The *Manchester Guardian*, C. P. Scott, and the Irish Question 1919-1922

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Candidate Declaration

I hereby declare that:

I have not been enrolled for another award of the University, or other academic or professional organisation, whilst undertaking my research degree.

None of the material contained in the thesis has been used in any other submission for an academic award.

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The word count of the thesis is 85, 952 words.

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Abstract

This thesis illuminates the connection between the *Manchester Guardian,* the Irish question, and British politics at the apex of Ireland's revolution (1919-1922). This is achieved through analysis both of material published in the newspaper and of the extensive Guardian Archive at John Rylands Library in Manchester. It provides the first in-depth study of a connection neglected in previous historiography, despite the fact that the *Guardian* was a keystone of British liberalism in the early twentieth century which had a long-standing commitment to reporting on and discussing Anglo-Irish politics and conflict. Through analysis of the editorial commentary of C. P. Scott, this thesis sheds light on the *Guardian's* stance on key themes in Anglo-Irish history including self-determination, violence, and the significance of Ireland's relationship with Britain and its empire. Going beyond analysis of published material, it also unearths the influences on the newspaper's editorial content on Ireland, including the multi-directional connections between Scott, *Guardian* readers, and influential figures in national and imperial politics, and the impact of propaganda and censorship. The study enhances understanding of the *Guardian's* politics and editorial ideology, and highlights the important role played by Scott in British public discussion on Ireland at this time. The Irish question was central to the relationship between the *Manchester Guardian's* liberal political stance and British national and imperial politics between 1919 and 1922, and this thesis reflects on how the newspaper's liberal philosophy played out in practice in its coverage of the Irish question. Taken as a whole, the thesis offers new perspectives on the place of the *Manchester Guardian* within the British press and British politics, on the role of the press in the Irish revolution, and on the importance of the Irish question to British liberalism, the British nation, and the British Empire in the early twentieth century.

Contents

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♥

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Chapter 1

Introduction

'The "Guardian" under Scott provided an effective voice for that England which resists the pervasive influence of the Great South of England Metropolis, and demonstrated superbly that English journalism need not be synonymous with Fleet Street journalism: and Scott was the voice of English Liberalism in its great day'.[1]

- Hamilton Owens, Editor of the *Baltimore Sun,* 1944

After the death of Editor W. P. Crozier in 1944, tributes were sent from all over the world to the offices of the *Manchester Guardian (MG)* newspaper, still based at that time on Cross Street, Manchester, in the North-West of England. These tributes celebrated Crozier as 'a very able man, a terrific worker, solid… indispensable'.[2] But the main reason Crozier received such praise was because he had, as the fourth editor of the *Guardian*, upheld a journalistic tradition established before he himself had taken the helm. It was Crozier's success in maintaining 'the great traditions that C. P. Scott created', which made him so worthy of acclaim.[3] The 'Scott tradition' was grounded in the liberal ideology and politics of the second editor of the newspaper, Charles Prestwich Scott, and established in the previous century during debates over Irish Home Rule. From then on, Scott and the *Guardian* were confirmation that London was not the sole hub of British journalism or politics. As recognised in the tribute to Crozier above by the editor of the *Baltimore Sun*, Hamilton Owens, it was a newspaper and editor based in Manchester that was the vanguard of English liberalism before its interwar decline. The *Manchester Guardian* and C. P. Scott are the subjects of this thesis, as is the flagship political issue that concerned the renowned editor for a generation: the Irish question.

This introductory chapter begins by discussing the aims and scope of this thesis. It then seeks to position the thesis within its broader historical context by providing insight into the Irish question and the *Guardian* connection in the period before 1919, the date when this study

[1] Mr. Hamilton Owens, Editor of the Baltimore Sun, in 'W. P. Crozier: U.S. and Canadian Tributes', *Manchester Guardian*, 19 April 1944.
[2] *New Statesman and Nation*, in W. P. Crozier: Further Tributes, *Manchester Guardian*, 22 April 1944.
[3] *The Spectator*, in W. P. Crozier: Further Tributes, *Manchester Guardian*, 22 April 1944.

begins. The third section of the Introduction moves on to position the thesis in relationship to existing scholarship on the *Guardian*, the Irish revolution, and British liberalism in order to highlight the new contributions provided by the research. This chapter then discusses the conceptual frameworks, primary sources and methodology of the study. Finally, it outlines the structure of the thesis as a whole, and explains the rationale for specific chapters.

Thesis Aims and Scope

This thesis illuminates the intimate relationship between the *Manchester Guardian* and the Irish question at the height of Ireland's revolution between 1919 and 1922.[4] It demonstrates the significance of Ireland to the newspaper's history, and to its editor C. P. Scott. It sheds light on Scott's editorial commentary on Anglo-Irish politics and conflict, and the influences that shaped the *Guardian's* stance. It also develops understanding of how readers engaged with these views via the correspondence columns, the *Guardian's* influence on these readers, and thus Scott and his newspaper's broader significance in Anglo-Irish politics. By focussing closely on the Irish question, this thesis seeks to provide a more nuanced and holistic analysis than hitherto of the *Guardian's* politics and practices, and of its importance as a newspaper and a beacon of English liberalism in the interwar period. It also aims to offer new insights into the relationship between the Irish question and liberalism, between the British press and the Irish revolution, and between press and politics in the early twentieth century.

The *Guardian* was a 'quality' daily newspaper that was frequently acknowledged nationally and internationally as the liberal voice of the English press in the early twentieth century, despite its distance from London and from Fleet Street. The exceptional status of the *Guardian* as historically provincial in character but possessing a reputation that breached national borders, warrants the concentrated attention on the newspaper in this thesis. From the Act of Union 1801 the Irish question shaped political life in England, having a particular impact on liberal politics and ideology in the Victorian period. The *Guardian* reported on Anglo-Irish politics as the 'voice of English Liberalism'.[5] This thesis argues that after the First

[4] The Irish revolutionary period is recognised in most Irish histories as spanning the early 1910s to the early 1920s. For debates on defining the period, see Peter Hart, 'Definition: Defining the Irish Revolution' in Joost Augusteijn (ed.) *The Irish Revolution 1913-1923* (Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 17-33.

[5] Mr. Hamilton Owens, Editor of the Baltimore Sun, in 'W. P. Crozier: U.S. and Canadian Tributes', *Manchester Guardian*, 19 April 1944.

World War, the Irish question continued as an imperative matter for the *Guardian* as the leading liberal newspaper, and central to its engagement in national and imperial politics.

The chronological scope of this thesis was selected to cover the period between the beginning of the Irish War of Independence in 1919, which marked the climax of Irish nationalist efforts to secure political self-determination, and the start of the Irish Civil War in 1922, which began after formal acceptance of the Anglo-Irish Treaty by the Irish republican parliament, Dáil Éireann. The Treaty transformed Ireland's relationship with Britain, and it marked the end of Scott's preoccupation with Ireland. The period selected for study also coincides with Scott's most active years of editorial writing, a period over which Ireland was his main topic of comment. These immediate years after the First World War are also significant as a period of great political turmoil in British domestic and imperial politics. The chronological scope of this thesis thus also enables it to contribute to wider scholarly debates about these developments.

Historical Background: The Irish Question and the *Guardian*, 1886-1918

In 1886 Prime Minister William Gladstone introduced the First Irish Home Rule Bill to the British Parliament. Gladstone's Bill was the first to propose change to the structures of government in Ireland to appease Irish nationalism, which had evolved since the Union. It proposed to devolve power from Westminster to a new assembly that would provide Ireland with a degree of political self-determination. The Bill split the Liberal Party between supporters of Gladstone and Liberal Unionists. Ninety-three Liberal Unionists voted with the Conservatives to oppose Irish Home Rule, and the Bill was defeated. A general election was subsequently called, which resulted in a Conservative Unionist group majority.[6] The *Manchester Guardian* supported Gladstone. It was already one of the most prominent provincial papers, alongside the Leeds Mercury,[7] but Gladstone's Home Rule movement was *the* turning point in the liberal evolution of the newspaper and its editor.[8] Prior to this, Scott had mirrored the Whig politics of his *Guardian* predecessors. Then, as Hammond points out,

[6] Hilary Larkin, *A History of Ireland, 1800-1922, Theatres of Disorder?* (London, 2014), p. 163.
[7] Andrew Walker, 'The Development of the Provincial Press in England c. 1780 - 1914: An overview', *Journalism Studies*, vol. 7 (2006), p. 378.
[8] William Haslam Mills, *The Manchester Guardian: A Century of History* (London, 1921).

'change in the political character of the paper came with the titanic contest over Home Rule'.[9] Indeed Scott's closest confidante, the prominent liberal L. T. Hobhouse, recognised that the Irish question was pivotal to the *Guardian's* development.[10] While it remained a moderate newspaper, Gladstone's Irish Home Rule movement turned the *Guardian* into 'an organ of advanced Liberalism'.[11] The *Guardian* now began to gain a national and international reputation. As former *Guardian* correspondent J. L. Hammond explained, the paper 'took a new place in public life, as the most accomplished and effective voice on the side of Home Rule'.[12] This moment also signalled Scott's direct entry into British politics, as the editor stood (albeit unsuccessfully) for North East Manchester in the 1886 general election.[13]

Despite the defeat of the Irish Home Rule movement in the 1880s, and the split it caused to the Liberal Party, Gladstone returned to Westminster in 1892 and proposed the Second Home Rule Bill. Scott again stood, albeit unsuccessfully, as the Liberal Candidate for North East Manchester in 1892. His increasing political presence helped to consolidate the growing influence of the newspaper.[14] Scott and the *Guardian* supported Gladstone's second Bill, as did the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP), the Irish nationalist party established in 1874 to seek Irish self-determination through constitutional means. The Second Home Rule Bill passed in the Commons in 1893, but it was defeated in the House of Lords by 419 to 41 votes.[15] After another defeat Gladstone retired and the Tories secured victory in the 1895 general election. Scott himself was elected for the first time that year as Liberal MP for Leigh,[16] but the 1895 election signified the beginning of ten years of Conservative Unionist national government in Britain.

[9] J. L. Hammond, 'C. P. Scott 1846-1932', in A. P. Wadsworth (ed.), *C. P. Scott, 1846-1932, The Making of the Manchester Guardian* (London, 1946), p. 39.
[10] L. T. Hobhouse, 'Liberal and Humanist', A. P. Wadsworth (ed.), *C. P. Scott, 1846-1932, The Making of the Manchester Guardian* (London, 1946) p. 84.
[11] C. E. Montague, 'Journalist and Editor', in A. P. Wadsworth (ed.), *C. P. Scott 1846-1832, The Making of the Manchester Guardian,* (London, 1946), p. 72.
[12] Hammond, 'C. P. Scott 1846-1932', p. 40.
[13] P. F. Clarke, *Lancashire and New Liberalism* (Cambridge, 1971), p. 158.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Larkin, *A History of Ireland, 1800-1922, Theatres of Disorder?*, pp. 164-165.
[16] Clarke, *Lancashire and New Liberalism*, p. 158.

Divisions in the Liberal Party over the Irish question, as well as over imperial policy surrounding the outbreak of the Boer War (1899), contributed to the repeated Liberal defeats on a national level over the next decade. The party also continually failed to capture the working-class vote that enabled Tory dominance, as was clear in the Khaki Election of 1900.[17] The growing presence of the Independent Labour Party and the establishment of the Labour Representation Committee in 1900 further demonstrated that liberalism in its current form was insufficient to attract working-class support. By the early twentieth century a rethinking of liberalism and its role in British society was needed.

From the 1890s, C. P. Scott, alongside a number of prominent liberals including L. T. Hobhouse and J. A. Hobson, recognised the shortcomings of the old liberalism and sought to progress liberal philosophy and politics.[18] Developments in liberal thought and policy manifested in the 'new liberalism'. New liberalism was more statist in its view, acknowledging the limitations of *laissez-faire* in assuring individual liberty.[19] New liberals saw government intervention as necessary in securing equality and freedom for all.[20] This ideology underpinned the Liberal Party's policies around social welfare that secured working-class votes and Liberal victory in the 1906 election.[21] Scott had stood down from parliamentary politics in 1905 when he became proprietor of the *Guardian* after the death of its former owner, John Edward Taylor,[22] but the editor's contribution to the new liberal movement was significant.[23]

When the Liberal Party secured power in 1906, it was ten years after Gladstone's second defeat on the Irish question, and Irish Home Rule was no longer the main priority for the party. But in 1910 the House of Lords rejected Lloyd George's People's Budget, which was grounded in new liberal ideology. This triggered a constitutional crisis and two general

[17] Ibid.
[18] James Robert Moore, 'Progressive Pioneers: Manchester Liberalism, the Independent Labour Party, and Local Politics in the 1890s', *The Historical Journal*, vol. 4 (2001), pp. 989-992.
[19] L. T. Hobhouse, *Liberalism* (London, 1911), pp. 78-100, and Michael Freeden, *The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform* (Oxford, 1978).
[20] Peter Weiler, *The New Liberalism, Liberal Social Theory in Great Britain 1889-1914* (London, 1982).
[21] Moore, 'Progressive Pioneers: Manchester Liberalism, the Independent Labour Party, and Local Politics in the 1890s', pp. 989-992.
[22] David Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper* (Ithaca, 1978), pp. 316-319.
[23] Moore, 'Progressive Pioneers: Manchester Liberalism, the Independent Labour Party, and Local Politics in the 1890s', pp. 989-992.

elections that were fought on the question of House of Lords reform. The Liberal government was forced to seek backing from the Irish Parliamentary Party in these elections. This was granted on condition that the Liberal Party would actively advocate, once again, for Irish Home Rule. Support from the IPP resulted in the reform of the House of Lords, a change that Scott and the *Guardian* had advocated with Irish Home Rule in mind as early as 1907.[24] The Parliamentary Reform Act 1911 capped the veto privileges of the Lords to two years for any one bill, to the benefit of Liberals and Irish Nationalist MPs in the Commons.

On 11th April 1912, Liberal Prime Minister H. H. Asquith introduced the Third Home Rule Bill to Parliament. The Bill was similar to Gladstone's proposals, but it was also intended to give Ireland continued, but reduced, representation in the British Parliament.[25] The Bill was fervently opposed by British and Irish Unionists, particularly Sir Edward Carson MP, Leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP).[26] The UUP was formally linked to the Conservative Party in Britain from 1912. But this Ulster Unionist opposition went beyond parliament. A popular political and military resistance movement concentrated in the north-eastern counties of Ulster with Protestant majorities, also emerged in 1912. This resistance was formalised by the unveiling of the Ulster Covenant by Carson in Belfast on 28th September that year. The Ulster Unionists set up a provisional government in Belfast in 1913 and formed a 90,000 strong paramilitary force called the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) with the intention of resisting Home Rule with force.[27] Some British Army officers stationed in Ireland also defied government orders to suppress the resistance. A well-known example was the 'Curragh incident' of March 1914, at the main British Army base in Ireland.[28]

The *Guardian* was highly critical of Ulster Unionists throughout the Home Rule Crisis. Scott believed the Bill would 'secure the great object of pacification and good government in

[24] C. P. Scott, Untitled, *Manchester Guardian*, 28 January 1907.
[25] Larkin, *A History of Ireland, 1800-1922, Theatres of Disorder?,* p. 204.
[26] D. George Boyce, 'Carson, Edward Henry, Baron Carson (1854–1935)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Online, 2014).
[27] Graham Walker, *The History of the Irish Unionist Party: Protest, Pragmatism and Pessimism* (Manchester, 2004), p.36.
[28] Ronan Fanning, *Fatal Path: British Government and Irish Revolution 1910-1922* (London, 2013), pp. 111-116.

Ireland',[29] maintaining that Ireland could not be divided and that Home Rule was inevitable.[30] This championing of Home Rule was important to local politics in Manchester as well as the unfolding national picture, as the *Guardian* challenged the militant Orangeism that had underpinned local conservatism in Lancashire mill towns from the late nineteenth century.[31] Despite Ulster's resistance, the Third Home Rule Bill received Royal Assent in September 1914. The Liberal government utilised its new powers to overrule objections from the House of Lords, and the Government of Ireland Act 1914 was passed. The Act was suspended, however, due to the outbreak of WWI.[32]

The Great War had a major impact on the Irish nationalist movement. As David Fitzpatrick maintains, it 'destabilised Irish politics and helped create the conditions for the revolution which followed'.[33] The Easter Rising in 1916 and the subsequent executions of the Irish nationalists involved by the British government had a significant impact on how the Irish public viewed its relationship with Britain. It 'alienated the majority of Irish public opinion' and widened support for republicanism.[34] Scott objected to the Easter Rising but recognised that harsh retaliation by the government would have a detrimental impact on moderate Irish nationalist opinion.[35] A proposal for Irish conscription in April 1918 further aggravated public opinion in Ireland. Scott also criticised this move for the radicalising impact it would have.[36]

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[29] C. P. Scott, 'Ulster and the Proposed Conference', *Manchester Guardian*, 15 September 1913.
[30] C. P. Scott, 'Lord Loreburn's Appeal', *Manchester Guardian*, 12 September 1913, and 'Ulster and the Proposed Conference', *Manchester Guardian,* 15 September 1913, and 'The Reasons for a Conference', *Manchester Guardian,* 18 September 1913, and 'Ulster and the Home Rule Bill', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 October 1913, and 'The Case of Ulster', *Manchester Guardian*, 09 October 1913, and 'Irish Unity', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 October 1913, and 'Conciliation and the Irish question', *Manchester Guardian*, 27 October 1913, and 'Sir Edward Grey's Speeches', *Manchester Guardian*, 28 October 1913, and 'Mr Redmond's Plea for Unity', *Manchester Guardian*, 15 November 1913, and 'Lord Lansdowne and Ulster', *Manchester Guardian*, 19 November 1913, and 'A Plan to Settle the Irish question', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 November 1913.
[31] Patrick Joyce, *Work, Society, and Politics, The Culture of the Factory in Later Victorian England* (London, 1980), ch. 8.
[32] Larkin, *A History of Ireland, 1800-1922, Theatres of Disorder?*, p. 209.
[33] David Fitzpatrick, 'Introduction', in David Fitzpatrick (ed.), *Ireland and the First World War* (Dublin, 1986), p. vii.
[34] Shereen Ilahi, *Imperial Violence and the Path to Independence, India, Ireland and the Crisis of Empire* (London, 2016), p. 6.
[35] C. P. Scott, 'The Irish Irreconcilables', *Manchester Guardian,* 26 April 1916, and 'The Irish Rising', *Manchester Guardian,* 27 April 1916, and 'Ireland and the Rising', *Manchester Guardian,* 28 April 1916, and 'Sequels to Rebellion', *Manchester Guardian,* 04 May 1916, and 'The Dublin Executions', *Manchester Guardian,* 06 May 1916, and 'The Dublin Executions', *Manchester Guardian,* 09 May 1916.
[36] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland and Compulsory Service', *Manchester Guardian,* 06 April 1918, and 'Conscription for Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 April 1918, and 'Ireland and Conscription', *Manchester Guardian,* 22 April 1918*,* and 'The Vatican and Conscription for Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian,* 26 April 1918, and 'Ireland and

As he anticipated, the policy inspired further support for the republican party, Sinn Féin,[37] and popular support for Sinn Féin was manifested in the 1918 general election. The republican party gained 73 of the 105 Irish seats, and the Unionists won 26 seats focused in the norther-eastern counties of Ulster, while The IPP only retained 6 seats, suffering a 63 seat loss.[38] The IPP had directed Irish politics with its moderate nationalist stance since the Gladstone era, but popular opinion now favoured Sinn Féin. In contrast to the IPP, Sinn Féin refused to participate in the British Parliament. On 21st January 1919 the republican nationalists set up their own parliamentary body, Dáil Éireann, in Dublin, and declared Irish independence.[39] This marks the point at which the investigation in this thesis begins.

Historiography

This section highlights the ways in which this study engages with existing scholarship. It addresses the work of historians focused on the *Manchester Guardian* itself, to demonstrate the prior lack of attention given to the Irish question in the newspaper's history, especially in the interwar years. It also illuminates how the *Guardian's* editorial ideology and influence has previously been viewed, providing a foundation for this thesis to expand on, and challenge, prior understandings. Successive sub-sections position the thesis in relation to histories of the *Manchester Guardian*, the literature on the Irish revolution and the press, and scholarship on the Irish question in British politics.

Histories of the *Manchester Guardian*

The *Manchester Guardian's* support for Gladstonian Home Rule following the introduction of the 1886 Bill has long been recognised as a crucial moment in the evolution of the politics and reputation of the newspaper, and its editor C. P. Scott.[40] However, while there are a number of histories of the *Manchester Guardian*, most of which indicate Irish Home Rule as important to the newspaper, the earlier histories neglect to discuss what Scott and the *Guardian* actually said about Ireland. This is especially the case for the later decades of Scott's editorship, when

Conscription', *Manchester Guardian,* 01 May 1918, and 'Labour and Conscription in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 16 May 1918, and 'The End of Conscription in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 20 May 1918.

[37] John Horne, 'Our War, Our History', in John Horne (ed.), *Our War: Ireland and the Great War* (Dublin, 2008), p.6.

[38] Michael Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence* (Dublin, 2004), p. 21.

[39] Ibid, p. 115.

[40] Mills, *The Manchester Guardian: A Century of History*.

debates over Irish political self-determination climaxed. For example, William Haslam Mills, in his centenary history (1921) focuses on the early decades of the newspaper's life, its role in Manchester, and the Whig politics that characterised the paper until C. P. Scott became editor in 1871. More attention is given to the *Guardian's* stance on the Boer War than the Irish question.[41] Indeed, *Guardian* histories prior to this thesis tend to focus on its involvement in the anti-Boer War movement, despite the *Guardian's* concern with the Irish question preceding and surpassing its concern for the war in South Africa. In fact, J. L. Hammond considers the controversy over the Boer War as a revival of 'all the passions that had been excited in 1886 over Home Rule'.[42]

Mills' history of the *Guardian* came too early to fully engage with the Irish question during the period with which this thesis is concerned. Nevertheless, even those histories that succeeded Mills' work, which give more appropriate attention to the importance of Ireland, still fail to provide any meaningful discussion of the *Guardian's* content on the subject. J. L. Hammond's biography of Scott published in 1934 devotes two chapters of the biography to the subject of Ireland. The content of these chapters is, however, predominantly verbatim reproductions of extracts from Scott's diaries and correspondence. Analysis of what these diary entries and letters actually meant and how these were reflected in the editorial columns of the *Guardian* is lacking, as is engagement with the broader political context.[43] Likewise, the first edited collection of *Guardian* history published in 1946 by A. P. Wadsworth reprints some of Scott's writings, including a leader on Ireland, but there is no analysis of what Scott said and why, or how this related to British national and imperial politics.[44] Mills, Hammond, and Wadsworth were all former *Guardian* reporters, and Wadsworth was editor of the newspaper when his contribution to *Guardian* historiography was published.[45] As such, this scholarship is largely hagiographical.

[41] Mills, *The Manchester Guardian: A Century of History.*
[42] Hammond, 'C. P. Scott 1846-1932', p. 41.
[43] J. L. Hammond, *C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian* (London, 1934).
[44] A. P. Wadsworth (ed.), *C. P. Scott, 1846-1932, The Making of the Manchester Guardian* (Manchester, 1946).
[45] Linton Andrews, revised by Mark Pottle, 'Wadsworth, Alfred Powell (1891-1956), *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Online, 2004).

In addition to these early publications by *Guardian* staff, a number of scholarly studies have appeared. David Ayerst has written the most comprehensive study of the *Guardian* to date.[46] His 1971 monograph provides insight into the mechanics of the *Guardian* from 1821-1956, but again, discussion of the *Guardian's* relationship with British politics is limited. As with many histories of the press, less attention is given to the paper's content and more to issues such as commercialisation and proprietorship, the rise of 'new journalism', and the impact of technological and legislative developments on the industry in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. While Ayerst does point to the *Guardian's* interest in Anglo-Irish politics in the interwar years, a close discussion of its stance on the issue is beyond the scope of the study. Michael Mckeown's PhD thesis, completed the following year (1972), attempts to shed some light on ideological facets of the *Guardian,* but the focus is pre-1914 and the Irish question is neglected. Mckeown focuses mainly on the *Guardian's* role in general election campaigns from 1900-1910, while missing the importance of the Irish nationalist movement to these broader developments in British politics.[47]

The first study of the *Guardian* to effectively analyse the newspaper's editorial ethos and stance on issues of national and imperial political importance, is Mark Hampton's 2001 article on the *Guardian* and the Boer War. Hampton argues that the *Guardian* was central to the anti-war movement as Scott attempted to influence the British public via the editorial segments of the newspaper. He also argues that the *Guardian* was committed to a culture of public discussion in the early twentieth century, maintaining that the newspaper promoted politics by considering the press a forum for public debate. This thesis offers a more nuanced analysis of the relationship between press and public on key matters of politics through discussing the influences at play on the editorial line, and the nature of readership engagement.

In addition, Hampton maintains that the influence of the *Guardian* was limited because its circulation was small in comparison to other 'quality dailies' such as *The Times*, and because

[46] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*.
[47] Michael Dennis Mckeown, 'The principles and politics of the "Manchester Guardian" under C. P. Scott to 1914', (Unpublished PhD thesis, Case Western Reserve University, 1972).

working men who made up the mass electorate did not read it.[48] However, as explored in Chapter 7, the *Guardian* readership was in fact more complex than press historians such as Hampton have previously recognised and should not, therefore, be collapsed down to the category of 'Liberal elites'. This thesis argues that while *Guardian* readers were largely educated, middle-class and politically liberal, and the working-class audience was indeed limited, defining *Guardian* readers purely by this category of 'Liberal elites' is reductive. Moreover, despite its small-scale circulation and lack of a 'mass readership', the nature of the *Guardian's* reach and reputation ensured that it had a very significant influence on political debate in a local, national, and global context. In focussing on the Irish question, this thesis also challenges the overriding emphasis in previous scholarship that the Boer War was the most important issue taken up by the *Guardian* during Scott's editorship.[49]

Another aspect of Hampton's study is the assertion that the *Guardian's* commitment to non-partisan news gathering limited its coverage.[50] This is a view also shared by Nicholas Owen, whose later article (2012) explores the influence the *Guardian* had on metropolitan anti-imperialism through its reporting of colonial violence in India, 1930-1932. Like Hampton, Owen argues that the *Guardian's* insistence on impartial news gathering ultimately hindered its reporting. Owen maintains that the voices of the oppressed did not qualify as 'truth' or 'fact' as they were not deemed 'impartial' or 'independent', whereas those providing insight from positions of power were considered more reliable. In turn, this limited the presence of Indian voices within the newspaper and thus its critique of British imperialism.[51] Chapter 7 of this thesis reflects on how the *Guardian's* readership may have been constrained by the newspaper's moderate approach to colonial grievances. Readers looking for more damning accounts of empire, from the perspectives of victims, would have read titles such as the *Labour Leader* or the *Daily Herald* instead. The new Labour press, which emerged in the early twentieth century, provided popular radical alternatives to the *Manchester Guardian*.[52]

[48] Mark Hampton, 'The Press, Patriotism, and Public discussion: C. P. Scott, The *Manchester Guardian*, and the Boer War, 1899-1902', *The Historical Journal*, vol. 44 (2001), p. 196.
[49] Ibid, pp. 183-185.
[50] Ibid, pp. 185-189.
[51] Nicholas Owen, ''Facts are Sacred': The *Manchester Guardian* and Colonial Violence, 1930-1932', *The Journal of Modern History,* vol. 84 (2012), p. 673.
[52] Laura Beers, *Your Britain: Media and the Making of the Labour Party* (London, 2010), ch. 3.

Nevertheless, this thesis sheds additional light on the *Guardian's* inclusion of aggrieved voices, witnesses of violence, and the newspapers' 'trust' in news from those in power. In contrast to Owen's study of India, the *Guardian* covered British violence in Ireland extensively, and exposing this violence of the Crown forces was central to upholding the *Guardian's* own purpose as a newspaper. Hence, during the Irish War of Independence, the *Guardian* did *not* trust news from officials or from government, often using information provided by Irish republican propaganda. Irish voices were also frequently represented and supported by Scott, although these voices still reflected the broader moderate readership. Of course, there is undoubtedly a racial dynamic also at play here concerning the relative authority and value given to Indian and Irish voice, and that warrants future further exploration, although that is beyond the scope of this thesis. The Irish case does, however, support Owen's argument that a key factor enabling anti-imperialist campaigns 'was a steady stream of reliable accounts of injustice and violent repression on the part of the British authorities' which appeared in papers such as the *Guardian*.[53] The *Guardian,* as this thesis will show, did indeed play a significant role in informing and influencing public opinion on Anglo-Irish politics and violence, even though its sympathy for Irish nationalism was constrained by liberal ideology.

Some of the most recent studies of the *Guardian* have sought to give its coverage of the Irish question fuller scholarly attention. David Moore's 2017 MA thesis focuses on the editorial coverage of *The Times* and the *Guardian* on Irish Home Rule during the British constitutional crisis 1910-1911. Moore's thesis is from a legal perspective, however, focussing on the adoption of referendum debates during this period preceding the timeframe of this thesis.[54] Kieran McMorran's 2019 article addresses the *Guardian's* coverage of the Easter Rising 1916, but his approach relies almost solely on published news sources, resulting in a one-dimensional analysis of the *Guardian's* view. This thesis analyses archival material neglected by McMorran in order to illuminate more clearly the connection between the *Guardian* and Irish nationalism. McMorran's limited exploration of the newspaper's politics and editorial ethos also leads him into problematic assumptions of how and why the *Guardian* reported

[53] Nicholas Owen, ''Facts are Sacred': The *Manchester Guardian* and Colonial Violence, 1930-1932', p. 643.
[54] David Frederick Ernest Moore, 'The Times and the Manchester Guardian's editorial perspectives on Irish Home Rule and the adoption of referendum debates during the British constitutional crisis December 1910-August 1911', (Unpublished MA thesis, University of Plymouth, 2017).

the Rising.[55] This thesis seeks to clarify the practical and political intricacies of the connection between the newspaper, its editor, its readers, and the Irish question.

The most recent study on the *Guardian* is Des Freedman's edited collection, *Capitalism's Conscience: 200 Years of the Guardian*, which was published to coincide with the bicentenary of the newspaper in May 2021. Through the reflections of journalists and activists this largely focuses on more recent decades in *Guardian* history, for example, on the *Guardian's* handling of key issues such as the 2016 Brexit referendum.[56] Aaron Ackerley's contribution to this study, 'The Political Economy of the *Guardian',* is the only chapter that addresses the Scott era in any detail, but he is writing on the *Guardian* from a business perspective, and as such, key political issues that defined Scott's editorship are beyond the scope of his work.[57] This latest study has thus neglected the *Guardian's* connection to the Irish question once again. Two hundred years after the *Guardian* was founded, therefore, a reappraisal of Scott and recognition of the place of Ireland in *Guardian* history is still needed. This thesis aims to provide this.

The Irish Revolution and the Press

This section now turns to positioning the thesis within historiography of the Irish revolution. The revolutionary period has been covered extensively by Irish historians, with twentieth-century scholarship being characterised by an early dominance of Irish nationalist historiography,[58] followed by revisionism, as championed by T. W. Moody, R. D. Edwards, and the *Irish Historical Studies* journal from the 1930's.[59] Revisionist historians sought to achieve what they considered the 'de-mythicisation' of Irish history,[60] by challenging the nationalist linear narrative of oppression under British rule, then revolution and liberation, fought for by

[55] Kieran McMorran, ''A German Bred Revolt': the *Manchester Guardian's* perceptions of the Irish Easter Rising, 1916', *Irish Studies Review*, vol. 27 (2019), pp. 564-577.
[56] Mike Wayne, 'The Guardian and Brexit', in Des Freedman (ed.), *Capitalism's Conscience: 200 Years of the Guardian* (London, 2021), pp. 255-274.
[57] Ackerley, Aaron, 'The Political Economy of the Guardian', in Des Freedman (ed.), *Capitalism's Conscience: 200 Years of the Guardian* (London, 2021), pp. 19-40.
[58] For an example see, Dorothy Macardle, *The Irish Republic: A Documented Chronicle of the Anglo-Irish Conflict and the Partitioning of Ireland* (London, 1937).
[59] T. W. Moody and R. D. Edwards, 'Preface to Irish Historical Studies', in Ciaran Brady (ed.), *Interpreting Irish History* (Dublin, 1994), p. 36.
[60] Ciaran Brady, 'Constructive and Instrumental': The Dilemma of Ireland's First 'New Historians', in Ciaran Brady (ed.), *Interpreting Irish History, The Debate on Historical Revisionism* (Dublin, 1994), p. 7.

a united and fierce republican force. Revisionism was subsequently criticised by scholars such as Brendan Bradshaw, writing in the 1980s, who considered it an exercise in desensitising historical writing which washed over Irish experiences of oppression and violence. More recent literature, which has particularly flourished over the decade of centenaries,[61] is providing new approaches. For example, more attention is now given to the role of women in Anglo-Irish politics and the conflict,[62] and gender as an analytical framework is being used to progress debates. The 2021 special issue of the *Irish Studies Review* focussing on 'Revolutionary Masculinities' is emblematic of these developments.[63] Furthermore, Maurice Walsh recognised the 'claustrophobic' nature of studies of the Irish revolution in his 2015 monograph, *Bitter Freedom*. Walsh draws attention to the politically and culturally revolutionary interwar world in which Ireland's struggle for independence took place.[64] Ireland's fight for independence is now increasingly being viewed through a transnational lens, and the global context of the Irish revolution is being recognised.[65]

Historiographical debates in this field have largely focused on the necessity, impact, extent and nature of violence during the conflict, the inevitability of a settlement that resulted in the partition of Ulster and the establishment of Dominion status for nationalist Ireland, and the debates around, and consequences, of the Anglo-Irish Treaty.[66] Dominion status was a term used to refer to the constitutional arrangement of the self-governing nations within the British Empire and under the British Crown. This thesis contributes to these discussions by

[61] Ten years spanning 2012-2022. For more details see, www.decadeofcentenaries.com.
[62] Linda Connolly, *Women and the Irish Revolution* (Newbridge, 2020).
[63] Articles include, Jennifer Redmond, 'Brave enough to fight? Masculinity, migration, and the Irish revolution', *Irish Studies Review*, vol. 29 (1921), pp. 193-211, and Aidan Betty, 'Counter-revolutionary masculinities: gender, social control and revising the chronologies of Irish nationalist politics', *Irish Studies Review*, vol. 29 (1921), pp. 229-242, and Jane G. V. McGaughey, 'Using masculinities as a paradigm for the history of the Irish revolution', *Irish Studies Review*, vol. 29 (1921), pp. 257-262.
[64] Maurice Walsh, *Bitter Freedom: Ireland in a Revolutionary World, 1918-1923* (London, 2015).
[65] Enda Delaney and Fearghal McGarry, 'Introduction: a global history of the Irish Revolution', *Irish Historical Studies*, vol. 44 (2020), pp. 1-10.
[66] Joost Augusteijn (ed.) *The Irish Revolution 1913-1923* (Basingstoke, 2002), and Ronan Fanning, *Fatal Path: British Government and Irish Revolution 1910-1922*, and Michael Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence* (Dublin, 2004), and Ivan Gibbons, *Partition: How and Why Ireland was Divided* (London, 2020), and Robert Lynch, *The Partition of Ireland 1918-1925* (Cambridge, 2019), and Kevin Matthews, *Fatal Influence: The Impact of Ireland on British Politics* (Dublin, 2004), and M. C. Rast, *Shaping Ireland's Independence: Nationalist, Unionist, and British Solutions to the Irish question, 1909-1925* (New York, 2019), and Charles Townshend, *The British Campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921* (Oxford, 1975), and *The Republic: The Fight for Independence, 1919-1923* (London, 2013), and Liam Weeks and Mícheál Ó Fathartaigh (eds.), *The Treaty: Debating and Establishing the Irish Free State* (Newbridge, 2018).

shedding light on the views on these issues and approaches to the Irish question held by the liberal *Guardian* editor C. P. Scott. The literature that this thesis speaks to most directly, however, is that which recognises the significance of the press in the history of the Irish revolution. D. G. Boyce's 1972 monograph *Englishmen and the Irish Troubles*, which addresses the influence of English public opinion on Irish policy, exposes a connection between the English press and developments in Anglo-Irish politics and conflict. Boyce argues that during the War of Independence, English public opinion caused the British government to move beyond Irish Home Rule, away from its policy of suppression, and toward a policy of self-government more far-reaching than ever proposed before: Dominion status for Ireland. He maintains that in turn, Prime Minister David Lloyd George harnessed English public opinion to encourage acceptance of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, which disappointed both republican and unionist aspirations. Boyce highlights the role of the press in reflecting public opinion in England during the Irish revolution, and thus the impact the press had on Anglo-Irish politics.[67]

More recently, G. K. Peatling also recognises the role of the press in shaping British public opinion on Ireland, and thus Irish policy, 'from Unionism to Liberal Commonwealth'. Peatling recognises the role of Scott and the *Guardian* in these political developments prior to the First World War, as part of a broader discussion of the influence of the liberal press. However, Peatling did not consult the Guardian Archive for his study, and completely neglects the *Guardian* for the period 1916-1925, despite Scott's views being central to liberal opinion and broader public discussion on the Irish question at this time. This omission is addressed by this thesis. Advancing Boyce's stance, however, Peatling argues that the liberal press *directed* the opinion of the public on the Irish question, rather than mirrored it.[68] This view places more emphasis on the influence of the press, rather than seeing the press as a representative body, and this issue of whether the press was influential or representative will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

[67] D. G. Boyce, *Englishmen and the Irish Troubles, British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy 1918-22* (London, 1972).
[68] G. K. Peatling, *British Opinion and Irish Self-Government: From Unionism to Liberal Commonwealth* (Dublin, 2001).

Since the publication of Boyce's *Englishmen and the Irish Troubles* and Peatling's *British Opinion and Irish Self-Government,* a sub-field of Anglo-Irish history has emerged that further explores this connection between the newspaper press, in Britain and Ireland, and the revolution. Historians such as Ben Novick and Angus Mitchell have addressed the earlier years of the revolutionary period from an Irish perspective.[69] Felix Larkin and Patrick Maume have considered the relationship between the Irish press and Irish nationalism within the context of Empire.[70] Keiko Inoue demonstrates how Dáil Éireann utilised the press for propaganda purposes during the Irish War of Independence,[71] and Brian P. Murphy illuminates the British propaganda campaign during the conflict.[72] Ian Kenneally's 2008 monograph evaluates the impact of censorship and propaganda on the Irish press. Kenneally also looks at coverage in *The Times* to address the English perspective. *The Times's* coverage was not, however, representative of the entire 'quality' English political press.[73] By exploring C.P. Scott's networks of influence and readership engagement with the *Guardian*, this thesis critiques Kenneally's assumption that *The Times* was Britain's most influential paper as regards the Irish question.

The ways in which the British press engaged with the Irish question has been further illuminated by Maurice Walsh's examination of the role of foreign correspondents in shaping the Irish debate during the War of Independence.[74] In his 2011 monograph, *The News from Ireland: Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*, Walsh shows how British and American journalists reporting on the war from Ireland played a crucial role in the development of international public knowledge and opinion during this period, ultimately influencing the British government's Irish policy. The role of editors and editorial commentary

[69] Ben Novick, 'Propaganda I: Advanced Nationalist Propaganda and Moralistic Revolution, 1914-1918', in Joost Augusteijn (ed.), *The Irish Revolution 1913-1923* (Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 34-52, and Angus Mitchell, 'John Bull's other Empire: Roger Casement and the press, 1898-1916', in Simon J. Potter (ed.), *Newspapers and Empire in Ireland and Britain, Reporting the British Empire, c. 1857-1921* (Dublin, 2004), pp. 217-233.
[70] Felix Larkin, 'The dog in the night-time: the *Freeman's Journal*, the Irish Parliamentary Party and the Empire: 1897-1919', in Simon Potter (ed.), *Newspapers and Empire in Ireland and Britain, Reporting the British Empire, c. 1857-1921* (Dublin, 2004), pp. 109-123, and Patrick Maume, 'The Irish Independent and Empire, 1891-1919', in Simon Potter (ed.), *Newspapers and Empire in Ireland and Britain, Reporting the British Empire, c. 1857-1921* (Dublin, 2004), pp. 124-142.
[71] Keiko Inoue, 'Propaganda II: Propaganda of Dáil Éireann, 1919-1921', in Joost Augusteijn (ed.) *The Irish Revolution 1913-1923* (Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 87-102.
[72] Brian P Murphy, *The Origins & Organisation of British Propaganda in Ireland 1920* (Aubane, 2006).
[73] Ian Kenneally, *The Paper Wall: Newspaper and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921* (Cork, 2008).
[74] Maurice Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution* (London, 2011).

is, however, beyond the scope of Walsh's study. This thesis addresses this gap through focussing predominantly on editorials and examining the role of editor Scott in shaping the *Guardian's* views on Ireland. Nevertheless, the work of journalists is still recognised as integral to the production of editorial content.

The most recent contribution to scholarship on the British press and Ireland is Erin Schoepner's 2019 PhD thesis.[75] Her ambitious study surveys conceptualisations of the Irish question across eleven newspapers from 1917-1921. However, while the *Guardian* is included, the broad scope of the thesis results in more generalised conclusions about the newspaper. In contrast, this thesis's concentration on the *Guardian* allows for more detailed analysis of its perspectives, enabling more nuanced contributions to the historiography. Additionally, as with Peatling and McMorran,[76] Schoepner's thesis does not engage with the paper archives of individual newspapers. Yet, this thesis contends that understanding the behind-the-scenes activity of the press - the activity recorded in the archive - is important for fully understanding published content.[77] Neglect of this archive material renders these previous assessments of the *Guardian's* coverage of the Irish question incomplete.

This thesis reconfigures understandings of the role of the press in Anglo-Irish politics. It argues that, rather than uni-directionally either reflecting or directing public opinion,[78] the *Guardian* operated within the context of a bi-directional relationship between certain sectors of public opinion, specifically liberal and moderate Irish nationalist opinion, and newspaper content curation. Irish news and editorial views simultaneously generated and were guided by these opinions, through networks of journalistic, political, and personal influence. Previous scholarship has emphasised the mass public objection to the British government's Irish policy

[75] Erin Schoepner, ''Miserable conflict and confusion': The Irish question in British Newspapers, 1916-21' (Unpublished PhD thesis, Goldsmiths, University of London, 2019).
[76] McMorran, ''A German Bred Revolt': the *Manchester Guardian's* perceptions of the Irish Easter Rising, 1916', pp. 564-577, and Peatling, *British Opinion and Irish Self-Government: From Unionism to Liberal Commonwealth*.
[77] Adrian Bingham, 'The Digitization of Newspaper Archives: Opportunities and Challenges for Historians', *Twentieth Century British History*, vol. 21 (2010), pp. 225-231, and Aaron Ackerley, 'Economic Ideas in the Interwar British Daily Press' (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Sheffield, 2018).
[78] Boyce, *Englishmen and the Irish Troubles, British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy 1918-22*, and Peatling, *British Opinion and Irish Self-Government: From Unionism to Liberal Commonwealth*, and Schoepner, ''Miserable conflict and confusion': The Irish question in British Newspapers, 1916-21'.

that was stimulated by reports of violence in the press, as the driving influence on both political and militaristic developments in the conflict. This thesis, while agreeing with this argument, contends that influential individuals such as editor C. P. Scott also played a unique role in policy discussions, policies that were eventually implemented by government. While mass opinion was important, just as significant was the work and thinking of small circles of elites, many of whom gravitated around the *Manchester Guardian,* had privileged access to decision-makers, or were the decision makers themselves.

This thesis also takes forward scholarship on the Irish revolution and the press by including a detailed examination on the somewhat neglected post-truce period: the months between the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, which ended the War of Independence, and the outbreak of the Civil War. This thesis illuminates this important stage in the resolution of the Irish question from the *Guardian's* perspective.

The Irish Question and British Politics

The final body of literature this thesis engages with, is that which considers the significance of the Irish question within British politics. As it was recognised as the voice of English liberalism, a detailed understanding of the *Manchester Guardian's* views toward Ireland is crucial to fully grasping the importance of the Irish question within this broader political context.

J. L. Hammond, who had previously participated in contemporary liberal discussions on Ireland through his journalism, addressed the significance of the Irish question in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Britain in his 1933 monograph, *Gladstone and the Irish Nation*. Unsurprisingly, his monograph is a vindication of British liberalism, which had significantly declined by the 1930s. Hammond is sympathetic toward Irish nationalism, while charging Unionism with harming Britain and the British Empire.[79] Hammond maintains that the rejection of Gladstonian Home Rule by unionists in the late nineteenth century was responsible for the disintegration of the Anglo-Irish relationship after the First World War. According to Hammond, Gladstone feared mismanagement of the Irish question, rather than

[79] J. L. Hammond, *Gladstone and the Irish Nation* (London, 1933).

popular Irish nationalism itself. Gladstone thought attempts to 'try to overrule it' would put England 'in a position morally unjust and in the eyes of the world discreditable, and create a lasting hostility between Ireland and Great Britain'.[80] This indictment of the British government's response to the Irish question over 1919-1922, as this thesis will demonstrate, is in line with the views of C. P. Scott.

Looking back on Hammond's journalism and historical scholarship, Peatling has argued that there was a continued nationalist sympathy and unionist antipathy among new liberals that had a significant impact on developments in Anglo-Irish relations to 1921.[81] As highlighted above, Scott and the *Guardian* were crucial to the emergence of new liberal politics in the late nineteenth century, which adopted a more progressive agenda and recognised the limitations of old liberalism in conceptualising the State in relation to individual liberty.[82] Peatling illuminates the centrality of Ireland to new liberal politics, arguing that 'a new Liberal Irish obsession' emerged after Gladstone's First Home Rule Bill to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty.[83] Indeed, Hammond even credits the political effect of the Home Rule movement of the 1880s on C. P. Scott's politics, as crucial to the later development of the new liberalism.[84] Despite this, however, the historiography on new liberalism has been mostly concerned with social policy, as seen for example, in the works of Peter Weiler and Michael Freeden.[85] While Peter Clarke acknowledges the role of Ireland in his history of new liberal politics in Lancashire, where the *Guardian* newspaper was based, his central focus is instead on the development of social reforms rooted in Manchester Progressivism.[86] This thesis does not dispute that the social reform movement was integral to the new liberalism, or seek to dismiss C. P. Scott's contributions to this social agenda, but it does highlight Scott's commitment to the Irish question as the issue he commented on most via his newspaper

[80] Ibid, p. 727.
[81] G. K. Peatling, 'New Liberalism, J. L. Hammond and the Irish Problem, 1897-1949', *Historical Research*, vol. 73 (2002), pp. 48-65.
[82] Weiler, *The New Liberalism, Liberal Social Theory in Great Britain 1889-1914*, and Freeden, *The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform*.
[83] Peatling, 'New Liberalism, J. L. Hammond and the Irish Problem, 1897-1949', p. 55.
[84] Hammond, 'C. P. Scott 1846-1932', p. 40.
[85] Weiler, *The New Liberalism, Liberal Social Theory in Great Britain 1889-1914*, and Freeden, *The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform*, and Michael Bentley, *The Liberal Mind 1914-1929* (Cambridge, 1977), ch. 1.
[86] Clarke, *Lancashire and New Liberalism*.

throughout his editorship, especially after the First World War.[87] Moreover, it builds on Peatling's work by positioning the *Guardian,* with Scott at its centre, as the institution round which new liberal public figures like Hammond rallied.

While Peatling highlights the importance of Ireland to the revival of English liberalism signalled by the emergence of new liberalism, George Dangerfield's classic work argues in contrast that the Liberal Party's attempts to solve the Irish question resulted in its downfall.[88] Patricia Jalland similarly argues that the failure to solve the Irish question prior to the First World War contributed to the decline of the Liberal Party in Britain.[89] In addition Paul Adelman describes the Irish question as 'the last and most difficult of the problems faced' by liberals prior to the First World War and the party's 'greatest failure by 1914'.[90] Nevertheless, he gives more prominence to the impact of the First World War and the rise of the Labour Party in his analysis of the reasons for Liberal Party decline.[91]

Indeed, the Labour Party's relationship to the Irish question is important to note. Gibbons argues that, with the absence of Irish Nationalists in the British Parliament following the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, the majority of Irish voters living in Britain were absorbed into the Labour Party. The Labour Party was more attractive to Irish voters living in Britain from 1922 onwards due to its progressivist and welfarist interests. This in turn contributed to liberal decline, as Irish nationalists had previously aligned themselves with liberals. It led to the hegemony of the Labour Party in local government in Glasgow for example. The 'resolution' of the Irish question also forced the Conservatives to develop new policies to appeal to working-class unionists.[92] This scholarship is all part of the overarching debate on the historical significance of Ireland in British politics.

This thesis addresses the significance of Ireland to liberal contemporaries after the First World War and the resolution of the Irish question in the liberal mind in 1922. By developing

[87] JRL, GDN/75-78a, Cuttings books of C. P. Scott's leaders, 1898-1931.
[88] George Dangerfield, *The Strange Death of Liberal England* (London, 1935).
[89] Patricia Jalland, *The Liberals and Ireland: the Ulster question in British Politics to 1914* (New York, 1980).
[90] Paul Adelman, *The Decline of the Liberal Party 1910-1931* (New York, 1995), p. 5-6.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Ivan Gibbons, *The British Labour Party and the Establishment of the Irish Free State, 1918-1924* (London, 2015), p. 221.

understanding of these perceptions through the commentary of C. P. Scott, it contributes to bigger debates on the place of Ireland in British politics. As this study demonstrates, by 1919 there was a prevalent sense of urgency among liberal commentators to resolve the Irish question, and there was an acute awareness of the far-reaching consequences of this for Britain and British liberalism. The desire to reconcile Ireland through peaceful and constitutional means, as espoused by Scott and the *Guardian*, was rooted in liberal principles. As such, failure to resolve the Irish question along these lines after decades of struggle would constitute a failure of British liberalism. Yet successfully resolving the Anglo-Irish conflict would also mean a conclusion of one of the key purposes of the Liberal Party in Britain. The end of an Irish policy in 1922 saw the removal of a political lynchpin for the Liberal Party. Hence, for Scott and the *Guardian,* the Irish question was *the* final fundamental concern for liberals between 1919 and 1922, and its resolution was the signal for a reconfiguration of liberalism in British parliamentary politics. Thus, it was the eventual success of liberals such as Scott in finding their solution to the Irish question in the interwar years that confirmed Liberal Party decline in the early twentieth century, rather than the 'failures' over Ireland prior to the First World War.

Nevertheless, while the Liberal Party as the primary vehicle for liberalism diminished, liberalism as an ideology based on principles remained. Scott's commitment to new liberal principles was steadfast, the *Guardian* continued as a significant liberal institution, and the 'liberal' readership continued to read the newspaper, even as the Liberal Party faded into insignificance. Despite the fate of the Liberal Party in the interwar years, as debated extensively by previous scholars,[93] liberalism as an ideology was sustained through key institutions such as the *Manchester Guardian*.

Finally, as noted above, Scott and the *Guardian'*s engagement with the Boer War has received more scholarly attention than their engagement with the Irish question. This is largely because debates on South Africa concerned Empire at a time when agendas about imperialism and foreign policy were pervasive, and foreshadowed liberal splits over the First

[93] G. R. Searle, *The Liberal Party: Triumph and Disintegration, 1886-1929* (New York, 1992), ch. 8, and David Dutton, *A History of the Liberal Party in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 2004), ch. 2.

World War. In contrast, the Irish question has been considered by many scholars to be a matter of domestic politics, and has thus not received as much consideration. This thesis demonstrates, however, that after the Great War the Irish question was deemed by liberals such as Scott as a question of both nation *and* Empire, which *demanded* 'solving' as a priority, at a time of turbulent domestic, imperial, and global political change. The question was still initially domestic in character, as it concerned the people of the United Kingdom, but the solution was an imperial one. Moreover, the eventual implementation of this solution and liberal support for this, demonstrated a shift in the liberal conceptualisation of Ireland in relation to Britain and its Empire. As such, this thesis places Ireland within the broader imperial and global context,[94] while not overlooking the importance of the Irish question to the regional politics of Manchester and the North-West of England, where the *Guardian* newspaper was based. Due to the large Irish population living in the region, Anglo-Irish politics was of local interest, as well as national and imperial significance.[95]

To sum up, this thesis focuses on the *Guardian's* editorials on the Irish question as a way of taking forward debates about the relationship between the Irish revolution, the British press, and liberal politics. The Irish question was pivotal in the development of British liberal politics in the early twentieth century, and in turn liberalism was pivotal in shaping debates on the Irish question. The press was fundamental to the development of Anglo-Irish policy during the Irish revolution, and the *Manchester Guardian* was one of the most visible extra-parliamentary liberal institutions in Britain, the archetype of the liberal English press. Despite this, previous scholarship has failed to pay sufficient attention to the *Guardian's* stance on Ireland during a crucial point in modern Anglo-Irish history, and the significance of the Irish question to the *Guardian* and its editor has been underestimated. The Irish question was one of the most extensively covered political issues by the *Guardian* during Scott's 57-year editorship, and was the single issue editorialised most by Scott.[96] This thesis thus seeks to fully establish the role played by the *Guardian* in Anglo-Irish politics at the apex of Ireland's revolution, as well as to demonstrate the central significance of the Irish question to political

[94] Kevin Kenny (ed.), *Ireland and the British Empire* (Oxford, 2004) provides a broad and useful picture of Ireland, the Irish, and Irish history in the imperial context.
[95] Mervyn Busteed, *The Irish in Manchester c. 1750-1921, Resistance, adaption and identity* (Manchester, 2016).
[96] JRL, GDN/75-78a, Cuttings books of C. P. Scott's leaders, 1898-1931.

engagements by the *Guardian*. In viewing the *Manchester Guardian* as a political institution and illuminating the connection between the *Guardian* and Ireland, the study offers new insights into the history of the newspaper, the role of the British liberal press in the Irish revolution, and the place of the Irish question in British politics.

Conceptual Frameworks, Sources, Methodology

Connecting Press and Politics

The nineteenth century saw the gradual consolidation of the social and political legitimacy of the newspaper in Britain, with its development into 'a style of publication intended to have influence on the propertied and influential classes', and the emergence of the discourse of the press as the Fourth Estate.[97] This discourse, as Martin Conboy explains, was the 'idealistic claim that the press functions as a watchdog of the powerful in society'. By the end of the century, the political functions of the newspaper press were crystallised in practise, as well as in contemporary imaginations, with the establishment of the Press Lobby in the British Parliament.[98] Paradoxically, as the press was increasingly viewed as a public watchdog, the connection between pressmen and politicians became increasingly intimate. Steven Koss highlights this in his two volumes on the rise of the political press in Britain. The press was considered capable 'of rousing the public conscience, facilitating (or retarding) the passage of legislation, and fuelling intra-party rivalries'.[99] Hence, involvement in the press industry often led to parliamentary service, or vice versa, as the influence of the press increased in the eyes of contemporaries.

Mark Hampton provides a useful conceptual model for understanding contemporary visions of the press in Britain.[100] Hampton's 'educational ideal' and 'representative ideal' classify the nature and purposes of newspapers in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. The educational ideal is a liberal view of the press that recognised newspapers as having two functions. The first function was to 'influence', 'inform', or 'elevate' readers, particularly

[97] Martin Conboy, *Journalism: A Critical History* (London, 2004), ch. 6.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Stephen Koss, *The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, Vol 2: The Twentieth Century* (London, 1984), p. 8.
[100] Mark Hampton, *Visions of the Press in Britain 1850-1950,* (Chicago, 2004).

about politics, by 'bringing them into possession of certain supposedly established truths'.[101] The second function was to provide a forum for public discussion, to enable open political debate so that truth and preferred outcomes could prevail. The educational ideal of the press promotes discussion and persuasion as the purposes of a newspaper.[102] This ideal was fundamental to liberal campaigns to abolish the 'taxes on knowledge' and debates over education reform from the early nineteenth century.[103] Indeed, the repeal of advertisement duty in 1853 and of stamp duty in 1855 led to an expansion of the press, and saw the *Guardian* become the first daily newspaper in Manchester.[104] The rise of a literate, educated, and informed readership in the regions from the mid-nineteenth century, as John Vincent has shown, was intimately linked to the formation of the Liberal Party in Britain.[105]

Nevertheless, Hampton argues, commercialisation of the press, expansion of suffrage, and a weakening in the belief that the masses could be persuaded through rational debate, led to the decline of the educational ideal in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was increasingly replaced with the representative ideal. This was the idea that the press should assume and represent the political views of its readers, rather than involve them in a process of discussion, persuasion, and influence.[106] These alternative contemporary 'visions of the press', the educational and the representative ideal, underpin analysis in this thesis of the *Guardian's* role in the political development of the Irish revolution. This conceptual framework is also essential to defining the editorial ethos of the *Manchester Guardian*, as part of the *Guardian* ideology.

The *Guardian* Ideology

The second conceptual framework that this thesis employs has been developed specifically for the purpose of this thesis. The concept of the *Guardian* ideology has been constructed through analysis of Scott's own writings, as well as insights from former *Guardian* staff and his liberal contemporaries. This framework identifies the political and editorial ideals of the

[101] Ibid, p. 9.
[102] Ibid, p. 61.
[103] Rachel Matthews, *The History of the Provincial Press in Britain* (New York, 2017), p. 67.
[104] Clarke, *Lancashire and New Liberalism*, p. 153.
[105] John Vincent, *The Formation of the British Liberal Party*, 1857-68 (London, 1966), pp. 94-101.
[106] Hampton, *Visions of the Press in Britain 1850-1950.*

newspaper in order to provide an understanding of the values that underpinned Scott's commentary on Ireland, and to support analysis of the degree to which these values were put into practice.

First and foremost, the *Guardian* ideology centred on the new liberal values upheld by Scott. Scott's liberalism was rooted in principles of individual liberty; political, economic, and religious freedom; freedom of expression; constitutionalism; international 'fair play'; anti-imperialism; non-violence; rule of law; societal order; and progress while exercising restraint, all for the greater benefit of the community - from the family community, to the national community, to the community of the world. Scott's politics were grounded in these principles, as espoused by L. T. Hobhouse.[107]

Scott, as a new liberal, also recognised the role of the state in securing the freedoms he deemed imperative to society, and the problems of individualism and *laisse-faire* for societal harmony.[108] Hence, he was open to collectivist ideas and collaboration with the Labour movement, as long as change 'grew out of true Liberal principles- freedom from oppression, equality of opportunity, scope for initiative, and humanity of feeling'.[109] Scott had faith in humanity, as 'the summed conception of all that there is of justice and honour, of reason and loving-kindness in the society of mankind'.[110] This thesis will consider how these principles and beliefs directed, and were reflected in, Scott's commentary on Ireland. It will also highlight how these beliefs, in practise, could change and be employed in alternative ways and in different contexts over time.

For example, liberal ideals shaped Scott's understanding of empire, and during the Boer War, Scott and the *Guardian* objected to the aggressive British imperialist policies that fuelled the conflict in South Africa. This view was rooted in an objection to the violence that Scott deemed to characterise British imperialism at this time. By the 1920s, however, Scott's approach to empire had shifted away from the firm anti-imperialist stance seen during the

[107] Hobhouse, *Liberalism* (London, 1911).
[108] Weiler, *The New Liberalism, Liberal Social Theory in Great Britain 1889-1914*.
[109] Hobhouse, 'Liberal and Humanist', p. 86.
[110] Ibid, p. 90.

Boer War, to the view that the British Empire was a worldwide association equivalent to the League of Nations. This was representative of a broader new liberal view of the empire in interwar Britain, which was now seen to align with the ideals of global community and international fair-play.[111] This had implications for liberal understandings of the Irish question. This thesis will illuminate how this changed interwar view of the British Empire came in to play in the *Guardian's* reporting, as Scott sought a resolution to the Irish question after the First World War.

In addition to shaping his politics, Scott's commitment to liberal principles also informed the *Manchester Guardian's* journalistic philosophy, which was comprised of three key ideals. The first was the educational ideal as conceptualised by Hampton, which encompassed the belief in the *Guardian's* ability to 'educate', 'stimulate' and 'assist'.[112] For Scott, a newspaper was 'much more than a business; it is an institution; it reflects and it influences the life of a whole community; it may affect even wider destinies…' Scott saw this influence and the educative function it provided as a moral obligation that was fundamental to the *Guardian's* character.[113] It is for this reason that Scott was so concerned with editorial commentary. For Scott, this was 'the prime instrument of policy, the voice, persuasive or protestant, for whose utterance, more than for any other single purpose, he believed the paper to exist'.[114] This was the most important part of the newspaper as it was through this commentary that the educational ideal could be achieved.

Scott was also committed to public discussion, though within limits, as part of the educational ideal. He insisted that those who were critical of the *Guardian's* view also had a right to a platform, though all comment, whether in opposition to Scott's view or otherwise, had to remain restrained and moderate in its delivery.[115] This policy not only impacted on Scott's own commentary, but also on the correspondence columns of the newspaper, as explored in Chapter 7.

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[111] Peatling, *British Opinion and Irish Self-Government: From Unionism to Liberal Commonwealth*, ch. 10.
[112] C. P. Scott, 'A Hundred Years', Manchester Guardian, 05 May 1921, p. 35.
[113] Ibid.
[114] W. P. Crozier, 'C.P.S. in the Office' in AP Wadsworth (ed.), *C. P. Scott, 1846-1932, The Making of the Manchester Guardian* (London, 1946), p. 91.
[115] C. P. Scott, 'A Hundred Years', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 May 1921, p. 35.

The second ideal was truth in news. In describing the purpose of a newspaper, Scott famously declared:

> Its primary office is the gathering of news. At the peril of its soul it must see that the supply is not tainted. Neither in what it gives, nor in what it does not give, nor in the mode of presentation must the unclouded face of truth suffer wrong. Comment is free, but facts are sacred.[116]

The *Guardian* insisted on a commitment to impartial news gathering, and as such, it was rarely attacked for suppressing or distorting news. Indeed, its readership believed in Scott's pledge to report the news impartially, despite his own dominant liberal editorial agenda.[117] In contrast, the popular press were often denounced for 'untruthfulness'.[118] Scott stressed, therefore, that 'sources of information are so important' and the responsibility of supplying news was great.[119] The sources that informed Scott's views on Ireland, and the news climate in which these source operated, are explored in Chapters 5 and 6. Scott still maintained, however, that a newspaper must 'act in some degree, not merely as purveyor, but also as interpreter', so that readers received 'some guidance in the maze of things'.[120] Hence, the editorial voice was reaffirmed as essential to the newspaper, and essential for readers to fully understand news.

The final ideal was editorial independence. In Scott's view, independence from official state or party control was essential to a newspaper's integrity. Scott maintained that proprietorial independence allowed a newspaper to 'have a soul of its own',[121] and believed newspaper proprietors were 'quite powerful enough already' without positions in government as well.[122] Scott argued a lack of editorial independence caused 'the critic to be absorbed into the body criticised'.[123] Here, the editor recognised the role of the press as the Fourth Estate; as 'the watchdog of society'.[124] Previous scholarship has recognised that being an independently

[116] C. P. Scott, 'A Hundred Years', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 May 1921, p. 35.
[117] Clarke, *Lancashire and New Liberalism*, p. 155.
[118] Mark Hampton, 'The 'Objectivity' Ideal and its Limitations in 20th-Century British Journalism', *Journalism Studies*, vol. 9 (2008), p. 483.
[119] C. P. Scott, 'The Function of the Press', *Political Quarterly,* vol. 2, (1931), p. 61.
[120] C. P. Scott, 'The Function of the Press', *Political Quarterly,* vol. 2, (1931), p. 60.
[121] C. P. Scott, 'A Hundred Years', Manchester Guardian, 05 May 1921, p. 35.
[122] C. P. Scott, 'Press and Government', *Manchester Guardian*, 12 March 1918.
[123] C. P. Scott, 'Press and Government', *Manchester Guardian*, 12 March 1918.
[124] Martin Conboy, *Journalism: A Critical History* (London, 2004), ch. 6.

owned publication meant that the *Guardian* 'had few of the complications and formal political ties' that swayed more widely read newspapers at this time.[125] This thesis explores the informal yet elite circles in which Scott circulated, which fed in to *Guardian* content, and to which politicians in government were integral.

The ideals of editorial independence, truth in news, and the educational power of the press were fundamental to the *Guardian* ideology, and it was Scott's continued commitment to this ideology that maintained the *Guardian's* position as the epitome of journalistic virtue into the interwar years. This was a position that Scott had secured for the newspaper over preceding decades, as the press industry went through a period of dramatic change, and the *Guardian* remained steadfast to its principles. Hampton has traced this ascension from the 1880s onward, contrasting Scott's position to the general decline of the press ideals that the editor believed in. This was largely driven by the establishment of titles such as the *Daily Mail*, which led the era of 'new-journalism'.[126]

From the late-Victorian age, 'new-journalism' saw news production become increasingly commercialised, sensationalist, and owned by fewer and fewer men who gained more and more economic and political power. The rise of press barons such as Lord Northcliffe (founder of the *Daily Mail*) and Lord Beaverbrook (proprietor of the *Daily Express*) in the first decades of the twentieth century saw the ideals of the press that Scott espoused, and the perceived moral function of the press, increasingly abandoned. Press barons were motivated by financial gain and the allure of political power, which contrasted Scott's own agenda – to use newspapers to educate and influence for the greater good. This was demonstrated during the Boer War, when the *Guardian* lost one seventh of its circulation due to its stance. Despite the decline however, Scott maintained his position as he believed reporting and opposing the war was a moral duty, regardless of the financial loss the *Guardian* suffered.[127] Other newspapers, including the liberal *Daily News* soon joined the chorus of anti-Boer sentiment, despite initial objections to the conflict. In the longer term, this resulted in an increase in respect for the

[125] Owen, ''Facts are Sacred': The *Manchester Guardian* and Colonial Violence, 1930-1932', pp. 660-668.
[126] Hampton, Visions of the Press in Britain, 1850-1950, ch. 5.
[127] Hampton, 'The Press, Patriotism, and Public discussion: C. P. Scott, The Manchester Guardian, and the Boer War, 1899-1902', p. 195.

Guardian among contemporaries, and fed into a belief that other newspapers, including other liberal newspapers, hardly count.[128]

Indeed, other newspapers including *The Times* claimed to adhere to similar ideals as Scott, but these claims were shown to lack substance. For example, *The Times* had been owned by Lord Northcliffe since 1908, whose other newspapers including the *Daily Mail* were known for mistruths. Unlike Scott, Northcliffe was deeply embedded in formal government, and wielded his power to manipulate political situations. In contrast, Scott rejected the offer of peerage after he became proprietor of the newspaper and sought to build and maintain amicable relations with politicians and policymakers based on mutual respect, rather than threat. Hampton has previously recognised this contrast between Scott and press barons such as Northcliffe, maintaining that the latter exploited public opinion to force a government's hand.[129] Moreover, as Ackerley points out, the *Guardian's* economic model showed the newspaper to, unlike other 'quality' titles such as *The Times*, ensure that business needs did not interfere with the integrity of the newspaper's coverage. The establishment of the Scott Trust in 1936 was emblematic of this long-standing facet of the Scott tradition. The purpose of the Trust was to ensure that the Guardian could always remain an honest and independent distributor and interpreter of news.[130]

Furthermore, Lord Northcliffe was director of propaganda for the government during the First World War, and actively contributed to mistrust of the press which proliferated in Britain in the immediate interwar years. This saw the moral position of the press under further attack.[131] The *Guardian's* reporting of Ireland, criticism of propaganda around the Irish War of Independence, and censorship of Irish newspapers, as explored throughout the body of this thesis, sought to show readers that the educative ideal was not synonymous with propaganda. Indeed, it was quite the opposite. As such, the *Guardian's* virtuous reputation was maintained, even among this debate. This reputation had been built during the era of

[128] JRL, GDN/A/B108/1, John Bryce to C. P. Scott, 21 January 1921.
[129] Hampton, 'The Press, Patriotism, and Public discussion: C. P. Scott, The Manchester Guardian, and the Boer War, 1899-1902', p. 183.
[130] Ackerley, Aaron, 'The Political Economy of the Guardian', in Des Freedman (ed.), *Capitalism's Conscience: 200 Years of the Guardian* (London, 2021), pp. 19-40.
[131] Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*, p. 180.

'new journalism' and secured due to Scott's 'moral stance' in news production regardless of commercial impact. This ultimately set Scott apart as the 'moral editor' and established the *Guardian* as the benchmark of 'moral journalism', an understanding reflected in the plethora of letters sent to the *Guardian* offices upon the editor's retirement in 1929.[132]

The editor continued to promote the moral function of the press in British society until his death. In 1931, the year prior, he published an essay in the *Political Quarterly* journal on the very subject. This essay reiterated the now well-known ideals upheld by Scott and the *Guardian*, as well as reaffirmed the editor and his newspaper as the vanguard of this sort of journalism. The essay closed, stating: 'The newspaper stands by to interpret, and, where it can, to help. What a spectacle! What an opportunity!'[133] Scott was one of the last editors proliferating the educational ideal after the First World War, [134] practising economic independence from political powers, and promoting the moral functions of the press.

The reality of how the *Guardian's* ideals translated in practise is a point of investigation in this thesis, but regardless, Scott believed in them. This point is vital to understanding the *Guardian* as a liberal newspaper, rooted in liberal philosophy, which informed and influenced its politics *and* journalistic practices, at a time when liberal conceptions of society and the role of the press within society, were waning.[135] As *Guardian* journalist and Scott's brother-in-law, C. E. Montague, confirmed: in the interwar period, 'when the great vogue of the rationalistic and utilitarian Liberal philosophy of a century ago was declining, Scott absorbed it'.[136] Scott's personal politics and editorial philosophy was crucial to the *Guardian*. He was 'the personality, controlling, directing, harmonising, which gave unity of purpose and character to the paper.[137]

Primary Source Analysis

This thesis takes a qualitative approach to archive material and digitised news sources that were accessed in person and online via libraries and databases in the UK and Ireland. In

[132] GDN 135/233-591, C. P. Scott's retirement correspondence, 1929.
[133] C. P. Scott 'The Function of the Press', *Political Quarterly*, vol. 2 (1931), 59-63.
[134] Hampton, *Visions of the Press in Britain 1850-1950*, p. 8.
[135] Hampton, *Visions of the Press in Britain, 1850-1950*, ch. 4.
[136] C. E. Montague, 'Journalist and Editor', p. 77.
[137] Crozier, 'C.P.S. in the Office', p. 104.

contrast to previous scholarship, the approach of combining research into the content of the published newspaper with research into the newspaper's archive has allowed for a detailed and multi-dimensional analysis of the *Manchester Guardian*, enabling more complex and nuanced conclusions to be drawn about the newspaper's connection with the Irish question. News sources alone cannot tell us how and why content was produced. Hence, engagement with the paper archives of individual publications is vital. This combined approach is maintained here as the most fruitful way of examining historic newspapers in relation to the wider world in which they were published.[138]

The majority of the sources used in this thesis, including some of those published in the *Manchester Guardian*, were accessed in person in the Archive of the Guardian (formerly Manchester Guardian) GB 133 GDN at the John Rylands Library (JRL), Manchester.[139] Sources accessed include Scott's editorials, which are a significant primary source base for the research. As highlighted above, these were the most important part of the newspaper for the editor. Qualitative analysis of these editorials was conducted by viewing the cuttings books of Scott's leaders, which cover the period 1898 to 1931 and were indexed by Scott himself.[140] These books are vital because they enable the researcher to differentiate between Scott's own leaders and those written by other editorial staff. This is not possible when accessing these sources online through the Guardian and Observer Digital Archive, due to the editorial anonymity policy employed by the *Guardian*. Ascertaining Scott's personal voice is important to this thesis, which argues that Scott's personal politics were at the heart of the *Guardian* as a liberal institution, and at the centre of a broader network of local, national, and international influence. Previous histories of the *Guardian* have assumed it impossible to determine which articles Scott wrote personally.[141]

The JRL also holds a vast collection of correspondence between C. P. Scott and his staff, his readers, and prominent public figures. Totalling over twelve thousand items, this material is

[138] Bingham, 'The Digitization of Newspaper Archives: Opportunities and Challenges for Historians', pp. 225-231, and Aaron Ackerley, 'Economic Ideas in the Interwar British Daily Press'.
[139] JRL, GDN, Guardian Archive, c. 1879-1969.
[140] JRL, GDN/75-78a, Cuttings books of C. P. Scott's leaders, 1898-1931.
[141] Hampton, 'The Press, Patriotism, and Public Discussion: C. P. Scott, The *Manchester Guardian* and the Boer War, 1899-1902'.

essential to understanding the politics and connections of Scott and the *Guardian*. Circulation and distribution data, reporters' diaries, wage and contributions books, and various miscellaneous items held at the JRL are also utilised in this research. In addition, visits to the Public Record Office Northern Ireland (PRONI), National Library of Ireland (NLI) and Trinity College Dublin (TCD) were undertaken. Items at the National Archives Ireland (NAI), particularly documents relating to Dáil Éireann, were accessed online using the Digital Repository of Ireland. Source books including *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy Volume I, 1919-1922,* also supported this research.[142]

While the majority of the published *Guardian* sources used in this thesis were accessed in person at the John Rylands Library, a substantial number of the news sources were retrieved via the Guardian and Observer Digital Archive. These digitised sources consist of news articles, opinion pieces, obituaries, and the *Guardian's* contents pages. The main body of digitised news sources used are the letters to the editor, which were produced by a variety of authors, some anonymised, and published in the *Guardian*. These form the basis of analysis conducted in the final chapter of this thesis.

