Environmental integration in infrastructure planning: a Foucauldian discourse analysis of the trans-European transport network

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Environmental integration in infrastructure planning: a Foucauldian discourse analysis of the trans-European transport network

Timothy Kevin Richardson

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Sheffield Hallam University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

November 1999
Abstract

Planning theory is turning again towards the question of power, particularly in relation to recent claims to a new communicative planning 'paradigm'. This thesis investigates how Foucauldian discourse analytics, embracing concepts of discourse, power/knowledge, rationality and space can contribute in sensitising planning research to power. A Foucauldian approach is developed which problematises the construction of rationality in spatial planning processes, focusing on the institutionalisation of rationality in the tools that provide decision-support. The power relations that condition this construction process are investigated in a detailed case study of the treatment of environmental risks in the policy process for the trans-European transport network.

Key events are analysed, as a new policy discourse of European space and mobility emerges and is institutionalised in an EU policy framework. A narrative of the micro-politics of power at work focuses on the construction of Strategic Environmental Assessment as the principal tool in institutionalising a new discourse of environmental integration into TEN-T policy discourse

The case study operationalises discourse analytics in a way which embraces social practices and institutional dynamics as well as texts, showing the value of a non-textually oriented research design. The result is a detailed analysis of how power relations affected environmental integration in a critical area of EU policy making. Discursive struggles were found to shape the local struggles taking place within the policy process, between EU institutions, individuals within them, and other interests. The policy outcome for environmental risks was found to be heavily conditioned by these struggles. These findings contribute to general understanding of the struggles for hegemony between economic, political and environmental discourses in spatial planning at EU and other levels.

The operationalisation of a Foucauldian discourse analytic approach in this study suggests its usefulness in planning research, as well as in exploring theoretical questions about the relations between discourse, rationality, power/knowledge and space in spatial planning.
Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisory team for their support and guidance. Particularly Gordon Dabinett for both his insight and his unflappability at all times, and Russ Haywood and Peter Townroe for their invaluable critical comments on early papers and drafts.

Many very busy people in the European Commission and Parliament, and in other organisations in Brussels and elsewhere gave me their valuable time during the fieldwork, for which I am grateful. I am also indebted to them for their engagement and directness in responding to challenging questions on sensitive issues.

I would also like to thank many colleagues and friends for the stimulating discussions and collaborations which have shaped this study. Particularly to Liz Sharp, Bent Flyvbjerg, Ole Jensen, Anthony Rosie, Chris Booth, and Phil Goodwin. And to Ted Kitchen, for cogent reminders about the often tenuous relevance of theoretical study to practice. I have also been greatly inspired by the protagonists of difficult questions within the wider community of planning theorists. I thank them for this, and encourage them not to stop asking.

Thanks are also due to the Trustees of the Rees Jeffreys Road Fund, who commissioned research in the Department of Planning and Landscape, University of Manchester, where the research approach was further developed and tested.

Heartfelt thanks to the friends who have helped me through one or two crises, and many more tricky moments. Particularly Elaine, Matt, Zoe, Denise, Jane, Marion, Richard, Ian and Sue.

Many thanks to my colleagues and friends in the Arkleton Centre in Aberdeen who provided a supportive environment to complete the task.

Finally, thanks to my mother for her care and love, even when I have been too busy to notice.
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Introduction

'What various forms of rationality claim to be their necessary existence, has a history which we can determine completely and recover from the tapestry of contingency' (Foucault, 1989: 252).

Power continues to be a vexed question in planning theory, addressed by a succession of theorists. John Friedmann has recently argued that theorists' ambivalence about power is one of the biggest outstanding problems in theorising planning (Friedmann, 1997). There does seem to be, however, a certain amount of convergence on the need for greater specificity over the ways 'power' is analysed in particular policy settings. Yet whilst the significance of power is almost universally recognised, there is a currently schism between those who seek to resolve the 'problem' of power, by creating planning processes which are grounded in principles of free speech and rational argument (recently Judith Innes, John Forester and Patsy Healey), and those who believe that these are normative approaches that cannot lead to universal solutions: power must be embraced (Bent Flyvbjerg, Oren Yiftachel, Margo Huxley among others). A recurrent problem is that power has been theorised as negative, coercive and oppressive, its effects to be removed from the planning process by reframing rationality and creating enabling practices. In particular, the claim to a new paradigm of communicative planning (Innes, 1995) appears to sacrifice a nuanced understanding of power in favour of a quest for idealised forms of communication. If, alternatively, power is understood as immanent and potentially productive, rather than oppressive, and escappable through procedural reform, then it deserves to become an explicit focus of planning theory and research.

Michel Foucault’s discourse analytics turns away from the preoccupation with normative paths, and opens up this possibility by focusing squarely on the microphysics of power. The idea of contingent rationality captures the essence of Foucault’s genealogy – a probing critical inquiry into the contingent nature of the rationalities at work in society. A line of inquiry which engages squarely with discourses, with fields of power relations, and with political actions. Embodied in this approach is the attempt to problematise the given - the taken for granted assumptions, knowledges, and values - which condition and shape the ideas, actions and opportunities of the present. It is this conceptualisation of rationality as contingent discursive construction which gives shape to this thesis. It structures the conceptual approach which is pursued at the level of meta-theory, in discussions of the nature of the domain of planning theory, and at the empirical level, through a case study of the contingent nature of rationality in practice.

Foucault’s work has impacted on almost every area of academic inquiry, yet is only beginning
to be fully appreciated in the domain of planning. Foucault turned attention towards the 'here and now' rather than the 'where we want, or feel we ought to be'. The implications for planning theory are enormous. Foucauldian analysis draws us ineluctably towards what 'really happens' in planning. In this thesis this focus is operationalised in a way which problematises the conceptions of rationality which underpin planning thought and activity. This line of inquiry challenges our understanding of key elements of planning: of planning knowledge, of policy discourse, of the tools and processes used in planning, and their spatial consequences.

**Structure**

A study which examines practice, theory and research methodology, needs to be carefully assembled. A nested structure is adopted for the study (figure 1). In the first ‘nest’, the theoretical context is established in a discussion of current issues in planning theory, and the relevance and potential of Foucault’s work to planning theory is elaborated. In the next nest a Foucauldian discourse analytic research design is constructed. The third nest contains a Foucauldian discourse analysis of the integration of environmental risks in policy making for the trans-European transport network. This case study allows empirical exploration of the theoretical questions, and tests the utility of the Foucauldian approach.

This nested research programme leads to a corresponding series of contributions to knowledge, in the areas of theory, practice and research in spatial planning (see table 1). In particular, the thesis complements the work of planning theorists who are exploring Foucauldian and other power-sensitised approaches to theory and research, responding to the calls for a more nuanced analysis of power. It is hoped that the theoretical and methodological elements will also prove relevant to broader debates in public policy, political science and social theory.

The structure of the thesis follows the nested approach described above, and is illustrated in figure 1. In Part 1 (Chapters 1-3) the theoretical basis for the thesis is developed. Firstly, a critique of planning theory identifies several weaknesses concerning the understanding of rationality, power / knowledge and space in spatial planning. It is argued that these recurrent problems and issues have been unsatisfactorily resolved by successive paradigms of planning theory. An engagement with communicative planning is taken as the departure point for the exploration of a Foucauldian approach. Next, the basic elements of a framework for analysing planning are developed from Michel Foucault’s work on discourse, knowledge and power. In Chapter 3, this framework is refined with more detailed consideration of how space is treated within policy processes. These elements provide the raw material for the research methodology, which is explained in Chapter 4. The methodology adopts a focus on discourses at work in the
fine grain of the policy process. The aim is to reveal the power dynamics which crucially influence policy making, by setting the ground rules for the creation and shaping of the particular knowledge that becomes the basis for policy making. The approach examines in detail how certain interests assert and reinforce their dominance in policy-making, whilst others fail and are excluded.

Part 2 begins with an introduction to the case study of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T) in Chapter 5. As well as standing in its own right as an analysis of the treatment of environmental risks in infrastructure planning at the EU level, it also provides a medium for the exploration of the contribution of Foucauldian discourse analytics to planning theory and research. Here, a critical narrative of the emergence of a new policy discourse is reconstructed. The case study is set out in Chapters 6-9. Four aspects of the emergence of a new policy discourse are addressed in turn - structuration, construction, institutionalisation and implementation. This results in a unique study of how the treatment of environmental risks in spatial policy making is conditioned by power relations, and precisely how these power relations construct policy rationality and policy knowledge, through their institutionalisation in new planning tools.

The analysis and discussion of the case study, in Chapter 10, considers the importance of the discursive struggle within the TEN-T policy process, and leads to conclusions on the treatment of environmental risks in European transport planning. Originality is enhanced by the focus on transport infrastructure, where crucial problems exist in addressing environmental risks. The case study also serves as a useful critical case study for the emerging European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), in that TEN-T is one of the key policy sectors to be integrated into the new spatial framework. Experience of developing a pan-European approach to developing policy on and delivering transport infrastructure is likely to be of interest to academics and policy makers in other policy sectors, and to those engaged in the ESDP process of establishing integration between them.

In Part 3, the usefulness of the Foucauldian discourse analytic approach to planning research is evaluated. In the final chapter, the contribution of Foucault's work to planning theory is evaluated. Three potential contributions are discussed: in guiding discourse analytics in researching both planning practice and theory; and in informing a new ethics of planning with power. The conclusion is that Foucauldian discourse analytics provides a useful and original contribution to the understanding of power in planning, and there is a clear need for further Foucauldian studies of spatial planning, which entwine the unique focus on discourse, rationality, power/knowledge and space.
This thesis is multi-disciplinary in nature, and draws on a number of theoretical and policy debates. Within the thesis, there is a great deal of argument developed around this literature. Therefore, rather than assembling a single literature review, the reference to and analysis of literature occurs where it is most appropriate to the arguments being deployed. For example, the planning literature informs the debate on planning theory; literature from a number of fields including philosophy, political science and social theory informs the discussion of Foucauldian discourse analytics; post-modern geography informs the spatial arguments; theories and research in public policy, and transport planning literature, inform the TEN-T case study; and the evaluation literature informs the analysis of strategic environmental assessment. It is recognised that the need to draw from such broad areas of literature has limited the time which could be spent on each. In some areas, the treatment is very brief. However, it is hoped that the richness of perspectives which results from this synthesis of diverse literature is of overall benefit to the objectives of the thesis.

The contingency of planning research

Once planning theory, practice and research are conceptualised as contingent activities, it becomes necessary to say something about my own position, which to some extent affected my choice of theory, and its application to particular questions in planning within the research.

My interest in questions about power in spatial planning arose from direct involvement with pressure groups working to represent environmental risks. Working for the Council for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE) whilst training as a planner, I became immersed in the ‘messy politics’ of planning with which this thesis is concerned. As an active environmentalist, my concerns were that ‘the environment’ was not just being ignored in the preparation of development plans and decision-making, but that it was being integrated in a way which appeared more rhetorical than practical. Sustainable development was rapidly being adopted as the lingua franca of planning, and new instruments such as environmental appraisal and assessment were being introduced. Once the burnout point was reached in my campaigning activities, it was a natural step to register for doctoral research which would allow me to reflect on these issues. The subject area of transport infrastructure followed from my work at CPRE, where strategic transport issues were becoming increasingly important, yet appropriate planning processes did not appear to exist. I came across TEN-T as did many others campaigning on local transport: as the wider European dimensions of a local scheme gradually became clear through research.
I adopted a Foucauldian approach to the research before I had become very involved with planning theory, and before I had done any real fieldwork. It was fortuitous that a fellow student suggested that I should read Foucault's *History of Sexuality*, because it seemed to 'fit' the way I was looking at things. I quickly found what I needed—a view of power which grasped and engaged with the 'big' questions by analysing how they were played out at the micro-level. My attempts to operationalise these ideas are perhaps personal and subjective, shaped as they must be by my experience of practice as an outsider, a lobbyist, and as someone whose role was to question and challenge the status quo, to adopt a deliberately critical position. This position is inherent in the Foucauldian approach, which avoids comfortable positions, and constantly problematises matters.

It was later that I found the Foucauldian position had its own significance in planning theory, in relation to the treatment of power. I was surprised how many theorists cited Foucault when talking about power, even when their normative positions seemed to be more about promoting consensual and collaborative approaches. So, as I became involved in planning theory debates, I found affinity with an emerging group of planning theorists who were also exploring Foucauldian approaches, although more established theorists felt that Foucault had 'been done' already.

My belief is that regardless of the adoption of one theorist or another, many of the concerns about democracy, social justice and the environment are shared by theorists on both sides of the communicative divide. The problem is to find a way forwards for theory which makes space for these (and other) different understandings.

I have been an active participant in the domains of theory and practice which this thesis explores. I have been active in theoretical debates by presenting papers at conferences and through refereed publications, and through a number of academic collaborations. This has been accompanied by activity in the policy debates concerning the trans-European network and European spatial planning more generally. This has included using my own substantive papers as primers for interviews with policy actors, as well as participating in policy relevant conferences.

I have also explored the Foucauldian approach in a further study, commissioned by the Rees Jeffreys Road Fund. A list of research projects, selected publications and conferences attended during the period of doctoral research is included in Appendix la. My overall aim in becoming so heavily engaged in theory has been to explore how theory can make a difference in the practice of spatial planning—a project which can only be started in this thesis.
### Table 1. Contributions to knowledge.

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<th>Planning research methodology</th>
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<td>• development of the application of Foucauldian discourse analytics in planning research, based on a detailed case study.</td>
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<th>Planning practice</th>
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<td>• improved understanding of a critical area of EU spatial policy making;</td>
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<td>• understanding of the fine grain of the treatment of environmental risks in the TEN-T policy process;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• understanding of the macro- and micropolitics of the political construction of Strategic Environmental Assessment.</td>
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**Figure 1. The research process.**

- critique -> construct methodology -> case study -> trans-European transport network -> Foucauldian research methodology -> Foucault and planning theory
"Power is not a game one can choose to play or withdraw from, but is the very name of the game itself" (Dyrberg, 1997).
Chapter 1. Planning theory: discursive struggles over rationality

At the cusp of the millennium, one of the central debates (or struggles for dominance) in planning theory is a sudden convergence of advocacy for and critical reaction against the paradigmatic status of communicative planning. At the core of this debate is the theoretical divergence between Foucault and Habermas - or at least some of the interpretations of the work of the two philosophers - which are reproduced in many academic domains. This thesis is positioned squarely within this debate, though as I will discuss below, it does not attempt any resolution. I must confess stumbling into this debate, rather than strategically positioning myself within it, after adopting a Foucauldian theoretical approach for this study. I remain within it because I believe that the questions which arise from the debate are genuinely useful ones, which have certainly sharpened my own understanding of planning.

I use the critical reaction to the communicative ‘paradigm’ as a platform from which to launch my study. The debate raises many of the questions which are explored within the thesis, both theoretically and empirically. The first task, then, is to carry out a brief analysis of this central debate in planning theory, in order to identify and introduce the issues that will be explored in the thesis. A central theme in this exploration is that planning theory has been characterised by competing theoretical debates. The issues investigated include the ways in which power, knowledge, rationality and space have been conceptualised.

The domain of planning theory is nebulous and elusive. It contains a wide diversity of ideas, multi-disciplinary theoretical work and empirical study within which, over the decades, strands of thought have achieved ‘paradigmatic’ status, influencing the path of theory development, displacing other ideas, and shaping practice. The boundaries of what can be called planning theory are wide, and are determined by the multifarious activities of the theorists themselves. Theoretical development can be traced through academic journals, conferences focusing on theory, and the publications of leading theorists. For the purposes of this thesis it was necessary to conceptualise the field in some way. The starting point is to see theory as the quest for knowledge: planning theory represents a field of endeavour within which theorists attempt to improve understanding of the practice of planning, and thereby to build a theory which explains the essence of planning. Here, alternative disciplines – for planning theory is a multi-disciplinary domain – develop their alternative positions. At this point, there appear to be at least two contrasting ways of understanding the process of development of planning theory. The
first is that one strand of thought, one theoretical formation, will attain paradigmatic status, where it is accepted as truth, as the model for planning. Such status is attained as a result of proper academic inquiry, through rational debate and empirical research, as the theoretical community accepts the new theory (there is also clearly a further question about the acceptance of the theory by the practising community). An alternative thesis is that planning theory is not a coherent field within which such rational consensus can be achieved. In fact, the different theoretical positions are not held simply for abstract reasons, they are also expressions of particular normative, or political positions, and certain interests. Also a great deal is at stake — scholars — in being at the forefront of theory, rather undant’ idea. It would not be surprising, then, if ggle for hegemony between different discourses — ution, characterised the field.

, is the conceptualisation of the rationality of d out in different ways, following different se and explain the particular rationalities at work es which can shape the mode of planning in ution of planning theory as discursive ies can be posited as either definitive explanations g done - or as normative models of how planning is contested in an attempt to secure hegemonic discourse provided by the literature and events such planations are often frustratingly tautological or as most scholars can agree on what constitutes the is what is economic or political theory - they differ ory’ (Campbell and Fainstein, 1996: 2).

define and draw distinctions between the various urban and regional planning, town and country planning, physical planning, and other overlapping ld result. Neither do I want to enter the difficult icy, planning, development, and so on. I take the initially operating at many different spatial scales is dependent at least in part on these specifics. The
The difference between describing something as 'policy' or as 'planning' can depend not on what is actually done in a particular case, but on the subtle politics at play. The point is perhaps to consider 'what can be said is being done?'. In the case study I enter the field of what is described as 'European spatial policy' – a domain within which many commentators talk of 'planning', yet formally speaking no planning is being done, and no plans exist, because there is no legal planning competence for planning at the European level. Interventions and strategies are instead described as 'policy' and 'development perspectives'. For this reason I prefer to use the term spatial planning in this thesis as one which can be quite broadly understood. As will become clear, I seek to develop a spatialised analysis of spatial planning – rather than a generic procedural analysis which could be applied to any area of public policy.

Planning cannot have a single definition. It is a domain of activity which is fuzzy and relatively undefined in its processes and outputs. Planning is informed by many different disciplines, and therefore is shaped by many contrasting and conflicting modes of thought. One of the major efforts of planning theory has been to attempt to define what planning is, through the development of paradigms of planning thought. However, we have yet to see a universally accepted paradigm. Planning can therefore either be understood by its products, by its processes, or by its modes of thought.

Peter Hall describes urban and regional planning in terms which could easily pertain to spatial planning, as being 'concerned with the spatial impact of many different kinds of problem, and with the spatial co-ordination of many different policies' (Hall, 1989: 8). However it is a definition which says little about the process of planning, emphasising instead the spatial nature of its subject matter. Yiftachel captures the more procedural view: 'Planning (urban planning or spatial planning) is defined herein as the formulation, content and implementation of spatial public policies. Theory is a reasoned account offered to explain phenomena, facts processes or events' (Yiftachel, 1997: 765).

Such views fail to make explicit the inherently political and value-laden nature of planning. Yiftachel provides a view of planning as making a difference in the social world, either as an instrument of oppression or as one of emancipation:

'We need to reformulate our understanding of planning. We should understand it as a form of deliberate social control and oppression, and acknowledge that historically planning emerged as an organised field of human endeavour as a byproduct of the 'modern' societal order, which rests on two hegemonic pillars - the nation state and the capitalist economy. Planning should be seen as a set of instruments which can be used effectively for either reform or control.' (op.cit.: 768).
Planning theory is a similarly elusive concept. It is noticeable, particularly in US planning debates, that ‘planning’ is taken to be a very wide ranging activity which encompasses public policy in a broad sense, and which is more specifically procedural than spatial. John Friedmann refers to his attempts to define a field of planning theory, and failing to find agreement: ‘no two of us could agree on the nature of the beast we wanted to theorise. None of those who wrote comments wanted to be ‘fenced in’ by any definition of planning discourse, however loose and encompassing’ (Friedmann, 1998: 246).

The placement of public agency at the heart of planning theory is one which seems overly narrow. In seeking to understand planning in a way which recognises contingency and interest, it becomes necessary to reinterpret planning as a process of spatial intervention which may be carried out by one or many agencies, influenced by a plethora of interests. These agencies and interests fall across the public private and voluntary sectors. Within transport and infrastructure planning (like other sectors), roles have become increasingly blurred as deregulation and privatisation have created a European transport marketplace. There is perhaps too a blurring between planning and development. As we will see, interests at the EU level which are often associated with economic development (transnational corporations), have been increasingly active in advocating and developing particular planning responses to perceived transport problems.

Rather than attempt to resolve these divergent interpretations of planning and planning theory, I adopt the position that planning is shaped by competing theoretical paradigms, and that it is this field of conflict, with the competing values and ideologies, that forms the canvas of planning thought, and shapes planning activity. In this thesis, I focus on spatial planning, as being concerned specifically with interventions in space. My interest is in how theory in this area of spatial planning actually addresses the thought, processes and substantive issues concerned with the planning of space. In the critique of planning theory below, then, I attempt to review this contested terrain, and explore critical problem areas in the development of theory.

**Planning theory: a short history of contingent rationality**

The development of theory in urban and regional planning, and in public policy more broadly, has been marked by a continuing debate over the relationship between rationality and power in policy making. The most vexed and unresolved areas concern explanations of how policy is made, and normative arguments about how policy should be made: through rational, value free, scientific processes, using the latest technical instruments to analyse and construct solutions?
through consensus building processes and rational debate? or in a field of political struggles between different interests where different knowledges and interests contest the ‘truths’ with which policy is legitimised?

Rationality has been a cornerstone of modern planning, described by Mannheim in 1940 as ‘the rational mastery of the irrational’ (Mannheim, 1940, cited in Healey, 1997: 9). In the 1960s, the systems approach to planning was typified by new techniques of technical analysis, aided by computer modelling, and micro-economic evaluation (see e.g. Faludi, 1973a, Friedmann, 1973, 1987). Inherent in this approach was the separation of political process from rational policy (Faludi, 1973a,b, Davidoff and Reiner, 1962, discussed by Healey, 1997). Healey has described this as ‘a modernist instrumental rationalism’ within which ‘the planning tradition itself has generally been ‘trapped’ ... for many years, and is only now beginning to escape’ (op.cit.).

The modernist tendency has been to maintain a claim to value-free objectivity, and to constantly refine scientific and economic instruments to shape and deliver policy. This instrumental rationality takes two forms in current theory and practice in public policy and planning. Firstly the neo-liberal assertion of the critical role of market forces rather than co-ordination or planning in shaping policy (op.cit.). This is a reassertion of instrumental approaches based on microeconomics, where policy formulation hinges on economic evaluation. Healey (1995) describes this as ‘a methodology of neo-liberal political ideology...an attempt to establish a dominant hegemony which crowds out the voices of other systems of meaning, while privileging big capital’. Secondly the resurgence of technical and scientific analysis typified by the development of new approaches to environmental planning (Wong, 1998). A resurgence of the systems approach is seen in the emergence in the post-Rio world of what could be termed ‘rational environmental planning’. Here, rational techniques of policy analysis are used to support planning in protection of environmental values. This approach is applied at the level of theory in planning, and has not yet been articulated as procedural theory. The new wave of technocentric tools in planning includes Geographic Information Systems, computer modelling, and technically oriented project and strategic level environmental impact assessments (op.cit.).

Since the 1960s, critics have pointed to the problems of this approach. Early on, Lindblom argued for a more negotiated approach to policy making within an environment of political rationality (Lindblom, 1959). Davidoff argued more explicitly for a planning based on principles of advocacy and pluralism (Davidoff, 1965). In the 1970’s, Marxist theorists such as Manuel Castells presented polemic critiques of the unequal distribution of power in planning. More recently, postmodern and poststructuralist theories have challenged the role of science and instrumental reason in planning.
More specifically, and of relevance to this thesis, the theoretical domain of transportation has been largely dominated by economic, technical and behavioural analysis. This has tended to address the workings of transport systems, and more recently the attitudes and tendencies of the people who might use them (Ettema and Timmermans, 1997, Jones et al, 1983). This has been accompanied by relatively sparse attention to the broader canvas upon which decisions and policies are made. Work in this area has again been dominated by economic theory. There have been few attempts, in transport thought, to close the gap between the technocentrism of operational theory, and the socio-political realities of everyday life. Yet this tension between the calm spaces of rational, scientific policy making, and the messy, turbulent world of politics and power, pervades theoretical debates throughout public policy.

The communicative turn can be broadly seen as an emerging body of theory which attempts to break free from instrumentalism, and instead posits policy making as argumentation, and focuses on communicative rationality (Fischer and Forester, 1993, Innes, 1995, Healey, 1997). So knowledge is negotiated in policy making, and ways of thinking, valuing and acting are "actively constructed by participants" (Healey, 1997: 29). Power is acknowledged, but regarded as a negative, distorting influence whose effects can be removed by constructing an idealised debate, where all participants have equal status, and where the rationality of argumentation that prevails. Policy making is based on argument: 'as politicians know only too well, but social scientists too often forget, public policy is made of language. Whether in written or oral form, argumentation is central in all stages of the policy process' (Majone, 1989).

The present communicative turn builds on previous movements that have similarly reacted to instrumental approaches. Since the 1960s, as a reaction to systems planning, planning has been redefined as a discursive activity between different interests. The first expression of this movement was in advocacy planning, developed by, among others, Paul Davidoff (1965), Marshall Kaplan and Lisa Peattie (Peattie, 1987), who argued that society is open enough for the power of logical argument, from the mouths of advocate planners, to sway decisions on urban development. The motive was to find a way of opening up planning to groups whose interest had not previously been served - towards a more egalitarian style of planning. That assumption, argued Mazziotti (1982), is not tenable and radicals must look elsewhere. This critique was common on both sides of Atlantic in early 1970's, linked to the growth of community action against the growing bureaucracy of planning. This reaction led to the advent of community planning in the UK (championed by Cliff Hague among others), which challenged the role of planner as advocate, and attempted to break down the barrier between planners and working class communities. Community planning has since become a slogan
rather than an analytical concept but usually embodies the following (Reade, 1976):

- that the problems found in given localities could be effectively tackled if only the inhabitants would see themselves as a ‘community’ and generate ‘community spirit’;
- that plans could be formulated not by the local authority alone, but also involving voluntary associations and other unofficial, informal and even private sector organisations;
- that the community as a whole (i.e. the population at large) should be involved in the making of plans; and
- that physical plans should not be made in isolation, but in conjunction with economic and social plans.

**The communicative turn**

Patsy Healey is one of a number of leading planning theorists exploring the possibilities of communicative theory. Healey’s position, informed by Habermas’ work, places at its core the notion of reason as intersubjective mutual understanding, arrived at by particular people in particular times and places (historically situated). Knowledge claims within this system are tested not through logic or science, but by establishing validity through processes of argumentation. From this conceptualisation, Healey argues that ‘planning and its contents is a way of acting we can choose, after debate’ (Healey, 1993: 236-240). The resulting collaborative planning process might be characterised as follows:

- its setting within an ideal pluralist political system
- its aim of redefining rationality in a new communicative way
- the consequent attempt to develop a new unified planning theory
- its pro-modernist theoretical tendency
- the central role of the policy analyst/planner

The communicative turn in planning is grounded in the application of Jurgen Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality. Clear links are drawn between a particular style of planning - seeking rationality through critical debate - and a particular pluralistic view of the socio-political world. In the late 1990s communicative planning is now claimed to be the dominant paradigm within planning theory (Innes, 1995, Mandelbaum, 1996). The apparent hegemony of Habermasian thought in planning theory warrants close attention. The ways in which Habermas seeks to restore the modernist project is one way out of the postmodern ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1992) and the end of theory (Mitchell, 1985). But it is an approach which has its strengths and weaknesses. ‘Claims to paradigmatic status should not be taken lightly, especially
when the ‘communicative turn’ itself rests on notions of debate and ‘the force of the better argument’ (Huxley and Yiftachel, 1998).

Allmendinger (1999) attempts to explode the myth that ‘there is any such thing as collaborative planning’, pointing to a diverse set of theoretical and normative approaches. Indeed, the new paradigm has been given a number of different labels: Communicative action (Innes, 1995), ‘communicative planning’ (Forester, 1989, Sager, 1994), ‘argumentative planning’ (Fischer and Forester, 1993), ‘planning through debate’ (Healey, 1992a), ‘inclusionary discourse’ (Healey, 1994), ‘collaborative planning’ (Healey, 1997), planning as discourse, ‘deliberative planning’ (Forester, 2000 forthcoming), and planning through consensus building (Innes, 1996).

Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) identify several interpretations of communicative rationality as a basis for planning:

- micro-political interpretations of planning practice usually based on a combination of Habermasian ideal speech and poststructuralist concerns with language (e.g. Forester, 1989, 1993, Fischer and Forester, 1993);
- ethnographic studies comparing this ideal to practice (e.g. Healey, 1992b, Hillier, 1993, Healey and Hillier, 1995);
- prescriptive studies aimed at using communicative rationality as a basis for collaborative planning (Healey, 1992b, 1996a,b).

Interestingly, Healey recognises a broader approach which encompasses practices as well as communication. The approach of the communicative theorists is ‘to focus not on formal strategies, government structures, and policy instruments, but on the interactive practices through which policy ideas are developed and disseminated, on policy discourses and on the social relations of policy practices’ (Healey, 1999: 1130).

The usefulness of communicative theory is widely acknowledged, even by its critics. The specific benefits seem to be the educational value of micro-studies of how planners go about their work, and secondly the more normative positing of a particular style of planning, embracing consensual, deliberative methods. However, each of these contributions requires separate scrutiny. Because of the weaknesses articulated below, the analyses and prescriptions suffer a credibility gap. The analytical work focuses only on certain parts of planning activity - principally communicative exchanges - and the normative work relies on a leap of faith - explained below - which goes beyond the experience and convictions of many practising planners (as well as others involved in theorising and doing planning). Fischler has suggested that the communicative focus raises two important methodological implications here:
First, the primary source of our knowledge of planning is the discursive output of planners, their spoken and written words, their conversations, reports and plans (Fischler, 1995; Healey, 1993; Mandelbaum, 1990; Ferraro, 1994). Second, the focus of research is the individual professional, her personal experience of local planning and politics (Forester, 1992; Healey, 1992a). (Fischler, forthcoming).

However a critical wave has reacted to the claim of paradigmatic status (for example the partnerships of Huxley and Yiftachel, Flyvbjerg and Richardson, Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger). The critiques are wide ranging, and are not exhaustively addressed here. However the question of the treatment of power raises many of the contentious issues, and it is this which is discussed in some detail. At the heart of many of the critiques, though is the concern that accounts provided from communicative perspectives can only provide only part of the story of how planning is actually done, yet they are not explicit about their partiality. Furthermore, the analysis of communicative events, driven by the normative perspective of Habermasian theory, seeks to draw attention to ‘distortions’, which planners can learn from, and therefore presumably avoid in their future work.

**A comment on normativeness**

‘(A) man who neglects what is actually done for what should be done learns the way to self-destruction’ (Machiavelli, cited by Flyvbjerg, 1998).

It is not surprising that planning theory is often strongly normative in nature. Theorists want to make a difference, and to do so according to their particular view of how things are, and how they should be. For example, Faludi’s theory of rational systems planning (Faludi, 1973a), was used in a normative way, to suggest several things about the role of planning and its relationship with its socio-political context:

- that rational systems planning should become the basis for decision making;
- the dynamic nature of the relationship between planning and politics would therefore shift;
- that the purpose of planning is to achieve ‘human growth’.

Here we can see the planning theorist operating according to a clear normative agenda, attempting to depoliticise planning and restore an instrumental rationality. In a similar way communicative theory advocates an idealised planning debate, where the distortions of power are removed, providing a vision of an ideal future state, but with little information on how to get there. Oren Yiftachel has challenged both Forester and Healey for confusing theory with normative idealism:

‘While novel, thought provoking and professionally useful, the new wave of
communication analysts were constantly mixing and confusing theory and normative agenda setting. They also focused attention on matters internal to the planning field, thereby committing the flaw of putting planning artificially at the centre, while giving scant attention to the powerful 'external' forces which shape urban and regional development. The normative and intra-professional basis of much of the new paradigm is best illustrated by quoting from recent works of two of the major proponents of this approach:

"by recognising planning practice as normatively role-structured communication action which distorts, covers up, or reveals to the public the prospects and possibilities they face, a critical theory of planning aids us practically and ethically as well. This is the contribution of critical theory to planning: pragmatic with vision - to reveal true alternatives, to correct false expectations, to counter cynicism, to foster enquiry, to spread political responsibility, engagement and action. Critical planning ... skilled and politically sensitive is an organising and democratising practice" (Forester, 1993: 25-26).

"We need to rework the store of techniques and practices evolved within the planning field to identify their potential within a new communicative, dialogue based form of planning ... what is being invented, in planning practice and planning theory, is a new form of planning, a respectful argumentative form, of planning through debate, appropriate to our recognition of the failure of modernity's pure reason, yet searching ... for a continuation of the Enlightenment project of democratic progress through reasoned inter-subjective argument among the citizens" (Healey, 1992a: 159-60).

The above are obviously normative statements which conflate theory with ideological models and desired visions ... the cutting edge of theory in the 1990s is still far from providing a genuine theoretical basis for this discipline’ (Yiftachel, 1997: 765-66).

The normative nature of planning theory is perhaps not surprising, but it is significant. This is particularly so where new theoretical advances are claimed to provide better ways of achieving 'rational' planning. Each theoretical movement is thus privileged in conditioning the boundaries of debate for the next generation of planners. There are two fundamental problems with this:

- if the influence of normative positions is not explicitly acknowledged, there is a danger that the political view or interest which lies behind the theory will not be communicated to the planning community and beyond. There is, then, no possibility of a full debate about which paradigm (if any) should be adopted;

- normative positions are necessarily shaped by particular socio-political and cultural situations. They are not necessarily right for other places and other times where conditions are different.
The problem with power

‘When it comes to portraying planners and planning, the quest of planning theorists could be called the escape from power. But if there is one thing we should have learned today from students of power, it is that there is no escape from it’ (Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 1998).

Power continues to be a vexed question in planning theory, addressed by a succession of theorists. Whilst some work has addressed the rationality of the policy process (following the work of Bachrach and Baratz, Dahl, Lindblom, Lukes), other work has consider the prospects for empowerment of various interests (e.g. Fainstein, Forester, Healey, Innes, Throgmorton). Whilst the significance of power is almost universally recognised, there is currently a schism between the proponents of the communicative turn who seek to resolve the ‘problem’ of power, by creating planning processes grounded in principles of free speech and rational argument (recently Judith Innes and Patsy Healey, for example), and those who believe that these are normative approaches that cannot lead to universal solutions: there is no escape from power, instead power must be embraced (Bent Flyvbjerg, Oren Yiftachel, Margo Huxley). Wherever this debate leads, it seems clear that for the moment, as John Friedmann has argued, that theorists’ ambivalence about power is one of the biggest outstanding problems in theorising planning (Friedmann, 1997).

Debates over the nature of power in policy making are not new. Since Lindblom, in the 1950s, defined political rationality (Lindblom, 1959), theorists have sought alternatively to avoid, mitigate, or embrace the problematisation of policy with power. Explorations into bounded rationality (Simon, 1957), incrementalism (Lindblom, 1959), and mixed scanning (Etzioni, 1967), and revisiting incrementalism (Lindblom, 1979) have sought to theorise the relationships between rational processes and the normative ‘chaos’ they are embedded in (D’Aoust and Lemaire, 1994). It is interesting that Lindblom eventually seems to accept the weakness of the incrementalist dependence on plurality (Ham and Hill, 1984). While theorists such as Lindblom were developing ‘ideal’ models of developing knowledge for decision making, an alternative school of thought was emerging which recognised the ultimate dependence on power in policy making. Dahl, for example, argued that where differences of opinion exist between actors, then their power relationship must be examined: that ‘the student of power needs to analyse concrete decisions involving actors pursuing different preferences’ (op.cit.: 66). This ‘decisional approach’ (Dahl, 1961) sparked a debate over the nature of power. Bachrach and Baratz contended that power was not simply related to decision making, but extended to the creation or reinforcement of social and political values and institutional practices in agenda setting, to protect the interests of particular groups (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962: 948). Inherent in this ‘non-decision making’ view of power is that power is something which is distributed among
particular actors in a given situation. Lukes (1974) adds a third dimension of power to those identified by Dahl and Bachrach and Baratz: the use of power to shape people’s preferences so that conflicts (overt and covert) are removed, and replaced by latent conflict. This view asserts that even in consensual situations, power may still be at work: ‘is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things...’ (op.cit.: 24).

This incremental typology of power in decision-making seems unsatisfactory, and Ham and Hill (1984) point out the difficulty in studying power when it is used to shape peoples’ preferences. It appears that an underlying problem is a wariness of developing a unified theory: that a single theory of the policy process (and power within it) risks attack either from those who control the policy process, or from those who gain or lose from policy decisions or non-decisions. This is perhaps why a single, all encompassing theory of power in the policy process has yet to emerge. We are left with an atheoretical approach where theory is reduced to the level of analytical instrument, rather than being offered as an explanation of the process and its context (for example, Blowers’ use of apparently conflicting theoretical approaches to provide complementary insights). This may be seen as symptomatic of a postmodern condition: that theoretical perspectives are called upon in a selective and arbitrary way, to suit a given situation. Clearly, this tendency bestows significant power in the policy analyst, who informs the selection of perspectives, theories, and ultimately methods.

Many theorists have explored the political nature of planning. For example, Chris Paris (1982) assembled a collection of radical critiques of planning theory, developing the view of planning as a political process. His analysis, based on a Marxist perspective, criticised the way that theory has obscured the politics in planning. For example, Andreas Faludi’s procedural planning theory was criticised for adopting a structural approach which supported the status quo of industrial market economies: ‘by elaborating the technology of planning in a non-critical way, while at the same time giving planning a central position as a mode of social communication, Faludi contributes to the attempts to depoliticise politics as well as planning’ (Thomas, 1982). What seems to emerge from this critique is a resurfacing of one of the strongest subtexts within planning theory: the relations between politics and rationality.

A recurrent problem is that power has been theorised as negative, coercive and oppressive, its effects to be removed from the planning process by reframing rationality and creating enabling practices. If, alternatively, power is understood as immanent and potentially productive, rather than oppressive, and escapable through procedural reform, then it deserves to become an
explicit focus of planning theory and research. Michel Foucault’s work on discourse, power and knowledge, turning away from the preoccupation with normative paths, opens up this possibility by focusing squarely on the microphysics of power.

The emerging paradigm of communicative rationality, with its focus on the micropolitics of communicative interactions in planning, loses the overview of the policy process in a broader social and political context. Crucially, it is blind to local power outside of communication - a key element of micro-politics, and therefore to the influence of power on policy development, the possibility of distortion of the policy process, and even more fundamentally therefore to the possibility of empowerment.

Mouffe and Throgmorton, in different ways, point to the problem with power in communicative theory:

‘...the link between legitimacy and power is precisely what the mode of ‘deliberative democracy’, currently in vogue, is unable to recognise because it posits the possibility of a type of rational argumentation where power has been eliminated and where legitimacy is grounded on pure rationality. In its Habermasian version, the discourse-centred approach to ethics is presented as providing, through the exchange of arguments and counter arguments, the most suitable procedure for the universalisation of interests and for the rational regulation of political questions’ (Mouffe, 1997: pxii).

‘Research inspired by Habermas’ ideal speech situation can enable the researcher to see power being exercised, but in the end the very notion of an ideal speech situation which overcomes "systematic distortions" implies that we can (at least hypothetically) enter some kind of blissful state of community in which everyone has an equal right to speak and share their differing perspectives. I do not believe such an ideal state can ever be achieved. Some form of power will always be exercised. Given this desire to overcome systematic distortions, many communicative theorists seek to create processes that involve no distortion. My sense is that the very notion of distortion implies some standard of objective Truth and some sense of equilibrium, and I’m quite skeptical about both.’ (Throgmorton, 1997, pers. comm.).

Healey recognises the weakness of communicative rationality: its dependence upon a consensual, pluralistic political model. She supports the challenging of oppressive power, and increasing accountability of decision-making processes, but the identification of the place and treatment of power in the analysis cannot be fully developed within the confines of Habermasian theory. As a result, Foucault’s thoughts on power are introduced in an attempt to make explicit the normative communicative planning agenda:

‘planning could be associated with the dominator power of systematic reason pursued through state bureaucracies. Evidence for this seemed to be everywhere, from the disaster of high rise towers for the poor to the dominance of economic
criteria justifying road building and the functional categorisation of activity zones, which worked for large industrial companies and those working in them, but not for women (with their necessarily complex lifestyles), the elderly and the disabled, and the many ethnic groups forced to discover ways of surviving on the edge of established economic practices’ (Healey, 1992a: 235).

Power here is characterised as negative and one-dimensional, imposed from the top down. The aim of communicative planning is to empower these groups, and to democratise the processes within which they may participate. This thesis, echoed by other advocates of communicative planning, is developed elsewhere by Healey: ‘Both knowledge production and exchange are infused with ideological and political practices that protect the powerful and confuse the powerless. Planning, if it is to contribute to the enterprise of democratic social change (Forester, 1989, Friedmann, 1987), must avoid such practices, and find ways of challenging the production of what Forester refers to as ‘misinformation’ (Healey, 1992b). Thus the need to avoid the negative effects of power in the search for empowerment and democratisation is linked with a move towards a focus on communication. Healey recognises the risk that a focus on the analysis of communicative acts ‘could render the researcher myopic to the power relations among planners, municipal councils and clients’ (op.cit.:10). This problem is addressed here by emphasising the permeation of power into communication: ‘Communicative acts contain assumptions and metaphors, which by conveying meaning, affect what people do. These assumptions and meanings may carry power relationships or structure within them. In turn, the ways communicative acts are created and used help sustain or challenge power structures’ (op.cit.: 10).

My own critique of power in communicative planning was originally set out in a paper in European Planning Studies (Richardson, 1996), and was developed outside the context of the planning theory debates referred to above. More recently Healey has responded to the arguments in this paper as part of a response to a critique of communicative planning theory by Mark Tewdwr-Jones and Phil Allmendinger (1998). She points to the idea of power-blindness as being incorrect, arguing that ‘many of those who are developing ideas of communicative governance practices or consensus-building techniques are deeply aware of the multiple bases of fracture and difference in contemporary societies, both as explicitly manifested in overt conflict and as embedded in social routines’ (Healey, 1999: 1132). The view of power adopted by Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger is seen as an over simplified dualism between consensus and conflict, community and individual autonomy. Citing Dyrberg (1997), Healey suggests that ‘[p]ower, for many interested in communicative practices, is understood not merely as power ‘over’ or power ‘to’, but power as ‘ability’, the power to ‘make a difference’. Dyrberg’s work, referred to by Healey, specifically concerns Foucault’s use of power. Dyrberg argues that it is the ‘making’ of ‘difference’ that is Foucault’s explicit focus, where power is an ever-ongoing
making of differences (op.cit.: 89-93)\textsuperscript{i}. Here, interestingly, Healey is using Foucauldian power analytics to defend the sensitivity to power among communicative theorists. This position seems to provide a further case of Fischler’s analysis that communicative theorists are often behaving in Foucauldian ways (Fischler forthcoming). I did attempt in my original critique to suggest that the communicative theorists are indeed aware of power. But my point was to question what happens when a planning paradigm is built upon Habermasian communicative theory. The problem, then, is that the focus on communication, on power within communication, or on communicative acts or processes that can make a difference, can only provide a partial view of power. Power as conceptualised by Foucault and apparently understood by the communicative theorists, is \textit{everywhere}, not just in communication.

Habermasian analyses of planning processes can tell us about distorted communications. But what can they say about the strategies which interplay through a variety of speech and power acts to shape planning policies and decisions? Wolf Reuter, for example, clearly distinguishes between speech and power acts, and identifies the many ways in which non-communicative power acts make a difference in planning situations (Reuter, 1998, 1999). So why restrict the analysis or the prescription to communication? This was my point in claiming communicative theory was ‘power-blind’. With hindsight, partially sighted might have been a more accurate term.

The problem of power blindness (or myopia) is keenly recognised by other theorists, including Jean Hillier, who like Healey seeks to resolve matters by combining Foucauldian power awareness with Habermasian communicative rationality (Hillier, 1993). Her aim is to create the idealised Habermasian planning arena, where ‘rational debate and negotiation are possible between proponents of different truths, tellers of different stories.... The idea is to pre-empt conflict through negotiated agreement rather than entrenching it’ (op.cit.: 108) It seems that the point of linking Foucault and Habermas is again to remove the effects of ‘negative’ power on the planning process. Yet Hillier’s aim, like Healey’s is the empowerment of disadvantaged interests, which surely requires an acknowledgement of power relations, and the possibility of power being used in a ‘positive’ way.

Within Judith Innes’ work, there is also some ambiguity about the claims being made about the nature of power (e.g. in Innes and Booher, 1998). It is often not clear whether ‘power’ is being used in an analytical or a descriptive way. Either Innes is arguing that planners have previously failed to understand the nature of power, and that an alternative form of power – network power – exists. Alternatively, she is arguing that planners should work to create new types of network power relations. This is a crucial difference, and it is important that we do not know whether Innes is claiming that these types of power relations are out there, or that we should go out and
Ultimately the communicative turn fails to ground itself in what Flyvbjerg has termed realrationalität - 'how knowledge, rationality and power work in real life' - and is instead a normative rationality (Flyvbjerg, 1996a: 384). Communicative planning theory fails to capture the role of power in planning. As a result, it is a theory which is weak in its capacity to help us understand what happens in the real world; and weak in serving as a basis for effective action and change. Because of these weaknesses, it is argued that this approach to theory building is highly problematic for planning.

Some theorists might contend that ‘using’ Foucault, they have repaired the weaknesses in communicative theory which are exposed by juxtaposition with Foucault’s work. A central premise here, however, is that this cannot be done convincingly (see also Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 1998). More importantly, in spite of regular reference to Foucault in planning theory literature, there has not so far been a cogent exploration of the full import of his work for planning.

**Discourse**

Theorising and analysing decision-making as discourse is becoming a popular fringe activity in planning-related disciplines, including public administration (Fox and Miller, 1995), politics (Haber, 1994), policy analysis and planning (Fischer and Forester, 1993), urban policy (ter Borg and Dijkink, 1995), and anthropology (Peace, 1993). Attempts to develop theories of discourse which can be applied to decision-making tend to fall into two camps: broadly Habermasian (e.g. Healey, Fox and Miller), and broadly Foucauldian (Haber, Fairclough). It is clear that discourse analysis is becoming an increasingly common approach in planning research, often using Habermasian textually-oriented approaches (e.g. Healey, 1997, Hastings, 1999, Jacobs, 1999). However Sharp and Richardson (1999) argue that the generic treatment of discourse analysis has tended to obscure distinct approaches where ‘discours es’ can combine different elements of text (or linguistic articulation), systems of thought, and action.

I want to suggest that in the move towards discourse analysis in planning research we need a fuller debate on what we mean by ‘discourse’. Specifically, discourse has often been explained (or assumed) as the sum of the communicative interactions which take place in planning events or processes. These most obviously include events such as public meetings, as well as other consultation processes surrounding the preparation of, for example, development plans. This conceptualisation follows the discourse theory of Jurgen Habermas on communicative action,
and is reflected in much recent theoretical work in planning, for example in the work of John Forester, Patsy Healey and Judith Innes. In this thesis, I set out an alternative conceptualisation of discourse, derived from the work of Michel Foucault. For Foucault, discourse is a complex medium which extends beyond communication, to other social practices, within which a complex dynamic between power and knowledge occurs. Significantly, discourse is not confined to formal environments such as policy processes, but pervades society.

Discourse theory, then, is an umbrella that includes thinking at the margins of 'postmodern' philosophy - the poststructuralist tradition of Bataille and Foucault, and the 'anti-postmodern pro-modernism' of Habermas (Jameson, 1991: 61). It presents us with an explanation of the order of things that challenges Cartesian rationality, and argues for new agendas focusing alternatively on social practices (Foucault) and communicative action (Habermas). What separates these two camps? Certainly Habermas, as a reforming modernist, is highly critical of Foucault, a poststructuralist who argues from a more polemical, even anarchistic position. While Habermas posits an idealised discourse of critical rationality, played out by equal actors, Foucault is more pragmatic, concerned with 'a struggle against power, a struggle aimed at revealing and undermining power when it is most invisible and insidious' (Foucault, 1977: 208). Some philosophical differences will be explored below, but this divergent normative starting point should provide some clues. It is significant that policy analysts and theorists have pursued Habermas' thinking, while those promoting the interests of 'outsiders' have followed Foucault. Yet the insights offered by Foucault appear to be very germane to our understanding of issues of exclusion, governance, power and truth - all fundamental to policy making.

Discourse analysis, following Habermas but also a wide body of other approaches, is often presented as a collection of methods of textual analysis, not necessarily embedded in the theoretical debate which surrounds them. Techniques of discourse analysis may be used by researchers in many disciplines, who seek an alternative to rationalistic or analycentric methodologies, and who have an interest in textual (whether written or spoken) meaning. However, Foucault's theory of discourse offers a strong theoretical underpinning for discourse analytics focused not simply on text, but on action in the social world. It is this theoretically grounded approach which is adopted here.

**A turn towards the dark side?**

Turning to Foucault's work requires a turn towards what has been described as the dark side of planning theory - the domain of power - which has been occasionally explored by planning theorists (e.g. Yiftachel, 1998, Flyvbjerg, 1996a, Roweis, 1983, Marcuse, 1976). Citing the
work of Fischler, Flyvbjerg and Richardson, Patsy Healey has suggested that Foucault’s power analytics has been one of the intellectual thoughtstreams which has influenced the evolving paradigm of communicative planning (Healey, 1999: 1129).

Instead of side-stepping or seeking to remove the traces of power from policy making, the ‘darksiders’ accept power as unavoidable, recognising its all pervasive nature, and emphasising its productive as well as destructive potential. Here, theory engages squarely with policy made on a field of power struggles between different interests, where knowledge and truth are contested, and the rationality of policy making itself is exposed as a focus of conflict. This is what Flyvbjerg has called realrationalität, or ‘real-life’ rationality (Flyvbjerg 1996a), where the focus shifts from what should be done to what is actually done. This analysis embraces the idea that ‘rationality is penetrated by power’, and the dynamic between the two is critical in understanding ‘what planning is and what the strategies and tactics are that may help change it for the better’ (op.cit.: 393). It therefore ‘becomes meaningless, or misleading - for politicians, administrators and researchers alike - to operate with a concept of rationality in which power is absent’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998: 164-65).

Flyvbjerg’s realrationalität turns towards a more critical approach to rationality, focusing on ‘the lived, as opposed to the ideal, world of modern democracy and planning, and how it acts as a guide to the transformative mechanisms of democracy and planning’ (Flyvbjerg, 1996a). This is a powerful argument which has yet to be countered by the proponents of the communicative turn.

The communicative turn has now generated its own critical wave. As Yiftachel has argued: ‘We may now be witnessing the emergence of another strong core of planning research and writings based on the works of these scholars which could balance the current dominance of the normative communicative approach’ (Yiftachel, 1997). The critical wave includes diverse work by Bent Flyvbjerg, Margo Huxley, Leonie Sandercock, Phil Allmendinger, Mark Tewdwr-Jones, Henk Voogd, and Yiftachel himself.

The theoretical work of Michel Foucault provides a useful springboard in this debate over the nature of rationality. His analysis of power is introduced by theorists who recognise problems with communicative rationality (e.g. Innes, Healey, Hillier). This has usually been done in a theoretical ‘mix and match’ approach where Foucault is used to fill the cracks in communicative rationality. Yet the full potential of Foucault’s ideas on power, knowledge and discourse have not yet been fully explored in their own right in relation to planning theory and policy process. His critical view turns attention away from both the preoccupation of instrumental rationality
with the search for new objective scientific or economic techniques, and normative communicative rationality, achieved through idealised debate and argument. Instead, Foucault suggests that we live in a society of socially constructed rationalities which are shaped by discourses, constituted through power / knowledge relations, and made visible in local practices. Foucault, then, appears to provide the theoretical foundation for a new understanding of rationality, which potentially unlocks an understanding of the policy process which may more closely fit the messy world of policy than approaches which try to reduce things to an objective level, or prescribe what we think ought to happen in an ideal world. This alternative approach is being explored by Flyvbjerg and McNay among others.

Forester is highly critical of the theoretical framework Flyvbjerg uses in his analysis of planning in Aalborg (Forester, 1999a). In particular, he rejects the Foucauldian all-pervasive view of power, which for him prompts several criticisms. The first relates to the position of the researcher: how can Flyvbjerg present a 'true' account of planning in Aalborg, with all its messy politics, if to do so requires being objective, and so operating outside of power. He argues that if Flyvbjerg can justify such a position, then why can't planners too – at least occasionally?:

'So if Flyvbjerg can give us knowledge of the case without simply being an instrument of power and thus manipulating us, so too at times might planners or other policy analysts also share information and knowledge without necessarily manipulating their audiences; as Norman Krumholz did in part in Cleveland (cf. Krumholz and Forester, 1990). They might, but they certainly might not, and we have to look and see in actual cases, rather than to assume that planners always lie or misinform (or always tell the truth).’ (Forester, 1999a).

I would take the opposite extension of the same argument. That as researchers, like planners, we are indeed shaped by power relations, by the strategies of others as well as our own. The communicative turn itself as a normative project must be seen as a case in point. The ethical positions which underlie communicative planning are those of theorists who advocate the approach. Planning theory is inevitably shaped by the personal politics of planning theorists. Forester seems to confirm this himself, by quickly moving on to seek to appropriate Flyvbjerg’s empirical work as actually being Habermasian, and therefore supporting Forester’s theoretical position, rather than Foucauldian:

'For my part, I find Flyvbjerg’s case study of Aalborg a beautiful example of just the kinds of systematic misinformation that the title chapter of ‘Planning in the Face of Power’ discusses (thus my blurb on the book’s cover), even if I find the framing theoretical chapters not to begin to do justice to the richness of the particulars of his own case description. Had Flyvbjerg begun to look closely at the systematic qualities of misinformation in his case; it was systematic, not accidental, that the planners and owners of property acted as they did in Aalborg,
remarkably; he could suddenly have found himself productively using an applied
Habermasian analysis at the very same time that he was writing about the limited
utility of Habermasian arguments (Flyvbjerg, in Douglass and Friedmann, 1998).'
(Forster, 1999a).

Interestingly, Forster’s attempted appropriation of Flyvbjerg’s work can be read as a
Foucauldian act, rather than an attempt at Habermasian rational discourse. Forster appears to
read power as negative, or to see Flyvbjerg’s work as simply attempting to prove the negative
nature of power (Forster, 1999a).

Foucault – just a recipe for more oppression?

I acknowledge that my reading of Foucault is more positive than some, particularly those who
see Foucault’s work as simply pointing out the heavily oppressive regimes of power which
shape and control our lives (e.g. Giddens, 1984). This oppressive analysis has been used both by
critics such as John Forster (discussed above) and John Friedmann (1998), and by advocates
such as Oren Yiftachel. Whilst Friedmann rejects the oppressive nature of the theory, as does
Innes in her criticism of Flyvbjerg’s Foucauldian analysis of planning in Aalborg (Flyvbjerg,
1998a, Innes and Booher, 1998), Yiftachel embraces the Foucauldian analysis of planning
systems as reproducing state controls. These positions appear to be derived from conflicting
normative positions as much as from analytical ones: one sees planning as a productive activity,
the other as repressive. Both, however, see emancipatory potential which begins from their
different analyses. Foucault’s analysis of the all-pervasiveness of power has been seen as
crushing the life out of any possibility of empowerment, of change, of hope. Yet this analysis
seems to be based on a reading of parts of Foucault’s major works, such as Discipline and
Punish, rather than an attempt to understand his overall project. Foucault’s theory of power is
exactly not about oppressiveness, of accepting the regimes of domination which condition us, it
is about using tools of analysis to understand power, its relations with rationality and
knowledge, and use the resulting insights precisely to bring about change.

‘When it comes to portraying planners and planning, the quest of planning theorists
could be called the escape from power. But if there is one thing we should have
learned today from students of power, it is that there is no escape from it.’
(Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 1998: 13).

It is at this point, once the nettle of power is grasped, that Foucault’s analysis of power as
constructive rather than oppressive becomes clear:

‘Habermas, among others, views conflict in society as dangerous, corrosive and
potentially destructive of social order, and therefore in need of being contained and
resolved. In a Foucauldian interpretation, conversely, suppressing conflict is
suppressing freedom, because the privilege to engage in conflict is part of freedom.’ (op.cit., 1998: 13).

Foucault does attempt to do more than simply depress us with his analysis of our oppression. By carrying out his analyses in a contingent way he attempts to show, in sharp relief, how certain things (ways of thinking, practices, ideas) have come to be as they are - what he described as the history of the present. This in turn suggests ways that something different can be created. By exposing how some ideas have been persistently marginalised, for example, it becomes possible to articulate this exclusion, and to identify ways to do something about it. Foucault challenged others to do similar things in their own areas of concern (Foucault, 1980: 65). The Foucauldian position is that the potential for change begins in recognition of the power relations which condition the present. It is from this starting point that change must begin.

The future of rationality in planning theory: a turn towards realrationalität?

In the preceding discussion, I have focused on a view of planning theory shaped by meta-level struggles between different discourses which advocate different procedural rationalities. If a weakness of Habermasian communicative rationality is its grounding in a normative approach to rationality, then is there an alternative approach to rationality in planning which might be useful in guiding planning research? Here Flyvbjerg’s ‘realrationalität’ moves away from the normative approach to rationality, and instead asks ‘how knowledge, rationality and power work in real life’ (Flyvbjerg, 1996a: 384, 1998a). Alongside procedural debates, the focus on realrationalität requires analysis of how rationalities are constructed within planning. This results in a fresh perspective on what has been called theory in planning, where the fine grain of rationality is contested and constructed.

Theorists have maintained a separation between theory of planning (as discussed earlier), and theory in planning. Policy making is influenced by a wide array of planning theories - theories about space, time, money, economic and political relations, for example - which are deployed through techniques of policy analysis within the policy process (cost-benefit appraisal is one example). These theories are shaped by diverse and potentially conflicting understandings of rationality, power and knowledge. Maintaining a dualism of theory of and theory in planning is therefore convenient, in that it permits policy analysts to draw from a wide body of techniques, without necessarily being aware or acknowledging that the techniques, they adopt may bear the imprints of broader scientific, political, economic, or social theory, which may carry normative agendas.
Interrogating rationality is a line of critical inquiry which inevitably draws us further into the policy process, to ask questions about the theories used in planning. This approach seems to respond partly to Throgmorton’s challenge that we need to ‘learn how our technical skills (forecasting, surveying, modelling) act as persuasive imagery within our texts, and to learn why those tropes help to persuade some audiences but not others’ (Throgmorton, 1992: 29). But again, shifting away from the communicative focus, it raises questions such as: what are the relations between power and knowledge within the theory-laden techniques used in policy analysis?

**Power, knowledge and evaluation in planning**

The central, contested issue that is resolved in the construction of a planning process is: what will be the process for securing rationality in reaching planning decisions or making policy? This may be determined through effects of power in the creation of structures and frameworks for policy development and decision-making, the selection of particular tools of policy analysis and the use / creation of knowledge. The point here is that the construction of the planning process is where the ground rules of rationality become embedded - which picks up one of the central debates identified in Campbell and Fainstein (1996). The focus here is on this embedding of rationality through discursive conflict, both in theory and in practice.

What may be the crucial stage in the process of defining the rationality of the policy process is the selection of particular methods, or techniques, of policy analysis. It is through these techniques that the planning problems are analysed, and information gathered by methods which create knowledge, and provide the crucial support for policy and decision making. The importance of selecting one technique rather than another, or applying a technique in a particular way, is that each is imbued with its own characteristics: drawing from certain data types and forms, lending itself to certain forms of analysis, and therefore possibly addressing planning policy issues in particular ways. The construction and application of these techniques is not a coolly rational process, but a contested one. It appears that there is little critical analysis being done in this area.

In seeking to analyse and understand the construction of the policy process, I focus on the development of tools for evaluation. Evaluation tools are commonly used in spatial planning processes to build the knowledge upon which alternatives may be compared, and decisions made. The shaping of such tools, then, is a critical moment in defining the rationality of policy making – in deciding which forms of knowledge, and which ways of conceptualising space and
The importance of the political context within which evaluation takes place is clearly recognised (e.g. Chelimsky, 1985, Patton, 1990, Haug, 1996, Karlsson, 1996). In the 1960s, Weiss emphasised that evaluation was driven by political strategies and has political consequences. More recently, in the rapidly growing literature on evaluation, reflecting its increasing use in policy making, Peder Haug has discussed the links between Weiss’s work, and Foucault’s work on power and discourse (Haug, 1996: 427). Haug argues the importance of Foucauldian thinking in understanding how evaluation may come to be delimited and defined, suggesting the need for a ‘power dimension’ in the concept of evaluation.

