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# **Picking up the pieces: social capital and entrepreneurship for livelihood recovery among displaced populations in Northeast Nigeria**

**Oluwaseun Kolade, Robert Smith & Saliba James**

## **Abstract**

This chapter draws from in-depth interviews of 15 respondents to interrogate the transformations of social capital among forcibly displaced peoples in Northeast Nigeria, and how the resulting formations of new networks has facilitated new entrepreneurship opportunities for livelihood recovery for the displaced populations. The chapter proposes a new framework that maps the changes in the stock of social capital of displaced people from a high level of bonding social capital with high homogeneity pre-displacement, to relatively higher levels of bridging and linking social capital, driven in part by new aggregations of residents in displaced peoples' camps. The chapter then analyses primary interview data to discuss the impact of social capital on access to resources, the creation of new markets, and the links between entrepreneurial opportunities and livelihood outcomes. The chapter concludes with some policy and practical recommendations for alternative interventions that focus on the agency of affected people to help themselves, in stead of the aid model that fosters dependency.

**Keywords:** Social capital; forced displacement; refugee entrepreneurship; livelihood recovery; Boko Haram

## **Introduction**

In the past few decades, there has been a significant increase in the global rate of forced displacement, often precipitated by persecution, civil wars, terrorism, transborder conflicts, as well as natural disasters. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that there are 68.5 million forcibly displaced people worldwide (25.4 million refugees and 43.1 million internally displaced people), and each year only a small fraction are able to return to their former homes

(UNHCR, 2019). The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has precipitated a humanitarian tragedy on a scale comparable to the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) and arguably the worst of any manmade or natural disaster in Nigeria's history. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimates that up to 3.3 million people have been internally displaced due to terrorist violence perpetrated by Boko Haram (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2015). The number of people displaced by the conflict is the largest in Africa and the third largest in the world. Using qualitative data obtained from interviews conducted with respondents in northeast Nigeria, this study examines the extent to which the displaced populations are drawing on social capital and human capital to withstand, cope with and recover from the adverse experiences and consequences of the insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Given that most forced displacements occur in developing countries like Nigeria, government resources are increasingly stretched to deal with such crises, and there are calls for fundamental rethink of the traditional approach to interventions in disaster situations. In particular, scholars and practitioners are highlighting the need to shift from the current emphasis on material solutions and financial input, to an approach that combines both material and social solutions, bringing people and communities to the forefront of interventions (Aldrich and Meyer, 2015; Johnson et al., 2013; Wind and Komproe, 2012). Forced migration entails social processes in which human agency and social networks play a major part. These networks can be instrumental in the construction and (re)-construction of livelihood systems and communities shattered by insurgencies and protracted conflicts.

The large-scale displacement in northeast Nigeria has precipitated the disruption and potential transformation of social capital as individuals and households are forced to leave the comfort zones of familiar neighbourhoods and physically separate from the strong ties of families, friends and neighbours with whom they have bonded for decades. They are instead compelled to meet new individuals and households, typically in camps and new communities, with whom they have to forge new relationships in order to survive and rebuild their lives (Aldrich et al., 2020). These new networks of relationship can play a key role in creating new entrepreneurial opportunities that can help displaced

peoples recover and rebuild their lives. This chapter makes two important contributions: firstly, it sets out a conceptual framework that captures the transformation of social capital due to forced displacement, and the instrumentality of the resulting new networks for entrepreneurial activities. Secondly, the chapter also explores the unique empirical context of Boko Haram insurgency in Northeast Nigeria, and how displaced peoples are drawing on social capital to cope and rebuild their lives through entrepreneurship.

