The representation of narrative: what happens in Othello

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The representation of narrative: what happens in *Othello*

The usual structure of Shakespeare's plays is that after an expository first act, the three central acts - the main body of the play - are given over to dramatic representation of the main body of the narrative action which constitutes the story and the plot, before crisis and resolution are achieved in Act V; thus the central portions of *King Lear* deal with the progressive degeneration of both the Lear and the Gloucester families, those of *Hamlet* with the Prince's progress from uncertainty to commitment and the changing fortunes of the Polonius household, and those of *Macbeth* with the period of Macbeth's unchallenged rule. When it comes to *Othello*, however, Shakespeare is forced to adopt a rather different method, for the simple reason that the events which provide the nominal mainspring to drive the plot of *Othello* never in fact take place. Desdemona's adultery with Cassio, on which all Othello's actions depend, is quite literally a non-event; even if it were not, it could never, as Iago so pithily reminds Othello, be represented on the stage. In its place Shakespeare must put something else to act as the central business of the play; instead of the representation of an act, he offers us the representation of Iago's story of that act - which thus stands, in fact, as the representation of a representation. In so doing, he draws attention to the fact and effect of performance in itself, as well as to its status as mode of representation, as Iago stages fictive playlets and deploys as his props two other ways of mediating the contents of the mind to the outside world: things written, and things dreamed. As this play of non-events, slippages and substitutions unfolds, writing, performance and dreamwork will be insistently played off against each other until we may well be unsure of what happens in *Othello*.

That this play which is so pre-eminently about stories should have at its heart a story is apt. It could perhaps be said that all of Shakespeare’s plays necessarily display a strong interest in
modes of narration, but what seems to me to distinguish *Othello* from the other works of Shakespeare’s early and middle period is precisely the radical falsity of the rooted belief which most strongly informs the hero’s actions. Lear perceives his mistake very early on, and Hamlet obsessively tests the truth of what he is told, but *Othello* gives us a central character whose view of events is so divorced both from our own and from ‘reality’ that he has lent his name to a delusional psychiatric condition, the Othello syndrome (Enoch and Trethowan); even here, we may be struck by the fact that, unlike Lear or, apparently, Hamlet, Othello is certainly never obviously certifiable, leading us to note how delicately the borderlines of a distorted perception are plotted. This emphasis on the idiosyncratic viewpoint and its disjunction from external facts is further underlined by the drunkenness of Cassio, with its accompanying mood-altering tendencies, and his equally abrupt return to a more normal perspective. To some extent, similar effects may be found in other Shakespeare plays with which *Othello* has strong links, *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*, with its magic juices, and two other plays of jealousy, *The Winter’s Tale* and *Cymbeline* (jealousy being a condition peculiarly apt for the dramatisation of belief in the false). In all of these, though, the presence of a supernatural element and of a comedic teleology allows for the realist mode to be overriden by the very different conventions of romance. It is uniquely in *Othello* that modes of representation and narration are systematically explored exclusively within the confines of the ‘realist’ mode (*pace* Rymer!), and of a theatricality which is never (as it is with inset plays and masques) explicitly extradiegetic.

In the case of *Othello*, the play's concern with narration has been often noticed (e.g. Gardner and Bayley; Sinfield; Bates; Wayne; Purkiss). Mark Thornton Burnett remarks that ‘in *Othello*, stories abound and conflict with each other, and the play delineates the attempts of characters to construct narratives for themselves which will permit them to understand personal preoccupations, to replace fear with certainty and self-assurance’ (Burnett 62). Thomas Moisan
comments that 'Othello engages us intertextually in the kinds of narratives, and narrativity, from which it derives its fable' (Moisan 50), while Stephen Greenblatt sees the play's characteristic process as 'submission to narrative self-fashioning' (his italics) (Greenblatt 234). Patricia Parker also takes this insistence on narrativity as the springboard for her telling examination of the function of 'dilation' and 'delation' in the play (Parker 1985, 54-74; see also Callaghan 61). I propose to argue, however, that it is not merely the fact of narration but the modes of narration, and its implications for dramatic representation, on which the play centres. In particular, Othello demonstrates a consistent concern with speaking, writing, performing, and narrating.

