Sheffield Hallam University

A Sheffield Hallam University thesis

A Critical Exposition of Nelson Goodman's

Concept of Metaphorical Exemplification

A thesis submitted for the degree of

Master of Philosophy

by

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September 1982

for

my parents

Stan and Cicely Coldron

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Summary

In tackling the concept of expression in *Languages of Art* Goodman first defines the concept of exemplification and then that of metaphor. The terms being presented, he proceeds to define expression as a metaphorical sub-species of the relation of exemplification. I follow Goodman in first considering exemplification. In doing so I also look at his theory of notation in so far as this introduces aspects of indeterminacy of reference. I consider criticisms of Goodman by Peltz, Brentlinger and Jensen and use an actual musical example to try first to clarify some of the technical terms by applying them and secondly to analyse the various modes of reference used simultaneously in a small part of one work.

I then expound and assess his theory of metaphor. In order to do this his theory of projection has to be carefully examined. A crucial equivocation is exposed in his appeal to similarity to explain the operation of metaphor. I introduce the notion of an affinitive projection as a necessary and useful amendment to avoid the problems discovered. Before proceeding to examine in detail how he formulates and applies the notion of metaphorical exemplification I pause to provide an historical account of the idea of expression, identifying the main threads that contribute to this strand of modem aesthetic thought. The theories of five influential expressive theorists are briefly outlined in order to set Goodman's account in an historical context. His account is then examined and assessed. An interpretation of Goodman's theory of art as interactive is developed and certain difficulties arising from the earlier equivocation are noted. His relation to the earlier historical accounts is traced and the success of his account discussed.

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Preface

……………; and, for the sage,
Let spear-grass and the spiteful thistle wage
War on his temples. Do not all charms fly
At the mere touch of cold philosophy?
There was an awful rainbow once in heaven:
We know her woof, her texture; she is given
In the dull catalogue of common things.
Philosophy will clip an Angel's wings,
Conquer all mysteries by rule and line,
Empty the haunted air, and gnomed mine -
Unweave a rainbow,…………..

from *Lamia* by John Keats

I was sufficiently aware in myself of the apparent incompatibility between philosophical understanding and the artistic way of knowing for it to trouble me. Perhaps it was partly for this reason that I was intrigued by the systematic approach of Goodman. After a long time I can say that this issue still interests me and a close critical study of Goodman's works has led me to a clearer understanding of what is involved in the contradiction. Both my ability to approach the real issues at stake and the description I would give of them have changed considerably. What has not changed is my feeling that it is, on the whole, a good strategy to attempt to understand what a person has said, or is trying imperfectly to say, before condemning what you imagine he or she has said. In the case of Goodman the effort required adequately to comprehend is considerable. I hope I have met the challenge satisfactorily.

This piece of work has been long in the making. Many thanks are owed not all of which can be properly paid. Throughout, the firm but unobtrusive support of my supervisor, Merilys Lewis, has been invaluable. Heartfelt thanks go to her. I am immensely grateful to Ruby Symonds for undertaking so professionally the mammoth task of typing at a time of deep personal trouble. In my circumstances, practical and financial help was very important and I must thank Barnsley M.D.C. for allowing me to take two terms leave. Without these my thesis would not now be finished. My parents also helped to make my leave possible - my thanks to them. The only way I can thank my family, Sue, David, Joanna and Tom, for their support is in innumerable practical ways that I shall take great pleasure in now fulfilling.

John Coldron
September 1982

1. Introduction

The concept of metaphorical exemplification is introduced by Nelson Goodman in his book *Languages of Art*. It is just one of the results of Goodman's attempt to,

> *take some steps toward a systematic study of symbols and symbol systems and the ways they function in our perceptions and actions and arts and sciences, and thus in the creation and comprehension of our worlds. (1)*

Preceding this final comment of the book is a subtle system of concepts designed to extricate our thought about the arts and related matters from the confusion and chaos that Goodman finds there. It is an attempt to extend our understanding of the,

> *varieties and functions of symbols (and their) use in the operations of the understanding. (2)*

As such it is not exclusively concerned with that cluster of problems traditionally called Aesthetics. For example there is little concern with the question of artistic merit and evaluation. He is instead concerned with modes of symbolising and rather than converging towards an explanation only of works of art he gives his attention to characteristics shared by many modes of symbolising in both the sciences and the arts.

Goodman's claims are not modest. Although his style is disarmingly direct, *Languages of Art* is a remarkable intellectual endeavour. He clearly hopes that the system he has developed will be found not only to account for significant features of pre-systematic usage and thought on these subjects but also that the clarity, simplicity, cogency, consistency and usefulness of his concepts will form for the future a systematic basis for an aesthetic philosophy which is at the moment confused. (3)

Neither should it be forgotten that Professor Goodman's view of this philosophical method is far from naive. In his work on logic, epistemology and the philosophy of science the status of the conditions required of a system and their relationship to truth and verification are exposed to careful analysis. The result is a body of thought of great strength and vigour – strength because the parts are interconnected and create an

interlocking pattern of concepts, vigour because the penetrating quality of such careful analysis provides new and fruitful insight. Even when new concepts are not forthcoming it is hoped that certain confusions surrounding old problems are cleared so as to allow work to continue less hindered than before.

The attempt to make at least part of aesthetics systematic cannot be easily dismissed. It is the conscious application of a sophisticated philosophical technique.

One of the advantages of a systematic or constructive approach is that certain kinds of problems are more readily perceived. By this I mean, for example that the demands of being systematic make any departure from self-consistency more susceptible to detection. In addition any worthwhile system is already going to be complex and therefore the temptation to tolerate unnecessary complexity is likely to be minimised. The system must account for the facts as consistently and as simply as possible.

There are other, perhaps more profound, advantages of system construction, namely clarification and fruitfulness. The very act of making a set of distinctions which successfully describes a state of affairs is a matter of constructive philosophical analysis. Such constructions further our understanding by providing a right version of the way things are, by clarifying the issues in the process and by so clearly establishing its terminology, assumptions and inferences as to facilitate alteration and improvement of the system. If the system be ultimately rejected it likewise helps define the grounds of rejection.

Part of the assessment of the system of which metaphorical exemplification is a part will therefore involve consideration of its internal consistency, its fecundity and its ability to fit the facts of aesthetic experience. The latter will require a comparison with other theories of expression in art.

There is no doubt that the concept of exemplification and its sub-species, metaphorical exemplification are of great importance to the overall constructive strategy of *Languages of Art*. If some traditional questions such as artistic merit are considered by Goodman to be peripheral (4) why is so much importance accorded to the problem of expression? The

reasons are not hard to see. Firstly the term 'expression' is widely used in many areas of our lives and has considerable, if somewhat obscure, purchase there. In artistic discourse in particular it is well established and expressive predicates such as 'is sad', 'is heroic', 'is flamboyant' are readily applied to works of art and people seem to understand each other when using such terms. A systematic account of artistic activity has to take account of this purchase. Secondly the phenomenon of expression in art has been used to support a description of the aesthetic as immediate, ineffable and ultimately mystical. Such a description is wholly at odds with any attempt to interpret art as a matter of reference by symbols. The disentanglement of the threads of artistic activity that support this view is an important part of making a convincing counter argument. Such disentanglement can only be achieved by a reformulation of what is involved in artistic expression. Thirdly, but very much related to the last point the concept of expression has been the central notion of some very influential aesthetic theories. It has been variously defined, to take only a few, as the spontaneous and immediate conception of feeling; the organising action of an individual in the adventure of reconciling the tension between personal interest and an unhelpful world; and as the conscious embodiment of forms of feeling in formally congruent artifacts. In each case, however the idea of expression has been fundamental. It has provided the bare concept on which that body of aesthetic thought rests. These accounts, subtly interacting with non-philosophical usage, have nurtured attitudes and ideas that have become entrenched and affect our view of the world. In some cases, according to Goodman, they hinder clear thought on the matter. Most certainly they militate against an account of art that rests on anything other than what Max Black has called 'internal meaning'. (5) These artistic theories are, however, very sophisticated accounts drawing on well established philosophical thinking not just on art but on language, mind and knowledge. In some cases they ingeniously combine traditions of thought to create a formidable argument for their view. Consequently an alternative view of artistic activity must not only marshal its forces at least equally as well, but must challenge the entrenched view at its foundations - namely the concept of expression itself. For these three reasons he must face the challenge of constructing an acceptable re-formulation of artistic expression.

It would be misleading, however, to consider it merely as a re-formulation that exactly overlaps the territory vacated by previous accounts. Metaphorical exemplification is a concept among a whole set of distinctions that drastically re-describes artistic activity. In this context his account of expression as metaphorical exemplification involves a shift of seismic proportions in the geology of the realm. The concept of metaphorical exemplification is best regarded not as a further variety of the old notion of expression but as a first step in weaning artistic discourse from the use of the term 'expression' altogether. The following discussion attempts to describe and to assess this venture.

The motivation to interpret art symbolically has its source in the general tenor of his thought. Following Carnap he held that the attempt to construct a system of concepts from an explicit base that could fully, simply and consistently describe our world was a worthwhile enterprise. This he tackled in *The Structure of Appearance* (1951). He there adopted a nominalist position as the most economical and productive base. In this book, and subsequently in *Fact, Fiction and Forecast* (1955) (as well as many articles), he developed the epistemological and ontological implications of this position. The identification of individuals by a subtle and complex labelling process was taken as prior to any claim to knowledge or existential proposition. Inevitably any restriction simply to verbal labels would render his system inadequate to account for prominent features of the apprehension of our world. He had previously suggested the possibility that we acquired a non-verbal symbol system prior to our linguistic one, and in the arts he detected a sophisticated symbolic activity involving non-verbal reference of a complex kind. The application of his nominalist position to this area tests that position's ability to be extended and, if regarded as successful, enhances the general system by embracing virtually the whole range of human intellectual activity. More specifically it offers the possibility of reconciling science and art as varieties of the same cognitive activity of mind. This provides a workable alternative to explanations of the aesthetic as obscure and mysterious by the mystic - his 'arch enemy'. As Goodman says:-

> *The objective is an approach to a general theory of symbols. (6)*

He aims to help towards this objective by undertaking an:-

> *....intensive examination of non-verbal symbol systems, from pictorial representation on the one hand to musical notation on the other,*

This must be done,

> *....if we are to achieve any comprehensive grasp of the modes and means of reference and of their varied and pervasive use in the operations of the understanding. (6)*

In tackling the concept of expression in *Languages of Art* he first defines the relation of exemplification and then that of metaphor. The terms being presented he then proceeds to define expression as a metaphorical sub-species of the relation of exemplification. After he has developed the various syntactic and semantic distinctions in his theory of notation, he combines the results of his analysis to contribute the symptoms of the aesthetic.

I follow Goodman in first considering exemplification. In doing so I also look at his theory of notation in so far as this introduces aspects of indeterminacy of reference. I use an actual musical example to try first to clarify some of the technical terms by applying them and secondly to analyse the various modes of reference used simultaneously in a small part of one work.

I then expound and assess his theory of metaphor. In order to do this his theory of projection has to be carefully examined. I introduce the notion of an affinitive projection as a necessary and useful amendment to his theory of metaphor. Before proceeding to examine in detail how he formulates and applies the notion of metaphorical exemplification I pause to provide an historical account of the idea of expression, identifying the main threads that contribute to this strand of modern aesthetic thought. The theories of five influential expressive theorists are briefly outlined in order to set Goodman's account further in an historical context. His account is then examined and assessed.

2. Exemplification

Why exemplification?

Systematically, expression needs to be distinguished from representation. This is because representation has been defined as a form of denotation and this will not be flexible enough to characterise the rich complexity involved in artistic activities, and because to assimilate representation and expression does not do justice to the pre-systematic independence and the strategic importance of the latter. As I shall emphasise later the two relations must also be distinguished because the comparatively determinate relation of denotation is incapable of providing the positive indeterminacy that will become an important aspect of the whole account.

