

Thinking through making and doing: sport science as an art of inquiry

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1	Thinking through making and doing: Sport science as an art of inquiry
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15 Abstract

16 How best to summarise the professional work of sport scientists? What if we were to view them as artisans? As enskiled crafts-persons who think through and with their materials? What implications 17 would this idea have for how we take up with research and ensuing scientific methods? Here, we 18 19 explore these philosophical questions – of applied relevance – through Ingold's process of making. 20 From this perspective, skilled artisans like potters, basket-makers and sport scientists, think through 21 making and doing, as opposed to make and do through thinking. Where the latter imposes form onto 22 matter by way of conceptualisation, the former goes along with materials in active participation, corresponding with what such things have to say with a skilled attentiveness and selective 23 24 responsiveness. We argue that the implications of these propositions for research in sport science are 25 profound; encouraging a progression from the traditional hypothetico-deductive theory of scientific 26 method (make and do through thinking), toward an art of inquiry (think through making and doing). 27 In the former, phenomena are studied *about*, (re)producing categorical (sub-)disciplinary knowledge 28 by way of vertical integration, while in the latter, phenomena are studied with, growing storied 29 knowledge of by way of correspondence. These arguments are not to be construed as a call for more 'qualitative' research within the sport sciences, but rather to underline the value of situating 30 31 participant observation at the core of one's inquiry. Through a prologue and epilogue, we exemplify 32 our arguments in the very process of this paper's becoming – detailing the careful attentiveness and selective responsiveness to the various invitations to write, emergent while thinking through making 33 34 and doing.

Key words: Scientific method, sport performance and preparation, making, doing, knowing, thinking,
skill

- 37 Art does not reproduce the visible but makes visible
- 38 Paul Klee, Creative Credo

39 **Prologue: On writing a paper**

40 We (the authors of this paper) often discuss the various ways in which we write our research articles. 41 Indeed, while it is a highly individualised process that is far from formulaic, a common thread to which 42 we both resonate is that, to us, writing a paper often feels like we are making something. This means 43 we share a sense of artisanship when writing a paper – in a similar way to what we imagine a potter 44 feels while throwing clay to shape a vase, or a dress maker feels while knitting threads to make a 45 garment. The process of making to which we both resonate is not one which sees us having a fully 46 mapped out route to be followed, like the paper somehow exists as a completely-formed entity in our 47 minds, simply waiting to be passively 'written up'. Rather, it is a process of making which sees us 48 actively feel our way forward, carefully attending and selectively responding to invitations that open 49 up as we weave together a larger, continually (re)forming, meshwork of inquiries. In other words, the 50 paper is not a (pre)determined 'object' waiting to be mechanically (re)produced, but is a determining 51 'thing' that actively emerges as we find our way along.

52 This process leads to a deeply temporalized thinking; thinking that does not occur separate to the act 53 of writing the paper, but that carries on through it. For example, while indeed we have a direction of 54 travel when writing a paper – a large-scale invitation to act that we continually stretch toward – there 55 exists no fixed steps to take, nor formed destinations waiting to be reached. Rather, we are selectively 56 responsive to smaller-scaled invitations, by way of words and sentences that, when woven together, 57 constrain our larger-scaled direction of travel. This means we are able to maintain a grip on the paper 58 in its unfolding, anticipating its future direction, while not losing touch on the immediacy of where we 59 are. Our anticipation, however, is not a prediction of what the paper will look like once 'finished', but 60 is a way of helping us look ahead, in the direction we are travelling, so that we can continue to 61 improvise a way forward.

The ensuing knowledge, then, is *grown* with our selective openness in 'making', not produced as an output of a pre-conceived idea waiting to be 'made'. That is, it is the process of the papers becoming through which our knowledge is grown. Thus, like artisans in many parts of society who actively join with their materials to improvise a way forward, we are, in a very real sense, *thinking through making and doing* when writing a paper. What you are reading, of course, is no different.

67 Introduction

How would a sport scientist respond if asked to describe how they support athletic performance? Ask 68 69 this question, for example, of a sports physiologist, and they may provide you with information about 70 an athlete's physiological capability - manifest through testing for various metabolic and 71 cardiorespiratory responses to training. Ask this question of a sports biomechanist, and they might 72 talk about formulae for various biomechanical derivatives – exemplified through an athlete's limb 73 segment properties, joint angles, velocities and forces. A sports psychologist might reference an 74 athlete's emotional control - represented through self-reported data on motivational status, 75 attentional focus, and self-determination. While a sports motor control theorist may reference the 76 role of a schema, programme or other internal representation of a skilled movement. Indeed, each 77 specialist would no doubt describe interesting facts and objective measurements; knowledge about 78 performance and preparation produced through various sub-disciplinary methodologies. But the 79 explanatory value of these genocentric outcomes - analyses scaled to the 'internal mechanics' of the 80 athlete (Araújo & Davids, 2011; Davids & Araújo, 2010) – risk misunderstanding the very phenomenon 81 they attempt to know and support by means of reduction, fragmentation, and classification.

How would an athlete respond if asked to describe athletic performance? Differing to the disciplinary specialists above, they may describe a range of unique, unpredictable, deeply relational and contextual *experiences* (Barker, Barker-Ruchti, Rynne, & Lee, 2012). These would likely be individualised experiences that do not belong to a discipline, and thus risk losing their richness if reduced into pieces, structured into sub-disciplines to be known *about*. After all, "unlike academic

87 disciplines, life does not break down into neat categories... and we ignore them [contexts, relations, 88 events] at our own risk" (Montuori, 2013, p. 45, text in brackets added). Such experiences in sport 89 may, therefore, be better conceptualised as complex, emergent and entangled becomings: 'things' 90 temporally suspended in an active participation with one's environment (Lave & Wenger, 1991). In 91 other words, performance and preparation – for the athlete – may not be something that can be 92 reduced and neatly classified into sub-disciplines to be known *about*. Rather, it is something implicit, 93 blurred, storied and ongoing, temporally stretched between the 'not yet' of aspiration, and the 94 'already' of prehension (Ingold, 2015, p. 118).

