

## **Cultivating “Good Will” Through Rural Welfare: The Near East Foundation in Iran, 1943-1951**

OFFILER, Benjamin <<http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6458-535X>>

Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:

<https://shura.shu.ac.uk/32126/>

---

This document is the Accepted Version [AM]

### **Citation:**

OFFILER, Benjamin (2022). Cultivating “Good Will” Through Rural Welfare: The Near East Foundation in Iran, 1943-1951. In: OFFILER, Ben and WILLIAMS, Rachel, (eds.) American Philanthropy at Home and Abroad. New Directions in the History of Giving. London, Bloomsbury Academic, 146-165. [Book Section]

---

### **Copyright and re-use policy**

See <http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html>

## **Cultivating ‘Good Will’ Through Rural Welfare: The Near East Foundation in Iran, 1943-1951**

**Ben Offiler**

Following his unexpected victory in the 1948 presidential election, Harry S. Truman used his inaugural address to for ‘a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.’ Put simply, the president stated, ‘Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens.’<sup>1</sup> Point Four, as this aspiration became known, held the door wide open for private organisations, including philanthropic foundations, to contribute to US foreign policy goals. Truman’s Point Four programme sought to embed two key principles into US foreign policy during the early Cold War. First, it emphasised the role of development as a means to inoculate countries against the appeal of communism. Second, it suggested that non-governmental organisations could be instrumental in this effort due to both their technical expertise and their local, on-the-ground knowledge. Private agencies were, then, integral to Harry Truman’s strategy for containing communism and maintaining US economic, political and strategic interests in the developing world.

One such agency was the philanthropic Near East Foundation, formerly known as Near East Relief. Founded in 1915 as a direct response to the emergency caused by the Armenian Genocide, Near East Relief had gained an international reputation for its humanitarian and relief programmes. But by 1930 it had transformed itself into the Near East Foundation from, in the words of Keith David Watenpugh, “an ad hoc food relief organization to...a bureaucratized, multidisciplinary, nongovernmental ‘development’

organization.”<sup>2</sup> By the time of Truman’s Point Four declaration the Near East Foundation was operating in a number of countries, including Greece, Lebanon and Syria, but it was its Iran programme that caught the Truman administration’s attention.

In the months that followed the pronouncement of Point Four, Truman administration officials approached the NEF to discuss the possibility of providing funds for the NEF’s work ‘to help the underprivileged countries of the Near East.’<sup>3</sup> Reporting his encounters with Department of State policymakers, one NEF officer noted that ‘the Foundation’s programs had been quoted frequently as typical of the activities around which “Point Four” should be developed.’<sup>4</sup> Just a year later, when extolling the virtues and promise of Point Four, President Truman himself pointed directly to the NEF’s Iran programme of leadership training, agricultural reform, rural education and sanitation projects as an ‘example of what point 4 [sic] can mean.’<sup>5</sup>

The Near East Foundation was not the only American non-governmental organisation or non-state actor that engaged with and contributed to Iranian development during the twentieth century. While many scholars have focused on formal diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran, especially during the Cold War era, John Lorentz, Thomas M. Ricks, Jasamin Rostam-Kolayi and Michael Zirinsky have illustrated the influence of American Presbyterian and evangelical missionaries in shaping Iran’s education system through a series of mission schools and colleges.<sup>6</sup> Others have explored the role of non-state actors, including academics and students, in the evolution of US-Iranian relations beyond government policy, yet despite their intimate involvement in Iran’s post-war development few historians have focused on the contribution of philanthropic foundations and private NGOs.<sup>7</sup> Victor V. Nemchenok, Christopher T. Fisher, and Gregory Brew have examined the activities of the Ford Foundation and David Lilienthal’s Development and Resources Corporation, revealing the intricate relationship these and other NGOs had with Iran’s official

development programmes.<sup>8</sup> The Near East Foundation's Iran programmes, however, have not yet been explored in depth, despite the fact that not only did the NEF arrive in Iran at the invitation of Tehran before both Ford and Rockefeller, they received funding from these larger foundations throughout the 1950s to support their rural reform projects.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, that the NEF's work in Iran was considered emblematic of President Truman's Point Four goals and methods is in indication of how significant the Near East Foundation, and private agencies more broadly, were in US foreign relations during the 1940s and 1950s.

This chapter explores the origins of the NEF's Iran programme by first outlining how the Foundation's guiding principle of 'helping people to help themselves' was central to its understanding of philanthropy. It demonstrates how the concept of cultivating 'good will' underpinned both NEF methodology and philosophy. The chapter then discusses the conclusions of a 1943 Foundation survey of Iran's rural education that resulted in the negotiation and eventual signing of the initial contract that allowed the NEF to establish its first programme in Iran. The appointment of its first director, Lyle J. Hayden, in 1946 and the encroaching impact of the Cold War were important factors that shaped the early nature and direction of the programme. The chapter then focuses on 1947-1948 when, under the stewardship of Hayden and his successor Theodore Noe, the programme was consolidated and expanded from its modest beginnings to incorporate a wider area of the country. These years were pivotal as the Foundation gained a special reputation within US policymaking circles, particularly inside the State Department, while they also marked the emergence of financial difficulties that would become increasingly apparent in 1949. Despite these challenges the programme continued to expand and NEF staff were employed on various projects across Iran, highlighting the high regard with which the Foundation was viewed by the Iranian government too. Finally, the chapter concludes by examining how the arrival of

Point Four funding both provided opportunities for expansion and created new challenges for the Iran programme.

In his 1947 annual report to the Near East Foundation's Board of Directors, HB Allen, Educational Director, encapsulated both the NEF's methodological and philosophical approach to philanthropy when he wrote 'its primary interest is in long-range programs of education aimed at helping people to help themselves.'<sup>10</sup> According to Allen, Foundation programmes could be divided into three separate stages: 'the exploratory, the demonstration stage, and finally the period of integration.'<sup>11</sup> The exploratory stage usually involved a survey by NEF personnel of the basic needs of the country in question, assessing which areas required urgent attention, what relevant infrastructure already existed, and the level of local enthusiasm and government support for the proposed programme.

If a programme was deemed to be viable then a demonstration could be established, which would quite literally, for example, demonstrate to local people different farming techniques or sanitation practices. As Allen noted, the Near East Foundation 'differed somewhat from that of most other American agencies operating in foreign countries' because it only required limited financial assistance from local governments to begin operating.<sup>12</sup> Once the demonstration programme was running effectively, however, its benefits would soon become apparent to both local communities and governments who, it was argued, would enthusiastically contribute financially and materially to the project.

The final stage, the period of integration, was when the programme, having demonstrated its effectiveness, could be integrated into the national development or reform project of the local government. 'A demonstration in rural extension is successful,' wrote Allen in 1955, 'when its effectiveness with the people and its economy of operation lead the

host government to adopt and support such a service for the national well-being and to extend this over the whole country.’<sup>13</sup>

By following these three stages, the NEF aimed to improve people’s lives but it was also recognised that the role of private agencies and philanthropic organisations did more than simply help people. They acted as representatives of the United States, even in countries where US government policy, influence or intervention was unwelcome. Where government projects could be unwieldy, private agencies could be flexible and, Allen observed, ‘The assistance given is usually accepted on its merits regardless of the current local attitude toward the policies of the American government.’<sup>14</sup> Moreover, US government missions rarely had the luxury of time, which was essential to allow for the ‘acceptance and adoption into the way of life of a people.’<sup>15</sup> Private agencies were able to integrate more fully into a society to gain the trust and respect of local communities.