## **Theoretical framework**

### ***Towards a new approach to humanitarian action: the humanitarian-development-peace nexus***

One of the larger-scale current trends in humanitarian action comprises efforts to engineer a more effective ‘nexus’ among humanitarian, development and peace-building action, to better achieve the objectives of each, on the argument that their respective objectives can be interdependent (Development Initiatives, 2019; ICVA, 2018; Wolf and Wilkinson, 2019). This trend, though it has antecedents going back decades, arises from a relatively recent realization (e.g. United Nations Secretariat, 2016) that most large-scale humanitarian crises become protracted (and in some cases seemingly intractable); that developmental deficiencies can instigate and almost always exacerbate crises; that perennializing short-term humanitarian aid is unsustainable within the context of limited resources; and that a country where a major part of the population is in crisis cannot attain the Sustainable Development Goals (‘SDGs’). These realizations are reflected in the New Way of Working promoted by the United Nations (UNOCHA, 2017). While the call for a nexus approach to humanitarian action has gained significant traction in recent years, scholars and practitioners are still grappling with the need for better conceptual clarity and simplicity that can inform better operationalisation of complementary interventions and bring achievement of the SDGs onto the horizon despite a prevailing crisis. In a recent contribution, Howe (2019) proposed a framework to capture the mutually reinforcing interactions among the three distinct but linked domains of humanitarian, development and peace actions (see figure 1). In this framework, nexus actions are seen

as those actions that, by intentional design and by mobilising comparative advantage of multiple actors, contribute to achieving outcomes in at least one of the other nexus areas.




Figure 1. The triple nexus framework (Source: Howe, 2019)

In practice, the triple-nexus approach has generated some sustained experiments in joint humanitarian-development assessment and analysis; formulation of ‘collective outcomes’ (shared objectives) that resonate with both the SDGs and humanitarian imperatives and that address pressing problems that require both developmental and humanitarian actions to overcome; and aligned programming so as to combine the necessary ingredients to achieve the collective outcomes (though this stage is to date the least advanced). The United Nations is focusing on a selected set of countries with protracted crises for these experiments (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia), though aid teams and governments in other countries are also practicing some or most elements (United Nations Secretariat, 2019). However, even though these initiatives tend to have more explicit objectives on resilience and empowering crisis-affected people than the humanitarian and developmental country strategies, respectively, from which the ‘nexus’ is drawn, they do not extend to systematic assessment

and purposive strengthening of productive social ties (International Rescue Committee, 2019; Medinilla et al., 2019).

On the donor side, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has adopted a strong “Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus” for its members, which comprise the major official donors (OECD, 2019). The largest part of development aid is bilateral (government to government); flows from international financial institutions is the second-largest part; and multilateral aid through United Nations and non-governmental organizations is smaller (though it tends to enjoy a larger proportion in countries with protracted crises, where problems of governance and/or security constrain development action). So, whether nexus approaches reach critical mass in a given country mainly depends on the affected-country government and its bilateral donors; the United Nations cannot do much alone.

The idea of better appreciating, and possibly leveraging, social capital among crisis-affected people thus arises in this context of new emphasis upon coordinating different aid streams and maximizing their synergies so as to bring into view a durable end to a given crisis. It is not so much a consequence of nexus thinking; rather, both arise from the search for new approaches to crises that seem insoluble with current methods. Nonetheless, the nexus is generally propitious for research and practice on social capital in crises. Social capital’s interactions with individual and community outcomes are fairly well charted and credited in development contexts (Fafchamps, 2006; Fukuyama, 2001; Portes and Landolt, 2000; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000), although interventions based thereon are less practiced and studied (Pronyk et al., 2008). In contexts of protracted humanitarian crises in less-developed countries, such charting is in its infancy. The emphasis on and spread of nexus approaches will not automatically rectify this, but it may help to mobilize social-capital expertise in the developmental sector to study and start to apply social-capital approaches more intensively in crisis settings.

### *Social capital, conflict and disaster response*

As used in this study, social capital refers to systems that result from social and economic organisation, trust, solidarity, shared values and norms of reciprocal cooperation, informational and economic exchange, and informal and formal groups and associations (Grootaert, 1998; Putnam, 2001, 1995, 1994; Uphoff and Wijayarathna, 2000). It has been defined as “the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Social capital is recognised as a key livelihood asset in the sustainable livelihood framework, by means of which individuals and communities can overcome vulnerabilities by transforming structures and processes to achieve livelihood outcomes (Krantz, 2001). Scholars have offered various categorisations of social capital. For example, some have described social capital in its structural, relational and cognitive dimensions (Camps and Marques, 2014). Structural social capital refers to the structures and overall pattern of connections among actors in a network, while cognitive social capital refers to those resources providing shared representation, interpretations and systems of meanings among parties. This includes intangible forms such as trust and norms of reciprocity (Baum and Ziersch, 2001; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Relational social capital refers to the type of personal relationships actors have, and how it influences their behaviours within the system (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Social capital has also been classified into bonding social capital among people with similar socio-economic characteristic and family and religious identities; bridging social capital among people belonging to different ethnic, social and religious groupings; and linking social capital between ordinary citizens and those in authority (Claridge, 2013).