From the beginning he rejects any characterisation of expression that might assume some direct causal relation with some 'inner' state either of artist or spectator. He confines 'express' to 'cases where reference is to a feeling or other property rather than to an *occurrence* of it' (1) and he quickly dismisses the idea that expression seems more direct and immediate because it is the effect of some emotion felt by the artist or the feeling caused in the spectator. Both of these can be dismissed, he argues, because there is no evident relation between what is expressed in the work and what is felt by artist or spectator. The spite expressed by an actor on stage neither means that the actor feels malicious hostility nor that as spectators we share the character's malice. We may rather be revolted by this display of the less pleasant side of human nature. Neither is expression an invariable relation. Different forms express different things in different cultures and even the expression of familiar feelings in our own culture is something that is learnt rather than an instinct, it is an achievement not a reflex. He concludes at the end of section one of the chapter concerned with expression that he has found no grounds for distinguishing expression from representation. Nothing so far prevents the assumption that they are both species of denotation 'distinguished only by whether that which is denoted is concrete or abstract.'(2)

In noting that expression was no more a matter of imitation than was representation he marks the fact that expression seems less literal than representation, and at the same tine

firmly puts this distinction in the nominalist context that will eventually enable him to assimilate both the literal and metaphorical to the actual.

> *Offhand, expression may appear to be less literal than representation. Most often the feeling or emotion or property expressed is remote from the medium of expression.... Surely any copying is out of the question here. Expression is by intimation rather than by imitation. But we have seen that representation is not imitation either, that no degree of similarity is required between even the most literal picture and what it represents. (3)*

He then uses a simple example to bring to the fore the notion of the possession of a property.

> *Before me is a picture of trees and cliffs by the sea, painted in dull groups, and expressing great sadness. This description gives information of three kinds, saying something about (1) what things the picture represents (2) what properties it possesses, and (3) what feelings it expresses. (4)*

He states that the assertion, '(the picture is) expressing great sadness' is the same as saying '(the picture is) a sad picture'. By comparison of the two assertions '(the picture is) a gray picture' and '(the picture is) a sad picture' it can be seen that they are both clearly assertions that the picture possesses certain properties. The first asserts literal possession, the second figurative possession. This, he argues, goes some way towards elucidating 'the logical character of the relationship the picture bears to what it is said to express.' (5)

Having achieved this 'partial and tentative' characterisation of expression as involving figurative possession the next set of objectives is clear. A definition of possession is required that is (a) recognisably distinct from denotation (as in representation) and (b) which can adequately account for the referential nature of this mode of possession. In addition an attempt must be made to develop a notion of the figurative that does not seriously weaken the truth or force of an applied expressive predicate even though the figurative seems to be contrasted with the actual.

The first two will be achieved, he hopes, by the introduction of the relation of exemplification, the last by his analysis of metaphor.

Bearing in mind the need for Goodman to distinguish expression from representation, the assimilation of the relation of expression to that of an attribution of an actual property seems counter-productive. He defines actual possession as a matter of being correctly denoted by a label.

> 1. *An object is gray, or is an instance of or possesses grayness, if and only if "gray" applies to the object. (6)*

Following this the following statement is warranted:-

> 2. *An object is sad, or is an instance of sadness, if and only if "sad" applies to the object.*

Thus, if this were all, representation and expression would be alike in as much as they are denotative. However the subtle distinction that Goodman goes on to draw at this point serves to avoid the unwanted assimilation of representation and expression, and forms the foundation for the distinctive symbolic relation of exemplification which is at the heart of his formulation.

Sentence 2 above *is* warranted since possession is defined as correct application of a label, but this is not all that is involved in expression. When a picture is said to represent say a seascape, the symbolic relation is one of label (picture) to an object (perhaps a particular, named, part of the coast). The symbol refers in one direction from a label to that which it denotes. When the extension of the denotative label is understood the representative function is fulfilled. In particular no special significance is afforded to the operation of denotation or to the label which performs this function once denotation is actually achieved. However in expression, Goodman argues, this is not the case. The same denotative relation exists, i.e. an expressive predicate such as '(is) sad' correctly denotes the picture but in addition the picture stands *as* a *possessor* of that property, it *displays* the fact that '(is) sad' applies to it, it *exemplifies* the property of being sad. This involves reference from the picture to the label it expresses. It is reference in the opposite 'direction' to the denotative relation that simultaneously holds between picture and label. It is not merely figurative possession but figurative possession plus reference.

It is with these considerations that introduces his analysis of the relation of exemplification.

It is appropriate here to comment on a peculiar difficulty of reading *Languages of Art*. The writing of the book must have presented Goodman with a formidable problem of style. On the one hand he will most likely have felt the need to write it as a book that induces its readers to follow his line of thought by letting them retrace the same, or some of the same, steps that led him to the final formulation of the various points. This, prudently, should include some reference to alternative viewpoints that need to be rejected. On the other hand the exposition of a sophisticated and highly complex system of related concepts requires that it be worked out in fine detail before putting pen to paper for the final manuscript. This, I suggest, contributes to the artificiality of the sections introductory to his systematic formulations. More importantly however it is not to be wondered at if in some cases the artful simplicity of those prefatory remarks seems arcane or recondite or that occasionally some apparently unwarranted or irrelevant step is only justifiable in the light of the sophisticated theory it purports to support. I would argue that the latter is the case in the crucial distinction made above. Rather than being delayed by the unfortunate obscurity of the preamble it is much more productive to pass quickly on to the precise formulations and to assess them as they stand after full analysis.

What is the relation of "exemplification"?

The distinction last alluded to is forcefully restated:

> *Exemplification is possession plus reference. To have without symbolising is merely to possess, while to symbolise without having is to refer in some other way than by exemplifying. (7)*

The tailor's swatch is given as the archetype of this relation. Characteristically Goodman identifies straight away the major difficulty that is to be encountered by adopting this definition - how formally to take account of the fact that only some of the properties of a sample are taken as exemplified?

> *.... A swatch does not exemplify all its properties; it is a sample of color, weave, texture, and pattern, but not of size, shape, or absolute weight or*

value.... The swatch exemplifies only those properties that it both has and refers to. (8)

An object does not necessarily exemplify all of its properties. Its properties are countless but it may be (as in the case of the tailor's swatch) that only some of them are exemplified because it only makes reference to part of what it possesses. (9) How is the variability of reference to be explained?

If possession is intrinsic, reference is not; and just which properties of a symbol are exemplified depends upon what particular system of symbolization is in effect. (10)

He goes on to illustrate what he means by 'system of symbolization' by arguing that the properties exemplified (i.e. possessed and referred to) by the tailor's swatch will vary if the interrogative context changes. The swatch will exemplify certain properties of the different kinds of cloth collected there if it is offered as a sample in response to some question as to what kinds of material are available. But if it is offered in response to a question as to what a tailor's swatch is it would exemplify being a tailor's swatch. To emphasize the difference, a swatch could, function perfectly as a sample in this last case whilst containing no available kind of cloth.

He is saying then that the exemplificational systems are the spontaneous product of context. He later defines a symbol system as follows:-

A symbol system consists of a symbol scheme correlated with a field of reference.(11)

He must mean then that the symbol system and its field of reference are, in these cases, only determined in context. Whilst we may become familiar with some often repeated contexts, like the example of the tailor's swatch, nothing prevents the same object operating as a different kind of sample, the same symbol scheme being correlated with a different field of reference. This, as we shall see, is the exact reverse of the case in pure notational systems.

The system of symbolisation and the referential relation having been emphasized, Goodman would find great difficulty in further developing exemplification in terms of properties. It does not easily lend itself to the task of tracing the interactive relationship between words as labels and objects as samples. Turning as it does away from properties reminds us how dependant on Goodman's general position his account of exemplification is.

Predicates versus Properties

There are, he argues, grave disadvantages associated with talk about exemplification of properties. As we have noted the issue of the selection of properties is a central concern since a satisfactory account must be provided to make the relation of exemplification viable.

The sample, Socrates, is a rational animal, a featherless biped, and a laughing mammal. Although these three properties are co-extensive Socrates may be taken as exemplifying only one of them. The natural explanation of this selection for those who wish to think in terms of properties is that whilst the properties are co-extensive they are not identical. It is hoped that by providing this logical separation as a criterion of selection the implication of the other two properties is avoided. Goodman rejects identity as a means of telling what is exemplified and what is not. He cites the counter-example:-

> ....*a figure that exemplifies triangularity, though always trilateral, does not always exemplify trilaterality. If trilaterality is not identical with triangularity, what is? (12)*

But if the two properties *are* considered as identical and the point is conceded that one figure can exemplify triangularity and another trilaterality then 'identical properties may differ in what exemplifies them.'(12) This would in effect be claiming that every predicate denotes a distinguishable and therefore different property - a conclusion that is both uneconomical and implausible. What is needed, Goodman implies, is a way of accounting for the selective reference of exemplification that at the same time is flexible enough to allow a cluster of predicates to denote the referring property of the sample and in turn for that cluster to be referred to. This flexibility is achieved, he believes, by

taking 'exemplification of *predicates* and other labels as elementary.'(l3) This option also has its difficulties.

To say what is exemplified is a predicate that denotes the sample is very restrictive. A red paint chip that serves as a colour sample will be taken as exemplifying the predicate '(is) red'. This excludes the possibility that the paint chip can function simultaneously as a sample of the colour for a Frenchman who does not know the English word 'red'. If the Frenchman assumes that it exemplifies the predicate'(est) rouge' there is no formal relationship at all between the two samples.   On the definition above where exemplification is of a single predicate we must say that they are two entirely different samples. What is at stake is the ability to refer to an inter-linguistic entity best described as 'redness'.

The obvious next step is to say:-

> *(let us) construe 'exemplifies redness' as elliptical for 'exemplifies some label co-extensive with 'red'.'(14)*

But if the first formulation was too strict this is too loose. It does not provide any criterion for the separation of the exemplified predicates from co-extensive predicates not regarded as exemplified.

> *For if Socrates exemplifies rationality, and 'rational' is co-extensive with 'risible', then Socrates will also exemplify risibility. (15)*

Risibility here is that aspect of the sample Socrates that is correctly denoted by 'risible' and is not normally part of the concept of rationality. To take another example, if the red paint chip exemplifies redness and 'red' is co-extensive with '(has) shape', then the red chip will also exemplify being extended in space. Whilst this result may seem less embarrassing than the last example it nevertheless shows the formulation to be at odds with our evident ability to select more specifically than this definition can account for. How does Goodman deal with the difficulty? He does not 'deal' with it at all. He accepts it as an aspect of exemplificational systems.

> *The answer is that the lines may be drawn with any degree of looseness or tightness. While 'exemplifies rationality', taken by itself, says only 'exemplifies <u>some</u> label co-extensive with 'rational', the context usually tells us a good deal more about what label is in question…. we can be as specific or as general as we like about what is exemplified, but we cannot achieve maximum specificity and maximum generality at the same time. (16)*

What does he mean by 'maximum specificity' and 'maximum generality'? When he first introduced the problem which arises from taking exemplification of predicates as elementary he identified, as we saw, a very strict and a very loose formulation. The former restricts reference to one identified predicate and one only. To do this is I take it, to achieve maximum specificity. It is consistent with Goodman's earlier held view that no two terms are synonymous if we take into account both primary and secondary extensions. (17) The loose formulation does not restrict reference to the initially exemplified predicate but uses that predicate to stand for itself and some other label or labels co-extensive with it. The other labels are not identified. This is, I assume, maximum generality. The context and the knowledge of customs and conventions of reference that we bring to it help us to determine what degree of specificity to expect and what set of labels we can justifiably take as being exemplified. In addition a person deploying the sample may comply with a request to specify more exactly which labels are exemplified. It is worthy of note that, in the absence of such a person, a great deal of constructive speculation, paying attention to many forms of evidence, can be generated to arrive at a plausible level of specificity and this is the prototype of the critical process. When Goodman subsequently refers to 'red' or redness being exemplified the second is not a concession to a position previously rejected but an elliptical term for a set of co-extensive predicates customarily assumed to be exemplified by 'red'. There is no inconsistency in Goodman suggesting a formulation that seems to suggest that some predicates have the same meaning. He holds that we should

> *construe degree of synonymy as, so to speak, degree of inter-replaceability. (l7)*

This will vary greatly from discourse to discourse and with our interests and purposes.