The digitization of newspaper archives has provided historians with a wealth of research opportunities due to improved accessibility and keyword search functions. Keyword searches have supported the qualitative approach of this thesis as they allowed for speedier discovery of relevant material. As Adrian Bingham cautions, however, just because a word does not appear, does not mean the topic is not discussed. Historians must use a variety of search terms of a similar meaning in order to maximise fruitful results,[143] a practise adopted for this research. Another methodological hazard noted by Bingham is the decontextualisation of news: the removal of articles as isolated results from their physical space within the pages of the newspaper. This can hinder understanding of the place and importance of content in a single issue, as well as the format of a publication.[144] In an attempt to mitigate this, articles

[142] Ronan Fanning, Michael Kennedy, Dermot Keogh, and Eunan O'Haplin (eds.), *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume I, 1919-1922* (Dublin, 1998).
[143] Bingham, 'The Digitization of Newspaper Archives: Opportunities and Challenges for Historians', pp. 229-230.
[144] Ibid, pp. 230-231.

were observed in full page view to develop awareness of surrounding content and overall page structure.

Internal institutional histories of the *Manchester Guardian* that were produced by former staff, as discussed in the historiography section above, are also used as primary source material in this thesis. These histories, which recall Scott in the office, and the politics and practices of the *Guardian*, were written by people who knew and worked for the editor. These sources are thus viewed as first-hand testimony: while they are still recognised as legitimate *Guardian* histories; they are also considered memoirs of the *Manchester Guardian* in the early twentieth century. As such, their rose-tinted hue is also acknowledged. Other published material informing this research includes named essays by C. P. Scott, and official correspondence and documents circulated publicly by Dáil Éireann and the British government.

Chapter Structure and Rationale

This thesis offers a holistic view of the *Manchester Guardian* of the kind absent from previous studies of the newspaper. The chapter structure reflects the importance of analysing area of content: editorial commentary, news gathering and reporting, and reader correspondence. This first introductory chapter has highlighted the *Guardian's* early support for Irish Home Rule, as well as the newspaper's political and editorial ideology under C. P. Scott. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 address the *Guardian's* editorial line on the Irish question from 1919 to 1922, covering the Irish War of Independence, the peace negotiations, and the *Guardian's* response to the Anglo-Irish Treaty respectively. Scott's editorials are the focus here. These address Irish political self-determination, violence, and the nature and significance of Ireland's changing relationship with Britain and the British Empire across the period. Chapters 2 to 4 build up the argument that Scott's commentary on Ireland was rooted in his interest in the morality of British government policy, his aversion to violence, and his desire for an Anglo-Irish settlement of the constitutional kind, in line with the *Guardian* ideology. These chapters demonstrate the ways in which Scott's position on Ireland shifted in 1919 from advocating Home Rule within the United Kingdom, to calling for Ireland to become a Dominion within the British Empire. Chapters 3 and 4 especially show how, in relation to the signing of the Treaty, Scott viewed the Irish question as one of nation *and* empire, and stressed the significance of

a settlement to both national and imperial politics. They highlight how ideological developments and political necessity shaped the *Guardian's* position. Chapter 4 argues that, for Scott, with the ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty the Irish question was solved. These chapters maintain the significance of the *Guardian's* stance as the voice of English liberalism in the development Anglo-Irish relations, while recognising that the Scott's concern for Anglo-Irish politics diminished in 1922.

Chapters 5 and 6 explore influences on the *Manchester Guardian's* editorial line on Ireland. Chapter 5 considers the role of journalistic, political, and personal networks in the production of Anglo-Irish news. Chapter 6 addresses the challenges to the news gathering (and thus editorialising policies), reflecting particularly on propaganda and censorship. This chapter offers a deeper understanding of the impact of censorship and propaganda policies on the content of this specific newspaper. These chapters advance this thesis from an analysis of what Scott and the *Guardian* thought and said about Ireland, to an exploration of how the *Guardian*, as a political institution, produced news and views from the centre of a bi-directional network of practical and ideological influence. These chapters provide further insight into how and why Scott editorialised Ireland from 1919-1922, while illustrating the limitations of the *Guardian* ideology in practice.

Chapter 7 completes the narrative by pulling together the threads of ideology, politics, and commentary and practice that lace through this thesis. It examines discussion of the Irish question in the correspondence columns, exploring how readers responded to the *Guardian's* stance via letters to the editor. This chapter argues that the correspondence columns of the *Guardian* provided a curated forum of public discussion that reinforced the editorial line, and the letter-writers who were published had an ability to influence in a local or national context. This chapter considers, therefore, how readers influenced *Guardian* content and how the *Guardian* influenced its readership. Chapter 7 concludes by emphasising that despite its relatively small circulation, the *Manchester Guardian* had an impressive national and global reputation, and was thus significant in both commenting on and shaping British engagement with Anglo-Irish politics.

The thesis ends with a concluding chapter which summarises the key findings of the study and discusses their significance in advancing scholarship on the *Manchester Guardian* as a newspaper and the voice of English liberalism, the part played by the British press in debates on the Irish question in the period immediately after the First World War, and the significance of Ireland in British political history.

Chapter 2

Irish War of Independence

This chapter explores C. P. Scott's commentary on the Irish War of Independence, a conflict between Irish nationalists and British forces that began after the Irish revolutionary parliament, Dáil Éireann, assembled for the first time in Dublin on 21st January 1919. Dáil Éireann was symbolic of the fulfilment of Sinn Féin's abstention policy, and severance from Westminster. It was the beginning of efforts to establish a republican counter-state in Ireland under the Presidency of Eamon De Valera and Vice Presidency of Arthur Griffith, the founder of Sinn Féin. The conflict became increasingly controversial as it progressed due to escalating violence from both sides and the continued failure of the British government to find a political solution to the Irish question. The violence that characterised the war and the policies of Lloyd George's Liberal Unionist coalition government were the subject of much debate among contemporaries. The war lasted over three years, encompassing the partition of Ireland with the Government of Ireland Act 1920. It ended following a truce in July 1921.

From January 1919 to the truce in July 1921, Scott's editorial commentary focused on a number of key themes: The Paris Peace Conference and the issue of Irish 'self-determination', proposed political solutions to the Irish question including Home Rule and Dominion Rule, partition and, violence. These themes are the focus here. These editorials illuminate the *Guardian's* editorial line on Ireland during the conflict and how this was presented to the newspaper's readership. As highlighted in the introductory chapter, previous scholarship on the Irish revolution has addressed these themes of Irish self-determination, violence, partition, and settlement. This chapter contributes to existing literature on the Irish revolution by providing understanding of how these big issues, which shaped Anglo-Irish politics and conflict, were viewed and editorialised by a significant extra-parliamentary liberal institution in Britain, the *Manchester Guardian*, and the reputable former politician, Editor Scott. In addition, the chapter contributes to our understanding of the Irish question in *Guardian* history, press coverage of the Irish revolution, and the significance of Ireland in British public life in the immediate years after the First World War.

The Paris Peace Conference and Irish 'Self-Determination'

The first meeting of Dáil Éireann in January 1919 sought to ratify the 'Irish Republic' and gain both national and international publicity for the Irish cause.[1] Around 2,000 people including fifty British and foreign journalists were present at Mansion House, Dublin, for the initial assembly.[2] This assembly involved the reading of two documents. The first was the Declaration of Independence, which stated that 'the Irish people is by right a free people'. The declaration maintained that Ireland had been subjected to 'foreign usurpation' for over seven hundred years, and that 'English rule in this country is, and always has been, based upon force'. It upheld the Easter Rising 1916 as the beginning of the Irish republic, and the 1918 general election as 'the threshold of a new era in history' that demonstrated the Irish electorate's 'firm allegiance to the Irish Republic'. The Declaration pledged to uphold the republic by any means, declaring 'foreign government in Ireland to be an invasion', and demanding the immediate evacuation of the forces of the British Crown. The Dáil proclaimed independence to be a condition of international peace thereafter.[3]

The second document read at the Dáil's first meeting was a 'Message to the Free Nations of the World'. This document stated: 'Ireland - resolutely and irrevocably determined at the dawn of the promised era of self-determination and liberty that she will suffer foreign dominion no longer'.[4] The message drew upon the Wilsonian idea of self-determination in an attempt to legitimise and gain international support for the declared republic. The term self-determination was based on ideas of government by popular consent, and was promoted by President Woodrow Wilson in international discourse over this period.[5] The term refers to nationally conscious peoples controlling their own state and choosing their own government. The concept provided an ideological platform from which Irish nationalists challenged British rule, and the Dáil used this platform to promote the republican cause from its first meeting.

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[1] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence,* p. 25.
[2] Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*, p. 58
[3] Irish Declaration of Independence, English Translation (Appendix C), in Michael Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence*, pp. 207-208.
[4] Dáil Éireann address to the free nations of the world, 21 January 1919 (Appendix D) in Michael Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence*, pp. 208-209.
[5] Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment, Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford, 2007).

The purpose of this second document was to garner international recognition of Irish self-determination and official representation in Paris. Hence, the 'Message to the Free Nations of the World' demanded that Ireland's 'right to its vindication at the Peace Congress' was recognised.[6] Irish republicans hoped their claims to self-determination would be heard at the Paris Peace Conference that also commenced in January 1919. Dáil members Sean T. O'Kelly and George Gavan Duffy travelled to France as envoys with the intention of attending the conference on behalf of Irish republicans, and over the following months, the Dáil and the delegates in Paris sent letters to the President of the conference and of France, George Clemencau, as part of this campaign to allow Irish republicans be represented and heard.[7]

The Paris Peace Conference was the main issue that dominated Scott's editorials in the first few months of the War of Independence. Scott and the *Manchester Guardian* supported formal representation for Ireland in any post-war peace negotiations from 1918,[8] and this position, which supported Irish demands, was maintained into 1919. There were three reasons for this. First, because of the longevity of the Irish question and the political violence associated with it. Scott described the conflict between England and Ireland as 'one of the oldest and most embittered' wars preceding the First World War.[9] Scott maintained that Anglo-Irish relations had been in crisis for decades and should have been resolved long before 1919. As highlighted in the introductory chapter, Scott advocated for more political autonomy for Ireland from the late nineteenth century, supporting the First, Second and Third Home Rule Bills. This grounded his belief that the war for Irish self-determination had been ongoing for a generation, which in turn fed into the *Guardian's* editorial stance on the Irish question in 1919. Scott argued, therefore, that Irish representation at the peace conference could not worsen the situation between England and Ireland. He maintained that no resolution on Ireland from an independent tribunal in Paris 'could possibly be so injurious as a continuance of the present disorder and impotence'.[10] For Scott, Anglo-Irish relations were already so

[6] Dáil Éireann address to the free nations of the world, 21 January 1919 (Appendix D) in, Michael Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence*, pp. 208-209.
[7] Francis M. Carroll, 'The American Commission on Irish Independence and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919', *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. 2 (1985), p. 107.
[8] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 30 July 1918, and 'The Skeleton in the Cupboard', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 October 1918, and 'An Irish League of Nations' and 'The Case of Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 November 1918.
[9] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 April 1919.
[10] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 April 1919.

fractious that granting this representation could only have a positive effect, or at the very least, no effect at all. For Scott, the Irish question had been disastrously prolonged already, and a conference committee in Paris on the Irish question could not worsen the situation.[11]

The second reason was because Scott genuinely believed Ireland did indeed have a right to some level of political self-determination, and thus had a right to represent their interests in Paris.[12] Wilsonian ideas of self-determination featured prominently in the *Guardian's* editorial columns throughout 1919, but particularly as part of arguments in favour of Irish representation at the peace conference. Scott's alignment with the ideas propounded at the Paris Peace Conference were in line with the attitudes of liberal opinion in Britain, where local branches of the League of Nations provided a late flowering for local liberal activism.[13] The *Guardian* promoted Irish self-determination primarily by maintaining that the Irish had a distinct national identity. Scott maintained that 'Ireland is not England, and never will be as England… she is a distinct national unit demanding recognition as such'.[14] Scott acknowledged divisions within Irish identity, but he insisted:

> An Ulster Protestant is just as much an Irishman and just as little a mere Englishman as a Catholic Nationalist. He is a different sort of Irishman, but Irish he is in his whole history and his whole outlook, and his material interests are indissolubly bound with those of the rest of Ireland. If it were not so he would not be so stiff-necked, so intolerably hard to deal with.[15]

Stubbornness was a characteristic often attributed to the 'Irish temperament' and Scott used this trope to argue that Protestant unionists were just as much Irishmen as Catholic nationalists. This notion of shared 'Irishness' was also fundamental to the *Guardian's* argument against the partition of Ireland, as explained below. Scott believed that the distinct Irish national identity entitled Ireland to some political autonomy, and thus formal representation in Paris as its own nation.

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[11] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 April 1919.
[12] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 April 1919.
[13] Helen McCarthy, *The British People and the League of Nations: Democracy, Citizenship and Internationalism 1918-1945* (Manchester, 2012), ch. 6.
[14] C. P. Scott, 'The Irish Dominion League', *Manchester Guardian*, 28 June 1919.
[15] C. P. Scott, 'Mr. Lloyd George on Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 22 July 1919.

Nevertheless, ambiguities around what the concept 'self-determination' actually meant in practice led to contrasting contemporary views on how Wilsonian ideas should be employed in the Irish case in 1919. Some of these different perspectives on what self-determination meant for Ireland were thrashed out in the pages of the *Guardian*. For example, on 3rd July 1919 two letters to the editor were published that were written by Irish republicans, which argued for complete Irish independence under the principle of self-determination.[16] The letters questioned why Ireland was being denied the right to self-determination when, at the same time at the Paris Conference, it was being considered for other small nations across Central Europe and Russia. They argued that denying Ireland independence was denying the right to political freedom which Woodrow Wilson's principles propounded. It was enabling the strong to oppress the weak and power to dictate justice.[17]

Scott agreed with the Irish republican view to an extent. In his first editorial published during the War of Independence he argued: 'The plain fact is that the case of Ireland differs essentially in no way and no degree from the case of other oppressed nationalities'.[18] Even prior to the conflict Scott maintained that it was the right 'of every people, and, so far as practicable, of every section of people, to live its own life and make its own laws free from the domination of any superior power, however strong, however long established', including the Irish.[19] The *Guardian* did not, however, support a fully independent Irish republic. Scott disputed the republican claims that full independence was justified by the principle of self-determination, as argued in the correspondence columns. The editor maintained that self-determination could not be used as a buzzword to justify an Irish republic because the principle could not be applied universally to all circumstances.[20] And for Scott and the *Guardian*, while supportive of some Irish self-determination, full independence for a united Ireland was not 'practicable'.[21]

[16] Sliabh Luachra, and W., 'The Irish Dominion League', *Manchester Guardian,* 03 July 1919.
[17] Sliabh Luachra, and W., 'The Irish Dominion League', *Manchester Guardian,* 03 July 1919.
[18] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 April 1919.
[19] C. P. Scott, 'The Case of Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 06 November 1918.
[20] C. P. Scott, 'The Claims to Irish Independence', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 July 1919.
[21] C. P. Scott, 'The Case of Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 06 November 1918.

In response to the republican views expressed in the correspondence columns, Scott wrote a full editorial that clarified the *Guardian's* stance on Irish self-determination and its opposition to a united Irish republic. In particular, Scott insisted that the principle of self-determination could not be employed in full in the Irish case due to a conflict of rights. This conflict of rights was a product of the internal divisions in Ireland between four Ulster counties and the rest of Ireland, between nationalists and unionists, and between Protestants and Catholics. Yet Scott maintained that Ireland's parts were still 'inextricably mixed', which made partition of the island impossible.[22] Scott also believed that Ireland was geographically inseparable both internally and from the rest of Britain, as the whole of Ireland would always be part of the British Isles. For Scott, Irish partition was impossible and continued connection with Britain was a geographically certainty. Hence, the issue of a divided Ireland but an interwoven Irish population geographically indivisible presented an unavoidable barrier to full independence. This notion chimes with long-standing contemporary views that the British imperial rule was needed overseas to temper internal struggles, although Scott also recognised that the British were largely at fault for these divisions and that British government policy continued to exacerbate these.[23]

Scott also maintained that England had a right protect itself, to international security, and to maintain its commercial interests between the two nations. Scott believed a republic could put these security and commercial interests at risk. With this, and Irish divisions in mind, Scott stated: 'Nationalist Ireland has [had] her rights too long neglected, but she must not forget the rights of others'.[24] Hence, the *Guardian* argued that Ireland had a right to *some* form of self-determination, but complete independence, a united Irish republic, was not possible or justifiable by the principle of self-determination in and of itself. The security of Britain and the rights of the Irish population in its entirety could not be guaranteed, and partition was not considered a viable remedy for internal divisions by the Scott at this time. The *Guardian* supported *some* Irish national political autonomy, and thus formal representation at the peace conference in Paris, but not a united Irish republic.

[22] C. P. Scott, 'The Claims to Irish Independence', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 July 1919.
[23] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 April 1919.
[24] C. P. Scott, 'The Claims to Irish Independence', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 July 1919.

Finally, Scott argued in favour of Irish delegates in Paris and Irish self-determination because he saw Ireland in the global context. For Scott, Irish nationalism was not purely a domestic concern for the United Kingdom. Scott maintained that the British government's approach to the Irish question had serious implications for Britain's 'credit in the world', particularly its relationship with the United States. These concerns were not unfounded. Indeed, there was much support for the Dáil across the Atlantic, and an American Commission on Irish Independence was established in March 1919. The Commission had three key objectives. The first was to secure safe passage for Sinn Féin leaders to the Paris Peace Conference, the second was to represent Sinn Féin leaders at the conference should their safety not be guaranteed, and the third was to work towards Ireland's claim to full independence.[25] On 6th June 1919, the US senate passed a resolution in favour of the Irish voice being heard at the peace conference.[26] De Valera was also given freedom of the city of New York in June 1919. In an editorial published on 26th June 1919, Scott warned that this recognition of de Valera should not be considered 'negligible'. Scott maintained that this reflected sympathy for the Irish cause and the uncertainty of Britain's relationship with America at this time.[27]

For Scott, American-Irish investment in the Irish question could affect Anglo-US relations.[28] But the *Guardian* may have overstated how much potential damage would be caused between these two powers by delays to a resolution, in light of increasing American-Irish support for an Irish republic. President Wilson met the American Commission on Irish Independence but believed their demands on him to advocate Irish self-determination were unfair. While he was sympathetic to the cause, he maintained that 'he had little influence over the governments of other nations at the conference'.[29] Wilson ultimately considered the Irish question 'officially a domestic problem of Great Britain' in which 'he had no right to interfere'.[30] This contrasted Scott's perspective on the issue. Still, Wilson thought Irish self-determination could be an issue for the League of Nations to deal with, following its

[25] Carroll, 'The American Commission on Irish Independence and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919', p.106.
[26] Ibid, p.115.
[27] C. P. Scott, 'Mr De Valera', *Manchester Guardian*, 26 June 1919.
[28] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian,* 04 April 1919, and 'A Typical Incident', *Manchester Guardian,* 12 May 1919, and 'Ireland and America', *Manchester Guardian,* 18 June 1919,and 'Mr. De Valera', *Manchester Guardian,* 26 June 1919.
[29] President Wilson, quoted in Francis M. Carroll, 'The American Commission to Ireland and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919', p. 105.
[30] Ibid.

establishment. The League of Nations was an institution founded by Wilson to promote peace in 1920, but ideas for the league were in discussion from 1919.[31]

Scott recognised the Irish question as intimately linked to the success of the League of Nations.[32] For Scott, the League could not succeed without an Irish settlement. Hence, the *Guardian* maintained that by ignoring Ireland, Britain and its allies only delayed dealing with the problem of Irish nationalism. The policies the Paris Peace Conference supposedly represented, particularly the notion of self-determination, mirrored the proposed values of the League of Nations. Once established, the League would have to abide by these values, which would mean dealing with the Irish question regardless of whether the Irish delegates were ignored by the conference in 1919.[33] Unlike Wilson, Scott and the *Guardian* argued that the issue was best dealt with immediately, in advance of the establishment of the League. Connecting the appeasement of Irish nationalist demands with the League of Nations is indicative of Scott's understanding of the global context and long-term implications of the Irish question. Scott was very vocal about this following the Anglo-Irish settlement in 1921, as discussed in Chapter 4.

Despite the work of the Dáil and their Irish delegates in Paris, Irish-American efforts, and the *Manchester Guardian's* stand in favour of Irish representation at the peace conference over the first six months of 1919, the Irish demand to voice Ireland's right to self-determination was denied. As Manela explains, many nations seeking to voice their nationalist desires, including the Irish, found that 'the hopes and expectations associated with Wilson were quickly disappointed'. Ultimately, 'the widespread reverence of the U.S leader in Europe and elsewhere quickly turned into bitter disillusionment'.[34] The Irish campaign for representation in Paris under the banner of Wilsonian self-determination did not achieve its primary objective. Nevertheless, these efforts still drew national and international attention to the Irish cause, particularly from the British press and the substantial Irish diaspora in the United States. This played a key role in keeping Irish independence in international view during peace

[31] Susan Pendersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford, 2015).
[32] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 April 1919.
[33] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 April 1919.
[34] Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment, Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford, 2007), p. 59.

talks in Paris, and the Irish question in the public mind in the early months of Dáil Éireann's existence.

Home Rule versus Dominion Status

Meanwhile in Ireland itself in 1919, Dáil Éireann worked to build the new republican state. In April it called for the ostracism of members of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC). The RIC were the police force in Ireland which, at this point, was made up predominantly of Irishmen.[35] This policy of ostracism was significant as it encouraged resignations, affected recruitment, and increasingly impacted on the ability of the British authorities to successfully police Ireland using Irish men. In May 1919, the first Dáil Courts were set up as part of the judiciary of the Irish republic, which was established by the Dáil in June 1919. There were over 900 Parish Courts and over 70 District Courts operating in Ireland by the truce in July 1921.[36] The Dáil's activities in 1919 laid the foundations of a counter-state.

Despite these clear political developments, the British government refused to publicly recognise the significance of Dáil Éireann. It insisted that political and military activity in Ireland was conducted by a small group of rebels. Hence, when Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, Lord French, called for martial law in Ireland in January 1919, the proposal was rejected by the British Cabinet.[37] The government refused to give Dáil Éireann any legitimacy or 'undue significance', hoping that it would simply collapse.[38] It was thought that once the few traitors had been eradicated, British control would be fully restored. The Home Rule Bill that had been postponed since 1914 would then be implemented. This would give the Irish a level of political autonomy within the union, as part of the United Kingdom.

Nevertheless, the *Guardian* discerned in 1919 that Irish republicanism was much more serious than the government was prepared to recognise. Home Rule would not satisfy the majority of Irish nationalists any longer, especially as Dáil Éireann worked to build a counter-state in opposition to British authority. Scott had been a proponent of Home Rule for Ireland since

[35] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence,* p. 26.
[36] F. S. L. Lyons, *Ireland since the Famine* (London, 1971), p. 407.
[37] Ilahi, *Imperial Violence and the Path to Independence, India, Ireland and the Crisis of Empire*, p. 113.
[38] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence,* p. 27.

Gladstone but recognised that this 'solution' to the Irish question as agreed prior to WWI, would now in 1919 be too little too late. Indeed, this was something Scott had realised before the end of the First World War, commenting in an editorial in October 1918 that previous moves towards Home Rule may as well be 'in the wastepaper basket'.[39] The decimation of the Irish Parliamentary Party in December 1918 General election and the outbreak of the Irish War for Independence only served to confirm this for Scott.

Throughout the first year of the Anglo-Irish conflict Scott's editorials maintained that Home Rule as it had been intended back in 1914 was no longer going to satisfy Irish nationalism.[40] Many Irish moderates had been radicalised over the course of the First World War and now supported the more extreme Irish nationalist party, Sinn Féin, who now demanded complete independence. Scott primarily blamed this on the failings of the British government, particularly its approach to Irish conscription and its suppression of the Easter Rising in 1916.[41] Indeed, he had opposed the 'ferocious' reaction of the British government to the Easter Rising at the time.[42] After the Armistice, he pointed out that the government's approach to Ireland during the war had turned much of previously moderate nationalist feeling to the extremes, and that Britain's ongoing policy of coercion in Ireland continued to contribute to this.[43]

Scott also maintained that the rise of Sinn Féin was the result of the longer-term failure of Parliament to resolve the problems in Ireland. On 17th December 1919, in an editorial criticising the delays to Anglo-Irish peace caused by the current government, C. P. Scott stated:

> It is a sardonic commentary of our past handling of this great question that now, when at last everybody, except perhaps the Ulster irreconcilables, recognises that Home Rule is necessary, Ireland, through the mouth of Sinn Féin, should declare it to be

[39] C. P. Scott, 'The Skeleton in the Cupboard', *Manchester Guardian,* 18 October 1918.
[40] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 04 April 1919, and 'The Liberal Party', *Manchester Guardian*, 20 June 1919, and 'The Irish Dominion League', *Manchester Guardian*, 28 June 1919, and 'The 12th July', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 July 1919, and 'Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 09 August 1919.
[41] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian,* 30 July 1918, and 'A Notable Deliverance', *Manchester Guardian*, 19 August 1918, and 'The Skeleton in the Cupboard', *Manchester Guardian,* 18 October 1918, and 'The Case of Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 November 1918, and 'A Lesson.', *Manchester Guardian*, 02 December 1918.
[42] Trevor Wilson, 'Scott, Charles Prestwich (1846-132)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Online, 2008)
[43] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian,* 09 March 1919.

> useless, and should put in a demand for something entirely different and unobtainable.[44]

Scott contended that had something been done sooner, the majority of Ireland *would not* now be supporting the call for an independent republic. The *Guardian's* editorial columns acknowledged that popular support for Sinn Féin and their victory in the 1918 election meant the Home Rule would now be insufficient to secure peace.

Throughout 1919, therefore, Scott's editorials were dominated by discussions of potential political approaches to resolving the conflict in Ireland that went beyond Home Rule. Having ruled out both complete independence for a united Ireland and partition as acceptable solutions, Scott proposed Dominion status for a united Ireland. This was a view that he had flirted with in editorials published in the first months of war.[45] He established it as the *Guardian's* recommended approach on 28th June 1919 in an editorial that outlined the intricacies of the solution, while offering praise and support for the newly formed Irish Dominion League.[46] It has previously been thought that *The Times* 'offered the first concrete example by the British press to work to define, understand, and address a solution to the Irish question'.[47] But the *Guardian* presented its own solution a month prior.[48]

Scott (and the Irish Dominion League) maintained that Dominion status would grant political self-determination with full responsibility for fiscal and domestic concerns whilst avoiding a partition of the 'inter-woven', albeit ideologically divided, Irish population. Dominion status for a united Ireland would also ensure that the Protestant minority were protected by the Imperial parliament, and that the security and trade interests of both Britain and Ireland were maintained. Scott also believed that unionist concerns would be satisfied by this approach, as Ireland would remain within the British Empire. Scott maintained that complete political liberty should be given with the caveat that the protection of religious freedom and religious education for Ulster Protestants would be guaranteed. Scott also insisted that Ireland's

[44] C. P. Scott, 'The Government of Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 17 December 1919.
[45] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 April 1919, 'The Liberal Party', *Manchester Guardian,* 20 June 1919.
[46] C. P. Scott, 'The Irish Dominion League', *Manchester Guardian,* 28 June 1919.
[47] Schoepner, ''Miserable conflict and confusion': The Irish question in British Newspapers, 1916-21', pp. 112-113.
[48] C. P. Scott, 'The Irish Dominion League', *Manchester Guardian,* 28 June 1919.

foreign policy and armed forces should continue under British authority due to security concerns. For the *Guardian*, this approach would allow Ireland to be 'as free as it is possible for her to be consistently with maintaining the unity of the realm'.[49] The liberal ideology that underpinned Scott's commentary shines through here: Political liberty within moderation, within the existing structure. While Scott recognised that nationalist Ireland wanted complete independence, not Dominion status, the editor believed that Irish nationalist opinion was more fluid than Sinn Féin's abstentionism implied, especially as the majority of Irish nationalists had only been radicalised in recent years. Scott suggested that Dominion status could shift Irish opinion back to a more moderate outlook, if the offer was made.[50]

The *Manchester Guardian's* solution to the Irish question was not the one initially adopted by the British government. In December 1919 a new, Fourth Home Rule Bill was drafted instead. This proposed that Ireland would be divided into two parts, north and south, each with its own parliament with powers similar to those that had been assigned in 1914 to the All-Ireland Parliament under the earlier, unimplemented, Act. Scott noted that unlike the Home Rule Act 1914 the new Bill made provisions for Ulster, however, the editor maintained the view that partition was not the best way to address the problem of the Protestant unionist north-eastern counties.[51] Scott had previously argued that Ulster should be satisfied by similar protections to those in place in other nations across Europe which had minority populations,[52] and that the Ulsterman should 'take his place, under any reasonable conditions which he may demand, in the fabric of a united and self-governing Ireland'.[53] From the *Manchester Guardian's* perspective partition was not necessary. Scott's initial stance on the Fourth Home Rule Bill was, therefore, highly critical, due to the proposal of partition. Scott was concerned that partition would represent a permanent barrier to a future united Ireland. The *Guardian* was prepared to recognise the Bill as a potential step towards finding a middle ground, but Scott maintained that the new Home Rule Bill would not put an end to dissatisfaction in Ireland, and would not end the nationalist fight for Irish autonomy.

[49] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 09 August 1919.
[50] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 09 August 1919.
[51] C. P. Scott, 'The Government Irish Proposals', *Manchester Guardian,* 23 December 1919.
[52] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 04 April 1919.
[53] C. P. Scott, 'Mr. Lloyd George on Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian,* 22 July 1919.

Discussion of the Fourth Home Rule Bill dominated Scott's commentary on Ireland in throughout 1920.[54] The issue of Ulster and how the government was going to decide the boundaries of partition were key concerns. Scott supported the whole province of Ulster becoming the jurisdiction of Northern Ireland, rather than just the six counties that were ultimately excluded from the rest of the nation. For the *Guardian*, the inclusion of three majority Catholic counties in the Northern Irish state would promote the opportunity for a united Ireland in the future. Scott argued that a Northern Ireland made up of Protestant-majority counties, 'by its exclusive character', would 'tend to make separation permanent instead of preparing the way for co-operation and union on agreed terms'.[55]

Thus, the *Manchester Guardian* stood firmly by its support for Dominion status for Ireland, arguing against partition, and insisting that Ulster was just as much part of Ireland as the Southern counties. Scott asserted:

> Ulster is and must ever be an integral part of Ireland, and no Constitution for Ireland can have the slightest chance of success which does not express this fact in its forefront. The symbol of Irish unity is a common Irish Parliament.[56]

In March 1920, however, the Ulster Unionist Council rejected the inclusion of the whole of Ulster in Northern Ireland after partition. In response, the *Guardian* argued that the Council's focus on Protestant interests was a misguided pursuit, as 'the real interests of Ulster are inextricably bound up with the interests of Ireland as a whole'.[57] Unionists disagreed, and a six county Northern Ireland was the one eventually established after the Bill was passed.

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[54] C. P. Scott, 'Ulster and the Irish Government Bill', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 February 1920, and 'The Irish Government Bill', *Manchester Guardian*, 28 February 1920, and 'The Prospect in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 08 March 1920, and 'Ulster and the Home Rule Bill', *Manchester Guardian*, 11 March 1920, and 'The Fate of Home Rule', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 March 1920, and 'Sir Horace Plunkett's Speech', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 March 1920, and 'The Government Home Rule Bill', *Manchester Guardian*, 29 March 1920, and 'The Home Rule Debate', *Manchester Guardian*, 30 March 1920, and 'The Irish Debate', *Manchester Guardian*, 31 March 1920, and 'The Second Reading', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 April 1920, and 'The Irish Bill', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 May 1920, and 'The Home Rule Bill', *Manchester Guardian*, 11 May 1920, and 'The Dominion of Ireland Bill', *Manchester Guardian*, 02 July 1920, and 'The Twelfth in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 July 1920, and 'Which Way in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 26 July 1920, and 'Mr George to Speak', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 September 1920, and 'Ireland in the Commons', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 November 1920, and 'Mr. George's Irish Policy', *Manchester Guardian*, 12 November 1920, and 'The Government of Ireland Bill', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 November 1920, and 'Half Home Rule', *Manchester Guardian*, 21 December 1920.

[55] C. P. Scott, 'Ulster in the Ireland Bill', *Manchester Guardian,* 13 February 1920.

[56] C. P. Scott, 'The Prospect in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 08 March 1920.

[57] C. P. Scott, 'Ulster and the Home Rule Bill', *Manchester Guardian*, 11 March 1920.

By its second reading of the Fourth Home Rule Bill in March 1920, the Unionists were generally prepared to accept it 'with groans and misgiving',[58] but the proposed changes failed to satisfy Irish nationalists. This problem was a key focus of Scott's editorial commentary in 1920 alongside discussions of the Ulster problem. Maintaining its stance in favour of Dominion status, the *Guardian* published an editorial in March 1920 on a speech made by Sir Horace Plunkett, former Unionist MP and founder of the Irish Dominion League, which argued 'nothing short of Dominion Home Rule, together with an agreed settlement for the protection of the Ulster minority, is of the slightest use at this time'.[59] Scott insisted that, while the North of Ireland might tolerate the Bill, the rest of Ireland, including the more moderate nationalists and unionists in the South, disavowed it. It was thus, as he reiterated yet again, unworkable for securing long term peace.[60]

Nevertheless, the Bill went to its third reading and was approved by the British Parliament by a large majority on 11 November 1920. Sinn Féin MPs were not present at the vote, having boycotted the British Parliament for Dáil Éireann. Southern Unionists and Irish Nationalist MPs voted against the Bill. This demonstrated the widespread dissatisfaction towards the Fourth Home Rule Bill within Ireland, with the exception of Protestant-Ulster. The *Guardian* asserted: 'The Bill as it stands is a Bill not to unite but to divide', and that 'Ireland is one, not only because nature and geography have made her one, but because a thousand common interests and in spite of everything common characteristics and subtle affinities have united her'.[61] Scott again used the notion of a shared 'Irishness' to promote his stance.

By the end of the 1920, the *Guardian's* editorial line remained as it had been since the end of the First World War: It was against permanent partition, particularly the establishment of a Northern Ireland of the six Protestant-counties, because it was in the interests of the Irish nation to remain united. For Scott the Bill signified the permanent division of Ireland and a violent future for the South. Nevertheless, the Fourth Home Rule Bill came into law as the

[58] C. P. Scott, 'Ulster and the Home Rule Bill, *Manchester Guardian,* 11 March 1920.
[59] C. P. Scott, 'Sir Horace Plunkett's Speech', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 March 1920.
[60] C. P. Scott, 'Sir Horace Plunkett's Speech', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 March 1920.
[61] C. P. Scott, 'The Government of Ireland Bill', *Manchester Guardian,* 24 November 1920.

Government of Ireland Act in December 1920. By this point, however, Scott's attention was on the violence that raged in Ireland North and South, and particularly, the campaign of reprisals that was being inflicted on the Irish population by the infamous Black and Tans.

Violence in Ireland

The first shots fired of the Irish War of Independence are known to have been at Solohedbeg in Tipperary in January 1919, on the same day as the establishment of Dáil Éireann. Still, violence was relatively limited in Ireland until September 1919 as the Dáil worked to establish its counter-state.[62] As part of these state-building activities, in August 1919 Dáil Éireann passed a motion which required all members of Sinn Féin, the Dáil, and the military arm of Irish republicanism, the Irish Volunteers, to swear allegiance to the Irish republic. This formally established the Irish Republican Army (IRA) under the republican government. The IRA then conducted an attack on the British Army on 7th September 1919 in Fermoy, County Cork, killing one solider. The Fermoy Ambush signified the move toward a much more aggressive approach in the nationalist fight for independence. Dáil Éireann was outlawed three days later. The following month, Sinn Féin and all other Irish nationalist institutions were banned.[63] Republican political machinery was driven underground, promoting violence on the surface.

Hence, from late 1919, raids, ambushes, and RIC fatalities were much more frequent. More high-profile assassination attempts were made, including an attempt on Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Lord French, on 19th December 1919. Leeson maintains that this was when the Irish insurgency really began.[64] The IRA also increasingly authorised attacks on police barracks to obtain weapons, and by Easter 1920, 300 police barracks had been burned down.[65] Nevertheless, IRA violence was soon paralleled by that of the RIC. The murder of the Lord Mayor of Cork in March 1920 was one particularly high-profile case of violence by Crown forces. The IRA responded by assassinating the police officer who ordered the attack, outside a Protestant church in Lisburn, County Antrim. The assassination was followed by attacks on

[62] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence,* p. 25.
[63] Ibid, p. 31.
[64] D. M. Leeson, *The Black and Tans, British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish War of Independence, 1920-1921* (Oxford, 2011), p. 15.
[65] Joseph McKenna, *Guerrilla Warfare in the Irish War of Independence, 1919-1921* (Jefferson, 2011), p. 138.

Catholic residents in the town. These events were indicative of a cycle of violence that accelerated from the spring of 1920.[66]

The escalation of police violence in Ireland coincided with increased recruitment of Englishmen to the RIC. IRA attacks exacerbated the decline in RIC recruitment and retention in Ireland caused by the Dáil's ostracism policy in early 1919.[67] Over the course of 1920, 34% of the barracks across the counties of Derry, Mayo, Tipperary and Wexford were abandoned.[68] In response, from January 1920 the British administration in Ireland, Dublin Castle, recruited from England rather than Ireland. These men joined the RIC Special Reserve, a paramilitary force soon nick named the 'Black and Tans' due to their uniforms, which were a mix of the black police attire and khaki worn by the British Army. In addition, the Auxiliary Division of the RIC, which comprised of former British Army officers, was created in July 1920. By the end of September 1920 recruitment of temporary constables from Britain tripled, and by 1921 89% of the RIC were Englishmen.[69] In addition to this, the British government passed the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act (ROIA) in August 1920 to supposedly help quell increasing violence, and aid policing in Ireland. ROIA extended the jurisdiction of the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) introduced in WWI to give special powers to the government for 'defence purposes', and gave Dublin Castle and the Crown forces powers similar to those under martial law.[70]

For the *Manchester Guardian*, the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act was coercive legislation indicative of the British government's policy of violence and oppression in Ireland in 1920. Scott's editorials objected to ROIA on both practical and moral grounds. Scott argued that coercion would not work in Ireland as Irish nationalists were prepared to sacrifice themselves for the cause.[71] He described the Act as 'A Mad Policy', and the 'most extreme and unconstitutional coercion Act ever invented for the castigation of Ireland'.[72] It restricted 'the elementary liberties' of Irish people, it was 'a tyranny', and 'as a measure of appeasement…

[66] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence,* p. 28.
[67] Ibid*,* p. 26.
[68] Leeson, *The Black and Tans, British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish War of Independence, 1920-1921*, p. 23.
[69] Ibid, p. 22-24.
[70] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence,* p. 65.
[71] C. P. Scott, 'A Mad Policy', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 September 1920.
[72] C. P. Scott, 'A Mad Policy', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 September 1920.

futile'.[73] Again, Scott's liberal understanding of personal and civil liberty underpinned his commentary. Moreover, Scott argued:

> Every end of orderly government and every hope of appeasement is defeated and all the time the Government can find nothing better to do than pour oil on the flames... Our rulers can find no better means of escape than the application of more and more force, while redress retires yet further into the background.[74]

The *Guardian* maintained that the government's approach would only worsen the conflict in Ireland, and ruin any opportunity for conciliation. Scott considered the British administration in Ireland as 'forcible-feeble government' and 'tragically incompetent'.[75] For Scott, the introduction of ROIA was a disastrous approach to the Irish question that would exacerbate anti-British feeling, and violence on both sides.

Indeed, it was from September 1920 that the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries gained an international reputation for violence in Ireland, due to an upsurge in cases of so-called 'reprisals' against Irish civilians. The *Manchester Guardian* first used the term reprisals with reference to the RIC in April 1920,[76] but the term became popular from September when the frequency and scale of reprisals spiked, following ROIA. Due to a printers' strike the *Guardian* could not publish daily issues as standard for the first three weeks of September 1920, nevertheless, a supplementary news bulletin or weekly issue was published until business as usual resumed on 19th September 1920. These bulletins were written by Scott, and Ireland was the most prominent topic that featured in these over these few weeks. This demonstrates that, even when words were severely limited, the *Guardian* considered the Irish question, particularly violence in Ireland, of utmost importance to the newspaper and its readers.

Scott's initial response to reprisals in Ireland attempted to illuminate the reasons for this violence, suggesting these acts were a result of provocation. Scott explained how the Crown forces saw 'their comrades ambushed and shot', and that it was only natural that the British forces would want to avenge these deaths.[77] Nevertheless, the *Guardian's* stance on this was that while the desire for revenge might be 'natural', it was still 'not tolerable or defensible'. It

[73] C. P. Scott, 'Coercion Once More', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 August 1920.
[74] C. P. Scott, 'A Mad Policy', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 September 1920.
[75] C. P. Scott, 'A Mad Policy', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 September 1920.
[76] 'Police and the People in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 19 April 1920, p. 8.
[77] C. P. Scott, *Manchester Guardian* News Bulletin, 06 September 1920.

was ‘systematic destruction’, and ‘utterly alien to our conception of law and government’. Scott’s liberal ideas of law and order were integral to his stance on British reprisals. Scott also recognised that the reprisals were not one-off incidents; they were part of an intensifying campaign of violence. Scott maintained that ‘a regular vendetta has been established with ever increasing violence and accumulating wrongs’.[78] This ‘regular vendetta’ was reported extensively in the British press over the next three months, during which a number of high-profile reprisals were carried out across Ireland.

The sack of Balbriggan on 20th September 1920 was the first highly publicised incident of British violence against Irish civilians during the war. Boyce maintains that this was the ‘single dramatic incident’ that drew public attention to a crisis of violence in Ireland, which had loomed for some time.[79] A commission sent by the Labour Party to investigate the event described how ‘Shops, houses, and inns were set on fire, and in one long street almost all the houses had been burnt or their windows broken’.[80] An article reporting the incident in the *MG* called it ‘An Irish Louvain’, referring to the Belgian town burnt out by German forces during the First World War.[81] The *Guardian’s* special correspondent in Ireland explained: ‘In its brutality, wanton-ness, and destructiveness last night’s work of the uniformed forces of the Crown is comparable only to the story of some Belgian village in the early days of war’.[82] Comparisons between ‘Prussianism’ and the Black and Tans became regular occurrences in the *MG.* On 23rd September a photograph (Figure 1) of burnt-out cottages was published in the paper.[83] The *Guardian* sought to show its readers the damage inflicted by the forces their own government.

[78] C. P. Scott, *Manchester Guardian* News Bulletin, 11 September 1920.
[79] Boyce, *Englishmen and Irish Troubles, British Public Opinion & the Making of Irish Policy 1918-22*, p. 51.
[80] Report of the Labour Commission to Ireland (London, 1921), p. 38.
[81] ‘An Irish Louvain’, *Manchester Guardian*, 22 September 1920.
[82] ‘Wild Police Excesses in County Dublin’, *Manchester Guardian*, 22 September 1920.
[83] Photograph, ‘The Sack of Balbriggan’, *Manchester Guardian,* 23 September 1920.

Figure 1: The Sack of Balgbriggan


THE SACK OF BALBRIGGAN.

After the police reprisals at Balbriggan; a row of cottages which was burnt out in the attack of Tuesday morning.

'The Sack of Balbriggan', *Manchester Guardian,* 23 September 1920.

Another high-profile case took place on 21st November 1920 at Croke Park Dublin. Auxiliaries shot at civilians attending a Gaelic football match, after the assassination of several British officers by the IRA that morning. The event became known as the Croke Park massacre and the day thereafter was called, Bloody Sunday.[84] The official line presented the shooting as provoked by IRA gunmen in the crowd, but an investigation by the *Guardian's* special correspondent found the official representation of events as 'unsupported by eyewitnesses in several important particulars', and revealed claims of provocation to be false.[85] The following month, December 1920, the Crown forces burned the city of Cork.[86] A special

[84] David Leeson, 'Death in the Afternoon: The Croke Park Massacre, 21 November 1920', *Canadian Journal of History*, vol. 38 (2003), pp. 43-68.
[85] 'The Shooting at Croke Park: Was There Provocation', *Manchester Guardian*, 23 November 1920.
[86] Boyce, *Englishmen and Irish Troubles, British Public Opinion & the Making of Irish Policy 1918-2*, p. 20.

correspondent for the *Guardian* reported that the Auxiliaries left 'hardly a pane of glass untouched'.[87] The Labour Commission described how 'large business houses and massively fronted shops were reduced to piles of smouldering debris, charred woodwork, and twisted iron girders'.[88] The reprisal in Cork caused £3 million worth of damages.[89] These attacks by the Crown forces, in Balbriggan, Dublin, and Cork, were widely reported in the British liberal press, and especially by the *Guardian*.

The *Manchester Guardian* was staunchly against British reprisals for two reasons. Firstly, it was usually only innocent people who suffered from this violence, and second, because Scott found the lack of discipline among the British forces abhorrent. The editor described acts of reprisal as 'utterly subversive of discipline and convert an armed force into a body of free booters', maintaining that such behaviour should not be enacted by those entrusted to protect society and uphold the law.[90] Scott identified the increased recruitment of Englishmen to the RIC as a cause of the increased violence:

> In almost every case these outrages are attributed to the British troops or the new British constabulary, the so-called 'black and-tans'. The old Irish constabulary was a highly disciplined force and very carefully selected… Recruiting in Ireland has now dried up and the troops are drawn from this country with no such careful enquiry. The troops too are mostly very young and in any case it is a dangerous thing to employ soldiers on police duties. These facts may partly explain but can in no degree justify what is now taking place…

Nevertheless, the *Guardian* maintained that ultimately, responsibility for police violence rested with the government. Scott stated: 'this thing must be stopped and it must be stopped first from the side of the Government'.[91] Scott believed it was the government's duty to intervene and criticised Chief Secretary Greenwood for not taking more practical steps towards preventing the violence, questioning the government's ability to control its own forces, and querying if it even dared try.[92] Describing the actions of British forces in Ireland

[87] 'The Ambush and its Sequel: How the Fires Began', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 December 1920.
[88] Report of the Labour Commission to Ireland (London, 1921), p. 35.
[89] Ilahi, *Imperial Violence and the Path to Independence, India, Ireland and the Crisis of Empire*, p. 124.
[90] C. P. Scott, *Manchester Guardian* News Bulletin, 06 September 1920.
[91] C. P. Scott, *Manchester Guardian* News Bulletin, 11 September 1920.
[92] C. P. Scott, *Manchester Guardian* News Bulletin, 06 September 1920.

using terms such as 'anarchy'[93] and 'mutiny',[94] Scott argued that a government that cannot control its armed forces is 'not a government at all; they are a public danger'.[95] He maintained that if the government could not bring their forces under control, then it should leave Ireland altogether.

Furthermore, criticism of the government and its forces by the *Manchester Guardian* became increasingly emotive over the final months of 1920. Scott described in an editorial on 23rd September entitled 'The Degradation of Irish Government', how the British forces had committed 'deliberate and cold-blooded murders' and given up 'nearly a whole town [Balbriggan] to the flames'. The use of the word 'murder' in Scott's editorials was important, as up until this point, the term had predominantly been reserved for the crimes committed by the IRA. Crimes committed by the RIC were more often described as outrages or reprisals. These more euphemistic terms were still used frequently, but there were also numerous examples of this development in Scott's discourse in late 1920. Scott termed the actions of the RIC as repaying 'murder with murder',[96] he described the system in Ireland as one where 'murder is requited with murder… arson on a great scale and plunder go hand in hand with murder'.[97] In October 1920 Scott charged Lloyd George with knowing that 'real murder by the forces of the Government has been committed'.[98] Scott maintained: 'They are meeting the attacks of the Sinn Féin banditti by letting loose their own banditti… house-burning, brick-burning, crop-burning, general terrorism, including very disgusting and indiscriminate flogging with not infrequent quite undeniable murder'.[99] Scott turned to overtly describing the RIC's actions as criminal, on a par in terms of legality with the violence of the IRA.

The *Guardian's* commentary on violence in Ireland was part of a broader press offensive against the British government's Irish policy, which played a vital role in shaping public opinion on the Irish question back in Britain.[100] The *Guardian's* role in this, as a respected

[93] C. P. Scott, *Manchester Guardian* News Bulletin, 06 September 1920.
[94] C. P. Scott, *Manchester Guardian* News Bulletin, 11 September 1920.
[95] C. P. Scott, *Manchester Guardian* News Bulletin, 06 September 1920.
[96] C. P. Scott, 'Words or Deeds', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 October 1920.
[97] C. P. Scott, 'Mr. George to Speak', *Manchester Guardian,* 08 October 1920.
[98] C. P. Scott, 'Lawlessness as a Policy', *Manchester Guardian,* 11 October 1920.
[99] C. P. Scott, 'Ruthlessness as a Policy', *Manchester Guardian,* 26 Oct 1920.
[100] Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*.

liberal paper, was significant, and Scott's commentary on violence had impact. Black and Tan and Auxiliary violence was also the subject of controversial debate in parliament. Leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party, Arthur Henderson, introduced a motion in the House of Commons calling for an investigation in to the 'lawlessness' of British forces in Ireland in October 1920. This was supported by his party and Liberal MPs in opposition.[101] Public discussion focused predominantly on the actions of the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries from September 1920 in to 1921.

Nevertheless, the *Guardian* also opposed Irish republican violence. The first editorial written by C. P. Scott to mention nationalist violence towards British authorities was published on 10th September 1919, after Irish nationalists had shifted to a more militarised approach. Scott's editorial focused on the Fermoy Ambush, which had occurred three days earlier, when the IRA ambushed British forces with the intent of seizing weapons, and killed one soldier. Scott's editorial actually began by highlighting the reprisal that took place after the ambush, describing it as a 'military riot', 'in which a great number of shops were wrecked and a good deal of looting took place and some harmless people were injured'. Scott stated that this violence by the Crown Forces could not be justified, a position we see maintained throughout the following year. But Scott then highlighted the 'cowardly murder of one soldier and the wounding of several other' in the IRA ambush as explanation for the 'riot'.[102] Scott called the Fermoy Ambush 'foolish' and 'wicked', noting 'this epidemic of murder seems to be spreading'. Scott thus used language to describe IRA violence in 1919 that we later see mirrored in his descriptions of RIC conduct in autumn 1920. This language denotes reckless criminality rather than acts of war conducted by a military organisation controlled by a national government.

In comparison to the editorials on violence committed by the British forces during the conflict, however, discussions of the activities of the IRA were limited. Scott rarely devoted entire columns to Irish nationalist violence, and this attracted some criticism from the *Guardian's* readership, as will be discussed in more detail in the section on letters below.[103] Scott

[101] Hansard, House of Commons Debate, 20 October 1920, vol. 133 cc925-1039.
[102] C. P. Scott, 'Anarchy in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 28 June 1919.
[103] J. E. Roberts, 'Reprisals in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 18 November 1920.

responded by arguing that lawlessness and crime committed by agents of the law is more serious than that committed by criminals.[104] He gave more coverage to police violence because it was an affront to the 'conception of law and government' that liberals upheld, and that he had believed Britain stood for.[105] The direct connection between the British government's Irish policy and the actions of the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries, which Scott highlights throughout his editorials, explained why more attention was given to the violence of the British forces.

Furthermore, the IRA as an organisation was actually rarely named as responsible for the acts of violence in Scott's editorials, especially in the first two years of war. Those who conducted ambushes or shootings were defined as faceless gunmen. In fact, the term Irish Republican Army was not used by Scott until November 1920. This anonymity of affiliation accorded to the republican volunteers again probably related to the issue of accountability. The *Manchester Guardian* argued that, while these episodes of violence were committed on behalf of the republican movement, they were not necessarily authorised by Sinn Féin and Dáil Éireann. In Scott's first editorial on Irish nationalist violence he insisted, 'there is no reason to suppose that it is instigated by the leaders of Sinn Féin, or approved by them or by public opinion in districts where it is most prevalent'.[106] This distinction between IRA violence and the republican political movement was maintained by the *Guardian* despite the increase in IRA activity from late 1919.

By the end of 1920 Scott began to recognise that much public opinion in Ireland supported the 'military element of Sinn Féin' or the 'Sinn Féin extremists'.[107] IRA violence continued to increase in late 1920, in line with police violence. The assassinations of British Army officers on Bloody Sunday exemplified this. The Kilmichael Ambush is another important example. This occurred on 28th November 1920, just a week after Bloody Sunday, the flying-column of the IRA's West Cork Brigade ambushed an RIC patrol and killed 17 Auxiliaries near the village of Kilmichael, County Cork. Across Ireland the ambush became 'the most celebrated victory

[104] Ed. Guard., 'Reprisals in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 18 November 1920.
[105] C. P. Scott, *Manchester Guardian* News Bulletin, 06 September 1920.
[106] C. P. Scott, 'Anarchy in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 28 June 1919.
[107] C. P. Scott, 'Steps Towards Peace', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 December 1920, p. 6.

of rebel arms'.[108] Still, Scott maintained that the entire political arm of the republican movement should not be held accountable for the violence. The *Guardian* maintained:

> It would be cruelly unjust to make Nationalist Ireland as a whole responsible for the dastardly crimes of the 'Irish Republican Army'. But it is only too true that these crimes are not condemned by public opinion in Ireland as they ought to be condemned, by many people not condemned at all.[109]

This is the first of only a few times that Scott uses the term Irish Republican Army in his editorial commentary. This stance, which disconnected IRA violence from the politics of Sinn Féin, is also a stark contrast to editorials on British violence which maintained that reprisals were a consequence of government policy.

Following the Kilmicheal Ambush, martial law was gradually introduced across the southern counties of Ireland. It was first declared in the counties of Cork, Kerry, Limerick, and Tipperary, on 10th December 1920, just prior to the Burning of Cork. It was then announced in Kilkenny and Wexford on 30th December 1920 and in Clare and Waterford on 5th January 1921.[110] The introduction of martial law was an important political as well as military development as it marked the official recognition by the British government that Ireland was in a state of war. The IRA was not just a 'murder-gang' as the government had previously insisted, but a revolutionary military organisation and a serious danger to British authority in Ireland. The announcement of martial law also coincided with the passing of the Government of Ireland Act 1920, which became law on 23rd December that year. This consolidated the proposal to partition Ireland, which was implemented in 1921.

C. P. Scott's initial reaction to martial law in Ireland in late 1920 was one of caution. Scott assumed it was being introduced so that the restrictions on the powers granted by ROIA could be lifted, and expressed concern that it might be 'violently and recklessly applied'. Scott was apprehensive that the application of martial law could lead to civilians receiving capital punishments through military courts for merely showing sympathy for the nationalist

[108] Peter Hart, *The IRA and its Enemies,* p. 21.
[109] C. P. Scott, 'Irelands War', *Manchester Guardian,* 30 November 1920.
[110] Townshend, *The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence, 1919-1923*.

movement. In his first editorial following the declaration of martial law in Cork, Kerry, Limerick, and Tipperary, Scott recalled the Easter Rising. He warned:

> It was the executions which followed the Dublin rising in 1916 which spread Sinn Féin- up to that time the doctrine of an unimportant section- like wild-fire over Ireland, and it is safe to say that anything like a military assize in the disturbed districts of Ireland now would render the task of the peacemaker hopeless.[111]

Scott was concerned that if martial law was applied to the extreme it would make peace impossible altogether. Scott harked back to the Easter Rising to remind the *Guardian's* readership that it was the oppressive militarised response to 1916 that had further radicalised Sinn Féin in the first place.

One potential positive that Scott hoped for from the declaration of martial law was the end of indiscriminate violence in Ireland. The editor maintained: 'It would be intolerable if in addition to the new martial law the lynch law hitherto prevailing should be permitted to continue'.[112] However, the very day that this editorial was published, 11 December 1920, British forces burned much of the city of Cork to the ground. Two days later Scott acknowledged that the Burning of Cork had dashed his hopes that the introduction of martial law would lead to an end to 'lynch law'. He now described martial law as 'the submission of life, liberty, and property, without legal check or restraint, to military authority… and the deportation in large batches of suspected persons… to concentration camps'.[113] The *Guardian* was now against martial law: it had become clear that its 'chief compensation', an end to reprisals, was not in fact going to happen. Reflecting on the Burning of Cork, Scott stated: 'here we have, as the immediate sequel to the proclamation [of martial law], the worst outbreak of lawlessness by the professed guardians and ministers of the law that has yet occurred'.[114]

Hence, 'official reprisals' were authorised by the British Government under martial law from late December 1920. British violence was sanctioned under British law. The first official

[111] C. P. Scott, 'Is it Peace?', *Manchester Guardian*, 11 December 1920.
[112] C. P. Scott, 'Is it Peace?', *Manchester Guardian*, 11 December 1920.
[113] C. P. Scott, 'Steps Toward Peace?', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 December 1920.
[114] C. P. Scott, 'Steps Toward Peace?', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 December 1920.

reprisal took place on 29th December 1920. Six houses were burnt down by British forces in Middleton, County Cork. These authorised attacks, allegedly against Sinn Féin sympathisers, were frequent occurrences until the policy was officially revoked on 6th June 1921.[115] The policy was indicative of the continued failure of the British government's Irish policy, but Scott welcomed official reprisals to an extent. He believed that at least if these violent acts were carried out officially they could be moderated. 'Excessive' uses of force could be punished and those who gave the orders held to account.[116] One of Scott's main concerns with the violence of the RIC was that it was being committed outside of the law. Official reprisals, he believed, might curb lawlessness. This stance resulted in criticism from *Guardian* readers via letters to the editor, as highlighted in the final chapter of this thesis.

Ultimately, however, the policy of 'official reprisals' only served to exacerbate IRA violence, which actually reached its climax in 1921.[117] And Scott recognised in April that sustained British violence in Ireland had 'antagonised the mass of normal nationalist feeling in Ireland, and given it colour far more extreme than it has ever borne before'.[118] The political strategy of republicans was revitalised following the return of Eamon De Valera to Ireland from the US in time for the final months of the war. De Valera had left Ireland in 1919 with the intention of developing the Irish-American support base.[119] Still, the final two months of the conflict saw the highest casualty rates for the British. At least 48 soldiers and 114 policemen were killed between May 1921 and the truce.[120]

The British government's policy of oppression also remained steadfast in 1921. Despite indicating that the policy of *official* reprisals might be more favourable, Scott still continued to criticise violence conducted by the government and its forces. In March 1921 he stated: 'The refuge of incompetence is force… We are getting plenty of it just now, and are likely to get more'.[121] Moreover, when six 'mere lads' were sentenced to death for carrying arms in

[115] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence,* p. 93.
[116] JRL, GDN/132/309, C. P. Scott to Hobhouse, 10 January 1921. Scott mentions an 'unlucky short' in the *Guardian* that espoused this view, but was received critically by readers.
[117] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence,* p. 93.
[118] C. P. Scott, 'The Appointed Day', *Manchester Guardian*, 19 April 1921.
[119] Lyons, *Ireland since the Famine*, p. 420.
[120] Townshend, *The British Campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921*, p. 185.
[121] C. P. Scott, 'Force as a Remedy', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 March 1921.

Ireland, Scott insisted that 'civilised code of law would visit such a punishment'.[122] Scott's commitment to civil liberty and justice, in line with his liberal ideology, shines through again here. Scott also harked back to the Easter Rising once again, in his objection to these executions. The editor proclaimed:

> It was the series of executions after the Easter rising in Dublin which threw all Nationalist Ireland in to the arms of Sinn Fein; the executions now about to be carried out are far less justifiable, and they in their turn…will not fail of their effect.[123]

George Russell was the *Guardian* contributor whose reporting informed this editorial on the executions, and as Scott felt necessary to clarify: 'Mr. George Russell is no advocate of violence; he is only a distinguished literary man who understands and loves his country'.[124] Russell's contributions to the *Guardian* will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

This ongoing violence also caused Scott to revisit discussion on the American influence on the Irish question. In March 1921 an American relief organisation, with the blessing of the President, began plans to donate £150,000 to Irish creameries which, as Scott stated sardonically: 'our noble Black and Tans destroyed'. This sum was subsequently raised to £2,500,000 to help rebuild Cork. The editor explained that Americans were not passing judgement on how the destruction of creameries and the city of Cork had occurred, 'but they see the results quite clearly, and, as no one else is coming forward to give help, they are coming forward'.[125] Scott's concern for how this could affect Anglo-Us political relations had tapered by the end of the War of Independence, but he still recognised that Ireland remained a focus of interest of the American people, especially as in this case, from a philanthropic perspective.

Nonetheless, in 1921 Scott's returned his focus to the political developments of the conflict, in particular, he commented on the implementation of the Government of Ireland Act 1920. This partitioned Ireland on 3rd May 1921, and subsequent elections intended to establish the new parliaments in Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland. On the 'Appointed Day' of the

[122] C. P. Scott, 'The Irish Executions', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 March 1921.
[123] C. P. Scott, 'The Irish Executions', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 March 1921.
[124] C. P. Scott, 'The Irish Executions', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 March 1921.
[125] C. P. Scott, 'America and Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 28 March 1921.

implementation of the Act, the *Guardian* reaffirmed its stance that the measures it granted failed to resolve the 'the fundamental problem of Irish Government, which is the satisfaction of nationalist feeling and the establishment of peace and order in Ireland as a whole'.[126] Scott reiterated the need for a united Ireland with powers beyond Home Rule.

The first Northern Irish and Southern Irish elections followed partition on 22nd May 1921. Sir James Craig was elected first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, and Sinn Féin returned unopposed in 124 out of 128 seats in the South.[127] The Irish Parliamentary Party made no attempt to oppose Sinn Fein.[128] The elected Sinn Féin candidates continued to recognise Dáil Éireann. Following Sinn Fein's victory in the South, Scott scorned the British government who, 'in their folly, within the short space of two years, wrecked the power of every moderate element of Southern Ireland'.[129] Scott maintained that these elections would fail to restore Ireland to peace.

Finally, in June 1921, the British government's approach to Ireland shifted. British public opinion as manifested in the British press, demanded peace.[130] On 22nd June 1921 King George delivered a speech to the new Northern Irish Parliament calling for peace, which was 'a catalyst for truce'.[131] On 24th June 1921, Lloyd George wrote to de Valera stating that the British government was 'deeply anxious that, so far as they can assure it, the King's appeal for reconciliation in Ireland shall not be made in vain'.[132] Lloyd George invited de Valera, 'as the chosen leader of the great majority of Southern Ireland' to attend a conference in London to try to find a settlement.[133] On 8th July 1921 de Valera informed the British Prime Minister that he was ready to meet personally to try to organise peace.[134] A truce was declared on 9th July.

[126] C. P. Scott, 'The Appointed Day', *Manchester Guardian,* 21 April 1921.
[127] Leeson, *The Black and Tans, British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish War of Independence, 1920-1921* p. 64.
[128] C. P. Scott, 'Nationalists and the Irish Elections', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 May 1921.
[129] C. P. Scott, 'Nationalists and the Irish Elections', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 May 1921.
[130] Boyce, *Englishmen and the Irish Troubles, British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy 1918-22*.
[131] Lyons, *Ireland since the Famine*, p. 426.
[132] Public Record Office Northern Ireland, D1584/10/7, 'Letter from the British Prime Minister to President de Valera, June 24th, 1921', in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).
[133] PRONI, D1584/10/7, 'Letter from the British Prime Minister to President de Valera', 24 June 1921, in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).
[134] PRONI, D1584/10/7, 'Further letter from President de Valera to the British Prime Minister, July 8th', in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).

Scott reported: 'it was felt, and rightly felt, that negotiation could not effectively be carried on till bloodshed ceased'.[135] Describing a visit by Chief of Staff, General Macready to Dublin for the truce, Scott stated: 'He arrived escorted by Sinn Féin volunteers and was received with acclamation by the surrounding crowd. How is it possible to attribute vindictiveness or malevolence to a people which can receive its chief tyrant with cheers'.[136] This last comment by Scott published during the War of Independence reiterated the *Guardian's* long-standing sympathy for the Irish nationalist cause. At midday on 11th July 1921 the truce was implemented. The peace negotiations that followed and their conclusion, the Anglo-Irish Treaty, will be the subject of the next two chapters of this thesis.

Conclusion

Scott's editorial commentary on the Irish War of Independence focused on several key themes which came to the fore at different stages of the war and reflected the ways in which the conflict progressed. In the initial months of the war, Dáil Éireann's strategy for gaining international recognition of the republic focused on gaining a seat at the peace table in Paris. The Dáil employed Wilsonian ideas of self-determination in their attempts to achieve this. The *Guardian's* editorial commentary thus focused on the Peace Conference and self-determination in relation to the Irish question. Scott's leaders argued that Ireland should be allowed to represent itself at the Paris Peace Conference as a nation in its own right. Scott maintained that the Irish were a distinct nationality, and thus should also be granted some level of political self-determination. Scott insisted, however, that self-determination was not synonymous with an Irish republic. Instead, the *Guardian* focused on alternative political solutions to Irish nationalism. Scott argued that the best solution would be Dominion status for a united Ireland, maintaining that the partition would not solve Irish grievances. Scott maintained this position in his critical commentary on the Government of Ireland Act 1920, and until the truce in 1921.

In autumn 1920, following the increase in recruitment to the RIC from England and the passing of ROIA, violence by British authorities in Ireland reached an unprecedented extreme. Hence,

[135] C. P. Scott, 'A Truce in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 09 July 1921.
[136] C. P. Scott, 'A Truce in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 09 July 1921.

in late 1920 the *Guardian's* editorial commentary focused almost completely on RIC reprisals. Scott attributed the actions of the Black and Tans to government policy and held the British government responsible for the cycle of violence that persisted. The language used to describe the actions of the RIC increasingly branded the Crown forces and their actions with criminality. Comparably little coverage was given to the IRA, and Scott was much more forgiving of the Dáil's association with Irish nationalist violence than with the British government for their responsibility over the RIC. Ultimately, all of Scott's editorial commentary on the Irish War of Independence revolved around British government policy, even when the focus was on violence. This dialogue on Ireland in the press, which the *Guardian* made an important contribution to, impacted on British public opinion and on political debate.[137]

Nevertheless, the *Manchester Guardian's* opposition to British rule in Ireland was limited by its moderate constitutionalist stance, and its own liberal ideology. Scott's editorial commentary was highly critical of the British government's Irish policy and supported moderate Irish nationalism, in line with liberal notions of political freedom, objection to arbitrary punishment, and the importance of the rule of law. These principles were fundamental to Scott's personal liberal politics, which underpinned the *Guardian* ideology. But the *Guardian's* proposed resolution to the Irish question, Dominion status within the British Empire, ultimately sustained British dominance in Ireland. It offered *the right amount* of freedom that Scott thought would satisfy Irish nationalist demands, while exercising restraint, and maintaining existing structures of authority. For Scott, however, the empire did not contradict ideas of freedom because the British empire of the 1920s was a 'Commonwealth of Nations' based on friendship. It was not the aggressive expansionist imperial power of the late nineteenth century that waged war in South Africa. Scott's conception of empire had changed, and as such, he considered Ireland's continued place within it the solution to the Irish question. This is the approach that was eventually adopted by the British government for Southern Ireland, as discussed in the next chapter.

[137] Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*, and Boyce, *Englishmen and the Irish Troubles, British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy 1918-22*.

Chapter 3

Negotiating Peace

By the summer of 1921 the British government and the Crown Forces were demoralised by the constant criticism they had received throughout the Irish War of Independence, both in Britain and on the international stage. The *Manchester Guardian* played a significant role in the censure of the British government's Irish policy in the public sphere during the conflict, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. The IRA's resources to continue fighting were also increasingly limited, and by the end 1921, both sides were ready to ceasefire and attempt to negotiate peace. The King's speech that opened the Northern Irish Parliament on 22nd June 1921, and called for peace in Ireland, was a catalyst for the truce that came into effect on 11th July 1921. This truce opened peace negotiations between the British government and Dáil Éireann.

The historiography of British public discussion on the post-truce period is limited. Boyce's monograph, *Englishmen and the Irish troubles, British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy, 1918-22,* seeks to illuminate the reactions and broader role of the press and public opinion in Anglo-Irish relations to 1922, but more attention is given to the War of Independence. Moreover, the *Manchester Guardian's* coverage of the peace negotiations has been overshadowed by discussions of the London press, despite the paper's important place in British liberal politics. This chapter provides a close analysis of the *Guardian's* editorial line on the peace process, which has hitherto been neglected. It also, as with the previous chapter, speaks to debates on the themes central to the Irish revolution.

The *Guardian's* commentary on the post-truce period is the focus here. This chapter addresses Scott's stance on the Irish question throughout the preliminary peace talks from July to September 1921, and the Anglo-Irish Conference from October to December 1921. Scott's editorials focused on supporting peace negotiations and the approach of the British government; achieving an Anglo-Irish settlement based on Dominion status for Ireland; censuring threats to peace; and emphasising the importance of Ulster to resolution. This chapter illuminates Scott and the *Guardian*'s contribution to public discussion on Anglo-Irish politics during the final stages of the Irish revolution.

Preliminary Negotiations

Following the truce, Scott's editorials immediately and persistently stressed the importance of success in the negotiations between Britain and Ireland. Scott argued that the truce was an exceptional chance for settlement, not due to an absence of similar opportunities in the past, but because Scott believed this truce was the last chance for the Irish question to be resolved in the near future. Scott maintained: 'Similar opportunities, full of promise for Ireland, have presented themselves before, and they have been lost and ruined through sheer lack of courage and of steadfastness…No similar failure must be allowed now to await us'.[1] The editor insisted that 'there is a chance to agree, a chance which may perhaps not return' and that it would be 'lamentable' should the opportunity be lost.[2] Scott also considered the current negotiations as exceptional due to Ireland's position following the War of Independence in comparison to during the Home Rule Crisis. When de Valera and Lloyd George met privately in London to start the preliminary negotiations in July 1921,[3] Scott recognised this as, at least partly, meetings between the Irish and the British as separate powers, rather than between two different parts of a United Kingdom.[4] This was a new diplomatic process between the British and Irish nationalist leaders.

Scott emphasised the exceptionality of the truce and necessity for successful negotiations by reflecting on the violence of the War of Independence. He maintained: 'The change from violent, cruel, and bloody conflict in Ireland to perfectly friendly converse in Downing Street is enormous and salutary'. Scott highlighted that the temperament of both sides had changed dramatically, even if their views on the future relationship between Ireland and Britain had not. Scott described Lloyd George's previous approach to Ireland as 'breathing fire and fury', but stated with incredulity that the Prime Minister now sought peace.[5] Scott's reflections illuminated the effective application of the truce in the south of Ireland (violence was still prevalent in the North East), and the beginning of peace talks as a remarkable step forward in Anglo-Irish relations. Thus, he argued, this opportunity for prolonged peace should not be

[1] C. P. Scott, 'Mr. Lloyd George's Speech.', *Manchester Guardian*, 16 July 1921.
[2] C. P. Scott, 'A Crisis in the Negotiations.', *Manchester Guardian*, 16 September 1921.
[3] PRONI, D1584/10/7, 'Proposals of the British Government for an Irish Settlement, 20th July, 1921', in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).
[4] C. P. Scott, 'The Problem for Mr. Lloyd George.', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 July 1921.
[5] C. P. Scott, 'What Next.', *Manchester Guardian*, 22 July 1921.

wasted. While Scott maintained that violence between Ireland and Britain was historic, it had historically failed to achieve anything positive for either side. He stated: 'It is force which for centuries has governed the relations of the two islands, and it has force which has failed and ever will fail - which never more conspicuously has failed than in the last two years'.[6] Again, Scott referred back to the Irish War of Independence.