Not only does Othello insistently emphasise the telling of stories, it also shows, in Iago’s case, the means by which they are concocted, and such means, grippingly, seem to include tricks of mind and speech hovering just below the level of full consciousness. The play itself registers a conspicuous interest in the logic and status of the dream as a mode of representation. Unlike A Midsummer Night’s Dream, which it may seem to resemble in the extent of this concern, Othello has no play-within-the-play; it does, however, offer repeated instances of a kind of ventriloquisation, by means of which one character co-opts the voice of another either innocently or as a technique of wilful misrepresentation. Finally, Othello also lacks, unlike Shakespeare’s other tragedies, a scene in which the text of a letter is read aloud and glossed; nevertheless, it contains a number of packed and allusive images which centre precisely on the decoding and on the communicative status of written, as opposed to oral, texts. Through examination of Shakespeare’s representation of all these representational modes, I hope to reflect on the aesthetic experience afforded by a theatrical performance of Othello. The play may encode a sophisticated understanding of the problematics of the meaning of meaning, but it can still speak a raw language of pain.
Othello opens with the words 'Tush, never tell me' (I.1.i); its closing lines are Lodovico's promise 'Myself will straight abroad, and to the state / This heavy act with heavy heart relate' (V.ii.371-2). Here the business of narration is directly foregrounded, and the impulse to recount offers the only form of comfort which seems available to the surviving characters in the face of the tragedy which they have witnessed. It is not only in the face of disaster, however, that characters are moved to tell tales; it is, on most occasions, more or less their first impulse. In our first encounter with Iago he and Roderigo are quite literally telling tales, as they attempt to convince Brabantio that his daughter has eloped with Othello. When Othello himself enters, the story that he tells of himself to the Senate casts him as the consummate teller of exotic romance narratives, as he speaks to Desdemona of 'The Anthropophagi, and men whose heads / Do grow beneath their shoulders' (I.iii.144-5) - Thornton Burnett comments of this that 'Othello's story caters to assumptions about his status as a black man even as it seems to resist them: it closely resembles contemporary accounts of travels to newly discovered countries' (65). There is, however, a curious reluctance on Othello's part to dwell on the processes of his own storytelling, for he actually seeks to render his own narration transparent and to obliterate all traces of its mediating effect on the facts of his life. His offer to the Senate is that:

And till she come, as faithful as to heaven
I do confess the vices of my blood,
So justly to your grave ears I'll present
How I did thrive in this fair lady's love,
And she in mine.

(I.iii.122-6)

Othello promises to be both 'faithful' and 'just' in his recounting, proffering a realist narrative in which the action of retelling is in effect a recreating; moreover, the verb he chooses, 'present', is suggestive more of an acting out than of a telling, with an echo of what Thomas Moisan has
called 'the uneasy antiphony the play negotiates between its narrativity and its theatricality' (68).

He will in effect replay the scene for them, except that in the absence of Desdemona - on which this whole interlude depends - he will also take her part.

Having thus secured the attention of his audience, he begins:

Her father lov'd me, oft invited me,
Still questioned me the story of my life,
From year to year; the battles, sieges, fortunes,
That I have pass'd:
I ran it through, even from my boyish days,
To the very moment when he bid me tell it.

(I.iii.128-133)

Here the mimetic properties claimed by Othello for his narrative enactment become even more pronounced. Both Moisan and Parker have pointed to the intimate relationship between difference and differance in narrative, between dilation and delation; this is precisely what Othello seeks to ignore as he presents his own narrative as transparent, authoritative, not the product of rhetoric or art. His whole life is summoned up, its immediacy accentuated by its striking culmination in the 'now' of Brabantio's command; and its truth is implicitly asserted by the starkness with which the potential fictionality of 'story' is cancelled out by the bald claim to factuality of 'my life'. The narrative process itself is not only elided, but is, quite literally, figured as a gap, a moment of non-existence: Othello's life to date stops at the moment when Brabantio bid him recount it, not at the moment when he had actually recounted it. It is odd that storytelling, in many ways the key activity of Othello's life, is thus apparently not counted by him as a part of that life at all - although to recount the story of the whole of it must, presumably, have
occupied quite some time. In this play in which the relationship of events to time is so thoroughly problematised, this is perhaps the most remarkable piece of temporal legerdemain of all. There is a slippage here which is further emphasised by the fact that Othello's invitation to Desdemona to 'witness it' (1.3.169) coincides, literally, with her entrance: she is asked to attest to the truth of an account she has not heard, and this seems to arise not so much from any bad faith on Othello's part as from his blindness to the processes of narrative which differentiate his verbal reconstruction from the event itself, at which Desdemona had indeed been present and to which she could, therefore, witness.

What of the story itself? Is it really true - or, more importantly, since nothing in a play is, in one sense, true, would its various audiences have considered it to be so? It seems to me to be important in two major aspects - what it does say, and what it does not. It reveals strikingly little of either of those two primary demarcators of people (arguably in most circumstances, but overwhelmingly in Shakespeare's Venice), class or race background; it offers no clues about motivation. Instead, its primary function, to the fulfilment of which Othello ascribes its spectacular success in winning over Desdemona's affections, is to depict the exoticism and dangers of his travels. This is certainly stirring stuff: a mere summary of it moves the Duke to comment, 'I think this tale would win my daughter too' (I.iii.171). Is it plausible, though? The Arden editor comments of the Anthropophagi and the 'men whose heads/Do grow beneath their shoulders' (I.iii.143-5) that 'such travellers' tales were current, and it seems as idle as the deserts to try to determine whether Shakespeare was primarily indebted to Mandeville or Raleigh or Holland's Pliny'. Patricia Parker, however, remarks that 'Othello's "dilated" traveller's tale recalls Africanus, Mandeville, Pliny, and the rest' (Parker 1994, 98), whose veracity was much in doubt, and Jyotsna Singh characterises Othello's 'stories of slavery and adventure' as featuring him as 'a
"character" in an imaginary landscape which viewers, then and now, recognize as a semi-fictional creation of colonialist travel narratives' (Singh 288).