Significantly Goodman here accepts (perhaps embraces would be a more appropriate word) a further kind of indeterminacy. The indefiniteness is inherent in the formulation so long as it is not open to us to ask for greater specificity. He does not use his ingenuity to avoid indeterminacy which suggests that he sees it as a positive aspect of exemplificational systems and added, as it is, to that detected in the determination of the operative symbol system it will be important to note how this is exploited and developed in the general account of expression.

The indeterminacy described here is lessened by help from the context. Goodman gives a number of illustrations as to how the context helps in this way. It is either by establishing an interrogative context - what is a tailor's swatch? What kinds of cloth are available? What colours of paint are for sale? What colour have you painted your house? - or an acknowledgement of a bounded language community. In the case where the sample is presented in response to a question the question itself determines the *kind* of predicate that is going to be exemplified. It does this by indicating what will count as an answer. A sample presented in response to a question about the colour of my house will be assumed to exemplify some predicate capable of denoting a colour. In cases where a question is not explicitly stated, part of the process of determining what is exemplified will be to identify plausible, if hypothetical interrogative contexts.

A further implication of Goodman's account, but one he does not draw himself, is that the degree to which one can specify which labels are exemplified also depends on context in the sense of the alternative objects available to act as samples. Consider the following question:-

In what colour have you painted your house?

The question determines that if I offer a sample as my answer it will only count as an answer if it exemplifies a colour predicate. My house is painted poppy-red. Imagine however, that this conversation is taking place at a table with an array of coloured paint chips on it each painted in one of the following colours, crimson, blue, yellow, orange, purple, and green. If I had to select my sample only from these I .would pick the crimson

chip. In so doing I would be letting the sample refer relatively non-specifically. Interestingly this relative non-specificity would be fairly effectively conveyed by the context if my interlocutor was aware of the restricted set of alternative colours at my disposal. Further clarification would be obtained by further questioning.

If the same question is asked when on the table is a full set of colour charts of the paint company showing many kinds of blues, yellows, oranges, purples, greens, and reds, and amongst them is the poppy red that I actually used, my sample has a different status. It is maximally specific and if my partner is aware of all the contextual facts (i.e. that these were the charts from which I chose the colour of paint) he will be aware of that level of specificity. Having traced some of the implications of his formulation it is evident that by defining exemplification as reference to labels by a sample denoted by those labels Goodman has enhanced the explanatory potential of this symbolic relation. We have already noted considerable subtleties associated with the determination of reference. They promise an interesting interpretation of the role of the critic and of the achievement of meaning in the arts in general.

Ann Brentlinger (18) has criticised Goodman's account. Whilst she agrees that an explanation in terms of exemplified predicates is more satisfactory than one that takes properties as exemplified, she believes that his account is in need of some alteration. By considering her suggested improvements certain positive features of Goodman's explanation are made clearer.

She presents the account in *Languages of Art* as follows. The strict form, which as we saw in effect defines maximum specificity, she gives as:-

> *1) X exemplifies triangularity ≡ X exemplifies the predicate 'triangular'.*

The loose form, which as we saw in effect defines maximum generality, she gives as:-

> *2) X exemplifies triangularity ≡ (Ey) (y is a label co-extensive with 'triangular' and X exemplifies Y)*

Following this she makes a crucial misreading of Goodman. She makes no reference to the fact that the two definitions above are considered unsatisfactory by Goodman only because they are extremes of a continuum - that we can, as we saw, locate the degree of specificity or generality at any point between these two extremes. Brentlinger misses the point that Goodman accepts this formal indefiniteness as a positive feature. She continues:-

> *To take account of the context in the way he intends Goodman's analysis should be put as follows:-*
>
> *3) X exemplifies triangularity ≡ X exemplifies Ø (where replacements for Ø are predicates co-extensive with 'triangular', which vary with the context in which "X exemplifies triangularity" is used).*

To take this as a formal restatement of the informal argument in *Languages of Art* is innocuous and fairly accurate. If however it is taken as a definition of a primitive term, in what we might call Goodman's system, it is misguided. If Goodman's argument in section 3 of Chapter II established anything it was that no formal definition was adequate to capture the way in which exemplification is actually achieved. Instead he identified two limiting definitions, one very strict and one very loose, and accepted the practical indeterminacy that this implied.

Consequently, Brentlinger's first criticism that 3) 'gives us no clue as to what it is about the context that determines what predicate replaces Ø in the analysis', misses the point. Her second criticism is even more revealing. She says:-

> *…. the analysandum provides more information than the analysans. We know by the use of the analysandum in context not only that some particular context-dependent predicate co-extensive with 'triangular' is exemplified, but we also know that any predicates equivalent in meaning to that predicate are also exemplified.*

This is true of her definition number 3) but it is certainly not what Goodman holds of exemplification. He lays emphasis on the fact that 'same' can mean only other concrete inscriptions of the predicate or that it can mean many other predicates yet to be specified. As he says, 'We can be as specific or as general as we like.' In particular there is no

allusion to any such notion as absolute equivalence of meaning. Any co-extensive predicates involved are admitted only in relation to one particular instance of exemplification. The concession of legitimacy to this act of inclusion must be justified on other grounds. (19) Criticism of Goodman may focus on his acceptance of relatively simple formulations but it cannot criticise him either for failing to achieve something he never tried to do (i.e. account for contextual influence in a formal definition) or for the inadequacy of a definition he need not acknowledge as his.

Brentlinger attempts to make her definition 3) more acceptable in the light of her two criticisms. This leads her to deploy the notion of 'same linguistic role' in order to account for equivalences of meaning, Thus:-

> 4) *X exemplifies triangularity ≡ 'triangular' denotes X and X refers to 'triangular' and (y) (y is a predicate and plays the same linguistic role as 'triangular' y denotes X and X refers to y).*

Accepting that 'same meaning' or 'plays the same linguistic role' are 'intolerably vague' she suggests that we do have an acceptable concept of synonymy in that 'we feel two terms are synonymous in general to the degree that both are and can be exemplified by the same-objects.' This co-exemplification is then defined in terms of purposes. 'Which aspect of a thing makes it a *sample* or exemplification depends on which features the person presenting it is referring to, and this in turn depends on his purpose in presenting the object.' She then proceeds to illustrate this intentional explanation of exemplification. No comment is made on the difficulty of determining intentions and purposes.

Her analysis is a complex four term relation involving dispositional notions. The four elements are a sample, a person (as language user), a class of predicates that the person uses the object to refer to and the purpose. Thus:-

> 5) *X exemplifies triangularity at -time t ≡ The T for P predicates denote X at t and a language user S uses X at t to refer to the T for P predicates in*
> *order to achieve purpose P.*

(where 'T for P predicates' denotes that set of predicates which serve the same purpose for S as the original exemplified predicate.)

Brentlinger claims two advantages over Goodman for her account. Firstly it brings out the role of purposes. Secondly it accounts more adequately for the ability to refer inter-linguistically by exemplification.

The first is not an advantage over Goodman for he gives adequate prominence to purposes. The context of aims is present as part of every illustration of modes of exemplification. Having eschewed the use of intentions in the formal definitions he chooses to show their importance in specific examples. Again, though not formally defined, purpose is given the crucial role of determining the specificity or generality of that which is exemplified. The fact that it is not included as a formally fixed relation means that a greater flexibility and usefulness is saved for the relation. The creator of the referential relationship has the right to determine the extent of that reference. The negotiation of meaning that this situation makes possible is a fruitful result of the inherent indeterminacy. It is only made possible by declining to include all aspects of the relation in a formal definition of the system. Brentlinger in trying to include context and purpose loses this fruitful aspect. She gains however what Goodman loses, namely a host of extra difficulties attendant on the attempt to determine intentions or purposes in any specific case.

When Brentlinger suggests that Goodman does not adequately account for the inter-linguistic nature of exemplification she is still misled by her misreading of his argument. We have already noted the difficulties for her own account of inter-linguistic reference by sample. Goodman's answer is that, on request, we may specify exactly which predicates are to be taken as co-extensive and we may indicate some which are from different languages. If I am not aware of some predicates that others would argue could plausibly be considered as co-extensive then my sample cannot be taken as referring to those predicates. It is interesting to note that for us to come to agree that we should include a previously unknown predicate as co-extensive involves firstly that such agreement would

be the result of a negotiation of meaning and secondly that both the act of negotiation and the resultant extension of comprehension constitute important educational activity.

We can conclude that Brentlinger does not provide a better account of the exemplification of predicates, resorting as it does to notoriously difficult and slippery concepts. But more importantly it loses the full explanatory force present in the formulation in *Languages of Art*.

The Exemplification of Non-Verbal Labels

We have already seen that exemplification, as Goodman defines it, seems able to illuminate aspects of our ways of referring. If exemplification can now be shown successfully to apply with non-verbal as well as verbal labels the relation will be made more adaptable and more widely applicable. In particular it will be much more likely to be useful in the field of the arts where labels are not necessarily, or even commonly, linguistic. In this section I will consider the examples Goodman gives of exemplification of non-verbal labels, develop some further examples of my own and, in particular, consider some implication of recognising that the formal restriction of an antecedent classification of exemplified labels need not obtain. In the process the practical illustrations help to clarify the notions of symbol system and contextual help.

An important result of his taking predicates and other labels as elementary is that representation and exemplification are thereby made more distinct in that,

> *...while anything may be denoted only labels may be exemplified. (20)*

Goodman is quick to point out, however, that this is not as limiting as it may seem at first sight. Not all labels are from linguistic systems. There are other kinds of label - gestural, pictorial and diagrammatic.

> *Such non-linguistic systems, some of them developed before the advent or organisation of language, are in constant use. Exemplification of an unnamed property usually amounts to exemplification of a non-verbal symbol for which we have no corresponding word or description. (21)*

The two separate points briefly stated in this passage represent significant lines of argument in which the application of exemplification is designed to illuminate problems in both the philosophy of language and of art. The first part alludes to his argument that we do not acquire a language as our initial symbolic system but rather as a secondary symbolic system. (22) His statement that,

> *what we call a language is a fairly elaborate and sophisticated symbolic system ....(and) before anyone acquires a language, he has had an abundance of practice in developing and using rudimentary pre-linguistic symbolic systems in which gestures and sensory and perceptual occurrences of all sorts function as signs. (23)*

is strengthened by a successful description of symbolising that is not dependent upon language.

His second part says that we can exemplify unnamed properties and if this is acceptable it will provide a very valuable explanation for familiar and sometimes bewildering aspects of artistic activity. The fact that no suitable verbal description is available for properties that are referred to in some way, is sometimes taken as grounds for characterising art as at best obscure and at worst mysterious. Goodman is against any resort to the mystical. It is the development of this second point that engages him in the section in *Languages of Art* subtitled. *Samples and Labels.*

He is careful however to emphasize the fact that since most of our labelling is achieved by linguistic systems then reference to verbal labels is a common feature of exemplification. This is an important point to establish since much of the power of his later descriptions of the activity of art is derived from the fact that they involve subtle and sophisticated interaction with language.

In a significant preamble to the illustrations of exemplification, verbal and non-verbal, he emphasizes that the relation is dependent on a *pattern* of reference between two related elements. There is often an obvious enough relationship with language so that identification of the denotative element and the exemplifying element is relatively easy.