For Scott, avoiding a reversion to war was imperative. He argued that should negotiations fail, violence in Ireland would be the reality for successive generations.[7] Renewing war would be 'folly'.[8] Therefore, Scott argued that even if a settlement could not be reached, the 'brutalities of unlicensed war' should still be avoided.[9] The *Guardian* maintained that the 'killings and burnings' seen during the War of Independence, 'the horrors we have escaped', 'the miseries of reciprocal murder and destruction', must not return should the truce breakdown.[10] In September 1921, Scott asserted: 'Whatever happens there must be no reversion to the futile barbarities of so-called 'war' which in truth was in the main was a competition in murder'.[11] Notions of British morality were also used to reinforce Scott's argument against violence. Scott argued that the moral gain of the truce and pursuit of peace 'in our own conscience and in the eyes of the world…has been enormous', and that at 'all costs we must retain this and keep the field open for further advance'.[12] For Scott, a peace settlement with Ireland would 'vindicate the moral position of the country' on the international stage.[13] Scott's desire for long-term peace and vindication of Britain's morality shaped his editorial commentary on Anglo-Irish relations during this period, particularly his reactions to the British government's settlement proposals and the Dáil's rejection of these in July and August 1921.

On 20th July 1921, Lloyd George presented de Valera with a draft peace settlement. The settlement immediately established that Ireland was to remain within the British Empire, arguing that Irish nationalism was compatible with, and would be able to thrive fully within

[6] C. P. Scott, 'The Government's Reply.', *Manchester Guardian*, 30 September 1921.
[7] C. P. Scott, 'On the Brink.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 September 1921.
[8] C. P. Scott, 'A Signal for Peace.' *Manchester Guardian*, 07 September 1921.
[9] C. P. Scott, 'What Next', *Manchester Guardian*, 22 July 1921.
[10] C. P. Scott, 'What Next', *Manchester Guardian*, 22 July 1921.
[11] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland's Choice.', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 September 1921.
[12] C. P. Scott, 'A Momentous Cabinet.', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 September 1921.
[13] C. P. Scott, 'What Next', *Manchester Guardian*, 22 July 1921.

the British Commonwealth of Nations. The settlement stated that retaining Ireland's position within the British Empire was 'not only for the welfare of Great Britain, Ireland, and the empire as a whole, but also for the cause of peace and harmony throughout the world'. Ultimately, it offered Southern Ireland Dominion status within the British Empire, with control over all affairs including fiscal autonomy, and the promise of 'liberties', 'fellowship' and 'freedom'. The British government argued that there was 'a deep desire' throughout the empire for an end to violence, and 'a solution should be found…which will enable her to co-operate as a willing partner in the British Commonwealth'. But Ireland's status as proposed by the draft settlement rested upon six conditions. Four of these related to defence, and secured Britain's naval and air power in and around Ireland. The settlement also stated that the powers of Northern Ireland as granted by the Government of Ireland Act 1920 could not be revoked without Ulster's consent or by use of force. It insisted that the British government would support a united Ireland, but 'in no conditions can they consent to any proposals which would kindle civil war', which would have impact across the British empire, and be worse than the war concluded by the recent truce.[14]

Even with the six conditions, the draft proposal was the greatest concession of self-determination that had ever been formally offered to Ireland. Nevertheless, it was rejected by the Irish republican leadership. It was first rejected in an unofficial meeting of the 'Inner Cabinet', which included Eamon de Valera, Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith, and took place at de Valera's house on 24th of July 1921. Members expressed that could not enter into any association with Britain until it was free, and that Dominion status did not grant this freedom. Griffith thought there would be a greater divide in Ireland if they refused a treaty, and Collins argued that Dominion status was a step in the road to independence. Indeed, Dominion status was a fluid term that was constantly developing at this time, and existing white Dominions had used this status to increasingly expand their powers of self-determination. But those opposed to the settlement maintained that 'Self-determination cannot be preserved by giving

[14] PRONI, D1584/10/7, 'Proposals of the British Government for an Irish Settlement, 20th July, 1921', in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).

it up'.[15] Hence, when the Irish Cabinet officially met on 27th July to discuss Lloyd George's proposals, they agreed to reject the settlement and demand external association.[16]

The idea of external association was that Ireland would be a completely independent nation, but voluntarily agree association with the British Empire to serve mutual interests, without actually being a Dominion within it. Demands for external association were sent to the British Cabinet on 10th August 1921. The Dáil argued that Ireland's 'national destiny' and a 'true friendship with England' would be best achieved 'free from Imperialistic entanglements', through complete separation from Britain. These 'entanglements' were described as 'destructive', 'fruitful only of ruinous wars, crushing burdens, social discontent, and general unrest and unhappiness'. It was damning of the nature of the British Empire and its role in the world. The offer of Dominion status was also denounced as 'illusory'. It was argued that the freedom enjoyed by other dominions was a result of geographical distance from the metropole, which had made British interference 'impracticable'.[17] Geography, as well as the conditions on defense outlined in the settlement, deprived Ireland of these assurances.

Moreover, the Dáil objected to the partition of Ulster and maintained that the issue of Ulster would be resolved internally without British interference. It argued: 'We cannot admit the right of the British Government to mutilate our country, either in its own interest or at the call of any section of our population'. The Dáil insisted that force would not be used against Ulster, and if the British government stood aside, reconciliation could be achieved. It placed the responsibility for violence in Ireland throughout its history on the British, and thus the power to grant peace on the British government. The offer of Dominion status for Ireland within the British Empire was formally rejected on this basis. Only free association with 'the British Commonwealth group' for a *united* Ireland would be considered. These key arguments; that the invitation to join the British Commonwealth was a 'guise'; that the

[15] No. 143 UCDA P150/173, Handwritten notes by Eamon de Valera of a meeting of the 'Inner Cabinet', in Fanning, Kennedy, Keogh, and O'Haplin (eds.), *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume I, 1919-1922*, pp. 246-248.
[16] NAI, DE/1/3, Minutes of Dáil Éireann Ministry and Cabinet, 24 September 1920 - 08 December 1921, p. 117B.
[17] PRONI, D1584/10/7, 'Reply of the Ministry of Dáil Éireann, August 10th, 1921 (Official Translation)', in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).

settlement would render Ireland subordinate to Britain and the other dominions; and the objection to the partition of Ireland, were maintained throughout the peace negotiations.[18]

Nationalist Ireland wanted both unity and independence, but the *Guardian* argued that while the newspaper and Britain as a nation wanted unity for Ireland and to be free of responsibility over Ireland, Ulster prevented this. Scott believed that Ulster would resist absorption into an independent Irish state as previously demonstrated in 1912 during the Home Rule Crisis. He rejected the Dáil's argument that if the British left Ireland the minority in the north-east would 'fall into line with the rest of the country'.[19] The Editor also maintained that the problem of Ulster was not created by the British; Britain was 'not responsible for Orange fanaticism' therefore Britain's departure could not solve the Ulster problem. As explained in Chapter 2, Scott had opposed partition and the creation of Northern Ireland, recognising then and now that the Government of Ireland Act 1920 only served to increase, or at the very least entrench, divisions.[20] However, Scott maintained that 'Orange fanaticism' as seen in 1912 was not promoted by the government. In fact, the government suffered because of it, and that would also be the case in 1921. Scott argued that 'at least the existence of Northern Ireland gave Ulstermen some security and kept the Orangemen quiet'.[21] Scott insisted that unless nationalist Ireland was prepared to use force against Northern Ireland, which it claimed it was not, complete independence for a united Ireland was not an option.[22]

Hence, for the *Manchester Guardian* the key to achieving long-term peace and unity in Ireland was through the compromise of Dominion status, such as that proposed by Lloyd George.[23] Dominion status within the British Empire would allow nationalist Ireland 'the substance of complete political freedom… with full liberty to develop her own distinctive national life' while maintaining 'essential unity' in Ireland.[24] Again, Scott believed that Irish nationalist demands and the British empire were compatible because in his view the interwar empire

[18] PRONI, D1584/10/7, 'Reply from the Ministry of Dáil Éireann, August 30th, 1921 (Official Translation)', in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).
[19] C. P. Scott, 'The Government's Reply.', *Manchester Guardian*, 09 September 1921.
[20] C. P. Scott, 'The Fateful Conference.', *Manchester Guardian*, 10 October 1921.
[21] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland's Choice.', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 September 1921.
[22] C. P. Scott, 'The Next Step.', *Manchester Guardian*, 20 July 1921.
[23] C. P. Scott, 'The Government's Reply.', *Manchester Guardian*, 09 September 1921.
[24] C. P. Scott, 'Is it a Hitch?', *Manchester Guardian*, 15 September 1921.

was like the League of Nations, an institution characterised by shared freedoms, friendship, and the desire for peace. Scott also maintained that Dominion status for the north and south would make unity in Irish self-government 'almost inevitable'. If both North and South were granted the same powers of self-government as Dominions within the British Empire they could eventually be united in a common assembly, with their rights as separate entities preserved.[25] Here, Scott suggested recognising Irish partition but achieving essential unity through an All-Ireland Parliament. This idea was formally proposed by British delegates at the Anglo-Irish conference. Scott supported Lloyd George's preliminary offer of Dominion status for Ireland with six limitations, believing that the peace negotiations and subsequent conference rested on persuading the Irish Cabinet that allegiance to the British Crown within the British Empire was in the best interests of the entirety of Ireland.[26] The *Manchester Guardian* considered Irish self-determination, governing by the consent of the governed, concepts compatible with the British Empire, as also argued by Lloyd George.

Scott highlighted in his commentary that the initial offer of Dominion status was perceived by the Dáil to be disingenuous, and the settlement conditions an attempt to deprive Ireland of the freedom that other Dominions had been granted.[27] According to Scott, these limitations were 'naturally to be demanded by the special historical and geographical conditions of Ireland'.[28] With this in mind, Scott believed that de Valera could eventually be persuaded to accept Dominion status, but he would need to open up to compromise.[29] That would be the purpose of the impending Anglo-Irish Peace Conference. The 'crux of the whole business' would be to discover 'how far it is possible to reconcile allegiance to the Crown and the position of a self-governing Dominion with the demands, as understood by the present Irish Nationalist leaders of Nationalist Ireland, of Irish liberty'.[30] Scott ultimately argued the Irish nationalist leadership would not meet the British in conference, as was the case in October

[25] C. P. Scott, 'The Next Step.', *Manchester Guardian*, 20 July 1921, and C. P. Scott, 'A Momentous Cabinet.', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 September 1921.
[26] C. P. Scott, 'The Government's Reply.', *Manchester Guardian*, 09 September 1921.
[27] C. P. Scott, 'The Government's Reply.', *Manchester Guardian*, 09 September 1921.
[28] C. P. Scott, 'A Signal for Peace.' *Manchester Guardian*, 07 September 1921.
[29] C. P. Scott, 'Some Plain Words Needed.', *Manchester Guardian*, 08 September 1921.
[30] C. P. Scott, 'The Government's Reply.', *Manchester Guardian*, 09 September 1921.

1921, if the prospect of Dominion status was completely irreconcilable with Ireland's demands.[31]

The *Guardian* also recognised that the term Dominion status was vague and fluid, as Collins stressed in the 'Inner Cabinet' meeting following Lloyd George's initial proposal. But again, Scott argued that Dominion status was perfectly compatible with Irish sovereignty. The editor stated:

> Of course Dominion status is a pretty vague thing, and there are high authorities who will contend that the Dominions themselves 'sovereign' States, and indeed we ourselves are constantly talking in that strain. They have the same Sovereign as we, but assuredly they are not subject to us. And so might it be with Ireland.[32]

Thus, in September 1921 Scott maintained that the first issue to resolve at the upcoming peace conference would be the ambiguity surrounding Dominion status, the offer of this status, and to better understand Ireland's initial rejection of this offer. Scott insisted that this was a crucial matter for discussion as it would establish the practical powers of the Irish State, not the 'metaphysics' of Kings, Kingdoms and sovereignty.[33] As highlighted below, however, settlement discussions during the Anglo-Irish Conference were rooted in the symbolic aspects of the relationship between Britain and Ireland, in the shared monarchy.

Hence, de Valera's dismissal of the Ulster question and persistence on independence from the British Crown provoked criticism from Scott during the preliminaries.[34] For Scott, Irish nationalist leaders were more concerned with the symbol of the Crown rather than the realities for Ireland should it receive full independence. Scott argued:

> It [Irish Cabinet] does not stop to consider whether it is better for Ireland to cut loose from the body of the British Empire and for Irishmen to become aliens rather than to win the substance of self-government without so utter a disruption. But then the ideal of complete independence has become, through conflict, so fixed in the minds of the present leaders of Sinn Féin that it has ceased to be a means to an end and has become

[31] C. P. Scott, 'The Fateful Conference.', *Manchester Guardian*, 10 October 1921.
[32] C. P. Scott, 'On the Brink.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 September 1921.
[33] C. P. Scott, 'The Acceptance - And After.', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 October 1921.
[34] C. P. Scott, 'A Momentous Cabinet.', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 September 1921.

> an end in itself, quite apart from any dangers or difficulties it may involve or any positive benefits it may bring as compared with a less drastic solution.[35]

Scott accused de Valera of playing down the significance of Ulster. The *Guardian* insisted that it did not wish 'to make use of Orange intransigence as a means of breaking down Nationalist intransigence', recognising that Irish nationalism would be much easier to appease if not for the Ulster problem, but, 'as a matter of history, all attempts to solve the Irish difficulty have hitherto broken down on the opposition of Ulster'.[36] The Irish Cabinet were preoccupied with questions of status and sovereignty in relation to their neighbour across the sea when the *Guardian* thought they should be concerned with their neighbour in the North East of Ireland.

The British government's position was made very clear during the preliminary negotiations; Ireland must remain, in some form or another, connected to Britain through the British Crown. Lloyd George maintained that the Irish leadership must accept this as the basis of negotiation. It saw any discussion on what this meant in theory for Ireland's national status as a waste of time as the point was non-negotiable.[37] Lloyd George stressed the geographical proximity and historical links between Ireland and Britain to reject claims that Ireland was a separate power that would be better off left alone as also upheld by C. P. Scott with the same intention. Lloyd George also cited previous Irish nationalist leaders to argue that complete separation from Britain had never been a desire of Irish nationalist ideology. Lloyd George defended the settlement proposed in July 1921, arguing that the conditions outlined contained 'no derogation from Ireland's status as a Dominion, no desire for British ascendency over Ireland, and no impairment of Ireland's national ideals'. The offer was upheld as 'beyond all precedent', 'approved as liberal by the whole civilised world' and 'regarded as the utmost which the empire can reasonably offer or Ireland reasonably expect', even by those most sympathetic to the Irish nationalist cause - such as the *Manchester Guardian*. Lloyd George insisted that prolonging meaningful negotiation further was 'dangerous' as the truce became increasingly fragile by September 1921.[38]

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[35] C. P. Scott, 'The Next Moves in Ireland and America', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 August 1921.
[36] C. P. Scott, 'A Fresh Start Needed.', *Manchester Guardian*, 29 August 1921.
[37] PRONI, D1584/10/7, 'Letter from the British Prime Minister to President de Valera, August 13th, 1921', in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).
[38] PRONI, D1584/10/7, 'Further letter from the British Prime Minister, August 26th, 1921', in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).

During the preliminary negotiations, Scott perceived Ireland as 'unhappily represented' with leaders that 'do not represent her [Ireland's] best spirit'.[39] In contrast, the *Guardian* maintained: 'Nobody is better able than Mr. Lloyd George to attempt this task with tolerance and understanding, and to bring it to success'.[40] While criticising the stubborn rather than conciliatory attitude of de Valera and the Dáil, the *MG* commended the British government for being 'as moderate and conciliatory as we hoped and believed it would be' and for extending the offer of a peace conference with the Irish nationalist leader.[41] Scott described Lloyd George's draft settlement as 'large and statesmanlike', arguing that this was all he could do to make appeasement a possibility. Scott continued: 'What he promises he can perform… If previous Governments could have promised as much there would have been no Irish question to-day'.[42] Scott was convinced that both the British and the Irish wanted long-term peace, and it was Lloyd George who could deliver this, - not with de Valera, but despite him.[43] This was a complete contrast in tone from just a few months previously when Scott incessantly attacked Lloyd George and his Cabinet for their Irish policy.

Praise of Lloyd George and critique of de Valera were key tropes that, during preliminary negotiations, emerged throughout Scott's editorials. For Scott the main threat to the truce and long-term peace was a lack of willingness to compromise on the part of the Irish leadership, particularly de Valera. Following the Dáil's rejection of the British government's draft settlement in August 1921, the Editor argued:

> It is perfectly natural that Mr. De Valera should feel a sense of elation at the progress made by his cause… But no mistake could well be greater than to suppose that, having achieved so much, the leaders of Sinn Féin have practically achieved all, that their task henceforth is simply one of persistence involving no element of constructive statesmanship.[44]

Scott was anxious that de Valera and the Dáil saw their current mandate in Ireland as indicative of the Anglo-Irish problem solved. Scott criticised de Valera's attitude of

[39] C. P. Scott, 'A Momentous Cabinet.', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 September 1921.
[40] C. P. Scott, 'A Signal for Peace.' *Manchester Guardian*, 07 September 1921.
[41] C. P. Scott, 'The Government's Reply.', *Manchester Guardian*, 09 September 1921.
[42] C. P. Scott, 'On the Brink.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 September 1921.
[43] C. P. Scott, 'Unprofitable Manoeuvres.', *Manchester Guardian*, 20 September 1921.
[44] C. P. Scott, 'A Fresh Start Needed.', *Manchester Guardian*, 29 August 1921.

'persistence' rather than compromise, arguing that this presented a danger to peace.[45] For Scott, by mid-September 1921, there had been 'no definite movement whatever on the part of Sinn Féin towards compromise'.[46] The importance of successful negotiations and the exceptionality of the truce for Scott influenced this commentary on the leadership of both sides.

Following the rejection of the draft settlement, it was clear that Britain and Ireland would have to meet in conference if a peace agreement was to be achieved. But disagreement on the basis upon which a conference would actually take place delayed negotiations further. De Valera maintained that the Irish people did not recognise any voluntary union between Britain, and thus would not enter conference negotiations on the basis of some form of union pre-agreed. They were an independent sovereign state entering negotiation with Britain as a foreign power. The Dáil agreed to appoint plenipotentiaries to a conference with British delegates, but on the basis that they would be 'untrammeled by any conditions' in working to establish a peace that adhered the principle of government by consent of the governed.[47] The British government, however, could not enter a conference with the Irish nationalist leadership on the basis of the broad principle of 'government by consent of the governed', as it would suggest Britain was open to any terms demanded by the Irish delegates. Instead, Lloyd George invited Ireland to meet in conference 'to ascertain how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire can best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations'.[48] The Prime Minister maintained that if Ireland refused this invitation to discuss Ireland's position within the British Empire under the British Crown, it would signify Ireland's complete repudiation of this relationship and thus all negotiation futile.[49]

[45] C. P. Scott, 'A Fresh Start Needed.', *Manchester Guardian*, 29 August 1921.
[46] C. P. Scott, 'The Irish Negotiation', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 September 1921.
[47] PRONI, D1584/10/7, 'Reply from the Ministry of Dáil Éireann, August 30th, 1921 (Official Translation)', in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).
[48] PRONI, D1584/10/7, 'The British Cabinet's Reply, September 7th, 1921, to the Irish Ministry's Letter of August 30th.', in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).
[49] PRONI, D1584/10/7, 'The British Cabinet's Reply, September 7th, 1921, to the Irish Ministry's Letter of August 30th.', in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).

The Irish Cabinet intended to enter a conference with the British government; it had been making decisions regarding a conference delegation since late August.[50] On 9th September they decided who would form the Irish delegation, and on 10th September the reply to Lloyd George's invitation was approved by the Irish Cabinet.[51] On 12th September the Dáil Ministry replied and a message agreeing to meet the British government in conference was sent.[52] This reply reiterated that Ireland had declared itself an independent sovereign state. This frustrated Lloyd George and he asked that the assertion of independence be removed.[53] But the Dáil gave unanimous approval to this reply, as well as approval of the conference plenipotentiaries on the morning of 14th September 1921.[54] Thus, Lloyd George called off the conference. He maintained that accepting to meet on these terms 'would constitute an official recognition by His Majesty's Government of the severance of Ireland from the empire and of its existence as an independent Republic'.[55] Unless the affirmation was removed, conference was 'impossible'.[56]

De Valera insisted that Ireland had to reaffirm its position on Irish independence to avoid confusion over the basis upon which the Irish delegation would be entering the conference with Britain.[57] He maintained that 'we can only recognise ourselves for what we are', and did not think this self-recognition should be cause to cancel the conference.[58] De Valera argued that the Irish Cabinet did not expect Britain 'to recognise the Irish Republic formally, or

[50] NAI, DE/1/3, Minutes of Dáil Éireann Ministry and Cabinet, 24 September 1920 - 08 December 1921, p. 117B.
[51] NAI, DE/1/3, Minutes of Dáil Éireann Ministry and Cabinet, 24 September 1920 - 08 December 1921, p. 118. B.
[52] PRONI, D1584/10/7, 'Letter of September 12th from Dáil Éireann Cabinet in answer to the British Cabinet's letter of September 7th, 1921.', in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).
[53] No. 154 UCDA P150/1905, Report from Harry Boland and Joseph McGrath to Eamon de Valera, 14 September 1921, in Fanning, Kennedy, Keogh, and O'Haplin (eds.), *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume I, 1919-1922*, pp. 267-268.
[54] PRONI, D1584/10/7, Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).
[55] PRONI, D1584/10/7, 'Reply Telegraphed by British Prime Minister to President de Valera, 15th September, 1921.', in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).
[56] PRONI, D1584/10/7, 'Letter Telegraphed by British Prime Minister, September 18th.', in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).
[57] PRONI, D1584/10/7, 'Letter Telegraphed by President de Valera to the British Prime Minister, September 16th.', in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).
[58] PRONI, D1584/10/7, 'Reply Telegraphed by President de Valera, September 17th.', in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).

informally', but by imposing preliminary conditions Lloyd George was asking for Ireland to surrender their position. De Valera asked Lloyd George to clarify whether the invitation to conference was 'intended to be a demand for a surrender' or an invitation to meet 'without prejudice'.[59] But Lloyd George was concerned that 'it might be argued in future that the acceptance of a conference on this basis had involved them in a recognition which no British Government can accord' - the recognition of a self-declared Irish republic.

This disagreement about the terms of conference resulted in heightened tensions that posed a major risk to the truce for the *Guardian*. Scott argued this was caused 'partly because of an uncompromising assertion by Sinn Féin leaders of their revolutionary standpoint'.[60] This was in line with Scott's commentary on the uncompromising attitude of de Valera. Scott explained that the Dáil fundamentally considered Ireland an independent sovereign state and de Valera, as its President, represented it as such. Still, the *Guardian* argued that Lloyd George could not agree to meeting on these terms as it would compromise the British government's position. Scott clarified that Lloyd George rejected these terms of meeting as 'they might be regarded as giving some sort of sanction to a claim which they were bound utterly to repudiate'.[61] Scott argued that de Valera's persistence on the issue was unnecessary, and again, criticised his overwhelming concern with the symbolic elements of Britain and Ireland's interactions rather than with the practical - rather than with peace. The *Manchester Guardian* also criticised Lloyd George for his handling of this issue around the 'terms of conference' along similar lines,[62] although Scott's editorials were generally much more positive about Lloyd George during the preliminaries, as illuminated above.

It must be recognised here that while Scott expressed frustration at de Valera's position, he also expressed sympathy and understanding for the hesitations and persistence of the Irish leadership. Scott recognised that the Dáil had fought for two years in the name of a republic, and encouraged readers to understand nationalist Ireland's reluctance to trust the British by

[59] PRONI, D1584/10/7, 'Letter Telegraphed by President de Valera, September 19th.', in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).
[60] C. P. Scott, 'The Breakdown of Negotiations.', *Manchester Guardian*, 17 September 1921.
[61] C. P. Scott, 'An Unreal Difficulty.', *Manchester Guardian*, 19 September 1921.
[62] C. P. Scott, 'The Breakdown of Negotiations.', *Manchester Guardian*, 17 September 1921.

entering into conference without establishing their own terms.[63] Scott also recognised the role of Britain in provoking this attitude. The editor asked *Guardian* readers to remember that for a hundred years Irish nationalism had sought redress through constitutional means, and 'only when we had given her reason to despair of these that, as again and again has happened in such cases, she fell back despairing on revolution'.[64]

Nevertheless, Scott still urged de Valera to compromise. He argued: 'There is the ideal and there is the practical, and the wise man and good patriot is he who knows how to descend at the appointed time from the one to the other, and to do it courageously, decisively, effectively'. Scott insisted that ending the truce through 'sheer impractibleness' was 'neither wise nor brave', thus, concessions from de Valera were necessary.[65] Again, Scott's commentary was influenced by his desire for settlement, and de Valera's approach to conference was a threat to peace. Nevertheless, when the Prime Minister issued a new, re-worded invitation to a conference, to the Irish delegates on 29th September 1921, 'as spokesmen of the people whom you represent with a view to ascertaining how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations'[66], the Irish Cabinet accepted.[67]

As well as the uncompromising attitude of the Irish leaders and disagreement over the terms of conference, ongoing violence in Northern Ireland was, for Scott, a serious threat to the truce during the preliminary negotiations. While the ceasefire had been implemented effectively in the south, political and sectarian violence in Northern Ireland was 'endemic'.[68] Scott argued that at a time when negotiations were at a critical stage, 'Belfast seizes the occasion for some of the most violent, bloody, and senseless rioting'. Scott questioned whether this violence was an attempt to derail negotiations and argued that this was reason

[63] C. P. Scott, 'An Unreal Difficulty.', *Manchester Guardian*, 19 September 1921.
[64] C. P. Scott, 'The Breakdown of Negotiations.', *Manchester Guardian*, 17 September 1921.
[65] C. P. Scott, 'An Unreal Difficulty.', *Manchester Guardian*, 19 September 1921.
[66] PRONI, D1584/10/7, 'Letter Telegraphed by the British Prime Minister, September 29th, containing 'a fresh invitation to a Conference'', in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).
[67] PRONI, D1584/10/7, 'Letter Telegraphed in reply, September 30th, from Dáil Éireann, accepting the invitation', in Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).
[68] C. P. Scott, 'A Fresh Start Needed.', *Manchester Guardian*, 29 August 1921.

for urgency with the peace process as violence might spread.[69] The *Guardian* also directed criticism at the Unionist Party. It stated: 'the very stronghold of the party which boasts itself as the special upholder of law and order, is the only part of Ireland in which since the truce disorder has been rampant'. Scott referred to a Sinn Féin source that had reported that the police and army had made no serious attempt to stop attacks on Catholics, until the IRA were called out to protect them instead. Scott criticised the Unionists who governed Northern Ireland for this, asserting that 'responsibility for the maintenance of order in a great city rests with those who control the machinery of government'. In addition, Scott defended Catholic nationalists, arguing that they could not be blamed as they were outnumbered three to one in the city. Scott also cited the treatment of Catholic Dockers in the city, who were being systematically dismissed on prejudicial grounds.[70] Scott maintained that factional violence had always been prominent in Belfast, and thus the war in the south was bound to have triggered a revival of this violence, but Scott was concerned that the lack of action from authorities would lead nationalists to believe that it was an attempt to drive Catholics out of Northern Ireland. This in turn would threaten the truce and long-term peace between nationalist Ireland and Northern Ireland.

Scott's desire for peace and censure of threats to peace was also demonstrated by his sympathy for 'the McKeown case' in early August 1921.[71] As part of the terms of truce it had been agreed that imprisoned members of Dáil Éireann would be released in order to attend Dáil meetings. On this occasion, all but Sean McKeown was permitted to do so. McKeown was a former leader of an IRA flying column and had been sentenced to death for the murder of a police officer during the War of Independence. For Scott, however, the refusal to release McKeown was a 'Menace to Peace'. Scott argued that while McKeown had technically committed murder, 'if we are to stand on the ground of strict legality' no agreement between nationalist Ireland and Britain could ever be reached and the truce would collapse. Scott called for leniency, even of the law, in order to maintain the peace and move towards settlement. Scott defended McKeown's actions, insisting that 'Mr. McKeown was not guilty

[69] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland North and South.', *Manchester Guardian*, 02 September 1921.
[70] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland North and South', *Manchester Guardian*, 02 September 1921.
[71] C. P. Scott, 'A Menace to Peace.', *Manchester Guardian*, 08 August 1921., and C. P. Scott, 'The McKeown Case.', *Manchester Guardian*, 09 August 1921.

of any mean or cowardly crime', in support of his release.[72] Following his eventual release Scott described the affair as a 'mischievous' perversity, calling whoever it was responsible a 'contriver of evil' for threatening the fragile truce.[73] Scott's overriding concern for maintaining the truce in Ireland in the summer of 1921 is apparent here: Despite criticising the Crown forces for 'lawlessness' throughout the War of Independence, the *Manchester Guardian* was prepared to sanction lenience of the law if it meant reaching an Anglo-Irish settlement.

Scott was also sympathetic towards the Dáil's state building activities throughout the summer of 1921, with peace and the prospect of settlement in mind. Scott described the work being done by the Irish Cabinet to strengthen its position during the truce as 'sensible' and 'inevitable', maintaining that 'for ourselves, we see no harm in it'.[74] These activities agitated die-hard Unionists MPs during the Anglo-Irish Conference, but for Scott and the *Guardian*, the Dáil's authority in Ireland was essential for making progress with the peace process: They were the only body with a mandate to represent the Irish people. Challenging these actions would only serve to threaten the truce and hinder negotiations. The editor explained:

> What is happening is that government by consent is being established throughout the 26 counties and that the country is peacefully settling down to it. …the self-government which has been offered as a matter of agreement is taking effect as a matter of fact. There is no violence or disorder and hardly any crime. Disputes are settled by arbitration or in the Sinn Féin courts. The Sinn Féin police, consisting in the main of the former members of the Irish Republican Army, have no difficulty in maintaining order and upholding the truce. The local Parliament is in session, and its various Ministries are actively at work. It has found time even to establish a Ministry of Fine Arts…[75]

Scott insisted that this placed 'beyond question' the ability of nationalist leaders to run an impartial and efficient government. Scott also cited the fact that Protestant property had been protected and the lack of wider prejudice or violence, unlike in Northern Ireland, to support this argument. In response to those who objected to the Dáil's activities as

[72] C. P. Scott, 'A Menace to Peace.', *Manchester Guardian*, 08 August 1921.
[73] C. P. Scott, 'The McKeown Case.', *Manchester Guardian*, 09 August 1921.
[74] C. P. Scott, 'A Fresh Start Needed.', *Manchester Guardian*, 29 August 1921.
[75] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland North and South', *Manchester Guardian*, 02 September 1921.

'unauthorised and irregular, a menace to lawful authority', such as the die-hards Unionists, the *Manchester Guardian* argued that the system of government established by Dáil Éireann was close to the conditions which Britain eventually proposed to establish. Hence, there should be no objection to state-building activities on these grounds, for the sake of peace.[76]

Nevertheless, while Scott recognised the relative success of Sinn Féin's state building activities he argued that the arrangement in the south in the summer of 1921 could not last forever. Scott cited the Irish political prisoners yet to be released by the British and reliance on revenue from the US to argue that more would be needed from the Dáil to establish an Irish state in the long-term. Moreover, for Scott, state-building success did not justify de Valera's policy of persistence that he believed had prolonged the preliminary discussions to October 1921. In the view of Scott and the *Guardian,* an agreement with Britain still had to be negotiated, regardless of the newly established infrastructure of the Irish nationalist state. Negotiating this agreement, nationalist Ireland's future relationship with Britain, was the purpose of the Anglo-Irish conference.[77]

The Anglo-Irish Conference

On 11th October the Irish delegation arrived in London for the Anglo-Irish Conference. Dáil members Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins, Éamon Duggan,[78] Robert Barton,[79] and George Gavan Duffy,[80] formed the Irish delegation, with Erskine Childers as secretary. They rightly expected conference proceedings to last 'for a couple of months'.[81] As plenipotentiaries they were given full power to negotiate and act on behalf of the Irish Cabinet, but it was agreed that no peace agreement would be committed to without consultation with the other Cabinet members in Dublin, particularly de Valera.[82] The British delegation included Prime Minister Lloyd George, Chancellor Lord Birkenhead, Leader of the House of Commons Austen Chamberlain, and Secretary of State for Colonies Winston Churchill. These men arrived in

[76] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland North and South', *Manchester Guardian*, 02 September 1921.
[77] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland North and South', *Manchester Guardian*, 02 September 1921.
[78] Teachta Dála (TD) for Kildare–Wicklow/ Member of Parliament (MP) for West Wicklow.
[79] TD for Louth–Meath/ MP for South Meath.
[80] TD for Dublin County/ MP for South County Dublin.
[81] NAI, DE/1/3, Minutes of Dáil Éireann Ministry and Cabinet, 24 September 1920 - 08 December 1921, p. 130.
[82] No. 160 UCDA P150/1925, Instructions to plenipotentiaries from the Cabinet (Copy), 07 October 1921, in Fanning, Kennedy, Keogh, and O'Haplin (eds.), *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume I, 1919-1922*, p. 272.

London with the power to decide the nature of the future Anglo-Irish settlement, although, any agreement reached between the Irish and British delegations would still have to be submitted to a vote in their respective Parliaments.

On 12th October 1921, C. P. Scott published an editorial in the *Manchester Guardian* focussing on the basis upon which the delegates for both Britain and Ireland were meeting in conference, a topic of much debate during the preliminary period. It opened: 'The Anglo-Irish Conference met at Downing Street yesterday. We purposely express the fact in terms of nationality because that is the point of view from which it can most usefully and truthfully be regarded'.[83] Scott recognised, as he had done throughout the War of Independence, that the Irish were a distinct nationality. It was upon this basis of nationality the *Manchester Guardian* considered the Irish and the British meeting in conference. Scott rejected the suggestion, as maintained by de Valera, that England was a foreign nation to Ireland, calling it 'nonsense', due to 'a bond, even an unwilling bond, and a continuous connection and intermixture going right back through the centuries'. For Scott, this meant that while the Irish and the British, or English, were meeting in conference as distinct nationalities, they were not 'foreigners' to each other. In the early sessions of the conference the Irish delegates refused to address Lloyd George in English and called for an interpreter, but for Scott, even this would not 'persuade us to regard them as unqualified aliens'.[84] This line of argument helped to corroborate the notion argued by the *Manchester Guardian* and the British government throughout the preliminaries and thereafter, that Irish sovereignty was compatible with allegiance to the British Crown.

Scott urged a friendly atmosphere between the British and Irish delegates. The *Guardian* opposed any threats to peace, as it had during the preliminaries. It argued that there had already been too many of these 'threatenings' so far on the part of the British and recognised that these 'naturally' had resulted in threats from nationalist Ireland. C. P. Scott criticised Winston Churchill for this in particular, who had threatened 'real war' should negotiations fail. Scott considered this 'foolish talk'. According to Churchill, who was part of the British

[83] C. P. Scott, 'Nations in Conference.', *Manchester Guardian*, 12 October 1921.
[84] C. P. Scott, 'Nations in Conference.', *Manchester Guardian*, 12 October 1921.

delegation, this 'real war' would not be like what Scott sardonically termed 'the glorious achievements of our Black and Tans', no; Ireland would feel the full force of the British Army. Despite Churchill's 'warlike aspirations' however, Scott maintained that there would be no return to war because the nation would not tolerate it. In Scott's view, there was no desire from the British people for a return to 'any frenzy of hate or terror' or 'the renewal of the brutalities' halted by the truce. This contrasted Scott's fears prior to the conference that the fragile truce and the opportunity for settlement could easily be lost to a renewal of violence. Scott hoped that the Irish delegates would be able to present their case 'without the disturbing or perverting sense that they are being bullied into submission'. While the editor now doubted that threats such as those expressed by Churchill would force a return to war, he advised that attempts to bully the Irish might only make them 'even more uncompromising and resistant'.[85]

The *Guardian* noted a change in tone from Ireland since the commencement of the conference, a tone more open to negotiation. Scott thought this more conciliatory atmosphere could be ruined by threats of force from Britain. The *Guardian* praised the stance of the *Irish Bulletin*, for example, for its 'new vein of moderation and of confidence'. The *Bulletin* urged goodwill and justice from both sides, and maintained that the peace was possible. But Scott stressed that if the new tone of moderation was to be maintained 'the threat of force and the whole intolerant and domineering attitude of which it is the expression must be abandoned'. Scott recognised de Valera's cautious attitude from Dublin, but understood this to be due to Ireland's unhappy history of negotiating with Britain, referring to the failure of the first and second Home Rule Bills and the Home Rule Crisis. He stated: 'Too often has the cup been dashed from her lips. It is prudent that she should be prepared to see it withheld once more'. Nevertheless, the *Manchester Guardian* took the stance that while negotiations would be difficult, 'the elements of a solution are there'. Scott maintained that it was 'the spirit' that would matter, and the spirit expressed by the *Irish Bulletin* was one that, for Scott, instilled confidence in long-term peace. The influence of the *Bulletin,* which Scott recognised as 'the official propaganda organ of Sinn Féin', is discussed in Chapter 5.[86]

[85] C. P. Scott, 'Nations in Conference.', *Manchester Guardian*, 12 October 1921.
[86] C. P. Scott, 'Nations in Conference.', *Manchester Guardian*, 12 October 1921.

Scott's editorials continued to reiterate the importance of moderation, a stance taken since the War of Independence. The editor stated: 'Was there ever a time when great issues so pressed upon one another and when there was so great a call for wisdom, for moderation, for foresight on the part of the men who will have the handling of them'. Here, Scott was not only referring to the Irish question but the broader political climate of the time and the multitude of issues, imperial and global, on the British government's agenda. Scott called for a moderate approach to these issues that 'may affect the relations of States and the peace of the world for years and perhaps generations'.[87] Scott platformed and supported Lloyd George's view that if it were left to moderates and moderates alone to resolve the Anglo-Irish problem; a settlement would have already been reached. Scott blamed extremists on both sides for blocking the way. Scott criticised the die-hards as threats to peace in his commentary on the negotiations.[88] Equally, Scott held extreme Irish nationalist views as a threat to peace, arguing that if the Irish Cabinet were 'unyielding and impracticable' then negotiations would end. Scott's critique of de Valera also demonstrated this view. Scott did not believe, however, that the Irish delegates would purposefully threaten peace because it would be against the will of 'the people'. The same applied to the British government. Scott maintained: 'Neither side can afford to ignore the feeling of its constituents'.[89] The *Manchester Guardian* emphasised that 'the people', both Irish and British, wanted peace, and this could only be achieved through moderation on both sides.[90]

The importance of Ulster in securing this peace dominated Scott's editorial commentary throughout the Anglo-Irish conference. The issue of Ulster was first raised at the conference on 14th October.[91] For Scott, reconciling Ulster with nationalist Ireland would be a practical step toward a long-term settlement. Hence, the *Guardian* remained against the permanent and definite partition of Ireland as a solution to the Ulster problem. Scott argued once again that Ireland could not be divided, regardless of previous legislation [Government of Ireland Act 1920], due to the history connecting Ulster and the South, and due to their shared

[87] C. P. Scott, 'Problems of the Nation.', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 October 1921.
[88] C. P. Scott, 'The Mischief-Makers.', *Manchester Guardian*, 19 October 1921., and C. P. Scott, 'The Debate.', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 November 1921.
[89] C. P. Scott, 'Is it a Crisis?', *Manchester Guardian*, 31 October 1921.
[90] C. P. Scott, 'The Mischief-Makers.', *Manchester Guardian*, 19 October 1921, and 'Is it a Crisis?', *Manchester Guardian*, 31 October 1921.
[91] Thomas Jones, *Whitehall Diary, Volume III, Ireland 1918-1925* (Oxford, 1971).

interests and culture. He stated: 'Ireland is one, one in a thousand ways - by the sea, by trade communications and interests, by the complete intermixture of the elements of her population, by all her history'. Scott also believed that Ulster could not function effectively as a completely separate state, describing its condition as established by the Government of Ireland Act as a 'constitutional limbo' in which it had 'none of the necessary resources or powers' for effective government.[92] Scott reiterated this point by highlighting Northern Ireland's lack of 'cash' and 'means of enforcing authority'.[93]

Scott considered Ulster's co-operation in the peace negotiations as essential to achieving some form of Irish unity, which he considered essential to an effective long-term settlement between nationalist Ireland and Britain. The *Manchester Guardian* argued:

> Ulster- by which we mean the Protestant and loyalist majority in that province who subscribed in 1914 to the famous 'Covenant'- is essential to the unity of Ireland, and the unity of Ireland, in some substantial form, is essential to any accommodation with the Nationalist majority.[94]

In the *Guardian's* view, Ulster and nationalist Ireland needed to collaborate with each other in the short-term in order to secure 'essential unity' and thus a long-term settlement with Britain.[95] Hence, the *Guardian* urged Northern Ireland to engage with the negotiating process. Initially, however, Sir James Craig played no active part in the Anglo-Irish Conference. For Craig, Northern Ireland was divorced from nationalist Ireland by the Government of Ireland Act. The negotiations were between Britain and the rest of the Irish island, with which Northern Ireland saw no connection.

Scott was critical of Craig's approach to the negotiations, describing the Ulster Unionists as 'consistently unhelpful and negative'.[96] The *Guardian* highlighted Ulster's past resistance to Irish self-determination, and the role of the Government of Ireland Act in entrenching this resistance, in its criticism. Scott described Ulster as,

[92] C. P. Scott, 'Problems of the Nation.', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 October 1921.
[93] C. P. Scott, 'The Apple of Discord.', *Manchester Guardian*, 25 October 1921.
[94] C. P. Scott, 'Is it a Crisis?', *Manchester Guardian*, 31 October 1921.
[95] C. P. Scott, 'Problems of the Nation', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 October 1921.
[96] C. P. Scott, 'Problems of the Nation', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 October 1921.

> …a dominant minority which resisted desperately all attempts to interfere with its dominance, and which only when it saw that it could no longer be dominant consented to accept a change in the old…condition that it could shut itself off in a fixed area of its own…[97]

The *Manchester Guardian* maintained its view, as expressed in 1920, that while the 'Partition Act' was supposed to settle the Irish question, 'it settles it wrongly'. Scott highlighted the inclusion of nationalist counties Fermanagh and Tyrone within Northern Ireland as particularly problematic. For Scott, Ulster had a simple choice: 'friendly partnership' with the rest of Ireland or 'barren and impracticable aloofness'. The latter had been affected since partition and throughout the peace negotiations, and Scott believed this only served to hinder both north and south.[98] Hence, the *Guardian* insisted that 'Ulster cannot stand forever aloof, declining any part or lot in the settlement'.[99] Scott urged Craig to formally join the negotiations and choose partnership with the south of Ireland.

On 18th October 1921, Scott argued that 'essential Irish unity' could be achieved via an All-Ireland Parliament that would encompass the separate Northern and nationalist Irish states as Dominions with equal powers within the British Empire.[100] This would ensure Irish partition was not a fixed condition, and partnership between the north and south could be achieved. The following week, on 25th October 1921, this notion of an All-Ireland Parliament was suggested by British delegates as a concession on the Ulster issue. Unlike Scott's proposal, however, the British delegates suggested that Ulster remain partitioned with its own separate powers of Home Rule, rather than Dominion status, as established by the Government of Ireland Act. Still, both north and south would come under an All-Ireland Parliament based in Dublin. As Northern Ireland had been operating with its own government under Sir James Craig since June 1921, the Irish delegates were prepared to confirm the existing powers of the Northern Irish government, under an All-Ireland Parliament.[101]

[97] C. P. Scott, 'Problems of the Nation', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 October 1921.
[98] C. P. Scott, 'Problems of the Nation', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 October 1921.
[99] C. P. Scott, 'Is it a Crisis?', *Manchester Guardian*, 31 October 1921.
[100] C. P. Scott, 'Problems of the Nation', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 October 1921.
[101] NAI, DE 2/304/1, Arthur Griffith to Eamon de Valera, 25 October 1921.

Scott believed that, if Ulster could be persuaded to comply, Irish delegates might surrender a republic for the sake of unity.[102] In turn, this would facilitate negotiations over the issue of Ireland's connection with the British Crown and the British Empire. The British delegates had the same idea, and agreed to try to persuade Ulster to accept an All-Ireland Parliament following assurances from Arthur Griffith on Ireland's association with the British Crown. Griffith made concessions on Irish sovereignty with Irish unity in mind. On 29th October, Irish delegates stated:

> The unimpaired unity of Ireland is a condition precedent to the conclusion of a Treaty of Association between Ireland and the Nations of the British Commonwealth. Subject to this, and subject to the conclusion of agreements on the other issues, the Irish Delegates are prepared to recommend that the Elected Government of a free and undivided Ireland, secured in absolute and unfettered possession of all legislative and executive authority, should, for the purposes of the association, recognise the Crown as symbol and accepted head of the combination of signatory States.[103]

After this statement from the Irish delegates and additional personal assurances from Griffith, Lloyd George sent for Sir James Craig with the intention of persuading him to accept an 'All-Ireland Parliament'.[104]

Securing Ireland's independence from the British Crown was the priority for the Irish delegation when it arrived in London, not the province of Ulster. The Irish Cabinet had agreed upon a draft Treaty that demanded Ireland be recognised as a sovereign and independent state, and that Britain ceased interference in Irish affairs.[105] It proposed Ireland's external association with the British Empire and that all British forces were withdrawn from Ireland immediately.[106] Each delegate had a copy of this draft Treaty on arrival in London.[107] There was no mention of Ulster in this draft Treaty.[108] By November 1921, however, Griffith was prepared 'to throw the question of Ulster against the questions of Association and the Crown',

[102] C. P. Scott, 'Problems of the Nation', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 October 1921.
[103] NAI, DE 2/304/1, Memorandum by the Irish delegation in reply to British memorandum of 27 October, 29 October 1921.
[104] No. 187 UCDA P150/1914, Arthur Griffith to David Lloyd George (Copy), 02 November 1921, in Fanning, Kennedy, Keogh, and O'Haplin (eds.), *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume I, 1919-1922*, p. 299.
[105] NAI, DE/1/3, Minutes of Dáil Éireann Ministry and Cabinet, 24 September 1920 - 08 December 1921, p. 130.
[106] NAI, DE 2/304/1, Draft Treaty proposals taken by the Irish delegation to London, 07 October 1921.
[107] NAI, DE 2/304/1, Memorandum by Robert Barton on Draft Treaty, Undated.
[108] NAI, DE 2/304/1, Draft Treaty proposals taken by the Irish delegation to London, 07 October 1921.

and agreed to essential unity under an All-Irish Parliament for some form of association with the British Empire. Although Griffith insisted privately to de Valera that 'external recognition' was still possible, the Irish delegation suggested concessions on Irish sovereignty in order to try to secure Irish unity in the long-term.[109]

De Valera remained steadfast against any concessions regarding Irish sovereignty, maintaining on 9th November 1921, 'as far as the "Crown and Empire connection" is concerned, we should not budge a single inch'.[110] But it was Griffith in charge of the Irish delegation in London, and de Valera remained in Dublin. Moreover, the extent of Ireland's relationship with the British Crown was the main concern of the British government. For the British Cabinet, Ireland must remain within the British Empire under the British Crown; external association was not sufficient. It was a position Lloyd George demonstrated during the preliminary negotiations, and throughout the Anglo-Irish Conference. It was a position that Griffith was, in the end, prepared to accept. The British government used Ulster and the suggestion of 'essential unity' via an All-Ireland Parliament as leverage to gain concessions on the issue of the Crown.

The question of the Crown was raised by the British delegation prior to this discussion of an All-Irish Parliament however, on 21st October 1921.[111] This discussion was prompted by a public telegram sent to Pope Benedict XV by de Valera, which reiterated that Ireland was an independent nation state with no allegiance to the King of Great Britain.[112] De Valera sent the telegram in response to correspondence between Britain and the Vatican in which the struggle between Ireland and Britain was discussed as a domestic issue. This implied a judgement against Ireland's claim of independence. According to de Valera, the British took the misrepresentation even further by discussing the dispute as not merely internal to the United Kingdom, 'but domestic to Ireland alone, between the two warring factions of King George's "people" there'.[113] This was a reference to Ulster. De Valera's telegram reasserting Ireland's independence caused confusion in London as it demonstrated to the British

[109] NAI, DE 2/304/1, Arthur Griffith to Eamon de Valera, 03 November 1921.
[110] NAI, DE 2/304/1, Memorandum from Eamon de Valera to Arthur Griffith, 9 November 1921.
[111] NAI, DE 2/304/1, Erskine Childers to Eamon de Valera, 21 October 1921.
[112] NAI, DE 2/304/1, Telegram from Eamon de Valera to Pope Benedict XI, 20 October 1921.
[113] NAI, DE 2/304/1, Memorandum from Eamon de Valera to Arthur Griffith, 22 October 1921.

delegation that there was no leeway on the issue of Irish Sovereignty. It also suggested to the Irish delegation that they had no power to negotiate this issue. The disruption caused resulted in small committees being formed from delegates on both sides to discuss, once again, the basis upon which they were negotiating. From the 24th October, therefore, the conference did not meet as a whole but instead in sub-committees of the two parties.

De Valera's telegram to the Pope garnered significant attention from the *Guardian*. Scott did not think the telegram would have too detrimental an impact now that the conference was underway, as De Valera was not part of the Irish delegation. Still, Scott recognised that 'it would be idle to make light of the message' as he was still the 'acknowledged head of Sinn Féin'. Scott criticised de Valera again for threatening the negotiations with his outright rejection of the British Crown. Scott maintained that these views 'would be fatal to the negotiation' if upheld by the Irish delegates. Scott argued that the whole point of the conference was 'to bridge the gulf between the extreme claim of Sinn Féin for an Irish republic and the offer of the British Government of Dominion status under the Crown'. But before the conference had barely begun, de Valera 'cuts in' by publicly reasserting the extreme claim. Scott referred back to the preliminary negotiations to highlight that this was not the first time de Valera had threatened the truce, stating: 'He almost succeeded in preventing the Conference from meeting at all'. Scott maintained that it was 'the tact and forbearance of the Prime Minister' that had saved the situation.[114] This also mirrored Scott's critique of de Valera and praise for Lloyd George, as seen during the preliminaries.

It became increasingly clear to Scott as the conference progressed that de Valera did not seek to negotiate on the issue of the Crown. The editor attributed this to de Valera's 'hard-and-fast mathematical mind' which considered 'any sort of departure from the rigidity of an abstract principle' as 'equivalent to a complete surrender'.[115] The *Guardian* began to acknowledge that for de Valera, any compromise on Irish sovereignty was yielding to the British and a loss to Irish independence. While the delegates in London, particularly Griffith, were open to discussion of Irish sovereignty from late October 1921, de Valera, who remained

[114] C. P. Scott, 'Mr. De Valera's Message to the Pope.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 October 1921.
[115] C. P. Scott, 'Mr. De Valera's Message to the Pope.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 October 1921.

in Dublin, was not. Again, the *MG* was critical of this not just because it was 'uncompromising', but because sovereignty was an abstract concept. As argued over the previous months, Scott believed that Irish nationalist leadership should be concerned with the practical, the realities of Irish self-determination and what it meant for every day political life moving forward, not abstract ideas of the Crown and what it represented. The *Manchester Guardian* argued that the conference had until then 'engaged on a strictly practical problem', the issue of Ulster, but de Valera's telegram had put emphasis back on the conceptual aspects of the Anglo-Irish relationship.[116]

Despite this critique, Scott's editorials gave de Valera the benefit of the doubt. The *Manchester Guardian* argued that the telegram was 'simply a protest' and while it was 'an uncalled-for and aggressive protest ', it was unlikely that de Valera wrote the telegram with the intention of affecting the conference.[117] The *Manchester Guardian* also referred to an article in the *Irish Bulletin* to reiterate this point.[118] Nevertheless, this telegram *did* have an effect on the conference and Scott recognised this. The *Guardian* argued that while de Valera may not have intended to 'create trouble and discord in the conference, which was going on with its work quite comfortably in a very practical spirit, he has, it is to be feared, fully succeeded'.[119] Scott was referring to the conclusion of plenary sessions and the formation of sub-committees after the telegram was published. Scott supported the sub-committees, as he thought it might speed up the negotiations.[120] However, Scott was frustrated that de Valera had reverted conversations back to the dispute over the position each side was negotiating from. Scott stated: 'So here we are again back into the region of formulas. It took three months to arrive at the formula on which the Conference actually met'.[121] The conference was now focused on 'the work of repair' rather than negotiating a settlement. Scott reemphasised the fragility of the truce and the urgent need for a settlement due to this fragility, insisting that further delays were a threat to the precarious peace.[122]

[116] C. P. Scott, 'Mr. De Valera's Message to the Pope.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 October 1921.
[117] C. P. Scott, 'Mr. De Valera's Message to the Pope.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 October 1921.
[118] C. P. Scott, 'The Irish Negotiations.', *Manchester Guardian*, 27 October 1921.
[119] C. P. Scott, 'The Apple of Discord.', *Manchester Guardian*, 25 October 1921.
[120] C. P. Scott, 'The Irish Negotiations.', *Manchester Guardian*, 27 October 1921.
[121] C. P. Scott, 'The Apple of Discord.', *Manchester Guardian*, 25 October 1921.
[122] C. P. Scott, 'The Irish Negotiations.', *Manchester Guardian*, 27 October 1921.

In addition to the 'immediate and disruptive' impact on the conference proceedings, Scott recognised that de Valera's telegram to the Pope had 'a very disturbing effect on Conservative opinion'. Not only did the telegram revert the debate 'from the region of practical details…to the question of status itself', but it also inspired a vote of censure in parliament. Scott welcomed but was still cautious of the House of Commons debate, which took place on 31st October 1921, on this motion to censure. In support of Lloyd George, Scott stated: 'We have not the smallest doubt of his success in the debate and in the division'. But Scott also recognised that the extent of Lloyd George's success in the debate depended upon the Sinn Féin leaders demonstrating the will to compromise.[123] The *Manchester Guardian* argued that the Prime Minister needed the full support of the House of Commons if he were to be successful in negotiating peace with nationalist Ireland.

Nevertheless, on 1st November 1921, C. P. Scott reported with admiration on Lloyd George's performance in the House of Commons the night before. Scott described the performance as a 'triumph' and criticised the die-hard Conservative Unionists who stood in opposition. The *Manchester Guardian* maintained: 'Among the whole little band there is not one man of real position and authority, nor one capable of crossing swords with the Prime Minister in debate'.[124] Scott explained that the die-hard faction still maintained the argument that the government should not be negotiating with 'rebels', bringing to light the long-standing arguments around the legitimacy of Dáil Éireann, which were the focus of much discussion during the Irish War of Independence. Now, however, in contrast to events during the War of Independence, Lloyd George was prepared to parley with the Irish nationalist leaders, and according to Scott, the Prime Minister successfully highlighted to Parliament that the British could not negotiate with anyone else. Scott agreed and the *Guardian* stated:

> They are undoubtedly rebels but, as Mr. George pointed out, this is not the first time in recent years that the Government has negotiated with persons who in the eye of the law are rebels, and that, too, with much resulting advantage to the State.

Scott was likely referring to South Africa here. Scott went on to criticise the 'objectors' for supporting a return to using force, highlighting how this policy had failed thus far. Scott asked:

[123] C. P. Scott, 'Is it a Crisis?', *Manchester Guardian*, 31 October 1921.
[124] C. P. Scott, 'The Debate.', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 November 1921.

'Have the results of the policy of force so far been so entirely satisfactory and creditable that nothing better is to be sought?' In contrast, the *Guardian* praised Lloyd George once again, applauding his 'courage' and 'sincerity' as representative of the 'true spirit' of Britain.[125]

The question of Ulster was also addressed during the Commons debate and thus in Scott's subsequent commentary. The *Manchester Guardian* explained: 'Ulster figures largely, as it figured last night, in the armoury of those who are opposed to any settlement of the Irish question except a settlement by force'. The die-hards threatened that the only result of any coming settlement with Ireland would be civil war. But Scott maintained that there was 'no intention of doing violence to Ulster, and therefore Ulster need not do violence to anybody else'. Moreover, Scott argued that it would also be 'morally impossible for the Ulster minority to wreck a settlement approved by their own responsible leaders and by the Conservative leaders in this country on whose support they have always hitherto relied'.[126] Scott also highlighted again that economic conditions meant that Northern Ireland would have to secure some form of arrangement with nationalist Ireland. Scott used the editorial on the debate to reiterate the *Guardian's* view that Ulster was the key to a long-lasting settlement. Ulster was potential leverage to persuade Ireland to accept allegiance to the Crown. This mirrored how Ulster was in fact used by the British delegation to negotiate association with the Crown and the empire. Following the debate, the *Manchester Guardian* claimed that the British delegation had the 'whole-hearted support not only of their own party but of all the parties and of the country at large'.[127]

Throughout November 1921 until the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, Scott continued to focus his editorials on Ulster. This focus was reflected in the titles of Scott's editorials: 'Ulster the key',[128] 'The Day of Fate for Ulster',[129] 'Ulster Next',[130] and 'Ulster's Decision'.[131] The *Guardian* persistently reiterated the centrality of Ulster in achieving a long-term peace settlement. It maintained its criticism of Ulster's attitude to negotiations since the Gladstone

[125] C. P. Scott, 'The Debate.', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 November 1921.
[126] C. P. Scott, 'The Debate.', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 November 1921.
[127] C. P. Scott, 'The Debate.', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 November 1921.
[128] C. P. Scott, 'Ulster the Key.', *Manchester Guardian,* 02 November 1921.
[129] C. P. Scott, 'The Day of Fate for Ulster.', *Manchester Guardian*, 02 November 1921.
[130] C. P. Scott, 'Ulster Next.', *Manchester Guardian*, 02 November 1921.
[131] C. P. Scott, 'Ulster's Decision.', *Manchester Guardian*, 26 November 1921.

era as 'blank negation'.[132] Scott's dismissal of the Northern Irish government was also sustained; he called it a 'phantom administration'.[133] When Sir James Craig, on behalf of Northern Ireland, finally entered negotiations with Lloyd George regarding an All-Ireland Parliament in November 1921, following Griffith's concessions on Irish sovereignty, Scott asserted: 'The purely negative attitude is no longer possible for Ulster',[134] and that 'Sinn Féin had given way on all the essentials… Now it is Ulster's turn'.[135] Still, Craig outright refused to enter Ulster in to an All-Ireland Parliament, objecting to any concessions that made Northern Ireland in anyway subordinate to Dublin.[136] Scott explained that Ulster objected to the All-Ireland Parliament as Britain 'casting them off', sacrificing them to 'hereditary enemies', depriving them of the security granted by the Government of Ireland Act, and cutting them off as citizens of the United Kingdom.[137] But he rejected the notion that the centuries-old 'racial and religious feuds' upon which Northern Ireland's refusal was based could not be reconciled. The *Guardian* maintained its predeterminist view of Irish unity to argue that Northern Ireland and nationalist Ireland should be united by a common assembly.[138]

Even after the prospect of an All-Ireland Parliament was rejected by Ulster, the *Guardian* tried to take the positive view that at least negotiations had not been shut down all-together. Still, Scott questioned how negotiations could move forward when James Craig still refused an all-Irish Parliament. Scott explained: 'It is not a question of conditions or of any safeguards. He simply will not consent to meet the representatives of the majority of his fellow-country-men in a common Assembly'. Scott explained that Craig's refusal was supposedly due to a 'moral' rather than 'political aversion', but went on to heavily criticise Craig for the treatment of Catholics in Northern Ireland and pointed to the comparative lack of sectarian violence in nationalist Ireland. With this in mind, Scott declared: 'Before Sir James Craig refuses on moral grounds to have anything to do with a common Parliament he might do well, perhaps, to

[132] C. P. Scott, 'The Day of Fate for Ulster.', *Manchester Guardian*, 09 November 1921, and, Ulster's Decision, *Manchester Guardian*, 26 November 1921.
[133] C. P. Scott, 'Ulster the Key.', *Manchester Guardian*, 02 November 1921.
[134] C. P. Scott, 'The Day of Fate for Ulster.', *Manchester Guardian*, 09 November 1921.
[135] C. P. Scott, 'Ulster Next.', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 November 1921.
[136] Thomas Jones, *Whitehall Diary, Volume III, Ireland 1918-1925* (Oxford, 1971), pp. 162-164.
[137] C. P. Scott, 'Ulster Next.', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 November 1921.
[138] C. P. Scott, 'The Day of fate for Ulster.', *Manchester Guardian*, 09 November 1921, and 'Ulster's Decision.', *Manchester Guardian*, 26 November 1921.

reconsider the basis of his morality'.[139] Unlike with the Irish nationalist leadership, Scott could not sympathise with Sir James Craig's stance or cause.

Following James Craig's refusal, Lloyd George had to persuade the Irish delegation not to break Anglo-Irish negotiations on the issue of Ulster. The British Prime Minister used the impending Conservative Party Conference in Liverpool to do this. Lloyd George warned Griffith that treaty negotiations would be opposed by die-hard conservatives at the conference, and seek to prevent any concessions to nationalist Ireland. The 'die-hard' faction of the Conservative Unionists had influenced the Anglo-Irish conference to an extent already. On 13th October, for example, the delegation had been accused of 'Truce breakage' due to the ongoing activities of the Dáil courts. Under the terms of the truce all fighting was to cease, and bar a few isolated incidents, violence in the south was effectively halted. However, the Dáil continued its state building activities and the IRA recruited more volunteers. Griffith maintained that the British government was not actually interested in the Dáil courts, the 'die-hard' faction in the British Parliament were attempting to use this as a reason to resume war.[140] Moreover, on 18th October, Griffith recognised:

> The difficulties this British Cabinet has are real…The *Morning Post* party at home is not without power, and it is obvious that both Ll.G. and Chamberlain are a trifle afraid, not of its present power, but of its potentialities.[141]

On 24th October when Lloyd George pressed the issue of the Crown, Griffith commented that the British government was seeking 'to reassure themselves against the Die-Hards'.[142]

Thus, Griffith agreed in November 1921, in light of the impending Conservative Party Conference in Liverpool, not to challenge Lloyd George on the issue of Ulster, despite having already agreed to compromise on Irish sovereignty. Lloyd George persuaded Griffith to make further assurances, which ultimately developed into concessions on Irish unity.[143] The Irish delegation ultimately agreed to give Northern Ireland a vote on 'essential unity' and a boundary commission to negotiate the borders following the signing of a Treaty. This was in

[139] C. P. Scott, 'A Postponement.', *Manchester Guardian*, 30 November 1921.
[140] NAI, DE 2/304/1, Arthur Griffith to Eamon de Valera, 13 October 1921.
[141] NAI, DE 2/304/1, Arthur Griffith to Eamon de Valera, 18 October 1921.
[142] NAI, DE 2/304/1, Arthur Griffith to Eamon de Valera, 24 October 1921.
[143] Thomas Jones, *Whitehall Diary, Volume III, Ireland 1918-1925* (Oxford, 1971), pp. 162-166.

place of the Treaty-bound All-Ireland Parliament rejected by Craig. Lloyd George used Ulster as leverage for the Crown, then the 'die-hards' as leverage for Ulster.

Nevertheless, Scott's commentary in November 1921, particularly his coverage of the annual Conservative Party Conference in Liverpool, argued that British conservative support for the unionist cause was faltering.[144] Scott previously noted that there had been potential for revolt in the Unionist Party against its leaders led by diehards who opposed the Liberal Unionist coalition's policy of appeasement in Ireland.[145] Indeed, Unionists had threatened to resign from the Cabinet and force a breakdown of negotiations on the Crown in late October 1921.[146] Scott asserted that the Liverpool Conference could have seen this party split materialise. However, the government received overwhelming support of its Irish policy at the meeting. Scott argued that this vote strengthened the government's position in the Anglo-Irish negotiations as Liverpool was both 'a Tory centre' and 'a great Orange centre'. The government could now 'pursue their policy with confidence and unperturbed'. The *MG* stressed the significance of this to the whole Irish peace process. For Scott, it showed the nation that the majority of British Conservatives were no longer willing to spring to Ulster's defence. This was a major shift in party politics with regards to the Irish question in the early 1920's that could not have been imagined in 1914. Ulster Unionists could no longer rely on British Conservative support on the Irish question. The *Guardian* still maintained, however, that Ulster was not being deserted by Britain or being betrayed. Scott stated that the Ulster Unionists were being asked 'at a critical moment in the history of the nation to play her part in securing the national welfare'.[147] Ulster was simply being asked to support the United Kingdom and its empire, which it had historically claimed to be its ultimate priority.

On 30 November 1921, the British presented a draft treaty to the Irish delegates to take back to Dublin.[148] It asserted Ireland's status as a Dominion, Irish allegiance to the King, and confirmed partition with the option for Ulster to 'opt-in' to an All-Ireland Parliament at a later

[144] C. P. Scott, 'The Liverpool Meeting.', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 November 1921.
[145] C. P. Scott, 'Ulster Next.', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 November 1921.
[146] No. 184 UCDA P150/1932, Minute of Conversation between Tom Jones Assistant Secretary to Cabinet and Erskine Childers (Copy), 28 October 1921, in Fanning, Kennedy, Keogh, and O'Haplin (eds.), *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume I, 1919-1922*, p. 296.
[147] C. P. Scott, 'The Liverpool Meeting.', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 November 1921.
[148] NAI, DE 2/304/1, David Lloyd George to Arthur Griffith, 30 November 1921.

date. Should Ulster 'opt-out', the powers of Northern Ireland as granted by the Government of Ireland Act 1920 would remain and a boundary commission be appointed to confirm the borders. The Irish Cabinet met to discuss the Treaty on 3rd December. Griffith argued in favour of the Treaty, and refused to break negotiations on the question of the Crown. Collins was also pro-Treaty, and reiterated that a treaty would be a stepping-stone. However, other members of the Irish delegation were against the draft treaty as they believed it did not grant Ireland national status. The delegation was split. De Valera maintained that he was not prepared to lose out on both the issues of partition and sovereignty.[149] Thus, the Irish Cabinet rejected the agreement based on the oath of allegiance to the crown of a partitioned Ireland.[150]

Following this rejection of the draft Treaty by nationalist leaders, the *Guardian* feared negotiations were close to collapse. But for all this, Scott blamed Ulster. Scott deployed a relentless editorial attack on the forces of Ulster unionism in early December 1921 in response to developments in the negotiations. The *Guardian* asserted:

> Nothing in this whole long controversy is more deplorable than the failure of the party in Ireland which is, above all, attached to the British connection to raise a finger to help to place that connection on a secure and permanent footing. They have it in their power to do so. With no sacrifice whatever of their own interests and security, they could now render incalculable service to their country. It is incredible that they can fully have realised this, or that, realising it, they should stand stubbornly aloof, regardless of the interests of the Crown or of the country… It has been determined that no coercion should be applied to Ulster. Is it right that Ulster should apply it to us?[151]

Ulster would not accept Irish unity, the condition upon which Griffith had initially agreed Ireland's association with the empire. Thus, Scott argued that despite claims of loyalty and shared Britishness, the Ulster Unionists would not serve the United Kingdom or the Crown. The *Manchester Guardian* had consistently illuminated the importance of Ulster in the Irish

[149] NAI, DE/1/3, Minutes of Dáil Éireann Ministry and Cabinet, 24 September 1920 - 08 December 1921, pp. 176-179.
[150] NAI, DE/1/3, Minutes of Dáil Éireann Ministry and Cabinet, 24 September 1920 - 08 December 1921, p. 182.
[151] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland at the Crossroads.', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 December 1921.

negotiations, and appealed to the Irish delegates for a practical solution to be found.[152] But ultimately, when it was feared that the truce was at breaking point and a return to war likely, Scott held Ulster Unionist MPs responsible.

Throughout November 1921, Scott had asserted that a breakdown of the truce was unlikely due to the overwhelming desire for peace in Britain, but in early December Scott's commentary revealed a tone of increasing desperation. Scott described the situation as 'developing towards a catastrophe',[153] stressing the significance of the situation to the British people, British life and the British reputation.[154] Still, the *Guardian* argued that a return to war would not be acceptable or effective. The British people were 'absolutely sick of war and the whole atmosphere of war'.[155] It would be an 'iniquity the nation would not support'.[156] Scott reasserted that force would only make Ireland's desire for independence stronger,[157] and re-emphasised the exceptionality of the truce, stating that the opportunity for peace 'might never recur'.[158] Scott also questioned the practicalities of war, highlighting that a military power of 200,000 men had been proposed as necessary to preserving British authority in Ireland. Scott doubted whether 200,000 men could possibly be recruited for war on Ireland, even in a climate of unemployment and poverty. The *Guardian* maintained that the mass would 'rightly refuse'. Scott contemplated whether conscription would be enforced to serve a war in Ireland, but argued that this 'would be rightly resisted'. Scott's suggested alternative to outright war was the strategic positioning of troops and naval support for the sole purpose of preventing the importation of arms.[159]

One of the main reasons Scott argued that men would refuse to sign up to fight in Ireland was because it would not be a foreign war. The *Guardian* stressed it would be 'a civil war of a particularly sordid and disgusting nature… war against our fellow-countrymen, and not against men only- against women and children, for the country must be swept, houses burnt,

[152] C. P. Scott, 'What Next in Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 December 1921.
[153] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland at the Cross Roads.', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 December 1921.
[154] C. P. Scott, 'What Next in Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 December 1921.
[155] C. P. Scott, 'What Next in Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 December 1921.
[156] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland at the Crossroads.', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 December 1921.
[157] C. P. Scott, 'What Next in Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 December 1921.
[158] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland at the Crossroads.', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 December 1921.
[159] C. P. Scott, 'What Next in Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 December 1921.

crops destroyed'. Scott still considered the Irish situation a domestic issue, the Irish and English were fellow countrymen, despite arguing that Ireland's distinct national identity and desire should be pacified by an imperial solution. On 6th December, unaware that the terms of agreement had been signed, the *Manchester Guardian* maintained that 'entering on a new war with men of our own blood' would be 'inhuman and intolerable'. Furthermore, Scott argued that the British Parliament would have to sanction to war: 'It would be done in the case of a foreign war, and a civil war is vastly more important'.[160] But, the *Guardian* argued: 'It should be resisted by every decent person, let alone every man who holds a shred of the creed of Liberalism or of Labour'. For Scott, no liberal could support a reversion to violence in Ireland.

Yet, while Scott maintained the Irish question was a domestic concern, the editor also recognised the implications of Anglo-Irish relations on the rest of the British Empire. Scott had made minimal reference to the broader imperial context of the Irish question until this point; however, he recognised openly in early December 1921 that a return to war in Ireland might have a negative impact on the empire as a whole. He stated:

> We have to consider also that the long series of possible reactions attending the issue may be felt right down our history and right down the history of Ireland. Egypt, India, the United States, our own dominions, all will respond, some of them perhaps disastrously.[161]

Scott was not only concerned with the long-term impact of the breakdown of negotiations on the Ireland and Britain, but also how Britain's other colonial possessions might respond to the renewal of oppression. Scott situated Ireland and Anglo-Irish politics within a broader imperial framework in a way unseen before. This positioning of the Irish question within the broader context of empire signified a shift in Scott's conceptualisation of Ireland. This is reflected in his post-Treaty commentary as illuminated in the next chapter.