Abdul Khakee (1998) has explored the link between different ‘paradigms’ of planning theory and different approaches to evaluation. Drawing from reviews by Healey et al (1983), Friedmann (1987) and Innes (1995), he identifies eight theoretical positions in planning theory each of which can be related to different evaluation styles:

- rational comprehensive planning
  - incremental planning
  - advocacy planning
  - implementation-oriented planning
  - strategic planning
  - transactive planning
  - negotiative planning
  - communicative planning

Incrementalism, implementation, advocacy and strategic planning are seen as responses to the instrumental rational planning model, whilst transactive and negotiative planning are seen as ideas leading towards communicative planning theory. He then identifies several key evaluation issues for communicative planning (op.cit., 1998):

- To organise a functional discourse;
- To achieve an inclusive arena;
- To promote a learning process which is emancipatory and expedites progress; and
- To increase political, social and intellectual capital.

Within communicative planning, evaluation becomes a form of interactive discourse where all those involved can explain their values, problems and concerns. This results in a set of
recommendations and value judgements, but those problems and issues for which no mutual consensus is available are then part of the following discursive process.

Debates within the evaluation field have proceeded in parallel with those in planning. Khakee (1998) and Dabinett and Richardson (1999) point out the similarities between Innes' (1995) analysis of the progression from rational planning to a communicative paradigm and Guba and Lincoln’s (1989) description of four generations of evaluation. The ‘fourth generation’ model is also conditional on an power free, ideal-speech situation, but as Karlsson argues, the problem with power pervades the evaluation debate:

‘Trying to solve questions about criteria through a power-free dialogue between interest groups is associated with Habermas....the argument against such a strategy for solving conflicts between different interest groups is that it appears to be too idealistic...Habermas’s theory of dialogue contains within it the dream of an ideal form of life, without any ruling elite...’ (Karlsson, 1996).

Instead, Rebien (1996) sees relationships of power to be involved in all processes that have to do with knowledge creation, knowledge communication and knowledge use. Thus, following Foucault’s line of thinking, Rebien suggests that power should be looked at as something natural and productive. Consequently, from this perspective, interaction may take place between stakeholders but the unevenness of power relations should be recognised. These arguments point to the central problem in pursuing the communicative approach to evaluation:

‘This leads us to a fundamental question. If pluralism is to become the model for evaluation, replacing traditional hierarchical approaches, then it follows that the values which become the basis for evaluation are arrived at through some pluralist process. What is absolutely critical in this process, then, is the extent of inclusion or exclusion of particular values. In a market-oriented paradigm, we may expect that the central values are likely to follow the needs of the market. Such values would be expressed through the multiple actors representing different interests. The inclusion of particular actors would thus shape the normative content of evaluation, determining the boundaries of the knowledge base, the scope, and potentially the outcomes of evaluation' (Dabinett and Richardson, 1999).

The Foucauldian – Habermasian exchange once again suggests that the communicative approach to evaluation remains a normative programme with weaknesses in its conceptualisation of power. Though there may be agreement between the communicative theorists and some critics of the movement over the exclusionary nature of the hegemony of scientific rationality, whether in the form of welfare economics and systems analysis, or the new public management, the search for an alternative approach to the construction of planning knowledge remains contested.
James Throgmorton, a planning theorist who has expressed reservations about the communicative approach, has carried out detailed analysis of how evaluation tools are used as persuasive rhetorical tropes. He argues that:

'...planning analysts should think of survey research and other tools as rhetorical tropes that reply to prior utterances (and give meaning and power to the larger narratives of which they are part), seek to persuade specific audiences, create open meetings subject to diverse interpretations, and help to constitute planning characters and communities.....They should embrace persuasive discourse and political conflict and realise that survey results are, like all alleged 'facts' of planning analysis, inherently tropal and contestable.....Surveys must be scientific and rhetorical, professional and political, because they, like all other planning and analytical tools, configure policy-oriented arguments’ (Throgmorton, 1992).

In this thesis, Throgmorton’s challenge is taken as the starting point, exploring the use of tropes as political techniques to determine the knowledge and rationality of TEN-T policy making.

**Theorising planning: what place for space?**

Whilst such debates in planning theory have tended to become narrowly procedural, others have focused on how power relations are played out in the more substantive spaces of urban planning. Richard Sennett, for example, has clearly expressed how patterns of urban space reflect social divisions. However, there exists a clear gulf between those who debate planning procedures, and those who talk about the socio-spatial outcomes of these planning processes. As a result procedural debates in planning have become strangely aspatial. Beauregard has argued that:

'modernist planning has been dominated by procedural theories; that is, generic, paradigmatic theories meant to be applicable regardless of context, thus leaving space and time unattended... Planning theorists and practitioners cling to relativist and physically inert notions of space and a linear sense of time. The postmodern challenge is to conceive of space and time dialectically, socially and historically; and to integrate such conceptions into a critical social theory' (Beauregard, 1989).

With reference to communicative planning, David Harvey has argued that 'Habermas has, in short, no idea of how spatio-temporalities and 'places' are produced and how that process is integral to the process of communicative action and valuation' (Harvey 1996: 354). As Huxley and Yiftachel (1998) point out, it is therefore 'ironic that his work has been (largely uncritically) taken up in the field of planning, a set of practices which above all else should be concerned with the production of space'.

Similarly, in debates about evaluation in planning, the omission of space manifests itself: ‘A
major challenge remains, though, which marks the distinction from evaluation in other areas. This is how spatial equity can be evaluated and then integrated effectively into planning policy through evaluation.’ (Dabinett and Richardson, 1999).

Space must be seen as a critical dimension in achieving greater specificity over the ways ‘power’ is analysed in particular policy settings. Focusing on the spatiality of power, and developing a more nuanced understanding of how power-space relations shape and are shaped by spatial planning processes, seems to be a particularly useful means of developing such specificity.

The spatial theorising of cultural geographers, which will be returned to, provides a varied and rapidly growing analytical perspective on space which seems helpful in spatialising planning theory in a way which is sensitive to issues about power and rationality. However, this work has often conceived of space in a static way, with particular attention to the exclusionary effects of different uses of space, and hence to the boundaries that separate different functional spaces (eg Sibley, 1995). The emphasis on fixed sites and boundaries fails to lead to engagement with questions about mobility, thus precluding what would seem to be a fruitful area of study in relation to exclusion. Studying the cultural struggles which take place within spaces of mobility seems to be an important aspect of the production of spaces and boundaries, which may in turn enrich understanding of the complex relations between processes of spatial planning and the production of social exclusion. A core concern in this thesis is the treatment of the relations between power and space in spatial planning, specifically within the spaces of mobility. In later chapters I will return to the questions of how planning theory has engaged with questions about power, space and mobility, touching on the need to add mobility to the conceptual canvas of spatiality.

A Foucauldian turn?

Power has become an inevitable question for planning theorists. John Friedmann, reflecting on the progress of theory to date, identifies theorists’ ambivalence about power as one of the biggest outstanding problems in theorising planning (Friedmann, 1998). He urges theorists to build relations of power into their conceptual frameworks. Other planning theorists who have been central to the communicative turn such as John Forester and Patsy Healey have also argued recently for a more sophisticated approach to the understanding of power in planning theory.
But 'power' cannot be simply bolted on to existing planning theory. Exploring the meaning of power involves a re-evaluation of the existing body of theory. What lies ahead is what Friedmann has called 'the long trek' of integrating discourses on power with the 'still sanitised multiple discourses of planning theory' (Friedmann, 1997). Along the way, planning research and emerging theoretical work will necessarily be subjected to difficult challenges about power. Power may become the acid-test of planning theory.

John Forester, pointing to what he regards Flyvbjerg as having failed to do, raises some useful questions for a refined view of power:

- What are the discrete and specific 'forms' of power and rationality that can come into play under specific institutional and political conditions?
- What are the conditions under which a rational critique of dominating power is possible; not to overcome such power, perhaps, but to expose it or even weaken it?
- What are the differences between power that hurts people and the power that might nurture people?
- What is the difference between claims to rationality that blind people and the kinds of rationality that Flyvbjerg himself used to write a lovely and instructive case study warning us once again about the politics of planning and the deceptively beneficent claims of 'experts'?

Patsy Healey suggests that changes in the nature of governance mean that power is a moving target:

>'The new interest in communicative and collaborative practices in governance contexts is being pushed along both by 'poststructuralist' intellectual developments and by the reconfiguration of governance. What is being invented is a form of policy analysis appropriate for these evolutions (see Muller and Sural, 1998) and a repertoire of policy actions which can be deployed in these emerging contexts. As this invention proceeds apace in the unfolding governance world, as analysts we need tools not merely to provide vocabularies to describe what is happening but to make effective critiques of specific practices in specific situations. This means moving beyond simple dualisms and explicit power-play into the fine grain and situatedness of the exercise of power in context ... as policy analysts we need to think carefully about how we are looking at the world, what we mean by power, and how we use the concept, the relation between analysis and normative assertion and how we should analyse and evaluate specific policy practices' (Healey, 1999a: 1134).

Healey has developed an institutional dimension to her work which helps to conceptualise power in context. Beauregard describes Healey's position as negotiating the institution-practice divide: 'She contextualizes communicative action and provides pathways for institutionalists to
tap into the concerns of daily practice’ (Beauregard, 2000 forthcoming). This institutional perspective to power is also apparent, in different ways, in the work of Bent Flyvbjerg, Margo Huxley and Judith Allen (again, discussed in op.cit.).

The arguments of Forester and Healey suggest the need to focus closely on the context dependent nature of power, to carry out very detailed examinations of power in particular settings, to move towards a new understanding of the power to make a difference. In doing this, the researcher must be alive to the power relations which shape their work.

This new attention to power seems to point very clearly to a continuing gap in planning theory, which has not been plugged by communicative theory. Whilst some planning theorists may feel they have already explored this route, that the obstacles to a Habermasian paradigm have been removed and the problem of power has been solved, these arguments by leading theorists active within the communicative turn suggests otherwise. The tendency of the communicative theorists to resort to Foucault in defence of Habermas, rather than returning to first principles, also seems to confirm this continuing problem. While the communicative theorists may share a deep understanding of power, although even this is not apparent, the communicative project relies on often generalised references to Foucauldian ideas to maintain its credibility. The conclusion must be that the problem of power in planning, whether this problem is seen as one of analysis or prescription, cannot be resolved by Habermas, or by a focus on communication alone. The direct consequence is that without a clear and cogent understanding of power, communicative theory can only partly understand the processes of creation of planning knowledge, the institution of rationality in planning, and the strategic struggles over space. Foucauldian perspectives are needed to help develop a more complete understanding of power.

Ultimately, it is not clear how the ‘actualisation of Habermasian communicative action’ (Hillier, 1993), which appears to depend on removing power from the gaze of planners and theorists, is to be achieved. Some theorists have suggested that there is much common ground between Foucault and Habermas, and that a combined theoretical approach can be constructed which resolves the problem of power. I do not share this view. From a purely theoretical perspective, it does not seem appropriate to merge Foucauldian and Habermasian approaches. As Jon Simons has argued, Foucauldian theory leaves room for the recognition of Habermas’ communicative theory as a legitimate project, even though he disagreed with it, whereas Habermas can accept the empirical insights provided by Foucauldian whilst opposing his overall project. The Foucauldian analysis is taken by Habermas to reveal the workings of power that he seeks to escape through his reformist project. This useful perspective sheds light on certain ‘practices’ within planning theory. Forester’s appropriation of Flyvbjerg’s analysis of planning in Aalborg
as a classic case of Habermasian distorted communication seems to be a case in point. The act of appropriation is clearly a Foucauldian strategic act, carried out in the name of a communicative ideal. Habermas is constructed as being ‘outside’ and beyond Foucault, who simply provides the fodder for Habermas’ superior theorisation.

Elsewhere, theorists have sought to develop a composite theory (eg op.cit.). However applying the Foucauldian agonistic interweaving of power, knowledge and discourse appears inappropriate to the task, and has perhaps been used to justify myopia rather than prescribe new spectacles. These are, after all, deeply opposed philosophies. Communicative rationality may be posited as an idealised form of policy debate, but Foucault reaches deeper towards an understanding of the deployment of power in the real world. This dilemma reveals the tensions between competing philosophies in the critique of modernity. Communicative planning remains limited as a paradigm until it has resolved this critical dispute. It cannot be enough to side-step the problem by constructing a composite Habermasian-Foucauldian theory from such contradictory positions, perhaps by suggesting that Foucault provides the analysis of the problem whilst Habermas provides the solution. The key unresolved question for proponents of communicative rationality is: how can fundamentally incompatible views of power / knowledge relations be resolved in moving towards the posited new practice of communicative planning? I take the view that this is not an achievable task.

Fischler’s exploration of the ground in between Foucault and Habermas is more subtle – he does not attempt to bridge the gap, to create some hybrid theory, but instead constructs a dialogue between the two positions which reveals interesting insights about the way planning theorists use theory. Fischler’s comments helpfully articulate the distinctive perspectives that Foucault provides:

‘... contrary to what some theorists have claimed, Foucault would find much to his liking in the writings of communicative planning theorists. Yet at the same time, he would raise the stakes for them: he would expect them to situate planning practice more firmly in its historical context and to evaluate more openly the cost that we may have to pay for the adoption of a "communicative rationality" in planning.’ (Fischler, 2000 forthcoming).

In this thesis, I respond to both of these points. Firstly, in the empirical work which follows I attempt to situate the policy process historically, by specifically addressing the early stages of emergence of a new discourse, which later conditions ‘practice’ as it becomes institutionalised. This is an important aspect of the research design. Secondly, although I do not try to provide empirical evidence to answer Fischler’s Foucauldian question about the risks and dangers of the hegemony of communicative rationality, I hope that the preceding discussion at least outlines
one of the central dangers – the focus on communication which limits the understanding of power. I aim to show that a broader focus on power can contribute to the understanding of planning.

Power has generally been understood as negative, as ‘power over’ or ‘power to’. The aim of communicative planning has been to remove the distorting, negative effects of power from the planning process by reframing rationality, and by creating enabling discursive practices. However by working from this normative view of power in communication, the possibility of a sharp focus on power is lost. If, alternatively, power is reconceptualised as immanent and positive, as power to ‘make a difference’ in Dyrberg’s words, then it deserves to become the explicit focus of planning theory and research, rather than the problem that theory seeks to resolve. The Foucauldian critique leads to the conclusion that policy making developed from the communicative theory of planning, contrary to expectations, is likely to be vulnerable to the workings of power, allowing manipulation and control, confusion and exclusion, and other distortions, to disrupt the process. This critique therefore demands a review of how theory is used in both explaining the policy process, and in doing policy analysis. Importantly, the aim is not to play down the influence of power in policy making - to make power vanish in a theoretical puff of smoke. The object, instead, is to accept the agonistic nature of planning by unmasking power.

Several planning theorists are exploring Foucauldian power-aware approaches to the analysis of planning (eg Flyvbjerg, 1998a, Fischler, 1998a, Huxley, 1994, Yiftachel, 1998). I will contribute to these explorations by articulating, with reference to empirical research, how Foucault’s work holds more promise, and is more relevant to planning theory than seems to have been generally recognised. I will attempt to show that Foucauldian theory is not what has been described as a ‘single minded preoccupation with the politics of coercion’ (Friedmann, 1997), but a sustained analytics of power and rationality which can be used in productive ways to support the empowerment of civil society, to make a difference. This productive interpretation of Foucault’s work often appears to have been missed, or dismissed, which has facilitated the rejection, or sometimes inappropriate use of his theories in relation to planning. Turning to Foucault’s work requires a turn towards the dark side of planning theory - the domain of power - which has been occasionally explored by planning theorists but which has been avoided by many others who appear to see only oppression and coercion where power operates. Meanwhile, Habermasian approaches have led to a particular style of research focusing on discourse as communication which has confined itself to a narrow view of planning.
The aim in this thesis is not to resolve the Foucault-Habermas debate (I think the tension has been creative). I am not trying to get bogged down in a positioned debate over whether Foucault is 'better' for planning theory than Habermas. The Foucauldian critique of Habermasian thought provides the departure point for this thesis, not its conclusion. The aim is more to create a theoretical space for the exploration of Foucauldian discourse analytics, where questions about the nature of power, rationality and knowledge can be considered from this particular perspective, rather than in juxtaposition with other approaches. I take the current debate as a departure point, and hope to return to it with some useful contributions resulting from a Foucauldian study. This seems to be at least one way of responding to the challenge by so many theorists to investigate the specificity of power in planning.

The main body of the thesis concerns itself with elaborating what a Foucauldian analysis of planning actually entails, and then doing it. Few such studies have previously been carried out. In the chapters which follow, a Foucauldian discourse analytic approach is elaborated, and then applied in empirical research. I focus specifically on the micro-physics of power in what I call the construction site of rationality: the critical contested stage in planning where frameworks are embedded, and tools are constructed, where the boundaries of knowledge are created, and decision rules are laid down. It is within these construction sites that future practice is conditioned, where realrationalität prevails. Within the following discussion, the role of institutions is examined, within and against which individuals sought to shape events.
Chapter 2. Foucauldian discourse analytics: through the revolving door of rationality

The policy process appears somewhat beleaguered. Its foundation of rationalism has been subject to sustained theoretical criticism. Philosophical debate rages over whether reason and rationality are discredited, and whether theory is dead (Mitchell, 1985). As the foundation of rationalism has cracked and subsided, so the bricks and mortar - the substantive issues which policy addresses - and the landscape - the structural environment within which policy is made - have shifted and reformed, presenting new challenges to the legitimacy of the policy process. The process of European integration, and increasing awareness of environmental risks, are examples of real-world issues which pose both substantive and procedural challenges to policy making. The issues and debates are diverse and fought across many arenas. A common theme, however, is this preoccupation with the legitimacy of rationality. This obsession with establishing or disproving the credentials of rationality blinds us to the simple fact that policy is shaped by discourses, asserting claims to knowledge which may be rational or irrational, reasonable or unreasonable. The relations between power and knowledge shape rationality as new policy discourses are constructed and institutionalised.

The work of Michel Foucault provides a rich resource for those exploring this power-aware approach to policy, the full potential of which has yet to be fully explored in its own right as an approach to both understanding and constructing the policy process. His critical view turns attention away from both the preoccupation of instrumental rationality with the search for new objective scientific or economic techniques, and normative communicative rationality, achieved through idealised debate and argument. Instead, Foucault suggests that we live in a society of socially constructed rationalities which are shaped by discourses, constituted through power / knowledge relations, and made visible in local practices. Foucault, then, offers the theoretical foundation for a new understanding of rationality, which potentially unlocks an understanding of the policy process which may more closely fit the messy world of policy than approaches which try to reduce things to an objective level, or prescribe what we think ought to happen in an ideal world. This approach to transport policy is being explored empirically and theoretically by Flyvbjerg (1998a) and Richardson (1996).

Foucault’s attack on rationality did not seek to undermine scientific - or other - dominant rationalities in the way that much postmodern theory seeks to do. Instead, he called for critical inquiry to expose how rationality is used, how it constructs our daily lives. However his critical approach, which he described as genealogy, was not a purely academic exercise. The
importance of rationality is that it makes possible the powerful conditioning effects which shape the values we hold, what we think and how we act. By analysing rationality, he sought, and encouraged others to use his methods, to ‘disrupt taken-for-granted knowledge and point to the contingent power relations which create spaces for particular assertions to operate as absolute truths’ (Pavlich, 1995):

‘I think that the central issue of philosophy and critical thought since the eighteenth century has always been, still is, and will, I hope, remain the question: What is this Reason that we use? What are its historical effects? What are its limits, and what are its dangers? How can we exist as rational beings, fortunately committed to practising a rationality that is unfortunately criss-crossed by intrinsic dangers? One should remain as close to this question as possible, keeping in mind that it is both central and extremely difficult to resolve. In addition, if it is extremely dangerous to say that Reason is the enemy that should be eliminated, it is just as dangerous to say that any critical questioning of this rationality risks sending us into irrationality. One should not forget - and I'm not saying this in order to criticize rationality, but in order to show how ambiguous things are - it was on the basis of the flamboyant rationality of social Darwinism that racism was formulated, becoming one of the most enduring and powerful ingredients of Nazism. This was, of course, an irrationality, but an irrationality that was at the same time, after all, a certain form of rationality .... This is the situation that we are in and that we must combat. If intellectuals in general are to have a function, if critical thought itself has a function, and, even more specifically, if philosophy has a function within critical thought, it is precisely to accept this sort of spiral, this sort of revolving door of rationality that refers us to its necessity, to its indispensability, and at the same time, to its intrinsic dangers.’ (Michel Foucault in Rabinow, 1991: 239).

Implicit in this analysis is a sophisticated understanding of the relations between power and knowledge, and of discourse as the meeting point of the two (Layder, 1994). In this Chapter, a theory of Foucauldian discourse analytics is elaborated which will be used subsequently to shape the research methodology. Here the way Foucault uses key concepts of power, knowledge, discourse, and rationality, are discussed.

**Power**

‘Of all the concepts used by sociologists, few are the source of more confusion and misunderstanding than power’ (Lenski, 1966: 52).

Whilst Habermasian communicative theory focuses on ‘distorted’ communications, Foucault analysed the relations and effects of power. Not the ‘distortions’ of power, because the very word implies deviation from a norm. For Foucault there is no norm for communication, or for the operation of power. Foucault systematised power in a way which distinguishes him from much postmodern (and previous) thinking. Unlike postmodernists such as Rorty and Lyotard, he does not see power as having a locus of sovereignty, but posits the alternative thesis that
power is exercised from innumerable points' (Foucault, 1990: 94). Modern power, for Foucault, is insidious, its relations of power not visibly emanating from a sovereign source, but masked as forms of truth and knowledge - a 'moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable .... Power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere' (op.cit.: 93). For Foucault, the agents of this normalising and disciplinary power included social scientists, psychologists, teachers. For our purposes, they might also be recognised as planners, policy analysts and researchers, and politicians. They also, significantly, include the citizens who internalise the codes and values of particular power regimes.

This ubiquitous view of power is considered by Haber (1994) as the unavoidable 'end result of any consistent poststructuralist or postmodern politics'. In arguing for a new politics of difference which accommodates the voice of the community she believes, further, that this view of power 'must be saved whatever else may turn out to be untenable in the postmodern or poststructuralist position' (op.cit.: 8). Haber, then, argues that Foucault sets an agenda which aims to empower minorities: 'his analysis of power paves the way for the multiplicity of yet-to-be specified "we's" necessary for poststructuralist and oppositional politics' (op.cit.: 89).

Foucault identified four 'cautionary prescriptions' for the understanding of power (Foucault, 1990: 98-101):

- Rule of immanence: power is not imposed on individuals (the juridical view), but instead is immanent in 'local centres', such as the relations between agents (planners, interest groups) and citizens. Power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere;

- Rule of continual variations: we should not focus on who has power, and who does not. The distribution of power varies continuously, so we should instead look for the pattern of modifications in its distribution.

- Rule of double conditioning: local centres and patterns of transformation are entwined within an overarching strategy. So, the wider context of a particular debate is critical to its form, content and outcome, and the implementation of a broad strategy depends fundamentally on the local power relations where it is deployed.

- Rule of the tactical polyvalence of discourses: the discursive formations that transmit and produce power relations are potentially reversible. 'We must make allowance for the
complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it. In like manner, silence and secrecy are a shelter for power, anchoring its prohibitions; but they also loosen its holds and provide for relatively obscure areas of tolerance’ (Foucault, op. cit.: 101).

The possibility of developing a sharper focus on these principles is greatly assisted by Foucault’s notion of techniques of power, exemplified by the physical arrangement of the prison as a means of surveillance (panopticism), which in turn facilitates a particular disciplinary regime (Foucault, 1979, discussed further in the next chapter). The focus of analysis of modern power, then, is not on the grand narratives of geopolitics or global economics, but on the ‘apparently humble and mundane mechanisms which appear to make it possible to govern: techniques of notation, computation and calculation; procedures of examination and assessment; the invention of devices such as surveys and representational forms such as tables; the standardisation of systems for training and the inculcation of habits; the inauguration of professional specialisms and vocabularies; building design and architectural forms - the list is heterogeneous and is, in principle, unlimited’ (Miller and Rose, 1993: 83). This is the key starting point for the development of methodology for this thesis.

Foucault did perhaps more than any recent philosopher to remind us of the crucial importance of power in the shaping and control of discourses, the production of knowledge, and the social construction of spaces. His analysis of modern power has often been read as negative institutionalised oppression, expressed most chillingly in his analysis of the disciplinary regime of the prison in *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1979). However, it is Foucault’s explanation of power as productive and local, rather than oppressive and hierarchical, that suggests real opportunities for agency and change (McNay, 1994). Whilst Foucault saw discourse as a medium which transmits and produces power, he points out that it is also ‘a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy’. So, at the same time as discourse reinforces power, it also ‘undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it’ (Foucault, 1990: 101).

Foucault, then, does not attempt to analyse discourse to reveal hidden meaning, but to spotlight the power relations within which discourse is embedded, which create the conditions of possibility of discourse. This type of analysis can tell us how particular hegemonic discourses operate. Instead of seeking the ultimate truth of arguments, the focus is turned towards how,
why, and by whom, 'truth' is attributed to particular arguments and not others. In particular, what types of thoughts, ideas and knowledges are accepted in, and marginalised or silenced by, policy processes? This association of values, power and techniques in the construction of knowledge can be understood as the rationality of discourse.

It is uncovering the historical conditioning of such relations which is the essential task of Foucauldian genealogy, to reveal: 'the union of erudite and local memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today .... What it really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledge against the claims of a unitary body of theory that would filter, hierarchise, and order them in the name of some true knowledge' (Foucault, 1980: 83).

**Power and institutions**

A further aspect of Foucault's analytics of power is the attention to institutions and governmentality:

'Foucault makes it possible to view the state as a strategic location in the political system - the terrain of power struggles which is at once an instrument and an outcome of these - which plays a crucial role in governing it, while at the same time being governed. This double aspect of government implies that while an increasing number of practices become part of the state, the state becomes more and more caught up in the struggles between political forces, whereby it cannot be unified and possess a 'rigorous functionality' (FN). ... the state can be seen as a dispersed unity whose cohesion is precarious because it is erected in power struggles which define its limits within society' (Dyrberg, 1997: 109).

Drawing from this perspective, one expects to find the operation of interests and the consequent power relations bearing on the construction of institutions, and of institutional practices. The policy process is problematised as an arena of 'guerrilla warfare of power struggles' (op.cit., 1997: 104), rather than as a manifestation of top down sovereignty:

'power relations have been 'progressively governmentalized, that is to say elaborated, rationalized, and centralised in the form of or under the auspices of state institutions' (FN44) ‘The state is caught up in ongoing processes of governmentalization that map out the terrain for political power struggles and the ways power is politically authorized. These processes play a crucial role in the structuring of relations between state and society’ (op.cit.).

Beauregard (forthcoming) argues that it is the operation of power on and within the institutions of planning that is central to the work of Flyvbjerg (1998), Allen (1996) and Huxley (1994b, 1996).
**Knowledge**

What we understand by knowledge and truth is critical in policy making, yet these concepts are rarely examined by those who theorise in policy analysis. Policy analysts and planners frequently claim that their work is based on rationality and objective reason. ‘Facts’ supporting arguments in policy making are generally supported by such claims to rationality. The postmodern critique of rationality poses a fundamental challenge to such manifestations of scientific objectivity: neither thought processes, nor ‘rational’ scientific experiments can lead to ultimate truth, therefore knowledge claims based on them are unfounded. This critique can be traced back to the attacks by Nietzsche and Heidegger on subjective rationalism, identified as the cornerstone of the philosophical discourse of modernity. The concepts of subject-centred reason and rationality developed from Descartes to Kant are seen to have a profound and continuing effect on Western society. The critique argues instead for an ‘irreducible plurality of incommensurable lifeworlds and forms of life, the local character of all truth, argument, and validity’ (McCarthy, introduction to Habermas, 1987).

Foucault attempts to break down the boundary between the natural and social sciences, arguing that truth, whatever its domain, is socially produced:

‘Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true ... Truth is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements’ (Foucault, in Fontana and Pasquino, 1991: 72-74).

So, in modern Western society, ‘truth’ is centred on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it’ (op.cit.: 51).

Foucault rarely separated knowledge from power, and the idea of ‘power/knowledge’ was of crucial importance:

‘we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests ... we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and that, by the same token, the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge. We should admit rather that power produced knowledge .. that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge ...’ (Foucault, 1979: 27).
From this perspective (anti-metaphysical, anti-ontological), Foucault recognises a danger in increasing rationalisation and technological development, following, but distinct from, the thinking of Weber, Heidegger, Adorno and Horkheimer. His work may be seen as 'a testament to sustained critical rationality with political intent' (Rabinow, 1991: 13).

Habermas, alternatively, presents a vigorous defence against the critique of modernism, based on his paradigm of 'communicative action'. He identifies with Hegel's notion of Absolute Knowledge, attacking the 'counter-enlightenment' of Nietzsche, and the two paths leading from Nietzsche into the present: through Heidegger to Derrida, and through Bataille to Foucault. Habermas portrays Foucault as 'irrationalist' (for example, Habermas 1981: 13). Foucault's response, however, is more subtle. More sympathetic observers interpret his view as being that reason should not be the focus of interest, as it represents 'neither our hope nor our nemesis' (Rabinow, 1991: 13). Foucault states that 'the relationship between rationalisation and excesses of power is evident... but the problem is: what to do with such an evident fact? Shall we try reason? To my mind, nothing would be more sterile. First, because the field has nothing to do with guilt or innocence. Second, because it is senseless to refer to reason as the contrary entry to nonreason. Lastly, because such a trial would trap us into the arbitrary and boring part of either the irrationalist or the rationalist' (Foucault, 1982: 208). This critical point seeks to steer the agenda away from rationality/irrationality, and towards knowledge/truth as qualities which are bestowed on statements rather than discovered as innate.

**Foucauldian discourse**

Discourse is often understood as the sum of communicative interactions. At the simplest level, when we talk to each other, we are engaged in 'discourse'. In this interpretation, discourse in policy making most obviously happens at public events such as meetings, inquiries, and in consultation processes surrounding the preparation of policies, plans and programmes. By extension, policy discourse can be understood as the bundle of exchanges which give shape to a particular policy-making process or debate, and researching policy discourse would entail analysing the meanings carried in discourse. This conceptualisation of discourse follows the work of Habermas on communicative action (e.g. Healey, 1997, Innes, 1995). For Foucault, in contrast, 'discourse' is understood as a complex entity which extends into the realms of ideology, strategy, language and practice, and is shaped by the relations between power and knowledge. Whilst Foucauldian discourses may shape what happens in public meetings and policy processes, such events are simply manifestations of their existence. In this conceptualisation, the continuous power struggles between competing discourses create the
conditions which shape the social and physical world, and construct the individual. Foucault’s analyses of the discourses of medicine and psychiatry, for example, showed the importance of discourses in constructing and maintaining social norms, in turn shaping individual identities by delimiting and conditioning thoughts and actions (Foucault, 1965, 1973). It was this controlling of discourse which was a central concern for Foucault. His work contains systematic attempts to understand why it was that in spite of the apparently infinite potential for creating and communicating ideas, thoughts, and language, there exists a ‘relative paucity or rarity of what it is possible to think and say at any one time’ (McNay, 1994: 86).

Here, drawing from Hajer’s work I adopt a definition of discourse which embraces both text and practice: ‘a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorisations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices through which meaning is given to physical and social realities’ (Hajer, 1995: 44). In this Foucauldian interpretation of discourse, power relations are central: ‘a discourse is an entity of repeated linguistic articulation, material practices and power-rationality configurations’ (Jensen, 1998).

Foucault’s view of the relationship between truth and power is one which refocuses inquiry. It suggests that questions about the ultimate truth of arguments are misplaced. We should instead ask how, why, and by whom, truth is attributed to particular arguments and not to others. This insight is of particular relevance to the understanding of the policy process as a political, rather than rational, form of decision making. It also helps us to understand why Foucault is not condemning rationality outright, but simply saying that rational and/or irrational arguments may be appropriated as ‘truth’ through the exercise of power:

‘We must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies. It is this distribution that we must reconstruct, with the things said and those concealed, the enunciations required and those forbidden, that it comprises; with the variants and different effects - according to who is speaking, his position of power, the institutional context in which he happens to be situated - that it implies; and with the shifts and reutilizations of identical formulas for contrary objectives that it also includes. Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are’ (Foucault, 1990: 101).

Here, Foucault is developing the idea that discourses are the media within which power and knowledge are deployed. Layder (1994) interprets it thus: ‘Foucault’s interest is the link between regimes of power based on conjunctions of discourses, knowledge and practice. In this analysis, discourse is seen as the meeting point of power and knowledge’. It is asserted by some (e.g. Norris and Whitehouse, 1988) that only through the identification of these discursive
formations can the effects of power be identified and opposed.

A further exciting area of Foucauldian inquiry is the relations between discourse, power and space. Foucault made extensive use of spatial metaphors to analyse transformations in discourses in terms of power. His interest was in the ‘dynamic, fragmentary potential of space’ (Marks, 1995: 68). A clear example is his use of Bentham’s panopticon as a diagram: for Foucault the panopticon is a physical, non-discursive space, which brings together functions such as surveillance and control with heterogeneous discourses including punishment, reform, education (op.cit.: 75). It therefore serves as an axiom for contemporary socio-political conditions, and can be interpreted as a means for creating a social ‘space-time’. Foucault’s focus on how discourses shape the form and function of places to reveal the workings of power suggests an exciting line of inquiry: how can different spaces be interpreted as ‘diagrams’ which may help to explain the workings of discourses in society? This approach may be applied not only to characteristic forms of place (in the way that Foucault analysed prisons, clinics), but also to forms of development such as infrastructure which are less about creating ‘places’, and more about shaping the dynamic ‘between places’. The spatial aspects of Foucault’s work are developed further in chapter 3.

**Control of discourse**

A key question for Foucault was why, given the infinite potential for meaning production in discourse, there is a ‘relative paucity or rarity of what it is possible to think and say at any one time’ (McNay, 1994: 86). In this shift to a genealogical perspective, signalled in his inaugural professorial lecture (Foucault, 1970), Foucault ‘takes the language-politics connection to a higher level of abstraction, one that permits us to go beyond the linguistically reflected power exchanges between persons and groups to an analysis of the structures within which they are deployed’ (Shapiro, 1981: 162). He seeks to explain the control of discourse not in terms of internal rules of formation - the essentially linguistic approach (Fairclough, 1992) - but in terms of a ‘series of external social forces - processes of control, selection, organisation and distribution’ (McNay, 1994: 86): procedures of exclusion which may be exercised through strategies of prohibition, division and rejection or the imposition of a ‘will to truth’. Discourse is further delimited by a series of ‘internal procedures of rarefaction’: the ‘commentary-principle’, the ‘author-principle’, and by disciplinary boundaries. In policy debates, we can interpret the commentary principle as the canonisation of certain texts: their elevation to unquestioned status. The author-principle assumes a classificatory function in discourse, by ‘manifesting the appearance of a certain discursive set, and indicating the status of this discourse within a society and culture’ (Foucault in Rabinow, 1984: 107). So, in policy making,
we should be aware that text produced by a particular organisation or individual carries meanings which extend beyond the qualities of the text itself, and which are attributable to the author. Policy analysts will be well aware of disciplinary boundaries which ‘keep the production of discourse and circulation of meaning within narrow confines, pushing a ‘whole teratology of knowledge beyond its margins’’ (McNay, 1994: 87, Foucault, 1970).

Foucault further identifies control through limiting access to discourse. Methods include speech rituals, societies of discourse, and the social appropriation of discourse. We may interpret these as, for example, professional jargon, elites, and the use of educational approaches to impose limits. Foucault weaves these principles into a theoretical frame, derived from interpretation and phenomenology, and Hegelian universal mediation, where discourse is embedded in the social relations of power.

Foucault’s work is helpful in facilitating a conceptualisation of policy discourse which is more useful, and more insightful, than an attempt to read policy making as either a scientific process, or as a process of argumentation. Policy discourse is reframed as a complex body of values (normative positions about how things ought to be), and related thoughts and practices - which includes communicative acts and scientific knowledge alongside unspoken actions and lay knowledge. How might this approach be applied to transport policy? Firstly, the social and political context of transport policy is provided by a constellation of discourses, some in harmony, some in competition. These include the role of the state in regulating transport; the importance of individual mobility; the priority given to economic activity; environmental sustainability. Each of these discourses is grounded in a particular set of contested values, expressed through its own language and practice. Transport policy processes at all levels are pursued within this field of discursive conflict, which shapes the relations of power and knowledge through the contestation of competing knowledge claims, and affects the fine grain of policy making. In the construction of policy processes, ground rules are set out for the creation of knowledge, by using certain data in certain methodologies. At this stage, judgements are made about what transport problems actually are, and which ones are worthy of attention. The specific ideas, practices and solutions which are possible in policy making at any particular time and place are conditioned. This is what we might understand as the construction of rationality of the policy process. This rationality defines the relationship between technical and lay knowledges, politics and communication, which will establish the legitimacy of policy. The policy processes can be understood as the transient and recurring arenas of conflict between these competing discourses. Gradually, transport ‘policy discourse’ emerges, which is gradually formed and reformed through many successive policy processes, reflecting the values, thoughts, languages and practices of successful discourses, as well as unresolved tensions. Because policy
processes occur at different levels and scales it follows that there is no single coherent discourse. Within a given policy setting, a particular set of local conditions - power and politics, geography, socio-economic factors - will result in a policy discourse which, although shaped by wider societal discourses and local struggles, remains unique. Local discourses are shaped by and in turn shape discourses at national or European levels. Transport policy discourse affects the social world, influencing the values we hold, and the ways we think and act - generating new ideas about the way we think about space and mobility, and affecting our lifestyles, economy and environment. A crucial element of this approach is that there is no final, once and for all, hegemonic policy discourse. Policy discourse is in constant flux and tension as different discourses continue their struggles for dominance. Instead of a final equilibrium, there is instead a continual reconstruction and shifting of the status quo. A single discourse may gain hegemony, and so may dominate the embedding of particular values and knowledge forms. But hegemonic discourses, even as they seek to reproduce themselves, create the conditions for oppositional discourses to emerge, and so are not inherently stable in their hegemony. This conceptualisation, summarised in Table 2, informs the later methodological discussion in Chapter 4, and in particular Table 5, which sets out the key elements of a Foucauldian discourse analytic approach.

Before continuing, it is important to address a dilemma familiar to those who have made use of Foucault’s work: his opposition to meta-theory. His position creates theoretical difficulties for those who see, in his work, the raw materials for a coherent analysis of the social world. After all, Foucault was never prescriptive: he clearly aimed to provide the tools for opposition, for others to take up. He did not suggest who should use them, or to what ends. Nevertheless, his work consistently developed and argued a theory of knowledge and power in discourse which is useful to those who are concerned with such issues. The way forwards was to accept that Foucault did not intend his theories to be used to create meta-theory – and this I attempt to avoid – but to use his theory in a more contingent way. This extract from an interview on the subject of geography illustrates the point:

‘it’s up to you, who are directly involved with what goes on in geography, faced with all the conflicts of power which traverse it, to confront them and construct the instruments which will enable you to fight on that terrain. And what you should basically be saying to me is, ‘you haven’t occupied yourself with this matter which isn’t particularly your affair anyway and which you don’t know much about’. And I would say in reply, ‘if one or two of these gadgets of approach or method that I’ve tried to employ with psychiatry, the penal system or natural history can be of service to you, then I shall be delighted. If you find the need to transform my tools or use others then show me what they are, because it may be of benefit to me’ (Foucault 1980a: 65).
Summary

Above I have set out the theoretical debate within which this thesis is located. I set out to explore the nature of power in spatial policy making, and in doing so utilised a theoretical approach which - although I did not realise its significance at first - has been a rallying point for at least some of those disaffected with the claimed hegemony of communicative theory. In developing a Foucauldian approach to researching spatial policy, I have focused squarely on issues of power and rationality. More specifically, in developing a research methodology, I have considered how Foucault’s work can help to analyse the subtle workings of power in complex policy processes. Foucauldian discourse analytics opens up lines of inquiry which focus on the micro-politics of struggles between competing discourses, over the construction of knowledges and rationalities that shape spatial policy processes. Table 2 sets out the key elements of Foucauldian discourse which have been identified in this chapter, and which form the basic elements of the analytical framework. Chapter 3 next expands on a further dimension of Foucault’s work which has already been alluded to – its spatiality. Spatialising Foucault’s discourse analytics completes the elaboration of the theoretical framework. Then in chapter 4 these elements are drawn together to build a conceptual framework which allows these elements to be operationalised.

Table 2. Key elements of Foucauldian discourse

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Chapter 3. Discourse analytics of spaces of mobility: towards specificity

'A whole history remains to be written of 'spaces' - which would at the same time be the history of powers - from the great strategies of geopolitics to the little tactics of the habitat' (Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*).

I have already pointed to the consensus among some planning theorists over the need for greater specificity over the ways 'power' is analysed in particular policy settings. A discussion of the full potential of Foucauldian discourse analysis in enhancing understanding of policy making would not be complete without considering the spatiality of Foucault's work. Focusing on the spatiality of power, and developing a more nuanced understanding of how power-space relations shape and are shaped by spatial planning processes, seems to be a particularly useful means of developing such specificity. The relations between power and space in spatial planning are a core concern in this thesis, with a specific focus on the spaces of mobility. In the brief discussion which follows I outline how planning theory has engaged with questions about power, space and mobility, the need to add mobility to the conceptual canvas of spatiality, the cultural politics of mobility and the place of policy knowledge. This discussion is contextualised with a brief synopsis of current problems in transport policy. Foucault's rather vague concept of heterotopia, and its use by different theorists, is discussed as a possible key to unlocking power-space.

Whilst some debates in planning theory have tended to become narrowly procedural, others have focused on how power relations are played out in the more substantive spaces of urban planning. Richard Sennett, for example, has clearly expressed how patterns of urban space reflect social divisions. However, there exists a clear gulf between those who debate planning procedures, and those who talk about the socio-spatial outcomes of these planning processes. As a result procedural debates in planning have become strangely aspatial. The arguments about space and power presented here are intended to relate as much to procedural debates ('how do we or should we make spatial policy?') as to more substantive debates ('what sort of spatial policies might have what effects?).

A crisis in planning for mobility

In urban and rural regions of the north, the seemingly relentless upward trend in road traffic has become one of the most urgent and damaging side effects of development. The social and
economic benefits of increasing mobility are rapidly being offset by damage to health, habitat and biosphere, by disruption of communities, and by the economic costs of traffic congestion. In the European Union, transport trends are undermining progress towards sustainable development targets (CEC, 1996b). In the 1990s the spaces of mobility, particularly in urban areas, have become spaces of increasing friction (congestion), haunted by the spectre of gridlock.

For several decades transport policy has pursued a goal of zero-friction: of creating free flowing networks of roads and railways facilitating unrestricted movement, and increase the reach of distribution networks. The inevitable consequence, it is now accepted (DOT, 1994), is that improved conditions for mobility encourage more movement. So, for example, new roads quickly become congested as travellers discover new journeys that can make use of a recently opened link road or bypass.

In some countries a turning point has been reached. In Britain, a massive road building programme launched by the Thatcher government in 1989 slowly subsided as the implications of traffic forecasts became clear: even the largest programme of construction since the Roman Empire could only alleviate congestion for a few years. It could not meet the rising demand for traffic movement. Transport decisions in Britain and elsewhere have become a focus of vocal public reaction and direct action. Infrastructure planning is now as much about conflict resolution as it is about ‘rational’ planning (Nijkamp and Blaas, 1994). Britain has now turned its attention to a new policy agenda, which embraces principles of integrated transport, demand management and sustainability. However in spite of dramatic policy change, the central importance of time savings in transport methodology continues to skew policy towards decongestion and high speed travel, creating difficulties for planning and financing spaces which are expressly designed to slow movement, such as pedestrianised and traffic calmed zones.

At this time of policy crisis, the governance of transport has become increasingly fragmented, and a transport market place is rapidly replacing public ownership and investment. Policy is increasingly responsive not only to those with regulatory power, but to those who hold capital, those who run services, and those with commercial interests in the outcome. The future development of road infrastructure, following the collapse of public investment, relies increasingly on the private sector. Within the contested policy space, market interests continue to press for decongestion as the central policy objective: keeping goods and services on the move. At the European level, plans are being shaped for infrastructure networks bringing high speed mobility between central and peripheral regions. The message here is that infrastructure brings social cohesion and single market prosperity (Richardson, 1997). In many other
countries, for example those in Central and Eastern Europe, a rapid growth in infrastructure provision is regarded as an inevitable step in gaining accession into the European club. In each case, even where the policy agenda has shifted away from road building, the aim remains one of removing congestion, of rapid movement, of ‘breaking the logjam’ of clogged transport spaces using a range of policy instruments (DETR, 1998). Policy remains driven by the utopia of a zero-friction society (Hajer, 1999).

The way forwards for mobility in society is not clear. There is a need to rethink, to bring new perspectives to bear in an attempt to understand the complexities of transport problems, the reasons why policy options are often strongly contested, and why implementation of policies may not necessarily bring about the expected outcomes. In this chapter, I explore how new perspectives on the understanding of space might be applied to these challenging questions of spatial mobility. I will utilise Foucauldian concepts of power-space and heterotopia in order to conceptualise spaces of mobility. Drawing from debates in the field of critical geography, I argue that these concepts help to elucidate a cultural politics of space which can lead to a more nuanced understanding of critical problems in planning for spatial mobility. A framework is then set out which identifies different types of spaces of mobility, which engages with cultural political debates, and provides some ideas for future research directions.

**Mobilising space**

Cultural geographers have often conceived of space in a static way, with particular attention to the exclusionary effects of different uses of space, and hence to the boundaries that separate different functional spaces. Richard Sennett, for example, provides a powerful analysis of the city suburbs as purified, exclusionary social space (Sennett, 1970). Sennett’s studies of city planning reveal how social exclusion is enforced through planning as a means of dealing with social tensions: ‘faced with the fact of social hostility ... the planner’s impulse is to seal off conflicting sides’ (Sennett, 1990: 201). David Sibley probes further into the spatial dimensions of exclusionary social practices: ‘... to expose oppressive practices, it is necessary to examine the assumptions about inclusion and exclusion which are implicit in the design of spaces and places.’ (Sibley, 1995: x). He calls for a critical geography which examines mechanisms of exclusion, including the creation of boundaries, and regimes of control over activity in space, from the perspective of the excluded. Sibley suggests that features in the urban landscape such as parks and childrens’ playgrounds, and domestic interiors, are also supervised and controlled spaces which ‘signal’ exclusion. The purified environment of the shopping mall, where deviations from norms of behaviour can be quickly identified and excluded, illustrates this point.
The emphasis on fixed sites and boundaries fails to lead to engagement with questions about mobility, thus precluding what would seem to be a fruitful area of study in relation to exclusion. Studying the cultural struggles which take place within spaces of mobility seems to be an important aspect of the production of spaces and boundaries, which may in turn enrich understanding of the complex relations between processes of spatial planning and the production of social exclusion.

**The cultural politics of mobility: from zero-friction society to a culture of congestion?**

The idea of zero-friction has captured the imaginations of some of the great urban thinkers: ‘what nobler agent has culture or civilisation than the great open road made beautiful and safe for continually flowing traffic, a harmonious part of a great whole life? Along these grand roads as through human veins and arteries throngs city life, always building, building, planning, working’ (Lloyd Wright, 1963: 147). Such utopian visions have been subject to more critical analysis. Erik Swyngedouw has argued that daily life is shaped by a culturally and temporally specific set of transportation, communication and mobility patterns which constitute ‘territorial organisation’ (Swyngedouw, 1993: 310). In late capitalist society, these patterns have increasingly been organised around the importance of rapid mobility for the growth of markets, and of shrinking space. The objective of planning in the era of high speed travel has been frictionless existence rather than meaningful human interaction (Hajer, 1999). Castells has described the process as the creation of a ‘space of flows’ which supplants the ‘space of places’ (Castells, 1996). Within cities, for example, urban spaces ‘have been systematically designed and organised to ensure that collisions and confrontations will not take place there’ (Berman, 1988: 165, cited in Jackson, 1998: 188). The urban street is one field of struggle here, where the street-level intermingling of economic and cultural activity described by Jane Jacobs (Jacobs, 1961) has been displaced by unrestricted car access, and road building, and the segregation of pedestrians (Wistrich, 1983). Similarly, shopping malls and other retail developments have been planned to reduce the risk of unplanned social encounters, part of a ‘purification of space’ (Sibley, 1988). Jacobs was one of the first urban geographers to identify the importance of the street as public domain rather than functional space of movement, calling for the attrition of the private car and the reclamation of pedestrian space within the street scene.

Foucault stressed the importance in this process not of what he called urbanists or architects, but of the civil engineers, who he called the ‘developers of the territory’: ‘[Architects] are not the technicians or engineers of the three great variables – territory, communication and speed’
Politicians and economic interests should also be identified as important drivers and agents of change, although it is questionable whether urban and regional planners have played a decisive role in the development of transportation networks. In the UK, for example, the objective of transport policy since the 1960s has been the restructuring space to meet the expectations and needs of a late-modern high mobility society: creating a motorway and subsidiary road system for rapid inter-urban travel, and facilitating a long distance goods distribution network. The key players in this process were not the land use planners, due to the institutional separation of transport from land use planning during this period.

However, the contemporary crisis of mobility has rocked the foundation of the zero-friction dystopia. The hegemony of car culture may be over, and the open question is whether new cultures of mobility will take its place. The spaces of mobility are likely to be where these new cultural forms are expressed, and so it becomes clear that, on the cusp of a change in the cultural politics of mobility, it is necessary to understand the dynamics happening in these spaces. Peter Jackson, for example, calls for a more culturally sensitive social geography of the high street and the shopping mall, moving from an analysis confined to the loss of public space and its transformation into privatised commodity spaces, to an appreciation of the differentiated ways in which people experience these highly contested spaces (Jackson, 1998). This type of study needs to be carried out for spaces of mobility as well as for spaces of consumption.

Hajer, echoing Jane Jacobs, has argued more generally that the alternative to a culture of zero-friction is a culture of congestion. Instead of designing public spaces as functional spaces of movement or consumption (or other activities), he advocates the deliberate introduction of public domain (Hajer, 1999), where positive congestion adds quality to daily life by enriching the cultural experience of (say) travel or shopping. He questions, though, whether designers and planners know how to construct public domain, rather than public space. He advocates that the development of infrastructure nodes as the new urban spaces with a strong public domain should become a key concern in thinking about urban design.

Such cultural-political debates have taken place in a different arena to the applied research which underpins transport policy making. Much empirical research related to transportation planning has consisted of reductionist economic and transportation analyses of the effects (potential and actual) of infrastructure. As a result, a technological legitimising discourse has emerged: a language of engineering, economics and science which masks the power struggles bound up in planning for mobility. Rarely have studies focused on the cultural impacts of infrastructure, as new patterns of mobility lead to 'disempowerment and exclusion of particular social groups while propelling others to new commanding heights' (Swyngedouw, 1993: 305).
However, the ways in which transport policy impacts on the production of spaces of mobility seems likely to be far more complex and contested than can be grasped within such analyses. In the analytical processes of transport policy making, space is often reduced to either an engineering problem, to a series of economic indicators, or to models where generic traffic flows between point spaces. What seems clear, though, is that as transport policy transforms physical space, and the possibilities for movement within it, it also ‘defines, shapes and transforms social relationships and daily practices’ (op. cit., 1993: 310). The policy knowledge within transport is based on technical analysis, rather than an appreciation of the cultural significance and contested nature of space. These subtle socio-spatial effects are not generally captured in policy making. However, by being blinkered to the heterotopic nature of space, what is also lost to policy knowledge is the possibility of understanding how: ‘mobility itself is part and parcel of the process of uneven development and of consolidating asymmetrical power relationships’ (op. cit.: 323).

At a time of crisis in planning for mobility there is a need to rethink, to bring new perspectives to bear in an attempt to understand the complexity of planning for mobility. This paper explores how insights from the current cultural turn in spatial theory might be applied to these challenging questions. Foucauldian concepts of power-space and heterotopia are utilised in order to conceptualise a cultural politics of spaces of mobility. A framework is presented which specifies five different spatialities of mobility: the dynamics of movement between spaces across transport infrastructure; the nodal spaces of infrastructure networks; the consumption of space by infrastructure; the fixed spaces of mobility and the mobile spaces of mobility. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for research.

**Developing a theoretical framework**

*Foucault empowering space*

Foucault’s work on discourse, knowledge and power has frequently been referred to by theorists engaged in procedural debates in planning. However the implicit spatiality of his work has regularly been ignored as his thinking has been injected into procedural arguments. The potential of Foucault’s work in developing a more nuanced socio-spatial theory has clearly been recognised by critical geographers (e.g. Philo, 1987, Sibley, 1995). However there is disagreement over whether the full import of Foucault’s arguments (and also those of Lefebvre, which Soja argues bear some similarities) has been properly addressed by many of those in the spatial disciplines. Soja calls for ‘a critical re-reading of the presuppositional work on space, knowledge and power by Henri Lefebvre and Michel Foucault’ (Soja, 1997: 246).
Above, I have suggested that Foucault’s work on power, knowledge and discourse could be helpful in understanding policy processes in urban and regional planning. The inherent spatiality of Foucault’s thinking adds a distinctive further dimension to discourse that would seem to make his work particularly relevant to understanding spatial planning, and places his potential contribution beyond the artificial boundaries of procedural theory. The importance of Foucault’s attempted ‘spatialisation of reason’ has been discussed elsewhere (e.g. Flynn, 1993, Marks, 1995, Casey, 1996). Space was a major concern for Foucault: ‘Yes. Space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power’ (Foucault 1980b). Spatial imagery is commonplace in his work, an attempt to challenge existing models of human thought and to develop his own thinking on power (Marks, 1995). Foucault linked space with the operation of discourses - and hence the ‘microphysics of power’ (Foucault, 1979: 139). He saw space as both socially constructed and actually lived, ‘concrete and abstract at the same time, the habitus of social practices’ (Foucault, 1986:143).

Foucault’s critique, in Discipline and Punish, of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon is perhaps the archetypal example of this linkage (Foucault, 1979). Bentham published his plan for the panopticon in 1791. The object was to create a prison arranged in a ‘semi-circular pattern with an inspection lodge at the centre and cells around the perimeter. Prisoners ... in individual cells, were clearly open to the gaze of the guards, but the same was not true of the view the other way. By a carefully contrived system of lighting and the use of wooden blinds, officials would be invisible to the inmates. Control was to be maintained by the constant sense that prisoners were watched by unseen eyes. There was nowhere to hide, to be private. Not knowing whether or not they were watched, but obliged to assume that they were, obedience was the prisoners’ only rational option’ (Lyon, 1993: 655-656). Foucault explains the panopticon as a physical space which, through its design, permits physical functions such as surveillance and control of prisoners, and in so doing makes possible the prevailing modern social discourses of punishment, reform, and education (Marks, 1995: 75). The panopticon therefore serves as an axiom for contemporary socio-political conditions, illustrating how surveillance and control are reproduced in the fine grain of daily life, in cities where ‘factories resemble schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons’ (Foucault, 1979: 228).

However, Giddens (1984) singled out Foucault’s carceral approach for special criticism. He argues that the notion of the total institution is inappropriate beyond the boundaries of specific sites such as prisons. Whilst this argument about boundedness may hold, the point Foucault makes is that the physical design of prisons can be seen as a manifestation of wider discourses in society, as may other spaces. It is not the idea of the total institution that is taken in this study as being crucial, but the inherent connection between discourse and space. Furthermore,
Giddens' reading of Foucault falls into the camp of those who see his work as simply coercive and oppressive. Alternative readings exist: if spaces may be constructed, in this way, to allow certain forms of control, they may also be reconstructed by others, to serve different functions.

For example, Jonathan Crush has explored the value of Foucault's genealogical approach to space to show how mining compounds in Africa, designed using panoptic principles, are not simply environments for repression and coercion, but that they 'were also sites for the development and practice of rich oppositional cultures, linked by complex power geometries to the immediate environs and the more distant countryside called 'home' (Crush, 1994: 320). Crush cites During's argument that Foucault's writings make room for the articulation and dispersion of silenced or marginalised knowledges, putting 'pressures on the institutions and modes of thought that cause misery by failing to hearken to the demands of their subjects' (During, 1992: 127).

Spaces, then, may be constructed in different ways by different interests, through power struggles and conflicts. This idea that spaces are socially constructed and contested, and that many spaces may co-exist within the same physical space is an important one. It suggests the need to analyse how discourses and strategies of inclusion and exclusion are connected with particular spaces.

The construction of the panopticon therefore creates a social 'space-time': it creates or makes possible a particular set of practices and knowledges that are specific in both space and time. In this way, social norms are embedded in daily life, and the individual is 'constructed' to think and act in particular ways. Through this type of analysis it becomes possible to understand, for example, how different planning policies construct their own 'space-time'.

For example, discourses of personal freedom and mobility may require transport policies which produce transport spaces which are dominated, for example, by high speed private transport, at the expense of other types of movement. In this way, the late-modern citizen is constructed as an increasingly mobile individual, rejecting barriers to freedom of movement, constantly increasing their boundaries of mobility. The pattern of daily life adapts to the opportunities of increased mobility, and land use patterns shift to accommodate the new trends. Conversely, discourses of accessibility, which recognise the mobility needs of those who, for example, do not have access to a car, or wish to travel by other modes, may require policies which intervene to restrict the opportunities of movement by private car. Physical spaces may be characterised by pedestrianisation and traffic calming.
Foucault's heterotopias

Although spatiality is a constantly present dimension of his work, Foucault never fully established a consistent theoretical approach to space. In a 1967 paper to the Architectural Studies Circle in Paris, the title of which has been translated variously as 'Of other spaces' and 'Different spaces' (Foucault, 1986, 1999), he introduced the concept of heterotopias – 'sites which juxtapose in a single real social 'place' several spaces' (Marks, 1995: 69), a notion which developed from his work on the prison. The paper, which Foucault withheld from publication for many years, until just before his death, appears more as work in progress than a coherently argued thesis. Heterotopic space was outlined in such imprecise terms that it has been subject to widely different interpretations. Heterotopia, it appears, has become a vague and carelessly used term (Edensor, 1998: 218, Hetherington, 1996: 158, Soja 1996:11). The importance of this aspect of Foucault’s work is seen by some to be overrated because of the absence of detailed elucidation (eg Barnett, 1997). However, even Foucault’s scant discussion of heterotopias provides spatial enrichment to a reading of his more substantial works, and it is in the context of his wider body of work, rather than a single essay, that the concept should be considered.

Heterotopias have been interpreted as marginal spaces which function beyond the constraints of social norms. Heterotopias are contested spaces, where coercion – as in Bentham’s panopticon – and resistance are at play. The point is perhaps not to conceptualise heterotopias purely as marginal spaces where the social order collapses - the heterotopia as a ‘space of liberty outside of social control’ (Harvey, 1996: 230) – but as the spaces where the prevailing social order is contested exactly where and as it is being reproduced. Heterotopias are spaces that make a difference. They may either serve to protect and reproduce social discourses, in the way that the prison does, or they may challenge and destabilise the social order. Or both. And, as Casey argues, ‘to make a difference in the social fabric, a heterotopia must possess a focus for the application of force. This focus is found in the marginal location of the heterotopia itself.’ (Casey, 1996: 300). Casey describes Foucault’s later work as a search for these ‘other spaces’, sites which ‘punctuated the historical and political order of things’, or where the existing order of things was challenged (op.cit.). Similarly, Soja describes Foucault’s studies of the asylum, the prison, the school and the body as microgeographies of heterotopias (Soja, 1997).

Foucault’s arguments elsewhere help to clarify the nature of heterotopias as spaces where struggles between coercion and liberation are played out: ‘I do not think that it is possible to say that one thing is of the order of ‘liberation’ and another of the order of ‘oppression’. There are a number of things that one can say with some certainty about a concentration camp to the effect that it is not an instrument of liberation, but one should still take into account – and this is not generally acknowledged – that aside from torture and execution, which preclude any resistance,
no matter how terrifying a given system may be, there always remain the possibilities of resistance, disobedience, and oppositional groupings' (Foucault, 1989: 338).

Heterotopic spaces may not be ‘on the edge’, either culturally or spatially (Casey, 1996). They may well be closer to home: the everyday ‘characteristic spaces of the modern world’ (Soja, 1993: 141). Within these lived spaces (motorways, urban streets, railway stations, city squares, cars and buses, and so on) it may be possible to identify the struggles being played out between strategies seeking to order space according to particular interests, and counter-strategies which seek to re-order these spaces, or to disrupt attempts to impose order. So, whilst studying the cultural chaos of streets in India may reveal disruptive heterotopic qualities where ‘the flow of expectations learnt in the sterile spaces of the West are shattered’ (Edensor, 1998: 218), the transgressive potential of heterotopias that ‘erodes epistemological and ontological security, disrupting the common sense meanings of space’ (op.cit.: 218), may equally be found within the western streetscape.