Although there has been a surge of interest in the phenomenon of social capital and how it may influence and improve the development process (Lautze and Raven-Roberts, 2006), the literature on social capital and how it interacts with violent conflicts, especially in the context of intra-state wars, remains limited, despite the attention to the major and persistent humanitarian crises that these wars

generate. Unlike in inter-state conflicts in which the need to confront an external national enemy tends to foster national unity and strengthen social cohesion, intra-state conflicts can be generally expected to weaken the social fabric of the communities concerned. Such violent conflicts often divide populations by eroding interpersonal and communal trust, and weaken or even destroy the social norms and values that underpin cooperation and promote collective action in pursuit of common interest. Erosion of social capital lies at the heart of communal strife. Not only does the destruction of social capital increase the likelihood of violent conflict, but this can also hamper the process of reconciliation and recovery after cessation of hostilities. Without the restoration of social capital, provision of other forms of capital is unlikely to promote economic and social development in post-conflict societies (Grootaert, 1998; Hoffmann and Muttarak, 2017; Uphoff and Wijayaratra, 2000).

### ***Social capital and disaster response***

Recent studies in disaster management and response have highlighted the importance of social capital as a key resource in humanitarian response. When disasters strike, especially sudden natural disasters and man-made conflicts, the first responders are family members, friends and neighbours in proximity to the incident. Their interventions are often underpinned by norms of expectations and obligations they feel towards affected neighbours, especially those within their personal networks (Dynes, 2006). Conversely, in disaster situations, governments and external actors typically have to grapple with capacity and resource constraints in trying to respond fast. This is especially so in emergencies where urgent actions may be required to save lives, and local knowledge is critical to effective coordination of humanitarian interventions (Bhandari, 2014). In addition, in response to disaster, affected people tend to evacuate in social groups such as family units, and external support needs to take these social organisations into account in order to be effective. As such, some researchers argue, and some practitioners have acknowledged, the need to link material and technological solutions with social solutions, and embed social networks into the fabric of humanitarian interventions (Aldrich and Meyer, 2015).



Other scholars have highlighted the informational potential of social networks in disaster situations. Networks are potentially channels of critical information that can help individuals and communities prepare well for, and respond effectively to, disasters. However, strong social capital can also have negative impacts, for example through exclusion of members of the outgroup and information hoarding within the in-group (Bhandari, 2014). There, the recent interest on social capital in humanitarian situations should not uncritically assume that social capital—in its various forms—is inherently a positive thing. Humanitarian interventions should therefore be aimed not just at harnessing but also, where necessary, at transforming social capital. This critical engagement is important in all disaster situations, but may be especially important in conflict situations and other man-made disasters: conflict situations are typically associated with negative social capital and low levels of human capital, and these are often inter-linked with in-group bias, outgroup prejudice, and other factors that precipitate and aggravate inter-group conflicts.

Furthermore, while there has been increasing attention to the role of social capital in emergency response, there is need for more empirical data on the role of social capital in longer-term livelihood recovery and re-settlement strategies. Humanitarian interventions tend to be, by default, oriented to short-term objectives such as evacuations, provisions of first aid and supply of urgent relief materials. However, crises increasingly tend to become protracted due to persistent root causes combined with lack of capacity of affected people to achieve long-term livelihood recovery and resettlement on their own. There is therefore a need for research that focuses on long-term outcomes. This paper examines the impact of social capital on entrepreneurial activities of affected households, and how this is contributing to their survival and livelihood recovery strategies.

