The crisis in sociological leisure studies and what to do about it

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The Crisis in Sociological Leisure Studies and What to Do about It

In recent years, social philosophers such as Zygmunt Bauman, Agnes Heller, Jacques Rancière, Richard Rorty and Peter Sloterdijk have generated tremendous excitement by offering some revolutionary and radical ways of thinking about human life in the twenty-first century that present some fundamental challenges to sociology as it is normally conducted. Responding to this trend, this article argues that we need to not only fundamentally re-think what we mean by theory in the sociology of leisure but also how we carry out research in leisure studies. The first part of the article argues that orthodox sociological ‘Theory’ is dead and it offers some good reasons why this is so. It is subsequently argued that there is a crisis in leisure theory which has its roots in the central tenets of sociology. Taking its cue from Jacques Rancière’s classic study The Philosopher and His Poor the article develops the argument that if social inequality was once upon a time the fundamental issue in the discursive formation known as the sociology of leisure, today it urgently needs an alternative cognitive framework for thinking outside this paradigm. In order to substantiate this critique the discussion considers two leading theoretical perspectives in leisure studies: the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu and feminist sociology, and in particular the emphasis currently placed on the idea of intersectionality. It is argued thereafter that sociologists of leisure, and others who carry out research in leisure studies, generally have a particular activity in view: methodological uniformity of both the employment of research methods and the philosophical study of how, in practice, researchers go about their business. But there are some different ‘rules of method’ when we engage in thinking sociologically after ‘Theory’. As will be demonstrated in the final part of the article, analysis of this second kind of activity does not rely on the tools, epistemological frameworks and ontological assumptions generally used to make sense of leisure. Instead it develops its own new ‘rules of method’ which turn out to be radical, because they are not ‘rules of method’ at all.

Keywords: sociology; leisure theory; social inequality; methodology; sociological hermeneutics; cultural intermediaries

Introduction
It seems to me unlikely that any important sociological theories of leisure will ever be written again. Leisure ‘Theory’ is dead. Theory, that is to say, within the sense of theory as the ‘founding fathers’ of sociology understood it. In the future, I can imagine Annals of Leisure Research articles and even some special issues still devoted to sociological leisure ‘Theory’.

But these will invariably represent flights into the past, package tours to much-loved Arcadias where sociology used to have some especially firm footholds: functionalism, Marxism, symbolic interactionism, feminism and so on. As is usually the case at properly consoling funerals, those writing these articles or responsible for putting the special issues together won’t dream of dwelling on the deceased’s bad points, because they’ll no doubt be so carried away by the eulogies that got them thinking about the resurrection in the first place—a bit of nostalgia; those were the days. But nobody should be fooled by what people will be saying at these wakes. Make no mistake about it, leisure ‘Theory’ is dead.

Personally, I see no reason to lament the passing of leisure ‘Theory’—the talent wasted on theorizing contemporary sociological understandings of leisure should be used for the more urgent task of theorizing contemporary leisure. It is, however, worthwhile enquiring why leisure ‘Theory’ has become redundant; it may help us to both understand more closely the sociology of leisure’s historical situation and begin to map out for it an alternative future. It is to these two tasks that this article is in the main devoted.

The end of leisure ‘Theory’

If I were asked to mark the moment when the decline of ‘Theory’ became inevitable in leisure studies, by identifying the work of one sociologist, I would choose Chris Rojek. Of
the key sociologists in leisure studies, Rojek is an important standard bearer. In books such as *Decentring Leisure* (1995) and *The Labour of Leisure* (2009), we are presented with a sociology that registers no allegiances to ‘isms’ or any other signature gestures. His work offers us not a ‘Theorist’s’ world of leisure but one in whose sociological evidence we can believe. As both of these books demonstrate, increasingly from the last three decades of the twentieth century, in pursuing their leisure interests, fewer and fewer individuals have been able to believe in the value of the social roles assigned to them at birth. If, in Rojek’s mid-nineties mind, the postmodern imagination emerged as a new way to think and understand how we engage with leisure in modernity, by the end of the noughties he was just as persuasively arguing that what we call ‘leisure’ today is actually a form of social and cultural life in which ‘work’ and ‘leisure’ often intersect and mutually inform one another. What Rojek’s work demonstrates more than anybody else’s is that theory continues to prosper when it challenges the intellectual attitude that once defined ‘Theory’. This is one good answer to our original question about the decline of ‘Theory’ in leisure studies.

This answer implies, however, that sociological leisure studies are in rude health. But they are not. To understand why, we must consider a second answer. Sociological leisure studies are actually in a quiet but deep state of crisis. But what do I mean by crisis? To squeeze together two definitions, the crisis of sociological leisure studies can be understood as a result of a ‘legitimation crisis’ (Habermas 1975), reflected in the erosion of the explanatory basis of previously important theoretical perspectives in sociology, which has led to an ‘organic crisis’ of authority that ‘consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’ (Gramsci 1971 p. 276). This crisis presents challenges that deliver some heavy blows to the discursive formation, which despite being relatively new feels more like an ageing boxer staggering
with exhaustion in the final round of a championship fight, who still thinks he has the right
punches and combinations to win, but can’t see that this is more illusion than hit. These
challenges bring into question the tacit, invariant assumption of sociology that in order to
understand people’s leisure choices we need to put their social inequality at the forefront of
our analyses. In other words, sociology, in leisure studies, as elsewhere, is the very thought of
social inequality (Rancière 2004). This is the paradox that pervades the discursive formation,
for it is in the idea of social inequality that sociology assumes the ‘truth’ about our leisure is
located. It is also a paradox of this crisis that its roots are to be found in the circumstances
that originally gave rise to sociological leisure studies.

As is well known, in the 1970s the study of leisure was led away from its uncritical comfort
zone by bright young academics from disciplines as diverse as urban studies, geography,
history, social work, and especially sociology, attracted to a new field of study whose subject
burned brightly in their own free time, and who in due course not only produced a new
dynamic subject field which reflected the diversity of their own interests straddling theory,
policy and practice, but also a paradigm shift by bringing attention to social inequality as the
fundamental issue in the study of leisure. It is this second observation that alerts us to the
compelling influence that sociology was to have on this new interdisciplinary subject field.
Indeed, not only did sociology make a recognizable aspect of human life appear strange by
de-familiarizing the familiar, but it also provided the means to think differently about leisure
and its intimate relation to the often unfair (and ideological) functioning, organization and
development of society. In broad outline, then, a new, critical perspective of leisure was
established through a sociological analysis: patterns and configurations of leisure vary across
time and from society to society and culture to culture (Dumazadier 1974; Elias and Dunning
1969; de Grazia 1964; Roberts 1978; 1981), and leisure is transformed fundamentally by
modernity in general (Rojek 1985; 1995) and the depredations of industrial capitalism in particular (Clarke and Critcher 1985).

Yet, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the crisis in the sociology of leisure has its roots in the aftermath this paradigm shift. Although the necessity of bringing to attention social inequality in constraining the freedom and reducing the ability of some people to take up ‘leisure’ on their own terms was important 30 or 40 years ago, it has by now run its course and is in need of an alternative vision. Why? By continuing to pose social inequality—particularly though not exclusively of class, of gender, and of ethnicity—as the primary ‘fact’ that needs to be explained with regard to people’s leisure, sociology has ended up explaining its necessity (Rancière 2004).

This might appear a somewhat scandalous proposition; it is meant to be. As such, it demands a critical discussion of some of the dominant standpoints in the sociology of leisure. Let us consider two. On one hand there is the massive legacy of Bourdieu, the social theorist of Distinction (Bourdieu 1984), whose theories and concepts are some of the most regularly and uncritically applied in leisure studies; on the other is feminist sociology, and in particular its foregrounding of intersectionality in the current theoretical landscape in leisure studies (Henderson 2013; Watson and Ratna 2011; Watson and Scraton 2013). Here my aim is to simply give two illustrations of what happens to understandings of leisure when inequality is presupposed. This is important to note, particularly with regard to feminist sociology of leisure with its qualitative evidentiary bases and miscellany of theoretical argumentation. Of course, it is important to remember that intersectionalities perspective must be understood as just one of many developments in feminist sociology of leisure. But there is no getting away from the fact that it is central to current feminist thinking in leisure studies and as such it
provides an ideal theoretical and methodological framework in terms of which one could apply Rancière’s polemic and respond to it.

The sociologists of the leisure and ‘the poor’

*Bourdieu: the arbitrary as necessity*

Let us begin with Bourdieu. There is a paradox at the heart of his sociology: although it is extremely critical of social inequality, its subjects have no social role in it other than to perform this social inequality as they endure it as their life. As Rancière explains this leads to ‘a theory of the necessary misrecognition of social relations as the very mechanism of their reproduction’ (Swenson 2006: 642). This tautology is important for our purposes since it clearly identifies the limits of Bourdieu’s sociology for understanding leisure. Not only is social inequality built into the deep structure of Bourdieu’s sociology, but it also performs the brilliant feat of making ‘the poor’ feel ennobled while confirming their extirpation from the world of leisure choices (see for example Bourdieu’s magnus opus *The weight of the world* (Bourdieu et al. 1999)). It isn’t that Bourdieu’s respect for ‘the poor’ isn’t genuine, it is simply the case that his insights are not convincingly constituted of the different situations in which social inequality occurs. In a nutshell, the great sociologist of reflexivity thinks that the majority of ‘the poor’ do not have any time for leisure and he presumes that those who do of being incapable of having any—well, any that doesn’t incite the kind of disapproving, puritanical look made corporate by the Frankfurt School, whose ghost lives on in Bourdieu’s sociology, grimly looking down and shaking its mocking head at those amongst ‘the poor’ ‘aspiring to reranking [reclassement] through [their] feats in the great simile industry of the new petty bourgeoisie: the manufacture of junk jewelry or sale of symbolic services; the commerce of youth leaders, marriage counsellors, sex therapists, advertising executives, or
dieticians determined to create within people the symbolic need necessary for the
enlargement of their market, hence for the reconquest of their inheritance’ (Rancière 2004, p.p. 192-193).

_The limits of the leisure intersectionalities perspective and methodology_

Another version of this theme is replayed in the theoretical perspective and methodology known as ‘intersectionality’ some feminists have adopted in leisure studies, which works on the basis that social inequality in leisure is relational and has multiple dimensions. The clear, rational logic of this perspective suggests that by taking into account the concept of ‘class’ multiplied by ‘gender’ multiplied by ‘race’ and so on what is revealed is something even more unequal. However, it never stops to consider, that in practice, an odd kind of polarizing effect might just take place. Rather than amplifying each other, social inequalities multiplied might just cancel each other out. A good example of this approach is Watson and Ratna’s (2011) research in the UK. Their article claims that intersectionality offers us a way to move beyond static interpretations of compound social inequality by taking into representations of shifting, multi-layered social inequalities which are constructed across racialized, classed and gendered social relations in particular leisure spaces. Yet Watson and Ratna’s account offers very little that is concrete or geared to representing the social conditions under scrutiny. What it does instead is lock the ostensibly multi-disadvantaged into a singular, self-contained leisure world. In so doing, what it fails to recognize is that ‘the poor’, in common with most other men and women in liquid modern societies (Bauman 2000), actually inhabit pluralized worlds where there are different possibilities. In liquid modernity, _everyone_ wears many hats and inhabits many worlds. It is sociologists who wish to lock them into a single, disadvantaged world.
Whereas those who theorize leisure by ‘thinking intersectionally’ see a singular world made up of complex intersections of social inequality, there is another approach to thinking sociology that sees worlds in the plural. This is a view that is not only critical of the assumption that the theoretical world is the only horizon from which really existing realities take their meaning, but one which argues that when we understand the world (sic) in the plural, as the social philosopher Peter Sloterdijk does, ‘then there are different existential possibilities, that is to say, difference itself becomes the unity into which life draws its breath’ (Davis 2013, p.p. viii-ix). This view is confirmed by some research in leisure studies which suggests that an individual may inhabit several different worlds at once and often within an ordinary day (AUTHOR 2003; AUTHOR and AUTHOR 2004; AUTHOR 2013). It is scarcely any longer possible (if it ever was) to explain really existing realities (or identities) rationally as unfolding in time and space with any kind of fixity.

