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AFRICAN ADVENTURES: FILM FINANCES LTD. AND ACTOR-PRODUCERS ON SAFARI

Sheldon Hall

At a particularly fraught moment during production of *Zulu* on location in South Africa, Film Finances' representative Colin Lesslie wrote in one of his confidential letters, with evident exasperation: 'God! how I wish Stars would remain Stars and Directors remain Directors instead of all wanting to be Producers as well. They just haven't any sense of responsibility either to their backers or to the men who work under them.'¹

This article examines and compares the case histories of two films which posed challenges to the completion guarantor Film Finances that were in certain respects similar. The films are *Zulu* (1964) itself, co-produced by its star, Stanley Baker, and director, Cy Endfield; and *The Naked Prey* (1965), starring, produced and directed by Cornel Wilde. As well as having in common the figure of a producer who was also the leading actor, these films were both made on location in South Africa, a fact which brought its own difficulties, not least those of fiscal control and the effect of this on artistic decision-making. The films also shared a number of production personnel and are even comparable thematically, in their treatment of colonial narratives from a liberal-humanist perspective.

A further reason for linking the two is that, because of the risks posed by location-made films and (in the company's view) undisciplined actor-producers, Film Finances felt the need to appoint to both films its own representative who would act as an on-site observer, report back on the progress of shooting and any problems encountered, and if necessary intervene to rescue the picture. Because these observers – Colin Lesslie and Basil Keys, respectively – filed detailed regular reports, we have candid first-hand records of the production of *Zulu* and *The Naked Prey* from a financial and managerial viewpoint. Such matters would normally be highly confidential, and these reports were kept even from the filmmakers involved. Their accounts are far from complimentary to them, but they testify with particular clarity to the different interests, loyalties and motivations held by

different members of the production team. They highlight not only the gulf that often lay between creative artists and practical administrators, but also the points at which they inevitably had to meet.

ZULU

Film Finances was first approached to provide a completion guarantee for *Zulu* in late September 1962, at the request of the insurance brokers appointed by Anglo Amalgamated, the British company which was at that stage to be a production partner. The film, with a budget of 1 million Rand (around \$2 million or £650,000), was said to be less than two months away from the start of shooting on locations in Pretoria, Transvaal Province, and near Durban, Natal Province.² The following month, Film Finances received copies of various documents pertaining to the preparation, planning and costing of the location shoot. They included details of arrangements for hotel accommodation and catering, estimates of sundry location, transportation and construction costs, and especially the logistics and expenses of hiring the services of 100 military personnel from the South African Defence Force and up to 2,000 Zulus.

As is well known, *Zulu* dramatises the battle of Rorke's Drift during the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, when as many as 4,000 Zulus laid siege to a tiny mission station and field hospital manned by 150 British soldiers. The garrison held out for a day and a night and survived with the loss of only seventeen men, saving the reputation of the British army following a disastrous engagement earlier in the day when virtually an entire column had been massacred.³ The screenplay, written by John Prebble and expatriate American director Cy Endfield, had been making the rounds of distributors for several years without attracting finance until Welsh actor Stanley Baker, who had already made four feature films under Endfield's direction, won the support of independent American impresario Joseph E. Levine while filming the biblical epic *Sodom and Gomorrah* for Levine's company Embassy. With Levine as chief sponsor, Anglo Amalgamated had been persuaded to come on board as the film's British distributor and co-financier, and its head David Deutsch met with Film Finances' chief

executive Robert Garrett in November to discuss the picture, whose start date had now been put back to April 1963.

Garrett was not at all optimistic, writing in a memo to staff that 'it has been made clear that we were very far from keen on undertaking anything of this sort'. His objections centred on the large scale of the proposed film, along with the fact that it was mainly to be shot on a distant location, which meant that it would be difficult to keep tabs on its progress.⁴ Nevertheless, Garrett agreed to put the proposition before the company's board for consideration. He acknowledged that there were a number of factors mitigating against his concerns, notably that most of the location shooting would now be concentrated at Mont-aux-Sources, a tourist spot in the Drakensberg Mountains, on a single set a short distance from the two hotels accommodating the principal cast and crew, thus reducing some of the logistical dangers; and the fact that a number of forms of fiscal protection had already been built into the deal.

The budget, to be shared equally between Embassy and Anglo, included a contingency fund in the event of cost overruns. Baker and Endfield had agreed to place their own salaries of £42,500 and £12,500, respectively, in escrow, which could be drawn upon to meet the first overcost beyond the contingency if the need presented itself. Garrett noted that it had 'been explained to them that we will object to the control being solely in the hands of the principal actor and director and that we would expect to appoint a production supervisor. I also told Deutsch that we would not be agreeable to Stanley Baker having approval of director in case we felt obliged for any reason to remove Enfield [sic].' The next overcost up to £30,000 after the producers' salaries had been exhausted would be met by Anglo, 'possibly in partnership with Levine', in exchange for Film Finances giving up half its own fee. Only after this would the completion bond be drawn upon, up to a maximum of £225,000.⁵

The pre-production papers, budget breakdown, shooting schedule and screenplay were sent to Film Finances' risk assessor John Croydon, who delivered his report on 17 November. The schedule was now set to occupy '14 weeks – divided as to 10 weeks shooting in South Africa, with a little over 2 weeks allowed for travelling, packing and unpacking and weather contingency – completing with

2½ weeks occupation of an unspecified studio'. The budget was '£648,641, including a production contingency allowance of £85,803 for the film to be shot in 70mm Technirama'.⁶

In eight pages of closely typed text, Croydon set down his – for the most part – reservations about the proposition, which were such as to make it impossible for him to give a firm recommendation on its viability. Croydon repeatedly compared the project to Stephen Crane's novel *The Red Badge of Courage*, set during the American Civil War, and to John Huston's 1951 film adaptation of it, whose production history had been detailed in Lillian Ross's famous book *Picture*:

I feel quite certain that the basic idea behind this project is to make another *Red Badge of Courage*. However, it has the advantage that war stories have become popular and to that extent, the script lacks what I am sure was the degree of spontaneous, unconventional story telling which applied to *Red Badge of Courage*. [...] It has the stock cowards and heroes; a leavening of disreputable [C]hristianity; a feminine revulsion to war from an inarticulate virgin; massed movements by an overwhelming enemy and Technirama to give the exposition of blood and violence on a big screen. I suppose, that from a box office point of view, it is what is known in Wardour St. as 'infallible.' (So long as nobody wants me to see it once it is finished!)

To some degree Croydon's judgment reflected his usual aversion to location-based productions, partly based on the experience of previous Film Finances projects that had overrun their budgets such as *Safari* (1956) and *Action of the Tiger* (1957). But his doubts this time also centred on the pedigree of *Zulu*'s co-producers, whom he considered untested for the scale for the project at hand:

Stanley Baker is undeniably a good actor, but I know nothing in his career which suggests that he would be a capable producer for a film of this sort. Cy Endfield when he first started to direct in this country, was a pretty safe bet to bring home a picture on

schedule and budget, but in recent years he has tended to work in opposites. This, quite obviously, would be the biggest and most magnificent film he has directed and, like Huston and *The Red Badge of Courage* could represent an important cross road in his life, and to that extent, and from what I know of the man, I feel he will be quite ruthless in his determination to secure the best possible product.