It does not seem fruitful to prepare lists of certain types of physical space as universally recognisable heterotopias. Foucault talked of the different heterotopic qualities of the garden, the fairground, cemetery and church, theatre, museum, library, barracks and prison, holiday village, hammam, sauna, brothel and colony. But all of these examples of heterotopias are culturally and temporally specific. As Foucault said, ‘there is probably not a single culture in the world that fails to constitute heterotopias’ (Foucault, 1970: 25). At the turn of the millennium in western Europe, and in other industrialised and post-industrial societies, spaces of mobility are becoming heterotopic, reflecting the contemporary state of crisis in transport. These spaces, which have been shaped by the hegemonic economic and political discourses of mobility and zero-friction, have become sites of friction and struggle: some of them obvious sites of conflict (such as direct action protests against road building for example), others more subtle (reclaiming the pedestrian environment from the car). Studying the heterotopic nature of spaces of mobility at this moment in space and time therefore appears to hold promise in understanding why spatial planning is in such difficulties with the question of mobility.

**Genealogies of space (heterotopology)**

The analysis of heterotopias called for by Foucault is genealogical (Flynn, 1994: 42): the purpose is to reveal strategy and conflict, not just to provide description. Heterotopias are not intended simply as a new category of ‘other spaces’ to add to the established ways of thinking spatially. ‘they are meant to detonate, to deconstruct, not to be comfortably poured back into old containers’ (Soja, 1996: 163). Foucault’s project is to emphasise the dynamic, fragmentary potential of space, and to destabilise utopian conceptions of space - for example, that territorial
governance is based on the premise that the state is like a large city (Foucault, 1989: 336). A genealogy of spaces of mobility might therefore ask: what are the dominant knowledges of space? and consequently, what (cultural) knowledges of space are either quietly hegemonic, or alternatively marginalised or silenced by this dominance? And what are the specific practices in policy making that permit these spatial power relations to occur and be reproduced?

Foucault’s focus on how discourses shape the form and function of places to reveal the workings of power suggests a further exciting line of inquiry: how can different spaces be interpreted as ‘diagrams’, or axioms of power, which may help to explain the presence and operation of discourses in planning? This genealogical approach may be applied not only to recognisable places such as shopping malls (in the way that Foucault analysed prisons and clinics), but also to forms of development such as transport infrastructure which are less about creating new spaces, and more about shaping the dynamic between other spaces. Researching spaces of mobility in a genealogical way seems likely to be particularly fruitful. Planning for mobility can thus be understood as a field where discourses contest the strategic control of spaces of mobility. The physical construction and use of these spaces is shaped by these struggles. A certain spatialised praxis emerges through the exercise of techniques of power. We should look for the effects of power in the shaping of praxis, not only in the practice of planning, but also within theoretical planning debates. Debates where the rationality of planning, and its explanation of space, are formulated.

**A framework for spatialities of mobility**

The problem, then, is how to introduce some specificity to the study of space in a way which could provide helpful insights into the cultural politics of planning for spatial mobility. Below, I set out a framework which specifies five different spatialities of mobility – different types of relations between spaces and mobility – exploring the utility of concepts of power-space and heterotopia (see table 3). These spatialities address: the dynamics of movement between spaces across transport infrastructure; the nodal spaces of infrastructure networks; the consumption of space by infrastructure; the fixed spaces of mobility and the mobile spaces of mobility. Worsening economic, social and environmental impacts of transport, and changing policy agendas, create new spatial tensions and recast old ones, as the specific construction of these different spatialities of mobility is contested in myriad spatial policy processes.
Table 3. Spatialities of mobility

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Managing the dynamics between spaces: infrastructure and mobility

The first space of mobility I will introduce is the systems of infrastructure – motorways, railways, airports, telecommunications and other networks - that facilitate mobility across and between spaces. These networks are an important first spatiality of mobility because their development is bound up closely with the development of spatial relations in society. Foucault historically pointed to the impact of the construction of the railroads as a major change in power space relations. (Foucault, 1989: 338). The spatial effects of infrastructure networks are shaped by the hegemonic strategies of geo-politics and market forces, yet they are also increasingly contested in a field of cultural political engagement. The uncertain development of infrastructure networks has become one facet of the struggle between the spatiality of alternative futures.

The central place of mobility and infrastructure in the reproduction of capitalist society has been explored previously (by eg Harvey, 1982, Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, Swyngedouw, 1993). In neo-marxist and post-structuralist readings, infrastructure development is managed by the state as part of a process of territorial organisation. Infrastructure development brings liberation from existing spatial barriers, and ‘time-space compression’ occurs as barriers of distance are removed (Harvey, 1982, 1985, Janelle, 1969). Movement across space becomes a strategic necessity for the functioning of markets and the state itself, and therefore mobility becomes a governed activity: 'It is not at all that the state knows nothing of speed; but it requires that movement, even the fastest, cease to be the absolute state of a moving body occupying a smooth space, to become the relative characteristic of a “moved body” going from one point to another in striated space’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 386).

Enhancing mobility is a ‘necessary element in the struggle for maintaining, changing or consolidating social power’ (Swyngedouw, 1993). However, as Swyngedouw realises, the liberation of mobility, which assists the development of a globalised economy, merely
reconstitutes boundaries, and creates new patterns of exclusion among changing sub groups in society: ‘mobility itself is part and parcel of the process of uneven development and of consolidating asymmetrical power relationships’ (op.cit.: 323).

The development of infrastructure networks reconfigures power relations in society as it, ‘defines, shapes and transforms social relationships and daily practices’ (op.cit.: 310). A link is thus drawn between the macro level of strategic infrastructure planning, and the micro level of activities and perceptions in everyday life. The outcome of the progressive removal of barriers to mobility through the introduction of new infrastructure leads, however, to the reconstruction of barriers rather than to their removal. The planning of infrastructure networks is therefore a potentially powerful tool in shaping the social world, affecting issues of equity and exclusion related to mobility: ‘Liberation from spatial barriers can only take place through the creation of new communication networks, which in turn, necessitates the construction of new (relatively) fixed and confining structures’ (op.cit.: 306).

At the European level, however, the need for infrastructure remains a dominant force in transport policy, and this is the focus of this thesis.

Nodal Spaces

Maarten Hajer has discussed how nodal spaces of mobility – railway stations, airports, transport interchanges for example – are frequently designed as ‘mono cultural zero friction enclaves’ (Hajer, 1999). These spaces function in a disciplined way, as machines for movement, designed to move people smoothly between one form of transport and another. Hajer cites Calatrava’s multi-modal station at the 1998 Lisbon EXPO, where the ‘symbolic strength of the design is the almost religious celebration of mobility and movement, of frictionless speed, of the smooth flows of people and vehicles’ (op.cit.: 14). His critique is that even though attention is paid to the policy turn towards integrated transport, there is no cultural sensitivity: ‘what is the meaning of the mobility that is being celebrated? Where do people go? Where do they come from? What is the meaning of their movement?’ (op.cit.: 14). Elsewhere, Castells has similarly discussed the functional design of Barcelona airport: ‘in the middle of the cold beauty of this airport passengers have to face their terrible truth: they are alone, in the middle of the space of flows ... they are suspended in the emptiness of transition. They are, literally, in the hands of Iberia Airlines’ (Castells, 1996: 421). Rem Koolhas theorises this design of spaces of frictionless movement as architecture’s engagement with the process of delocalisation (Koolhas, 1995).

As transport policy turns towards integration of modes, and towards a reassertion of the role of public transport, the tendency is to pursue the functional model. The objectives concern how
quickly, and smoothly, travellers can complete their transitions between buses, cars, trains and planes. Cultural interests are overlooked in this friction-free utopianism. Instead of taking advantage of the new possibilities for meaningful interaction which are provided in the grand interchanges of late capitalism, the agenda of efficient crowd handling dominates.

By focusing his analysis on the transport node, Hajer addresses the role of architects, planners and urban designers in attending to a particular static component of the network of mobile spaces: the nodal spaces which travellers enter at fixed points on their journeys. Certainly the transport node provides opportunities for these professions of space to engage with questions of public domain and friction. But the spaces of mobility require further analysis, and Hajer’s arguments hold relevance for other spaces of mobility where friction and public domain may be at stake.

**Infrastructure consuming space**

If infrastructure plays a central but contested role in the development of spatial relations in society, and in creating, breaching and redrawing boundaries, then it also plays a more direct role in re-shaping the concrete spaces where it is constructed. The hegemonic strategy of constantly improving and expanding infrastructure networks has resulted in myriad locally contested spaces, where new roads, airports, or high speed railway lines, are proposed and constructed. These projects directly supplant urban and rural communities, habitats, and landscapes. Lefebvre describes the consumption of space by transport infrastructure thus: ‘urban space tends to be sliced up, degraded and eventually destroyed by this contradictory process: the proliferation of fast roads and of places to park and garage cars, and their corollary, a reduction of tree-lined streets, green spaces, and parks and gardens’ (Lefebvre, 1991: 359).

Perhaps the most apparent aspect of the cultural politics of mobility in the 1990s has been the way that proposals for new infrastructure projects have become foci of organised opposition. Indeed, these individual local protests have grown into a broader cultural political movement: ‘Protesting about roads has become that rarest of British phenomena, a truly populist movement drawing supporters from all walks of life’ (The Economist, 19 February 1994). This movement is claimed to be at least partially responsible for the demise of the British roads programme: ‘The once mighty Department (of Transport) has been humbled by groups of local people around the country who have risen up in revolt against its destructive road schemes’ (Alarm UK, 1996). Within these cultural movements, particular spaces may emerge as causes célèbre: ‘In a way that nobody ever wanted, the destruction of Twyford Down has become a symbol of everything that is senseless and sacrilegious about this country’s obsession with road building’ (Bryant, 1996: 309). So the concrete space of the M3 motorway, which today slices through the
open downland, can be understood as a heterotopic space, a space which has been the subject of one particular localised cultural struggle, which captures and reflects a more general cultural problem with mobility.

As the transport agenda has shifted, so these spaces of protest have broadened to include other infrastructure projects, such as the Betuwe rail freight line in the Netherlands, which is planned to cut through a number of ecologically important sites, or neighbourhood level opposition when disused railway lines – which have been reclaimed as cycle and pedestrian paths, or wildlife corridors – are turned to new transport uses such as tramways. In urban areas particularly, these concerns have sometimes been expressed differently, in a backlash against the loss of public domain to spaces of mobility. A growing social movement seeks to symbolically reclaim streets from the car, through non-violent direct action. For a brief time, spaces have been forced back into the public domain as roads have been blocked and street parties and theatre have taken over. Sometimes cars have been burned, and tarmac torn up to plant trees.

The nature of contests over infrastructure spaces is shifting with the current policy turn. In the mobility crisis in Britain, the relations of power which linked infrastructure development with economic growth have broken down. Uncertainty has replaced inevitability. The idea has recently been introduced into the policy debate that, now it is accepted within policy discourse that new roads bring extra traffic, then perhaps removing roads will cause traffic to dissipate. This counter-intuitive thesis has been supported by recent empirical research (Cairns et al, 1998). The longstanding hegemony of infrastructure over other forms of space, protected by deeply embedded policy knowledge, is appearing increasingly fragile. Increasingly, the interests which have for many years been associated with infrastructure development, are shifting ground, moving into debates about improving network efficiency, rather than adding more roadscape.

So the struggles over specific roads and other infrastructure projects – either where new proposals threaten habitats or communities, or where the tide is turning and they may be threatened by the inevitable logic of their own construction - are deeply affected by the cultural politics of the moment. These examples from the British experience reflect developments in some other post-industrial societies. Elsewhere, the cultural politics of infrastructure may vary greatly. In the countries of Central Europe seeking accession to the European Union, for example, transport and communications infrastructure development is a core condition for entry, and personal mobility is a highly valued commodity in post-Communist states.
Fixed spaces of mobility

It is becoming clear that with the retreat from infrastructure provision, policy attention is shifting to managing the use of finite network space. Here, roadspace is the primary contested territory, a space where the private car and the goods vehicle have maintained a longstanding hegemony. Historically, part of the process of development has been the waging of a losing struggle to defend roadspace as public domain. Streets and highways have become the archetypal spaces where the goal of zero-friction has been equated with the freedom of movement of cars and trucks, the loss of space for public transport and more vulnerable modes such as cyclists and pedestrians, and the diminution of the cultural richness and potential of the street domain. Roadspace has become carspace.

In some cultures, though, carspace has not achieved hegemony, as Soja’s description of one street in Amsterdam shows: ‘One cannot avoid noticing that the automobile is an intruder in the Centrum. Spuistraat, like so many others, is a street designed and redesigned for pedestrians and cyclists. Alongside the busy bike path there is a busy one way car lane and some newly indented parking spaces, but this accommodation to the automobile is tension-filled and wittily punctuated. The police are always ready to arrive with those great metal wheel clamps and the spectacle of their attachment usually draws appreciative, occasionally cheering and laughing crowds of onlookers. Traffic is nearly always jammed, yet (most of the time) the Dutch drivers wait patiently, for they know they are guilty of intrusion and wish to avoid the steel jaws of public disapprobation. I was told that the city planners have accepted the need to construct several large underground parking garages in the gridlocked Centrum, but only with the provision that for every space constructed below ground, one space above is taken away’ (Soja, 1996: 286). Hajer talks similarly of the reclamation of public domain at Covent Garden, of the ‘undoing’ of the space from car dominance (Hajer, 1999).

In policy making, roadspace is the new contested territory (Goodwin, 1996). The new agenda of sustainable mobility is beginning to embrace the reallocation of road space as a core concept, providing more space for buses, cyclists and pedestrians, and introducing various means of controlling the car by introducing friction through traffic calming devices. This shift can be seen as part of a cultural turn: ‘...traffic calming is far from being a witch-hunt policy against the car. It will be the struggle for the ‘emancipation’ of the pedestrian, the reclamation of public and cycle transport and the preservation of the historic environment’ (Hass-Klau 1990: 4). The struggles over reallocation of roadspace, and the extent to which friction is deliberately used to control the car, will be played out in many local settings, in individual streets and neighbourhoods. These struggles will shape transport policies which favour particular interests over others (for example motorised vehicles over cyclists or pedestrians, buses over cars,
moving traffic over parked vehicles, parked vehicles over public space, freight over private traffic, travellers over non-travellers). They will be politically contested, and outcomes will be shaped by power struggles between citizens, interest groups, as well as local politicians, planners and highway engineers.

Mobile spaces of mobility

So far, I have discussed the spaces which are often filled by the car, rather than the car itself as a mobile space. Yet the significance of the car in industrial society cannot be ignored: 'In the hundred years of its existence the motor vehicle has been a constant source of anxiety, love, hatred, condemnation and political bickering, and we don’t seem to be anywhere near the end of it' (Colin Buchanan, cited in Hass-Klau, 1990: 258).

Car culture is grounded in the frictionless utopia: in modern society the car is constructed as a private space which provides freedom of mobility whilst providing comfort, protection and security from the risks and inconvenient encounters of public space. But the car is more than a functional provider of mobility. It has become a symbol of freedom, for example as a cornerstone of Margaret Thatcher’s ‘great car society’ in 1980s Britain. The car is being reconstructed more ambiguously in the current policy turn, as the utopian image of the open road perpetuated through advertising is displaced by the more frequent reality of the gridlocked street. This condition has generated cultural responses which directly threaten the previously sacrosanct internal space of the car. Road rage, a 1990s phenomena, shatters the illusions of safety and privacy of car travellers (Macnaghten and Urry, 1998). Other more vulnerable road users, typically cyclists and pedestrians, have also become more assertive in protecting their space, with new forms of direct action such as walking over cars parked illegally on pavements, or responding aggressively to the intimidating behaviour of car drivers. The vulnerability of these other users of road space is deliberately brought to into play.

The cultural problem of mobility centres on the place of the car in our daily lives. As the mobile space of the car becomes vulnerable and contested, and its space on the road is challenged, questions arise about the construction of other mobile spaces – particularly other forms of mass transportation. Commonplace spaces of mobility - buses, trains and planes - may hold particular cultural significance. These spaces are constructed to accommodate particular types of traveller – from the spartan functionality of the mass transit underground trains carrying workers from residential to industrial zones in eastern European cities, to the cosseted executive spaces within jet aircraft. Mass public transport systems can become spaces of exclusion, used by those who need to travel but do not have access to a car. In other cases, it is precisely the socially excluded
who are barred from 'public' transport. People living in rural areas or in certain parts of cities, may find public transport is not oriented to meet their needs. In culturally divided societies, access to public transport has sometimes been regulated. Lack of mobility has become a recognised dimension of social exclusion in the UK.

Again, arguments about reconstructing public domain in the mobile spaces of mobility apply. Liniado, for example, argues that there is an opportunity to take advantage of new communications technology, among other developments, to provide opportunities for the 'repackaging of traditional travel experiences... transforming trains and buses from utilitarian forms of transport to cruise ships on wheels’ (Liniado, 1996: 68). In this way, travelling by public transport might become an opportunity for cultural experience rather than a frustrating or dangerous engagement over congested roadspace.

A discourse analytics of spaces of mobility

The Foucauldian genealogical approach appears to hold promise in developing a discourse analytics of spaces of mobility. Utilising Foucauldian concepts of power-space and heterotopia, I set out a framework specifying five different spatialities of mobility. The brief discussion of each spatiality begins to suggest the contribution that this approach has to offer, and provides a framework which helps to locate the analysis of the trans-European transport network alongside other studies of aspects of mobility. Pursuing such lines of inquiry seem likely to bring specificity to understanding the cultural politics of mobility as shaped by the relations between power, mobility and space. Revealing the diverse cultural and political meanings of spaces of mobility offers a more nuanced understanding of current contested areas, such as sites of protest, and of the strategies and tactics which are used to shape spaces and spatial relations.

At a time of policy crisis in transport, the role for such critical research may be threefold: firstly to foreground these struggles through critical analysis, resulting in a more realistic view of the policy terrain, and providing some balance against the technical analyses which currently predominate within transport planning and continue to shape the new policy agenda. Secondly, to enrich the understanding of the cultural aspects of spatiality, so broadening the knowledge base and challenging exclusionary approaches to the generation of policy knowledge. Thirdly, to contribute to the reflexive design of policy processes, by enriching understanding of the cultural-political setting within which decisions are made, and hence informing debates about ‘appropriate’ decision making frameworks and processes.

Foregrounding cultural struggles may be operationalised by analysing how different spatial
strategies are deployed in constructing the different spaces of mobility. The local tactics of producing these spaces, which are a focus of this case study, may include: developing and asserting new theories; agenda setting; systems design; plan preparation; policy analysis; model construction; survey design and analysis; the management of public consultation and participation; lobbying; decision-taking, and so on. Existing planning practices are likely to be subject to criticism from this perspective, particularly in relation to how certain strategies of power over space are reinforced by particular practices. Foucauldian analysis may explain how power struggles result in particular knowledges of mobility and space being constructed in policy processes whilst others are marginalised, and may help explain the role of (for example) particular tools of policy analysis in cementing these constructions.

Enriching understanding of spatiality may be achieved by elucidating the cultural politics of different spaces of mobility, as they are locally contested. The cultural significance of spaces – heterotopic knowledge – can be added to existing technical knowledge about movement in space. The design of spaces of mobility – whether transport interchanges, urban streets, or buses and trains – may become responsive to different discourses. Not just discourses which demand smooth and frictionless environments, but also those which may open up possibilities for cultural experiences and encounter. In this way, research may contribute to meeting Hajer’s challenge to ’strategically orient the endeavour to develop a public domain to the extension of new infrastructure networks’ (Hajer, 1999, and table 4 below).

Finally, if the current crisis in decision-support is to be resolved, research is needed which can support the reflexive development of policy making processes. The theoretical approach outlined in this chapter suggests critical engagement with the different rationalities that form the basis for policy making. Where technocentric approaches are being pursued relentlessly, or where a shift is taking place towards deliberative processes, questions about rationality, power and knowledge need to be probed, to determine precisely how and why different approaches to policy making are being used, and evaluating their effectiveness. Conceptualising the construction of spaces of mobility as taking place in fields of conflict, where alternative discourses contest the regulation and management of space, may provide new insights into the cultural politics of mobility in society, and into how tensions between social, economic and environmental risks and benefits are played out.

The identification of these different spatialities of mobility plays a crucial part in the analysis of the TEN-T policy process which follows. A core principle of the research approach (discussed further in chapter 4), which flows from this, is that spatialities are constructed and contested in spatial policy making, based on particular values and knowledges of space. This seems to be a
crucial stage in determining the nature of the physical spaces that result from 'planning'. In examining a particular spatial policy process, it should then be possible to identify how different spatialities are asserted within competing discourses, or how particular visions of space become hegemonic in some cases, or marginalised in others. This offers the prospect of adding a specifically spatial dimension to the discourse analysis.

Table 4. Contrasting public space and public domain.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zero-friction public space</th>
<th>Public domain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic</td>
<td>Socio-cultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimal flow</td>
<td>Positive congestion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing physical mobility</td>
<td>Enhancing cultural mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-minded</td>
<td>Open-minded, tilting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformist</td>
<td>Confronting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style</td>
<td>Intriguing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form</td>
<td>Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectoral</td>
<td>Post-sectoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic</td>
<td>Mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirming opinions</td>
<td>Presenting new options</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 4. Methodology: operationalising Foucauldian discourse analytics

Discourse analysis is becoming a regularly used methodology in planning and policy research (Lash et al, 1996; Hajer, 1995; Myerson and Rydin, 1996; Healey, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 1998a; Macnaghten and Urry, 1998; Hastings, 1999; Jacobs, 1999). However the form of analysis is usually focused on discourse as text. Research methodology often centres on the close analysis of various forms of text - speeches, documents, verbal exchanges. This thesis elaborates a different understanding of discourse, drawing from Foucault’s work, which embraces thoughts, language and practices, power and knowledge. Analysis of Foucauldian discourse needs to capture the power dynamics at work, the relations between rationality, power/knowledge, and space. In the absence of any off the shelf methodology, and without a body of empirical analyses to draw from, it was necessary to construct a research design specifically for this study. This view of analysing first the creation of a new discourse and second its constitutive effects of power borrows partly from the genealogical, and partly from the archaeological stages of Foucault’s work. It is used as an experimental analytical model of a policy process.

Foucauldian discourse analysis, rather than focus on attempting to interpret hidden meanings, places the spotlight on what is open to view, but may often be missed: the ways that discourses condition how we think, communicate and act. But it does this by focusing attention on the way discourses are manifested in everyday communication and practices. So, rather than look for hidden meanings, the discourse itself becomes the object of analysis, understood through examination of the practices and modes of communication which seek to constitute and maintain a certain ‘reality’. As Norval explains, in relation to her study of apartheid discourse: ‘this analysis of the political grammar shaping and informing the construction of apartheid hegemony does not seek to uncover some dimension of activity covered over by ordinary language and practices. It is my contention that the view of the world constructed and disseminated by apartheid ideologues is already present and open to view in its ordinary, everyday language and material practices’ (Norval, 1996). The Foucauldian inspired research in planning may therefore involve elements of searching for discourses at work in planning processes (archaeology) and analysing these discourses to understand their origins and conditioning effects (genealogy). It is a way of dealing with complexity of the policy process which at the same time creates its own complexity, by problematising the taken for granted, the hegemonies, the silences. The Foucauldian approach therefore provides a particular critical perspective towards the research subject.
The next task, then, is to begin to translate this into a more concrete framework which can be used in research. Several questions inevitably follow: how can such an analysis be carried out? How can such an analysis be made relevant to the explorations in planning theory which are the subject of this thesis? The task here, then, is to operationalise the concepts discussed in chapters 2 and 3, by developing a research design through which they may be applied in planning research.

The second task in developing the research design is that it should be responsive to the aims and interests of the research. The focus of the case study of the TEN-T policy process is on how conflicting interests and values were treated. The core research question is how the tensions between the possible economic and political benefits of infrastructure development were balanced against the potential environmental impacts. As the research progressed, it was found that the introduction of a new policy discourse of environmental integration was key to this balancing act.

In operationalising a broadly Foucauldian approach to discourse analytics the key features discussed in the preceding chapters need to be integrated into the research design. First it needs to be borne in mind that it is policy discourse that is under scrutiny as the unit of analysis. Policy discourse is seen as being formed within a policy process – the research site – which is given shape by wider discourses. The inevitable central questions concern the conditions of possibility and reproduction of a particular position, policy or decision. The point of such a line of inquiry is not to evaluate the utility of the policy, but to expose what makes it possible, necessary or inevitable; to probe the conditions which have made possible, or have required, the creation / construction of the trans-European transport network discourse, and the strategies and dynamics of power which have enabled this discourse to operate.

The first key feature of the approach is the focus on knowledge claims. This is a highly appropriate focus in a domain such as planning which is characterised by processes of generating various forms of knowledge about space. The second feature is that these knowledge claims are regarded as contested in power struggles rather than rationally constructed. The knowledge thus produced is part of the structuration of discourse – the creation of an emergent body of ideas, expressed in language and other media, and then institutionalised in the creation of new practices.

These practices embed particular claims to spatial knowledge. This knowledge may be articulated in Lefebvrian representations of space within documents, where maps and other forms of spatial imagery articulate powerful spatial ideas (Lefebvre, 1991). The overall effect of
institutionalisation is the embedding of a particular policy rationality, which will bring about specific effects on spaces as well the activities that take place within them. All of these processes are subsumed by attempts at domination and control, the imposition of particular strategies, and resistances to these attempts at hegemony.

Defining discourse in relation to policy is critical here. When I refer to ‘practices’ I do not mean to embrace all types of practices. The point is to focus specifically on practices which institutionalise spatial knowledge claims. These are the tools which shape planning processes, as different ways of looking at and resolving planning problems are contested.

When looking at the institutionalisation of a discourse through the construction of a particular practice, and drawing from the Foucauldian conceptualisation of transport policy discourse set out on page 55, it should be possible to consider the following:

- the historical conditioning of the spatial policy field under scrutiny by wider discourses;
- the power struggles which shape the broader policy terrain;
- the specific construction and institutionalisation of policy discourse;
- the spatial knowledge claims which are contested in the construction of the practice;
- in particular the spatial ideas (or representations of spaces) which are embedded in them;
- how the specific construction of the practice has conditioning effects, embedding a particular policy rationality.

The focus on institutionalisation means that analysing the construction of policy practices becomes the crux of analysis of a new planning discourse.

**Framing discourses**

The first step in operationalising the approach is to clarify how ‘discourse’ is understood within the research design. This also requires clarification of the frequently used concept of ‘policy discourse’. Above, drawing from Hajer, I set out a definition of Foucauldian discourse as ‘a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorisations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices through which meaning is given to physical and social realities’ (Hajer, 1995: 44). Hajer goes further, and suggests that at supra-national scales, transnational policy discourses ‘permeate regional, national and supranational policy making circuits’ (Hajer, 1995: 44). And:

‘Discourse as an analytical term is better reserved for an underlying structure or pattern that the analyst can discern in a particular debate. A first rule is that a transnational policy discourse is to be defined by the analyst him/herself in terms
of the key ideas, concepts and categorizations that the analyst finds in a particular discussion' (Hajer, 2000).

Within this study, then, the political setting of the policy process was regarded as a constellation of discourses, some in harmony, some in competition. Political, economic and environmental discourses were grounded in particular sets of contested values, expressed through their own language and practices. A development from Hajer’s work is the identification of institutional discourses, which can be understood as internal discourses, reflecting certain values and positions held by the key EU institutions. So for example a core value in the internal institutional discourse of the European Parliament was its need to adopt a more powerful role in EU decision-making. So the thinking and actions of MEPs would be conditioned in part by this core value, as well as by wider discourses about environment, economy and EU political integration, which affected all institutions (albeit in different ways). So policy discourse is conceptualised as being constructed within a field of institutional discourses in conflict or harmony, in turn set within a wider constellation of societal discourses in conflict/harmony (see figure 2). The TEN-T policy process – the research site - is then seen as a transient space given shape by discursive conflict. The construction of the policy process is understood as being shaped by the relations of power and knowledge, affecting the fine grain of policy making as ground rules are established for the creation of knowledge, by processing certain data using particular methodologies. The specific ideas, practices and solutions relevant to the TENs problematic are being conditioned. Here policy rationality is under construction, defining the relationship between technical and lay knowledges, politics and communication. Gradually, a ‘policy discourse’ emerges, reflecting the values, thoughts, languages and practices of the successful discourses, as well as unresolved conflicts.

Crucially, a shift also takes place from a formative phase of structuration, where power struggles focus on the creation and acceptance of particular ideas and language, to a more concrete phase of institutionalisation, where the struggles shift to the embedding of these ideas in new policy practices. Drawing from Hajer (1995) the institutionalisation of discourse can be understood as the reproduction of core values, ideas and policy knowledges in, for example, tools of analysis, decision-making frameworks and other local practices. All this is conditioned by discursive struggle. Tools used for analysis in planning, such as appraisal techniques, can be seen to capture and crystallise certain policy ideas, and frame the boundaries of what policies and strategies are possible. Certain knowledges become embedded whilst others are excluded, corrupted or marginalised. The construction of analytical tools is therefore a critical stage in institutionalising policy discourse. Hajer explains the shift from discourse structuration to institutionalisation in this way:
‘we will speak of the condition of discourse structuration if the credibility of actors in a given domain requires them to draw on the ideas, concepts and categories of a given discourse, for instance if actors’ credibility depends on the usage of the terms of ecological modernization in the domain of environmental politics. We will speak of discourse institutionalisation if a given discourse is translated into institutional arrangements, ie if the theoretical concepts of ecological modernization are translated into concrete policies (ie shifting investment from road to rail) and institutional arrangements (introduction of multi-value auditing, or the restructuring of old departmental divisions)’ (Hajer, 1995: 60-61).

This idea of discourse institutionalisation, of ideas and concepts crystallised in new practices, which Hajer regards as the test of whether a discourse can be said to be hegemonic within a given domain. It is the institutionalisation of TEN-T discourse in new institutional forms, specifically the strategic level assessment of environmental impacts, conceptualised in this way, which is the focus of the case study.

It is here that I again differ in my approach from Hajer, who warns against the ‘reification of particular policy initiatives’, and suggests that it is more appropriate to look across different programmes to find common ideas in use, ‘such as the European Commission’s Agenda 2000+, sectoral plans with spatial effects such as the Cohesion Funds or papers presented by lobby groups etc.’ (op.cit.). I do not attempt here to reify the TENs process, but to analyse it in greater depth than would have been allowed by scanning across different policy initiatives. The focus on the fine grain of policy making, rather than the broad sweep of ideas, was what I attempted. In the research it was therefore assumed that policy processes such as TENs do play a part in constructing broader policy discourses which may be locally and temporally specific, fragile and transient, and reflect the temporary outcome of struggles on the wider discursive terrain of planning policy – which is becoming increasingly organised at the EU level. These policy discourses in turn affect the social world, influencing the values we hold, and the ways we think and act - generating new ideas about the way we think about (for example) European politics, space and mobility, and affecting our lifestyles, economy and environment. Analysing the wider reproduction of policy discourse beyond the policy process would be highly problematic, would require a very different research design, and is beyond the scope of this study.

A crucial element of this approach is that there is no final, once and for all ‘discourse’. Policy discourse is in constant flux and tension as different discourses continue their struggles for dominance in the policy process. Instead of a final equilibrium, there is instead a continual reconstruction and shifting of the discursive status quo.

How, then, can this understanding be operationalised? Derived once again from the discussion on page 55-56, and developed from this understanding of policy discourse emerging within an
environment of discursive competition, an analytical framework can be constructed which is
set out in Table 5. The case study makes use of a series of tables, using this framework, which
set out the different discourses which were encountered, the related values, knowledge claims,
spatialities, micropolitics of power, and consequently an analysis of rationality under
construction.

Table 5. Operationalising a Foucauldian discourse analytic approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of the approach</th>
<th>General principle used in the methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourses</td>
<td>Transnational policy discourse, is constructed in a policy process which forms a field of local struggles between wider and institutional discourses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Discourses are grounded in core values, or normative positions about how things ought to be. Policy discourse is shaped by the outcome of struggles over which core values gain hegemony and which are excluded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge claims</td>
<td>Core values are supported by and reproduced through knowledge claims which give shape to conflicts in the policy process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatiality</td>
<td>Spatialities are constructed and contested in the policy process, based on particular values and knowledges of space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micropolitics of power</td>
<td>Techniques of power are exercised locally within the policy process to assert and reproduce certain discourses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalisation of discourse in new practices</td>
<td>A critical locus of conflict is the creation or use of tools of spatial analysis which institutionalise particular spatial knowledge claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationality under construction</td>
<td>A hegemonic spatial policy discourse may emerge, grounded in a particular relation between values, knowledges and spatialities, and supported by a particular spatial analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Using ‘discourses’ to refine the research question

The discursive framework set out in Table 5 helps to move from general concerns about the forces which appeared to be driving the European infrastructure programme so successfully at a time of increasing concern over the social and environmental impacts of transport, towards more sharply focused research questions which could be operationalised in the study. In particular, the framework opened up the possibility of focusing on tools of spatial analysis being used in TEN-T policy making.

The approach adopted was to initially identify relevant discourses, including the institutional discourses, directly from policy literature and broader reading related to the policy area under study. The discursive struggles which became the focus of the research, and involved the introduction of a discourse of environmental integration, emerged from the case study (in contrast with the approach used by Sharp where the discourses were identified from environmental academic literature (Sharp and Richardson, 1999)). So, within the EU policy process for TEN-T a struggle was seen to be occurring between economic, political and environmental discourses, which became an obvious locus for research.

Several discourse shifts shaped the terrain to be researched. Firstly, the twin discourses of European Union: the political integration of the European community, and the economic integration of the single market, together created a logic which required the creation of long distance high speed transport networks. From the mid 1980s, official EU discourse, manifested in policy documents, increasingly recognised the need for TENs. Secondly, over the same period, a resurgence of environmental discourse placed road traffic as one of the most serious environmental problems facing the EU. The research could thus be focused on how these wider discourses contested the particular policy process under analysis. At the same time, policy was being made within a specific institutional setting, and the institutional discourses would also be important in determining policy outcomes. The research question could be refined to ask how these political, economic and environmental discourses in the EU shaped the policy process, and conditioned the treatment of environmental risks in the development of Policy Guidelines for the trans-European transport network, within a field of inter-institutional conflict.

This process of selecting the discourses which are to be the framework for the research is a vital area in which the researchers’ subjectivity impacts on the research. It is always the case that the selection of a topic for research reflects a researcher’s interests and preoccupations. In cultural politics research, this subjective impact is the selection of discourses. Whether identifying discourses directly from the policy domain, or more abstractly from theory, it is clear that the policy domain is being simplified somewhat to allow analysis. The advantage of identifying
discourses in the field is that they are more clearly observable within policy conflicts. Discourses are portrayed as they are arrayed, without any attempt to organise frameworks.

How can the trans-European transport network be conceptualised? A simple explanation might paint TEN-T as a strategy of European integration discourse, and this may in some ways explain its conception. However, TEN-T was more than this - it was a new discourse, with its own language, knowledge, rationalities and practices: a reality constituted through the competitive dynamics of power and discourses. The TEN-T policy process, then, can be understood as the constructed space within which this new discourse was created and institutionalised. Within the policy process, alternative environmental, social and economic development discourses competed to shape TEN-T discourse: shaping the contours of the process itself, then the policy knowledge, language, and practices. As will be seen, the research revealed how the outcome of this discursive struggle was the deployment of a new discourse of environmental integration as a means of responding to environmental challenges within and outside the policy process. TEN-T discourse, shifting as it did to respond to such challenges, in turn became the logic and articulation of policy, leading to its programmatic effects: the implementation of the concrete and steel infrastructure of the TEN-T programme, and finally the effects or outcomes in the 'real world', though these are beyond the scope of this study. The contested and dynamic nature of TEN-T discourse means that policy practices could lead to programmatic outcomes in policy and implementation and in the 'real world', which could vary significantly from the original strategic policy objectives. Furthermore as TEN-T discourse fluctuated under the effects of different discourses of integration, economy and environment, the form and content of policy was likely to change.

**Focusing: finding a critical moment**

One important critique of Foucault's work is that he was highly selective in use of sources, quoting only from those which supported his broad observations. In the choice of specific sites for the research a similarly self conscious process of selection was necessary. Explicit description of this selection process is important as it indicates the extent to which the specific findings of the research can be more generally applied.

The challenge was to find a way to usefully focus research in a policy process which has lasted at least a decade and a half, and has engaged institutions at the EU level and in every member state. Clearly, the question of balancing economic, political and environmental interests could be addressed in many ways across the different arenas, events and texts that comprised the policy process. The approach adopted was to identify through initial reading and interviews a
critical moment in policy making where these competing interests were brought together and some explicit balancing act attempted. Was it possible to identify a pivotal issue or event in embedding environmental risks, in crystallising the emerging policy rationality? Critical could be taken in two ways: critical in policy terms, where the outcome of the event would be crucial in determining the balance between environmental, economic and political values in the construction of policy discourse; and critical in a research sense, where the focus would usefully reveal the fine grain of discursive competition in policy making over these issues. By considering such Foucauldian questions, whilst building knowledge of the policy terrain, the aim in the case study became to reconstruct the narrative of one strand of policy development, to understand the contested construction of Strategic Environmental Assessment as a policy instrument which embedded the new discourse of environmental integration. This was clearly both a subjective and pragmatic decision, designed to reduce the overwhelming amount of data which was being gathered, yet generate a useful analysis. However, the reasoning that this was a critical moment in policy terms supported by the political importance attached to SEA by all sides – by the European Parliament who pressed for SEA against the resistance of the Council of Ministers, and to environmental pressure groups. Analysing the specific construction of SEA within the policy process was a way of exploring the fine grain of the conflict over the construction of environmental integration – how a wider discursive battle was played out in political and institutional power struggles.

Using the focusing device of selecting a critical moment raises the concern that events can become ‘critical’ simply by being foregrounded in this way by the researcher. At the same time, other important events may be marginalised. In this study, the focusing process was deliberately left open, and could have led to a policy document, an institutional reform, a political struggle, or as it turned out a policy instrument – the fieldwork informed the focusing process.

**Conceptualising the policy process**

How, then, could these ideas of discourse, policy discourse, structuration and institutionalisation, and finding a critical moment, be used to conceptualise the policy process in a way which would enhance the application of the discourse analytical approach set out in Table 5? This was done by breaking the policy process down into elements, each of which related to different stages in the emergence of a new policy discourse. The research design centred on these elements: the structuration of pre-policy discourse; the construction of the EU policy process; the institutionalisation of the new policy discourse; and consequent policy development and implementation. Throughout these stages, a conflict between European single market and political integration discourses, environmental discourses, inter-institutional discourses, and
regional development discourse, was played out. Figure 2 illustrates this conceptualisation of policy discourse emerging in the policy process within a field of discursive conflict.

The critical problem in the research was to establish that the events which were being analysed bore relation to the conceptual framework. The point was not simply to prove that events within the policy process demonstrated that discursive competition of a certain type was occurring. Further, the aim was to see if the discursive framework could assist in explaining what was going on in the policy process, and in particular could illuminate precisely how the conflict between economic, political and environmental discourses was being played out. The difficulty, then, was to draw some relation between fieldwork which yielded much useful information about internal politicking, inter-institutional and inter-personal power plays, and so on, and the discursive conceptual framework. The obvious danger was that the early identification of discourses would pre-empt later analysis and obscure other aspects of the picture.

**The emergence of TEN-T discourse (structuration)**

The first task then is to examine the conditions for possibility of TEN-T discourse. How was the ground laid for the policy discourse to be constructed in terms of particular knowledges, practices, and rationality? This question, for the purposes of this study, is divided into two elements. Firstly, an analysis of the early conception of TEN-T: the emergence of a new language and way of thinking about European transport infrastructure, and its adoption as a political priority. This can be understood as pre-policy discourse as far as TEN-T is concerned, where a new discourse can be identified, but the formal policy process has yet to be launched. In the case of the trans-European transport network, the pre-policy phase is taken as running through the 1980s, culminating in 1991, when TEN-T was written into the Maastricht Treaty, marking the start of a formal EC policy process. This distinction allows an analysis of how pre-policy discourse became the progenitor of the formal policy process, shaping the process and in turn being further shaped and consolidated [as policy discourse] as the process continues. Different methodological approaches, explained below, are appropriate to the study of each of these stages. In the pre-policy stage, the important questions are not only what are the elements of the discourse (values, knowledges, practices, language), but more importantly how were they conditioned, and how did they become possible / inevitable.

The approach adopted was to first identify the elements of the new discourse, and then to analyse how these elements were shaped and constructed. Firstly, then, what was the new discourse of trans-European networks? Clearly, the nature of the discourse varied over time so here the decision was taken to examine the discourse as it existed in 1991, at the time of
preparation of the Maastricht Treaty. This was carried out by first examining the formal
documents produced by the EC at this time. What was the language of trans-European
networks? What knowledge and theories were brought to bear? What practices were
anticipated/planned in carrying forward policy development and implementation? The methods
used were content analyses of statements made in key policy documents, to identify knowledge
claims, and to interpret the conditions that were being created for the policy process that was to
follow. How was ground being laid for the next stage of the process?

How, secondly, had this discourse come about? This inquiry required first a detailed review and
analysis of documentation which originated before the commencement of formal policy making.
This literature was identified primarily by working backwards from the more recent policy
literature, mostly published after 1991. Examination of formal policy documents, commentaries
and academic texts provided references to earlier documents which had been significant in
shaping the emerging discourse. Through this process, the attempt was made to discover what
made possible / inevitable the new discourse in its particular form. The point here was not to
simply outline the context for policy, but to explore how this context had created the very
conditions of possibility for the process. The methods used were to trace the origins of the
statements studied previously, principally by comparing those statements with the content of
earlier key documents, particularly those prepared by lobbying organisations. Although most of
this work was carried out through documentary analysis, information obtained through
interviews with actors in the process was helpful in checking and validating the analysis. The
presentation of the case study then restores the timeline by reversing the analytical process,
setting out first the conditions and processes by which the new discourse was constructed, and
then the nature of this discourse. The lead in to the next section is made by considering how the
pre-policy discourse created in turn the conditions for possibility of the policy discourse. The
spatial imagery that emerged as part of the newly structured discourse is also considered.

Policy discourse

Once a new pre-policy discourse had been created, how did it develop as a policy discourse?
Three distinct stages of policy development can then be identified, which structure the critical
narrative: the period between 1992 and 1994, when network proposals were prepared by the
Council and Commission; the period from 1994-96, when policy guidelines were agreed under
co-decision with the Parliament; and the 1996-99 period of implementation of the guidelines.
Each of these phases is analysed in turn.

The 1992-94 period is the construction phase in the policy process because it was over this
period that ground rules were created for policy development. Initially, these related to the
decision-coalition of the Commission and Council, but later shifted as the Parliament gained a
more powerful role. Here I focus on the lobbying strategies as the network plans emerged,
growing environmental concern at the extent of the proposals, and the early struggles for
decision-power. I also consider how particular representations of space were integrated into the
policy process.

**Institutionalisation**

Between 1994 and 1996, I focus in detail on how institutional power struggles shaped the policy
process, as the need to find a means of integrating environmental risks became a priority. I
explore how the policy discourse responded to environmental risks by deploying a new
discourse of environmental integration, and how Strategic Environmental Assessment became
crucial in its institutionalisation, and was constructed on the political terrain of the EU
conciliation process. This is the most significant section of the case study. The preceding stages
can be seen as preparing the ground, by setting out part of the historical context, and then the
emergence of a new policy discourse and process. They are necessarily brief. It is the
institutionalisation of discourse, as policy rhetoric became embedded in policy practice, which
is analysed in much greater depth, and which was the focus of most of the ‘live’ fieldwork. The
period of institutionalisation was between 1994, when the European Parliament first became
closely involved in decision-making, and the publication of detailed policy guidelines in 1996.
Here, the institutional discourses become important in the positioning of the EU institutions, and
in shaping the power relations between them. The analysis focuses in particular on the selection
and development of techniques for policy analysis and the contested construction of a policy
rationality for TEN-T. Here, the narrative is reconstructed in great detail, and the events and
institutional politics of the EU co-decision and conciliation process are analysed from the
perspectives of those engaged in the process, as well as observers.

Here a complication occurs, which compromises the neatness of the framework. Although we
can see the emergence of the new discourse of environmental integration proceeding through
these stages, other forms of institutional practices were being constructed before, during and
afterwards, which would have serious effects on the viability of SEA and therefore the fate of
environmental integration. These were principally the development of proposals maps for the
network, and the subsequent prioritisation of particular corridors, and later linking to the
development strategy of the European Spatial Development Perspective. All of which will be
discussed more fully below. These major events conditioned and moderated the construction of
SEA, and are important in illuminating how, the construction of a policy practice can be weakened because of factors taking place in parallel or beyond its reach. I was aware of these events at a very early stage in the research, but I felt that they should not be prioritised as critical moments for this research. They are seen as important strands in the narrative of environmental integration, rather than alternative foci which might have been selected instead of SEA.

Figure 2. The construction of policy discourse within a discursive field

![Diagram showing the construction of policy discourse within a discursive field.]

**The conditioning effects of TEN-T discourse**

I then explore the conditioning effects of the institutionalisation of rationality, as policy developed between 1996 and the policy review in 1999. The point here is how the ‘playing out’ of policy was conditioned by the specific ways in which the new policy discourse was institutionalised. As the struggles over institutionalisation took place, simultaneous struggles were taking place over the content of policy: the adoption and prioritisation of projects, corridors and networks. In this section, this struggle over policy content is analysed. How are key tensions being resolved in the playing out of the process? The further development of SEA, once a policy framework was established, is clearly an important element here. However the discussion also tries to capture how particular spatial strategies and ideas became embedded in
the policy process, particularly as TEN-T became an important element in the emerging European Spatial Development Perspective. The analysis of institutionalisation of policy discourse is used to inform a preliminary discussion of what the effects of TEN-T could be for European space. Clearly this cannot be an ex-post evaluation of a programme - this is a task which cannot be undertaken for some years yet. No attempt will be made to forecast future transport conditions or economic/social/environmental impacts. The purpose is to consider in part how European space, economy and society may be affected by the TEN-T policy process, through an exploration of how thought, language and practice with respect to European space has been affected by the new policy discourse. This, then, is clearly a more reflective and theoretical discussion than the previous three stages. It links the TEN-T policy process with its wider contexts: economic and political integration, social and environmental concerns.

**Researching the EU policy process**

Approaches to analysing the EU policy process are still in their infancy. This is not surprising given that the European Union is still finding its feet, and relations between key institutions are still being forged. The main theoretical approaches have been to use models from political science such as: policy networks (J. Richardson, 1996), issue networks, epistemic communities (Haas, 1992), advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1988), and institutional analysis (J Richardson, 1996, Ch1). Jeremy Richardson suggests that such approaches, which focus on actor behaviour - as well as on institutions and institutional relationships - will bring progress in searching for a better understanding of the EU as a policy system. He argues that the policy networks approach is particularly useful in EU level analysis because it focuses on stakeholders:

> 'if EU politics is about who gets what, how and when (as surely it is?) then identifying the range of actors involved and trying to see if they can realistically be described as networks is at least the starting point for understanding how the system of making EU policies works’ (op. cit.: 10).

This would lead to research questions such as ‘who has an interest in this policy problem? How are they mobilised and organised? What is the timing and nature of their involvement in the policy process? Do they develop stable relationships with each other?’. Secondly, he poses the question who gains and who loses from different policy outcomes. These questions lead to the assertion that ‘focusing on networks of stakeholders may, therefore, help us to analyse the detailed processes by which new knowledge and policy ideas are translated into specific policy proposals via the involvement of the wide variety and large number of stakeholders that can be identified’.

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A development of the policy network approach is the concept of 'epistemic communities':

'an epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area. Although an epistemic community may consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of validity - that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise - that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.' (Haas, 1992:3).

What is significant in these approaches is that the focus is very much on stakeholders, and the interactions between them. The epistemic communities concept introduces the role of knowledge, values and contingency within policy communities. Jeremy Richardson argues that the epistemic communities approach is useful in 'understanding how policy problems emerge and come to be 'framed' for official policy makers' (op. cit.: 20). However, what has perhaps been less well developed in such approaches is the dynamics of power / knowledge. It has been argued that the limitations of the power of such communities, affected by both institutional forces, and by the operation of interest groups, need to be better understood (Haas, 1992: 7, J. Richardson 1996: 16). Though the importance of power has been noted, within the policy communities/networks literature, by for example Sebenius (Sebenius 1992: 325, quoted by J Richardson 1996: 13), it is here in particular that Foucauldian discourse analytics, with a focus on policy discourse, may have a contribution to make. It is simply suggested here that the Foucauldian focus on discourses, although at variance with the focus on policy stakeholders, at least seems consistent with the focus on knowledge in the concept of epistemic communities, and may be useful in developing understanding of power / knowledge dynamics in this approach to analysis of EU policy processes. It may also connect the understanding of 'high' and 'low' politics at the EU level (Hoffmann, 1966), by analysing process of 'low' politics in a way which clearly identifies influences of 'high' politics: 'There is an increasing amount of [low] political activity at this level within the EU and some means has to be found of analysing and conceptualising it' (J. Richardson 1996: 5). It would appear, even from this very brief glimpse into current debates actor-network approaches to researching the EU policy process, that there is scope for the further exploration of Foucault's sophisticated understanding of discourse, power and knowledge.
Some considerations on method

Fieldwork

Operationalising the approach required a distinctive combination of research methods. The focus was now clear - on how SEA, new policy practice, was constructed in a specific policy process. Although certain texts were critical to the process of policy development, they could only capture, at various moments, certain interpretations of the emerging practice. The context within which these texts were written, and the complex goings on around and between them, also needed to be analysed. So to achieve the research aims it was necessary to analyse not just textual descriptions of SEA, but to relate this emerging form to power and politics, to institutional struggles. This could not be done by analysis of documents alone. The task was to reconstruct a critical narrative of the policy process, gathering information about key relations, events and processes in policy development. This could be done partially using documents to construct a skeleton of the process, with key events, revealed positions, rhetorical constructions. But by conducting interviews, key texts could be related more clearly to the power struggles that had shaped them, and were going on around them. Such dynamics were not discernible from the texts themselves. So texts such as lobbying and policy documents became part of the unfolding narrative of how a particular policy rationality and practice was constructed within a complex network of power relations.

Once the focus on SEA was established, the approach was to critically review policy documents and interview policy actors to carefully probe the events which shaped this process. Reconstructing a critical narrative, following the conceptual framework above, involved a methodological shift from historical analysis of the early process of discourse structuration, to the analysis of events as they were happening during the research period – the institutionalisation of discourse. This problem was resolved by carrying out a secondary analysis of the emergence of TEN discourse, through documentary and literature analysis, followed by a more mixed approach to the live events which included reading, but also interviews with policy actors, and observation of specific events where policies and positions were being formulated (such as meetings of the Parliament’s transport committee, or of environmental activists). Inevitably the concerns of the interviewees influenced the focus of the research, but balance was sought by deliberately seeking opposing positions, particularly in selecting interviewees.

The process of research was to use policy documents, and other literature, to build a narrative
path, including a track of key decisions and developments. From this analysis it was possible to develop some ideas about the power relations at work. Analysis of documentation led to several working papers on issues of environmental and economic aspects of the policy process. A suite of policy documents was gathered and collated (Appendix 1b). This comprised the sequence of core official EU documents which was generated by the policy process, together with other documents related to this. Literature produced by pressure groups – such as the ERT and T&E was also gathered. Extensive use was made of European Documentation Centre at Sheffield Hallam University, as well as the libraries and staff at the Council of Ministers, and DGs VII and XI. The EU Official Journal was a key source of many of the documents. Internet searches of Commission web sites were also carried out on a regular basis, particularly CORDIS and EUROPA. A narrative structure emerged from this reading, moving from the early stages of lobbying, through the early policy development by DGVII, the increasing involvement of DGXI as environmental risks rose in prominence, and the involvement of DGXVI as the broader spatial aspects of TEN-T also became more prominent. The arrival of the European Parliament in the decision-making arena, and the consequent conflicts with the Council of Ministers, was a further key strand.

This groundwork was followed by in depth interviews with people intimately involved with the policy process, albeit with different interests in it (listed in Appendix 2a). The approach was to identify the key institutions and interests, and to attempt to carry out interviews with representatives of each. In this way, a critical narrative of the policy process was coloured in using information from different perspectives. This approach allowed the detailed knowledge of those closely involved to be drawn from, and the positions from which statements were made to be recognised. The interviews were all senior figures within their institutions: MEPs, international lobbyists, senior officials within the Commission Directorates and Transport Commissioner Kinnock’s Cabinet. Potential interviewees were identified quite simply: I tried to identify and interview every individual who was active on the issue of environmental integration within the ‘Brussels’ TEN-T policy process. It was possible to quickly identify a small circle of people who were constantly referred to by other interviewees, or were identifiable through authorship of documentation, or through position. These included bureaucrats within DGVII and DGXI, certain MEPs working on the Transport and Environment Committees, and environmental lobbyists who had gained access to the debate through their persistence. Every person approached agreed to be interviewed, though the interviews were often quite tightly constrained. It is worth noting that I targeted those who were working actively on environmental integration, rather than heads of Directorates or Commissioners. In this way I found it possible to get into detailed discussion of both political nuances and technical issues in a surprisingly frank and open way – although often off the record. People
were interviewed at a time when they were closely engaged in the most bitterly fought stage in the process. The depth of feeling was often palpable.

In practice, most interviews were quite short – as little as 20 minutes in one case. Also, the conditions were sometimes difficult. One interview, for example, was carried out in the lobby outside a Parliamentary Committee Chamber, the interviewee entering to vote several times, breaking the flow of the interview. Several were slotted into spaces between meetings, capturing a small time slot after waiting for several hours. Conversely, other interviewees gave a great deal of time. The access to EU policy makers was surprisingly easy, after the difficulty of gaining access to British governmental officials (at least as a postgraduate researcher!).

One of the notable absences from the list of interviewees is a representative of DGXVI. During the Brussels fieldwork it was not possible to identify a member of the Directorate with responsibility for TENs who I could approach. This could be put down to a lack of knowledge about how to get into the system and identify the right person, though even making use of a colleague working in the Directorate was not fruitful. It seems that during the development of the Policy Guidelines for TEN-T, DGXVI remained silent, and chose not to be actively involved in the process. Certainly interviewees did not mention their active involvement, and they were not involved in the working group on SEA. However, the sequence of spatial policy documents produced by DGXVI clearly identifies TEN-T as having spatial impacts which could have adverse impacts, and arguing that TEN-T should be integrated with other policy sectors within the overall framework of the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP). For this reason, a decision was made to include DGXVI documentation within the suite of policy documents, and to recognise the ESDP as providing a wider spatial policy context as TEN-T developed, particularly after 1996. If interviews had been carried out after 1996, this omission could have perhaps been rectified, given the increase in activity on drafting the ESDP.

A working paper on ‘the integration of environmental concerns into the policy process’ was sent to interviewees before the interview took place, with a covering letter which reinforced my initial discussions in setting up the interviews, explaining the focus on the balancing of environmental, political and environmental interests in the TEN-T policy process. In several cases it had been read, and shaped the interview. In one case it had not been received, whilst a few interviewees said they had not had the time to read it. However, for those who did, this was an effective way of getting quickly into the detail of the policy process, by showing that a knowledge base had already been established. In effect, a dialogue was established between the positions and analysis expressed in the paper, and those of the interviewees. Clearly, there was some danger of interviewees being put off by what was essentially a fairly critical article.
However, the robustness of all of the interviewees seemed to overcome such problems. Given the constraints, the interviews were basically unstructured. Each one focused on the area of expertise of the interviewee, and on the aspects of power relations that they were closest to. Talking to the MEP who represented the Parliament in the Conciliation Committee yielded a great deal of detailed information about that process, but it would have wasted time to ask all interviewees about this stage of the process. So a mosaic of information was gathered, which could be used to colour in the narrative frame. In Appendix 2b, several extracts from interview transcripts show the diversity of material covered, and the unstructured nature of the interview process.

However, it was important to be confident that what was expressed by one interviewee, or in one document, was not taken out of proportion. What was added through the interviews was firstly checking the analysis of policy documents and other material: making sure the events, institutions, framework and process were correctly understood. Secondly the dynamics of the process were explored in detail, probing at the power relations, and politics, which had emerged in the reading. Returning to the example above, politicians and bureaucrats provided colourful accounts of the power plays which took place behind closed doors in the conciliation process between Parliament and Council, not all of which can be reported here for reasons of confidentiality. As Flyvbjerg argues, ‘... the dynamics of conflict and struggle become the centre of analysis’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998a: 6). The effects of institutional politics, for example, were teased out by interviewing actors occupying different positions in the struggle. However, focusing on the relative minutiae of a single policy instrument allowed questions to be asked about the rationality at work as environmental integration proceeded, and to build up layers of understanding from different perspectives. Instead of simply seeking different institutional positions, the deeper discursive struggles were revealed. It is important to note that within the analysis there was no attempt to attribute particular discourses to the statements of individual policy actors. The narrative was reconstructed, through the analysis of interview transcripts and documents, as a small illustration of a broader power struggle between discourses over the fate of environmental integration in European policy making.

A further benefit was that various research studies and other documents were also obtained through the interviews, particularly internal and working documents. Some of the working papers and notes, which are not in the public domain, and which were obtained in this way, helped to piece together fragments of the narrative. For example, the culmination of the Conciliation Process would be a last minute drafting and redrafting of an article on SEA. Obtaining annotated working documents which were passed between Council and Parliament delegations, gave useful insights into the nature of policy making, and confirmed more general
evidence on the playing out of the conflict.

Selectivity

Focusing on the ‘Brussels’ layer of policy making is a simplification, and it ignores other layers of politics and power at different levels of government. Within different member states, for example, quite different struggles took place to shape the position of each government on environmental integration. But that is another story. I believe that my focus on Brussels brings a unique perspective to the treatment of environmental risks in the EU which shows the weakening of environmental measures as a result of conflict within and between the EU institutions based there. However, an unavoidable consequence is that no detailed attention was paid to specific projects within the overall development of the networks. In the preliminary stages of the fieldwork, information was gathered about decision-making on TENs in the UK and in the Czech Republic, as a means of exploring a possible comparative case study approach. However this approach was discounted in favour of the Brussels approach, and this material was used only in early working papers, listed in appendix 1a. A choice had to be made if an adequate depth of analysis was to be achieved.

In seeking to understand the critical moments in the construction of a particular set of rationalities I was again selective. The analysis focuses on the stages of structuration and institutionalisation of the new policy discourse. My research questions address the fine detail of institutionalisation. The structuration phase - the creation of a new language and way of thinking, prior to 1992 - is included to provide the historical view necessary to a Foucauldian analysis, and the analysis is primarily based on original documents prepared by interest groups, and secondary material. Whilst the material presented here is not original it is the conceptualisation of this phase as ‘structuration’ of a new policy discourse which is innovative. The institutionalisation of policy discourse is the main focus of study, and draws heavily from a range of sources, but particularly from original data obtained in the interviews. The data is used to analyse how rationalities were constructed within the policy process. Key events are presented in some detail, and analysed to reveal the relations between power and rationality. This structuration phase, for the TEN-T policy process, is divided into several chronological stages: from co-operation (1992-1994) to co-decision (1994-1996) culminating in conciliation (1996). As the critical narrative unfolds, the changing power relations at each stage are analysed. The power struggles increase in temperature throughout the process, culminating in a very heated conciliation process. Whilst some of the early material was obtained from a historical perspective, the later co-decision and conciliation process were unfolding as the
fieldwork was being conducted. As a result, the intensity of the material collected is different from the reflective nature of views expressed on the early stages of policy making. The quotations used give resonant expression of not just what happened, but of the frustrations and other feelings of those involved in the policy process.

The focus of the case study was narrowed in a further way. Willem Buunk, analysing high speed railways in the Netherlands, has identified four distinct sub-arenas within the policy arena for the trans-European transport network (Buunk, 1999): technical interoperability; funding of projects; liberalisation of transport markets; and the TEN-T policy process itself. It is within the policy process that the activities relating most closely to spatial planning take place, principally the preparation of network outline plans, analysis of potential environmental impacts, and the prioritisation of particular corridors. In this case study, the other three parallel sub-arenas, with their own policy processes, were not analysed.