Part of the attraction of 'travellers' tales' is surely their overt improbability, and an age with a growing interest in anatomy and medicine might well be sceptical of men with heads beneath their shoulders. In this case, the lack of immediacy of this narration of a narrative is further figured by Othello’s tautological replacement of the word 'cannibal' with 'anthropophagi'. Cannibal, which seems in anagrammatised form to have provided the origin of Caliban's name, perhaps functions as an isolated relic of the native speech of which we hear so little in Othello; its replacement by the classical term 'anthropophagi' thus symbolises not only Othello’s learning but also the firmness with which he is inserted into pre-existing discourses of travel which must radically inform and structure his ostensibly experiential account. Even as Othello thinks he tells his story, it in fact tells him, but he is as blind to its constitutive structures as he is to the narrative constraints which make the telling of the story as much a part of the chronological history of his life as the experience of it. Othello, in short, thinks narration is a transparent mode, as he demonstrates too when he claims simply ‘My parts, my title, and my perfect soul / Shall manifest me rightly’ (I.ii.31-2) and that ‘My services, which I have done the signiory, / Shall out-tongue his complaints’ (I.ii.18-19). What Shakespeare's representation of narration shows the audience, however, is that narration is always already a representation which in fact remakes itself with each re-presentation.

Such consciousness of fictionality never features in Othello's account, but it is perhaps appropriate that Desdemona's immediate response to his story is to tell another, and of a far more palpable mendacity, than his own:

she thank'd me,
And bade me, if I had a friend that lov'd her,
I should but teach him how to tell my story,
And that would woo her.

(I.iii.163-6)

Desdemona here seems clearly aware that the concoction of a fiction can be a useful mechanism for the direct manipulation of reality: upon this hint, Othello spake. It may well seem ominous here that Othello can register the disguised truth of Desdemona’s story, recognising it as a ‘hint’ and as referring to himself and to her rather than the putative ‘friend’, but can show no awareness of his own imbrication in similar tactical ploys: implicitly, he already assumes lying in her, and truth in himself. Ironically, though, Desdemona’s fiction lies only to tell a deeper truth, which she cannot express in any other way.

What Desdemona knows, and Othello does not, is that narration is not a separate compartment from experience, a cut-and-dried rerun of it, but is in complex and mutually formative interplay with it. The story that Othello has told of his life has resulted in a change to the story that, in future, he will tell of it (as we see when his anecdote of the killing of the Turk takes on new symbolic meaning when applied to his present circumstances); once again, the stress is on the materiality and the consequentiality not only of the narration but of the lived (or, on the Shakespearean stage, represented) moment of its representation. For Othello, though, essence and representation are consistently figured as fused. His attitude, and its difference from that prevalent in Venice, is perhaps best encapsulated in two paired moments in Act I, scene iii.

When the First Senator is told that the Turks are heading for Rhodes, he dismisses the news with ‘’Tis a pageant, / To keep us in false gaze’ (I.iii.18-19); when Othello’s followers draw in his defence, he rebukes them ‘Were it my cue to fight, I should have known it, / Without a prompter’ (I.iii..83-4). The supersubtle Venetian senator plays with the discourse of theatricality, which he
casts as inherently deceptive, but Othello draws no distinction between his own internalised behaviour and the externalised fictionality of the stage, and registers no consciousness of the kind of perceptual fallacy which is so obvious to the Senator. It is in the same vein that he will later command Iago, ‘if thou dost love me, / Show me thy thought’ (III.iii.119-120).

Othello's absolute faith in the reliability of his own story as a transparent mediator of his experiences clearly prepares him all too well for his role as the dupe of Iago. From the outset of the play, Iago exhibits a sustained concern with modes of narration, persuasion, and of figuring, both to oneself and to others. Suggestively, he registers an early awareness of a mechanism for self-narration of which he will later make very telling use, the dream: he assures Roderigo, ‘If ever I did dream of such a matter, abhor me’ (I.i.5-6). He also mounts a miniature play-within-the-play in his use of inset dialogue to characterise (and presumably, in performance, ‘impersonate’) Othello:

But he, as loving his own pride and purposes,

Evades them, with a bombast circumstance,

Horribly stuff’d with epithets of war:

And in conclusion,

Nonsuits my mediators: for ‘Certes,’ says he,

‘I have already chosen my officer.’