But Croydon considered that insufficient information had been provided about the director's proposed modus operandi. Endfield's 'crossplot' – a chart setting out the scene numbers to be shot on each day of the schedule and the actors who would be needed – gave no firm indication of whether he planned to use wide, 'massed' shots (as his decision to use the widescreen Technirama format seemed to imply) or break each sequence up into the standard syntax of long shots, medium shots and close-ups (as the script directions appeared to suggest); it was therefore unclear how much time each scene was likely to require for completion. 'I do not know whether it is the intention of the director to take each and every individual piece of fighting and stage it as it is scripted, or whether he intends to pick it out of a much larger canvas of the fighting as a whole', Croydon noted. 'If this film were to be shot by conventional means I would be inclined to say that it was under-scheduled by at least 25%.' He also questioned the plan to shoot scenes out of chronological order in order to accommodate actors' work schedules, which would necessitate substantial redressing of the set, and the scheduling of all the *Zulus*' principal scenes at the end of the shoot, which 'virtually disassociates the encampment itself from these battle movements'.

Among Croydon's more general concerns were the plan to use only one main camera, a converted Technicolor unit, along with two supplementary lightweight cameras, for large-scale battle scenes that would appear to demand multi-camera shooting throughout (though he also noted that the choice of Technirama as screen format might have made that impracticable). He felt that the schedule, and the attendant daily running costs of maintaining a large, virtually self-contained production village, would most likely be exceeded, particularly because of the large

number of people to be employed both in front of and behind the camera; how, he wondered, would the Zulus be controlled when shooting was at 'full stretch'? He noted that certain unknown factors mentioned in the production papers appeared not to be budgeted for: on location these included 'the question of change in colour of the terrain [due to varying patterns of rainfall] and traditional methods of feeding the native crowds'.

Croydon also saw the potential for a great many injuries, both minor and major, as 'even rubber tipped spears can cause some very nasty injuries, and blank ammunition can cause quite a lot of damage even when the exercise is under strict supervision'; but he noted that only one unit doctor and one nurse had been allowed for in the budget. He recalled his own past experience on *O.H.M.S.* (1937), 'when one soldier, in the heat of the moment, mistook one of his companions, simulating death, for a dummy and stuck his bayonet right through his body'. Where, he asked, 'is an allowance made for compensation to victims of this sort of thing?' He also wanted to know if the schedule, travel and accommodation arrangements and the crew's salary basis had been agreed or even discussed with the joint union location committee.

Despite Croydon's many reservations, Garrett was nevertheless persuaded to send Anglo Amalgamated a letter of intent setting out the terms on which Film Finances would be prepared to issue a guarantee of completion. Among the conditions set out was an increase in the budget (and the corresponding contingency fund) so that the shooting schedule could be extended, along with sundry additional allowances.⁷ The location schedule was increased from 62 to 75 shooting days and the studio schedule from thirteen to seventeen days; an additional week was allowed for travel; the period allowed for editing and dubbing was also increased, from twelve to fifteen weeks; and there were increased budget figures for various items. This raised the direct cost of making the picture from £493,488 to £553,200, excluding fees and salaries, which brought the total up to £688,672. The amount of Endfield and Baker's salaries to be placed in escrow was reduced to 50 per cent (amounting to £27,500 in total).⁸ Embassy had by now taken over complete financing from Anglo, which had dropped out of the deal, and a new company, Diamond Films – jointly owned by Baker

and Endfield – had been created to produce the picture. Shortly before shooting started a new international distributor was found, which in turn took over financing from Embassy: this was the major Hollywood studio, Paramount.

The principal recommendation that Croydon had made was the nomination by Film Finances of a representative who would join the film unit, report in detail on its operation and stay with the production until the end of shooting or preferably the final delivery of the completed picture. Consequently, in confirming the offer of a guarantee, the company specified that ‘a producer (without screen credit) will be appointed to the picture who shall exercise all the usual functions of a producer except that he will not concern himself with the script nor with the artistic direction of the picture unless the latter should appear to be seriously endangering the financial outcome of the project.’⁹ The person appointed to this role was Colin Lesslie, most recently the producer of *Tunes of Glory* (1960).

Plans were being made to shoot some of the scenes in Zululand, 100 miles away, rather than at Mont-aux-Sources, to reduce the cost of transporting and accommodating Zulu extras. The screenplay had been rewritten to reduce the number of scenes and characters and a new shooting schedule had been drawn up. In late February 1963, production accountant Arthur Hall was able to demonstrate cost savings amounting to £7,578 thanks to deals made with a South African firm, S.A. Films, though Hall considered that ‘the value of the contracts is considerably greater than this’ as S.A. was supplying production services such as a projector and projectionist (for viewing rushes), office supplies, equipment and transportation facilities which had not been provided for in the budget.¹⁰ In early March a revised production budget showed the estimated total cost now to be £666,554, including a contingency allowance of £82,241.¹¹

On the basis of these changes, John Croydon produced two further reports, respectively on the new schedule and the revised budget. He was, however, no more positive than he had been before, feeling that ‘the script is impractical and the schedule ducks the issue’. Croydon still found no clear evidence of the director’s ‘plan of campaign’ and doubted that the picture could be completed in the

time allotted and in the manner indicated in the revised crossplot, which he thought confusing and lacking in sufficient detail.

Many of the sequences are very difficult indeed to shoot. So much 'staging' is required.

The picture is progressive in action and, therefore, certain sequences must be scheduled in chronological order, so that the destruction which happens inside the camp – the burning of the hospital for instance – must come at the right moment in the schedule, and this is only known [from the crossplot] by chronological progression of scene numbers, without any notation of the manner in which it will be achieved. [...]

I think there will be days when the unit will be concerned with 'setting the stage' and little or no shooting will take place. I think the amount of rehearsal for some of the 'stunt' action scenes will be lengthy, tending to reduce the amount shot each day. I think that second and third takes will be much more than a mere repetition of the action (mess will have to be cleared up and new rehearsals take place). All of these things will tend to slow the schedule, and I shall be extremely surprised if the schedule will be able to flow along at the pace indicated in this X-plot [crossplot].¹²

Croydon was scarcely more complimentary about the revised financial provisions, casting a sceptical eye over virtually every entry in the new budget. He recommended calculating the likely overage for at least an additional month's shooting and deducting that figure from the contingency fund 'as certain to be expended'. The logistical scale of the film brought its own particular challenges, as Croydon outlined:

On a location film of this sort, it is impossible to calculate the hazards before commencement of shooting. I think illness and accident will affect the schedule, perhaps resulting in emergency schedule alterations. The crowd movements, especially

the Zulus, may take a great deal longer to work out and put into operation than has ever been envisaged. [...]

As time goes on and the director's plan of campaign begins to emerge, so the results of his work in terms of speed should be constantly applied to costs in a very accurate degree, so that were the film to start to run away with itself, red lights could begin to flash, thus giving us an opportunity to discuss, on the spot, what action could be taken to minimise costs, or at least confine them to contingency availability.