According to Allen then, ‘Through simple, down-to-earth projects administered by [the NEF’s] highly trained, hard-working leaders the helping hand of America is extended to our sometimes skeptical neighbors.’<sup>16</sup> By doing so, the Near East Foundation was contributing to what former presidential candidate Walter Wilkie referred to as ‘that great reservoir of goodwill’ that the United States enjoyed across the world. The concept of ‘good will’ was a guiding principle for the Near East Foundation as it sought to foster positive relations with the local people and governments that engaged with its rural welfare programmes. More than this, however, Allen believed that the activities of the Foundation contributed to the maintenance and defence of peace in a world only slowly recovering from the ravages of the Second World War and already embroiled in a new Cold War which appeared to be on the brink of turning hot at any moment. Noting the UNESCO constitution, which states ‘since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed,’ Allen declared in October 1948 that the ‘Near East Foundation

with its practical personalized, humanitarian approach must be constructing the strongest defenses of all.’<sup>17</sup>

For the NEF, Iran became a test case of both its capacity to cultivate good will and strengthen its defences against totalitarianism. During World War One, Near East Relief had provided aid to rural populations in the northwest of the country and, mostly, Christian refugees fleeing the Ottoman invasion. It was not until 1943, thirteen years after the Near East Foundation had pivoted toward providing long-term development instead of disaster relief, that the Iranian government invited the NEF to conduct a survey of the country with a view to establishing a rural education programme.

In his first report for the survey, written in August, Allen noted that there were a number of issues that needed direct attention, notably a provision of elementary education and a program to improve local health and sanitation. As Dr Ora Morgan, a member of the Foundation’s Program Committee, described it when commenting on Allen’s report, there was a “crying need for [an] extension service” whereby an organisation like the NEF operated demonstration projects to educate and train local people in new techniques and skills. Allen also noted some positives. Not only were there the remnants of a state-sponsored ‘rural uplift’ programme whose infrastructure could be adapted, Allen was impressed by the intelligence and industriousness of the peasants he encountered, revealing an Orientalist perspective underlying his perspective on Iran.<sup>18</sup>

His final report summarising his six-month survey, written in November, was less optimistic. Estimating that 85-90% of Iran’s population was ‘living in poverty; many in abject misery,’ Allen noted several areas that required urgent attention.<sup>19</sup> On the question of home economics, at the time a largely female endeavour in both the US and Iran, Allen observed that ‘aid to women [is] deplorably lacking.’ School facilities were ‘quite

inadequate,' more needed to be done to recruit male and female teachers from villages, and a rural adult literacy program was vital. Most poignantly, Allen observed that a 'Rural health program cries [sic] aloud for organization and implementation... Diseases of Near East scourging the village population. Infant mortality 40%, 50%, even 60% in some unfortunate villages.' Summarising Allen's reports, Morgan quoted the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Saed, who had remarked to Allen that 'Iran is in dire need of the particular kind of help that is usually provided by Near East Foundation.' For Morgan, this was 'clear evidence that Near East Foundation is really wanted in Iran' and therefore validation for the possibility of an extension of NEF activity into the country.<sup>20</sup>

Upon receiving Allen's reports, members of the Foundation's Program Committee were "willing to suggest a full-fledged program" in the country.<sup>21</sup> A few weeks later, E.C. Miller, NEF Executive Secretary, noted that the Foundation's proposed venture in Iran had been 'received with unusual enthusiasm' within the US State Department.<sup>22</sup> Considering the international context of 1944 such recognition among US officials was an indication that once the war was over private agencies would play an important role in advancing both Washington's foreign policy goals and international development.

On 21 April 1944, the Iranian government extended an official invitation to the Near East Foundation to 'send a representative to Iran' to negotiate the creation of a programme along the lines set out by Allen.<sup>23</sup> At the June Board of Directors meeting it was agreed 'That the matter of instituting Near East Foundation's programs in Iran be approved in principle, the details to be developed upon Dr. Allen's return to America.'<sup>24</sup> American and Iranian government support notwithstanding, the challenge before the NEF was nevertheless a significant one, as Allen's report to the Board attested.



Despite having been invited by the Iranian government itself, Allen noted that when he arrived the previous year 'Iranian officials did not know who I was or what I was there for.'<sup>25</sup> The high turnover of ministers and officials meant that those with some familiarity with Allen's endeavour were no longer in government. Between the beginning of 1944 and the end of 1946, Iran went through no less than seven different prime ministers. As Allen put it, 'The Iranian government was and is seriously disorganized. ... Cabinets change frequently ... Other missions told me I might as well fold up and come home.'<sup>26</sup> He did, however, receive assistance and genuine interest from the Ministries of Education and Agriculture, as well as the Minister of Court and even the Shah himself.

Nevertheless, Allen described the rural situation in Iran as 'tragic', with most of the population living as 'tenants under a medieval feudal system... They work soil that does not belong to them under a feudal system that makes them virtually slaves.' According to Allen it was apposite that the Iranian government had invited the NEF to survey the country as 'Unless the country puts its own house in order it is very apt to have some one from the outside come in and do this for them.'<sup>27</sup> Allen also noted that although the US State Department was in favour of an NEF programme, instability and corruption within the Iran 'would make the job extremely difficult.' Trying to put a positive spin on such a gloomy description, Allen suggested that if the NEF could find the right man for the job, who necessarily required relevant agriculture educational and administrative experience, they would 'stand out in such a sharp contrast that he would get I believe wonderful cooperation from the job.'<sup>28</sup> While Allen's description once more revealed his Orientalist perspective of Iranians as generally corrupt and incompetent, it also illustrated the scale of the task facing the Near East Foundation.

Writing to the Iranian Minister, M. Shayesteh, Allen explained the principles of how NEF demonstration programmes worked. He made it clear that 'we make no attempt to solve

the rural problem for the whole country, or even in several places of a country.’ Instead, the Foundation would ‘develop methods that may be applicable to the whole country,’ with a focus on ‘itinerant agricultural instruction, health activities which are largely in the nature of practical sanitation, carefully adapted programs for women and children, and finally, recreation.’ By emphasising practical experimentation that would develop replicable methods of instruction, Allen told Shayesteh, the Foundation sought to maximise the impact of smaller projects by ensuring that their principles and techniques could be easily adapted and rolled out elsewhere.<sup>29</sup>

Despite Allen’s efforts to cultivate awareness within Tehran, however, two US officials wrote to him in September 1944 to warn that ‘there is little real comprehension of your scheme or the basic principles of the Near East Foundation in government circles.’ Their warning was not just in reference to the practical elements of a Foundation rural welfare programme but, equally significantly, the financial implications for the Iranian government. Allen was informed that Iranian officials were ‘under the impression that ... there was no suggestion that the expenses were to be shared’ between the NEF and Tehran. Indeed, it was assumed that the NEF would bear the costs of the initial demonstration programme, thereby showing ‘the government exactly what the program means.’<sup>30</sup> As early as February 1944, the Iranian Council of Ministers had determined that the invitation to the Near East Foundation to establish a programme of rural activity ‘should evidently not create financial obligations for the Iranian Government.’<sup>31</sup> Dr Isa Sedigh, Minister of Education, reiterated that ‘in a conversation some years ago with the then head of the Near East Foundation’ he had been told that all that was required was an invitation from the government, ‘No cash contribution was asked for.’<sup>32</sup> For Iranian officials, a demonstration was required before funding would be provided, while for the NEF government funding was essential to not only finance the

operation but also, perhaps more importantly, to illustrate the cooperative nature of the programme.