Nevertheless, Scott's fears and desperation were soon relieved. The Irish delegates returned to London and successfully negotiated the oath of allegiance be removed. It was replaced

[160] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland at the Crossroads.', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 December 1921.
[161] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland at the Crossroads.', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 December 1921.

with the condition that the Dáil swears to be faithful to the crown, and swear allegiance to a constitution rather than to the King. The constitution would be written by the subsequent Irish Parliament and approved by Britain (de Valera still objected to any association with the empire and the King.) Further attempts were made by the Irish delegates to gain more assurances over the North-East of Ireland but these requests were denied. Lloyd George reminded Griffith that he had promised not to break on the issue of Ulster. The Prime Minister also warned that there would immediate war between Britain and Ireland if a break occurred. Thus, Griffith agreed to sign the terms of agreement of the Anglo-Irish Treaty on 6th December 1921, and the other delegates followed suit. For Griffith, all other issues including that of the oath of allegiance to the King had been resolved.[162] The Vice President of Dáil Éireann accepted that the Crown must be written in to the Treaty, and that

> Ireland shall have the same constitutional status in the Community of Nations known as the British Empire as the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa with a Parliament having powers to make laws for the peace order and good government of Ireland and an Executive responsible to that Parliament, and shall be styled and known as the Irish Free State.[163]

Ulster would be subject to a vote of the people and a boundary commission at a later date. When faced with the choice of agreeing to a Treaty that secured Ireland's position within the British Empire under the British Crown, or a return to war, the Irish delegates chose the Treaty.

Conclusion

Throughout the negotiations between the British government and the Irish nationalist leaders, the *Guardian* promoted peace through a constitutional settlement based on compromise. The *Guardian* considered the truce an exceptional moment in the Anglo-Irish relationship, which if wasted, would spell conflict for even more generations. For Scott, it was imperative that there was no return to violence. This would be an affront to his liberal principles and the *Guardian* ideology, which promoted 'freedom from oppression',[164] and

[162] NAI, DE 2/304/1, Notes by Robert Barton of sub-conferences at 10 Downing St., 05-06 December 1921.
[163] NAI, DE 2/304/1, Final text of the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland as signed, 6 December 1921.
[164] Hobhouse, 'Liberal and Humanist', p. 86.

'reason and loving-kindness in the society of mankind'.[165] Scott's liberalism underpinned his commentary on post-truce negotiations, which urged moderation and conciliation with the understanding that this approach would achieve Irish liberty while exercising constraint, and thus secure long-term peace. Scott also believed that this was what most people in Britain and Ireland wanted. Hence, the *Guardian* praised those who promoted a settlement. From July 1921 Lloyd George was upheld as a great statesman whose approach and offer of Dominion status, even with the six conditions, was one of compromise that demonstrated a willingness to offer generous concessions, in an attempt to avoid further conflict. This was a complete break away from the *Guardian's* critical coverage of Lloyd George and his Irish policy seen during the war, and a reflection of the changed approach by the British government in Scott's view.

Scott's desire for a settlement, in line with his liberal principles, also motivated the *Guardian's* criticism of those who suggested a return to war, or were deemed a threat to the truce. This included Winston Churchill following his suggestions the first week of the Anglo-Irish Conference that war would resume if negotiations failed. But Scott was mostly critical of Éamon de Valera and Sir James Craig. For the *Guardian*, de Valera was uncompromising and unrealistic, especially on the question of Ulster, which Scott believed was imprudently down-played by the nationalist leader. De Valera's resistance to allegiance to the British Crown was also deemed impractical in Scott's view, and based on a preoccupation with symbols rather than the benefit of the Irish nation. For Scott, Irish sovereignty was perfectly compatible with the oath of allegiance. The *Guardian* was still sympathetic to republican feeling, bearing in mind the emotions felt at the core of the nationalist struggle. De Valera's attitude to negotiations was, however, considered a threat to achieving long-term peace.

Similarly, Scott saw the new Prime Minister of Northern Ireland as an obstacle to a peaceful settlement. Craig's refusal to engage with negotiations, his rejection of an All-Ireland Parliament, his lack of action on sectarian violence against Catholics in Belfast, all reaffirmed Scott's view upheld since the Home Rule Crisis 1912: Ulster Unionists were divisive and uncompromising and Ulster unionism promoted violence and threatened all reasonable

[165] Ibid, p. 90.

solution to the Irish question. Scott insisted 'essential unity' through some shared assembly was necessary at the very least; hence, Ulster's co-operation was imperative to the lasting peace. But Ulster rejected this, and Scott remained critical of the Northern Irish government to the final hour. It was ultimately concessions by the nationalist delegates who agreed to remain within the British Empire, despite the likely exclusion of Ulster, which concluded negotiations.

By the signing of the Treaty, Anglo-Irish politics and conflict had been reframed as a question of nation *and* empire. The imperial solution of Dominion status to what was for a generation of liberals a domestic concern, refocused Ireland through an imperial lens. This process had begun prior to the truce, with the *Guardian* promoting Dominion status from 1919, but was completed by December 1921 when negotiations concluded. The context of empire enabled a liberal reimagining of Ireland's relationship with Britain after the First World War, and ultimately provided the landscape in which a settlement was reached. This reconfigured understanding of Irish nationhood, separate from the United Kingdom, but destined to be forever connected to Britain on imperial terms, is made visible in Scott's editorials after the Treaty was signed. These editorials are the focus of the next chapter, as are the implications of the Anglo-Irish Treaty for Ireland, Britain, the empire, and the world.

Chapter 4

The Anglo-Irish Treaty

This chapter analyses C. P. Scott's editorial commentary on the period between the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in December 1921, and the beginning of the Irish Civil War in June 1922. This period has been particularly neglected by historians interested in the British press and the Irish question. Likewise, the reactions of newspapers outside London to the Treaty have received relatively limited scholarly attention. The *Guardian's* commentary throughout this period immediately after the Treaty was signed and ratified is given extensive focus here. This chapter illuminates the *Manchester Guardian's* pro-Treaty stance and the reasons for this, Scott's praise of Lloyd George and liberalism for securing the Treaty, and his critique of opponents of the Treaty in the months preceding the Civil War. It argues that C. P. Scott viewed the Irish question as 'solved' following the ratification of the Treaty in early 1922, and as such neglected to comment on the accelerating violence in the North and South of Ireland in 1922, choosing to try to smooth over the issue instead. The chapter also demonstrates that, for the *Guardian* and C. P. Scott, the Treaty was significant in national, imperial, and global contexts.

Pro-Treaty

The *Manchester Guardian* was overwhelmingly pro-Treaty. Scott believed the Treaty offered Ireland 'her fullest liberties', [1] 'the best possibilities of its life and development and good relations with its neighbours', and was rightfully confident that the Treaty would be ratified by the British Parliament.[2] The House of Commons debated the Anglo-Irish Treaty on the 15th and 16th December 1921,[3] and voted in favour of the Treaty by 401 to 58.[4] Scott described the ratification of the Treaty by Westminster as 'a great and historic decision', arguing that the Treaty was the best option for both Britain and Ireland and thus 'needs no other defence'.[5] Hence, Scott praised the British government, especially Lloyd George, for his role in

[1] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland to Decide.', *Manchester Guardian* 10 December 1921.
[2] C. P. Scott, 'The Great Decision.', *Manchester Guardian*, 15 December 1921.
[3] Hansard, House of Commons Debate, 15 December 1921, vol. 149 cc133-258, and Hansard, House of Commons Debate, 16 December 1921 vol. 149 cc305-63.
[4] Hansard, House of Commons Debate, 16 December 1921, vol. 149 c363.
[5] C. P. Scott, 'A Great Decision.', *Manchester Guardian,* 17 December 1921.

negotiating the Treaty and its ratification in Britain. The *Guardian* described the 'Irish peace' as 'the crowning achievement' of Lloyd George's career,[6] and argued that the concessions made by the British delegation had enabled peace.[7] For Scott, the Anglo-Irish Treaty negotiated by Lloyd George was an appropriate resolution to the generations-old Irish question, despite the partition of six counties of Ulster.

One of the main reasons Scott was enthusiastically pro-Treaty was because he objected to any reversion to violence. This theme of anti-violence had been prominent in Scott's commentary since the War of Independence. The *Manchester Guardian* believed this objection was widely shared, maintaining that the nation did not want to return to the policy of force that was employed in Ireland before the truce. This explains the *Guardian's* confidence that the British Parliament would ratify the Treaty. Scott's view was in line with the majority of British parliamentary and public opinion, which ultimately wanted the conflict in Ireland, both literal and political, to be resolved.[8] Scott maintained that even if Dáil Éireann rejected the Treaty, a policy of appeasement must remain. The *Guardian* stated*:* 'Having once realised the folly and futility of force as a method of government, we can never go back to it'.[9]

In the Treaty debate in the House of Commons, Lord Birkenhead, who was the Lord Chancellor and a member of the British delegation to the Anglo-Irish Conference, emphasised the impracticalities of returning to war. Birkenhead argued and Scott reiterated:

> After you had carried fire and sword through all the villages of Ireland you would have to do then what we have had to do now, only under circumstances infinitely more disadvantageous and after stirring up a hatred which it would take generations to allay.[10]

The *Manchester Guardian* reiterated that war would be disastrous and pointless. Should violence resume, it would be on a level exceeding that of the War of Independence, and shatter all hope for a resolution between Britain and Ireland for future decades.

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[6] C. P. Scott, 'The New Peace', *Manchester Guardian*, 08 December 1921.
[7] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland to Decide', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 December 1921.
[8] Boyce, *Englishmen and the Irish Troubles, British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy* 1918-22.
[9] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland to Decide', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 December 1921.
[10] C. P. Scott, 'A Great Decision.', *Manchester Guardian,* 17 December 1921.

Scott also emphasised that returning to a policy of force would be fundamentally immoral. He argued that Britain did not have the right to dominate Ireland by force. In Scott's view, the overwhelming resistance to British authority made this impracticable anyway, but even if this were not the case, force and domination could not be justified.[11] This echoed arguments made throughout the War of Independence on the futility of violence. Scott still, however, argued that satisfying nationalist grievances and resolving the Irish question through moderate means was the appropriate course of action.[12] In the *Guardian's* view, the Treaty provided this. Scott reiterated the moral implications of a return to violence with reference to the Church. While the editor recognised that the Church should not intervene in political matters, he maintained: 'the kind of conflict which has for the past year been waged and which the protesters are prepared to renew involves an element of barbarity which the Church cannot but view with profound alarm'.[13] The *Guardian* considered a reversion to war a moral issue with which the Church would rightly be concerned with.

Furthermore, Scott framed the Anglo-Irish Treaty as a 'triumph of moral forces' rooted in liberalism.[14] It was the moral forces of liberalism that had found a solution to the Irish question. Scott described the peace process and the resulting Treaty as 'a tremendous and far-reaching Liberal reform, a supreme act of liberal statesmanship'. As such, Scott was hopeful that Lloyd George was returning to his liberal tradition, viewing the 'Irish peace' and the Anglo-Irish Treaty as 'the fulfilment of the earliest efforts and aspirations of his [Lloyd George's] political life'. Scott maintained: 'it should recall him somewhat to that earlier tradition from which in these last days he has at times conspicuously departed'. The recent departure from liberal values which Scott is referring to here is the policy of force upheld by the Prime Minister prior to the Anglo-Irish truce. Nevertheless, Scott hoped, 'we may yet regain much of the fighter for all good Liberal causes'.[15] Scott was pleased to see Lloyd George returning to what the editor considered to be his former, and truer, liberal principles of conciliation, moderation, and non-violence; principles at the core of the *Guardian* Ideology.

[11] C. P. Scott, 'A Great Decision', *Manchester Guardian,*17 December 1921.
[12] C. P. Scott, 'A Great Decision', *Manchester Guardian,*17 December 1921.
[13] C. P. Scott, 'Omens of Peace.', *Manchester Guardian,*12 December 1921.
[14] C. P. Scott, 'Omens of Peace', *Manchester Guardian,*12 December 1921.
[15] C. P. Scott, 'The New Peace', *Manchester Guardian,*08 December 1921.

Scott could not ignore that this liberal success was achieved under a coalition government, and acknowledged that the ratification of the Treaty in the House of Commons was 'carried through with the active support of men who hitherto have worked in the Conservative tradition'. He referred specifically to Joseph Chamberlain and Lord Birkenhead, commending them for their openness to a policy of Irish appeasement that contrasted their earlier position during the Home Rule Crisis.[16] The *Guardian* was also generous to former Conservative Leader, Andrew Bonar Law. Scott described Bonar Law's speech to the Commons during the Treaty debates as 'a straightforward and manly declaration of adhesion to the Irish policy of the Government', that did a great service in securing Anglo-Irish peace.[17] While the *Guardian* acknowledged that the Treaty had in part resulted from cross-Party co-operation however, for Scott, liberals were the 'old friends of Ireland' and it was liberalism that had created this opportunity for long-term peace.[18] The *Guardian* also indicated that, while it was thankful for the more conciliatory approach taken by Conservative leaders in the interwar years, in Scott's view, former objectors to Home Rule had little choice but to accept what Scott believed to be the inevitability of Irish self-determination.[19]

The general favourable consensus in British Parliament over the Treaty (bar a small group of 'die-hard' Unionists) was not mirrored among Irish nationalist leaders. The Irish split over the Treaty in December 1921, with Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins supporting the Treaty, and de Valera opposing it.[20] Thus, Scott took a very positive view of Collins and Griffith, in line with its pro-Treaty stance. Scott maintained that Collins was 'an exceptional man',[21] and even invited him to contribute to the *Guardian's* content on the Treaty, as discussed in more detail in the following chapter. Scott described Collins as having a 'constructive mind',[22] and as Ireland's 'hardest fighter'.[23] Scott also contrasted Collins with de Valera. In Scott's view, Collins was concerned with the practicalities of peace while de Valera was absorbed by an abstract notion of independence. Hence, Scott praised Collins for accepting the Anglo-Irish

[16] C. P. Scott, 'The New Peace', *Manchester Guardian,* 08 December 1921.
[17] C. P. Scott, 'Mr Bonar Law on the Irish Settlement', *Manchester Guardian,* 16 December 1921.
[18] C. P. Scott, 'A Pause in the Irish Debate', *Manchester Guardian,* 23 December 1921.
[19] C. P. Scott, 'A Great Decision', *Manchester Guardian,* 17 December 1921.
[20] NAI, DE/1/3, Minutes of Dáil Éireann Ministry and Cabinet, 24 September 1920 - 08 December 1921, p. 184.
[21] C. P. Scott, 'The New Peace', *Manchester Guardian,* 08 December 1921.
[22] C. P. Scott, 'Omens of Peace', *Manchester Guardian,* 12 December 1921.
[23] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland to Decide', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 December 1921.

Treaty as 'the substance of independence'.[24] The *Guardian* had urged both the Irish and British delegations to take a more practical approach throughout the preliminary negotiations and the peace conference. Collins had been of the view that a Treaty with Britain was a practical way forward, a stepping stone to independence, since the preliminary negotiations. De Valera had rejected this view, and continued to do so post-Treaty. The *Guardian* was highly critical of de Valera for his anti-Treaty stance.

The *Guardian* also praised Griffith for taking a practical approach to achieving Irish self-determination, and denouncing the 'sophists of men of words' who 'would sacrifice the substance of freedom for a phrase'.[25] This 'phrase' was the oath to the King that was at the root of Irish divisions over the Treaty. While nationalist leaders did not welcome the oath, for Griffith it was not worth sacrificing 'the substance of freedom for'. In contrast, de Valera believed the oath was a worthy cause for renewing war. The *Guardian* condemned this outlook.[26] Furthermore, Scott considered the approach of Griffith and Collins as proof of moderates within the Irish Cabinet.[27] Scott hoped that this might prove to the historically anti-Home Rulers in Britain that elements of Sinn Féin were compatible with the British government, the Crown, and the empire, and that these moderates within Irish politics might in the end prove strong enough to eliminate the more radical elements of Irish nationalism.[28]

Scott considered de Valera's rejection of the Treaty as 'uncompromising' and pointless. For Scott, the abstract idea of independence that de Valera was so attached to, the 'principles or ideals' that inspired republican opposition to the Treaty, had 'pretty much lost their substance'.[29] Hence, the *Guardian* also criticised de Valera's attempts to modify the Treaty with the introduction of Document No. 2 during the Dáil debates.[30] Document No. 2 was an alternative treaty essentially outlining external association with Britain and the empire, and was swiftly dismissed by the Dáil and the British government.[31] Scott saw de Valera as a

[24] C. P. Scott, 'Omens of Peace', *Manchester Guardian,* 12 December 1921.
[25] C. P. Scott, 'Thee Debate in Dáil Éireann', *Manchester Guardian,* 20 December 1921.
[26] C. P. Scott, 'The Debate in Dáil Éireann', *Manchester Guardian,* 20 December 1921.
[27] C. P. Scott, 'Omens of Peace', *Manchester Guardian,* 12 December 1921.
[28] C. P. Scott, 'Omens of Peace', *Manchester Guardian,* 12 December 1921.
[29] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland to Decide', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 December 1921.
[30] C. P. Scott, 'The Irish Treaty', *Manchester Guardian,* 29 December 1921.
[31] NAI, DE 4/5/14, Proposed Alternative Treaty of Association between Ireland and the British Commonwealth by Mr. Eamon de Valera, 13-14 December 1921

barrier to the Treaty and thus a barrier to long-term peace. This negative view was a continuation of the stance expressed by the editor during the peace negotiations. For the *Guardian,* rejecting the Treaty would only lead to 'desolation', and those who encouraged Ireland to 'turn away' from the 'new life' that was open to her, such as de Valera, were not 'her true friends or wisest councillors'.[32] The *Guardian* expressed concern that anti-Treaty hostilities would 'once again, with fatal consistency, dash the cup of peace from the lips of Ireland and throw her back into the old, miserable conflict and conclusion'.[33] Scott recognised that opposition to the Treaty in Ireland might result in civil war, and held de Valera responsible for this.

The *Manchester Guardian* had expected some opposition to the Treaty,[34] as demonstrated during the debates in Dáil Éireann from December 1921.[35] Scott viewed these divisions as inevitable due to the 'embittered strife' Ireland had faced over the War of Independence and over generations fighting for self-determination. But he also argued that it was because the Dáil was new to self-government. The *Guardian* maintained:

> To us in this country, trained in affairs and accustomed always to look at the substance rather than the form in all political arrangements, the choice may appear easy; to a country emerging from revolution it may present itself in quite another light.[36]

In comparison to the British government, the Dáil was 'largely made up of young men and almost wholly of men inexperienced in affairs'.[37] In addition, Scott insisted that until this point Ireland had only had to concern itself with achieving 'one simple, limited thing - independence'. But now it had to consider, as a soon-to-be dominion, 'something larger and more complex - powers, duties, and privileges of a self-governing member of the British Empire'.[38]

The Treaty was eventually ratified in Ireland on 7th January 1922, but continued divisions were reflected in the votes. The pro-Treaty camp only won by a vote of 64 to 57. Nevertheless,

[32] C. P. Scott, 'Omens of Peace.', *Manchester Guardian,* 12 December 1921.
[33] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland to Decide', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 December 1921.
[34] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland to Decide', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 December 1921.
[35] C. P. Scott, 'The Debate in Dáil Éireann', *Manchester Guardian,* 20 December 1921.
[36] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland to Decide', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 December 1921.
[37] C. P. Scott, 'A Great Decision', *Manchester Guardian,* 17 December 1921.
[38] C. P. Scott, 'The Great Decision', *Manchester Guardian,* 15 December 1921.

Scott maintained that the vote had 'removed the last obstacle to the emancipation of Ireland, and, after long years of struggle, the dream of Ireland a nation can be translated into reality'.[39] However, de Valera resigned as President in protest, and subsequently ran for re-election with the hope of achieving a mandate in the Dáil to block the Treaty. This worried Scott. The *Guardian* feared that de Valera could consolidate his power, dismiss Collins and Griffith, 'destroy the treaty', and ultimately resume war with Britain. Scott argued this 'cunning and unscrupulous' plan would ultimately 'cheat' the Irish people, 'wreck the treaty' and see de Valera emerge as 'dictator'.[40] The *Guardian* urged the Dáil to block the move.[41] De Valera failed in his re-election campaign by a fractional vote of 58 to 60, and was replaced by Arthur Griffith as President. Scott described the close vote as being 'near the brink of a precipice', and if de Valera had remained in power 'troops could not have been evacuated or the administration transferred. There would have been a condition of things in Ireland little short of chaos'.[42] The Irish question could not be resolved as the Treaty would be blocked, and it would be de Valera and anti-Treaty opposition to blame.[43]

The *Guardian's* criticism of the anti-Treaty stance focused largely on de Valera, but Scott also criticised the 'die-hard' British and Irish Unionist MPs who objected to the Treaty. The *Guardian* described die-hards as 'medievalists',[44] for whom the Treaty 'excites terror only equalled by indignation'.[45] Scott hoped that at least this die-hard resistance in Britain might encourage anti-Treaty opposition in the Dáil to see that there was good in the settlement. But this was not to be the case. Scott was particularly critical of Lord Edward Carson, describing him as 'the evil genius of Irish politics',[46] and 'the leader of a faction bitterly hostile to everything for which Sinn Féin stands'.[47] The *Guardian* explained that for Carson the Treaty represented 'treachery and cowardice'.[48] Although it called out Carson's accusations of

[39] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland a Nation.', *Manchester Guardian,* 09 January 1922.
[40] C. P. Scott, 'At the Parting of the Ways', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 January 1922.
[41] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland a Nation.', *Manchester Guardian,* 09 January 1922.
[42] C. P. Scott, 'At the Parting of the Ways', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 January 1922.
[43] C. P. Scott, 'The Crisis in Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian,* 15 February 1922.
[44] C. P. Scott, 'A Great Decision', *Manchester Guardian,* 17 December 1921.
[45] C. P. Scott, 'The Great Decision', *Manchester Guardian,* 15 December 1921.
[46] C. P. Scott, 'The Great Decision', *Manchester Guardian,* 15 December 1921.
[47] C. P. Scott, 'A Great Decision', *Manchester Guardian,* 17 December 1921.
[48] C. P. Scott, 'The Great Decision', *Manchester Guardian,* 15 December 1921.

treachery as absurd, stating: 'If this be treachery let us all be traitors'.[49] Nevertheless, Scott acknowledged Carson's influence and thus encouraged him to concede. He maintained:

> There is no man who in Ulster commands greater confidence or can exercise greater power than Lord Carson. Let him look the situation in the face, and advise old followers to accept what they cannot alter, and to seek a united Ireland, to whose prosperity and happiness they can contribute so much.[50]

Ulster's outlook had frustrated Scott throughout the peace process. The *Guardian* maintained that Ulster Unionists had made no attempt to assist in the British government's negotiations; it had 'stood blindly and obstinately still'.[51] The editor drew comparisons between the anti-Treaty republicans and the anti-Treaty Unionist MPs in Britain and Ulster for their 'uncompromising' stances.[52]

Regardless of opposition, however, a provisional government under Collins was formed in 1922 to take over the jurisdiction of Southern Ireland in the place of the British administration, as established by the Government of Ireland Act 1920. This assembly was to remain in place until elections were held to establish the government of the Irish Free State. On 16th January the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland transferred the authority of Dublin Castle to Collins, and the evacuation of British troops began.[53] The drafting of the Irish Constitution and a general election to install the Free State government was all that remained for the Treaty to be fully implemented.

Between February and June 1922, however, tensions between pro-Treaty nationalists and anti-Treaty republicans heightened. These tensions were propelled by the formation of the Republican Party under de Valera in March 1922. On 24 April, in a direct challenge to the provisional government, armed anti-Treaty forces occupied the Four Courts in Dublin. Still, the *Manchester Guardian's* very limited commentary on this maintained its support of the Treaty, pro-Treaty nationalists, and conciliation between all parties. Scott believed that the

[49] C. P. Scott, 'A Great Decision', *Manchester Guardian,* 17 December 1921.
[50] C. P. Scott, 'The Great Decision', *Manchester Guardian,* 15 December 1921.
[51] C. P. Scott, 'Mr. Bonar Law on the Irish Settlement', *Manchester Guardian,* 16 December 1921.
[52] C. P. Scott, 'The Great Decision', *Manchester Guardian,* 15 December 1921, and C. P. Scott, 'The Debate in Dáil Éireann', *Manchester Guardian,* 20 December 1921.
[53] Keith Middlemas (ed.) in, Thomas Jones, *Whitehall Diary, Volume III, Ireland 1918-1925* (Oxford, 1971), p. 193.

provisional government established under Collins was doing 'its duty to the utmost' to implement the Treaty and govern the South despite being 'under circumstances of extraordinary difficulty'. By June 1922, when the South was on the brink of civil war, the *Guardian* maintained that the provisional government had displayed 'good faith' throughout the process of implementing the Treaty.[54]

Scott's limited commentary on violence in Northern Ireland also sought to promote conciliation and defend the Treaty. Sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, particularly in Belfast, had been ongoing since July 1921. During the peace negotiations the *Guardian* had been most critical of unionists for violence in the North but was more reluctant to censure them in early 1922. Scott maintained that 'it is impossible to say from the accounts that reach us which side is most to blame', and that the situation was 'far more hopeful and incomparably more satisfactory than it was before the Treaty was concluded'. Scott maintained that despite the violence, the situation had improved because of the Treaty. He continued: 'At least we now have the deep satisfaction of knowing that our policy is the right policy'.[55] The *Guardian* stood firmly by its stance that the Treaty was the appropriate resolution to the Irish question, even as divisions and violence in Ireland persisted.

The Irish Question Solved

The *Guardian's* editorial columns during the post-Treaty period propagated the view that the Treaty had solved the Irish question from a British perspective. The view that the Anglo-Irish Treaty essentially brought Britain's responsibility in Ireland to an end was prevalent in Scott's commentary from December 1921. In an editorial published the week after the terms of agreement were signed Scott stated that Britain 'ceased to be actors and have become spectators in the process of the great transformation'. Despite 'the British army on her soil and the British administrators at Dublin Castle', Scott maintained the Treaty made Ireland 'a free nation', and through debating the Treaty in Dáil Éireann the Irish wold be engaging 'in the first task of a free nation- that of determining her own future'. For Scott the Treaty granted the self-determination Ireland had fought for, and now all Britain had to do was step

[54] C. P. Scott, 'A Great Decision', *Manchester Guardian,* 17 December 1921.
[55] C. P. Scott, 'The Crisis in Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian,* 15 February 1922.

back and let this 'free nation' organise its own affairs. Scott recognised the limits of this self-determination, acknowledging that was 'not wholly unrestricted', but defended the arrangement by questioning 'what choices in the lives of men or of nations really are'.[56] For Scott the restrictions on Irish self-determination under the treaty were a minor detail. With regard to anti-Treaty sentiment in Britain, the *Guardian* argued that over time the fruits of the settlement would be revealed. Scott maintained that this development in Anglo-Irish relations should bring 'immense relief' to Britain, as Ireland's fate was 'at last securely in the hands of Irishmen and well out of ours'.[57] Scott believed that the Treaty signified the beginning of a peaceful and prosperous relationship with Ireland.

The *Guardian* considered the Anglo-Irish conflict settled, but Scott still considered Britain's relationship with Ireland as more important than ever before. Scott maintained that the connection between Britain and Ireland was not severed by the Treaty, but strengthened. Yet, he could not see why republicans objected to it, when severance from Britain had been their main aspiration. Scott argued: 'Ireland can never be indifferent to us. Ireland reconciled, instead of mattering less to us, would matter infinitely more'. Scott maintained:

> In place of losing a possession we should have won a new source of strength and quickened life. Ireland, mistress of herself, will not be alien to us. She will be infinitely closer than in all her past history. For the first time common citizenship will begin to mean something.[58]

The language used here reinforces the *Guardian's* long-standing view that Ireland was a separate nation. It also indicates that, while the Irish question was for the most part seen as a domestic issue, as constitutionally speaking it was; even liberals such a Scott recognised that Ireland itself was a possession, rather than an equal to England. And that the relationship between Britain, and Ireland and its possession, was inherently colonial. The use of this language at this point in the debates demonstrates that the shift to viewing Ireland through the imperial lens, a process illuminated in the previous chapter, was completed.

With regard to the divisions in Ireland itself and anti-Treaty sentiment in the Dáil, Scott maintained: 'These are matters on which Englishmen are not called upon to express an

[56] C. P. Scott, 'Omens of Peace.', *Manchester Guardian,* 12 December 1921.
[57] C. P. Scott, 'The Great Decision', *Manchester Guardian,* 15 December 1921.
[58] C. P. Scott, 'Omens of Peace.', *Manchester Guardian,* 12 December 1921.

opinion. Ireland is now engaged in the novel but satisfactory process of self-determination, and she must choose her own course without reference to us'.[59] Scott maintained that Englishmen were now merely spectators, who would watch with sympathy as Ireland moved forward. Scott did recognise that divisions were, in part, England's creation. The *Manchester Guardian* argued:

> If Ireland in the past had had a better education in self-government, if the life of the nation had not been cast in perpetual opposition, she would have had less difficulty now in turning what she has won to good account.[60]

This notion of educating 'others' in government in the colonial context is rooted in liberal concepts of empire and belief in the civilising mission. Here, Scott is using colonial discourse to criticises former governments, and again, indicates that Ireland should have been granted some form of political self-determination long before 1921. Scott had, however, previously compared the Dáil to the Irish Parliamentary Party, arguing that the IPP, as a more experienced party than Sinn Féin, would have been better suited to govern Ireland as a Dominion.[61]

Scott also made references back to the policy of violence enacted by the British government during the War of Independence to highlight how Britain's past errors had entrenched divisions that were impacting Ireland in 1922. Scott described the British government's Irish policy as one of 'regret' and 'shame', stating that men of all parties wished to 'blot out for ever' this episode in British history. But, for Scott, the Treaty represented a 'monument of freedom' which gave hope for reconciliation.[62] Throughout the War of Independence and during the peace negotiations the *Guardian* had maintained that the British government's policy of violence had only served to worsen the Irish situation, but the Scott maintained now, even in the face of division and in recognition of Britain's role in this that it was no longer Britain's role to interfere.

[59] C. P. Scott, 'The Debate in Dáil Éireann', *Manchester Guardian,* 20 December 1921.
[60] C. P. Scott, 'The Meeting of Dáil Éireann', *Manchester Guardian,* 03 January 1922.
[61] C. P. Scott, 'A Pause in the Irish Debate', *Manchester Guardian,* 23 December 1921.
[62] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland a Nation.', *Manchester Guardian,* 09 January 1922.

Scott had expressed hope that the North and South of Ireland would now move toward essential unity in January 1922. He had believed that there was a 'new spirit of friendliness and co-operation' and that 'the essential unity of Ireland in practical affairs and interests has already begun to be recognised'.[63] But as violence escalated, the *Guardian* recognised it as 'sufficiently disquieting', despite Scott's commentary on this violence being minimal. Nevertheless, the *Guardian* maintained that 'if the mass of moderate opinion in Ireland continues constant and if opinion in this country retains the saving British virtues of tolerance and stolidity, we shall both reach a good end'. Scott maintained that 'the best we can hope is that it should do so without bloodshed'. Rhetoric of British imperial virtue is employed again here, this time to persuade British readers that the British government should not intervene. Scott maintained that 'Ireland's fate is now, as never before, in the hands of the Irish people'.[64] In a climate of escalating violence which the *Guardian* recognised as, at least in part, England's fault, the Irish question was considered resolved from a British perspective.

A Question of Nation and Empire

With the Irish question settled in Scott's mind, the *Guardian* deliberated how national party politics in Britain would be affected by the 'resolution' of the Irish debate. From December 1921, Scott stressed the significance of the 'resolution' of the Irish question for the British nation. The *Guardian* maintained that the Irish question 'has been with us so long, it has entered so deeply into the very structure of our politics and even into the character of our national life'. Scott believed that 'its removal is like a change to the climate. Nothing henceforth can be as it was before'.[65] After Lord Birkenhead's speech to parliament in favour of the government's Irish policy in December 1921, Scott stated: 'we must indeed feel that the old boundaries have crumbled'.[66] The *Guardian* also recognised the changed national context after the First World War as influential, maintaining that although Home Rule was a 'modest proposal a generation ago', for many it was 'clad with all kinds of terrors which a true understanding… would have dispelled'. But in 1922, The *Guardian* believed that bar a minority of die-hard Conservative Unionists, these 'terrors' had been 'dispelled' from British attitudes

[63] C. P. Scott, 'Irish Union', *Manchester Guardian,* 23 January 1922.
[64] C. P. Scott, 'The Crisis in Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian,* 15 February 1922.
[65] C. P. Scott, 'The New Peace', *Manchester Guardian,* 08 December 1921.
[66] C. P. Scott, 'The New Peace', *Manchester Guardian,* 08 December 1921.

to Irish self-determination.[67] Hence, for the *Guardian*, the 'resolution' of the Anglo-Irish conflict directly changed, and reflected change, in the boundaries and ideologies of the political parties that had governed the United Kingdom since the nineteenth century.

First and foremost, Scott argued that the resolution of the Irish question would have a monumental impact on liberal politics in Britain. The *Guardian* recalled the role the Irish question had played in Liberal Party politics since Gladstone, maintaining that the Irish question had defined liberal politics for generations, but the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty meant that this was no longer the case. For the *Guardian*, the whole political system would now be overhauled, and parties would have to return to principles. Scott argued that the settlement of the Irish question meant that the Liberal Party's 'immediate programme is accomplished' and that 'it must reorganise itself on new lines'.[68] Scott noted the extension of the franchise in 1918 in relation to this, recognising how the Labour Party has a new place in British politics. Here, Scott recognised how the 'resolution' of the Irish question in 1922 within the changed political climate of the immediate interwar years, could lead to the decline of the Liberal Party in Britain. Indeed, it suffered significant decline from this point on, largely due to the increased Labour vote. Nevertheless, Scott's suggestion of returning to principles, now the Liberal Party had accomplished its greatest and most long-standing policy, suggests that Scott did not consider Liberal Party decline as a decline of liberalism.

Scott also argued that the 'resolution' of the Anglo-Irish conflict, this domestic issue which increasingly took on an imperial flavour, had rendered the Unionist Party redundant in Britain. It maintained that the Unionists had 'ceased to have a meaning since the thing which gave it birth has disappeared'.[69] Scott predicted the fragmentation of the Tories because of this, as Unionists and Conservatives had only formally affiliated during the Home Rule Crisis in 1912. For Scott, the resolution of the Irish question 'obliterated' the Unionists, as well as 'undermined' the liberals. As such, the coalition government that was in power at this time was also made redundant.[70] Hence, the *Guardian* maintained in February 1922 that a general

[67] C. P. Scott, 'The Future of Parties', *Manchester Guardian,* 13 February 1922.
[68] C. P. Scott, 'The Future of Parties', *Manchester Guardian,* 13 February 1922.
[69] C. P. Scott, 'The New Peace', *Manchester Guardian,* 08 December 1921.
[70] C. P. Scott, 'The Future of Parties', *Manchester Guardian,* 13 February 1922.

election was imminent. This demonstrates Scott's understanding of the Irish question as the defining issue in British politics for over a generation. In Scott's view, with the Irish question solved, Unionists and Liberals alike were now required to rethink the purpose of their own existence, and in the case of the Liberal Party, rebuild their foundations on the principles rather than policy.

Scott recognised the significance of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in the national context, believing that with the Irish question solved, British national politics would be reorganised. But the impact of the Anglo-Irish Treaty within the broader context of the British Empire was also acknowledged by the *Guardian*. This recognition was symptomatic of the shift in the *Guardian's* view of Ireland as a national question with an imperial solution, to Ireland as part of the imperial body politic. Scott had occasionally drawn connections between Ireland's demands for self-determination and the British government's Irish policy, with other anti-colonial nationalist movements, particularly in South Africa. The ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the establishment of Ireland as a Dominion, saw this rhetoric on Ireland in the broader imperial context amplified.

Following the passing of the Treaty in the House of Commons, the *Guardian* maintained 'it will mark an epoch in the evolution of our institutions and will bring strength or weakness into the very heart of the country and the Commonwealth'.[71] Scott maintained that the Dominions would be reassured by Ireland's new status as it demonstrated that the Imperial government were willing to work with its white possessions on making steps toward independence. Scott stated: 'there is not one of our Dominions where it will not bring a sense of relief'.[72] The *Guardian* explained that Dominion status was a fluid concept, it was 'always growing, and its most recent growth has been portentous'.[73] This status, in Scott's view, gave Ireland 'full dignity and state', it was *practically* independence.[74]

[71] C. P. Scott, 'A Great Decision.', *Manchester Guardian,* 17 December 1921.
[72] C. P. Scott, 'The New Peace', *Manchester Guardian,* 08 December 1921.
[73] C. P. Scott, 'The Great Decision', *Manchester Guardian,* 15 December 1921.
[74] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland a Nation.', *Manchester Guardian,* 09 January 1922.

Hence, Scott had feared the imperial implications of the Dáil rejecting the Treaty, which guaranteed 'beyond possibility of mistake or evasion, the rights, liberties, and status of Canada'.[75] If Ireland did not accept the same terms as Canada, it was thought perhaps then these terms would no longer be deemed enough among other white Dominions. The eventual ratification of the Treaty by the Dáil was, therefore, upheld as a positive influence on the politics of the British Empire. The *Manchester Guardian* described Ireland as 'the Cinderella of our politics'.[76] Ireland, as the 'Cinderella', had been granted her wish of self-determination by the Anglo-Irish Treaty and transformed into a self-governing nation. Scott also, once again, compared the situation in Ireland to the process by which South Africa's status was changed to that of a Dominion.[77]

As well as satisfying the Dominions, the *Guardian* argued that the Anglo-Irish Treaty might also soothe the broader crisis of empire in the inter-war years. The Treaty might calm the increasingly fractious colonial relations in Britain's non-white imperial possessions. Scott stated: 'The problem of Egypt, the problem of India, cannot look quite the same in the light of the Irish example'.[78] The *Guardian* maintained that the Irish example, the government's policy in Ireland following the truce, should be considered for making peace elsewhere in the empire during this time, when anti-colonial nationalist movements were accelerating their challenge to British imperial rule like never before.

The *Guardian* took a 'pro-Empire' line in its commentary, encouraging Ireland to appreciate the value of its new status. Scott argued that while Ireland should be satisfied that it had achieved self-determination, 'it is a greater thing to be an independent member of a world-wide society of nations than a small and isolated unit dependent on her own resources'.[79] It believed Dominion status within the British Empire was better for Ireland than isolated independence, despite the fact it was independence external to the empire that nationalist Ireland had been fighting for.

[75] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland to Decide', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 December 1921.
[76] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland a Nation.', *Manchester Guardian,* 09 January 1922.
[77] C. P. Scott, 'Mr. Bonar Law on the Irish Settlement', *Manchester Guardian,* 16 December 1921.
[78] C. P. Scott, 'The New Peace', *Manchester Guardian,* 08 December 1921.
[79] C. P. Scott, 'The Great Decision', *Manchester Guardian,* 15 December 1921.

Nevertheless, while the *Guardian* was enthusiastic about the impact the Treaty would have on the empire, and the new relationship between Ireland and Britain, it recognised that Ireland was uninterested in this and preoccupied with reordering its internal affairs following the departure of the British administration. Scott maintained:

> For the present and for a pretty long time to come, Ireland, unless we are much mistaken, will be quite content to ignore this side of her potential greatness and will prefer to devote her undivided attention to certain humdrum but not unimportant domestic affairs, which, to her mind, have long been neglected or mismanaged, and of which she aspires to make a much better job.[80]

Scott understood that after generations of fighting for self-governance, Ireland wanted to focus on governing itself rather than looking outward. Still, the *Guardian* argued that Ireland's new status within the Commonwealth was worth celebrating.

The *Guardian* also insisted on the global impact of the Anglo-Irish Treaty from December 1921, particularly the significance for Anglo-American relations. Scott feared friction with the US due to conflict with Ireland, as outlined in the previous chapter. Scott argued the Treaty would 'be felt in Washington',[81] and was aware of the effect a rejection of the Treaty could have on opinion in the US.[82] Furthermore, with regard to the 1922 Washington Agreement that limited naval activity in the Pacific, Scott argued that 'peace in Ireland has been the prelude to peace in the Far East'. The *Guardian* maintained that while the 'two movements proceed independently' both were a result of 'the spirit which seeks to substitute co-operation and equity for rivalry and force'. Scott considered this an 'immense' change in the conditions of the world that gave hope for world peace. Scott continued: 'A harassed world may surely begin to breathe a little more freely and, having thus invoked the spirit of peace in the two hemispheres'.[83] Scott also believed that the Treaty had lessons for 'our whole policy in Europe'.[84] The *Guardian* hoped that the Anglo-Irish Treaty signified a turning point in global international relations.

[80] C. P. Scott, 'The Great Decision', *Manchester Guardian,* 15 December 1921.
[81] C. P. Scott, 'The New Peace', *Manchester Guardian,* 08 December 1921
[82] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland to Decide', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 December 1921
[83] C. P. Scott, 'Omens of Peace.', *Manchester Guardian,* 12 December 1921.
[84] C. P. Scott, 'The New Peace', *Manchester Guardian,* 08 December 1921

Following the ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1922 however, Scott's contributions to the newspaper dropped significantly. Scott published just three editorials in February 1922,[85] then nothing until June, despite stressing the importance of the potential aftermath of the Treaty for Britain and the world during the Treaty debates in in the immediate weeks that followed. The contrast in the frequency of contributions made by the editor before the New Year in particular was stark. In December 1921 Scott wrote 10 editorials on Ireland. It is not that there was a lack of news to comment on, as violence or the threat of violence continued to rise, but further confirmation that the Scott considered the Irish question solved. Scott only returned to writing editorials after the British government rejected the first draft of the Irish Constitution on 1st June 1922, which threatened the implementation of the Treaty. Scott responded with another defence of the Treaty and the provisional government.[86] The provisional government subsequently accepted amendments to the constitution, held a general election, and secured 58 of 92 seats. Scott's next editorials were not published until the assassination of Sir Henry Wilson, just prior to the commencement of the Irish Civil War.[87]

Assassination of Sir Henry Wilson

On 22nd June 1922, Sir Henry Wilson, Unionist MP and former Imperial Chief of Staff was assassinated in London by the Anti-Treaty IRA. The *Guardian* immediately censured the attack, describing it as 'hateful murder', an 'undeserved and wicked blow'.[88] The *Guardian* maintained that Wilson had been 'struck down' by 'ignorant men', perhaps alone or perhaps 'in collusion with some others as wicked and misguided as themselves'.[89] Scott undoubtedly censured the assassination; however, the key issue addressed in the editorials following the shooting focused on the question of culpability, and this culpability was sparingly placed on the attackers themselves. Firstly, Scott highlighted Wilson's unionist politics and his approach to Catholics in Northern Ireland as a potential cause for the attack. He explained that Wilson

[85] C. P. Scott, 'Preparing for the End.', *Manchester Guardian*, 08 February 1922, and 'The Crisis in Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 15 February 1922, and 'The Irish Debate.', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 Feb 1922.
[86] C. P. Scott, 'Mr. Churchill's Grave Statement.', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 June 1922.
[87] C. P. Scott, 'The Crime and Its Origins.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 June 1922.
[88] C. P. Scott, 'The Crime and Its Origins.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 June 1922, and 'The Nation's Tribute.', *Manchester Guardian*, 26 June 1922.
[89] C. P. Scott, 'The Nation's Tribute.', *Manchester Guardian*, 26 June 1922.

was ‘a man who perhaps more than any other was likely to be the object of a wild and reckless vengeance’.[90] Scott clarified:

> Sir Henry Wilson had come, rightly or wrongly, to be regarded as the very embodiment, if not the actual instigator, of the policy of ‘thorough’ in the Six Counties which, futile in preservation of order, has served only to intensify the war of reprisals. It is probable that the responsibility for this lies quite elsewhere, but nothing is more likely than that, in aiming at his life, his murderers believed themselves to be striking at the author of the sufferings of friends or kindred and acted on that conviction just as though they had themselves been parties in the series of bloody reprisals by which Belfast and other parts of the Six Counties have been disgraced.[91]

The *Guardian* attributed Wilson’s role in this repressive approach in Northern Ireland as a cause of the assassination, an approach the *Guardian* had disagreed with. Scott still described Wilson as an ‘honourable and sincere man’ but maintained that he had been held responsible for ‘outrages’ against Northern Catholics.[92] Scott’s use of the term reprisals for violence committed without reprimand from the state is also noteworthy here, as this drew a connection back to the violence of the Black and Tans, conducted during the War of Independence. Scott also described the areas where this violence had taken place as ‘disgraced’. The idea of Britain being ashamed of the Black and Tan violence was also a prominent trope during the war.

The *Manchester Guardian* believed the general climate of violence in Northern Ireland, as well as Wilson’s own role in this, was in part to blame for his death. Scott insisted that the assassination ‘could hardly have taken place but for the appalling exchange of acts of violence of which every day brings the tale in Northern Ireland, and all of which remain practically unpunished’. Scott highlighted that those who carried out the attack had fought in the First World War, maintaining that ‘in ordinary circumstances these are hardly the kind of men who would be likely to be guilty of so black a crime’. But, the *Guardian* argued that it was ‘quite conceivable’ that they had been driven to commit such an act due to the treatment of fellow Catholics, who had suffered ‘intolerable wrongs’. As noted above, Scott’s commentary on

[90] C. P. Scott, ‘The Crime and Its Origins.’, *Manchester Guardian*, 24 June 1922.
[91] C. P. Scott, ‘The Crime and Its Origins.’, *Manchester Guardian*, 24 June 1922.
[92] C. P. Scott, ‘The Nation’s Tribute.’, *Manchester Guardian*, 26 June 1922.

violence in Northern Ireland to this point had been limited, but Wilson's death motivated Scott to call on Sir James Craig to hold the criminals of all violence in Northern Ireland responsible. The *Guardian* described Craig's approach thus far as a 'scandalous failure in the primary duties of civilised government'. Moreover, Scott explained that crime was going unpunished, the activities of factions inciting violence were going unchecked, and that 'the nominal agents of the law are not infrequently to be found among the promoters of disorder'.[93] This was not dissimilar to the way in which the government initially dealt with the violence of the Black and Tans, and how the *Guardian* reported on their behaviour, during the Irish War of Independence. The *Manchester Guardian* argued that only when impartial justice was properly enforced in Belfast could the situation improve, and could there be long-term peace.

Furthermore, while Scott placed culpability for the assassination of Sir Henry Wilson at the door of the Northern Irish government, he sought to deflect any blame from the new government in the South. Scott insisted that the Irish Free State was not to blame for the assassination, and criticised MPs in Westminster who suggested otherwise. Scott explained that Arthur Griffith had denounced the crime as an 'anarchic deed', 'an outrage on the fundamental principle of civilised government'. Scott agreed and argued that this response was the 'true heart and mind of Nationalist Ireland'. The *Guardian* insisted that 'all that is sound in Nationalist Ireland' was against the assassination, and even some extremists had been quick to distance themselves from the crime. Nevertheless, the *Guardian* urged the Free State to take control of the radical republicans that threatened peace in the North and the South. Scott highlighted the Free State government's victory in the recent elections and asked if this government was now strong enough to eliminate 'its own rebels and extremists'. He also argued that while the assassination of Wilson was not the fault of the Free State, it had to 'prevent to the utmost of its power the disorder on its border and the influx from the south into the northern province of armed desperadoes whose business it is to see to it that reprisals shall never cease'.[94] Scott used the term reprisals here to draw a connection between republican extremists and the Black and Tans.

[93] C. P. Scott, 'The Crime and Its Origins.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 June 1922.
[94] C. P. Scott, 'The Crime and Its Origins.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 June 1922.

The *Guardian* also deflected blame from the British government following Wilson's death. It maintained that there was 'always an obvious danger that the war in Belfast might be carried across the Channel', but it was the role of the chief of police to have considered this. Scott did not see the assassination as related to 'any remaining controversy' between England and Ireland, it was 'simply an extension of the terrible conflict carried on day to day in Belfast and other parts of Northern Ireland'.[95] It was the policy of repression led by Sir James Craig in Northern Ireland that was mainly responsible for Wilson's assassination; it was not the fault of the British government or of the provisional government.

As such, the *Guardian* argued that Wilson's assassination should not hinder the implementation of the Treaty, and urged the British government to continue its policy of conciliation. Scott stated: 'we should not seek to pick a quarrel where no quarrel is', maintaining that the only thing the British government should do in response to the assassination is 'persist in the course of restraint and goodwill to which, to their infinite credit, the [British] Government have in these last trying months steadily adhered'. Scott did not think it likely that the government would retaliate with force. Nevertheless, the *Guardian* still expressed fears of the potential impact of the assassination on Anglo-Irish peace. Scott recognised:

> …it is not merely a murder; it is to all appearances a political murder, and political murder strikes not merely at an individual life but at something much larger- at the very fabric on which political society and the security of States are founded.[96]

The *Guardian* recognised that the nature of the assassination could threaten Britain's trust in the Free State. Nevertheless, Scott attempted to mitigate this threat through its editorial line that relieved the British government and the Free State of any culpability. Scott used his editorial columns once again to promote the implementation of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, and to encourage peace.

[95] C. P. Scott, 'The Crime and Its Origins.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 June 1922.
[96] C. P. Scott, 'The Crime and Its Origins.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 June 1922.

The Irish Civil War

The Irish Civil War began on 28th June 1922, the week after Sir Henry Wilson's assassination, when Free State soldiers were ordered to clear the Four Courts in Dublin that had been occupied since April. The Irish Civil War was a short but violent conflict that centred on the Anglo-Irish Treaty, which the *Manchester Guardian* enthusiastically supported. Yet, Scott's editorial commentary on Ireland during the Civil War was minimal. Scott only contributed four editorials to the *Guardian* over the course of the war. The first of these was published on 1st July 1922 in response to the clearing of the Four Courts. The second directly addressed the state of war, and was the only editorial to do so purposefully during the conflict. The third and the final were published in response to the death of Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins respectively in August 1922. Scott did not contribute to public discussion of the Irish Civil War in the *Guardian's* editorial columns between September 1922 and the end of the conflict. The events of the Irish Civil War itself, other than the clearing of the Four Courts, did not receive any attention from Scott.

The editorials that were published by Scott sought to reiterate the arguments he had made since the signing of the Treaty. First and foremost, his commentary supported the pro-Treaty stance and the provisional government. Scott defended the provisional government's decision to leave the anti-Treaty garrison in the Four Courts unchallenged until late June 1922, by insisting to the *Guardian* readership that it had endeavoured 'to escape the shedding of blood, of the blood of fellow-Irishmen, even though authority might suffer through delay'. Scott viewed this delay as demonstrative of a conciliatory approach that sought to avoid violence, an approach which the *Guardian* had always supported. Scott maintained following the clearing of the Four Courts that the provisional government 'is now called upon for a grimmer assertion of her authority'.[97] The *Guardian* argued that this use of force by the Irish Free State against the anti-Treaty garrison was not only in defence of its own authority in the South, but would also prevent the permanent alienation of Northern Ireland.

[97] C. P. Scott, 'Daylight in Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 July 1922.

Again, Scott also compared the Irish situation to South Africa where, in his view, force had been necessary and justified in suppressing insurgents who were part of an organised rebellion. Scott stated:

> It is a surgeon's work, and the surgeon hurts to save. So it was in another recent and not dissimilar case, when General Smuts delayed to deal with the disturbance on the Rand till it had assumed the proportions of an organised rebellion and then crushed it at a blow.[98]

The same circumstances and resolution applied in Ireland in 1922. This connection between Ireland's experience and that of South Africa is also made in a subsequent editorial. Scott stated: 'Relatively to her population and resources Ireland, in Mr. Gwynn's estimate, is paying for the rebellion as much as Great Britain paid for all the years of the Boer War'.[99] Gwynn was a prominent Irish nationalist. The contributions of Irish nationalists to *Guardian* content are discussed in the next chapter.

Following the death of Arthur Griffith on 12th of August 1922 the *Guardian's* editorial support for Griffith and the Treatyites was reemphasised. Scott stated: 'There is no doubt that he [Griffith] was the ablest, as he was also the sanest, man whom the storm and stress of the Irish revolution had thrown up'.[100] Harking back to the Treaty negotiations, Scott explained how Griffith was 'steadfast in aim', the aim being to achieve Irish self-government, but able 'to adapt his means as facts demand'. Here Scott is referring to Griffith's willingness to accept a self-governing Ireland within the British Empire. Scott maintained that because of this, Griffith 'was not only a patriot but a statesman'. The *Guardian* argued that Griffith, as the 'father of Sinn Féin', played the first part in 'the great preparatory work of the freeing of the Irish spirit', describing the founding of Sinn Féin as 'the necessary forerunner of Irish political freedom'. This is a very significant assertion, considering Scott was a life-long Home Ruler who continued to support the more moderate Irish Parliamentary Party, even after its dissolution. Nevertheless, Scott made a distinction between Griffith's Sinn Féin and the Sinn Féin under de Valera that found victory in the 1918 general election. In Scott's view, Griffith's Sinn Féin was 'a spiritual rather than a material thing, appealing not so much to force as to self-

[98] C. P. Scott, 'Daylight in Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 July 1922.
[99] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland's Trial.', *Manchester Guardian*, 21 July 1922.
[100] C. P. Scott, 'The Death of Mr. Griffith.', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 August 1922.

conquest, and capable therefore of life and of success even under alien domination'. The *Guardian* recognised that 'he joined heart and soul in the political emancipation' of Ireland, but insisted that 'this earlier conception always remained to give colour and consistency to his policy and to save him from the snare of an empty and futile political idealism'.[101] Scott compared Griffith to de Valera once again.

In Scott's view, Griffith and de Valera were alike in their aspirations for Ireland, but unlike de Valera, Griffith was 'a realist as to the means for attaining them'. Scott argued that it was impossible to negotiate with de Valera, but with Griffith 'it was easy, not indeed in coming to terms, for he was as hard a bargainer as any, but at least in finding the ground on which fruitful negotiation becomes possible'. Scott reiterated that unlike de Valera, Griffith had been willing to accept 'the historic link which bound Ireland to the British Crown' in order to secure 'spiritual and political emancipation' of Ireland. Scott considered Griffith's part in the negotiation of the Treaty as a 'great and incomparable service' to both Ireland and Britain. The *Guardian* also praised Griffith for carrying the Treaty through the Dáil and the provisional government's victory in the first election of the Free State, despite the 'wrecking tactics' of de Valera.[102]

Following the clearing of the Four Courts, de Valera declared allegiance to the anti-Treaty IRA. Until this point he had publicly disowned the anti-Treaty garrison, although the *Guardian* argued that the Four Courts Garrison, these 'insurgents', 'fillibusters', 'usurpers', this 'freebooting band', were only doing openly what de Valera had been doing himself since December 1921. De Valera and the Four Courts garrison were both seeking to ruin the Treaty in the name of a republic, but until the outbreak of civil war, de Valera had sought to achieve these aims via 'more devious paths'.[103] Scott argued that in supporting the anti-Treaty forces de Valera was responsible for new fractures in Ireland worse than those existing previously. He maintained:

[101] C. P. Scott, 'The Death of Mr. Griffith.', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 August 1922.
[102] C. P. Scott, 'The Death of Mr. Griffith.', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 August 1922.
[103] C. P. Scott, 'Daylight in Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 July 1922.

> The chief crime of Mr. De Valera and his party against their country is that they have been apostles of disunion, that they have riven their own party and split Ireland as a whole more deeply than ever in two.[104]

This damning indictment was published alongside the accusation that de Valera feared an Ireland left free to move forward as a Dominion within the British Empire under the Anglo-Irish Treaty. According to Scott, de Valera thought this would lead to an abandonment of the republican cause altogether by the Irish people.[105] Scott argued that once the fruits of Dominion status were realised, Ireland would happily accept its position within the British Commonwealth of Nations under the British Crown.

Hence, Scott described the death of Arthur Griffith by heart attack in August 1922 as 'lamentable' with potentially 'grave' and 'far-reaching' consequences. The editor expressed concern that it would cause 'immense loss and confusion' for the provisional government. Still, Scott insisted that the newly elected Free State parliament had to now elect Griffith's successor. It had important work to continue, namely the formalisation of the Irish Constitution, which was crucial for the full implementation of the Treaty.[106] But ten days after the death of Griffith, Michael Collins was killed in an ambush by anti-Treaty forces. The *Guardian* described the death of Collins as 'another cruel loss', a 'foul blow of a treacherous ambush' that had 'struck down the man whom at this moment she could least spare'.[107] Scott blamed the anti-Treaty forces for the death of both leaders. He stated: 'Mr. Griffith was the victim of the immense labour and anxiety imposed upon him by the violence of a rebellious faction; Mr Collins has fallen by a more direct method of attack'.[108] As with Griffith, Scott was highly complimentary of Collins, although he insinuated that the Irish national character which Collins embodied was also in part responsible for his own death. It stated:

> Mr. Collins had a great name among his countrymen. He was full of courage, full of resource. And he was moderate and conciliatory as well as prompt to action and regardless of danger. It is this element of recklessness, native to the Irishman and

[104] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland's Trial.', *Manchester Guardian*, 21 July 1922.
[105] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland's Trial.', *Manchester Guardian*, 21 July 1922.
[106] C. P. Scott, 'The Death of Mr. Griffith.', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 August 1922.
[107] C. P. Scott, 'The Death of Mr. Collins.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 August 1922.
[108] C. P. Scott, 'The Death of Mr. Collins.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 August 1922.

> intensified no doubt in him by years of peril and adventure, which probably is in part responsible for his death.[109]

Nevertheless, the *Guardian* recognised the death of Collins as an assassination.

Scott had considered Griffith and Collins the most appropriate leaders Sinn Fein had for the government of the new nationalist Ireland: 'Mr. Griffith was its brain, Mr. Collins its right arm in the struggle against faction and for Ireland's liberty to live her own life as the vast majority of her citizens had determined'. He believed Ireland was faced with 'a heavy task without their aid'. Hence, the *Guardian* thus saw the death of Collins as a potential turning point in the Irish Civil War. It expressed concern over the fate of the new Free State government following the death of both its leaders, but most significantly, it suggested an escalation of force on the part of the provisional government in order to suppress the anti-Treaty rebellion. Scott supported the provisional government's use of force in removing the Four Courts garrison; equally, following the death of Collins, Scott suggested that more force might be necessary to 'put a speedy end to an intolerable position'.[110] Scott did not make any further comment on this however, and this was his last editorial published during the conflict. Scott was less critical of force when it sought to maintain his form of peace.

Significantly, Scott also used these few editorials published during the civil war to reinforce the stance that Britain's role in Ireland had come to a close: the Irish question, from a British perspective, had been solved. Britain had moved from 'brutal exercise of force' to 'almost faultless restraint and wisdom' since the truce in July 1921.[111] For Scott, only the final stages of implementing the Treaty remained, and these had to be achieved without any return to conflict between Britain and Ireland. For Scott, the assassination of Sir Henry Wilson need not have threatened the new relationship between Britain and Ireland, and neither should the civil war. Scott maintained: 'Englishmen can only wish her well, knowing that the best service they can render is to respect in word and deed her independence and never to despair of her future any more than of our own'.[112] The *Manchester Guardian* insisted Britain stay out of it,

[109] C. P. Scott, 'The Death of Mr. Collins.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 August 1922.
[110] C. P. Scott, 'The Death of Mr. Collins.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 August 1922.
[111] C. P. Scott, 'Daylight in Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 July 1922.
[112] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland's Trial.', *Manchester Guardian*, 21 July 1922.

as 'interference of an external power' would be 'deadly'.[113] It was Ireland's turn to take responsibility for its affairs under the Treaty, all Britain could do is 'hope for the best for Ireland in her dire misfortune'.[114] Nevertheless, Scott also reiterated his argument that despite Britain's role in Ireland concluding, they were forever linked. The *Guardian* maintained that the two nations had '700 years of association', that 'a thousand links have forged themselves which forbid severance and make friendly connection natural', and that 'her whole history has been linked with this country [Britain]'.[115] For Scott, England's fortunes were inevitably linked with 'those of the kindred people close to her shores'.[116] Still, the *Guardian* insisted that it was for Ireland to organise its affairs, regardless of this close connection which constitutionally was now an imperial one.

Finally, Scott's last few editorials of 1922 attempted to unpick the reasons for civil war in Ireland in a way that ensured no blame was directed at the nature of the Treaty. Scott suggested that the long-standing climate of violence and division in Ireland, an aversion to authority bred for centuries in opposition to the British, alongside the 'recklessness', the 'madness' of Irish character, were reasons for the ongoing violence. Scott maintained, therefore, as he had done many times before, that had the Home Rule been implemented earlier the climate of conflict in Ireland could have been avoided. He stated: 'Emancipation any time since it was first proposed thirty-six years ago would, until the last six of them, have brought to Ireland, if freely accorded, order and peace. We waited too long'. Once again, he placed blame at the door of previous parliaments for not dealing with the Irish question sooner. But he did not just blame the drawn out response to the Irish nationalism by parliaments-prior. Scott insisted: 'two years ago we let murder loose in Ireland, and murder once let loose is not easily chained up again. Thus before finding a solution to the Irish problem we contributed to it every element of exasperation'.[117] The *Guardian* argued that the Irish policy led by the current British government during the Irish War of Independence was also responsible for persistent violence across the Irish Sea in 1922.

[113] C. P. Scott, 'Daylight in Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 July 1922.
[114] C. P. Scott, 'The Death of Mr. Griffith.', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 August 1922.
[115] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland's Trial.', *Manchester Guardian*, 21 July 1922.
[116] C. P. Scott, 'The Death of Mr. Griffith.', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 August 1922.
[117] C. P. Scott, 'The Death of Mr. Collins.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 August 1922.

Furthermore, Scott maintained that Britain's approach to Ireland had ultimately bred a climate of discontent which it, as a people, were now struggling to escape. He maintained: 'Authority is not in much favour in an Ireland which throughout its history has been rebelling against it'.[118] But Scott still stressed that it was Irishmen not the British who were doing the fighting now, and it was the responsibility of Ireland to resolve the conflict. He stated: 'These are no blows inflicted by an outside power. It is Irishmen who are guilty of the blood of Irishmen, and it is Ireland's own sons who are spreading ruin over the land'. Again, he was asserting that from Britain's perspective, the Irish question was now solved. Scott then quoted Bernard Shaw who had recently declared 'this people is mad'. Shaw's comment on the madness of Irishmen and Scott's platforming of this fed into a discourse that conflict was somewhat inherent to Irish character and thus Ireland's national life. Scott's comments on Collin's reckless Irish nature also fed into this discourse.[119] Scott alluded to the Irish character as part of the reason for the civil war.

Furthermore, the *Guardian* explained that the civil war in Ireland had, for die-hard unionists, confirmed their long-standing belief that Ireland was incapable of governing itself. This belief was connected to ideas of national character within an imperial framework. In July 1922, Scott explained: 'There are plenty of people who have seen in this the fulfilment of their worst prophecies and the justification of the long denial of the right of Irish self-government'.[120] The editor reiterated this following the death of Collins, stating: 'There will not be wanting those who will find in these things the fulfilment of all, and more than all, the evil they had foretold from the establishment of Irish self-government, and the justification of their own opposition'.[121] For Scott, this was all the more reason for the Treaty to be implemented without hindrance and the anti-Treaty forces shut down swiftly, even by means of force. Even if not within Ireland itself, the Treaty would still bring peace between Britain and Ireland, and that was the priority for Scott. The aftermath of the Treaty in the Free State was the business of the Free State, not Britain, as the editor had made clear. Nevertheless, Scott urged fellow

[118] C. P. Scott, 'Daylight in Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 July 1922.
[119] C. P. Scott, 'The Death of Mr. Collins.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 August 1922.
[120] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland's Trial.', *Manchester Guardian*, 21 July 1922.
[121] C. P. Scott, 'The Death of Mr. Collins.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 August 1922.

liberals, his readers, and other sympathisers of the Irish nationalist cause not to be 'abashed' by this turn of events. Scott argued:

> Disappointment there well may be, but behind it should still stand faith and hope… there is no reason to doubt that in the end the judgement and the interests of the mass of her [Ireland's] people will bring her to safety.[122]

Scott still encouraged liberals to have faith that peace would one day be secured for and by the Irish people, despite his comments on the climate of conflict and national character highlighted above.

The final editorial Scott wrote during the Irish revolutionary period was published on 24th May 1922, four days after the civil war ended. Under the heading, 'Peace at Last in Ireland', Scott stated that 'after eighteen months of bitter domestic strife, Ireland is to be permitted once more to live her own life and govern herself as the vast majority of her people have determined'.[123] The editor described the value of the 'hard-won' victory of the Free State as coming from 'the fact that it has been won without any sort of assistance or interference from outside'. Scott reinforced his argument that it was not Britain's place to intervene and it was for the Free State to assert its authority alone. Scott praised the provisional government for 'refusing to make terms with rebellion', and reiterated its criticism for de Valera and his anti-Treaty followers, who 'sought every method of violence to impose their will on the mass of their countrymen'. This contrasted with Scott's critical commentary on the British government's refusal to parlay with Dáil Éireann during the War of Independence, which it too had viewed as rebels.

Nevertheless, while Scott insisted that the Free State should be congratulated 'on this complete and signal victory', he believed Ireland had one more victory to achieve - Irish unity. Scott believed, however, that unity was now possible following the suppression of the anti-Treaty opposition. This final editorial closed by recognising that 'Ireland has suffered grievous hurt' but maintained that 'today she enters a new chapter of her history'. Scott highlighted the difficult tasks ahead for the Irish Free State government, including the restoration of the

[122] C. P. Scott, 'The Death of Mr. Collins.', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 August 1922.
[123] C. P. Scott, 'Peace at Last in Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 29 May 1923.

'whole fabric of moral order and respect for law', and implementing effective legislation and administration, but the *Guardian* upheld the view that the Free State leaders were trustworthy and capable, and assured that they would have 'the deep and friendly sympathy' of the British people. The *Guardian* had faith in the Free State's future as a Dominion of the British Empire that would one day be reunited with its partitioned countrymen. C. P. Scott wished Ireland all the best, and said goodbye.[124]

Conclusion

The *Manchester Guardian* had promoted a settlement along the lines of that agreed by the Anglo-Irish Treaty since the early months of the Irish War of Independence in 1919. It was, therefore, enthusiastically pro-Treaty in its commentary from December 1921, when debates over its ratification began. The main reasons for the *Guardian's* support of the Treaty were the same as those that had underpinned Scott's promotion of Dominion status for Ireland during the war, as well as his commentary throughout the peace negotiations. Scott wanted an end to Anglo-Irish conflict by way of a solution that offered Irish nationalists political self-determination within the bounds of moderation and existing structures of authority. This was in line with his liberal ideology that upheld freedom from oppression, and promoted progress while exercising discipline. The Treaty was considered a reasonable constitutional solution, rather than being revolutionary, and a solution that encouraged conciliation rather than division, despite it ultimately confirming partition. The Treaty granted Ireland political liberty while maintaining overarching structures of British rule, and as such, Scott believed peace and unity would ultimately prevail. The Treaty was thus, in the *Guardian's* view, a triumph for British liberalism, and with its ratification the Irish question was solved.

Hence, Scott used the editorial columns of the *Guardian* to defend the Treaty and promote its successful implementation. He was critical of those who he believed threatened the Treaty, particularly de Valera and Sir Edward Carson, and praised the British and Irish leaders who supported the Treaty. Violence in the North and the South was ongoing in the months prior to the Civil War, but Scott's limited commentary on this insisted that the Treaty as it stood was the way to reconciliation and peace. Following the assassination of Sir Henry Wilson,

[124] C. P. Scott, 'Peace at Last in Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 29 May 1923.

Scott's defence of the Treaty was renewed, and all blame for the assassination diverted away from those responsible for implementing the Treaty: the Free State provisional government and the British government. Blame was instead placed upon the Unionist Northern Irish government and the anti-Catholic sentiment that Scott held it responsible for. In his limited commentary during the Civil War, Scott praised Collins and Griffith yet again, and defended the decisions made by the provisional government, including using violence against those opposed to the Treaty. Scott even suggested that a hard swift blow was needed to suppress the anti-Treaty forces, as this would secure the peace he believed the Treaty still promised. Primarily though, Scott's few editorials published during the Civil War reiterated that the Treaty had solved Irish question from a British perspective; it was thus no longer Britain's responsibility to intervene in Irish conflict.

For Scott, the Treaty signified a new phase in Britain's relationship with Ireland, one where they were *more* equal and united than had been under the Union. The relationship was now an imperial one in which both nations shared in the commonwealth and prosperity of the British Empire. These ideas of shared prosperity and unity through empire was emblematic of Scott's understanding of the British empire in the interwar period. His view had shifted away from the aggressive-imperialist characterisation that caused him to so strongly object to the Boer War, for example. From 1922, therefore, Ireland was now fully viewed through an imperial lens, after a process of refocussing that had been instigated by the *Guardian's* promotion of an imperial solution to the Irish question from 1919. The completion of this process in the liberal imagination was reflected in Scott's rhetoric, which adopted more overtly colonial discourse after the Treaty was signed. Tropes around the political education of subjects, nations as possessions, and the dynamics of British and Irish national character, were much more obvious than before. The impact of the Treaty was also discussed within a broader framework of empire, and Ireland was more directly compared to white Dominions such as Canada and South Africa. Scott had previously referred to these nations in his discussion of Ireland, but now Ireland was one of them. The *Guardian* also saw the Treaty as a blueprint for Britain's non-white colonial possessions, as well as for a global peace under British lead.

Finally, and significantly, Scott also saw the resolution of the Irish question as a conclusion of the immediate purpose of two leading political parties in British politics: the Liberals and the Unionists. The Unionists were now irrelevant as the Union had been maintained for Protestant-Ulster and dissolved for the majority of Ireland. This rendered the Unionists, and thus their affiliation with the Conservatives, redundant. For Liberal Party, in Scott's view at least, the defining policy of generations had been achieved, and as such, liberalism itself needed to reorganise on the basis of principles or affiliate with others, particularly Labour. Scott acknowledged that with the resolution of the Irish question the Liberal Party in Britain could well be a victim of its own success. But he insisted that liberal principles would always survive. Indeed, despite the decline of the Liberal Party in the interwar period, Scott remained a liberal, and the *Guardian* remained a liberal paper, albeit with a complex readership. This is explored in the final chapter of this thesis.

Chapter 5

Professional, Political, and Personal Networks

This chapter illuminates the professional, political, and personal networks that influenced Scott's editorials on the Irish question from 1919 to 1922, which have been the focus of the previous three chapters of this thesis. First, this chapter explains which reporters, correspondents and outside contributors played a role in the production of news content, and thus, shaped *Guardian* editorials. Reports and articles produced by the *Guardian's* professional journalistic networks informed Scott of key developments in the conflict in Ireland and debates on Irish policy in Westminster. These also contributed to the newspaper's overall depiction of Ireland's revolution. Walsh has explored the role of reporters in Ireland extensively, highlighting their work as integral to shaping public opinion in Britain.[1] This chapter expands on this work to shed more light on the *Guardian's* journalists. It also addresses the work of correspondents based in Britain, and elsewhere, as well as those based in Ireland itself.

In addition to the reports of journalists, politicians, businessmen, academics and intellectuals all facilitated the flow of information to Scott's *Guardian*. As his political diaries and private letters demonstrate, Scott was very well connected with important officials, MPs, public figures, and other elites, and had been so since the late nineteenth century.[2] A glance at the list of attendees to the *Manchester Guardian's* centenary dinner in 1921 demonstrates how well connected C. P. Scott was both locally and nationally.[3] These personal and political connections were also, albeit in a more private and previously unseen way, vital to Scott's understanding of the Irish question. This chapter illuminates the ways in which these connections were influential to Scott's editorial commentary. As explained in the introductory chapter of this thesis, previous scholarship has addressed the significance of the role of the British press in the Irish revolution,[4] but little consideration has been given to the behind-the-

[1] Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*.
[2] JRL, GDN/133-134, Political diaries of C. P. Scott, 1911-1928.
[3] JRL, GDN/150/25, List of Attendees to the *Manchester Guardian* Centenary Dinner, 03 May 1921.
[4] Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*, and Boyce, *Englishmen and the Irish Troubles, British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy 1918-22*.

scenes interactions that impacted on public discussion. This chapter explores these interactions, which were fundamental to editorialising Irish news.