This may not be the case when the elements are non-verbal. Attention to the formal features of the pattern of reference can help to determine which is which.

> *If a diagram of reference is such that all its arrows are single-headed, exemplification is absent, for we know that exemplification implies the converse of denotation. Where double-headed arrows occur, we may be able to tell in which direction denotation runs. For example, if the elements (nodes of the diagram) are antecedently distinguished into two categories, A and B, and every single-headed arrow runs from an A to a B, then reference from an A to a B here is always denotation, reference from a B to an A exemplification. (24)*

This identification of the relation as a pattern between elements contributes to its formal independence from language. A pattern such as this can be imposed without requiring that the exemplified element (the label) have an antecedently fixed denotation. Now labels can be, exemplified. This is a valuable feature of the relation in its application to the arts and other activities. Of course, if the denotation of an exemplified label is fixed prior to being picked out by a sample then that label must be applicable to that sample. It is this double reference, from label to sample and from sample to label that makes exemplification seem 'more intrinsic, less arbitrary' than denotation, Goodman gives two examples that exhibit various modes of exemplification. The first is of a gymnastics instructor. An adaptation of this example will serve to illustrate that variety more clearly. (25) Imagine the following sequence of events:-

A. the class gathers for a lesson on how to improve their performance of knee-bending, toe-touching, and squat-jumping

B. the instructor, wishing to gauge the initial standard of the class, instructs them verbally to perform ten knee-bends, ten toe-touches and ten squat-jumps.

C. following this he stands at the front of the class, instructs them to watch carefully, and performs the same actions, sometimes explaining what points need care to achieve and pointing out what problems might be encountered.

D. he then instructs the class to perform a certain number of each kind of action in turn. He watches and offers further advice, instructions and admonitions.

E. after a while the time has come for the class to practise what they have learnt. The instructor explains as follows, "I shall show you which action to perform and I want you to continue until I show you the next one." He then performs a knee-bend and after the class have begun he wanders around watching their performances.

F. then he moves to the front, performs one toe-touch and watches again.

G. again he moves to the front and performs one squat-jump and returns to watching.

H. he then says, that they will do a sequence all together and they will all change actions when he does so. He then performs the actions in sequence, the class doing likewise, changing when he does. The class and the instructor perform the same number and sequence of actions.

What modes of reference in this example are denotational and which are exemplificational? Clearly the instructor's original verbal instruction (B) is denotational. His subsequent demonstration (C) helped by explanation seems clearly exemplificational. The actions at this point exemplify 'competent knee-bend', 'competent toe-touch', 'competent squat-jump.'

The second instance when he performs these actions (E) is primarily denotational in the context since each is a label denoting which actions should be performed. Indeed it seems that the instructor could as easily have substituted verbal prescriptions. It would be a mistake however to miss a crucial difference that exists between the label 'knee-bend', exemplified by the class the first time they did it and the label 'knee-bend', exemplified by the instructor and, hopefully, the class at the end of the session. An understanding of the denotation of 'knee- bend' would involve (indeed may be measured by) perception of the properties referred to by the samples provided by the instructor. The term the instructor exemplifies is, as we saw, 'competent knee-bend' and this label was not exemplified by the class's first performance. The action of the instructor whilst being

performed to denote the kind of action next to be performed by the class *may* also be taken as an example of the required response. It is then a label exemplifying itself.

The final performances by the instructor (H) are of two kinds. The first performance of each set, i.e. the first knee-bend, the first toe-touch, the first squat-jump, denotes and prescribes what action should then be performed. His subsequent performances of each kind are a matter of his obeying the instruction that each first performance conveys. His first performances act primarily as labels exemplifying themselves and all subsequent performances as examples.

An interesting feature of this explanation is that the example participates in the characterisation of a revised meaning of the label. In the example just discussed the predicate 'competent knee-bend', was as far as the class were concerned, without an established antecedent denotation, or more accurately the educational context led them to a willing suspension of any prior denotation they may have assumed. Indeed it seems plausible to describe the educational purpose of the class as to consider and achieve an alternative denotation with the hope that this will better enable them to exemplify it in their own performances. This alternative denotation would be regarded as more authoritative. Consequently the exemplificational relationship helped constitute the final denotation insofar as this authority was conceded.

His second example is taken from modern dance.

> *Some elements of the dance are primarily denotative, versions of the descriptive gestures of daily life (e.g., bowings, beckonings) or of ritual (e.g., signs of benediction, Hindu hand-postures). But other movements, especially in the modem dance, primarily exemplify rather than denote. What they exemplify, however, are not standard or familiar activities, but rather rhythms and dynamic shapes. The exemplified patterns and properties may re-organise experience, relating actions not usually associated or distinguishing others not usually differentiated, thus enriching allusion or sharpening discrimination. To regard these movements as illustrating verbal descriptions would of course be absurd: seldom can the just wording be found. Rather the label a movement exemplifies may be itself; such a movement, having no antecedent denotation, takes on the duties of a label denoting certain actions including itself. Here, as often elsewhere in the arts, the vocabulary evolves along with what it is used to convey. (26)*

There are in this short section some intriguing points. We should consider exactly how enrichment of allusion and sharpening of discrimination are achieved by movements that exemplify but do not denote. Similarly it will be useful to dwell a little on how Goodman might expand upon the way in which a 'vocabulary' of dance can be established, in what it would consist and how it would evolve.

There is little difficulty in asserting the proposition that the act of making a sequence of human movements into a dance performance focuses our attention on that sequence. A denotative function need not be involved. The act of choreographic performance picks out and highlights the movements. From the beginning this implies that they are important and significant in some way. Simply to attend to them during the performance increases the likelihood that we will recognise these particular movements when we meet them again either as specially highlighted in another performance or in our daily lives. The more accurate way of characterising the way this act of attention sharpens our discrimination is to take the dance as providing us with additional means of categorising human movements. Prior to this it would not be so easy to discriminate just these aspects but the label 'those movements, seen in that particular dance' facilitates their re-cognition. A similar kind of special attention is invited in painting when, say, a non-figurative painting (27) displays, with particular emphasis, certain colours. By referring back to '*that colour* in *that* picture' we can discriminate more subtly. This 'reference back' is a matter of comparison with the sample to determine whether the subsequently perceived, colour can be subsumed under the label 'that colour in that picture'. Since the denotative aspect is not part of this achievement of significance it is not 'standard or familiar activities' that are exemplified but rhythms and dynamic shapes (or, in the case of the picture, the depth and hue of the colours and its relationship with others in the picture). Attention is given to intrinsic features of the actions rather than any function these features might contingently serve. In this way such attention 'sharpens discrimination'. But how does it 'enrich allusion'?

Enrichment involves 'relating actions not usually associated'. By 'relation' Goodman means, I think, that the new relationship is exemplified. It is displayed and clearly

intended as a comment. It is not merely actual juxtaposition of movements and actions but that the bringing into relation is a significant act. This pre-supposes that the two related elements are identified prior to their being brought into relation. This process of identification is part of the building of a vocabulary. It will therefore be useful first to consider what bearing the establishment of a vocabulary might have on the enrichment of allusion.

How are we to understand the idea of a vocabulary of the dance? Such a vocabulary is dependent on the existence of identifiable elements. A sequence of movements, by being part of a performance, is intended to be seen. It displays itself, draws attention to itself, by its very nature as dance. This displaying is part of what makes it an art form rather than another kind of action. We have seen above how elements of a work can help sharpen discrimination by being taken as labels of certain kinds of movements or colours. Added to these labels which contribute to the vocabulary is a set of labels produced by quotation and comment. Sequences, even whole dances are quotable. They are quoted when they are re-performed and are therein taken as referring to their instance in the earlier performance. Such quotation allows sequences (which may be short or long) to be placed in new relationships and to be commented upon by such changes. This subsequent use identifies units that may become the elements of a vocabulary of dance, I do not mean by this a vocabulary of terms that categorises dance movements into kinds to facilitate notation or talk about dance - this is a meta-language. I mean a current and changeable stock of dance-ideas that dancers use to re-formulate, extend, comment upon or relate to in some other way. By being identified and distinguished a dance-idea comes to label a certain kind of movement including any direct quotation of itself. As a label it also denotes itself.

This account so far lays great stress on subsequent identification .of the unit as label and I may therefore be accused of depriving the original performance of any significance by relegating it to the status of a potential label. This is of course not true since as we have seen earlier performances can both denote and exemplify themselves as self-exemplifying labels. It is however true that a work continues to grow in significance as –

more of its original ideas are taken and related to in subsequent works or are found to sharpen our discrimination more and more.

We have seen that subsequent quotation is active in identifying the unit as a label. We need now to reflect on exactly how this is achieved at the time of first performance as well as afterwards. In other words how do we come to select certain sequences as self-exemplifying labels rather than others? To be identifiable the label must come to be distinguished as a single denoting unit. This means that, unless the whole dance is taken as that unit, some definite sequence must be isolated from the continuous stream of the dance. There are two points of influence affecting the choice of units to be isolated for special attention, one situated within the work and one external to it. The latter is the activity of critical appreciation. By this I do not mean only those journalists or writers who earn their living by providing comment on performances of various kinds. I mean, as well, the whole reflective process set going by any work. In some cases this process results in the publishing of disciplined and careful thought, sometimes in the way another dance is directed and staged, sometimes in an imperceptible modification of attitudes. The crucial point is that there is a complex but powerful interaction between the critical process and the way certain features of works are perceived as relatively significant. Any sequence can be isolated for quotation and comment. The reasons for any such choice are more or less determined by specific and variable purposes and interests. By relating to these ideas in various ways and by presenting associations between different dance-ideas they are made significant in various ways, thus enriching allusion. Ideas can be shown as contradictory or similar, relatively important or trivial, ridiculous or sacred, formally fruitful or shallow, and they can display many other relations. The choice of unit may be helped by knowledge of the process of rehearsal, of the personal preferences or pre-occupations of the choreographer and dancers. Knowledge of the whole range of clues that critics can use to help towards a well grounded interpretation of the work can be useful. Equally, however, it may be an entirely personal response to the work which implicitly denies any need to justify the finding of significance in certain parts of a performance.

The other point of interest on the selection and isolation of sections as elements of an evolving vocabulary of movement is the conventions or internal signals of the dance. The continuous sequence of movements may be subtly phrased; a sense of natural grouping of movements can be created by the skilful use of rhythm, crescendo and diminuendo of the movements, and many more such suggestions of ends and beginnings. We have already seen that isolation of identifiable units constitute labelling of dance-ideas. They have no antecedently established denotation and become movements exemplifying themselves. But what do we mean by the phrase 'connections or internal signals of the dance'. Is this a further and different mode of symbolism upon which the self-exemplification is dependant?

If we look to the case of form in music we can see some more familiar examples of how sections are isolated and made recognisable within a non-figurative whole. The formalised act of repetition in Simple Ternary, Sonata, Rondo and Fugue form is a well established method of signalling the subject or voice which the hearer must identify in order to be able to perceive the alterations of key and context it undergoes during the piece. In some of these forms a second subject or voice is introduced and therefore offers the possibility of contrast as well. Repetition is a powerful mode of signalling, for it is in effect an internal quotation. By such alterations and interpositions as are alluded to above a kind of commenting or variation can be achieved which is capable of great formal or expressive effect.

Repetition is a fairly basic mode of signalling but perhaps the use of the pause is even more so. And yet from the minute or so that separates movements to the almost imperceptible interruption that distinguishes the subtlest phrasing the pause is a most important way in which the hearer is given clues as to the location of beginnings and ends. But repetition and pausing are perhaps more basic than other features in that they are a more general mode of signalling whilst others in our music are more dependent on a specific historically based connection. For example the beginning and ending of the cadenza is often signalled by certain key relationships and rhythmical signals and recognition of still finer aspects of form may well require not only a full acquaintance with musical conventions bust also a well practised ear. To have knowledge of the usual

features of the form is important in the efficacy of these modes of communication. When we know that subjects will be repeated we listen for the differences that constitute the comment and we can only revel in unusual passages if we have expected something else. Modes of signalling such as these and many more that have not been mentioned are available to those who create and perform dances.