Allen's initial proposal for the new programme, which he shared with Upton for feedback, emphasised the importance of local government investment and cooperation. However, he conceded that 'the government's material share be kept to a minimum during the early stages' and 'the financing and directing of the programs would be chiefly the responsibility of the Near East Foundation.' It was Allen's expectation that 'in the course of time these responsibilities would be gradually transferred to the Iranian government until the point is reached where the project is almost entirely maintained by the government.'<sup>33</sup> For the NEF, a financial commitment by the local government from the very beginning, no matter how small, was vital to illustrate the cooperation required for a programme to be successful.

Towards the end of 1944 a significant milestone was reached when Allen confirmed to the Program Committee that the search for a suitable director for the nascent Iran programme was over. Lyle J. Hayden, an agriculturist and administrator in his early forties, had been selected for the job.<sup>34</sup> In the months that followed, while Hayden waited to be released from his present instructional position in the US Naval Reserve, negotiations with the Iranian government over the contract for the NEF programme began.<sup>35</sup> During this process, Upton made a number of suggested revisions to Allen's original proposal.

Upton advised tweaking language, rather than substantive content, in order to ease its acceptance and circumvent the need for parliamentary legislation, which would likely be a longwinded exercise. For example, the original request for a 'Maintenance allowance for the director' was changed to 'Maintenance Aid' - essentially the provision of accommodation and servants, so as to avoid the necessity of parliamentary approval for putting a foreigner on the government payroll. Similarly, Upton suggested referring to Hayden as a 'voluntary

technical assistant', rather than a 'counselor or advisor,' as these latter terms were negatively associated with undue foreign influence in Iran.<sup>36</sup>

Allen replied to Upton to confirm that he had adopted all of his suggestions with two minor exceptions.<sup>37</sup> The following day, Allen wrote to Shayesteh to convey the NEF's proposed programme, explaining that the delay had been due to the important search for a director which had now been completed.<sup>38</sup> Three months later, having not received a response, Allen once again sought out his contacts in the US State Department and Embassy in Tehran, enquiring whether they had any knowledge that his proposal had even reached the relevant Iranian authorities.<sup>39</sup> Allen also wrote to Shayesteh again asking for confirmation that 'our proposals have been received, carefully studied, and favorably accepted' so that Hayden could depart for Iran to begin work.<sup>40</sup> Despite friendly relations with both American and Iranian officials, the Foundation was at times dependent on factors outside of its control before any projects could be set up.

At the same time, Hayden formally joined the Near East Foundation having served his notice with the Navy and completed the final stages of his PhD at Cornell University. During the summer of 1945 Hayden 'spent July and August with Dr Allen in New York absorbing the Foundation's philosophy and studying the plans for the project in Iran.' In September he left the United States to visit NEF rural programmes in Lebanon, Syria and Cyprus before finally arriving at his post in Iran.<sup>41</sup> In November, Allen would briefly join Hayden to introduce him to relevant Iranian officials but then leave him to work things out by himself; Allen was, in his own words, letting him 'work out his own salvation, which seems to be the only sound procedure in a situation of this kind.'<sup>42</sup> However, despite Hayden's appointment and arrival in Iran the contract between the Near East Foundation and the Iranian government was yet to be signed due to the burgeoning tensions of the Cold War.

Iran, occupied during the war by American, British and Soviet troops, had played a key strategic role in the allied supply lines that helped secure victory. After Nazi Germany's defeat it had been agreed that all three allies would withdraw their troops. However, Iran soon became a test of the Truman administration's resolve to contain communism when Soviet forces instead helped establish Azerbaijan, in the north of the country, as an autonomous and separatist province. With the Iranian government focused on the Soviet incursion, the official signing of the contract for the NEF programme, which should have taken place in January 1946, was delayed.<sup>43</sup>

In the meantime, the Foundation received help from the State Department in acquiring surplus army materials and in its ongoing negotiations with the Iranian government. The US ambassador to Iran, Wallace Murray, in particular was very positive about the NEF, stating that it 'has the type of program I have dreamed of for Iran.'<sup>44</sup> Unsurprisingly, both Iranian and American officials were then too preoccupied with the crisis to spare much time for the Foundation but in April 1946 the contract establishing the rural welfare programme was at last completed.<sup>45</sup> Yet these positive steps were undermined by the difficulty the Foundation faced in actually implementing the contract with the Iranian government.

In June 1946, nearly two months after the contract had been formally signed, Hayden wrote to Allen to complain that further progress was delayed because the Minister of Agriculture was yet to add his signature as directed by the Iranian Council of Ministers. Hayden explained that internal divisions within the ministry were causing problems, suggesting that the Minister was 'deliberately delaying the formal signing because he is unfavorable to the idea of the program, especially when it will be conducted by Americans. Like many others, he probably fears this is a clever piece of American propaganda to reduce the effect of Russian influence in Iran.'<sup>46</sup> Once more, the Cold War was encroaching on the NEF's efforts.

By October though, Allen felt confident to report that the recently inaugurated Iran programme 'has progressed far beyond the Foundation's most optimistic time schedule.'<sup>47</sup> While managing the ongoing negotiations with the Iranian government, Hayden had set up a demonstration project approximately 25-30 miles outside Tehran in the district of Veramin. The project at this stage consisted of five villages, 'the so-called Palisth group,' owned by the 'Veramin Endowed Properties' and administered by 'a progressive committee' which used revenue from the land to finance a local orphanage for boys.<sup>48</sup> The project itself would consist of a ten acre 'garden plot' rented by the Foundation from the Palisth group. Hayden would use this area, approximately the size of eight American football fields, 'for growing vegetable seeds, seedlings and nursery stock for distribution to farmers and for certain tests.' A further thirty acres of farmland would 'be used for demonstration and experimental purposes.'<sup>49</sup>

Hayden also agreed 'to provide agricultural instruction for all boys in the fifth and sixth grades; establish schools (with the assistance of the Minister of Education) in the three villages not now having educational facilities; establish for breeding and experimental purposes small flocks of sheep, poultry, possibly a few head of cattle; conduct variety, fertilized and tillage tests on the experimental plots, importing certain necessary machinery and equipment for this purpose.'<sup>50</sup> Acknowledging the importance and challenge of maintaining an adequate water supply in much of rural Iran, Hayden also prioritised experiments in irrigation using 'inexpensive, mechanical pumps,' and hired an Iranian agriculturist, A.A. Yassi. It was also intended that the programme would 'be rounded out to include the home, public health through elementary sanitation, and certain types of social-cultural activities' with the appointment of an American rural sanitation technician being a vital first step.<sup>51</sup>