Let us explore this argument in a little more detail. Robert Musil, the great Austrian writer, suggested 80 years ago (in his highly influential unfinished novel Theman Without Qualities) that what gives modern life its uniqueness in the absence of any sign of singularity is the universal ability of men and women to exceed whatever identity they have been allotted. In other words, we learn from Musil that ‘universal man can only be a man without qualities, for a man without qualities is the only one who can possess any quality’ (Jonnson 2010: 117). That is, whilst there are many ways of becoming-in-the-world, all humans share the meaning of what it means to be human—in other words all human beings have the sense of an inevitable, universal, relation but with contingency attached to the individual form their life will take. As Jonnson goes on to explain:
There is a slogan for this mode of universality as negativity: the right to difference. But
human beings possess no such ‘right’; rather, they practice such difference inseparably
from their life process. There are situations in which this negativity becomes
politicized, such as when an external power seeks to fix a person or a group in a certain
identity—as Jews, women, Muslims or youth—thus disavowing their capacity for
negativity (ibid: 117-118).

Indeed, the satisfaction we find in our leisure is often the satisfaction of finding another
aspect of ourselves, which permits us to be somebody else and this has nothing to do with the
desire of external powers (such as sociologists) to recognize us ‘for who we really are’.

This observation leads to a further troubling aspect of intersectionality. This is the argument
that despite its adherents’ claims to the contrary, ‘thinking intersectionally’ does a double
disservice to ‘the poor’, by not only being resolutely determined to ‘give voice’ to the
conditions of the multiplicity of their subjugation, but also by judging ‘them’ as oppressed
creatures. As Rancière (2004) would say, in the kind of sociology promulgated by the
intersectionality perspective, there are no ‘thieves’, only ‘the possessors and the disposed’.

One of the consequences of this is that in trying to understand leisure through relational and
multiple dimensions of inequality, the world of the research subjects under scrutiny is always
bound to remains partial to say the least, and if the intersectionality perspective is one that is
successful in giving voice, the only voices really heard are those of the sociologists. One of
the other consequences is that ‘thinking intersectionally’ has to nurture with its thought the
lives of its ‘subjects’; but in so doing it fails to grasp the fact that its monsters cannot be
tamed by bolting together objectified versions of their existence from intersections that never
quite cohere with one another. The overall effect is so full of its own virtuousness that it gives
the impression of showing little regard for its respondents, and the arch structuring the
sociology—with its inability to grasp the existential contingency of the individual lives at
stake in the commentary—renders the perspective critically inert. As that most discerning
critic of this social scientific fixation with turning subjectivity into objectivity and converting
people from subjects into objects of investigation, Jacques Derrida once put it, ‘One cannot
say: ‘Here are our monsters’’, without immediately turning the monsters into pets’ (1990, p.
80).

What is perhaps most problematic with ‘thinking intersectionally’, then, is that it ends up
overstating the significance of the relationship between difference and subjugation. This
constitutes the limit of a particular sort of sociology, for which true freedom is only that of
the sociologist, and which is conceivable and functions as the exact opposite of the ostensible
powerlessness of those who are subjugated. As Rancière would say, here sociology ends up
as the very thought of inequality because by posing social inequality as the primary fact that
needs to be explained it ends up explaining its necessity.

What ‘thinking intersectionally’ also does in this regard is deny the true interpretive role of
thinking sociologically since its conception of reflexivity (in common with Bourdieu’s),
foregrounds social inequality at the expense of understanding leisure worlds through the self-
understandings of social agents. Indeed, the awareness of what is lost, overlooked, and
distorted in the process of transforming people’s everyday worlds into sociology cannot help
but be missing from ‘thinking intersectionally’; and what it shares in common with
Bourdieu’s sociology, is the inability to escape the tendency to impose its own narrative order
on all kinds of untidiness—worst of all, the necessities of sociological ‘Theory’ above the
identification with and compassion for those whose worlds it claims to be explaining—while
failing miserably to reflect on the process by which that order has been achieved.
Rethinking social inequality and its relationship with leisure

The argument developed so far suggests that in sociological ‘Theory’ ‘the poor’ have to stay in their place: on the hand, they have no time to go anywhere else because work won’t wait for them, which is an empirical fact; and on the other, their immovability rests on the belief that ‘God mixed iron in their makeup while he mixed gold in the makeup of those who destined to deal with the common good’ (Rancière 2009, p. 276). This second reason is not an empirical fact, but it provides the alchemical myth (‘the story of the deity who mixes gold, silver, or iron in the souls’) that underpins the ‘natural’ order of things and which sustains the idea that ‘the poor’ have to remain in their assigned places. In other words, in order for sociology to function it has to rest on the idea that the social divisions and the inequalities emanating from these are performed by those who endure them ‘as their life, as what they feel, and what they are aware of’ (ibid). To use one of Rancière’s analogies, the identity of someone from ‘the ‘must fit like a handmade pair of shoes, but the type of shoe is never in question.

Obviously, Rancière doesn’t think that ‘the poor’ actually believe that God mixed iron in their souls and gold in the souls of those higher in the system of social stratification, but it is enough that they sense it and as a result feel obliged, responsible and actively committed to this idea as if it were true. In other words, for Rancière, social divisions are not only a reflection of actually existing conditions of existence, but also the extent to which sociologists believe that they are natural and inevitable. In Rancière’s scheme of things ‘myth’ and ‘reality’ and ‘activity’ and ‘passivity’ are not opposed; just as a ‘reality’ always goes along with ‘myth’, so ‘activity’ always goes along with ‘passivity’. In other words, for
Rancière, sociologists give their own meaning to the world through the patterns of hierarchy and order which appear in their ‘Theories’ and which they help to create and sustain.

Rancière (2009) argues that what sociologists need to grasp is that actually existing reality and the ability to transform it lies not in their theories or their research but in the collective passion of individuals. What he also argues is that when the status quo of actually existing reality is challenged, ‘a break of epistemology as the qualifying perceptual criterion for political participation’ (Panagia 2010, p. 98) takes place, which leads to a demand for a share, a place, a part des san-part, in the social order by those who do not have one. To this extent, Rancière understands politics as a form of disruption of the established order of things by those who challenge their own invisibility, silence and unimportance within that order. Here Rancière is not talking about the empowerment of a group that already has a subordinated part or a place. Rather, that ‘politics is the emergence of a claim to enfranchisement by a group that has been so radically excluded that its inclusion demands the transformation of the rules of inclusion’ (Martin 2005, p. 39). What this suggests is that men and women acting politically not only demand to be included in the world in ways that have previously not been open to them, but that they are also intent on a total transformation of the ways in which they are seen in this new ‘part’ or role—that is, they are after a radical transformation of experience. In other words, in order for them to be included, the world has to be transformed to accommodate them in different ways than it has done previously, and in order for the world to be transformed, men and women acting politically need to conjure a different world. This is where often leisure comes in.

The essential point I want to make here can be made by briefly discussing some of the findings from my study of the ‘Inbetweeners’, the intermediary generation that provide the
focus of a life history interpretation of working-class life in northern England in the period after the Second World War (AUTHOR 2013). Amongst other things, this study explores the extent to which a generation of working-people found through their leisure interests and activities the means to transform a world in which they had hitherto been predisposed to remain invisible. As this study shows, through the life course this generation would re-discover life as unintended and contingent and they would as a result set about re-making new worlds in their own image, and discovering also, by extension, that leisure is often pivotal to these reconstructions.

What the evidence emerging from this study suggests is that when the balance of work and leisure tilts over from the former to the latter, as it did for many working-people in England in the post-war period, the distribution of iron and gold is disturbed. Indeed, by stealing ‘a certain sort of gold, a sort of gold which is at once more and less precious than the gold which is supposed to be mixed in the soul of the rulers’ (Rancière 2009), the Inbetweeners were at the vanguard of the dawn of a new order of things in which leisure moved steadily into its position as the principal driving force underpinning the human goal of satisfying its hunger for meaning and its thirst for giving life a purpose (AUTHOR 2010). In other words, what the findings of this study demonstrate is that leisure was key to understanding the interruption of a tacitly accepted order of things by working-people who had hitherto been invisible in it. The result was, as the evidence of the study demonstrates, in the post-war period, that leisure as a certain kind of gold, instead of being out of the reach of most working-people, began to take up a more central and radical place in their lives.

Interim summary
Amongst all the issues that emanate from the cognitive dissonance found in sociological leisure studies discussed in the preceding section of this article, the following stand out. First and foremost, the prevailing discourse underpinning some orthodox sociological accounts is premised upon situating ‘the poor’ in a singular, self-contained leisure world. One of the upshots of this is (as we saw with intersectionality), while it provides its adherents with a vocabulary for analyzing how social inequality in leisure is relational and has multiple dimensions, it does this at the expense of understanding that all men and women today—notwithstanding whether they are ‘the poor’ or not—inhabit pluralized worlds where there are different possibilities for leisure. We also saw that such an outlook can lead to some sociologists equipping ‘the poor’ with an excess of the most unattractive, but also most necessary features of ‘people like them’—features that while purporting to ‘give them voice’ actually turn them into monsters, or even worse still, pets, whose leisure interests incite the kind of disapproving, puritanical look made universal by the Frankfurt School.

What is also clear from this discussion is that the discursive formation known as the sociology of leisure has been too insular, too parochial, and too complacent in framing the idea of its subject, and while many of the once bright young academics from the 1970s are still around, the waves that they make nowadays seem much more modest. Beyond the odd blue-moon gem from Rojek, the sociology of leisure seems to have reduced its ambitions to the shrinking comfort-zone of coterie approval that is its key associations, conferences and journals. Moreover, what is hardly debated in leisure studies is that the subject field has lost its lustre. The study of leisure has by and large dropped off the curriculum at most universities and most bright young postgraduates nowadays seem more attracted to subjects like sport, criminology and cultural studies. The fundamental issue at stake here can be found in the failure to incorporate into the sociology of leisure what has happened in social, cultural, political and economic life over the last thirty or so years.
It is important to qualify something at this point. I am not suggesting for a moment that social inequality is by now unimportant to leisure studies. That is not my argument. My argument is that there is now an unacceptable gap between sociological accounts and quotidian leisure. This gap has arisen as a result of the discursive formation’s anxious reluctance to let go of the ‘zombie categories’—zombies frighten us by being both dead and alive—associated with orthodox sociology, which no longer have a compelling grip on reality. What I am talking about in this regard are the zombie concepts associated with social inequality which have a strange ghost like presence in the sociology of leisure, which still uses them as if they represent something, including power; and to some extent they do still represent power. But the social networks and patronage, the paddings of privilege and the stereotypes leftover from modernity in its ‘solid’ phase do not carry the same power that they once did—even if sociologists carry on ‘business as usual’. Breaking this spell is a game that sociologists of leisure need to play if the discursive formation is to emerge from the current crisis.