This form of control can only be obtained by our representative forming a very close liason [sic] with the production accountant and production manager, so that each and every variation of schedule can be instantly related to cost.¹³

Considering how profound were Croydon's doubts as to the project's viability, Film Finances' on-site representative Colin Lesslie was altogether more upbeat when he joined the location in late March, just prior to the commencement of shooting. Throughout the production, Lesslie kept up a series of letters to Garrett and to Embassy's Kenneth Hargreaves in London, along with daily telegrams to Paramount in Los Angeles. His first report was full of admiration for the efficiency of the crew and for the thoroughness of the preparatory work that had been done at Mont-aux-Sources. The key figure here was location manager Bob Porter, who had set up the picture in South Africa and who was also to serve as second unit director. Leslie was equally enthused by the permanent corps of 250 Zulus attached to the film, especially after, dressed in full costume regalia, they had performed a welcome ceremony for the crew and the soldiers of the South African Defence Force who were to play the British troops.¹⁴ Contrary to rumours circulating in recent years, the Zulus were not paid with cattle or wristwatches but in wages, in the amount of 25 Rand per month, or the equivalent of nine shillings per day. The additional extras to be filmed in Zululand were to cost the company eight shillings per day and the female dancers used for the tribal wedding dance

sequence slightly less again; remarked associate producer Basil Keys in a letter to Film Finances, 'There is no equality of pay for women in the Zulu nation!'¹⁵

Lesslie was much less favourably impressed by Cy Endfield, whose apparent lack of tact and diplomacy struck him as a potential problem from the outset; at least one crew member was subsequently to quit because of the director's rudeness and others threatened to do so. Endfield's ad-lib approach to filmmaking was a further matter of concern:

He shoots completely off the cuff – nothing prepared or planned whatsoever either on paper or in his head. Always, *always* changing his mind. You will remember I told you some time ago in London that, although a sketch artist was allowed for in the Preliminary Budget, Cy said he didn't want one; nor did he make any use of the model set Ernie built him. However at the time Stanley assured me Cy was planning on paper at home in the evenings but now I am convinced that this was not so. It is difficult, however, to push him too hard. Both Stephen [D]ade, the cameraman and John Merriman, the Production Manager have worked with him before and both say that he is quite incapable of planning ahead and if you push him too hard it only confuses him. Already it is noticeable on the set that Stanley is a bit worried how slow he is making up his mind and is quietly trying to push him along but, obviously, for the sake of the picture, cannot push him too hard.¹⁶

Lesslie was also underwhelmed by the quality of the acting Endfield elicited from his players in the first few days of filming, with the exceptions of Baker's own performance and that of an apparently unpromising newcomer: 'I am very glad to be able to tell you that in my opinion and from the little he has done so far, Michael Caine as "Bromhead" is very good indeed. When he was cast for the part I couldn't see it but I think (and hope) I was wrong.'¹⁷

The shoot was timed to coincide with the South African winter, when the weather was supposed to be at its driest but when the days were short, so filming was scheduled for a six-day week. Variable conditions rapidly turned to unseasonably heavy rain which caused whole days or parts of days to be written off and the film quickly to fall behind schedule. It was further put back with the Easter holiday weekend two weeks into the shoot, when all work ceased for three days. When the first set of rushes arrived for viewing, Lesslie found his worst fears confirmed: 'The direction was amateurish to say the least; the small part acting horrible and the colour varying from excellent to terrible!'¹⁸ He even had second thoughts about Caine's performance: 'Now I've seen more of Michael Caine as "Bromhead" I'm a little afraid that my original feelings were right after all but it's so difficult to judge here as the sound and acoustics are terrible in the hotel theatre.'¹⁹ The view back in London was quite different, however: Hargreaves and Garrett found the footage more than satisfactory.²⁰

On the ground, Lesslie's concerns mounted as the shoot progressed, and continued even after the weather had begun to improve. A flying visit from Joe Levine in mid-April gave him the opportunity to draw the executive producer's attention to Endfield's apparent reluctance to employ Bob Porter's second unit, which might have enabled the production to catch up on lost time. It was not easy to have two units operating simultaneously when shooting was largely confined to a single set but Endfield agreed to allow Porter to film action shots not involving the principal actors. However, he reneged on this following Levine's departure and, according to Lesslie, 'made what I think is almost a classic statement. He said "I wouldn't even let Willie Wyler direct a 2nd unit shot for me unless I had checked the set-up first"!!'²¹ Nevertheless, Porter was later despatched to Zululand with his crew to capture additional shots of tribesmen en masse – footage which never ultimately appeared in the finished picture. But Lesslie had been more impressed with Porter's action footage than with Endfield's: he wrote to Kenneth Hargreaves that 'Bob has managed to make 250 Zulus look like 1,000 whereas Cy makes them look like 50 – hardly ever filling the frame'.²²

Lesslie attributed the slow rate of progress partly to what he felt were the unwarranted ambitions of Endfield and Baker to make a more important film than, in his view, the material and the assembled talent permitted: 'This can never be the "great picture" Cy and Stanley are always talking about – nor will it win the "Oscars" they talk about either, but it can still be a very commercial "Western" set in South Africa and the answer to it all is in my opinion in the Zulus.'²³ Lesslie had hoped Levine would make this clear to Endfield, that 'instead of cowboys and "injuns", it's Zulus and soldiers and depends for its success on excitement and action and *not* on beautifully composed shots and Oscar-winning photography. If you want to win any Oscars, you've got to get a better cameraman, cast – *and* director than we've got!'²⁴ Back in London, Bobby Garrett concurred with his main point: 'I agree with your view that the film is a western put into a different setting and if this can be impressed upon Cy, it would be a good thing.'²⁵ The understanding of 'western' operative here is not that of the great American art form celebrated by critics and cultural historians but rather the Saturday-matinee appeal of Gene Autry and Hopalong Cassidy – the kind of B-grade action film that had been shown to the Zulus early in the shooting schedule to demonstrate to them what filmmaking was all about.

Garrett's own major concern, prompted by Lesslie's progress reports, involved the seemingly excessive amount of coverage Endfield was shooting for a film intended to run no more than two hours. By Lesslie's calculations, 'at the rate of pages of script he was covering compared to the screentime he was getting' the director would most likely deliver a picture running around three and a half hours.²⁶ Lesslie was sufficiently alarmed at this prospect to inform Levine about it directly, along with his anxiety at the continued failure fully to use the second unit. Levine wrote personally to Endfield and Baker to make his position clear: 'Never in any of my conversations with you did I ever indicate that I wanted *Zulu* to run 3-1/2 hours. I think this would be disastrous and completely unnecessary.' Levine urged Endfield 'to make more use of the second unit and cut down drastically on the length of the picture.'²⁷ He followed up his letter with a cable to Lesslie in which he stated that the film would 'not be released in excess of approximately two hours'.²⁸

To address his anxiety over whether some of Endfield's shots would cut together, Lesslie agreed that the film's editor, John Jympson, and his assistant, Jennifer Thompson, should fly out to the location to begin assembling the mass of footage.²⁹ With Jympson present on site to assess the material, Lesslie felt more confident that the editor might 'be able to make a good picture out of it at its correct length'.³⁰ Endfield himself anticipated an eventual running time of two hours and twenty minutes, and in the end this was proven to be right: the film was released at 138 minutes, with relatively little material of substance deleted from the script.³¹

Lesslie continued to regard Endfield as something of a liability but had been reluctant to suggest to Levine that the director be replaced, as this would have further set back the schedule and would probably have resulted in the loss of several cast members, such as Jack Hawkins and James Booth, who had been contracted for only a fixed period of time. Lesslie frequently took the opportunity to disparage both the film's producer-star and its director, writing that the crew 'don't like Stanley and are contemptuous of Cy: it's as simple as that.'³² Of his own role, which largely remained that of an observer and advisor, Lesslie noted: 'I am ignored by both of them as much as possible anyway but very much the reverse by the rest of the unit.'³³ At one point he even compared the shoot to his wartime experiences: 'Being in this place is just like being a P.O.W. again – only between ourselves the company in Italy was more congenial! I know I'll never set foot out of this place until the day we finish – God help me!'³⁴