However, just three months after Allen's report financial constraints meant that Hayden's requested budget of \$33,761.50 for the first half of 1947 had to be reduced by one-third to \$22,750. In order to achieve this saving, Hayden delayed his request for a sanitation technician, half of the equipment he had planned on purchasing, and downscaled some of his projects.<sup>52</sup> In spite of these setbacks, in March 1947 Allen told the Program Committee that Hayden was doing a 'wonderful job.'<sup>53</sup> As the year progressed, Hayden reported that he was beginning to make inroads in his demonstration work. In addition to a forage and poultry project, he had also overseen the digging of one well to improve the water supply for one of the villages and was planning 'to sell it back to the village, and with this money he hopes to dig the second well.'<sup>54</sup> Through these sorts of activities Hayden sought to not only help the local community gain access to a safe water supply but also to cultivate good will by demonstrating the value and efficacy the programme.

The progress made on the ground was, however, not always matched by the cooperation of the Iranian government. According to Hayden, 'there seems to be no feeling on the part of any one with whom we have talked that the program has not been worthwhile or that there is any particular criticism [sic].' Even so, due to debates about whether the original agreement remained valid, the Agriculture Minister refused to sign an extension to the contract until a special request had been submitted to the Prime Minister 'asking permission to continue the present agreement.' Hayden's frustrations were expressed in his observation that 'It is just one of those matters that move infinitely [sic] slow in this part of the world,' but the reality was that further funding from the Iranian government would not be forthcoming for at least another two months.<sup>55</sup> For an organisation like NEF, which relied on local government cooperation and whose finances were less generous than those of the larger foundations, such as Ford or Rockefeller, every cent and every rial counted.

As such, although the NEF was largely funded by money received from small donors, alternative sources were always being considered, including the foundations just mentioned and the US government. By September, the passing of the Fulbright Bill, which used the sale of surplus war materials to support welfare activities, presented the Foundation with a new source of funding. In Iran's case, \$2 million had been designated across a ten-year period, of which the NEF was to receive \$68,000 per year to cover the cost of American and local personnel.<sup>56</sup>

In October, Allen reported that Hayden's project in Iran was 'an impressive example of how one should go about building a new program in a difficult area, constructing the foundations piece by piece and in such a manner as to insure ultimate success.'<sup>57</sup> Although primarily an agricultural, educational and sanitation programme, Hayden had built three 'modest dwellings' for his staff that also 'serve as demonstrations of slightly improved, economically constructed village homes,' as well as a storage shed and poultry house. A small garden orchard was used for 'demonstrating pruning, spraying, and orchard management.'<sup>58</sup> In just fifteen months, Hayden had conducted over one hundred farm and home surveys, determining that 'ill health, the low level of home life and general illiteracy' were all major factors impeding progress in rural areas. He cleaned and repaired one village's 'umbar,' an underground water storage system, and installed 'a simple but effective sand filter.'<sup>59</sup> Identifying malaria as a widespread scourge in the region, Hayden, assisted by three Iranian employees, sprayed every house, outbuilding, stable, and standing pool in the demonstration area with DDT, the insecticide used in many developing countries during the 1940s and 1950s to try to eradicate malaria. School rooms were established in three of the five villages and evening literacy classes were set up for adults.<sup>60</sup>

According to Allen, 'Hayden was more and more in demand by the government, especially the Ministry of Agriculture, to advise on technical questions,' and was requested to



conduct eight reports on various issues for Tehran. Hayden had also appointed a new sanitation technician, Theodore Noe, and was mentoring an Iranian as his ‘understudy.’<sup>61</sup> It is perhaps not surprising that Allen’s report, written for the benefit of the Foundation’s executive board, would be glowing in its appraisal of one of its area directors, especially one based in a country where the US government was showing considerable interest. Even so, Allen’s fulsome praise of Hayden is indicative of the NEF philosophy that an effective programme needs to be embedded into the local community and demonstrate its worth through the introduction of practical and incremental improvements.

While Hayden and Allen’s reports largely focused on the work at hand, describing in detail the progress of specific projects – how many egg-laying hens had been distributed to local villagers and so on – the activities of the Near East Foundation aligned closely with the thinking of US foreign policy officials at the time. Indeed, American policymakers regularly remarked upon the parallels between US national interests and the NEF’s development efforts. Loy Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs at the Department of State, speaking at a Foundation luncheon in December 1947, outlined the Truman administration’s perspective on how private agencies and philanthropic organisations contribute to US foreign policy goals.

Henderson stated that ‘poverty, disease, and ignorance are disturbers of tranquillity and constant threats to peace and security,’ before implicitly referencing the threat of communism by arguing that ‘Deprivation, economic chaos, and misery are the breeding grounds for the counsels of despair which lead to totalitarianism.’ Although Henderson acknowledged that governments necessarily have a much greater capacity to provide certain kinds of relief than philanthropic organisations, he noted that the Truman administration and the NEF ‘share one important aim – to help the peoples of the area to help themselves.’<sup>62</sup> The Truman administration was not being altruistic, of course, but sought to give people in the

Middle East the tools, figuratively and literally, to improve their lives and thereby make them less vulnerable to the appeal of communism. Moreover, according to Henderson 'the philanthropic and far-sighted projects of the Foundation have served as convincing evidence of American friendliness and good will.'<sup>63</sup>

Within Near East Foundation circles, the concept of 'good will' as being integral to the success of any given development programme was well understood. In January when reporting on the success of the well that Hayden had dug the previous year, HB Allen wrote 'It is hard to measure either in dollars or in good will, the value of such contributions. This, however, is typical of the work in Iran.'<sup>64</sup> The cultivation of 'good will' was, then, vital for both US foreign policy goals and the NEF. For the Truman administration, it would help to create a positive image of the United States to counter the propaganda of its adversaries. For the Near East Foundation, it would help facilitate the development of its programmes on the ground and generate enthusiasm and support among local people, as well as government officials.

There were times, however, when its relationship with official US foreign policy could inhibit the work of the Foundation. If the NEF could cultivate good will that could help advance both NEF and US foreign policy goals, it stands to reason that ill will generated by US policies could impact the Foundation. For example, in June 1948 Hayden argued that President Truman's support for the creation of the state of Israel was making it impossible for him to secure additional funding from the Iranian government, which just a few months earlier had seemed close to being finalised. Hayden argued the delay was because of 'Truman's stand on the Palestine question. So the reason we cannot expect expansion in Iran this year can all be traced directly back to Mr Truman. One month ago I said that the Palestine trouble had not reached Iran. Today that picture has radically changed. Newspapers are starting campaigns to help the Arabs, Mullahs are appealing to all good Moslems and

mass meetings in the large Mosques are increasing.’<sup>65</sup> His assertion may or may not explain the problems he was encountering with the Iranian government at the time but it indicates the awareness within the Foundation that it was often impossible to keep private philanthropy and US government policy entirely separate. For NEF personnel, however, there was little they could do other than to concentrate on the job at hand.