So how to refresh the sociology of leisure in a way that thinks outside social inequality? The first answer to this question must be that the explanations I have given for the decline of sociological ‘Theory’ have implications which reach much further than just theory. Indeed, the whole function of sociology is in question if we can no longer accept that it has the authority to either lock individuals (no matter how ostensibly multi-disadvantaged) into a single identity or to convince us that the theoretical world is the only horizon from which human existence takes its meaning. What this suggests is that the sociology of leisure needs some new ‘rules of method’. To understand why, we must consider yet another answer.

Towards an alternative sociology of leisure
Today we find ourselves living in a society at once strange and yet strangely familiar. It is still far from being an equal one, which means that a democratic deficit continues to bedevil the leisure opportunities of many. However, with the emergence of what Bauman (2000) calls ‘liquid modernity’ there has been a shift from a structured and structuring society in which our identities were largely predetermined by our social class, gender, ‘race’ and the like, to an unstructured and de-structuring one in which individualization dominates more than anything else, and where our identities always remain a work in progress. Social class, gender and ethnicity may still exert some degree of influence on our leisure lives, but they certainly do not dictate them. There are many reasons why this is so, but it is still difficult to define this change briefly. But what individualization involves, fundamentally, is the change, as Raymond Williams once observed, from unaware alignment to active commitment, or in other words, the moving of social relationships to human consciousness. Unaware alignment refers to the kind of life you are born into and stuck with, while active commitment refers to the kind of life we make for ourselves because we feel it our duty to do so. And this is because all of us—modern men and modern women both rich and poor—are existential agents who are very much aware of our social contingency.

The implications of these observations for sociology are profound. In the rest of this article I shall develop a thumbnail sketch of an alternative sociology of leisure with certain epistemological, ontological and ethical implications. In so doing, my approach differs noticeably from the doxa of orthodox sociology of leisure, by which I am referring to the knowledge it thinks with, but not about. The views that I shall develop below have their point of origin in another kind of sociological thinking which begins with the assumption that truth is better revealed through essential action rather than ‘Theory’. These views are intimately shaped by the work of social philosophers such a Bauman, Heller, Rancière, Rorty and Sloterdijk, who each stress the ambivalence and social contingency of modern life, and which

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culminates in a way of thinking that reverses a number of assumptions underpinning orthodox sociology’s rational theorization of the modern world.

The first merit of this way of thinking is that it abandons the binary oppositions orthodox sociology inherited from the Enlightenment tradition. Its second strength, and a considerable one, is that it inscribes social theory within modernity by taking it out of the academy and placing it politically into everyday life (Badiou 2005). Its third virtue is to foreground the question of what it means to be human in the modern world. In so doing it frames human life as an existential problem. However, contra Heidegger, it stresses ‘becoming’ over ‘being’ and the recognition that modern life is irreducibly mutable and heterogeneous. In addition to this, it argues that rather than finding ourselves merely ‘being-thrown-in-the-world’, we are knowledgeable actors who recognize the conditions of own social contingency. The fourth virtue of this way of thinking is that it replaces the idea of a singular world as an ontological given with the idea that we in fact inhabit pluralized worlds—contingent, shape-shifting, fractured, underdesigned and undesignable, fuzzily-hierarchical, imperceptible worlds—in which life is lived noch nicht surrounded by possibilities that have not yet been realized, and where freedom is considered as our duty. Its fifth distinguishing feature, and perhaps its most contentious, is that it brings the idea to sociology that what we understand about the pluralized worlds in which we find ourselves is only knowable through some kind of story.

Let us look at this fifth feature in some more detail. My way of thinking sociologically attempts to fasten the delight we find in the pluralized worlds of liquid modernity (Bauman 2000) onto new kinds of narrative informed by the kind of passion found in the best works of literature and poetry. In other words, in deconstructing binary oppositions—between ‘subject’ and ‘object’, ‘concept’ and ‘existence’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘action’, and so on—and in the absence of ontological certainty, it is my contention that ‘rules of method’ have to be assigned on what are essentially aesthetic grounds—on the basis of whose narrative has the
more attractive language, or the more engaging style. For a second time, I have put forward what might appear a somewhat scandalous proposition—though once again for good and assignable reasons.

**Telling stories: sociological hermeneutics and the role of the cultural intermediaries**

Let us look at this feature in more detail. Sociology will never be quite equal to the complexity and infinite nuance of what takes place in everyday life, but it is impossible to think sociologically without arriving at some kind of interpretation, or another. However, and to paraphrase what the great Canadian literary critic Northrop Frye (1963, p. 24) in his Massey Lecture *Giants in Time*, drawing on Aristotle’s idea of the ‘universal event’, said of the work of poets, what we meet in any interpretation is neither ‘real’ nor ‘unreal’: it is the product of the educated imagination—if by imagination we mean not, as is sometimes thought, the ability to invent, but the ability to disclose that which exists (Berger cited in Burn, 2009). Thinking sociologically is neither fixed nor definitive. It is, on the contrary, a place of perpetual deliberation, speculation calmed by an awareness of the ‘facts’ that lie behind what is often naively called ‘reality’ and the sociological imagination, and which makes them one and indivisible. Quite simply, sociologists make a good deal of assumptions about everyday life and that there is a good deal of truth behind these, and these assumptions are as good a place to start as any.

To continue with Frye’s synopsis, sociologists should never try to make any ‘real’ statements at all, certainly no particular or specific ones. It is not our job to tell our readers what happened, but what happens: not what did take place, but the thing that always does take place. The biggest charlatans in sociology are the ‘Theorists’; the ones who claim that they are telling their readers how things ‘really’ happened’. As Giddens (1974) has convincingly argued, the relation between sociology and its subject matter—the two-way process by which
everyday experience is turned into sociology and sociology is turned into everyday
experience—has to be understood in terms of a ‘double hermeneutic’. In volunteering
themselves as cultural intermediaries in this way, what sociologists do is demonstrate that
virtue is better revealed in action rather than ‘Theory’. In so doing they reveal themselves as
the most honest of sociologists who say ‘This is my interpretation of the world and I’m going
to try like hell to make you believe that it’s true; all I ask is that you suspend your own
ontological assumptions for a little while until I have told you my story’.

In other words, sociologists as cultural intermediaries challenge their readers to engage in
what Rorty (2007) calls ‘cultural politics’: the beginning of a conversation about what words
to use to create a better vision of the society we want to live in. What this tells us is that
rather than trust sociological ‘Theory’; we should trust sociologists’ stories instead. This is
because sociology conducted under the auspices of cultural politics can only be good or bad
in its own categorization. Sociologists as cultural intermediaries know what they are
presenting us with is both a superior and an inferior world than the one we usually live with,
but what they demand is that we keep looking steadily at them both. In this way of thinking
sociologically, no idea of reality is final and no interpretation, however good, is going to
pronounce some final absolute truth. Every new interpretation, every new formulation
emerging from this or that interpretation has the potential to change our understanding.

In anticipation of my critics, I am acutely aware that, as the eminent philosopher R.G.
Collingwood (1994) famously pointed out, the work of the scholar is constrained by two
important issues that need not concern the novelist or the poet. First, its narrative must be
localized in a time and space that has actually existed; and, second, it must be allied to
evidence which the scholar has gathered from reliable sources. In other words, as
sociologists, we do not have the freedom of the novelist or the poet; we are constrained by the
evidence.
Walter Benjamin, a scholar who occupied the opposite pole on the continuum on which the rather conservative Collingwood’s views could be plotted, offered a more radical solution. To scholars who wish capture the lives and times of any era, Benjamin (1974) suggested, they should develop a ‘procedure of empathy’ by turning to the period in question in order to redeem its sufferings. Benjamin’s invocation gives a crucial role to developing solidarity with the worlds of those whose lives we seek to understand. This concern is captured succinctly by Brewer’s (2010) practice of ‘refuge history’ whose ‘procedure of empathy’ forms the basis of the ‘rules of method’ underpinning the aforementioned book TITLE. As Brewer explains, ‘refuge history’

is close-up and on the small scale. Its emphasis is on a singular place rather than space, the careful delineation of particularities and details, a degree of enclosure....Within the space of refuge historical figures are actors and have agency, motives, feeling and consciousness. They are the subjects not objects of history. The emphasis is on forms of interdependence, on interiority and intimacy rather than surface and distance. The pleasures of refuge history derive not from a sense of control of history but from a sense of belonging, of connectedness—to both persons and details—in the past. Whether as the expression of a certain common humanity or as an identification with a particular group, this sort of history sees sympathy and understanding—a measure of identification which can range from the quite abstract to the deeply emotive—as essential to historical knowledge and insight. Refuge history is therefore… Heimlich (2010, p. 89).

Trying to understand different worlds with different rules demands a special kind of sociological inquiry. This is the kind of inquiry that takes into account the objective features of the world while contemplating real-life situations—research respondents’ inner and outer
worlds—by accounting for their personal priorities and relationships with others. There are
two other important building blocks to this kind of inquiry. First it begins with the
assumption that the human ‘becoming-in-the-world’ is knit together with its own sense of
security and comfort—with *feeling* just right—and second that every world has its own sense
of morality—its inhabitants *living* life in a way that they deem right.

*Thinking with feeling: how to make the sociology of leisure heimleich*

These insights form the basis of my own sociological ‘rules of method’, which demand
that if we should seek to record the leisure lives of our research respondents accurately, we
must also aim at getting into the evidence of how and in what ways they *experience* leisure
and its *social meaning* for them, as well as something of its disorderly continuity—often
invisible, but all the more consequential for being so—which makes life palpable, and in
some cases, bearable. To paraphrase Foucault (1970, p. xi), the purpose of researching
leisure *heimleich* is to try to restore what usually eludes the consciousness of the sociological
imagination, which is looking at a milieu and its people from the inside and trying to feel
what it feels, what they feel.

One of my key concerns in the aforementioned book is to explore and evoke the emotional
contours of my respondents’ collective history. In other words, to paraphrase Nora, it is
concerned with what wells up from this generation that memory has welded together (1996,
p. 3). In developing this study, I inhabited a realm between the past and the present, moving
back- and-forth, in dialogue, constructing a narrative as an interpretive device made between
me and my respondents. The study works with the assumption that reality cannot be
reproduced in history, but the concentrated act of reproducing some of reality’s dynamics
can, of turning history into an essential action—even if the best it can hope to achieve is
make the world it renders in its pages feel human and not merely academic machination. In
other words, refuge history—understood here as the empathetic study of what Hegel called ‘absolute spirit home-experience’ (Heller 2011) and the narrative that moves it—is the domain *par excellence* of sociological hermeneutics.

Sociological hermeneutics is reminiscent of what Foucault termed a ‘general’ history (as opposed to a ‘total’ history). Whereas a ‘total’ history draws its resources around a single unifying centre—‘a principle, a meaning, a spirit, a worldview, an overall shape’; a ‘general’ history, deploys ‘the space of a dispersion’ (1972, p. 10). Foucault’s critical method recognizes that all historical (and sociological) accounts are embedded in, and concerned with, the exercise of power-knowledge. This critical awareness informs the study in question in the sense that it deploys its own ‘space of a dispersion’ in the gap between what is necessarily present and unnecessarily absent in the individual and collective memories of the Inbetweeners. What this tells the reader of the book is that between the past and memory there is something else at stake that it much more important than ensuring reliability and representativeness. This is that interpretation itself is a moral issue: subject and object, the counterfactual and the ‘factual’, the necessary and the contingent, and so on, are intermingled; in this study, contraries always come together.