95 What does this change in perspective imply for how we – as sport scientists – come to know the 96 phenomena we research and support? Specifically, if the favoured modus operandi of research in the 97 sport sciences is founded upon a philosophical paradigm of positivism (see Uehara, Button, Falcous, 98 & Davids, 2014), rooted in the categorisations of the hypothetico-deductive theory of scientific 99 method (i.e., theory-hypothesis-reduce-fit) (Haig, 2018; Woods, Rudd, Araújo, Vaughan, & Davids, 100 2021a), but the inhabited world of athletes is one of primary experience (i.e., relation-context-101 becoming) (Barker et al., 2012), are we not set upon a path of being perpetually one step behind? Of 102 forever choosing between Scylla or Charybdis – being either too narrow and definitive to be widely 103 applicable, or overly general and abstract such that we miss the very nuances of the phenomena we 104 proclaim to study? If so, how could we reconcile this distinction and step out, beyond the confines of 105 our disciplinary paradigms, and take up with a sport science, not of nouns (i.e., of 'objects' to be 106 classified and categorised), but of verbs (i.e., of 'things' becoming and transiting between states, 107 revealing a dynamical ongoing-ness)?

In addressing this complex question, our aim here is to encourage sport scientists to take up with a sense of artisanship. To appreciate that phenomena, like an athlete's performance, are not fixed 'objects' that can only be known about through theorising, hypothesising, predicting, and fitting, but

as on-going 'things'1, which we can study with and learn from. This distinction is critical for the 111 arguments presented here, as the latter is found upon an ontology which appreciates that people are 112 113 things who inhabit a world never quite the same from one moment to the next. The inspiration for 114 these arguments stem from Tim Ingold's (2013) process of making, a notion that sees artisans think 115 through making, as opposed to make through thinking. Where the latter thinks up ideas by way of 116 representations in the mind to then be imposed upon formless matter by a passive body, the former 117 goes *along* with materials in an active participation, corresponding to what such things have to say 118 with a skilled attentiveness and selective responsiveness to improvise a way forward (Ingold, 2011, 119 2013).

120 In what follows, we discuss the implications of these notions for sport science researchers and 121 practitioners. Specifically, we explore how they encourage a progression from the traditional – and at times positivistic and interactionist – hypothetico-deductive theory of scientific method (making and 122 doing through thinking), toward an art of inquiry² (thinking through making and doing). To borrow 123 124 terminology from the ecological psychologist James Gibson (1966), where the former focuses on 125 categorisation and classification – a science of nouns that produces knowledge about objects, the latter focuses on improvisation and participation with – a science of verbs that grows knowledge of 126 things. This corresponsive approach to research in the sport sciences, practised as an art of inquiry, 127 128 opens the door for researchers to be responsive to a plurality of paradigms and societal ways of being. 129 For example, to help sport scientists learn to study with and not just about, fields like anthropology 130 can provide important guidance (see Ingold, 2018), leading researchers to (self) discover key relations 131 in-between sources of information that could guide empirical formalisations rooted in, for example,

¹ The difference between an object and thing is not vacuous. Here, the former implies a fixed state; total, complete, bounded, waiting to be known about by being *looked at*. A thing, however, is dynamic; a *going on*, a place of entanglement with other goings on in a world continually re-forming (see Heidegger, 1971). In these entangled places, 'things' are not connected in a network like 'objects', but entwine together in a *meshwork* (see Ingold, 2011). Thus, to know of a 'thing', is to join with it in its becoming – or, in a word, it is to *correspond* (Ingold, 2013).

² Discussed in detail later, in an art of inquiry, knowledge is grown as one *goes along* with the ebbs and flows of what it is that holds their attention.

the science of complex systems and non-linear dynamics (Balague, Torrents, Hristovski, Davids, &
Araújo, 2013; Williams, Davids, & Williams, 1999).

What we lay out here is not just 'blue skies' of philosophical discourse, but is of deep practical and 134 135 applied scientific relevance. In 2019, for example, Marc Portus – one of Australia's most respected and 136 experienced sport scientists - raised issues on the possible effects of de-centralising sport science 137 support at the Australian Institute of Sport (AIS). He specifically highlighted challenges to the potential for practitioners from different sub-disciplines to use a 'case approach' in an integrated manner to 138 139 focus on the needs of individual athletes. Portus (2019) argued that high performance sports 140 organisations, like the AIS, could be at their most effective when sport scientists, practitioners and 141 athletes work with one another in a 'vibrant ecosystem'. This entangled description of the future of 142 sport science delivery 'at the crossroads' raises important issues on the need to guide such integrated 143 support, dovetailing neatly with a transdisciplinary narrative on sport science research instigated by 144 Woods et al. (2021a). Thus, in what is to follow, we attempt to propose a way forward, guided by an 145 Ingoldian notion of artisanship – making and doing through thinking, and thinking through making 146 and doing. As an aside, while we discuss what such notions could mean for sport science practised as 147 an art of inquiry, the paths we traverse are far from complete – offering an enticing direction of travel 148 for works to come.