Moreover, some of Scott's contacts directly shaped the content of the *Guardian* as contributors external to the permanent staff, and had views published in the correspondence columns. In turn, Scott and the *Guardian* influenced the views of these figures. These networks of influence were not one-directional. Readership engagement with the *Guardian* via the correspondence columns, and the impact the *Guardian* had on its readership, is evaluated more in Chapter 7, but this chapter adds further depth to our understanding of the connections between the *Manchester Guardian* as a liberal newspaper, C. P. Scott as an editor and influential public figure, and the Irish question in its broader political context. Hence, this chapter develops understanding of the relationship between press, politics, and public. The chapter concludes with reflections on Scott's commitment to editorial independence as part of the *Guardian* ideology. While the *Guardian* was free from formal political ties through proprietorship, connections with elite circles, including with individuals in positions in government, were integral to Scott's everyday life, his thinking, and therefore, editorial commentary, which he considered the most important part of the newspaper.

***Guardian* Correspondents in Ireland**

After the First World War, Chief Reporter for the *Guardian*, William Haslam Mills, recruited a number of new reporters to the paper who reported the conflict in Ireland. Mills joined the *Guardian* staff in the late nineteenth century, made a significant contribution to the *Guardian's* success and reputation in the early twentieth century, and wrote the first history of the *Guardian* published in 1921 in celebration of the centenary.[5] After a brief interlude at *The Times* from 1901 to 1904, Mills returned to the *Guardian*.[6] He was made Chief Reporter in 1914, and remained so until he left the paper on 23rd August 1919.[7] George Leach, as Mills' deputy, succeeded him on 23 October 1919,[8] and remained in the position until his death in 1920, when Hedley Lockett took over.[9] Lockett had joined the *Guardian* as a reporter in

[5] Mills, *The Manchester Guardian: A Centenary of History.*
[6] Farnie, D. A., 'Mills, (William) Haslam, (1873-1930), *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Online, 2004).
[7] JRL, GDN/52, Reporters diary, 1919.
[8] JRL, GDN/52, Reporters diary, 1919.
[9] JRL, GDN/A/A33/3a, Frank Appleby to Hedley Lockett, 01 April 1920.

1903,[10] was appointed deputy to Leach on 23 October 1919,[11] and remained in the role of Chief Reporter after Leach until 1925, when he became editor of the *Manchester Guardian Weekly.*[12] Of these Chief Reporters, Leach was the only one to have worked in Ireland personally, but as Chief Reporters, all of these men had a say over which reporters did.

The reporters sent to Ireland played a key role in news gathering on Ireland during the War of Independence, the truce, and the post-Treaty period. This reporting was particularly important for Scott's commentary from late 1919 to early 1921, as it was during this period of open conflict that his editorials gave most attention to events in Ireland themselves. Throughout 1919 there was usually just one reporter in Ireland at a time, but from 1920, the conflict became increasingly violent, and military activity most significant, hence, this increased to two or three at any one time.[13] Larsen describes the role of reporting from Ireland during the War of Independence as 'an assignment of great hardship, much emotional upset, and little glory'.[14] Indeed, the job was recognised as dangerous, as elucidated in the next chapter. As such, no *Guardian* reporter was deployed unwillingly.[15]

George Leach was the main reporter to Ireland from the 1918 election until his death in 1920. He frequently moved between Belfast, Dublin and Manchester during this time, and also visited Limerick and Cork.[16] He was half Irish, from Greater Manchester, and trained to be a reporter by working first for the *Rochdale Star,* then the *Rochdale Observer*, before his move to the *Yorkshire Observer.*[17] At the turn of the twentieth century, he left the *Yorkshire Observer* to join the *Guardian's* parliamentary reporting staff in London, where he worked for eight and a half years.[18] He took up the position of Parliamentary Sub-Editor at the *Daily News* for a short time,[19] but returned to the *Guardian* as a reporter in 1910 and moved to the head

[10] 'Obituary: Mr H. Lockett', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 June 1953.
[11] JRL, GDN/52, Reporters Diary, 1919.
[12] 'Obituary: Mr H. Lockett', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 June 1953.
[13] JRL, GDN/52, and GDN/53, and GDN/54, GDN/55, Reporter's diaries, 1919-1922.
[14] Egon Larsen, *First With the Truth, Newspapermen in Action!* (London, 1968), p. 60.
[15] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 419.
[16] JRL, GDN/52, Reporters diary, 1919.
[17] 'Mr. George E. Leach', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 February 1920, p. 6.
[18] JRL, GDN/A/L19/4a, George Leach to C. P. Scott, 31 March 1919.
[19] JRL, GDN/A/L19/1, George Leach, Resignation Letter to C. P. Scott, 01 February 1909.

office in Manchester.[20] *The Times* attempted to poach him in 1911, but Leach stayed with the *Guardian* as he considered it his 'good fortune' to work for a newspaper with 'whose general views' he had 'full sympathy'. The liberal politics of the *Guardian* suited him, and he found working on the *Guardian* to be 'especially congenial'.[21] Up to 1918, Leach reported from Ireland intermittently. For example, he was in Ireland during the 'Curragh Incident' in 1912, and was sent to Ireland to investigate the Easter Rising in 1916.[22] He was promoted to Chief Reporter in 1919, after the departure of Mills.[23]

George Leach built a strong reputation in Ireland and forged valuable connections on behalf of the *Manchester Guardian* with Irish politicians and the Irish press. When Leach died of pneumonia in Dublin in 1920, the *Guardian's* Dublin Correspondent explained:

> The death of Mr. George Leach is deeply regretted in political and press quarters here. On his frequent missions as representative of the 'Manchester Guardian' he had won hosts of friends throughout Ireland, and had established his place firmly in the comradeship of the Irish Press. He was admired for his great fairness and candour, and he was generally recognised as one of the most reliable and illuminating of the investigators of Irish conditions. Few correspondents from other countries ever penetrated so far into the mystery of the Irish difficulty, and none contributed more effectively to the enlightenment of the British public upon the elements of the problem.[24]

This telegram highlights the impact and reputation Leach had in Ireland as a reporter, and his strong links with Irish pressmen, while recognising his influence on a broader understanding of developments in Ireland. Because of this, crowds gathered to see his body being returned to England for burial, including over fifty members of the Irish press. Wreaths were laid on his coffin from the Irish Press Association and 'friends' from the *Freeman's Journal,* a moderate Irish nationalist paper.[25] These links remained important for the *Guardian* after Leach's death, as also discussed in the next chapter.

[20] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, pp. 388-389.
[21] JRL, GDN/A/L19/2, George Leach to C. P. Scott, 11 January 1911.
[22] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, pp. 388-389.
[23] JRL, GDN/A/L19/7, George Leach to C. P. Scott, 05 November 1919.
[24] 'Mr. George E. Leach', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 February 1920, p. 6.
[25] 'The Late Mr. George Leach', *Manchester Guardian,* 05 Feb 1920.

Furthermore, a letter published in the liberal London based *Nation* in tribute to Leach described the impact his reporting had from 'behind the scenes'. The letter sent by 'Wayfarer', who alludes to being a journalist themselves, asked:

> How many Liberals whose opinions of the events in Ireland during the past ten years have grown out of the information communicated to the 'Manchester Guardian' by its 'special correspondent' in Dublin and Belfast have ever heard of Mr. George Leach? But when some of us who knew Leach and his work were shocked by the news of his sudden death in Dublin last week, what we chiefly regretted was not of a man whose knowledge, cool wit, and judgement had done much to compensate for us the stupidity of a world given to violence, but that the public had lost an energetic and trustworthy young servant whose name it did not even know.[26]

This letter acknowledged the influence Leach had on *Guardian* content during his time in Ireland and thus, by extension, his influence on liberal understanding and opinion. Liberals like Scott. This letter reiterates that the death of George Leach was a loss felt across the journalism profession. Neville Cardus, the *Guardian's* cricket correspondent from 1919 until 1940, described Leach as 'the finest Irish correspondent in England during the dire years of 1916-1920'.[27]

Following the death of George Leach in 1920, A. P. Wadsworth and Harry Boardman became the main reporters to Ireland.[28] Born in 1891 in Rochdale, Wadsworth trained as a reporter with the *Rochdale Observer* at aged 14, and joined the *Manchester Guardian* in 1917 upon the recommendation of Leach. From early 1920 to June 1921, Wadsworth did four tours of Ireland for the *Guardian,* and travelled between Belfast and Dublin on numerous occasions in 1920.[29] His work mainly involved investigating atrocities committed by the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries, which earned him the approval of C. P. Scott.[30] Upon his return from Ireland, Wadsworth was promoted to the *Guardian's* editorial team as a leader-writer and special

[26] Wayfarer, Letter to the Editor of *Nation,* quoted in 'The 'Nations' Tribute to the Late Mr. G. E. Leach', *Manchester Guardian,* 14 February 1920.
[27] Neville Cardus, *Autobiography* (London, 1947), p. 97.
[28] JRL, GDN/52, Reporters diary, 1919, and GDN/53, Reporters diary, 1920, and GDN/54, Reporters diary, 1921.
[29] JRL, GDN/53, Reporters diary, 1920, and GDN/54, Reporters diary, 1921.
[30] Professor T. S. Ashton, 'A. P. Wadsworth: A Great Editor's Career; Creator of the Post-War Guardian', *Manchester Guardian,* 05 November 1956.

correspondent. In 1923 he was responsible for the publication of *Guardian* supplements on the Irish Free State. He then went on to become the *Guardian's* Labour correspondent. Wadsworth succeeded W. P. Crozier as editor of the *Manchester Guardian* in 1944. In 1946, Wadsworth edited the third history of the *Guardian*.[31] Wadsworth retired as the editor of the *Manchester Guardian* in October 1956,[32] and died a few weeks later.[33]

Boardman was also relatively new to the *Guardian* staff when he became a reporter to Ireland, joining the staff on 28 July 1919 and travelling to Dublin that December.[34] Born in Macclesfield, Cheshire, Boardman joined the reporting staff under Haslam Mills after serving in the First World War. Before the war, Boardman worked for the *Manchester Courier* then the *Birmingham Post.*[35] He applied for a position at the *Guardian* in 1913,[36] but he was not hired until Haslam Mills was Chief Reporter. Boardman wrote as an anonymous contributor to the *Guardian* prior to his recruitment and is one example of how some casual contributors would go on to join the permanent *Guardian* staff.[37] Boardman was in Ireland at key points throughout the conflict, including during the campaign of reprisals in autumn 1920,[38] and just after the truce in August 1921.[39] Like Wadsworth, Boardman is also an example of a reporter to Ireland later promoted to an editorial position for the *Guardian*. In October 1925, he was promoted to deputy to editor of the *Guardian Weekly*,[40] for his 'experience and aptitudes'.[41] He then joined the editorial staff of the daily newspaper in October 1928,[42] and in 1929, was transferred to the London Office.[43] He contributed a chapter on the *Guardian's* London Office to Wadsworth's history of the *Manchester Guardian*.[44] When Boardman died in 1958 he was

[31] Wadsworth (ed.), *C. P. Scott 1846-1932,The Making of The 'Manchester Guardian'*.
[32] 'Mr. A. P. Wadsworth: A Personal Note', *Manchester Guardian*, 17 October 1956.
[33] 'A Good Journalist - A Great Editor: Memorial Service to Mr A. P. Wadsworth', *Manchester Guardian*, 08 November 1956,
[34] JRL, GDN/52, Reporters diary, 1919.
[35] 'Death of Harry Boardman, 'A Great Parliamentarian'', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 July 1958.
[36] JRL, GDN/A/B61/1, Scott to Boardman, 02 July 1913.
[37] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 418.
[38] JRL, GDN/53, Reporters diary, 1920.
[39] JRL, GDN/54, Reporters diary, 1921.
[40] JRL, GDN/A/B61/5, Harry Boardman to C. P. Scott, 16 October 1925.
[41] JRL, GDN/A/B61/4, C. P. Scott to Harry Boardman, 15 October 1925.
[42] JRL, GDN/A/B61/9, C. P. Scott, Memo, c. October 1928.
[43] 'Death of Harry Boardman, 'A Great Parliamentarian'', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 July 1958.
[44] H. Boardman, 'The 'London End'', in A. P. Wadsworth (ed.), *C. P. Scott 1846-1932, The Making of The 'Manchester Guardian'* (London, 1946), pp. 121-124.

remembered for his parliamentary reporting in London, which he carried out for over twenty years.[45] Nevertheless, he began his career as a reporter stationed in Ireland.

Frank Appleby joined the *Guardian* on 17th February 1920,[46] immediately 'taking his share in the reporting of the Irish troubles'.[47] Appleby requested a position at the *Guardian* in 1914 whilst working for the *Yorkshire Observer*, having already spent eight years there.[48] The editor of the *Observer*, A. M. Drysdale, described Appleby as 'a highly competent writer', with 'an aptitude for a great many of the subjects which a newspaper is expected to discuss with authority'.[49] Appleby secured his place at the *Guardian* five years later under Chief Reporter, Hedley Lockett, who succeeded Mills.[50] Appleby also reported from Ireland during the preliminary peace negotiations in September 1921,[51] and then during the Irish Civil War after arriving in Ireland once again in January 1922.[52] He continued reporting on Irish affairs in later decades, visiting Northern Ireland via Dublin as a special correspondent during the Second World War, for example.[53] When Appleby retired in 1950 after 30 years at the paper, he stated: 'My term with the "Guardian" under four editors has been as happy as mortal man has a right to expect… May I wish you much happiness in your task before you, too, as time will dictate, have to lay down your pen and responsibilities'.[54] Appleby considered his work a moral obligation, a responsibility to society. This view echoed the *Guardian* ideology.

In the final months of the Irish War of Independence, most of the reporting on Ireland went to Donald Boyd and A. V. Cookman.[55] Boyd joined the *Guardian* as a reporter from the *Daily Mail* in 1920.[56] Cookman joined the *Guardian* in 1919 after his demobilisation during the First

[45] 'Death of Harry Boardman, 'A Great Parliamentarian'', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 July 1958, and 'A keen and witty interpreter of Parliament: Tribute to Harry Boardman', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 July 1958, and, 'A True Interpreter of Parliament: Tribute to Harry Boardman', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 July 1958.
[46] JRL, GDN/53, Reporters diary, 1920.
[47] JRL, GDN/A/A33/8, Clipping of an obituary of Frank Appleby, *Manchester Guardian*, c. February 1957.
[48] JRL GDN/A/A33/1, Frank Appleby to C. P. Scott, 29 January 1914.
[49] JRL, GDN/A/A33/2, Copy of Testimonial by Mr. A. M. Drysdale to C. P. Scott, 07 December 1915.
[50] JRL, GDN/A/A33/3a, Frank Appleby to Hedley Lockett, 01 April 1920.
[51] JRL, GDN/54, Reporters diary, 1921.
[52] JRL, GDN/55, Reporters diary, 1922.
[53] JRL, GDN/A/A33/5, Frank Appleby to W. P. Crozier, 23 May 1941.
[54] JRL, GDN/A/A33/6, Frank Appleby to W. P. Crozier, 20 October 1950.
[55] JRL, GDN/54, Reporters diary, 1921.
[56] 'Donald Falconer Boyd', *Manchester Guardian,* 13 August 1973.

World War, before which he worked at the *Salisbury and Winchester Journal*.[57] One of his first appointments for the *Guardian* was a meeting with de Valera on 3rd June 1919,[58] and during the six years Cookman spent at the *Guardian*, 'one of his chief assignments was covering the Black-and-Tan fighting in Ireland and the civil war that followed'.[59] His first tour began just before the Black and Tan violence accelerated, arriving on 24th June 1920.[60] Both reporters continued with the majority of the reporting from Ireland following the truce.[61] Boyd in particular did the majority of the reporting around Dáil Éireann after the truce in July 1921. He demonstrated to *Guardian* readers how Sinn Féin worked as an alternative government by visiting Dáil Courts, which operated openly following the ceasefire.[62] This was a point taken up for discussion in Scott's editorials during the preliminary period of the peace negotiations. Boyd left the *Guardian* to work for the BBC in 1936, a decision that he maintained was very difficult, having worked at the *Guardian* for such a long time, 'and having so much admiration & affection for it'.[63]

H. D. Nichols also spent time in Ireland, particularly Belfast in February 1920,[64] as did Howard Spring.[65] Nichols was another Lancashire man born near Blackburn in 1889, who fought in the First World War. He started working for the *Guardian* in 1911. Reporting in Ireland occupied most of his interwar work. Nichols was promoted to news-editor in 1936 and worked on the editorial staff of the *Guardian* for nearly 44 years until his retirement.[66] Nichols contributed the chapter 'Scott's Lieutenants' to Wadsworth's history of the *MG*.[67] Howard Spring was a novelist from Cardiff, who began his journalism career with the *South Wales News*. He joined the *Guardian* from the *Yorkshire Observer* in 1913 where he remained for 15 years, bar the three he spent in France during the Great War.[68] Spring's first visit to Ireland was with George

[57] 'A. V. Cookman, Critic: Obituary', *Manchester Guardian,* 01 May 1962.
[58] JRL, GDN/52, Reporters diaries, 1919.
[59] 'A. V. Cookman, Critic: Obituary', *Manchester Guardian,* 01 May 1962.
[60] JRL, GDN/53, Reporters diary, 1920.
[61] JRL, GDN/54, Reporters diary, 1921.
[62] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 425.
[63] JRL, GDN/A/B79/7, Donald F. Boyd, Resignation Letter to W. P. Crozier, 21 March 1936.
[64] JRL, GDN/53, Reporters diary, 1920.
[65] JRL, GDN/52, Reporters diary, 1919, and JRL, GDN/55, Reporters diary, 1922.
[66] 'Mr. H. D. Nichols', *Manchester Guardian*, 07 April 1955.
[67] H. D. Nichols, 'Scott's Lieutenants', in A. P. Wadsworth (ed.), *C. P. Scott 1846-1932, The Making of The 'Manchester Guardian'* (London, 1946), pp. 114-120.
[68] 'Howard Spring, Novelist and Journalist', *Manchester Guardian,* 04 May 1965.

Leach in April 1919.[69] He also reported the Dáil debates on the Anglo-Irish Treaty, arriving in Ireland in January 1922.[70] He left the *Guardian* to join the *Evening Standard* in November 1931.[71] Ted Scott, then editor, made no attempt to keep him.[72] Charles Green, an ex-royal engineer, also worked as a reporter in Ireland having joined the Guardian in September 1919.[73] Green joined Boardman and Wadsworth in Dublin to report on reprisals in November 1920,[74] did three more tours of Ireland in 1921,[75] and returned again during the Civil War.[76] And finally, Matthew Anderson reported from Ireland, especially in 1922. Anderson was a former journalist for the *Scotsman* recruited by Scott in 1919, and was stationed in Ulster in 1922.[77]

The *Guardian* reporters were managed by W. P. Crozier, who was news-editor from 1912. Crozier was originally from Durham but came with his father, a nonconformist minister, to Lancashire as a child. After completing his undergraduate degree at Trinity College, Oxford he worked at the *Times* before joining the *Guardian* as a leader-writer in 1903.[78] He made himself known on the *Guardian* staff for his articles on the Tariff Reform controversy.[79] Crozier became the news-editor following Sidebotham's departure at the end of the First World War, and was given control over the content of the paper bar the editorial columns, which Scott dominated. Crozier also gave way to the London Office when it came to London news, but the main body of *Guardian* news fell under Crozier's jurisdiction. As Ayerst argues: 'The overall impression the *Guardian* made on its general readers, apart from the Gentlemen and Players of politics, came from his controlling hand'. Gentlemen and Players of politics were Scott's forte and the intended audience of his editorials.[80]

[69] JRL, GDN/52, Reporters diary, 1919.
[70] JRL, GDN/55, Reporters diary, 1922.
[71] JRL, GDN/A/S83/5, R. Howard Spring, Resignation Letter to Ted Scott, 24 October 1931.
[72] JRL, GDN/A/S83/6, Ted Scott to R. Howard Spring, 25 October 1931.
[73] JRL, GDN/52, Reporters diary, 1919.
[74] JRL, GDN/53, Reporters diary, 1920.
[75] JRL, GDN/54, Reporters diary, 1921.
[76] JRL, GDN/55, Reporters diary, 1922.
[77] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 429.
[78] 'Death of Mr. Crozier: Editor of the 'Manchester Guardian'', *Manchester Guardian,* 17 April 1944.
[79] Hammond, *C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian*, p. 59.
[80] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, pp. 446-447.

Still, Crozier influenced the *Guardian's* content on Ireland and thus the editorialising of the Irish question. Crozier only had this kind of power because 'the kind of paper he provided was the kind of paper Scott wanted'.[81] But he had control over how the *Guardian's* reporters were deployed, which meant he influenced news and, by extension, points of issue that were taken up in the editorial columns. Crozier was promoted to assistant editor under Scott and succeeded as editor.[82] According to the *Guardian's* own appraisal, Crozier 'regarded a serious newspaper as a great co-operative public enterprise'.[83] This idea of public duty was inherited from his predecessor, Scott, and promoted by the *Guardian* ideology established by Scott.

Under the instruction of Crozier and the Chief Reporter, all of these journalists, who are pictured in the photograph (Figure 2) overleaf, ensured that *Guardian* readers and the staff in Manchester and London were aware of what was happening in Ireland, contributing to Scott's knowledge of Anglo-Irish relations. These men were, as Larsen explains:

> a formidable array of correspondents whom Scott employed, for one or two months at a time, to cover the 'Troubles' from every possible angle and provide him with facts for his own leaders, for he believed it was his duty to put the weight of his newspaper on the scales of public opinion to make them descend on the side of decency and reason.[84]

Their work gathering news and communicating reports back to Manchester for publication were imperative for Scott's editorials.

[81] Ibid, pp. 446-447.
[82] 'Death of Mr. Crozier: Editor of the 'Manchester Guardian'', *Manchester Guardian,* 17 April 1944.
[83] 'W. P. Crozier', *Manchester Guardian*, 17 April 1944.
[84] Larsen, *First With the Truth, Newspapermen in Action!*, p. 62.

Figure 2: Guardian Reporters, 1921

John Rylands Library, GDN/140/2, Centenary Album, 1921.

The reporters deployed to Ireland for the *Manchester Guardian* were primarily Lancashire born men and former staff of other provincial papers, with less wide-reaching reputations. Most permanently resided in the local North-West region, with Anderson living in Moss Side, Manchester, Nichols at Old Trafford, Spring in Whittington, and Green in Liverpool.[85] They were 'Intellectually self-made', and most did not attend Oxford like the *Guardian* leader-writers of the early twentieth century.[86] Still, their work in Ireland influenced national questions. This significance is emblematic of the *Guardian* itself; it was a northern paper, fundamentally provincial, but indicative of broader significance, and influential as such.

[85] JRL, GDN/52, Reporters diaries, 1919.
[86] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*.

Moreover, the previous chapters have highlighted how the Irish question was for the *Guardian* a question of nation and empire, but it was also significant to the local population of Manchester, many of who were Irish.[87] Irish news was also local news, and local news occasionally reflected the national developments in Anglo-Irish politics and conflict. On 9th May 1920, for example, Boardman attended a Sinn Fein meeting at Boggart Hole Clough, a green park space in Greater Manchester. On 24th August 1920, Cookman visited Irish prisoners at Strangeways, Manchester. In November that year, Boyd attended a meeting of the Irish Self-Determination League (ISDL) at Belle Vue, Manchester. On 26 October 1920, Anderson and Green met with Sir Horace Plunkett, founder of the Irish Dominion League, at the Reform Club in Manchester.[88] The ISDL, particularly its propaganda role in Britain during the War of Independence, is discussed in the next chapter, and the connection between Plunket and the Guardian is discussed in more detail below.

The London Office

From the summer of 1921 the role of the *Guardian's* reporters in Ireland itself depleted. After the truce was called, Scott's focus turned to the peace negotiations in London. And during the Irish Civil War, Ireland 'ceased to provide a welcome outlet' for reporters based in Manchester.[89] Anderson was still stationed there in 1922,[90] but this work had much less impact on Scott's editorials, which by this point had almost completely ceased.[91] The work of the *Guardian's* London Office staff (Figure 3), on the other hand, was imperative throughout the entire period with its reporting on parliamentary proceedings and Anglo-Irish policy in to 1922.

James Bone was editor of the London Office, having joined the *Guardian* in 1912.[92] He wrote the 'London Letter' for thirty years from the Capital.[93] Harry Boardman described Bone's time as London Editor as a 'long and shining reign', and the London Letter as consciously following 'the convention of a letter from a Londoner to his Manchester Friends giving what he could

[87] Busteed, *The Irish in Manchester c. 1750-1921, Resistance, adaption and identity*.
[88] JRL, GDN/53, Reporters diary, 1920.
[89] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 450.
[90] JRL, GDN/55, Reporters diary, 1922.
[91] JRL, GDN/78a, Cuttings books of C. P. Scott's leaders, 30 July 1920 - 26 October 1922.
[92] 'Mr. James Bone', *Manchester Guardian*, 22 January 1951.
[93] 'Mr. James Bone', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 January 1946.

gather of the inner side of affairs in politics and diplomacy'.[94] Hammond described Bone (alongside Crozier) as the 'strong hands' in which C. P. Scott left his paper when he retired, who had 'earned the confidence that Scott, as a rule, gave slowly, but gave without stint when a man's quality was proved beyond all doubt'.[95] Ivor Brown, leader-writer at the London Office at this time, described his superior as having 'Pepysian qualities: ceaseless curiosity, ceaseless investigation, and ceaseless enjoyment of the news-getting job'.[96] Brown went to Ireland in 1920 to gain insight into Irish reactions to the Government of Ireland Bill.[97] Brown's investigation complimented the work of the Political and Parliamentary Correspondents whose role was to report and comment on proceedings in Westminster.

Between 1919 and 1922, the Parliamentary (Gallery) Correspondent and the Political (Lobby) Correspondent were James Drysdale and Harold Dore respectively. As the parliamentary expert, Drysdale was responsible for reporting debates on Ireland, and providing updates on speeches made on Irish policy.[98] Drysdale began his journalistic career working for the nonconformist liberal organ, the *Edinburgh Daily Review* before joining the *Yorkshire Post* in Leeds. He joined the reporting staff of the *Guardian* in 1889, moving to the London Office in 1902. Drysdale initially worked in the Lobby before committing to the Gallery in 1909. Drysdale's work was centred in the Commons; he died at his desk there in 1924.[99] Harold Dore attended his funeral in London, alongside a host of other political correspondents from Fleet Street, including J. W. McNerney of the *Irish Independent*.[100] Dore had joined the *Guardian* as Lobby Correspondent during the Great War. According to a Westminster colleague, he took politics very seriously and his liberalism was 'deep if not invariably orthodox'.[101] Dore's role gave him direct access to politicians. This was not the kind of intimate access Scott exercised when in London; nevertheless, Dore was largely responsible for providing news of the peace negotiations between Britain and Ireland from July 1921.[102]

[94] Boardman, 'The London End', p. 129.
[95] Hammond, *C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian*, p. 303.
[96] Ivor Brown, 'James Bone: journalist', *The Observer,* 25 November 1962.
[97] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 425.
[98] Ibid, p. 422.
[99] 'Mr James Drysdale: Death of Our Parliamentary Correspondent', *Manchester Guardian* , 09 April 1924.
[100] 'Mr. James Drysdale: Funeral Yesterday in London', *Manchester Guardian,* 12 April 1924.
[101] 'Our London Correspondence: Guessing the Viceroy', *Manchester Guardian,* 08 June 1943.
[102] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 428.

London sub-editor J. M. Denvir was also an important source of Irish news during this period. He began working for the *MG* in 1915.[103] Denvir helped arrange a meeting between C. P. Scott and Éamon De Valera in July 1921.[104] In 1922, he reported the destruction of the Four Courts in Dublin and the beginning of the Irish Civil War.[105] Denvir was from a family of Irish nationalists; when he was a boy he helped his father smuggle copies of the suppressed newspaper, *United Ireland*, from Liverpool to Dublin.[106] When he died in 1934, former Irish Nationalist MPs and politicians from the Irish Free State attended his funeral.[107]

Figure 3: Guardian London Office Staff, 1921



John Rylands Library, GDN/140/2, Centenary Album, 1921.

[103] JRL, GDN/A/D28/1, Telegram relating to employment of Denvir at the *MG* London office, November 1915.
[104] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 426.
[105] JRL, GDN/A/D28/4, C. P. Scott to J. M. Denvir, 13 August 1922.
[106] JRL, GDN/A/D28/6, Newspaper cutting from the *Manchester Guardian*, 14 August 1934.
[107] 'Funeral of Mr. J. M. Denvir', *Manchester Guardian*, 17 August 1934.

Special Correspondents

J. L. Hammond had significant influence on the *Guardian's* narrative on Ireland, both in 1919 and again during the Anglo-Irish peace negotiations in 1921. Hammond was born in Yorkshire in 1872 to a liberal family of home-rulers who were strong advocates of Gladstone. Alongside Scott and Hobhouse he supported the pro-Boer movement at the turn of the 20th century, objecting to Britain's imperial policy. Like Scott and many other *Guardian* journalists, Hammond also attended Oxford to study Greats. He then gained experience in press-work by writing leaders for the *Liverpool Post* and the *Spectator*.[108] Hammond was recommended to Scott by Sidney Ball, Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford, who had taught Hammond as an undergraduate. Ball described Hammond as 'an ardent Liberal'.[109] John Brunner, Liberal MP for Northwich from 1885 to 1909 and thus a colleague of Scott's, also recommended Hammond, describing him as 'well informed on most political questions'.[110] Edward Russell, editor of the *Daily Post and Mercury,* Liverpool, also recommended him as 'an excellent writer on politics'.[111] Hammond left the *Guardian* and took up the editorship of the *Speaker* in 1906.[112] He then spent most of the 1910's writing history rather than journalism, but he returned to press work in 1919 to cover the Paris Peace Conference for the *Manchester Guardian*.[113] Scott had written to him following Sidebotham's resignation the year before, asking him to return to the *Guardian* with Irish policy in mind. Scott stated: 'Questions of policy - the Irish question… seem to be of ever increasing consequence and may prove decisive. So you would not be deserting your war work'.[114] But Hammond declined the invitation, only returning to write on the peace conference.[115]

Developments at the Paris Peace Conference were significant to Scott's editorials on Ireland, and fed into a broader narrative on political self-determination in the pages of the *Guardian*. Prior to Hammond's departure to Paris at the end of November 1918, Scott stated: 'The great

[108] Stewart A. Weaver, 'Hammond, (John) Lawrence Le Breton (1872-1949)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,* (Online, 2004).
[109] JRL, GDN/A/H19/2, S. Ball to C. P. Scott, 09 January 1899.
[110] JRL, GDN/A/H19/7, John T. Brenner to C. P. Scott, 28 January 1899.
[111] JRL, GDN/A/H19/9, Edward Russell to C. P. Scott, 30 January 1899.
[112] JRL, GDN/A/H19/11, J. L. Hammond to C. P. Scott, 31 August 1906.
[113] Stewart A. Weaver, 'Hammond, (John) Lawrence Le Breton (1872-1949)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,* (Online, 2004).
[114] JRL, GDN/A/H19/13, C. P. Scott to J. L. Hammond, 10 June 1918.
[115] JRL, GDN/A/H19/14, J. L. Hammond to C. P. Scott, 18 June 1918.

issue will be the maintenance, broadly speaking, of the Wilson terms'. Scott expected that Wilsonian ideals of peace and political self-determination for small nations would be 'violently resisted by powerful interests'.[116] As explained in Chapter 2, the peace conference and Wilsonian ideas of self-determination were central to Scott's editorials on the Irish question in the first months of the War of Independence. Hammond kept Scott informed of discussions of these principles in relation to peace during the conference.[117] William Haslam Mills assisted Hammond at the peace conference initially, but returned to England in March 1919 and left the paper a few months later.[118] The last months of the Paris Peace Conference were covered by C. M. Lloyd, who went on to join the *New Statesmen* in 1921.[119]

Scott also deployed Hammond as a Special Correspondent to cover the Anglo-Irish Conference from October to December 1921, in addition to the London staff.[120] Working under the pseudonym 'Politicus', Hammond helped shape Scott's commentary on the peace negotiations. For example, on 1st December 1921, Politicus reported that negotiations were on the brink of collapse, and that 'Ulster stands in the way' of a settlement between the Irish and the English.[121] This report was followed up by two further articles entitled 'Irish Conference in Danger of Collapse',[122] and 'The Truce in Danger'.[123] This fearful reflection on the negotiations was reflected in Scott's editorials in early December 1921, when Scott's commentary revealed a tone of increasing desperation. Following the Irish Cabinet's rejection of the treaty proposal due to objections over the oath of allegiance to the British King, Scott described the situation as 'developing towards a catastrophe'.[124] His editorials also held Ulster Unionists responsible.[125]

[116] JRL, GDN/A/H19/17, C. P. Scott to J. L. Hammond, 31 October 1918.
[117] Scott to Hammond, 04 March 1919, and Scott to Hammond, 20 March 1919, and Scott to Hammond, 05 April 1919, in in Trevor Wilson (ed.), *The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott* (London, 1970), pp. 372-373.
[118] JRL, GDN/52, Reporters diary, 1919.
[119] 'Mr. C. M. Lloyd: Lecturer and Writer', *Manchester Guardian*, 25 February 1946.
[120] Ayerst, *Guardian Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 428.
[121] Politicus, 'Premier Working on The New Plan', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 December 1921.
[122] Politicus, 'Irish Conference in Danger of Collapse', *Manchester Guardian*, 02 December 1921.
[123] Politicus, 'Truce in Danger', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 December 1921.
[124] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland at the Cross Roads.', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 December 1921.
[125] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland at the Crossroads.', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 December 1921.

While Hammond was in Paris in 1919, Scott recommended he work with Walter Lippmann, the *Guardian's* New York Correspondent and secretary to the American delegation at the peace conference.[126] *The Observer* described Lippmann as a 'formidable pundit in 1918' and by his 70th birthday in 1959, was recognised as 'the unofficial king of journalism and dean of columnists'.[127] As the *Guardian's* only correspondent in America, he was responsible for reporting Irish-American feeling to Scott between 1919-1922.[128] He became a link between Scott and President Wilson while in Paris.[129] Scott emphasised the significance of Ireland in Anglo-US relations in his commentary. In September 1921, following the publication of Lloyd George's initial offer of Dominion status, Lippmann informed Scott that 'American sympathy is overwhelmingly in favour of the British offer'. Furthermore, Lippmann maintained that de Valera's 'abstract statements' would be 'extremely alien' to Americans, whereas Lloyd George had been 'extremely persuasive'.[130] This echoed Scott's commentary on the two statesmen, and Scott's criticism of De Valera for being more concerned with abstract concepts than practicalities. Moreover, Lippmann and Scott also discussed the Washington Conference. Lippmann suggested that neither he nor Scott be too hopeful for its outcome following their disappointment at the Paris Peace Conference. As acknowledged in Chapter 2, the Paris Peace Conference was ultimately a disappointment for anti-colonial nationalists and British liberals alike. As seen in Chapter 3, the armaments agreement that resulted from the Washington Conference was a point taken up in Scott's commentary in relation to the Irish question.

***Guardian* Contributors**

As well as the reporters and correspondents who were hired formally by the *Manchester Guardian*, whether for specific events like the Paris Peace Conference or on a permanent basis, informal contributors were also key to the *Guardian's* network of journalists that informed Scott's commentary. These were individuals who wrote news articles or short leaders for the *Guardian*, usually anonymously in line with newspaper's policy, and thus contributed to public knowledge and editorial opinion of the conflict. These contributors were a range of characters from freelance journalists to more prominent public figures. Literary

[126] 'Walter Lippmann', *The Observer*, 19 October 1947.
[127] 'Press Honours Lippmann', *The Observer*, 20 September 1959.
[128] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 412.
[129] JRL, GDN/A/H19/17, C. P. Scott to J. L. Hammond, 31 October 1918.
[130] JRL, GDN/A/L47B/1, Walter Lippmann to C. P. Scott, 06 September 1921.

men were particularly keen to send contributions to Scott, and Walsh has previously illuminated the trend of 'Literary Tourists' reporting from Ireland for the broader press.[131] For example, George W. Russell wrote for the *Guardian* during the War of Independence and the peace process. Russell's reporting was also referenced directly in Scott's editorials.[132] Russell was an influential literary figure and Irish nationalist, who was offered a seat in the Dáil following the ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1922. He had connections with other influential nationalists including Horace Plunkett, and was involved in the Irish Dominion League.

On 15th September 1921, Russell contacted Scott regarding an article for the *Guardian* entitled 'Ireland and the Empire at the Court of Conscience'. He stated: 'I wonder whether the article enclosed could help to make clear to the minds of your English readers the killings, deaths and humiliations which exist in Ireland at present'. He is likely referring to violence in Belfast here. Russell also maintained that little had been published in the Irish press about the 'British offer' of Dominion status that had been proposed by Lloyd George to the Irish Cabinet during the preliminary peace negotiations. This offer had been made public knowledge the week prior. Russell maintained that 'underneath the silence' there was much discussion about the 'pro's and con's' of Lloyd George's proposal, and enclosed an article that presented these arguments. Russell stated that 'the problem is not as simple as some wholehearted Sinn Féiners imagine', there was more than one side to the debate.[133] He was alluding to moderate Irish nationalists who were more open to the initial offer of dominion status. Russell informed Scott that he intended to turn the article in to a pamphlet after it was published in the *Guardian*.[134] In response to Russell's proposed article, Scott stated:

> I think your mode of approach is very useful and will help the ordinary man to understand which is the first step to agreement. I am entirely sanguine as to the ultimate issue. There is no feeling here which could be whipped up for a new terror. The public here is sick and tired of the whole business which indeed in its latest stage of word splitting has passed wholly beyond most people's comprehension.[135]

[131] Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*, pp. 154-177.
[132] C. P. Scott, 'The Irish Executions', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 March 1921.
[133] JRL, GDN/A/R71/4, George W. Russell to C. P. Scott, 15 September 1921.
[134] JRL, GDN/A/R71/3, George W. Russell to C. P. Scott, 16 September 1921.
[135] JRL, GDN/A/R71/5, C. P. Scott to George W. Russell, 19 September 1921.

Scott was referring to the disagreement around the terms of the conference between de Valera and Lloyd George during the preliminary negotiations, which Scott also criticised in his editorials. Scott's argument that the British people had had enough of violence was also reflected in the editor's commentary. Russell also contributed to the letters to the editor section under the pseudonym 'AE' during this period, as seen in Chapter 7.

Desmond MacCarthy was another literary critic of Irish descent who contributed news and views to the *Guardian*. MacCarthy organised trips to Ireland with the intention of visiting the Dáil courts to see 'the way they administer justice & the methods by which they keep order'. He also sought to visit 'some places where rebellion has blazed up most recently and the iron heel has stamped down hardest'.[136] This is a reference to sites of reprisals committed by the British forces. In August 1920, a series of articles written by MacCarthy were published in the *MG* entitled 'Ireland of To-day', which focused on violence in Ireland and a way to settlement.[137] This sort of reporting kept Scott informed of the Dáil's state-building activities and the ongoing violence in Ireland, both topics taken up for discussion in editorials. MacCarthy recognised that he and Scott shared the same views on Irish policy.[138]

As part of his journalistic duties, MacCarthy arranged to meet government ministers including Herbert Fisher, Coalition MP, who played a key role in shaping Anglo-Irish policy, to get 'an insight in to official psychology'.[139] In addition, MacCarthy arranged to meet Irish men 'of all shades of opinion' including Sir Horace Plunkett and Eamon De Valera.[140] He was later in contact with prominent republican, Erskine Childers, and made plans to meet the Dáil's Minister of Foreign Affairs in London.[141] MacCarthy was well connected with Irish nationalists and with other correspondents in Ireland,[142] and attempted to use his 'influences' in order to gain more favourable terms of work from the *Guardian*.[143] Like Boardman who contributed to the *Guardian* before joining the permanent staff, MacCarthy was eventually hired as a

[136] JRL, GDN/A/M4/8, Desmond MacCarthy to C. P. Scott, 29 June 1920.
[137] Desmond MacCarthy, 'Ireland of To-day: Poisoned Springs', *Manchester Guardian,* 12 August 1920, and 'Ireland of To-day: The First Step to a Settlement', 19 August 1920.
[138] JRL, GDN/A/M4/6, Desmond MacCarthy to C. P. Scott, 14 May 1919.
[139] JRL, GDN/A/M4/8, Desmond MacCarthy to C. P. Scott, 29 June 1920.
[140] JRL, GDN/A/M4/6, Desmond MacCarthy to C. P. Scott, 14 May 1919.
[141] JRL, GDN/A/M4/8, Desmond MacCarthy to C. P. Scott, 29 June 1920.
[142] JRL, GDN/A/M4/8, Desmond MacCarthy to C. P. Scott, 29 June 1920.
[143] JRL, GDN/A/M4/6, Desmond MacCarthy to C. P. Scott, 14 May 1919.

salaried correspondent. In June 1920 MacCarthy informed Scott that being paid piece-rate was insufficient as he needed to be in London and Ireland to report effectively, as developments in Anglo-Irish policy took place in Westminster.[144] Scott granted MacCarthy six months employment as the *Guardian's* Irish correspondent.[145]

MacCarthy, like many other freelance journalists, successfully approached the *Guardian* with their articles for publication. But some contributions were written by invitation from Scott, based on social and political currency, or perceived expertise. For example, Joseph Devlin, Irish Parliamentary Party MP, was asked to write an article for the *Guardian* in January 1919. He refused the invitation, but maintained that 'there is no paper in these islands for which I would be more delighted to write… the *Guardian* has always stood out as a friend of Ireland, and has done strikingly when it was not fashionable to be Ireland's friend'.[146] Another example can be seen in William O'Brien's correspondence with Scott, who also rejected Scott's invitation to write for the *Guardian* in 1922 on the Irish Civil War.[147] O'Brien was a prominent Irish Nationalist and Labour leader, who supported the Anglo-Irish Treaty, worked to prevent Civil War, and was elected to the Dáil in June 1922.[148]

Threads of content provided by these professional networks were reflected in the pages of the *Guardian*, and can be traced across daily issues. The immediate coverage of 'Bloody Sunday', 21st November 1920, illustrates this. On Monday the 22nd the *Guardian* published an article informing readers of the assassination of British officers in Dublin and the large-scale reprisal that followed at Croke Park that occurred the previous day.[149] The London Letter of this issue informed readers that a debate on the condition of Ireland was expected to take place Wednesday that week.[150] On 23rd November, Scott published an editorial entitled 'The Policy of Frightfulness', which clarified that 'terrible deeds are done, as in Dublin on Sunday' and censured all violence in Ireland.[151] The London Letter of the same day reported 'Views

[144] JRL, GDN/A/M4/8, Desmond MacCarthy to C. P. Scott, 29 June 1920.
[145] JRL, GDN/A/M4/9, C. P. Scott to Desmond MacCarthy, 06 July 1920.
[146] JRL, GDN/335/78, Joseph Devlin to C. P. Scott, 17 January 1919.
[147] JRL, GDN/A/O1/6, C. P. Scott to William O'Brien, 08 September 1922.
[148] Arthur Mitchell, 'O'Brien, William (1881-1968)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Online, 2004).
[149] 'Home.', *Manchester Guardian*, 22 November 1920.
[150] 'Our London Correspondence', *Manchester Guardian*, 22 November 1920.
[151] C. P. Scott, 'The Policy of Frightfulness', *Manchester Guardian*, 23 November 1920.

about the Dublin Terror' from Westminster, explaining that 'it was impossible to get any reasoned views today on the events in Dublin, so strong was the horror and anger felt in every section about the murders'.[152] On 24th November, further updates were reported from Dublin, and the London Office informed readers of a motion moved in the Commons censuring the government for violence in Ireland. The following day, the 'Home' news reported that the motion moved in the Commons was defeated by 303 to 83.[153] This article was succeeded by an editorial from Scott discussing this debate on reprisals, which had taken place 'under the impression, still fresh, of the wholesale and bloody crimes in Dublin'. Scott denounced the violence seen on 'Bloody Sunday' again, criticised the stance taken by the Chief Secretary of Ireland and supported the stance of Asquith, who led the motion of censure against the government.[154] A full write up of the debate was then provided by the Parliamentary Correspondent on page 9 of the same issue (the editorial was published on page 6), which further illuminated the position of the Chief Secretary and Asquith in particular.[155] Meanwhile, of course, the *Guardian* journalists in Ireland were continuing to contribute their own content from Ireland on the same theme.[156]

Scott's editorials were intimately linked to reports and commentary from Ireland and London. Letters to the editor in response to these content threads, and the Editor's replies to these letters, completed the narrative, and readership engagement with the *Guardian* will be the focus of the final chapter of this thesis. The *Guardian's* system of correspondents and contributors enabled news and views to flow from Ireland, Westminster, and the *Guardian's* London Office, to the office of C. P. Scott in Manchester. This network is illustrated in Figure 4.

[152] 'The London Letter', *Manchester Guardian,* 23 November 1920.
[153] 'Home.', *Manchester Guardian*, 25 November 1920.
[154] C. P. Scott, 'Force as a Remedy', *Manchester Guardian*, 25 November 1920.
[155] 'Debate in the Commons on Reprisals', *Manchester Guardian*, 25 November 1920.
[156] For example, see 'Public Funeral For Murdered Officers', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 November 1920, and 'The Murdered Officers', *Manchester Guardian*, 25 November 1920.

Figure 4: Professional networks contributing to Anglo-Irish news



Liberal Circles

As well as networks of journalists, political connections and personal relations also had a significant influence on Scott's commentary. As Scott's liberalism was central to his views on Anglo-Irish politics and conflict, his liberal networks played a particularly important role in shaping the views he expressed via the *Guardian's* editorial columns. Scott's closest friend was L. T. Hobhouse, a liberal intellectual, former journalist for the *Guardian*, leader-writer and one of 'Scott's Lieutenants'.[157] Hobhouse's thinking was central to the editor's liberal ideology. This ideology informed Scott's understanding of the Irish question, as well as broader themes such as violence and empire. It also underpinned Scott's commitment to moral ideals of the press, as explained in the introduction to this thesis. As such, Hobhouse was Scott's most important connection in relation to the intellectual development of the *Guardian* during his editorship, and thus the newspaper's coverage of the Irish question. Hobhouse also played a key role in the development of the *Guardian's* new liberal ideals more broadly. Scott and Hobhouse, along with J. A. Hobson, were the most influential individuals in the new liberal movement.[158]

Hence, although Hobhouse left the *Guardian* formally in 1903 he was still invited to contribute articles to the paper into the inter-war years and sat on the board of directors of the newspaper.[159] Scott recognised the importance of Hobhouse retaining close contact with the paper and Scott personally.[160] Hobhouse was Scott's closest confidante and Scott often sought direction from him on the key issues of the day. Scott also tasked Hobhouse with extending his own networks for the sake of the paper, for example, in 1918 Scott encouraged Hobhouse to forge links with Arthur Henderson, Leader of the Labour Party, on behalf of the *Guardian*.[161] Scott recognised that a close relationship with Labour was important for the future of liberalism.

Following the Paris Peace Conference, Scott and Hobouse expressed their disappointment with the outcomes to each other. Hobhouse maintained: 'I think if I had been Wilson I had

[157] H. D. Nichols, 'Scott's Lieutenants', p. 114.
[158] Clarke, *Lancashire and New Liberalism.*
[159] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 373.
[160] JRL, GDN/132/309, C. P. Scott to L. T. Hobhouse, 27 October 1921.
[161] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 430.

rather have put a bullet in my head than sign those terms'. Scott pointed out that 'every man I talk to whose opinion I value takes the same view'.[162] Scott and Hobhouse's view of the peace treaty was in line with that of fellow liberals. Regarding Ireland, Scott and Hobhouse critically discussed Lloyd George's policies as well as the campaign of reprisals in autumn 1920.[163] Scott wrote to Hobhouse to express his amazement at the conditions in Ireland and the response of the British government to violence. Here, Scott also noted how if reprisals were to be conducted then 'they ought to be carried out officially'.[164] In January 1921 the *Guardian's* editorial line also reflected this view, suggesting that it was better reprisals were conducted in an official capacity than without orders. This resulted in backlash from readers. Scott wrote to Hobhouse following this criticism:

> I confess I think people needn't have misunderstood it so much as they seem to have done. The whole point of it… was that authorised severities are vastly preferred to the license of a military mob, and I stick to that absolutely. But the hasty reader has assumed that we meant to justify severities. Evidently one ought to have made it plain that one did not. But for so much one imagined that one might have been given credit without explanation.[165]

Scott confided in Hobhouse regarding his views on Ireland, the content of the *Guardian,* and how this was received from the newspaper's readership.

As such, Scott kept Hobhouse updated on developments in the Anglo-Irish conference. For example, on 27th October 1921 Scott confessed that 'Ireland just now overshadows everything', that he had been summoned by the Prime Minister to London, and questioned whether it might mean a crisis in the negotiations. Scott admitted: 'It will give me a chance to find out what- if *anything*- he has in his mind in case of a breakdown of the Conference'. Scott maintained however, that there must be no return to the violence seen during the war, 'no more Black-and-Tan business'. This was echoed in Scott's editorials. Scott had heard that if war was to resume 'it is to be 'real war' with *press censorship* and everything handsome'. To which he remarked, 'In that case I shall certainly find myself in prison'.[166] Scott firmly believed

[162] L. T. Hobhouse to C. P. Scott, 12 May 1919, in Trevor Wilson (ed.), *The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott*, p. 742.
[163] JRL, GDN/132/308, C. P. Scott to L. T. Hobhouse, 15 December 1920.
[164] JRL, GDN/132/306, C. P. Scott to L. T. Hobhouse, 4 November 1920.
[165] JRL, GDN/132/309, C. P. Scott to L. T. Hobhouse, 10 January 1921.
[166] JRL, GDN/132/310, C. P. Scott to L. T. Hobhouse, 27 October 1921.

in the free reporting of Irish news. Challenges to this reporting are the focus of the next chapter. The views Scott shared with Hobhouse, and thus sought his opinion on, were subsequently expressed in the *Guardian*.

John and Violet Bryce were also integral to the liberal circles of influence in which Scott participated. John Bryce was born in Belfast, educated in Scotland, and worked for the Wallace Brothers (East India merchants) from 1875 until 1906 when he retired from imperial business to become Liberal MP for Inverness. Bryce, who decided not to seek re-election in 1918, was a long-standing supporter of Home Rule and wrote frequently to *The Times* during the War of Independence on reprisals in Ireland.[167] When his wife, Violet Bryce, was arrested under the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act in 1920,[168] an editorial in the *Manchester Guardian* maintained: 'our constitutional liberties are flushed away by the Executive in order that it may make war on its political opponents, for the arrest of Mrs. Bryce amounts to nothing else'.[169]

Moreover, Bryce wrote to C. P. Scott requesting help raising funds for the Peace with Ireland Council, as well as a list of names of 'prominent sympathisers' to the cause.[170] The Peace with Ireland Council was a cross-party political group established with the aims of gathering 'facts about what is happening in Ireland and to relieve the distress there'. It also drew up its own plans in 1921 for resolving the Irish question, which in April 1921, involved withdrawing British troops from Ireland and negotiating with Dáil Éireann.[171] Bryce explained to Scott that 'Ireland, from which I have lately returned, is unhappily as you know worse than ever'.[172] These requests were agreed by Scott, and the editor used the pages of the *Guardian* to support the cause. Requests from friends could influence the *Guardian's* pages.[173] Bryce also mentioned that he was a subscriber for delivery of the paper in Ireland and the South of England, but the paper had frequently not arrived in both cases and asked Scott to rectify the

[167] Iain F. Russell, 'Bryce, (John) Annan (1843–1923), Merchant and Politician', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Online, 2004).
[168] Ibid.
[169] 'The Arrest of Mrs. Bryce', *Manchester Guardian*, 11 November 1921.
[170] JRL, GDN/A/B108/1, John Bryce to C. P. Scott, 21 January 1921.
[171] 'Peace with Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 25 April 1921.
[172] JRL, GDN/A/B108/1, John Bryce to C. P. Scott, 21 January 1921.
[173] 'Peace With Ireland Council: An Appeal for Funds', *Manchester Guardian,* 25 April 1921.

problem. This was important for Bryce because as far as the quality press was concerned, the *Guardian* was 'practically alone, for the 'Daily News' hardly counts'. Bryce admired the paper, revealing that the *Guardian* was thought of in such high regard in liberal circles, and how for some, the liberal London press did not compare.[174] This was a compliment Scott received frequently from British liberals.

Nevertheless, after the truce, Scott prioritised protecting peace. Scott Correspondence with Violet Bryce demonstrates this. Violet wrote to Scott to ask him to support her in the publication of evidence of the actions of the forces of the Crown against the Irish. She stated: 'I feel so strongly that peace or no peace, the world ought to know what has been done by the forces of the Crown in Ireland'. She asked if Scott would publish the evidence in the *Guardian* or at least agree that they should be published. She criticised English responses to violence in Ireland, arguing that 'England has been so apathetic about what has been done here, although she has howled over what the Germans did to their prisoners'. Bryce maintained that she understood the taking of prisoners but had testimony regarding the use of torture in smaller prisons.[175] Scott replied: 'it would be unwise for us to go back on the horrible things which have gone before. We have given them the utmost publicity we could at the time and that was, I think, the best service we could render'.[176] Scott did not want to retrospectively publish on the violence of the Black and Tans. He thought the record should be fully preserved for the sake of the historian, but it was not for the consumption of the British public in 1921. Scott was not prepared to threaten the truce, and his desire to preserve it was unmistakeable in his editorial commentary. This refusal to publish this evidence, however, was in conflict with the *Guardian's* editorial commitment to exposing truth through news, but in line with Scott's liberal principles of defending the peace.

Scott's connections frequently sent contributions to the *Guardian*, or at the very least made suggestions or requests regarding content. R. B. Haldane, former Liberal MP and ally of Asquith is another example: He sent Scott a short opinion piece on 22 January 1919.[177] In

[174] JRL, GDN/A/B108/1, John Bryce to C. P. Scott, 21 January 1921.
[175] JRL, GDN/A/B108/5, Violet Bryce to C. P. Scott, 25 July 1921.
[176] JRL, GDN/133 A/B108/6a, C. P. Scott to Violet Bryce, 04 August 1921.
[177] JRL, GDN/335/79, R. B. H. Haldane to C. P. Scott, 22 January 1919.

addition, Haldane informed Scott that he had recently met with his close friend and colleague, Lord French (Lord Lieutenant of Ireland), and formed some 'fresh ideas' which he hoped to discuss with Scott at a later date.[178] No article was published under Haldane's name around this time, but it may have been published anonymously as was standard practise. Nonetheless, this demonstrates the ways in which the editor's connections played an explicit role in curating news content. The same can be said for Scott's connection with A. D. Lindsay. Lindsay was an educationalist from Glasgow and at this point, a fellow at Balliol College Oxford.[179] Scott met Lindsay for lunch in London on 14th July 1921. They discussed Lindsay's recent trip to Ireland where he met Erskine Childers and other Irish republicans. Lindsay believed de Valera was a man 'without much sense of reality and obsessed by a sort of poetic vision of an ideal Ireland'. He believed Lloyd George was keener for a settlement.[180] These views mirrored those in Scott's editorials. Lindsay sent Scott a number of articles for publication in August 1921, which highlighted Sinn Féin's perspective following the rejection of Lloyd George's initial settlement proposal. These articles were accepted.[181] On 5th September 1921 Lindsay sent another contribution, and expressed hope regarding the peace negotiations.[182] Other examples of prominent liberals weighing in their opinion with Scott and the *Guardian* include Charles Masterman, former Liberal MP, who corresponded with Scott in 1920 about 'the Terror' in Ireland.[183] Scott and Masterman discussed Lloyd George's letter to Church leaders published in the *Guardian* in 1921.[184] Masterman felt little hope about the situation in Ireland following Lloyd George's letter, a sentiment shared by Scott in his editorial commentary.[185]

It was not just British liberals that had the opportunity to influence the *Guardian's* editorial line in this way. Scott also developed close relationships with liberals on the international stage. The most prominent of these was Jan Smuts, President of the Union of South Africa. When Smuts visited England in May 1919, Scott planned to see him to discuss the outcomes

[178] JRL, GDN/335/81, R. B. H. Haldane to C. P. Scott, 28 January 1919.
[179] Gary McCulloch, 'Alexander Dunlop Lindsay, first Baron Lindsay of Birker (1979-1952)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (Online, 2004).
[180] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 14 July 1921.
[181] JRL, GDN/A/L45/1, A. D. Lindsay to C. P. Scott, 26 August 1921.
[182] JRL, GDN/A/L45/3, A. D. Lindsay to C. P. Scott, 05 September 1921.
[183] JRL, GDN/335/145, Charles Masterman to C. P. Scott, 11 November 1920.
[184] JRL, GDN/135/135, Charles Masterman to C. P. Scott, c. April 1921.
[185] C. P. Scott, 'Mr. Lloyd George's Letter.', *Manchester Guardian*, 20 April 1921.

of the peace conference.[186] Smuts admired Scott for his position on the Paris Peace Treaty, and admired him for fighting 'many of its reactionary provisions'.[187] When Smuts visited Manchester in July 1919 to receive an honorary degree, he was hosted by Scott.[188] Smuts played a significant role as a liaison during the Anglo-Irish peace negotiations, and it is during this period that his connection with Scott was most influential. On 13th July 1921, the week following the truce, Scott had lunch with Smuts in London. Smuts had been spending time with de Valera in Dublin as well as the Irish delegates in London. Smuts informed Scott that de Valera was 'a Romantic, lacking in practical sense', which made him 'difficult to deal with'. In contrast, he respected Lloyd George. Smuts criticised Ulster's 'irreconcilable attitude', maintaining that the powers granted to Northern Ireland by the Government of Ireland Act could not be retracted, and force could not be used to assure submission. Nonetheless, Smuts argued that 'the economic weapon might prove effective. Her [Northern Ireland] prosperity depended largely on the South'.[189] These views on de Valera, Lloyd George, and Ulster, were reproduced in Scott's editorials for the *MG* during the preliminary negotiations. As discussed at length in Chapter 3, Scott criticised de Valera's lack of realism, supported Lloyd George, and employed economic arguments to demonstrate why essential unity was essential for Ulster.

Smuts and Scott met again for dinner at the end of July 1921. Smuts expressed to Scott his belief that the failure of negotiations would lead to 'the perpetuation of strife[,] the ruin of Ireland, the embroiling of this country not only with America but with our own colonies'. He maintained that 'the policy of force must fail in the end'.[190] These views on the futility of force, and their detriment to Anglo-US relations and the empire, were all upheld by Scott in his commentary in the *Guardian*. Smuts reiterated how de Valera was 'a man living in a world of dreams', insisting that 'the real crux of the situation was Ulster'.[191] Smuts also thought the negotiations would be a long process. These sentiments were mirrored by the *Guardian's* editorial columns.

[186] JRL, GDN/132/281, C. P. Scott to L. T. Hobhouse, 19 May 1919.
[187] Jan Smuts to Scott, 26 June 1919, in Wilson (ed.), *The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott*, p. 374.
[188] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 05 July 1919.
[189] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 13-15 July 1921.
[190] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 28 July 1921.
[191] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 28 July 1921.

Nevertheless, it was not just liberals who had access to the *Guardian*. Sir Henry Bentinck, British peer who was elected as Conservative MP for Nottingham South in 1922, was a political connection of Scott's who also contributed to the *Guardian's* pages, whether directly through publication or indirectly through the discussion of ideas with the editor. In August 1921, following the rejection of Lloyd George's initial proposal by the Irish Cabinet, Bentinck asked Scott to publish a contribution he had written. He recognised that Scott might not entirely agree, but assured him that it was 'a perfectly legitimate opinion'. With reference to the Government of Ireland Act, Bentinck argued that there was no hope trying to persuade the Irish Cabinet of 'comfortable partnership with the British Empire'.[192] Bentinck had a letter to the editor published the following week, and thanked Scott for the 'good place' his letter on Ireland was given.[193] In April 1921, he also thanked Scott for the *Guardian's* support for the Peace with Ireland Council,[194] following the publication of the *Guardian's* appeal for funds.[195] Bentinck explained that subscriptions had begun and considered the *Manchester Guardian's* encouragement instrumental to the success of the Council. Bentinck also thanked Scott for the 'generous publicity' given to his speeches in the Commons.[196]

Moreover, Bentinck did not only contribute to the *Guardian* on Ireland during this period. In September 1921, he offered Scott his views on minorities in Czechoslovakia,[197] which Scott was keen to publish.[198] Upon sending his articles to Scott, Bentinck maintained:

> I hesitate to ask this favour and would not do so, did I not know your unfailing sympathy for the oppressed and your love of liberty and justice. Thank you once more for your kindness and consideration to me personally. I can assure you your friendliness is a great encouragement to me.[199]

Scott did not always accept articles, however, as in the case of Bentinck in 1923.[200] Just as those invited to contribute did not always accept, as illuminated in the first section of this chapter. Still, Bentinck's relationship with Scott highlights how political connections could

[192] JRL, GDN/335/142, Henry Bentinck to C. P. Scott, 30 August 1920.
[193] JRL, GDN/A/B38/1a, Henry Bentinck to C. P. Scott, 04 September 1921.
[194] JRL, GDN/A/108/1, John Annan Bryce to C. P. Scott, 21 June 1921.
[195] 'Peace With Ireland Council: An Appeal for Funds', *Manchester Guardian,* 25 April 1921.
[196] JRL, GDN/135/139, Henry Bentinck to C. P. Scott, 26 April 1921.
[197] JRL, GDN/A/B38/1a, Henry Bentinck to C. P. Scott, 04 September 1921.
[198] JRL, GDN/A/B38/2, C. P. Scott to Henry Bentinck, 7 September 1921.
[199] JRL, GDN/A/B38/1a, Henry Bentinck to C. P. Scott, 04 September 1921.
[200] JRL, GDN/A/B38/4, C. P. Scott to Henry Bentinck, 19 November 1923.

contribute articles, offer opinion, ask for favours, and feel the return of their relationship with the *Guardian* editor.

Irish Moderates

Scott also had close relationships with a number of prominent Irish moderates. These included John Dillon, whose relationship with Scott dated back to the nineteenth century.[201] Dillon was an Irish Parliamentary MP who succeeded Redmond as leader of the party but lost his seat to Eamon De Valera in the 1918 General election.[202] Dillon was Scott's closest and most important Irish nationalist connection in relation to the *Guardian's* editorial line. Despite his direct influence on Anglo-Irish politics declining after the 1918 election, he played an essential role in the *Guardian's* stance. Dillion ensured Scott was informed about Irish feeling on the ground, especially among other Irish nationalists who allied with British liberals. Dillon helped Scott to realise that Home Rule was no longer enough to satisfy nationalist Ireland. This underpinned Scott's commentary on Anglo-Irish politics throughout the Irish War of Independence. As such, Dillon, despite his lack of power in the House of Commons, had an influential position as a close friend of Britain's most respected liberal editor, and Scott could reflect the views of Irish nationalist allies because of his connection with Dillon.

As Scott did with many of his connections, he discussed the outcomes of the Paris Peace Conference with Dillon in July 1919. In these discussions Dillon spoke very highly of Jan Smuts, describing him as a 'true statesman', 'the finest personality the war has thrown up'. He described Lloyd George, however, as 'a disappointment and a failure'.[203] Dillon also blamed the government for the demise of the Irish Parliamentary Party at the 1918 General election, insisting to Scott that he would have on 'at least 50 seats' had Lloyd George dropped the proposals for Irish Conscription. Dillon insisted that the IPP would have been open to a settlement for peace, unlike Sinn Féin.[204] Scott had also objected to Irish Conscription and recognised the effect this had on Irish politics in the *Guardian*.

[201] Trinity College Dublin, MSS 6843/ 1-97, John Dillon's correspondence with C. P. Scott, 1893-1926.
[202] Alan O'Day, 'Dillon, John (1857-1927), *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Online, 2008)
[203] TCD, MSS 6843/67, John Dillon to C. P. Scott, 21 July 1919.
[204] TCD, MSS 6843/67, John Dillon to C. P. Scott, 21 July 1919.

Scott and Dillon wrote to each other frequently throughout the War of Independence. They predominantly discussed political solutions to the Irish question and the stance of Lloyd George. In a letter sent to Dillon on 2nd August 1919, Scott asked why Lloyd George had 'failed so utterly in Ireland'. [205] Scott's correspondence with Dillon highlights his increasing frustration at Lloyd George as the war progressed. Following the introduction of the Government of Ireland Bill in May 1920 Scott and Dillon discussed their concerns with the new legislation, particularly partition. Scott stated: 'Its effect, one fears, will be not to make a solution easier but to make it harder, by creating a fresh and powerful obstacle'. Scott had the same view of the Bill as Dillon and other Irish contemporaries, a view that was propagated through Scott's editorials. Scott and Dillon also discussed the prospect of Dominion status for Ireland, another topic of significance in Scott's leaders. In a letter to Dillon on 30th May 1920, Scott maintained that Sinn Féin would have to pay a price if the war was to end, and 'the price would, no doubt, be the frank acceptance of quasi-Dominion status'. Indeed, this is what the Anglo-Irish Treaty ultimately granted. In the same letter Scott stated 'I wish I knew what you think about this'.[206] He invited Dillon to share his views and have influence on Scott's own.

Scott respected Dillon's perspective, as such, he inquired as to whether Dillon would write a 'book of revelations' on Ireland, although Dillon declined to do this. Equally, Dillon respected Scott and his newspaper, professing himself to be 'a very careful student of the MG'.[207] But Dillon also on occasion challenged the content of the *Guardian* in his correspondence with Scott. For example, in the final month of war Dillon informed Scott that he did not believe the *Guardian's* editorial line or the work of Irish correspondents 'grappled the realities of the Irish situation'. Instead, 'it dealt with the question in the way best calculated to promote a real attempt at settlement'.[208] Dillon was right: Securing and maintaining a peaceful settlement was fundamental to Scott's editorial commentary. Over the course of the conflict, Scott and Dillon discussed Dominion Status for Ireland, Lloyd George, the Government of Ireland Bill, and the violence of the Black and Tans at length. Dillon frequently provided feedback to Scott on the line taken in the *Guardian's* editorial columns on these issues.[209] Upon his death in

[205] TCD, MSS 6843/69, C. P. Scott to John Dillon, 02 August 1919.
[206] TCD, MSS 6843/77, C. P. Scott to John Dillon, 30 May 1920.
[207] JRL, GDN/A/D37/7a, John Dillon to C. P. Scott, 18 June 1921.
[208] JRL, GDN/A/D37/7a, John Dillon to C. P. Scott, 18 June 1921.
[209] TCD, MSS 6843, John Dillon's correspondence with C. P. Scott, 1919-1921.

1927, the *Guardian* devoted an editorial to the old IPP leader, which maintained that 'no man ever served his own nation more loyally or steadfastly than John Dillon'.[210]

Sir Horace Plunkett was another prominent Irish politician with whom Scott had a close relationship. Plunkett's history with the Irish nationalist movement was complex. Whilst he was sympathetic to the cause in private from the late nineteenth century, he opposed the movement publicly until the First World War. However, he was appointed Chair of the Irish Convention in 1917, which sought to address the Irish question. By this point, his support of Irish nationalism was public, although he remained a moderate. Plunkett set up the Irish Dominion League in 1919 with the hope of avoiding partition in Ireland.[211] The League advocated Dominion status for a united Ireland within the British Empire. Scott's editorials explicitly supported the League.[212] Even prior to the war Plunkett recognised that he and Scott shared similar views.[213]

In the final months of war, Plunkett in his correspondence with Scott reaffirmed his objection to partition and thus to the recently passed Government of Ireland Act which would enforce it. He insisted that the British government's 'Partition Act' was 'rotten'.[214] The two men were also concerned about the impact of the Irish conflict on British-US relations. Plunkett held Scott in high regard, and was thus delighted that they shared similar views on Ireland. In May 1921 he stated: 'We moderates rejoiced that you approved our Irish settlement'.[215] Plunkett also believed in the *Guardian's* influence, and thus made suggestions regarding content. For example, he asked Scott to call upon de Valera to denounce the violence of the IRA.[216] Likewise, Scott admired Plunkett. He reassured him that they 'shall pull through the valley of death in Ireland'. Scott maintained 'you will have done more than any other Irish man to help. Nothing could make me happier than to feel that I and the paper have helped in the same cause'.[217]

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[210] 'John Dillon.', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 August 1927.
[211] Phillip Bull, 'Plunkett, Sir Horace Curzon (1854-1932)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Online* (Online, 2008).
[212] C. P. Scott, 'The Irish Dominion League', *Manchester Guardian,* 28 June 1919.
[213] JRL, GDN/335/59, Horace Plunkett to C. P. Scott, 22 November 1918.
[214] JRL, GDN/335/167, Horace Plunkett to C. P. Scott, 10 May 1921.
[215] JRL, GDN/335/167, Horace Plunkett to C. P. Scott, 10 May 1921.
[216] JRL, GDN/335/168, Horace Plunkett to C. P. Scott, 17 May 1921.
[217] National Library of Ireland, MS 49 803, 131/3, C. P. Scott to Horace Plunkett, 11th April 1921.

Sir James O'Connor was another moderate Irishman whose connection with Scott informed the editorial line throughout the War of Independence. O'Connor was Attorney General for Ireland from 1916 and Judge of the Chancery Division from 1918 to his retirement in 1924. The *Guardian* described his policy as 'Liberal and wise'.[218] In December 1919 O'Connor wrote to Scott regarding the Government of Ireland Bill, explaining that he had recommended a 26 county Southern Ireland with Dominion status to the Prime Minister. In line with Scott's view, he believed the Government of Ireland Bill would make the situation in Ireland worse. O'Connor insisted that all he wanted was peace, and thus the Bill 'must be dropped'. He provided Scott with an extensive memo that he had given to Lloyd George recommending Dominion status.[219]

As well as providing updates and opinion on government policy, O'Connor also explicitly asked Scott to use the paper to influence the Irish situation. For example, following 'Bloody Sunday' in November 1920, O'Connor asked the *Guardian* to encourage Sinn Féin leaders 'to stop this orgy of murder and mischief in this country'. In order for Scott to do this, O'Connor sought to put the editor 'in possession of the full facts'. O'Connor argued that 'No English correspondent has gone to the root of the matter'. O'Connor went on to emphasise that Ireland was indeed in a state of war from the republican perspective, and thus republicans believed the warfare being conducted in Ireland was justifiable. He then stated: 'I do think if your paper, always trusted in Ireland, would now, in a powerful article, and in light of what I say, point out the futility of the whole business, much good would be done'.[220] Scott published a number of leaders over the following week that emphasised the extent and futility of violence in Ireland.[221]

Furthermore, in January 1921 O'Connor informed Scott of a recent meeting between Lloyd George and Irish nationalist, Father O'Flanagan, who had asked for fiscal autonomy for Ireland

[218] 'Obituary: Sir James O'Connor', *Manchester Guardian*, 30 December 1921.
[219] JRL, GDN/335/124, James O'Connor to C. P. Scott, 30 December 1919.
[220] JRL, GDN/335/148, James O'Connor to C. P. Scott, 22 November 1919.
[221] For example, C. P. Scott, 'The Policy of Frightfulness', *Manchester Guardian*, 23 November 1920., and C. P. Scott, 'Force as a Remedy', *Manchester Guardian*, 25 November 1920.

in order to encourage acceptance of the Government of Ireland Bill among nationalist leaders. Lloyd George rejected this suggestion. O'Connor stated to Scott:

> I am, of course, giving you this information in confidence, and neither Father O'Flanagan's, nor my connection with it, will be stated, but I think you would be justified in saying something to the effect that the general trend of opinion in Ireland would favour a settlement of this kind, and if you called upon the Government to adopt it, it might do some good.[222]

Scott subsequently published an editorial 11 January 1921 entitled 'Peace Prospects in Ireland', which informed readers of O'Flanagan's recent visit to London, described him as the most able and eloquent leader of Sinn Féin, and argued 'more would have to be given than is given by the Government of Ireland Act. Fiscal autonomy, full control over its economic as its political life, would have to be conceded'.[223] O'Connor called on Scott to use the pages of the *Guardian* to try to influence Irish policy, and Scott complied.