*Metaphoricity and pictorial thinking*

And yet, whether we are always conscious of the fact or not, we scholars—historians or sociologists or whoever, depending on our education or individual taste or contingent encounters (or more often than not, I suspect, all three of these), will have been captivated by certain theories, certain ideas. From these ideas we derive the framework of our own intuitions, the underpinning convictions that form our own scholarship. Many of the shaping beliefs (of which I am conscious) that underpin my own scholarship are located in the sociology of Zygmunt Bauman—especially his ideas of ‘solid’ modernity and ‘liquid’
modernity—which attests that as the world alters, we need the right vocabulary with which to interpret it.

It is my view that Bauman sets the agenda for sociology today: for what we think sociologically about when it comes to the modern world. Bauman came up with his own narrative voice that allows him to interpret modernity in a special way. Writing the modern world as ‘solid’ versus ‘liquid’ is the creation of two discrete modern experiences in themselves on the page. The way the reader knows that Bauman has found the right narrative voices for those experiences is because the sociology gives you access to those two experiences—the felt life—that is those two opposing versions of modernity in themselves.

Used in the way that Bauman uses them, the metaphors of ‘solidity’ and ‘liquidity’ are intellectual devices, not ‘things’ in the world (Beilharz 2010). In other words, Bauman constructs the world as ‘ideal typical’ meaning (ideal types are not descriptions of reality, but analytical tools sociologists use to try to understand it). This enables him (and us) to see the modern world through ‘solid’ and ‘liquid’ representations that he has imaginatively posed on it by using these ‘ideal types’.

The juxtaposition of ‘solidity and ‘liquidity’ offers sociologists a fresh way of thinking about leisure. This is a way of thinking that does not depend on ‘Theory’, but rather on metaphor, which is the rhetorical tool that enables us to ‘defamiliarize the familiar’ and show it in a new light (Bauman 1990). Metaphor is that part of language that enables us to practice hermeneutics. That is, on the one hand, to make meaning i.e. make intelligible that which could not otherwise be grasped, and on the other, to deepen our understanding so as to make meaning even more meaningful, in the process creating some democratic operating principles as we go along. Seen in this way, Bauman presents us with some intellectual devices which signal the continuation the sociological imagination by an alternative means, which retrains it.
into looking for both similarities and contradictions, in other words, the ambivalence of what we casually call ‘reality’, and to see significance and meaning in unexpected places.

This metaphorical reconstruction of modernity, as Bauman conceives it, is by no means a simple replacement of ‘solid’ modern by ‘liquid’ modern considerations: on the contrary, the central tenet of Bauman’s sociology is the need to exhort critical analysis to constant juxtaposition. Bauman recognizes that thinking is unsurpassed when we juxtapose, when we recognize the value of bringing opposites together, when we realize that two ‘realities’, one posed next to the other, are in one way or another connected.

As the Wittgenstein scholar, Peter Hacker (2010), points out, questions about ‘what it is like to be something?’ require contrasts in order to make sense. What is it like for a person born into the working class to experience leisure? This is not a good question. For Hacker, critical inquiry is dialogical in spirit. In other words, we should turn our attention to what two things—in the case my study TITLE (2003), the certain solid modernity and the unpredictable liquid modernity—might say about each other. What is it like for a person born into a solid, seemingly permanent, immutable modernity to find themselves in a liquid modern world?

This is a perfectly good question. In other words, following Wittgenstein’s emphasis on seeing things differently and the associated notions of pictorial thinking through ‘family resemblances’, there is a requirement that there be a juxtaposition, and once there is all sorts of stories are likely to follow. From this shuttling between ‘solid’ and ‘liquid’—concepts as magic wands in and of themselves which illuminate, with an almost miraculous precision, our way of thinking by maximizing contrast—it is my argument that it is possible to weave a larger fabric, a sustained deliberation on some key themes, to be precise, a picture of the always unrestful modernity.

Indisciplinarity
What the foregoing discussion tells us if nothing else is that every study is, in part, a reflection of its author and his putative assumptions. This is not to say that I cannot look at the world other than through the spectacles fitted for me by Zygmunt Bauman. Bauman’s sense of sociology, as he once told me, is that it is like a sponge, a creature porous in texture and of uncertain outline, whose hollows embody countless visiting ideas which swim and often stay to breed. Sociology will never be an academic discipline sure of itself, capable of making authoritative statements or offering definitive answers. It will always be, for better or worse, tentative in its deliberations. What this also tells us is that thinking sociologically should never be content with any one way of making sense of the world, nor should it rest content that there is any one discipline best placed to make sense of it.

Steering a course between different perspectives, my own approach develops its own hermeneutics of ‘undecidability’ that offers a principle of convergence that we extend beyond sociology, history, philosophy and all the rest into the world of culture and our knowledge of it, the world of Kulturwissenschaft. What this tells the reader is that my approach attempts to account for individuals and their worlds by operating on an indisciplinary basis (Rancière 2008), which is not only a matter of going above and beyond the call of duty of sociology as we normally understand it, but also breaking with it. Whereas interdisciplinarity merely signals a combination of approaches drawn from various disciplines, indisciplinarity moves outside boundaries, setting itself free by subordinating the false divisions between sociology, psychology, geography, philosophy and so on, to the sociological imagination, which affects the whole person rather than just training the mind, bringing with it moral development that leads to the discovery that the imaginative world and the world around us are different worlds, and that the imaginative world is more important (Frye 1963).

Conclusions
What these last observations attest is not only that all those awakened to rethinking sociologically anew must be aware that ethical questions are today more difficult (Sloterdijk 2013, p. 90), but also that sociological theory means something different. As it rose from its death it developed some ‘new rules of method’ which, following Wittgenstein’s emphasis on seeing things differently and the associated notions of pictorial thinking through ‘family resemblances’, abandons theorizing altogether. In other words, after ‘Theory’, narrative—another expression for story-telling, as says Sloterdijk (2013, p. 11), bent on the ‘musical-rhapsodic transmission of knowledge rather than the ‘prosaic-communicative procurement of knowledge’—was now resurrected as a viable alternative to ‘Theory’, and not just as intelligent but better made to the measure of the contemporary world. This ‘new’ method not only entailed taking ‘Theory’ out of the academy and placing it politically into everyday life. It was also to become a way of explaining social life that is on the one hand ‘indisciplinary’ and on the other content to rely on interpretations drawn from metaphors (and by default other tropes drawn from literature and poetry), rather than depending on facts or being fixated with establishing grand ‘Theory’.

Those who use pictorial thinking through ‘language games’ argue two things: firstly, that it is a different way of thinking that recognizes that as worlds alter, we need new vocabularies with which to interpret them, and secondly, that sociologically there are many different stories that we can tell and re-tell. What these stories do not do is try to conceptualize the worlds under scrutiny through the rules of logic. What they do, instead, is literalize metaphor. This is what makes pictorial thinking valuable. It alerts us to what abstract conceptual thinking cannot: those stubbornly universal human dilemmas—questions to which sociologists have found few compelling answers—which have never vanished from life. The hallmark of this ‘rule of method’, then, is that it recurs perennially as our understandings are revised and revivified as society and culture shift and change.
As we have also seen, the practice of pointing out the questionable epistemological grounds which form the basis of orthodox sociological ‘Theory’, while simultaneously asking ones readers to temporarily suspend their own ontological assumptions, is one of the most distinctive features of this reflexive approach. Some readers will no doubt find the combination of outspoken epistemological criticism and deferred ontological judgement troubling. Others will be equally unhappy about accepting such a frankly novelizing methodological approach, especially when it is applied to certain aspects of abnormal leisure (Rojek 2005; 2013), for example. However, the disorderly continuity of modern life is infinitely less predictable and more strangely ambiguous than any sociological theory would suggest. Sociologists must face up to the fact that each and every one of them is standing in a moral quagmire as they try to illuminate the lived (leisure) life through their different stories. As such, to paraphrase Sloterdijk, we must recognize that as sociologists we must be prepared to be challenged where our own tacit assumptions are interrogated. When there is no solid ground under the sociological enterprise, no basis for moral certainty, the truth is that the only other way the authority of any work can be enhanced is through the acknowledgment of its predispositions.

The effects of social inequality, we can agree, continue, and always will be important for understanding leisure. In this regard we have learned from Giddens, the two-way process by which everyday experience is turned into sociology and sociology is turned into everyday experience should always be promoted by sociologists as a democratic activity. Any sociologist intent on revealing the effects of social inequality on leisure must try to ensure that they are showing us both of these things. There is no one theory or ‘rule of method’ in this regard; the genuinely reflexive sociologist will write these the way that they must write them. In the most compelling stories the writing will be clear and the ideas will be based on
things *seen* by the sociologist and *spoken about* by their research respondents rather than on what they think as a professional sociologist and is excited to think they now understand it all.

This finally brings me to the sixth, and final, feature of my ‘new rules of method’. This is the admonition to all sociologists that they must complicate their stories by questioning what it is possible for them as researchers, or anyone else for that matter, to finally ‘know’ about other people. It is all too easy to feel and to theorize people less fortunate than yourself (also known as ‘the poor’) as part of a mass—or any other kind of social grouping vulnerable to political manipulation. It is also all too easy to disapprove of what that mass do in *their* leisure. But that kind of feeling and theorizing is as foolish as the disapproving is reprehensible. To put some additional gloss on James’ (2009, p. 9) perceptive observations, the mass are *us*: a multitude of individuals. They just happen to be leading less fortunate lives. Any sociologist who speaks about social justice from their privileged position will not be able to do so in any compelling ways unless they can dispel the disapproving, puritanical attitude that often pervades sociology. In order to do this, they will not only have to replace this attitude with compassion—as Paul Taylor (2009) observed, identifying with those less privileged than yourself is not enough, you need to really feel their plight: ‘to identify is merely to love one’s neighbour as oneself; to empathise is to love one’s neighbour for himself or herself’—but just as importantly recognize that their own fortune begins with their own freedom.

What I have argued in a nutshell in this article is that, to paraphrase Bauman (1989), if sociology is going to claim the right to speak with authority about leisure in the twenty-first century, it is going to have to update its conceptual, empirical and normative understandings
of leisure. Currently it presents us with only a two-dimensional understanding of leisure inherited from the dichotomous thinking that underpins the Enlightenment tradition. We need a third dimension. What I have offered in the second part of the foregoing discussion is an alternative way of thinking sociologically that gives us this dimension. This is the path forward for the sociology of leisure. Bauman, Heller, Rancière, Rorty and Sloterdijk have led the way. Given the resources of their scholarship, there is no reason not to follow.