Throughout 1948, the programme expanded from the original five villages to thirty-five to become ‘a comprehensive integrated program of rural improvement which emphasizes the reduction of illiteracy among adults and the development of elementary education for the youth.’<sup>66</sup> Without wishing to list every aspect of Hayden’s wide-ranging efforts, a few suffice to illustrate the nature of the programme: poultry demonstrations; the digging of wells and installation of water pumps and filters; demonstration of modern farm machinery and implements; development of techniques for managing ticks found in sheep and cattle; distribution of eggs and seeds; DDT spraying to control malaria; treatment of lice in 193 school children; establishment of 10 additional elementary schools, which also saw 348 adults enrol in night classes to improve literacy; preparation of lessons on health, sanitation and agriculture; weekly teacher-training sessions; and publication of 5,000 copies of an education bulletin entitled ‘Guide for Rural School Teachers of Iran’ at the request of the Ministry of Education.

Allen concluded his report by stating simply, ‘It should be quite unnecessary to point out the limitless value of fundamental work of this kind. That this type of education is appreciated in Iran is indicated by the eager cooperation of the villagers and the reaction of government officials.’<sup>67</sup> As a result, Allen wrote, ‘The latter have seen to it that the contributors’ dollar from America has been multiplied by Iranian rials in order that the benefits of this program may be extended as far as possible. This is the kind of investment

that pays.’<sup>68</sup> As Allen and Loy Henderson had argued elsewhere, effective demonstration programmes cultivate good will which results in concrete support.

Yet, despite the considerable progress that Hayden had made in the two short years he had been serving in Iran, the future of the programme was, due to financial considerations, still uncertain. At one point in October 1948, the Foundation’s Treasurer, Harold Hatch, noted ‘that we have about used up our available funds,’ due to an apparent downturn in the number of donations. It was Hatch’s recommendation that the NEF needed to take ‘immediate and substantial retrenchment.’<sup>69</sup> All options were considered and the Iran programme was not immune from the threat of cuts or worse. The following week it was suggested that if Hayden, who was currently on his way home to the United States, decided not to return to his work in Iran then ‘the Iranian program should be closed but if he did return, the work in Syria or Lebanon should be eliminated.’<sup>70</sup>

Although Hayden was to take a leave of absence so that he could join the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) for a year, he strongly recommended that all three country programmes should be maintained; it was agreed that ‘it would be a mistake to pick out one of the three areas and close it completely’ but each would need to survive on a reduced budget until further funding became available, perhaps through the Fulbright Bill.<sup>71</sup> It was hoped that the Foundation’s reputation among US policymakers might offer some salvation. Hayden’s activities in Iran continued to be well-thought of within the State Department, while Allen and Miller were approached by US officials shortly after Truman announced his Point Four programme who suggested that the NEF may be a suitable recipient for funding to ‘help the underprivileged countries of the Near East.’<sup>72</sup>

The NEF also remained popular within Iran. Theodore Noe, newly appointed as Assistant Area Director while Hayden was with the ECA, cooperated with the Iranian

government to expand its malaria control activities. Noe's efforts were warmly appreciated by Iranian officials, including the Ambassador to the United States, Hossein Ala.<sup>73</sup> Overseas Consultants Inc., an American organisation helping the Iranian government create what would become its seven-year development plans, also 'enthusiastically endorsed' the NEF programme and advocated for increased funding from Tehran.<sup>74</sup> The looming Cold War threat also created a potential opportunity for the Foundation, highlighting the role that private agencies such as the NEF might play in both advancing US interests and containing communism. As Miller observed, in Iranian government circles there was 'the constant fear of the next menacing move on the part of its neighbor, Soviet Russia' but the Truman administration's new emphasis on development as a key foreign policy goal placed private agencies and philanthropic organisations at the heart of its Point Four activities.<sup>75</sup>

As the Foundation's Foreign Director Laird Archer would put it in reference to NEF activities in Greece, 'We are, in a way, the advance technicians and light-bearers of the American Point IV.' The anti-communist ideology behind Point Four also aligned with thinking within the Foundation. Writing about Iran, Archer added that 'with alert, undeceived eyes constantly on its northern frontier and inner vision turned toward the west,' the government in Tehran was 'planning its New Day in rural reconstruction with our advice and specific demonstrations, knowing the struggle it has before it to beat the Communist race to capture with trick phrases the hopes of the underprivileged.'<sup>76</sup> Archer also noted that the Soviet Union's anti-religious, especially anti-Islam, purges had made by necessity allies out of the Christian and Muslim worlds.<sup>77</sup>

In his annual report for the same year, Theodore Noe confirmed that progress was being made in the Iran programme's three key areas of focus - education, sanitation, and agriculture – although the latter was perhaps not as advanced as one would have hoped since the departure of Hayden who specialised in that field. By contrast, the Foundation's

sanitation activities, Noe's area of expertise, were expanding across the country as the Iranian government requested further assistance, particularly regarding the spraying of DDT in the border provinces of Azerbaijan and Baluchistan in collaboration with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of War, who provided the necessary equipment and personnel, respectively.<sup>78</sup> Not all of the programme's successes, however, were on such a national scale; indeed, they were more likely to be illustrated by case studies involving just a few individual people.

In his annual report, Allen cited the example of a landlord who had initially refused to pay the requisite fee after his field had been ploughed by the NEF using a tractor. When the landlord asked the following year if the NEF would repeat the service, Noe refused, explaining that he did not want an awkward situation to arise if he were to not pay again. In response, the landlord paid for the service in advance, as well as reimbursing Noe for last year's work. According to Allen, the landlord was determined to have his field ploughed by the NEF tractor again because 'his crop was so much better' and had since become 'one of the Foundation's best friends and recently started voluntarily, at his own expense, to make a fine addition to the school.'<sup>79</sup> It was this kind of good will that the Foundation sought to generate through its painstaking and meticulous approach to its demonstration programmes. The proof was in the pudding; peasants, farmers and landlords alike were able to see the improvements that were being made as a result of the Foundation's efforts and, it was hoped, would in turn become enthusiastic supporters of the programme.

Similarly, when Noe and his colleagues sprayed sixteen villages with DDT they did so with the cooperation of the villagers themselves, as well as the landlords. Otherwise, Allen noted, to do so without cooperation 'would represent simply a contributed service without adhering to the policy of helping the people to help themselves.'<sup>80</sup> This guiding principle of the Near East Foundation was, according to Allen, also borne out in the case of several NEF-

trained Iranian staff who were engaged in sanitising the city of Dezful, 'which has the unfortunate reputation of being one of the dirtiest places in Iran.'<sup>81</sup> The operation was funded partially by the Shah himself who, according to Allen, 'requested that his appreciation be expressed to those American people who have supported this constructive effort which has already become a model for the country.'<sup>82</sup>

These positive developments coincided in the following months with a 'slight increase' in Foundation income, which Allen hoped might be start of 'a more favorable trend.'<sup>83</sup> Even so, later in his report he noted that while there was some enthusiasm inside Iran for expanding the Foundation's demonstration projects to other parts of the country, such an endeavour would require far more American technicians than were currently involved in the programme, which in turn would require considerably more funding.<sup>84</sup> At this time, the programme was still run by a single American, Theodore Noe who had replaced its founder Lyle Hayden as director. Aside from the brief secondment of a home making supervisor to conduct a month-long survey and being ably supported by Iranian staff, including those involved in agricultural training, sanitation, and teaching and teacher-training, whom both Noe and Allen were always quick to commend in their reports, it remained a small-scale operation due to the financial implications of increasing the number of American staff.