Both these internal signals and the external influence of critical activity serve to constitute the element of a vocabulary of dance that facilitates the extension of the significance of performances and which subsequently sharpen our discrimination of aspects of movement hitherto unnoticed. Earlier I asked whether the internal features discussed above were a further mode of reference upon which exemplification was dependent. If this were so it would warrant a great deal more investigation than Goodman affords it. Whilst their importance must not be minimised nor study of them discouraged, the ways in which the form contributes to the identification of such elements is by basic and familiar modes of signalling or by conventions. Neither of these requires any theoretical justification within the system of *Languages of Art*.

A Further Source of Indeterminacy

It will be useful to restate some of the points already encountered that have a bearing on the question of indeterminacy. Goodman uses the analogy of direction to point up the contrast between representation (denotation in a pictorial symbol system) and exemplification. For a symbol A to denote B we can simply let A apply to B. If A has no prior denotation then it applies literally but if in being applied it breaks a customarily established boundary of application then it applies figuratively. If '(is) A' correctly denotes B then B may be said to possess the property of being A. Using Goodman's example, if '(is) gray' correctly applies to an object then the object can be said to possess the property of being gray. But mere possession does not imply any reference to that possession. If A is exemplified by B then B possesses A and refers to A. Goodman argues that denotation is reference from A to B and exemplification is reference from B to A then this is usefully described as a difference in direction of reference between denotation and exemplification.

A kind of indeterminacy arises from the fact that any object as sample will possess many properties or more accurately will be correctly denoted by many different labels. Because of this the particular property (or restricted set of properties) exemplified must be selected from this multitude. This means however that the same object can serve as a sample of different properties when different selections are made. The criterion of selection varies with context and purpose. A second level of indeterminacy arises if the process of determination is seen as having two distinct stages. The first stage is satisfactorily to identify an initial label that is clearly exemplified and the second stage is to determine as far as possible the set of labels that, in this case, can be taken as co-extensive with that initial label. I should stress that this division into stages is for explanatory purposes and I do not mean to suggest that a formal division exists. Theoretically both stages exhibit the same formal process of determining what labels are exemplified. Practically however we realise that some labels that are acceptable as co-extensive are not immediately apparent and some negotiation and research may be required to establish the fact. For this reason the distinction between initial and co-extensive labels is apparent in practice but it is not part of the formal definition. It should be remembered that exemplification of labels is developed by Goodman to include non-verbal and self-exemplifying labels thus considerably enhancing the applicability of the relation.

A further source of indeterminacy affecting exemplificational systems is defined in his Theory of Notation in *Languages of Art*. In this section he takes as his task a formal analysis of the requirements a symbol system must fulfil if it is to achieve unique determination of a class of objects denoted by the characters of the system and unique determination, by those same objects, of the characters that uniquely determine them. By formally characterising strict determination he formally characterises another kind of indeterminacy which he will later deploy in his full account of artistic activity in which exemplification plays an important part.

Apart from- this quite specific relation to the nature of exemplification the discussion of notation illuminates his general approach to larger epistemological issues. He says at the very beginning of the chapter:-

Concerning notation in the arts there are some questions, often dismissed as mere annoyances, that reach deep into the theory of language and knowledge. (28)

For these reasons it is useful at this point to consider his theory of notation. In what follows I shall be paying particular attention to how it affects exemplification of systems. Consequently some of the subtleties and fine discriminations are left unexplained. (29)

According to Goodman's technical analysis of notation indeterminacy arises when a system is ambiguous or is either syntactically or semantically dense, or both, and density is defined in relation to differentiation. These concepts describe a symbol system. A symbol system is defined as a symbol scheme correlated with a field of reference. Although Goodman is concerning himself exclusively with denotational systems the two concepts of scheme and field of reference apply also to exemplificational systems. As we shall see it is only the mode of reference that is changed.

The symbol scheme is the class of 'characters' in the system used to refer to some object or event. Thus in the standard system of musical notation this note
Fig. 1

would be an instance of a character in that system and all other G naturals would be an instance of the same character. A character is a class of such instances. The symbol scheme is the syntactic element of a symbol system. The field of reference of a character is that which is denoted (or referred to in some other way) by a character. The field of reference of the above musical character if it occurred in a work is a sound event in a particular relation to all other sound events within the frame of that work. This is the semantic element of the system.

Clearly both the symbol scheme and the field of reference can be more or less determinate. The particular features of a symbol system depend on the function the system is designed to fulfil. What Goodman has done is to analyse what characteristics a symbol system requires if it is to fulfil the task of a notation. He takes this task to be

> ....*the authoritative identification of a work from performance to performance. (30)*

He concludes that to do this, five logically independent conditions must be fulfilled by the system.

> Conditions of the syntactic apparatus:-
>> (1) Characters must be disjoint.
>> (2) Characters must be finitely differentiated.
> Conditions of the semantic field:-
>> (3) Compliance classes must be disjoint.
>> (4) The semantic field must be finitely differentiated.
>> (5) There must be no semantic ambiguity.

A system that fulfils these requirements has maximum precision and determinacy and is capable of maintaining identity of a work in any chain of reference from character to instance back to characters. In the absence of these conditions indeterminacy and confusion of meaning results. An example of a workable notation other than music is chess notation whereby each move of a game can be recorded and the game re-played if wished. (31) Systems can fail to fulfil some or all of these requirements by not developing far enough or by careless formulation (as some recent musical 'notations'.) However the syntactic or semantic nature of some systems is such that they can never be precise and determinate enough, and in the strict way of ensuring identity through a chain of reference as noted above. One such inherent inability is characterised as density.

Syntactic density (i.e. density of the symbol scheme) is contrasted with the finite differentiation of characters in an effective notational scheme (2) above). Requirement one above states that the characters of a symbolic scheme must be disjoint. That is there should be no inscriptions that belong to more than one character. If there were then the

chain of inscription - compliance class - inscription could lead to two different inscriptions and eventually to two different compliance classes. If this does not happen it can only be that the two characters to which the offending inscription belongs have the same compliance class, in which case the two characters collapse into one. So different characters of a symbol scheme must be disjoint. It must also be possible, in a notation, to tell two characters apart, or whether an inscription belongs, or does not belong to a given character. For example consider a scheme whose characters are the three primary colour pigments, red, blue, yellow, and the three secondary colours purple, orange and green. A change to a different colour within the scheme constitutes a change of character. For most people this change is readily recognisable. These characters can be ranged on a colour wheel.

Figure 2

Figure 3

Each region is clearly bounded but even if there were not a line between say the blue and the purple the difference is sufficient for even the inexperienced eye to see. The pointer distinguishes a character when pointing to any position within a bounded region. (32) In such a symbol scheme the characters are finitely differentiated.

Now consider another symbol scheme taking, as before, change of colour as a change of character. (Fig. 3). In this scheme we have the same colours as above but there is a gradual change from one colour to the next as in the spectrum. This means that no matter how small a movement the pointer makes, a change of colour, however minute, will have occurred. Now this is not symbolically different from our previous example <u>if</u> we still take the same six colours as the only characters in our scheme. All that we will have done is to make determination of the boundaries much more difficult. But there will be little difficulty in the central areas of the characters. However we do change the symbolic nature of the scheme if we say that for every movement of the pointer, there being a change in colour there is therefore a change in character. In this case there are an infinite number of characters for between any two there will always be a third. Discrimination of such changes of character is impossible to accomplish. From this Goodman argues:-

> *....the difficulty can no longer be dismissed as merely technological when it goes beyond insurmountability in practice and becomes an impossibility in principle. So long as the differentiation between characters is finite, no matter how minute, the determination of membership of mark in character will depend upon the acuteness of our perceptions and the sensitivity of the instruments we can devise. But if the differentiation is not finite, if there are two characters such that for some mark no even theoretically workable test could determine that the mark does not belong to both characters, then keeping the characters separate is not just practically but theoretically impossible. (33)*

A scheme then is 'syntactically dense if it provides for infinitely many characters so ordered that between each two there is a third.' (34)

Semantic density arises in a parallel way within the symbol system, only now it is the field of reference that is dense and undifferentiated. In a notational system it is necessary for a particular character to pick out precisely and unequivocally the class of objects or

events that it denotes and that in turn uniquely determines the character that denotes it. This Goodman calls a compliance class in order to draw attention to the fact that it serves referential relationships not normally considered under the more usual term 'extension'. (35) For such a task the compliance classes must be disjoint. This means that they cannot intersect for otherwise the overlap would contain instances belonging to at least two characters. This in turn leads to the possibility that a chain from inscription to compliant to inscription may lead to a change of character thus allowing a compliant to relate to two characters and this defeats the primary purpose of a notational system.

But if the compliance-classes must be differentiated then, as with syntactic features it should be possible to perceive this differentiation. Impossibility to perceive unequivocally the instances of a compliant class must be taken as a change in the nature of the system away from being notational. Hence a requirement for a notational system is semantic finite differentiation.

> *.....For every two characters K and K' such that their compliance classes are not identical, and every object h that does not comply with both, determination either that h does not comply with K or that h does not comply with K' must be theoretically possible. (36)*

The requirement of semantic disjointness, and its implication of the necessity for finite differentiation, has important consequences. It characterises most ordinary languages as non-notational since a notational system cannot contain any pair of semantically intersecting terms like 'doctor' and 'Englishman'. Therefore, where exemplification is of ordinary language terms then such exemplification cannot fulfil the condition of a notation. As we have seen the co-extensiveness of labels is an important feature of exemplification. From this failure to fulfil the requirement of semantic finite differentiation we get the concept of semantic density. If a field of reference is defined such that a continuous aspect (37) (such as the continuous increase or decrease of temperature) of the compliance classes is significant and any movement along that continuous aspect requires a character then the field is dense. An example given by Goodman is of a system whose scheme is fully reduced Arabic numerals and whose compliants are physical objects according to their weights in fractions of an ounce.

> *....since no limit is set upon significant difference in weight, there will always be many characters such that not even the finest measurement can attest that an object does not comply with them all. (38)*

The continuous aspect of weight, if not ordered into disjoint classes, becomes in principle, impossible to monitor precisely. Thus there will be at any time of measurement many characters (i.e. fractions of an ounce) such that it cannot be shown that they do not have the object as a compliant. A further example is provided by our continuous colour circle. This time it represents the semantic element of the symbol system. The various colours are now denoted by characters and are not the characters themselves. If every change of colour is deemed to be significant we would need an infinite number of characters in the symbol scheme. This may be achieved by taking some such scheme as Yellow, Green, Blue. The colour between Yellow and Green would be Yellowy-green and that between Green and Blue would be Bluey-green. The colour between Yellowy-green and Yellow would be Yellowy-yellowy-green, that between Yellowy-yellowy-green and Yellow would be Yellowy-yellowy-yellowy-green and so on in such a way that between any two characters there would be a third. Since every difference in colour is to be taken as significant we could set no limit to the number of additions of 'yellowy' etc. But very soon it would become impossible for us to notice any difference between the compliants of the characters. The semantic field is dense.

Ambiguity of the inscriptions of a character is defined as follows:-

> *A mark that is unequivocally an inscription is nevertheless <u>ambiguous</u> if it has different compliants at different times or in different contexts, whether its several ranges result from different literal or from literal and metaphorical uses. (39)*

Applying this to exemplification we remember that a sample as a character can be taken to refer to many different things simply because it can be taken as operating in different symbol systems. Any ambiguous *inscription* must be excluded from a notational system since it will lead to conflicting decisions as to which object complies with it. In addition any ambiguous character must be excluded even if its inscriptions are all unambiguous for inscriptions of such a character will have different compliants and some inscriptions

that count as true copies of each other will have different compliance-classes. Ambiguity is of course a common characteristic of natural languages. Both density and ambiguity result in indeterminacy in a symbol system.