(I.i.12-17)

Strikingly, Iago also refers to his own preferred method of communicating information: he feels that Othello should have promoted him on the grounds of sure personal knowledge, referring to himself as ‘I, of whom his eyes had seen the proof’ (I.i.28). For all his later brilliance as manipulative stage-manager of the various representational strategies through which he will
deceive Othello, and for all the sophistication in hermeneutics which leads him to explain to Othello the impossibility of ocular proof, it is precisely on such proof that his own claim is based. As the word ‘proof’ re-echoes throughout the later part of the play (we hear it at III.iii.194-5, III.iii.200, III.iii.436 III.iii.448 and, as ‘prove’, at V.i.66), we may recall this ur-investigation of its problematics.

Iago’s inability to prove even by proof is radically symptomatic of the problem he experiences in the early part of this scene. Although what he is telling Brabantio is true, he cannot initially get him to believe it - an ironic contrast with the ease with which he will later persuade Othello of a lie. The breakthrough, suggestively, involves a recurrence of the dream motif, as Brabantio moves from incredulity to declaring, ‘This accident is not unlike my dream, / Belief of it oppresses me already’ (I.i.142-3). This prefigures Iago’s later fabrication of a dream-sequence involving Cassio, and also exemplifies his most successful strategy of inducing his victim to internalise the persuasion. Interestingly, a later comment of Iago’s is similarly prophetic: ‘I must show out a flag, and sign of love / Which is indeed but sign’ (I.i.156-7). This not only plays grimly on his own role as Othello’s flag-bearer; it equally affords ironic prolepsis of his later co-option of the handkerchief as literal ‘flag, and sign of love’. Throughout the early stages of the play, Shakespeare lays great stress on the provisionality of Iago’s plan, and the processes of its formation - ‘A double knavery....how, how?...let me see’ (I.iii.392). To see the later developments of the scheme foreshadowed here may well be to glimpse Shakespeare’s representation of something akin to dreamwork taking place in Iago’s mental processes, and certainly this is echoed in the way Iago himself figures the progress of his strategy - ‘If consequence do but approve my dream, / My boat sails freely, both with wind and stream’ (II.iii.58-9). To some extent, the unfolding action of Othello does indeed reflect Iago’s dream - or Iago’s nightmare - come true.
In itself, and as it forms the main business of both Iago’s plot and Shakespeare’s, Iago’s story is as circumstantial as Othello’s own, and it is no more inherently improbable: indeed Coppelia Kahn argues that Iago himself effectively comes to believe it (Kahn 143). Like Othello ‘presenting’ his story to the senate, Iago too cements his narrative structure with carefully staged playlets: Cassio handing the stolen handkerchief to Bianca, Cassio drunk and fighting, Iago offering us his little vignette of Cassio’s dream. In this last instance, Iago functions as a double of Othello’s own performative style: just as Othello acts out Desdemona’s part in her absence from the senate meeting, so Iago plays Cassio’s role for him. In both cases the role of the subsidiary actor is ventriloquized: fictionally, we are offered their voices, but factually they are silent. Although it has no formal play-within-the-play, Othello’s exploration of theatricality repeatedly offers such moments of characters who play each other, from Iago’s quotation of Othello’s promotion of Cassio to the Duke’s highly suggestive words to Brabantio, ‘Let me speak like yourself’ (I.iii.199); Iago will produce another such moment of role-slippage when he labels women ‘Players in your houswifery; and housewives in your beds’ (II.i.112), and Othello makes perhaps the most poignant use of the motif when he firsts casts Emilia as a bawd (IV.ii.28-30) and then, ironically, pretends to misrecognise Desdemona as not being the whore that, in fact, she is not (IV.ii.90-2). It is this technique that will later allow Iago to attempt the incrimination of Bianca by a similar ventriloquisation, this time of the language of the body: ‘Stay you, good gentlewoman; look you pale, mistress? / Do you perceive the gestures of her eye?’ (V.i.104-5). Finally, the ultimate act of ventriloquisation will also be the most poignant: Emilia, on her deathbed, will imitate Desdemona as she resolves, ‘I will play the swan, / And die in music: [Singing] Willow, willow, willow’ (V.ii.248-9). Emilia, unlike her husband, does not mean to deceive here; but both she and we are well aware of the precise status of this moment as representation, since it is precisely from that quality that it takes its affective force.
Iago’s relation to Cassio, though, is more sustained than any of these. In all of Iago’s stage-managed episodes, Cassio is allotted a part, and Cassio’s promotion is the reason for Iago’s initial discontent: Iago sees Cassio in the role he had coveted for himself. Iago and Cassio are doubled in other ways. Famously, they twice offer closely juxtaposed and completely antithetical views of Desdemona: Cassio blazons her to the Cypriots (II.i.65), Iago is ‘nothing, if not critical’ (II.i.119), and their responses to the withdrawal of Desdemona and Othello for their wedding night are similarly counterpointed, Cassio seeing purity and Iago lust (II.iii.15-25). Equally, Cassio’s lament for lost reputation is soon echoed by Iago’s disquisition on good name (III.iii.159-65), though contrasts of dramatic context and rhetorical style make for very different effect. Just as the substance of their speech is different, so is there a marked difference in the way they are received as tellers of stories. Whereas Iago’s messages are, initially at least, habitually disregarded, Cassio’s are avidly received, and he is repeatedly turned to as an informant of authority. When we first encounter him, Othello immediately asks him ‘What is the news?’ (I.ii.36) and follows it up two lines later with ‘What’s the matter, think you?’ (I.ii.38). Arriving in Cyprus, Desdemona greets him with ‘I thank you, valiant Cassio. / What tidings can you tell me of my lord?’ (II.i.87-8).

