance and stability. Organized crime groups and terrorists thrive in structures of poor or ideologically driven forms of governance (Martin, 2014; Whittaker, 2012). The blurring of boundaries between official/state bodies and criminal enterprises is also noteworthy, and 'state complicity' in crimes further erodes the existence of capable or willing guardianship. Chin (2009), Aas (2013) and Grabosky and Stohl (2010) have explored such interfaces between state agencies and criminal enterprises. Chin for example demonstrates a convergence between state and criminal narcotics enterprises, pointing to corruption and ineffective governance regimes. Whilst Aas has noted how wider official or *legitimate* economies in Asia benefit from organized crime activities.


Thus here we see the outlines of a more expansive application of routine activity theory. It is also important to note that there are a number of parallels between organized crime and terrorism, despite caution being raised by some commentators. The relationships between them have been explored successfully by a number of authors (including Makarenko, 2004; Grabosky & Stohl, 2010) yet this remains a relatively under-reported account within criminology. In parts of South Asia the relationships between those two activities are particularly noteworthy. Makarenko (2004) for example, demonstrates a number of crime-terror 'interfaces' (please read for further details). The illicit trade in heroin for instance, presents an obvious case study of how organized crime and terrorist activities coincide in parts of Afghanistan. One might point to the use of funds from the heroin trade to resource terrorist activities. Grabosky and Stohl (2010) explored a number of connections between those activities, and they cite the phenomenon of 'narco-terrorism'. This relates to the involvement of terrorist organizations in the drugs trade as a means through which to fund their activities. Others have directly explored this in the context of Afghanistan. Singh (2011) offers a useful case study. He demonstrates that the situation in reality can be slightly more complex than the uni-dimensional relationship of illicit drugs supporting terrorism, but this has seemingly been the case in some instances.

Grabosky and Stohl's analysis briefly touched on routine activity theory as an explanatory framework. Within this they note how motivations for offending are multiple, but may include factors such as greed, rebellion, indignation, the pursuit of

security, power, revenge, and excitement (Grabosky & Stohl, 2010). And so one question we might ask is how such motivations are *created*? The local, regional and international influences on places such as Afghanistan or Kashmir shape everyday experiences such that this becomes conducive for motivating terrorist behaviours amongst some members of the population. Similarly, the conditions created in those locales, plus other areas in South Asia, are conducive to the rise and influence of organized crime networks - particularly the illicit trades in drugs and people. Grabosky and Stohl (2010) also consider the role of group influences in motivating terrorists; the desire to be a part of a group or fraternity of some sort, and once this is coupled with a sense of outrage or hatred for another group that desire to collectively act or respond is exacerbated. In the context of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India we see religion as an obvious driver, both in terms of extremism and sectarianism. The exploration of 'opportunities' and 'guardianship' by Grabosky and Stohl was less expansive, but this nevertheless demonstrates how we might develop our *handling* of the three nodes of analysis within routine activity theory. Similarly, Martin (2014) attempted to apply routine activity theory to terrorism, although this did not focus on South Asia and it was done fleetingly. Yet, there is then a precedent set for thinking about routine activity theory in the contexts of terrorism and organized crime and this chapter has sought to further develop such analysis.

### A revised module

It is often helpful to visually present theoretical frameworks in order to consider the interplay between the various dynamics under consideration. Thus, in Figure 5 a typical depiction of the routine activity framework is included. As is evident, this is focused around factors associated with the immediate environment which can encourage crime. Here, the "Hot Spots" represent the coming together of those conditions conducive to crime. Note how the application of the framework tends to be in relation to everyday behaviours and scenarios:




*Adapted from Tibbetts (2011)*



It is, however, possible to re-work the framework to reconcile it with wider influences, those beyond the immediate nature of the event, as demonstrated earlier in the chapter. We are able to employ a more dynamic and expansive level of analysis in relation to the framework. In short, we can move it beyond the rational actor model and borrow from other theoretical models. Thus, beyond the immediacy of the environment, we can consider the social, cultural, economic and political conditions that influence a given space. We can also extend our thinking beyond the immediate vicinity of the environment in to regional, national and international influences. More than this, we can also consider influences over time - traditions, cultural legacies, the spreading of ideologies, the conditions created by poor governance and processes of development and so on. This can be viewed in the context of *creating* motivation for crime, that is, drivers for criminal behaviours beyond impulse. It can also be seen within the creation of suitable targets where those targets have become vulnerable as a result of those wider regional, national and international events and processes. Finally, the absence of capable guardianship can be viewed as a consequence of those same types of processes. This is depicted in Figure 6, where the focus is around terrorism and organized crime in South Asia:

Figure 6: A more expansive application of routine activity theory



## Conclusion and Implications

As a model for understanding law and order responses to organized crime and terrorism, a more expansive application of routine activity theory demands that we consider how policies and practices work with the three nodes of analysis at local, national and international levels. Thus, the policy questions emergent from this include:

- I. How can we reduce the supply of motivated offenders? How can we change or interrupt illicit markets? How can we reduce or temper the ideological divisions and religious hatred operating locally between different sects, and more widely in the context of jihadist ideologies? How can we reduce the stark inequalities in wealth and power which fuel reactions conducive to crime?
- II. How can we reduce the numbers of vulnerable targets - those people susceptible to trafficking or terrorist activities? How can we ensure that families and children are not left in economically and socially vulnerable positions at the mercy of gangs in the trafficking trade who may kidnap or dupe? How can we ensure universal security and protection for all?
- III. How can we create more robust processes of *guardianship*, locally, nationally and internationally? How do we foster stronger and fairer governance regimes, effective surveillance and motivated and competent law enforcement? What role can domestic and international legislation play? How can we disrupt organized crime operations abroad? How can we guard against the spread of ideology and insurgencies that have shaped places such as Afghanistan and the disputed territories in South Asia?

Such questions reflect the acute challenges facing those who are tasked with making a difference.

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Figure 1: terrorism incidents over time in South Asia




Figure 2: victims of trafficking




Figure 3: Global flows of Asian heroin




Figure 4: The demand for heroin




Figure 5: A typical depiction of routine activity theory



Figure 6: A more expansive application of routine activity theory