### ***Human capital, social capital, and entrepreneurship***

Scholars have also highlighted the need to put human capital at the heart of development interventions. One of the leading figures of modern human-capital theory, Theodore Schultz, observed that there was an apparent contradiction between the assumption of donor countries that poor countries are poor

mainly because they lacked capital, and the views of some practitioners that poor countries do not have sufficient ability to absorb additional capital. According to Schultz, this apparent contradiction can be resolved by clarifying and distinguishing between different forms of capital. Most development aid are provided in the form of financial—grants, loans, etc.—or physical—structures, equipment, inventories—capital. There is less investment in human capital. As a result, ‘human capabilities do not stay abreast of physical capital, and they do become limiting factors...’ (Schultz, 1961).

Human capital is defined as “the aggregation of the innate abilities and the knowledge and skills that individuals acquire and develop throughout their lifetime” (Laroche & Ruggeri, 1999, p.89). It is acquired and developed mainly through formal education, on-the-job training and other informal means (Acemoglu & Autor, 2011; Becker, 1964; Schultz, 1961). Human capital interacts closely with social capital (Coleman, 1988), and this in turn can influence disaster outcomes: scholars have observed that the impact of education on disaster preparedness is sometimes mediated by social capital. For example, individuals who are better connected and actively engaged within the community tend to have better access to information and expertise, and this enables them to be better prepared in the event of disasters (Hoffmann and Muttarak, 2017). Social networks are channels of information-sharing and knowledge transfer, and they can also function as a hub for skill development and training (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005).

This paper examines how affected peoples deploy their human capital in entrepreneurial activities, and how they develop and complement their ideas, skills and knowledge using opportunities and resources accruing from their social networks. It thus aims to elucidate the interaction of human and social capital in a crisis context.

The aggregate stock of human capital—in educational qualification, vocational skills, talents and entrepreneurial competencies—are effective drivers of new venture creation and entrepreneurial performance, especially in turbulent environments. This can complement the role of social capital, in terms of opening access to new markets and facilitating new linkages with suppliers and other key

actors in the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Entrepreneurs have been described as socially embedded agents who leverage resources from their social environment. These resources include information, industry knowledge, financial assistance, and social support, among others (Neumeyer et al., 2019; Theodoraki et al., 2018). Furthermore, entrepreneurship has been found to have transformative impacts in conflict situations by facilitating increased transactions and lowering outgroup prejudice in multi-ethnic and multi-ethnic communities and other similar contexts (Tobias et al., 2013).

In this chapter, we propose a conceptual model that explains how forced displacement disrupts and transforms social capital, and how transformed social capital can be instrumental for new opportunity creation through the development of new networks which are in turn harnessed for entrepreneurial activities (figure 2). Among other things, we suggest that, prior to displacement, there is a higher level of bonding social capital associated with high homogeneity and strong ties within families and friendship networks. As people are forcibly displacement from their settled locations, families and friends separate, and individuals and households come into contact with new households from other backgrounds, typically in displaced persons camps, but also in less institutionalised, informal settlements outside of their familiar communities. In other words, as bonding social capital depletes, bridging social capital tends to expand. The resulting formation of new networks have productive economic function and creation of entrepreneurial opportunities, in terms of new customers and suppliers. Firstly, as the displaced persons forge new linkages with other households as well as new communities outside the camp, they are able to gather valuable information about demands and opportunities that enable them to expand their customer base, as well as their products/services range. Secondly, they can harness new bridging networks to access new options for suppliers in both existing and new supply chains. Thus, the new networks can enable entrepreneurial activities- opportunity seeking, resource acquisition and the development of new markets. These can play a significant outcome in livelihood outcomes of displaced households.




Figure 1. Social capital and entrepreneurship in situations of forced displacement (authors)

### ***Entrepreneurship and livelihood recovery in humanitarian crises***

Households caught up in humanitarian crisis typically face critical battles for survival in the first instance, and then the struggle to rebuild their lives in the aftermath. In the survival stage of post-disaster response, humanitarian agencies often have an indispensable role in providing urgent medical aid, shelter, food items and other relief materials. However, material aid that neglects to foster conditions (economic, social, infrastructural, incentives) for entrepreneurship misses an opportunity to engineer a better and more durable outcome or potentialities. This is unsustainable and problematic, not least because humanitarian agencies do not have the resources and capacity to meet all the needs of affected populations in the long term.