Notes on contributor

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My use of the term ‘the poor’ here is Rancière’s which works with the assumption that the history of Western thought is one in which freedom and the right to think are premised on situating and excluding those whose social role is perceived other than to think. In applying the term in this way I am also using it as a shorthand to include all those social groups who are in one way or another subjugated and/or excluded.
The Crisis in Sociological Leisure Studies and What to Do about It

In recent years, social philosophers such as Zygmunt Bauman, Agnes Heller, Jacques Rancière, Richard Rorty and Peter Sloterdijk have generated tremendous excitement by offering some revolutionary and radical ways of thinking about human life in the twenty-first century that present some fundamental challenges to sociology as it is normally conducted. Responding to this trend, this article argues that we need to not only fundamentally re-think what we mean by theory in the sociology of leisure but also how we carry out research in leisure studies. The first part of the article argues that orthodox sociological ‘Theory’ is dead and it offers some good reasons why this is so. It is subsequently argued that there is a crisis in leisure theory which has its roots in the central tenets of sociology. Taking its cue from Jacques Rancière’s classic study *The Philosopher and His Poor* the article develops the argument that if social inequality was once upon a time the fundamental issue in the discursive formation known as the sociology of leisure, today it urgently needs an alternative cognitive framework for thinking outside this paradigm. In order to substantiate this critique the discussion considers two leading theoretical perspectives in leisure studies: the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu and feminist sociology, and in particular the emphasis currently placed on the idea of intersectionality. It is argued thereafter that sociologists of leisure, and others who carry out research in leisure studies, generally have a particular activity in view: methodological uniformity of both the employment of research methods and the philosophical study of how, in practice, researchers go about their business. But there are some different ‘rules of method’ when we engage in thinking sociologically after ‘Theory’. As will be demonstrated in the final part of the article, analysis of this second kind of activity does not rely on the tools, epistemological frameworks and ontological assumptions generally used to make sense of leisure. Instead it develops its own new ‘rules of method’ which turn out to be radical, because they are not ‘rules of method’ at all.

**Keywords:** sociology; leisure theory; social inequality; methodology; sociological hermeneutics; cultural intermediaries

Introduction
It seems to me unlikely that any important sociological theories of leisure will ever be written again. Leisure ‘Theory’ is dead. Theory, that is to say, within the sense of theory as the ‘founding fathers’ of sociology understood it. In the future, I can imagine *Annals of Leisure Research* articles and even some special issues still devoted to sociological leisure ‘Theory’.

But these will invariably represent flights into the past, package tours to much-loved Arcadies where sociology used to have some especially firm footholds: functionalism, Marxism, symbolic interactionism, feminism and so on. As is usually the case at properly consoling funerals, those writing these articles or responsible for putting the special issues together won’t dream of dwelling on the deceased’s bad points, because they’ll no doubt be so carried away by the eulogies that got them thinking about the resurrection in the first place—a bit of nostalgia; those were the days. But nobody should be fooled by what people will be saying at these wakes. Make no mistake about it, leisure ‘Theory’ is dead.

Personally, I see no reason to lament the passing of leisure ‘Theory’—the talent wasted on theorizing contemporary sociological understandings of leisure should be used for the more urgent task of theorizing contemporary leisure. It is, however, worthwhile enquiring why leisure ‘Theory’ has become redundant; it may help us to both understand more closely the sociology of leisure’s historical situation and begin to map out for it an alternative future. It is to these two tasks that this article is in the main devoted.

**The end of leisure ‘Theory’**

If I were asked to mark the moment when the decline of ‘Theory’ became inevitable in leisure studies, by identifying the work of one sociologist, I would choose Chris Rojek. Of
the key sociologists in leisure studies, Rojek is an important standard bearer. In books such as *Capitalism and Leisure Theory* (1985), *Decentring Leisure* (1995), *Leisure and Culture* (2000), *Leisure Theory* (2005) and *The Labour of Leisure* (2009), we are presented with a sociology that registers no allegiances to ‘isms’ or any other signature gestures. His work offers us not a ‘Theorist’s’ world of leisure but one in whose sociological evidence we can believe. As both of these books demonstrate, increasingly from the last three decades of the twentieth century, in pursuing their leisure interests, fewer and fewer individuals have been able to believe in the value of the social roles assigned to them at birth. If, in Rojek’s mid-nineties mind, the postmodern imagination emerged as a new way to think and understand how we engage with leisure in modernity, by the end of the noughties he was just as persuasively arguing that what we call ‘leisure’ today is actually a form of social and cultural life in which ‘work’ and ‘leisure’ often intersect and mutually inform one another. What Rojek’s work demonstrates more than anybody else’s is that theory continues to prosper when it challenges the intellectual attitude that once defined ‘Theory’. This is one good answer to our original question about the decline of ‘Theory’ in leisure studies.

This answer implies, however, that sociological leisure studies is in rude health. But it is not.

To understand why, we must consider a second answer. Sociological leisure studies is actually in a quiet but deep state of crisis. But what do I mean by crisis? To squeeze together two definitions, the crisis of sociological leisure studies can be understood as a result of a ‘legitimation crisis’ (Habermas 1975), reflected in the erosion of the explanatory basis of previously important theoretical perspectives in sociology, which has led to an ‘organic crisis’ of authority that ‘consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’ (Gramsci 1971 p. 276). What sort of crisis is this? My argument is that the situation in sociological leisure
studies is part of an intellectual crisis that is mirrored in all areas of leisure studies, which has
in no uncertain terms precipitated the decline in the study of leisure in universities across the
globe. But what makes this crisis even more serious is that it has presaged ‘business as usual’
and the deepening of present trends. This crisis presents challenges that deliver some heavy
blows to the discursive formation, which despite being relatively new feels more like an
ageing boxer staggering with exhaustion in the final round of a championship fight, who still
thinks he has the right punches and combinations to win, but can’t see that this is more
illusion than hit. These challenges bring into question the tacit, invariant assumption of
sociology that in order to understand people’s leisure choices we need to put their social
inequality at the forefront of our analyses. In other words, sociology, in leisure studies, as
elsewhere, is the very thought of social inequality (Rancière 2004). This is the paradox that
pervades the discursive formation, for it is in the idea of social inequality that sociology
assumes the ‘truth’ about our leisure is located. It is also a paradox of this crisis that its roots
are to be found in the circumstances that originally gave rise to sociological leisure studies.

As is well known, in the 1970s the study of leisure was led away from its uncritical comfort
zone by bright academics from disciplines as diverse as urban studies, geography, history,
social work, and especially sociology, attracted to a new field of study whose subject burned
brightly in their own free time, and who in due course not only produced a new dynamic
subject field which reflected the diversity of their own interests straddling theory, policy and
practice, but also a paradigm shift by bringing attention to social inequality as the
fundamental issue in the study of leisure. It is this second observation that alerts us to the
compelling influence that sociology was to have on this new interdisciplinary subject field.
Indeed, not only did sociology make a recognizable aspect of human life appear strange by
de-familiarizing the familiar, but it also provided the means to think differently about leisure
and its intimate relation to the often unfair (and ideological) functioning, organization and
development of society. In broad outline, then, a new, critical perspective of leisure was
established through a sociological analysis: patterns and configurations of leisure vary across
time and from society to society and culture to culture (Dumazadier 1974; Elias and Dunning
1969; de Grazia 1964; Kelly 1978; 1983; Parker 1971; 1983; Roberts 1978; 1981), and
leisure is transformed fundamentally by modernity in general (Rojek 1985; 1995) and the
depredations of industrial capitalism in particular (Clarke and Critcher 1985).

Yet, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the crisis in the sociology of leisure has its
roots in the aftermath this paradigm shift. Although the necessity of bringing to attention
social inequality in constraining the freedom and reducing the ability of some people to take
up ‘leisure’ on their own terms was important 30 or 40 years ago, it has by now run its course
and is in need of an alternative vision. Why? By continuing to pose social inequality—
particularly though not exclusively of class, of gender, and of ethnicity—as the primary ‘fact’
that needs to be explained with regard to people’s leisure, sociology has ended up explaining
its necessity (Rancière 2004).

This might appear a somewhat scandalous proposition; it is meant to be. As such, it demands
a critical discussion of some of the dominant standpoints in the sociology of leisure. Let us
consider two. On one hand there is the massive legacy of Bourdieu, the social theorist of
Distinction (Bourdieu 1984), whose theories and concepts are some of the most regularly and
uncritically applied in leisure studies; on the other is feminist sociology, and in particular its
foregrounding of intersectionality in the current theoretical landscape in leisure studies
(Caudwell and Brown 2011; Henderson 2013; Watson and Ratna 2011; Watson and Scraton
2013). Here my aim is to simply give two illustrations of what happens to understandings of
leisure when inequality is presupposed. This is important to note, particularly with regard to feminist sociology of leisure with its qualitative evidentiary bases and miscellany of theoretical argumentation. Of course, it is important to remember that intersectionalities perspective must be understood as just one of many developments in feminist sociology of leisure. But there is no getting away from the fact that it is central to current feminist thinking in leisure studies and as such it provides an ideal theoretical and methodological framework in terms of which one could apply Rancière’s polemic and respond to it.

The sociologists of the leisure and ‘the poor’

Bourdieu: the arbitrary as necessity

Let us begin with Bourdieu. Bourdieu is someone whose work is widely taught (if not applied empirically) in sociological leisure studies (Jarvie and Maguire 1994; Harris 2005); one of the main reasons for this is that the key theme underlying his oeuvre is to understand the resources—namely economic capital, social capital and cultural capital—brought to bear in competitive struggles for leisure. Yet there is a paradox at the heart of his sociology: although it is extremely critical of social inequality in leisure, its subjects have no social role in it other than to perform this social inequality as they endure it as their life. As Swenson explains, for Rancière, this leads to ‘a theory of the necessary misrecognition of social relations as the very mechanism of their reproduction’ (2006: 642). This tautology is important for our purposes since it clearly identifies the limits of Bourdieu’s sociology for understanding leisure. Not only is social inequality built into the deep structure of Bourdieu’s sociology, but it also performs the brilliant feat of making ‘the poor’ feel ennobled while confirming their extirpation from the world of leisure choices (see for example Bourdieu’s magnus opus The weight of the world (Bourdieu et al. 1999)). It isn’t that Bourdieu’s respect
for ‘the poor’ isn’t genuine, it is simply the case that his insights are not convincingly 
constituted of the different situations in which social inequality occurs. In a nutshell, the great 
sociologist of reflexivity thinks that the majority of ‘the poor’ do not have any time for 
leisure and he presumes that those who do of being incapable of having any—well, any that 
doesn’t incite the kind of disapproving, puritanical look made corporate by the Frankfurt 
School, whose ghost lives on in Bourdieu’s sociology, grimly looking down and shaking its 
mocking head at those amongst ‘the poor’ ‘aspiring to reranking [reclassement] through 
[their] feats in the great simile industry of the new petty bourgeoisie: the manufacture of junk 
jewelry or sale of symbolic services; the commerce of youth leaders, marriage counsellors, 
sex therapists, advertising executives, or dieticians determined to create within people the 
symbolic need necessary for the enlargement of their market, hence for the reconquest of 

The limits of the leisure intersectionalities perspective and methodology

Another version of this theme is replayed in the theoretical perspective and methodology 
known as ‘intersectionality’ some feminists have adopted in leisure studies, which works on 
the basis that social inequality in leisure is relational and has multiple dimensions. The clear, 
rational logic of this perspective suggests that by taking into account the concept of ‘class’
multiplied by ‘gender’ multiplied by ‘race’ and so on what is revealed is something even 
more unequal. However, it never stops to consider, that in practice, an odd kind of polarizing 
effect might just take place. Rather than amplifying each other, social inequalities multiplied 
might just cancel each other out. A good example of this approach is Watson and Ratna’s 
(2011) research in the UK. Their article claims that intersectionality offers us a way to move 
beyond static interpretations of compound social inequality by taking into representations of
shifting, multi-layered social inequalities which are constructed across racialized, classed and
gendered social relations in particular leisure spaces. Yet Watson and Ratna’s account offers
very little that is concrete or geared to representing the social conditions under scrutiny. What
it does instead is lock the ostensibly multi-disadvantaged into a singular, self-contained
leisure world. In so doing, what it fails to recognize is that ‘the poor’, in common with most
other men and women in liquid modern societies (Bauman 2000), actually inhabit pluralized
worlds where there are different possibilities. In liquid modernity, everyone wears many hats
and inhabits many worlds. It is sociologists who wish to lock them into a single,
disadvantaged world.