Other measures taken to speed up production included an agreement with the crew to shoot on every alternate Sunday on payment of overtime rates. This and the increased employment of the second unit allowed the production to catch up somewhat with the schedule and the last six weeks of the shoot proceeded relatively smoothly, a happy state of affairs marked by the infrequency of Lesslie's written reports during this period. He even allowed himself a rare compliment on the 'excellent film [shot] so far'.³⁵

The location wrapped after 81 shooting days, including the Sundays that had been worked: six more days than had been scheduled, and incidentally confirming John Croydon's initial view that the

originally planned 62-day schedule had been too short by 25 per cent. Lesslie estimated at this time that the contingency fund would be depleted only in the amount of £19,000.³⁶ This helped to avert the potential loss of James Booth – all of whose scenes were to be shot in the studio – to another picture. In the event, Booth's contract had to be extended and his salary increased to allow him to complete his part in *Zulu* before moving on to the other film, Ken Russell's *French Dressing* (1964).³⁷

By October, when the studio shoot (lasting twenty days, three more than scheduled) and most post-production work had been completed, the overage had risen to £34,563 – still less than half the contingency fund of £82,241, leaving the completion guarantee, along with Baker and Endfield's escrowed salaries, untouched and the production officially under-budget.³⁸ From the point of view of Film Finances, as well as Embassy and Paramount, this made the project a success even before it went on to triumph at the box office. Garrett for one was convinced of Lesslie's central role in helping to achieve this result, writing to him on 28 June, while he was still in Africa:

We have been very conscious that you were doing a fine job under what must have been most trying conditions. Ken has appreciated this too, and Paramount and Levine should be very grateful to you for not only seeing that they got the sort of length and shape of film they wanted but also for saving them something that at a guess might have been a six figure sum if you had not been there. Your information service also was first class.

News has just arrived from the Palace that in the Battle Honours for Rorke's Drift 1963 you are to get the only V.C. with several bars!³⁹

Privately, however, Garrett thanked Baker and Endfield with an official letter congratulating them 'on the most satisfactory manner in which the shooting of the production has been handled.'⁴⁰ Inviting Garrett to attend the film's world premiere in London on 22 January 1964, Kenneth

Hargreaves could refer confidently – if incongruously, judged in any context other than the final result – to Film Finances’ ‘trouble free association with *Zulu*’.⁴¹

THE NAKED PREY

The benchmark for the kind of project Film Finances wanted to avoid was provided by *Lancelot and Guinevere* (1963), an historical epic starring, produced and directed by the American actor and filmmaker Cornel Wilde. The production, made on location in Yugoslavia in 1962, had run wildly over schedule and nearly £200,000 over budget, and had resulted in the largest loss to the company since it had been founded in 1950. It was remarkable, therefore, that having been severely burned once with Wilde, Garrett should be prepared to consider renewing the association. That he actually did so most probably had a good deal to do with the ultimately satisfactory result with *Zulu*.

In assessing the financial risk posed by *Zulu*, John Croydon had repeatedly compared the project to the recent experience of *Lancelot and Guinevere*. According to Croydon, Baker and Endfield had ‘a very much more professional approach for one thing; we are dealing, I hope to our advantage, with professional film makers.’⁴² On the other hand, that film’s under-budgeting and under-scheduling led him to fear a similar outcome to Wilde’s. But there were significant differences in the nature of the material that had made *Zulu* a slightly safer proposition: ‘We are perhaps fortunate in the probability that nothing similar to *Lancelot and Guinevere* can happen in this instance. I mean, there seems to be little likelihood of any significant sequence being added to the story, either because it is invented later, or because of expansion of some throwaway scene heading.’⁴³ Their principal similarity, of course, was the presence of a leading actor who was also a producer – and in Wilde’s case, also the director.

Wilde approached Film Finances to provide a completion bond for his new film, then called *The African Adventure*, in January 1964. If *Zulu* could be compared to a western, this property had actually begun as one: it had originally been set in frontier America and was based on the real-life adventures of John Colter, who in 1809 had been taken prisoner by Blackfoot Indians but had been

given the chance literally to run for his life; stripped naked and pursued by warrior braves, he was forced to fight for survival. In its new incarnation the story had been relocated to Africa in the mid-1800s, largely because of the cheaper shooting costs and government subsidies available there.⁴⁴ Wilde's letter to Garrett was dated exactly one week after the highly successful London opening of *Zulu*, which had gone straight to the top of the West End box-office chart. Wilde enclosed a copy of the script by Clint Johnston and Don Peters and asked for Garrett's views on it 'as soon as possible – very soon'. He intended to play the lead role as well as direct and was looking for a strong co-producer to assist him. Wilde stressed that it would be an economical project to shoot, requiring only one week's direct sound recording and 'only lights for protection – two arcs at the most, and a small crew, with two cameras'. Much of the film would, he said, involve only himself and a small camera unit.⁴⁵

Garrett's reply was non-committal: 'I should say to you that at the moment location films in Africa, presumably with animals, are not very popular with us and, in fact, some members of our Board take the view we should not do them at all'. There were few films currently being made in English studios, so 'we tend to get our books full of location pictures although the locations are probably nearer home than Africa.' Garrett added pointedly that the company still had a 'phobia about actor/director/producer (or co-producer) set ups, and I am sure we would ask if you were going to act in a film and direct it that you should have an experienced and fully powered producer whose final word would have to be accepted'. What Garrett wanted was a representative similar to Colin Lesslie on *Zulu* but he acknowledged that Wilde wouldn't 'want the producer to be our man' and that whoever was selected they would need a relationship built on mutual respect: 'What you in effect want is a partner rather than a paid employee,' he told Wilde.⁴⁶ Wilde himself later noted: 'I am aware of your misgivings about my usual multiple activities and I will do what I can to reassure you on this point'. He pointed out that he had met the pre-production and script development costs himself and would 'provide some of the deferments from my various salaries'.⁴⁷

On the advice of producer Ivan Tors, who had recently shot *Rhino!* (1964) there, Wilde planned to base the film in South Africa because of its low production, labour and transport costs. There was also the chance of receiving a government subsidy which a locally based producer, Sven Persson, was to arrange. But Wilde also suggested shooting parts of the film in neighbouring countries such as Mozambique and Rhodesia, in order to capture suitable animal footage. He wanted to sacrifice the Eady subsidy available if the film were to use an English studio and crew (which Film Finances would have preferred) and instead use South African crews, 'who have quite a bit of experience'. He ended a second letter with a plea:

Please, Sir Robert – (pardon me, *Bwana Garrett*) – let not even tea-time interfere with your prompt attention to this matter. I'm most anxious for you to make some money on this one *without* having to go into any completion [bond], and to establish with you the kind of confidence in me which I enjoy here, at Paramount, U.A., etc...⁴⁸