**Significance**

As described, the Foucauldian discourse analytic approach leads the researcher to adopt particular critical lines of inquiry regarding the contested nature of rationality within policy making. Within a case study methodology, the research questions and general line of inquiry which ensue create a distinctive style which can be seen in the work of Bent Flyvbjerg (1998a) as well as others exploring similar approaches (eg Isaksson, 1999, Allen, 1996).

The analyst is drawn deeply into the case study, working in depth over a long period. Knowledge is built up through reading, interviews, analysis, various forms of peer review. Inevitably, the researcher must negotiate a vast amount of data. The question is, then, what is significant. It is in this process of sifting, filtering and ordering information that the Foucauldian approach – for me at least – becomes a tool for sharpening the inquiry. The research design must address how the discursive construction of environmental integration is played out in the fine grain of policy making. The focus is drawn inevitably to knowledge claims in policy documents and interviews, to statements which suggest normative positions and hegemonies, to points of conflict and contradiction where the harmony and coherence of policy rhetoric appears to be troubled. The Foucauldian ideas of ‘making the taken-for-granted visible’ by focusing on discourse, and ‘interrogating rationality’ capture this approach neatly. Reading policy documentation in this way led to a series of questions about how the discourses of European integration and the single market were dominant in shaping policy. The next distinctive element of the approach is to focus on the fine grain of institutionalisation – and to the instrument of
environmental integration which is the product.

The resulting analysis should place a critical moment in the institutionalisation of a new planning discourse under careful and particular scrutiny, but also place it firmly within the ‘longue durée’ of the policy process and its origins, which help to explain the conditioning of events at that point in time. With this approach in mind, the ways in which policy documents were reviewed, and the lines of questioning in interviews, seemed natural. It is the data relating to this line of inquiry which was reassembled into the critical narrative which follows.

The issue of replicability is difficult with this approach. Could the same approach be followed by another researcher, leading to the same results? The methodology places a high reliance on the ability of the researcher to recognise, evaluate and distil relevant information, the importance of which may be difficult to establish until a later stage in the research. Several subjective decisions were made. However, the discursive framework which was constructed, refined and tested throughout the research process, does suggest a more structured approach which does lend itself to repeated study. Whether other researchers would be drawn to the same critical moment is a more open question. However, I hope that the credibility of the case study itself will convince the reader that this was, indeed, an appropriate focusing of analysis which could be followed by others.

**Peer review**

Throughout the research process, over a five year period, further peer review was obtained through presentation of papers at conferences. For example presenting at the PTRC European Transport Conference, in a session chaired by the Director of the European Conference of Ministers of Transport, and to a policy rather than academic audience, was extremely helpful in testing ideas. Frequent presentation at academic conferences, and referees comments on my papers following submission to academic journals, have further helped in testing and developing the theory and analysis.

**Presenting the case study**

The various forms of data gathering were used to develop a critical narrative which uses thick description. From chapter 5 to chapter 9, the dynamics of discourse, power and knowledge are explored in the four ‘stages’ of the TEN-T policy process. The narrative follows the conceptual
framework, providing a historical analysis, and an account of the policy process, before focusing on the critical moment and its implications.

Quotations from interviews are all anonymised, and attributions are made according to the general position from which a respondent is speaking. Thus the terms ‘Brussels bureaucrat’, ‘lobbyist’ and ‘MEP’ are used. The quotes selected for inclusion in the text are not entirely random or arbitrary. A process of transcription and coding was carried out for all interviews, which were then agglomerated under broad headings relating to the four stages of the policy process. Through this process evidence was assembled which could be integrated into the skeleton narrative which had already been prepared from the initial reading of policy documents. The quotations therefore confirm and illustrate themes, issues and arguments for which other supporting evidence exists. It could be argued that the Foucauldian approach led me into seeking to draw out information about power struggles in the interviews, and that this might foreground struggles where a good deal of consensus and rational debate was actually taking place. I hope it is clear from the quotations used, as well as from the other evidence, that none of the interviewees saw themselves as participants in a deliberative or rational planning process, and that many of them were personally involved in the power struggles that were being probed.

Gradually, a narrative was reconstructed from the variety of evidence, using the discursive analytical framework to help identify what was important and what could be left out. The fragments of the narrative relate closely to the elements of discourse: to competing strategies, knowledge claims, and power acts; the attempts to embed particular policy rationalities and to marginalise others; the contested treatment of space and spatiality; and the playing out of these elements in the construction of SEA.
A case study

Environmental integration in planning the trans-European transport network

'The TENs plan should ensure that by 2015 a motorist in northern Scotland can drive, via the Chunnel shuttle, on motorways to the Russian city of Nizhny-Novgorod, in the shadow of the Ural mountains, either through Berlin, Warsaw and Moscow, or through Denmark, Sweden, Finland and St. Petersburg'

Chapter 5. Introduction

Discourses of mobility in Europe

As outlined above, transport policy making is not carried out in isolation. Many factors outside the domain of transport are critical in conditioning thought and practice. In the 1990s, a particular discursive field provides the setting for transport policy making in Europe.

The twin discourses of *European integration* and the *single market* together have a strong effect in shaping EU policy making. These political and economic discourses create very specific demands on the transport sector, necessitating what Maarten Hajer, following Castells, has described as a discourse of a *Europe of flows* (Hajer, 2000). This discourse is characterised by the development of technologies such as Just in Time logistics, which have enabled a more footloose approach to economic development, reliant on the fast, low cost movement of goods by road. The increasing demand for personal mobility is also characteristic of this discourse.

However the discourse of a Europe of flows is challenged by increasing environmental concern over the impacts of growth. This has been expressed at all levels from local to global, and a resurgence of concern has placed increasing road traffic as the most serious environmental trend in the European Union (CEC, 1996a,b). EU policy discourse increasingly addresses the environmental counterdiscourse by integrating environmental aspects into sectoral policy making. Consequently a discourse of *sustainable mobility* has emerged in the transport sector (CEC, 1992a).

The tensions within and between these discourses are clear. For example, the impacts of increasing personal mobility on the environment have been apparent in transport policy since at least the 1960’s (HMSO, 1963, Liniado, 1996), and are still apparent in the UK Government’s sustainability strategy (HMSO, 1994), and in the EU’s concept of sustainable mobility.

Ecological modernisation

The pivotal question, then, is whether environmental protection can be successfully integrated with economic growth within the development path of the European single market. Since the mid 1980s a discourse of ecological modernisation has emerged, based on the conviction that ‘the ecological crisis can be overcome by technical and procedural innovation’ (Hajer, 1996: 249). Policy integration of environmental risks is seen as a crucial element of ecological modernisation: ‘rather than perceiving the goals of environmental protection to be a brake on
development, ecological modernisation promotes the application of stringent environmental policy as a positive influence on economic efficiency and technological innovation’ (Gouldson and Murphy, 1996). Gouldson and Murphy argue that the EU has progressed towards ecological modernisation in several ways: by adopting the belief that environment and economy can achieve synergy for further economic growth; by integrating environmental policy into other sectors; by exploring innovative policy measures; and by promoting new clean technologies. In this analysis, the EU is passing through an institutional learning phase. The main barrier to ecological modernisation in this analysis is that, whatever the EU’s desire to instigate change, its strategic capacity to do so is limited, principally because of the resistance of member states to environmental reforms. However this case study of the deployment of a discourse of environmental integration in the TEN-T policy process leads to very different conclusions on the progress of ecological modernisation in the EU.

The trans-European transport network (TEN-T)

The trans-European transport network is on the threshold of becoming one of the major practical initiatives of European integration. Agreement has been reached by the European Community on Guidelines for the development of a transport network which will reach into every corner of Europe, and extend its physical contact across the EU external borders into regions to the north, south and east. The vision is global: an integrated network of modern high speed roads, railways, and other infrastructure crossing the European continent, filling the missing links between national transport networks, and applying state of the art information technology to the operation of the system. Increasing competitiveness, cohesion, and economic growth, creating jobs and reducing peripherality: benefits are expected to flow in these key areas of the 1992 process. The political and economic raisons d’être for TEN-T are inseparable from those of the European Union itself. Key Commission documents, from the Maastricht Treaty to the Delors White Paper, entwine European integration, the single market, and transport infrastructure, fuelling the seemingly unstoppable momentum of the trans-European transport network. By 2010, some 400 billion ECU’s are needed to complete the planned network, little of which will be provided by the EU itself.

The TEN-T programme is a clear strategy for the restructuring of European space according to the integrationist vision, as a patchwork of national networks is transformed into a pan-European system, which identifies links, nodes and corridors of European significance. Transport and telecommunications networks are together seen as ‘strategic carriers of the rapid and deep transformation of Europe’s sociopolitical features’ (Banister et al, 1995: 335). This restructuring will have profound implications beyond the identified political and economic
objectives: as TEN-T removes national boundaries physically, reinforcing the new strategy of inclusion in Europe, it will simultaneously create new patterns of exclusion, both inside Europe, and between Europe and its neighbours. The implementation of TEN-T therefore enables a particular spatial development model for Europe.

The overwhelming majority of academic research related to TEN-T has concentrated on operationalising the networks, by exploring new approaches to evaluating, planning, financing and operating large scale infrastructure projects (e.g. Mackie et al, 1994, Nijkamp et al, 1994, Banister et al, 1995, Vickerman et al, 1995, Vickerman, 1996, Stead and Banister, 1997, Nellthorpe et al, 1997, Pearman et al, 1997). This thesis clearly pursues a different line of inquiry, following a Foucauldian analytics of power relations within the policy process. Certainly, as will become clear, the development of policy for the trans-European transport network did not progress smoothly. Turbulence was caused by the rapidly increasing weight of the European environmental agenda, translating the environmental concern of the 1980s into formal policy. The conflict between the European integration process and the protection of the European environment has become one of the critical spatial issues for the foreseeable future, and TEN-T has become one of the arenas where this conflict is most apparent, most intractable, and potentially phryric in outcome.

The environmental concerns over TEN-T may be better understood by returning briefly to the relations between European transport trends and the single market. Cecchini, among others, has argued that the single market would bring overall macro-economic benefits. The underlying vision is of an evenly developed Europe of economically competitive regions, where TEN-T provides efficient access to resources, labour and markets across the continent (Cecchini, 1988). However, critics have responded that the distribution of these benefits is more likely to be uneven (e.g. Padoa-Schioppa, 1987, Grahl and Teague, 1990, Begg, 1989). An alternative possibility, recognised by the Commission as a danger (CEC, 1994a), is of an increasingly centralised Europe where TEN-T opens up peripheral markets to rapid access from the economically dominant centre (Whitelegg, 1992). These uncertainties about the redistributive effects of the single market highlight a difficulty in establishing exactly what new patterns of mobility may be facilitated by TEN-T. However, the trend which underlies both scenarios is a dramatic increase in mobility, and in particular in long distance movements of goods, as regional economies restructure to respond to the pan-European scale of activity.

In this case study, the treatment of environmental concerns is examined in a detailed analysis of how a discourse of environmental integration was institutionalised in EU policy making. The policy process is conceptualised as a field of conflict between discourses of environment and
development, shaping the policy outcome. As the narrative unfolds, we will see how power relations at the EU level condition the treatment of environmental risks, as the policy process is constructed in a way which excludes destabilising ideas and knowledges. The aim of the case study is to analyse the fine grain of the policy process, to reveal these workings of power, knowledge and rationality.

The case study focuses on the treatment of environmental issues in the development of Policy Guidelines for the trans-European transport network. Through a narrative account, key events are charted by which the treatment of environmental risks in the TEN-T policy process came to hinge on a single issue - the inclusion of an article on Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA). Figure 3 sets out key events in relation to the four stages of the conceptual framework. The development of Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) as a policy tool became a hotly contested issue in the policy process. The way in which the construction of SEA became the site of a power struggle between the EU institutions and pressure groups will be closely examined. This account of the policy process is followed by an evaluation of the extent to which environmental risks were actually resolved in the policy output. An important aspect of this approach is to explore how, through the actions of the key players, the hegemonic discourses in the EU shape the policy process, and condition the treatment of environmental risks.

In this analysis, it is necessary to consider how economic uncertainties and concerns were addressed. After all, as we will see in the narrative that follows, proposals for TEN-T have provoked critical questions about the relations between competitiveness and balance in the spatial development of Europe. According to Commission documents, TEN-T is instrumental to the single market, enabling the rapid and free movement of goods and people within the Union, and increasing global economic power. It is also, in Commission policy rhetoric, a key to the future economic prosperity of regions on the periphery of Europe. In what follows, we will see how these apparently conflictual ideas were bound into a harmonious policy discourse, supporting an uncritical momentum driving TEN-T policy, and avoiding an uncertainty that is recognised by many as a central spatial challenge in an integrating Europe.

In analysing the construction of rationalities within the EU policy process, there is no attempt to analyse the many individual transport projects which are components of the TEN-T, or to explore the complex power relations which determine the outcome of each of them. The significance of TEN-T in this study is as the network which gives substance to a particular spatial vision for the EU, and it is this level that is analysed. The policy makers in and around the EU institutions, and interests operating at the EU level are the key players in this narrative rather than those involved in the constellations of local networks shaping individual projects.
As the critical narrative unfolds, the fine grain of the policy process will be analysed in detail. The weakness of the treatment of environmental risks will be revealed. The aim is to reconstruct how this particular policy outcome was conditioned by the hegemonic discourses of the single market and political integration, played out in the localised struggles between actors and institutions at the EU level. The narrative builds up to the playing out of the power struggle between the Parliament and Council in the conciliation process, where a weak form of SEA was finally adopted at the eleventh hour, avoiding the imminent collapse of the policy process. In the following narrative, we will track the emergence of a new discourse of environmental integration, and its culmination in a single programmatic moment of policy making.

**A brief introduction to the institutions and institutional spaces of the TEN-T policy process**

Policy development at the EU level does not take place in a clearly identifiable arena. There is no single body with control over decision-making. Instead policy takes shape through a complex inter-institutional process which is not immediately transparent to the observer. Over the period of TEN-T policy development, significant changes took place in the relations between the key institutions – the Commission, Council of Ministers and the Parliament – with marked effects on the policy process. The positions of each of the key EU institutions, the array of other interests which sought to shape the path of policy development, and the relations between them, were not fixed. All were contingent and highly transient, reflecting the volatile state of institutional relations at the EU level, the high level of lobbying, and of course the controversial nature of TEN-T policy.

It is not the intention here to explain in great detail the nature of the key EU institutions. There is a vast and rapidly growing literature on this subject. However it is useful to provide some context for the case study by introducing the institutions which were critical to the TEN-T policy process, and explaining some important aspects of the relations between them. These particular relations provide the setting for policy making, and are an important element in understanding the specificity of the dynamics between discourse, power, knowledge and rationality.

Transport has been a central plank of EU policy since the Treaty of Rome, and TEN-T was specifically identified in Title XII of the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty thus requires the EU to promote the development of the trans-European transport network (as well as telecommunications and energy infrastructure networks). Jacques Delors, Commission President during the key early stages of policy development, was a champion of TENs, devoting
The EU is a supranational body which uniquely has juridical authority, setting it apart from other supranational bodies such as the Council of Europe. The key institutions are the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the Parliament, each of which will be described briefly in turn.

The Council of Ministers is the EU’s legislative authority, and is an important arena for policy making. The Council is a shifting institutional framework which brings together representatives of the EU member states on a range of sectoral issues. Transport ministers, for example, come together as the Transport Council, while ministers responsible for the environment, regional policy, agriculture, and so on, meet separately. The European Council is the name given to the Council of heads of state, which meets twice each year. The President, who is the appropriate minister from the member state holding the rotating EU presidency, convenes meetings of the Council. Transport ministers holding the presidency at key stages of the policy process play an important role, alongside the Transport Commissioner, in ensuring progress.

The Council of Ministers is the arena within which member states, with their conflicting agendas and priorities, seek common positions. This clearly raises difficulties on controversial policy areas. Commission proposals, such as those for TENs, before being considered by the Council of Ministers, are scrutinised by COREPER, the Council of Permanent Representatives of the member states' governments in Brussels. It is within COREPER that negotiation takes place between different governments to try and establish texts which can be agreed by the Council of Ministers. The Council has a reputation for lack of transparency, and the Commission has attempted to open up its various structures, in particular by bringing documentation into the public domain. This has, however, not been very successful, and information is generally more accessible to those established in Brussels, who understand the relevant processes (Greenwood, 1997). It is perhaps for these reasons that the Council appears in this study to be more unified than the other EU institutions. Its internal differences are obscured by lack of transparency and its need to act in a unified way within the EU inter-institutional arenas. Whilst it is clear that the member states held different positions on exactly how policy on TEN-T should develop, which will be referred to in the following chapters, it is the Council acting as a unified body which is critical to the outcome of the policy process, rather than the actions of individual member states. The Commission is the EU’s executive, pursuing measures adopted by the Council and the Parliament. However as well as carrying out this bureaucratic role, it is also a political player, with a political leadership which acts as guardian of the European treaties. The Commissioners, supported by their personal Cabinets,
The bureaucratic structure of the Commission is formed by the 24 Directorates-General (DGs). DGVII Transport are the lead Directorate on TEN-T. DGs XI Environment and XVI Region were also involved in policy development at different stages. DGXI on environmental questions, and DGXVI on questions relating to the broader spatial policy canvas of which TENs were one element. The Commission has a small staff, which means it suffers from a lack of in depth expertise in many technical areas. On many areas of detail, both Commission and Parliament may not have the resources to develop their positions, whilst the Council can draw on the resources of civil servants from the various governments to provide expert input. Within the Commission, small groups of bureaucrats worked on TEN-T policy development. Staff in the different DGs worked informally together, for example creating a working group on Strategic Environmental Assessment of TEN-T. Perhaps partly connected is the Commission’s open door policy, which means that lobbyists are able to build and maintain close communication with bureaucrats. The technical input from environmental lobbyists regarding SEA development would be important in shaping its form.

Members of the European Parliament are the only directly elected, and therefore directly accountable, politicians among the EU institutions. MEPs serve a five-year term, with elections taking place in mid-1994. Within the Parliament, the presence of different political groupings meant that any position was contingent on securing enough political support from other groups to get through a vote in full session. The Parliament's position with regard to greening TEN-T was shaped by the green group and the socialists, but the message was tempered by the need to carry other groups. It was the Parliament that, more than any other institution, was subject to great pressure from outside interests. MEPs were lobbied by local and regional authorities, and from specialist interest groups. As will become clear, the Parliament's position would need to balance these often-conflicting pressures. A further problem for the Parliament is that it lacks its own bureaucracy, and so often lacks the expertise to support its engagement on complex technical issues. The Commission is regarded as a separate entity due to its political nature. So MEPs are open to outside interests who may provide expertise in various forms. In the case of TEN-T, environmental and transport lobby groups worked in proximity to MEPs, providing information whilst lobbying the Parliament on the position it should adopt.

The key point here is that each of the three core EU institutions plays an integral part in policy and decision-making, but that each institution cannot be seen simply as a homogenous body. Different interests are at work within each institution as well as between them. Broader
discourses give shape to conflicts and debates within institutions, and individual bureaucrats and politicians must negotiate their way through a complex array of competing ideas, values and ‘assumed’ knowledges about what ‘should’ be done.

What is also significant is the absence of any formal inter-institutional space where the Parliament, Commission and Council can come together, and engage in debate and decision-making. Much debate across institutional boundaries, negotiation, and even decision-making ultimately continues through a variety of informal processes. In the early years of TEN-T development a relationship existed where the Council could adopt policies proposed by the Commission. As ideas about Missing Links emerged, and later as the first TENs proposals took shape, the Parliament’s role was almost as a lobby, rather than as a decision-making partner. In the 1970s and 1980s, to the frustration of the Parliament, there had been relatively little progress towards a common transport policy due to lack of action by the Council. Williams (1996: 67) describes this as ‘one of the greatest failures of the EU’. However the Parliament lacked any formal powers to intervene. In 1980 its Transport Committee called for a transport infrastructure plan for the EU. In 1984, it went so far as to seek a ruling in the European Court of Justice against the Council for failing to fulfil the Treaty of Rome by not adopting a common transport policy. The Council argued in its defence that lack of agreement between members had prevented progress, but the Court’s findings were that it had in fact been negligent.

It is around this period that a concerted movement towards an integrated transport infrastructure network took off. In the 1990s the position changed, with the Parliament gaining new powers in Co-decision, with the Council placing transport infrastructure higher on its agenda, and with Jacques Delors as Commission President giving prominence to the need for integrated transport infrastructure. With co-decision, policy making resembles a triangular tennis match, with the Commission trying to keep the Council and Parliament playing the game. At least with TEN-T there was now a convergence of interests at the institutional level that rapid policy development was in everyone’s interest, even if issues of control remained at stake. Policy development under Co-decision centres on a succession of draft proposals launched by the Commission, and replied to by the Council (and Parliament under Co-decision). This iterative process allows amendments to be made by one institution and adopted by the others, until hopefully a position is reached which all parties can adopt. If this fails, a Conciliation process is triggered, as a last ditch means of securing consensus. TEN-T was one of the first cases of conciliation, a process now regularly used by the Parliament and Council to explore and test their relations of power.

Here the Commissioner plays a critical role, acting as go-between during negotiations, appearing at the Parliament's Transport Committee, cajoling DGs to make progress at the
required rate, and establishing common ground between Council and Parliament. Indeed, at
critical moments the entire policy process would hinge on whether a few individuals could find
a compromise position, and convince others of its necessity. The experience of the
Parliamentary delegation, entering the daunting space of the Council during the Conciliation
process, which will be explored later, illustrates how policy making fares in the in-between
institutional spaces of a young and transient EU framework.

Other institutions played a part in policy development. The Committee of the Regions (CoR)
acts as both a decision-making structure for regions, and a source of interest representation in its
own right (Greenwood, 1997). The Committee was used as a channel for regional interests to
assert their various needs to be on the TEN-T map, which basically meant that regional
infrastructure projects should be adopted as part of the network. The activity of different
lobbies was important from the beginning. Initially industrial lobbies were crucial in framing
the need for TENs, and in ensuring through high level lobbying that the EU took action. Later,
once formal policy making was under way, transport and regional lobbies sought to change the
shape of policy by adding new infrastructure projects to the growing list. At the same time
environmental lobbies pressed the case for environmental reforms of the proposals.

As the case study unfolds, more detail will be added to these first glimpses into a complex
process. The aim here has simply been to establish the identity of some of the key players in the
policy process, and to outline the nature of some of the relations between them.

**TEN-T: first steps in European spatial planning**

‘Planning is for member states. To put community level planning through the co-
decision procedure is asking for trouble. It’s not surprising you got into difficulties’
(Brussels bureaucrat).

The case study is significant for the study of spatial planning in that TEN-T represents one of
the EU’s first practical initiatives in spatial policy (Giannakourou, 1996). Studying the
construction of the TEN-T policy process provides an interesting exploration of the issues that
will be encountered as EU spatial planning emerges, through the European Spatial Development
Perspective (ESDP) which has already integrated TEN-T, and as TENs are extended eastwards
into the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and are subsumed into pan-European spatial
planning processes such as future iterations of the ESDP, and the parallel CEMAT process
(CEMAT, 1999). Furthermore many of the issues arising within the TEN-T policy process
mirror those found in planning at other spatial scales: particularly the tensions between
discourses of economic development and environment, played out in decision-making for
transport infrastructure. Indeed, many of the struggles taking place within member states over particular infrastructure projects are over elements of the TENs.

Because European spatial planning as an entity is still under construction - indeed the draft ESDP had still not been prepared when the TEN-T Policy Guidelines were published in 1997 - a valuable opportunity was presented to observe in real time the construction of policy rationality which in many established planning systems would have been of necessity a historical study. The implications of the findings of this study of TEN-T for European spatial planning will be discussed in more detail in later chapters.

Figure 3. Key events in the TEN-T decision process.

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<th>The early years: the structuration of pre-policy discourse (1980-1991)</th>
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<td>Maastricht Treaty chapter on TENs</td>
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<td>Council and Parliament develop framework and policy</td>
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<td>National consultations on outline plans</td>
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<td>Adoption of outline plans for modal networks</td>
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<td>Adoption of Christophersen list of priority projects</td>
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<td>Emergence of environmental campaigns against TENs</td>
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<th>Institutionalisation of the new policy discourse (1994-96)</th>
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<td>Co-decision over TEN-T policy guidelines</td>
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<td>SEA becomes the fulcrum of environmental integration</td>
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<td>Conciliation between Council and Parliament</td>
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<td>Adoption of TENs policy guidelines</td>
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<th>Future policy development and implementation (post 1996)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Programme of further study on SEA</td>
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<td>Consultation and adoption of ESDP</td>
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<td>Review of TEN-T Policy Guidelines</td>
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Chapter 6. The early years: the structuration of pre-policy discourse

‘TEN-T as a policy has been around for a long time, developed from the “missing links” and the European Round Table, and all this kind of business, you know’ (Brussels Bureaucrat).

In the 1980s, a new discourse of European space and mobility emerged. This discourse combined ideas about mobility and transport with the political integration of Europe, and the completion of the single market. One expression of this discourse was advocacy for the development of a pan-European transport infrastructure network. In the construction of this discourse, new modes of thought, knowledges and practices emerged, which significantly shaped the EU policy agenda, and created the conditions for trans-European networks to become a priority focus of EU policy in the 1990s. In this section, the emergence or structuration of this new discourse is analysed, revealing a strategy to condition the thinking that would provide the uncritical political momentum for trans-European networks as a key priority for EU policy attention.

Shaping the European infrastructure problem

In 1983, the term Euro-sclerosis was coined, capturing the idea of a protectionist, uncompetitive Europe of fragmented economies (Welsh, 1998). In the same year the Ball-Albert Report, commissioned by the European Parliament, analysed trade barriers, identifying what it termed the ‘costs of non-Europe’, and citing lengthy border delays for goods traffic as symptomatic of the absence of a single market. In 1985, Jacques Delors assumed the Presidency of the Commission with the idea of a barrier-free market.

Advocacy for improvements in international infrastructure linkages as part of the single market programme can be found in lobbying material produced by the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) as early as 1984. The critical role of the ERT in shaping EU policy has been analysed elsewhere by academics, for example by Green (1993), van Apeldoorn and Holman (1994), Cowles (1995) and Lemberg (1995), and attacked by environmental activists (eg A SEED, 1993). Here, I draw from this material, and from my own analysis and review of key ERT policy documents, to construct an overview of the emergence of a new discourse of European space and mobility as a result of concerted political action by European industrialists. This provides essential context for the more detailed analysis of the formal policy process which follows.

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The ERT has been described as ‘the spiritual progenitor of the 1992 process, and the single most powerful business group in Europe’ (Gardner, 1991: 48, see also Cowles, 1995). Endo (1999) points to the ERT as one of the few pressure groups able to actually change EU policy. The ERT was established in 1983, following the initiative of Etienne Davignon, then EC Commissioner for industrial affairs, in launching a pilot programme of ESPRIT (European Strategic Programme for Research and Development), which triggered closer cooperation amongst European industrialists. The ERT describes itself as ‘A grouping of 46 leaders of major European companies; they represent a wide range of sectors of industry and come from 16 European countries; combined turnover of 550 billion ECU; together they employ more than 3 million people world-wide’. Its stated objective is ‘to strengthen Europe’s economy and improve its global competitiveness’. The ERT’s critical role in EU policy making has been described thus: ‘behind the scenes, these corporations are orchestrating the present and future shape of Europe’ (Doherty and Hoedeman, 1994).

In 1985, the ERT launched their proposal ‘Agenda for action - Europe 1990’, which became a blueprint for the White Paper which began the 1992 process just five months later. Umberto Agnelli from Fiat chaired their working group on infrastructure in the formative stages of TEN policy, with Bosch, Daimler Benz, Petrofina, Pirelli, Total and Volvo amongst the membership. In early documents (Missing Links, ERT 1984) can be found strong advocacy for international infrastructure projects, as well as attempts to define new concepts and language. In Missing links, the ERT coined a key concept which has become common parlance in the policy talk of European infrastructure. The critical missing links were those between national transport systems, the archetypal ones being the Channel Tunnel, the Scan-link between Sweden and Denmark, and transit motorways through the Pyrenees. These critical connections between the infrastructure networks of member states would become a central focus of policy attention. In this report, the ERT also called for the creation of a high speed rail network, one of the first expressions of the concept of trans-European networks. The development of argumentation of a rationale for planning infrastructure at the European scale can be followed from early documents prepared by the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) in the 1980s. Crucial in this advocacy was the recognition of a need to rethink spatial relations, and to develop strategies and mechanisms for reorganising communications networks in Europe. A new discourse of European infrastructure and mobility was being promulgated. A concept used graphically by the ERT was the delay in travel time for goods movement across Europe, compared to the US (figure 4).
Figure 4. The ERT’s imagery of the problem of travel distances and border crossings in Europe.

FRONTIERS CREATE COSTLY DELAYS FOR ROAD TRANSPORT

<table>
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<tr>
<th>USA</th>
<th>EUROPE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Chicago - Tucson</td>
<td>Antwerp - Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000 km</td>
<td>2,000 km</td>
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<tr>
<td>33 hours</td>
<td>57 hours</td>
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The cost of a non-united Europe: loss of time and money

Source: A.T. Kearney

The lobbying of the ERT in the 1980s and early 1990s was clearly important in conditioning later policy discourse. During the Commission’s preparation of a work programme on TENs, the contribution of the ERT was noted, and the need to involve industrial producers and users of the networks is stated (CEC, 1990a). Language created by the ERT is recognisable throughout later policy documentation, and appears to have been successful in framing the need for TENs as a clearly defined and urgent problem, and in shaping the policy response. The ERT’s argumentation, and key elements of a new policy language, are repeated in later documents produced by the Commission, by specialist groups/organisations, and by academics. What took place was a convergence of argumentation around a particular rationale for TEN-T, implemented through a planning policy framework. The policy discourse thus became dominated by several key knowledge claims. These related to:

- the necessity for improved international infrastructure networks to complete the single market;
- the beneficial role of infrastructure in economic development; and
- the political and economic benefits that would flow from TENs.
So far, these claims to knowledge had been no more than rhetorical, based on traditional if poorly understood assumptions in transport planning and economics. Together, however, they constituted a powerful political and economic rationality, which succeeded in raising TENs to the top of the European political agenda (recognised by a separate chapter in the 1992 Single European Act (Maastricht treaty)), and triggering a formal EU policy process. The emphasis within the discourse was very much on removing obstacles, and establishing new frameworks for implementation. Overall, the ERT was successful in setting a dual agenda: gaining acceptance of the need both for hard infrastructure, and for dynamic frameworks and methods to secure their implementation. The new concepts and languages of space, including terms like missing links, and missing networks, neatly articulated the new rationality.

**Missing networks and infrastructure dragons: towards a new mode of thought**

Having defined the infrastructure problem, the ERT next sought to set the agenda for action in *Missing Networks - A European Challenge, proposals for the renewal of Europe’s infrastructure* (ERT, 1991a). The first level of action, based on the rethinking of spatial relations on a European scale, was to continue to deal with the problem of missing links, as explained above. By 1991, however, the need for physical infrastructure improvements had extended eastwards, to encompass the new European orientation of the Central and Eastern European states, and had become more of a network view, as international corridors were identified.

The second level of action called for by the ERT was perhaps more far reaching in its scope. They called for a fundamental restructuring of institutions and practices in order to achieve the required pan-European transport perspective. The report goes beyond arguing for physical solutions - building new roads or railways - and states the need for new ways of conceptualising, decision making and financing TEN-T. Here, then, was an explicit call for an EU policy response, rather than simply trans-national infrastructure project implementation. Building on the imagery of *Missing Links*, in *Missing Networks*, the ERT proposed not only new physical infrastructure, but also a shift in the mindset of politicians and policy-makers: 'to think and rethink existing networks in specifically European spatial and economic terms' (op.cit.).

The ERT propose a number of ways forward. Among these is the identification of ‘missing networks’ - new mechanisms for the planning and delivery of transport, which are needed to bridge the gaps between transport modes, and to deliver international infrastructure corridors - and the adoption of holistic, integrated approaches. The concept of ‘missing networks’ clearly expresses a problem to which the logical policy response would quickly become ‘trans-
European networks’. The institutional problem perceived by the ERT in delivering European infrastructure was captured in its image of the ‘infrastructure dragon’ (figure 5). A dragon, depicted angrily attacking its own tail, and titled ‘fighting the infrastructure dragon’, is accompanied by the words: ‘deverticalization, deregulation, harmonization, planning’, all pointing a way forwards. Representing the institutional framework for infrastructure delivery in this way articulates a deep frustration with historic approaches, and a call for radical change.

A text analysis of Missing Networks was carried out to explore the nature of the ERT’s demands for planning TEN-T (see Appendix 2c). Published in the run up to the Single European Act, the report is forthright in its advocacy for a new approach to infrastructure planning. A set of knowledge claims are made, which construct a particular European transport problem, before setting out the required policy response. The ERT’s narrow case argues a linkage between economic growth and quality of life. This makes possible the argument that if infrastructure secures economic benefits then it also enhances quality of life. Thus it can be argued that removing congestion by improving infrastructure, and thus saving time, is a quality of life argument. This logic does not address the alternative argument that the construction of infrastructure may instead lead to increased vehicle movement and a return (in time) to previous congestion levels, that building infrastructure is not a long term solution (e.g. DOT, 1994). Environmental arguments are only briefly addressed. Here, congestion is put forward as the principal environmental impact of transportation. Solutions to congestion (i.e. the improvement of infrastructure) therefore bring environmental benefits. This is a very tightly argued point, which avoids the broader debate surrounding transport and the environment. It does, however, provide a platform for the ERT to argue that their proposals will bring environmental as well as social benefits. The end point of ERT’s identification of the European infrastructure problem is that the provision of infrastructure is, in principle, in the broad public interest.

**Access and exclusion**

The ERT’s own literature provides some insights into the forces which it brings to bear in shaping the emerging discourse. In its policy documents, the ERT establish credibility for their arguments by identifying the powerful industrialists across Europe who have collaborated in its preparation (see appendix 3 for a list of ERT members).

**Claimed ERT activities:**

- ‘Regular meetings with the President and Members of the EC’
- ‘Meetings with senior ministers of each government holding the Presidency of the EU’.
- ‘Publication of reports on subjects of particular importance. These are circulated widely to European and national decision making bodies, to national and international organisations, to the press and general public’
For the ERT, access is a key issue. In their terms, ‘access means being able to phone Helmut Kohl and recommend that he read a report ... access also means John Major phoning ... to thank the ERT for its viewpoints...’ (source: ERT information leaflet, February 1995). In 1992, for example, a conference organised by the ERT was attended by Karel Van Miert, Transport Commissioner, and Commission Vice President Bangemann.

The ERT’s own view of access provides one insight into the forces shaping the emerging discourse. Other interests, which might have presented a challenge to the position which was gradually becoming EU policy, did not have the same opportunities to shape the debate. A view from the perspective of excluded interests is provided by Kate Geary, a green activist quoted during a demonstration at the ERT’s headquarters: ‘The ERT is not comparable with the other lobbying groups at Brussels. Through its personal contacts it is setting the agenda for Europe. The problem is not so much the ERT, as the fact that the EC is still highly undemocratic’ (cited in Doherty and Hoedeman, 1994).
Pre-empting the environmental backlash

The discourse being promoted by the ERT in the 1980s and early 1990s existed primarily at a level which was remote from other - specifically environmental - interests. In linking infrastructure with the single market and political integration, and deploying social and environmental knowledge claims, the ERT was building a discourse which excluded alternative thinking. Environmental risks, beyond those narrowly defined in the ERT's own documents, were marginalised through argumentation and claims to knowledge, reinforced by the structuration of the discourse in arenas which were remote from destabilising influences.

The ERT's recognition that it is engaged in a battle between discourses is revealed in this quote from Missing Networks: 'If Europe is to escape from the effects of the sterile veto, the increasingly effective organisation of those arguing for environmental citizens' rights must be matched by a more effective organisation of the advocates of change, adaptation and growth' (ERT, 1991a). This statement clearly sets the boundaries between the discourses: it portrays environmental discourses as resistant to 'progress', in contrast to the ERT's integration discourse. The new discourse was being structured in a way which anticipated and sought to exclude, from the outset, the difficult and potentially destabilising environmental knowledges which related to local concerns about the impacts of particular infrastructure projects, as well as to the broader impact of catering for transport and market demands with a network approach to infrastructure planning.

The importance of the ERT's work in conditioning a new way of thinking is clearly recognised within the EU policy community. It is also - more recently - noted with concern by those pressing alternative agendas at the European level: 'it is only recently that environmental and social activists have become aware of how much of what is now taken for granted as the policy and the vocabulary of European political and economic integration has been formed by a handful of organisations that stand to profit' (Doherty and Hoedeman, 1994: 141).

Conditioning a new way of thinking about European space and mobility

The emerging discourse was grounded in knowledge claims about the economic benefits that would flow from the implementation of TEN-T. A policy knowledge was being constructed which held that TEN-T would provide not only the essential gluing together of the single market, but that it would also help secure EU objectives with regard to cohesion and in particular peripheral regions. Embedded within the discourse was the idea of a pan-European spatial strategy, driven by the single market, well before the EU began its formal deliberations on its role in spatial planning.
TEN-T policy discourse would rely strongly on these economic knowledge claims. As long as they avoided or resisted challenge, a strong case for TEN-T could be sustained within the EU institutions. Alongside these economic arguments, there were potentially destabilising environmental risks to be addressed. At the heart of the TEN-T agenda is the principle of increased mobility for all transport modes. Yet TEN policy was being developed at a time when public and institutional concern over the environmental impact of transport had reached a peak. Rationalising TEN-T as a way forwards at a time of increasing environmental concern was to become a critical issue for policy development.

The new discourse supported an uncritical momentum for trans-European networks, as European politicians and the Commission embraced the ERT’s proposals. Powerful arguments linking infrastructure, the single market, and jobs, provided the political capital which would carry the trans-European networks into the Single European Act. The language and ideas promoted by the ERT are recognisable throughout later policy documentation, and appear to have been successful in framing the European transport problem in a particular way which established the need for improved pan-European transport networks as policy knowledge. Many of the assumptions and knowledge claims made by the ERT would simply be repeated in later formal policy making, rather than scrutinised. A normatively driven policy process, shaped by power relations, was being conditioned by the structuration of the new discourse.

By 1992, trans-European networks had gained considerable political momentum. TENs were now clearly on the EU policy agenda, and a formal EU policy process was about to be launched. The new discourse – which I describe as a pre-policy discourse because it had taken shape outside formal policy processes, and was to generate its own policy process – placed the political and economic raisons d’être for TENs at the heart of the European agenda for the 1990s. Key EU documents around this time, including the Treaty on European Union (1992) and the Delors White Paper (1993), state boldly that TENs are critical to European integration and the single market. This entwining of integration, the single market, and TENs had become the driving force behind TEN policy development.

The following quote, reflecting the 1992 position, illustrates the view held by the EU institutions of the economic and political importance of TEN-T: ‘The single market will produce all the expected positive effects to benefit citizens and firms only if it can rely on effective trans-European networks’ (Extracts from the conclusions of the Presidency of the Corfu European Council Meeting, June 1994).

The discourse which was gradually assembled between 1984 and 1992 would endure the turbulent policy process relatively unscathed. In 1998, Neil Kinnock, who had taken the
Transport Commissioner’s mantle from Van Miert, would be repeating much the same core message, reflecting the missing links and missing networks concepts, within the changing context of the EU growing eastwards: ‘If we are really serious about building a wider Europe, integrating our economies and increasing competitiveness, the dislocations that come from inadequate infrastructure and fragmented administration must be overcome’ (Kinnock, 1998: 83). In this paper, Kinnock also repeats the linkage of de-congestion with economic and environmental benefits: ‘The completion of the TEN is one of the keys to relieving the major transport problem facing Europe: congestion. Congestion is already epidemic … in these conditions failure to get on with the task of strengthening and updating Europe’s transport networks now means extra cost burdens, late delivery, more dangerous travel and greater environmental damage’ (op.cit.: 83).
Chapter 7. Constructing the EU policy process

In the 1992 Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) TENs were enshrined as an integral component of EU integration policy in a separate chapter. A watershed had been crossed, and a formal policy process began. In the previous section, the outcome of powerful lobbying in constituting a new political and economic rationality of European space and mobility was outlined. Here, the further development of this discourse is analysed as it becomes institutionalised through a formal EU policy process.

As suggested above, by 1992 certain knowledge claims had become accepted in TEN-T discourse. These knowledges related to: the beneficial role of infrastructure in economic development; the political and economic benefits that would flow from TEN-T. So far, these claims to knowledge had been no more than assertions, based on traditional (if poorly understood) assumptions in transport planning and economics.

The focus now shifts to the terrain of the struggles which shaped policy, and as a series of environmental and anti-EU-intervention counter-discourses grew, giving expression to alternative ideas, and eventually a policy rationality was constructed. However, this conflict was not an abstract one between rational alternatives. It was played out in the complex web of power relations that constitute the EU policy making environment. Institutional power struggles were played out within the policy process, giving expression to different discursive positions, but also reflecting deeper tensions in the institutional growth of the EU. The effects on the shape of policy of the emerging discursive struggle, tempered and aggravated by these institutional power struggles, are analysed.

Here, then, I analyse this discursive competition over the construction of rationality in the TEN-T policy process. This construction became an area of competition between discourses, reinforcing certain patterns of inclusion and exclusion of language, ideas, organisations and people. This can be understood as a battle over the process by which certain knowledges would be legitimised as the basis for planning pan-European transport systems.

**TEN-T: the issues for EU policy development**

TEN-T, as a formal element in EU policy, raised a series of difficult questions about the role of the EU in European spatial planning in general and infrastructure planning in particular. We have already seen that constructing the need for supra-national infrastructure planning had been
a key element of the pre-policy discourse. And establishing this need was certainly crucial if
TEN-T was to be implemented. What had to be resolved in the formal process was how this
supra-national planning was to be carried out. How would competencies and responsibilities be
shared out in the construction of a planning framework for TEN-T? How would the EU justify
intervention in what had traditionally been national interests?

There were various strands of policy development: the development of policy guidelines which
would assist in identifying the projects which together formed the network; the prioritisation of
certain major projects - missing links; and the creation of a framework for Community funding.
However, there was clearly a great deal of confusion about what, exactly, the TEN-T would be:
‘There were all these sort of different ideas, sort of boiling around in a big mass, and gradually a
lot of misconceptions grew, which were that the Community was actually going to start
financing some of these things in big way, and that the Commission was in some way
responsible for building some of these projects. And a lot of these misconceptions had grown
out of this sort of vacuum of understanding... you had this vague idea that the community
should be stepping in and building missing links and things’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

The rational justification for Community involvement in planning TEN-T was that ‘there are
some projects in the EC which have a significance beyond the borders of the country in which
they are built. Therefore there may be a case for the community to step in and make a
contribution, reflecting the fact that benefits may run beyond the borders of the member state’
(Brussels bureaucrat).

**Policy development 1992-94: masterplans for network Europe**

Early TEN-T policy was formally the joint responsibility of the Commission and the Council of
Ministers. The key periods of development of TEN-T policy took place during the Commission
Presidency of Jacques Delors, who between 1985 and 1994 pursued a strong European
integration agenda: ‘The Commission started from what should be, whilst we [the Council and
presidency officials] from what could be agreed’\textsuperscript{xiv}. And ‘Clearly M. Delors went beyond the
governments’ wishes’\textsuperscript{xv}. But the early 1990s were characterised by worsening relations between
the Council and the Commission, where most Commission initiatives were simply pushed aside
by the Council. It is significant that TENs policy progressed through the 1991
intergovernmental conference on European union mostly unchanged (Endo, 1999: 187). The
amount of funding the TENs would require actually increased. At the Edinburgh European
Council in 1992 the projected cost between 1995 and 1999 was ECU 24 billion. By the
publication of the 1993 Delors White Paper the costs had risen to ECU 100 billion.
The High Speed Rail (HSR) network master plan was published by the Commission as early as 1990 (CEC, 1990b). It was not until several years later, following the Treaty on European Union that Karel van Miert (Transport Commissioner 1989-95) set out the first Commission proposal for trans-European networks in the principal transport modes (COM(92)231). This led to a Council Decision on the creation of separate trans-European networks in the areas of roads, combined transport and inland waterways (Council Decisions 93/628-630/EEC of 29/10/93, European Council, 1993). These separate network master plans were brought together in 1994 into a single, multi-modal proposal, incorporating road, rail, inland waterways, combined transport, seaports and airports, as well as information and management systems for the integrated network. The concept of the trans-European transport network was now properly institutionalised.

Policy development in the period after 1992 followed two parallel courses. One was the preparation of a policy / planning framework (explored in detail below) which would guide future decision-making on networks, individual corridors and projects. The other was the preparation of a series of outline plans for individual transport modes. The drawing up of master plans was increasingly influenced by lobbying from regions and member states on the inclusion (or otherwise) of particular lines on the maps. The succession of revised plans for each transport mode came to form a central focus to the development of policy, running parallel to development of policy guidelines.

This stage basically reflected political interests, particularly those of member states. In the drawing up of maps, several strategies can be identified. The first is the use of TENs by member states as a means of promoting their adopted national transport plans. The emerging maps reflected in large part the transport plans of individual member states, rather than a European view: ‘... where things went wrong in the first place was that the Commission then got in touch with each member state and asked them what they wanted and of course all they did was dust down all their old national plans from the shelves and put them in.’ (MEP).

Later, regions and other local authorities would become more active in lobbying for the adoption of locally preferred schemes within the outline plans, but in the early 1990s member states carried out only limited consultations in developing their submissions to the Commission.

The infrastructure lobby maintained a powerful hold at the EU level, as the proposals from member states and other bodies were filtered and assembled into network outline plans. The membership of one of the key decision making bodies illustrates the institutional power of this lobby. Proposals for the Trans-European Road Network (TERN), for example, were developed
by the Motorway Working Group (MWG) of the Commission’s Transport Infrastructure Committee. Membership of this Group includes the Commission, member states, the European Conference of Ministers of Transport, and significantly a number of private sector interests including the European Round Table (ERT), the Association des Constructeurs Européens d’Automobile (ACEA), and the International Road Transport Union (IRU) (CEC, 1992b). The overwhelming dominance of transport interests, and the infrastructure lobby, and the absence of environmental interests can be seen. It is difficult to imagine that such a committee could produce anything other than a solid case for progressing TERN. The decision making process adopted by the MWG is unclear, although they transformed national infrastructure ‘shopping lists’ into international network proposals. However, environmental criteria were not integrated into decision making although they were identified, in broad terms, in policy documents (Bina et al, 1995). The published proposals identify a network of corridors, but fail to set out the criteria used in their designation. It appears that the debate within this key decision making arena was largely political. Figures 6 and 7 show the outline plans for the road and rail networks.

The importance of the European industrial lobby in the development of TEN-T was clearly recognised within the EU institutions, but perhaps seen more as a positive influence in achieving a pan-European perspective, counter to some of the more parochial lobbying: ‘We’re building a single market for Europe, we need a single European transport system to go with it, that system must be sustainable. But it’s got to be European, we can’t have national networks superimposed on each other and bad interconnections. And they’re the people building this stuff, and also they’re the people using it’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

A feature of the preparation of outline plans was that, although the infrastructure lobby enjoyed a high level of access in decision-making, environmental organisations were never formally consulted. The Member States were expected by the Commission to represent their respective environmental interests (Frommer, 1992: 10, and Brussels bureaucrat’s comments).

Given the above, it is not surprising that any comprehensive planning which might have taken place in the preparation of the outline plans was overshadowed by multi-level lobbying and political bargaining. What was launched as a grand European vision risked becoming an assemblage of local pet projects:

‘Oh yes. It was all terribly parochial, terribly parochial. I mean this isn’t really European planning this is all about out member states trying to get a bit of commission money for things they were going to do anyway, and local authorities trying to jump on the bandwagon. That’s really what was happening’ (Brussels bureaucrat).
This high level of interest in TENs can be simply explained by the prospect of a new source of funding (the EU budget) for local or national projects at a time when finance was becoming difficult in the face of recession and increasing resistance to infrastructure development on environmental and social grounds. One interviewee explained this financial interest thus:

‘... And at that point ministers got involved, and said “well these are some maps and we want to put a bypass on there”. And then people start smelling money, so you get everyone coming along. Local authorities, they fail to get money out of national government, they haven’t got enough money in their own coffers, so they think they’re going to get money out of the Community. So everyone comes along lobbying to get their little pet schemes onto the TEN and the result is that you end up with, not a tight limited set of routes of importance, but you end up with a whole load. Right, so rapidly this process started spiralling out of control. In addition, the southern member states were told that the maps for TENs would be used in some way as the basis for the allocation of cohesion funding. And that’s big money. So of course they’ve bunged on everything they could find’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

The fine grain of TEN-T – the outline plans composed of individual projects - was being shaped politically. For some policy makers this politicisation of decision-making was simply business as usual.

Environmental policy and reaction

European transport policy contains major commitments to the principles of sustainable mobility (CEC, 1992c). As environmental concerns have gained a high priority on the European agenda, a tension has emerged between policies for environmental protection and infrastructure development (Whitelegg, 1992).

Article 2 of the Maastricht Treaty placed environmental compatibility as a basic principle in policy making, and an integral aspect of economic growth. This is extended to the Union’s Common Transport Policy (CTP) in Article 74. TEN-T are a key component of the Common Transport Policy (CTP). A central debate in the emerging policy surrounds the principle of sustainable mobility, discussed in the EC Green Paper (CEC, 1992a), and enshrined in the EC White Paper (CEC, 1993). No definition of sustainable mobility was given in the White Paper, but it can be interpreted as an attempt to resolve the conflict between traffic and environmental impacts, at a conceptual if not at a practical level. This tension, however, remains in CTP: ‘The internal market will cause considerable increases in the volume of traffic and related environmental damages. The main concern of the future CTP must be to find a solution to the transport sector’s conflicting economic and ecological objectives ‘ (Bail, 1993).
Environmentalists have argued that TEN-T will result in major environmental impacts. A critical dimension of the anticipated environmental problems are: the physical impacts of infrastructure projects, particularly in environmentally sensitive areas such as Europe's mountain regions and other border areas; and the increase in emissions likely to result from enhanced roads-based mobility. Potential specific impacts include: disturbance to, or destruction of, protected landscapes and habitats, particularly in the environmentally sensitive zones of many of Europe's border regions; land take, barrier effects and new development pressures; increased atmospheric emissions of carbon dioxide and other pollutants from increasing traffic (particularly on roads), the disruption of traditional cultures in remote rural areas, increased energy consumption and noise pollution. Certainly TEN-T policy, a cornerstone of the CTP, appears difficult to reconcile with EC environmental policy (Whitelegg, 1992), particularly regarding the protection of the physical environment, and the reduction of atmospheric pollution and global warming emissions.

In these early stages of the policy process, the environmental implications of TEN-T were already being recognised by environmental NGOs. In response to the rapidly gaining momentum of the trans-European transport network, an environmental counter-discourse began to crystallise.

From the perspective of environmental NGOs, a major problem in the TEN-T proposals was how a system designed to increase the capacity of all individual modal transport systems, to meet the increased mobility demands of the single market, could achieve the modal transfer away from road which was regarded as being critical to environmental protection. For example the development of the high-speed rail network as currently planned is likely to secure a 25% share of the air travel market. However, this modal shift was likely to be accompanied by a shift by air movers towards long haul flights. The overall trend of increases in both mobility and environmental impact was therefore likely to continue (Research by People and Space, cited in A SEED, 1996: 32).

Environmental NGOs across Europe had slowly begun to build a campaign responding to the TEN-T proposals. At first, there was a noticeable absence of the major NGOs. One group, however, Action for Solidarity, Equality, Environment and Development (A SEED), had been active from the early stages. Broad based international environmental NGOs such as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) (through Birdlife International), along with more specialised transport groups such as the European Federation for Transport and the Environment (T+E), did not engage actively until later.
A SEED started campaigning against the TEN-T proposals in 1992, concerned both about the environmental impact of road building, and about the globalising impact of the programme: ‘Our position was clear: we were against new motorways, and the TEN-T plans were shaped by and for industrial giants like Volvo, Philips and Fiat (ERT members). All these roads would be used to shift goods back and forward through the regions of Europe and strengthen the grip of TNCs on markets everywhere’ (environmental lobbyist).

The origins of the A SEED position can be traced back to campaigns against infrastructure projects in member states which had European dimensions. For example ‘Swedish environmental groups (like Miljoforbundet) campaigning against the Oresund bridge which was part of TEN-T. The campaign against the Oresund bridge all the time hammered on the fact that the bridge was not build for people in Denmark or Sweden but for long distance transport of goods from and to the Internal Market.’ (environmental lobbyist). Alongside this was the work of Belgian NGOs that had been monitoring the activities of the European Round Table of Industrialists in promoting TEN-T. Awareness of the motives behind the infrastructure ‘boost’ was there all the time. But A SEED’s central message was ‘No more roads’, and arguing linkages between the 12,000 km of new roads proposed in the TEN-T with environmental impacts of transport. Those involved in the A SEED campaign were surprised at the lack of involvement by other NGOs: ‘During the first years of campaigning (mainly through information distribution, action days, letter writing, etc.) we were amazed that the big NGO’s kept so quiet and did not do anything against TEN-T’ (environmental lobbyist).

Targeting the roads bias of the emerging network, and the powerful role of the infrastructure lobby in the decision making process, campaigns focused on major planned infrastructure projects filling key ‘missing links’ in environmentally sensitive areas. Critical trans-national projects such as the Oresund link between Sweden and Denmark, and the Somport Tunnel, linking France and Spain across the Pyrenees, were targeted. In the Somport, decision making had taken place before TEN-T policy was finalised, and construction work had begun without strategic consideration of environmental impacts and alternatives. The response by campaigners to such constraints on decision making has ranged from selling off parcels of land in the path of the planned access roads (in the Pyrenees), to long term non-violent direct action.

The Christophersen list: a struggle for decision power

A further feature of the early stages of policy development, following the 1993 Council decision, was the creation of a group headed by Henning Christophersen (Commission Vice-President) responsible for identifying priority projects from the many routes identified in the draft network plans. The aim of this high level working group was to eliminate obstacles to
progress, and to 'facilitate rapid political agreement' on TEN-T (CEC, 1994b). Membership of this group was restricted to representatives of the (then) 12 heads of state, and the President of the European Investment Bank (EIB) (Sir Brian Unwin). The Christophersen Group developed a focus on the priority projects, holding seminars which involved 'in principle all interested partners: national and regional authorities, promoters, financial institutions, industrialists, users, etc' (op.cit.: 51). The prioritised projects have become central in the TEN-T debate, benefiting from closer study of the international corridor context of individual projects, and being placed in the front line for Community financial support.

The Commission's White Paper (CEC, 1993) and Member States' interests were the basis for the priority list, with environmental protection stated as one of eight criteria for selection: 'Projects should comply with the Union's legislation regarding the protection of the environment'. However, it is difficult to identify any concrete way in which environmental concerns altered the outcome of the prioritisation, apart from a bias towards high speed rail in the prioritised list. However, this was apparently not for environmental reasons, but 'reflects primarily that work [of the Group] is more advanced in certain transport modes than in others' (CEC, 1994b: 94). It is also worth noting that whilst the development of motorway networks across Europe has proceeded rapidly in recent years, there are significant problems in creating a rail network, including inter-operability between national systems, and the current crisis of investment in European railways. This may have influenced a stronger Community focus on rail networks. The treatment of environmental risks by the Christophersen group has been criticised as 'a formal rather than substantial inclusion of environment interests in the debate' (Bina et al, 1995). The cost of the 11 priority projects was estimated at ECU 68 billion over their lifetimes, requiring investment of ECU 4-6 billion per year. At the Essen Summit (December 1994) the Christophersen list was endorsed, and supplemented by a further three projects, reflecting in part the accession of Nordic nations, but also including the UK West Coast Main Line (rail), and the Ireland-UK-Benelux road link. The Essen list is shown in figure 8.

Later, the Parliament complained about a lack of involvement in the work of the Christophersen Group, and sought through formal amendments to bring the list into the co-decision process, so that it did not remain separate from the overall network decision-making. This difference was to lead to what has been described as a 'rather bloody co-decision and conciliation process' (Brussels bureaucrat):

'And of course the new member states were having a slice of the action too, so it became a bit of a political carve up. And a political deal was done at Essen, and these projects were endorsed, whatever that means, the priority nature of these 14 projects was endorsed. And this was heads of state' (Brussels bureaucrat).
Figure 6. The trans-European network road outline plan. Source CEC, 1995d.
Figure 7. The trans-European network rail outline plan. Source CEC 1995d.
Figure 8. Essen priority projects. Source CEC 1995d.

PRIORITY PROJECTS FOR THE TRANS-EUROPEAN NETWORKS

- ROAD PROJECT
- RAILWAY PROJECT
- ROAD/RAILWAY PROJECT
- AIRPORT PROJECT
- UNDER CONSTRUCTION

LIST OF PROJECTS
1. High-Speed Train/Combi Transport North-South
2. High-Speed Train/Combi Transport France-Italy
3. High-Speed Train London
4. High-Speed Train East
5. Calais-Brussels Rail Link/Combi Transport Belgium/Luxembourg
6. Major Road/Highways/Combi Transport Belgium/Luxembourg
7. Major Road/Highways/Combi Transport France/Italy
8. Major Road/Highways/Combi Transport France/Spain
9. Major Road/Highways/Combi Transport France/Netherlands
10. Major Road/Highways/Combi Transport France/Germany
11. Major Road/Highways/Combi Transport Denmark/ Sweden/Norway
12. Major Road/Highways/Combi Transport France/Germany
13. Major Road/Highways/Combi Transport Switzerland
14. Major Road/Highways/Combi Transport Italy
15. Major Road/Highways/Combi Transport France
16. Major Road/Highways/Combi Transport Switzerland
Chapter 8. Institutionalisation of the new policy discourse

"The [European policy] process is obviously exceedingly complex; in part it is because the process is changing ... the politics of the EU is also about constantly changing the 'decision-rules' of the system" (J. Richardson 1996: 20).

It is at this stage, in the institutionalisation of the policy discourse, that crucial decisions were made which held important consequences for subsequent policy development and implementation. One key contested area was the identification of appropriate tools of policy analysis: the use of micro-level cost-benefit analysis was strongly argued by economists; assessment of environmental impacts was demanded by environmentalists, and assessment of wider economic benefits (such as jobs created) was pressed for by the socialist group of MEPs. Here, different discourses could be seen asserting control over the techniques which could be used in developing policy. The adoption of one technique rather than another, and the shaping of techniques in particular ways, might shift the balance of power within the policy process. The type of knowledge which should be used as a basis for 'rational’ decision-making itself became an area of political conflict between economic, social and environmental interests.

Often, such battles over tools of policy analysis are not apparent. Tools are handed down through established policy, practice and tradition, and so within a particular policy process, the selection of tools of analysis may appear to be more of an academic or technical debate than an exercise in power relations. However, what is important about the TEN-T policy process is that the selection of methods became a crucial site of opposition. Contrasting approaches were advocated by economic and environmental discourses. In this section then, the exercise of power is explored by analysing how such tools of policy analysis were deployed in the institutionalisation of the policy discourse. In particular, how the selection and construction of certain techniques of policy analysis (tropes) became the focus of a power struggle, with alternative outcomes offering perceived benefits or costs to various interests.

This analysis of discourse institutionalisation is the main output from the fieldwork carried out in this study. The fieldwork was carried out in 1995 and 1996, during the period of formulation of policy guidelines for TEN-T, which contained a commitment to SEA. Most interviews took place during and soon after the process of co-decision and conciliation, which led up to the agreement of EU policy guidelines for the TEN-T in July 1996. The analysis focuses on this phase of policy development, and is enriched by the reflections of those who were active in the process.
In 1994 the individual proposals and outline plans for different transport modes were drawn together into a single multi-modal proposal. This integrated approach was intended to allow ‘higher efficiency, higher safety standards, improved services to customers, and less impact on the natural environment under economically viable conditions’ (CEC, 1994c). Environmental objectives were written into the Commission’s proposals for TEN-T alongside the objectives of integration and regional development (op.cit.):

- ... ensuring the sustainable and safe mobility of persons and goods within the area without internal frontiers under the best possible social conditions, while contributing to the attainment of the Community’s environmental objectives;

- the integration of all networks ... with a view to especially protecting the environment by making optimum use of existing capacities’.

The key issues here are of sustainable mobility, network integration and capacity management. It is significant that these broad, non-specific statements were the only mentions of environmental risks in the Commission’s original proposals for TEN-T: no detailed environmental measures were proposed.