As the end of 1950 approached, the Near East Foundation had reason to view the coming year with optimism. In June, President Truman had singled out the NEF's activities in Iran as a prime example of how private agencies could improve the lives of people in the developing world. By December, Edward C. Miller and Halsey B. Knapp were thrilled to declare that 'The Foundation possesses the highest standing over the widest field of any voluntary agency in the Near East.' After two decades of service, the NEF had 'accumulated a tremendous heritage of goodwill and appreciation,' receiving praise from 'ambassadors and

ministers of the United States, members of US official missions, prime ministers, ministry heads and undersecretaries of the various countries, and many others.’<sup>85</sup>

However, Foundation officers were all agreed that while recognition by government sources was valuable, not least for the funding that may accrue as a result, private agencies had a vital role to play that, despite their superior coffers, governments could not replicate. As Allen wrote in October, private philanthropy allowed for a ‘slow, patient, personalized approach’ that did not need to meet arbitrary deadlines in response to Congressional appropriations; although Allen conceded that the latter method ‘may have its advantages when building railroads, bridges, highways or destroyed harbors: it is a distinct handicap dealing with the human equation.’<sup>86</sup> Factoring in the ‘human equation’ was vital in order to cultivate the good will that was integral to both the methodology and success of the NEF’s activities. Perhaps foreseeing the potential issues that may arise if the Foundation were to receive increased funds from the US government, Theodore Noe emphasised the importance of maintaining the slow, methodical approach favoured by the NEF and resisting pressure from external sources to expand or replicate the programme elsewhere.<sup>87</sup>

As hoped though, the new year brought positive news as Allen revealed that he had been informed by State Department officials that the Foundation would be among the recipients of Point Four funding, \$50,000 of which would be allocated to expand the NEF programme in Iran.<sup>88</sup> The Near East Foundation’s finances, however, remained precarious, leading to the closure of the Lebanon programme, a ‘slight reduction of \$1,500’ to the Syria programme, and ‘the reduction of the programs in Greece to a skeleton basis.’ Only Iran escaped unscathed.<sup>89</sup> While further interest from Point Four officials about the possibility of additional funding for the NEF programme in Iran was welcomed, Foundation personnel also expressed some caution.



In March, after noting that discussions about expanding the programme beyond the Veramin district were being held with the Truman administration, the Board of Directors voted to authorise negotiation of another contract but only on the grounds that ‘special funds... [and] proper safeguards’ were outlined to ensure that the Foundation’s work could continue to the same standard.<sup>90</sup> By May, two further Point Four contracts had been signed, one of \$88,140 for Syria and a second for Iran of \$247,000. Another for \$25,000 ‘for an improved rural housing demonstration in Iran’ was also being discussed with the State Department.<sup>91</sup>

In its press release announcing these contracts, the Technical Cooperation Administration declared ‘The purpose of the Foundation’s work is the same as that of the Point Four mission: to raise standards of living at the village level by a concerted effort to improve agriculture, health and education, and to train a body of Iranian experts to carry this work to other parts of the country.’<sup>92</sup> The new funds would allow for a significant expansion of the programme: ‘In Iran it will mean increasing the number of village demonstration centers from 35 to 75. It will add ten American technicians to the staff and a large number of Iranians trained under United States supervision.’<sup>93</sup> There was, however, a clear sense among NEF personnel that although greater funding would mean a larger and better staffed programme, it also brought with it potential problems.

Not least of these new challenges was the recognition that the Near East Foundation’s slow and steady approach to rural development and extension education did not necessarily align with the State Department’s need for quick results. As Cleveland E. Dodge noted at the June 1951 Finance Committee Meeting, ‘the Foundation might have to adjust its policy from the slow careful development to a plan that would provide quicker results if we are to continue to have funds from the government.’<sup>94</sup> Allen also observed that while the Near East Foundation was held in high esteem in many quarters, the Point Four funding both made

‘possible many refinements and additions long overdue’ but also presented ‘a serious challenge.’ Point Four money could only be spent on *new* activities, it could not be used to supplement funding required to maintain existing programmes. In Allen’s words, ‘If the trend of the past few years of declining income, with the resultant cutting of basic work, were to continue, the foundations on which the new super-structure is to be erected would be seriously weakened.’<sup>95</sup>

Even so, thanks to funding from Point Four the programme was expanding far beyond its modest origins under Lyle J. Hayden’s direction when he was the sole American technician working for the NEF in Iran. The agreement with the TCA now provided for ‘the addition of three agricultural extension agents, a poultry specialist, a fruit specialist, two sanitarians, two rural educators for the supervision of village schools and the direction of the teacher-training course,’ in addition to a home welfare specialist.<sup>96</sup> The following year a third contract was signed by the Near East Foundation and Point Four authorities relating to the Iran programme. This latest agreement granted the Foundation \$482,034, dwarfing the funding previously used to support the NEF programme in Iran. As had been predicted by Dodge and Allen, however, such a significant figure inevitably led to adjustments in the programme. Where Hayden’s programme had originally overseen just five villages in the Veramin district it had since expanded to 135 as a result of the first two Point Four contracts and was now extended to over 300 villages by the new agreement. Allen observed that such an expansion ‘departs somewhat from the basic policy of Near East Foundation’ but because Point Four authorities aimed to ‘cover the ten ostends or states of the country it is necessary for the organization to cooperate by providing complete coverage for one district.’<sup>97</sup>

The preceding six years of painstaking, small-scale project work had paid off. The Near East Foundation, which had become highly-regarded among US policymakers, was now a key component of the Truman administration’s Iran policy and the recipient of Point Four

funding. Iranian officials were equally impressed with the efforts of Hayden, Noe and their Iranian colleagues. By emphasising a focused and patient approach to development, the Foundation was able to cultivate good will among the local population through its practical demonstration projects. The NEF's philosophy of embedding its programmes within a society in order to gain people's trust and respect was effective in Iran. Hayden and Noe were able to establish a series of projects that would remain for the next thirty years.

From the beginning the NEF's Iran programme was closely aligned with the goals of the US government. It developed a fruitful relationship with the State Department even while it managed to maintain its autonomy, benefiting from the expertise of US diplomats without needing to submit to their influence. Yet throughout this period the programme was beset by financial constraints and faced the possibility of closure at least once when Foundation funds nearly dried up. The Point Four funding that the programme received in 1951 and 1952 was therefore hugely significant in allowing it to continue to operate and even expand considerably. These opportunities also brought new challenges for the Foundation that would become increasingly apparent in the 1950s as it faced pressure from the US government to accelerate its development programmes. Throughout its time in Iran the Near East Foundation tried to maintain a balance between retaining its high standard of projects and not overstretching the overall programme, while at the same time cultivating good will – among the local population and government officials, both American and Iranian – and continuing to make progress in broad development terms.