In April, Garrett was favourably impressed by a visit from Persson, who would be Wilde's co-producer and the second unit director on the film, also providing much of the equipment. Garrett told Wilde: 'He seems to know a great deal about working in Africa and particularly the type of picture you have in mind.'⁴⁹ Wilde hoped that Film Finances could reduce the size of its usual fee – based on 5 per cent of the direct cost plus 20 per cent of location costs – because, 'in this project, there would be no expensive cast aside from myself. Accordingly, there would be no risk of overage on stars, producer, director or script.' Most of the risk would be on the relatively low costs of production unit salaries, extras and 'running overtime on the rental of equipment, etc., but these would not entail any major amounts.'⁵⁰ Garrett explained that the fee was calculated using its standard practice, taking into account every budgeted item except the contingency allowance and the company's own fee.⁵¹ Film Finances also expected the producers to hold 'not less than half their

cash salary in escrow to meet the first overcost' – the arrangement which had recently been introduced for *Zulu*, with favourable results.⁵²

Meanwhile, Wilde had been setting up finance for the picture with Paramount, the principal backer and distributor of *Zulu*. A preliminary budget had been prepared of £257,101 (\$719,883), which included a contingency of £15,000 (\$40,000). Half Wilde's salary of £33,929 (\$95,000) was to be placed in escrow.⁵³ Paramount and Film Finances' representative on the film was to be Basil Keys, who had been associate producer on *Zulu*, and who would this time serve as a working producer rather than a mere observer as Colin Lesslie had been on the earlier film. An unsigned memo suggested that Paramount rather than Film Finances should inform Wilde of Keys' appointment: 'This way it is face-saving from Cornel's point of view.'⁵⁴

Wilde planned a seven-week shooting schedule, based on filming the 'big scenes' first over three weeks at Sibasa, the principal location in the Northern Transvaal, where two village sets and a fort would be built. Other scenes were to be shot at Pafuri (one week), and animal shots were then to be filmed in various locations by a much-reduced crew; additional animal footage would be photographed by Persson's second unit. Wilde was incorrigibly optimistic: 'In some ways this will be a remarkably pleasant location film, but occasionally everyone will have to work harder than usual, faster than usual, and without the amenities – without "hardship" money, etc!' He talked about using three cameras for the big scenes to get enough coverage and to speed up production by covering more set-ups per day. As regards weather, Wilde noted: 'There should be no trouble on this count, but one can never be sure... a good part of the time our daily operation will be very inexpensive and we cannot be hurt too much by weather.'⁵⁵

On 15 July Garrett sent the papers prepared for the project to Maurice Foster of Lowndes Productions for his comments; Foster seems to have been the risk assessor, as John Croydon was on *Zulu*, but there is no copy of a report from Foster in the Film Finances files. A new budget of \$625,000 (£242,101) had been prepared and Basil Keys was said to be 'reasonably satisfied' with it and the schedule except that he thought it wise to include some additional days for weather cover

(bad weather having been a major problem on *Zulu*). However, Paramount wanted the script to be cut by around ten minutes and if this was done the additional cover would not be deemed necessary.

A letter of approval for the project was sent on 21 July to Wilde's company Theodora Productions, specifying Film Finances' usual terms and conditions. The proposed start date was 24 August. Garrett still had misgivings, and shared his reservations with Paramount's London representative R.H. (Howard) Harrison:

From my experience of Wilde, having now got the project accepted he believes he has a lot of money to spare and therefore that he can start splashing about a bit. He is also one of those people, who when he reckons he has a saving anywhere in his budget, treats it as if it were a widow's cruse and ends up using it many times over and is quite truthfully surprised when it is pointed out to him.

Garrett told Harrison that 'we intend to treat him roughly and make him stick to his original plan. If he has any money to spare he will certainly need it to meet those hazards which at the moment he is disregarding and he should not be allowed therefore in any way to eat into his finances at this stage.'⁵⁶

Much like Lesslie had on *Zulu*, Keys kept up a regular flow of correspondence from the set, sending a total of eighteen letters (addressed mainly to Harrison, but seen also by Garrett and by Paramount in Hollywood) detailing the progress of the shoot and the problems encountered. The latter began before shooting had even started, as Keys later observed: 'On my arrival in Pretoria, I found that we had inadequate office accommodation, one telephone, and a magnificent spirit of inspired confusion!'⁵⁷ He considered the South African assistant director and production manager 'insufficiently experienced to cope with the multifarious problems that have inevitably arisen as a result of setting up this picture at such short notice'.⁵⁸ They were soon replaced by Bert Batt and

John Merriman, respectively: both of them *Zulu* veterans whose services increased the budget for the film, now to be known as *The Naked Prey*. Others among the crew who had worked on *Zulu* were accountant Arthur Hall, continuity clerk Muirne Mathieson, unit manager Dawie Van Heerden, construction manager Edu Masuch and actors Gert van den Bergh and John Marcus.

Keys found the production wholly under-prepared in other respects too. The major locations had been established as 'Blyde River Canyon, 300 miles North-East of Pretoria; Sibasa, 300 miles North of Pretoria [...]; and Pietermaritzburg, 200 miles North of Pretoria.' The plan was first to shoot an elaborate sequence involving brush fire ('a difficult and hazardous operation', according to Keys) for four days at Blyde River Canyon before moving on to Sibasa, which was to be the main location 'for the best part of six weeks'. The prefabricated administration buildings that the South African government's Bantu Affairs Department had promised to provide at Sibasa proved to be unavailable and instead of the crew being accommodated in hotels 45 miles distant as originally planned, they were forced to set up a caravan camp near the location site. Keys was also concerned that Wilde's desire to shoot with three cameras would put strain on the film stock allocation. He pointed out: 'we are attempting to achieve a well nigh impossible task to prepare and mount a large film with costumes, props, special effects, etc., with an inexperienced crew in two weeks, with locations widely scattered from our basic headquarters in Pretoria.'⁵⁹

However, before shooting was able to commence, Wilde was taken ill with bronchitis and ordered by doctors to rest for at least five days to prevent the condition developing into pneumonia.⁶⁰ Wilde was central to the success or failure of the film: as both star and producer-director he could not be replaced; if he was ill, filming stopped except for second unit work. However, Keys admitted that he could not pretend to be 'anything but delighted to find Cornel confined to bed' as it meant the company was unable to proceed to the Blyde River Canyon location, for which it was 'under-prepared in various departments'. It would have meant a 300-mile trip from the Pretoria base and living in 'hotels which are 25 and 50 miles from the shooting areas.' Keys vowed that he would 'never go on another location picture without first going on the reconnaissance [sic] trip.' He was

preparing a cost statement with Arthur Hall, but was 'a little alarmed at Wilde's attitude towards costs as, even now, he does not realise how tight our budget is.'⁶¹

After five days Wilde was again fit to work and the unit was preparing to move directly to Sibasa. Staff in wardrobe and props had been increased, further pushing up the budget.⁶² A cost statement was produced on 5 September, with eighteen itemised overages in various departments. Having now had the chance to assess the situation in more detail, Keys reported:

It is quite obvious from conversations I have had with Cornel that he has no idea of the difficulties he faces in shooting this picture. No detailed planning was ever gone into with Sven Persson when Cornel was here, nor was any real consideration given to the difficulties when certain locations were chosen. I am convinced that he has never studied our new budget – he certainly has never gone through it item by item with me, Arthur Hall, or Sven Persson. He fails to realise or appreciate, for instance, that by suddenly increasing the 'Safari' party in the Ambush and Village sequences, he is imposing an impossible task on a totally inexperienced Wardrobe and Props department, as well as incurring additional transport costs.⁶³