Whereas those who theorize leisure by ‘thinking intersectionally’ see a singular world made
up of complex intersections of social inequality, there is another approach to thinking
sociology that sees worlds in the plural. This is a view that is not only critical of the
assumption that the theoretical world is the only horizon from which really existing realities
take their meaning, but one which argues that when we understand the world (sic) in the
plural, as the social philosopher Peter Sloterdijk does, ‘then there are different existential
possibilities, that is to say, difference itself becomes the unity into which life draws its
breath’ (Davis 2013, p.p. viii-ix). This view is confirmed by some research in leisure studies
which suggests that an individual may inhabit several different worlds at once and often
within an ordinary day (AUTHOR 2003; AUTHOR and AUTHOR 2004; AUTHOR 2013). It
is scarcely any longer possible (if it ever was) to explain really existing realities (or identities)
rationally as unfolding in time and space with any kind of fixity.

Let us explore this argument in a little more detail. Robert Musil, the great Austrian writer,
suggested 80 years ago (in his highly influential unfinished novel The Man Without
Qualities) that what gives modern life its uniqueness in the absence of any sign of singularity is the universal ability of men and women to exceed whatever identity they have been allotted. In other words, we learn from Musil that ‘universal man can only be a man without qualities, for a man without qualities is the only one who can possess any quality’ (Jonsson 2010: 117). That is, whilst there are many ways of becoming-in-the-world, all humans share the meaning of what it means to be human—in other words all human beings have the sense of an inevitable, universal, relation but with contingency attached to the individual form their life will take. As Jonnson goes on to explain:

There is a slogan for this mode of universality as negativity: the right to difference. But human beings possess no such ‘right’; rather, they practice such difference inseparably from their life process. There are situations in which this negativity becomes politicized, such as when an external power seeks to fix a person or a group in a certain identity—as Jews, women, Muslims or youth—thus disavowing their capacity for negativity (ibid: 117-118).

Indeed, the satisfaction we find in our leisure is often the satisfaction of finding another aspect of ourselves, which permits us to be somebody else and this has nothing to do with the desire of external powers (such as sociologists) to recognize us ‘for who we really are’.

This observation leads to a further troubling aspect of intersectionality. This is the argument that despite its adherents’ claims to the contrary, ‘thinking intersectionally’ does a double disservice to ‘the poor’, by not only being resolutely determined to ‘give voice’ to the conditions of the multiplicity of their subjugation, but also by judging ‘them’ as oppressed creatures. As Rancière (2004) would say, in the kind of sociology promulgated by the intersectionality perspective, there are no ‘thieves’, only ‘the possessors and the disposed’.
One of the consequences of this is that in trying to understand leisure through relational and multiple dimensions of inequality, the world of the research subjects under scrutiny is always bound to remain partial to say the least, and if the intersectionality perspective is one that is successful in giving voice, the only voices really heard are those of the sociologists. One of the other consequences is that ‘thinking intersectionally’ has to nurture with its thought the lives of its ‘subjects’; but in so doing it fails to grasp the fact that its monsters cannot be tamed by bolting together objectified versions of their existence from intersections that never quite cohere with one another. The overall effect is so full of its own virtuousness that it gives the impression of showing little regard for its respondents, and the arch structuring the sociology—with its inability to grasp the existential contingency of the individual lives at stake in the commentary—renders the perspective critically inert. As that most discerning critic of this social scientific fixation with turning subjectivity into objectivity and converting people from subjects into objects of investigation, Jacques Derrida once put it, ‘One cannot say: ‘Here are our monsters’’, without immediately turning the monsters into pets’ (1990, p. 80).

What is perhaps most problematic with ‘thinking intersectionally’, then, is that it ends up overstating the significance of the relationship between difference and subjugation. This constitutes the limit of a particular sort of sociology, for which true freedom is only that of the sociologist, and which is conceivable and functions as the exact opposite of the ostensible powerlessness of those who are subjugated. As Rancière would say, here sociology ends up as the very thought of inequality because by posing social inequality as the primary fact that needs to be explained it ends up explaining its necessity.
What ‘thinking intersectionally’ also does in this regard is deny the true interpretive role of thinking sociologically since its conception of reflexivity (in common with Bourdieu’s), foregrounds social inequality at the expense of understanding leisure worlds through the self-understandings of social agents. Indeed, the awareness of what is lost, overlooked, and distorted in the process of transforming people’s everyday worlds into sociology cannot help but be missing from ‘thinking intersectionally’; and what it shares in common with Bourdieu’s sociology, is the inability to escape the tendency to impose its own narrative order on all kinds of untidiness—worst of all, the necessities of sociological ‘Theory’ above the identification with and compassion for those whose worlds it claims to be explaining—while failing miserably to reflect on the process by which that order has been achieved.

**Rethinking social inequality and its relationship with leisure**

The argument developed so far suggests that in sociological ‘Theory’ ‘the poor’ have to stay in their place: on the one hand, they have no time to go anywhere else because work won’t wait for them, which is an empirical fact; and on the other, their immovability rests on the belief that ‘God mixed iron in their makeup while he mixed gold in the makeup of those who destined to deal with the common good’ (Rancière 2009, p. 276). This second reason is not an empirical fact, but it provides the alchemical myth (‘the story of the deity who mixes gold, silver, or iron in the souls’) that underpins the ‘natural’ order of things and which sustains the idea that ‘the poor’ have to remain in their assigned places. In other words, in order for sociology to function it has to rest on the idea that the social divisions and the inequalities emanating from these are performed by those who endure them ‘as their life, as what they feel, and what they are aware of’ (*ibid*). To use one of Rancière’s analogies, the identity of
someone from ‘the ‘must fit like a handmade pair of shoes, but the type of shoe is never in
question.

Obviously, Rancière doesn’t think that ‘the poor’ actually believe that God mixed iron in
their souls and gold in the souls of those higher in the system of social stratification, but it is
enough that they sense it and as a result feel obliged, responsible and actively committed to
this idea as if it were true. In other words, for Rancière, social divisions are not only a
reflection of actually existing conditions of existence, but also the extent to which
sociologists believe that they are natural and inevitable. In Rancière’s scheme of things
‘myth’ and ‘reality’ and ‘activity’ and ‘passivity’ are not opposed; just as a ‘reality’ always
goes along with ‘myth’, so ‘activity’ always goes along with ‘passivity’. In other words, for
Rancière, sociologists give their own meaning to the world through the patterns of hierarchy
and order which appear in their ‘Theories’ and which they help to create and sustain.

Rancière (2009) argues that what sociologists need to grasp is that actually existing reality
and the ability to transform it lies not in their theories or their research but in the collective
passion of individuals. What he also argues is that when the status quo of actually existing
reality is challenged, ‘a break of epistemology as the qualifying perceptual criterion for
political participation’ (Panagia 2010, p. 98) takes place, which leads to a demand for a share,
a place, a part des san-part, in the social order by those who do not have one. To this extent,
Rancière understands politics as a form of disruption of the established order of things by
those who challenge their own invisibility, silence and unimportance within that order. Here
Rancière is not talking about the empowerment of a group that already has a subordinated
part or a place. Rather, that ‘politics is the emergence of a claim to enfranchisement by a
group that has been so radically excluded that its inclusion demands the transformation of the
rules of inclusion’ (Martin 2005, p. 39). What this suggests is that men and women acting politically not only demand to be included in the world in ways that have previously not been open to them, but that they are also intent on a total transformation of the ways in which they are seen in this new ‘part’ or role—that is, they are after a radical transformation of experience. In other words, in order for them to be included, the world has to be transformed to accommodate them in different ways than it has done previously, and in order for the world to be transformed, men and women acting politically need to conjure a different world.

This is where often leisure comes in.

The essential point I want to make here can be made by briefly discussing some of the findings from my study of the ‘Inbetweeners’, the intermediary generation that provide the focus of a life history interpretation of working-class life in northern England in the period after the Second World War (AUTHOR 2013). Amongst other things, this study explores the extent to which a generation of working-people found through their leisure interests and activities the means to transform a world in which they had hitherto been predisposed to remain invisible. As this study shows, through the life course this generation would re-discover life as unintended and contingent and they would as a result set about re-making new worlds in their own image, and discovering also, by extension, that leisure is often pivotal to these reconstructions.

What the evidence emerging from this study suggests is that when the balance of work and leisure tilts over from the former to the latter, as it did for many working-people in England in the post-war period, the distribution of iron and gold is disturbed. Indeed, by stealing ‘a certain sort of gold, a sort of gold which is at once more and less precious than the gold which is supposed to be mixed in the soul of the rulers’ (Rancière 2009), the Inbetweeners
were at the vanguard of the dawn of a new order of things in which leisure moved steadily into its position as the principal driving force underpinning the human goal of satisfying its hunger for meaning and its thirst for giving life a purpose (AUTHOR 2010). In other words, what the findings of this study demonstrate is that leisure was key to understanding the interruption of a tacitly accepted order of things by working-people who had hitherto been invisible in it. The result was, as the evidence of the study demonstrates, in the post-war period, that leisure as a certain kind of gold, instead of being out of the reach of most working-people, began to take up a more central and radical place in their lives.

**Interim summary**

Amongst all the issues that emanate from the cognitive dissonance found in sociological leisure studies discussed in the preceding section of this article, the following stand out. First and foremost, the prevailing discourse underpinning some orthodox sociological accounts is premised upon situating ‘the poor’ in a singular, self-contained leisure world. One of the upshots of this is (as we saw with intersectionality), while it provides its adherents with a vocabulary for analyzing how social inequality in leisure is relational and has multiple dimensions, it does this at the expense of understanding that all men and women today—notwithstanding whether they are ‘the poor’ or not—inhabit pluralized worlds where there are different possibilities for leisure. We also saw that such an outlook can lead to some sociologists equipping ‘the poor’ with an excess of the most unattractive, but also most necessary features of ‘people like them’—features that while purporting to ‘give them voice’ actually turn them into monsters, or even worse still, pets, whose leisure interests incite the kind of disapproving, puritanical look made universal by the Frankfurt School.

What is also clear from this discussion is that the discursive formation known as the sociology of leisure has been too insular, too parochial, and too complacent in framing the
idea of its subject, and while many of the once bright academics from the 1970s are still
around, the waves that they make nowadays seem much more modest. Beyond the odd blue-
moon gem from Rojek, the sociology of leisure seems to have reduced its ambitions to the
shrinking comfort-zone of coterie approval that is its key associations, conferences and
journals. Moreover, what is hardly debated in leisure studies is that the subject field has lost
its lustre. The study of leisure has by and large dropped off the curriculum at most
universities and most bright young postgraduates nowadays seem more attracted to subjects
like sport, criminology and cultural studies. The fundamental issue at stake here can be found
in the failure to incorporate into the sociology of leisure what has happened in social,
cultural, political and economic life over the last thirty or so years.