Given the foregoing, entrepreneurship has emerged as a key, and recent, area of interest in humanitarian practice. A significant proportion of affected people in post-disaster and post-conflict contexts are usually driven by necessity to engage in various forms of subsistence entrepreneurship.

They use these ventures to generate additional income to complement the support they get from humanitarian agencies, and they use this extra income to meet critical household needs such as food and shelter. While this practice has been reported by a number of NGOs and practitioners, it has not attracted commensurate attention among scholars. This chapter seeks to make a contribution towards this gap in knowledge.

Given the foregoing, this chapter examines the extent to which social networks are helping to shape and expand market opportunities for displaced persons engaged in entrepreneurship. In particular, we explore how displaced peoples are harnessing bonding networks to access information and build entrepreneurial capacity; and how they are using bridging and linking networks to create and expand new markets for their products and services. Finally, we discuss the link between these entrepreneurial opportunities and livelihood outcomes for the displaced.

## **Methodology**

This paper draws on in-depth interviews to explore how social networks and individual skills are contributing to coping and recovery strategies of displaced households in northeast Nigeria. In order to gain a broad perspective IDPs' experience across the region, fifteen respondents were interviewed across three camps for internally displaced people (IDPs), in Borno State and Yobe state—two key areas affected by the insurgency. The respondents include male and female representatives of displaced households, NGO workers and government officials. This approach enables us to complement information from the affected households with insights from NGOs, government officials and other stakeholders working with them. The female representation also enables us to grapple with gendered perspectives, often under-reported in these contexts. The interviews were carried out in Hausa, the lingua franca in the region. The respondents were asked to respond to open ended questions such as: 1) Have your extended family members been of any help to you after you were displaced from your home? If so, how?. 2) Do you have friends from other towns and other parts of the country? How, if ever, have they been of help after you left your home? 3) Are you running any business at the moment?

If so how has it helped you to recover from the insurgency? 4)Has your past and new networks helped with your business? If so, how? The transcripts of the interviews were then subjected to thematic analysis using NVivo11, to explore key issues relating to the role of social capital in promoting IDP entrepreneurship and livelihood recovery. The qualitative data collection whose results are presented in this paper is the first phase of a project that will next entail quantitative data.

### ***Study context***

Northeast Nigeria is one of the six geopolitical zones in the West African nation, and it comprises six states: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe. It is the poorest geopolitical zone in the country, and the region with the highest levels of illiteracy and unemployment. Borno State, the epicentre of the Boko Haram insurgency, has an estimated population of 5.2 million and a landmass of 61,435km<sup>2</sup>, the largest state by landmass in Nigeria (University of Maiduguri, 2009). It is bordered by Niger Republic to the north, Chad to the north-east, and Cameroon to the east. Within Nigeria, it shares borders with other Northeastern states of Adamawa, Yobe and Gombe states. Maiduguri is the capital city of Borno and the largest city in Northeastern Nigeria, covering an area of 543 km<sup>2</sup>, and with an estimated population of 1 million (Mayomi and Mohammed, 2014).

In 2002, Boko Haram was formed in Maiduguri, Borno State, by the radical cleric Mohammed Yusuf. Its official name is *Jamaatu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda Awati Wal Jihad*, the Arabic for “People Committed to The Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad”. Its popular name, Boko Haram, derives from its core teaching that western education is forbidden (Adesoji, 2010). Although the group was founded in 2002 essentially as a protest movement, by 2009 it had evolved into a violent insurgency. This is against the background of historical and socio-economic conditions prevalent in the Northeast region in general and Borno State in particular. Between 2003 and 2009 Mohammed Yusuf articulated his ideology which included *tawhid* (Oneness of God), opposition to and refusal of service to secular government (*taghut*), and rejection of western education, which gave rise to the term Boko Haram or Western education is forbidden (Adamu, 2009). Although the Ulama (Muslim scholars) and majority

of Muslims in Borno remained moderate and opposed to the new Salafist ideology, it resonated with the youths, most of whom were illiterate, unemployed and vulnerable to religious indoctrination. The ideology forms the basis for a strident and potentially violent demand for a Shariah state based on the Quran rather than a government guided by a secular constitution. In this respect religion became the powerful driver of the insurgency.