149 Making and doing through thinking

In our prologue, we reflected on the shared sense of artisanship felt when co-writing a paper. To us at least, writing *is* making, so to view ourselves like crafts-persons seems appropriate. What, though, does this mean for the thinking that takes place during the process of writing? Ask this question of a conventionally trained sport scientist, and the common answer would likely be reflective of the deeply pervasive positivist paradigm in which sport science is found (Abernethy & Sparrow, 1992; Pisk, 2014). In such a paradigm, the common method of inquiry sees researchers formulate a hypothesis – viewed through a theoretical lens – to be directly measured through an oft-laboratory based (in an attempt 157 to experimentally control the messiness of the 'lived in' world) empirical test (Araújo, Davids, & Passos, 2007; Haig, 2018; Reed, 1996b, p. 7). In other words, this approach to inquiry sees the 158 159 researcher formulate ideas and representations in the mind, to then be tested against observations in the world. This traditional process is what Ingold (2013), in his book, Making: Anthropology, 160 161 Archaeology, Art and Architecture, refers to as 'inversion', where 'lessons of life become 'data', to be analysed in terms of an exogenous body of theory' (p. 5, paraphrased). It is, in effect, to look at the 162 163 world backwards, in a 'theory-before-facts' sequence, whereby phenomena are taken out of context, 164 reduced into parts and then explained (away) by way of quasi-mechanical processes. For us, it would be to view the papers we write as a process of making and doing through thinking, or contradictory 165 166 to the quoted words of artist Paul Klee (1920) with which we opened, it would be to reproduce the 167 visible by way of replicating the words on paper which originate from a fully formed idea, pre-168 determined in our heads. Note, while discussed in detail later, inversion should not just be viewed as 169 an issue that methodologies in a 'quantitative' science need to consider, but refers to how a 170 researcher approaches inquiry more generally.

171 This notion of making and doing through thinking has its roots in the Aristotelian model of 172 hylomorphism – hylo meaning 'form', morphism meaning 'matter' (see Ingold, 2013, p. 20/21). The 173 key proposition of this model is that form is imposed onto matter, founded on internalised concepts 174 or representations created separate to the matter in which such representations are imposed. To 175 consider an athlete performing a skill, for example, would be to retain a template of the 'technique' 176 represented in the mind of the sport practitioner working with the athlete, predicated on an input and 177 output. This means we would see the technique as an object to be acquired and known *about*, perhaps by way of documenting and classifying the movement components and dimensions (e.g. range, 178 179 duration, accuracy) and other quantifiable properties that describe the action. Such a hylomorphic 180 'objectification' of the technical information would be no doubt of use in manufacturing a coaching 181 manual that consists of 'step-by-step' instructions to be memorised and rehearsed. The caveat, 182 however, is that we 'see' nothing of the contexts – the processes – from which a movement emerges,

capturing the skilled attentiveness of the sport practitioner in facilitating the flow and feel of the
athlete's movements. In other words, it would be to separate knowing from knowledge; turning away
from the becoming of things by narrowing one's focus toward a mechanistic unit of analysis which
seeks only to produce and transmit post-hoc, reductionist, knowledge *about* (Lave, 1990; also see Lave
& Wegner, 1991).

188 In the field of sport science there has been recognition of the limitations of this type of detached 189 inquiry (see Sparkes & Smith, 2014), referencing to the need for models of applied research to bridge 190 theory and practice (see Bishop, 2008). While we agree that this is an intuitive step in the right 191 direction, such models do risk leading us back to the hylomorphism of making and doing through 192 thinking. For example, such models often encourage sport science researchers to initially perform 193 systematic reviews or meta-analyses to 'get across the disciplinary literature' on a topic that holds 194 their interest, leading consumers of knowledge to identify 'gaps' around which a hypothesis can be 195 formed (Bishop, 2008). By no means do we wish to argue that reading about phenomena is not an 196 important aspect of inquiry in the sport sciences – nor do we mean that of systematic reviews and 197 meta-analyses. Rather, our claim is that to really 'know of' phenomena that we wish to study - to see 198 things in their becoming – we need to carefully and attentively observe and participate, in a natural 199 ecology of relations. That is, to spend time with things, responding to what things may have to share 200 with us, not just what the conventions of scientific method have extracted and recorded in order to 201 tell us about. By taking up with such participant observation in sports science, we can learn from what 202 it is that holds our attention, which could minimise the apparent gap noted between research 203 questions designed by academics, and the everyday professional activities of coaches, athletes and 204 other stakeholders deeply embedded in sporting contexts (see Fullagar, McCall, Impellizzeri, Favero, 205 & Coutts, 2019).

206 Different conceptualisations of knowing

207 One way of distinguishing this conceptualisation of knowledge is based on what Gibson (1966, 1979) 208 referred to as knowledge of and knowledge about the environment. The latter is understood as 209 mediated information by way of words, data, pictures and symbols: indirect information that has been produced and documented by another human individual (Gibson, 1966, p. 91; also see Reed, 1996b, 210 211 ch. 1). The former, by contrast, is direct and unmediated information that is omnipresent in the 212 environment, available to be directly picked up and acted upon by an attentive perceiver (Gibson, 213 1966, 1979). It is the patterned structure of the invariant features of this information which directly 214 specifies invitations to act within an environment (Withagen, do Poel, Araújo, & Pepping, 2012) – that 215 is, its affordances (Gibson, 1979). This distinction is most apparent in the differences between knowing 216 about a sporting landscape, by reading facts and data noted by another person (perhaps documented 217 and depicted in a coaching manual), and knowing of the landscape's invitations to act by way of 218 engaging directly with (i.e., attuning to) its sounds, textures, sights, and smells (Woods & Davids, 219 2021). Indeed, both types of knowledge may be used in supporting human behaviour. But our concern 220 here is that the predominant method of inquiry within the sport sciences has been built upon a 221 foundation of the former source, where phenomena are only known about by way of second-hand 222 information extracted through the hypothetico-deductive theory of scientific method (Haig, 2018). 223 Sport scientists, in this sense, could be understood as 'occupants' who mediate – by way of disciplinary 224 convention, theory, method and concept – their interactions with the phenomena they study about. 225 No more is this apparent than in mainstream publications and editorials that proclaim 'data is power' 226 for sport scientists (see Nimphius & Jordan, 2020). The word 'data', after all, is the plural of the Latin 227 word 'datum', roughly meaning 'to give' – a static representation of the thing which it has been taken 228 to be analysed as an object of 'fact' (Rosenberg, 2013). While perhaps well intentioned, editorial 229 statements like the aforementioned, in our opinion, risk keeping sport science within its overly 230 narrow, mechanical and determinable worldview, trivialising direct and primary experience - perhaps even demoted as being 'merely subjective' - in favour of a 'realer', more quantifiable, 'objective truth' 231 232 (Abram, 1997; also see Sparkes & Smith, 2014 for critique). This, we argue next, risks leading to the production, consumption and regurgitation of knowledge about phenomena, generated through a
type of hylomorphic vertical integration. Knowledge, parcelled in this way, risks over-compliance,
being connected up, documented and labelled in categories and systems of classification.