Goodman, then, makes it clear that there are symbol systems that are inherently indeterminate because of their syntactic and semantic features. Why though are exemplificational systems always disqualified as notations?

> *Exemplificational systems, no matter what their syntactic and semantic properties, do not qualify as notations or languages. (40)*

We need to refer back to the discussion concerning the exemplification of co-extensive predicates. The conclusion Goodman came to was that to say that "Socrates exemplifies rationality is to say that Socrates exemplifies some label co-extensive with 'rational' and that the lines of interpretation may be drawn with any degree of looseness or tightness." Indeed what is exemplified depends on understanding and taking account of the particular context. Understanding the context means in effect that a judgement must be made as to what constitutes the symbol system operative at that time. Clearly such latitude must disqualify a system as notational.

Since Goodman distinguishes between the denotational form of reference and that operative in exemplification if any of the distinctions and terms developed are to be useful for the latter then they must be restated with this in mind. In particular it means replacing the strict relation of 'compliance' with the broader term 'reference' in acknowledgement of the non-notational nature of exemplification.

> *....the semantic properties of ambiguity, disjointness, differentiation, density, and discontinuity must now be defined more generally, in terms of reference and reference-classes rather than of compliance (or denotation) and compliance-classes (or extensions); but the way of doing this is obvious. For example, a system is semantically differentiated in this broader sense if and only if for every two characters K and K' and every element h not referred to by both, determination either that K does not refer to h or that K' does not refer to h is theoretically possible. The narrower definitions were used earlier because we were concerned exclusively with denotative systems. (41)*

The step taken in this passage is an important one since it makes possible the extremely fruitful application of the formal description of the semantic and syntactic features of denotational systems to exemplification and in turn, to those aspects of artistic activity where exemplification operates. Before this application he makes many interesting observations on the notational features of art and other systems.

The theoretical formulations discussed above define the conditions of notationality and non-notationality in any system. In doing so they define the nature of maximum determinacy. This makes possible the recognition of degrees of in-determinacy as the - violation of some or all of the conditions of maximum determinacy. The set of descriptive, terms serves to clarify the formal features of familiar notational systems such as the standard musical notation and to assess the notational efficacy of new systems such as Labanotation and the more innovative musical scores. It also makes a systematic analysis possible of relative notationality. For example: of diagrams, maps, models, scores, sketches and scripts. All of the remarks made by Goodman on the denotational aspects of systems are formally illuminating but they also fulfil another important function. One of the main purposes of *Languages of Art* is furthered by having shown how both the arts and the sciences share important symbolic characteristics. The fact that he discusses scientific and artistic systems without any sense of having transgressed boundaries is remarkable and it provides a foundation for his later assertions that both science and art are assimilable as cognitive activities.

This application to denotational features is important and revealing. When applied to exemplification in the arts and elsewhere the results are equally far reaching. It turns out that exemplification and expression in all the arts involves reference to a semantically dense field. In the case of the pictorial arts the syntactic scheme that exemplifies is also densely ordered. For example, if a picture literally exemplified the colour red or metaphorically exemplified sadness both are such that it is impossible to determine exactly which of two or more labels that correctly denote the picture, is exemplified. This is so because reference is to an unlimited set of terms from a natural language, which as our colour example showed (42) is capable of infinitely many distinctions that eventually become too fine to detect. In addition the field has many intersecting elements

which are also ambiguous. A kind of determinacy is only gained at the expense of precision. We can be more certain that we have caught that which is exemplified by making our net wider - that is 'by asserting that the predicate exemplified is more and more inclusive. Thus using terms that extensionally include others we can be safer from error. Once again we may note that to strive to determine more precisely the reference involved is to make, or become aware of, fine distinctions and is a fundamentally important cognitive activity. Goodman's analysis here neatly encapsulates the process of learning.

Similar problems of determinacy are characteristic of exemplification in music, literature and, by implication, of all the arts. Goodman deploys this result in a provocative and revealing way. It is at this point that the convergence of his technical analysis and the practice of art appreciation most clearly show the force of his re-description of the artistic process as a complex, interactive, symbolic activity. The precisely defined conditions of indeterminacy are essential for this convergence to be successful. The following quotations describe the basis, aim and justification of critical discourse. He says of pictorial exemplification and expression:-

> *In any such system with a dense symbol scheme and a dense or unlimited set of reference-classes, the search for accurate adjustment between symbol and symbolized calls for maximal sensitivity, and is unending. (43)*

and of music :-

> *....despite the definition of works by scores, exemplification or expression of anything beyond the score by a performance is reference in a semantically dense system, and a matter of infinitely fine adjustment. (44)*

and of literature:-

> *Thus even though a literary work is articulate and may exemplify or express what is articulate, endless search is always required here as in other arts to determine precisely what is exemplified or expressed. (45)*

Such an analysis gives great importance to contextual clues and the determining influence of the host of semi-rules, customs and conventions of artistic practice. Thus understanding is dependent on being historically informed and artistically sensitive. Goodman steps back from the task of providing any substance to the forms of reference he has described.

> *The pictorial systems of exemplification are not nearly so standardized as most of our practical systems of sampling or gauging or measuring. I am by no means claiming that the details of the pictorial systems are before us for easy discovery; and I have offered no aid in deciding whether a given picture exemplifies a given property, or expresses a given feeling, but only an analysis of the symbolic relations of pictorial exemplification and expression wherever they may obtain. (46)*

In effect he claims to have provided the forms by which various kinds of reference may be achieved but denies any obligation to offer any rules by which a specific reference can plausibly be determined. That, he seems to assert, is the job of the critical experts.

Evidently this indeterminacy is an essential part of Goodman's whole account. It follows, as we have seen, from semantic and syntactic features. It also results from the nature of exemplification as a symbolic relation. As we saw earlier the particular properties exemplified by a sample are determined by the operative symbol system which may at one time be ad hoc at another, be more or less fixed by custom. Both demand attention to the context to decide what system operates. Even when the system is fixed the label or labels exemplified may be more or less specific, in one case being maximally specific in another maximally general.

The theoretical advantages of this indeterminacy are considerable. The complexity and wealth of artistic reference is plausibly explained. The activity of appreciation and critical reflection emerges as important since through critical transactions meanings are generated. The fruitfulness of the art object, its ability to offer a constant source of new interpretations is explained in terms of symbolic features rather than as a mystical ineffability. The nature of this description of artistic activity is not only compatible, but forces us to recognise affinities with scientific forms of representation and articulation. A

basis is formed that takes as a fundamental theoretical principle the interaction of art with other aspects of our symbolic life. All of these advantages are capable of systematic justification.

Goodman has defined three different but related modes of symbolisation; denotation, notation and exemplification. The usefulness of the indeterminacy characteristic of exemplification may be seen as a strong motive for maintaining its distinctness from denotation. The distinction between the two kinds of reference has been questioned by Richard Peltz. (47)

Peltz identifies two problems which any semiotic aesthetic theory is called upon to solve - how to explain the fictional character of art and how to accommodate the apparent incompatibility of the symbolic character of signs and the immediacy of art. In his discussion of the answers provided by Goodman he makes it clear that he considers that the principles on which the solutions are based are both important and fruitful. He does however think that correction is needed in important details.

His first emendation, set out in part one of his paper, argues for an analysis of fictional predicates which takes due note of references between art forms. This is I think an acute observation and, as Peltz says, is not incompatible with Goodman's general aim. I am not going to discuss the merits and demerits of this argument here. However his second emendation, in Part II, concerning exemplification seems to me to be based on a flawed interpretation of the concept.

As we have seen exemplification is a special mode of possession. Possession for Goodman is a matter of being correctly denoted by a label. To say, 'This red chip is red' is to assert that "This red chip is denoted by the label 'red'". Exemplification occurs when an object becomes an example (or sample) of some property it possesses, or, excluding reference to properties, an object serves as a sample of a label that correctly denotes it. Thus the red paint chip may come to be used as a sample on a colour chart exemplifying 'red'. The label 'red' would not merely denote the chip but the chip would direct attention to the label. Thus exemplification involves reference by the sample to the label it exemplifies. Two opposing directions of reference are involved. From the label

to the sample and from the sample to the label. The first is defined as denotation. The second is contrasted with denotation and is called by the broader term 'reference'.

Peltz argues that Goodman has not succeeded in clarifying this second kind of reference. It is, he says, only negatively characterised as non-denotational. This has serious implications for the plausibility a semiotic explanation of immediacy:-

> *....if exemplification involves reference which is characterized negatively only as not denotation, then it seems that the defender of immediacy as non symbolic can justly claim that exemplification has not been established as a symbolic process........other than being told that "refer" does not mean "denote" we are given no insight into "reference ".(48)*

In an attempt to meet such objections and despite the clear contrast that he finds in Goodman's account between denotation and exemplificational reference, Peltz nevertheless thinks that:-

> *These objections can be met.......if all the various kinds of exemplification, even the most unlikely can be legitimately interpreted as conjunctions of denotations. (49)*

What does Peltz mean by a conjunction of denotations? In effect he is replacing Goodman's notion of 'reference' by the relatively clear idea of 'denotation' with a difference of direction. The difference of direction amounts to acknowledging the labelling function of a sample. The special interest of this relationship is that the label possesses those properties which it can be used to denote in itself and other samples.

Goodman states that if A exemplifies B then

   1) 'B' denotes A

and

   2) A refers to 'B'

Where 'B' is a label and A is a sample. Peltz would interpret A exemplifies B as:-

       1) 'B' denotes A (A possesses B)

and

       2) 'A' denotes what 'B' denotes

Where A is a sample and 'A' is a label. Thus, "this red chip exemplifies 'red'" can be taken to mean,

       1) 'Red' denotes this chip

and

       2) this red chip is a label denoting whatever 'Red' denotes.

It is possible to interpret this as implying that the label 'Red' is a special one. By operating in a particular exemplificational relationship the label 'Red' comes to mean 'Red as possessed by the sample'. This would restrict the wider extension usually associated with 'Red'. In the above example it would apply only to paint chips possessing those properties picked out in the sample. If this is the case then the paint chip can without difficulty denote all those things denoted by the restricted label 'Red'. It could not, however, be used to denote all the things that the unrestricted label denotes without making it clear that a new system of symbolisation is operative. To argue that the sample can denote as widely as the label it exemplifies, one must deny that this label is restricted to the unique sample. The sample however is unique and exemplifies red-as-possessed. There seems to be a problem of how to reconcile the particular nature of reference by a sample with the general nature of reference by a verbal label.