It is important to qualify something at this point. I am not suggesting for a moment that social
inequality is by now unimportant to leisure studies. That is not my argument. My argument is
that there is now an unacceptable gap between sociological accounts and quotidian leisure.
This gap has arisen as a result of the discursive formation’s anxious reluctance to let go of
the ‘zombie categories’—zombies frighten us by being both dead and alive—associated with
orthodox sociology, which no longer have a compelling grip on reality. What I am talking
about in this regard are the zombie concepts associated with social inequality which have a
strange ghost like presence in the sociology of leisure, which still uses them as if they
represent something, including power; and to some extent they do still represent power. But
the social networks and patronage, the paddings of privilege and the stereotypes leftover
from modernity in its ‘solid’ phase do not carry the same power that they once did—even if
sociologists carry on ‘business as usual’. Breaking this spell is a game that sociologists of
leisure need to play if the discursive formation is to emerge from the current crisis.
So how to refresh the sociology of leisure in a way that thinks outside social inequality? The first answer to this question must be that the explanations I have given for the decline of sociological ‘Theory’ have implications which reach much further than just theory. Indeed, the whole function of sociology is in question if we can no longer accept that it has the authority to either lock individuals (no matter how ostensibly multi-disadvantaged) into a single identity or to convince us that the theoretical world is the only horizon from which human existence takes its meaning. What this suggests is that the sociology of leisure needs some new ‘rules of method’. To understand why, we must consider yet another answer.

Towards an alternative sociology of leisure

Today we find ourselves living in a society at once strange and yet strangely familiar. It is still far from being an equal one, which means that a democratic deficit continues to bedevil the leisure opportunities of many. However, with the emergence of what Bauman (2000) calls ‘liquid modernity’ there has been a shift from a structured and structuring society in which our identities were largely predetermined by our social class, gender, ‘race’ and the like, to an unstructured and de-structuring one in which individualization dominates more than anything else, and where our identities always remain a work in progress. Social class, gender and ethnicity may still exert some degree of influence on our leisure lives, but they certainly do not dictate them. There are many reasons why this is so, but it is still difficult to define this change briefly. But what individualization involves, fundamentally, is the change, as Raymond Williams once observed, from unaware alignment to active commitment, or in other words, the moving of social relationships to human consciousness. Unaware alignment refers to the kind of life you are born into and stuck with, while active commitment refers to the kind of life we make for ourselves because we feel it our duty to do so. And this is
because all of us—modern men and modern women both rich and poor—are existential
agents who are very much aware of our social contingency.

The implications of these observations for sociology are profound. In the rest of this article I
shall develop a thumbnail sketch of an alternative sociology of leisure with certain
epistemological, ontological and ethical implications. In so doing, my approach differs
noticeably from the doxa of orthodox sociology of leisure, by which I am referring to the
knowledge it thinks with, but not about. The views that I shall develop below have their point
of origin in another kind of sociological thinking which begins with the assumption that truth
is better revealed through essential action rather than ‘Theory’. These views are intimately
shaped by the work of social philosophers such a Bauman, Heller, Rancière, Rorty and
Sloterdijk, who each stress the ambivalence and social contingency of modern life, and which
culminates in a way of thinking that reverses a number of assumptions underpinning
orthodox sociology’s rational theorization of the modern world.

The first merit of this way of thinking is that it abandons the binary oppositions orthodox
sociology inherited from the Enlightenment tradition. Its second strength, and a considerable
one, is that it inscribes social theory within modernity by taking it out of the academy and
placing it politically into everyday life (Badiou 2005). Its third virtue is to foreground the
question of what it means to be human in the modern world. In so doing it frames human life
as an existential problem. However, contra Heidegger, it stresses ‘becoming’ over ‘being’
and the recognition that modern life is irreducibly mutable and heterogeneous. In addition to
this, it argues that rather than finding ourselves merely ‘being-thrown-in-the-world’, we are
knowledgeable actors who recognize the conditions of own social contingency. The fourth
virtue of this way of thinking is that it replaces the idea of a singular world as an ontological
given with the idea that we in fact inhabit pluralized worlds—contingent, shape-shifting,
fractured, underdesigned and undesignable, fuzzily-hierarchical, imperceptible worlds—in
which life is lived noch nicht surrounded by possibilities that have not yet been realized, and where freedom is considered as our duty. Its fifth distinguishing feature, and perhaps its most contentious, is that it brings the idea to sociology that what we understand about the pluralized worlds in which we find ourselves is only knowable through some kind of story.

Let us look at this fifth feature in some more detail. My way of thinking sociologically attempts to fasten the delight we find in the pluralized worlds of liquid modernity (Bauman 2000) onto new kinds of narrative informed by the kind of passion found in the best works of literature and poetry. In other words, in deconstructing binary oppositions—between ‘subject’ and ‘object’, ‘concept’ and ‘existence’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘action’, and so on—and in the absence of ontological certainty, it is my contention that ‘rules of method’ have to be assigned on what are essentially aesthetic grounds—on the basis of whose narrative has the more attractive language, or the more engaging style. For a second time, I have put forward what might appear a somewhat scandalous proposition—though once again for good and assignable reasons.

*Telling stories: sociological hermeneutics and the role of the cultural intermediaries*

Let us look at this feature in more detail. Sociology will never be quite equal to the complexity and infinite nuance of what takes place in everyday life, but it is impossible to think sociologically without arriving at some kind of interpretation, or another. However, and to paraphrase what the great Canadian literary critic Northrop Frye (1963, p. 24) in his Massey Lecture *Giants in Time*, drawing on Aristotle’s idea of the ‘universal event’, said of the work of poets, what we meet in any interpretation is neither ‘real’ nor ‘unreal’: it is the product of the educated imagination—if by imagination we mean not, as is sometimes thought, the ability to invent, but the ability to disclose that which exists (Berger cited in Burn, 2009). Thinking sociologically is neither fixed nor definitive. It is, on the contrary, a
place of perpetual deliberation, speculation calmed by an awareness of the ‘facts’ that lie
behind what is often naively called ‘reality’ and the sociological imagination, and which
makes them one and indivisible. Quite simply, sociologists make a good deal of assumptions
about everyday life and that there is a good deal of truth behind these, and these assumptions
are as good a place to start as any.

To continue with Frye’s synopsis, sociologists should never try to make any ‘real’ statements
at all, certainly no particular or specific ones. It is not our job to tell our readers what
happened, but what happens: not what did take place, but the thing that always does take
place. The biggest charlatans in sociology are the ‘Theorists’; the ones who claim that they
are telling their readers how things ‘really’ happened’. As Giddens (1974) has convincingly
argued, the relation between sociology and its subject matter—the two-way process by which
everyday experience is turned into sociology and sociology is turned into everyday
experience—has to be understood in terms of a ‘double hermeneutic’. In volunteering
themselves as cultural intermediaries in this way, what sociologists do is demonstrate that
virtue is better revealed in action rather than ‘Theory’. In so doing they reveal themselves as
the most honest of sociologists who say ‘This is my interpretation of the world and I’m going
to try like hell to make you believe that it’s true; all I ask is that you suspend your own
ontological assumptions for a little while until I have told you my story’.

In other words, sociologists as cultural intermediaries challenge their readers to engage in
what Rorty (2007) calls ‘cultural politics’: the beginning of a conversation about what words
to use to create a better vision of the society we want to live in. What this tells us is that
rather than trust sociological ‘Theory’; we should trust sociologists’ stories instead. This is
because sociology conducted under the auspices of cultural politics can only be good or bad
in its own categorization. Sociologists as cultural intermediaries know what they are
presenting us with is both a superior and an inferior world than the one we usually live with,
but what they demand is that we keep looking steadily at them both. In this way of thinking sociologically, no idea of reality is final and no interpretation, however good, is going to pronounce some final absolute truth. Every new interpretation, every new formulation emerging from this or that interpretation has the potential to change our understanding.

In anticipation of my critics, I am acutely aware that, as the eminent philosopher R.G. Collingwood (1994) famously pointed out, the work of the scholar is constrained by two important issues that need not concern the novelist or the poet. First, its narrative must be localized in a time and space that has actually existed; and, second, it must be allied to evidence which the scholar has gathered from reliable sources. In other words, as sociologists, we do not have the freedom of the novelist or the poet; we are constrained by the evidence.

Walter Benjamin, a scholar who occupied the opposite pole on the continuum on which the rather conservative Collingwood’s views could be plotted, offered a more radical solution. To scholars who wish capture the lives and times of any era, Benjamin (1974) suggested, they should develop a ‘procedure of empathy’ by turning to the period in question in order to redeem its sufferings. Benjamin’s invocation gives a crucial role to developing solidarity with the worlds of those whose lives we seek to understand. This concern is captured succinctly by Brewer’s (2010) practice of ‘refuge history’ whose ‘procedure of empathy’ forms the basis of the ‘rules of method’ underpinning the aforementioned book TITLE. As Brewer explains, ‘refuge history’

is close-up and on the small scale. Its emphasis is on a singular place rather than space, the careful delineation of particularities and details, a degree of enclosure....Within the space of refuge historical figures are actors and have agency, motives, feeling and consciousness. They are the subjects not objects of history. The emphasis is on forms of
interdependence, on interiority and intimacy rather than surface and distance. The pleasures of refuge history derive not from a sense of control of history but from a sense of belonging, of connectedness—to both persons and details—in the past. Whether as the expression of a certain common humanity or as an identification with a particular group, this sort of history sees sympathy and understanding—a measure of identification which can range from the quite abstract to the deeply emotive—as essential to historical knowledge and insight. Refuge history is therefore… Heimlich (2010, p. 89).

Trying to understand different worlds with different rules demands a special kind of sociological inquiry. This is the kind of inquiry that takes into account the objective features of the world while contemplating real-life situations—research respondents’ inner and outer worlds—by accounting for their personal priorities and relationships with others. There are two other important building blocks to this kind of inquiry. First it begins with the assumption that the human ‘becoming-in-the-world’ is knit together with its own sense of security and comfort—with feeling just right—and second that every world has its own sense of morality—its inhabitants living life in a way that they deem right.

**Thinking with feeling: how to make the sociology of leisure heimleich**

These insights form the basis of my own sociological ‘rules of method’, which demand that if we should seek to record the leisure lives of our research respondents accurately, we must also aim at getting into the evidence of how and in what ways they experience leisure and its social meaning for them, as well as something of its disorderly continuity—often invisible, but all the more consequential for being so—which makes life palpable, and in some cases, bearable. To paraphrase Foucault (1970, p. xi), the purpose of researching leisure heimleich is to try to restore what usually eludes the consciousness of the sociological
imagination, which is looking at a milieu and its people from the inside and trying to feel
what it feels, what they feel.

One of my key concerns in the aforementioned book is to explore and evoke the emotional
contours of my respondents’ collective history. In other words, to paraphrase Nora, it is
concerned with what wells up from this generation that memory has welded together (1996,
p. 3). In developing this study, I inhabited a realm between the past and the present, moving
back-and-forth, in dialogue, constructing a narrative as an interpretive device made between
me and my respondents. The study works with the assumption that reality cannot be
reproduced in history, but the concentrated act of reproducing some of reality’s dynamics
can, of turning history into an essential action—even if the best it can hope to achieve is
make the world it renders in its pages feel human and not merely academic machination. In
other words, refuge history—understood here as the empathetic study of what Hegel called
‘absolute spirit home-experience’ (Heller 2011) and the narrative that moves it—is the
domain par excellence of sociological hermeneutics.