O'Connor, like Scott's other connections, greatly respected the *Guardian* and recognised the newspaper's reputation. In May 1921 he told Scott: 'You and your paper have enormous influence, and upon your attitude may depend the future of the Irish settlement'.[224] The following week he stated: 'I appreciate your view. All Ireland knows what a good friend to her you have been and are'.[225] And a few days after that, O'Connor maintained:

> The standard of newspapers, generally speaking, does not seem to me very high… The distortion of arguments, actions, events… for political or other motives is, I think, one of the greatest disgraces of our complex civilisation… Your paper is a remarkable exception. It stands for truth: it speaks truth: it argues fairly.[226]

Here O'Connor confirms one of the central ideals of the *Guardian* Ideology - truth in news. In addition, O'Connor also provided feedback on the *Guardian's* editorial line on Ireland, like Dillon. In June 1920, following the publication of Scott's editorial entitled 'The Way Out in Ireland',[227] O'Connor stated: 'Bravo! 'The Way Out in Ireland' in the *MG* on Friday is the way

[222] JRL, GDN/335/152, James O'Connor to C. P. Scott, 08 January 1921.
[223] C. P. Scott, 'Peace Prospects in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 11 January 1921.
[224] JRL, GDN/A/O2/1, James O'Connor to C. P. Scott, 03 May 1921.
[225] JRL, GDN/A/O2/2, James O'Connor to C. P. Scott, 11 May 1921.
[226] JRL, GDN/135/185, James O'Connor to C. P. Scott, 15 May 1921.
[227] 'The Way Out in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 June 1920.

out & there is no other'.[228] In December 1920 O'Connor told Scott how he 'read with great pleasure the editorials in today's and yesterday's *MG*'. O'Connor suspected, however, that these editorials would be boycotted by the Irish press due to the threat of the Black and Tans.[229] This also exemplifies how the *Guardian* was indirectly affected by suppression of the press in Ireland by British authorities, as explained more in the next chapter.

Connections in Government

Finally, Scott was also in contact with a number of British government officials instrumental to Anglo-Irish policy from 1919-1922. For example, Phillip Kerr, private secretary to Lloyd George, who drafted much of the Government of Ireland Act met with Scott in March 1920. Kerr 'admitted the defects of the Bill, but said it was the best that could be got from the existing Government'. For Kerr, it would at least accomplish two things: take Ulster out of the Irish question which it had blocked for a generation and take Ireland out of English party controversies.[230] Scott also met with H. A. L Fisher, Liberal MP, in December that year. Fisher was the minister in charge of preparing the Government of Ireland Bill.[231] Lloyd George had described him as 'most popular and influential in the Cabinet, and a thorough Liberal-evidently in chief support on the Liberal side'. Scott and Fisher discussed the Irish question, in particular the ongoing hunger strikes of Irish political prisoners. Scott urged Fisher not to push the hunger strikes 'to the extremities', as this would make a settlement impossible.[232] Fisher agreed.[233] This was also a position Scott maintained in his leaders.[234]

Scott saw Fisher again in March the following year after the Government of Ireland Bill had passed. Despite being in part responsible for the Bill, Fisher regarded it as 'falling far short of the Liberal standard, but none the less judged it to be of the utmost importance that it should pass'.[235] Fisher conveyed to Scott that he did not think Sinn Féin would accept it, and this would lead the military government to continue for several years. The *Guardian* remained

[228] JRL, GDN/335/139, James O'Connor to C. P. Scott, 06 June 1920.
[229] JRL, GDN/335/150, James O'Connor to C. P. Scott, 01 December 1920.
[230] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 16 - 17 March 1920.
[231] TCD, MSS 6843/91, C. P. Scott to John Dillon, 10 February 1925.
[232] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 30 November - 01 December 1919.
[233] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 16 - 17 March 1920.
[234] C. P. Scott, 'The Hunger Strikes', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 November 1920.
[235] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 16 - 17 March 1920.

against the 'Partition Act' throughout 1920 and following its implementation in 1921, nonetheless, these discussions with policy-makers gave Scott insight in to the mind-set of government and developments in policy. Following the signing of the Treaty, Fisher and Scott wrote to each other about Lloyd George and Ireland. Fisher believed Lloyd George was poisoned by Downing Street and Whitehall over the previous years, but 'when he has been dipped in an atmospheric bath of free air, can be trusted to do the right things!' Still, while Fisher maintained that the Irish question had been difficult, in 1922 he considered it 'childs play' compared to anti-colonial nationalism in India.[236] But Scott, as discussed in the previous chapter, saw the Anglo-Irish Treaty as a potential blueprint for resolving the India question as well.

After the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, Lionel Curtis, a civil servant who was secretary to the Anglo-Irish Conference, was also in contact with Scott. Curtis advocated Dominion status for Ireland, and recognised the *Guardian* as having done 'as much as any English paper could to secure the approval of the Treaty'. Thus, he believed that 'people who are especially interested in Irish affairs are, therefore, apt to turn to accurate information and sound advice'.[237] However, Curtis took issue with a number of reports published from *Guardian* correspondents in Ireland and recent editorial commentary. For example, with regard to the *Guardian's* reporting of the transfer of the RIC to the provisional government, Curtis maintained: if 'the R. I. C in their present temper took note of the statement of your correspondent, the difficulties of the Government might be greatly increased'. He also took issue with an article by 'Politcus' (Hammond). Curtis insisted he was informing Scott about these points of contention so that Scott could 'test the work' of his correspondents.[238] Curtis sought to influence the work of *Guardian* staff and thus *Guardian* content.

Furthermore, Curtis stated: 'I am sure you will agree with me that our best hope for the future lies in sticking to the terms of the Treaty' - Indeed, this was the line asserted in Scott's editorials. He proceeded:

[236] JRL, GDN/336/4, Herbert Fisher to C. P. Scott, 30 January 1922.
[237] JRL, GDN/A/C115/1, Lionel Curtis to C. P. Scott, 12 January 1921.
[238] JRL, GDN/A/C115/1, Lionel Curtis to C. P. Scott, 12 January 1921.

> I do not know any other editor in this country to whom I should write with the same frankness. The *Manchester Guardian* is the last remnant of British journalism as I knew it in my youth, and one hates to see its columns filled at a critical moment with things that are untrue and unwise.

The multi-directional nature of Scott's networks of influence is evident here. Curtis requested that in any subsequent instructions to Scott's Irish correspondents, he be kept anonymous.[239] Scott's political connection could have influence on the *Guardian's* journalistic networks, and the influence exercised here was, as often the case, done so covertly behind the scenes.

Finally, David Lloyd George was perhaps the most important connection Scott had in Westminster in 1919, and one of Scott's most influential connections throughout his editorship. Lloyd George's connection with the *Guardian* initially began with him writing contributions for the Welsh edition of the newspaper. He wrote 140 paragraphs in 1893, earning over £57 in the process.[240] This connection developed into a longstanding relationship with Scott, fostered during their time together in parliament, their role in the development of new liberal politics, and their unity on the key political questions of the early twentieth century. These included the conflict in South Africa and House of Lords reform. As Clarke explains, Scott and Lloyd George were "old pro-Boer allies', and from the 1910s, it was "into Lloyd George's orbit that Scott was increasingly drawn."[241] Indeed, prior to the First World War, Scott also saw Lloyd George as the one to deliver on the question of Women's Suffrage, which the editor advocated. As Clarke elucidates, "It was Lloyd George's willingness, and above all his ability, to act over the whole range of the *Guardian's* concerns that commanded Scott's allegiance and made him tolerant for the time being of certain shortcomings."[242] This relationship between the two men was not, therefore, unconditional. During the Irish War of Independence this was made very clear. As explained in chapters 2 and 3, Scott did not hold back on his criticism of the Prime Minister, but when the peace negotiations began, Lloyd George was favoured once again. This relationship thus fluctuated, and as such, so did the significance of this connection for the *Guardian*.

[239] JRL, GDN/A/C115/1, Lionel Curtis to C. P. Scott, 12 January 1921.
[240] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, pp. 290-293.
[241] Clarke, *Lancashire and New Liberalism*, p. 195.
[242] Ibid.

In 1919, Scott corresponded with Lloyd George regularly and they would often meet when the editor was in London. On some occasions Scott would travel to London at the request of the Prime Minister.[243] During their meetings they discussed high-profile events, government policy, and coverage on Lloyd George and his government in the *Manchester Guardian*. For example, when they breakfasted on 22 February 1919 they discussed the peace conference and the attitudes of delegates including Woodrow Wilson, whom George viewed as 'a little too stiff'.[244] They also talked about the *Guardian's* recent criticism of the selection of Lloyd George as President of the Manchester Reform Club. The Prime Minister told Scott, 'You can say what you like. I shan't resent it'.[245]

Lloyd George respected Scott and his paper, even as it became increasingly critical of the government as the War of Independence progressed. In August 1919, Lloyd George was reported saying of the *Guardian*: 'It is very strange; it hasn't got a large circulation; yet it's the only paper that counts'. Jan Smuts, President of the Union of South Africa informed Scott that Lloyd George 'doesn't mind what others say, but when you attack him he squirms'.[246] Scott and Lloyd George discussed Irish policy together on a number of occasions in the first year of war, and Scott even assisted Lloyd George on composing official correspondence on Irish business. Scott maintained in his discussions with the Prime Minister that some form of Dominion status for Ireland might be the most appropriate settlement, as advocated in the editorials of the *Guardian*.[247]

From the summer of 1919 however, Scott's relationship with Lloyd George became strained due to the British government's approach to the Irish question. This rift coincided with an upsurge in criticism in the *Guardian* of Lloyd George's Irish policy. This critique was maintained in Scott's correspondence with other connections, particularly fellow liberals, as noted above. Another example of this is seen in a letter to Scott sent by prominent liberal politician, Harold Spender, which stated:

[243] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 21-22 February 1919.
[244] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 21-22 February 1919.
[245] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 21-22 February 1919.
[246] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 05 July 1919.
[247] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 21-22 February 1919.

> I had a long talk with the Prime Minister on Ireland, and found him entirely hopeless. He said that Ireland always had hated England and always would. He could easily govern Ireland with the sword … He seemed to me to have surrendered to the most extreme Anti-Irish hatred.[248]

In correspondence with Lord Loreburn, former Liberal MP and Lord Chancellor for the Cambell-Bannerman ministry, Scott suggested that Asquith take Lloyd George's place.[249] Loreburn agreed a change in government was needed, but did not think Asquith was up to the job.[250] Despite political disagreements with Lloyd George, Scott maintained a friendship with him throughout 1919, going to his house for dinner on 30th November with the American ambassador and his wife,[251] and meeting again on 20th December, two days prior to the first reading of the Government of Ireland Bill. Scott noted after this second meeting that the Prime Minister was mid-way through writing his speech regarding the Bill and remarked, 'I never saw him so gloomy'. Scott recalled: 'Everybody in Ireland he said would be against him and unless he got support in England he could not go on'.[252] But that support would not come from Scott or the *Guardian*, which remained critical of the Prime Minister's Irish policy.

Scott did not go to London much over 1920, but he still talked with other ministers about the situation in Ireland and met with Lloyd George on a number of occasions. On 17th March, Lloyd George remarked to Scott, 'Come and see me sometimes & correct my faults… Or help my best self', demonstrating the respect the Prime Minister had for the editor, and the desirability of Scott's opinion.[253] Scott visited again on 10th April 1920, and discussed the Government of Ireland Bill. According to Scott, Lloyd George was 'emphatic that the Bill must be put through'.[254] But as police violence escalated in Ireland in spring 1920 under the government's policy of repression, Scott distanced himself from the Prime Minister. When they met on 4th June 1920 Scott had heard that the Prime Minister 'was casting about for a new Irish policy' but found him still 'entirely occupied with plans for repression'. It was clear

[248] Harold Spender to C. P. Scott, 23 August 1919, in Wilson (ed.), *The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott*, p. 377.
[249] C. P. Scott to Lord Loreburn, 02 October 1919, in Wilson (ed.), *The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott*, p. 379.
[250] Lord Loreburn to C. P. Scott, 03 September 1919 and 02 October 919, in Wilson (ed.), *The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott,* p. 378.
[251] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 30 November - 01 December 1919.
[252] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 20 December 1919.
[253] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 16 - 17 March 1920.
[254] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 10 April 1920.

to Scott that Lloyd George wanted stronger measures against Irish nationalists, whom the Prime Minister believed were committing crimes without recourse. Lloyd George outlined to Scott his proposals for a special tribunal to try murder cases without a jury, to which Scott asked: 'What about evidence?... Would the trials be public?... Would conviction follow only on evidence which was definite and unimpeachable?' Lloyd George told Scott that the government had evidence, and that 'the first need was to break up the murder gang'.[255] This was their last meeting for the year. These special tribunals were introduced by the ROIA in August 1920, and were immediately censured by the *Guardian*.

The *Guardian's* editorial line remained fiercely critical of Lloyd George and the government's repressive policy in Ireland into 1921. Scott and Lloyd George did not reconcile with each other until the government changed its approach in the final months of the war. On 3rd May, two months prior to the truce, Lloyd George wrote to Scott. He congratulated the editor on the upcoming centenary of the *Manchester Guardian* and expressed admiration for both C. P. Scott and his paper.[256] In response to this letter, Scott replied: 'I wish events had not so utterly divided us. Your Irish policy breaks my heart…Forgive me for speaking so. I could not do it if I had not loved and admired you'.[257] Following the truce, Lloyd George wrote to Scott recognising the issue that had divided them and seeking to resume their friendship. Lloyd George stated:

> You and I have been so hopelessly at variance of late over Irish affairs that I was afraid it would be difficult for us to meet without coming to blows! But now that the atmosphere is more serene I should very much like to see you once more…[258]

Scott subsequently resumed meeting Lloyd George again on a regular basis, and this returned fondness was reflected in Scott's editorials. As seen in Chapter 3, Scott praised George throughout the peace negotiations. Meanwhile, he criticised de Valera. Scott met with de Valera in July 1921 upon Lloyd George's request then conveyed his thoughts on the Irish republican leader to the Prime Minister. Scott believed that de Valera had a 'closed-mind',

[255] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 04 June 1920.
[256] Lloyd George to C. P. Scott, 03 May 1921, in J. L. Hammond, *C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian* (New York, 1934), p. 279.
[257] C. P. Scott to Lloyd George, 04 May 1921, in J. L. Hammond, *C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian* (New York, 1934), p. 279.
[258] JRL, GDN/335/182, Lloyd George to C. P. Scott, 23 July 1921.

which posed an obstacle to peace that could not be overcome, only worked around. The editor maintained that a settlement with de Valera could only be reached by 'conceding everything of theoretic assumption for argument's sake and then getting on to the practical problems'.[259] This stance, which argued both sides focus on the practical, was maintained in Scott's editorials throughout the peace negotiations, although, more by way of compromise was expected from the Irish delegates.

Scott's relationship with Lloyd George meant that during the Anglo-Irish Conference, the editor became a liaison between the British and Irish delegation. Hammond, who was working for the *Guardian* as special correspondent to the Anglo-Irish conference at this time, explained in his biography of Scott that the editor was 'almost the only man who held the confidence of both parties, [and] was often able to smooth away difficulties and to dispel misunderstandings'.[260] In late October 1921 Scott travelled to London at Lloyd George's request, where he informed the editor of a debate called by the government to gain a mandate on their Irish policy.[261] Lloyd George recognised that much rested on his own statement to the House of Commons. This debate was subsequently editorialised by Scott, and Lloyd George's statement to the House was praised.[262]

Lloyd George described the Irish delegation to Scott as, on the whole, 'very difficult', although Griffith was 'quite reasonable'. The Prime Minister maintained that if he could not secure allegiance to the Crown by the Irish delegates at the conference then war would resume, and that he would send 100,000 additional recruits to Ireland if needed. Scott maintained that he and the *Guardian* would ensure public opinion would not tolerate a renewal of violence. Indeed, Scott's editorials devoted swathes of column space to persuasive arguments against the renewal of war and questioned whether such vast numbers of volunteers could be found to fight in Ireland. Thus, Lloyd George suggested Scott to meet Griffith and Collins to try to aid the negotiations.[263]

259 JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 28 July 1921.
[260] Hammond, *C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian*.
[261] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 28th-29 October 1921.
[262] C. P. Scott, 'The Debate.', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 November 1921.
[263] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 28-29 October 1921.

Scott met with Michael Collins on 29th October 1921. The meeting was organised through Desmond Fitzgerald, now co-Secretary to the Irish delegation at the peace conference and former Dáil Minister for Propaganda. They met at Cadogan Gardens near Westminster where they talked for just over an hour and discussed the important subject of allegiance to the British Crown. Scott explained:

> I pressed him on the question of allegiance, but he was for giving nothing away. At last I had to point out that if he had come to negotiate on the principle of claiming everything and conceding nothing he might have spared himself the trouble of coming and might just as well pack up at once. Then he became more moderate and evolved a constructive policy of his own. Why not have a linking of constitutions, each country swearing allegiance to its own constitution. But where I asked would the King come in? 'Oh! we'll find room for the King' he said.[264]

The meeting concluded with Scott urging Collins to consider the demands of English politics in the peace process, as well as the Irish perspective. From this meeting, Scott considered Collins 'a straightforward and quite agreeable savage',[265] a reflection that emerged in his editorials on Collins following the signing of the Treaty, and a glimmer of insight into Scott's understanding of Irish character, as illuminated in Chapter 4. They met again in December 1921 when peace negotiations seemed on the brink of collapse. Collins confirmed to Scott that he thought negotiations would breakdown. Anxiety over a renewal of war emerged in Scott's editorials published after this meeting.[266]

These meetings gave Scott direct insight into the mind-set of republican leaders. They also provided Irish republicans with an opportunity to express their own views and feed into Scott's thinking on the ongoing negotiations, and thus the writing of his editorials. As Boyce explains, however, 'Neither Denvir nor these very occasional meetings with Sinn Féin Ministers could take the place of Scott's old intimacy with Nationalist leaders'.[267] Boyce is referring to Scott's long-standing friendship with John Dillon, the final leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party. Nevertheless, Scott's connections still influenced Scott's thinking, and

[264] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 28 October 1921.
[265] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 28 October 1921
[266] C. P. Scott, 'What Next in Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 December 1921, and 'Ireland at the Crossroads.', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 December 1921.
[267] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 28 October 1921.

thus the *Guardian's* editorial line during this period. Scott's influence was also exerted in return. Following the meeting, Lloyd George reported to Scott that a 'considerable advance' was made regarding this question of allegiance to the King.[268]

The Anglo-Irish Peace Conference lasted another six weeks after Scott's meetings with Irish nationalist leaders upon Lloyd George's suggestion, and Scott met with Lloyd George on a number of occasions, especially in the final week. On 2nd December he travelled to London at Hammond's request, 'who reported the situation almost desperate'. As elucidated above, Hammond believed negotiations were on the brink of collapse and anxiety over this was then expressed in Scott's editorials. Hammond hoped Scott would see Lloyd George, which he did. Scott described Lloyd George as 'looking tired', having been up all night with the Irish delegation. The terms of peace had just been rejected by Dáil Éireann based on the oath to the King. Lloyd George maintained: 'If there was no settlement there must be coercion'. Scott questioned him again on where the government would find the men needed for a return to war, as conscription would not be accepted. This view on the practicalities of the renewal of fighting was discussed in Scott's editorials on 5th and 6th of December 1921.[269] Significantly, during this meeting, Lloyd George 'begged' Scott 'not to encourage Sinn Féin to stand out on the question of allegiance'.[270] Scott had already sought to sway Collins on the issue during their October meeting. Still, Lloyd George directly sought to influence the *Guardian's* editorial line. Indeed, Scott argued in his commentary that allegiance to the Crown was an abstraction that should not prevent the Irish delegates from agreeing to a settlement. Scott's sentiments on the practicalities of war and on Irish allegiance were also confirmed by former Conservative MP, Lord Buckmaster, and Liberal Party Leader Herbert Asquith, in private meetings with Scott.[271]

Scott spent the final hours of the peace negotiations with the Prime Minister, and met him again for lunch the following day when the Anglo-Irish Treaty had been signed. Lloyd George informed Scott in detail of how he convinced Arthur Griffith to sign. Scott congratulated his

[268] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 29 October 1921.
[269] C. P. Scott, 'What Next in Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 December 1921, and 'Ireland at the Crossroads.', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 December 1921.
[270] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 02 December 1921.
[271] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 03-04 December 1921.

success, to which the Prime Minister responded: 'we have succeeded at last in the task we have both worked at for more than thirty years'.[272] Lloyd George, like Scott, believed the Irish question was solved, after careers spent devoted to it.

Conclusion

The *Manchester Guardian's* editorial line as championed by Scott's leaders was influenced by the news and views from Ireland, London and beyond, transmitted by the *Guardian's* networks of journalists, and by Scott's personal and political connections. These networks ensured that Scott remained updated on events in the conflict and on political developments, and thus able to make informed comment. Points made by correspondents would be taken up for comment in the editorial columns, and the work of correspondents and contributors thus laid the foundations for Scott's leading articles. These correspondents and contributors directly influenced the *Guardian's* editorial line.

The personal and political connections of Scott contributed to the editor's thinking on the Irish question. At the very least, these connections helped reinforce Scott's existing views, which he communicated to *Guardian* readers via the editorial columns. These networks of influence were bi-directional, and it is clear the *Manchester Guardian* was considered a highly influential force, respected by moderates of different political persuasions. For the demographic it served, the *Guardian's* editorial line offered an important contribution to public discussion on Anglo-Irish politics. Furthermore, the line between professional or journalistic networks and personal and political relationships is difficult to draw, as Scott's political connections played a key role in the curation of *Guardian* content. This content also contributed to the editorial line.

Scott's connections, as highlighted in this chapter, were overwhelmingly men. This reflected much of formal high politics, policymaking, and journalism at this time. But it should be noted here that Scott had meaningful connections with women that also contributed to his thinking, influenced his liberal politics, and shaped the content of the newspaper. Scott's close friendship with Millicent Fawcett, the famous suffragist, is one relationship of particular

[272] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 05 December 1921.

importance. Scott was committed to the cause of women's suffrage, and this, alongside the campaign for House of Lords Reform, were the only topics taken up by Scott in his editorials, with fervour and frequency close to his preoccupation with the Irish question.[273] Fawcett sat next to Scott during the *Guardian's* centenary dinner at the Midland Hotel in Manchester in 1921.[274]

Moreover, women's suffrage campaigner and editor of *Votes for Women*, Evelyn Sharp, was a regular contributor for the *Guardian*. She was also one of several prominent women who helped to expose the violence of the Black and Tans and used the press as a tool to do this. Although, unlike the men highlighted above who also contributed to Scott's knowledge of events in Ireland, evidence of Sharp's investigations in Ireland is absent from the Guardian Archive.[275] Nevertheless, she was one of a collective of women who played an important role in connecting Scott and the *Guardian* with events in Ireland. These women, who were predominantly Irish nationalists, are discussed more in the following two chapters.

While Scott may have formally upheld editorial independence by sidestepping Westminster as part of the *Guardian* ideology, the informal and covert influences of politicians and other important public figures can be traced in the *Guardian's* pages. Influences on news-content were multi-faceted and the way in which these influences played out in the different areas of the newspaper was complex. It is important, therefore, not to see Scott's editorials on Ireland as isolated items of newspaper content; they were inherently linked to the rest of the paper through multi-directional influences inherent to the *Guardian's* news gathering and editorialising processes.

[273] JRL, GDN/75-78a, Cuttings books of C. P. Scott's leaders, 1898-1931.
[274] JRL, GDN/150/25, List of Attendees to the *Manchester Guardian* Centenary Dinner, 03 May 1921.
[275] JRL, GDN/A/S38/24, Cutting of obituary for 'Mrs. Evelyn Nevinson', published in the *Manchester Guardian*, 20 June 1955.

Chapter 6

Censorship and Propaganda

The British government and Dáil Éireann recognised the important role of the press in influencing public opinion in Britain in relation to developments in Anglo-Irish politics, particularly during the years of conflict between 1919 and 1921.[1] This chapter considers how press censorship and propaganda policies in Ireland and Britain during the War of Independence and post-truce period impacted on the *Guardian*. Attempts to censor or suppress news from Ireland, as well as propaganda campaigns on both sides of the conflict, impacted on the news gathering environment and the broader press dialogue in which the *Guardian* worked and participated. This chapter sheds light on the obstacles faced by *Guardian* journalists and contributors reporting on Ireland, as well as the broader milieu of misinformation that the interested public had to navigate during the years 1919-1922. It also demonstrates the *Guardian's* views on these policies, which have hitherto remained unexplored. First the chapter covers press censorship and suppression by the British Government in Ireland, then it discusses the role of Irish republican propaganda, and finally it addresses 'Official News' and the British propaganda campaign. Illuminating this broader news climate provides a more complete understanding of the *Guardian's* coverage of Ireland at this time, and the atmosphere in which Scott's own commentary was being produced and published.

Although studies have been made of the nature of press censorship and propaganda efforts from both sides during the Irish War of Independence,[2] what this meant for the editorial line of individual newspapers in Britain has been neglected, as has discussion of the press in the post-truce period. This chapter seeks to address this oversight for the case of the *Guardian*. It also challenges previous scholarship, which maintains that press policies in Ireland had limited impact on British newspapers, by demonstrating the link between press policies aimed at the Irish press, and the *Guardian's* news gathering and reporting.

[1] Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*, p. 185.
[2] Boyce, *Englishmen and the Irish Troubles*, and Murphy, *The Origins & Organisation of British Propaganda in Ireland 1920*, and Ian Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, and Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*.

Press Censorship and Suppression in Ireland

The Irish administration used press censorship and suppression policies throughout the War of Independence in an attempt to limit Dáil Éireann's publicity in Ireland, Britain, and on the international stage. Official censorship was already in effect in Ireland from the beginning of the conflict due to the Defence of the Realm Act, which was still in place following the First World War.[3] This legislation had been enacted in both Britain and Ireland during WWI, and authorised the censorship of the British and Irish press via the Press Bureau. The Press Bureau had used DORA to try and stifle reports from Ireland in the wake of the Easter Rising in 1916.[4] DORA enabled official censorship of the Irish press in to 1919, with the specific aim of curtailing radical Irish nationalism.[5] As the *Guardian* reported in January 1919, it was 'the view of important officials… that the present political situation in Ireland now demands, if anything, a tightening of the censorship'.[6] The censorship was maintained under Lord Decies, who had been the official censor for Ireland for the last two and a half years.[7] Reports of the first meeting of Dáil Éireann, the boycott of the RIC, criticisms of DORA, and the treatment of Irish prisoners, were all subjected to censorship in Ireland in the first months of the war.[8]

Unsurprisingly, the Irish press were hostile to this policy, with the *Freeman's Journal* arguing that it denied the Irish 'elementary rights'. The majority of the British press also disagreed with the policy. *The Times* criticised censorship in editorials that were reprinted in the Irish press.[9] The *Guardian* also editorialised the issue of Irish censorship. The *Guardian* opposed the use of DORA to enforce censorship by highlighting the impracticalities of this policy, as well as the moral implications of suppressing news. The *Guardian* explained that 'the character of the situation in Ireland cannot be suppressed nor kept from the light. We are too close to Ireland to make an effectual censorship practicable'.[10] The *MG* also described any grounds for censorship by the British authorities as 'insufficient', and the policy itself as 'futile, wrong, and dangerous'.[11] The *Guardian* criticised the British government for trying to 'push

[3] 'Irish Press Censor', An Offer of Resignation', *Manchester Guardian,* 24 January 1919.
[4] Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*, p. 120.
[5] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, pp. 5-6.
[6] 'Government and Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 January 1919.
[7] 'Irish Press Censor: An Offer of Resignation', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 January 1919.
[8] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, p. 6.
[9] Ibid, p. 8.
[10] 'The Censorship', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 April 1919.
[11] 'The Irish Censorship', *Manchester Guardian*, 28 March 1919.

the Irish skeleton back into the cupboard', arguing that it would not solve the Irish question by attempting to hide it. The *Guardian* believed that 'public opinion is entitled to be thoroughly enlightened on the course of events and the trend of feeling and opinion throughout Ireland'.[12] Here the *Guardian* expressed its commitment to ideals of truth in news and the newspaper as a medium for public discussion, as part of the *Guardian* ideology. The *Guardian* had criticised censorship during the First World War (although it had complied) and was strictly against its use in Ireland in 1919.

In April 1919 the Press Bureau in London closed and Lord Decies retired, officially signalling the end of wartime censorship in England. The *Guardian* maintained: 'No one will mourn its death, except perhaps its staff'.[13] However, the *Guardian* also recognised that the most obstructive elements of the censorship in Britain would remain unchanged following the closure of the Bureau. Indeed, its closure did not signal the end of censorship in Ireland. The *Guardian* reported that 'the censorship on cables in code still maintained; the postal censor is at work, and so far as we know telegrams from abroad are still subject to censorship.[14] It was particularly concerned about the censorship of telegrams to Britain from overseas as this would hinder the news gathering, reporting, and editorialising of all issues outside of England, Scotland and Wales: This included the Irish question. DORA was central to this. The *Guardian* described DORA as 'ubiquitous and threatening', arguing that not only should censorship be repealed, but the legislation that facilitated press suppression be dropped. It maintained: 'the time has come to abolish the censorship root and branch and let us everywhere have light'.[15] Nevertheless, DORA remained, and official press censorship in Ireland lasted another four months 'on the ground that the conditions in Ireland required it'.[16] The Press Censor's Office in Dublin eventually closed on 31st August 1919.

Formal censorship of the Irish press was replaced by a policy of press suppression. An official censor removed or modified reports in newspapers; press suppression was a policy of bringing legal action against Irish newspapers and their staff by the British authorities using

[12] 'The Irish Censorship', *Manchester Guardian*, 28 March 1919.
[13] 'The Censorship', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 April 1919.
[14] 'The Press Bureau', *Manchester Guardian*, 02 May 1919.
[15] 'The Censorship', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 April 1919.
[16] 'Irish Censorship to Go', *Manchester Guardian,* 29 August 1919.

DORA. If successful, it prevented newspapers from publishing by shutting down offices, arresting staff, and dismantling machinery. Even the threat of legal action was political intimidation. On 1st September 1919, the *Guardian's* Irish Correspondent in Dublin reported:

> The Irish Censorship has yielded to the protests of the 'Manchester Guardian' and its Liberal contemporaries. But the Irish newspapers do not exhibit many signs of rejoicing. They are evidently apprehensive lest the blue pencil of the Censor should have given place merely to the dislocating machines of the General Officer Commanding.[17]

This report gave credit to the *Guardian* and its liberal networks for helping to end the official censorship, indicative of the newspaper's perceived political currency in Britain and Ireland, but it also recognised that the end of the formal censor only meant the beginning of a different kind of news management policy.

September 1919 saw a mass suppression of Irish newspapers under this policy following the publication of the prospectus of Dáil Éireann's loan fund. This was a campaign for donations from the Irish public to the Dáil to support the running of the republican administration. The *Guardian* reported how the *Cork Examiner*, which it considered 'the most influential paper in the South of Ireland', as well as six Dublin weeklies, had been suppressed by Crown Forces. It described how 'Police and military visited the printing works, seized all the copies found on the premises, broke up the type, and in some cases dismantled the machinery'.[18] At least forty-two other Irish national and provincial newspapers were suppressed for printing the Dáil fund prospectus.[19] Again, the *Guardian* recognised the role of DORA in this 'Suppression Week'. It explained: 'A few weeks ago a paper like the 'Cork Examiner' would have submitted the tainted matter to the censor, and would have abided by his decision'. The removal of the press censor meant that here was 'no oracle to consult now, but DORA is still in full operation', and for the *MG*, DORA represented censorship 'in its stiffest and crudest form'.[20]

[17] 'Passing of the Irish Censorship: How Sinn Fein was Helped On', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 September 1919.
[18] 'Suppression Week in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 22 September 1919.
[19] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, pp. 8-9.
[20] 'Suppression Week in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 22 September 1919.

In December 1919 the *Freeman's Journal,* an organ of constitutional nationalism, was suppressed for criticising the British administration in Ireland, Dublin Castle, and its proposal to recruit an auxiliary force to the RIC. This force would become known as the Black and Tans. A dispatch from the *Guardian's* correspondent in Dublin was sent at midnight on 14th December explaining how, under the orders of Brigadier General Lambert, 'the plant and type would be seized' as well as all copies of the next issue, due to offences against DORA.[21] The suppression of the *Freeman's Journal* instigated a debate in the House of Commons,[22] attracted criticism from the English press, and was censured by liberal contemporaries. On 24th December, the Manchester Liberal Federation passed a resolution protesting against 'the unwarranted interference with the freedom of the press by military authority as in the case of the "Freeman's Journal"'.[23] The editor of the *Freeman's* immediately sought to take legal action to have the ban lifted,[24] but the suppression was upheld for six weeks.[25] The *Daily News*, a British liberal paper based in London, gave the *Freeman's Journal* two of its own columns during the ban in an act of solidarity, and without consequence. The policy of suppression in Ireland, as Kenneally explains, revealed a 'dichotomy between the freedom of the press in Ireland and England, both, ultimately, being parts of the same jurisdiction'. Even the censor who replaced Lord Decies in April 1919 objected to these methods of suppressing the Irish press.[26]

This policy of suppression under DORA continued until the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act was passed by British Parliament in August 1920. ROIA made it an offence to spread false reports or make statements that could cause hostility towards the British authorities. Any form of criticism of British authority in Ireland could be considered an offence. In effect, it replaced DORA as the legislation that would be used to suppress Irish newspapers.[27] Arrests

[21] 'Freeman's Journal Suppressed', *Manchester Guardian*, 16 December 1919.
[22] 'Suppression of the Freeman's Journal: Executive's Action Challenged, Debate in the Commons', *Manchester Guardian*, 17 December 1919, and 'Military and the Irish Press: Acts of Provocation. Debate on Suppression of the Freeman's Journal', *Manchester Guardian*, 17 December 1919.
[23] 'Freeman's Journal and DORA: The Editor's Protest', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 December 1919.
[24] 'Freeman's Journal and it's Suppression: Legal Action Against the Authorities', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 December 1919, and 'Suppression of the Freeman's Journal', *Manchester Guardian*, 20 December 1919, and 'Freeman's Journal and DORA: The Editor's Protest', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 December 1919.
[25] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*.
[26] Ibid, pp. 7-9.
[27] Ibid, p. 13.

and the confiscation of printing machinery immediately followed. The Editor and directors of the *Freeman's Journal* were convicted under this act in November 1920, for example.[28] On 24th December 1920 they were sentenced to 12 months in prison, although they were released a few weeks later following pressure on the British government by the English press.[29] As explained in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the *Guardian* was strongly opposed to ROIA.

These news management policies did not cause British newspapers the same hardship they caused the Irish press. Until the formal censor was removed from Ireland at the end of August 1919, telegraphic communications from Ireland to the *Manchester Guardian* Offices were subjected to censorship.[30] There were also occasions when *Guardian* staff were cut off whilst trying to telephone news back to Manchester, or when correspondents had to take the overnight mail boat to Holyhead in order to deliver reports. Howard Spring was one correspondent who recalled taking this journey.[31] But obstacles such as these were easily overcome as Ireland's proximity to England made the transfer of information relatively fast and uncomplicated. The government was unable to suppress news in the same way that it could from the further reaches of its empire.[32] Indeed, the *Guardian* maintained that 'the Censorship is weak in the details of its working; censorship always is'.[33] This was also demonstrated by the international coverage given to Dáil propaganda, as highlighted below Walsh and Kenneally demonstrate that these policies proved ineffectual in managing the British national and the international narrative on the conflict.[34]

Nevertheless, the *Guardian* still considered these acts of censorship as obstructing the British public from learning 'the true condition of Ireland'. In the *Guardian's* view, this meant the British people 'cannot form a trustworthy judgement of the problem which it has to face and how to solve it'. These press policies did not outright prevent *Guardian* reporters from relaying key developments in Ireland back to Manchester, but disruption to news gathering

[28] Mark O'Brien, *The Fourth Estate, Journalism in Twentieth Century Ireland* (Manchester, 2017), p. 41.
[29] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, p. 15.
[30] 'The Irish Censorship', *Manchester Guardian*, 23 August 1919.
[31] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 422.
[32] Ilahi, *Imperial Violence and the Path to Independence, India, Ireland and the Crisis of Empire,* p. 152.
[33] 'The Irish Censorship', *Manchester Guardian*, 23 August 1919.
[34] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, and Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*.

through censorship and suppression was considered detrimental to the British public forming opinions on the Irish question. This included Scott's opinions, which he expressed in his editorials. The *Guardian* argued: 'the Irish problem is not military. It is political, and the Censorship is just an obstruction to our understanding it and dealing with it wisely'.[35] Here the *Guardian* recognised Irish censorship as a negative influence on informed public discussion, to which in Scott's view, the editorial columns of newspapers were essential.

Furthermore, the *Guardian* had close links with the Irish press, largely due to the work of George Leach over the 1910s, as highlighted in the previous chapter. J. M. Denvir, leader writer for the *Guardian's* London Office also worked for the *Cork Examiner,* for example.[36] The *Guardian* also had a close connection with the *Freeman's Journal*, and both papers took a similar editorial line on the Irish question. Robert Donovan and J. W. Good, leader writers for the *Freeman's*, also worked for the *Guardian*.[37] In June 1920, Good covered Desmond MacCarthy's work for the *Guardian,* while the contributor was in London working for the *New Statesman*.[38] It was well known that English and Irish journalists tended to meet at the *Freeman's* offices in Dublin.[39] Hence, when the *Freeman's Journal* faced liquidation in September 1919, the *Guardian* reported: 'it would be a grave political fatality, involving more than Irish interests, if the nationalist cause ceased to be represented in the Dublin daily press'.[40] By 'nationalist cause', this report meant moderate constitutional nationalism in line with the *Guardian's* own view. British government's press policies in Ireland may not have affected British newspapers in the same way or to the same extent they did the Irish press, but censorship and suppression interrupted the journalistic networks that were integral to the *Guardian's* reporting processes. Maintenance of local networks was fundamental to news gathering in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: for example, the *Guardian* also forged links with local journalists in South Africa as part of its news gathering strategy during the Boer War.[41]

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[35] 'The Irish Censorship', *Manchester Guardian*, 23 August 1919.
[36] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*.
[37] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 420.
[38] JRL, GDN/A/M4/8, Desmond MacCarthy to C. P. Scott, 29 June 1920.
[39] Larsen, *First With the Truth, Newspapermen in Action!*, p. 65.
[40] 'Passing of the Irish Censorship: How Sinn Fein Was Helped On', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 September 1919.
[41] Simon J. Potter, 'The dark stream of shameless falsehood?' The British Press and News Gathering Strategies during the Boer War, in Craig Wilcox (ed.), *Recording the South African War: Journalism and Official History 1899-1914* (London, 1999), pp. 17-27.

In the final six months of the conflict, martial law was implemented across the Southern and Western counties of Ireland, and thus official censorship of dispatches was reintroduced. Under martial law, however, this censorship was enforced by the military across multiple localities, rather than by a central press censor at Dublin Castle. Crucially, the censorship policies in these areas also applied to British journalists. Reports were not checked individually, but correspondents risked expulsion if their reporting was deemed to be 'reflecting on the conduct of the Crown Forces or encouraging the rebels'.[42] This put all *Guardian* correspondents in the line of fire. The *Guardian* reported on censorship in Cork under this policy at length.[43] The direct impact on *Guardian* content is difficult to gauge, but this censorship sought to obstruct all correspondents in Ireland, and thus exert control over the reporting and editorialising of news from Ireland in Britain.

In addition to the official policies of censorship and suppression, the Crown Forces in Ireland actively intimidated the press during the conflict. The RIC and the British Army inflicted violence against newspapers and their staff in Ireland over the course of the War of Independence. They threatened the staff of the *Freeman's Journal* for its reporting of the sack of Balbriggan, subsequently attacking its offices. Other examples include the murder of a printer from the *Tralee Liberator*, after which the other staff of the newspaper were too scared to continue working.[44] In December 1920 the *MG* reported a journalist threatened in Tralee.[45] In April 1921, John Moyniham of the *Kerry Weekly Reporter* was also attacked by Crown Forces.[46] Diarmund O'Hegarty, director of communications for the IRA, explained one way in which correspondents were identified:

> Accounts of fights and shootings are usually telegraphed to Dublin. The local man has to hand in his message in the local P.O (sic) and present a pass signed with his name. This makes him an easy target for the Black and Tans…[47]

[42] 'The Press Censorship: 'Selected Facts' Given in the Commons', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 May 1921.
[43] 'Censoring the Press in Cork', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 April 1921, and 'Four Executions at Cork: New Development of the Censorship Scenes in City Not Allowed to Be Described Messages to Papers Seized', *Manchester Guardian*, 29 April 1921, and 'The Censorship in Cork', *Manchester Guardian,* 03 May 1921.
[44] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, p. 17.
[45] 'News Censorship in Kerry: Correspondents Messages to Barracks First', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 December 1920.
[46] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, p. 16.
[47] Diarmund O'Hegarty, quoted in Francis J. Costello, 'The Role of Propaganda in the Anglo-Irish War 1919-1921', *The Canadian Journal of Irish Studies*, vo. 14 (1998), p. 8.

A *Guardian* correspondent also found that journalists in Kerry were being forced to submit reports to the military for unofficial censorship in 1920.[48]

Guardian journalists were also threatened with violence despite being from the British press. For example, Donald Boyd was once horse whipped by a British Colonel alongside the editor of the *Connacht Tribunal.*[49] Threats of violence against British reporters became increasingly common as the war progressed. The threats made towards Hugh Martin, renowned journalist for the *Daily News,* are another noted example.[50] The *Guardian* maintained that the British public 'are indebted to him [Martin] for his revelations of many shameful things that have been done in their name'.[51] Violence was so rife in 1920, that journalists including J. M. Denvir of the *Guardian's* London Office wrote a letter published in the *Daily News*, another liberal paper, calling for the safety of reporters in Ireland from the unofficial censorship of the Black and Tans.[52] Indeed, after the Burning of Cork the *Guardian* reported that 'representatives of the press who have the indiscretion to report such things are searched, threatened, and told that Cork is not a safe place for them… Soon there may be no pressmen left in Cork'.[53] Here the *Guardian* recognised openly the impact of intimidation of journalists on British journalists reporting from Ireland.

These attempts by Crown forces to unofficially censor news only resulted in bad publicity for the British administration in Ireland, and further criticism from the British press.[54] Nevertheless, it made the lives and work of *Guardian* journalists more difficult. Threats of violence influenced the environment in which reporters operated. The effects of official censorship and policies of suppression on the *Manchester Guardian* were diluted, but intimidation of reporters by the Crown Forces had a direct impact on the work of *Guardian* staff. There is evidence of some instances of IRA violence against journalists in Ireland during the Irish War of Independence, but republican intimidation of the press, or unofficial

[48] 'News Censorship in Kerry: Correspondents Messages to Barracks First', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 December 1920.
[49] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 421.
[50] Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*, p. 74.
[51] 'New Books', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 March 1921.
[52] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*.
[53] C. P. Scott, 'Words and Deeds', *Manchester Guardian*, 16 December 1920.
[54] Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*, p. 123.

censorship, was on a much smaller scale than that conducted by the British forces. As explained in depth below, the Irish republican propaganda effort was committed to making the press its friend rather than its enemy.

From July 1921 to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, Scott's attention was on the Anglo-Irish peace negotiations taking place in London. News from Ireland itself became increasingly irrelevant to Scott's editorial commentary on the Irish question as negotiations progressed. Moreover, the Irish press was generally supportive of the British government efforts to find a settlement, thus censorship or suppression of the Irish press was unnecessary in the South. This perceived compliance of the Irish press resulted in censure by De Valera in January 1922. In a damning statement reported by the *Guardian's* special correspondent in Dublin, De Valera stated: 'your press is the press that when the enemy was actively making war upon you obeyed its dictates' - here he is referring to compliance with British authorities under threat of suppression during the War of Independence. De Valera maintained that the Irish press encouraged the Dáil to accept the initial offer of Dominion status proposed by Lloyd George in July 1921 and hindered the Irish Delegates at the peace conference. De Valera argued that the Irish press were rushing the Irish people to accept the Treaty that he opposed.[55]

There were reports of newspapers being seized by the anti-Treaty IRA in the South from 1922.[56] There was also intimidation of journalists in Northern Ireland in the build up to the Civil War. In May 1922, *Guardian* reporter Matthew Anderson travelled to Ireland with the intention of staying in Dublin, but moved north following the assassination of Sir Henry Wilson in Belfast. Ayerst explains: 'Very little un-doctored news was coming out of Belfast because most of the outside papers had decided that the treaty meant the end of major Irish stories. This gave added importance to Anderson's work'. During his stay, Anderson found that he was often followed by armed men in civilian clothing, and the hotel in which he was residing gave him the attic room just in case he needed to escape. He often saw 'Orangemen' in public libraries scorning him for his reports (published anonymously), and unionist papers claimed

[55] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper,* p. 420.
[56] 'Newspapers Seized by I.R.A', *Manchester Guardian*, 20 January 1920.

his stories as false.[57] Moreover, the Northern Irish government planned to prosecute him for his work, indicative of the continued suppression of news in the North. Anderson returned to England in 1922 after receiving a threatening letter, but the Northern government still planned to arrest him if 'in the course of his Sinn Féin mission' he returned to Belfast.[58]

The official press policies of the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland from 1922 are beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is important to point out that these would have influenced the environment within which *Guardian* journalists in the North and South worked during the Civil War.[59] The *Guardian* was sympathetic of the Free State's censorship policy during the Civil War however, as it recognised State censorship as somewhat necessary for the suppression of those opposed to the Treaty and the realisation of the Anglo-Irish settlement. The *Guardian* compared the suppression news regarding the anti-Treaty campaign with the British need to suppress news of German victories during the First World War.[60] Similar to Scott's defence of Free State violence in June 1922, the *Guardian* defended the provisional government for the sake of promoting the Treaty settlement, which both parties advocated, and the provisional government were responsible for implementing.

Irish Republican Propaganda

The importance of the press for Irish political organisations had long been recognised in Ireland.[61] During the War of Independence, Dáil Éireann was particularly conscious of the necessity of gaining news coverage for the republican cause. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 'Message to the Free Nations of the World' that was read at the Dáil's first meeting in January 1919 was read with this purpose in mind. However, all republican newspapers were completely suppressed in 1919 and the Dáil itself made illegal in November of that year. As we have seen, the non-republican Irish press also faced censorship, suppression and intimidation. Hence, Dáil Éireann implemented a propaganda strategy throughout the conflict in an attempt to harness the potential power of British and international news for the

[57] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, pp. 428-429.
[58] PRONI, HA/32/1/192, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of Northern Ireland, Proposed Prosecution of Belfast Correspondent of *Manchester Guardian*, 01 July 1922.
[59] Peter Martin, *Censorship in the Two Irelands 1922-1939* (Dublin, 2006).
[60] 'Mr. Collins Sees It Through', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 July 1922.
[61] Stephanie Rains, 'City streets and the city edition: newsboys and newspapers in early twentieth-century Ireland', *Irish Studies Review*, vol. 24 (2016), p. 143.

republican cause. This approach was taken despite official censorship and suppression policies and the threat of violence by Crown Forces. This propaganda policy focused predominantly on gaining favourable coverage outside of Ireland in newspapers such as the *Manchester Guardian*, and was managed by the Department of Propaganda of Dáil Éireann.[62]

The Department of Propaganda was rooted in the propaganda department of Sinn Féin, which was founded at Number 6 Harcourt Street Dublin in April 1918. This department played a key role in the 1918 General election, which saw Sinn Féin gain the majority of Irish seats. Following the establishment of the Dáil after the election, the national propaganda department that was responsible for publicity outside of Ireland was established under the Dáil's jurisdiction. The similar department within the Sinn Féin Party still remained, and they co-operated with the Dáil on the republican propaganda effort.[63] Laurence Ginnell was the first Director of the Department of Propaganda. He was former secretary to John Dillon MP (a close friend of C. P. Scott), and started the Irish Press Agency in the late nineteenth century. In 1899 he became secretary of the United Irish League under William O'Brien, an Irish nationalist and another connection of Scott's. Ginnell was elected to Westminster as Irish Nationalist MP for Westmeath North in the 1906; he supported the Third Home Rule Bill in 1912, but was radicalised by the issue of Irish Conscription and the execution of prisoners following the Easter Rising. He joined Sinn Féin in 1917.[64] Ginnell spent most of 1918 as a political prisoner; as such, it was only on his release in March 1919 that he took up his position as Director of the Department of Propaganda. He was arrested again in May 1919 and replaced by Desmond Fitzgerald.[65]

Despite being born in London, Desmond Fitzgerald had a longer history with radical Irish nationalism than Ginnell. He joined the Irish Volunteers in 1913 and fought in the Easter Rising alongside his wife, Mabel Fitzgerald, in 1916.[66] Mabel was Propaganda Director for Cumann

[62] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, pp. 43-44.
[63] NAI, DE 4/4/2, Dáil Éireann Department of Publicity: History and Progress, August 1921.
[64] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, p. 44.
[65] D. R. O'Connor Lysaght, 'Ginnell, Laurence (*bap*. 1852, d. 1923)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Online, 2008).
[66] David Harkness, 'Fitzgerald, Thomas Joseph [Desmond] (1888-1947), *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (Online, 2004).

na mBan, the women's auxiliary force of the Irish Volunteers.[67] As Minister for Propaganda for the majority of the war in Ireland, Fitzgerald instigated the most significant propaganda campaigns, particularly the launch of the *Irish Bulletin* in November 1919. He was arrested by Crown Forces in February 1921, and replaced by Erskine Childers.[68] Childers was also born in England but after visiting Ireland in 1908 he became increasingly involved in Irish politics. He retired from his role as a clerk in House of Commons in 1910, and published *The Framework of Home Rule* in 1911. He stood for Parliament as a Liberal in 1914 but withdrew his candidacy following the Ulster Crisis and was also radicalised during the First World War. Childers was secretary to the Anglo-Irish Conference in 1921, but ultimately joined the anti-Treaty forces and was executed by the Irish Free State in 1922.[69] Childers, like Fitzgerald and Ginnell before him, led the Irish nationalist propaganda machine during the War of Independence.

Dáil Éireann focused most of their initial propaganda efforts on the Paris Peace Conference. Several envoys went to Paris as representatives for Sinn Féin in 1919, including Erskine Childers. The conference resulted in disappointment for the republicans, but it did help establish contacts in Europe that could be used for disseminating propaganda. This experience of attempting to influence the international press and politicians encouraged republicans to establish their own vehicle for propagating their cause.[70] From the summer of 1919, therefore, Irish republicans began producing their own publications. These were the *Sinn Féin Weekly Summary of News* and the *Irish Bulletin*, which began publication in July and November 1919 respectively.[71] The *Weekly Summary* was produced by the Sinn Féin Propaganda Department, and the *Irish Bulletin* was published by the Dáil's department for propaganda under Desmond Fitzgerald.

The *Irish Bulletin* was the most significant element of Dáil Éireann's propaganda campaign during the War of Independence. Its purpose was to counter the impact of British censorship and suppression of the Irish press, and increase international discourse on the Irish republican cause. The *Bulletin's* content publicised and condemned the violence of Crown Forces, while

[67] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, p. 50.
[68] Harkness, 'Fitzgerald, Thomas Joseph [Desmond] (1888-1947)'.
[69] Jim Ring, 'Childers, (Robert) Erskine (1870-1922), *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Online, 2004).
[70] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, pp. 45-46.
[71] Murphy, *The Origins & Organisation of British Propaganda in Ireland 1920*, p. 10.

legitimising the violence of the IRA and promoting the unity of Irish people.[72] It made numerous attacks on Chief Secretary of Ireland, Sir Hamar Greenwood, and his actions in concealing the attacks made by Crown Forces on Irish Civilians.[73] The *Bulletin* also reprinted favourable reports published in the British press. These links in content generation between the *Bulletin* and British newspapers was significant to shaping the narrative of the conflict on both sides of the Irish Sea. Until the publication of the *Irish Bulletin*, British newspapers relied much more on 'official' information from Dublin Castle, as well as the first-hand accounts of their correspondents deployed to Ireland.[74]

Costello maintains that the *Irish Bulletin* 'became a useful source of information for both the Irish and British daily press'.[75] Indeed, the *Manchester Guardian* explicitly used it for content from March 1920. It may have used it more covertly during the first months of the *Bulletin's* publication, and indeed covertly after, but it is from March 1920 that the *Bulletin* is credited as a source of news in *Guardian* articles.[76] The *Guardian* primarily used the *Irish Bulletin* for news of British violence in Ireland during the period of conflict. It provided details of the reprisals committed by Crown Forces. For example, in September 1920 it published a list of reprisals that had been committed by British Forces over the course of the previous year, as it appeared in the *Bulletin.*[77] This violence was central to Scott's editorials in 1920.

Fitzgerald and later Childers based the *Irish Bulletin* on evidence, which meant that although it was a propaganda sheet and acknowledged as such, it was trusted by British journalists and editors alike. This was central to its success. By mid-1920 the *Bulletin* had gained a 'reputation for accuracy', and even Reuters reprinted *Bulletin* content.[78] The *Guardian* directly quoted it without question on the vast majority of occasions, which had an impact in Britain. *Bulletin* articles reproduced in the British press were used to interrogate the government on their Irish

[72] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, p. 48.
[73] Murphy, *The Origins & Organisation of British Propaganda in Ireland 1920*, pp. 17-18.
[74] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, pp. 46-47.
[75] Francis J. Costello, 'The Role of Propaganda in the Anglo-Irish War 1919-1921', *The Canadian Journal of Irish Studies*, vo. 14 (1998), p. 7.
[76] 'The Castle and Sinn Fein MPs', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 March 1920.
[77] 'A Year's 'Reprisals': Sinn Fein Organs Long List Repeated Visitations', *Manchester Guardian*, 29 September 1920.
[78] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, pp. 48-51.

policy in the House of Commons.[79] And even if there were some doubts about accuracy due to the sheer extent of reports of violence published in the *Bulletin,* it was still detrimental to the British government in Ireland.[80] As Desmond MacCarthy maintained in an article for the *Guardian* published in 1919: 'If one quarter of the cases which Sinn Féiner records in the Irish Bulletin are true, the charges which lay at the door of the Executive are many and grave'.[81] The British press, on the whole, did not publish the same level of detail as the *Irish Bulletin* did when describing British violence, but as Kenneally points out: 'by providing the information and making it known to journalists they would have undoubtedly have influenced how these journalists viewed the Crown Forces'.[82] This included *Guardian* journalists who informed Scott's editorials, and thus Scott's own view on the violence. In January 1921 the Dáil noted the influence of the *Irish Bulletin*. It stated:

> The Foreign Press makes considerable use of the Irish Bulletin. During the last three months the world's newspapers have given more space to Ireland than in the previous two years. Most of the special articles written have been based on information contained in the Bulletin.[83]

In August 1921, the Department of Propaganda reported that the *Irish Bulletin* was being received by approximately 900 newspapers and individuals.[84] This included the *Guardian* and Scott.

The *Irish Bulletin* remained in circulation following the truce and shaped Scott's editorials during the peace process. In August 1921, Scott wrote an editorial entitled 'The Next Moves in Ireland And America' in which he engaged directly with content published in the *Bulletin*. He highlighted that the *Bulletin's* assertion that Ireland had a complete claim to independence and that a republic would be of no threat to Britain. Scott responded by reasserting his long-standing argument that Ireland's internal divisions made complete self-determination impossible, and remaining part of the British Empire would benefit the Irish people more than a republic.[85] The *Bulletin* did not influence Scott's commentary to the extent that it changed

[79] P Murphy, *The Origins & Organisation of British Propaganda in Ireland 1920*, p. 19.
[80] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, p. 49.
[81] Desmond MacCarthy, 'Ireland-of-Today II', *Manchester Guardian*, 12 August 1919.
[82] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, p. 50.
[83] NAI, DE 4/8/8, Dáil Éireann Report on Propaganda, 18 January 1921.
[84] NAI, DE 4/4/2, Dáil Éireann Department of Publicity: History and Progress, August 1921.
[85] C. P. Scott, 'The Next Moves in Ireland and America', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 August 1921.

his fundamental political stance on Irish independence, which remained moderate and constitutionalist, but the publication still gave a foundation for Scott's commentary on the politics, as well as the violence, in the editorial columns. The *Bulletin* provided news and views for the *Guardian* to engage with, it helped to set the agenda. Moreover, Scott was highly complimentary of the *Bulletin* during the peace negotiations, describing it as having 'moderation of tone and no little argumentative ingenuity',[86] and 'a new vein of moderation and confidence' that expressed the necessary 'spirit' for peace.[87] This was very generous in comparison to Scott's commentary on de Valera at this time. The *Irish Bulletin* ceased publication as a daily in December 1921,[88] but in subsequent decades the *MG* still recalled it as being a 'most skilful propaganda sheet'.[89]

The links between the *Irish Bulletin* and the British press also facilitated 'practical propaganda' for the Dáil.[90] 'Practical propaganda' involved demonstrating to Britain and the world, through action, that the Irish republican administration was capable of governing the Irish nation. The workings of the Dáil Courts were an example of this as it showed the Dáil's ability to form and manage its own judicial systems. Proceedings of the Dáil Courts were published in the *Irish Bulletin* for publicity purposes. Summaries of these proceedings were subsequently reprinted by the British and Irish press, including by the *Guardian*. For example, on 19th June 1920 it republished a summary of the activities of the Dáil Courts, which maintained that 'No more striking illustration could be given of the fact that the Irish Republic is functioning successfully in spite of the enormous effort now being made to suppress it by British troops and police'.[91] Desmond MacCarthy also visited Dáil Courts during the War of Independence,[92] and Donald Boyd reported their proceedings following the truce.[93] Scott was particularly sympathetic towards the Dáil's state building activities post-truce with peace and the prospect of settlement in mind. This activity agitated die-hard Conservatives and Unionists in the Commons and was used to try to justify a return to war during the Anglo-Irish

[86] C. P. Scott, 'The Next Moves in Ireland and America', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 August 1921.
[87] C. P. Scott, 'Nations in Conference', *Manchester Guardian*, 12 October 1921.
[88] NAI DE 2/10, Report on Publicity Department, April 1922.
[89] 'Obituary: Mr Desmond Fitzgerald', *Manchester Guardian*, 10 April 1947.
[90] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, p. 48.
[91] 'Work of the Sinn Fein Police Courts', *Manchester Guardian,* 19 June 1920.
[92] JRL, GDN/A/M4/8, Desmond MacCarthy to Scott, 29 June 1920.
[93] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 425.

Conference, but for Scott and the the *Guardian*, the Dáil's authority in Ireland was essential for making peace.[94] This 'practical propaganda' had the desired effect, as Scott insisted that the activities of the Dáil in the summer of 1921 placed 'beyond question' their ability to run an impartial and efficient government.[95]

Irish republicans also sought to secure column space in British newspapers as part of the republican propaganda effort. This was mainly achieved through offering interviews with British journalists.[96] Donald Boyd recalled visiting Sinn Féin ministers for interview and being joined by senior officers of the IRA, and Charles Green recollected visiting Arthur Griffith in a secret room hidden behind a false wall in a shop in Dublin.[97] An extensive interview with Griffith appeared in the *Manchester Guardian* on 9th April 1921, in which Griffith maintained Ireland's complete right to independence, asserting that Sinn Féin was 'determined to put President Wilson's principles to the test'. Griffith also maintained that there was no Ulster question.[98] While the *Guardian's* editorial line did not align with Griffith's stance, it gave a view which Scott could engage with and counter in his editorials. The proceedings of an interview with De Valera were also published in the *Guardian* in January 1921,[99] and Michael Collins wrote an opinion piece for the *Guardian* following the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty.[100] By this point though, Collins had agreed to Dominion status for Ireland, a position which Scott supported. As explained in more detail in the final chapter of this thesis, there were also a number of letters to the editor published in the *Guardian* written by republicans.

The Dáil Propaganda Department actively forged relationships with English journalists in order to secure coverage, column space, and publicity for practical propaganda.[101] As early as September 1919, before the *Irish Bulletin* was established, the Department of Propaganda expressed its motivations to attend to the 'English Correspondents of Foreign Papers'.[102] On 7th November 1919 the Dáil approved £500 of expenses for the 'entertainment of friendly

[94] C. P. Scott, 'A Fresh Start Needed.', *Manchester Guardian*, 29 August 1921.
[95] C. P. Scott, 'Ireland North and South', *Manchester Guardian*, 02 September 1921.
[96] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, p. 70.
[97] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 422.
[98] 'Interview with Mr. Griffith', *Manchester Guardian*, 09 April 1920.
[99] 'Mr. De Valera in Ireland: A New Statement', *Manchester Guardian*, 29 January 1921.
[100] Michael Collins, 'Ireland as the Pivot of a League of Nations.', *Manchester Guardian*, 07 December 1921.
[101] Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*, p. 109.
[102] NAI, DE 1/2, Minutes of Dáil Éireann Ministry and Cabinet, 26 September 1919, p. 2.

journalists'.[103] Fitzgerald made good friends with *Guardian* correspondent, Donald Boyd, to the extent that when the Dáil Minister was arrested in 1920 his wife called Boyd for help.[104] Fitzgerald was generally respected among British journalists, which could only benefit from the Dáil's propaganda campaign. Upon the death of Fitzgerald in 1947, the *Manchester Guardian* described his role during the conflict as 'a task of immense importance' carried out 'with skill that was generally admired'.[105] Childers and his assistant, Frank Gallagher, also fostered a good relationship with Boyd, and invited the *Guardian* correspondent to join his family for dinner on a number of occasions.[106]

Molly Childers, who married Erskine Childers in 1904, also contacted Scott personally to provide news from Ireland and copies of the *Irish Bulletin*. Scott, in a letter to Childers, drew a comparison between the actions of the Black and Tans and that of General Dyer, who had recently been at the centre of a public discussion on violence in India following the Amritsar Massacre. Scott feared that 'Dyer's in Ireland' would further destabilise Anglo-Irish politics and cause a deeper and unresolvable rift within the United Kingdom.[107] This letter preceded the most intense period of reprisals by Crown Forces and the frequent commentary on these reprisals that Scott published in the *Guardian* from August 1920. It is likely, therefore, that Molly Childers was one of the first to draw Scott's attention to this. Molly Childers was a republican who had played an important role in her husband's radicalisation. She was one of several Irish nationalist women who maintained a connection with the *Guardian* and its editor with the nationalist cause in mind.

Alice Stopford-Green, another prominent Irish nationalist woman, was instrumental to aiding *Guardian* correspondents from her residence in Dublin during the War of Independence. Her house became a stop on what British authorities termed the 'republican scenic railway' - a route upon which news correspondents were taken to meet the likes of Fitzgerald, to get an interview with Arthur Griffith, and meet women such as Stopford-Green or Molly Childers

[103] NAI, DE 1/2, Minutes of Dáil Éireann Ministry and Cabinet, 07 November 1919, p. 21.
[104] Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*, p. 115.
[105] 'Obituary: Mr Desmond Fitzgerald', *Manchester Guardian*, 10 April 1947.
[106] Larsen, *First With the Truth, Newspapermen in Action!*, p. 65.
[107] TCD, MSS/7851/1189, C. P. Scott to Molly Childers, 11 July 1920.

who would describe the reprisals being committed by Crown Forces.[108] Sources and information were accessible to journalists throughout the war via 90 St. Stephen's Green, Dublin. Indeed, it became a centre for *Guardian* journalists and Sinn Féin leaders to meet during the conflict.[109] Stopford-Green positioned herself as a liaison intentionally. In 1918 she asked Scott to send the *Guardian's* correspondent in Ireland her way, to which Scott agreed.[110] These connections aided the Dáil's campaign to gain coverage in the international press from journalists who had seen first-hand the situation in Ireland.[111]

Still, Stopford-Green's link to the *Guardian* was not a new connection. She had helped *Guardian* reporters with their Irish affairs long before the War of Interdependence. She was closely acquainted with the *Guardian's* Dublin Correspondent, John F. Taylor, in the late nineteenth century.[112] The connection also went beyond providing its reporters access to Irish news. She provided letters of recommendation to Scott for a number of the *Guardian's* Irish correspondents and contributors, including renowned Irish nationalist Roger Casement in 1912, which Scott acted on.[113] She also recommended Padraic Colum,[114] who Scott subsequently welcomed as the *Guardian's* correspondent in Ireland prior to the First World War.[115] Contributor G. W. Russell (AE) was also recommended by Stopford-Green, describing him as having 'fine knowledge of local Irish life', as 'a fervent nationalist', who was 'respected by everyone of every view'.[116] Scott and Stopford-Green had a long-standing relationship, having corresponded from at least as early as 1902.[117] They discussed the situation in South Africa at the turn of the century, as well as the Irish situation and Home Rule prior to the First World War.[118] In 1918 they exchanged letters on the Irish conscription crisis and Prime Minister Lloyd George.[119] Stopford-Green's view of the Irish question was very much in line

[108] Richard Bennet, *The Black and Tans* (Barnsley, 2001), p. 100.
[109] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 421.
[110] NLI MS 43, 260/24, C. P. Scott to Alice Stopford-Green, 10 May 1918.
[111] O'Brien, *The Fourth Estate, Journalism in Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 40.
[112] NLI, MS 43, 312 /1-26, Letters from John F. Taylor to Alice Stopford-Green, 1891-1902.
[113] JRL, GDN/A/C25/1a, Alice Stopford-Green to C. P. Scott, 17 April 1912.
[114] JRL, GDN/A/C70/2, Alice Stopford-Green to C. P. Scott, 13 May 1908.
[115] JRL, GDN/A/C70/3, C. P. Scott to Alice Stopford-Green, 28 May 1908, and GDN/A/C70/5, C. P. Scott to Padraic Column, 01 January 1909.
[116] JRL, GDN/A/R71/1, Alice Stopford-Green to C. P. Scott, 1908.
[117] NLI, MS 43, 322, C. P. Scott to Alice Stopford-Green regarding the death of J. F. Taylor, 10 November 1902.
[118] NLI, MS 43, 260/24, Correspondence of Alice Stopford-Green with C. P. Scott, 1903-1928.
[119] NLI, MS 43, 260/24, C. P. Scott to Alice Stopford-Green, 10 May 1918.

with that of Scott, and British liberals like him.[120] She sought advice from him on her own writings on Ireland,[121] and also appeared in the *Guardian's* correspondence columns in relation to the Irish question.[122]

Stopford-Green also featured in news articles in the *Guardian* on a number of occasions. Prior to the First World War her name primarily appeared in relation to her scholarly work,[123] and during the War of Independence the *Guardian* reported a raid on her house in Dublin by British authorities.[124] In May 1921, Scott told Stopford-Green that he hoped 'the raiders have not lately paid you further attentions'.[125] Similarly, her presence at the Irish delegation's departure from Dublin to London for the Anglo-Irish conference in October 1921 was reported by the *Guardian*.[126] Stopford-Green was not a republican, but her position, her relationship with and influence on the work of the *Guardian* and the British press, was still instrumental to the Dáil's propaganda campaign. In 1922, the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of Northern Ireland described her as 'a very dangerous propagandist…'[127] But Scott knew her as a 'friend' and fellow 'helper' for Ireland.[128] In his later years he remembered her 'vividly and with particular pleasure', at whose London residence he 'more than once met such interesting people'.[129] Clearly, the connection between Stopford-Green, Scott and the *Guardian,* was deeper than simply facilitating the news gathering process of its correspondents, although this alone had significance.

Stopford-Green's relationship with the *Guardian* and Scott demonstrates the complexity of the networks that contributed to the production of news and views. Her name could have equally been one of focus in the previous chapter as one of Scott's Irish moderate friends, and *Guardian* contributors. This connection also demonstrates again that despite the largely

[120] Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*, p. 185.
[121] NLI, MS 43, 260/24, Alice Stopford-Green to C. P. Scott, 19 July 1918.
[122] Alice Stopford-Green, 'The Government of Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 24 April 1917.
[123] For example, 'Irish Women Writers Honoured', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 May 1910, and 'New Books: Ireland v. The Devil's Advocate', *Manchester Guardian*, 28 June 1912.
[124] 'Dublin Military Raids.', *Manchester Guardian,* 22 October 1920.
[125] NLI, MS 43,260/24, C. P. Scott to Alice Stopford-Green, 12 May 1921.
[126] 'Departure from Dublin', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 October 1921.
[127] PRONI, HA/32/1/192, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of Northern Ireland, Proposed Prosecution of Belfast Correspondent of *Manchester Guardian*, 01 July 1922.
[128] NLI, MS 43, 260/24, C. P. Scott to Alice Stopford-Green, 12 May 1921.
[129] NLI, MS 43, 260/24, C. P. Scott to Alice Stopford-Green, 02 April 1927.

masculine character of the circles that the editor interacted with, women still played a crucial role in Scott's knowledge of Ireland and the *Guardian's* coverage of the Irish question. These Irish nationalist women were active, trusted, and their voices were deemed valuable. This point is reiterated in the final chapter of this thesis, which highlights the use of correspondence columns to promote the Irish nationalist agenda by Irish revolutionary, Maud Gonne MacBride.

In Britain, Art O'Brien, the Dáil's Press Liaison in London, was crucial to fostering relationships between the Propaganda Department and journalists. O'Brien's London Office opened in March 1919 at 3 Adam Street, Strand, and 'soon established itself as a port of a call in relation to all things Irish - both legal and illegal'.[130] The main duties of his office included the distribution of the *Irish Bulletin* in Britain; providing statements to English and international press correspondents, and to sections of the English public on key developments in Irish politics and conflict; interviewing press correspondents and arranging their visits to Ireland; and supplying journalists with literature and photos for propaganda purposes.[131] MacDiarmada maintains: 'London was a major hub for the world's press and within a few weeks O'Brien had assembled a large coterie of British and foreign journalists who gathered at his office for news of Ireland'.[132] Describing the nature of his work life throughout 1920, he stated:

> I was at the office from 9 a.m. until 11 or 12 at night every day, including Sundays. On several occasions I was there until 3, 4 and 5 o'clock in the morning. During that period there were occasions when I interviewed 40 or 50 journalists and foreign correspondents during the day…[133]

[130] Mary MacDiarmada, 'Art O'Brien: London Envoy of Dáil Éireann, 1919–1922: A Diplomat in the Citadel of the Enemy's Authority', Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 30 (2019), pp. 62-63.
[131] No. 75 NAI DFA ES London 1921, Extract from a memorandum from Art O'Brien to Eamon de Valera, 14 April 1921, in Fanning, Kennedy, Keogh, and O'Haplin (eds.), *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume I, 1919-1922*, pp. 128-132.
[132] MacDiarmada, 'Art O'Brien: London Envoy of Dáil Éireann, 1919–1922: A Diplomat in the Citadel of the Enemy's Authority', p. 65.
[133] No. 75 NAI DFA ES London 1921, Extract from a memorandum from Art O'Brien to Eamon de Valera, 14 April 1921, in Fanning, Kennedy, Keogh, and O'Haplin (eds.), *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume I, 1919-1922*, pp. 128-132.