---

<sup>1</sup> Harry S. Truman: "Inaugural Address," 20 January 1949. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229929> Accessed 9 September 2019.

<sup>2</sup> Keith David Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015), 93.

<sup>3</sup> Minutes of the Program Committee Meeting of Near East Foundation, 21 February 1949, Box 46, Dockets - October 1948 to June 1949, Near East Foundation Records, Accessions 2010:002, RG 2, Rockefeller Archive Centre, Sleepy Hollow, NY, 1 (31). Hereafter referred to as NEF Records.

<sup>4</sup> Minutes of the Program Committee Meeting of Near East Foundation, 1 June 1949, Box 46, Dockets - October 1948 to June 1949, NEF Records, 2 (37).

---

<sup>5</sup> Harry S. Truman: "Address Before the Annual Convention of the American Newspaper Guild," 28 June 1950. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-the-annual-convention-the-american-newspaper-guild> Accessed 1 August 2021.

<sup>6</sup> John H. Lorentz, "Educational Development in Iran: The Pivotal Role of the Mission Schools and Alborz College," *Iranian Studies* 44, no. 5 (2011): 647-655; Thomas M. Ricks, "Alborz College of Tehran, Dr. Samuel Martin Jordan and the American Faculty: Twentieth-Century Presbyterian Mission Education and Modernism in Iran (Persia)," *Iranian Studies* 44, no. 5 (2011): 627-646; Jasamin Rostam-Kolayi, "From Evangelizing to Modernizing Iranians: The American Presbyterian Mission and its Iranian Students," *Iranian Studies* 41, no. 2 (2008): 213-240; Michael P. Zirinsky, "A Panacea for the Ills of the Country: American Presbyterian Education in Inter-War Iran," *Iranian Studies* 26, no. 1/2 (1993): 119-137. On official diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran during the 1940s and 1950s, see James F. Goode, *The United States and Iran: In the Shadow of Musaddiq* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997); Mark Hamilton Lytle, *The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance, 1941-1953* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987); David R. Collier, *Democracy and the Nature of American Influence in Iran, 1941-1979* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2017); Mark Gasiorowski, *US Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); James Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988); Barry Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience in Iran* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981)

<sup>7</sup> Richard Garlitz, *A Mission for Development: Utah Universities and the Point Four Program in Iran* (Louisville: Utah State University Press, 2018); Matthew K. Shannon, *Losing Hearts and Minds: American-Iranian Relations and International Education during the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017); *American-Iranian Dialogues: From Constitution to White Revolution, c. 1890s-1960s*, ed. Matthew K. Shannon (London: Bloomsbury, 2021).

<sup>8</sup> Victor V. Nemchenok, "'That So Fair a Thing Should Be So Frail': The Ford Foundation and the Failure of Rural Development in Iran, 1953-1964," *Middle East Journal* 63, no. 2 (2009): 261-284; Christopher T. Fisher, "'Moral Purpose is the Important Thing': David Lilienthal, Iran, and the Meaning of Development in the US, 1956-63," *The International History Review* 33, no. 3 (2011): 431-451; Gregory Brew, "'What They Need is Management': American NGOs, the Second Seven Year Plan and Economic Development in Iran, 1954-1963," *The International History Review* 41, no. 1 (2019): 1-22.

<sup>9</sup> Nemchenok does discuss some of the NEF's projects in relation to the funding they received from the Ford Foundation.

<sup>10</sup> Annual Report of the Educational Director, October 1947, Box 6, Annual Reports, 1946-1956, NEF Records, 1-2.

<sup>11</sup> Annual Report of the Educational Director, 21 October 1948, Ibid, 3.

<sup>12</sup> Annual Report of the Educational Director, December 1954, Ibid, 8.

<sup>13</sup> Annual Report of the Educational Director, December 1955, Ibid, 1.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, 20.

<sup>15</sup> Edward C. Miller and Halsey B. Knapp, A Report to the Directors of Near East Foundation covering a trip to the field and an examination of Foundation Activities in Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Greece, during the period Oct. 20 – Dec. 3, 1950. Box 46, Dockets, January 1951 to May 1951, NEF Records, 10.

<sup>16</sup> Annual Report of the Educational Director, 21 October 1948, Box 6, Annual Reports, 1946-1956, NEF Records, 38-39.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 39.

<sup>18</sup> Report to Near East Foundation Program Committee on Dr H.B. Allen's Reports on Iran (Exhibit A), 19 January 1944, Minutes of the Program Committee Meeting of Near East Foundation, 19 January 1944, Box 5, 1944 Dockets of Board of Directors Meetings, NEF Records, 1.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>21</sup> Minutes of the Program Committee Meeting of Near East Foundation, 19 January 1944, Ibid, 7.

<sup>22</sup> Minutes of the Program Committee Meeting of Near East Foundation, 17 February 1944, Ibid, 2.

<sup>23</sup> M. Shayesteh, Minister of Iran, to Near East Foundation, 21 April 1944, Box 63, Iran, Government 1944-47, NEF Records.

<sup>24</sup> Minutes of the Sixty-Second Regular Meeting of the Board of Directors of Near East Foundation, 15 June 1944, Box 45, Board of Directors Minutes, March 1944 – October 1947, NEF Records, 2.

<sup>25</sup> Dr H.B. Allen's Report at Directors' Meeting, 15 June 1944, Ibid, 3.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 4.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, 7.