The plan to shoot all the big scenes in 28 days was in Keys' view 'unworkable'. Two sequences involved trying to find a river location where the water was not contaminated by disease.⁶⁴ Responding to Keys' dismal reports, Garrett told him that his letters brought back 'chilly memories' of *Lancelot and Guinevere* when Wilde had chosen an inaccessible location that was rained out, wasting much time and expense. But Garrett suggested that 'When he appreciates how close he is to spending his own money I think you will find it will pull his horns in. You will still have to keep on constantly reminding him as he is a great optimist and always thinks he has got savings which, in fact, he has already spent.'⁶⁵

On 15 September, Wilde himself wrote a brief note to Garrett, which was indeed breezily upbeat in tone: 'We have had a good many problems, some of which were to be expected and some which took us by surprise. Nevertheless, we have gotten some really exciting film and one big surprise! – we are slightly ahead of schedule. I will try to keep it that way.' Wilde praised 'the hardest working unit I have seen' and its 'excellent company spirit', though he noted: 'There were threats of rebellion by a few the first two or three days. I merely said that this is the way I want to work, since it is the only way in which we can get the quality I want and stay on schedule, and that anyone who did not want to work my way was free to give his notice.'⁶⁶ The same day, Harrison wrote to Garrett quoting a budget overage of £1,200. But he also noted the apparent contradiction between Keys' 'pessimistic tone' and the above-average number of setups Wilde had achieved to date, as well as by the quality of the 45 minutes of rushes he had seen.⁶⁷

As Garrett had predicted, after receiving the first cost statement Wilde reduced the number of African warriors involved in the pursuit.⁶⁸ Following two successful weeks' shooting Keys was now more positive and felt that difficulties were being overcome, though he was still concerned that the problems of staging the water and fire sequences had not yet been resolved and he was anxious about the quality of the location sound recording, which might necessitate increased post-production costs for re-recording.⁶⁹ When Keys expressed concern at the overloading of the camera cars, two of which had broken down, and suggested leaving one of the cameras behind to reduce the strain on the cars, Wilde insisted that he needed three cameras to maintain the pace: 'I will not allow any change in procedure which will slow down our shooting.'⁷⁰

On 25 September Keys reported another 'excellent week's work', including a difficult sequence, 'with hundreds of natives amongst burning huts, and Cornel is racing along, sparing neither himself nor the crew'.⁷¹ He also noted that the Health Department had informed the unit that the water at the location chosen for the river sequence was free of contamination. He was, however, worried that high winds might blow down the fort set and had holes punched in the walls to prevent this. Back in London, the rushes reaching Film Finances and Paramount still met with a favourable

reception. 'It looks as though it is going to be a very interesting picture,' Garrett wrote to Wilde. 'We all admired the amount you got out of your native actors.'⁷² The unit itself had not been able to see the rushes because the nearest cinema was 50 miles away; unlike on *Zulu*, there was no projectionist in the crew or any facility for screening footage. Harrison wrote to Keys reassuring him that the footage so far was excellent and that coverage appeared sufficient.⁷³

However, Keys was soon again 'despondent' following a three-hour meeting with Wilde, 'Cornel being a most impractical planner'. After leaving Sibasa Wilde was planning to take a 23-man unit to three different locations, including Blyde River Canyon for 'scenic' shots, over a twelve-day period, followed by another twelve-day trip with a reduced twelve-man crew to two further locations to shoot animal scenes. Keys wanted to film all these in Bechuanaland (now Botswana), avoiding Blyde entirely.⁷⁴ However, as he had hoped, the cost estimate for this "'round Africa Safari" gave Cornel a nasty jolt' and Wilde rescheduled the work.⁷⁵ The new plan still involved a unit of twenty going to Blyde but then moving on to Kruger National Park ('quite close'), followed by a unit of twelve going to Mozambique to shoot an elephant-killing sequence 'and, if necessary, Cornel with other game.' Keys noted that Wilde was 'very anxious to film himself against huge herds of wild animals.' This reduced the expected overage of £17,000 in excess of the £15,000 contingency fund by more than half; Keys observed: 'When Cornel realises that we are again well over budget, we may once more reschedule our final weeks in Africa.'⁷⁶

Illness again struck when Wilde was diagnosed with a temperature of 100.4 in what proved to be a painful bout of tick-bite fever.⁷⁷ The shoot having fallen a day and a half behind schedule because of Wilde's illness, the plans for the animal scenes were indeed again revised. The idea of filming the elephant kill in Mozambique was abandoned as too expensive and this scene was to be shot in Bechuanaland instead, though whether Wilde himself was present depended on completing the scenes in Kruger National Park and on 'to what degree we are spending his contingency'.⁷⁸ The budget was now overspent by £4,000 beyond the contingency, less than previously estimated due to a reduction in the size of the unit filming in Kruger. The plan to go to Bechuanaland was again

changed, as it seemed possible to film the elephant kill scenes in Northern Rhodesia, only 180 miles away. But Keys was still concerned that the company was slipping further behind schedule and could run over by four or five days, delaying the move to Blyde River Canyon. He and Arthur Hall discussed the situation with Wilde, who studied the script 'to see if he can make any cuts which will not harm but help the picture' and prevent it from running over-length.⁷⁹

Bad weather put the company further behind schedule. While Wilde was working on the script, 'concentrating the action' rather than deleting scenes, Sven Persson went to Rhodesia to shoot the elephant scenes. Keys noted that the main unit was now so small it resembled a 'news reel outfit'. He reported that 'we shall have to compromise on what will be stock and what Sven should try and shoot of the more spectacular game scenes [...]. Some of these scenes will take weeks to shoot, but when we went through the script last, Cornel appreciated that a "flexible" approach would have to be taken in regard to these scenes.' Keys thought that 'the really difficult animal scenes' were 'practically unobtainable and can only be filmed at great cost. It will be interesting to see when and to what degree we compromise over this.'⁸⁰

One week later, Keys reported that the company was now two or three days behind schedule, but he was hopeful that a day could be made up by working on a Sunday. He thought that the daily costs previously estimated as £1,200 were more realistically around £800 and he expected to make savings on special effects: 'All in all, the schedule and cost positions are remarkably good', he observed. Keys and Hall had succeeded in selling everything bought for the Sibasa camp, 'including tents, water carts, fire extinguishers, blankets, identity discs, chairs, rakes, hoses, etc, to one firm, at one third of the original cost', with the buyer taking on the job of dismantling and clearing the site. Less positively, Persson had not been able to get all the elephant shots required. Keys also reported that he and three other members of the unit – Bob Thomson, Bert Batt and Trevor Crole-Rees – had all had a 'blazing row' with Wilde: 'These three have done the work of nine men and in the end even their patience was broken by Cornel's impractical approach to shooting the film.'⁸¹

In response, Wilde made yet further changes of plan, intended to complete all work in Africa within two weeks. He cancelled the location in Blyde River Canyon altogether, filming the brief necessary shots in Sibasa, and eliminated a sequence involving a vulture. According to a memo Wilde sent to Keys, the main unit would go directly to Kruger National Park,

to do the animal tie-in shots with me. These I am reducing in number, and will deal with as elastically as necessary. [...] The lion/zebra scene obviously requires some luck in the Kruger Park. I can shoot it in pieces if necessary and put them together with editing. If we cannot get the proper shots in the Kruger Park or Bechuanaland without too much loss of time, I will finish the sequence in Hollywood with a highly trained and tame lion, whose work as an actor I am very familiar with!⁸²