236 Vertical integration of knowledge production

237 Through the notion of *making and doing through thinking*, knowledge is understood to be produced and consumed by way of higher-order vertical integration (Ingold, 2011, p. 153). By this, we mean that 238 239 the concepts and hypotheses, determined separate to the phenomena one is to study, sit above the 240 goings on of the phenomena 'at ground level', providing a drone-like perspective that leads to an 241 understanding of phenomena as 'objects of analysis', viewed through a conceptual or 242 representational lens (Ingold, 2011, 2013). To adopt a hylomorphic account, this would be to 243 understand the conceptual idea, already determined in the scientist's mind by way of disciplinary 244 paradigms (perhaps even noted as 'gaps within the literature'), to be imposed onto the phenomena 245 analysed as an object. The resulting observations on the ground, then, are vertically fed back up into 246 the higher-order conceptual framework to be modelled accordingly, leading to the production of new 247 knowledge by way of classification and categorisation, altering the drone perspective of the factual 248 landscape (Figure 1).

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****INSERT FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE****

This description of knowledge as classificatory, produced through vertical integration, is synonymous with what David Rubin (1988) – in discussing memory – metaphorically referred to as a 'complexstructure'. In this metaphor, knowledge is understood by way of conceptual representation to be determined *before* being applied in context:

254 "[...] knowledge takes the form of a comprehensive configuration of mental representations that
255 has been copied into the mind of the individual, through some mechanisms of replication, even
256 before he or she steps forth into the environment. The application of this knowledge in practice
257 is, then, a simple and straightforward process of sorting and matching, so as to establish a

258

homology between structures in the mind and structures [objects] in the world." (Ingold, 2011,

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p. 159, text in brackets added)

260 In the sport sciences, and in other heavily positivist disciplines (see Costanza, 2003), vertical 261 integration has led to a fixation on *analysis* (i.e., reduce and deconstruct to produce knowledge about) 262 at the expense of synthesis (i.e., observe the entangled becomings of things to know of) (Davids & Araújo, 2010). Why this is a concern, is that it risks leading us away from the phenomena by creating 263 organismic asymmetries in research and practice, where the 'internal mechanics' of the athlete are 264 265 viewed as somehow separated or detached from the ecology of relations in which they emerge – that 266 is, the context of behaviours (Davids & Araújo, 2010). Moreover, this fixation on analysis can lead 267 researchers to view phenomena, like athletic performance, not as ongoing things on the cusp of becoming, temporally stretched in-between dynamic states, but as objects that are fixed and static 268 269 waiting to be split up, categorised into pieces by way of analytics; explained away by being placed into 270 disciplines or sub-disciplinary frameworks. To us, this is unsustainable – closing paths of travel rather 271 than opening them³ – and is why inter- and multi-disciplinarity within the sport sciences, albeit a 272 welcomed shift toward collaborative research, can still be limiting (cf. Songca, 2007). Specifically, while 273 a team of researchers, each bringing their sub-disciplinary speciality, work together to 'solve' a 274 complex problem, they each still risk viewing phenomena from their own drone-like perspective of 275 the factual landscape. That is, as objects of analysis to be known about, driven by methods underlined by disciplinary assumptions that prevent investigators from 'seeing' phenomena as an ongoing thing 276 277 on the cusp of becoming (Figure 2).

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****INSERT FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE****

This approach is typically manifest by researchers in the sport sciences focusing on data collection, or
recorded observations documented after the fact. Such mediated interactions leave little room to

³ We signpost this here, as an exploration of what these propositions could mean for the sustainability of research in the sport sciences could be a fertile direction of travel.

281 carefully listen to what the phenomena may have to say, or see what it may have to show - to critically 282 understand what the 'data' or 'documented observation' actually mean through the process of their 283 very becoming. This is because phenomena – like athletic performance – are viewed deterministically, composed of objects (i.e., techniques, performance variables, manoeuvres, set plays, tactical 284 285 formations) with cause (input) and effects (output), explained (hylomorphically) by way of 286 classification into a disciplinary framework (see Morin, 2008). In other words, through "processes of 287 making appear swallowed up in objects made" (Ingold, 2013, p. 7). Thus, by taking up with a sense of 288 artisanship, our proposal is that we, as sport scientists, can refocus our attention toward phenomena, 289 viewed not as objects and nouns, but as things and verbs. This approach transitions research that 290 'produces and consumes' knowledge (about) by way of making and doing through thinking, toward 291 one that 'grows and develops' knowing (of) by way of thinking through making and doing.