Most notable in this respect is the description of Cassio’s own arrival on the island, which immediately follows Third Gentleman’s assurance that the Turkish fleet is destroyed:

Mon. How, is this true?

Third Gent. The ship is here put in,

A Veronesa; Michael Cassio,

Lieutenant to the warlike Moor Othello,

Is come ashore: the Moor himself at sea,
And in full commission here for Cyprus.

Mon. I am glad on’t, ‘tis a worthy governor.

Third Gent. But this same Cassio, though he speaks of comfort,

Touching the Turkish loss, yet he looks sadly,

And prays the Moor be safe, for they were parted,

With foul and violent tempest.

(II.i.25-34)

The Arden edition prints ‘How, is this true?’; but it would be just as apposite to read ‘How is this true?’, because that is what the passage is substantially concerned with. The precise mechanism of the transmission of this information is never uncovered (it cannot be ‘the ship’ which speaks the message), but it is amply suggested by the introduction of Cassio’s name followed by the idea of ‘speaking’. For once in the play, the process of recounting is rendered genuinely unproblematic: Cassio sees, tells, and is believed, and nothing occurs later in the play to undermine the substance of his report. There are other echoes of this sane world: Desdemona wants the Clown to ‘[b]e edified by report’ (III.iv.12), and Emilia’s imagined story about the putative story-teller who has slandered Desdemona is, ironically, true. Equally, Bianca, despite the fact that she is told so little, manages usually to get a pretty accurate idea of what is going on through conjecture. Perhaps to some extent these moments of simplified decoding provide the same kinds of respite from tension as is, in other tragedies, supplied by comic relief, of which there is so noticeably little in Othello, and afford us a sort of epistemological relief, though one which only makes more poignant our understanding of the machinations of Iago.

Iago’s own approach to the transmission - or in his case the distorting - of information is clearly characterised. He is, himself, a remarkably insensitive reader of situations, believing Emilia to be likely to commit adultery with both Othello and Iago, believing Cassio to be in love with
Desdemona, believing it possible that she might return the affection; Emilia’s word for his wishes is, interestingly, ‘fantasy’ (III.iii.303). His recapitulations, in particular, are crude, albeit inflected for the benefit of Roderigo: ‘with what violence she first lov’d the Moor, but for bragging, and telling her fantastical lies’ (II.i.21-2); ‘Lechery, by this hand: an index and prologue to the history of lust and foul thoughts’ (II.i.254-5). Iago’s initial problem, seen from his own perspective, is no small one: a man whose announcements are rarely heeded must try to weave a convincing story whose success will depend entirely on people acting in certain ways which are, in fact, against their own interest. His first attempt at producing such a narrative is particularly fraught, since he must retell the story of the fight between Montano and Cassio, in the presence of both, in a way which while not seeming directly to incriminate Cassio will actually have precisely that effect; and he must, moreover, avoid being caught out in any of the lies he has told. In this last consideration, he sails particularly close to the wind. He tells Othello that he heard ‘Cassio high in oaths, which till to-night / I ne’er might see before’ (II.iii.226-7), and he thus comes dangerously close to contradicting his earlier assertion to Montano that Cassio’s drunkenness is habitual. In fact, though, to focus exclusively on swearing allows him to deflect attention completely from the problematic issue of the frequency of Cassio’s drinking, and his re-presentation of the affair has precisely the effects that he desired. Later, he will use a similar strategy when he deliberately makes his interlude with Cassio a dumb-show, an archaic mode of representation in theatrical terms, but the only one that will do duty here. It is particularly ironic that this is overtly framed in terms that hint at its fictionality: Iago opens the episode with ‘For I will make him tell the tale anew’ (IV.i.84), and Othello comments aside, ‘Iago beckons me, now he begins the story’ (IV.i.130); but Othello’s uncritical attitude towards his own story-telling prevents him from perceiving the re-presented nature of even so crude and unrealistic (in metatheatrical terms) a device as the dumb-show.
The crucial role in Iago's story is of course that of Desdemona, but since she continually refuses to play it for him, Iago has to resort to an overt declaration of the unstageability of certain parts of his narrative:

It were a tedious difficulty, I think,
To bring 'em to that prospect, damn 'em then,
If ever mortal eyes did see them bolster
More than their own; what then, how then?
What shall I say? Where's satisfaction?
It is impossible you should see this