However, an even more significant driver was the underdeveloped economic condition in the northeast region. In 2015 the National Bureau of Statistics indicated that 76.8 percent of people in Northern Nigeria lived below the poverty line compared to 19.3 percent in the Southwest. The Bureau in 2017 cited a poverty index of 74.2 percent in the North. The grim statistics derived from the reversal of agricultural growth by deindustrialisation, as major agro-allied industries, including textile, food and beverages and other small and medium-scale enterprises across the North including Maiduguri, collapsed. The level of poverty and unemployment propelled the impoverished youths into the waiting arms of Boko Haram and its leader whose oratory and social support programmes seemed more real than futile government promises.

The insurgency broke out in July 2009 with violent attacks on government institutions including police headquarters and stations in Maiduguri. Eventually schools and churches were targeted and destroyed. By 2014 the insurgents were in control of 13 Local Government Areas in northern Borno, parts of Northern Adamawa and Yobe. Their activities extended to other states outside the Northeast including Kano, Jos and Abuja where the United Nations headquarters and police headquarters came under attack (James, 2017).

Government response to the Boko Haram insurgency was more violence. The initial response indeed included violent crackdowns, harassment and arrest of youths in communities suspected to be harbouring Boko Haram. Many alienated youths joined the Boko Haram, but the majority joined the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) or Yangora, reinforcing the counter- insurgency. (Garba, 2017). While the military strategy provided modest short-term results, the crisis became intractable. By 2015

the insurgency had taken its toll on the region. More than 2.2 million people had been displaced from their homes and over 35,000 killed. (Bagu, 2017). A humanitarian disaster had ensued as schools were shut down and villages were deserted. Agriculture was grounded in emptied rural communities. The tragedy was reflected in the emergence of IDP camps in Borno Adamawa, Yobe, Gombe and as far as Abuja. The scope and intractable nature of this disaster exposed the relative ineffectiveness of a purely military approach and limitations of the top-down interventions.

## Findings and discussion

### *Respondents' profile*

The summary of the respondents' profile is provided in table 1. Altogether, nine IDPs were interviewed. In addition, three NGO workers, two government officials and one member of the host community were interviewed across three locations. The majority of the respondents reported here are male heads of households, but this is an ongoing study and care has been taken to ensure adequate female representation in the rest of the field exercise. Most of the respondents are young, under 40 years of age, and most hold primary or no formal education.

<b>ID</b>	<b>Category</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Level of education</b>
1	IDP	Gwoza, Borno State	Female	32	Primary
2	Government official	Gwoza, Borno State	Male	51	Post-secondary
3	NGO	Gwoza, Borno State	Female	31	Degree
4	Host community	Gwoza, Borno State	Male	48	Primary
5	IDP	Gwoza, Borno State	Male	28	Secondary
6	NGO	Gwoza, Borno State	Male	33	Post-secondary
7	IDP	Kasaisa, Yobe State	Male	52	No formal education
8	IDP	Kasaisa, Yobe State	Male	32	No formal education
9	IDP	Kasaisa, Yobe State	Male	41	Primary
10	IDP	Kasaisa, Yobe State	Male	51	No formal education



11	IDP	Kasaisa, Yobe State	Male	23	No formal education
12	IDP	Kasaisa, Yobe State	Female	26	Primary
13	Government official	Bakassi, Borno State	Male	25	Degree
14	NGO	Bakassi, Borno State	Male	32	Degree
15	IDP	Bakassi, Borno State	Female	36	Secondary

The following key themes emerged from the interview transcripts. They highlight the role of social capital on access to funding and resources, and skill development and access to market opportunities. The interviews also illuminate how entrepreneurship activities are contributing to livelihood outcomes of displaced persons.