292 Thinking through making and doing

293 Recall our earlier discussion of Rubin's (1988) metaphor of 'complex-structures', which we aligned with knowledge produced by way of vertical integration (see Figure 1). Our main critique was that 294 295 such an approach left little room for understanding - knowing of - the very processes that led to the 296 emergence of the 'object of analysis'. Fortunately, in contrast to his metaphoric proposition of 297 complex-structures, Rubin (1988) introduced that of 'complex-processes'. Where the former focuses 298 on classifying objects based on external attributes or characteristics (aligned with Gibson's knowledge about), the latter prioritises the very process of the becoming of things (aligned with Gibson's knowing 299 300 of). Thus, rather than suggesting that knowledge is produced by way of its application onto objects of 301 the world (making and doing through thinking), a complex-process metaphor suggests that people 302 come to know the things they seek to understand by way of active participation 'with' (thinking 303 through making and doing) (Ingold, 2011). To use our earlier example of a movement technique – it 304 may be better to view it, not as an object formed by way of a mental representation located inside 305 the mind of the athlete that has been applied to the compliant body (after being transmitted from a 306 coach), but as a processual perception-action coupling, emergent in an ongoing correspondence

between an athlete's skilled attentiveness and the ebbs and flows of the environment they are a part
of. Knowledge, in this sense, is not produced through vertical integration, but *grown along sentient lines of correspondence* (Ingold, 2011, 2013).

310 Though, if the skilled crafts-person does not possess a formed and determined representation to be 311 imposed onto objects of the world, what does it say about the thinking that takes place through 312 making? Taking one step back, the mere asking of such a question may seem odd given the heavily 313 unchallenged Cartesian and Newtonian thinking that is deeply pervasive to the sport and movement 314 sciences, as well as related sub-disciplines of psychology and the neurosciences (see Reed, 1996a). But 315 for skilled artisans and crafts-persons, knowledge is *inseparable* from the very processes of knowing 316 (Lave & Wegner, 1991). In other words, to know, is to do in place (Woods & Davids, 2021). The 317 implication is that to really come to know of what it is that holds our attention in sport science, we 318 need to move from being occupants to inhabitants, sharing a place, not above in order to survey 319 about, but dwelling *in-among* so that we can *look with*:

320 "Though we may *occupy* a world of objects, to the occupant the contents of the world appear
321 already locked into their final forms, as though they had turned their backs on us. To *inhabit* the
322 world, by contrast, is to join in the processes of formation." (Ingold, 2013, p. 89)

323 Sport science practised as an art of inquiry

According to Ingold (2013, ch. 1), to practise an art of inquiry is not to describe and document what it is that holds our attention, but is to open ourselves to its *goings on* so that we can learn to correspond with what it has to say⁴. This perspective helps us to attend directly to phenomena in their becoming, not indirectly by way of theory or representation established prior to, thereby flipping the 'theorybefore-facts' conventions of the hypothetico-deductive method to a 'facts-before-theory' sequence. Note, this position does not deny the importance of theory, concept or data in coming to know

⁴ By 'it', we mean phenomena – like sport performance.

330 phenomena, but that such things do not determine observations for us⁵. Simply, as noted in the 331 excerpt above, it promulgates the view of phenomena not as objects, but as things, and ourselves not 332 as occupants, but as inhabitants. This crucial distinction in anthropology signifies the importance of 333 participant observation and primary experience for sport scientists taking up with a sense of 334 artisanship. By this, though, we do not mean to imply an ethnographic analysis deduced through a 335 theoretical framework, leading to the generation of qualitative data documented 'after fact'. Rather, 336 it signifies a commitment to participant observation and understanding of primary experience that 337 supports researchers in knowing from with-in (also see Ingold, 2013, ch. 1). It is this situatedness, after 338 all, that philosopher John Dewey, in this masterpiece Art as Experience, argued was central to one's 339 understanding:

340 "In order to *understand* the esthetic in its ultimate and approved forms, one must begin with it *in*341 *the raw*; in the events and scenes that hold the attentive eye and ear of man, arousing his interest
342 and affording him enjoyment as he looks and listens" (1934/1980, p. 4/5, emphasis in original
343 and added)

In other words, observing – by way of watching, listening and feeling – the everyday goings on of the
 things with-in which the places they are; legitimately participating in activities as a co-inhabitant, not
 passively documenting what has happened as an occupant hovering above.

This idea leads to an important contention for our propositions, in that they should not be read as a
simple plea for more qualitative research (e.g., ethnography) within the sport sciences (in which Sport,
Education and Society has a long and esteemed history in publishing). Rather, they should be seen to

⁵ A wonderful example of this is shown in Edward Reed's (1996a) ecological (re)analysis of Darwin's seminal experimental observations on the behaviour of earthworms. Notably, Darwin *observed* that earthworms burrowed in such way that resulted in a greater probability of protecting their skin from damage. Drawing on Gibson's (1979) theory of direct perception, Reed (1996a) then argued (a century later) that this observation could be explained by way of the earthworm's regulating behaviour through the perception and realisation of affordances. The 'fact' that the earthworms regulated their behaviour while burrowing, observed experimentally by Darwin, was thus explained 'theoretically' by Reed (1996a). Theory, in this sense, can help us understand what we directly observe and primarily experience in the world we inhabit.

350 argue for more anthropological research within the sport sciences. The difference is not vacuous, and 351 requires brief discussion. Notably, both Ingold (see 2013, ch. 1; 2018, ch. 4) and Woods and Davids 352 (2021) argue that the former, ethnography, is documentational, describing what one is observing as a 353 by-stander, perhaps even occupying a *drone-like* perspective relative to the phenomena one seeks to 354 know (about). After all, what the word ethnography literally means is a 'description of people' -355 ethnos: 'people'; graphia: 'description'. Comparatively, anthropology is transformative, seeking to 356 study with and learn from people through an active participation. This, in the words of James Gibson 357 (1979), would be to undergo an *education of attention* to the everyday goings on of the things we seek 358 to know. In sport science, such an anthropological appreciation to research would see scientists deeply 359 embedded with-in a sports organisation, learning to progressively resonate with its rhythms by 360 spending months or even years corresponding with coaches, athletes and other stakeholders, as they 361 improvise a way forward, together.