Alongside this policy shift came a crucial change in the institutional framework for policy development. Following ratification of the Treaty on European Union, TEN-T policy after 1994 came under the process of co-decision (under Article 189b of the Treaty). In co-decision, the Council and Parliament are jointly responsible for decision-making, and approval of both bodies is necessary for policy to be adopted. This is the important change in the balance of power: that ‘Under co-decision Parliament is now an equal partner in the legislative process …’ (Earnshaw and Judge, 1997: 124). The Commission plays a key role in this iterative process, attempting to develop a compromise which can be adopted as a common position. The Commission were responsible for initiating policy proposals. These proposals then became the subject of committee work and debates in the Council and Parliament. First the Parliament responded to the proposal, and the Council then responded to the Parliament’s position, with its own common position. The role of the Commission in this iterative process is clear - guiding policy development in a way which moved towards a community position which could be agreed by all parties.

For TEN-T, co-decision was limited to the approval of general policy guidelines. These guidelines would establish criteria for identifying projects of ‘common interest’, which would become part of the TEN-T (although financing regulations were excluded). A critical issue in the preparation of the guidelines was the extent to which environmental risks would be reflected in the criteria adopted.
Co-decision has, according to observers, brought about a change in the micropolitics of Brussels: 'The Council, its procedures, its secretariat, its personalities and even buildings are no longer “off limits” to Parliament ... MEPs are now entitled to stalk its corridors and sit at its tables in search of compromise and concession' (Westlake, 1994: 150, cited in Earnshaw and Judge, 1997: 124).

Where agreement is not forthcoming, a conciliation process follows. 'Under co-decision, conciliation is essentially a bipartite bargaining process [between Council and Parliament] which, in turn, places the Commission in a considerably more ambiguous position than in the co-operation or consultation procedures (before the Treaty). The ultimate logic of the Commission’s position is that it needs to act in a more even handed manner between Parliament and Council in its search for legislative agreement' (Earnshaw and Judge 1997: 124).

In this case, the preparation of policy guidelines for TEN-T went to the wire: policy was finally agreed in the very last moments of conciliation, narrowly avoiding policy breakdown. The relatively limited experience of these new procedures, with the increased power of the Parliament, led to particular difficulties, as institutional power struggles were played out as policy developed. Below, I explore some of the dimensions of the co-decision and conciliation processes. First, it is necessary to outline the positions of the different EU institutions as they engaged in the policy process.

**Finding a way on environmental integration: SEA becomes a fulcrum of policy**

'...the problem is that nobody has done [SEA] before, so a methodology has had to be developed. Unless there is a degree of consensus about the adequacy of the means of assessment the value of the whole thing will be reduced, and it won’t stick' (Neil Kinnock, EC Commissioner for Transport).

The early momentum behind TEN-T, as we have seen, was unencumbered by concerns about its environmental impact. However, as environmental concerns rose up the European policy agenda in the 1990s, there was a growing need to address them within the policy process. However, at the EU level, there existed few mechanisms for the integration of environmental issues in infrastructure development. The principal measures which could be used were the Environmental Impact Assessment and Birds and Habitats Directives. However, neither of these approaches provided a means of analysing transport issues above the project level (among other weaknesses). There was nothing which could be applied directly to the emerging plans for an international infrastructure network, composed of trans-national corridors of different transport modes.
The perhaps inevitable turn was towards Strategic Environmental Assessment. Although there was no EU legislative base for using SEA, it had been in the frame of the discussions during the development of the EIA Directive since the early 1980s, and proposals for a Directive on SEA had been put together by DGXI. The introduction of SEA is anticipated in various EC policy documents (e.g. CEC, 1993, CEC, 1996a). SEA was seen – at least by the advocates of EIA – as a way of addressing the environmental implications of the strategic-level TEN-T programme, as a procedural instrument for environmental integration.

SEA has been defined as ‘the formalised, systematic and comprehensive process of evaluating the environmental effects of a policy, plan or programme (PPP) and its alternatives, including the preparation of a written report on the findings of that evaluation, and using the findings in publicly accountable decision-making’ (Therivel et al, 1992). It is important to stress here the conception of SEA as a participative planning process, rather than simply a ‘scientific’ study. Whether such participation occurs in practice is a more open question. However, this type of conceptualisation is reflected in papers written by Ann Dom, whilst working as a fonctionnaire for the Commission on the development of SEA of TEN-T (Dom, 1997 a, b): ‘The improvement of the environmental performance of the Community’s transport systems requires the participation of all actors. A strategy should also be developed to address the concerns that are increasingly being expressed by transport users, environmental protection groups and local authorities. Extended consultation will be necessary both in order to obtain information and data and to enhance the credibility of the process’ (Dom, 1997b: 7).

SEA is generally conceptualised as a cascade: SEA carried out at the policy level provides a context for SEAs at lower levels, ending in project level EIA. SEA might therefore be applied at the overall network level, but also at the national or regional level. The concept of corridor analysis also emerged in the TEN-T/SEA debate, and is generally understood as the comparative study of the environmental impact of different transport options within a particular geographical corridor, which may extend across national boundaries (CEC, 1995a).

Due to its innovative nature, there has been little practical experience of SEA in the transport sector. A review by consultants Steer Davies Gleave for the Commission found very little experience of SEA which integrated different transport modes (Chadwick, 1996). However, an SEA pilot study was carried out for the high speed rail (HSR) network in 1992 (Mens en Ruimte, 1993). This study attempted to make a comparative assessment between HSR and competing conventional rail and road networks and key airports. The findings suggested that HSR could help to reduce the environmental impact of long distance travel relative to other modes, although wider policy options were not addressed. Significantly, the study was carried
out at as an expert-led desk study, with no public consultation or dissemination of findings. There has been little apparent influence on the decision-process for the network. The pilot study shows that SEA is feasible, but that there are both methodological and procedural problems to overcome if SEA is to become an integral part of the planning process. The procedural problems concern the extent of binding power of the SEA, in relation to the actions of member states, and decisions on EU financial support (Dom, 1996).

As the narrative unfolds, the inclusion of SEA in the TEN-T policy guidelines becomes a fulcrum of conflict. I will show how the specific construction of SEA within this process, and plans for its future development, were shaped by these power struggles. Reconstructing the battle over SEA provides a sharp focus for understanding the competition between strategies, power struggles, and the resulting effects on policy.

**TENS as an institutional battlefield 1: constrained positions**

*The lobbies move on*

In the early stages, the industrial lobby had played an active part in setting the agenda, shaping the policy process. However, once formal policy making was under way, there was less obvious involvement of organisations such as the ERT. In the fieldwork, during the co-decision process, there was no evidence of the active involvement of the ERT. The position was that they had concluded that the job was effectively done - the new discourse had been created, and the institutions of the EU had begun to implement the programme:

'We do not do so much work on infrastructure anymore. Everything that we could say, we had said: that Europe needs a better infrastructure. A lot of that is being done. On the whole, we have transferred our interests to an organisation called ECIS which is in Rotterdam. They do a lot of good work. But a lot of this is now in detail. I think the issue in principle is there. The Channel Tunnel has been built, the highspeed trains are being built, the crossing from Scandinavia to Denmark is being built' (Keith Richardson, secretary-general of the ERT).

The focus now moved to the power struggles between the EU institutions.

*The Commission in co-decision: side-stepping environmental and economic uncertainty*

As stated above, the Commission entered the policy process adhering to the arguments about the critical importance of TEN-T for the single market and for cohesion. However, its position was problematised in several ways: the increasing weight of environmental concern, and doubts about what, exactly, the economic impacts of the network might be.
In the 1990s environmental policy documents from the Commission increasingly expressed concern with the impacts of current and forecast transport trends. Commission studies show that since 1980, 'road transport of goods and passengers has increased by about 45% and 41% respectively .... In parallel, rail transport of goods has actually decreased...'. Forecasts for road transport predict continued growth past 2000, whilst air transport is likely to grow most dramatically, increasing by 182% from 1990-2000 (CEC, 1996b). ‘Transport demand and traffic in the Community are expected to increase significantly in the future, especially following the completion of the internal market’ (CEC, 1996c: 7). This growth in mobility is recognised as having a range of environmental impacts. For example, the Commission’s evaluation of progress towards CO2 targets states that ‘whereas energy related emissions in most sectors have levelled off... or substantially fallen ... they are still rising in the transport sector (7% increase 1990-1993)’. Similarly, for NOx, the growth in car ownership and the sharp increase in road transport of goods will offset reductions in other sectors so that the EU 30% reduction target by 2000 is unlikely to be achieved (CEC, 1996b: 56).

The 1995 update of the EU’s Fifth Environmental Action Programme identified priority measures in the transport sector, including demand-side management initiatives (internalising external costs and promoting integration between land-use and transport planning, and the use of telematics), and reducing imbalances between modes, in particular through the development of strategic environmental assessment for TEN-T (CEC, 1996a). The Commission has also expressed concern that, in spite of an emphasis on rail and combined transport in the TEN-T priority projects, there remains a general emphasis on EU financial support for road construction (CEC, 1996c: 33).

These concerns would place the Commission in a sympathetic position with regard to environmental measures in the policy process, although clearly the tension between mobility and environmental agendas would not be an easy one to resolve within a policy process focused on infrastructure networks. Alongside this increasing concern about the environmental implications of transport trends was recognition that the economic implications of TEN-T were not as straightforward as early advocacy had maintained.

Key Commission documents state boldly that TENs are critical to European integration and the single market, for example:

'It is essential for the functioning of the internal market to improve the efficiency of transport infrastructure networks between the regions of the Community' (93/629/EEC).
The force behind such arguments is strong. But the Commission also promotes TENs as a key factor in regional development: they will further cohesion, spreading the economic benefits of the single market more evenly across the Union, and particularly to peripheral regions. Here lies an apparent contradiction: how can a market intervention such as TEN-T facilitate both the single European market, and individual regional economies? Experience at the national level suggests that the development of strong national economies may run counter to the interests of particular disadvantaged regions. European trends appear to confirm this pattern, as economies flourish at the centre.

The strength of advocacy by the Commission of the single market and integration discourses cannot be overstated. The regional development discourse is less forcefully put. It is present as a dissonant voice: raising problems which, according to the Commission, can be resolved within the TEN policy framework. Moving TEN-T policy forwards would rely on successfully addressing this area of uncertainty in some way. This apparent dichotomy calls for a close focus on the redistributive effects of TEN-T. I next explore the alternative arguments being put forward in competing discourses about what these might be.

**Discourses in competition**

Europe 2000+ (CEC, 1994a) addresses the tension explicitly. This DGXVI document places TENs at the centre of a pan-European spatial planning framework, stating: ‘while TENs should help to bring about a truly single market, under the Treaty [on European Union], they are also assigned the explicit role of promoting the harmonious development of the Community as a whole’. Significantly, the document recognises that TEN-T creates a tension between these core spatial issues. Global competitiveness - the objective of the single market - is seen as dependent upon ‘continuation, even acceleration of the implementation of large-scale TENs’. Associated with developing transport and communications networks is the risk ‘of an increase in the imbalances in the Union’, stemming from the ‘strengthening of the centre to the detriment of the periphery’ (among other factors). The document contains a powerful image of a shrinking European space, made possible by the future development of TENs (see figure 9).

The question of harmonious, or balanced, development is linked with competitiveness. Ensuring spatial competitiveness between regions within the Union depends on ‘avoiding the unacceptable risks and costs of widening disparities’ between regions. Balanced development, in turn, is seen as reliant upon decreasing the competitive disadvantage of peripheral regions. Achieving both of these objectives relies on avoiding the centralising impacts associated with TEN-T. So, TENs are clearly identified as threatening to drive a wedge between European
global competitiveness and internal spatial competitiveness. This view is shared by some observers (e.g. Whitelegg, 1992) who argue that TEN-T may undermine the interests of peripheral regions by facilitating the centralisation of business and industry.

Here we can see manifestation and interaction of the two discourses: a powerful argument for integration representing the market, which has, through its own logic, precipitated the creation of an alternative or counter-discourse of regional development, representing the interests of the regions. It appears that there is tension present between the two, which needs to be further explored. This tension is explored by unpacking some of the assumptions underlying the integration discourse: assumptions that have enabled the Commission to conclude that TEN-T is a truly ubiquitous programme.

Assumption 1: regional competitiveness and balance are the same thing:
The Commission’s strategy for cohesion is based on market competition between regions. The role for TENs is to facilitate more of a level playing field for inter-regional competition. The conditions for economic development are, however, many and varied. Even if TENs provide a framework for equitable accessibility, other conditions will not necessarily be harmonised. Implementation of TENs may therefore raise the competitive stakes in disadvantaged regions. Competition creates winners and losers, and the outcome is not bound to be the even development of regional economies.

Assumption 2: that there is a causal link between infrastructure provision and economic development
The relationship between infrastructure provision and economic development is becoming one of the more vexed questions in transport planning. The link has long been assumed in policy making, but research has yet to establish causality. This policy blindspot is increasingly being challenged (e.g. RCEP 1994, EIB, 1994, SACTRA 1999), with calls for a more critical analysis of infrastructure needs - identifying where infrastructure is a constraint on development rather than seeing it as a simple solution to economic depression.

Assumption 3: centre / periphery distribution of economic benefits
Linked with this is increasing awareness of the centralising effects of infrastructure, which can undermine the hoped for benefits to disadvantaged regions. Transport investments often tend to have centralising effects on the location of production and distribution facilities. Europe 2000+ fails to explain how this problem can be addressed.

Assumption 4: TENs and peripherality - even distribution of benefits within regions
The assumption of causality discussed above is related to a further assumption of accessibility.
This is that as TENs support the development of peripheral economies, the consequent benefits will be evenly distributed within regions. The weakness of this position is illustrated by closer analysis of issues of accessibility (Vickerman et al, 1995, Vickerman, 1996). This research firstly identifies the uneven distribution of accessibility within regions, caused by the presence (or otherwise) of strategic transport nodes and corridors. The conclusion from this work is that the impact of TENs will be unpredictable, but that it may increase disparities in accessibility through concentration and shadow effects. In other words, new strategic infrastructure improvements on the peripherality may, at the same time as it brings parts of remote regions closer to the centre, create zones of relative peripherality both in these remoter regions, and more generally.

TEN policy assumes that regional transport networks will provide efficient access to TENs, to avoid these problems. This relies on a reorientation of national and regional transport networks towards the nodes and corridors of TENs. Whilst appearing to bring overall regional benefits, TENs may result in new fine grain patterns of subregional peripherality, challenging the approach to peripherality adopted in Europe 2000+, and suggesting that the impact of TENs on peripherality will not be as clear in practice as it is made to appear in EC documentation.

Assumption 5: long distance movements on TENs will be cheap enough to allow effective competition between central and peripheral regions

Recent patterns of economic development have placed a heavy reliance on low transport costs of goods. In particular, the low cost of road freight has enabled industry to rationalise into a fewer number of centres, and for complex distribution networks to be established over large areas. This reliance on cheap transport is being increasingly challenged by two developments:

- arguments that costs incurred by users do not reflect the full social and environmental impacts of transport, supporting the extension of user charges through road pricing and taxation;

- serious concerns about the financial burden of TENs. The EC will provide only a small amount of the funding required for TENs: there is a high level of expectation that national governments, the private sector and other institutions will bear the costs of TEN projects. In at least a few EU member states, the level of government expenditure on public infrastructure is being revised downwards. The prospect of user charges is one policy option for generating the return that will be required to recoup this investment.
Figure 9. Shrinking European space. Source CEC, 1994.

Map 14
Shrinkage of the European space

Note: The map shows how distances are deformed in relation to the time taken to travel between regions by high-speed train. Planned improvements will, for a constant time scale (6 hours), effectively bring regions closer together.

Source: Spiekermann, Wessels 1990
As public investment and free access are replaced by a new environment of partnership and pricing, it is difficult to see how expensive infrastructure networks can create the economic level playing fields required for equitable regional competition. As TENs seek to reduce travel times between centre and periphery, they seem likely to increase the cost of movement of goods on these journeys. The effect of this may be disadvantageous to the competitiveness of regions on the periphery, relying on TENs for access to distant markets.

Assumption 6 - peripherality is about being on the edge

In examining the argumentation surrounding peripherality, we should be aware that the term is politically charged. ‘Peripherality’ is seen as a valuable argument to be deployed in the quest for EC financial support. Ball (1995: 154) explained it thus: ‘Perhaps, it is the opportunity for such (infrastructure) development that motivates some authorities into representing themselves as peripheral, despite constant attempts in other areas of image construction to put across precisely the opposite picture’. We should therefore be careful about claims made for peripherality, and measures proposed for reducing it.

Clearly, the Commission would have a challenging task in developing policy guidelines which adequately addressed these environmental and economic concerns. This task would not be helped by the fact that different Directorates within the Commission would have different interests. DGVII (Transport) was the lead Directorate on TEN-T policy. DGXI (Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety) maintained an interest in addressing environmental risks, whilst DGXVI (Regional Policy) took an interest in the implications of TEN-T for regional development as well as for spatial policy. The departmental nature of the Commission is important, and the relationship between DGVII and DGXI would be particularly crucial in integrating environmental concerns into transport policy. Endo (1999) notes that relations were close between Jacques Delors and Karel Van Miert, who was described as his protégé, suggesting one reason why DGVII was strongly placed. Relations with other European Commissioners were not so good. Carlo Ripa di Meana resigned from the post of Environment Commissioner in June 1992, following a turbulent period in which environmental policy was increasingly marginalised (op.cit.: 112-113). The relative strengths and weaknesses of the directorates responsible for transport and the environment during the critical early stages of the TEN-T process would have inevitably marked the character of environmental integration.

Developing SEA within the Commission

Within the TEN-T policy process, SEA was first proposed by DGXI in the Commission’s inter-service consultations in December 1993. However, the perceived lack of experience of SEA clearly hindered progress. In June 1994, DGVII held a seminar, ‘hearing of experts about
methodologies for SEA’, in which DGXI participated. A main conclusion was that there was at that time no established methodology for SEA. The Commission regarded any application of SEA to TEN-T as requiring further work on SEA methodology. As a result the Commission launched studies to review the current state of the art of practice on SEA, and to consider possible methodologies.

However, DGXI felt these studies were simply delaying the application of SEA. After all, the work on the High Speed rail network showed that SEA was possible at the network level. DGXI didn’t want to delay, but found it difficult to move forwards decisively given the conclusions of the seminar. The slow progress on SEA methodology points in part to the weakness of DGXI, in that it lacked expertise, and did not have the institutional power required to push it forward. DGVII, on the other hand, was less interested in speeding up the application of SEA, its main task being to deliver TEN-T rather than to hinder the development of the network.

It appears that DGXI requested a specific environmental amendment (on SEA) to the draft guidelines after the seminar in 1994. DGVII seem to have supported this request, but to have maintained reservations about the amendment. They did not want to introduce new procedures which could slow decision making on TEN-T guidelines. SEA was regarded as a procedure which would delay the implementation of TEN-T, perhaps by several years. This possibly explains why SEA was itself the subject of resistance and delay. Environmental NGO’s have since pointed out that SEA had been in existence since at least 1992 as a possible methodology for TEN-T, given the Commission’s early work on the high speed train network referred to above.

Later in the process, frustration with the slow progress on SEA was evident. Some of this frustration was targeted at DGXI, who, it seemed, were developing proposals for an SEA Directive, but moving slowly on the specific application of SEA to TEN-T. Work on methodology, as well as on pilot analysis of selected TEN-T corridors, requested by Neil Kinnock’s Cabinet, had not progressed rapidly.

The Council of Ministers in co-decision: resisting greening TEN-T

The strong position of the Council of Ministers (or Council of the Union) against the formal treatment of environmental risks in the TEN-T process was to be a major factor in determining the final outcome on SEA. The Council of Ministers is at the heart of EU decision-making, with a powerful historic role recently complicated by co-decision. Although some analysts have described the Council as a forum for interstate bargaining and the representation of national interests (Moravcisk, 1993), others have recognised the role of the Council as a body at the
supranational, rather than interstate level (Wessels, 1991: 137 cited in Edwards, 1996). The Council, then, is an ambiguous creature, being ‘both the centre of intergovernmental bargaining in the Union as well as continuing to be the legislature of the Union’ (Edwards, 1996: 142). It is not the intention here to explore the complex structures and internal workings of the Council, or to become enmeshed in the complex advocacy for individual national interests within the Council’s deliberations on TEN-T. In the analysis below, I simply focus on how the Council acted as an inter-institutional player, pressing a common position within the policy process, but recognising the tension within its position caused by national interests.

The strong resistance of the Council to adopting environmental measures may be partly explained by the resistance of member states to the empowering of the EU in the planning and delivery of infrastructure, possibly providing the Commission with an executive role. Establishing a process such as SEA at the European level would possibly strengthen the Commission’s role in matters which the member states viewed as their own concern. So it could be argued that the apparent anti-environmentalism of the Council was simply the result of an expression of national interests and an assertion of subsidiarity in decision-making on infrastructure: ‘SEA for cross-border corridor studies would effectively give the Commission a role. You start shifting the whole question of who’s responsible for planning and delivery of infrastructure away from member states to the Commission. And again that is going to be a no-no for just about every member state’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

A further factor was that the Council, like the Commission, viewed SEA simply as an irrelevant delay: it could take years to prepare a suitable methodology and apply it. The idea of delay to projects which were already part of national transport programmes, because of EU procedural hurdles, was simply unacceptable to national level politicians.

A general feeling expressed by several interviewees was that SEA was seen by many proponents of TEN-T, within the Council as well as the Commission, as simply creating a procedural bind, obstructing and delaying infrastructure projects, rather than providing any meaningful environmental input into decision-making:

‘SEA is a procedural thing. It offers endless scope to those who wish to object to things on procedural grounds. ... the concern is that it will just give more chance to those who want to make mischief, rather than to those who have genuine complaints ... It basically just makes the project more difficult to build, and it just struck us as being completely counter to the idea of TENs. The idea of TENs was to get these things going. I mean Kinnock keeps saying the aim is to get these things built, and we’re putting up hurdles.’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

It is not easy to discern the individual positions and actions of member states within the Council of Ministers with regard to TEN-T. Certainly, the majority of Council procedures are not open
to public inspection in the same way that Parliamentary debates are, for example. The Council, in the inter-institutional struggle of the EU policy process, presented a united case which emphasised the benefits and importance of TENs. However, it can be said that member states’ individual views on TEN-T depended partly on their more general positions on whether community intervention should be low or high profile. Many interviewees commented on strong French interest in the networks, embodied in the central involvement of Jacques Delors throughout the early stages of policy making, whilst a more tepid reaction was noted from the UK government. It appears that Austria and Sweden were more supportive of environmental amendments, although other governments had, for example, put pressure on their MEPs to refuse the environmental article. The UK government’s resistance to the proposed SEA Directive at the Edinburgh Summit is an indicator of its position with regard to environmental policy instruments being instituted at the EU level.

The strategy adopted by the Council in co-decision would be to oppose the greening of TEN-T through environmental instruments which might delay or put the overall programme in jeopardy. As policy making progressed, resistance focused on SEA, first opposing its introduction, and then working to systematically weaken its effect.

The European Parliament: between a rock and a hard place

After 1994, the co-decision process provided the Parliament with new powers in decision-making over TEN-T. Final policy decisions would in future be made through common agreed positions between the Council and Parliament, whereas beforehand the Parliament had not held formal power in the policy process. The Parliament quickly used this new platform to voice concern about the undemocratic nature of the early stages of the process, strongly condemning in particular the failure to involve the Parliament in the Christophersen Group’s work, or to provide information about its work (EP working document on TEN, September 1994, cited in Doherty and Hoedeman, 1995).

The advent of the European Parliament as a key player in decision-making gave new force to the integration of environmental risks. Within the Parliament a growing environmental concern was becoming apparent, boosted in the June 1994 Parliamentary elections by a new wave of environmentally aware (as opposed to Green) MEPs. For example, Mark Watts, an MEP in the European Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP), arrived in Brussels in 1995, and stood for re-election in 1999. He, like many MEPs, was not present during the early stages of co-decision, and on arriving was surprised by the culture of the Parliament and the Transport Committee: ‘some of the newer MEPs like myself couldn’t believe what we were expected to endorse ... When I arrived at the Transport Committee there was also a view which was officially
expressed, when I would say "hang on a minute what about the environment? We ought to be thinking about the environmental impact", they would say "that’s not a matter for the transport committee, that’s a matter for the environment committee". So there was a classic case of departmentalism even here, in this Parliament. Right from the outset [in 1994]. That’s changed a bit, and I think as you may know, the European elections [have resulted in] a major turnover in members. Half of us are new, and I would say the majority of the new members have much more of a grasp of environmental issues than some of the people we replaced. So I think there has been a bit of a seismic shift.’

Watts, like other MEPs, was concerned at the way the Parliament’s position on TEN-T was developing: ‘... what struck me immediately was the apparent dominance of road schemes, and the missed opportunities for promoting rail, and also short sea shipping and maritime transport generally. And of course the total lack of any recognition that this would have an environmental impact. I then looked at it a bit further and realised that this was not a transport tool, let alone an environmental tool. It was predominantly an economic tool and a political tool’. Indeed, in one of its first meetings with the DGVII, in the autumn of 1994, the Parliament were also surprised at the apparent lack of attention to environmental concerns within the Commission’s work.

The Parliament’s aim became one of achieving a ‘sensible balance between economy and ecology’ in the creation of TEN-T (CEC, 1995b). Its position centred on the principle that any EU investment in TEN-T should be conditional on projects satisfying EU environmental objectives. This clearly presented the potential for introducing new obstacles in a process which had so far concentrated on removing them.

However, in spite of its stated environmental concern, the overriding aim of the Parliament remained, like the Commission, to pursue integration and the completion of the single market. A tension existed between the Parliament’s desire to see the economic benefits of TEN-T arrive speedily, and the concern that environmental issues should be properly addressed. The Parliament’s position was always a difficult one. The increasing environmental awareness and concern among MEPs was a clear influence, but the overriding aim of the Parliament remained, like that of the Commission, to complete the 1992 process. The debate was therefore characterised by references to environmental protection, as well as to rapid implementation of TEN-T, and advocacy for the inclusion of individual projects. The lobbying activities of environmental NGOs, the presence of the Green Group and the EPLP in the Parliament, and the Parliament’s formal involvement through co-decision, were clearly important in bringing environmental risks to the centre of the policy debate. As has been stated, ‘despite its newly acquired "pinkish and greenish" tinge, the Parliament remains reasonably receptive to the input of business interests...’ (Gardner 1991: 82). So the Parliament’s position on TEN-T was
destined to tread a difficult path between a desire to see TEN-T implemented as rapidly as possible, and a concern that the environmental impacts should be properly addressed in policy.

This tension within its position reflects the broader discursive conflict within the policy process, which caused difficulties for those involved throughout the process. This is how one MEP saw it: ‘In the objectives of TEN-T the environment doesn’t take centre stage at all, when really it should have been a tool by which we try to secure Europe’s environmental objectives .... So we were confronted with this thing, that there’s a very big jobs argument. That’s a number one political priority. There’s 18-20 million people unemployed, you can’t just dismiss that’ (MEP).

**Institutional issues for the Parliament**

The Parliament’s position was made more difficult still by several further institutional factors. Firstly because it was still developing as an institution: its experience had been mostly ‘in opposition’, and so it had still to develop its ability to handle its new powers. The Parliament was described by interviewees as still finding its feet in moving from a position of opposition to an increasingly powerful role in decision-making.

Secondly, although the Parliament was becoming increasingly involved in the minutiae of policy making, it was pointed out that, on transport and environmental matters at least, it didn’t have the technical capacity to engage in an informed way in technical policy debates. MEPs simply do not have technical support in depth to sustain involvement in highly technical debates: ‘But where do we gain our environmental expertise from? What resources do we tap on? You’ve got the Commission on one side, you’ve got all the member states, in our case the DOT on the other. How are we supposed to, as mere representatives of the people, confront these experts and bureaucrats? It’s extremely difficult’ (MEP).

This was seen as having two ramifications. Firstly, that the arguments put forward by the Parliament suffered a credibility gap: ‘So is it really worth listening to what they have to say on projects? It blooming well isn’t.... that is the problem with the [Parliamentary] institution as a whole, they don’t have the technical capacity to make these kind of amendments’ (Brussels bureaucrat). Indeed, the major resources of technical expertise were available to individual member states, thereby reinforcing the Council position. The Commission, although clearly to a lesser extent than the Parliament, lacks expertise in critical areas of infrastructure and environmental evaluation. This was acknowledged by several Commission staff in interviews.

Secondly, this gap in environmental expertise meant that the Parliament was particularly receptive to the lobbying of environmental NGO’s, which could provide expert input as well as
political support:

‘Basically all the things we were lobbied about by the environmental lobbies we were already pursuing. But it did reinforce it. And it was good to have the environmental lobby on our back because it gave weight to the argument’ (MEP).

Furthermore the broad spectrum of political interests within the Parliament meant that reaching a common position on the environment would always be difficult. The Parliament’s Transport and Tourism Committee, which was responsible for preparing the position, was aware that any environmental article had to secure a broad base of support within the Committee, if it was to be accepted by the Transport Council. So the EPLP and some other MEPs had to take the entire socialist group plus the Liberals and Christian Democrats.

Inevitably, then, a further reason for pragmatism in its proposed environmental reforms was acceptance of the political reality that many MEPs simply did not have an environmental agenda.

For the Transport and Tourism Committee, TEN-T was challenging because it required detailed involvement in environmental issues. The committee had previously regarded environmental concerns as the domain of the environment committee, whilst referring often to ‘sustainable mobility’ in general terms. TEN-T represented an opportunity to put this rhetoric into practice. Wilhelm Piecyk, the rapporteur on TEN-T, was a member of this new environmentally aware constituency of MEPs, and was partly pushed along by it.

The Parliament’s Strategy

Given its contradictory position, the Parliament was clearly faced by some difficulty in finding a strategy on TEN-T. There was a clear desire to place conditions on any EU intervention, rather than allow TEN-T to develop as simply an alternative infrastructure fund for member states. One MEP described the emerging TEN-T framework as ‘a pot of money for member states to do what they bloody well like with in terms of building these networks, whether they are road, rail or whatever. And we just felt as a matter of principle if we are giving money to member states it should be conditional upon a whole number of points, and we thought that was fully compatible with the concept of subsidiarity, and a way of pursuing Europe’s environmental and transport objectives’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

For one MEP who was active within the Environment Committee on TEN-T, the aim of these desired conditions was to shift policy away from a roads-bias: ‘We were not going to have just loads of roads built. Our big thing was that we wanted the main thrust for rail and water, and not roads. That was a real uphill struggle because of the plans which were put in by the national governments. So you know already we were fighting a tough battle’.
However, the Parliament’s dilemma was that if it used its new powers to press for strong environmental reforms, it could put the TEN-T programme at risk, which was clearly not in its broader interests. The pragmatic position adopted by the Parliament was to demand environmental measures which could take several years to enact, but at the same time pressing for rapid implementation of the TEN-T programme. Not surprisingly, this position was criticised as ‘incoherent’ by several interviewees, for example:

‘They wanted an assessment of the whole of the TEN as a precondition for building. But too late folks, most of it is there already. And this was the thing that was most annoying to the Council. You had the Parliament saying “right, stop everything, we’re going to do SEA on the whole of the TEN”. There is no consensus on how to do this, in fact some of the methodology doesn’t exist. So we’re going to wait five years to do the methodology, we’re then going to stop the planning process and put all this into practice, then we’re going to carry out corridor studies for individual corridors and decide what is the best modal solution for each individual corridor. So maybe we don’t want a motorway here, we want a railway, a waterway or something like this. So you do all this, which is going to take 20 years, and yet they want the TEN delivered next year. Frankly this was just incoherent. Stupid. The kinder way of describing it was that they just thought they were going to push for some environmental protection all round, and they weren’t too worried about the internal coherence of the actual measure, but they thought let’s go for it. They realised that they weren’t going to get a lot, but they were keen to raise the stakes and raise a flag for this thing. And they certainly did raise the profile of it in the Council’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

The option of demanding that SEA be carried out prior to EU agreement on the TEN-T was in fact eventually discounted in face of the risks threatened by delays: ‘The problem when we came in [in 1994] was if we said to them “right before we approve this you’ve got to do an SEA”, we would have delayed TEN-T and the feasibility studies for 2 or 3 years’ (MEP).

Similarly, MEPs knew that if the Parliament used its powers to block EU funding because of its concern over the lack of environmental precautions, it risked attack because of the consequential ‘lost’ job opportunities: ‘if we block the TEN-T budget, block the TEN-T co-decision, then the headline would be “EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BLOCKS JOB CREATION PLAN”. That’s what the media would have said. To most of the media this is what TEN-T is. To most of the Council of Ministers this is what TEN-T is’ (MEP).

The constraints on the work of the Parliament in developing policy on TEN-T are relevant in considering the position it adopted on the environmental implications of TEN-T. The Parliament’s attitude to environmental integration was pragmatic and reformist, based on securing the best deal for the environment, rather than pursuing an ideologically stronger but politically unsustainable position. As one MEP put it: ‘... you’ve got to be practical, and our view was, its better to try and develop an awareness of the environmental issues and build in
some safeguards than just say ‘oh there’s no real attempt to properly plan this, there’s no participation, no environmental dimension, its going to be bad for the environment, so we’re just against it’. We don’t think we would have really achieved much. It may have made us feel better, but wouldn’t have achieved much for the environment. So we felt this attempt to be positive and constructive, and try and build in environmental safeguards, was the right approach’ (MEP).

**Kinnock as Transport Commissioner: the new green broom?**

As mentioned above, Neil Kinnock became Transport Commissioner in 1995, inheriting TEN-T policy from Karel van Miert. Like the Parliament, the Kinnock Cabinet were latecomers to the process, inheriting a policy process at a relatively advanced stage. The role of the Commissioner would be critical in providing the political guidance and direction to DGVII as policy developed.

In early exchanges, Kinnock did not appear overly interested in the environmental aspects of TEN-T, resulting in some early lobbying from the Parliament’s Transport and Tourism Committee. Although this seemed to cause some consternation, the Parliament perhaps wrongly giving the impression that it was against TEN-T, Kinnock quickly addressed these concerns, and a compromise position was adopted. The Cabinet marked this new position by beginning to move TEN-T discourse away from what ‘both environmentalists and traditionalists tend to see as a pure infrastructure policy’, towards a broader transport policy: ‘a policy which is about making infrastructure work better, making networks much more holistic overall, thinking in terms of the system rather than purely building a road’ (Brussels bureaucrat). TEN-T was reconstructed as a tool for moving towards sustainable mobility. The environmentally sensitive position of Kinnock’s cabinet in other transport topics was indeed welcomed with caution by environmental NGOs, notably his work on pricing in transport. The main reservation among environmental NGOs was that this position was a politically astute rhetorical position which would not, however, be translated into meaningful actions.

In debates and statements, Kinnock also drew attention to the fact that of the Christophersen priority projects, some 80% were rail, 10% were road-rail and only 10% were road projects. Kinnock emphasised this shift in infrastructure investment away from road towards railways as a measure of environmental concern.

In 1995 the Cabinet requested that DGVII and DGXI should work together on the development of SEA methodology, and start work on analysis of the Christophersen corridors. However as co-decision progressed there was little substantive progress on either front which could be
injected into the emerging policy guidelines. However, an open question is the extent to which the Cabinet were supportive of SEA in principle. It seems likely that SEA was regarded as a procedural device, which would do little to bring forward environmental protection.

The Cabinet would play a crucial role in conciliation, entering into detailed negotiations with the Parliament, Commission and Council. This involvement was more intensive than normal given that many of the issues under discussion were of a highly technical nature rather than broad policy statements. The Cabinet had good structural links into DGVII, to the heads of the divisions dealing with TEN-T as well as to officials within these divisions. A less formalised open door policy existed with MEPs, particularly with the Socialist Group, the Transport and Tourism Committee’s rapporteur on TEN-T (Wilhelm Piecyk), and the Parliament’s delegation in the final conciliation process.

**TENS as an institutional battlefield 2: shaping environmental integration**

‘To put into co-decision something as important to national governments as the planning of infrastructure projects is asking for trouble’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

How, then, were the conflicts inherent in the emerging discourse reproduced as policy developed in the co-decision process? What follows is an analysis of the strategies and practices of power which were pursued. Under co-decision, the power struggles between the EU institutions increasingly conditioned the shape of the emerging policy. Many of those deep inside the policy process felt that TEN-T was being substantially shaped by these inter-institutional power struggles. As one insider put it: ‘A nasty affair. They weren’t arguments over TEN-T, I should point out, they were inter-institutional. TEN-T was the playing field for a wider struggle, which made it hard - which pissed us off royally. TEN-T became an inter-institutional football’ (Brussels bureaucrat). The policy outcome on TEN-T was played out in bipartite power struggle between the Council and Parliament, mediated to some extent by the Commission, and further complicated by the pressure of other institutions and interests.

Within this power struggle, individual policy issues inevitably became sites of conflict. The treatment of the environment, and specifically the use of Strategic Environmental Assessment, became one of these sites. As the Parliament began to push strongly for a tranche of environmental reforms including SEA, supported by the Commission, the Council entered into a strategy to resist and weaken this ‘greening’. Environmental NGOs, in an increasingly co-ordinated way, pressed the Parliament and Commission to maintain a strong position, whilst other interests from regions and member states relentlessly pursued individual infrastructure projects. As SEA became a site of power struggle, its shaping as a strong or weak tool for
environmental integration became intrinsically linked to the outcome of the power struggle. Thus the discursive conflict – between economic development / political integration discourses and environmental counter-discourse – was reproduced within a power struggle which conditioned the outcome of the discursive conflict in policy. Below, I analyse in some detail the strategies for environmental reform and resistance to them, identifying the ‘local tactics’, or techniques of power, which were deployed.

**Co-decision: the policy football match**

The European Parliament’s first reading of the Commission’s TEN-T proposals took place on 18 May 1995. The tenor of the Parliament’s position was set in the report by the EP’s Committee of Transport and Tourism, drafted by Wilhelm Piecyk, the Rapporteur on TEN-T. The report, adopted by the Parliament, sought to redirect EU transport policy towards transport modes least harmful to the environment, in order to achieve a ‘sensible balance between economy and ecology’ in the creation of TEN-T. Here, then, was explicit recognition of a strategy to change the culture and language of TEN-T from a simple instrument of the 1992 process, to a more environmentally sensitive instrument of sustainable development. Some of the most significant of the Parliament’s 159 proposed amendments were:

- the requirement to carry out Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of the networks;
- further to this is the requirement to carry out a corridor analysis for every project, using cost-benefit analysis, and incorporating environmental considerations;
- cost-benefit analyses of economic and ecological aspects;
- an investment structure favouring rail (minimum 40% of EU investment) and combined transport (minimum 15%) rather than road (maximum 25%);
- all TEN-T projects should be consistent with EC environmental legislation, including the EIA and Habitats Directives.

Many other amendments concerned the inclusion of individual infrastructure projects within the outline network plans, put forward by individual MEPs (Source: CEC, 1995b).

Other proposed amendments included a European Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP) amendment for minimum environmental standards. This proposal was that minimum standards on environmental impact should be established, which projects should meet as a condition for Community funding. The EPLP believed that this proposal was ‘more radical than the greens’ (MEP), and would assist in harmonising transport standards in Europe. However the Commission were opposed to this amendment, preferring SEA as a means of integrating
environmental risks. The Greens also proposed an amendment requiring analysis of economic and social impacts.

Overall, the proposed amendments can be seen as wide ranging, and originating from different political groups, principally the EPLP and the Green Group. Together, the Parliament’s proposals set out a demanding and innovatory series of environmental conditions for new infrastructure, which would exceed the requirements for new infrastructure both at the EU level and in individual member states (for example there is no formal requirement for SEA in infrastructure planning in the UK). The Parliament’s position can be interpreted as making strong environmental demands. Yet it was aware that its requirements were perhaps in excess of what could be expected based on accepted national practice, and required new techniques which had yet to be fully developed.

Inherent in the EP’s position was the principle that TEN-T was properly within the competence of the Community, rather than being simply a concern of member states (MEP). Investment in infrastructure should therefore be tied to EU environmental conditions. They considered this to be fully compatible with subsidiarity, and a way of pursuing EU environmental and transport objectives. There was support for a formal role at the EU level in planning and implementing TEN-T. So the environmental amendments had become expressions of the tension between the Parliament and Member States (the Council). The environmental amendments were techniques of procedural power in the EU policy process, which in fruition could become embedded as techniques of power over member states. The treatment of the environment in the policy process now seemed likely to become part of a broader struggle over the definition of subsidiarity, as well as a test of the EU’s competence in infrastructure planning.

Within the Parliament, the strength of feeling on the environmental implications of the TEN-T emerged during internal consultations carried out by the Committee on Transport and Tourism following the first reading of the proposed policy guidelines. In its response to the consultation, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection adopted a very critical position, pointing out that the Commission’s proposals remained biased towards road transport, and stating that SEA should be carried out before the road network and airports were adopted in the TEN-T. The committee’s opinion stressed that the roads bias in TEN-T highlighted the gap between Commission policy and practice on sustainable development (EP, 1995: 74).

The tactics adopted by the Council of Ministers in co-decision were uncompromising. It roundly rejected all the amendments proposed by the Parliament in its first reading (Council Common Position of 28/9/95). The proposed article on SEA was single out for special attention. It was

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specifically rejected because, according to the Council, environmental safeguards were already substantially built into the proposals (European Council, 1995). In the Council’s position can be seen the resistance of several member states to handing over decision-making power to the EU on what were regarded as, essentially, national projects.

The Council’s tactics also included arguing formally that in any case the Parliament was mistakenly trying to introduce new environmental legislation under the wrong legal base – i.e. under the TEN article, not the environmental article, in the Treaty. This legal difference of interpretation of the Treaty became a hotly contested issue.

The Commission, on the other hand, were more responsive to the strong and specific environmental arguments raised by the Parliament in its first reading. As many as 67 of the Parliament’s amendments, made in the first reading were accepted in full by the Commission, 35 in part. The need for a specific article on SEA was incorporated into the Commission’s revised proposal (CEC, 1995b).

Both DGVII and DGXI were open to the Parliament’s amendment on SEA, although they held different views on its possible formulation. DGXI was opposed to the use of policy level SEA, comparing policy scenarios, e.g. reducing demand, taxation - measures which appear normal in the SEA literature. This was explained as a sign of the weakness of DGXI as a player in the process, that they did not have the power to push through anything as potentially challenging as comparing policy options. SEA was rapidly becoming a pivotal issue in the policy process, offering real prospects for environmental integration, but also threatening disruption of a major policy initiative. The Council’s position was becoming a major factor in shaping SEA.

The Parliament’s Second Reading took place on 13 December 1995, where the Parliament largely maintained its original position. The rapporteur, Wilhelm Piecyk, lamented the lack of co-operation by the Council of Ministers, and described its Common position as miserable, unimpressive and provocative. The EP’s renewed position recommended 111 amendments to the Council’s common position (of 28/9/1995), maintaining the article on SEA. The Commission, in response, continued its support for this article (CEC, 1996d). However, a proposal for economic cost-benefit analysis and job creation studies for the regions affected by TEN-T was rejected, on the grounds of subsidiarity: this should be the responsibility of Member States.

The Council once again rejected the Parliament’s amendments (announcement of 29/1/96), triggering a conciliation process between Parliament and Council. The cost of not reaching agreement through conciliation would have been to disrupt the legislative path of TEN-T,
leading to a possible delay of several years. This was considered to be unacceptable by all parties, resulting in a shared commitment to finding a workable common position.

**SEA: vague, late, but convenient**

Having explored in some detail the positions held by the key EU institutions, and their engagement in the policy process, I will now elaborate on how SEA fared on this complex playing field.

It was notable that many interviewees regarded SEA as a procedural instrument, and described it in these terms. There was very little discussion of what SEA could actually achieve in decision-making. Its exact nature seemed to be very unclear. One common impression was of SEA as a device for creating an impression of meaningful progress on the environment. For example:

> ‘But I can tell you that it is pure philosophy. Nobody that I know in the Commission or elsewhere knows exactly what is meant by [SEA]. It is another nice word to keep politicians at bay’ (EIB representative).

SEA can be interpreted as a procedural device which satisfied many interests by having something tangible to point at, beyond bland policy statements about conforming to environmental objectives. The vagueness of the concept, and its slow deployment, further served the interests of expediting the TEN-T programme.

For those who were interested in SEA as an environmental tool, this power dimension, as SEA became a political football almost without concern for the final outcome, was frustrating: ‘SEA in itself is a very, very simple tool for helping decision-making. So neither party should have been really so violent about it’ (Environmental lobbyist).

However, given that SEA was at the crux of the strategy to green TEN-T, it is not surprising that positions for and against it were strongly expressed. For the environmental activists as well as policy insiders, there was a need to create a political, rather than technical, case for the adoption of SEA: ‘The problem was, it was so late in the day, it was so pathetic the ways the Guidelines had been proposed in the first place that you had to find something rather dramatic to get the whole thing into the picture.’ (Environmental lobbyist).

Consequently the positions around SEA reflected interests rather than a more reasoned evaluation of the procedure itself: ‘So this [was] a realpolitik as opposed to reasonable
scientific approach’ (Environmental lobbyist).

The pursuit of knowledge as a delaying tactic

As mentioned above, in late 1993, DGXI had first proposed that SEA should be carried out for TEN-T. In 1994, DGVII held an expert hearing, which concluded that there was at that time no established methodology for SEA. As a result of this hearing, and requests from Kinnock’s Cabinet to move things forward, the Commission launched studies on methodology and best practice in SEA.

This action resulted partly from a difference of position throughout policy development between advocates of early application and hands-on development of SEA, using best available methods, and advocates of a more cautious approach based on researching and improving methodology before application. It seemed that the positions of DGVII and DGXI reflected this polarisation, with the Directorate responsible for infrastructure keen to make progress, and the Directorate responsible for environmental protection keen to secure some useful outcome. The outcome may reflect the more powerful position of DGVII, and the inability of DGXI to argue convincingly for the deployment of SEA on the findings of the 1994 seminar.

There was a clear feeling among environmental NGOs as well as policy insiders that the further studies on methodology were part of a strategy of delaying the application of SEA, particularly given the piloting work already carried out on the High Speed Rail Network. However, the delayed application of SEA may have masked a deeper uncertainty over the way forwards: ‘Certainly there has been a dragging of feet over SEA. But this delaying may have been more than just a delaying of environmental integration, but symptomatic of a wider lack of certainty on a way forwards on TEN-T’ (Environmental lobbyist).

TENS as an institutional battlefield 3: pork-barrelling

A feature of the TEN-T process was that even as policy was being developed, advocacy for the detailed projects which would comprise the networks was taking place. As the procedural arguments continued over issues such as environmental integration, simultaneous struggles were taking place over the content of policy: the adoption and prioritisation of projects, corridors and networks. In some cases, EU money was already being used to finance projects as well as to fund feasibility studies.

In early decision-making, lobbying for the inclusion of individual projects in the lists annexed to the policy guidelines, and represented on the outline plans, had been important in shaping the
emerging proposals. In co-decision, a new lobbying route was opened – through MEPs and the Parliamentary process. The later stages of drafting the policy guidelines were marked by intensive lobbying from regions for projects to be added to the network, as ‘what was for the Commission a skeleton became all the veins and arteries as well’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

This ‘pork-barrelling’, as it was described by one interviewee, raised the concern that TEN-T, rather than delivering a European infrastructure plan was being taken over by member states trying to obtain money for projects they were going to do anyway, and local authorities trying to jump on the bandwagon, in a climate of uncertainty over continued public investment in infrastructure.

There was clearly a perceived regional interest in getting projects onto the maps. TEN-T designation offered a new lever for releasing funding from the EU budget for local infrastructure projects. For example, in the UK’s governments consultation on roads, which shaped its submission to the Commission on TEN-T, the regions complained when their local ‘lines’ were not adopted in the proposals map, because they felt ‘no line on the map, no money’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

Lobbying from regions was generally directed at member states and MEPs, rather than the Commission. The UK regions, for example, lobbied the UK government both through the Department of Transport, and through the UK’s Permanent Representation in Brussels, as well as lobbying the Parliament through approaches to MEPs. This two-pronged approach was aimed at securing amendments to the member states’ proposals, thereby possibly influencing the Council common position, and to the Parliament’s list of projects in its own position. However, this process started ‘spiralling out of control’ as an enormous number of projects were added to the proposals maps. This rush was exacerbated by the cohesion countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland) perceiving that the proposals maps would be used as the basis for the allocation of cohesion funding, ‘so of course they’ve bunged on everything they could find’ (Brussels bureaucrat). In all, the lobbying of the Parliament produced some 600 amendments to the proposals, mentioning particular infrastructure projects.

Perhaps the dominance of national and regional interests in the preparation of project lists reveals why it was difficult to get member states’ transport ministries to think in terms of an international network rather than in more parochial terms, raising difficulties in planning TEN-T. The adoption of many local projects in the proposals once again highlighted the Parliament’s difficult position, and would further hamper its calls for strong environmental measures. The nature of the policy process was clearly shaped by this lobbying. Developing a ‘rational’ network from these diverse projects was a difficult task, as local political interests blurred the
clear rationality of the original vision:

'This was one of the worst aspects of the process. It was frankly almost scandalous, the kind of pork-barrelling that was going on. There were ridiculous things. In the first reading you’ll find for example two high speed train [proposals] from Amsterdam to Hanover. Those were the kind of amendments that we were having to put up with. It was a joke, which detracted from the more serious amendments’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

The lobbying and debate in co-decision over which projects should be adopted in TEN-T was to some extent already being overtaken by events. Certain TEN-T projects were being progressed quickly under separate EU budget headings, in particular through the structural and cohesion funds, even before the agreement of a financing regulation in September 1995, which allowed the release of Community funds for the co-financing of feasibility studies, interest subsidies, guarantees and direct grants, as shown in Table 9 (CEC, 1995c). The trend in overall funding is biased towards roads, mainly through Cohesion funding in peripheral countries, although most of the specific TEN-T budget line goes towards rail projects.

Clearly, the final outcome on environmental integration risked being marginalised by this rapid, politically led decision-making. Together with the delays in implementing SEA, it was increasingly unlikely that an environmental policy instrument could wield enough force to have significant effect on the shaping of the networks. SEA was becoming an increasingly rhetorical device.

**Constructing legitimacy: the search for economic knowledge**

Within the policy process, different positions existed over what methods of decision-support were appropriate. Alongside the advocacy for environmental tools by environmental NGOs and MEPs, which is the main focus of this study, economic evaluation measures were also being posited as a means of supporting decision-making. Specifically, the need for micro-level cost-benefit analysis was strongly argued by economists; and assessment of wider economic benefits (like jobs created) was pressed for by the Parliament. Here, then, the type of knowledge which would be used as a basis for ‘rational’ decision-making, for providing legitimacy for policy decisions, was becoming an area of political conflict between economic, social and environmental discourses. The adoption of one technique rather than another, in embedding a particular rationality of policy making, might shift the balance of power in the policy process.

Above, I have argued that by 1992 a new discourse had been structured which placed TENs at the top of the European political agenda, bolstered by powerful economic knowledge claims. The acceptance of these knowledge claims was demonstrated by the very high level of lobbying.
particularly from regions and other local government, for the addition of projects to the outline network plans. Very few questioned whether the opening up of their regions by the development of major international corridors would be beneficial for local economies (for example).

Table 6. EU financing of the trans-European transport network (mECU), 1993-1996.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>EIB (i)(2)</td>
<td>4028</td>
<td>3310</td>
<td>2229</td>
<td>9567</td>
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<tr>
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<td>76</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>461</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
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<td>884</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>2639</td>
<td>3638</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fund (i)(3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Grants, interest rate subsidies, loan guarantees, co-financing of studies</td>
<td>TEN heading</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(of which the 14 priority projects)</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>181.05</td>
<td>211.23</td>
<td>572.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cohesion Fund</td>
<td>1887.5</td>
<td>1107.6</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>4083.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) TEN and TEN related projects
(2) Signed contracts
(3) Usually includes appropriations committed, for the 1996-99 period
(4) Proposals having received a positive opinion from the TEN-T Financial Assistance Committee by 20/11/95
Source: CEC, 1995c, CEC, 1996e.

However, as the crisis in public investment grew in the 1990s, the question of finance became a serious problem for the TEN-T. There was increasingly a need to demonstrate the economic benefits that might actually be created by the networks. This was thrown into sharp relief when the Parliament in its first reading demanded a clear identification of the economic benefits that were likely to be created by TEN-T.

In response to this challenge, and to the need to establish legitimacy for continued and increasing EU commitment to TEN-T, the Commission pursued two strategies:

- the institutionalisation of economic evaluation of international transport movements
- elevating the broader economic imperative of TEN-T to unquestioned status

Below, I expand briefly on each of these strategies to construct an economic rationality for
TEN-T which would provide legitimacy in the face of uncertainty over economic benefits and criticism from environmentalists.

**Institutionalisation of [micro-]economic evaluation**

For the EU to give financial support to the development of the networks, there was a need to prove the overall benefits to the community that could accrue from such investment. This was achieved through methodological innovation in cost-benefit analysis (CBA), identifying what has been termed ‘Community Benefits’.

CBA has become the main technique in support of infrastructure decision making in member states: ‘...the convergence of the core countries is seen in a renewed commitment to economic evaluation in investment appraisal and decision-making’ (Roy, 1994: 53). Recent work by the European Centre for Infrastructure Studies (ECIS), analysing CBAs of the flagship Paris-Brussels-Cologne-Amsterdam-London (PBKAL) high speed rail project, identified a persistent methodological flaw in the evaluation of international infrastructure projects (ECIS, 1995). Because CBAs are carried out at the national level, within national boundaries, they ignore the benefits accrued by travellers on international routes outside their country of origin, thereby undervaluing international projects. This finding, welcomed by the European Commission, proved the economic viability of the individual national elements of the PBKAL, and led to the prospect of evaluation of the ‘Community Benefits’ for decision making in individual corridors and for the network as a whole.

**The economic imperative - establishing macro-economic knowledge**

A second key strategy was to secure consensus on the wider economic benefits of TEN-T. It has been noted that all the EU institutions supported TEN-T in principle, because of the perceived causal link between infrastructure investment and economic growth. In particular, the potential for job creation through TENs was heavily underlined in the Delors White Paper. Uncertainties about the nature and distribution of benefits have yet to be taken seriously in decision-making, in spite of a vigorous debate among policy makers, pressure groups and academics over the extent and direction of economic benefits that actually flow from infrastructure investment (CEC, 1994a, T+E, 1996). Work by ECIS highlighted the importance (and contingent nature) of macro-economics: ‘The novel element provided by the macroeconomic research is to indicate the degree to which primary transport benefits [of new infrastructure] feed through to economy-wide productivity gains. The relevance of macroeconomic research is thus to complement CBA - not indeed by magnifying the benefits but, rather, by demonstrating to decision-makers the significance of those benefits in terms of the national interest in competitiveness’ (Roy, 1994: 154).
The findings of macro-economic evaluation were that the 14 priority projects would lead to the creation of 700,000 person years of work between 1998 and 2007 (the construction phase), and that the complete TEN-T would generate as much as 3.2m person years of work over this period. The wider employment benefits would be as much as 4.7 million permanent jobs (CEC 1996e). However, these evaluations have failed to remove the uncertainties raised in Europe 2000+ about the risks for peripheral regions.

Nevertheless, the twin strategies of developing micro- and macro-economic evaluation at the EU level, served to support the case that TEN-T projects would bring a high level of social return for the EU as a whole, and that the overall employment benefits would be very large. A knowledge base was being established, which all the key institutions involved in the policy process could accept. MEPs - the most accountable - could justify their support for TEN-T by the number of jobs that could result.

More recently, the proposal by the Federal Trust for a single European infrastructure agency to co-ordinate the future development of the TEN-T suggests the possibility of an even deeper hierarchy in infrastructure planning, and one which would further entrench the single market discourse: ‘A principal function of a TENs agency ... would be to evaluate projects from an overall European point of view, and to harmonise the assessment of potential projects. What is clearly required is a common methodology for network Europe’ (Federal Trust High Level Group, 1996). The methodology anticipated is based, unsurprisingly, on economic evaluation. A review of infrastructure appraisal methods in member states by EURET had earlier concluded that there was a need for a common appraisal framework for road schemes in the EU. The framework would include extended cost-benefit analysis, incorporating economic evaluations of strategic environmental impacts (CEC, 1994b).

**Challenging legitimacy: emergence of the environmental counter-discourses**

As policy progressed under co-decision, a number of environmental NGOs began to take a more active interest in TEN-T. Although the early campaigning had been characterised by activities such as direct action, co-ordinated at the international level, and focused mainly on critical projects, a turn took place as more ‘professionalised’ NGOs became involved. A coalition of NGOs came together to campaign on TEN-T, which adopted a strategy of environmental reform, or ‘greening’ of the proposals, rather than seeking to stop them outright. A discourse of environmental opposition existed, but was rapidly marginalised in this process of concerted NGO action. This common position was a result of compromise, and reflected recognition of the realpolitik of the situation, rather than a strong ideological position.
The NGO coalition, 'TENGO', was formed in early 1995 under the initiative and co-ordination of the European Federation of Transport and the Environment (T&E), itself an umbrella organisation with a wide ranging membership including, for example, Transport 2000 in the UK. The timing was in response to the European Parliament’s imminent first hearing, which was seen as a critical opportunity to influence the proposals. Its membership comprised the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), the European Federation for Transport and the Environment (T&E), Birdlife International, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and Action for Solidarity, Equality, Environment and Development (A SEED).

The position put forward in lobbying the Parliament was a moderate one, based on a perception that the Parliament was likely to be weak in its response: ‘The demands we formulated for the first EP session in Strasbourg were fairly moderate, not questioning TEN-T as such, but trying to ‘green’ the plans. We agreed on that because it looked like the EP was completely uncritical and some strong environmental paragraphs could prevent the most disastrous TEN-T schemes’ (environmental lobbyist).

However, the NGOs were surprised when the EP’s position reflected almost all of the demands they had lobbied for, raising the feeling that perhaps more could have been asked for: ‘...we were rather surprised to see that the EP had taken over almost all of our demands. It made me wonder whether we couldn’t have asked for more, or have been more clear in our approach’ (environmental lobbyist).

In its lobbying, TENGO targeted the Parliament, the National Ministers, and the Cabinet, rather than the Commission itself. These were seen as ‘the politicians, the decision makers’ (environmental lobbyist). One example of this was a TENGO press release (TENGO, 18/5/95) which criticised the Parliament’s compromised position in its first reading. Kijs Kuneman, Director of T&E, stated: ‘the inconsistent EP vote leads us to conclude that the new environmental requirements in the text are mostly empty words. Professed principles and practice seem as wide apart as ever’. The press release pointed out that some 15 motorway projects had been added by the Parliament, including projects in the Pyrenees which would threaten the Somport Valley, which ‘undoubtedly means the extinction of the brown bear habitat in the valley’. The Somport had already been an international cause célèbre for the European environmental network for several years.

Once the Council of Ministers had rejected the Parliament’s position, TENGO’s work shifted into a struggle to keep the Parliament committed to its amendments.
NGO's compromise

If the realpolitik of the EU institutions and the formal policy process were important in shaping TENGÖ’s strategy, the dynamics of its membership were also significant. TENGÖ expressed a common position, around which individual groups were free to pursue their own campaigns. Whilst there was awareness of the differences in position between NGOs, there was also a strong desire to work together once there was an opportunity for the EP to reshape the emerging proposals. The diverse arguments put forward by environmental NGOs in their own campaigns varied from fundamental rejection of single market values, because of its potential environmental impacts, to advocacy for better integration of environmental risks within the policy process.

TENGÖ comprised some insider groups, which lobbied for procedural reform, and others which supported massed international direct actions, operating outside the formal policy process, and advocating alternative development paths. For the majority of TENGÖ-partners it was the roads-bias of TEN-T which was the major cause of concern, rather than the basic principle of European transport networks. T&E, for example, was never against TEN-T in principle, and had a positive stance on High-Speed Trains (HST) and freight railways, which was not shared by A SEED.

In particular, A SEED, with its ideologically driven culture, and modus operandi of non-violent direct action, found it had to make a significant compromise within the coalition: ‘both in terms of the co-operation with the rest of TENGÖ and the relations with MEPs, A SEED couldn’t really start shouting “stop TEN-T”. We had to continue shouting “stop the TEN-T as the Council wants them”. At least that’s what we did, along with lots of local groups from all over Europe in their letters and faxes to MEPs’ (environmental lobbyist).

Within A SEED’s position was an interest in disrupting the policy process, to ‘make a deep conflict arise from which TEN-T itself would not survive’ (environmental lobbyist). However this was recognised as a naïve hope, because of what it saw as a basic commitment of MEPs to European unification, dependent on TEN-T.