### ***Social capital and access to funding and resources***

The respondents highlighted how their networks have helped them in different ways to access funding and various material resources that helped them to cope in the aftermath of displacement. This can be especially critical in the point of arrival in a new location, often in areas with no NGOs, or where NGOs and other organisations are unable to access easily. In such cases it becomes more critical for displaced persons to tap into existing support mechanisms within their host communities, as one respondent observed:

“When the first attack was launched by Boko Haram in our community, we left without taking anything with us, and we arrived this community (Kasaisa). After two days, the ward head (Bulama) gave us an accommodation for a while and allocated a piece of land to all of us and we erected a makeshift structure and stayed in it. Two days later, the Chairman of our Local Government Area (Gujba) gave us two bags of maize each to all displaced persons.” (Respondent 7, Kasaisa Camp, Yobe State Nigeria, June 2019).

This respondent, along with others, was introduced to the community in question by family and friends. In addition, these displaced persons with active external networks are able to access support from their friends based in other parts of the country. These include old friendships and professional relationships forged when the respondents visited, lived or worked in other parts of the country’s six geo-political

zones, or had people from other parts of the country coming to live or visit temporarily in their community prior to the insurgency. This support helps affected households to meet urgent primary needs such shelter and food needs, which is an important threshold before they can begin the process of rebuilding their lives:

“...some few friends and business partners have been very helpful when we were first displaced due to Boko-Haram insurgency and relocated to this place. In-kind and cash assistance were brought to me, and that has greatly helped in addressing some of our immediate need like clothing, kitchen utensils and food stuff.” (Respondent 8, Kasaisa Camp, Yobe State, June 2019).

The material and financial resources that some of the IDPs accessed from their network have also been used to support income-generating entrepreneurial activities. This is in recognition of the need to have an extra stream of income to meet ongoing households needs. Therefore, some of the cash they received from their networks are used as start-up funds or to revive businesses that were shut down after the respondents were forced to flee from their homes:

My new friends helped me introduce me to their market; they also helped me with cash to start my business in my new place (Respondent 1, Gwoza Camp, Borno State, June 2019).

Some of our families residing in Damaturu town have come to our assistance when we were displaced and settled in this place. Monetary and in-kind supports were brought to us and these have really made us to recover from the loss we encountered. One of my nieces among our family gave me N120,000 to start something and with that I started a business to sustain us (Respondent 9, Kasaisa Camp, Yobe State, June 2019).

### ***Social networks, market opportunities and skill development***

The subject of access to new market opportunities, mentioned by respondent 1 above, is another key theme that ran through the interviews with the displaced persons and other stakeholders. It is obvious that forced displacement has a disorienting impact on affected households. However, it also precipitated new market opportunities that can reinforce pathways to long-term recovery. Displaced households bring to their host communities different, and sometimes new, products, services, skills, and tastes. Each of these, individually and as an aggregate, can have varying benefits to expansion and

organisation of markets. As they settle in their host communities, it is possible, over time, for displaced people to assume full roles as consumers, suppliers, producers, and service providers. However, this is not a guaranteed outcome, as a lot of other factors need to align in order for this to happen. These include appropriate policy instruments and interventions to support the development and expansion of new markets, and targeted capacity building and funding to support entrepreneurial activities.

Bridging social capital can help them to access market opportunities and achieve integration into the wider entrepreneurial ecosystem- that is, the system of micro-enterprise owners, customers, suppliers and other actors that support the creation and growth of new ventures. For example, IDPs who are micro-enterprise owners can draw on their new networks of friends in the host community to gather information that can support the creation of new products and services. They can also draw on these new networks to develop new skills and create new markets for their products and services. As one respondent observed, they also profit from acquisition of relevant skills within their new networks:

They helped me by accommodating me and being kind to me, and also teach me so many skills that I didn't have before and it really helps me. They also connect me to other customers. What I learn from these people is what is really helping me. (Respondent 5, Gwoza Camp, Borno State, June 2019).

Some of the NGOs have incorporated skills training into their intervention programmes, in recognition of the need to help IDPs help themselves, and not rely entirely on handouts:

We empowered them with materials to start the business and monitoring them on how to do it. We also teach them so many skills that can help them do their business on their own. We also teach them how to serve - We also teach them marketing strategies. (Respondent 3, NGO Worker, Gwoza Camp, Borno State Nigeria, June 2019).