362 What we are advocating here is, in effect, to practise the two-century old Goethean approach to 363 science – a science that commits itself to doing away with explanations and classifications of 364 phenomena-as-objects, known about through means of reduction and reification (making and doing through thinking), instead entering into a conversation (or correspondence) with phenomena in its 365 366 becoming. Such a corresponsive approach opens up new ways of knowing - leading us to ask of 367 ourselves, not "how can I find ways of adapting the phenomena to my specific approach so that I can 368 answer my question?", but "how can I make myself into a better, more transparent instrument of 369 knowing?" (Holdrege, 2005, p. 31, our emphasis)⁶. This perspective threads us neatly back to the 370 practicality of our propositions, supported by the earlier accounts of Portus (2019) outlined in our 371 introduction. Specifically, by viewing research within the sport sciences as an art of inquiry, thereby 372 engaging in participant observation, sport scientists can develop with coaches, athletes and other 373 stakeholders in a corresponsive, blurred, entangled, and transdisciplinary way (which is perhaps what

⁶ For a detailed insight to works of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, we encourage readers to visit Craig Holdrege's (2005) wonderful paper, titled, *Doing Goethean Science*.

374 Portus (2019) meant when referring to the need for a 'vibrant ecosystem'). This development in sport 375 science is not forged through a rigid, hypothesis-driven question developed ex-situ and retrofitted to 376 a specific performance context. Rather is created by a *delicate hope* of finding a way to carry on, in a 377 unique direction, together; growing knowledge of and with phenomena in contexts of practice and 378 performance. Note, such propositions do not diminish the importance of experimentation. Rather, 379 when practised as an art of inquiry, experimentation is not just about proving or disproving 380 hypotheses developed in advance, tested in de-contextualised settings, but is about giving things a go 381 - watching, listening, and feeling to how things respond in place - not to know more, but to help us 382 know better.

383 We have elaborated, at length, on the potential value of transdisciplinarity for the sport sciences 384 elsewhere (see Woods et al., 2021a), but here, it is important to briefly re-visit four dimensions of 385 transdisciplinary research as outlined by Alfonso Montuori (2013) given their practical alignment with 386 Ingold's (2013) art of inquiry. First, transdisciplinarity is inquiry-based, not disciplinary-based. This 387 means that research questions should emerge, not just from (pre)formed ideas or disciplinary 388 concepts developed ex-situ, but through continued correspondence with phenomenon that has 389 caught our attention, leading one to (self) discover what it has to say. Montuori (2008) suggests that 390 because of the deeply personal interest which drives transdisciplinary research, this approach pushes 391 against 'reproductive education' - where an established body of knowledge is consumed and 392 reproduced in order to comply with established tenets of a defined disciplinary framework or concept 393 (perhaps intended to 'fill gaps within the literature'). Thus, given the sense of misfit and nomadism 394 associated with this first dimension, the sport science researcher practising an art of inquiry could be 395 understood, not just as an artisan, but also as a perpetual traveller⁷ who weaves together pertinent lines of inquiry as they go: 396

⁷ We borrow this phrase from Woods et al. (2021a).

397 "Inquiry means exploration and feeling alive, it means welcoming the mystery of life, not in order
398 to control it but to more fully *participate* in it [...] The more you inquire, the more the world is a
399 source of wonder [...] in the sense that every new advance probably exposes more new
400 *unknowns.*" (Montuori, 2008, p. 17, paraphrased)

401 Second, transdisciplinarity adopts a complex systems perspective, which counters the traditional, 402 reductionist, interactional and internalised notion of making through thinking. Moreover, this 403 perspective encourages researchers to view phenomena as things (not objects) – that is, as places of 404 entanglement. This implication has profound meaning for researchers in the sport sciences, as it 405 emphasises that to know of phenomena is to be able to correspond with its story of becoming, moving 406 along with its direction of travel (Figure 3). For it is along these places of correspondence where stories 407 are bound together in relation, leading to knowledge growth (Ingold, 2011). Thus, to know a 408 phenomenon, is to know its story. Perhaps, then, sport scientists practising an art of inquiry could see 409 their research as a way of storytelling, going along with the messiness of the lived-in world by 410 transcending passive descriptions about it – manifest in data and 'hard facts'⁸. A brief note regarding 411 our use of the word 'relation': we mean it not as an interaction between complete and bounded 412 entities as objects, but as a (re)tracing of the primary experiences of things (Ingold, 2011). From this 413 perspective, 'to relate' is transactional, joining with the stories of others.

For a sport science practised as an art of inquiry, tools and measures from complexity science and dynamical systems theory could help researchers formalise a phenomenon's entangled story of becoming. To exemplify, in a team game like football, the cluster-phase method could be used to understand the synchrony of player movements – both as a whole team and between individuals within a team – as a function of time, ball possession and field direction (Duarte et al., 2013). Further, various social network analyses could be used to resolve path-dependent passing behaviours by

⁸ For a wonderful insight into the power of storytelling in philosophy and science, see Thom van Dooren's gripping book (2014), *Flight Ways: life and loss at the edge of extinction*.

adopting measures such as centrality (Passos, Araújo, & Volossovitch, 2016). The point here is: sport
science practised as an art of inquiry can help researchers move from the collection of isolated,
reduced and static performance variables, captured 'after fact' (noun-based sport science), toward
the measurement of deeply-contextualised behaviours emerging in real-time (verb-based sport
science)⁹.

425

****INSERT FIGURE THREE ABOUT HERE****

The third key dimension of transdisciplinarity, as proposed by Montuori (2013), is that researchers study with, not about. This means that they include themselves in the inquiry through careful participant observation, not hovering 'drone-like' above in the hope of maintaining 'objectivity' (as the hypothetico-deductive theory of scientific method would advocate). For it is the latter that some argue is the very foundation of scientific inquiry:

431 "But science as it stands rests upon an impossible foundation, for in order to turn the world into
432 an *object* of concern, it has to place itself above and beyond the very world it claims to understand.
433 The conditions that enable scientists to know, at least according to *official protocols*, are such as

434 to make it impossible for scientists to *be* in the very world of which they seek knowledge." (Ingold,

435 2011, p. 75, emphasis added and in original)

By engaging in participant observation, researchers in the sport sciences can remain 'in touch' with a phenomenon, situated in its field of relations (for a recent example of this, see O'Sullivan, Vaughan, Rumbold, & Davids, 2021). This proximity leads to a deep and storied understanding, as the researcher is not just passively documenting events – leading to the production of knowledge about – but is actively transforming *with* what they directly experience and discover for themselves – growing knowledge of. To revisit the earlier mention of Goethe, how could one maintain a conversation with

⁹ While a detailed account of dynamic systems modelling within the sport sciences is beyond this papers direction of travel, we encourage interested readers to consult the work of Araújo and Davids (2016) for a detailed overview.