(III.iii.403-408)

This is an aesthetic strange to Othello, who is unused to the notion that any experience, however arcane - whether of slavery or of anthropophagi - cannot be summoned up to the imagination of the auditor. Iago, as his inability to convince Brabantio in the first scene showed, is a poorer narrator and stager than Othello, despite - or perhaps because of - his far more sophisticated approach to the problematics of representation. But his approach works because he is able to effect a gradual shift in Othello’s horizons of narrative expectation. Initially, Othello adheres to his own ideas of the entire transparency of representational systems: he adjures Iago to ‘give the worst of thought / The worst of words’ (III.iii.136-7); he complains:

Thou dost conspire against thy friend, Iago,
If thou but thinkest him wrong’d, and makest his ear
A stranger to thy thoughts.

(III.iii.146-8)

Once again, Othello shows no consciousness whatsoever of the mechanics of representation: for him, the thought of one friend has immediate passage to the ear of another.
Iago soon sets to work on these ideas, however. It is remarkable how much of his attack on Othello consists not in the providing of evidence, but in instructing his victim in new ways of interpreting evidence. When Othello demands ‘give me the ocular proof’ (III.iii.366), Iago explains patiently, ‘It is impossible you should see this’ (III.iii.408). He amazes Othello by telling him of the alleged representational code of Venice: ‘their best conscience / Is not to leave undone, but keep unknown’ (III.iii.207-8). Othello, whose very identity is so extensively predicated on narration, responds in appalled fascination: ‘Dost thou say so?’ (III.iii.209) - a reply which ironically encodes the very problematics of representation that it itself discounts, since the fact that Iago says so does not make it true. Iago continues in this vein, repeatedly stressing an aesthetics of concealment:

Alas, alas!

It is not honesty in me to speak

What I have seen and known

(IV.ii.272-4)

And Othello is convinced. The man who earlier in the play is presented to us as the consummate narrator, and who has earlier demanded with such vehemence an accurate account of the origins of the brawl, begins to veer towards silence:

I should make very forges of my cheeks,

That would to cinders burn up modesty,

Did I but speak thy deeds.

(IV.ii.76-8)

This is the effect of Iago’s doctrine of the dangers of re-presentation, and it is potent indeed: Othello, the worker with words, will not use them now, and it is actually his refusal to make any more specific accusation than this that so radically disempowers Desdemona, since she can make no detailed rebuttal.
In more ways than one, then, Iago’s machinations lead directly to the tragedy, for he not only feeds Othello false information, but radically conditions his mechanisms for responding to it. Left alone, Othello mutters ‘This honest creature doubtless / Sees and knows more, much more, than he unfolds’ (III.iii.246-7). Most terribly of all, this new belief in the power of the hidden does not completely override his earlier faith in transparency of narration, but rather fuses with it. When Iago, mock-deprecatingly, asks ‘Will you think so?’ he replies at once ‘Think so, Iago?’ (IV.i.1): though Othello has lost faith in signifying systems, he remains paradoxically and dangerously adamant about his own ability to decode them. Even if everything Desdemona says to him is a lie, he can know the truth about her; he is, instead, caught up in the epistemological impasse of the Cretan paradox.

As for Desdemona herself, she remains blissfully unaware even of what story she has been cast in. This is revealed by her dogged persistence in pleading for Cassio and in refusing to believe that her husband could be jealous of her. In this respect, she may well seem to play into Iago’s hands; certainly, in the stories that they themselves have told of her, critics have frequently constructed her as naive, even irritating, in this part of the play. Equally, however, Desdemona’s actions can be seen as arising from a total lack of awareness of the role scripted for her by both Othello and Iago. What she discovers is that even when she is physically present on the stage and apparently controlling her own behaviour, she is still subject to ventriloquization through the interpretative strategies applied to her by others. When she does finally learn this, her response is an apt one in this play structured by narratives, for she too tells a story: displacing her own anxieties into the safely distanced world of fiction, in a classic narrative strategy, she tells the tale-within-the tale of Barbary, her mother’s maid, who at a time of grief herself fell back on to
the recounting of stories as she sang the 'song of willow' which, though 'an old thing', 'express'd her
fortune' (IV.iii.28-9). This bedchamber scene which shows us Desdemona and Emilia alone
together is ostensibly coloured by an atmosphere of intimacy, but actually it is largely structured
by absences and silences, as Desdemona, instead of revealing to us her own innermost thoughts,
instead tells us a story of a woman who told a story. As such, it can be taken to stand for all the
stories in Othello which have a hollowness at their heart, as is so strikingly figured by the
imaginary nature of the adultery which forms the very kernel of the play.