However, from the respondents' comments such as the one quoted above, there is a sense that much of the NGOs' interventions, including skills-training programmes, is underpinned by a top-down approach. There is therefore a need to actively engage affected households in a co-creation process that includes assessment of existing skills, analysis of areas where skill augmentations are more appropriate, and a provision of opportunities for the IDPs to present their own business ideas. In effect,

the existing skills and business ideas of displaced people can be used as a baseline for NGOs' intervention programming.

### ***Entrepreneurship and livelihood outcomes***

The respondents highlighted various ways in which their entrepreneurial skills and activities have contributed to livelihood outcomes. These include meeting basic existential needs primarily food, clothing and shelter. They also include indirect impact on other important, if intangible, outcomes such as education and human capital development. For example, this respondent describes how his entrepreneurial activities have not only helped him to meet basic needs like food and clothing, but also how it has afforded him the income to support his education and those of his siblings:

This really helps me, because these skills that I learned is of great help to me in this insurgency. Anywhere I go I can do work that will help me to provide food, clothing for myself and my brothers and so many things to help us in life ((Respondent 5, Gwoza Camp, Borno State, June 2019).

In this insurgency, I was able to run a business that helped me to complete my secondary school and also support my brothers too for their primary school education. Because of the limited cash I have and many responsibilities awaiting me, I couldn't go further with my education, but I believe one day I will still go further (Respondent 5, Gwoza Camp, Borno State, June 2019).

In addition, engaging in entrepreneurial activities appear to have boosted respondents' self-belief, dignity and sense of independence. This can be hugely significant in terms of mental and psychological recovery from the trauma and distress precipitated by forced displacement. As the following comment reveals, the quest for dignity and independence is a key priority for displaced persons:

These [skills and business activities] have helped me in my day-to-day living as a displaced person. I can engage myself in my little business... And it helps me move on with my life, with a hope that I can be an independent person in life (Respondent 1, Gwoza camp, Borno State, June 2019).

## **Conclusion and recommendations**

Traditional, mainly material approaches to interventions in disaster situations have come under increased scrutiny in recent years because they have failed to deliver desired long-term outcomes and, being expensive and logistically difficult, have encountered resource and capacity constraints in the face of continually expanding humanitarian crises. The study found that displaced households typically rely on their networks of family and friends as the first source of support in the immediate aftermath of the insurgency, before they are in a position to access any other possible external support. Furthermore, even after affected households have come in contact with humanitarian agencies, they continue to rely extensively on their social networks, including newly forged ones, in order to access new resources and opportunities to rebuild their lives. In this regard, we present a new theoretical framework that maps the changes in the social capital stock of affected peoples before and after displacement. The framework explains the instrumentality of new forms of social capital in shaping new relationships and interactions among entrepreneurs, suppliers and customers; fostering new channels of information flow and diffusion of innovation; and lowering outgroup prejudice. In turn, these are conducive to opportunity seeking, resource acquisition and market organisation for entrepreneurial outcomes. In line with this, the study found that entrepreneurial activities and market opportunities among displaced people provides a viable pathway to generate income and thereby improve household welfare and other livelihood outcomes. Governments and stakeholders can draw on this in the design and implementations of policies and humanitarian actions that foster long-term livelihood outcomes through entrepreneurial development among the displaced.

However, while social capital is a source of critical support, it need not be a replacement for humanitarian agencies. Rather, the findings in this paper can point to opportunities and methods for humanitarian actors to stimulate social and human capital among crisis-affected people purposively as part of their interventions, with the aim of better outcomes and value for aid money. The links and interactions of displaced peoples can be viewed as a form of linking social capital. In terms of specific

policy recommendations, governments in the affected region can use public procurement to incentivise entrepreneurship. Procurement can be used in a strategic and targeted way to drive demand and reward entrepreneurial activities. For example, government can contract IDP farmers to supply raw produce for government-sponsored free school meals, produce school uniforms for free government-sponsored provision thereof, and deploy the services of IDPs in public construction works.

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