442 what has caught their attention, if they are forever hovering above events in order to be 'objective'? 443 For by trying to remove oneself, we argue, would be to perpetuate the very dualism that underlines 444 making and doing through thinking. Though, this proposition should not be confused as lessening the 445 importance of searching for truth within a sport science practised as an art of inquiry. Rather, the 446 pursuit of 'objectivity' and the pursuit of 'truth' should not be conflated as being one and the same -447 for where the former is detached from the world, the latter participates deeply with it. The pursuit for 448 truth, then, is an ongoing, sustainable practise of *curiosity* and *care* – a curiosity that compels one to 449 re-search, and a care that sees one concerned about getting the right things, right (Ingold, 2018; 450 Rietveld, 2008, p. 468).

451 This pursuit requires attentiveness and selective responsiveness, both to the immediacy of the 452 situation in its unfolding, and to events emergent on the horizon such that one is able to anticipate where to move next. As an aside, our interpretation of anticipation is influenced by both van Dijk and 453 454 Rietveld (2018) and Ingold (2013), who discuss it not as a prediction, but as a deeply embedded 455 practice of current activity that constrains and keeps open a larger-scaled direction of travel. This 456 approach, importantly, highlights a potential misunderstanding of sport science practised as an art of 457 inquiry. Specifically, if the sport scientist is to view themselves as an artisan who thinks through 458 making and doing, what role then, does planning have? In response to this question, we draw from 459 Keller's (2001) account of an 'umbrella plan', which is understood as a basic assembly of "a 460 constellation of tools and material to carry out the project" (p. 35). Indeed, although an umbrella plan 461 requires forethought on behalf of the researcher, it is thinking not separated from the context in which 462 the phenomenon occurs (Keller, 2001) – meaning, it is part of the process of making. This approach 463 would exemplify a researcher embedded within a sports organisation, making key decisions upon 464 which stakeholders to discuss observations with, which meetings or activities to record and how (i.e., field notes, measurements, analyses, experiments, videos), and which tasks to participate in. Each of 465 466 these things is constrained by, and woven into, the fabric of the sociocultural context one is situated: 467 meaning they do not occur separate to being with the organisation, nor are they solely confined to

468 the mind of the researcher. An umbrella plan, then, is stretched across the entirety of the organisation 469 in relation to the sport scientist's attentive and responsive participation with the ebbs and flows of 470 the everyday goings on. This means that contrary to popular belief, to anticipate where one is going, 471 it is not a requisite to log or plan out every step in-advance – nor even to have a determined 'end' in 472 sight - so long as one maintains a selective openness to the available invitations to act, enabling them 473 to carry on (Ingold, 2013; van Dijk & Rietveld, 2018). In other words, an umbrella plan – in sport science 474 practised as an art of inquiry – provides intentionality, which does not determine the research but 475 guides its determining, shaped by the embodied, skilled attentiveness and responsiveness of the 476 researcher to the ebbs and flows of place.

477 The last dimension of transdisciplinarity is that it is meta(trans)-paradigmatic, not intra-paradigmatic 478 (Montuori, 2013). This view frees sport scientists from the perhaps hidden and unchallenged shackles 479 of their path-dependent disciplinary ways of doing, endorsing a refusal to conform (Montuori, 2005). 480 This approach means that sport scientists can be responsive to many different ways of doing and 481 being, opening themselves to other paradigms such as interpretivism to explore how 'forms of life' in 482 sport organisations and institutions emerge through variations in everyday activities (for recent 483 examples, see Uehara, et al., 2018; O'Sullivan et al., 2021; Vaughan, et al., 2019). Our own research 484 on enskilment within the sport sciences (i.e., learning as inseparable from doing in place) has seen us 485 correspond with paradigms from fields like anthropology and ecological psychology (see Woods, 486 Rudd, Gray, & Davids, 2021b). The point here being: sport science practised as an art of inquiry does 487 not integrate knowledge vertically (i.e., within disciplinary paradigms), but grows it along paths of 488 travel – in-between, through and beyond landscapes.

489 Conclusion

By advocating for sport science as an art of inquiry, we sought to refocus attention toward the phenomena in context, thereby challenging some traditional conventions of sport science founded upon the hypothetico-deductive theory of scientific method, which advocates reduction,

493 fragmentation and classification. Through a notion of artisanship, we argued for sport scientists to 494 think through making and doing (emphasising a verb-based approach), as opposed to make and do 495 through thinking (demoting the current noun-based dominance). Where the latter integrates 496 knowledge-as-production by way of verticality, the former grows knowledge through correspondence, 497 joining with the stories of things in their becoming, carefully attending and responding to what such 498 things have to say, and where such things have to lead. This makes sport science practised as an art 499 of inquiry, both wonderous and wandering – unbound by conventional ways of doing or being. 500 Because of this, it is humble, rooted in its ontological commitment that we – as sport scientists – are 501 also things, who have as much to learn from the phenomena we study, as the phenomena from us. 502 This is why sport science practised as an art of inquiry is transformative, in-among, rather than 503 documentary, out-above.