A SEED viewed HST’s as unacceptable unless they replaced considerable amounts of air and road transport: ‘For A SEED, investments in prestigious expensive long-distance high speed transport links is not the right choice; this kind of money, wherever it is supposed to come from, should primarily go to public transport for people’s daily, local needs’ (environmental lobbyist). This simple concept was one which was excluded from TENGÖ’s position, and which not surprisingly found no place within the policy debates on TEN-T. It is important to note that this idea, of a re-prioritisation of transport investment away from international infrastructure
projects, was excluded from the most concerted environmental lobbying through a process of mediation between the NGOs, rather than being rejected by the EU institutions. In this way, the discourse of environmental opposition effectively marginalised itself from the formal policy process. It was as if the boundaries of the debate were already circumscribed by the NGO positions, and clearly not all the NGOs objected to the linkage between infrastructure and the single market:

'I think one of the crucial differences between T&E’s and A SEED’s vision is on the Internal Market, which A SEED sees as one of the core problems. It’s the Internal Market with its dramatic restructuring of production and distribution that fuels the demand for long distance transport. A SEED would love to see politicians look for ways to roll back these tendencies and relocalise economies. T&E does not touch this issue, but puts all its eggs in the bracket of technical standards and including environmental costs in the fuel prices’ (environmental lobbyist).

'The very technical and non-political approach of T&E is not a viable strategy, mainly because it does not question the basic development model of the EU..... That might be a realistic choice in the short term, but in the long run it’s a disaster if the environmental movement does not properly confront politicians with the impacts of the Internal Market. If they get the idea that technical measures and price adjustments will do the job, they will not see the urgency of the problems TEN-T will cause. That’s what I think now that TEN-T have survived the EP with only minor changes, some weak environmental paragraphs of which nobody knows if they actually be of any use.’ (environmental lobbyist).

However, T&E were active in lobbying MEPs, and appeared as a credible advocate of environmental concern:

'Oh yes, T&E ... there’s a nice little bunch there, a nice little batch of groups, and when you get something like that you feel “we’ve got right on our side, we’ve got expertise on our side, we’ve got mobilisation of people on our side”, and you can go for it. So that’s excellent’ (MEP).

The NGO strategy: environmental integration by technical reform

It was noticeable, then, that the TENGO campaign focused on reform rather than fundamental challenge to TEN-T. Rather than stopping the programme, the strategy was to green TEN-T, to secure strong environmental integration. A shift took place from campaigning on the general environmental risks associated with the TEN-T proposals to a more technical argument about how these risks should be addressed. This was the position which was advocated in lobbying the Parliament:

'The first text the MEPs received, during an action outside the Parliament in Strasbourg said something like “don’t let TEN-T create environmental disaster”. It
didn’t say “stop TEN-T” (although the huge Greenpeace banner at the action did!),
but that the proposal was disastrous and that the minimum they should do was to
change it, and then listing a handful of quite strong demands’ (environmental
lobbyist).

In the position which formed the basis of TENGOS campaign there were several distinct
elements, which expressed discourses of environmental reform and integration, rather than basic
opposition:
• a focus on expressing concern over the roads bias, which masked the difference between
NGOs over high speed rail. As one representative put it, ‘we would never reach consensus
on that’;
• a focus on environmental integration using policy instruments such as SEA;
• placing scrutiny on the economic uncertainties of investment in road infrastructure; and
• an avoidance of difficult questions about the role of TEN-T in relation to the cultural and
environmental impact of the single market.

Within the environmental counter-discourses, then, it can be seen that the more radical ideas,
those which could be seen as anti-EU, were excluded from the policy arena. The realpolitik of
NGO engagement with the EU institutions had already substantially shaped their original
position. TEN-T was essentially being accepted by the environmental movement, even though it
adopted a critical stance. Here, the conditioning effects of the power relations can be seen. To
appear credible within this policy process, to influence policy makers, which was clearly
TENGO’s aim, the NGOs themselves decided to moderate their position. This was an
important stage in setting boundaries to the policy debate, centralising procedural ideas about
environmental integration, but marginalising other discourses which were challenging to the
EU, and local knowledges which espoused the importance of local cultures and environments
threatened by TEN-T.

As co-decision progressed, several of the NGOs involved in TENGOS produced documents
arguing the need for Strategic Environmental Assessment of TEN-T (Bina et al, 1995, Birdlife
International et al, 1996). SEA was called for as a combination of Community level analysis of
the proposed network, using best available information, followed by corridor analysis for every
TEN-T scheme. The documents argued that this ‘strong’ SEA should ‘play a decisive role
during implementation and revision of the TENs Guidelines’, and corridor analysis should be a
condition of EU funding (Birdlife International et al, 1996: 5,7). Certainly for environmental
NGOs, including Birdlife International, advocacy for SEA in the early stages of policy
development was a clearly political strategy: ‘SEA was a political tool at that stage. It was the
best way we could think of at that time to make sure there was something in the Guidelines that
had anything to do with the environment’ (environmental activist). The exact nature of the
environmental content was less important than the fact that something was included.

The potential environmental effects of TEN-T, from the NGO perspective, were summed up in the following extract from the document:

‘TEN-T represent an obsolete approach to transport policy, focusing heavily on infrastructure building, at odds with the widely accepted need to focus efforts on demand management. What could have been a major opportunity to direct investment in Europe towards sustainable transport will result in a major programme centred on infrastructure projects. These will damage nature conservation and landscape, contribute significantly to the growth in greenhouse gas emissions from transport, and fuel the growth in demand for transport. It will also jeopardise individual countries’ attempts to promote sustainable transport’ (op.cit., 1996: 9).

Significant in this position, once again, is that TEN-T is criticised for its formulation, rather than in principle.

This document advocated particular approaches to SEA, in particular elaborating the principles of a hierarchy of corridor and network level assessments. The paper produced a strong critical response from the Commission. It led to an informal meeting in May 1996 attended by Olivia Bina, Ann Dom (whilst still an NGO lobbyist) and representatives of DGXI. ECIS had written to DGXI saying they disagreed with the content. The Commission was unhappy with the general position argued in the document that SEA could be carried out using simple methodology, and that continuing to explore methodology without application was wasting time: ‘What the paper meant was “look you’re wasting your time our time and everybody’s time talking about the difficulties on methodologies”’ (environmental lobbyist). This position represented an evolution in the demands of Birdlife International. The document set out a minimum position that TEN-T project proposals should at least be compared against policy objectives as a first step, as well as calling for a hierarchy of assessment of the overall networks and individual corridors.

A key issue for NGO’s was whether SEA should impinge directly on TEN-T decision-making. The document argued that SEA could only achieve environmental integration if such decision-making power was created. Yet the broader argument that a weaker SEA could still have a more subtle impact on the thinking of policy makers and politicians was also recognised by its authors.

As SEA became the focus of struggles for environmental integration in TEN-T, a great deal of effort was spent on elaborating and advocating its use. Most of the work of elaboration, among the NGOs, was carried out by the RSPB. One environmental policy expert became, within this
policy network, the recognised NGO expert on SEA, and was invited to Commission workshops on SEA methodology. However, she expressed a great frustration with the time she had spent on exploring and advocating SEA for TEN-T: ‘thank god for [the other NGOs] they didn’t have to waste so much time on it. That’s the truth’ (environmental lobbyist).

The problem was that SEA became a political device, which took up perhaps more importance in the policy process than any of the policy actors wanted. The strong positions that were adopted for and against SEA can be interpreted as political strategies and reactions, rather than deeply held views. What was described by one lobbyist as the ‘violence’ of these positions was a reaction to the lateness of SEA in the policy process, and the poor quality of the proposals, a response to the ‘need to find something dramatic for agenda setting’. Increasingly, the campaign for environmental integration came to hinge on SEA which, if strongly implemented could make a real difference to the policy. However, placing such reliance on such an elusive instrument was raising the stakes.

**Conciliation: the last chance saloon?**

‘In years gone by, drawing lines on maps has led to war. Nowadays people draw lines on maps and it leads to Conciliation, which is pretty close to the same thing’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

‘So the whole conciliation meetings are just a kind of ballet. They’re unreal. Absolutely unreal’ (MEP).

As stated above, in the Parliament’s Second Reading on 13 December 1995, the Parliament largely maintained its original position, including the commitment to SEA. The rapporteur, Wilhelm Piecyk, lamented the lack of co-operation by the Council of Ministers, and described its Common Position as ‘miserable, unimpressive and provocative’. The Parliament’s renewed position recommended 111 amendments to the Council’s Common Position, maintaining its demand for SEA. The Commission, in response, continued its support for SEA (CEC, 1996d). However, other amendments, including a proposal for economic cost-benefit analysis and job creation studies for the regions affected by TEN-T, were not supported, on the grounds of subsidiarity. The position was that this should properly be the responsibility of Member States.

The Council again rejected the Parliament’s amendments, triggering conciliation between Parliament and Council. This final stage in the development of policy guidelines became perhaps the most tangible arena of struggle for political power between the two institutions.

In conciliation the stakes were high. The cost of not reaching agreement within the tight
timetable for conciliation would have been to disrupt the legislative path of TEN-T, leading to a possible delay of several years. This was an unacceptable outcome for all parties, and consequently there was a shared commitment to finding a workable common position. However, the conciliation itself was anything but amicable, and resembled a naked power struggle rather than a consensus-seeking process.

**Naked power**

In the conciliation process can be seen a flexing of the Parliament’s muscles, as it asserts its new role in EU decision-making. The reaction was resistance from the Council (and therefore Member States) to this sharing of power. Tensions ran high, and resentment at the way the opposing parties had engaged in the process was expressed by interviewees from both institutions, as well as recorded in Parliamentary debates. MEP’s roundedly criticised the Council’s attitude, feeling that it had not participated fully in the co-decision process: ‘I would say to the Council that in future it is important that it works with Parliament rather than going off at a tangent and doing its own thing.’

Through most of the conciliation process, the Council was represented by fonctionnaires, and so there was no possibility for movement until the very end of the process. This was frustrating for the Parliament’s delegation. The Commission supported the EP’s amendments through these stages. But in the last two to three days their position shifted, and they tried to convince the Parliament to adopt the Council’s position. The following quote from the MEP who represented the Parliament’s Environment Committee in conciliation, gives a flavour of the process, and hints at the power relations at work. It concerns the way the article on SEA (Article 8) was treated in the last stages of conciliation:

‘The worst meeting was the second formal meeting ... which was held in the new Council of Ministers building across the road from the Parliament, which is a huge power building, a megalopolis, designed by Stalin and built by Mussolini. It’s the most incredible big heavy granite and marble edifice with huge ceilings. And we kind of crept in looking like worms, and we were put in this enormous room with a big table half a mile long. After quite a long time of preparatory meetings in filed all these officials, three per country, and we had twelve of us from the Parliament, and two staff or something, and it was just like intimidation, total intimidation. And that was the point where they came up with another version [of Article 8], and we chucked that out as well, and we adjourned until three o’clock in the morning - we had started at about five o’clock in the afternoon. We adjourned, we were just in and out with little adjournments. And at three o’clock in the morning they came in and Neil [Kinnock] thought he had actually struck a deal, and he came in and made an impassioned speech for about an hour, and then the Italian [Transport] Minister made an impassioned speech for about an hour. And we didn’t like it. We didn’t think it was good enough. And about four thirty in the morning, ten to five it had got to, we just said no. And they all said “right, all the compromises that have been
made so far are off the table. Everything’s off.” And they stormed out. And we thought “shit we might have blown it here”.

Another MEP captured the Council’s attitude: ‘They just felt “it’s nothing to do with you, you’re just the Parliament. What the hell are you doing here?” Almost. This is from the bureaucrats as well. I don’t mind being told by the minister that, but when I’m being told by bureaucrats from the member states...’.

Two contested issues were at the heart of conciliation. As suggested above, both issues were about the power relations between Council and Parliament, as much as about their content. They were the treatment of the Christophersen priority list, and the inclusion of the article on SEA as a means of addressing environmental risks. A notable feature of the process was that it was heavily procedural, with no real opportunities for debating the issues at stake: ‘...it was this most horrendous nightmare of endurance, when you never really actually got round the table and shouted at each other’ (MEP).

**Conflict one: who owns the Christophersen list?**

The status of the Christophersen list had been a controversial issue throughout co-decision. In conciliation it became one of the crux issues. The original list of priority projects had been prepared under the aegis of the Council and Commission prior to co-decision, and the Parliament were keen to secure some decision-making power over these critical projects. Two issues were in dispute. Firstly whether priority projects should be agreed in co-decision, and therefore whether the list, agreed at the Essen Summit, needed to be validated by the Parliament. Secondly, and related to this, was whether the list actually placed any duty on member states to implement the priority projects, or whether it simply enabled the EU to take a proactive role in their development. These issues of decision-making control were hotly contested in conciliation.

At the heart of the arguments between the Council and Parliament over the Christophersen list was a dispute over the EU’s proper role in national infrastructure planning and implementation. The Christophersen list was a mechanism for prioritising certain international corridors from the many TEN-T projects. These projects could be seen as important in an overall European context, but all also had special significance for their respective member states. For the Council, the matter of prioritisation was about implementation rather than policy, and so fell outside the co-decision process for the policy guidelines. This reading effectively meant that it was the member states, meeting in Council, that would agree the priority projects which would receive the lion’s share of EU funding. The Parliament, however, saw the list as a crucial element of policy, and therefore of co-decision. However, Parliamentary involvement in prioritisation could be seen as giving the Parliament political power over which projects went ahead: an
The Council’s position was that according to Treaty Article 129d decisions regarding whether to build projects needed to be approved by Member States, rather than the European Parliament:

‘You can’t have the community forcing you to build a project, when it’s actually going to pay 1/2% towards the actual costs and you’ve got to pay the other 99 1/2%’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

‘It was all about a power struggle on institutional matters about whether it was just going to be the 12 - or whatever - Essen projects ... and whether any changes to the Essen system would have to come back to the Parliament to be agreed or whether they could be agreed by the Council of Ministers. And that became the whole stamping ground for the battle, all the stuff about whose power it was to decide. And that was a mega-stopper, because countries like France were basically saying we’re not putting money into something that we’re not deciding ourselves. And they started quoting clauses in Treaties and Articles and being legalistic and constitutional and stuff, and so 99% of the stuff was this constitutional and legalistic mega-battle which was kind of all about power, and very important but immensely boring [laughs]’ (MEP).

So within conciliation, the interests of individual member states could be seen shaping the negotiations.

‘Basically what happened was, at two o’clock in the morning Kinnock came in and beat them up for two hours and said “you must stop being so stupid about this, we’ve got to get these guidelines through, you’re never going to persuade the Council about this”. I mean you can see it from the point of view of member states, and there were quite a few others that were stronger than the UK on this point. They are not going to accept a community obligation to spend billions of their own money on their own projects. That’s what it boiled down to (Brussels bureaucrat).

In the adopted policy guidelines, the priority projects are included in an annex. Different interpretations of this policy formulation exist. From the Parliament’s perspective, the inclusion of the list is seen as a success, in that it brings the prioritisation of projects into the domain of co-decision. However, from other viewpoints, less weight is given to its inclusion:

‘Well it’s in here as a historical statement. It basically says it is noted that this list, that these projects, were endorsed at the European Council of Essen as being of a priority nature. But it doesn’t stop anybody changing them, or make anybody do them. We were very careful to get legal device on this. It is no obligation on member states to do any of these projects’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

The political nature of the agreed formula was clear: ‘It was a presentational way of getting them off the hook ... the Parliament were given a fig leaf. And some of them realised it was a fig leaf, and others pretended that they had got a victory’ (Brussels bureaucrat).
Shortly after the conciliation process reached agreement, but before the guidelines were formally adopted, one event pointed to the different readings of the Christophersen outcome. At the Florence Summit, two member states, Spain and Portugal, sought to alter a joint project on the list from a motorway to a multi-modal project. The Parliament reacted angrily to the Council’s action, pointing out that this should have been a matter for co-decision. The ambiguity of the outcome allowed both sides to claim success in the power struggles of conciliation, but events quickly exposed the lack of clarity: ‘I think we don’t see it as a victory for anybody frankly. ... it was a political fudge at the end of the day and I think they all knew’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

**Conflict 2. Treatment of SEA in conciliation**

‘I have never seen such a miserable bunch of individuals in my life, in terms of their views on the environment’ (MEP).

Once again, the dispute between Council and Parliament over SEA had several dimensions. I have discussed how the Council viewed SEA as posing threats to the rapid implementation of the programme. Furthermore, it raised a similar institutional question as the status of the Christophersen list: creating new procedures for SEA could empower the Commission in the decision-making on national infrastructure projects which composed TEN-T, which greatly worried the Council: ‘SEA for cross-border corridor studies would effectively give the Commission a role. You start shifting the whole question of who’s responsible for planning and delivery of infrastructure away from member states to the commission. And again that is going to be a no-no for just about every member state’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

It was these institutional arguments which would dominate the conciliation meetings. Although environmental risks were clearly an important issue, there were no opportunities to get down to any substantive debate: ‘...and we never, ever, ever had a debate about the environment in the full conciliation meeting. Ever. Never got on the floor. I had speeches written, all kinds of passionate speeches written, which I never got to make, except in our own internal meetings’ (MEP). Instead, the process focused on the procedural arguments surrounding the adoption of an article on SEA.

The outcome on SEA - a pilot study as a way forwards - was the outcome of a political battle, fought out on the terrain of EU legislation. Even in conciliation, Parliamentary delegates were told by the Council there was no case for any sort of environmental article in the policy guidelines. Here seemed to be an attempt to resist policy integration, to keep environmental policy measures separate from transport policy. One blockage presented in conciliation by the Council was the legal argument that there was no basis under EU legislation for requiring SEA
To require SEA for TEN-T, which was essentially composed of national transport projects, exceeded what was legally possible. This legal argument caused some difficulties for members of the Parliamentary delegation:

'We were actually trying to go further if you like under the table. And it took a very long time, certainly for me, to grasp that. I kept not being able to get a grip on what the difficulty was here, and why we were having such trouble. It was all about articles, and "under this article" and "under that article", and "you can’t have this because..."' (MEP).

Significantly DGXI, the main driving force behind SEA within the Commission, were not involved in conciliation – DGVII represented the Commission in the negotiations.

A way forwards was needed: ‘we were just, like, stuck in the mud totally. Not moving anywhere’ (MEP). The Parliament’s solution was to develop the idea of pilot studies, and to redraft the article in these terms. In this way an article could be included on SEA without running into legislative difficulties with the Council. First the Cabinet was persuaded, and then the Cabinet took the argument to the Council. Eventually, a formula was hammered out behind the scenes, through a series of drafts.

The outline corridor studies were agreed as a compromise which ‘emerged between the complete breakdown of everything over the weekend and the Monday night when we had to reconvene, and this was the result of Kinnock’s office and the Italian Minister breaking their backs, because they had to convince the other countries to get round the table’ (MEP).

Examination of successive drafts of the SEA article, which were gradually shaped into a compromise position, is illuminating. The Council’s original position makes simple reference to existing EU Directives, and suggests that ‘... the Commission may take account, where appropriate ... of the results of the studies on the methods of analyzing the overall effects of the networks on the environment’ (General Secretariat of the Council, 24/4/96). This weak statement fails to make any commitment to a full application of SEA, and later drafts, by the Commission and Parliament, introduce more detailed statements on the use of SEA and corridor analysis. However, as the drafts progress, a weakening of these commitments is clear. For example, the Parliamentary delegation pressed for a commitment to corridor analysis for the entire network once the pilot stage had been completed, but no such wording appears in the final text. The concept of corridors is also weakened, with the words ‘trans-European’ deleted from later drafts. Throughout this exchange, SEA is referred to in the following way: ‘... the development of methods of analysis ...’ and occasionally even ‘... potential methods of analysis ...’, suggesting that it was not possible to secure a binding commitment to actually carry out SEA as a component of the planning process.
Eventually concessions were made by both parties, in order to reach agreement within the tight conciliation timetable, and avoid any further obstacles to implementation. The conciliation committee reached agreement on a common position on 19 June 1996, which was subsequently adopted by both Council and by Parliament (by 351 votes to 41, with 5 abstentions). The common position was adopted by Parliament as a workable compromise, bearing in mind the underlying urgency of implementation: 'we have to be practical; we have to be aware of the need for TEN-T, in infrastructure terms and in job-creation terms and in getting people and goods moving throughout the European Union' (MEP).

**The final article**

‘Article 8 stands as a clear expression of the confusion, the endless debates, and the opposed views of the European institutions’ (Environmental lobbyist).

The final TEN-T Guidelines (EC, 1996) include network plans for road, rail, inland waterways, airports and combined transport (known as projects of common interest). These are supplemented by new criteria for other potential projects of common interest, and the potential for future interconnections to neighbouring States. The 14 Essen priority projects are included in an annex, with the possibility of adding more in the 1999 revision.

The main environmental articles in the Guidelines are:

**Article 2. Objectives:**

‘... ensuring the sustainable mobility of persons and goods within the area without internal frontiers under the best possible social and safety conditions, while contributing to the attainment of the Community’s objectives, particularly in regard to the environment ....’

**Article 5. Priorities:**

‘...the integration of environmental concerns into the design and development of the network’, and ‘...optimisation of the capacity and efficiency of existing infrastructure’

A significant omission from the Guidelines was the Parliament’s proposal for a quota limit for roads funding, and a quota minimum for rail and inland waterways, to encourage modal shift away from road.

The effectiveness of these rather general formal policy statements may be assessed by examining the substantive measures on SEA contained in the Guidelines. These are found in Article 8, ‘Environmental Protection’, which sets out a number of measures at Community and
Member State levels:

- the Commission will develop methodology for Strategic Environmental Assessment of the entire network;
- the Commission will develop methodology for corridor analysis covering all relevant modes, but without prejudice to the definition of the corridors;
- the findings of this work to inform the review of Guidelines, to take place before 1 July 1999, and then after every five years. The review to be overseen by both Council and Parliament;
- Member States should take environmental protection into account when implementing projects, by implementing the EIA and Habitats Directives;

Article 8 of the Guidelines, covering SEA, was the subject of much lobbying and debate, reflected in the agreed wording. The final Article raised a number of procedural, methodological and practical issues (shown in table 10). Significantly, the precise wording of the Article does not require mandatory SEA or corridor analysis. Rather it requires further development of methodology, through pilot studies. There is no formally stated commitment to actually carry out an SEA of TEN-T, or to apply the outcome to decision-making, although the outcome of the work on SEA would be taken into account in the review process.

Procedural issues

The weight of the SEA in the decision-process is limited in several ways. The results will primarily be used in the periodic review of the Guidelines. SEA is not linked to community investment decisions on TEN-T, and will have no power over the actions of member states. It therefore seems that SEA will have little effect on the network plans now adopted, and particularly on the prioritised Essen corridors. The corridor analyses will be also carried out ‘without prejudice to the definition of the corridors themselves’, a caveat introduced in conciliation.

The cascade approach does not appear to have been fully adopted. At the Community level, the scope of the network SEA appears to be focused on the overall environmental impact, representing SEA at the programme level. There is no mention of policy level SEA, which could evaluate TEN-T against Community environmental objectives, and alongside options for transport demand management, and pricing and regulatory measures set out in the transport White Paper (CEC, 1993). Similarly, the cascade does not flow smoothly across the subsidiarity divide - from the Community to the Member State level. Proposals by Parliament to considering environmental impacts at the national level - included in the Commission’s amended proposal
prior to conciliation - were lost in the conciliation process. This is an important issue because, given the weakness of Community level SEA and corridor analysis, much responsibility will fall back on national frameworks for environmental assessment. Recent research indicates that few member states have formal SEA requirements which would meet the needs of an SEA of the trans-European transport network (Chadwick, 1996). Two problems may occur here. Firstly, community SEA and corridor analysis will require inputs from the national level, where large variations in structures and policies for dealing with environmental issues can be found between respective states. Secondly, the absence of national level SEA frameworks means that environmental assessment by Member States will generally be restricted to project level EIA. However, project level EIA suffers from several critical weaknesses, which include a frequent fragmentation of application down to very small projects along the length of a corridor, which remove the possibility of strategic analysis of environmental impacts; and a lack of comparison of the impacts of different modal options. Taken together, it would seem that there will be inadequate support from Member States for Community level analysis, and a reliance on EIA frameworks to perform a strategic task for which they have not been designed. This problem is particularly important because most detailed project development, funding and implementation will take place at the national level.

Finally, SEA as described in the Guidelines contains little apparent potential for public participation. The model adopted appears to resemble an analytical tool to be used in closed policy work rather than to facilitate a participative planning process.

The words ‘without prejudice’ in Article 8 are interesting, and ambiguous. One interviewee interpreted them as a clear statement that the Commission is empowered to select any corridors it wishes to carry out corridor assessment. This was in response to a Council attempt to restrict the Commission’s involvement to purely international corridors, not ones which were ‘national’, i.e. within national boundaries. An alternative, more literal, reading suggests that the analysis of a corridor should not produce the outcome that the definition of the corridor itself be threatened.

**Methodological issues**

A range of general methodological issues in SEA have been discussed elsewhere (see for example Therivel and Partidario, 1996, Therivel et al, 1992). However of particular relevance to transport SEA at the European level is the problem of comparability of data between countries, and in particular the lack of transport models for all Member States. Also, scoping in transport SEAs has generally excluded impacts on land use, such as the pressure for development in new locations resulting from infrastructure provision (Chadwick, 1996).
The Guidelines do not clarify whether the Community level assessments will focus on 'Brussels impacts' (i.e. the purely international elements of the environmental impacts of the network) or on all impacts. This will hopefully become clear as methodology is developed. The work by DGXI - a study on the generation of traffic as a result of infrastructure development, following the SACTRA 1995 report - indicates that it will be the Brussels impacts that will be focused on. Also, the parallel debate on the economic evaluation of the community benefits of TEN-T, referred to above, has focused on the international elements of movements on TEN-T. Such a development would strengthen the argument for parallel national level SEAs.

Corridor analysis rests on the principle that there exist modal options for corridors, so that realistic investment alternatives exist, say between road and rail. However, for many corridors identified in the roads network plan, there exist no rail options. It is therefore difficult to see how corridor analysis could be used as a widespread tool for encouraging multimodal shift away from roads, as anticipated in the update of the 5th environmental action programme. The separate development of the outline plans for different networks has perhaps masked this problem. Corridor analysis is further weakened by the failure to include a reference to the need to indicate the variant least harmful to the environment, as proposed by the Parliament.

The depth of methodology remained a point of conflict. Should it be a shallow methodology, using currently available techniques and data, or should it be a more detailed approach?

**Implementation issues**

The preparation of lists of projects and networks has in practice proceeded in parallel with the debate over the integration of environmental policy measures, as discussed above. The decision process is so tied to pragmatic delivery of the networks that the selection of techniques for planning and evaluation is being carried out simultaneously with the actual political debate over mode and route choices. As a result, by the time SEA is eventually carried out, progress on policy will be far advanced, and implementation of many prioritised corridors and other network projects will have become irreversible (Sheate, 1994, Bina et al, 1995). This is illustrated by the approach of the Parliament, which strongly advocated environmental amendments alongside new lists of projects put forward by MEPs. Recent research also suggests that SEA carried out after the definition of policies, plans and programmes does not result in policy changes (Chadwick, 1996).
A last word on Article 8

‘The SEA article is pretty rhetorical really - it just says develop a methodology’ (Environmental lobbyist).

The first overwhelming conclusion is that the power struggle which enveloped the construction of SEA clearly determined its form, compromising its potential contribution to decision-making by first creating uncertainty over whether and how SEA would be carried out, and secondly ensuring that it does not impact heavily on decision-making in any case.

Ambiguity characterises the policy outcome. Positions are divided on the interpretation of Article 8. The Council and DGVII position appeared to be that any implementation of SEA would depend on the outcome of the methodological work, whilst the Parliament clearly saw things differently: ‘I think the main difficulty is really that in the present Article 8 it says that the Commission will work on methodology, while the Parliament clearly aimed at having SEA of the network and the corridors. There’s a clear difference’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

Whilst the Parliament certainly expected SEA to be implemented, rather than just subjected to further study, they also appear to accept the realpolitik of the situation:

‘So you’ve got to be again pragmatic, accepting [that] the political reality for Europe is just that a lot of people just don’t have an environmental agenda. So you’ve got to take them on board. So that’s what we did. So the article therefore is extremely ... well, much weaker than we would have liked, and the wording is open to interpretation. And particularly since it doesn’t say there will be an SEA, but something like “we will develop methods”. I think that’s almost a classic case of the way politics works. A lot of things happen by accident, and that got redrafted so many times and translated so many times eventually I don’t think it made much sense’ (MEP).

The Cabinet support the Parliament’s desire to go further than the bald statement of intent to develop methodology: ‘Neil [Kinnock] has said in public we are going to develop a methodology and apply it. We weren’t allowed to say that in the [policy guidelines]. If the methodology turns out to tell us very little we will only be able to apply very little, but we will definitely apply what we can’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

Overall, the Guidelines appear to provide for weak SEA, far from the ideal of a participatory planning procedure discussed by academics. The lack of close integration of SEA into the policy process suggests that its impact is likely to be minimal. For the environmental NGOs, it is this detachment from decision-making which is the critical weakness in the outcome. The outcome of the power struggle was ultimately a weak procedural form of SEA which is unlikely to become the holy grail which can translate TEN-T into an environmentally sustainable programme. The final formulation of Article 8 fails to establish SEA as either participative
planning process, or useful analytical tool in strategic decision making, with weaknesses in procedure, methodology and implementation. The gulf between policy rhetoric and practical measure does not appear to have been crossed in this particular policy debate.

Perceptions varied about the impact of the environmental NGOs on the policy process. In terms of the influence on the Parliament, MEPs recognised that the NGOs had been helpful in building stringent environmental demands into their original position. However, others suggested that the Parliament was relatively green in any case, and that the lobbying had made no real difference. A different view was the importance of the broad-based campaign in lending support and credibility to the Parliament's position, and in reinforcing its confidence over what was likely to become a controversial issue.

An environmental lobbyist, who was the most closely involved NGO representative in the development of SEA of TENs, set out two ways of evaluating the impact of the campaign on the shape of policy. On the one hand, it could be argued that the NGOs had been successful in securing an article on the environment, and in having the environment and SEA as one of the top items in the policy debate throughout co-decision, in the Parliament, the Commission, and the Council. Alternatively, it could be argued that the final construction of SEA was so weak that it had been a waste of effort: 'You could argue that article 8 is a pathetic piece of law, it has no weight whatsoever on the decision making process, and therefore you could argue we've all wasted our time' (environmental lobbyist). She also accepted the impact of the Council on the outcome: 'There is no way we could have got anything better, I think, because the Council was so incredibly opposed to it, in a rather diplomatic and very short term approach.'
Table 7. Weaknesses in SEA of the trans-European transport network as adopted in Article 8 of the European Community Guidelines.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedural issues</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Incomplete SEA cascade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of formal power in decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Not a participative planning process</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodological issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Comparability of data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Scoping excludes land use impacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Scope only includes Brussels impacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Modal alternatives unavailable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementation issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• SEA not integrated at early stages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Project selection, development and investment run in parallel with debate on SEA methodology</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Chapter 9. Post 1996: policy development and implementation

The 1996 Policy Guidelines provide both the framework for the future iterative development of policy on TEN-T, and for the implementation of the network. Thus, as before, policy development and implementation proceed in parallel. EU budget funding is released for the programme, and initiatives are established to develop policy further, particularly on SEA. In this section, I explore how future progress in policy and implementation is likely to be affected by the precise formulation of these agreements - by the language and practices which were embedded in them. How are key tensions likely to be resolved in the playing out of the process? And how did the specific policy rationality establish boundaries of knowledge in policy making?

In this section the development of TEN-T policy is considered in several ways. First, the continuing prominence of TEN-T policy in EU policy is considered. The robust rhetorical position of the Commission is compared to earlier less positive statements heard in the fieldwork interviews. The diminishing involvement of environmental pressure groups is discussed. Next, the progress on SEA is assessed. Next, the implications of TEN-T in relation to the emerging European spatial approach are discussed. Finally, the extension of TENs into Central and Eastern Europe is discussed.

The point of these discussions of different aspects of policy development is to inform a preliminary assessment of the possible effects of TEN-T in restructuring European space. Clearly this cannot be an ex-post evaluation of a programme - this is a task which cannot be undertaken for some years yet. No attempt will be made to forecast future transport conditions or economic, social or environmental impacts. Its purpose is to consider the potential impacts through an exploration of how thought, language and practice with respect to European space has been affected by the new policy discourse. This, then, is clearly a more reflective and theoretical discussion than the previous three stages. It explores how TEN-T policy has shifted to embrace the changing pressures of continuing EU economic and political integration, with a new spatial turn, the prospect of enlargement, and increasing environmental concern. At the heart of this assessment, once again, is the development of SEA, and its significance in legitimating a particular European spatiality.
TENs – a European pipe dream?

Considering the extent of policy attention, there was surprisingly little consensus on what, exactly, TEN-T amounted to. Certainly, the vision of TEN-T as a means of planning a pan-European infrastructure network was strongly held:

‘We’re building a single market for Europe, we need a single European transport system to go with it. … we can’t have lots of different national networks superimposed on each other and very bad interconnections and very poor planning on a European basis’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

Set against such powerful and positive images, it is important to ask the question: is all this being overblown? For many of those involved in the policy process, considerable scepticism existed about what TEN-T really amounted to:

‘The big ambitious 300-400 billion pound programme will never happen, because there’s just not going to be that sort of public money around with the Maastricht criteria. And therefore these major road and rail projects across Europe that may or may not damage the environment are never going to be built anyway’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

‘I personally think we’re now seeing in Europe the last ever large new infrastructure projects … large new greenfield infrastructure is going to become so rare, if not unknown, in the developed part of Europe. The motorways are more or less built, and people aren’t going to put up with high speed rail. That public pressure is taking hold’ (MEP).

This final quote in many ways sums up the inter-institutional struggles that took place to shape and define a vague concept from different interest-bases:

‘Oh, this whole thing is people trying to make something out of nothing. There’s actually very little in this lot. There’s very little money, there’s very little in practice that doesn’t happen already. But because there’s so little in it everybody looks for lots in it. And maps are the worst. I mean maps are fine when they are an expression of what’s there. When they’re an expression of what people would like to do they’re always the cause of conflict. In years gone by, drawing lines on maps has led to war. Nowadays people draw lines on maps and it leads to Conciliation, which is pretty close to the same thing. You’ve got people in the Commission who are hunting around trying to look for a focus in all this. You’ve got the Parliament and the member states playing a double game in this, because they’ll play along with the Community as long as there’s some chance of getting some money out of it’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

However, in 1998, Neil Kinnock was still promoting a positive view of the programme and its future investment requirements (Table 11).

The overall picture is one of significant progress: three projects are near completion, 8 are under construction or at an advanced stage of preparation and most will be complete by 2005. This may be slower than some envisaged when the TEN policy was being established, but judged against the normal timescale for very large infrastructure projects – and all 14 come into this category - this represents rapid progress, and it is worth noting that it has been made at a time of great budgetary rigour.

Looking ahead, these estimates confirm that the next financing period (2000-2006) will see a significant increase of expenditure on the 14 priority projects as many of the major projects reach the peak construction phase, and several new projects will be launched, to improve and expand the trans-European Transport Network. The Commission sees a need for supporting these investments at EU level, and has therefore proposed to increase the TEN-budget for transport projects in the new financial period (2000-2006) to about 5 BECU. The Cohesion fund and the Structural funds will also continue to make significant contributions to the realisation of the Trans-European Transport Network.

The climate of budgetary rigour will continue, but the considerable progress already made in improving the sustainability of public finances makes it likely that the scope for infrastructure spending within tightly controlled overall national budgets should be greater.

A major effort will also be required in order to prepare for the extension of the TENs to the accession countries. That is vital in order to service an enlarged Single Market and to strengthen the competitiveness of the applicant countries economies. The Commission has proposed a new pre-accession facility as the main instrument for EU funding in response to this challenge.

Achieving implementation of the TEN network will require a combination of public and private finance in partnership. This can achieve more rapid project implementation and better value-for-money.

This realistic assessment leaves no room for complacency, but it strongly suggests that we are now entering a period when decisive progress can be made both in completing the trans-European transport network in the EU 15 and in extending it to the applicant countries.'

The Commission also remained optimistic about the economic impact of the network:

‘On the most cautious assumptions, the full implementation of the TENs programme could increase Community GDP by over ECU 500,000 million by 2030 creating between 600,000 and 1,000,000 new permanent jobs’ (DGVII/A/2, 1998).

The private sector is set to play a crucial role in providing much of the finance:

‘To maintain the momentum and ensure that the network is completed on schedule by 2010, it is clearly important to research new funding sources such as public
private financing partnerships. It will also be important to ensure adequate funding at EU level, notably the TEN Budget itself, for which the Commission has proposed an allocation of ECU 5,000 million for the period 2000-6, a virtual doubling of the current allocation.' (op.cit.).

The investment in TEN-T through the various EU programmes up to the adoption of the Policy Guidelines was shown above. Since 1996 this pattern of investment has continued (CEC 1998c, Table 12). Total investment in the TEN-T for 1996-7 was ECU 38,400 million. Total support from Community funds and the European Investment Bank amounted to ECU 12,600 million. It is interesting to note that, although the Commission usually emphasises that only 15% of the Community TENs transport budget is spent on road schemes, and 60% on rail, the overall figures are quite different. Of the EIB and Community funding, only 39% of total investment in the period went on rail, and mostly on high speed lines, but 38% was spent on roads and 15% on airports.

Table 9. EU financing of the trans-European transport network (mECU), 1996-99.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of assistance</th>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>EIB</td>
<td>3504</td>
<td>4943</td>
<td>4415</td>
<td>5977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantees</td>
<td>EIF</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies</td>
<td>Structural Funds</td>
<td>2639</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cohesion Fund</td>
<td>1221</td>
<td>1251</td>
<td>1337</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies, interest</td>
<td>TEN budget heading B5-70</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rebates, loan guarantees, co-</td>
<td>(of which the 14 priority</td>
<td>211.23</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>financing of studies</td>
<td>projects)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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**Environmental NGOs: job done, time to move on?**

The continued involvement of environmental NGOs in the policy process was also under review. The adoption of policy guidelines marked an endpoint, and it was noticeable that none of the NGOs had a strategy for further close involvement in the development of SEA after this point. The resolution of SEA between 1996 and 1999 took place largely without the scrutiny and lobbying which had taken place in co-decision. There was a feeling that TEN-T remained a very ephemeral concept, compared with other, more ‘real’ transport issues and projects targeted...
by the environmental movement. For an environmental lobbyist, who had been close to the process, it was not easy to find a rationale for the continued involvement of their NGO: ‘...the confusion about what the TENs are is a big question which is still there, which doesn’t allow us to identify it as a constant priority for us’. Other NGOs adopted the same position, and would not be so closely involved in the future. For organisations with limited resources, having what could be argued to be only a rhetorical impact on an elusive EU programme was unlikely to remain an activity of central importance:

‘The A20 is a TEN but that’s not why its going ahead. It’s going ahead because the German government wants to be seen investing a hell of a lot of money in that region for purely political reasons ... So am I supposed to worry about the TENs? Two years ago we thought we were supposed to worry about it. We are increasingly not sure that that is the biggest problem we have on transport’ (Environmental lobbyist).

The way forwards on SEA methodology

This assessment draws on the above analysis of the policy guidelines. In particular, the outcome on SEA in Article 8 remained unclear in the 1996 Guidelines. The Commission set out a work programme on SEA: by mid-1999, it was committed to carrying out a review of the 1996 policy guidelines, and reporting back its progress on SEA development and application. Clearly, however, there was scope for interpretation of the Guidelines, and the institutional power relations which were so crucial in their development continued to shape matters. For the Parliament, the review was regarded as a critical stage. The key question would be whether enough meaningful work had been done on SEA to avoid further conflict. It seemed likely that the drawing up of a strategy for the full application of SEA would continue to be a controversial issue, along with the evaluation of what impact the network level SEA would have on decision-making.

MEPs were positive about the prospects, but pragmatic about the their position: ‘we hope that by 1999 we have got more confidence as a Parliament, we’re more aware of the issues, we’re more enlightened, we’ve done more of our homework, the NGOs are more involved and we can really ensure that they stick to the agreement that we struck in co-decision ... clearly by 1999 we need some support, backup from the academic world, and from the NGO world, to allow us to properly get to grips with the issue’ (MEP). However, a continuing problem may be that TEN-T will still not be an important issue for the electorate, and consequently for many MEPs. Furthermore, the review took place at the time of the 1999 Parliamentary elections, so MEPs were faced by other priorities.
The continued tension over the procrastination over SEA continued to constrain progress. The key question for this next phase of policy development, where the Commission was charged with developing SEA, was the extent to which further study of SEA methodologies would take the place of application of SEA. However, many interviewees recognised this would continue to be a tense issue. The Parliament clearly wanted SEA to be carried out, rather than simply further developed: ‘I mean no disrespect to the academic community, and indeed some of the environmental community, but there will no doubt be a whole industry generated by the article in the TEN-T decision and we don’t want that. We want almost a rough and ready assessment of the overall impact in global terms of the TEN. That’s what we mean by SEA’ (MEP).

The working group on SEA of TEN-T after 1996

One major unresolved issue was the extent to which SEA would be implemented by the policy review in mid 1999. Views clearly differed over whether the work programme between 1996 and 1999 would focus on developing methodology, or actually carrying out SEA. Taking account of the outcome of this work in the review will clearly be difficult if only methodological work has been done.

The joint DGVII-DGXI working group adopted a strategy for moving forwards on SEA which contained several elements, shown in table 13.


| • a pilot SEA of the whole multi-modal TEN-T |
| • a number of pilot corridor assessments developed by the member states with co-operation and finance form the Commission |
| • consultation within the Commission, and with EU institutions, member states and other stakeholders including industry, users, environmental NGOs, and technical experts |
| • dissemination of results including the elaboration of a methodological handbook |
| • recommendations for the revision of the guidelines, and for the development of a longer term SEA strategy beyond 1999 |

The approach is very much to learn from experience, by carrying out practical studies which can inform further development of the methodology, rather than simply relying on reviews or
This pragmatic approach followed the experience gained in the early work on the high speed rail network. Then, initial plans were to carry out a detailed GIS based analysis, but it was quickly found that the necessary data simply didn't exist, and a more broad-brush methodology had to be used. A further reason for learning through doing was the realpolitik of working with member states on such work, where commitment could not be guaranteed.

What is missing from this work plan is, once again, the cascade of SEA, and notably the national level of analysis is not present. Also, in practice the pilot analysis of corridors will only be applied to a handful of routes, and only at the member state, rather than trans-national level, due to the difficulty of establishing co-operation between governments on cross-border analysis. At least the aim is to carry out the overall network analysis, rather than to simply further explore methodology.

A further concern is that the exploratory nature of the work programme on SEA leaves open many critical questions about methodology. One of these concerns the use of technical methods of analysis, such as computer modelling, in an extension of methods often used in project level transport EIA's. Certainly, experts with experience in modelling have been active in the discussions on methodology, and in the trans-Pennine corridor, one of the pilot corridor studies, GIS and computerised transport models are being assembled. One problem with this approach is the resources and time needed to develop the necessary models, particularly given the need to report back in 1999. A second related area which remains to be resolved is how public participation will be carried out in the SEA work. The tendency towards technical SEA methodology found in the transport sector tends to be accompanied by an overall SEA process which is not participative and transparent, but desk-bound and closed in nature.

Progress on SEA methodology – the state of play in 1999

The methodological handbook (DGVII, 1999) was prepared by the EIA Centre at the University of Manchester in collaboration with DHV. On the subject of integration of SEA into planning and decision making, the report recommends that SEA findings should be fed into the planning process before final proposals are presented to decision-makers. Impacts of proposed plans should be compared with those of alternatives, including do-nothing options, and ‘distinctively different plans’, which could include not only alternative modes and routes, but also traffic management alternatives and different environmental perspectives. Interestingly, the use of both multi-criteria analysis and monetary evaluation is recommended as a means of evaluating alternatives. Communication with ‘affected groups’ is recommended throughout the SEA process, and the need for both ‘consultation’ and ‘participation’ is stressed. It seems
TEN-T and the polycentric European spatial vision

In the new era of pan-European spatial planning, TEN-T is part and parcel of the polycentric spatial development pattern, articulated in the European Spatial Development Perspective (the ESDP; CSD, 1999). So, from being in the early 1990s crucial to the development of the single market, facilitating economic growth, competitiveness and balanced economic development, they are now placed centre stage in the future spatial development of Europe (discussed in more detail in Richardson and Jensen, 1999). In the brief discussion which follows, the treatment of mobility and the place of TENs within the ESDP is addressed.

The question of mobility has long been a vexed issue within the EU. Developing a common transport policy has been difficult, and subject to deeply entrenched disputes between member states (Whitelegg, 1992). What is indisputable, however, is that EU transport policy has always placed increasing mobility at its heart. Achieving ‘sustainable mobility’ was a key policy theme in the early 1990s, but within the ESDP the policy language has shifted. While the rhetoric of the ESDP returns frequently to the theme of mobility, the problem of mobility is framed in two ways. Firstly, particularly for regions on the periphery, as a problem of accessibility, and secondly, particularly for the core regions, as one of efficiency.

The ESDP states that improvements to accessibility are regarded as a critical priority in the development of the polycentric urban system and furthermore as preconditional in enabling European cities and regions to pursue economic development within an overall spatial strategy of harmonisation. Thus the notion of frictionless mobility and the cities as nodes in a polycentric spatial development model are two sides of the same coin:

‘Urban centres and metropolises need to be efficiently linked to one another, to their respective hinterland and to the world economy. Efficient transport and adequate access to telecommunications are a basic prerequisite for strengthening the competitive situation of peripheral and less favoured regions and hence for the social and economic cohesion of the EU. Transport and telecommunication opportunities are important factors in promoting polycentric development. … Spatial differences in the EU cannot be reduced without a fundamental improvement of transport infrastructure and services to and within the regions where lack of access to transport and communications infrastructure restricts economic development’ (CSD, 1999: 26).

The ESDP continues the emphasis in EU documents from the Maastricht treaty to the Delors White Paper on the construction of the trans-European transport network (TENs) to remove barriers to communication and facilitate economic convergence and competition. TENs are
identified as the area of existing EU spatial policy with most relevance to the ESDP process in terms of spatial development impacts and financial implications (op.cit.: 14). Indeed, their development is regarded as crucial to the economic and social aims of the ESDP as well as potentially contributing to the third environmental objective. Furthermore, specific policy options, such as the ‘dynamic zones of economic integration’, are particularly dependent on infrastructure development. It is stated that policy measures in such areas, which could include the structural funds in Objective 1 areas, should focus on providing a ‘highly efficient infrastructure at transnational, national and regional level’ (op.cit.: 21). Significantly, the ESDP states that prioritisation of development of the major arteries and corridors of the TEN network will not suffice. It is necessary to upgrade the regional transport networks which will feed into the TEN, if economic benefits are to be secured.

Here the ESDP repeats the blurring of earlier Commission policy documents (Richardson, 1995a). As discussed above, Europe 2000+ (CEC, 1994a), placing TENs at the centre of a pan-European spatial planning framework, identified the problematic double role of assisting the creation of the single market whilst enabling balanced development of the Community as a whole. I have argued that EU discourse manages to avoid the difficult policy implications of this dilemma by making a series of assumptions about the effects of infrastructure development, allowing the impression that TENs can achieve such divergent policy objectives (Richardson, 1995a). Whilst the ESDP repeats concerns about ‘pump’ effects (where new high speed infrastructure removes resources from structurally weaker and peripheral regions) and ‘tunnel’ effects (where such areas are crossed without being connected) (CSD, 1999: 26), all of the policy options identified pursue the general aim of improving accessibility as a generic response (figure 10).

The ESDP’s analysis of the problem of accessibility in the EU is straightforward:

‘Good accessibility of European regions improves not only their competitive position but also the competitiveness of Europe as a whole ... Islands, border areas and peripheral regions are generally less accessible than central regions and have to find specific solutions’ (op.cit.: 69).

The examples of Sweden and Finland, where regional airports link to European gateways, are quoted. The consequent risks are explicitly recognised, that:

‘improved accessibility will expand the hinterlands of the economically stronger areas ... the newly accessible economies will have to compete against the large firms and the competitive services in these economically stronger areas ... competition may well benefit the stronger regions more than the newly accessible weaker ones’ (op.cit.: 70).
Policy options:
1. Strengthening a polycentric and more balanced system of metropolitan city regions, city clusters and city networks through closer cooperation between structural policy and the policy on the Trans-European Networks (TENs) and improvements of the links between international/national and regional/local transport networks

Polycentric development model - a basis for better accessibility. Policy options:

24. Strengthening secondary transport networks and their links with TENs, including development of efficient public transport systems.

25. Promotion of a spatially more balanced access to intercontinental transport of the EU by an adequate distribution of seaport and airports (global gateways), and an increase of their service level and improvement of links with their hinterland.

26. Improvement of transport links of peripheral and ultra-peripheral regions, both within the EU and with neighbouring third countries, taking into account air transport and the further development of corresponding infrastructure facilities.

27. Improvement of access to and use of telecommunication facilities and the design of tariffs in accordance with the provision of 'universal services' in sparsely populated areas.

28. Improvement of co-operation between transport policies at EU, national and regional level.

29. Introduction of territorial impact assessment as an instrument for spatial assessment of large infrastructure projects (especially in the transport sector).

Yet the policy response is no more than to suggest that such infrastructure improvements need to be seen alongside other sectoral policies and integrated strategies.

So, within the ESDP, mobility is framed as accessibility, and accessibility is framed in economic terms. This rhetorical construction appears to ignore the rather different ways that accessibility is being used in transport policy debates. In the UK, for example, accessibility is a key idea in the rapidly burgeoning debate about social exclusion. Here access to employment, services, leisure, etc. are considered to be important policy concerns. A further European spatial trend recognised in the ESDP is the growth of development corridors, where new development
concentrates along transnational and cross-border corridors in already relatively urbanised areas. The need is recognised for integrated trans-national strategic planning (op.cit.: 71).

The second core element of the discourse is efficiency. The problem of mobility framed here is the growth in road and air transport with resulting environmental and efficiency problems. Transport trends within the EU threaten to undermine progress towards sustainable development targets (CEC, 1996b). The need to promote alternative modes is emphasised, but with several strong caveats:

‘however this objective must be achieved without negative effects on the competitiveness of both the EU as a whole and its regions ... [and] nevertheless, both road traffic for passengers and freight will remain of great importance, especially for linking peripheral or sparsely populated regions’ (CSD, 1999: 28).

Similarly, while the potential for high speed rail is recognised as a competitor to air travel in the denser regions, ‘in sparsely populated peripheral regions, particularly in insular locations, regional air transport including short-haul services has to be given priority’ (op.cit.: 28).

**Dissonant discourses of mobility**

Here again there is the question of the extent of harmony between EU and national policy discourse. Drawing again from the UK example, where policy discourse has shifted towards demand management and integration, efficiency of networks is certainly an increasingly important objective. However, in the UK, policy has shifted away from road building, which remains the major component of the TENs budget. Where the UK is in the process of creating local targets for road traffic management, no such shift is discernible at the EU level. Another example of the contradictory effects of the general mobility policy of efficiency can be drawn from the Danish case of the fixed link over the ‘Great Belt’. After one year of operation, the number of cars crossing the bridge already exceeds the most optimistic forecasts made by the proponents of the bridge, undermining the official Danish policy of reducing car traffic. Elsewhere, in the accession countries, increasing road traffic levels – car ownership in particular - are positively welcomed as signs of freedom in the post-Soviet era. Indeed, the rhetoric of the ESDP suggests that growth in overall traffic movements will be the key to improving accessibility.

**Articulating space within the policy process: excluding the particular**

In the theoretical chapters I set out the idea of linkage between exclusion within the policy process to exclusion in the experienced world as a result of subsequent policy interventions. Whilst it is clear that TEN-T is at the heart of the future development of European space, it is
telling that the policy space failed to provide opportunities for exploration of this complex and critical issue of spatial policy. The linkage of TENs, political integration and the single market are not placed under scrutiny, and alternative development paths, with different transport demands, such as those advocated by A SEED, are excluded from the policy space. These boundaries of exclusion were institutionalised by such practices – discussed above – as membership of decision-making bodies, by institutional power struggles which shaped the thinking of policy insiders as well as lobby groups.

As illustration of this argument, the articulation of space within the policy process was considered for one remote valley in the Pyrenees. The construction of the Somport tunnel, and its connecting motorways, will eventually link France and Spain across the Pyrenees. The route is articulated within the policy process as a ‘missing link’, a space of strategic political importance for physical integration and economic development (figure 11). The Pyrenean mountain chain represents in this construction, a natural barrier to the completion of TEN-T, crossed by this key link.

An alternative construction has been promoted by the European environmental movement. The Vallée d’Aspes, a mountain valley through which the route passes, is one of the last surviving habitats in Europe of the brown bear. The threats to the ecology of the area posed by the infrastructure project have been used to build a high profile international campaign, which has drawn activists from across Europe to this remote valley. One hope is that procedures such as SEA will be able to integrate such concerns into decision-making, although, for the many reasons analysed in this study, this seems unlikely. The construction of the Somport area as internationally important ecological habitat has failed to impinge in any significant way on the Brussels process.

A second alternative construction is of the area as a traditional hill farming community. The local community has campaigned vigorously against the infrastructure projects, in defence of its own culture and heritage. This local voice has been a lonely one, which has failed to attract the attentions of either EU politicians and policy makers, or international environmental NGOs. The one exception is A SEED, an NGO which acts as a network of local groups, and explicitly links environmental and developmental issues, in the context of the single market. Within campaign literature produced by A SEED, a small international platform has been created for this construction of a local cultural space endangered with first physical fragmentation followed by cultural homogenisation (figures 12-13).
Figure 11. Rolling out the TEN-T. Source CEC, 1994d.

Figure 12. Image of resistance to TEN-T. Source: A SEED campaign literature.
A fourth possible construction of the area affected by the route might have been that of one of Europe’s last wilderness areas – the high mountains of the Pyrenees – being destroyed by infrastructure. This construction has not been articulated, having no place in the EU policy language, or in the specific ecological and cultural concerns of those actively opposing the project.

Ultimately, the ways in which international infrastructure disrupts local space (cultural, ecological, etc) is inconsequential to the policy framework. Europe, in TEN-T policy space, is constructed as a grand design rather than a constellation of localities with their own importance. By focusing decision making on ‘Brussels impacts’ (or ‘Community benefits’), and constructing a rationality around them, legitimised by evaluation tools such as SEA, it becomes possible to exclude local knowledges from policy-making at the EU level. Other concerns are left to be addressed at the project level, through processes such as EIA and CBA provided by member states’ individual frameworks for decision-making on infrastructure. However the rationality of infrastructure decision-making at the national level is not always capable of addressing such concerns adequately, as shown by the current crisis of decision-support in transport planning (Nijkamp and Blaas, 1994). Leaving more localised, or spatially specific, concerns to the national or project level, effectively marginalises them from decisions made in Brussels. The actual impacts of constructing a motorway through an environmentally sensitive area may not in fact be assessed as a criteria for its inclusion in the list of projects of common interest.

**Constructing European space: the prospects**

Finally, it is important to briefly consider the possible effects of TEN-T in spatial terms. Next I begin to set out how the implementation of the network may result in a range of spatial impacts, which flow from the way policy has been shaped.

The new millennium seems likely to begin in Europe with a period of unprecedented infrastructure development. The Commission’s plan is to implement TEN-T by 2010. The ESDP further requires the development of regional transport networks within member states, to avoid the possible adverse economic impacts of their development. And the prospect of EU enlargement has focused attention on the eastwards growth of the networks. Hajer’s discourse of a *Europe of Flows* seems likely to predetermine ‘the spatial futures that turn up in EU policy’ (Hajer, 2000 forthcoming). Yet TEN-T undoubtedly has implications for ‘local’ spaces across Europe. Physically, the creation of TEN-T will see the construction of new high speed transport corridors in many of Europe’s remoter areas, as local spaces are striated by the generic spaces of international infrastructure.
Source: newsletter Somport no pasaran, produced by La Coordination Autonome des Comites Somport pour l’Arret Immédiat des Travaux en Vallee d’Aspe.

**Restructuring spatial relations**

A further powerful conceptual effect will be the shrinking of Europe, as it is expressed through the measurement of travel time between key centres. Urban areas will become ‘closer’ to each other, in the manner advocated by the ERT, and strikingly illustrated in the Commission document Europe 2000+ (CEC, 1994a) At the same time a new, finer grain pattern of physical exclusion will emerge in the shadows and on the margins of the new high speed corridors and polynodal spatiality of Europe (Vickerman et al, 1995). Academics have attempted to interpret the new spatial relations that will occur:

‘Growth will be concentrated in corridors of good communications and at peripheral urban locations where it is cost effective to link in with both the transport and information networks. Peripheral areas may still remain isolated and separate from the new infrastructure as access costs and capacity requirements may make the installation costs of the new networks uneconomic and the costs of using
the system too high.....the most attractive locations in Europe are likely to be those
where the transport and infrastructure networks link in with other factors such as a
skilled labour force, a high quality environment and the availability of low cost
land.... International airports, high-speed rail stations, and major motorway
intersections could all provide the sites of maximum accessibility which would
minimise location and transport costs.... Where more than two of these factors
actually work together, then a major Euro-hub would develop' (Banister et al,

**Unintentional effects**

Alongside the economic and environmental effects of TEN-T, which are themselves bound up
in uncertainty, as previously discussed, there are other possible effects of TEN-T which have so
far fallen completely outside the policy process. Perhaps the most significant of these is the
social impacts of the new opportunities for mobility – both individual and economic. New
patterns of socio-economic exclusion are likely to result from changing spatial relations,
although these are barely touched on in the policy debate. Questions about accessibility beyond
the reductionist economic analysis are beyond the scope of the TEN policy process, and even
the ESDP (Richardson and Jensen, 1999). The other, slightly more abstract effect seems to be
the fuelling of a network of resistance at the European level, of a counter-discourse which
challenges the single market development model.

**Extending TEN-T into the accession countries and beyond**

On 7 May 1996, an EU initiative was launched to prepare the extension of TENs into Central
Europe (CEC, 1996f). In 1997 a high level group was formed with representatives from the EU
governments and those of the accession countries. Under the aegis of this group, the
Commission initiated the ‘Transport Infrastructure Needs Assessment’ (TINA) programme.
TINA focused on infrastructure plans in the CEE countries, and in particular on financing
arrangements. The initial report [TINA 1998], mirroring the early work on TENs, set out the
need for a dramatic increase in infrastructure development. It identified an existing core network
of 13,430 kilometres of railway and 11,890 kilometres of road - and recommended new projects
which would extend the road network to 18030km, and the rail network to 20290km. A number
of key corridors were identified for development (figure 14), requiring some 87 billion ECU of
new investment, of which 36.62 billion ECU will go to rail and 45.78 billion ECU to road
(figure 15). In Poland, the scale of proposed investment is enormous, some 24.32 billion ECU:
10.59 billion ECU for developing the national road network and 9.81 billion ECU for rail (CEC,
1998a).

It is planned that the investment will be obtained through public-private partnerships, but
already EU financial support for the accession countries is shifting towards infrastructure
spending. Figure 16 shows how investment in the accession countries through the PHARE programme, which has taken on a regional development role, is increasingly biased towards infrastructure investment (1.488bn of 6.6bn total in the period 1990-96). After 2000, a new Instrument for Pre-accession Aid (ISPA) may contribute a further 0.5 billion ECU to transport infrastructure development. As in the existing member states, the question of accessibility to these international corridors suggests the prospect of a correspondingly dramatic increase in regional infrastructure development. The point, as with SEA of the TENs within the existing 15 member states, is that environmental integration in the planning process is already heavily compromised.

**Summary**

In the 1990s, the trans-European transport network underwent a process of environmental integration which, through the complex and conflictual process analysed above, seems to have met the concerns raised by the EU institutions, particularly the environmental and social concerns of the Parliament. Policy making and progress toward implementation have continued, work on SEA development is continuing, but the SEA itself has yet to be implemented.

The particular construction of environmental integration allows TEN-T to be posited as part of the broader EU spatial vision (enshrined in the ESDP), and also for it to be rebranded as environmentally sustainable. Yet the image remains of a Europe of flows. The trend of increasing mobility in Europe seems set to continue, and to be exacerbated by developments within the accession countries. The environmental implications of the implementation of TEN-T have been at once resolved and marginalised. The success in conditioning policy rationality with a weak but politically acceptable form of environmental integration has won the day for its proponents. None of the priority corridors appears to have been affected by the SEA work. It is surprising that environmental pressure groups have moved on. Perhaps the next challenge will be for parallel organisations in the accession countries to engage with the plans to extend TEN-T eastwards.
Pan-European Networks (PAN)

Helsinki - Tallinn - Riga - Kaunas - Minsk - Moskva
Nîmes - Bergamo
Berlin / Dresden / Wroclaw / Lviv / Kiev
Berlin / Nuremberg / Praha / Budapest / Bucuresti
Constanta / Theodosii / Istanbul

Bridge over the Danube as needed

Venecia / Trento / Koper / Ljubljana
Budapest / Zagreb / Lviv
Branch A: Bratislava / Zlin / Komot / Ostroh
Branch B: Praga / Bratislava / Brno
Branch C: Praga / Bratislava / Brno

Gdansk - Gdansk / Warszawa
Katowice - Katowice / Ostrava / Corridor IV

Bratislava - Zilina / Komarno / Uzhgorod / Lviv
Branch A: Bratislava / Brno
Branch B: Praga / Brno
Branch C: Praga / Brno
Branch D: Praga / Brno

Egra (Via Illyria)

EU countries
New member countries
Other countries
EEA countries (special EU)
Associated countries
Figure 15. Estimated costs of TINA core network. Source: TINA, 1998.