Unfortunately, the Kruger shoot did not turn out as Wilde had envisioned. Keys reported: 'The "elastic" approach to the animal scenes has become very elastic! Cornel found directing wild animals in the park very difficult and has, in consequence, spent some time looking at both 16mm and 35mm animal material which is available in Pretoria. In the end, practically all the exciting animal material will be stock shots.'⁸³ There was a sadly anticlimactic end to the filming: owing to a third illness suffered by Wilde in Bechuanaland, this time gastroenteritis, no footage was shot there at all. Flying out of Africa on 18 November, Wilde suffered a further misfortune when his London-bound plane almost crashed on take-off as it 'dipped violently towards the ground'.⁸⁴

The initial budget for the picture had been £257,101, subsequently revised downwards to £242,101. By the time the final cost statement was drawn up it was over budget by £14,709 – or to put it another way, just £291 under the original budget. Keys remained convinced that the central problem with the production had always been Wilde's overly ambitious artistic aspirations for the film: 'it is a great pity that Cornel plans to enter this picture, officially or unofficially, at the Cannes Festival, as he wants every location to be different and exciting.'⁸⁵ He had further commented: 'Our

labour force is geared for a “quickie” type production and will not stand up to the grandiose ideas that Cornel expounds [...] he refuses to accept the fact that we are only geared and budgeted for a small, simple picture, which makes me suspicious of his ulterior motives.’⁸⁶

Wilde had in fact written personally to Harrison to explain his aims and ambitions:

I think that this film, with its combination of harsh realism and beauty, would have a really good chance at one of the important film festivals. I have had this in mind from the beginning in every aspect of making the film. This includes the performances, the camera set-ups, the unusual photographic effects, selection of backgrounds, the use of indigenous native music and native instruments, the inclusion in the various sequences of details of native customs and behaviour, etc.’ He had added a short, unscripted sequence showing the warriors approaching an impala for a kill at a waterhole: ‘I think it will turn out to be one of the most beautiful scenes in the film – something which I have never seen in a feature before, but which again shows a vignette of African life, not only as it was 100 years ago but even more recently.’⁸⁷

Despite the compromises he was forced into during production, Wilde came closer to achieving his aims than Keys thought possible. Although not a Cannes contender, the film opened the San Sebastian Film Festival in June 1965 and the screenplay was subsequently nominated for an Academy Award. And although it was not a huge commercial success, the film gave Wilde the greatest critical praise of his career, with favourable press reviews and a lasting reputation manifested, for example, by its appearance as a Criterion Collection DVD.

A further irony is that the very shortcomings that Keys identified were consistent with the artistic personality identified by favourable critics. Andrew Sarris’s comment on the director is relevant here, seeming partly to endorse Keys’ view: ‘Wilde is still too bland as both actor and director to be given major consideration, but he does reveal a modestly likable personality in over its head with

themes oversized for the talent and skill available.’⁸⁸ But perhaps the most memorable judgement on Wilde is David Thomson’s: that he was a genuine ‘primitive’ whose films express a raw, crude, naive but authentic power comparable to a parable.⁸⁹ Wilde himself had sought something of this quality and used the term ‘primitive’ to describe the African paintings he used behind the main titles. How appropriate that someone who was, in business terms, a liability in his impractical approach to filmmaking, should in that very limitation be true to his artistic personality.

CONCLUSION

From Film Finances’ viewpoint, both these productions presented extreme challenges, owing not only to the nature of the material and the different logistical demands the films entailed, but also to the attitudes, personalities and, to use John Croydon’s term, *modus operandi* of their respective directors and producers. It is clear that one of the reasons why Garrett’s company was uncomfortable with actor-producer and director-producer setups – let alone both, as was the case here – is that the characteristic temperament of an artist was perceived to conflict with the managerial and administrative role of a producer. The apparent lack of a ‘sense of responsibility’ identified by Colin Lesslie was thus due not merely to the particular recalcitrance of, in that instance, Stanley Baker and Cy Endfield, but was seen as being part and parcel of a general condition afflicting creative types, as the generalising nature of Lesslie’s remarks attest. Hence the felt need for Lesslie’s and Keys’ appointments as overseers of the projects, tasked, when the necessity arose, with putting the filmmakers’ artistic temperaments in their ‘proper’ place and reminding them of their fiscal obligations and the practical constraints of their endeavours.

It is difficult not to present this opposition as one of either mature professionalism versus rank amateurism or of artistic visionaries versus crass philistines (one’s preference depending on which side one finds more sympathetic). I don’t believe either to be the case in these instances. The production histories of *Zulu* and *The Naked Prey*, as seen through the eyes of their respective Film Finances observers, instead seem to me to demonstrate the very concrete and pragmatic nature of

filmmaking as an art form, and the close, symbiotic relationship that obtains between the concrete logistical and financial conditions of filmmaking and the ability of filmmakers to realise their ambitions within those parameters.

It would be too simplistic to see questions of money and practicality as simply a barrier to free creative expression, just as it would be to endorse wholeheartedly Lesslie's opinion of his clients quoted at the head of this article. Rather, such matters are among the forces actively shaping the realisation of artistic endeavour in a medium which is at once commercial, technological, industrial and physical (among other things). We can never know how Baker and Endfield's or Cornel Wilde's artistic visions might have been realised in conditions of unlimited financial luxury and creative freedom – whether the films, made in such circumstances, would have been better or worse than they now appear.⁹⁰ But the popular success and critical acclaim both *Zulu* and *The Naked Prey* have enjoyed over the years surely demonstrate that, whatever compromises were entailed in order to meet the obligations of budgets and schedules, they were not so fundamental as to undermine these films' claims to be regarded as accurate testimony to their makers' talent.

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my gratitude to Charles Drazin and James Chapman for inviting me to participate in the project to explore Film Finances' company archives, and to the current staff of its London office for their boundless hospitality and cooperation during my visits there.

Notes

¹ Film Finances Archive Realised Film Box 366: *Zulu*: Colin Lesslie to Kenneth Hargreaves, 13 May 1963; capitalisation as per original.

² Ibid: Morice, Tozer & Beck Ltd. to Film Finances, 28 September 1962.

³ On the production history of *Zulu*, see Sheldon Hall, *Zulu: With Some Guts Behind It – The Making of the Epic Movie* (Sheffield: Tomahawk Press, 2005; 2nd edition, 2014).

⁴ Ibid: memo from Robert Garrett, 7 November 1962.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid: John Croydon, risk assessment, 17 November 1962.