- 
- <sup>29</sup> H.B. Allen to The Hon. M. Shayesteh, 19 July 1944, Box 63, Iran, Government 1944-47, NEF Records, 2.
- <sup>30</sup> J.M. Upton to Dr H.B. Allen, 15 September 1944, Box 63, Iran, Rural Committee 1944, NEF Records, 1; Donald Wilber to Dr Allen, 6 September 1944, Ibid.
- <sup>31</sup> Decree of the Council of Ministers, 16 February 1944, included as an attachment to Ibid.
- <sup>32</sup> J.M. Upton to Dr Allen, 10 November 1944, Ibid, 1.
- <sup>33</sup> Considerations Relative to a Program of Rural Development for Iran, included as an attachment to H.B. Allen to Mr J.M. Upton, 26 December 1944, Ibid.
- <sup>34</sup> Minutes of the Program Committee Meeting of Near East Foundation, 22 November 1944, Box 5, 1945 Dockets of Board of Directors Meetings, NEF Records, 2.
- <sup>35</sup> Minutes of the Program Committee Meeting of Near East Foundation, 15 March 1945, Ibid, 7.
- <sup>36</sup> J.M. Upton to Dr Allen, 11 February 1945, Box 63, Iran, Rural Committee 1944, NEF Records, 1-3.
- <sup>37</sup> H.B. Allen to Mr J.M. Upton, 10 April 1945, Ibid.
- <sup>38</sup> H.B. Allen to The Hon. M. Shayesteh, 11 April 1945, Box 63, Iran, Government 1944-47, NEF Records.
- <sup>39</sup> H.B. Allen to Mr J.M. Upton, 9 July 1945, Box 63, Iran, Rural Committee 1944, NEF Records.
- <sup>40</sup> H.B. Allen to The Hon. M. Shayesteh, 18 July 1945, Box 63, Iran, Government 1944-47, NEF Records.
- <sup>41</sup> C.I. Crowther to Harold A. Hatch, 27 September 1945, Ibid, 7.
- <sup>42</sup> Annual Report of the Educational Director (Dr H.B. Allen), 4 October 1945, Ibid, 28.
- <sup>43</sup> Dr Allen's Report Delivered to Board of Directors of Near East Foundation, 4 April 1946, 1946-1947 Dockets of Board of Directors Meetings, NEF Records, 2-4.
- <sup>44</sup> Ibid, 3.
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid, 4.
- <sup>46</sup> Lyle J. Hayden, Director, Iranian Area, to Dr H.B. Allen, Educational Director, No. T-27, 16 June 1946, Box 63, Iran, Government 1944-47, NEF Records, 1.
- <sup>47</sup> Annual Report of the Educational Director, October 1946, Box 6, Annual Reports, 1946-1956, NEF Records, 2.
- <sup>48</sup> Ibid, 4.
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid, 5.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid, 5-6.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid, 6.
- <sup>52</sup> C.I. Crowther, Comptroller, to Harold A. Hatch, Chairman, Finance Committee, 22 January 1947, Box 45, Dockets, October 1946 to June 1947, NEF Records, 5
- <sup>53</sup> Minutes of the Program Committee of the Near East Foundation, 18 March 1947, Ibid, 1.
- <sup>54</sup> Minutes of the Program Committee of the Near East Foundation, 15 May 1947, Ibid, 3.
- <sup>55</sup> L.J. Hayden to Executive Secretary, Ref. No. T-50, 30 July 1946, Box 63, Iran, Government 1944-47, NEF Records, 1-2.
- <sup>56</sup> Minutes of the Program Committee of the Near East Foundation, 11 September 1947, Box 46, Dockets - October 1947 to July 1948, NEF Records, 3 (46).
- <sup>57</sup> Annual Report of the Educational Director, October 1947, Box 6, Annual Reports, 1946-1956, NEF Records, 41.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid, 42.
- <sup>59</sup> Ibid, 44.
- <sup>60</sup> Ibid, 45.
- <sup>61</sup> Ibid, 46.
- <sup>62</sup> Speech by Mr Loy Henderson of the State Department, Washington, DC, at a Near East Foundation Luncheon of about 400 guests held at the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, DC, on 9 December 1947, Box 46, Dockets - October 1947 to July 1948, NEF Records, 1.
- <sup>63</sup> Ibid, 2.
- <sup>64</sup> Report of Educational Director on Middle East Tour, 19 January 1948, Ibid, 9.
- <sup>65</sup> Report of Educational Director to the Board of Directors of Near East Foundation, 28 June 1948, Ibid, 5.
- <sup>66</sup> Annual Report of the Educational Director, October 1948, Box 6, Annual Reports 1946-1956, NEF Records, 34.
- <sup>67</sup> Ibid, 34-37.
- <sup>68</sup> Ibid, 37.
- <sup>69</sup> Minutes of the Eighteenth Annual (Seventy-Seventh Regular) Meeting of the Board of Directors of Near East Foundation, 21 October 1948, Box 46, Dockets, October 1948 to June 1949, NEF Records, 7.
- <sup>70</sup> Minutes of the Finance Committee Meeting of Near East Foundation, 27 October 1948, Ibid, 3.
- <sup>71</sup> C.I. Crowther, Comptroller, to Mr Harold A. Hatch, Chairman Finance Committee, 23 December 1948, Ibid, 4.

- 
- <sup>72</sup> Report of the Executive Secretary of the Board of Directors of Near East Foundation, 17 January 1949, Ibid, 3. Minutes of the Program Committee Meeting of Near East Foundation, 21 February 1949, Ibid, 1.
- <sup>73</sup> Hossein Ala, Ambassador of Iran, to Dr H.B. Allen, No. 4677, 16 March 1949, Ibid.
- <sup>74</sup> Part III – Comments by E.C. Miller, Executive Secretary, Meeting of Board of Directors Near East Foundation, 8 June 1949, Ibid, 4.
- <sup>75</sup> Ibid, 1.
- <sup>76</sup> Annual Report of the Foreign Director, 1948-1949, 15 August 1949, Box 5, Annual Reports, 1947-1950, 7.
- <sup>77</sup> Ibid, 8.
- <sup>78</sup> Near East Foundation Iranian Area Annual Report, 1 July 1948 to 30 June 1949, 10 July 1949, Box 46, Dockets, June 1950 to December 1950, NEF Records, 1-7.
- <sup>79</sup> Annual Report of the Educational Director, December 1949, Box 6, Annual Reports, 1946-1956, NEF Records, 5-6.
- <sup>80</sup> Ibid, 6.
- <sup>81</sup> Ibid, 7.
- <sup>82</sup> Ibid, 8.
- <sup>83</sup> Report of Educational Director to the Board of Directors of Near East Foundation, 10 April 1950, Box 46, Dockets, October 1949 to April 1950, NEF Records, 1.
- <sup>84</sup> Ibid, 7.
- <sup>85</sup> Edward C. Miller and Halsey B. Knapp, A Report to the Directors of Near East Foundation covering a trip to the field and an examination of Foundation Activities in Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Greece, during the period Oct. 20 – Dec. 3, 1950. Box 46, Dockets, January 1951 to May 1951, NEF Records, 2.
- <sup>86</sup> Annual Report of Educational Director, October 1950, Box 5, Annual Reports, 1947-1950, NEF Records, 2.
- <sup>87</sup> Ibid, 28.
- <sup>88</sup> Minutes of the Program Committee Meeting of Near East Foundation, 9 January 1951, Box 46, Dockets, January 1951 to May 1951, NEF Records, 1.
- <sup>89</sup> Ibid, 3.
- <sup>90</sup> Minutes of the Eighty-Fifth Regular Meeting of the Board of Directors of Near East Foundation, 22 March 1951, Ibid, 4.
- <sup>91</sup> Minutes of the Eighty-Sixth Regular Meeting of the Board of Directors of Near East Foundation, 24 May 1951, Ibid, 2.
- <sup>92</sup> Press Release: Point Four Agreements with Near East Foundation for Rural Programs in Iran and Syria, Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State, 3 May 1951, Ibid, 2.
- <sup>93</sup> Ibid, 1.
- <sup>94</sup> Minutes of the Finance Committee Meeting of Near East Foundation, 12 June 1951, Box 46, October 1951 to December 1951, NEF Records, 1.
- <sup>95</sup> Annual Report of Educational Director, 8 October 1951, Box 6, Annual Reports, 1946-1956, NEF Records, 3.
- <sup>96</sup> Ibid, 19.
- <sup>97</sup> Annual Report of Educational Director, December 1952, Ibid, 2.