Estimated costs of TINA core network for road and rail, broken down among corridors and countries
(Total rail: 21.258 mECU. Total road: 31.171 mECU)

Bulgaria  ■ Czech Republic
■ Estonia  ■ Hungary
Latvia  ■ Lithuania
Poland  ■ Romania
Slovakia  ■ 3 leva, is

Figure 16. PHARE grants for infrastructure 1990-96. Source: TINA 1998

PHARE grants for infrastructure 1990-1996
(total: 1.469 mECU)
Chapter 10. Case study discussion and conclusions

‘One of the most important issue facing European transport policy makers in the next ten years ... [will be] the quality and extent of the existing transport network, and the role that the new telecommunications and transport infrastructure will have on European integration and the new map of Europe at the end of the twentieth century’ (Banister et al, 1995: xiv).

‘I don’t think anyone’s sat down and said “right before we do this TENs policy let’s have a look and see whether it’s really going to work”... it never became a serious kind of problem because I think most people believe in the end it is a good thing. Rightly or wrongly’ (Brussels bureaucrat).

The aim of this case study has been to illustrate the theoretical arguments raised in this thesis. I have sought to explore the institutionalisation of a new policy discourse, particularly focusing on the power struggles which shaped the rationality of policy making. In drawing this case study to a close, I reiterate that I have attempted to reconstruct, through a critical narrative, what can only be a partial view of the TEN-T policy process. The issues and events which I have chosen to focus on could of course have been studied in much finer detail. I have avoided, for example, probing the complex power relations between member states, or the micro-level relations between the many actors within the policy network, which would have required much more exhaustive research. However, the narrative succeeds in giving a strong impression of the power struggles which shaped and conditioned a new policy discourse, elucidating the fine grain of discourse institutionalisation through the construction of rationalities and their contestation.

The narrative sets out how, as a policy process for spatial development was constructed, difficult political issues became critical to the shape of policy: the question of the appropriate role of the EU institutions in the planning and delivery of international infrastructure projects; the treatment of difficult environmental risks; the skirmishes between the EU institutions as the boundaries of a new legal framework – the co-decision process – were pushed. In spite of such uncertainties the discursive strategies and knowledge claims pressed in the 1980s by industrial interests were gradually institutionalised in a new policy discourse.

Tables 11-13 set out the competing economic, political and environmental discourses which conditioned the environment within which the new TEN-T policy discourse was constructed, underpinned by the rationalities of the single market, political integration, regional development, and environmental concern, opposition and integration. The setting is further explained by the presence of institutional discourses. Figure 17 illustrates the different discourses at work in the policy process. The narrative explains in some detail the discursive
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core values</th>
<th>Discourse strategies</th>
<th>Knowledge claims</th>
<th>Micropolitics</th>
<th>Rationality under construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frictionless mobility</td>
<td>Shaping the European infrastructure problem</td>
<td>The necessity for improved international infrastructure networks to complete the single market</td>
<td>Infrastructure lobbies active in shaping discourse early on</td>
<td>TEN-T becomes crucial to achieving European integration and the single market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shrinking European space</td>
<td>Creating a new discourse of European space</td>
<td>Beneficial role of infrastructure in economic development</td>
<td>Regions lobby EP through MEPs</td>
<td>TEN-T crucial to EU growth, competitiveness and employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe of space of flows</td>
<td>Fighting the ‘infrastructure dragon’</td>
<td>Economic benefits will flow from TENs</td>
<td>Pork-barrelling</td>
<td>Economic rationality: TEN-T proven on micro and macro economic grounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Struggle over appropriate tools for decision support</td>
<td>Costs of ‘non-Europe’</td>
<td>Formal process: EP amendments call for SEA but also new projects</td>
<td>TEN-T becomes part of a sustainable transport strategy for the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Need to demonstrate economic benefits:</td>
<td>‘Eurosclerosis’</td>
<td>Resistance: Council of Ministers oppose green amendments</td>
<td>TEN-T shapes EU space: high speed networks corridors, and nodes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commission institutionalises economic evaluation of international transport movements and elevate broader economic imperative to unquestioned status</td>
<td>Missing links and networks are urgent problems</td>
<td>Environmental Article opposed – Parliament and Council in conflict over Christophersen list</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental instruments would jeopardise the programme</td>
<td>Uncertainty over regional impacts</td>
<td>Departmentalism: EP transport committee didn’t focus on environmental risks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positions for and against SEA politically driven, not ‘rational’</td>
<td>Micro and macro economic knowledge, ‘Brussels impacts’</td>
<td>EP didn’t veto policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Create weak procedural device to address and then marginalise environmental concerns</td>
<td>Kinnock’s Cabinet claims TEN-T is rail not roads biased</td>
<td>Conciliation power play:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EP claim TEN-T is an EU competence</td>
<td>Council not represented by politicians until very end</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Council of Ministers resist handing over decision power</td>
<td>Council intimidates EP delegation in conciliation meetings</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ambiguous outcome – both ‘sides’ claim victory</td>
<td>Ambiguous outcome – both ‘sides’ claim victory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/continued</td>
<td>Marginalise environmental debate</td>
<td>Rapid implementation needed</td>
<td>Environmental interests excluded from key committee Environmental issues not discussed in conciliation Debate avoided – focus on procedural issues</td>
<td>Environmental concerns sidestepped Local knowledges excluded Striation of local spaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Ministers resist SEA and weaken its implementation</td>
<td>SEA would cause harmful delays</td>
<td>De-link SEA from decision making and finance</td>
<td>Weak SEA adequate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delay SEA</td>
<td>Methodological improvements needed</td>
<td>The pursuit of knowledge as a delaying tactic: SEA methodological studies commissioned Pilot studies avoid action</td>
<td>SEA not necessary in initial policy development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel implementation</td>
<td>Need to get networks implemented rapidly</td>
<td>Advocacy and decision-making for projects parallel to policy development Projects developed under other budget heads (eg Regional Funds, Cohesion)</td>
<td>Implementing TEN-T is a priority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 11b. Discourse of regional development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core values</th>
<th>Discourse strategies</th>
<th>Knowledge claims</th>
<th>Micropolitics</th>
<th>Rationality under construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balanced economic development</td>
<td>Show that regional economic impacts will be positive and harmonious</td>
<td>Commission assumptions: Regional competitiveness and balance are the same thing: There is a causal link between infrastructure provision and economic development Centre / periphery distribution of economic benefits TENs and peripherality – even distribution of benefits within regions Long distance movements on TENs will be cheap enough to allow effective competition between central and peripheral regions</td>
<td>Study commissioned to show macro-economic benefits</td>
<td>TEN-T will result in overall and evenly distributed economic benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure connections a good thing</td>
<td>Regions need to be on the TEN-T map</td>
<td>TEN-T connection vital for regional economies</td>
<td>Regions lobby governments and MEPs</td>
<td>Pork barrelling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 12. Political integration discourses shaping the TEN-T policy process

#### 12a. Discourse of EU political integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core values</th>
<th>Discursive strategies</th>
<th>Knowledge claims</th>
<th>Micropolitics</th>
<th>Rationality under construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remove internal barriers</td>
<td>TEN-T critical for EU political integration</td>
<td>Missing links and networks are urgent problems</td>
<td>TENs chapter in Maastricht Treaty ERT high level lobbying</td>
<td>TEN-T becomes integral to the EU spatial vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased power of EU</td>
<td>Infrastructure inserted into integration discourse</td>
<td>Infrastructure is inadequate</td>
<td>Need formal policy for TEN-T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Europe: borders and natural</td>
<td>EU seeks political control over key corridors</td>
<td>Administration of infrastructure is fragmented</td>
<td>Motorway Working Group filter road network proposals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>barriers crossed</td>
<td>Marginalise environmental opposition</td>
<td>Key corridors should be prioritised</td>
<td>Infrastructure lobby secured access to decision-making</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental risks constructed as de-congestion</td>
<td>Environmental organisations not consulted</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of High Level Working Group to ‘facilitate rapid political agreement”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of the Christophersen list</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN-T in the public interest</td>
<td>Need to counter crisis of public investment</td>
<td>EU investment in TEN-T is in the public interest</td>
<td>Study commissioned to show macro-economic benefits</td>
<td>Economic rationality: TEN-T proven on micro and macro economic grounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN-T merits EU funding</td>
<td>Proving the case for public finance</td>
<td></td>
<td>Commission identifies Community Benefits (ECIS)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Need to demonstrate economic benefits: Commission</td>
<td></td>
<td>Macro-economic evaluation proves wider case (ECIS)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>institutionalises economic evaluation of international</td>
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<td>transport movements and elevates broader economic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>imperative to unquestioned status</td>
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12b. Discourse of resistance to EU intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core values</th>
<th>Discoursive strategies</th>
<th>Knowledge claims</th>
<th>Micropolitics</th>
<th>Rationality under construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Resistance to increased power of EU in infrastructure decision-making | Struggle to define subsidiarity  
Member states resist EU control over corridors / prioritisation etc  
Council opposes role for Commission in planning infrastructure  
Member states oppose EU involvement in decision making on corridors and projects (through SEA) | Member states should retain control over infrastructure decisions  
SEA threatens such control and so should be resisted | Struggle to weaken SEA  
Struggle to maintain Council control over Christophersen list | TEN-T allows no EU control over decision-making |
### 12c. Discourses of inter-institutional power struggles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core values</th>
<th>Discoursive strategies</th>
<th>Knowledge claims</th>
<th>Micropolitics</th>
<th>Rationality under construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU institutions struggle for control over decision-making</td>
<td>TEN-T used as an inter-institutional football</td>
<td>Parliament represents green concerns</td>
<td>Shift from Cooperation to Co-decision</td>
<td>EU institutions agree on expediting TEN-T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>But all EU institutions united in pursuing integration and single market</td>
<td>Parliament challenges democratic deficit and seeks controls over EU investment in TEN-T</td>
<td>Parliament ‘lacks expertise’</td>
<td>Whether to adopt SEA. Weak or strong</td>
<td>Weak construction of SEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>through TEN-T</td>
<td>EP seeks to assert power in conciliation process, Council rejects, Commission mediates</td>
<td>Control of Christoffersen list becomes a site of conflict</td>
<td>Delaying tactics in Conciliation:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council opposes role for Commission in planning infrastructure</td>
<td>Control of Christoffersen list becomes a site of conflict</td>
<td>Environmental integration and SEA used as site of conflict</td>
<td>Council represented by fonctionnaires ‘Intimidation’ of Parliament in Conciliation meetings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member states, regions and other local authorities see funding opportunity</th>
<th>National and regional shopping lists</th>
<th>Local projects key links in international corridors</th>
<th>Pork barrelling</th>
<th>Pork barrelling</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Table 13. Environmental discourses shaping the TEN-T policy process.

#### 13a. Discourse of environmental reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core values</th>
<th>Discourse strategies</th>
<th>Knowledge claims</th>
<th>Micropolitics</th>
<th>Rationality under construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TEN-T damaging in its proposed form</td>
<td>Campaign on environmental risks</td>
<td>TEN-T proposals and funding are roads-biased</td>
<td>TEN-T claimed to be unsustainable in their planned form</td>
<td>SEA can (and will) show whether TEN-T is sustainable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy reform needed</td>
<td>Multi-modal approach needed</td>
<td>Environmental lobby calls for reform</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lobbying of politicians (EP, national ministers and Cabinet)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Calls for environmental articles including SEA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 13b. Discourse of environmental opposition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core values</th>
<th>Discourse strategies</th>
<th>Knowledge claims</th>
<th>Micropolitics</th>
<th>Rationality under construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TEN-T part of globalising process</td>
<td>Generate a conflict which could derail the policy process</td>
<td>TEN-T intrinsically harmful to the environment</td>
<td>Non-violent direct action</td>
<td>Deadlock over environmental articles could stop policy process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stop TEN-T</td>
<td>Target ERT</td>
<td>Negative environmental impacts will result</td>
<td>BUT voice of opposition marginalised in policy process</td>
<td>Infrastructure consuming space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect local places; fragile environments and cultures</td>
<td>Campaigns focus on endangered local spaces</td>
<td>Roads-bias a bad thing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High speed rail a bad thing</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Single market a bad thing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core values</th>
<th>Discourse strategies</th>
<th>Knowledge claims</th>
<th>Micropolitics</th>
<th>Rationality under construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ecological modernisation</td>
<td>EP: Environmental risks need to be addressed: shift away from a roads bias</td>
<td>SEA is the right tool</td>
<td>Environmental NGOs form coalition targeting politicians in Brussels and member states</td>
<td>SEA allows environmental integration into policy process TEN-T become sustainable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and environmental interests can be successfully integrated</td>
<td>SEA emerges as a procedural device which can integrate environmental risks</td>
<td>TENs can be greened</td>
<td>EP lack of expertise = credibility gap</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for an efficient and sustainable European transport system</td>
<td>SEA will generate appropriate knowledge for policy review</td>
<td>TENs budget is spent mostly on rail</td>
<td>NGO lobbying shapes EP position</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shift debate towards ‘efficiency’: move towards multi-modal network</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical lobby documents articulate SEA process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NGOs lobby EP to put and defend amendments</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Commission supports case for SEA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cabinet shifts discourse towards ‘efficiency’</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
strategies, knowledge claims, and micropolitics which related to these different discourses, through which environmental risks were dealt with by recourse to a discourse of environmental integration, and how the needs of the key institutional discourses were satisfied by the policy outcome.

Table 11a summarises how the discourse of the European single market rested on core values of shrinking European space, and a ‘Europe of flows’. In the 1980s, principally through the lobbying of the ERT, these core values were pursued through a set of discoursive strategies which linked them to the need for a new way of thinking about European space, and the need for European infrastructure networks. Initially, knowledge claims concerned the economic necessity of TEN-T to achieve the full benefits of the single market, and setting out key needs such as the completion of missing links. Later challenges to the process, including the identification of uncertainties over economic impacts, and the concern over environmental impacts, meant that new discoursive strategies were needed, to demonstrate scientifically that TEN-T would bring the promised benefits, and that environmental risks needed to be finessed in some way, without undue delay to implementation. In the micropolitics of the policy process these issues were hotly contested, and complicated by the institutional discourses, which were expressed in powerplays over the ownership of the Christophersen list, for example. Finally,
through these struggles an economic rationality was constructed which embodied the original single market core values, and the Europe of flows, but at the same time framed TEN-T as part of a sustainable transport strategy for the EU. The sense of urgency and the need for rapid implementation was maintained.

For TEN-T to become a core plank in EU policy, it was necessary for TEN-T to be seen as contributing to balanced regional development as well as to the overall single market process. From a Commission viewpoint the main discursive strategy was to prove that the economic benefits would be evenly distributed. This was achieved not through any detailed analysis, but through a macro-economic study which suggested overall benefits, underpinned by a set of assumptions that, if unchallenged, would create the impression that benefits would be evenly distributed. Perhaps the reason that such a weak case was left unchallenged was that the main discursive strategy employed by those on the periphery, who might have actually raised a challenge, was instead to ensure that their regions were ‘on the map’. This can be seen as a straightforward recognition that TEN-T, if implemented, would bring additional investment to its designated corridors, and that pragmatically it would be better to be on a designated corridor than to press difficult questions about whether being on a corridor would be beneficial or not. So regions and other interests fought to ensure their areas were linked into the network proposals, rather than risk being marginalised from a programme that could unlock significant new expenditure on projects that, in any case, were often already proposed locally.

The core values of the political integration discourse (Table 12a) show how TEN-T was shaped by important political values, even though these are perhaps not as visible in the final policy guidelines, which reflect economic rationality more strongly. However the removal of internal barriers, through the creation of major infrastructure links between France and Spain across the Pyrenees, and between Denmark and Sweden across the Oresund, were deeply symbolic of the political integration of Europe. Infrastructure was woven into European political discourse through the 1980s, again in large part through the high level lobbying of the ERT. Significant in the political discourse was first the identification of missing links, but then the idea of planning infrastructure at the European level, and in particular the prioritisation of key corridors in the Christophersen list. Though political integration discourse was critical in the pre-policy stage, in articulating the need for TEN-T and the sense of urgency of implementation, it appears that during formal policy making the political significance of TEN-T was largely established, and left unchallenged by all institutions.

A more controversial question was the extent to which the EU should intervene in the implementation of TEN-T. Core values of the political integration discourse which became significant in the formal policy process were that the creation of TEN-T was in the public
interest, and that there was consequently a case for EU public finance. This was a key issue if the EU was to play any significant role in the implementation of the network, particularly given the retreat from public investment in infrastructure experienced in many member states in the 1990s. The principal strategy therefore was to construct a case at the international level that TEN-T would bring additional economic benefits – beyond the development of projects in isolation. This was pursued not through any participative planning process, but through technical macro- and micro-economic studies carried out by ECIS, resulting in the identification of ‘Community Benefits’ which would result from implementation. In opposition to this strategy to prove the case for EU intervention, a discourse of resistance to EU intervention emerged. This expressed itself in the struggle by member states, through the Council of Ministers, to retain control over key aspects of policy, and not to allow any significant powers to be passed upwards to the Commission. The Christophersen list, and the control that might result from strong SEA were the critical areas. The outcome of these struggles was that the Commission, and the EU, should have no formal powers over decision-making on infrastructure, although it is clear from the analysis above that the EU does have influence through funding programmes.

By 1992, a policy discourse had emerged which was characterised by economic and political imperatives, and an urgency to move quickly to implement TEN-T. Between 1992 and 1996, a formal process had been constructed which had institutionalised these elements, and had essentially removed significant barriers to the implementation of TEN-T. It was during these stages that the discourses of inter-institutional power struggles added new dimensions to the struggles over TEN-T policy. The Parliament and Council both held core values about which institution should have control over TEN-T decision making. For the Council, it was clear that it represented the member states, and this was where decisions on infrastructure should take place. For the Parliament this represented a democratic gap, where European policy would not be accountable to the European public, and so it saw itself as having a rightful role in decision-making. TEN-T, like many other policy areas, became an inter-institutional football, and issues within the process, such as the Christophersen list and SEA, became hotly contested arenas of inter-institutional struggle. This dimension of the policy process is critical, as it shows that the construction of SEA was subject to wider discursive struggles, between economic and environmental discourses, but also to more local struggles to construct the instrument in a way which would give more or less decision power to particular institutions. However, all this was moderated in this case by the shared core value among all the institutions that TEN-T was necessary for the single market, and should be rapidly implemented. This was perhaps the most significant reason that SEA first attracted so much political attention, but was eventually constructed in a weak way which would not create a barrier to implementation. This fundamental support for TEN-T was replicated at all levels from member states down to local
authorities, where TEN-T was seen as a new way of promoting projects which were facing increasing difficulty in a changing policy climate.

Gradually, as TEN-T policy crystallised in the early 1990s, environmental NGOs began to focus their attention on it. Two distinct environmental discourses could be identified among the positions adopted. A discourse of environmental reform (Table 13a) was expressed in the joint campaign organised by environmental NGOs, with the aim of showing that TEN-T, in its proposed form, would be environmentally damaging. A range of articles was put forward, including a dramatic reduction in the amount of new road development, and the use of SEA to show what the environmental impacts would be. An alternative discourse of environmental opposition (Table 13b), based on more radical core values about the intrinsically misguided nature of TEN-T, was excluded from the policy process from the outset, through the decisions made by the environmental coalition about its campaigning stance. These core values were expressed through local direct action against many projects, but the message ‘Stop TEN-T’ was never put directly to MEPs by the environmental movement. Through a self-disciplining process, this discourse, which was perhaps the most potentially destabilising of all, was excluded from any contact with the policy process. The only hope held by its advocates was that fundamental disagreement between the Parliament and Council over SEA could derail the policy process, but clearly this was unlikely given the overwhelming interests at the EU level to find a solution, even at the eleventh hour of negotiations.

The institutionalisation of the policy discourse was necessarily conditioned by all of these dynamics, and the emergence of a new discourse of environmental integration (Table 13c) provided the means of negotiating these potentially destabilising challenges, and finding an outcome which would be acceptable to all key interests. The environment was now written firmly into the objectives and the small print of policy, and had become a major agenda item. The language of TEN-T now embraced a rhetoric of sustainable mobility. The environmental coalition was able to claim success in this respect. Even if it did not manage to secure strong environmental safeguards, at least the language of TEN-T now embraced environmental thinking.

In discourse terms, it is possible to trace a thread from the reformist position adopted by the environmental coalition, and its proposals for SEA as a key measure for establishing whether TEN-T would be harmful or not, through to the Parliament’s strong advocacy for SEA, and to the eventual weak outcome as the perhaps inevitable outcome of conciliation. A process of translation from possible opposition to reform to integration took place, made possible by the technical advocacy of the NGOs, and the open channel of access to a receptive Parliament that, short of expertise, needed a credible way of asserting environmental concerns. SEA was the
vehicle for this, and despite clear hopes for its value in revealing the environmental risks posed by the TEN-T proposals, its eventual weak construction would deny this possibility. The Parliament had been handed an instrument which would allow it to carry an environmental argument as a way of promoting its institutional discourse of democratisation and gaining power. What is very striking is the lack of any reaction to the SEA outcome by environmental NGOs, who moved quickly on to other concerns. This seems surprising given that even by 2000 a detailed SEA of the TEN-T network had not been carried out, which would identify the most damaging proposals, or alternatives to them.

In the TEN-T policy process, then, the importance of broader discourses of European integration, the single market and the environment cannot be denied. Ingrained in the discourses of the key EU institutions, they fundamentally shaped the nature of the policy process, and consequently the nature of the policy discourse which emerged. And it is this new policy discourse which is crucial to my argument. That through a contested policy process, decisions were reached by the EU about a physical programme for European infrastructure, and a new policy discourse has been created which is partly about infrastructure, but also about mobility, economic and political union, the environment, and European space. And this discourse is articulated in a number of ways: not only new ways of thinking about mobility in Europe, but also in new language and practice. It is the practices - the ways in which the discourse constructs and reconstructs itself - that need extra-special attention. In the case of TEN-T I have argued that new practices have been born which will serve to further embed and reproduce the discourses of the single market and political integration. TEN-T policy discourse, supported by the deployment of a discourse of environmental integration, can be said to have achieved hegemony, in Hajer’s terms of achieving successful institutionalisation.

Table 14 below, drawn from tables 11-13, sets out how certain rationalities became integral to the new policy discourse, while others which threatened the policy process were marginalised or excluded. In this way, the EU institutions were able to negotiate complex discursive struggles and arrive at an apparently coherent rationality for TEN-T. This rationality can be seen in part as the institutionalisation of the economic and political visions which had been there from the outset. Also, the later environmental challenges to the policy process were addressed through procedural environmental integration, principally using SEA, and this allowed a rationality of environmental sustainability to be added to TEN-T discourse. The fieldwork shows how many of the concerns over impacts which were raised during policy making, were not in fact resolved by the time the Policy Guidelines were adopted. Some of the concerns – for example over the extent of environmental impacts, or over the direction and extent of economic benefits - were clearly seen as more serious than others, and were taken up by, for example, the Parliament in
its position. These concerns were ultimately finessed through the deployment of SEA and economic studies, which were used to show that the concerns had been successfully addressed.

This is in spite of the fact that by 1996 no studies had been carried out to show what the environmental impacts of the network would be, or to resolve the uncertainties raised in Europe 2000+ about the economic risks for peripheral regions. So SEA and the macro- and micro-economic studies explored in the case study played a procedural role which allowed all interests to show that these concerns had been addressed. These alternative rationalities, which were threatening but were marginalised, are set out in Table 14. A further set of concerns never got close to the formal policy process, and these are identified in Table 14 as excluded rationalities. These relate partly to the perhaps more radical ways of thinking about local cultures which were threatened by the homogenisation of the EU, accelerated by TEN-T in remote areas such as the Pyrenees. And partly to radical positions that the existence of the EU itself was damaging to the environment, and by extension that TEN-T was a bad thing. The impacts of large scale infrastructure networks on European space – the striation of space, and consumption of space by infrastructure for example – were also excluded from formal policy making. It seems significant that in this case of spatial policy making at the EU level it was not difficult to exclude local environmental and cultural concerns, and that this was facilitated because such concerns did not ‘fit’ into the struggles over the construction of rationality.

Overall the case study shows that in the EU of the 1990s, the powerful discourses of the single market and political integration are deeply ingrained in the discourses which shape the EU institutional environment, conditioning the possibilities of the policy process, shaping the problems that need to be solved, the methods to be used in their analysis, and the solutions that can be considered. This powerful conditioning resulted in a TEN policy process which successfully assimilated environmental concerns by creating and institutionalising a policy discourse embracing a discourse of environmental integration. And the institutionalisation of this discourse came to hinge primarily on the introduction of an SEA procedure. The research reveals firstly the weakness of this construction, but secondly, and more importantly, that this construction is the product of the interaction of the (at the time) hegemonic single market and political integration discourses with those of the EU institutions. Within the TEN-T policy process, these were the conditions that prevailed over the construction of a new policy discourse, shaping the contours of the process itself, the policy knowledge, language, and practices: embedding the rationality of policy making. The discourse, in turn, became the logic and articulation of policy, leading to its direct programmatic effects, and eventually (though beyond the scope of this study) to the implementation of the concrete and steel infrastructure of the TEN-T, and its consequent spatial effects. The particular construction of the policy process
Table 14. TEN-T policy discourse: fragmented, marginalised and excluded policy rationalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEN-T Policy rationalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TEN-T a cornerstone of EU integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN-T crucial for EU global competitiveness and the single market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN-T will result in evenly distributed economic benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN-T part of a sustainable transport strategy for the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN-T’s high speed networks, corridors and nodes integral to the EU spatial vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert knowledge allows proper treatment of impacts and benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN-T is in the public interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU has no power over infrastructure decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should part-finance TEN-T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental risks adequately addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation is a priority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU institutions in harmony on expediting TEN-T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA allows environmental integration into policy process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA not necessary in initial policy development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA can (and will) show whether TEN-T is sustainable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marginalised rationalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pork barrelling: lobbying replaces network planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak construction of SEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty over possible economic impacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN-T could result in negative economic impacts on the periphery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN-T could result in negative environmental impacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN-T is roads biased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-institutional conflicts could stop the process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Excluded rationalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local knowledges and protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single market ‘a bad thing’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN-T threatens cultural homogenisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure consuming space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Striation of local spaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk of homogenisation of culture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
seems likely to have profound effects on the playing out of decision-making, making possible certain ways of thinking about and debating these issues, whilst marginalising others.

In the following sections, I set out some more specific conclusions on the implications of these findings for evaluation strategies in spatial planning, the conceptualisation of SEA as a political tool, and its use in institutionalising a discourse of environmental integration. This is followed by a brief discussion of the issues raised for EU competence in spatial planning, and for the exclusion of competing spatialities in European policy making.

**Evaluation strategies**

‘In the TEN-T policy process, the nature of partnership has maintained a narrow scope for evaluation and policy development, which suggests caution in the partnership approaches being explored in the Structural Funds. Of particular relevance to EU spatial planning is the subsidiarity principle, which recognises the need for transparency of the decision-making process as a critical factor in strengthening the democratic nature of the EU institutions, and supporting the public’s confidence in the administration. We conclude that reflections on the nature and use of evaluation are important to European spatial planning, and are urgently needed. There is a need for empirical studies and evidence from evaluation practice, at the national and European levels, which explore evaluation in planning in the context of emerging alternative theoretical paradigms.’ (Dabinett and Richardson, 1999).

One major contested area in the policy process was the construction of evaluation strategies. A line of cleavage in this struggle opened between the advocates of cost-benefit analysis, and the advocates of strategic environmental assessment. Whilst the case for economic rationality was put consistently and strongly by the economic and political discourses, the call for alternative evaluation came from the margins. It was perhaps not surprising that economics should be adopted as the appropriate discipline to evaluate measures that were designed principally to bring economic benefits. However, the increasing concern over the environmental risks of TEN-T precipitated a campaign for broader impacts and options to be considered in making decisions at network and corridor levels. These attempts to shape and control the evaluation process can be interpreted as struggles over the embedding of particular values, knowledges and power relations. The adoption of particular approaches and techniques in evaluation created boundaries of inclusion and exclusion of knowledge, which potentially established bias in favour of a range of interests which would benefit politically and economically from infrastructure investment.

A range of evaluation tools has emerged with a mix of roles. Macro- and micro-economic evaluation was used to justify EU financial support for individual transport corridors, and to legitimise the EU’s broad political support for the TEN-T programme. Environmental evaluation tools (SEA and corridor analysis) should provide information on the overall impact
of the networks, and different modal options at the corridor level. The outcome of a
paradigmatic battle appears to have been the elevation of economic evaluation to hegemonic
status. Economic criteria will be used to justify EU intervention in projects, and institutionalise
economic and political discourses. At the same time environmental knowledge will be deployed
to support decisions rather than carry any binding power, assuming such knowledge does
eventually result from the SEA machinations. The value of international mobility will be more
significant in influencing decision-making than the value of (for example) the impact of
constructing new motorways in remote mountain valleys.

Discursive struggles were found to be crucial in determining the specific construction of
evaluation. The hegemony of economics in evaluation would appear to favour the wide range of
interests which are likely to benefit most from the construction of the trans-European transport
network. Concerns about the environmental impacts of the networks were marginalised. The
particular methodologies adopted further compound this exclusion of interests. Cost-benefit
analysis is a technical exercise which does not lend itself to the participation of multiple actors.
Its values and workings are not transparent. SEA, alternatively, can potentially be implemented
within a participative planning framework. However, in the case of TEN-T, this possibility is
not being followed - rather SEA, like CBA, is being conceived as a desk exercise. The processes
by which these methodologies were selected and incorporated into the policy framework are
opaque - though this case study sheds some light here - and have not benefited from public
participation. The ground rules have been laid down for projects which will be implemented
within member states, yet evaluation is not being used in a way which makes transparent,
participative or accountable the planning of projects, corridors and networks. It appears that the
democratic deficit in infrastructure planning, which we have been familiar with at the national
level, is being reconstructed at the EU level, and embedded in evaluation strategies.

The evaluation strategy for TEN-T excludes:
• any significant risk to projects because of potential environmental / social impacts
• scrutiny of primary EU visions / policies / objectives
• alternative mobility scenarios / transport options
• transparency / participation of many interests

What the evaluation strategy achieves:
• support for the vision of international mobility at the heart of the single market project
• justification for EU investment in TEN-T
• enables member states to advance prioritised TEN-T projects, without imposing decisions
In conclusion, it appears that innovations in evaluation in the TEN-T policy process will provide information about the broader environmental impacts of infrastructure development in major international corridors and networks as a whole, but will not create transparent processes of decision-making, or broaden the scope of the policy debate.

**SEA as a political tool**

As the environmental impacts of transport have become a key area of Community concern, TEN-T has emerged as a critical area for the integration of environmental policy. Within the policy process, the use of Strategic Environmental Assessment became the central instrument for achieving this.

The development of SEA was at one level the terrain of a discursive struggle over environmental politics and environmental integration, and at another level a struggle over institutional power relations. The use of a discourse analytic approach allows close scrutiny of the practices by which these conflicts were played out. SEA (and other evaluation tools) was constructed in a way which would sustain a policy process furthering the single market and European integration. Particular ‘macro-knowledges’ of European space and development became embedded in policy knowledge, whilst environmental and local cultural knowledges were excluded.

In the critical narrative above, I set out in some detail how SEA emerged as a means of institutionalising a discourse of environmental integration: a response to difficult arguments about environmental impacts. As the Parliament and Council struggled over the final shape of policy, the inclusion of an Article on SEA became a crux of conflict. Perhaps inevitably, the outcome was a compromise, shaped by two main factors: the resistance of the Council to the environmental stance of the Parliament, but the underlying interest of all parties to secure the rapid implementation of TEN-T. I showed how key events in the development of policy resulted in a weakened form of SEA. These events included the use of legislative arguments, the closing down of debate, moving forwards with project decisions whilst delaying SEA in the quest for further knowledge, and finally constructing SEA in a form which tightly constrained its possible impact on decision-making. Work to progress the methodology of SEA became itself a means of slowing down the integration of environmental concerns into TEN-T.

Once again, the political treatment of SEA means that many difficult questions about the appropriateness, role and scope for the use of SEA in planning TEN-T were not addressed. The concern was more that *something* was done about the environment, than that the appropriate means of responding to environmental risks should be carefully considered.
If SEA cannot be a strong decision making tool for TEN-T, then does it have a more pragmatic role? Weak application in the TEN-T process may be a necessary, pragmatic stage in a longer iterative process of developing the technique. It is argued that SEA has other contributions to make: causing shifts in the thinking of policy makers and politicians, creating transparency, raising public awareness of environmental issues. In this particular policy process, certainly SEA served as a catalyst for environmental debate. SEA can, then, be understood as a softer, longer term approach. However, while this argument suggests that policy thinking may gradually change, it does not guarantee that this thinking will be translated into solutions to ‘real’ environmental problems.

Its eventual implementation is unlikely to ask basic policy questions, to veto any particularly harmful project, or to move transport in Europe towards a strong interpretation of sustainability. Furthermore, by failing to enable EU environmental intervention, SEA leaves the powers of environmental jurisdiction and competence largely at the member state level. Quite apart from the problems this raises in achieving EU environmental objectives, the opportunity to use SEA as a tool to achieve broader objectives of sustainable development - creating a more transparent, accountable, and participative approach to infrastructure planning - has for the moment been missed. SEA, in its current form, seems unlikely to have any meaningful effects on the environmental risks of TEN-T.

**Weak environmental integration**

The focus on power relations and rationality used in this case study yields useful insights into this process of environmental integration, which contribute to broader debates. In this analysis I have conceptualised environmental integration as a discourse which was deployed within the policy process, which was helpful in analysing its contested construction. The analysis appears to support the wider concern over the ‘disappointing’ progress of environmental integration in EU policy making (CEC, 1994e, cited in Gouldson and Murphy, 1996: 16). The case study reveals firstly the weakness of this construction of environmental integration, dependent upon the weakness of institutionalisation, but secondly, and more importantly, that this construction was the product of the hegemonic discourses of the EU itself as they were played out in the TEN-T policy process.

This analysis further suggests that ecological modernisation in the EU is taking a different form to that anticipated by Gouldson and Murphy. It is not just the lack of strategic capacity, caused by the resistance of member states, that limits the possibility for environmental integration. It is
the very nature of EU discourse, reproduced in every EU institution, that conditions and sets limits to institutional learning. The discourse of ecological modernisation in the EU may be closer to Hajer’s more pessimistic concept of an institutional problem: ‘Behind the official rhetoric of ecological modernisation one can discern the silhouette of technocracy in a new disguise that stands in the way of implementing ‘real solutions’ for what are very ‘real problems’” (Hajer, 1996: 253). If this is the case, then the prognosis for environmental integration in EU policy is poor as long as we rely on the EU institutions to ‘learn’ how to deliver it.

However, Hajer also offers a more positive way forwards, introducing the alternative concept of ecological modernisation as cultural politics. Here, the relations between environment and development in EU policy can be understood as the product of cultural politics: environmental problems are constructed through the adoption of certain metaphors, categorisations, techniques of analysis, ‘making certain framings of reality seem plausible and closing off certain possible future scenarios whole making other scenarios ‘thinkable’” (Hajer, 1996: 257). From this starting point, cultural politics offers new opportunities to unmask and challenge these discursive practices, problematising the problems and challenging unchallenged assumptions. Hajer advocates a clear role for academics in this activity: ‘they have to help to open the black boxes of society, technology and nature’ (1996: 259). In following this line of academic inquiry, Hajer notes the relevance of Michel Foucault’s post-structuralist analyses of how discourses construct and condition social ‘reality’. This case study may be read as an exploration of this type of critical analysis.

A fundamental challenge for ecological modernisation in the EU is to make space for alternative discourses which extend the boundaries of what is ‘thinkable’, and hence what is possible. Unless this occurs, it seems likely that the construction of policy tools like SEA will continue to protect the interests of existing hegemonies. Whether the EU institutions have the will or the capacity to make this space remains to be seen.

The strong resistance of Member States to environmental policy, asserted through the Council, is particularly worrying. The main grounds for optimism are that the European Parliament, and to a lesser extent the Commission, are clearly responsive to environmental concerns. As the Parliament grows more central to Community decision making through co-decision, and its relations with the Commission and Council are tested and defined, the translation of environmental concerns into substantive policy measures stands more chance of success.

The political and institutional setting of SEA development clearly shapes its scope, timing, methodology, and ultimately its impact. In this case SEA was shaped by the discourses of the
single market and political integration, by inter-institutional politics, and by the actions of interest groups. Appreciating the constructed nature of techniques of environmental integration, like SEA, helps us to understand the dangers in regarding them simply as rational scientific tools.

**What place for EU competence in spatial planning?**

The construction of TEN-T discourse can be seen as a key element in the emergence of a European spatial planning approach. As Dick Williams has argued, ‘In the context of spatial planning at the EU scale, TENs have an obvious resonance .. the relationship between transport TENs and the development of EU spatial policy needs to be clear if the latter is to achieve general acceptance’ (Williams, 1996: 168). The lessons learned in the TEN-T policy process should therefore be directly relevant to the implementation of the ESDP.

In this case study, the lack of clarity over the EU’s formal capability in infrastructure (and spatial) planning had dire effects on the possibility of any real planning taking place. The Commission, Council and Parliament struggled horizontally for control over decision making as part of broader inter-institutional struggles at the EU level. There was a further vertical struggle between the member states and the EU institutions, over the relations of power. The fields of these struggles embraced broad principles such as spatial planning, and specifics such as the treatment of economic and environmental risks. Ultimately the rationality of the new policy discourse itself was contested across this complex terrain, with the clear impacts on policy outcomes discussed above. Running through these struggles was the central question of the EU’s competence to intervene. Could the EU actually plan one of its largest programmes for physical development? The evidence above suggests that it could not.

In the Europe of subsidiarity, where Community actions must be justified in terms of value added, the idea of Community Benefits provided a valid rationale for Community intervention. However, this position was resisted by member states, who held that ‘planning’ national infrastructure projects – the components of TEN-T – had to be solely the competence of member states. There was concern that the EU should not have power over member states in the planning and implementation of such projects. One consequence is the use of EU structural (and other) funds to secure spatial programmes by the back door.

A further conclusion is that the power struggles which shaped the rationality of policy making precluded the possibility of any ‘rational’ or deliberative approach to determining an appropriate spatial planning framework. Power relations ruled the day in a way which excluded debate and reflection on what were seen as marginal or irrelevant issues. The reasoned basis for EU
intervention in infrastructure planning was never the subject of critical debate within the policy process. An unproblematic rationality was constructed through discursive struggle which marginalised or excluded potentially destabilising challenges. Critical arguments were subsumed through the process of integration into weak evaluation frameworks. TEN-T policy debates never contained a question-mark, a pause for thought. Indeed the engagement of industrial interests, and the EU institutions later on, was focused on speeding implementation, removing barriers to progress. The widespread acceptance of the need for TEN-T across the EU institutions meant that difficult questions had to be accommodated without compromising the overall project. This clearly suggests that very careful analysis of the emerging involvement of the EU in spatial planning will be required, to scrutinise these workings of power.

Furthermore, it is clear that inter-institutional issues at the EU level are likely to continue to problematise the EU’s search for an appropriate level of competence in spatial planning. At least in this case, the co-decision process itself does not appear to have been a useful arena for supra-national planning.

**Hegemony and exclusion of competing spatialities**

More broadly, through the TEN-T policy process, a new European spatiality was being created. The discourses of political integration and the single market, with their increasing demands for high levels of mobility, have begun to underpin a new pan-European discourse of high speed transport and spatial mobility. The vision is of a Europe of flows, of a shrinking, high speed, polycentric, single market Europe, where physical and institutional barriers to movement are removed. This has been supported by the successful resolution of environmental concerns through environmental integration and the marginalising of opposition, and the construction of a methodology for policy implementation which will create knowledge, attribute relevance, and enfranchise interests which espouse the Europe of flows approach to European futures. Ultimately, ways of understanding and intervening in European space, through infrastructure development, are being conditioned according to a new policy discourse grounded in these rationalities of space and mobility. However, as TEN-T removes national boundaries physically, reinforcing the new strategy of spatial integration in Europe, it simultaneously creates new patterns of exclusion, both within Europe, and between Europe and its neighbours.

In the TEN-T policy process, it appears likely that we have witnessed a new un-level playing field being constructed in transport planning, this time at the new trans-European level. The construction of the policy process seems likely to have profound effects on future decision-making, making possible certain ways of thinking about and debating European space and infrastructure, whilst marginalising other possibilities. The environmental, social and cultural
risks associated with TEN-T are unlikely to play a significant part in determining whether particular projects, corridors or networks proceed, or whether particular modal choices are selected. The constructed rationality is not one of planning in the sense of anticipating and avoiding unacceptable risks, or ensuring even distribution of benefits, but planning in the sense of ensuring rapid implementation, and managing knowledge to ensure that threats to the process itself are marginalised.

Returning to the framework set out in Chapters 3 and 4, identifying spatialities of mobility, it is clear that the new policy rationality contains particular constructions of these spatialities, whilst marginalising or excluding other constructions. Table 15 draws together these spatialities from Tables 11-14 above. At the heart of the TEN-T policy discourse is the management of the dynamics between spaces through the creation of a new infrastructure system. The core TEN-T vision embodies the Europe of flows, relying on integrated networks, the reduction of peripherality, and the related polycentric spatial strategy. Within the policy process, the challenges to this spatial vision were the risks of uneven development and unacceptable environmental impacts, though these were not presented explicitly as challenges to the vision itself, but rather as difficulties which needed to be resolved.

Integral to TEN-T is the identification and development of key transport nodes, such as major airports and high speed rail terminals. This two spatialities was contested in a different way – through the pork barrelling as regions and other interests struggled to ensure that they were ‘on the map’.

The concept of fixed spaces of mobility became significant later in the process, as part of the response to environmental concerns was a discursive shift which included increasing the efficiency of the infrastructure which would comprise TEN-T, and introducing the concept of multi-modality as a mechanism for ensuring that different modal options and combinations could be developed within particular corridors.

An alternative spatiality, of infrastructure consuming space, could have posed a more significant threat to the policy process. The TEN-T proposals included a number of major new infrastructure projects which would could result in serious local environmental or cultural impacts. However the specific construction of rationality managed to excluded such threats. So alternative spatial visions, of the striation of space by TEN-T, or of environmental destruction, were excluded from the policy debate, from the evaluation frameworks, and from the policy discourse itself. In this study, no information which could help in an analysis of mobile spaces of mobility within the policy discourse was gathered.
The exclusion of spatial constructions relating to the damaging consumption of space by TEN-T was critical to policy progress, but runs against a current policy turn, in some member states at least, away from high levels of infrastructure spending, particularly on roads. The development of infrastructure according to the particular spatial vision of a Europe of flows seems likely to bring about profound spatial economic, social and environmental effects. In Europe, TEN-T has become a focus for political action from the regional to the international level. In France direct action has been staged against the construction of the southern extension of the TGV network. In the Netherlands, demonstrations have taken place on the runway at Schiphol airport. In the Basque regions high speed trains have been stopped in their tracks by activists. All of these actions, targeting proposed regional infrastructure projects, are linked. Their aim, through opposing local projects, is to assert that TEN-T, as an instrument of the single market, is fundamentally damaging. These protests do not set out any alternative proposals at the level of managing the dynamics between spaces. The discourses of environmental reform and opposition fail to make competing alternative demands for mobility in European space, their focus being placed more clearly on resisting the threat of destruction of local ecologies and the homogenisation of local cultures. However, the discursive struggles which conditioned the policy rationality of TEN-T resulted in the systematic exclusion of such destabilising knowledges, through the overwhelming force towards ‘integration’. The spatial framework helps to illustrate how the discourse of environmental opposition failed to construct a message at a level appropriate to TEN-T, so that the emerging spatiality of the Europe of flows was left unchallenged. Ultimately, the competing European spatialities failed to engage with each other.

In sum, the case study provides a unique study of how the treatment of environmental concerns in spatial policy making is subject to power relations. In this case through the deployment of a discourse of environmental integration as a component of the policy discourse. It illuminates in detail how these power relations conditioned the construction of the new policy discourse, with a particular base of knowledge and rationality, and its embedding in decision-support systems. The focus on the transport infrastructure policy sector, where crucial problems exist in addressing environmental risks, adds further interest: the analysis of power struggles and the analysis of their impact on the policy process, is original. The case study also serves as a useful critical case study for the emerging field of European spatial planning, in that it is one of the crucial policy sectors to be integrated into the ESDP. Experience of developing a pan-European approach to developing policy on and delivering transport infrastructure is likely to be of interest to academics and policy makers in other policy sectors, and to those engaged in the ESDP process of establishing integration between them.
Table 15. Spaces of mobility in the TEN-T policy process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spaces of mobility</th>
<th>Constructions in the TEN-T policy process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managing the dynamics between spaces:</td>
<td>Core TEN-T vision – Europe of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>infrastructure systems</td>
<td>flows, integrated networks, reducing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>peripherality, polycentricity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nodal spaces: airports etc</td>
<td>TEN-T nodes crucial to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>polycentric vision</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional development pressure for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nodes and links</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure consuming space</td>
<td>Excluded threats: striated spaces. EG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>opposition in the Vallée d’Aspes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corridor and Shadow effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed spaces of mobility</td>
<td>Increasing efficiency of transport systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-modality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile spaces of mobility</td>
<td>Not found</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part 3

Conclusions

Foucault, planning research, and planning theory
Chapter 11. Evaluation: using Foucauldian discourse analytics in planning research

I knew at the outset that I wanted to focus on power in planning, and so Foucault's work seemed instantly relevant and exciting. However, drawing from this wide body of work to create a research design required a more prolonged engagement. I found no examples of Foucauldian research in planning which could be readily used to study policy making, and therefore began from the bottom up, constructing a methodology from first principles. Many of the early challenges encountered were discussed in Chapter 4. In this chapter, I reflect on the usefulness of the methodology which I eventually developed, based on the experience of implementation. I touch on methodological issues, and consider the place of Foucauldian discourse analytics alongside existing research approaches.

A first general conclusion is that the value and relevance of Foucault's work to planning research has been underestimated. The value of the Foucauldian approach, as operationalised here, lies in both the richness of analysis - resulting from the overall approach, and the particularity of the findings, which lead from the discursive framework. The research outputs are differently oriented to other approaches, and therefore lead to different insights into planning processes.

Fischer and Forester argue that using discourse analysis it becomes possible to examine both policy content and performance, analysing policy arguments for their 'partiality, selective framing of the issues at hand, their elegance or crudeness of presentation, their political timeliness, their symbolic significance, and more' (Fischer and Forester, 1993). The approach used in this study clearly brings out these themes - particularly in providing a good focus on exactly how partiality and framing take place. But I would argue that, using the different understanding of discourse developed in this study, it is possible to use discourse analytics to place such policy arguments in a much broader context, adding depth to the analysis. In this study, though argumentation is clearly part of the narrative, the policy process is seen to be won and lost by other means.

The approach reveals how planning tools are critical in constructing policy knowledge and rationality, yet how both are strongly contested. Evaluation tools are thus revealed as contingent techniques for articulating exclusionary policy knowledges and validating particular rationalities of space in spatial policy making. Foucauldian discourse, applied in a non-textually oriented way, helps to probe the all-important relations between power, knowledge and rationality. The
result is an illustration of how theoretically informed planning research can accept, focus on, and seek to explain, the realpolitik and 'realrationalität' of planning.

The methodology aimed to explore the relations between power and space in spatial policy processes, by analysing the construction of spatiality within policy discourse. This was carried out in perhaps a tentative way, but the potential can be seen for further work on the links between discourses, power struggles in policy making, and particular spatial strategies.

The case study suggests how the actions of institutions (and of individuals within them) were conditioned by the discourses of European integration and economy. However the focus of study is not just how local power struggles were affected by broader interests. The focus goes further in exploring a specific policy relevant question – about the treatment of environmental risks – and illuminating it by exploring in fine detail how this policy issue was locally contested and played out, leading to specific policy outputs, with serious real world implications. Within the European Parliament, for example, environmental interests took a variety of forms which crystallised in a temporary, fragile alliance. However, the fallback position was clear. Although the Parliament possessed the ‘power’ to derail the entire TEN-T policy process, ultimately it would not do so because of its shared interest in the European political and economic project. This was manifest in interviews and policy documents. Similarly within the Council of Ministers, the more environmentally concerned member states would resist upsetting the TEN-T apple cart. Within the Commission, DGVII’s concerns with implementation of the networks prevailed over DGXI’s concerns with the potential environmental implications.

So the construction of SEA could be partly explained as the product of EU inter-institutional politics. The discursive approach, however, led to a different explanation, which viewed the actions of individuals within institutions, and the institutions themselves, as shaped by the discourse territory. It was clear that, in this case at least, the hegemonic EU discourses would prevail on every institution to deliver rather than undermine the policy. The critical narrative focuses on the playing out of discursive competition through local power struggles - in this case primarily within and around the EU institutions. Environmental measures, therefore, would be constructed in a weak way which would not delay implementation. This was clear in the political analysis, as well as in the analysis of the policy outcome. The point is that the discursive framework assisted in providing a particular and cogent explanation of these events within the policy process.

The fieldwork therefore provides a useful case study of the political deployment of policy evaluation tools, in response to Throgmorton’s call for close analysis of the use of such ‘tropes’ in policy making, and to the specific literature discussing the political nature of evaluation.
Planning tools are understood as techniques of power, with local struggles over their construction and deployment as critical moments in discursive struggles for hegemony in policy making. The particular construction of tropes is seen to reproduce particular discursive ideas and power struggles. Analysing these construction sites helps to elucidate this power dimension of evaluation. The selection, in policy processes, of certain evaluation tools may be understood as an indicator of the hegemony, or dominance of a particular discourse in the policy process. The particular local construction of such tools is also likely to be marked by power struggles. It is interesting to consider the link between these tropes and the subsequent playing out of the policy process. It seems likely that, in spite of deliberate use of simple, accessible language, transparency, and facilitation of participation and debate in the policy process, tropes will have a deep effect on outcomes which is difficult to perceive, and even more difficult to challenge. What ensues in later stages of policy debate is therefore likely to be historically and contextually conditioned, in that many permissible knowledges, statements, actions, and so on, are already institutionalised. As a result, the transparently communicative stages in policy making take place after the critical decisions have been made. What is required is a framework and a language for a critical analysis of the political nature of planning tools, which may be deployed to better understand, challenge where necessary, and counterbalance these effects. Again, this thesis makes progress in this direction.

What also becomes clear is that this is not simply a story of untroubled hegemonic discourses being reproduced across planning arenas and processes. Whilst certain discourses and interests may prevail, in certain places and at certain times, they are also subject to opposition and resistance. From this analysis of the EU policy process, it can be concluded that it is the specific institutional arrangements within the EU that permit this hegemonic project to succeed for the moment. Crucial to this was the absence of adequate checks and balances in the TEN-T policy process - a central instrument of the integration process. This analysis does not mean that this can be the only possible outcome. It certainly raises important questions about the nature of EU institutions, which can inform the debate about their reform. With internal opposition, EU enlargement, political change and institutional reform, and other major events, it is possible that a new balance of power between discourses will reshape the policy process such that the policy discourse is reconstructed. The message from this study is that a reconstruction of policy rationality will also be required if fundamental change is to come about.

The uniqueness of the approach lies in its ability to help explain the institutionalisation of new policy discourses. It goes further than simply rediscovering that rationality gets constructed in power struggles, because it sheds light on how this actually happens in particular settings – in this case in part through the deployment of a discourse of environmental integration. Operationalised in this way, the research design is able to throw light on how institutional
power struggles can condition policy processes. But it also shows that the institutions themselves are shaped by discursive struggles. Within this complex environment individuals, and specific interest groups, are found able – within limits - to bring about change. The outcome of policy making is seen to be uncertain on this difficult and unstable terrain, and not necessarily within the control of the most apparently ‘powerful’ interests.

An obvious danger with the methodology was that the early identification of discourses would pre-empt later analysis and obscure other aspects of the picture. The response to this problem was specific to the research, and again implies reflexivity on the part of the researcher. The approach sets out the rhetorical positions of different policy documents, but then attempts to contextualise these competing positions as tactical elements in wider power struggles. Instead of becoming preoccupied with the detail of the positions being adopted, I have focused on how these positions were adopted for political or realpolitikal reasons, and on how the strategies were not simply related to the issues at stake, but also to inter-institutional power plays, all suffused by broader discoursive conflicts. The approach reveals some of the multi-layered nature of power acts and practices, which are part of wider strategies and discoursive conflicts.

In some versions of discourse analysis, ‘only relatively small pieces of texts can be analysed so that the researcher is always open to allegations of partiality in their selection of a discursive event’ (Jacobs, 1999: 209). In this study partiality was a significant influence on the research process in both the selection of discourses and the focusing of the research. However this is considered to be a strength of the approach rather than a problem. The social constructionist perspective recognises the influence of the researcher’s partiality or subjectivity in the research process. Specifying the discourse territory early in the research process helps to make this subjectivity transparent, allowing the reader to come to his or her own judgement about the approach adopted.

Faced with the challenge of researching a highly complex policy debate, spread across many arenas at different levels of government, with discourse communities active across different arenas, the aim was to ‘grasp together and integrate into one whole and complete story multiple and scattered events’ (Ricoeur, 1984). Of course in attempting to do this a great deal of selectivity and careful focusing was necessarily required. What became quickly apparent in the writing up is that a great deal relies on interpretation and the careful construction of the critical narrative. The problem is one of providing an account which will hold the reader’s attention, when a great deal of detail is required to carry the general argument. This is a similar problem to that reported by readers of Flyvbjerg’s Rationality and Power. However, the insights which result would be difficult to obtain if the narrative were dramatically edited, and findings were presented in, say, tabular form. A great deal therefore relies on how the narrative is assembled,
and on the quality of writing. On both counts, I found difficulties, again resulting mainly from the complexity of the material.

**Plurality and catching up**

Foucauldian discourse analytics is clearly a very distinctive research style. Fischler suggests that Foucauldian genealogy can complement existing communicative approaches, but that both need to be supported by more traditional political analysis which focuses on the play of economic and social interests (Fischler, 1998). One of the general contributions of the Foucauldian approach, which I believe this study illustrates, is to 'show that prevailing institutional arrangements are local innovations institutionalized on a large scale because they served dominant interests ... genealogy also links the micro- and macro-sociological study of planning' (op.cit.: 46). However, as Fischler points out, genealogists have a lot of work to do to catch up with ethnographic research in the communicative mode, and institutional analysis in the political economy mode, which are both well established fields of inquiry. This is a worthwhile challenge because it holds the promise of reconnecting some of the arguments between structure and agency. In this study, through the medium of policy discourses, I have tentatively explored some of these connections between the operation of institutions and social and environmental effects in the real world. The resulting critical narrative is unlike that which would result from either a political economy or a communicative approach. In this study I have been closer to the institutional terrain where discourses are constructed than to the real world where they ultimately bring about change. In future work I would like to work from the ‘other end’ to explore outcomes in relation to rationality and discourse. This could well be done in a follow up to the TEN-T case study.

The discourse analytic approach resolves some of the difficulties of other approaches. Firstly, it provides a means of bringing structural forces into the research through the explicit analysis of the 'discourse territory' – partly from broader literature but mainly from initial analysis of the policy domain in the early stages of the research. This goes further than other approaches which 'acknowledge' structural forces, but have no explicit means to build them into their analysis (Jacobs, 1999).

**Potential applications**

From the case study, it is possible to identify a number of planning situations where Foucauldian discourse analysis may be an appropriate research method:

- where policy issues and concerns are contested
• where policy tools are under construction
• where new policy knowledge is required to address changing circumstances
• alongside more formal or technical policy review
• where key changes take place in the decision making framework or setting
• where the policy process encompasses a range of disciplines, techniques, and arenas of debate
• where there is a need to connect between what institutions do and the spatial effects which may result

Specifically in relation to EU policy research, the discursive approach holds promise in linking the understanding of ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics at the EU level (Hoffmann, 1966), by analysing process of ‘low’ politics in a way which clearly identifies influences of ‘high’ politics as broader discourses. In doing so it could supplement existing policy networks approaches. As Jeremy Richardson argues: ‘There is an increasing amount of [low] political activity at this level within the EU and some means has to be found of analysing and conceptualising it’ (Richardson 1996: 5).

In the case of TEN-T, many of these dimensions were apparent. Whilst the Commission will carry out its own periodic policy reviews of TEN-T, critical policy research of this type can provide a different type of feedback. By probing at uncomfortable aspects of policy making, which are usually avoided in formal reviews, it is possible to provide a critical commentary of relevance to the policy process. In this case, the conclusions on the weakness of construction of SEA should be of immediate interest. The critical narrative itself may also prove useful to those engaged in policy making, because of the more general insights it gives into the process. Certainly, the case study raises questions which should be borne in mind by policy makers and others concerned with the policy outcome when policy review is carried out.

Overall, the research approach proved to be a useful means of researching how new policy or planning discourses are institutionalised. Adopting a similar research design should allow other researchers to engage with such questions in other planning contexts. In so doing, a new style of planning research could emerge, which could usefully complement existing work. However, the cautionary note must be that a great deal of further work is needed to clarify and make accessible the different – but distinctively Foucauldian – ways in which a Foucauldian discourse analytic approach can be constructed. In this study I have simply touched on many of the difficult challenges that would need to be negotiated. Furthermore, I would not suggest that Foucauldian inquiries are ever likely to be simple to carry out.
Chapter 12. Foucauldian discourse analytics and planning theory

Three possibilities for Foucauldian theory

My intent in pursuing a Foucauldian approach is not to supplant other theories, but to provide a theory of discourse rationality and power which expects to co-exist with other theories, and does not in itself seek hegemonic status. Foucault would not have been at all surprised to encounter a theoretical domain such as planning in which fundamentally different paradigms compete for such status. He would naturally seek to question how such struggles condition thinking and theory itself.

Foucauldian theory seems to offer three quite different possibilities in planning:

• discourse analytics in researching planning practice, as illustrated in the case study
• discourse analytics in planning theory, as a means of scrutinising and problematising the domain of planning theory, as exemplified by the recent Foucauldian challenge to the ‘communicative paradigm’.
• informing a new ethics of planning, which embraces power

This thesis has explored the first two of these potential contributions. The third is a more open question, which perhaps can only be fully explored once a body of Foucauldian analyses of planning practice and theory have established the basis for such exploration. In 1999, it is clear that there is a long way to go: the critical mass of work is only just beginning to appear. In this final chapter, an evaluation is made of the extent to which the Foucauldian approach can be seen as a useful contribution to planning theory.

Discourse analytics in researching planning practice

Returning to the challenges raised by Friedmann, Healey and others which were set out in chapter 1, it seems fair to conclude that Foucauldian analysis does usefully contribute to understanding of the specific operation of power. This thesis suggests that focusing on Foucauldian discourse analytics, with its interweaving of discourse, rationality and power, produces a rich analysis which does usefully articulate planning activity in a way which is not encumbered by any one view of what rationality ‘should be’. As a result, the researcher is freed to explore how politics and policy analysis combine in particular planning cases. The case study showed in some detail several ways in which power is at work in the construction of a policy rationality. This clearly responds to calls for a more nuanced
understanding of the workings of power in planning. It sits alongside the work of Flyvbjerg and others who, through their detailed empirical work, have sought to engage with power in planning.

My study, like Flyvbjerg’s *Rationality and Power*, confirms that planning and politics are ‘nasty, messy, instrumental and strategic’ (Huxley, 1998: 7). The originality of both these studies is in the analysis of how power relations influence policy making, which is carried out at a very detailed level. It is the deliberate engagement with the discursive conflicts which condition the policy process, and the explicit attention to spatiality, that mark this study as different to Flyvbjerg’s, and add depth to the Foucauldian approach.