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- ⁷ Ibid: Film Finances to Oakhurst Productions, 29 November 1962.
- ⁸ Ibid: Cy Endfield to Bernard Smith, 14 December 1962.
- ⁹ Ibid: Film Finances to Oakhurst Productions, 18 December 1962.
- ¹⁰ Ibid: Arthur Hall to Basil Keys, 26 February 1963.
- ¹¹ Ibid: revised budget, 8 March 1963.
- ¹² Ibid: John Croydon to Garrett, 8 March 1963.
- ¹³ Ibid: Croydon to Garrett, 16 March 1963.
- ¹⁴ Ibid: Colin Lesslie (undated), attached to letter from Kenneth Hargreaves to Garrett, 1 April 1963.
- ¹⁵ Ibid: Keys to Smith, 29 November 1962.
- ¹⁶ Ibid: Lesslie to Hargreaves, 31 March 1963.
- ¹⁷ Ibid: Lesslie to Hargreaves, 31 March 1963.
- ¹⁸ Ibid: Lesslie to Garrett, 8 April 1963.
- ¹⁹ Ibid: Lesslie to Hargreaves, 9 April 1963.
- ²⁰ Ibid: Hargreaves to Garrett, 5 April 1963.
- ²¹ Ibid: Lesslie to Hargreaves, 25 April 1963.
- ²² Ibid: Lesslie to Hargreaves, 29 April 1963.
- ²³ Ibid: Lesslie to Hargreaves, 29 April 1963.
- ²⁴ Ibid: Lesslie to Garrett, 8 April 1963.
- ²⁵ Ibid: Garrett to Lesslie, 17 April 1963. On *Zulu's* relationship to the western, see: Christopher Sharrett, 'Zulu, or the Limits of Liberalism', *Cineaste*, vol. 25, no. 4 (2000), pp. 28-33; Stephen Bourne, 'Secrets and lies: black histories and British historical films', and Sheldon Hall, 'Monkey feathers: defending *Zulu*', both in Claire Monk and Amy Sargeant (eds.), *British Heritage Cinema* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 47-65, 110-28; Robert Shail, 'Stanley Baker's "Welsh Western": masculinity and cultural identity in *Zulu*', *Cyfrwng: Media Wales Journal*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2004), pp. 11-25; James Chapman, *Past and Present: National Identity and the British Historical Film* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), pp. 199-227; and Sheldon Hall, 'Carry on, Cowboy: Roast Beef Westerns', *Illuminace: The Journal of Film History, Theory, and Aesthetics*, vol. 25, no. 3 (Fall 2012), pp. 103-25.
- ²⁶ Ibid: Lesslie to Hargreaves, 25 April 1963.
- ²⁷ Ibid: Joseph Levine to Endfield and Stanley Baker, 7 May 1963.
- ²⁸ Ibid: Levine to Lesslie, 15 May 1963.
- ²⁹ Ibid: Lesslie to Hargreaves, 25 April 1963.
- ³⁰ Ibid: Lesslie to Hargreaves, 29 April 1963.
- ³¹ Ibid: Lesslie to Levine, 15 May 1963.
- ³² Ibid: Lesslie to Hargreaves, 5 May 1963.
- ³³ Ibid: Lesslie to Hargreaves, 29 April 1963.
- ³⁴ Ibid: Lesslie to Garrett, 8 April 1963.
- ³⁵ Ibid: Lesslie to Hargreaves, 10 June 1963.
- ³⁶ Ibid: Lesslie to Garrett, 26 June 1963.
- ³⁷ Ibid: Hargreaves to Garrett, 14 June 1963.
- ³⁸ Ibid: statement of production cost no. 15, week ending 18 October 1963.
- ³⁹ Ibid: unsigned (but probably Garrett) to Lesslie, 28 June 1963.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid: Film Finances to Diamond Films, 19 September 1963.
- ⁴¹ Ibid: Hargreaves to Garrett, 7 January 1964.
- ⁴² Ibid: Croydon, *Zulu* risk assessment, 17 November 1962.
- ⁴³ Ibid: Croydon to Garrett, 16 March 1963.
- ⁴⁴ On the background to the story, the development of the screenplay and other aspects of the production of *The Naked Prey* not covered here, see James Chapman and Nicholas J. Cull, *Projecting Empire: Imperialism and Popular Cinema* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), pp. 113-35. A 1913 version of the Colter story is included as a special feature on the Criterion DVD of the film, read aloud by actor Paul

Giamatti. It had earlier provided the inspiration for a sequence in Samuel Fuller's *Run of the Arrow* (1957).

⁴⁵ Film Finances Archive Realised Film Box 387: *The Naked Prey*: Cornel Wilde to Garrett, 29 January 1964.

⁴⁶ Ibid: Garrett to Wilde, 6 February 1964.

⁴⁷ Ibid: Wilde to Garrett, 11 February 1964.

⁴⁸ Ibid: Wilde to Garrett, 5 February 1964.

⁴⁹ Ibid: Garrett to Wilde, 28 April 1964.

⁵⁰ Ibid: Wilde to Garrett, 20 May 1964.

⁵¹ Ibid: Garrett to Wilde, 29 May 1964.

⁵² Ibid: Smith to Wilde, 13 February 1964.

⁵³ Ibid: memo from Garrett, undated.

⁵⁴ Ibid: unsigned memo, 10 July 1964.

⁵⁵ Ibid: Wilde to Smith, 10 July 1964.

⁵⁶ Ibid: Garrett to R.H. Harrison, 23 July 1964.

⁵⁷ Ibid: Keys to Harrison, 8 September 1964.

⁵⁸ Ibid: Harrison to Garrett, 27 August 1964.

⁵⁹ Ibid: Keys to Harrison, 24 August 1964.

⁶⁰ Ibid: Keys to John Hill (Hartley, Cooper & Co., Ltd.), 28 August 1964.

⁶¹ Ibid: Keys to Harrison, 29 August 1964.

⁶² Ibid: Keys to Garrett, 3 September 1964.

⁶³ Ibid: Keys to Harrison, 8 September 1964.

⁶⁴ Ibid: Keys to Harrison, 9 September 1964 (addendum to above).

⁶⁵ Ibid: Garrett to Keys, 9 September 1964.

⁶⁶ Ibid: Wilde to Garrett, 15 September 1964.

⁶⁷ Ibid: Harrison to Garrett, 15 September 1964.

⁶⁸ Ibid: Keys to Harrison, 15 September 1964.

⁶⁹ Ibid: Keys to Harrison, 20 September 1964.

⁷⁰ Ibid: Keys to Wilde, 22 September 1964.

⁷¹ Ibid: Keys to Harrison, 25 September 1964.

⁷² Ibid: Garrett to Wilde, 29 September 1964.

⁷³ Ibid: Harrison to Keys, 1 October 1964.

⁷⁴ Ibid: Keys to Harrison, 30 September 1964.

⁷⁵ Ibid: Keys to Harrison, 5 October 1964.

⁷⁶ Ibid: Keys to Harrison, 6 October 1964. It should perhaps be explained that no animals were deliberately killed exclusively for the film: the elephant kill was already being undertaken by the local game wardens.

⁷⁷ Ibid: Bettina Dicks (Harrison's secretary) to Garrett, 14 October 1964.

⁷⁸ Ibid: Keys to Harrison, 16 October 1964.

⁷⁹ Ibid: Keys to Harrison, 18 October 1964.

⁸⁰ Ibid: Keys to Harrison, 23 October 1964.

⁸¹ Ibid: Keys to Harrison, 29 October 1964.

⁸² Ibid: Wilde to Keys, 31 October 1964.

⁸³ Ibid: Keys, to Harrison 11 November 1964.

⁸⁴ Ibid: Keys to Harrison, 19 November 1964.

⁸⁵ Ibid: Keys to Harrison, 29 August 1964.

⁸⁶ Ibid: Keys to Harrison, 8 September 1964.

⁸⁷ Ibid: Wilde to Harrison, 2 October 1964.

⁸⁸ Andrew Sarris, *The American Cinema: Directors and Directions, 1929-1968* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 225.

⁸⁹ David Thomson, *The New Biographical Dictionary of Film* (London: Little, Brown, 2002), pp. 935-6.

⁹⁰ Cy Endfield's widow, Maureen, told me that *Zulu* was the one film of his 'where he'd been left to get on and do what he wanted', without significant interference (Hall, *Zulu: With Some Guts Behind It*, p. 83).