504 In following key ideas advocated by van Dijk and Rietveld (2018) and Ingold (2013), we argued that 505 researchers in sport science practising an art of inquiry are indeed able to maintain a grip on the 506 immediacy of the goings on of things, while concurrently looking ahead to improvise a way forward. 507 This means that sport scientists do not need to plan every step out in advance, nor do they require 508 fixed end-points or destinations. In fact, the mere suggestion of such would go against its very 509 ontological commitment. This proposition draws into question the inherent determinacy of traditional 510 systemic conventions of training within the sport sciences, like that of doctoral candidates who are 511 often required to present a proposal of research covering three or more years of study within only six 512 months of enrolment. Such determinate planning risks leaving little room for attending and selectively 513 responding to what phenomena may have to say - to correspond with its story of becoming - leading to an inadvertent hylomorphism. This is because, to us, sport science is founded upon an oft-514 515 unchallenged separation of knowledge from the processes of knowing; viewing phenomena as objects 516 of analysis, not as things of synthesis temporally suspended in movement. What this can risk leading 517 to is a view of sport science as one of determinable rule following, which fails to appreciate the skill 518 of the researcher. For as philosopher of science Joseph Rouse (1987) suggests, "science is first and

foremost knowing one's way about in the laboratory (or clinic, field site)" – implying that it is the craft (or dare we say, *artisanship*) of the scientist which leads to (re)discovery, not abstract universals or passive rule following. Thus, it is our belief that by bringing together knowledge with its process of growth, thereby appreciating the skilled artisanship of researchers, sport scientists practicing an art of inquiry can progress the field forward, into places not determined, but *determining as they go*.

524 Indeed, there may be those who contend that what we have proposed here is overly esoteric or 525 perhaps even 'too soft' in scientific discourse. To this, we would respond by saying that sport science 526 practised as an art of inquiry is intended to be replete with emotion and feeling – it should matter to 527 us; we should care about it. If this is deemed as being 'overly philosophical' or not 'objective enough' 528 for mainstream science within sport, then perhaps it is more telling of the state of sport science, than 529 of our propositions. After all, should we not care about what we spend our time coming to know and how? Should we not immerse ourselves within what captivates and matters to us? Should we not be 530 531 open and responsive to what we study, as sport scientists? In answering such questions, we may not 532 just come to know what we seek to understand through shared primary experiences as inhabitants -533 *in-among* – but we may also come to better know ourselves in the very midst of becoming.

534 Epilogue: To write a paper, is to carry on with

535 We now find ourselves at a point of this paper in which convention would say that it is finished, or at least finishing. But to say that this paper is finished, is to have missed its very point. For it would be to 536 assume that we had a fully formed idea at its 'beginning', simply waiting to be written up -to537 538 reproduce the visible by way of making through thinking – matching what you are reading against an 539 idea determined prior to. The reality, though, is that where we are now is a place that has emerged 540 through attending to smaller invitations to write as we followed the paper in its unfolding. This means that our thinking was very much emergent through the words and sentences written, reflected upon 541 542 and woven together while improvising a way forward. While this did require forethought, it was 543 thinking not isolated to our minds, as if being some higher-level 'cognitive' process going on separate to the paper. But it was rather spread across, and constrained by, the many conversations, emails,
books, drafts, sketches, notes, reviewer and editor comments and suggestions, and numerous places
in which we walked and jogged while attending and selectively responding to our paper's direction of
travel. That is, it was stretched across the various timescales of the paper's becoming, within its
manifold relations.

549 So, to us, this is more like pause – a moment of inhalation – catching our breath while searching for a 550 way to *carry on*, toward the next place, wherever or whatever that may be. Importantly, as our 551 knowledge has grown through the process of this paper's becoming, we are not the same sport 552 scientists we were when writing the prologue, or sections thereafter. This is because we learnt *from* 553 the process of this paper's becoming. It has, in other words, been transformative rather than 554 documentational; processual rather than projective; you have been reading *with* us, not *about* what 555 we have written.

556 By implication, if there is no finish to this paper, then there was no beginning. This is to say that this 557 paper is a continuation of our ongoing wayfinding, entangled somewhere in-between where we have 558 been, and where we are going (wherever that may be). What could be said, then, about the papers 559 we write - such as this - if our concern is less to view them as 'phrase books', finished, manicured 560 products filled with determinate content explicitly chosen to be transmitted into the minds of others, 561 and more to view them as places of goings on, entangled off-shoots leading out in various directions 562 that attentive readers can selectively respond to while going along their own personal direction of 563 travel? In thinking through this question, we stumbled into the resonate words of essayist, Rebecca 564 Solnit (2001, p. 72, emphasis added), who, like us, views the books she writes not as objects with end 565 points, but as ongoing things, wandering off through various terrain:

566 "To write is to carve a new path through a terrain of the imagination, or to point out new features
567 on a familiar route. To read is to travel through the terrain with the author as the guide – a guide

568 one may not always agree with, but one who can at least be counted upon to take one 569 *somewhere.*"

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672 **Figure 1.** The vertical integration of knowledge production as *making through thinking*

Note, the straight black line denotes the sport scientist occupying a world of objects to be known
about by way of concepts, theories and paradigms, while the shaded grey of the phenomena inhabits
of world of things; blurred, messy and stretched along paths of travel

676

Figure 2. Knowledge about phenomena, analysed as objects, connected up in a multidisciplinarynetwork

679 Note, the connected heavy black lines represent a multidisciplinary team of sport scientists. Each dot

is a zoomed-out perspective of what is shown in Figure 1. The shaded grey line, by contrast, denotes

the phenomena studied about. The network is static and enclosed on itself, while the phenomena is

682 dynamic, messy, open and ongoing.

683

684 Figure 3. Sport science as art of inquiry, leading to knowledge growth through correspondence

Note, correspondence is messy and entangling, as both the sport scientist and phenomena are, of
 course, *things*. This means that the relation established through correspondence is not an interaction
 of objects, but a *joining together of things becoming*.