The point of this study is not to breathlessly rediscover power, in the manner lamented by John Forester (Forester 1999a,b). I had a reasonable idea of how power could operate in planning before I began the research, based on practical experience. The point of using a fairly elaborate theoretical framework was to go further into the exploration of power than merely to point out its pervasiveness in planning. If it is possible to learn more about the specific operation of power in particular cases, it should then be possible to move forwards with theoretical planning debates as well as possibly impacting on planning activity. I felt it necessary to inform this engagement with my own empirical work for one main reason: to reveal different aspects of the workings of power than those often discussed, which are generally to do with control over communication – the usual operationalisation of the Habermasian approach in planning research.

The case study shows how, when searching for critical events in policy making, a Foucauldian approach shifts the focus. In this study, based on a particular reading and interpretation of Foucault’s work, the focus is on the early stages of policy development, where rationality is under construction. Indeed, the case study shows how power takes effect before and outside the communicative ‘debate’, so policy outcomes are conditioned early, and in ways which can’t all be grasped by communicative approaches. Planning tools – in this case SEA - are revealed as powerful techniques for articulating exclusionary policy knowledges and validating particular rationalities of space in spatial policy making.

More broadly, the case study explored how the TEN-T policy process, which aims to provide an integrated pan-European communications system, is driven by two powerful, related discourses: a political discourse of European integration, and an economic discourse of the single market. It is opposed by a weaker counter-discourse of environmental sustainability. It is the dynamics between these discourses, among others, that have shaped the policy process: defining problems, legitimising language and techniques, controlling access to decision making arenas.
Exploring these linkages suggests that planning in the face of difficult real world problems is enhanced by awareness of the discursive conflicts which create the setting for, and permeate, the policy process. This in turn allows us to see the making of policy as both the generation of a response to a real world problem, and as a critical moment where conflicts between broader socio-political, cultural, or other discourses may be resolved, exacerbated or side-stepped. Thus we realise that policy processes are shaped by (and in turn shape) the real world at several levels: sparked by real world problems and shaped by discourses; resolving planning problems, and affecting the relations between discourses which shape the social world.

The empirical work illustrates how planning theory can accept (rather than seek to remove), problematise, and seek to explain, the realpolitik and ‘realrationalität’ of planning. It elucidates how power shapes space in spatial policy processes. It confirms a Foucauldian view of planning as discursive conflict played out in power struggles over knowledge and rationality, where consensual debating arenas, and the deployment of planning tools, may occur as strategies within struggles for policy hegemony.

The role of the planning researcher in this is quite clearly to engage critically with rationality. Foucault’s question ‘What is this Reason that we use?’, aimed at philosophers, also makes a direct challenge to the planning academic that ‘rationality’ must be constantly scrutinised:

‘If intellectuals in general are to have a function, if critical thought itself has a function, and, even more specifically, if philosophy has a function within critical thought, it is precisely to accept this sort of spiral, this sort of revolving door of rationality that refers us to its necessity, to its indispensability, and at the same time, to its intrinsic dangers.’ (Foucault, interview with Paul Rabinow).

Getting planners stuck

However, the view of planning opened up by Foucauldian analysis is likely to be an uncomfortable one for many engaged in planning. It raises difficult questions, and challenges existing policies and practices, and the ideas and interests which shape them. This goes against the grain of other theoretical approaches, and more general academic study, which focuses on precisely the opposite – on moving planning processes forward, by equipping planners with new tools and strategies (such as consensus building). Foucault, it seems, may not be welcomed with open arms. As Fischler comments: ‘His work, therefore, may not be of much use in planning schools if we believe that “[p]lanning theory is what planners need when they get stuck” (Forester, 1989: 137). But Foucault would probably not have been unhappy to learn that his books had led some professionals to get stuck, that they had stopped them in mid-movement and forced them to ask themselves what on earth they are doing (Porter, 1996). “[M]y project,” he commented, “is precisely to bring it about that they ‘no longer know what to do’, so that the
acts, gestures, discourses which up until then had seemed to go without saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous" (Foucault 1991: 84).’ (Fischler 1998).

**Discourse analytics in planning theory**

As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, it seems that the communicative paradigm has problems dealing with power. Communicative rationality promises democratisation and empowerment in a postmodern paradigm shift that redefines rationality. The cost of this emphasis on communication is that the gaze of the planner and theorist is turned away from the ‘negative’ workings of power. Unfortunately, this blinkering of planning theory does not actually remove power. It simply shifts analysis onto a different plane. Here, communicative acts may well be imbued with power in various ways, but without Foucault, there is no detailed analysis of power dynamics beyond the focus on distorted communication.

But without a fuller recognition of, and attention to, issues of power, how can the possibility of empowerment – central to the project – be properly explored and furthered? In drawing a narrow focus on power, the communicative approach sets tight boundaries to the possibilities of empowerment, through its normative goal of bringing actors into a regularised arena. In this way, instead of empowering disadvantaged interests, the process becomes vulnerable to more sophisticated forms of control, by allowing participation based on certain ground rules. We should be clear that power influences planning decision making in ways which may never enter the public domain, may never be expressed, visible or recorded, and may in fact be subliminal to most actors in the process. The case study provides several instances of this. Similarly, there are actors who behave in ‘unreasonable’ ways. For example, activists who may have not participated in the ‘appropriate’ formal stages of policy development, may take to the trees or chain themselves to bulldozers as expressions of their objection, not just to a single construction project, but perhaps to a deeper concern. Resistance against TENs, which encompassed expert lobbying and non-violent direct action, again illustrates the point. These are two examples of how power and empowerment may influence and impact on policy, but are unlikely to be normalised into a rational, communicative debate. The tendency to exclude or attempt to marginalise these types of involvement will not be addressed by creating deliberative processes.

Ultimately, communicative theory does not seem to provide the analysis or the answers that are needed to achieve the normative agenda of the communicative theorists. The uncertain question is whether Habermasian communicative theory can provide the appropriate grounding for its own planning paradigm. Once again, the suggestion must be made that Foucauldian theory may be more appropriate to the forward movement of theory, particularly for those who espouse Habermas. As Fischler puts it:
‘In some ways, communicationalists may even have more affinity with the historian Foucault than they have with the philosopher Habermas. As researchers, they cannot fail to notice the inescapable play of power that characterizes social interaction, including consensus-building. As educators and activists, they must emphasize practical solutions here and now, eschewing grand theories and searching for incremental gains. Habermas’s theory of communicative action may have inspired them at first, but, as Foucault would say, that theory, as any grand theory, is a very blunt instrument indeed’ (Fischler, 1998).

Along these lines, Tore Sager has questioned whether ‘planning theory’, as it develops its own path and becomes established, may lose its theoretical foundation. So communicative planning may lose its Habermasian flavour, and indeed the communicative movement may shift away from a preoccupation with communication. This is an alternative view to that of Allmendinger, for example, who laments the diversity of communicative theory (Allmendinger, 1999).

**Plurality of planning theories**

It seems improbable that any one theoretical ‘paradigm’ can secure permanent hegemony in the domain of planning theory. Foucauldian discourse theory rests fundamentally on a recognition of the diversity and competition between interests. Planning is seen to be in permanent tension and flux, and the point of the theory is to provide useful tools for those who are engaged in/with/against planning. If power becomes visible in planning, then there arises a clear possibility that strategies and techniques of power can be identified and opposed. This approach recognises what planning is, rather than to attempt to make a series of quantum leaps towards a planning in a different, idealised society, where consensus is commonplace.

There seems little point in continuing to argue for the paradigmatic status of any particular planning theory. Given the diversity of the domain, any such attempt will become the subject of conflict. Foucault’s work perhaps suggests that this continuous conflict between discourses within theoretical domains is only to be expected, but that, similarly, any hegemonic status may well be temporary, and will create the conditions for its oppositions as well as its reproduction. At this level, Foucauldian discourse theory seems to provide a helpful means of understanding the theoretical domain of planning: of continual discursive conflict, where technical or communicative theories, for example, may gain the ascendance, but where undercurrent, resistances, etc., are to be expected.

The point may not be to expect to achieve plurality of theory, but continued conflict and difference between theoretical positions. And it is perhaps in the areas of friction and collision, such as that between Habermas and Foucault, where difficult issues in planning may be explored from different perspectives, enriching debates within the field.
Seeking plurality requires careful consideration. We should not expect theories to live happily alongside each other - that is not their essential nature. We should expect challenges, weaknesses revealed through empirical application and reflection, and more basic power struggles.

As planning theorists seem to be quite happy to suggest that distortion, etc., power play, is normal practice for planning practitioners, perhaps we should also be prepared for the same observation to be made about planning theorists - who are also often professional academics. Can one community be so different from the other? Is the politics and power which shapes the activity of planning so absent from the activity of theorising planning?

The way forward should not be to try and make composite theories, which call upon (for example) Foucault to resolve some difficulties with the deployment of Habermas. Foucauldian analysis is a different sort of analysis to a Habermasian one. Both have their uses. Combining the two, however, seems theoretically doomed, and simply invoking Foucault from time to time is theoretically inappropriate.

Foucault seems useful for those who wish to ask fundamental questions like: what is this planning that has been created (as it is in this particular place at this time)? what practices of ordering space, of exclusion, etc are being used, and what knowledges and rationalities? If planning theorists want to ask 'what could planning become?' then Habermas can provide the vision of a particular planning paradigm, based on a particular understanding of rationality. But he cannot tell us how to get there, nor can he explain the here and now of planning. These seem necessary preconditions for being able to take steps away from the present. Habermas’s work has been used to structure a new discourse in planning theory - a discourse about communicative action, etc - yet the institutionalisation of this discourse has yet to take place. Theorists are actively pursuing its institutionalisation, by advocating the widespread adoption of particular practices, such as consensus building. But the uptake has been slow, and the practice of consensus building within complex power relations is unlikely to provide the stepping stone towards a Habermasian ideal.

The idea, then, is not to supplant other theories, but to provide a theory of discourse, rationality and power which expects to co-exist with other theories, and does not in itself seek hegemonic status. Foucault would not have been at all surprised to encounter a theoretical domain (planning) in which alternative paradigms compete for such status. He would naturally seek to question how such struggles condition thinking and theory itself.
Informing a new ethics of planning with power

The final step, then, is to consider whether there is a Foucauldian discursive praxis which can move beyond analysis. Whilst this has not been the primary focus of this thesis, it is clearly a crucial concern in clarifying and locating the Foucauldian contribution in planning theory. It has often been pointed out that, because Foucault avoids normative positions, his work is not helpful in thinking about how planning should be done. Whilst this may be true, his work opens many avenues of inquiry for those thinking about how planning could be done. Certainly, Foucault's conceptualisation of power is specifically about power as making a difference (Dyrberg, 1997).

In my earlier work, I wrote: ‘The outcome could be a Foucauldian policy making which, unlike Habermasian communicative rationality, accepts agonistic planning, sharpens the jagged edges of opposition, and brings to the surface the underlying politics, exposing attempts to control access and appropriate knowledge’ (Richardson, 1996).

In reply, James Throgmorton has helpfully articulated the potential dilemma for the Foucauldian analyst, which might result from relentless critical inquiry:

‘I would also want to suggest that it is simply not enough to want to reveal and undermine power. If the purpose is always to ‘reveal and undermine,' then one is left with no positive purpose for acting’ (James Throgmorton, pers. comm.).

In response, I conclude this thesis with a brief discussion of how Foucault’s work opens up a way forwards, albeit one which requires work well beyond the scope of this study.

Analysing spatial planning as contested discourse presents the obvious challenge: if we can identify how discourses contest policy in specific situations, can we not then learn from this experience and find ways to effectively operate within these contested policy environments? Some of these lessons are general ones, and the question Flyvbjerg poses for analysts and policy makers - 'do we have a case of Aalborg here?' - is certainly appropriate. However the more specific lesson is that analysis of the contested policy space of, say, TENs, may enable those who learn from the analysis to operate more effectively within that specific policy process.

What ‘effective’ means here cannot be normatively determined. It will depend on the agendas of those who seek to influence the policy process in one way or another. However, if the Foucauldian analysis reveals the micropolitics of hegemony, exclusion, and marginalisation, then it should prove more useful to those seeking to change the balance of power, by exposing hegemonies, restoring excluded interests and marginalised knowledge. This may appear destabilising to those interested in efficient planning, or in maintaining the status quo.

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As Mouffe argues, pursuing the Foucauldian conception of power fundamentally changes the project of democratic politics: 'the main question of democratic politics cannot any more be how to eliminate power, but instead how to constitute relations of power that are compatible with democratic values' (Mouffe, 1997: xi). For those planning theorists who embrace the politics of democratisation the challenge is clear. It is not to contribute further to what Mouffe describes as an 'already long list of attempts to eliminate power by subordinating it to reason’ (op.cit.: pxii).

The researcher becomes, in the Foucauldian frame, a player within the contested discursive process, alongside planners, politicians, lobbyists and citizens. The findings of research may play a part in shaping policy struggles. The question is whether the researcher can anticipate and strategically orient their research endeavour to achieve the impacts they desire. Certainly research outputs will be subject to such strategic manipulation by other interests. This politicised view of planning research arises inevitably from the Foucauldian approach. The possibility is opened up that research can contribute to the construction of particular rationalities of planning. The communicative planning movement, with its transition from analysis to prescription, has been a case in point.

Flyvbjerg, in concluding his Aalborg case study, neatly captures the Foucauldian view of democratic change, and perhaps suggests how academics and planners can act together in Foucauldian ways:

‘In the longue durée, we should see that in practice democratic progress is chiefly achieved not by constitutional and institutional reform, but by facing the mechanisms of power and the practices of class and privilege more directly, often head-on: if you want to participate in politics but find the possibilities for doing so constricting, then you team up with like-minded people and you fight for what you want, utilizing the means that work in your context to undermine those who try to limit this participation. If you want to know what is going on in politics, but find little transparency, you do the same. If you want more civic reciprocity in political affairs, you work for civic virtues becoming worthy of praise and others becoming undesirable. At times direct power struggle over specific issues works best; on other occasions changing the ground rules for such struggle is necessary, which is where constitutional and institutional reform come in; and sometimes writing genealogies and case histories like the Aalborg study, that is, laying open the relationships between rationality and power, will help achieve the desired results. More often it takes a combination of all three, in addition to the blessings of beneficial circumstances and pure luck. Democracy in practice is that simple and that difficult’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998a: 236).

Here the role of the researcher is placed in proper perspective. For planning theorists who work towards the democratisation of planning, the challenge is clear. In this study, my own genealogical inquiry has aimed to explore difficult questions about the European spatial policy process, particularly in terms of the power struggles which currently dominate policy making. In
bringing about change to such processes, which is certainly my intention, it seemed necessary to carry out such an analysis. But my expectation is that the findings from this research will not be injected into any particular rational debate over the nature of EU spatial policy making, even if there were an obvious arena for that to occur. I expect instead that if such conclusions are to make a difference, they will need to be used strategically within wider power struggles. However, the findings of the analysis of TEN-T suggest the need for institutional reform within the EU spatial policy arena.

The point of Foucauldian discourse analytics, then, is not simply to challenge, or seek to expose or undermine power simply for the sake of it, but to open new spaces for alternative discourses. This seems to be a useful task for the planning theorist - to find ways of making such spaces. For example in my research, I am trying to show how the trope of Strategic Environmental Assessment, in planning for European transport infrastructure networks, has been clearly contested, but has also been constructed in a way which is exclusionary - conditioning the sort of knowledges, debates, interventions which are possible. Challenging this construction of SEA - or any other planning instrument - because of its exclusionary nature seems to me to offer the possibility of introducing more diversity into policy processes. The intention is that closed processes of policy thinking are not simply reinvented and reproduced without scrutiny or challenge.

Conflict, not consensus, is at the heart of this approach:

‘A strong democracy guarantees the existence of conflict. A strong understanding of democracy, and of the role of planning within it, must therefore be based on thought that places conflict and power at its centre...’ (Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 1998).

Exploring the dark side of planning theory offers more than a negative, oppressive confirmation of our inability to make a difference. It suggests that we can do planning in a constructive and empowering way, but that we cannot do this by avoiding power relations. Planning is inescapably about conflict: exploring conflicts in planning, and learning to work effectively with conflict can be the basis for a strong planning theory.

**A way forwards for planning theory**

In conclusion, the planning academic is faced with three opportunities to bring about change. The first two concern the constant unsettling of rationalities in planning theory and practice: exposing and countering exclusionary or hegemonic tendencies, and making space for alternative discourses, maintaining vigilance on the construction sites of rationality. The value of discourse analytics can be to produce analyses which can explain to those immersed in,
touched by or entering the domain of planning, what goes on here. It is hoped that this type of analysis can resonate with practitioners as well as theorists, with valuable learning and developmental outcomes. The third opportunity, which makes sense of and draws on the first two, is to bring about change by shaping new policy discourses, by seeking to change the very nature of rationality in planning through direct engagement. Foucault’s work can be helpful in analysing planning as it is actually done - in studying the real rationality of planning - but it also suggests ways to move forwards: from analysing the operation of discourses to building new discourses; from examining practices to constructing new practices; from problematising the conditioning which shapes and limits our thinking, to extending the boundaries of what can be thought and done.
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CEC (1994d) Trans-European Networks: Europe on the move. Brussels: CEC.


CEC (1995c) Progress on Trans-European Networks: Commission report to the Madrid European Council, CSE (95) 571. Brussels: CEC.


CEC (1996b) Towards sustainability: Progress report from the Commission on the implementation of the European Community programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development, COM(95) 624 final, 10.1.96. Brussels: CEC.

CEC (1996c) Progress towards the Community CO2 Stabilisation Target: second evaluation of national programmes under the monitoring mechanism of Community CO2 and other


Committee for Spatial Development (CSD)(1999) European Spatial Development Perspective - Towards Balanced and Sustainable Development of the Territory of the EU, Presented at the Informal Meeting of Ministers Responsible for Spatial Planning of the Member States of the European Union, Potsdam 10/11.5.99: CSD.


Department of Transport (DOT) (1992) *Assessing the environmental impact of road schemes*, Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment (SACTRA). London: HMSO.


European Centre for Infrastructure Studies (ECIS) (March 1995) *ECIS newsletter*, 4. Rotterdam: ECIS.


European Council (1993) *Council decision on the creation of a trans-European road network*, 93/629/EEC. Brussels: CEC.


European Investment Bank (1994) *EIB papers no. 23*, a series of papers on the relations between infrastructure investment and economic growth. Luxembourg: EIB.


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ERT (1991a) *Missing Networks - A European Challenge, proposals for the renewal of* *Europe’s infrastructure*. Brussels: ERT.


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Sharp and Richardson (1999) 'Using Foucault: Reflections on discourse analysis in urban and environmental research', paper presented at *Planning Academics Conference*, University of Sheffield.


Appendix 1a

Research projects, selected publications and conferences attended during the period of doctoral research

Submitted in accordance with the formal requirements of Sheffield Hallam University.

Research projects


Unravelling the web: delivering the new transport realism in a complex policy environment (1996-1999). Researching the experiences of local authorities in implementing sustainable transport policy. The study examines what progress is being made, what barriers are being encountered, and how they are being overcome. Funded by the Rees Jeffreys Road Fund.

Promotion of citizens' participation in development planning (1997-98). Working in partnership with the Centre for Community Work in the Czech Republic. External advisor and UK partner. Funded by EU PHARE-TACIS Democratisation Programme.


A Postgraduate Certificate in Research Methodology was successfully completed within the PhD programme, with study units in Social Theory, Research Design, and two units in Qualitative Research Methods, one relating to interview analysis.

Selected publications and conferences


Regions in partnership: the trans-Pennine corridor study, (with B.T. Robson et al), 1995, Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds, and Department of Planning and Landscape and Centre for Urban Policy Studies, University of Manchester.


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Appendix 1b

Policy documents consulted during the research

EU adopted documents


1996. Joint text approved by the Conciliation Committee on Community Guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, C4-0364/96. Brussels: CEC.


European Parliament documents


8.7.96. *Report on the joint text approved by the Conciliation Committee for a European Parliament and Council decision on Community guidelines for the development of the trans-
European transport network. Parliament’s delegation to the Conciliation Committee. A4-0232/96.


Council of Ministers documents

1993. Council decision on the creation of a trans-European road network. 93/629/EEC. Brussels: CEC.

24-25.6.94. Extracts of the conclusions of the Presidency of the Corfu European Council.


21-22.6.96. Extracts from the conclusions of the Presidency of the Florence European Council.

24-25.3.99 Extracts from the conclusions of the Presidency of the Berlin European Council.

3-4.6.99 Extracts from the conclusions of the Presidency of the Cologne European Council.

Commission Documents


Towards sustainability: Progress report from the Commission on the implementation of the European Community programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development, COM(95) 624 final.

Progress towards the Community CO2 Stabilisation Target: second evaluation of national programmes under the monitoring mechanism of Community CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions, report from the Commission under Council Decision 93/389/EEC, COM (96) 91 final.


DGVII


The European High Speed Train Network.


Trans-European Networks: Europe on the move. Brochure.

Hearing of experts about methodologies for a strategic assessment of the trans-European network for transport. Agenda.

Amended proposal for a European Parliament and Council decisions on Community guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, COM(95)298 final 94/0098 (COD).

Progress on Trans-European Networks: Commission report to the Madrid European Council, CSE (95) 571.

The Trans-European Transport Network: transforming a patchwork into a network.

The trans-European road: a network for Europe.

Opinion of the Commission on the European Parliament’s amendments to the Council’s common position regarding the proposal for a European Parliament and Council Decisions on
Community Guidelines for the Development of the Trans-European Transport Network,
COM(96) 16 final, 94/0098 (COD).

to the European Council, the Council and the European Parliament, COM(96) 645 final.

28.10.98. First report on implementation of the Trans-European Transport Network.

Speeches by the Transport Commissioner

5.4.95. Trans-European Networks and the Environment. Address by Neil Kinnock to Socialist
members of the Transport and Environment Committee of the European Parliament.

16.7.96. Speaking note for a joint meeting of the Environment and Budget Committee of the EP.
Neil Kinnock.

19.9.96. Fair and efficient pricing for sustainable transport. Speech by Neil Kinnock to the
Rostock conference of Lander Transport Ministers.

24.9.96. The transport challenge. Address by Neil Kinnock to the Irish Belgian Business
Association.

DGXI documents

January 1997. SEA of the TEN and its corridors: state-of-the-art, key issues and methodological
recommendations, paper to the meeting of the ad-hoc group on environmental evaluation of the
TEN. Internal working paper by Ann Dom.

Conference paper by Ann Dom.

Transport Infrastructure Committee Motorway Working Group documents

1993. Trans-European Networks: towards a masterplan for the road network and road traffic.
Report to DGVII.

1994. Strategic Environmental Assessment: a part of the planning of trans-European road
network. Internal communication.

VII/694/94-EN.

High Level (Christophersen) Group documents


Committee for Spatial Development (CSD) documents

June 1997. *European Spatial Development Perspective. First official draft*. Presented at the Noordwijk informal meeting of ministers responsible for spatial planning of the member states of the EU.


European Conference of Ministers Responsible for Regional Planning (CEMAT) documents


Committee of the Regions documents


European Investment Bank documents

European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) documents


March 1989. The need for renewing transport infrastructure in Europe.


September 1991. Reshaping Europe: a report from the European Round Table of Industrialists.

European Centre for Infrastructure Studies (ECIS) documents


1994-96. ECIS Newsletters.


4.7.95. Workshop on SEA of TENs. Issues paper.

TENGO documents


25.10.95. The position of six major international NGOs on the TENs guidelines. Letter to MEPs.

27.2.96. Untitled. Letter to members of the Conciliation Committee.

2.4.96. Importance of Strategic Environmental Impact Assessments. Letter to MEPs in the Conciliation Committee.
European Federation for Transport and the Environment (T&E) documents


10.6.96. Deep concern over the TENs – a personal appeal. Letter from Gijs Kuneman, Director, to MEPs in the Conciliation Committee.


A-SEED documents

Undated. ERT: the corporations have poisoned the air we breathe the water we drink the food we eat. Campaign information pack.


December 1993. Misshaping Europe: a report about the European Round Table of Industrialists.


May 1996. Lost in Concrete: activist guide to European transport policies.

Other lobby documents


Other unpublished communications

April-May 1996. Unpublished drafts and notes of a compromise version of the article on Strategic Environmental Assessment produced in the conciliation process.

1994-96. Exchange of letters between Roger Higman, Friends of the Earth UK, and UK Department of Transport on the subject of TEN-T.

Press releases


6.4.95. Kinnock refutes criticism that the transeuropean networks 'will carpet Europe with six-lane motorways'. Commission Press Release. IP/95/365.


9.5.96. Commission launches new initiative to extend TENs network to Central and Eastern Europe. CORDIS RTD-NEWS. http://dbs.cordis.lu/cordis-cgi/srchidad...NEWS&RCN=EN_RCN_ID:6092&CALLER=EN_CORDIS

6.6.96. Commissioner Kinnock outlines transport strategy for Central and Eastern European accession. CORDIS RTD-NEWS. http://dbs.cordis.lu/cordis-cgi/srchidad...NEWS&RCN=EN_RCN_ID:6270&CALLER=EN_CORDIS

25.6.98 Outline transport network for applicant countries takes shape. CORDIS RTD-NEWS. http://dbs.cordis.lu/cordis-cgi/srchidad...EWS&RCN=EN_RCN_ID:10578&CALLER=EN_CORDIS

18.8.98. Priorities for the development of the trans-European transport network. CORDIS RTD-NEWS. http://dbs.cordis.lu/cordis-cgi/srchidad...EWS&RCN=EN_RCN_ID:10954&CALLER=EN_CORDIS

TENGO 16.5.95. TENs: which road to take? Announcement of press conference.


Documents relating to preliminary work on Czech case study


Appendix 2a

Interviewees

The majority of interviews were conducted in Brussels, in October 1996. Other interviews were carried out at the offices of the interviewees, in Berlin, Rotterdam, London, and Sandy, Bedfordshire.

MEPs and Parliamentary Aides

Anita Pollack, MEP, Member of the EP Environment Committee and delegate to the conciliation process.

Brian Simpson, MEP, member of the European Parliament Transport Committee.

Mark Watts, MEP, member of the European Parliament Transport Committee, European Parliamentary Labour Party transport spokesperson.

Paul Beekmanns, Aide to the Green Group of the European Parliament.

Environmental and transport lobbyists

Gijs Kuneman, Director, European Federation for Transport and the Environment.

Olivia Bina, Senior Policy Officer, Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) and Birdlife International.

Roger Higman, Transport Campaigner, Friends of the Earth UK.

Olivier Hoedeman, Action for Solidarity, Equality, Environment and Development (A SEED), campaigner on trans-European networks and ERT.

European Commission officials

Chris Boyd, cabinet member Commissioner Kinnock former cabinet member of Commission President Delors, in charge of economic and monetary affairs.

Alfonso Gonzalez Finat, DGVII Directorate General for Transport, Unit A/3 – Networks and infrastructures: projects. Responsible for implementation of TENs projects.

Mr J H Rees, European Commission, DG VII Directorate General for Transport, Unit A/2 - Networks and infrastructures: strategy. Responsible for development of TENs policy.


**Other Brussels bureaucrats**

Norbert Schobel, Director, Committee for the Regions (COR).

Martin Jones, UK Government Permanent Representation in Brussels (UKREP).

Mateu Turro, European Investment Bank.

**Others interviewed**

Wolfgang Hager, Director, European Centre for Infrastructure Studies (ECIS), Rotterdam.

Lawrence Harrell, European Centre for Infrastructure Studies (ECIS), Rotterdam.

**Meetings attended as an observer**

Meeting of environmental activists campaigning against TENs. Vitoria, Spain.

Meetings of the European Parliament’s Transport and Environment Committees in Brussels.

During the preliminary stages of the research, information was obtained on TEN-T decision-making in Britain and the Czech Republic, with a view to carrying out a comparative national level case study approach. During the research projects listed in Appendix 1b, further information was obtained about TENs decision making within the UK, through discussion and interviews with actors in the North West and Yorkshire and Humberside regions, focusing particularly on the Trans-Pennine corridor. This material is not included in the thesis because of the decision to focus on the Brussels policy process, explained in the text. As part of this preliminary work, interviews with the following were carried out in April 1995:

Ing. Machart, Deputy Minister of Transport, Ministry of Transport, Prague.

Ing. Matejovic, Czech Technical University (CVUT).

Dr. Jan Kára, Czech Technical University (CVUT).

Jiri Dusik, Director, Czech Public Environmental Assessment Center (PEAC)
Simon Evans, Highways Policy and Programme Division, UK Department of Transport, Official responsible for Trans-European Road Network (TERN) policy in the UK.

Mike Hayward, UK Government Office, North West Region.

A number of other interviews were carried out with transport activists in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, representing national and local organisations.
Appendix 2b

Extracts from transcripts

The following extracts from interview transcripts are designed to provide the reader with some insight into the type of discussion which took place within the interviews, the nature of data that was yielded, and its complexity.

Extract from interview with environmental lobbyist

TR  The Birdlife paper talked about methodology but also demanded a clear impact on decision making - feeding into the TENs review - with an impact on modal balances etc... Surely the Commission doesn’t see SEA as having this sort of role, and would react against such strong decision making power for SEA?

?    I mean well what are we talking about? You know ...

TR  But this reflects ?’s reaction to my paper. She believes SEA won’t have much effect in the revision of TENs - she said SEA could be effective but not necessarily in terms of decision making

?    This is because this paper was produced at a particular time in the political arena and, you know, in the whole process of the decision making on the TENs. So it had a very specific target. I agree with ? in saying that anything of whatever depth or whatever result will have some impact. It’s the same thing as saying Article 8 is a success from the NGO perspective. It’s just a matter of what you want.

TR  So is this your base position - ‘if it doesn’t impact on decision making in a clear way then it’s not working’?

?    That depends how desperate we have, and how pessimistic we have, to be in this world. I mean I don’t think we would argue we have a fixed position. We want clearly ... SEA is a decision making tool essentially. It is .. I suppose you could ... we could start a whole conversation about the meaning of life and SEA .... you could argue that SEA is a decision making tool and you could argue also more - I don’t think its ?’s only position - but what ? was telling you about it. But then it’s in another perspective that you would argue that kind of contribution of SEA. In other words, this perspective of sustainable development if you wish, yeah. ‘We’re trying to educate the world to think about the environment’. And SEA can be a tool for that. But if we want to integrate environment in to TENs, and we propose SEA as a tool for that, then this is the type that we want [decision making tool]. This is as good an answer as I can give you.
OK. Do you see a target that TENs can become environmentally sustainable?

A target or actually happening? ... Can SEA ensure that environment is integrated into TENs?

Can you set objectives for TENs that they become environment sustainable, and does SEA help?

So long as member states, the Council, the Commission, the Parliament, and the whole lot of us decide that the TENs have to be environmentally sustainable, then that can be. It's only a matter of whether people want or not for that to happen. Anything can happen. But is there the political will behind it? SEA is or is not an instrument to achieve that. You don't need SEA to do that, you just need to redraw the whole thing.

Which is very difficult at this stage - would require political will beyond what exists?

You could certainly argue that, and parallel one of the points I made earlier, 'what are we talking about anyway'. So I think because TENs remain a rather undefined entity then I wouldn't even go so far as saying yes...

I'm probing this because of different opinions I've come across

Like?

Kinnock's cabinet states that TENs can become a tool for achieving sustainable infrastructure / transport - greening TENs. DGXI, however, states that TENs are not going to be environmentally sustainable, that SEA may be used to compare scenarios - better or worse with / without TENs - but not with an objective of sustainability as a bottom line.

I think that's proof to you of the weakness of DGXI. When I had the meeting and I was talking about this with ? and the DGXI people on this paper, ? asked me 'do you really mean that we should compare scenarios such as transport policy, against infrastructure? For example reducing demand, taxation'. I said yes. He said 'that is absolutely unacceptable. out of the.. you know its just not going to happen'. This is DGXI. when I say this to ?, who is a completely different person, animal, and in a difficult situation altogether, he will say of course this is one of the things he will be considering. Now whether he's saying that for political reasons, whether he's saying that because he's open to do all sorts of things, depending on what will happen, or what the political scenario will be in 2 months time, is anybody's bet really. But it reveals a very different approach. DGXI is a very weak player and this kind of answer to me by ? in an unofficial and informal meeting is amazing.
Extract from interview with MEP

TR So when the environment was discussed in the conciliation committee, what sort of form did that take? Was it very quickly moving onto SEA and that particular clause?

? Well I’ll tell you how it basically worked. Because this was the first one of these I was on, and I’ve haven’t ever been on another one, and also I was dropped on it as a rep from the environment committee. The environment committee said ‘you go and do your bit to make sure there’s an environmental clause in the thing - that’s your role, don’t worry about anything else just go in there and push for the environmental clause’.

TR And was there a written brief?

? No, no I had to make it up myself. No That was just verbal. You’re on it because we want you to fight for the environment. I wasn’t even the rapporteur in the environment committee in actual fact. But I was basically put there because they thought I’d be a strong fighter, to get the clause and we got it in the end, although as I say it’s not as good as I would like it. So the whole conciliation meetings are just a kind of ballet. They’re unreal. Absolutely unreal. You never ... I didn’t realise this till I’d actually got into them ... first of all you have weeks and weeks and weeks of preparatory meetings before you even make the decision to open the conciliation period because it’s all got to be done within 6 weeks. ..... [other long quotes from this interview are included in the main text of the thesis]

Extract from interview with Brussels bureaucrat

TR Was the work on integrating the environment affected by the relations between directorates?

? Absolutely. I mean when we came along we were horrified at the lack of environmental input. Just a few anecdotes. I am an economist – macro - and 2 things horrified me with transport ministries, including DGVII. One was they are the most ‘nationalistic’ ministries I have ever known, because paradoxically they all think in terms of their own national networks. It’s very difficult to get them to think in terms of an international network, to think of themselves as part of a whole. And they act very much on national lines. And the enmity to environmentalists. They see them as an enemy. Environmentalists get in the way of projects, cause delay and more work. Real environmental thinking is totally absent in DGVII and in most transport ministries. We
have had 2 basic policy aims- one is to try and internationalise things, and to bring environment into decision making (green paper on fair and efficient pricing). It’s a discussion paper, it’s not a legalistic approach, it’s not a DGVII style approach which I’m not at all in favour of. They are the reason we are in the situation with transport ministries where its a battle. There’s no real environmental ...

TR And DGXI?

? The environmental impact directive, and the ideas that DGXI have on SEA, and a directive to make sure they are done, are going to do very little to bring forward the environment as an element of policy and decision making, at least in transport which I know. First of all they are framework directives, so they don't deal with EIA, all they say is there has to be one. It’s a legalistic approach in the sense that it’s a set of rules that have to be followed. Again nothing to do with the environment. They have to be democratic, but the environment, and its called an EIA. But I can see by the way the bureaucrats apply the thing that it’s simply a bit of paper that gets through that particular bureaucratic or administrative hurdle. Now it might have the side effect of helping EIAs but I’m not at all sure that its the best way to go about it, and it creates this conflictual situation and also this kind of rule bending situation where people look at ways of how can I have interpreted my study as fulfilling the criteria. And again you’re not thinking about the environment, whereas the approach that we’ve taken in the green paper is that we need to convince people - that is the job. To put down laws in a world where people are not convinced intellectually as to what’s going on, will not get us very far forward. And I think our approach where we actually do some work - and I can tell you DGXI has done nothing on SEA for TENs, nothing, absolute bloody scandal. And when we asked them to come and help us to come and give us some policy input, we get nothing. And all we get is this massive great draft directive which will again polarise.

TR What about the studies commissioned on the environmental impacts of TENs?

? I know what happened on TENs and they have had no effect .... we are having to - and this is something that the cabinet does, the services have done sod all about - it is us that are having to bring the environment into this process, and I should explain again that we came late into this process. If we had been there at the beginning, we would have designed it differently or at least we would have tried to bring the environment in. And how, that’s a different question and I’m not all sure how to do it, but at least we would have made an effort. Because we come from outside the sector we can see things differently from those inside the sector.

TR Have the Parliament played a significant role in raising green concerns?
The EP also have a role here - there’s a lot of truth in that. They are good at taking the view of the people about new motorways, new infrastructure, new cars and so on - they bring that to a political forum - and bringing it out and creating the pressure to do something about it. One can argue about how certainly in that sense they have played a strong role, particularly the left.

TR What is your opinion on the SEA article?

The SEA article is pretty rhetorical really - it just says develop a methodology. Well we are going to, and Neil has said in public we are going to develop a methodology and apply it. We weren’t allowed to say that in the directive. If the methodology turns out to tell us very little we will only be able to apply very little, but we will definitely apply what we can. We truly believe that we have to - that transport is the source of 1/3 of all pollution and we’ve jolly well got to do something about it, and the infrastructure that we build, and the way we use it are all part of that. We’ve got to take account of sustainability in the design, that’s one point.
Appendix 2c

Text analysis: identifying knowledge claims


The approach taken was to separate the text of *Missing Networks* into meaning units, attributing one or more codes to each. The list of codes was developed by reading the text, in the context of a broader awareness of the policy debate, to identify a list of the types of knowledge claims that are made in the text. The meaning units could well have other functions, and their structure could have other aims, but the focus of this test is simply on the claims to knowledge put forward in the text. It was found that it was possible to identify a range of knowledge claims for almost every unit of text. Further, these could be grouped in a way which highlighted a framework of knowledge claims - or the ways in which individual claims to knowledge fit into a broader argument or discourse. Below a portion of the text is broken down into meaning units, with a brief explanation of the knowledge claims being made, and then coded. The summary table below shows the groupings of knowledge claims.

### Summary

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<th>Problem definition:</th>
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### Coding

01  *Europe is growing - growing up, growing together, and growing larger.*

This linking of the themes of a maturing Europe, integration and new member states suggests
that further integration is a natural progression, and that this agenda is particularly relevant to new and prospective member states

**CODES:** INTEGRATION

02  *Inevitably, it is outgrowing some of its old institutions.*
We should be ready to review accepted structures and practices

**CODES:** STRUCTURAL, NEW

03  *The inadequacies of past ways of doing things - and the conflict with today’s and tomorrow's needs - are particularly worrying in the field of transport and communications infrastructure.*
In the field of infrastructure, a problem is defined: here, the legacy of poor practice cannot hope to accommodate present and future needs. Past practice is challenged

**CODES:** STRUCTURAL, DEMAND, NEW

04  *At the same time, Europe is rediscovering its pride in its great achievement this century: its ability to balance private and public needs, economic growth and quality of life for a large majority of its citizens.*
Here, a strong message is put: that ‘Europe’ has made a great achievement in finding a balance between private and public interests. These are paraphrased as economic growth and quality of life for the majority. A subtext here is that Europe apparently has been acting in a concerted way, and in the public interest, which supports the argument that it should continue to do so.

**CODES:** INTEGRATION, PUBLIC INTEREST

05  *That balance needs to be struck anew each decade as priorities shift, technology changes and new opportunities for prosperity and a better life appear.*
The balance between public and private interests is transient. Four influences are identified: political priorities, scientific innovation and emerging opportunities for enhanced economic growth and quality of life

**CODES:** PUBLIC INTEREST, NEW

06  *The 1980s were dominated by the need to mobilise investment for growth and technological renewal.*
The priority in the last decade was to find financial means of securing growth (presumably economic), and scientific innovation - economic and scientific measures

**CODES:** ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC, PAST

07  *The 1990s can build on these achievements, but there is a need to mobilise Europe for*
large tasks which, one way or another, are collective undertakings.

In this decade, the primary focus should be on preparing Europe to work collectively on major initiatives - structural measures

CODES: STRUCTURAL, PRESENT, NEW

08 Implementing the Internal Market agenda by means of new Treaties on Political, Economic and Monetary Unions and the integration and consolidation of Eastern Europe are two such tasks.

Two tasks are identified: furthering integration through political, economic and monetary measures, and integrating Eastern Europe into the Union.

CODES: STRUCTURAL, INTEGRATION, EASTERN EUROPE, NEW

09 Investment, both public and private, to meet the demands of the environment, is another.

A further need is to spend money on environmental measures

CODES: PUBLIC INTEREST, INVESTMENT, ENVIRONMENT,

10 The modernisation of Europe's infrastructure is an urgent task in its own right,...

It is possible to argue for upgrading infrastructure using traditional arguments

CODES: INFRASTRUCTURE, INVESTMENT, PAST, NEW

11 ...but also a precondition for carrying out the whole of Europe's ambitious political, economic and social agenda.

However, upgrading infrastructure is critical to the broader agendas of integration

CODES: INFRASTRUCTURE, INVESTMENT, INTEGRATION, NEW

12 The functioning of Europe's transport and telecommunications networks needs to be adapted to the emerging single economy if there really is to be a Single Market.

Structural changes need to be made, so that the transport sector operates in a harmonised way, and is responsive to the conditions of a single economy

CODES: INFRASTRUCTURE, INTEGRATION, NEW

13 Links to the east, and in the East, need to be created.

Simply, there is a need for new infrastructure between Western and Eastern Europe, and within Eastern Europe

CODES: INFRASTRUCTURE, EASTERN EUROPE, NEW

14 Congestion of cities, highways, railroads, airways and telecommunications must be tackled if precious working, commuting and leisure time is not to be wasted,...

Congestion is identified as a central argument for improving infrastructure, because of its
imparts on TIME. Time is critical because it is used in cost-benefit analyses which are used in the evaluation of infrastructure projects.

CODES: CONGESTION, INFRASTRUCTURE

15 \textit{...and heavy burdens on the environment avoided.}

Congestion is also argued to be harmful to the environment because it leads to slower moving traffic, and therefore the inefficient burning of fuel, and the generation of excessive emissions. This in turn is an argument frequently used to justify the building of new roads on environmental grounds - reducing congestion is good for the environment. This is the only environmental argument which is given serious consideration in the document - one which supports the implementation of TEN-T.

CODES: CONGESTION, ENVIRONMENT

16 \textit{The European Round Table of Industrialists has been an early advocate not only of the renewal of Europe’s infrastructure,...}

The ERT declares itself here as a lobbyist in the traditional infrastructure debate

CODES: ERT, INFRASTRUCTURE, NEW

17 \textit{...but also of the need to think and rethink existing networks in specifically European spatial and economic terms.}

Here, the ERT argues that what is required is not just a physical response to infrastructure needs, but a need to fundamentally reform our approach to infrastructure on a European basis - in terms of both needs and implementation mechanisms.

CODES: ERT, INFRASTRUCTURE, RETHINK, DEMAND, STRUCTURAL, NEW

18 \textit{Our own understanding has evolved from our earlier proposals for physical ‘missing links’ to a growing realisation that a much more radical re-evaluation of priorities at all levels is required.}

Here, the need to reconsider priorities at all levels is argued. This should take the place of simply arguing for infrastructure investment based on traditional arguments.

CODES: RETHINK, ERT, PHYSICAL, STRUCTURAL, NEW

19 \textit{New approaches are needed for deciding where to invest and how networks are to be operated: not through piecemeal connections of existing national networks and clumsy interfaces between different modes,...}

A holistic view is required, based on new structures for decision making on investment and control of systems. The focus on national links (eg the Channel Tunnel) and on interfaces (eg container terminals) is too simplistic.

CODES: STRUCTURAL, PHYSICAL, NEW
...but by setting ambitious functional transport and communications requirements for Europe as a whole and meeting these with an appropriate mix of modes.

The appropriate response is to identify the needs for Europe as a whole, at an ambitious level.

This demand should be met by an 'appropriate' mix of modes.

**CODES: INFRASTRUCTURE, DEMAND, HOLISTIC, NEW**

This in turn not only requires new inter modal links - 'missing networks'

Here, the concept of 'missing networks' is introduced - a physical response, finding new ways to move goods and people efficiently between different modes of transport

**CODES: INFRASTRUCTURE, MISSING NETWORKS, NEW**

- but also a conceptual revolution which recognises that Europe's communications needs are in fact served by a single if still fragmented network which needs to be looked at in its entirety.

Alongside the physical response is the need for the adoption of a holistic view of transport networks

**CODES: INFRASTRUCTURE, HOLISTIC, NEW**

This report, Missing networks: a European challenge, is based on preparatory studies carried out for the ERT by Touche Ross (on the feasibility of creating an independent European Centre for Prospective Analysis on Infrastructure), the European Science Foundation NECTAR network (on 'Missing networks in Europe'), and by Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte (on the basis of a seminar on 'User charges for transport infrastructure')

The validity of the claims made in the report is underlined by the identification of the blue chip consultancies that have worked on it.

**CODES: ERT, VALIDITY**

Rather than presenting ready made answers, this report underlines the urgent need for highly informed debate, at all levels of society and among public and private decision makers - local, national, and European.

This suggests that the report sets out an agenda for discussion. This appears to be in conflict with the general thrust, which is based on a series of advocacy statements. Debate should be channelled towards resolving the agenda of problems set out in the report, not in questioning the issues raised by it. It also suggests that the debate over the need for renewed infrastructure and structures for implementation should take place in particular arenas - at all levels, and among decision makers in the public and private sector.

**CODES: DEBATE**
They often belong to very different worlds, but they must find a consensus if Europe's new opportunities are not to be strangled by the absence of basic tools for doing the job.

This is an important statement - it suggests that the agenda contained within the report is critical to economic growth and quality of life issues, and that therefore finding a consensus on new approaches is critical. Progress demands for action from decision makers at all levels.

CODES: INFRASTRUCTURE, ECONOMIC, QUALITY OF LIFE

Emerging themes

1. Defining the parameters of the problem

CONGESTION

14 Congestion is identified as a central argument for improving infrastructure, because of its impacts on TIME. Time is critical because it is used in cost-benefit analyses, which are used in the evaluation of infrastructure projects.

15 Congestion is also argued to be harmful to the environment because it leads to slower moving traffic, and therefore the inefficient burning of fuel, and the generation of excessive emissions. This in turn is an argument frequently used to justify the building of new roads on environmental grounds - reducing congestion is good for the environment. This is the only environmental argument which is given serious consideration in the document - one which supports the implementation of TENs.

DEMAND

03 In the field of infrastructure, a problem is defined: here, the legacy of poor practice cannot hope to accommodate present and future needs. Past practice is challenged

17 Here, the ERT argues that what is required is not just a physical response to infrastructure needs, but a need to fundamentally reform our approach to infrastructure on a European basis - in terms of both needs and implementation mechanisms.

20 The appropriate response is to identify the needs for Europe as a whole, at an ambitious level. This demand should be met by an 'appropriate' mix of modes.

ENVIRONMENT

09 A further need is to spend money on environmental measures

15 Congestion is also argued to be harmful to the environment because it leads to slower moving traffic, and therefore the inefficient burning of fuel, and the generation of excessive emissions. This in turn is an argument frequently used to justify the building
of new roads on environmental grounds - reducing congestion is good for the
environment. This is the only environmental argument which is given serious
consideration in the document - one which supports the implementation of TENs.

PAST

06 The priority in the last decade was to find financial means of securing growth
(presumably economic), and scientific innovation - economic and scientific measures
10 It is possible to argue for upgrading infrastructure using traditional arguments

PUBLIC INTEREST

04 Here, a strong message is put: that ‘Europe’ has made a great achievement in finding a
balance between private and public interests. These are paraphrased as economic
growth and quality of life for the majority. A subtext here is that Europe apparently has
been acting in a concerted way, and in the public interest, which supports the argument
that it should continue to do so.
05 The balance between public and private interests is transient. Four influences are
identified: political priorities, scientific innovation and emerging opportunities for
enhanced economic growth and quality of life
09 A further need is to spend money on environmental measures

QUALITY OF LIFE

25 This is an important statement - it suggests that the agenda contained within the report
is critical to economic growth and quality of life issues, and that therefore finding a
consensus on new approaches is critical. Progress demands for action from decision
makers at all levels.
24 This suggests that the report sets out an agenda for discussion. This appears to be in
conflict with the general thrust, which is based on a series of advocacy statements.
Debate should be channelled towards resolving the agenda of problems set out in the
report, not in questioning the issues raised by it. It also suggests that the debate over the
need for renewed infrastructure and structures for implementation should take place in
particular arenas - at all levels, and among decision makers in the public and private
sector.

PRESENT

07 In this decade, the primary focus should be on preparing Europe to work collectively on
major initiatives - structural measures

2. Presenting responses: substantive
Here, the need to reconsider priorities at all levels is argued. This should take the place of simply arguing for infrastructure investment based on traditional arguments.

A holistic view is required, based on new structures for decision making on investment and control of systems. The focus on national links (e.g. the Channel Tunnel) and on interfaces (e.g. container terminals) is too simplistic.

The priority in the last decade was to find financial means of securing growth (presumably economic), and scientific innovation - economic and scientific measures are needed.

Two tasks are identified: furthering integration through political, economic and monetary measures, and integrating Eastern Europe into the Union.

Simply, there is a need for new infrastructure between Western and Eastern Europe, and within Eastern Europe.

3. Presenting responses: procedural

The priority in the last decade was to find financial means of securing growth (presumably economic), and scientific innovation - economic and scientific measures are needed.

This is an important statement - it suggests that the agenda contained within the report is critical to economic growth and quality of life issues, and that therefore finding a consensus on new approaches is critical. Progress demands for action from decision makers at all levels.

This suggests that the report sets out an agenda for discussion. This appears to be in conflict with the general thrust, which is based on a series of advocacy statements. Debate should be channelled towards resolving the agenda of problems set out in the report, not in questioning the issues raised by it. It also suggests that the debate over the need for renewed infrastructure and structures for implementation should take place in particular arenas - at all levels, and among decision makers in the public and private sector.

A further need is to spend money on environmental measures.

It is possible to argue for upgrading infrastructure using traditional arguments.
However, upgrading infrastructure is critical to the broader agendas of integration

STRUCTURAL
02 We should be ready to review accepted structures and practices
03 In the field of infrastructure, a problem is defined: here, the legacy of poor practice cannot hope to accommodate present and future needs. Past practice is challenged
07 In this decade, the primary focus should be on preparing Europe to work collectively on major initiatives - structural measures
08 Two tasks are identified: furthering integration through political, economic and monetary measures, and integrating Eastern Europe into the Union.
17 Here, the ERT argues that what is required is not just a physical response to infrastructure needs, but a need to fundamentally reform our approach to infrastructure on a European basis - in terms of both needs and implementation mechanisms.
18 Here, the need to reconsider priorities at all levels is argued. This should take the place of simply arguing for infrastructure investment based on traditional arguments.
19 A holistic view is required, based on new structures for decision making on investment and control of systems. The focus on national links (eg the Channel Tunnel) and on interfaces (eg container terminals) is too simplistic.

INFRASTRUCTURE
10 It is possible to argue for upgrading infrastructure using traditional arguments
11 However, upgrading infrastructure is critical to the broader agendas of integration
12 Structural changes need to be made, so that the transport sector operates in a harmonised way, and is responsive to the conditions of a single economy
13 Simply, there is a need for new infrastructure between Western and Eastern Europe, and within Eastern Europe
14 Congestion is identified as a central argument for improving infrastructure, because of its impacts on TIME. Time is critical because it is used in cost-benefit analyses which are used in the evaluation of infrastructure projects.
16 The ERT declares itself here as a lobbyist in the traditional infrastructure debate
17 Here, the ERT argues that what is required is not just a physical response to infrastructure needs, but a need to fundamentally reform our approach to infrastructure on a European basis - in terms of both needs and implementation mechanisms.
21 Here, the concept of ‘missing networks’ is introduced - a physical response, finding new ways to move goods and people efficiently between different modes of transport
22 Alongside the physical response is the need for the adoption of a holistic view of transport networks
24 This suggests that the report sets out an agenda for discussion. This appears to be in
conflict with the general thrust, which is based on a series of advocacy statements. Debate should be channelled towards resolving the agenda of problems set out in the report, not in questioning the issues raised by it. It also suggests that the debate over the need for renewed infrastructure and structures for implementation should take place in particular arenas - at all levels, and among decision makers in the public and private sector.

25 This is an important statement - it suggests that the agenda contained within the report is critical to economic growth and quality of life issues, and that therefore finding a consensus on new approaches is critical. Progress demands for action from decision makers at all levels.

4. The way forwards

DEBATE

24 This suggests that the report sets out an agenda for discussion. This appears to be in conflict with the general thrust, which is based on a series of advocacy statements. Debate should be channelled towards resolving the agenda of problems set out in the report, not in questioning the issues raised by it. It also suggests that the debate over the need for renewed infrastructure and structures for implementation should take place in particular arenas - at all levels, and among decision makers in the public and private sector.

HOLISTIC

20 The appropriate response is to identify the needs for Europe as a whole, at an ambitious level. This demand should be met by an 'appropriate' mix of modes.

22 Alongside the physical response is the need for the adoption of a holistic view of transport networks

MISSING NETWORKS

21 Here, the concept of 'missing networks' is introduced - a physical response, finding new ways to move goods and people efficiently between different modes of transport

INTEGRATION

01 This linking of the themes of a maturing Europe, integration and new member states suggests that further integration is a natural progression, and that this agenda is particularly relevant to new and prospective member states

04 Here, a strong message is put: that 'Europe' has made a great achievement in finding a balance between private and public interests. These are paraphrased as economic
growth and quality of life for the majority. A subtext here is that Europe apparently has been acting in a concerted way, and in the public interest, which supports the argument that it should continue to do so.

08 Two tasks are identified: furthering integration through political, economic and monetary measures, and integrating Eastern Europe into the Union.

11 However, upgrading infrastructure is critical to the broader agendas of integration

12 Structural changes need to be made, so that the transport sector operates in a harmonised way, and is responsive to the conditions of a single economy

NEW
The application of this code aims to test, in a simple way, the extent to which the ERT position advocates change. Of the 25 meaning units which the text was divided into, 16 were coded as containing this theme of change. This illustrates an emphasis in the document for a move towards new ways of doing things.

RETHINK
17 Here, the ERT argues that what is required is not just a physical response to infrastructure needs, but a need to fundamentally reform our approach to infrastructure on a European basis - in terms of both needs and implementation mechanisms.

18 Here, the need to reconsider priorities at all levels is argued. This should take the place of simply arguing for infrastructure investment based on traditional arguments.

5. Linking integration/infrastructure

INTEGRATION
A central question is the extent to which the report links the concept of European integration with the need to develop infrastructure. This linkage was illustrated by the extent of knowledge claims referring to either or both topics, but also to a more general reading of the text

6. Validity

23 The validity of the claims made in the report is underlined by the identification of the blue chip consultancies that have worked on it.

ERT

16 The ERT declares itself here as a lobbyist in the traditional infrastructure debate
Here, the ERT argues that what is required is not just a physical response to infrastructure needs, but a need to fundamentally reform our approach to infrastructure on a European basis - in terms of both needs and implementation mechanism.

Here, the need to reconsider priorities at all levels is argued. This should take the place of simply arguing for infrastructure investment based on traditional arguments.

Note: this analysis was carried out for an assessment in Qualitative Research Methods, one unit of the Postgraduate Certificate in Research Methodology which was undertaken within the PhD programme.
Appendix 3

Membership of the European Round Table of Industrialists, 1991

Chairman: Wisse Dekker (Philips)
Vice Chairman: Karlheinz Kaske (Siemens)
Vice-Chairman: Jérôme Monod (Lyonnaise des Eaux-Dumez)
Counsellors: Giovanni Agnelli (Ambroise Roux)

Round Table members:
Torvild Aakvaag, Norsk Hydro
Umberto Agnelli, Fiat
Américo Amorim, Amorim Group
Jean-Louis Beffa, Saint-Gobain
Yves Böel, Sofina
Vincent Bolloré, Group Bolloré
Technologies
Nigel Broackes, Trafalgar House
Bertrand Collomb, Lafarge Coppée
Françoise Cornélis, Petrofina
Etienne Davignon, Société Générale de Belgique
Carlo de Benedetti, Olivetti
Raul Gardini, Ferruzzi
Fritz Gerber, Hoffman-La Roche
Alain Gomez, Thomson
Klaus Götte, MAN
Pehr Gyllenhammar, Volvo
Wolfgang Hilger, Hoechst
Robert Horton, British Petroleum
Daniel Janssen, Solvay
André Leysen, Gevaert
Luis Magaña, CEPSA
Floris Maljers, Unilever
Helmut Maucher, Nestlé
Mærsk Mc-Kinney Møller, A.P.Møller
Hans Merkle, Robert Bosch
Theodore Papalexopoulos, Titan Cement
Antony Pilkington, Pilkington
Edzard Reuter, Daimler-Benz
Antoine Riboud, BSN
Tony Ryan, GPA
Stephan Schmidheiny, Anova
Robert Scholey, British Steel
Hugo Sekyra, Austrian Industries
Patrick Sheehy, BAT Industries
Dieter Spethmann, Thyssen
Poul Svanholm, Carlsberg
Serge Tchuruk, Total
Jan Timmer, Philips
Lo Van Wachem, Royal Dutch / Shell
Cándido Velázquez, Telefónica
Jacopo Vittorelli, Pirelli
Simo Vuorilehto, Nokia

Source: ERT 1991b
Endnotes

i Healey has correctly pointed out that she is identified by myself and others as a ‘carrier’ of communicative theory, at least in Britain (Healey, 1999). Healey is a clear advocate of the Habermasian agenda (within a broader institutionalist perspective – see Healey, 1997). However, I see communicative theory as being ‘carried’ by the wider group of theorists which are referred to in the discussion.

ii The implications of Foucault’s specific focus on power are returned to in later chapters.

iii Forester’s comment on the cover of Rationality and Power is: ‘Showing how power corrupts not only character but public discourse, how bluffing and deception displace sound argument, how rationalization displaces rationality, Flyvbjerg provides the best Habermasian example of systematically distorted communications that I know of’.

iv Plenary discussion at seminar, Department of Government, University of Manchester, 13 March 1998.

v See Richardson, 1999, for a broader discussion of the relevance of Foucauldian ideas of discourse, rationality and power to understanding transport policy.

vi See Lyon, 1993, for a detailed critique of Foucault’s panopticism.

vii More broadly, the journal Discourse and Society explores ‘the political implications of discourse and communication’, and was supplemented in 1999 by Discourse Studies, a journal for the study of ‘text and talk... the structures and strategies of written and spoken discourse’.

viii Colin Gordon identifies four lines of inquiry which flow from Foucault’s work (Gordon, 1980: 233):

1. genealogical – ‘what kind of political relevance can enquiries to our past have in making intelligible the ‘objective conditions’ of our social present, not only its visible crises and fissures but also the solidity of its unquestioned rationales?’

2. archaeological - ‘how can the production in our societies of sanctioned forms of rational discourse be analysed according to their governing systems of order, appropriation and exclusion?’

3. ethical – ‘what kind of relations can the role and activity of the intellectual establish between theoretical research, specialised knowledge and power struggles?’

4. power/knowledge – ‘the question of the proper use to be made of the concept of power, and of the mutual enwrapping, interaction and interdependence of power and knowledge’.

In this thesis, an implicit attempt is made to explore each of these questions to different degrees. The first two lines of inquiry are developed in the case study, particularly by developing a narrative which recognises the prior conditioning of policy making. The fourth, the question of power/knowledge, is a central and explicit concern throughout the theoretical and empirical work. While the third question, of the role of the intellectual, becomes relevant to both the position of myself as a researcher, and to the role of individuals within the domain of planning theory and within the TEN-T policy process.

ix This is in contrast with Hajer’s (2000) suggestion that ‘TENs is better seen as a set of particular discursive practices within which a particular policy discourse is reproduced and transformed’.

x The alternative approach - the predetermination of discourses from theory - could help in imposing some structure on the analysis of a complex policy process with multiple elements, thus simplifying the research process. The policy-oriented approach adopted was regarded as appropriate to the research. Either way, the selection process has a key impact on the implications of the research findings. In some discourse studies using textual analysis, the
search for objectivity precludes recognition of the subjectivity of the researcher. In Foucauldian discourse analytics, however, the position of the researcher needs to be acknowledged, to help the research audience understand the choices made.

xi Others have analysed individual projects, eg Lemberg, 1995, Dekker Linnros and Hallin, 1999.

xii During the fieldwork the member of the UK government’s permanent representation in Brussels (UKREP) responsible for TEN-T was interviewed.

xiii The interests of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in a common pan-European spatial perspective are expressed more completely in a parallel process, managed by the European conference of ministers responsible for spatial planning (CEMAT, 1999). The CEMAT document views the ESDP as simply the EU’s contribution to the development of a pan-European spatial strategy.

xiv Interview with a Director General of the Council Secretariat, carried out by and cited by Endo (1999: 177).

 xv Interview with Mitterand’s diplomatic counsellor at the Elysee palace, carried out by and cited by Endo (1999: 177).


xvii The concept of Community Benefits has been pervasive. In 1998 the Commission announced a call for tender to examine priorities for the further development of the TENs, based on the ‘added-value to the Community as a whole (as opposed to the individual and specific interests of each Member State)’ CEC, 1998a.


xix I was noted as a ‘contributing expert’ to this study.

xx Note: Parts of the discussion in this chapter are extracts from Sharp and Richardson, 1999.

xii Comments made in discussion at the Planning Theory Conference, Oxford Brookes University, 2-4 April, 1998.