Sociological hermeneutics is reminiscent of what Foucault termed a ‘general’ history (as
opposed to a ‘total’ history). Whereas a ‘total’ history draws its resources around a single
unifying centre—‘a principle, a meaning, a spirit, a worldview, an overall shape’; a ‘general’
history, deploys ‘the space of a dispersion’ (1972, p. 10). Foucault’s critical method
recognizes that all historical (and sociological) accounts are embedded in, and concerned
with, the exercise of power-knowledge. This critical awareness informs the study in question
in the sense that it deploys its own ‘space of a dispersion’ in the gap between what is
necessarily present and unnecessarily absent in the individual and collective memories of the
Inbetweeners. What this tells the reader of the book is that between the past and memory
there is something else at stake that it much more important than ensuring reliability and
representativeness. This is that interpretation itself is a moral issue: subject and object, the
counterfactual and the ‘factual’, the necessary and the contingent, and so on, are intermingled; in this study, contraries always come together.

Metaphoricity and pictorial thinking

And yet, whether we are always conscious of the fact or not, we scholars—historians or sociologists or whoever, depending on our education or individual taste or contingent encounters (or more often than not, I suspect, all three of these), will have been captivated by certain theories, certain ideas. From these ideas we derive the framework of our own intuitions, the underpinning convictions that form our own scholarship. Many of the shaping beliefs (of which I am conscious) that underpin my own scholarship are located in the sociology of Zygmunt Bauman—especially his ideas of ‘solid’ modernity and ‘liquid’ modernity—which attests that as the world alters, we need the right vocabulary with which to interpret it.

It is my view that Bauman sets the agenda for sociology today: for what we think sociologically about when it comes to the modern world. Bauman came up with his own narrative voice that allows him to interpret modernity in a special way. Writing the modern world as ‘solid’ versus ‘liquid’ is the creation of two discrete modern experiences in themselves on the page. The way the reader knows that Bauman has found the right narrative voices for those experiences is because the sociology gives you access to those two experiences—the felt life—that is those two opposing versions of modernity in themselves.

Used in the way that Bauman uses them, the metaphors of ‘solidity’ and ‘liquidity’ are intellectual devices, not ‘things’ in the world (Beilharz 2010). In other words, Bauman constructs the world as ‘ideal typical’ meaning (ideal types are not descriptions of reality, but analytical tools sociologists use to try to understand it). This enables him (and us) to see the
modern world through ‘solid’ and ‘liquid’ representations that he has imaginatively posed on it by using these ‘ideal types’.

The juxtaposition of ‘solidity and ‘liquidity’ offers sociologists a fresh way of thinking about leisure. This is a way of thinking that does not depend on ‘Theory’, but rather on metaphor, which is the rhetorical tool that enables us to ‘defamiliarize the familiar’ and show it in a new light (Bauman 1990). Metaphor is that part of language that enables us to practice hermeneutics. That is, on the one hand, to make meaning i.e. make intelligible that which could not otherwise be grasped, and on the other, to deepen our understanding so as to make meaning even more meaningful, in the process creating some democratic operating principles as we go along. Seen in this way, Bauman presents us with some intellectual devices which signal the continuation the sociological imagination by an alternative means, which retrains it into looking for both similarities and contradictions, in other words, the ambivalence of what we casually call ‘reality’, and to see significance and meaning in unexpected places.

This metaphorical reconstruction of modernity, as Bauman conceives it, is by no means a simple replacement of ‘solid’ modern by ‘liquid’ modern considerations: on the contrary, the central tenet of Bauman’s sociology is the need to exhort critical analysis to constant juxtaposition. Bauman recognizes that thinking is unsurpassed when we juxtapose, when we recognize the value of bringing opposites together, when we realize that two 'realities', one posed next to the other, are in one way or another connected.

As the Wittgenstein scholar, Peter Hacker (2010), points out, questions about ‘what it is like to be something?’ require contrasts in order to make sense. What is it like for a person born into the working class to experience leisure? This is not a good question. For Hacker, critical inquiry is dialogical in spirit. In other words, we should turn our attention to what two things—in the case my study TITLE (2003), the certain solid modernity and the unpredictable
liquid modernity—might say about each other. What is it like for a person born into a solid, seemingly permanent, immutable modernity to find themselves in a liquid modern world? This is a perfectly good question. In other words, following Wittgenstein’s emphasis on seeing things differently and the associated notions of pictorial thinking through ‘family resemblances’, there is a requirement that there be a juxtaposition, and once there is all sorts of stories are likely to follow. From this shuttling between ‘solid’ and ‘liquid’—concepts as magic wands in and of themselves which illuminate, with an almost miraculous precision, our way of thinking by maximizing contrast—it is my argument that it is possible to weave a larger fabric, a sustained deliberation on some key themes, to be precise, a picture of the always unrestful modernity.

**Indisciplinarity**

What the foregoing discussion tells us if nothing else is that every study is, in part, a reflection of its author and his putative assumptions. This is not to say that I cannot look at the world other than through the spectacles fitted for me by Zygmunt Bauman. Bauman’s sense of sociology, as he once told me, is that it is like a sponge, a creature porous in texture and of uncertain outline, whose hollows embody countless visiting ideas which swim and often stay to breed. Sociology will never be an academic discipline sure of itself, capable of making authoritative statements or offering definitive answers. It will always be, for better or worse, tentative in its deliberations. What this also tells us is that thinking sociologically should never be content with any one way of making sense of the world, nor should it rest content that there is any one discipline best placed to make sense of it.

Steering a course between different perspectives, my own approach develops its own hermeneutics of ‘undecidability’ that offers a principle of convergence that we extend beyond sociology, history, philosophy and all the rest into the world of culture and our knowledge of
it, the world of *Kulturwissenschaft*. What this tells the reader is that my approach attempts to account for individuals and their worlds by operating on an *indisciplinary* basis (Rancière 2008), which is not only a matter of going above and beyond the call of duty of sociology as we normally understand it, but also breaking with it. Whereas *interdisciplinarity* merely signals a combination of approaches drawn from various disciplines, *indisciplinarity* moves outside boundaries, setting itself free by subordinating the false divisions between sociology, psychology, geography, philosophy and so on, to the sociological imagination, which affects the whole person rather than just training the mind, bringing with it moral development that leads to the discovery that the imaginative world and the world around us are different worlds, and that the imaginative world is more important (Frye 1963).

**Conclusions**

What these last observations attest is not only that all those awakened to rethinking sociologically anew must be aware that ethical questions are today more difficult (Sloterdijk 2013, p. 90), but also that sociological theory means something different. As it rose from its death it developed some ‘new rules of method’ which, following Wittgenstein’s emphasis on seeing things differently and the associated notions of pictorial thinking through ‘family resemblances’, abandons theorizing altogether. In other words, after ‘Theory’, narrative—another expression for story-telling, as says Sloterdijk (2013, p. 11), bent on the ‘musical-rhapsodic transmission of knowledge rather than the ‘prosaic-communicative procurement of knowledge’—was now resurrected as a viable alternative to ‘Theory’, and not just as intelligent but better made to the measure of the contemporary world. This ‘new’ method not only entailed taking ‘Theory’ out of the academy and placing it politically into everyday life. It was also to become a way of explaining social life that is on the one hand ‘indisciplinary’ and on the other content to rely on interpretations drawn from metaphors (and by default
other tropes drawn from literature and poetry), rather than depending on facts or being fixated
with establishing grand ‘Theory’.

Those who use pictorial thinking through ‘language games’ argue two things: firstly, that it is
a different way of thinking that recognizes that as worlds alter, we need new vocabularies
with which to interpret them, and secondly, that sociologically there are many different
stories that we can tell and re-tell. What these stories do not do is try to conceptualize the
worlds under scrutiny through the rules of logic. What they do, instead, is literalize
metaphor. This is what makes pictorial thinking valuable. It alerts us to what abstract
conceptual thinking cannot: those stubbornly universal human dilemmas—questions to
which sociologists have found few compelling answers—which have never vanished from
life. The hallmark of this ‘rule of method’, then, is that it recurs perennially as our
understandings are revised and revivified as society and culture shift and change.

As we have also seen, the practice of pointing out the questionable epistemological grounds
which form the basis of orthodox sociological ‘Theory’, while simultaneously asking ones
readers to temporarily suspend their own ontological assumptions, is one of the most
distinctive features of this reflexive approach. Some readers will no doubt find the
combination of outspoken epistemological criticism and deferred ontological judgement
troubling. Others will be equally unhappy about accepting such a frankly novelizing
methodological approach, especially when it is applied to certain aspects of abnormal leisure
(Rojek 2005; 2013), for example. However, the disorderly continuity of modern life is
infinitely less predictable and more strangely ambiguous than any sociological theory would
suggest. Sociologists must face up to the fact that each and every one of them is standing in a
moral quagmire as they try to illuminate the lived (leisure) life through their different stories.
As such, to paraphrase Sloterdijk, we must recognize that as sociologists we must be prepared
to be challenged where our own tacit assumptions are interrogated. When there is no solid
ground under the sociological enterprise, no basis for moral certainty, the truth is that the
only other way the authority of any work can be enhanced is through the acknowledgment of
its predispositions.

The effects of social inequality, we can agree, continue, and always will be important for
understanding leisure. In this regard we have learned from Giddens, the two-way process by
which everyday experience is turned into sociology and sociology is turned into everyday
experience should always be promoted by sociologists as a democratic activity. Any
sociologist intent on revealing the effects of social inequality on leisure must try to ensure
that they are showing us both of these things. There is no one theory or ‘rule of method’ in
this regard; the genuinely reflexive sociologist will write these the way that they must write
them. In the most compelling stories the writing will be clear and the ideas will be based on
things seen by the sociologist and spoken about by their research respondents rather than on
what they think as a professional sociologist and is excited to think they now understand it
all.

This finally brings me to the sixth, and final, feature of my ‘new rules of method’. This is the
admonition to all sociologists that they must complicate their stories by questioning what it is
possible for them as researchers, or anyone else for that matter, to finally ‘know’ about other
people. It is all too easy to feel and to theorize people less fortunate than yourself (also
known as ‘the poor’) as part of a mass—or any other kind of social grouping vulnerable to
political manipulation. It is also all too easy to disapprove of what that mass do in their
leisure. But that kind of feeling and theorizing is as foolish as the disapproving is
reprehensible. To put some additional gloss on James’ (2009, p. 9) perceptive observations,
the mass are us: a multitude of individuals. They just happen to be leading less fortunate
lives. Any sociologist who speaks about social justice from their privileged position will not be able to do so in any compelling ways unless they can dispel the disapproving, puritanical attitude that often pervades sociology. In order to do this, they will not only have to replace this attitude with compassion—as Paul Taylor (2009) observed, identifying with those less privileged than yourself is not enough, you need to really feel their plight: ‘to identify is merely to love one's neighbour as oneself; to empathise is to love one's neighbour for himself or herself’—but just as importantly recognize that their own fortune begins with their own freedom.

What I have argued in a nutshell in this article is that, to paraphrase Bauman (1989), if sociology is going to claim the right to speak with authority about leisure in the twenty-first century, it is going to have to update its conceptual, empirical and normative understandings of leisure. Currently it presents us with only a two-dimensional understanding of leisure inherited from the dichotomous thinking that underpins the Enlightenment tradition. We need a third dimension. What I have offered in the second part of the foregoing discussion is an alternative way of thinking sociologically that gives us this dimension. This is the path forward for the sociology of leisure. Bauman, Heller, Rancière, Rorty and Sloterdijk have led the way. Given the resources of their scholarship, there is no reason not to follow.

Notes on contributor

References


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My use of the term ‘the poor’ here is Rancière’s which works with the assumption that the history of Western thought is one in which freedom and the right to think are premised on situating and excluding those whose social role is perceived other than to think. In applying the term in this way I am also using it as a shorthand to include all those social groups who are in one way or another subjugated and/or excluded.