Peltz does not want to interpret the label as being a special restricted one and he embraces the difficulty of understanding how a specific sample can denote as generally as the label it exemplifies. He proposes that this interpretation

> *......comes near to what Bishop Berkeley had in mind in his account of how ideas become general. "I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort." (50)*

Not only does Peltz want samples to denote as widely as the labels they exemplify but the conjunction of denotations, he feels, must be logically implied. Goodman, Peltz argues, comes close to this interpretation when he says,

> ......samples which have not already established denotation...... may - like any sample not otherwise committed as to denotation - also be taken as denoting what the predicates they exemplify denote, and are then labels exemplifying themselves. (51)

If then 'refer' can be taken as 'denote' in such cases where antecedent classification does not rule it out, why can't a way be found for others, perhaps all, cases. In answering this question he assumes that Goodman refuses to treat 'refer' as 'denote' because there are 'uncomfortable' cases of exemplification involving samples with antecedently established denotation. Peltz cites the following examples designed to illustrate the difficulties. Firstly he shows how antecedent classification does *not* create difficulties. If 'short' exemplifies 'short' then 'short' possesses the property of being short and refers to the label 'short' which denotes it. The sample may be taken to denote whatever 'short' denotes including itself - 'short' is short - the word denotes and exemplifies itself. On the other hand in the case of 'long' as exemplifying 'short' the antecedent classification produces apparent paradox, 'long' possesses the property of being short and it refers to 'short'. If it also denotes whatever 'short' denotes that it denotes itself and exemplifies itself. It is false however, that 'long' is long. Hence either 'refer' cannot involve denotation or else 'long' cannot exemplify 'short'. Peltz concludes:-

> Hence, it seems preferable to Goodman in all cases of exemplification to claim that samples refer to their exemplified predicates and only in those cases where there are no conflicting denotations may also denote what those predicates denote. (52)

Having discovered these difficulties Peltz proposes how to overcome them in a way that is consistent with Goodman's system. Using Goodman's own account of metaphor, he proposes that it is possible to view the apparent contradiction in, for example, saying that 'long' denotes "short", as semi-metaphorical and that this approach then allows the interpretation of reference as a conjunction of denotations. (Metaphor, as we shall see

below, is the application of a label from one realm to another, alien realm where it organises those things it denotes according to the structure of relationships operative in its home realm. Such invasions can be cognitively constructive by extending our perception of relationships between things.) It is semi-metaphorical because, whilst literal exemplification is literal possession plus reference and metaphorical exemplification is metaphorical possession plus reference, semi-metaphorical exemplification is literal possession plus metaphorical reference.

> *It is the legitimacy of this third mode which justifies the interpretation of 'reference' as denotation in every mode of exemplification. (53)*

Now in my opinion there is no problem of self-exemplifying labels as Peltz poses it. Consequently it is incorrect to suggest that Goodman refuses to treat 'refer' as 'denote' because of this problem and therefore an answer in terms of a new and dubious concept, namely semi-metaphorical reference, is unnecessary. The problem of self-exemplifying labels springs from a misinterpretation of the way samples and labels work in exemplification. From the beginning of his account Peltz confuses the labelling and the exemplifying functions of a symbol. He argues that Goodman inadvertently admits that fictive predicates such as 'Pickwick' or 'Odysseus' have a sense, in Frege's terms, when he (Goodman)

> *claims that 'Pickwick' exemplifies 'clown-label'. According to the definition of exemplification this implies that 'Pickwick' refers to 'clown-label'. Since 'Pickwick' has null denotation its reference to 'clown-label' cannot be denotation. Hence 'Pickwick' refers even though it does not denote. (54)*

Peltz is here confusing the way in which 'Pickwick' refers as label and as sample. As a label it has null denotation - no such man as Pickwick exists. But 'Pickwick' is clearly an actual label even if it has no primary extension and so can happily serve as a sample of a label.

Peltz's arguments that attempt to show that there is a problem of antecedent classification are fraught with the same confusion of label and sample. The problems outlined in the

examples concerning 'long' and 'short' dissolve when the labelling and sampling functions are clearly separated. The convention of quotation marks is inadequate to mark the different functions of the inscriptions 'short' and 'long'. Failure to mark those distinctions of function leads to the false conclusion that a contradiction is implied.

A sample only refers to what it exemplifies. For instance, 'long' as a sample of short words exemplifies shortness (or the predicates taken as co-extensive with 'short') and so in this case its linguistic sense is not part of what is exemplified. If it is used as a label its denoting function may depend on the properties it possesses or upon its linguistic meaning. There is no way of telling which it is without knowing its context and the system of symbolisation within which it is operating. It could very efficiently label a drawer in which all flash-cards of short words were to be kept and 'monosyllabic' could equally label a drawer for all long words. Alternatively it might label all adjectives from a given set of words.

By the use of suffixes these distinctions can be made clearer.

S stands for sample

P stands for predicate

L stands for label

Thus

short$_S$- exemplifies short$_P$

means

short$_S$ is denoted by and refers to short$_P$

Only when used as a label to denote short words can short$_S$ denote short$_P$.

Thus

$$(short_S)_L \text{ denotes } (short_P)_S, (dog_P)_S, (cat_P)_S,$$

$$(long_P)_S \text{ etc.}$$

and

$$long_S \text{ exemplifies } short_P$$

means

$$long_S \text{ is denoted by and refers to } short_P$$

and

$$(long_S)_L \text{ denotes } (short_P)_S, (dog_P)_S, (cat_P)_S,$$

$$(long_P)_S \text{ etc.}$$

Thus there is no contradiction in saying that 'long' is long, if the second inscription is properly a sample of 'short' taken as a label of what it exemplifies and the first inscription is taken as a word whose relevant characteristics are the number of letters that go to make it up.

Peltz is certainly aware of the different job he wants the sample to do when he formulates it at the beginning of Section II. A exemplifies B can mean

'B' denotes A (A possesses B) and

'A' denotes what 'B' denotes.

Here he encloses the sample A in quotation marks to show that it is being used as a label. And yet in the subsequent examples he seems careless of the distinction. It is important to note that in the formation above A is a sample and 'A' is a label. Peltz seems to be arguing that all samples should be taken as labels as well as samples *at the same time:* in other words that the function of the sample *is* to label. Goodman on the other hand considers them as separate and merely states (55) that the sample *may* be taken as

labelling or denoting what the exemplified predicate denotes; namely itself and other samples. This extremely ambiguous passage cannot easily be used in isolation to support either Peltz's view or mine. It needs to be set into the context of the whole strategy of *Languages of Art*. When this is done Peltz's interpretation becomes much less likely.

Peltz's view changes the notion of reference entirely. Goodman's point is that a sample picks out or refers to a label. This is the crucial difference of direction between exemplificational reference and denotation. Peltz's formulation makes this 'reference' a matter not of picking out the predicate exemplified but of coterminous extension. The crucial picking out of the exemplified predicate is not captured by Peltz. The effect of this is to re-define exemplification as a kind of declaration that one label (a linguistic predicate) is sharing its denotative functions with another label (an object as sample). However the label it is sharing its powers with is one that is denoted by the original predicate and consequently may have a special status. Such a proliferation of labels can be seen (certainly on Goodman's analysis) as fruitful and constructive. The cognitive role of labels in organising and re-organising our world is a major theme of *Languages of Art*.

That this growing point of language, the creation of new ways of saying, is foremost in Peltz's mind is suggested by the revealing quotation from Berkeley cited earlier. Now this is an interesting idea and it is well worth thorough investigation but I believe it is *not* part of Goodman's account of exemplification. Indeed to interpret exemplification in this way deprives the concept of the explanatory force with which Goodman has tried to endow it and which has been illustrated earlier. The crucial contrast between denotation and exemplificational reference is between determinacy and indeterminacy. To re-label can bring important cognitive gains but Goodman does not try to describe the symbolisation special to the arts in this way. Instead he attempts to explain that characteristic of artistic systems which seems to preclude *the* definite answer, *the* correct response and *the* right interpretation. Exemplification together with the concepts of semantic and syntactic density developed in his theory of notation is, as we have seen, crucial to this aim, for part of the concept is a creative indeterminacy. It is in this context that the contrast between exemplificational and denotational reference must be set. It is

quite true that exemplification is negatively defined but this does not mean that it is a vacuous concept.

Jensen argues more cogently for a flaw at the heart of Goodman's formulation. (56) Exemplification is a form of reference. Specifically it is reference by some object standing as symbol to some exemplified label. It is the nature of this label that Jensen questions.

> *Surely on any plausible theory concerning the nature of reference, what must be insisted upon and what Goodman appears at this point to neglect is the fact that when a refers to b, a does not refer to b-as-possessed-by-a, that is, to b characterized as being possessed by a.*

From this it follows that the exemplificational reference is to something distinct and separable from a.

> *It is not self-contradictory to maintain both that a possesses b and that the same property b, may be referred to apart from its being possessed by a.*

The attempt to accommodate the notion of immediacy in a theory falls down, according to Jensen, on this point.

It is necessary first of all to distinguish between the general characteristics of exemplificational systems and those systems as they operate in relation to art objects. Jensen is correct, I think, in asserting that in many cases of exemplification and certainly in many of the cases used as examples by Goodman in his exposition of the concept, the labels exemplified by samples have multiple denotation. The tailor's swatch and the red chip fall into this category. As such the label exemplified will often be used not only to denote that sample but also to denote other samples which in turn may also exemplify it. Thus the tailor's swatch exemplifies predicates that necessarily can be applied to the batch of cloth for which it functions as a sample and to other swatches fulfilling the same specifications. In addition however the predicates may severally be used to label other

things perhaps entirely unconnected with the cloth. The labels exemplified are multi-denotational.

But the evident necessity of this multi-denotation follows not from the relation of exemplification but from the specific system of symbolisation. To function as a tailor's swatch the sample must refer to predicates that are, to some more or less definite extent, applicable elsewhere. The question could then be rephrased as; does exemplification involve reference to multi-denotational labels regardless of what system of symbolisation is operative? The answer must be no, but there are subtleties involved in the question which call for attention.

The answer is No, since we already have a clear understanding of how self-exemplifying labels work. In those cases the label has no antecedent classification. Consequently the original denotation is unique. In such instances it is the case that the sample does refer to the property-as-possessed-by-the-sample. This point was particularly evident in our discussion of the gym-instructor's lesson, and is worth repeating. When the sample functioned as a label it could have been replaced with a verbal instruction, in this case 'knee-bend', and it would seem that the verbal label 'knee-bend' has multiple denotation being referable to many actions. In fact because it functions as an alternative to the sample it is not applicable elsewhere. It uniquely denotes the sample in this system. That is, the instructor's example refers to a-knee-bend-as-displayed-by-the-sample.

Such self-exemplification involves non-linguistic labels. This does not preclude their use as multi-denotational labels subsequent to their original self-exemplification. Indeed it is just this possibility that, in part, allows the development of a 'vocabulary' of particular artistic forms. Would Jensen consider that such *potential* multi-denotationality offends against the immediacy of art? But is self-exemplification the major or even the only form of exemplification exhibited by art works? Nowhere does Goodman suggest this and there is ample evidence to the contrary. A further defence seems to be needed. It may be found in the comments on the level of specificity or generality at which the co-

extensiveness of labels is to be fixed. Here it is possible to conceive of a sample that exemplifies such a detailed predicate that it could denote only the sample or some other object only with very great difficulty. This however all but collapses into the same defence as self-exemplification since the label that would offer the maximum specificity would be the sample taken as label. The two defences are only distinct so long as we insist on there being a verbal as well as a non-verbal label.

Apart from art works that are self-exemplifying Jensen's argument is correct when it states that to assert that exemplification plays a central role in art implies that in some cases the art work refers to things distinct and separable from itself. But do the disastrous consequences follow? Simply to point out that a theory implies that reference is made beyond the art work does not automatically disqualify a theory. The general explanatory work of Goodman's account is not necessarily devalued because of it. Goodman can claim to have gone some considerable way to account for the characteristics of art works including a sense of immediacy. Apart from its wide ranging explanatory force it does in fact accommodate unique denotation which, as I have argued, does not fail on Jensen's criterion. Goodman does however face the challenge head on and in so doing clearly sets himself at odds with such arguments as Jensen's.

> *Establishment of the referential relationship is a matter of singling out certain properties for attention, of selecting associations with certain other objects. Verbal discourse is not least among the many factors that aid in founding and nurturing such associations.......... Pictures are no more immune than the rest of the world to the formative force of language even though they themselves, as symbols, also exert such a force upon the world, including language. Talking does not make the world or even pictures, but talking and pictures participate in making each other and the world as we know them. (57)*

and

> *.....while I quite agree that knowing a work of art or a scientific system is not for the sake of anything else, still nothing can be known in isolation; for knowing - by sense, emotion or intellect - involves discriminating,*

comparing, contrasting, and so relating what is experienced to what lies beyond it. (58)

Whether or not such admissions are disastrous is determined by what one's views are concerning the characteristics of art works and how far Goodman's account as a whole captures and explains a sufficient number of those characteristics. Goodman wishes to stress the complexity of the symbol systems operating in art forms. No one symbolic relationship is adequate to describe them. He is even careful not to claim that the whole range of symbolic activity can be subsumed under his theoretical formulations. Not every referential relationship in the arts is a matter of denotation or exemplification.