The most striking gap in any story in the play is perhaps that of Iago. Famously, critics have been
consistently unconvinced that the motivation which Iago himself describes is sufficient to actuate
the levels of malice which he demonstrates. What is his hidden agenda, the secret self which he
never reveals to us, what is his ‘dream’ and his ‘fantasy’? To plug this gap, critics have offered
stories of their own, reading Iago as anything from disgruntled soldier to repressed homosexual.
On one level, it is arguable that this is because his part is in fact underwritten. But I would like to
suggest that it may be precisely the secret of Shakespeare's success, of his universally
acknowledged 'greatness', that he habitually underwrites roles, and indeed whole plays, in ways
which provide immense stimulation to audience involvement and imagination. Iago is, perhaps,
merely the most striking example of the phenomenon. Equally, his opacity may serve as an
important corrective to Othello's own aesthetic of the transparency of narrative by reminding us
of the inherent difficulties involved in all decoding; in an ultimate irony Iago, whose stories and
whose ventriloquized playlets we know we must disbelieve, thus nevertheless becomes the most
reliable voice to guide us in the proper interpretation of our own experiences of stage
representation.
The difficulties of decoding are most strikingly figured at the very end of the play in a tale by that most innocent of tellers, Othello himself. Othello, fittingly, chooses to die as he had lived, recounting a story:

set you down this,

And say besides, that in Aleppo once,

Where a malignant and a turban'd Turk
Beat a Venetian, and traduc'd the state,

I took by the throat the circumcised dog,

And smote him thus.

[Stabs himself.

This is a story which obviously means a lot to Othello: he dies uttering it, giving it the talismanic force habitually attached to last words, and he is anxious that those hearing it should, in their turns, recount it. It is, however, unclear how exactly this relation relates to him. Initially, Othello is the hero of his own tales: has he now become the villain? Both the 'I' and the 'him' of the story (suggestively echoing Desdemona’s earlier and more sophisticated comment that ‘I do beguile the thing I am / By seeming otherwise’ [III.122-3]), he is himself both Turk and not-Turk, subject and object of his own narration. Perhaps, however, even to think in such terms is in itself to commit one of the most common (though at the same time one of the least, if at all, avoidable) of all interpretative errors: to read the self into the text. On a thematic and psychological level, of course, it obviously is a roman a clef; I am not saying that I cannot see the extraordinary symbolic force of having Othello at this crucial moment presented to us as that most demonized of others, the Turk. Mention of Turks may also, however, remind us of their abrupt disappearance from the narrative (if not the thematic) structure at the opening of Act Two, when all the narrative competence we possess had encouraged us to expect them to form a major part of
the story. It thus underlines the problematics and containing structures of the narrative mode itself.

This reminder that we ourselves have, during the course of the play, experienced problems with the decoding of narrative may serve to concentrate our minds on the interpretative processes of Othello himself, and in particular to make us aware of the delicately drawn relation between Othello as narrator and Othello as hearer. The logic of his account to the senate implies a stress on the presentness of representation, rather than on the element of re-presenting, which would allow for the introduction of difference. When he himself is told a story by Iago, though, he focuses instinctively on precisely those elements of the narrative which allow for the maximum flexibility of reader response and, ostensibly at least, allow of greatest interpretative leeway. Repeatedly, he imposes his own guilt-based reading over the possibilities of innocence which Iago pretends to hold out to him. Iago's narrative, then, is, for Othello, both an accurate representation - a transparent account of events - and, simultaneously, a representation, a version of events offered by an inaccurate narrator whose poor readings must be erased in favour of those supplied by Othello himself. Though uncritical as narrator and spectator, Othello does, in many ways, pride himself on his performance as close reader.

The ‘reading’ element of the interchanges between Iago and Othello is interestingly imaged at several points. One such passage is perhaps the most famous in the play, and as such, may well be taken rather for granted: but when Iago declares that ‘trifles light as air / Are to the jealous, confirmations strong / As proofs of holy writ’ (III.iii.327-9) we should, I think, be particularly attentive to the implied comparison between the suggestions he has been making to Othello and a written text. This is made especially pointed if we take ‘proofs’ as meaning not only ‘evidence’ but ‘page-proofs’, a usage first recorded by OED in 1563 and with recorded occurrences also in
1600, 1612 and 1613. In rather similar vein, Othello refers to Iago’s mutterings as ‘close
denotements’ (III.iii.127), and the idea of ‘note’ there is precisely what Iago repeatedly invites
Othello to do. In a play which, uniquely among Shakespeare’s ‘great’ tragedies, has no actual
text-within-the-text - no letter is read out on stage and glossed, as they are by Claudius,
Gloucester and Lady Macbeth, and Iago suggestively refers to Othello’s ‘unbookish jealousy’
(IV.i.101) - Iago holds out the alleged relationship between Desdemona and Cassio as a text
which he himself has lightly annotated but which obviously requires much more extensive
marginalia, and these Othello is only too happy to supply, as the two join each other in a happy
game of glossing and out-glossing in which Desdemona is the ‘most goodly book’...’to write
“whore” on’ (IV.ii.74, 73). The proofs are, after all, only at proof stage; they still need to be
corrected, and Othello can emend them to what he pleases.