O'Brien forged connections with around 90 individual publications and agencies during his role, courting journalists and expecting assistance and sympathy in return.[134]

O'Brien's work in London also involved assisting Irish organisations based in Britain.[135] These organisations included the Irish Self-Determination League (ISDL). He was founder of the London branch, which opened in March 1919 with the purpose of bringing together Irish residents who wanted to support Ireland. The League distributed literature bought directly from Dáil Éireann's propaganda department,[136] and provided British contacts for the mailing list of the *Irish Bulletin*.[137] The *Manchester Guardian* reported the activities of the Irish Self-Determination League, including protests at the Albert Hall, London, [138] attempted suppression of ISDL meetings in Manchester,[139] and the ban on their annual convention due to take place in Manchester in November 1920.[140] From November 1919 to the truce, the ISDL increased its branches from 54 across England and Wales to 300 and its membership from 3823 to 38,726, almost tenfold.[141] O'Brien maintained that the ISDL did 'more to consolidate our people in all the Irish centres, but particularly in London, than any previous political organisation'.[142] Inoue argues that the ISDL was fundamental to the success of the Irish republican propaganda campaign in Britain.[143] MacDiarmada insists: 'public opinion was, in no small way, influenced by the propaganda engineered by O'Brien since the establishment of the ISDL in early 1919'.[144] The success of the League can perhaps be measured by the perceived threat it posed to the British authorities. Despite the fact the organisation was

[134] No. 61 NAI DFA ES London 1921, Art O'Brien to Eamon De Valera, 23 February 1921, in Fanning, Kennedy, Keogh, and O'Haplin (eds.), *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume I, 1919-1922*, pp. 111-112.
[135] No. 75 NAI DFA ES London 1921, Extract from a memorandum from Art O'Brien to Eamon de Valera, 14 April 1921, in Fanning, Kennedy, Keogh, and O'Haplin (eds.), *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume I, 1919-1922*, pp. 128-132.
[136] NAI, DE 2/10, Dáil Éireann Report on Propaganda Department, June 1920.
[137] Boyce, *Englishmen and the Irish Troubles, British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy 1918-22*, p. 86.
[138] 'Disturbance at Irish: Entrance to Albert Hall Guarded by Police', *Manchester Guardian*, 12 February 1920.
[139] 'Irish Meeting Banned in Manchester', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 August 1920.
[140] 'Orderly Meetings at Salford', *Manchester Guardian*, 29 November 1920.
[141] Keiko Inoue, 'Dáil propaganda and the Irish self-determination league of Great Britain during the Anglo-Irish war', *Irish Studies Review*, vol. 6 (1998), p. 48.
[142] No. 61 NAI DFA ES London 1921, Art O'Brien to Eamon De Valera, 23 February 1921, in Fanning, Kennedy, Keogh, and O'Haplin (eds.), *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume I, 1919-1922*, pp. 111-112.
[143] Inoue, 'Dáil propaganda and the Irish self-determination league of Great Britain during the Anglo-Irish war', p. 52.
[144] MacDiarmada, 'Art O'Brien: London Envoy of Dáil Éireann, 1919–1922: A Diplomat in the Citadel of the Enemy's Authority', p. 69.

never declared illegal, its meetings were suppressed and its headquarters were raided in in May 1921. The President, P. J. Kelly was also arrested during the League's annual conference.[145]

Art O'Brien also played a major role in the diplomatic missions of Dáil Éireann: 'Virtually all correspondence and funding for foreign missions was channelled through O'Brien in London'.[146] He also facilitated meetings with key political figures in Britain. For example, he sought to arrange a meeting with Jan Smuts during the Imperial Conference in June 1921.[147] Smuts was a South African statesman who 'played a key role in the adjustments made to the constitutional relationships across the British Empire'.[148] Smuts was also a close connection of Scott. Following the truce, O'Brien facilitated meetings between de Valera and Lloyd George during the preliminary peace talks,[149] and his presence at each meeting was reported by the *Guardian's* London Office.[150] O'Brien also helped organise the logistics of the Irish delegation's stay in London during the Anglo-Irish Conference.[151] Nonetheless, O'Brien's position diminished following the arrival of the Irish delegates in London for the peace conference. O'Brien took an anti-Treaty stance in 1922, and as such was removed from his position as envoy to London by the Free State.

While O'Brien's role was reduced after the truce in July 1921, connections between the Dáil and British newspapers remained important, as a settlement in line with their demands was yet to be won. Even after peace talks began it was recognised that the future settlement would be weighted by British opinion. But these connections were also beneficial to the *Manchester Guardian* post-truce. It is these connections that gave Scott personal access to

[145] Inoue, 'Dáil propaganda and the Irish self-determination league of Great Britain during the Anglo-Irish war', p. 50-51.
[146] MacDiarmada, 'Art O'Brien: London Envoy of Dáil Éireann, 1919–1922: A Diplomat in the Citadel of the Enemy's Authority', p. 63.
[147] NAI DE 2/526, Art O'Brien to Eamon de Valera, 4 June 1921.
[148] O. Geyser, 'Irish Independence: Jan Smuts and Eamon De Valera', *Round Table* (1998), p. 473.
[149] MacDiarmada, 'Art O'Brien: London Envoy of Dáil Éireann, 1919–1922: A Diplomat in the Citadel of the Enemy's Authority', pp. 70-71.
[150] 'Our London Correspondence: The Reception of Mr. De Valera', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 July 1921, and 'Our London Correspondence: Sinn Fein at Downing Street', *Manchester Guardian*, 15 July 1921, and 'Our London Correspondence', *Manchester Guardian*, 16 July 1921, and 'Our London Correspondence: Mr. De Valera's Departure', *Manchester Guardian*, 23 July 1921.
[151] NAI, DE/1/3, Minutes of Dáil Éireann Ministry and Cabinet, 03 October 1921, p. 128.

de Valera. As discussed in the previous chapter, they met personally on 15th July 1921. J. M. Denvir of the London Office arranged the meeting. They discussed, and disagreed upon the nature and legitimacy of IRA violence in Ireland and the *Guardian's* reporting of this. Scott explained to de Valera that the *MG* saw a distinction between 'acts of war done in the open' and insidious assassinations, as seen in Dublin on Bloody Sunday in November 1920. De Valera defended the assassinations of British Officers in Dublin as 'executions for a purpose against spies'. They also discussed Lloyd George, Ulster, and fears among Southern unionists of a republican government. Again, these meetings did not change Scott's fundamental view of Irish self-determination, but they played a part in his view of the Irish leader, who was the subject of many of Scott's editorials post-truce. Following the meeting Scott reflected on de Valera's inability to take a practical approach to negotiations, a point he made publicly in his leaders.[152] As also highlighted previously, Scott met with Griffith and Collins during the peace talks, as well as de Valera.

From January to April 1922, the former Dáil Propaganda Department (now Publicity Department of the Irish Free State), focused most of their efforts in Northern Ireland, particularly Belfast. The sectarian violence in Northern Ireland after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty was reported by the Belfast press as the work of Sinn Féin, and these miscommunications were transmitted overseas. In order to counter this situation, the publicity department of the Irish Free State began issuing daily 'reliable' reports on Belfast. The Minister for Publicity also visited Belfast to arrange a direct telegraphic news service, 'to get the truth published before the misrepresentations had been accepted'.[153] Propaganda was important to consolidating the Irish Free State post-Treaty, as Hora explains. Hora also highlights the commonalities between Northern Irish and Free State propaganda approaches from 1922, including methods of censorship and suppression like those seen under British rule.[154] The anti-Treaty campaign also employed its own propaganda tactics, which included mimicking the *Irish Bulletin* from July 1922.[155] Scott was adamant, however, that the Treaty

[152] JRL, GDN/134, C. P. Scott's political diaries, 15 July 1921.
[153] NAI, DE 2/10, Report on Publicity Department, April 1922.
[154] Kevin Hora, *Propaganda and Nation Building: Selling the Irish Free State* (New York, 2017)
[155] 'A New 'Irish Bulletin': Reappears in Old Form as De Valera's Organ', *Manchester Guardian,* 28 July 1920.

was the solution to the Irish question, and by this point had almost ceased writing editorials on Ireland completely. The Irish question was solved.

'Official News' and British Propaganda

It has been established that press censorship and suppression were in effect in Ireland from the beginning of the War of Independence, but that these policies did not have the same impact on newspapers published in England as they did on the Irish press. British reporters in Ireland did face intimidation and censorship, and the networks integral to newsgathering were disrupted by suppression, but newspapers and their staff in Manchester or London were still free to publish and criticise the government and the Crown forces without the same legal or corporal threat. The political impact of negative reporting of the situation in Ireland by British newspapers, coupled with the success of the Dáil's propaganda activities, became increasingly clear as the war progressed.[156] From the spring of 1920, therefore, a new press management policy was introduced by the British authorities in Ireland with British newspapers and republican propaganda in mind. As they could not directly censor or suppress British news in the same way as the Irish press, and as the *Irish Bulletin* continued to gain traction and evade the authorities, Dublin Castle increasingly sought to harness the British press for its own purposes, mirroring Dáil Éireann's propaganda campaign.

British propaganda in Ireland derived from three sources. The first was the press section of the General Staff of the British Army, which was established in May 1920.[157] The second was the Information Section of the Police Authority. During the War of Independence, Major Hugh Pollard was the Press Officer and William Darling was the Information Section Secretary of this section.[158] The third source was the Dublin Castle propaganda department, established under Basil Clarke following the passing of the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act in August 1920. These three authorities took varied approaches to distributing British propaganda in Ireland and Britain during the conflict, approaches that often conflicted. Kenneally argues this is part of the reason why British propaganda on the war in Ireland was largely unsuccessful.[159]

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[156] Boyce, *Englishmen and the Irish Troubles, British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy 1918-22*, and Maurice Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*.
[157] Murphy, *The Origins & Organisation of British Propaganda in Ireland 1920*, p. 13.
[158] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, p. 32.
[159] Ibid, p. 41.

Nevertheless, these three jurisdictions and their propaganda efforts all sought to counter 'the plethora of adverse news reports' in Britain with 'the neutralisation, so far as possible, of the unfavourable factors in news'.[160] Thus, they had an impact on the climate in which *Guardian* journalists and editorial staff in Ireland and Britain worked, even if British propaganda failed to achieve its overall aims. Childers commented on the introduction of British propaganda in Ireland in an article published in the *Daily News* in May 1920, stating:

> The Castle rule is absolute; it admits nothing, deplores nothing, and, so far as it can, imposes silence on the whole of this black side of the military regime. The rule is perfectly logical. War practise and war propaganda imperatively demand it.[161]

Indeed, this new press-management policy that attempted to have influence in Britain coincided with the escalation of police violence in Ireland. As we have seen, this violence resulted in overwhelming criticism of the Irish administration by the *Manchester Guardian*. British propaganda efforts sought to counter this.

The most significant propaganda policy employed by Dublin Castle was 'propaganda by news'. This policy envisioned by Basil Clarke sought to feed the mainstream press with 'official' new reports. By 'informing' newspapers of developments in Ireland with reports that had sufficient elements of truth in them to be convincing, the British authorities sought to sway the press narrative in the government's favour.[162] Clarke maintained that 'by issuing news ourselves we maintain the propaganda initiative and attack'. He maintained that even the nationalist press needed the Dublin Castle reports, and this gave the Irish administration an advantage. Clarke explained:

> About 20 Pressmen, Irish, British and foreign, visit the Castle twice Daily, take our version of the facts- which I take care are as favourable to us as may be, in accordance with truth and verisimilitude - and they believe all I tell them. And they cannot afford to stay away.

[160] Ilahi, *Imperial Violence and the Path to Independence, India, Ireland and the Crisis of Empire,* p. 153.
[161] Erskine Childers, *Daily News*, 11 May 1920, quoted in Brian P Murphy, *The Origins & Organisation of British Propaganda in Ireland 1920*, p. 16.
[162] Murphy, *The Origins & Organisation of British Propaganda in Ireland 1920*, p. 28.

He insisted that 'the service must look true and it must look complete and candid or its "credit" is gone at once and it becomes suspect…'[163] This policy employed 'news', not views, for propaganda. An example of this can be seen in the aftermath of the Croke Park Massacre. The British government's account focused almost exclusively on the assassinations of British Officers that occurred earlier that day. They also claimed that the Crown Forces were provoked by IRA gunfire, seeking to frame the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries as the victims not the perpetrators.[164] By whitewashing or countering 'unfavourable factors' from official statements from the offset, Dublin Castle hoped to control the narrative around this high-profile reprisal.

Initially, British correspondents were inclined to trust 'official news'. Similarities between early news reports and the official view suggest that reporters were following leads provided by Dublin Castle.[165] Indeed, the *Manchester Guardian* reported news directly from Dublin Castle prior to Basil Clarke's arrival, when news was sourced from the press section of the General Staff and the Police Authority.[166] As Walsh explains however, 'visiting journalists gradually switched from taking their line from government sources to holding the government responsible for the state of Ireland'.[167] As the war progressed and violence increased, reporters became increasingly mistrustful of official accounts of events and more inclined to trust Irish nationalist sources, such as the *Irish Bulletin*. The *Guardian's* use of the *Bulletin* demonstrated this. Basil Clarke's arrival was perhaps a little too late then, as violence notably intensified from September 1920. Newspapers also employed their own journalists to investigate too, of course. As highlighted above, the *Manchester Guardian* had a large team of reporters who took on this role. The *Guardian* also increased the number of reporters in Ireland during the conflict, as 'official' sources became increasingly unreliable.

[163] Basil Clarke, 10 March 1921, quoted in, Murphy, *The Origins & Organisation of British Propaganda in Ireland 1920*, p. 28.
[164] Davies, 'British Reactions to Amritsar and Croke Park: Connections and Comparisons'.
[165] Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*, p. 61.
[166] For example, 'One Policeman: Three Soldiers', *Manchester Guardian*, 15 May 1920, and 'Labour and Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 June 1920, and 'Dublin Castle chiefs visit Derry', *Manchester Guardian*, 26 June 1920.
[167] Maurice Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*, p. 125.

As the British press became aware of this attempt to hoodwink, the investigative work of the *Guardian's* Irish correspondents became increasingly central to news gathering, reporting and editorialising events in Ireland. *Guardian* journalists sought to verify official accounts or bear witness to the stories they reported, visiting sites of reprisals in particular. A. P. Wadsworth visited Tipperary and Galway to investigate and report on the police violence, and both he and Charles Green witnessed the Burning of Cork. Green is purported to have caught a lift to the scene with the Dublin Fire Brigade.[168] Other correspondents from the *Manchester Guardian* attended scenes of shootings, and destroyed creameries and village streets, in Tipperary, Kerry and Longford.[169] In the case of the Croke Park Massacre, a correspondent for the *Guardian* found that upon investigation the official narrative was 'unsupported by eye-witness accounts in several important in particulars'.[170] Hence, the *Guardian* maintained: 'The question of the freedom of the press in Ireland was never more important than to-day, when the correspondent is the only disinterested witness to the state of the country'.[171] The failure of Clarke's policy is evidenced by Scott's editorials, which continuously censured the British administration in Ireland. Still, 'propaganda by news' fostered a climate of misinformation throughout the conflict that impacted on *Guardian* correspondents. These journalists and their editor considered it their job to try to combat half-truths in order to provide accurate reports of Anglo-Irish developments, which the editor could then take up for comment. This notion of being an 'honest witness' was a journalistic ideal encompassed by the *Guardian* ideology.

In addition to the 'propaganda by news' approach, Dublin Castle also produced its own publications. A publication edited in Dublin Castle aimed at the RIC emerged in 1920, entitled the *Weekly Summary.* It was commissioned by Chief Secretary Greenwood to encourage the fight against the IRA, featuring an item entitled *Some of This Week's Victories* that sought to ridicule the IRA.[172] In November 1920 Greenwood maintained that it was 'produced by the heads of the police for the benefit of members of the force, who if no such periodical existed

[168] Egon Larsen, *First With the Truth, Newspapermen in Action!* (London, 1968), p. 61.
[169] Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*, p. 75.
[170] 'The Shooting at Croke Park: Was There Provocation?', *Manchester Guardian*, 23 November 1920.
[171] 'News Censorship in Kerry: Correspondents Messages to Barracks First', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 December 1920.
[172] Murphy, *The Origins & Organisation of British Propaganda in Ireland 1920*, p. 22.

would have no means of knowing the truth regarding current events in Ireland'.[173] But, unlike the *Irish Bulletin*, the publication was not considered an appropriate source of news by *Guardian* reporters. On 23rd September 1920, one of the *Guardian's* correspondents in Ireland described it as an 'egregious' publication which preached the doctrine: 'Murder must be met with murder'.[174] The following month the *Guardian* reported that the *Weekly Summary* sought to make Ireland an 'appropriate hell for murderers' in Ireland.[175] This doctrine of meeting murder with murder was one strongly denounced by Scott in his editorial commentary.

The *Weekly Summary* was also censured by Irish nationalists and Liberal MP's in the British Parliament, and the *Guardian* reported this censure. Leader of the Liberal Party, Herbert Asquith MP, described it as 'one of the most inflammatory publications' that stimulated 'revengeful feelings'. He maintained that it was 'being circulated among the Royal Irish Constabulary by way of keeping them in the further development of this war of reprisals'. Asquith vowed to open the eyes of the British public 'to the dishonour being done in their name' in Ireland.[176] This was a sentiment shared by the *Guardian.* On 18th December the *Guardian* reported that the *Weekly Summary* 'continues to publish inflammatory articles'.[177] In addition, the *Guardian's* special correspondent stated that the publication was 'an incursion into politics', quoting extracts from a recent edition and maintaining that these would 'hardly be taken as a vigorous repudiation of reprisals'.[178] In February 1921, an editorial described the publication as 'notorious' for its 'obvious encouragements to crime'. It maintained: 'A Government that allows its officials to circulate incentives to misconduct among its own armed forces can only pass, among other Governments of the world, as a Government of bad character…'[179] Another editorial published the following day also criticised the *Weekly Summary* for inciting police violence.[180] Hugh Martin of the *Daily News* concurred with this assessment.[181] The *Manchester Guardian* considered the *Weekly*

[173] Hansard, House of Commons Debate, 22 November 1920 vol. 135 cc32-4.
[174] 'Vengeance in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 23 September 1920.
[175] 'Murders and 'Reprisals' in Ireland, *Manchester Guardian*, 04 November 1920.
[176] 'The Police Journal: Stimulating the Reprisal Spirit', *Manchester Guardian*, 20 November 1920.
[177] 'District Inspector Shot in Dublin', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 December 1920.
[178] 'R.I.C. and Politics: Extracts for the 'Weekly Summary'', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 December 1920.
[179] 'The Mallow Murders', *Manchester Guardian*, 17 February 1921.
[180] 'The Weekly Summary Again.', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 February 1921.
[181] Hugh Martin, quoted in 'New Books', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 March 1921.

Summary indicative of government policy of violence in Ireland, which Scott was firmly was against.

On the whole the *Weekly Summary* received little respect from British journalists. Other publications were also circulated, such as *A Survey of the Week's Activities,* but these publications did not garner the respect and influence enjoyed by the Dáil's *Irish Bulletin* and its makers.[182] It is for this reason, the Dáil claimed, that the British attempted to counterfeit the *Irish Bulletin* in March 1921.[183] Instances of British authorities forging Dáil documents became increasingly regular, particularly in the final year of war, but the counterfeit *Bulletin* was the most significant forgery undertaken by the British. Organised by William Darling following a successful raid on the *Bulletin's* offices, it was a prime opportunity for the British propaganda effort. But the counterfeits were poorly executed and the forgers continuously failed to correct their own errors. Edition numbers were incorrect, the format was suspicious, and the content was based on British propaganda sources such as the *Weekly Summary*. The forgery still had some impact however, as it was deemed necessary that Erskine Childers inform readers how to spot fakes, and Art O'Brien issued a statement to the British press informing them of the incident. By this point some papers including the *Daily News* had already printed some of the fake material, but the impact was short-lived.[184]

An editorial in the *Manchester Guardian* described the raid on the *Bulletin* as 'a clever coup'. It stated that Dublin Castle's publicity department would now 'breathe more freely' and that any re-emergence of the *Irish Bulletin* would be testament to Sinn Féin ingenuity.[185] The following day, the *Guardian* reported that the *Bulletin* had indeed remerged.[186] It was quickly revealed to readers, however, that the latest issues were suspected counterfeits. On 30th March 1921, a special correspondent for the *Guardian* reported that there were several reasons to doubt the authenticity of issues circulated since the *Bulletin's* offices were raided. The *Guardian* noted that the format of these issues was 'exactly similar to those run off on

[182] Murphy, *The Origins & Organisation of British Propaganda in Ireland 1920*, p. 25.
[183] No. 65 UCDA P80/14, Dáil Éireann Report on Propaganda, 10 March 1921, in Ronan Fanning, Michael Kennedy, Dermot Keogh, and Eunan O'Haplin (eds.), *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume I, 1919-1922* (Dublin, 1998), pp. 116-117.
[184] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, pp. 51-53.
[185] 'An Elusive Journal', *Manchester Guardian*, 29 March 1921.
[186] 'The 'Irish Bulletin' Reappears.', *Manchester Guardian*, 30 March 1921.

the machines captured by the auxiliaries'. It also recognised that the content contradicted Sinn Féin policy. The counterfeit *Bulletin* suggested that Sinn Féin would accept Home Rule as 'an instalment', but this did not align with de Valera's clear demands for a republic.[187] The forgeries were also called out in parliament: Henry Cavendish Bentinck, a connection of Scott, requested in the House of Lords that Dublin Castle stop sending him counterfeits.[188] On 8th April, not two weeks since the raid, the *Guardian* reprinted at length the statement by Childers published in the real *Irish Bulletin* which explained the differences between the genuine publication and the fake. This statement held the British government responsible for what officials had eventually described as a 'hoax'.[189] The following day the *Guardian* published further testament from its correspondent in Dublin of British government responsibility for this propaganda attempt.[190] What little impact the forgery had on the *Guardian's* content was brief: Scott did not consider the issue a priority for comment in his own editorials. Nevertheless, these propaganda activities shaped the climate in which *Guardian* journalists and the editor worked to cover the Irish question.

Earlier attempts to forge documents in order to damage the reputation of the Irish republican cause have also been recorded. In November 1920, the *Guardian* reported a Commons debate in which Chief Secretary Greenwood read 'captured documents from senior officers of the Republican army'. Irish Nationalist MP, Joseph Devlin, called these 'penny shockers' out as fakes, as products of the editor of the *Weekly Summary*.[191] A map of Cork was also falsified by Dublin Castle in an attempt to minimise the look of damage done to the city during the December reprisal in 1920. A fake 'Sinn Féin Oath' also emerged that called for violence against Protestants. This is thought to have been the work of Pollard and Darling of the Information Section of the Police Authority. These poorly executed propaganda tactics contradicted Basil Clarke's policy of 'propaganda by news' and thus contributed to the failure of the British propaganda campaign.[192] Once exposed, these forgeries only left the British

[187] 'Fake Reports of Negotiations', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 April 1921.
[188] Costello, 'The Role of Propaganda in the Anglo-Irish War 1919-1921', p. 7.
[189] 'The Forged 'Bulletin': Government Admit', *Manchester Guardian*, 08 April 1921.
[190] 'The Irish Forgery', *Manchester Guardian*, 09 April 1921.
[191] 'Debate in the Commons of Reprisals', *Manchester Guardian*, 25 November 1920.
[192] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, p. 35.

government in Ireland embarrassed, and British journalists even more distrustful of 'official sources'. These forgeries contributed to this increasingly hostile climate of news gathering.

Furthermore, the *Manchester Guardian* did not rely solely on news from Ireland itself for 'official' updates on Anglo-Irish politics and the ongoing conflict. News was sourced directly from the British government via the Houses of Parliament. It was the job of the *Guardian's* London Office, particularly Harold Dore and James Drysdale, to gather and report this news. The 'London Letter' that arrived daily from James Bone also provided updates and commentary on the latest in political affairs from the capital. Scott's editorials were regularly based on the recent activities of Westminster, and frequently began with reference to a parliamentary speech or debate as a foundation for his commentary. As the Chief Secretary for Ireland also sat in Westminster, the House of Commons provided a direct source from the Irish executive. Similarly, Dáil Éireann published from official correspondence, Dáil proceedings, and updates from the Irish perspective via public statements and speeches.[193] This also provided a source of news for the *Manchester Guardian* These were predominantly reported by the *Irish Bulletin* and the *Guardian's* correspondents in Dublin. Both administrations were aware of how their public contributions to discussion could be shaped for propaganda purposes.

Speeches were delivered in the House of Commons with propaganda motives in mind. Speeches were also given at public events and conferences which sought to bolster support for the government's Irish policy, as seen at the Unionist Party Conference in November 1921 for example, which Scott took up for comment.[194] The Unionist Party Conference was also highlighted in the London Letter,[195] and reported at length by Drysdale in the same issue.[196] In addition, Lloyd George played a personal public role in the government's propaganda attempts. Costello explains how the Prime Minister's response to public criticism from church leaders in April 1921 exemplified how public statements or correspondence were used for propaganda purposes. The original letter, which Scott described as 'a weighty document

[193] PRONI, D1584/10/7, Dáil Éireann, *Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations, June - September, 1921* (Dublin, 1921).
[194] C. P. Scott, 'The Liverpool Meeting.', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 November 1921.
[195] 'Our London Correspondence', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 November 1921.
[196] 'Unionists Rally Their Leaders', *Manchester Guardian,* 18 November 1921.

supported by weighty names', was published in full by the *Guardian*.[197] Lloyd George wrote eight drafts of his reply to this letter as he was aware of the impact his response could have on public opinion.[198] This reply was also published in full in the *Guardian*, and received the attention of one of Scott's editorials. Scott, however, did not take hope from the Prime Minister's chosen response, and spring-boarded from commentary on the response itself to further criticism of the government's Irish policy.[199]

The government also published official documents for propaganda purposes including two White Papers that sought to link Sinn Féin with German Imperialism and Soviet Communism. The government's plan was to make Sinn Féin 'guilty by association' in the eyes of the British public.[200] As Boyce explains, however, these efforts 'convinced no one who was not already convinced'.[201] An editorial published in the *Manchester Guardian* on 13th January 1921 criticised these documents, produced 'at the taxpayers expense', as trying to 'further incense Englishmen against Irishmen'. The *Guardian* had summarised the contents of these documents a few days prior, but ultimately dismissed them as propaganda.[202] Another example of this was a document published as an accompaniment to the Government of Ireland Act. This document purported to explain what the Act achieved, stating that it recognised the aspirations of the Irish people and granted powers exceeding those proposed by Gladstone. Scott dedicated an editorial to this document, describing it as 'pure propaganda… colourable falsehood'. Scott maintained: 'The thing is absurd, and the issue of this partisan gloss on an Act of Parliament at the public's expense is not only something of a scandal in itself but it also a slight on the intelligence of the public'.[203] Scott censured these propaganda efforts of the government as well as the Act itself. Nonetheless, these propaganda efforts still influenced editorials, even if this influence was not in the way the government intended. The British propaganda effort became a topic for commentary, and thus shaped the *Guardian's* content.

[197] C. P. Scott, 'Mr. Lloyd George's Letter.', *Manchester Guardian*, 20 April 1921.
[198] Costello, 'The Role of Propaganda in the Anglo-Irish War 1919-1921', p. 12.
[199] C. P. Scott, 'Mr. Lloyd George's Letter.', *Manchester Guardian*, 20 April 1921.
[200] Costello, 'The Role of Propaganda in the Anglo-Irish War 1919-1921', p. 10.
[201] Boyce, *Englishmen and the Irish Troubles, British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy 1918-22*, p. 88.
[202] 'Propaganda and Counter-Propaganda', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 January 1921.
[203] C. P. Scott, 'The Latest Propaganda', *Manchester Guardian* 31 January 1921.

The influence of British propaganda in Ireland was relatively limited, but the government's activities in England, particularly Westminster, were fundamental to the *Guardian's* content on Anglo-Irish politics. The *Guardian* still called out propaganda efforts as part of their role as 'honest witness' seeking to facilitate truth and public discussion, but Parliament was more difficult to disentangle, and proceedings were usually reported verbatim at length by the London Office. The majority of the *Guardian's* reporting on political developments in Anglo-Irish relations during times of conflict and truce was sourced from London, and events in the British capital became even more imperative after the truce. The signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty then aligned the government closely with Scott's view: According to the *Guardian*, the Irish question was solved. This does not detract from the work of those reporters in Ireland who illuminated the developments on the ground throughout the period, especially the violence of the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries, but the focus shifted in 1921, and the British government rhetoric promoted settlement by Dominion status and then the Anglo-Irish Treaty was ultimately in line with the view of Scott and the *Guardian.*

Conclusion

Throughout the Irish War of Independence the British government and the Crown forces adopted a number of policies and unofficial approaches in response to press coverage of Anglo-Irish politics and conflict. These policies of censorship, suppression, and propaganda all impacted on the environment in which *Guardian* staff worked, and thus their operations in Ireland and in Britain. The impact of this on the British press was much less than on the Irish press, and was ultimately ineffective in containing the critical narrative of the British liberal press toward the British government.[204] Nevertheless, in the case of the *Guardian* at least, the indirect effects of these policies have hitherto been understated. Press censorship and suppression of the Irish press disrupted the *Guardian's* journalistic networks in Ireland, which ultimately shaped the content published from the *Guardian* offices in Manchester, including the editorials of C. P. Scott. British propaganda also created a climate of misinformation that reporters and editors, as well as the broader British public, were forced to navigate. Hence,

[204] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, and Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*.

the *Guardian* maintained that attempts to manage the press, regardless of their comparative success, were detrimental to public discussion on the Irish question as they hindered open and truthful discourse on both sides of the Irish Sea.

The *Guardian'*s stance was underpinned by an ideological aversion to these policies. The newspaper considered it a duty to observe and report Irish news, as well as to expose propaganda being circulated in Ireland and Britain. As Walsh explains, 'the authority of journalists as honest witnesses had always been important to their self-image, but this watchdog role was reinvested with validity during the Anglo-Irish War'.[205] This aligned with the truth-telling facet of the *Guardian* ideology. Nevertheless, after the truce this watchdog role diminished, as the rhetoric on Ireland promoted by the government and the *Guardian* aligned.

In contrast, the propaganda efforts of Dáil Éireann were well received by the *Guardian*. The *Irish Bulletin,* in particular, was a source of news and views for Scott's editorial commentary. Moreover, the *Guardian's* journalistic networks in Ireland aided the Dáil's propaganda campaigns, as seen in the case of Alice Stopford-Green. The dynamic nature of these connections meant that the relationship between nationalist propaganda and *Guardian* content was complex, and indeed much more so than has previously been recognised.

[205] Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*, p. 188.

Chapter 7

Reader Engagement and Influence

This final chapter investigates readership engagement with the *Manchester Guardian's* coverage of the Irish question from the War of Independence to the Irish Civil War and examines the relationship between the newspaper and its readers. It focuses predominantly on the correspondence columns of the newspaper, exploring how readers engaged with the editorial line on Ireland via letters to the editor, identifying who these published letter-writers were, and discussing the purposes of the correspondence columns for both the *Guardian* and its readers. This chapter also develops further understanding of the *Guardian* readership, and considers readership and reader correspondence in relation to the newspaper's influence. Letters to the editor have been used by scholars of the Irish question and the British press to highlight certain perspectives during the revolutionary period,[1] however, a holistic and detailed analysis of this reader correspondence published in the newspapers cited has not previously been conducted. Equally, previous histories of the *Guardian* have completely neglected the correspondence columns, and reader engagement with the newspaper more.

This chapter begins by providing insight into the broader *Guardian* readership, in order to better understand the reach of Irish news and Scott's editorial commentary. It then focusses on letters to the editor, examining the content of published correspondence that discussed Ireland between 1919 and 1922. This section demonstrates how letters interacted with the editorial line and the views of other readers, particularly via 'letter rallies', which involved ongoing threads of discussion and comment from multiple contributors over several issues.[2] It highlights how readers impacted on *Guardian* content through their epistolary activity. The chapter then looks more closely at who wrote the letters selected for publication, shedding light on the geography and demographics of published letter-writers, and the dynamics of the connections between some of these writers and the editor. The geographical data is presented in a visual form to illustrate where published letters were sent from.

[1] Boyce, *Englishmen and the Irish Troubles, British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy 1918-22*, Peatling, *British Opinion and Irish Self-Government: From Unionism to Liberal Commonwealth*.
[2] Alison Cavanagh, 'Letters to the Editor as a Tool of Citizenship', in Alison Cavanagh and John Steel (eds.), *Letters to the Editor: Comparative and Historical Perspectives* (Basel, 2019), pp. 89-108.

This chapter enhances our understanding of the *Guardian* readership and illuminates how correspondence columns were used as a platform for dialogue between readers and the newspaper. In so doing, it facilitates an evaluation of the *Guardian's* commitment to public discussion as part of the newspaper's editorial ideology. The chapter ends with a broader discussion about readership, circulation, and influence which argues that, despite its relatively small circulation, the *Guardian* was considered an important publication. The correspondence columns show that it engaged, and had opportunity to influence, an authoritative readership that had power to action the politics of Scott and the *Guardian* in the wider world. This was indicative of the paper's broader significance in Anglo-Irish politics. It also cements the idea that the *Guardian* and its readers were part of a bi-directional network of influence that impacted on the *Guardian's* content and C. P. Scott's commentary on these developments in debates on the Irish question.

Guardian Readers

From its founding in 1821, the *Manchester Guardian* had 'a very considerable circulation'.[3] Sales doubled from 3,000 a week in the 1820s to around 6,000 a week in the 1830s. By the 1840s the paper outsold all of its top three rivals, the *Manchester Courier, Manchester Times*, and the *Manchester and Salford Advertiser,* combined.[4] When the *Guardian* became a daily following the abolition of the stamp duty in 1855, its circulation reached 10,000 per day within two years,[5] and by the 1890s, the *Guardian's* average circulation was over 40,000 copies daily. Circulation decreased by 14% in the early twentieth century, a loss that Koss attributes to its stance against the Boer War,[6] but by the 1910s circulation recovered,[7] and by the early interwar years it had reached on average 65,000 copies per day. The *Guardian's* daily readership was still only around 25% that of the *Times* in the 1930s, but it expanded twenty-fold over the first hundred years of the newspaper's history, and secured an international audience, after first carving out a unique position for itself in the North West of England.[8]

[3] JRL, GDN/150/1, Original Prospectus of the *Manchester Guardian*, circulated April 1921.
[4] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper* (Ithaca, 1978), p. 129.
[5] Ibid, p. 79.
[6] Mark Hampton, 'The Press, Patriotism, and Public discussion: C. P. Scott, The *Manchester Guardian*, and the Boer War, 1899-1902', *The Historical Journal*, vol. 44 (2001), p. 196.
[7] Stephen Koss, *The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, Vol 2: The Twentieth Century*, p. 44.
[8] Clarke, *Lancashire and New Liberalism*, p. 155.

The *Manchester Guardian* was established for the Manchester region, and had committed to giving 'particular attention to all subjects of local interest' since its founding.[9] As Simon Potter recognises, it served 'the interests of the locality in which it circulated',[10] a characteristic maintained into the interwar years. A glance at the contents pages of the newspaper demonstrates that Manchester and Lancashire news was a fundamental part of the *Guardian's* news coverage. In the first week of February 1919, for example, the *Guardian's* contents pages listed stories including, 'Manchester Radium Institute', '£5,000,000 scheme for Workington',[11] 'Manchester Engineers & 40 Hour Week', 'Lancashire Officer's Gallantry' and 'Manchester Housing', [12] 'Manchester and the Barrow Engineers Against a Strike', 'Manchester Council: Salaries', 'Salford Council', and 'Opposition to Manchester Water Bill'.[13] The demographics of readership engagement with the newspaper via the correspondence columns, as explored in this chapter, illuminates the energetic voice of the Manchester and North West readership. This community of readers saw Manchester as key to the identity of the paper, as demonstrated by their dismay when Manchester was eventually dropped from the paper's title in 1959.[14]

From the *Guardian's* early years, however, newsrooms in towns as far as Glasgow and Exeter still bought the *Guardian*,[15] and in 1857, 16% of sales were external to the Manchester area.[16] The arrival of business manager, George Dibblee, to the newspaper in 1892 saw proactive attempts to expand the *Guardian's* geographical reach. Dibblee established the Welsh edition of the *Guardian* in 1893 in an attempt to harness the high literacy rates and liberal traditions of North Wales, and reached out to readerships in the Potteries, Yorkshire, and elsewhere in the North of England. In 1900, two news trains connected Manchester with Scotland and the Lake District via Wigan, and Halifax and Bradford via Leeds. A bicycle delivery service was also introduced for the central residential areas of London at the turn of the century, and by 1929

[9] JRL, GDN/150/1, Original Prospectus of the *Manchester Guardian*, circulated April 1921.
[10] Simon J. Potter, 'Empire and the English Press, c.1857-1914', in Simon J. Potter (Ed.) *Newspapers and Empire in Ireland and Britain, Reporting the British Empire, c. 1857-1921* (Chippenham, 2004), p. 40.
[11] 'Table of Contents', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 Feb 1919.
[12] 'Table of Contents', *Manchester Guardian*, 02 Feb 1919.
[13] 'Table of Contents', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 Feb 1919.
[14] Carole O'Reilly, ''The magnetic pull of the metropolis' : the *Manchester Guardian*, the provincial press and ideas of the north' , *Northern History* (2020), vol. 57, pp. 270-290.
[15] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper,* pp. 37-38.
[16] Clarke, *Lancashire and New Liberalism*, p. 153.

there were four bicycle boys in operation.[17] By the 1940s, almost half (45%) of sales of the *Manchester Guardian* daily newspaper across Britain and Ireland were from outside of Lancashire.[18]

Moreover, almost immediately after its founding in the 1820s, the *Guardian* informed other newspapers across the British Empire. In the interwar years, Australian newspapers frequently referred to and reprinted articles, editorials, and letters to the editor originally published in the *MG*, including content on the Irish question. On 18 January 1919, three days before the Irish War of Independence commenced, Melbourne's Catholic newspaper, *The Advocate*, re-printed an editorial under the heading: 'The Case of Ireland: The "Manchester Guardian" warns the Government'. The was preceded by a description of the *Guardian* as 'the leading paper'.[19] On 29 April 1920 the *Freeman's Journal* in Sydney (later renamed the *Catholic Weekly*) reprinted a 'remarkable' *Guardian* editorial while connecting the Irish struggle with anti-colonial nationalism in Egypt.[20] The frequency of *Guardian* appearances in the Catholic press in Australia indicates that the paper was respected among the Irish diaspora in particular, but *Guardian* content was not just reproduced for Catholic or Irish audiences in Australia. For example, an article published on 28 September 1920 in the *Braidwood Review and District Advocate*, New South Wales, used the reports of the *Guardian's* Dublin correspondent,[21] the following day, *The Recorder* based at Port Pirie, South Australia, quoted a *Guardian* leader,[22] and the *Western Star*, which reported to residents of outback Queensland quoted a letter to the editor and a leading article three days after that, all in response to Black and Tan violence.[23]

The *Guardian* was also utilised by the press in India. For example, *The Times of India* re-printed an article after the Anglo-Irish truce on 14th July 1921 titled, 'Ireland and Africa. A Task for Smuts', which refers to the role of Jan Smuts in the peace negotiations.[24] The *Guardian's*

[17] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 292.
[18] JRL, GDN/148/3/54, *Manchester Guardian* Net Sales Comparison, 1943.
[19] 'The Case of Ireland: The "Manchester Guardian" warns the Government', *The Advocate,* 18 January 1919.
[20] 'Ireland and Egypt: A Striking Parallel', *Freeman's Journal*, Sydney, 29 April 1920.
[21] 'Ireland', *Braidwood Review and District Advocate,* 28 September 1920.
[22] 'Reprisals in Ireland'*, The Recorder,* 29 September 1920.
[23] 'Screening Counter-Murder', *Western star and Roma Advertiser*, 02 October 1920.
[24] 'Ireland and Africa. A Task for Smuts', *The Times of India*, 14 July 1921.

coverage of the cotton trade was also of interest to readers in India.[25] Moreover, When Scott retired in 1929 'at the ripe age of eighty-three', the paper stated:

> For fifty years or more *The Manchester Guardian* has held a firm place in the esteem not only of Lancastrians, but of political students throughout the county… *The Manchester Guardian* stood for all that was best in British journalism… Yet, despite its international repute and its important influence, *The Manchester Guardian* has never been a popular paper. The public probably does not know - and does not care to know - whether the circulation of *The Manchester Guardian* exceeds distinguished rivals in Liverpool and the West Riding. For what made the *Manchester Guardian* secure has been its style; the sound reasoning and literary excellence of its leading articles, its political notes, its reviews of books, plays and films; the conscious effort to avoid all that was slovenly, mean or ungenerous; the enlightened purpose, the dignity and restraint.[26]

Despite its relatively small circulation, the *Guardian's* content and reputation reached audiences across the British Empire. As such, it exerted influence beyond national boundaries, and even beyond its own direct readership.

The *Guardian's* reach was further expanded with the founding of the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* in 1919, which intended to tap into new international audiences, particularly in the US. In its first month, 20,400 copies were dispatched to New York City. Newsagents in Ireland also sold the *Guardian Weekly*, connecting the newspaper and Scott's editorial commentary with more Irish readers. In July 1919, 4,725 copies were dispatched to Dublin, 1,215 to Belfast, 405 to Cork, 230 to Limerick, and 162 to Waterford.[27] Almost seven thousand copies were sent to Ireland that month in total. It is likely that most readers of the *Guardian* based in Ireland who wrote letters to the editor on the Irish question between 1919 and 1922, as discussed below, read the *Guardian Weekly*. The *Guardian Weekly* was also widely distributed in towns as close as Stockport, Bolton, Blackburn and Burnley, as well as places including Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh, Carlisle, Newcastle, Stratford, Lincoln, Leicester, Torquay, and

[25] For example, see 'Cotton Conference', *The Times of India*, 16 December 1919.
[26] 'Scott of Manchester', *The Times of India*, 05 July 1929.
[27] JRL, GDN/286/3, *Manchester Guardian Weekly* dispatch book, 1919.

of course, London.[28] The *Guardian Weekly* ensured that the readers who could not take the paper daily or in time for the breakfast table, could still access the editorials published that week, including those written by Scott on the Irish question.

The *Guardian* was intended for politicised readers who were interested in the national and international questions of the day, regardless of their locality. Political reporting was also key to the *Guardian's* purpose as part of the *Guardian* ideology. As a liberal press however, the daily news tended to focus on liberal concerns. Taking the same week in February 1919 as above, the contents pages featured stories including 'Mr. Asquith and the League of Nations',[29] 'Independent Liberal MP's Chairman and Whips',[30] 'Labour and Liberal Relations', 'Non-Coalition Liberals and the Party',[31] and 'Liberal Unity'.[32] The *Guardian's* liberal stance was well understood by contemporaries, and Scott's liberalism was at the heart of his commentary on Ireland, as highlighted in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. The *Guardian's* local and national readership was, therefore, largely liberal with a level of education that allowed them to engage with high politics. They were local reverends, councillors, and school masters, and they were often nonconformists, who were historically connected to the *Guardian* and the development of English liberalism.[33] They were also liberal politicians, intellectuals, and other elites in the local and national context, which is why the readership has previously been generalised as a 'Liberal elite', but not exclusively. As the section on letters writers in this chapter demonstrates, many readers were from humbler backgrounds, although, their presence demonstrates that the *Guardian* still had a level of political and social currency that could appeal to them. These elements of the readership were the kinds of people interested in the Irish question as a key national, imperial, and liberal concern.

Furthermore, readers also included commercial men whose primary interests were trade and industry news, particularly relating to the cotton industry. The cotton trade was fundamental to the economic life and history of Manchester and the broader region, and the *Guardian*

[28] JRL, GDN/286/3, *Manchester Guardian Weekly* dispatch book, 1919.
[29] 'Table of Contents', *Manchester Guardian*, 02 Feb 1919.
[30] 'Table of Contents', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 Feb 1919.
[31] 'Table of Contents', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 Feb 1919.
[32] 'Table of Contents', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 Feb 1919.
[33] John Seed, 'Unitarianism, Political Economy and the Antinomies of Liberal Culture in Manchester 1830-50, *Social History,* vol. 7 (1982), pp. 1-25.

founders themselves were cotton merchants. Hence, until the decline of the industry from 1922, the *Guardian* 'enjoyed a secure circulation among the thousands of small firms of which the industry was composed', as each firm 'almost automatically purchased a copy for each member of its staff who reached the level of a manager'. Commercial news was an important facet of the *Guardian's* news coverage, and attracted this more conservative demographic of readers to the newspaper. Cotton traders constituted around 20% of the *Guardian's* readership in the early twentieth century,[34] and until 1922, the *Guardian* secured approximately £300,000 a year in advertising revenue from the industry.[35] This further demonstrate that the *Guardian* readership was more than a 'liberal elite', indeed, it was more than liberal. The complexity of the *Guardian* readership meant that the newspaper could not reflect the political views of all, but its news coverage was still emblematic of the interests of its readers. These interests could also intersect. For example, stories such as 'Bombay Cotton Strike Ended' published in February 1919 had local, national and imperial significance, in terms of commerce and trade, labour politics, and the politics of nation and empire.[36]

Despite these complexities of interests and politics, the *Guardian* readership was still largely confined to the middle-classes upward.[37] It was not that the *Guardian* was apathetic to working-class issues as, from the 1860s onward, it reported labour news, on strikes, trade unions and co-operatives, burial clubs, and other institutions of working-class life where it, at least, hoped to appeal to working-class readers. This would also mean a greater influence over individuals, which Scott desired as part of the *Guardian* ideology. But readers had to be able to afford a copy of the *Guardian* at two pennies a piece, or at least have access to the newspaper, such as through their employer like the commercial men highlighted above. Readers also required a certain level of education that allowed for the coverage and style to be informative, interesting, useful, and even entertaining. The *Guardian's* frequently published book and theatre reviews alongside the headlines are indicative of the cultural capital enjoyed by its readers. Sports news was also important; although cricket was the sport of the *Guardian*, as opposed to football, which was more central to working-class culture.

[34] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper* (Ithaca, 1978), p. 336.
[35] Ibid, p. 489.
[36] 'Table of Contents', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 Feb 1919.
[37] Hampton, 'The Press, Patriotism, and Public discussion: C. P. Scott, The *Manchester Guardian*, and the Boer War, 1899-1902', p. 196.

Neville Cardus made his name as the cricket correspondent for the *Guardian* in the interwar years.[38]

The availability of more radical labour alternatives by the 1920s also reduced the *Guardian's* working-class audience. Newspapers such as the *Labour Leader* and *Daily Herald* that received funding from trade unions and penny donations were aimed at the working-classes and provided an outlet for radical/labourist views.[39] These publications also provided a stronger critique of British imperialism than the liberal *Guardian*. The *Labour Leader* and *Daily Herald's* reporting of the Amritsar Massacre in India in 1919 and the Croke Park Massacre in Ireland in 1920 exemplified this more radical coverage.[40] Working-class and radical readers got their news from publications such as these, which offered a more damning account of British imperialism, unrestrained by liberal moderation. Scott and the *MG* struggled to provide this imperial critique, ultimately viewing the empire as the solution to conflict.

Nevertheless, the *Manchester Guardian's* readership is still a complex picture. The paper reached of people all over the world, while maintaining a large base of readers in Manchester and the North-West region of England. These readers were interested in different local, national and international news and causes, and they had the necessary education and financial resources to access the newspaper. It was a comparatively small readership, but its expansion in terms of circulation, geographical reach, and reputation built on Scott's politics and editorial policy, was impressive, especially considering its provincial tradition. The *Guardian's* readership was local and global, it was politically dynamic, and it was influential, even if it was not the paper for the working classes or 'mass electorate'. This relationship between readers and influence is explored throughout this chapter.

[38] Cardus, *Autobiography*.
[39] Laura Beers, *Your Britain: Media and the Making of the Labour Party* (London, 2010), ch. 3.
[40] Davies, 'British Reactions to Amritsar and Croke Park: Connections and Comparisons, ch. 4.

Letters to the Editor

The Irish question was a topic of interest for many readers between 1919 and 1922, and this is illustrated by their engagement with the *Guardian's* editorial line on Ireland via letters to the editor. Letters to the editor of the *Manchester Guardian* were a fundamental part of the newspaper's content, presented as a tool through which readers could engage in public discussion on the issues taken up for commentary in the editorial columns. As such, the correspondence columns were considered an important forum in promoting the educational ideals of the press, as part of the *Guardian* ideology. The significance of these letters is indicated by the amount of space devoted to the correspondence columns, especially in comparison to the popular press. Reader-letters in the *Guardian* were also, on the whole, much longer than letters published in papers such as the *Daily Mail* or the *Daily Express*. The attention given to correspondence in the *Guardian's* contents tables also demonstrates the significance of this aspect of the newspaper. The purpose of the tables of contents is to direct readers to articles of special interest or importance: letters to the editor featured here, especially those sent by people of local or national recognition. Letters were usually published verbatim, although on occasion, they would be condensed if they were too long to print in full. The *Guardian* instructed its readers to keep contributions brief 'In order to avoid delay or the necessity of curtailment'.[41] Letters varied in topic and number per issue, but they usually all featured on the same page, which changed day to day, and occasionally overflowed on to the next.

Letters to the editor could be proactive or reactive:[42] Proactive letters were usually stand-alone, and sought to draw attention to something that had yet to be reported or editorialised. These were a small minority of letters in the *Guardian*. Reactive letters offered responses to editorial commentary, and were the most common. Reactive letters were also published in response to the letters of other readers. In addition, a member of the *Guardian* staff, or 'Ed. Guard', would frequently reply to letters in the correspondence columns, especially if it took a critical stance of the *Guardian's* reporting or editorial commentary. These letters and replies formed threads, or letter rallies, across a number of issues, with critical letters opening up the

[41] 'Notices to Correspondents', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 May 1906.
[42] Alison Cavanagh, 'Letters to the Editor as a Tool of Citizenship', in Alison Cavanagh and John Steel (eds.), *Letters to the Editor: Comparative and Historical Perspectives* (Basel, 2019), pp. 89-108.

most extensive public discussion. 'Ed. Guard' decided when correspondence for a particular thread would be concluded, and would inform readers of this within the correspondence columns. But it is difficult to ascertain who, of the *Guardian* staff, responded to readers in individual cases, as reporters also took on some of the responsibility of 'Editorial Letters', as recorded in the Reporters' Diaries.[43] Nevertheless, the letters to the editor represented a connection between Scott as Editor, and the *Guardian* readership.

The key themes addressed in the letters to the editor on the Irish question published between 1919 and 1922 mirrored those addressed in Scott's editorial commentary. The events of the day dictated the news articles published, this influenced editorial content, and the *Guardian's* editorials in turn inspired readership engagement via letters to the editor. The correspondence columns completed the narrative. Hence, during the War of Independence, Ireland's right to self-determination and the prospect of Dominion status, Ulster, partition, and violence, were the focus of most letters to the editor, in line with Scott's editorials. Most of these letters reinforced Scott's view. This is evidenced by the numerous letters published over the course of the conflict that underlined the *Guardian's* stance on Dominion status for a united Ireland. These included correspondence from M. Sidney Parry of County Antrim, Ireland,[44] Reverend H. Enfield Dowson of Gee Cross, Manchester,[45] Henry Harrison of the Irish Dominion League in Dublin,[46] and Scottish politicians Colin R. Coote and Walter E. Elliot.[47]

Nevertheless, letters that challenged the *Guardian's* stance were still published in the correspondence columns during the conflict. On the 3rd of July 1919, a critical, reactive letter to the editor was sent in response to Scott's editorial published on 28th June 1919. This editorial established Dominion status as the best course of action for Ireland in the *Guardian's* view, and offered praise and support for the newly formed Irish Dominion League.[48] The letter was signed with the pseudonym 'SLIEVE LUACHRA', likely referring to a region in Munster, Ireland, of a similar spelling. Another critical letter sent by 'W.' from Dublin also appeared

[43] JRL, GDN/52-55, Reporters diaries, 1919-1922.
[44] M. Sidney Parry, 'Ireland and the League of Nations', *Manchester Guardian*, 26 June 1919.
[45] H. Enfield Dowson, 'The Irish Problem', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 March 1920.
[46] Henry Harrison, 'The Dominion Plan for Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 29 April 1920.
[47] Colin R. Coote and Walter E. Elliot, 'A Way to Peace in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 November 1920.
[48] C. P. Scott, 'The Irish Dominion League', *Manchester Guardian,* 28 June 1919.

alongside the contribution made by 'SLIEVE LUACHRA'.[49] Both letters were from an Irish republican perspective and argued for full independence for Ireland upon the principle of self-determination.[50] The letter-writers asked why Ireland was different to other small nations across Central Europe and Russia, insisting that Ireland's claim to political self-determination was historic and was being oppressed by British rule.[51] The *Guardian* agreed that Ireland was its own nation,[52] however, the *MG* disputed that full independence was justified. Scott wrote an editorial in response to these letters that reasserted the *Guardian's* position on the principle of self-determination in the Irish case.[53] This argued that one reason for its objection to *complete* independence was due to potential security concerns for England in the future, a position outlined in Chapter 2.[54] In response, the letter-writer asked: 'Are Ireland's rights then to be sacrificed to England's interests?' The letters maintained that this excuse around security could be used as grounds for the subjugation of other smaller nations by other powers. The correspondent drew similarities between this approach and the German invasion of Belgium. Germany disregarded Belgium's neutrality for its own interests, just as England disregards Irish nationalism.[55] As also highlighted in Chapter 2, the *Guardian* drew connections between British violence in Ireland and the German invasion of Belgium during the First World War, but Scott did not accept the comparison made by Irish republicans here.

Scott responded to these critical letters from an Irish republican perspective by publishing an editorial that addressed and refuted them.[56] Scott continued to argue for a *united* Ireland with *some* level of self-governance. In reaction to this, 'SLIEVE LUACHRA' sent another letter.[57] This reiterated opposition to the *Guardian's* view that Irish independence was not justifiable by the principle of self-determination. The author argued that as England is Ireland's biggest market, Ireland would seek to protect the commercial interests of both

[49] SLIEVE LUACHRA., 'The Irish Dominion League', *Manchester Guardian,* 03 July 1919, and W., 'The Irish Dominion League', *Manchester Guardian,* 03 July 1919.
[50] SLIEVE LUACHRA., 'The Irish Dominion League', *Manchester Guardian,* 03 July 1919, and W., 'The Irish Dominion League', *Manchester Guardian,* 03 July 1919.
[51] SLIEVE LUACHRA., and W., 'The Irish Dominion League', *Manchester Guardian,* 03 July 1919.
[52] For example, see C. P. Scott, 'Ireland.', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 April 1919.
[53] C. P. Scott, 'The Claims to Irish Independence', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 July 1919.
[54] C. P. Scott, 'The Claims to Irish Independence', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 July 1919.
[55] SLIEVE LUACHRA., and W., 'The Irish Dominion League', *Manchester Guardian,* 03 July 1919.
[56] C. P. Scott, 'The Claims to Irish Independence', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 July 1919.
[57] SLIEVE LUACHRA., 'The Irish Dominion League', *Manchester Guardian*, 08 July 1919.

nations; that denying self-determination due to England's security interests was a 'Prussian principle'; and that difficulties with Ulster were no different to 'Jews in Poland and to the Germans in Bohemia'. The letter argued that should Ireland be left to its own devices, the issue of Ulster would be resolved among Irishmen themselves.[58] This echoed de Valera's sentiments, which were maintained throughout the War of Independence and peace process, and were criticised by Scott.

'Ed. Guard' replied to the second letter of 'SLIEVE LUACHRA' reiterating Scott's view. They stated: 'There is no such thing, and we have never maintained that there was, an absolute right of "self-determination" on the part of any population wholly without regard to the interests of the larger aggregate of which it has formed part'. 'Ed. Guard' argued that Ireland should remain part of the British Empire, 'with full responsible self-government such as is enjoyed by our great Dominions'. They maintained that complete separation from Britain would cause Ireland to become a 'fifth-rate independent power…deeply divided internally and overshadowed by a mighty neighbour who she treats as an enemy'.[59] This interaction between Irish republican letter-writers and the *Guardian* demonstrates that critical letters were published, in line with Scott's commitment to public discussion, as part of the *Guardian* ideology. But these letters were then used to reiterate the *Guardian's* own stance, whether through replies by 'Ed. Guard' or additional editorial commentary published in the leader columns.

Another example of this can be seen in a letter rally started by T. C. Horsfall in the first months of the war.[60] Horsfall was a prominent local figure in Manchester, a liberal unionist,[61] and strong supporter of the Ulster Covenant.[62] On 11th March 1919, a letter he wrote was published in the *Guardian* under the heading 'Irish Protestants and Home Rule',[63] which criticised the *MG* for one of its leading articles. The editorial had maintained that the Ulster Unionists had set a violent precedent back in 1914 by threatening to take up arms to preserve

[58] SLIEVE LUACHRA., 'The Irish Dominion League', *Manchester Guardian*, 08 July 1919.
[59] Ed. Guard., 'The Irish Dominion League', *Manchester Guardian*, 08 July 1919.
[60] T. C. Horsfall, 'Irish Protestants and Home Rule', *Manchester Guardian*, 11 March 1919.
[61] Stuart Eagles, 'Horsfall, Thomas Coglan (1841-1932)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Online, 2009).
[62] 'Signing the Covenant: Mr T. C. Horsfall Retires from the Bench', *Manchester Guardian*, 08 April 1914.
[63] T. C. Horsfall, 'Irish Protestants and Home Rule', *Manchester Guardian,* 11 March 1919.

the Union between Britain and Ireland.[64] Horsfall disagreed with the *Guardian's* perspective that the move towards lawlessness in Ireland began with this threat from the Ulster Unionists prior to WWI. Horsfall defended the Ulster Unionists, whom he had supported at the time, by maintaining that there was a difference between the actions of the Ulster Movement, and the actions of Sinn Fein. Ulster, by taking up arms, would be defending themselves as part of the Irish Protestant minority, whereas Sinn Fein and Irish Nationalists were already safeguarded as part of the Catholic majority.[65] Scott disagreed, and Horsfall's letter instigated a discussion on the threat of Catholic nationalism to the Protestant minority in Ireland.

The first response to Horsfall's view was from William Henry Carr, an active Labour Party member and unionist for the cotton trade, originally from London but living in Manchester by 1919.[66] Carr agreed that there was a difference between the Ulster Unionist movement and Sinn Fein, as Horsfall had stated, but opposed Horsfall's reasoning. Alternatively, Carr argued that the Unionist threats of violence in 1914 'was an act of 'loyalists' who declared that they would resist, even unto death, any attempt to bring into operation an Act of Parliament passed by their own Government'. Irish nationalist violence, however, was the 'demand of a people to be freed from captivity to which it has never consented'. Carr stressed that the religious affiliations of Irish Nationalists are more nuanced than Horsfall recognised, and that Sinn Féin was 'not religious but political, not for religious freedom but for Irish national liberty', and thus the 'transition from politics to religion is not permissible by the laws of logic'. Carr supported Irish nationalism, but did not identify as a 'Sinn Féiner'.[67]

A response from a Thos. F. Burns featured alongside Carr's letter in the same *Guardian* issue. Burns was an Irish Nationalist and Secretary of the Catholic Confederation Salford Diocesan Council,[68] and also a Labour Party member.[69] Burns' letter recognised that many Protestants believed Irish self-government would lead to their own suppression, but argued that there

[64] C. P. Scott, 'The Ulster Precedent', *Manchester Guardian,* 05 March 1919.
[65] T. C. Horsfall, 'Irish Protestants and Home Rule', *Manchester Guardian,* 11 March 1919.
[66] 'Cardroom Operatives: Air. W. H. Carr's Services', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 November 1913.
[67] W. Carr, 'Irish Protestants and Home Rule', *Manchester Guardian*, 12 March 1919.
[68] Catholic Confederation Salford Diocesan Executive Council, 'Church Missions in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 21 March 1919
[69] Thos. F. Burns, 'The Ministry of Health Bill', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 March 1919, and Thos. F. Burns, 'The Labour Party and Social Democracy', *Manchester Guardian*, 31 March 1919.

was no foundation for this belief. Burns points out that Irish Nationalists were not exclusively Catholic, but even so, they would not support a government that sought to subject Protestants to Catholic rule. Similarly to Carr, Burns indicated that Irish nationalism was not a religious issue.[70] This echoed Scott's view of Irish nationalism as a political conflict around national identity, rather than sectarian division.

The next day, on 13th March 1919, a letter was published from 'SEAGHAN' that was sent from Liverpool. The pseudonym used and the content of the letter indicated that the writer was Irish or of Irish decent. The letter argued that Horsfall's suggestions regarding the Catholic subjugation of Protestants under Sinn Fein had no 'facts or principles' as basis. He highlighted that not all of Sinn Fein were Catholic, pointing out Darrell Figgis as a prominent Protestant republican.[71] Alongside 'SEAGHAN', another letter argued that Protestants have nothing to fear from Catholics in Ireland. It stated: 'The Irish Catholics have suffered too much from persecution to turn out to be persecutors themselves; their history has been written in blood and tears'. This letter-writer, who wrote under the pseudonym 'POCAHONTAS', was living in Manchester but likely Irish, as they had knowledge of local people in Killarney and Tralee.[72]

A letter from Horsfall in response to Thos. Burns was then published on 14th March.[73] This argued that Burns had misrepresented his view of Protestant fears in his recent letter to the editor. Horsfall defended his original point, maintaining: 'it is an exceedingly difficult thing even in this country for members of different churches to treat each other justly, and that in Ireland it is certainly much more difficult'. Horsfall maintained that under Home Rule this would be exacerbated. He saw weakening Protestantism as a fundamental desire of Catholics. Hence, he maintained that Home Rule should be granted with the exclusion of Ulster. Horsfall insisted that when the South of Ireland demonstrated that Protestants there lived without religious subjugation, 'a great majority of British and Irish Protestants' would demand an extension of Home Rule to a united Ireland.[74]

[70] Thos. F. Burns, 'Irish Protestants and Home Rule', *Manchester Guardian,* 12 March 1919.
[71] SEAGHAN, 'Irish Protestants and Home Rule', 13 March 1919.
[72] POCAHONTAS, 'Irish Protestants and Home Rule', 13 March 1919.
[73] T. C. Horsfall, 'Irish Protestants and Home Rule.', 14 March 1919.
[74] T. C. Horsfall, 'Irish Protestants and Home Rule.', 14 March 1919.

Burns replied in a letter published the following day that reinforced his original point that there was no basis for Protestants to fear the Catholic majority under Home Rule, highlighting that 'Souperism is an Irish Protestant institution'. Souperism was a practice that emerged during the Irish Famine, in which Protestant institutions offered food to Catholic children on the condition that they received Protestant religious education. Burns also drew attention to the work of Catholics in the US to promote religious freedom, in comparison to the lack of tolerance in 'colonies established by the Pilgrim fathers'. He maintained that Sinn Fein policy supported 'Liberty of Religions'. He objected to the partition of Ulster, and as a 'self-determinist', believed Ireland as a whole should accept the system of the majority. Burns closed his letter with an appeal to Horsfall, 'not to think about Home Rule in terms of religion but in terms of self-determination'. Burns maintained that if it was not possible to view Ireland as having some level of self-determination, the ongoing peace conference and the proposals for a League of Nations were a 'farce', 'an idle dream'. Burns insisted that Britain held Ireland by force, and that 'if Mr. Horsfall is right, we must continue to hold it by physical force'.[75] Again, this supported Scott's commentary. The *Guardian* closed the correspondence thread down following this letter, concluding four days and seven letters of reader debate.[76]

At first glance, the inclusion of critical letters in the correspondence columns, and the letter-rallies that ensued such as the one above, appear to be an expression of public discussion as part of the *Guardian* ideology. However, all the replies to Horsfall that were published criticised his perspective, and ultimately reinforced the *Guardian's* position. This rally demonstrates that the *Manchester Guardian* did not seek to omit critical letters, but that these exchanges still ultimately reinforced Scott's views. Published criticism from letter-writers was taken as an opportunity to reassert the *Guardian's* position, and the letter rallies that followed were curated as such.

[75] Thos. Burns, 'Irish Protestants and Home Rule', 15 March 1919.
[76] T. C. Horsfall, 'Irish Protestants and Home Rule.', 11 March 1919, and Thos. F. Burns and, W. Carr, 'Irish Protestants and Home Rule', *Manchester Guardian,* 12 March 1919, and Pocahontas and, Seaghan, 'Irish Protestants and Home Rule', *Manchester Guardian,* 13 March 1919, and T. C. Horsfall, 'Irish Protestants and Home Rule', *Manchester Guardian,* 14 March 1919, and Thos. F. Burns, 'Irish Protestants and Home Rule', *Manchester Guardian,* 15 March 1919.

Discourse around violence in Ireland also stimulated reader debate. A rally began on 18th November 1920 following a letter from the Rev, J. E Roberts of Withington, Manchester,[77] published in response to an article claiming he had been at a recent meeting protesting reprisals at the Manchester Free Trade Hall.[78] Roberts stated that he had not attended this rally, and went on to criticise those who denounce reprisals for their 'grievous partiality'. Roberts maintained that any condemnation of the IRA by the *Guardian* had merely been 'lip service', and that there had been unfair and unbalanced focus on the British 'reprisals' in comparison to the actions of the IRA.[79] As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the *Guardian* did focus much more on the violence of the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries than on nationalist violence.

After apologising for the reporting error, 'Ed. Guard' defended the newspaper's position in a short reply. The *Guardian* argued that lawlessness and crime committed by agents of the law is more serious than that committed by criminals. This was a position maintained in Scott's leaders. The response also asserted that the *Guardian* frequently criticised the IRA as 'a stain upon the whole nationalist movement', and that Roberts insisting otherwise was libel.[80] The *Guardian* had criticised the IRA, even if there was a disparity in the extent of this coverage in comparison to commentary on the Crown forces.

The short interaction between Dr. Roberts and 'Ed. Guard' generated additional responses from other readers who agreed with Roberts that the *Guardian's* coverage was unfairly focused on British violence. John J. Skemp of Ansdell College, Lytham St. Annes, Lancashire, stated that he was 'a loyal reader for even a longer time than Dr. Roberts, and like him I am very jealous for its reputation. For that reason I must support his complaint'. Skemp maintained that it was not a question of whether Scott was right in his stance on reprisals, but whether 'facts have been fairly stated'. Skemp argued that the *Guardian* 'has given ten times the space to reprisals that it has given to Sinn Fein atrocities. It has stressed one set of facts and slurred another'.[81] The *Guardian* responded to Skemp insisting that 'We are quite impertinent': the *MG* believed it had published 'all that was known or could be ascertained'

[77] J. E. Roberts, 'Reprisals in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 18 November 1920.
[78] 'Outrages in Ireland: A Manchester Protest Meeting Arranged', *Manchester Guardian,* 11 November 1920.
[79] Ed. Guard., 'Reprisals in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 18 November 1920.
[80] Ed. Guard., 'Reprisals in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 18 November 1920.
[81] John G. Skemp, 'Reprisals in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 22 November 1920.

regarding both sides of the conflict.[82] Rev. W. H. Jeffries of Rycroft Independent Church, Ashton-under-Lyne, Greater Manchester, also stated in the same issue:

> In common with many others who share Dr. Roberts appreciation and gratitude for the 'Guardian' I feel it right to say that in this matter he has expressed what many of us feel. We deprecate reprisals and denounce both their authors and their agents, but we consider inadequate attention has been given to that which provoked them.[83]

This was, however, more a criticism of how violence had been represented to *Guardian* readers.

These letters also highlight, therefore, the role of readers and readership engagement via the correspondence columns in upholding the *Guardian's* editorial ideology, as well as debating the newspaper's politics. The *Guardian* promised its readers fair presentation of the facts. Here, we see readers publicly questioning the *Guardian's* fulfilment of this ideal in practice. Still, the *Guardian's* politics and editorial practises were intertwined. This was highlighted by Rev. A. H. Walker of Manchester during this same debate, who maintained that the *Guardian's* 'zeal for moderation and mildness' had led to a loss of 'its balance of judgement in respect to the policy of the present Government towards the perpetrators of crime in Ireland'.[84] For Rev. Walker, the *Guardian's* editorial commitment to moderation had led to undeserved lenience in its coverage of Irish nationalist violence.

Other challenges to the *Guardian's* coverage of violence in Ireland followed commentary on 'official reprisals' under martial law in late 1920. For example, a letter sent under the pseudonym 'Old Redmondite', implying the author was a moderate nationalist in line with former IPP leader John Redmond, expressed 'amazement' that this policy had received the *Guardian's* approval. The writer maintained that they looked to the *Guardian* for 'enlightenment and guidance on the Irish question', and was thus surprised by the *Guardian's* stance on official reprisals. 'Old Redmondite' maintained: 'One need not be a Sinn Féiner to express the strongest condemnation of the 'new reprisals' policy'.[85] The *Guardian's* reply

[82] Ed. Guard., 'Reprisals in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 22 November 1920.
[83] W. H. Jeffries, 'Reprisals in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 22 November 1920.
[84] A. H. Walker, 'Reprisals in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 22 November 1922.
[85] Old Redmondite, 'Reprisals with a Difference', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 January 1921.

reasserted Scott's editorial line, that 'the procedure is not ideal. No procedure under martial law can be. But at least it is a great improvement on indiscriminate violence'.[86] Scott expressed frustration at the backlash he has received for his stance on official reprisals in his private correspondence with his closest confidante, L. T. Hobhouse.[87] Violence dominated the correspondence columns until March 1921, until these letters were superseded by appeals for humanitarian responses to the conflict, correspondence on the Northern Irish elections, and the prospect of peace.[88]

Throughout the War of Independence the *Guardian* published many letters that challenged the editorial line. These were almost always used as opportunity to reassert Scott's views, with or without assistance from other readers, but these opposing perspectives were still given a platform by the newspapers. However, following the truce in July 1921 to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty that December, there were no letters published in the *Guardian* that opposed or challenged Scott's editorial commentary. The letter rallies between readers and editor completely ceased. There were no letter rallies published in the *Guardian* during the peace negotiations. It is unlikely that these sorts of letters suddenly halted, or that reader's interest in participating in public discussion on the Irish question suddenly ceased. There was still an abundance of news from Ireland and Westminster for readers to comment on, and as seen in Chapter 3, Scott was still publishing editorials at a frequent rate. Most *Guardian* readers, as liberals, welcomed the truce, but it is unrealistic to assume a sudden vanishing of alternative perspectives on the Irish question, which was still to be solved. It is more likely that Scott's aspirations for settlement, which shaped his editorial commentary, also influenced the letters selected for publication.

During the War of Independence, a curated forum of public discussion, exemplified by the letter rallies above, had purpose. Letters were a conduit for the political conflict unfolding in Ireland, in parliament, and in the private conversations between those of social and political

[86] Ed. Guard., 'Reprisals with a Difference', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 January 1921.
[87] JRL, GDN/132/309, C. P. Scott to L. T. Hobhouse, 10 January 1921.
[88] D., 'Irish White Cross', *Manchester Guardian,* 19 March 1921, and W. J. Gruffydd, 'Ireland: An Appeal to Wales', *Manchester Guardian*, 19 March 1921, and Ellis Lloyd, 'Ireland: An Appeal to Wales', *Manchester Guardian*, 19 March 1921, and James G. Douglas, 'Relief of Distress in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 05 April 1921, and E. A. Aston, 'After the Ulster Elections', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 June 1921, and John H. Humphreys, 'P.R. in Ulster Elections', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 June 1921.

power, for *Guardian* readers to observe. Because there was such debate on Ireland during the conflict, even among moderates, this public discussion was necessary for the common good to prevail in the minds of *Guardian* readers. Debates were performed so that Scott's view could be shown as the best political course of action. But public discussion on the Irish question via the correspondence columns would only threaten the truce that the *Guardian* desperately promoted.

Hence, from July 1921 the correspondence columns were overtly supportive of the key themes stressed in Scott's commentary. Letters to the editor became a direct extension of Scott's editorial line and were left publicly unchallenged by other readers. They persistently promoted peace, opposed a reversion to violence, and encouraged moderation. M. H. Huntsman in a letter entitled, 'Healing the Wounds of Ireland', stressed the importance of 'friendly feelings' between Britain and Ireland in order to secure long term peace. He thus encouraged readers to donate to the Irish White Cross, referencing a recent appeal made by 'Mrs. Erskine Childers'.[89] Frederick MacNeice, a prominent Protestant rector in Country Antrim, stressed the exceptionality of the truce, like Scott. He stated:

> A new situation presents itself in Ireland, and in it we are witnessing what must be one of the most amazing transformations in human history. A few months ago there seemed to be in agreement in nothing except reliance on the efficacy of force. Violence met violence, enmity answered enmity, reprisal followed reprisal.

MacNeice strongly opposed further violence, stating that Protestants and Catholics alike would 'shudder at the thought of a return to the conditions that prevailed before the truce' and that this would be treason against God and man.[90]

Letters to the editor also promoted Lloyd George's post-truce offer of Dominion Status for a united Ireland. MacNeice's letter insisted that the proposal differed from all previous proposals and contained 'the offer and guarantee of justice, liberty, and peace for Ireland'.[91] Henry Bentinck, one of Scott's political connections, also promoted the proposal. Bentinck maintained: 'I agree with Burke. The offer of the Government is undoubtedly a generous

[89] M. H. Huntsman, 'Healing the Wounds of Ireland', *Manchester Guardian,* 09 September 1921.
[90] Frederick MacNeice, 'The New Situation in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 16 September 1921.
[91] Frederick MacNeice, 'The New Situation in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 16 September 1921.

one'.[92] Here, Bentinck is referring to Edmund Burke's idea of 'a natural, cheerful alliance' between England and Ireland. Employing Burke to support debate on the Irish question was a political and intellectual tradition established in the late nineteenth century.[93] Bentinck argued for Dominion status without reservation to ensure long-lasting peace. Moderate Irish Nationalist, M. Sidney Parry, also argued that full Dominion status without reservation would give Ireland practical independence. Parry described Lloyd George's draft proposal a far-reaching even with the six conditions that mainly restricted defence provision.[94]

The correspondence columns also praised Lloyd George for his statesmanship while criticising de Valera's attitude to negotiations. This also mirrored Scott's commentary. Rev. H. Enfield Dowson of Gee Cross stated in another one of his letters to the *Guardian,* sent in August 1921:

> To say a word to discredit the Prime Minister in the momentous step he has taken to make peace with Ireland is unpardonable. He has had the courage to turn his back upon his own immediate past on the most vital issue of public affairs to-day.