It is at the close of the play that the emphasis on its textuality is most marked, as Lodovico
laments ‘O bloody period!’ (V.ii.358) with its connotation of the literal, printed full stop.
Interestingly, Gratiano’s response to this is ‘All that’s spoke is marr’d’ (V.iii.358). As much as
anywhere in the play, it is in this final scene that the dynamics and problematics of narration,
representation and ocular proof find incisive exploration. When Othello, in a potentially highly
bizarre moment, looks towards Iago’s feet and finds them uncloven, he seems finally to have
accepted the possibility that a story may be merely a ‘fable’ (V.ii.287); but only a few lines later
his aesthetics of inalienably accurate representation are back in place as he implores ‘I pray you in
your letters, / When you shall these unlucky deeds relate, / Speak of them as they are’ (V.ii.341-
3). This in itself has a double-edged force: on the one hand, it returns to the misleading and
mutually contradictory letters reporting the Turkish campaign to the Venetians, but on the other it
chimes with the letters found on Roderigo’s body (V.ii.309-19), which have proved potent
instruments to reveal the truth. ‘Proof’ has, at last, come forth, and it is in the written text that it has surfaced.

The logic of Othello's own proof-readings is clear enough. As readers are so often tempted to do, he construes the story as centred on himself - as Desdemona implicitly does with the tale of Barbary, and as Barbary in turn did with the 'old song' which, both to her and to Desdemona, 'express'd her fortune', so that, for him, even an exchange between Cassio and Bianca becomes a story about himself and Desdemona. This is, of course, to say little more than that everyone reads from their own highly particularised subject position, and that readers are frequently likely to make an immense emotional investment in works which have, objectively viewed, nothing whatsoever to do with their own lives - as can easily be illustrated by the common reaction to films-of-books that 'he doesn't look anything like Heathcliff/Rhett Butler/Mr Darcy'. In one way, this is precisely the key to the secret of Iago's success with Othello, since it is by his omissions that he gets Othello interested enough in his narrative of Desdemona's supposed infidelity to make the Moor wish to fill in the gaps by his own imaginative engagement with them. Writing ourselves into films, books, and plays, we constitute a fantasy out of a narrative in ways very closely analogous to Iago's Hamlet-like 'interpeter' role for the script elements with which the actions of Desdemona and Cassio supply him.

*Othello*, though, may operate rather differently. Michael D. Bristol, commenting on the story of the spectator who shot dead the actor playing Othello to stop a black man killing a white woman, notes that ‘[g]iven the painful nature of the story, the history of both the interpretation and the performance of *Othello* have been characterized by a search for anaesthetic explanations that allow the show to go on’ (Bristol 79). If Bristol is right, does the demand for the anaesthetic actually foreclose on our response to the *aesthetic* pleasures of the text? Rowland Wymer,
discussing Webster and Ford, has recently commented, ‘[m]odern academic criticism, in its concern with meaning and contextualisation, has often given an inadequate account of the experience provided by works of art’, and he goes on to quote Susan Sontag’s urging that ‘[in] place of a hermeneutics we need an erotics of art’ (Wymer 104). Perhaps our own highly-tuned interpretative abilities, consistently trained to the making of meanings, tend to blind us to the possibility that at the heart of Othello may lie an exposure of the indeterminacy and opacity at the heart of all narratives, and the problematics of our own responses to them, as the play insistently underlines in its repeated emphasis on both the hermeneutics and the erotics of enactment, re-enactment, narration and representation. It is only in the re-presentation of Othello - in the temporally conditioned, imaginatively engaged process of responding to the actors' own engagement with it in the theatre - that we re-experience the quality of the play's exploration of the dynamics of narration staged. Throughout the play, we are made powerfully aware of that urgent imperative which underlies the triple-layered use of the Willow Song, expression: ‘an old thing ’twas, but it express’d her fortune’. Characters in Othello tend on the whole to be bad at explaining - both Cassio and Desdemona fail spectacularly at it - but they are good at expressing. Every time that the play is performed, they are given a rich and full opportunity to do so, which, as the play’s own use of reading metaphors reminds us, touches us in ways distinct from the experience of reading.

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Notes

1 See Cheadle for the interesting suggestion that ‘the reference to the anthropophagi could...even figure as Othello’s most apposite rebuke of the man who has proved credulous in being prepared to believe in fabulous creatures no less than love charms’ (492).

2 On Othello’s use of classicising discourse, see also Martindale, 3.

3 In the case of Othello, the norms of critical response have in fact been distorted by what Rochelle Smith terms ‘the tendency of Othello criticism to mirror the perspectives of the play’s main characters. She cites various examples of this tendency (Smith 311).

Works Cited


Gardner, Helen. Wain 147-168.


Smith, Rochelle. ‘Admirable Musicians: Women’s Songs in Othello and The Maid’s Tragedy’. 