Lloyd George's dramatic shift in position was discussed by Scott on a number of occasions. Dowson was also very critical of die-hard Conservative Unionists, in line with Scott.[95] St. John Ervine, a well-known dramatist from Belfast who described himself as 'an Ulsterman who is neither Orangeman nor a Sinn Féiner', also criticised de Valera. He argued that Ulster Protestants 'do not discover statesmanlike qualities' in the Irish republican. For Ervine, a united Irish government was possible but not if de Valera continued with his approach of 'exalted pedantry', rather than approaching the negotiations from 'the regions of fact'. This echoed Scott. Ervine also thanked the *Guardian* for encouraging de Valera to change his approach to one that was more conciliatory, as seen in Scott's editorials.[96]

After the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, public criticism of the *Guardian's* editorial line remained absent in the correspondence columns. Letters published served to reinforce Scott's views. On 9th December 1921, three days after the signing of the Anglo-Irish treaty, H.

[92] Henry Bentinck, 'The Irish Problem: An Englishman's Appeal to Sinn Fein', *Manchester Guardian,* 01 September 1921.
[93] Emily Jones, *Edmund Burke and the Invention of Modern Conservatism, 1830-1914: An Intellectual History* (Oxford, 2017).
[94] M. Sidney Parry, 'The Irish Crisis', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 September 1921.
[95] H. Enfield Dowson, 'The Prime Minister's Negotiations', *Manchester Guardian,* 01 August 1921.
[96] St. John Ervine, 'Sinn Fein and Ulster', *Manchester Guardian,* 20 August 1921.

Enfield Dowson wrote to the *Guardian* once again to praise the Treaty and the Prime Minister. The letter stated:

> Sir, - I have felt it my duty to speak in no measured terms of reprobation of the past policy of the Prime Minister in relation to Ireland. Nor do I withdraw a word of it. But I am all the more moved to pay him tribute of admiration for the magnificent efforts whereby he has associated his name forever with the emancipation of Ireland. It is the promise of a new day for the British Commonwealth of Nations, and through it for the peace of the world and fulfilment of the dream of an association of free nations in one brotherhood of man.

These words could have been Scott's own. As seen in Chapter 4, Scott considered the Anglo-Irish Treaty the most momentous achievement of Lloyd George's political career. Scott praised the Treaty and employed the newspaper's columns to promote it.

Furthermore, when Dáil Éireann postponed the debate on the Treaty over the Christmas period, the letter's columns took a positive stance. A letter from 'HEMPHILL', likely third Baron Fitzroy Hemphill, of Rathkenny and of Cashel in the County of Tipperary, was published on 31 December 1921. It argued that the postponement of the debate was wise, as 'such an important decision should only be arrived at after full and mature consideration'.[97] Scott had commented directly on the 'Pause in the Irish Debate' the week prior to this.[98] Nevertheless, 'HEMPHILL' maintained that Irish nationalists 'have to consider, above and beyond their own feelings, the welfare of the country'. Hemphill maintained that an Irish republic was not possible, that there should be no delay to a settlement he described as 'acceptable to the vast majority of Irish people in Ireland and elsewhere'. Again, this reflected Scott's views. Moreover, while the partition of Ulster was 'unsatisfactory' to Hemphill, it was 'inevitable under all the circumstances' and 'only temporary'. Hemphill saw Irish reunification as a certainty. The letter ended by stating:

> The members of the Dáil and their supporters who hesitate to accept the treaty ought to make one more sacrifice for their country by agreeing to its ratification, even if it

[97] Hemphill, 'Irish Peace', *Manchester Guardian,* 31 December 1921.
[98] C. P. Scott, 'A Pause in the Irish Debate', *Manchester Guardian*, 23 December 1921.

> does not completely fulfil all their hopes. Let the dead bury the dead. Let Irishmen and Irishwomen, now and for all time, "forget and forgive."[99]

The letter attempted to persuade readers in favour of the Treaty, especially Irish nationalist readers. As such, Hemphill reinforced Scott's arguments that peace was essential and thus the Treaty should be accepted, and Ireland should move on. Scott certainly moved on from the issue as soon as the Treaty was ratified, as his significant decline in commentary demonstrated. Hemphill was a Liberal Party politician and justice of the peace for County Galway. His father, First Baron Hemphill, had also been a Liberal MP for Liverpool and supported Gladstone.[100]

Scott's commentary maintained that the Anglo-Irish settlement was a liberal victory fought for since the Gladstone era, and a number of letters referenced Gladstone following the signing of the Treaty.[101] These included a letter written by Edgar C. Gates of Chortlon-cum-Hardy, Greater Manchester.[102] Gates rejoiced: 'at last we have emerged from the atmosphere of hatred and mistrust', before quoting the words of Gladstone, spoken during the second reading of the Home Rule Bill in 1885:

> Let me entreat you - if it were with my latest breath I would entreat you - to let the dead past bury its dead. Cast behind you every recollection of bygone evils, and cherish, love, sustain one and other through all the vicissitudes of human affairs in the times that are to come.[103]

Using the words of Gladstone, Gates encouraged forgetting the conflict of the past and moving forward, as also encouraged by Scott, and echoed by fellow correspondent, Hemphill.[104] Gates also argued that the Treaty had significance beyond the internal politics of the United Kingdom, and hoped that the message of peace propounded in the settlement with Dáil Éireann would 'reach to Washington and find an echo in Paris and Berlin'.[105] Similarly, unionist politician 1st Baron Parmoor, Charles Cripps, expressed hope that the

[99] Hemphill, 'Irish Peace', *Manchester Guardian,* 31 December 1921.
[100] J. G. S. Macneill, revised by Terence A. M. Dooley, 'Hemphill, Charles Hare, first Baron Hemphill (1822-1908)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Online* (2004).
[101] A. H. Scott, 'Praise to Whom Praise is Due', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 December 1921, and Edgar C. Gates, 'The Irish Settlement', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 December 1921.
[102] Edgar C. Gates, 'The Irish Settlement', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 December 1921.
[103] Gladstone, as quoted in, Edgar C. Gates, 'The Irish Settlement', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 December 1921.
[104] Hemphill, 'Irish Peace', *Manchester Guardian,* 31 December 1921.
[105] Edgar C. Gates, 'The Irish Settlement', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 December 1921.

approach taken to securing an Anglo-Irish settlement, peace and negotiation, could be considered for 'ex-enemies' in Europe, in order to aid reconciliation on the continent.[106] Again, readers echoed Scott's view that the Anglo-Irish Treaty would have impact elsewhere.

Despite the desire for peace in Scott's commentary, which was mirrored in the correspondence columns, just two letters were published on escalating violence in Belfast in 1922.[107] This is unsurprising as Scott only published one editorial himself, but still a contrast to the discussions of violence that featured in the correspondence columns during the War of Independence. This is because this violence was not directed by the British. Moreover, these letters offered supplements to news, and offered accounts of events, rather than political commentary.

The content of letters to the editor published in the *Manchester Guardian* on the Irish question demonstrates that the correspondence pages were an extension of the *Guardian's* editorial line. The topics discussed mirrored the content of the leader columns, and while critical letters were published, these were rebuked by 'Ed. Guard' and letters from other readers who supported the editorial line. The most critical letters were taken up for comment in the leader columns. Letter rallies performed public discussion, but the outcome of the debates reinforced the *Guardian's* stance. The 'truth' or 'common good' that prevailed as part of the *Guardian's* commitment to public discussion was Scott's view. Here we see an internal conflict within the *Guardian* ideology. The *Guardian* insisted on its commitment to public discussion, but it needed to promote Scott's stance on the Irish question. Moreover, access to the forum for discussion was limited to moderate men, who had local or national influence, and were deemed qualified to speak due to their professions, their Irishness, or, because they were part of Scott's existing personal and political networks, as demonstrated in the next section.

[106] Parmoor, 'The Irish Settlement & European Problems', *Manchester Guardian*, 10 December 1921.
[107] Ulsterman, 'The Persecuted Catholics of Belfast', *Manchester Guardian*, 07 June 1921 and Scotsman, 'The Persecuted Catholics of Belfast', *Manchester Guardian*, 07 June 1921.

Published Letter-writers

Letter-writers for the *Manchester Guardian* who addressed the Irish question sent their correspondence from various locations across Britain and Ireland. This is illustrated by the visualisations below. These visualisations indicate the source of letters to the editor sent from letter-writers who explicitly indicated their location in their correspondence. This equates to 117 of the 144 letters collected as part of this study. All letters signed with a location were sent from England, Ireland, Scotland, or Wales. The level of precision of these locations varied from letter to letter, with some giving house number, street name, and town/city. Others simply stated the area more broadly, such as 'Manchester', or 'Liverpool'. All of these instances were included in the data mapped here. Geographical pseudonyms were sometimes used as signatures, for example 'Ulsterman' or 'Scotsman', but these have been taken as indicators of personal identity not source location and have not been included in this data. Letters sent by multiple authors from the same location, for example, 'Manchester', are indicated by the same node. The number of nodes, therefore, does not indicate the number of letters, or letter-writers. These visualisations seek only to provide a sketch of the distribution of letter-writers whose correspondence was published by the *Guardian*.

Figure 5 demonstrates that readers as far north as Edinburgh wrote to Scott on the Irish question. John R. Armstrong of 37, Woodburn Terrace, Edinburgh, was published in the *Guardian* on 9th December 1921. His letter recited a poem in a positive response to the Anglo-Irish Treaty.[108] Another reader from Scotland, Robert O'Connor, wrote from 18, Buccleuch Street, Dumfries, on 6th August 1919, to comment on the proposed partition of Ireland.[109] Letters were also, on occasion, sent from Wales, with W. J. Gruffydd writing from the University College of Wales, Cardiff, in 1919. Gruffydd was a University lecturer who also attended Oxford, like many *Guardian* men. The *Guardian* described him as 'one of half a dozen outstanding men of his generation in Wales'.[110] Ellis Lloyd, a Welsh writer who stood in the 1924 election as a Labour candidate,[111] sent a contribution from Bridgend, Glamorgan. A Baptist minister, T. Whitton Davis, wrote from Bangor. He worked as a Professor of Hebrew

[108] John R. Armstrong, 'The Irish Settlement', *Manchester Guardian*, 09 December 1921.
[109] Robert O'Connor, 'Ireland 'Two Nations'', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 August 1919.
[110] 'Obituary: W. J. Gruffydd', *Manchester Guardian*, 30 September 1954.
[111] 'Mr. MacDonald's Seat', *Manchester Guardian,* 13 October 1924.

at the University College of North Wales.[112] St. John Ervine, another letter writer, was an Irish playwright from Belfast. He wrote from Anglesey, but according to the *Guardian*, Ervine 'never ceased to be an Ulsterman in sympathy even when he had long ceased to be one of its residence'.[113] A number of Ervine's plays focused on themes of Ulster,[114] as did his letter to the *Guardian* sent in 1920, as mentioned above.[115] It is clear from figure 5, however, that letters were mainly sent from within England and Ireland.

Figure 5: Source of letters to the editor (un-sized nodes)



[112] Lewis Edward Valentine, 'Davies, Thomas Witton (1851-1923), *Welsh Dictionary of National Biography* (1959).
[113] 'St John Ervine', *Manchester Guardian*, 25 January 1971.
[114] John Cronin, 'Irvine, John Greer [*pseud.* St John Greer Ervine]', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (Online, 2006).
[115] St. John Ervine, 'Sinn Fein and Ulster', *Manchester Guardian,* 20 August 1921.

As this map highlights, readers from across the north of Ireland were reading and responding to the *Guardian's* editorial line via the letters pages. For example, Reverend C. Wesley Maguire wrote from 1, Woodland Avenue, Cliftonville, Belfast on 27th March 1920 in relation to Anglo-US relations and the Irish question. Maguire was associated with the Protestant Friends of Ireland, an American-based nationalist organisation.[116] Frederick MacNeice sent his letter to the editor from Carrickfergus, Co. Antrim, where he was rector at St. Nicholas's Church. MacNeice has opposed the Ulster Covenant, was an advocate for peace and Irish unity, and one of the founders of the interdenominational League of Prayer for Ireland.[117] Also writing from Co. Antrim was M. Sidney Parry of Cushedun, who had three letters published across the 1919-1922 period.[118] Methold Sidney Parry was an Englishman married to an Irishwoman, a rubber planter and moderate Irish Nationalist connected with other moderates including Alice Stopford-Green, Henry Bentinck, and Alec Wilson.[119] These figures were also part of Scott's networks. Parry supported Dominion status and maintained that Ireland should be accepted into the League of Nations.[120] Parry also offered to write an article for the *Guardian* on the rubber industry in 1924, although Scott refused and asked Parry to write a letter for the correspondence columns instead.[121] This shows how correspondence columns were curated. Parry also wrote to the *Guardian* on 'France, Disarmament, and Debt Remission' in 1931.[122] Letter writers in Ireland contributed views on more than the Irish debate.

Other Irish letter-writers included Louis J. Walsh from the village of Draperstown, Co. Derry. Walsh was a Catholic Irish Nationalist and lawyer who originally supported the IPP but moved to Sinn Fein in 1916. He stood for Sinn Fein in the 1918 election, and in the first Northern Irish elections in 1921, but was unsuccessful on both occasions. Walsh supported the Anglo-Irish Treaty and moved to the Free State where he worked as the first justice for north co.

[116] Connor Morrissey, *Protestant Nationalists in Ireland, 1900-1923* (Cambridge, 2019), p. 150.
[117] Christopher Fauske, 'MacNeice, John Frederick', *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (Online, 2009).
[118] M. Sidney Parry, 'Ireland and the League of Nations', *Manchester Guardian*, 26 June 1919, and 'The Military Manufacture of Sinn Fein', *Manchester Guardian*, 02 July 1919, and 'The Irish Crisis', *Manchester Guardian*, 06 June 1921.
[119] NLI, MS 39, 120/5, Methold Sidney Parry Correspondence, 1919-1932.
[120] M. Sidney Parry, 'Ireland and the League of Nations', *Manchester Guardian*, 26 June 1919.
[121] JRL, GDN/A/P12/4, C. P. Scott to M. Sidney Parry, 01 October 1924.
[122] M. Sidney Parry, 'France, Disarmament, and Debt Remission', *Manchester Guardian*, 23 July 1931.

Donegal.[123] His edited letter to the *MG* criticised partition, insisted on Irish unity, and declared that the 'two nations theory', which was used to argue for partition of Ulster, was 'absurd'. Walsh maintained that there was 'more Celtic blood in North Antrim than in North Tipperary', insisting on a unity of Irishmen in line with Scott.[124]

Cahir Healy wrote a proactive letter from Eniskillen, Co. Fermanagh, about the seizure of the local council following its censure of the Northern Irish elections in 1921.[125] Healy was a prominent Sinn Fein member in the North, and played an active role in the running of the Dáil courts during the War of Independence. Healy was against partition but ultimately supported the Anglo-Irish Treaty, like Scott. Healy was imprisoned by the Northern Irish government for his commitment to Irish unification, but as an elected Sinn Fein MP for Fermanagh and Tyrone in 1922 and 1924, he was eventually released amid public pressure.[126] Healy's imprisonment and subsequent release was reported at length by the *Guardian*.[127]

Irish readers from as far south as Cork also contributed. Arnold Marsh wrote a letter published on 6th October 1920 addressing the government's Irish policy. K. O. Callaghan sent a letter from Limerick, and Joseph Dolan wrote from Ardee, Co. Louth. Dolan was a Catholic Nationalist businessman, who founded the Louth Historical and Archaeological Society in 1903, and served as town commissioner until his death in 1930.[128] Most letters, however, were sent from Dublin city. Correspondents included Irish nationalists, such as John Swift MacNeill, an Nationalist MP in the House of Commons until 1918. MacNeill was born in Dublin in 1849 to a Protestant family, and graduated from Oxford University in 1872. He was a legal and constitutional authority, and as professor of constitutional and criminal law at the King's Inns in Dublin until 1888. Like Scott, MacNeill was a Home Ruler, a supporter of Gladstone, and aligned himself with the left of the British Liberal Party.[129] MacNeill contributed 3 letters

[123] Patrick Maume, 'Walsh, Louis Joseph', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Online, 2008).
[124] Mr. Louis J. Walsh, 'Ireland 'Two Nations.'', *Manchester Guardian,* 28 July 1919.
[125] Cahir Healy, 'Coercion of Fermanagh and Tyrone', *Manchester Guardian*, 19 December 1921.
[126] Eamon Phoenix, 'Healy, Cahir', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Online, 2004).
[127] For example, '400 Men Interned on Ship in Lough Labne', *Manchester Guardian,* 29 December 1922, and 'Real Character of Mr. Cahir Healy: Not a Conspirator', *Manchester Guardian*, 17 January 1924, and 'Mr. Cahir Healy: Immediate Release from Internment Expected', *Manchester Guardian*, 25 January 1924.
[128] Patrick Maume, 'Dolan, Joseph', *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (Online, 2009).
[129] S. L. Gwynn, revised by Alan O'Day, 'MacNeill, John Gordon Swift (1849-1926)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Online, 2004).

to the *Guardian* from 1919-1922.[130] Following his death in 1926, the *Guardian,* still under Scott's editorship, reported:

> Swift MacNeill took much to heart, and it is a sad reflection that he died forgotten by the majority of those for whom he toiled with such unbounded zest. But to his old colleagues his memory will always remain green as that of a good, honest, faithful, and entirely lovable character.

Scott had been in parliament himself during McNeill's time in office, so the editor himself was one such 'old colleague'.[131]

E. A. Aston was a moderate Nationalist, who wrote to the *Guardian* from Middle Abbey Street, Dublin six times over the period, and was Secretary of the Proportional Representation Society of Ireland in 1919.[132] The Society was formed in 1911 under the presidency of Irish moderate, Sir Horace Plunkett, with the support of 'Irishmen of all shades of opinion'.[133] Aston suggested that Irish representation in the League of Nations was implied by Dominion status, and as such enforced the argument for Dominion status in Ireland. Aston implied that this would have a positive impact on British-US relations. Scott was very concerned with the impact of the Irish question on British-US relations in 1919, as explained in Chapter 2.[134]

Irish republican, Maude Gonne MacBride, also wrote from Dublin city. She was one of few republican voices whose letters on Ireland were published. MacBride was part of the anti-Boer War movement, like Scott, and married John MacBride in 1903, an Irishman who had fought for the Boers. Maude was arrested in 1918 as part of the supposed pro-German Irish Nationalist plot, and incarcerated at Holloway Prison, London. When she was released, she returned to Dublin.[135] It was from 73 St. Stephen's Green Dublin that she wrote her letters, the same street as the residence of Alice Stopford-Green who, as explained in the previous

[130] J. G. Swift MacNeill, 'Federal Devolution: A Forgotten Episode', *Manchester Guardian*, 16 July 1919., and 'The Irish Nation in the Parliament of Ireland', 01 August 1919., and 'Military Expenditure in Ireland', 26 August 1919.
[131] 'Mr. J. G. Swift MacNeill: A Famous Nationalist Member', *Manchester Guardian*, 25 August 1926.
[132] Proportional Representation Society of Ireland, 'Proportional Representation in Ireland', 22 September 1919.
[133] 'A Test Election: Ireland and Proportional Representation', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 Dec 1919.
[134] E. A. Aston, 'Ireland and the League of Nations', *Manchester Guardian,* 30 June 1919.
[135] Deirdre Toomey, 'Gonne, (Edith) Maud (1866-1953)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Online, 2008).

chapter, was another woman who was influential in her relationship with Scott and on the Irish question.[136]

Gonne MacBride wrote proactively to inform Scott and readers of the treatment of Irish political prisoners including Countess Markievicz, first woman MP elected to Westminster, renowned member of Sinn Féin and Dáil Éireann, who participated in the Easter Rising 1916. Scott had corresponded with Markievicz's sister, Ava Gore-Booth, following the Rising. She asked the editor to help secure a death penalty pardon by writing to Lloyd George.[137] This was recognition from a prominent Irish nationalist of the editors' influence. It is also another example of Scott listening to women activists.

MacBride's letter described the 'serious state' of Laurence Ginnell, the Dáil Minister for Propaganda, who was also imprisoned by this point. The letter took a humanitarian approach to maximise the emotional impact of the correspondence and objections to the Crown forces treatment of Irish people. Like Molly Childers and Stopford-Green, she was strategic in her approach to the press, and as such she was given exposure in the Guardian. She featured in another humanitarian piece on 22 May 1920 after starting 'a scheme for supplying the poor children of Dublin with goats' milk'.[138] MacBride was one of the more radical contributors published in the *Guardian*, and she was able to secure herself this space she due to her considered focus on the humanitarian challenges of the ongoing conflict in Ireland.

The letters sent from Dublin made up 15 of the 41 letters known to be sent from within Ireland. A closer look of the source-locations within Dublin city is provided by Figure 6. Of course, the real number of locations in Dublin and across Ireland could be higher. It is likely that Irish contributors would be more inclined to use pseudonyms to protect their location at this time. After the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act in particular, critics of the British authorities in Ireland could face serious, often violent, consequences. Censorship of the press and the postal services may have also had an impact on correspondence from Ireland.

[136] Ayerst, *Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, p. 421.
[137] PRONI, D4131/K/1/2/1, Countess Markievicz Papers, Letters from C. P. Scott to Ava Gore-Booth, 1916-1918.
[138] Photograph, 'Madame Gonne MacBride, who has started a scheme for supplying the poor children of Dublin with goats' milk', *Manchester Guardian*, 22 May 1920.

Figure 6: Dublin City



= 'Dublin' (representative of 4 letter-writers)

The extent of the Irish contribution to the *Guardian's* pages demonstrated here is significant. It not only confirms that Irish people were reading the *Guardian*, but that Irish readers were concerned with what the *Guardian* had to say about the Irish question. It also highlights the importance of Irish views to Scott. These voices were deemed qualified to comment, and thus could add weight to the editorial line that the correspondence pages ultimately sought to reinforce. Many Irish contributors were also part of Scott's networks. Horace Plunkett, for example, was a close Irish connection whom Scott corresponded with. Plunkett had a letter published in the correspondence columns on 13th March 1920.[139]

The majority of letters were, however, sent from England. One letter from Reverend C. E. Osborne came from as far north as the Rectory at Wallsend on Tyne.[140] Osborne graduated from Trinity College Dublin in 1881.[141] Another came from as far south as the Isle of Wight. This letter writer was J. Howard Whitehouse of Bembridge School, Whitecliff Bay. His contribution, which opposed a return to war and criticised Ulster, was published on 31st October 1921.[142] Whitehouse was a social reformer and Liberal MP. He was warden of

[139] Horace Plunkett, 'Sir H. Plunkett on a Constituent Assembly', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 March 1920.
[140] C. E. Osborne, 'A Sidelight on Reprisals', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 November 1920.
[141] Trinity College Dublin, *The Dublin University Calendar* (Dublin, 1919), p. 144.
[142] J. Howard Whitehouse, 'The Irish Conference', *Manchester Guardian*, 31 October 1921.

Manchester University Settlement in Ancoats for a year in 1909 and during his early parliamentary career worked for Lloyd George. Whitehouse objected to conscription, and supported women's suffrage, in line with Scott.[143] The *Guardian* reported his death in 1955.[144]

A number of letters were also sent from London. These included two letters sent from Harold Spender,[145] a liberal, who published literature on the Irish question in 1893 and again in 1912.[146] Spender worked briefly for the *Manchester Guardian* before leaving for the *Daily News* in 1900. Scott and Spender also corresponded on the general election of 1922, and Spender offered to write an article for the *MG* in 1924 on the state of British politics.[147] Spender's connection with the *Guardian* and the Irish question was long-standing. Moreover, John H. Humphreys of the Proportional Representation Society sent 4 letters from London, and a letter from A. S. Duncan Jones published on 18th May 1921 came from St. Mary's vicarage, Primrose Hill.[148] Duncan-Jones appealed to Christians for Anglo-Irish peace. In 1929 he became the Dean of Chichester Cathedral.[149] Another Irishman, Valentine James O'Hara, wrote on Churchill and Ireland from the National Liberal Club in London in 1921.[150] Figure 7 illustrates the source locations of readers' letters sent from London.

[143] James S. Dearden, 'Whitehouse, (John) Howard', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Online, 2015).
[144] 'Obituary: Mr. Howard Whitehouse', *Manchester Guardian*, 30 September 1955.
[145] Harold Spender, 'A Word for the Home Rule Act', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 August 1919, and 'Ireland. Is There a Way to Peace?', 04 January 1921.
[146] Harold Spender, *Story of the Home Rule Session*, (London, 1893), and *Home Rule* (London, 1912).
[147] JRL, GDN/A/S81/7, Harold Spender to C. P. Scott, 28 December 1923.
[148] A. S. Duncan-Jones, 'A New Spirit Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 18 May 1921.
[149] Paul Foster, 'Jones, Arthur Stuart Duncan-', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (Online, 2011).
[150] Valentine O'Hara, 'Mr. Churchill and Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 June 1921.

Figure 7: Source of letter from London



Nevertheless, most letters that were published were sent from in and around Manchester. 54% of all letters signed, were from addresses within Greater Manchester. This reflected the proportion of *Guardian* readers based in the region. Many of these letter-writers have already been noted in this thesis, including W. Carr, Thos. F. Burns, 'Pocahontas', H. Enfield Dowson, Rev. Albert H. Walker, Dr. J. E. Roberts, and T. C. Horsfall. Thomas Coglan Horsfall was an archetypal *Guardian* letter-writer. He was the son of cotton industrialist William Horsfall, and grandson Thomas Coglan, and an Irish born Unitarian. Horsfall established the Manchester Art Museum in 1877,[151] and began contributing to the *Guardian* in 1878. Personal correspondence between Horsfall and Scott from as early as 1887 still survives.[152] He began writing to Scott on the Irish question as early as 1893.[153] Horsfall became a subject of *Guardian* news that same year: On 7th October 1887 an article was published on a recent lecture he gave at the art museum.[154] He was justice of the peace for Manchester for 28 years,[155] and his civic activities were reported on numerous occasions throughout the late

[151] Stuart Eagles, 'Horsfall, Thomas Coglan (1841-1932)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Online, 2009).
[152] JRL, GDN/118/82, T. C. Horsfall to C. P. Scott, 11 February 1887.
[153] JRL, GDN/119/166, T. C. Horsfall to C. P. Scott, 29 August 1893.
[154] 'The Right War of Using An Art Museum', *Manchester Guardian*, 07 October 1887.
[155] 'Signing the Covenant: Mr T. C. Horsfall Retires from the Bench', *Manchester Guardian*, 08 April 1914.

nineteenth and early twentieth century.[156] Horsfall had, at the very least, 129 letters published in the *Guardian*.[157] He wrote on a wide range of issues including education, religion, social problems, local and national politics, and the Irish question. Horsfall was a friend of Scott's, and upon his departure from Manchester in 1922, Scott sought to organise a farewell celebration with the Chairman of the Manchester Art Gallery, Walter Butterworth.[158] The *Guardian* also called for subscriptions to the 'Horsfall Prize' to be awarded for 'research work on civic problems', which was proposed in collaboration with the University of Manchester. Scott donated £10 to the prize fund.[159] Horsfall had local prominence, was active in public life, and within Scott's networks of influence. David Dorrity, Canon of Manchester Cathedral, was the same. Dorrity had two letters published during the War of Independence.[160] Both Horsfall and Dorrity attended the *Manchester Guardian's* centenary dinner in 1921.[161]

A number of the letters sent from the Manchester area were, however, also sent from Irish writers. George Clancy of Gorton, who was chairman of the Irish Self-Determination League in Manchester,[162] was published in the *Guardian* in 1919.[163] Clancy also, unsuccessfully, petitioned the Lord Mayor of Manchester in 1920 to protest the imprisonment of Irishmen without trial at Mountjoy Gaol.[164] He was arrested in 1923 for his republican sympathies.[165] James Reilly, President of the Michael Davitt Branch of the United Irish League wrote from 53 Rochdale Road on 27 November 1920.[166] James Reilly was a City Councillor for the Labour Party in Manchester from 1913-1930. Upon his death in 1932, the *Guardian* described his 'organisation of Irish voters in Manchester in the days before the treaty' as some of his most important political work. Reilly owned a leather shop in the city, and Irish politicians often

[156] For example, see 'Mr. T. C. Horsfall on Town Councils', *Manchester Guardian*, 20 August 1895, and 'Manchester Ruskin Society: Address by Mr. T. C. Horsfall', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 February 1902, and 'The Central Hall Lectures: Mr. T. C. Horsfall on Christian Living and Teaching', 31 October 1904, and 'Art and Town Life: Mr T. C. Horsfall on Galleries', 21 December 1907, and 'Little-Used Playgrounds: Mr T. C. Horsfall Suggest and Remedy', *Manchester Guardian*, 12 November 1909.
[157] Figure obtained via *Guardian* Digital Archive using advanced keyword search.
[158] JRL, GDN/A/B124/1, C. P. Scott to Walter Butterworth, 08 August 1921.
[159] 'A Good Citizen's Record: Mr. T. C. Horsfall Leaving Manchester', *Manchester Guardian*, 03 February 1922.
[160] David Dorrity, 'Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 25 September 1920, and 'The Irish question', *Manchester Guardian*, 26 November 1920.
[161] JRL, GDN/150/25, List of Attendees to the *Manchester Guardian* Centenary Dinner, 03 May 1921.
[162] 'Sinn Fein in Manchester: Self-Determination League Launched', *Manchester Guardian*, 31 March 1919.
[163] George Clancy, 'Peace Celebrations in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 27 May 1919.
[164] 'Sinn Fein Deputation in Manchester: Lord Mayor's Reply', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 April 1920.
[165] 'The Manchester Arrests', *Manchester Guardian*, 13 March 1923.
[166] James Reilly, 'A Disclaimer', *Manchester Guardian*, 27 November 1920.

gathered there to discuss Irish affairs.[167] Several more letter-writers from Manchester who indicate Irish heritage also wrote under pseudonyms including 'Some Ex-Servicemen in Manchester',[168] and 'Slieve Luachra'.[169] The significance of the Irish in Manchester has been recognised by Busteed.[170]

Beyond Greater Manchester there also existed a periphery of letter-writers that stretched North to Preston, West to Liverpool, South to Macclesfield, and along the coast to areas like Blackpool. 67% of letters published in the *MG* on the Irish debate during this period were sent from the broader North-West region (Figure 9). The letter-writers included John J. Skemp of Ansdell College, Lytham St. Annes, whose contribution has been already been noted.

The frequency of contributions from letter-writers from different areas in the UK, however, is best represented by Figure 10. Nodes in this visualisation still indicate a single source location, but the sized nodes demonstrate the higher number of letters from individual places. Multiple letters sent by the same author (and thus the same location) have been counted per occasion, which is reflected in the sizing of these nodes. The significance of Manchester is especially obvious here. Voices from Greater Manchester clearly dominated the correspondence columns. This map also reflects that Dublin city was the second most prolific source of reader commentary on the Irish question and the *Guardian's* editorial line.

[167] 'Ald. James Reilly', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 November 1932.
[168] Some Irish Ex-servicemen in Manchester, 'Ex-Servicemen in Ireland', *Manchester Guardian*, 12 May 1920.
[169] SLIEVE LUACHRA, 'The Irish Dominion League', *Manchester Guardian,* 03 July 1919.
[170] Busteed, *The Irish in Manchester c. 1750-1921, Resistance, adaption and identity*.

Figure 8: Source of letters from Manchester



= 'Manchester' (Representative of 9 letter-writers)

Figure 9: Source of letters from Manchester and North-West periphery



Figure 10: Source of letters to the editor (sized nodes)



Analysis of who the letter-writers were shows that readers from a range of geographic, political, and religious backgrounds engaged with the *Guardian's* editorial line on Ireland. While most were liberals or moderate Irish nationalists, other political perspectives were also published. For example, 1st Baron Parmoor Charles Cripps was a unionist politician who contributed four times between the start of the War of Independence and the Irish Civil War.[171] Another example is Conservative politician Lord Henry Bentinck.[172] Scott also supported Bentinck's Peace with Ireland Council, and invited him to the *Guardian*'s centenary

[171] Parmoor, 'Irish Government', *Manchester Guardian,* 17 April 1920, and 'The Coercion Bill', *Manchester Guardian*, 12 August 1920, and 'A Pleas for Truce', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 June 1921, and 'The Irish Problem and European Problems', *Manchester Guardian*, 10 December 1921.
[172] JRL, GDN/335/142, Henry Bentinck to C. P. Scott, 30 August 1920.

celebrations in 1921.[173] Mr. J. V. Bates of the Ulster Unionist Council wrote to the newspaper in August 1919.[174] Labour men, such as W. Carr, have also been mentioned above. Moreover, religious leaders published in the *Guardian* also tended to be nonconformists writing from in and around Manchester. This is unsurprising as the Manchester middle-class and the *Manchester Guardian* had strong nonconformist roots.[175] But Protestant and Catholic leaders also engaged with the *Guardian* on Ireland. Regardless of political or religious affiliation, however, the letters sent presented moderate views, remaining in line with the *Guardian's* editorial policy. Even when a broader range of views were published, as seen during the War of Independence, the majority of these were still from moderate perspectives. Hence, Irish republican voices seldom featured in the letters pages unless, as in the case of Maude Gonne MacBride, they purposefully took a humanitarian approach to Anglo-Irish issues. This helped to secure access to the platform. When letter content provided more 'extreme' political views *were* published, the *Guardian* took extra steps to rebuke them.

Most letters published were also written by men, with only 9 of 144 letters that were published being signed by women. This does not mean that women were completely absent from the discussion, or that their influence on the Irish question implemented elsewhere was insignificance. As established in chapters 5 and 6, there were several prominent women who maintained connections with Scott to promote their own agenda on Anglo-Irish politics and conflict. Still, even if we take in to account the potential use of pseudonyms, there was a clear imbalance between men and women's voices that were ultimately published.

Furthermore, C. P. Scott's networks were an important factor in the curation of the correspondence columns, and these networks were largely made up of men. These politicians, religious leaders, academics, and literary figures that were published, tended to know Scott personally, as did fellow journalists such as J. L. Hammond, who made three contributions to the correspondence columns on Ireland during this period.[176] The various

[173] JRL, GDN/135/139, Henry Bentinck to C. P. Scott, 26 April 1921.
[174] Mr. J. V. Bates, 'Ireland: Two Nations', *Manchester Guardian*, 01 August 1919.
[175] Seed, 'Unitarianism, Political Economy and the Antinomies of Liberal Culture in Manchester 1830-50', pp. 1-25.
[176] J. L. Hammond, 'The Irish Scandal', *Manchester Guardian*, 27 March 1920, and 'The Irish Coercion Bill', *Manchester Guardian*, 17 August 1920, and 'Lord Robert Cecil's Letter', *Manchester Guardian*, 28 April 1922.

examples highlighted in this chapter demonstrate that a number of letter-writers were already connected to the *Guardian*. These public figures that had their opinions published in the *Guardian* moved in the same local and national circles as the editor, which gave them increased access and priority. Hence, many of these contributors were published on multiple occasions, including: Rev. J. E. Roberts, Lord Sheffield, Lord Parmoor, W. H. Dawson, Thos. Burns, Charles Masterman, George Middleton, Rev. W. Whitaker, and Sidney Parry. This reinforces the notion that the correspondence columns were curated to perform public discussion, rather than being an organic forum for debate.

Those given access to the *Guardian's* correspondence columns for comment on Ireland had social and political currency, or were considered qualified to speak on Anglo-Irish politics. Many were public figures, whether locally or nationally, and their view was valuable. These people had the education and time to write letters, and the political expertise and public standing necessary to be read and to be heard. Hence, many were involved in Anglo-Irish politics personally. Ultimately, these names and the letters they signed were purposefully selected for publication because they had power to influence. This recognition of influence was also returned. Prominent figures believed that writing to the *Manchester Guardian* was worth their time and resources, because if they were published in the *Guardian*, people would listen.

Readership and Influence

The relationship between *Guardian* and its readers was based on influence. Reader engagement helped to shape the newspapers content, and letters, on occasion, provided the basis for some of Scott's editorials. Those in Scott's networks, which as demonstrated in chapter 4 had influence on editorial commentary, also read the newspaper. All of these readers who engaged publicly via the letters to the editor, and privately, wanted to influence the discourse on the Irish question. Letter-writers wanted to share their views with other readers, in the hope that this would have effect. The *Guardian* provided the forum for this discourse, but its own desire to influence the public discussion toward Scott's own views on Anglo-Irish politics and conflict, particularly in the post-truce period, shaped the way that forum was managed, and who had access to it. Published letter-writers for the *Guardian* tended to be public leaders or influential in civic life at local or national levels, and the debates

between them (or lack thereof) in the correspondence columns reinforced the *Guardian's* general stance toward Ireland. Readers sought to use the *Guardian* to propagate their own view, and equally, the *Guardian* used the influence of these readers to further convince its readership of its editorial line.

Hampton maintains in relation to the *Guardian* readership that because working men did not read the *Guardian*, its influence was limited.[177] Indeed, the *Guardian's* readership was relatively small and exclusive, but Hampton's view assumes that each voting man had the same political power as the other. Despite the introduction of universal male suffrage and partial female suffrage in 1918, power was not distributed equally. The social and political capital, the opportunity to immediately influence local and national politics and policy, was still a privilege very much enjoyed by the sorts of people whose names signed the letters that appeared in the *Guardian*. Hence, circulation cannot be equated with influence. The *Guardian*, though modestly distributed, was read and respected by those who wielded real decision-making power in the local, national, and global context. The *Guardian's* extended influence was, therefore, much greater than circulation figures might imply. Those reading Scott's views on Ireland had authority, and their own networks of influence. Whether the local Reverend in Greater Manchester talking to his congregation, or the politicians who directly impacted on national and imperial policy, it was the opinions of readers like those who read and wrote to the *Guardian* that, at this time at least, ultimately mattered.

The broader link between the influence of the press and Irish policy is drawn in existing scholarship, but it was also noted at the time. Labour politician, C. R. Morden, highlighted the significance of the press in influencing the Irish question in a letter published in February 1922.[178] Another letter sent from 'G.' of Manchester also argued that 'public opinion takes credit' for Anglo-Irish negotiation.[179] But contemporaries also recognised the role of the *Guardian* specifically. J. L. Hammond argued that 'if the Government was gradually borne down by the pressure of moral opinion, Scott's pen was one of the chief forces in putting an

[177] Hampton, 'The Press, Patriotism, and Public discussion: C. P. Scott, The *Manchester Guardian*, and the Boer War, 1899-1902', p. 196.
[178] C. R. Morden, 'Lord Birkenhead and Coalition', *Manchester Guardian*, 04 February 1922.
[179] G., 'Mr. McCurdy on the Coalition', *Manchester Guardian,* 17 October 1921.

end to the terror of the Black and Tans'.[180] And L. Winstanley stressed the influence of Scott against the government's Irish policy in a letter published in October 1921.[181] The *Guardian* had carried weight locally and nationally, and the types of people published in the correspondence columns, as well as the locations from which they sent their letters from, is indicative of this.

The extent of the reputation and influence of the *Manchester Guardian* and Scott is, however, best shown in the letters to the editor upon his retirement in 1929. These flooded in from all over the country and the wider world. The Prime Minister, Ramsay Macdonald, wrote:

> I see with great regret that you are recognising the passing of years and are to hang upon your walls the armour which you have worn so long and with such great distinction… you can look from your quiet retreat upon the doings of men who hold you in great esteem and who are doing their best - as you have so nobly done - to make the world a better place to live in.[182]

Similarly, Arthur Henderson, former leader of the Labour Party wrote:

> Under your guidance the 'Manchester Guardian' has been distinguished by its devotion to the public interest…I know from my own observation the extent of the prestige enjoyed by the 'Guardian' in the intellectual and political circles of other countries, and I am aware how much the Statesmen of this country owe to the progressivism and patriotic internationalism expounded in its columns.[183]

Local politicians also expressed their admiration, as demonstrated in a letter from Councillor Jason Mathewson, which stated:

> I love the 'Manchester Guardian' and its Editor. I have been a keen and loyal supporter since ever I came to Manchester… I was in Llandudno a fortnight ago, staying at the Grand Hotel, and went up to the porter in the morning and said 'I want the finest paper in the world' and the porter replied 'The Manchester Guardian, sir'… I sit beside Councillor Shephard in the City Council and he was one of the deputation who went to America to see about the libraries there. He told me that in every library he went into there was a copy of the 'Manchester Guardian'.[184]

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[180] Hammond, *C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian*, p. 278.
[181] L. Winstanley, 'The Russian Famine', *Manchester Guardian,* 10 October 1921.
[182] JRL, GDN/135/311, Ramsay Macdonald to C. P. Scott, 02 July 1929.
[183] JRL, GDN/135/295, Arthur Henderson to C. P. Scott, 02 July 1929.
[184] JRL, GDN/135/269, Jason Mathewson to C. P. Scott, 01 July 1929.

This letter also reflects the geographical reach of the *Guardian* despite it still mainly serving Manchester. This also shows that the reach of the *Guardian* was even further than the circulation records of the daily newspaper or weekly edition reveal.

Streams of journalists, editors, and publishers from around the world also expressed their admiration of Scott and the newspaper. S. Morgan-Powell of the *Montreal Daily Star* recalled: 'I well remember as a junior on the Yorkshire Post hearing my chief time and time again hold you up to us cubs as an example of everything a British journalist should be'. He also enclosed a tribute editorial that he wrote, which was published in the *Montreal Daily Star*.[185] William Morrow, a publisher in New York City asked if Scott would publish an autobiography with him.[186] And British journalist, Henry Nevinson, expressed:

> For the last 40 years at least I have looked at the 'M.G.' for guidance or support, and it has never failed me; no, not once. I cannot tell you how deeply I admire and envy you for such a service as yours to the country and the rest of the world. How many times when things were blackest I have thought with consolation, 'At all events the Guardian is all right!' And how often when I was weak or dubious myself, I have simply followed your line, knowing it could not lead me wrong!

Here, Nevinson admitted how Scott's editorial line had influenced him and other newspapers. He went on to state: 'As everyone knows you have established a grand tradition of honour and justice in journalism'. This tradition was the *Guardian* ideology. Nevinson insisted that Scott did not reply to his letter, because 'you and your secretaries must be worn out with answering similar letters coming to you from all over the earth'.[187] Similarly, the editor of *The Nation* expressed thanks, 'with all earnestness and sincerity… for all that you have done for our profession'.[188] And former *Guardian* journalist, Robert Dell, maintained that Scott had 'made the M.G. one of the greatest papers in the world, if not the greatest', describing the newspaper as 'a powerful international force' for which Scott deserves full credit, as he 'made it what it is'.[189]

[185] JRL, GDN/135/317, S. Morgan-Powell to C. P. Scott, 02 July 1929.
[186] JRL, GDN/135/359, William Morrow to C. P. Scott, 03 July 1929.
[187] JRL, GDN/135/371, Henry Nevinson to C. P. Scott, 04 July 1929.
[188] JRL, GDN/135/490, *The Nation* to C. P. Scott, 11 July 1929.
[189] JRL, GDN/135/409, Robert Dell to C. P. Scott, 06 July 1929.

Organisations such as the Federation of British Industries also congratulated Scott and praised the editor for his work. A letter from the Federation expressed 'the gratitude of industrialists… for the manner in which you have upheld the highest traditions of journalism, and industry, far beyond the geographical limits of Manchester or Lancashire'.[190] This letter recognises the sector of *Guardian* readership made up of industrialists, as outlined at the beginning of this chapter. But recognition of Scott's political work was most common, for it was Scott's liberal editorial line that the *Guardian* was best known for. Hilda Clarke, on behalf of the Women's International League of Peace and Freedom, wrote:

> But for the Manchester Guardian, organisations working for peace would indeed have had a very difficult task, and I think we should all put the work that your paper has done as one of the greatest factors in any advance towards peace and better international relations that has been made in this country…Many of us have for long depended on your paper to help us to understand the bearing on matters of foreign policy. I myself was brought up on your paper from childhood and I realise how often it has helped me to understand in time what line of action would help and what would hinder the bringing of peace…We are thankful, too, for the influence it is spreading in the country.[191]

Furthermore, religious institutions such as the Council of Christian Congregations also recognised Scott's commitment to promoting peace, and the influence of the newspaper. It maintained:

> We believe that your great influence has ever been in the direction of righteousness; that you have manifested a spirit of fairness to all, and have manifested a high standard of public duty. In you we have had a powerful opponent of forces tending to degrade the spirit of the people; a friend of all good causes; a champion of the wronged and oppressed, and a consistent advocate of peace and good-will.[192]

And the Manchester Great Synagogue stated that Scott 'can now look back over half a century of work nobly done, not only in upholding the highest traditions of a newspaper, but in the

[190] JRL, GDN/135/409, Federation of British Industries to C. P. Scott, 09 July 1929.
[191] JRL, GDN/135/488, Women's International League of Peace and Freedom, 11 July 1929.
[192] JRL, GDN/135/523, Council of Christian Congregations to C. P. Scott, 20 August 1929.

knowledge that his mind, his voice and his pen have ever been devoted to the progress of humanity'.[193]

Other individuals who wrote to Scott on his retirement also included John Boyd Orr, academic and future MP for Scottish universities.[194] He reflected on the delivery of the *Guardian* in Glasgow during the Boer War, writing:

> It is 30 years since the 'Guardian' became one of the most cherished institutions to me. There was a group of people in Glasgow who felt that peculiar indignation with the policy which led to the South African War, and which marked its prosecution. I remember with what eagerness we waited for the arrival of the 'Guardian' in Glasgow in order to see our feelings expressed day after day in the full… You performed a unique service in the world at that time with your powerful organ.[195]

May Morris, English embroidery designer, insisted that 'The dignity and the consistent and straightforward criticism that the Manchester *Guardian* has always maintained - to say nothing of its many other excellences - places it in my mind on a height above any other journals in the world'.[196] J. W. Kilnick explained: 'From the time you became the editor of the Guardian it has been my political guide…Allow me to add my tribute to your fearless advocacy of liberty for thought, for speech, and for action'. [197] And F. J. Fryer described the 'extensive…educative influence of [Scott's] great newspaper', and how 'in these feverish times' it was 'not easy to cultivate sound and unbiased thought on the more important subjects of our day'.[198] There were hundreds of these kinds of letters sent to Scott in 1929.

The significance of the *Guardian* in relation to the Irish question specifically was also articulated in this retirement correspondence. A letter by Kevin R. O'Neil, for example, stated that Scott had been 'in England for a long time a voice seemingly crying in the wilderness on behalf of Ireland'. But that peace was 'due in no small degree to your [Scott's] efforts'.[199] O'Neil recognised the importance of the *Guardian* in the Irish debate. With Scott's support,

[193] JRL, GDN/135/234, Manchester Great Synagogue to C. P. Scott, July 1929.
[194] K. L. Blaxter, 'Orr, John Boyd, Baron Boyd Orr', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Online, 2008).
[195] John Rylands Library, GDN/135/520, John Orr to C. P. Scott, 17 July 1929.
[196] JRL, GDN/135/484, May Morris to C. P. Scott, 11 July 1929.
[197] JRL, GDN/135/261, J. W. Kilnick to C. P. Scott, 01 July 1929.
[198] JRL, GDN/135/401, F. J. Fryer to C. P. Scott, 06 July 1929.
[199] JRL, GDN/135/523, Kevin R. O'Neil to C. P. Scott, 17 July 1929.

he was also responsible for setting up an Irish supplement for the *Guardian* published in three parts over three month, starting in March 1923 and advertised on a number of occasions in the *Guardian* daily.[200] The first part of the Irish supplement included an article titled, 'The Outlook for the Irish Free State', by W. T. Cosgrave, T.D., who was the first President of the Executive Council of the Free State.[201] Cosgrave also sent a letter to Scott upon his retirement in 1929. He wrote:

> I cannot let the occasion of your recent retirement for the editorship of the 'Manchester Guardian' pass without writing to express my congratulations upon your long and brilliant journalistic record and to convey my sincere good wishes that you may enjoy many years of tranquillity and happiness in your well-deserved rest… For fifty years the powerful and eloquent advocacy of the great journal you did so much to build up was devoted generously and with indifference to popularity to causes which you deemed to be just. To the light which you so fearlessly turned on events in Ireland in times when things seemed black indeed may be attributed in no small degree the better understanding which has happily come about between this country and Great Britain… Be assured that you carry with you into your retirement our deep gratitude, and an appreciation of the high standard of clean and conscientious journalism for which you have always stood and with which your name is so closely associated.[202]

When Scott died three years later, Cosgrave stated that Scott's 'services to Ireland will long be remembered by my countrymen'.[203] The *Guardian's* influence and reputation was impressive, and this had broader political impact.

[200] 'Display Ad 31', *Manchester Guardian*, 10 March 1923, and 'Display Ad 1', *Manchester Guardian*, 15 March 1923, and 'Display Ad 8', *Manchester Guardian*, 08 March 1923.
[201] 'Display Ad 31', *Manchester Guardian*, 10 March 1923.
[202] JRL, GDN/135/510, W. T. Cosgrave to C. P. Scott, 18 July 1929.
[203] PRONI, D2519/D/17, 'C. P. Scott - 1846-1932, Memorial Number', Supplement to the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 08 January 1932.

Conclusion

The *Guardian's* circulation was relatively small, and a large proportion of readers were still based in the Manchester region at this period, but it had national prominence and global reach. This is reflected in the correspondence columns of the newspaper, and the retirement correspondence of C. P. Scott. Many of the readers who publicly engaged with the newspaper's politics via letters to the editor had power and influence in wider society. The *Guardian's* extended influence, therefore, counted for more than circulation figures might imply. At the apex of Ireland's revolution, those who could action political decisions, whose public and private conversations mattered, and had consequence, comprised of those who read, respected, and engaged with the *Manchester Guardian* via letters to the editor. Historians of the press and Ireland agree that public discussion was instrumental to developments in Anglo-Irish politics, and this was acknowledged at the time. The participation of the *Guardian* and its readers in this debate was significant because the engagement of these readers ultimately helped to reinforce the *Guardian's* editorial line. Thus, while the *Guardian's* editorial ideology committing it to facilitating public discussion was in practice more restrictive in terms of the types of letter-writers it published, it did secure the *Manchester Guardian's* political influence, something which was also fundamental to this ideology. These editorial ideals, even if not always wholly achieved in practise, were fundamental to Scott's impressive personal reputation. Scott was admired, and this admiration was fully expressed when he retired in 1929, and then when he died in 1932. At a time when newspaper proprietors were increasingly viewed as insatiably power and money hungry, this affectionate response to C. P. Scott's life as the editor of the *Manchester Guardian* was striking.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

Gladstone's Home Rule Movement of the 1880s marked the beginnings of a connection between the Irish question and the *Manchester Guardian* that was to endure over four decades. The *Manchester Guardian's* support for Gladstone in his attempts to appease Irish nationalist demands to run their own nation signified a political and editorial turning point for C. P. Scott and his newspaper. As such, Ireland became the issue most editorialised by the editor over the course of his 57-year editorship. As this thesis has shown, this commitment was especially fervent after the First World War. Scott's personal contributions to the newspaper increased between 1919 and 1922 because of the Irish question, and then dramatically declined once the issue was deemed solved. As editor of the *Guardian*, which by the interwar period had established itself as a fundamental part of liberal politics and culture, this was significant. The analysis of the connection between Scott, his newspaper, and the Irish question, which has formed the focus of this thesis, thus provides new perspectives essential to fully understanding the relationship between the Irish revolution, the British press, and British politics in the early twentieth century.

Politically, the *Guardian* spoke for liberals, and the influence of liberalism was reflected in Scott's commentary on the Irish question. During the Irish War of Independence, as Chapter 2 of this thesis has revealed, the *Guardian* promoted Irish self-determination because it believed the Irish were a separate nationality from the English, and Scott believed in political and national liberty. But the *Guardian* did not support an Irish republic. As a liberal newspaper it believed in progress through reform of existing structures of authority, and amendments to constitutions, rather than radical or revolutionary means. As such, it maintained that Dominion status for a united Ireland was the appropriate way to solve the Irish question, end conflict, and secure long-term peace. This, it believed, would give Irish nationalists the freedom they desired, while Ireland remained under overarching British imperial authority.

Scott's liberalism was also reflected in his commentary on violence, which he criticised throughout the period. For Scott, the Crown forces were agents of the law, and the rule of law was imperative to a fair and orderly society. Arbitrary punishment was an affront to liberal

values. As such, when the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries inflicted indiscriminate acts of violence against the Irish people, Scott did not shy away from censuring these attacks, and holding the British government responsible. The British government were the makers of law, and responsible for seeing it upheld. Hence, violence from the British side was given much more attention than the violence of the IRA. Moreover, in the *Guardian's* view, the press was supposed to provide 'honest witness' to truths that demanded reporting, even if they discomforted those in power. The *Guardian's* staff saw themselves as public servants who held power to account. This coverage of British violence was thus imperative to the *Guardian's* politics, and its editorial ideology.

During the peace negotiations, Scott's commentary on the British government, as analysed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, changed dramatically as their Irish policy shifted to promote Dominion status for Ireland, which the *Guardian* had promoted since the outbreak of the conflict. Scott saw this position as in favour of settlement, as granting liberty while exercising constraint. As such, the *Guardian* praised the likes of Lloyd George while heavily criticising de Valera, who rejected settlement proposals and was seen as a threat to peace. Scott also criticised the new Northern Irish Prime Minister, Sir James Craig, and the attitude of Ulster Unionists as divisive during the negotiations. This criticism was upheld through to 1922. The *Guardian* saw a resolution to the Irish question at this time as imperative, and this underpinned Scott's editorial line. Scott also believed the proposed settlement constituted what the people of Britain and Ireland really wanted, which was compromise.

The necessity to compromise saw a change in the way Ireland was viewed in relation to Britain. As Chapter 4 of the thesis has explained, the Irish question was refocused under an imperial lens, a process completed by the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The Irish question had transitioned within the liberal imagination from its pre-war conception of a clash of national sentiments that could be resolved within the Union, to conflicting nationalities within a domestic context requiring an imperial solution, and then to an imperial relationship between two separate nations achieved by constitutional change. This was reflected in Scott's rhetoric, which increasingly used ideas of national character and liberal conceptions of empire to promote a pro-Treaty view. This understanding of empire that Scott promoted, contrasted sentiments expressed earlier in his editorship, as indicated by his anti-imperialist stance

against the Boer War. This is because, by the 1920s, the empire had been increasingly redefined to be a 'Commonwealth of Nations', similar to the 'League of Nations' in that it united the world through shared freedom, peace, and prosperity.

Despite the continued partition of six counties of Ulster, which it had opposed, the *Guardian* saw the ratification of the Treaty as the resolution of the Irish question. Scott maintained hope for Irish reunification but saw the new imperial dynamics of the Anglo-Irish relationship as a unifying force, nevertheless. The Treaty confirmed the constitutional compromise the *Guardian* had long supported which, in Scott's view, was generous and granted essential independence. Scott's commitment to the Anglo-Irish Treaty was reflected in his limited commentary from 1922, which largely ignored violence in the North, and violence in the Free State, in order to promote peace. The Anglo-Irish Treaty, for Scott and the *Guardian*, was the achievement of a generation, a blueprint for future foreign policy, and the marker of a new age of politics in Britain.

Scott was the driver behind the *Guardian's* stance on Ireland, and the influence of his politics is evident in his commentary. But, as Chapter 5 has demonstrated, this rhetoric was not produced and published in a vacuum. The chapter reveals that liberal networks whose role has hitherto been neglected by scholars played a significant role in sustaining, reinforcing, shaping, and propagating Scott's views on the Irish question. The *Manchester Guardian* was a political institution, around which circulated men who thought, discussed, and actioned liberal politics. This thesis has shown the influence of these networks as echoed in Scott's editorials and revealed how Scott's impact was felt in return.

Chapter 5 has also revealed that it was not just liberal politicians and intellectuals that had a role. Scott engaged with a range of people with different political affiliations, particularly Irish nationalists. Scott's connections with Irish nationalists are indicative of the long-standing association the *Guardian* and liberalism had with the Irish question, which was still significant after the First World War. These were still predominantly moderate, but their engagement with Scott and the *Guardian* reflects the dynamics of Scott's networks, which had bi-directional influence.

Scott also had close relationships with women who also played an influential role in news production. His professional, political, and personal networks were undoubtedly male dominated, but he was also listening to prominent women in his role as editor and liberal commentator. Women such as the famous Irish republican, Molly Childers, were highly influential in the Irish nationalist movement, and consciously pursued Scott to inform him of events on the ground in Ireland. This information was vital to Scott's thinking. Moreover, the gendered nature of the correspondence columns of the newspaper is demonstrated in Chapter 7, but women's voices were not completely absent or ignored. Scott still published accounts sent by women including republican Maude Gonne McBride because he considered them valuable. The connection between Scott, the *Guardian,* and women's voice, is a theme that warrants further investigation in future research.

Moreover, reporters, special correspondents, and casual contributors, were also essential in shaping the content of the *Guardian*, including the editorial columns, and thus exerting the newspaper's political impact through print. Yet again, these were predominantly men, but women were not completely absent. Although no records relating to Evelyn Sharp's work in Ireland remains in the Guardian Archive, her work in Ireland was still recognised in the obituary for her that was published in the newspaper.[1] A. P. Wadsworth recollected the impact of other journalists such as George Leach in Ireland and J. L. Hammond in Paris when he was editor in 1946. He maintained: 'Though Scott expressed himself mainly through the leader columns, the paper's influence was exerted hardly less through its special correspondence, home and foreign'.[2]

The broader news gathering climate was thus an important factor in the networks of information and ideas feeding into the *Manchester Guardian* from Ireland and in Britain. It was in this environment that news stories and subsequent commentary was produced. This part of the bigger picture of the *Guardian's* coverage of the Irish question has been explored in Chapter 6 of this thesis. The Irish press were more directly affected by policies of censorship

[1] JRL, GDN/A/S38/24, Cutting of obituary for 'Mrs. Evelyn Nevinson', published in the *Manchester Guardian*, 20 June 1955.
[2] A. P. Wadsworth, 'Special Correspondence', in A. P. Wadsworth (ed.), *CP Scott, 1846-1932, The Making of the Manchester Guardian* (Manchester, 1946).

and suppression than British newspapers, as previous scholarship had identified. Nevertheless, research presented in this thesis has shown that disruptions to news gathering networks also impacted on the *Guardian*, which utilised links with Irish publications such as the *Freeman's Journal*, and Irish activists such as Alice Stopford-Green, as part of its operations. At the same time, Irish nationalist propaganda policies, particularly those of Dáil Éireann and the production of the *Irish Bulletin*, influenced Scott's editorials. Republican propaganda gave foundation to Scott's commentary, especially during the period of Anglo-Irish conflict. The unofficial censorship of British reporters by the Black and Tans also directly affected *Guardian* reporters in Ireland, and the propaganda attempts of the British government contributed to the dialogue taking place in the British press and the British Parliament, which reporters, editors, and the British public had to navigate.

This environment, which was made particularly hostile by British government censorship, suppression, and propaganda, was criticised by Scott. The *Guardian* saw censorship and suppression as deliberate obstacles to journalists attempting to report the truth, and as hindering full and free public discussion. This in turn was detrimental to understandings of the Irish question among *Guardian* readers, as well as the broader British public. Criticism of these press management policies, as published in Scott's editorials, was in line with the *Guardian* ideology. Freedom of the press, independent from government, was essential to liberal democracy. But the *Guardian's* commitment to public discussion was ultimately limited, as illuminated by the way debate was managed in the correspondence columns.

The final chapter of this thesis has exposed the nature and significance of readers' engagement with the *Guardian* over the Irish question. Many *Guardian* readers were given a platform to perform public discussion, as part of the educational ideal of the press, via the correspondence columns. These columns were an important facet of *Guardian* content. They were also used, however, to reinforce the *Guardian's* editorial line. The letters reflected the topic taken up in Scott's commentary, and occasionally resulted in letter rallies sparked by critical responses to editorials from readers. But the outcome of these rallies overwhelmingly worked in the *Guardian's* favour. Moreover, following the Anglo-Irish truce, critical letters were no longer published, as the *Guardian's* stance became final. This also mirrored Scott's commentary, which praised those responsible for implementing the Treaty. Scott prioritised

the politics of the *Guardian*. The settlement of the Irish question was imperative. The *Guardian* ideology was, therefore, limited in practice in terms of its openness to freedom of debate and difference in perspective.

Nevertheless, reader engagement with the *Guardian* on Ireland from 1919-1922 via the correspondence columns, was emblematic of the character of the readership as well as the intentions of the newspaper. Research has revealed that just over half of the letters published were sent from Manchester, although correspondence was sent from a variety of locations, as the paper reached readers beyond the Lancashire region. Letter-writers were from the educated middle classes, as well as some political elites. Their political affiliations varied, but most were liberals, or at least moderate men, with local or national influence. As such, Scott's local and national networks dictated who was selected for publication. They had influence on Scott, but they also used their influence *for* Scott. Their names and letters had weight. Like Scott's networks, the correspondence columns were also dominated by men, and this is indicative of those who were seen to wield the most power in British politics and society at this time. These people who wrote to the *Guardian* had power and they had interest in the Irish debate; those selected had influence or authority on the subject, and saw the *Guardian* as influential in return. This was indicative of the *Guardian's* place in British politics and society, and in relation to the Irish question.

As well as limitations to public discussion, other aspects of the *Guardian's* editorial policy can be scrutinised. The *Guardian* prided itself in its editorial independence, for example, but while the *Guardian* did not have formal political ties, the influential relationship the editor had with politicians behind-the-scenes impacted on the *Guardian's* content. The *Guardian's* coverage of Ireland was not solely based on the work of its investigative journalists, who worked to uphold truth in news; influencing its readers was also fundamental to the *Guardian's* purpose as a newspaper. It is why Scott saw the editorial columns as so important, and why, ultimately, the politics of Ireland took priority. Despite the limitations and conflicts visible in the way the *Guardian* put its ideals into practice, it remained a benchmark for British journalism throughout the remainder of Scott's editorship, and one of the most visible and important extra-parliamentary liberal institutions in Britain after the First World War.

In 1932, when C. P. Scott died at the age of 83, King George V of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, described the editor as 'distinguished'.[3] Lloyd George stated that he was 'Deeply grieved' to hear of his death. Mohandas Gandhi expressed that he 'Shall ever treasure the memory' of meeting Scott at Bognor Regis.[4] The *New York Times* maintained: 'For many years the "Manchester Guardian" has been regarded both at home and abroad as the most influential newspaper in England'.[5] And while it did not have the largest circulation or make 'the most noise', it was 'an organ of intelligent and sane policies'.[6] The *New York Herald* described Scott as 'a powerful actor in moulding public opinion',[7] and even the *Morning Post*, perhaps the political antithesis of the *Manchester Guardian*, stated:

> It is not too much to say that Mr. C. P. Scott, of the "Manchester Guardian" was much more than the directing and inspiring genius of a great newspaper. He was a national figure… For 57 years he dedicated himself to the task of making the 'Guardian' both a potent influence and a high example. And he succeeded so well that he raised his journal, local in name and provincial in association, to a significance that was not only national but international. It came to be recognised that no measure of public opinion in England could be complete that did not reckon with the "Manchester Guardian"… In the "Manchester Guardian" he not only has a monument of which any man might be proud, but a monument built with his own hands.[8]

The influence and reputation of Scott as editor of the *Guardian* has thus been widely acknowledged. However, the connection between the *Manchester Guardian* and the Irish question, the cause to which C. P. Scott was most fiercely committed, has hitherto been a neglected aspect of the history of the newspaper.

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[3] PRONI, D2519/D/17, The King's Private Secretary in 'C. P. Scott - 1846-1932, Memorial Number', Supplement to the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 08 January 1932.
[4] PRONI, D2519/D/17, Mohandas Gandhi in 'C. P. Scott - 1846-1932, Memorial Number', Supplement to the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 08 January 1932.
[5] PRONI, D2519/D/17, Lloyd George in 'C. P. Scott - 1846-1932, Memorial Number', Supplement to the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 08 January 1932.
[6] PRONI, D2519/D/17, *New York Times* in 'C. P. Scott - 1846-1932, Memorial Number', Supplement to the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 08 January 1932.
[7] PRONI, D2519/D/17, *New York Herald* in 'C. P. Scott - 1846-1932, Memorial Number', Supplement to the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 08 January 1932.
[8] PRONI, D2519/D/17, *Morning Post* in 'C. P. Scott - 1846-1932, Memorial Number', Supplement to the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 08 January 1932.

In seeking to rectify this neglect, this thesis has advanced three key areas of scholarship. The first is the historiography concerning the *Manchester Guardian* newspaper, in which the significance of the Irish question has not previously been fully explored, especially for the period 1919-1922. While previous scholarship acknowledged the connection between the Irish Home Rule movement and the *Guardian's* development, the significance of the Irish question in shaping the newspaper, and vice versa, has not hitherto been closely examined.[9] More prominence has previously been given to the Boer War as the key political issue in *Guardian* history. Challenging this emphasis, this thesis has shown that debates around Britain's relationship with Ireland were central to the *Guardian's* content, its liberalism, its readership, and its reputation, and this was especially the case when Anglo-Irish politics and conflict came to a head after the First World War. It has demonstrated that the history of the *Manchester Guardian* newspaper and the history of the Irish question are intimately connected.

Furthermore, this thesis has offered a new, holistic, and nuanced picture, of the *Guardian* as a political organisation under C. P. Scott, in the business of printing news and views. As such, it has shown that the practical implementation of the *Guardian's* underpinning liberal editorial ideology was a more complex process than hitherto acknowledged. This thesis contends that Scott's commitment to facilitating open public debate was conflicted with his desire to influence readers toward a resolution of the Irish question which accorded with his and the *Guardian's* particular brand of liberalism. This thesis has also challenged the reductive characterisation of *Guardian* readers as purely British 'Liberal elites', while demonstrating that readers had political power in the local and national context. This, along with the *Guardian's* international reputation, reveals an influence more far-reaching than the circulation figures imply. Similarly, this thesis provides a more nuanced picture in relation to the *Guardian's* reporting of violence, representing aggrieved voices, and the commitment to impartial news gathering, which ultimately contrasts Owen's findings.[10] The complexity of the *Guardian* ideology and how this played out in practice needs to inform all future scholarly studies of the *Guardian*.

[9] Mills, *The Manchester Guardian: A Century of History*, and Hammond, *C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian*, and Wadsworth (ed.), *C. P. Scott, 1846-1932, The Making of the Manchester Guardian*.
[10] Owen, ''Facts are Sacred': The *Manchester Guardian* and Colonial Violence, 1930-1932', pp. 643-678.

The second area of scholarship that this thesis advances is historiography on the role of the press in the Irish revolution. Previous scholarship argues that the British press either reflected or, alternatively, directed public opinion on events in Ireland and British government policy. It has also focussed predominantly on London based newspapers.[11] This thesis advances these debates by shedding light on the complexities of the relationship between the *Manchester Guardian* and Anglo-Irish politics and conflict. It illuminates the *Guardian* as instrumental in a nexus of mutual influence between various stakeholders on the Irish question. As such, state press management policies, which have previously been dismissed as having very little impact on the British press, are shown to have still been significant. Hence, the relationship between the press and official engagement with the Irish revolution was, for the *Guardian* at least, much more dynamic than has been previously been recognised. This has implications for scholars' wider understanding of the relationship between the British press and politics at this time. This dynamic picture has only been revealed through research into archival materials, suggesting that the paper archive of newspapers is vital to interpreting their published content.[12] The impact of both ideological and practical factors on this content is a central focus of this thesis, and further contributes to our grasp on the connection between the press and the Irish revolution.

This thesis has shown that the *Guardian*, as a keystone of liberal politics and culture by the interwar period, made significant contributions to debates on Ireland from 1919-1922 through its editorial commentary, networks of influence, and the engagement of readers via the correspondence columns of the newspaper. Despite its provincial tradition and its relatively small readership, the newspaper and its editor were integral to the politics and thinking of the policy-makers of the community and the nation. Thus, understanding the *Guardian's* commentary on the Irish War of Independence, the peace negotiations, and the subsequent settlement, also makes a crucial contribution toward a more nuanced understanding of contemporary views of the Irish question. The *Manchester Guardian's* reporting, and Scott's editorials in particular, were imperative to contemporary liberal

[11] Boyce, *Englishmen and the Irish Troubles, British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy 1918-22*, and Peatling, *British Opinion and Irish Self-Government: From Unionism to Liberal Commonwealth*, and Walsh, *The News from Ireland, Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution*.
[12] Bingham, 'The Digitization of Newspaper Archives: Opportunities and Challenges for Historians', and Aaron Ackerley, 'Economic Ideas in the Interwar British Daily Press'.

understandings and approaches to the Irish question at what can be described as *the* most pivotal moment for Anglo-Irish relations, and English liberalism. The thesis further demonstrates the continuing influence and pull of liberalism and liberal opinion outside existing party structures at a time when it was commonly perceived to have been in decline as an electoral force.

The third and final contribution this thesis provides, therefore, relates to debates on the significance of Ireland and the Irish question to British politics, particularly liberal politics. The historiography of British liberalism in the twentieth century has focused overwhelmingly on the developments in social policy and the role of figures, including Scott, in developing the new liberalism that secured electoral victory in the 1910s.[13] This thesis has reaffirmed that the *Manchester Guardian* was a crucial commentator and influence in the history of broader British national and imperial politics in the twentieth century. But it has also shown that C. P. Scott considered Ireland the most important issue for liberals during his editorship, which spanned 53 years, from 1871 to 1929. Furthermore, the historiography of the connection between Ireland and liberal decline has pointed to the failures of Irish policy prior to the First World War as fundamental to the Liberal Party's decline.[14] This thesis has demonstrated, however, that the most prominent liberal outside parliament in Britain at this time, Scott, saw the 'resolution' of the Irish question in 1922 as a liberal success, while recognising that it spelt change for British party politics. This thesis contends, therefore, that it was the eventual success of liberal Irish policy that was the pivotal moment. The conclusion of *the* political issue that had absorbed liberals for a generation saw a conclusion of purpose for the party. Nevertheless, this did not mean the end of liberalism as represented by the *Guardian*. Resolving the Irish question might have seen the liberals sink into insignificance, but the *Guardian* itself as a force for liberal principles, remained.

[13] Weiler, *The New Liberalism, Liberal Social Theory in Great Britain 1889-1914*, and Freeden, *The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform* (Oxford, 1978), and Clarke's *Lancashire and the New Liberalism*.
[14] Jalland, *The Liberals and Ireland: the Ulster question in British Politics to 1914* , and Adelman, *The Decline of the Liberal Party 1910-1931*.

Reginald Fletcher was one of 118 Liberal MPs who lost their seat in the 1924 election. He subsequently left the Liberal Party. Twenty years after this defeat the fourth editor of the *Guardian,* W. P. Crozier, died. Like so many around the world, Fletcher sent a tribute to the offices of the newspaper, still based on Cross Street in Manchester. This tribute stated:

> For many years now it has been to the "Manchester Guardian," to Scott, and to Crozier that I have turned for the foundations of my political belief. I left the Liberal Party, but I have never left the "Manchester Guardian"[15]

Lord Winster, like so many others, saw the *Guardian* as a political guide. As denoted by the cartoon overleaf (Figure 11), C. P. Scott was 'The Old Shepherd' and the *Guardian* was his trustee sheep dog who, under the editor's command, guided British opinion and politics as the voice of liberal England.[16]

[15] Lord Winster, in W. P. Crozier: Further Tributes, *Manchester Guardian*, 22 April 1944.
[16] 'The Old Shepherd', *Time and Tide*, 05 July 1929, in JRL, GDN 79, Cuttings book: C. P. Scott's resignation of the editorship, 1929.

Figure 11: The Old Shepherd

The Old Shepherd', *Time and Tide*, 05 July 1929, in John Rylands Library, GDN/79, Cuttings book: C. P. Scott's resignation of the editorship, 1929.

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