.....by no means every case of reference is a case of denotation or exemplification. An element may come to serve as a symbol for an element related to it in almost any way. Sometimes the underlying relationship is not referential, as when the symbol is the cause or effect of (and so sometimes called the sign of), is just to the left of, or is similar to, what it denotes. In other cases reference runs along a chain of relationships, some or all of them referential. (59)

When we come to understand these different modes of symbolisation we will be better able to understand such notions as immediacy and how meaning is generated in the arts. It will be useful to see how far such an interpretation of significance in art works as a function of the simultaneous operation of symbol systems can be justified by reference to a practical example. Take the following piece of music by Handel, Chorus number 46 in Part III of Messiah (figure 4 reproduces the musical setting of the first two lines of the chorus. (60)

I have numbered the Sections one to four to make description easier. They are not numbered in this way in the score.

(1) Since by man came death,

(2) By man came also the resurrection of the dead

(3) For as in Adam all die

(4) Even so in Christ shall all be made alive.

The first section, in the Key of A minor, is sung unaccompanied after a brief chord from the orchestra. It is slow in tempo with a pre-dominance of minims and semi-breves. It is marked 'pianissimo'. The chords are chromatic.

The second section is marked 'allegro' and is faster and louder. The chords are diatonic and the orchestra accompanies the chorus in the same vigorous manner. The notation consists of crotchets and quavers. The Key is C major.

The third section is again introduced by a brief minor chord from the orchestra this time in the Key of G minor and the singing continues unaccompanied. The features are the same as in the first line, slow, quiet, and chromatic.

Figure 4

The final section is similar to the second in its marking of 'allegro', its volume, its accompaniment by the orchestra and its shorter notes. It is however in the minor Key of D minor.

Having briefly described some main formal features of the music I may now look for grounds for taking certain symbol systems as operative. The passage is in the context of a work apparently abounding with 'word paintings', in music. There are many passages where Handel seems to have attempted to exemplify the meaning of the words by the formal features of the music. Such choruses as, 'All we like sheep' and 'Ev'ry Valley', spring to mind. This was not a habit peculiar to Handel but had long been a common practice of composers (61). In a sacred oratorio it is plausible to assume that Handel would have regarded the words as having a special significance. This, plus his theatrical sense, evident from other works, warrants the belief that the music was composed so as, at the very least, not to obscure the meaning of the words but was most likely meant to serve to enhance their significance. Expressing this elliptically we might have said that Handel was at pains to convey the meaning and force of the words through his music. The context and assumed purpose of the passage thus sanction the attempt to interpret this passage as a matter of 'word painting' or exemplification by the music of features of the words. It is important to remember that it is only the attempt that is warranted or made plausible. Any actual interpretation must be justified on the additional grounds of providing an account that is preferable to others. This is to test an interpretation through critical discourse.

We already have some indication then of a kind of symbol system that might be operative. We must now turn to the passage itself. The most obvious feature is the alternating contrast between the music for the four sections. This leads to the next most obvious feature which is the likeness of sections one and three and of two and four.

To say that the sung sections one and two *possess* contrasting features is not the same as to say that such contrast is *significant*. However if I am saying that it *is* significant, indeed that the music exemplifies the contrast between death and resurrection, then I must show that not only a formal contrast evident but that it is referred to by the passage. I shall try to see how such an interpretation might be justified.

To juxtapose music with the kinds of formal differences as have been described has the effect of emphasising the differences between them. This emphasis is strengthened by the repetition of the juxtaposition. The need to see the sections as separate is conveyed by conventional cadences at the end of sections one and three, the orchestra's single minor chord at the beginning and the change of Key. These are stylistic signals of ends and beginnings. Therefore not only are the sections contrasting but the fact that they are different is deliberately emphasised.

Because of the contrast thus displayed the likeness of the alternating lines is also emphasised. By the same tokens, as contrast is deliberately displayed so the likeness is strengthened. These formal features of the treatment are not of course independent of the words. They correlate with a polarity of linguistic meaning - the polarity between death and resurrection. Linguistic opposites are juxtaposed alternately.

The music, then, literally exemplifies contrast, change, difference. It doesn't merely possess it. It is plausible to assert that it refers to this relationship. In addition it is clear that a further association is intended with the despair of death and the joy of resurrection. This justifies the step of taking the formal contrast of the music to symbolise the contrast of despair and joy.

I shall call the two treatments •Death Music' and Resurrection Music'. Is there any literal exemplification within the Death Music itself? Is it plausible to argue that the slowness

and quietness of the music literally exemplifies the slowness and quietness often characteristic of death? Or does it literally exemplify the behaviour of a person in mourning or that kind of behaviour considered proper and respectful? Are all of these things, our manifestations of grief, our forms of respect, and our music-associated-with-death, all founded on a more fundamental association at the very root of our thoughts and feelings?

This search for literal exemplification in the music itself is not well warranted and appears a little strained. The same sense of over-extension accompanies the similar search in the resurrection music. But if we cannot find any clear and literal exemplification the deliberate association of slow, quiet chromatic music with death and of quick, loud diatonic music with death's opposite has been forcibly and evidently made by the music. This in itself leads people to judge the appropriateness of the associations of the musical treatments, and such judgements are instructive and constructive in themselves. They lay down precedents that inform our future assessments. Since the Death Music stands for death then the formal contrast will also take on a symbolic significance. So where for example chromatic chords are significant in the one the diatonic chords are significant in the other, not because of some obscure connection between death and physically un-harmonic sound waves but because of the formal contrast not arbitrarily chosen by Handel, Such choices create patterns of precedents until certain sounds are indissolubly linked with specific kinds of meanings.

If we cannot find aspects of the music which literally exemplify death and resurrection there seems to be no shortage of expressive features, features that link the music to the words in a figurative way. The darkness and pain of the discords, the hopelessness and despair of the cadences, the mournfulness of the drawn out notes, the vitality and vigour of the tempo, the open, happy sound of the diatonic chords. In summary, the short passage from Handel's Messiah involved, on our interpretation, the following symbol systems:

- Simple signalling i.e. repetition etc.

- Conventional signalling.

- Significance derived directly from the formal relationships.

- Denotation

- Literal exemplification.

- Expression.

This example illustrates that, although conducted for the most part in the theoretical language of Goodman's system, the process (I do not claim the quality) is not so very different from that followed in any critical encounter with a work of art, (One simple difference is that much that is made explicit above would be taken for granted in normal critical discourse) The way in which critics attempt to ground their judgements on the same kind of evidence and by sensitivity to the same elements of context is clear. (62) However an important aspect of works about which great sensitivity is demanded is their expressive nature. In order to formulate an acceptable explanation of this property of art works as a symbolic relation he first needs to lay down an adequate theory of metaphor.

3) Metaphor

Reconnaissance

Goodman confronts the notion of metaphor not indifferently but with quite specific initial interests to consolidate and to further. Consequently any concept of metaphor, if it is to serve, will respect certain prohibitions and requirements determined by those interests. This constructivist approach, by making important assumptions explicit, enables us to gain some understanding of the account by perceiving what influence they exert on the final formulation. It will be useful briefly to reconnoitre the routes by which Goodman arrives at certain crucial problems the answers to which will be fundamental to his whole enterprise. This will also serve to illustrate, in a somewhat crude way, some of the ways in which the argument is influenced by requirements and prohibitions argued for in other parts of Goodman's work.

No part of Goodman's thought is comprehensible without reference to his systematic development of concepts from *The Structure of Appearance* to *Ways of Worldmaking*. But the construction of a suitable concept of metaphor more than any other required a full and open deployment of his systematic assumptions. To clarify how metaphorical expressions operate is to come to certain conclusions as to how our language applies to the world. This involves consideration of its 'creativity' and in what sense it can be said to purvey 'reality'. It is not surprising that there has been an increased interest in recent years in metaphor. For Goodman the relation of language to the 'world' has been the central theme of his work issuing in conclusions systematically constructed. His account of metaphor must therefore have as a strong initial requirement that it be compatible with such conditions. But in any case much of his account of metaphor can only be understood with reference to his theory of projectibility, his insistence on the plurality of equally valid descriptions and the way these are reconciled with his notion of signalling as a fundamental relationship between language and the world. More specifically he is committed to according metaphor some importance by virtue of its role in the definition of expression. *Languages of Art* is an attempt to systematise the modes of symbolism operative in the arts. Expression is clearly an important and pervasive term and any definition Goodman offers will have to take notice of this purchase within pre-systematic

usage. His account of metaphor must not detract from this importance by assimilating expression to mere decoration or an ineffective fiction. An adoption of some accounts of metaphor might threaten this (1). The power or distinctiveness of expression cannot easily be maintained if it is in part dependent on a concept of metaphor which is reducible to some mode of literal meaning. So even if more fundamental interests had not steered him towards an interaction (2) theory of metaphor then his more immediate concerns would have been sufficient.

I have pointed out that compatibility with past work can be supposed to lead Goodman to select some approaches rather than others. In addition subsequent work makes clear, aims of his thinking which are implicit in *Languages of Art, Structure of Appearance* and *Fact, Fiction and Forecast*. In *Ways of Worldmaking* he considers, illustrates and tabulates a number of ways in which we construct 'world versions'(3). Metaphor, as he defines it, is an important device for world making which makes for an invaluable economy (4). It is also an integral part of his painstakingly constructed system whereby systematically equal status is accorded to the arts and to the sciences. They are both contributors to world-versions.

> *The worlds of fiction, poetry, painting, music, dance, and the other arts are built largely by such nonliteral devices as metaphor, by such nondenotational means as exemplification and expression.....(5)*

With such a fundamental function in the system metaphor needs to be supported by a robust and well founded theory. Awareness of this context of the theory of metaphor allows us to see how it leads to problems that will have to be confronted since they underlie the whole structure. Acceptability of the solutions offered to these problems is consequently crucial to the general acceptability of his whole enterprise. One such crucial problem is inherent in justifications that can be offered for assimilating the metaphorical to the actual.

He asserts that metaphorical possession is to be characterised as actual possession. But the contrast of metaphorical statements with literal statements remains crucial to his account. Therefore actual possession is clearly being construed in terms other than literal

possession. But common sense seems to decree that the best way of defining the actual is as that which is described or attributed by true literal statements. That is that true literal statements have a special relationship with the world - which metaphorical statements do not have - by virtue of which we call the former 'true' or 'attributions of actual properties. To subsume both the literal and the metaphorical under the actual and to maintain some sense of the pre-systematic phrase 'literally true attribution' requires some justification. He attempts to provide this by arguing that the way we determine or confirm the truth or falsity of a statement is much the same whether it is metaphorical or literal. With this he, in effect, refers us to his work on confirmation theory. From this it is possible to construe a full justification that can be offered. As we shall see in the later detailed analysis Goodman argues that the thing that *seems* to distinguish the two forms of statement is that the true literal statement attributes *manifest* properties whereas true metaphorical statements do not. He disperses this distinction by asserting that the way both metaphorical and literal statements relate to the world is a matter of valid signalling. It is just here that one of the crucial problems and equally crucial solutions of his analysis is encountered. For the way the signal is determined to be valid is if it correctly forecasts the experience which would be described as a manifest property. Thus the validity of the explanation depends upon the validity of the statement that the explanation is intended to support. The arguments that can be mustered to establish the virtuosity or non-viciousness of this circle illuminate some important aspects of Goodman's thinking. It will be necessary to attempt to establish this virtuosity because, even supposing the preceding steps have been acceptable, if this last proves to be implausible his account is very seriously weakened.

Another central problem springs specifically from his account of metaphor. In his theory of the application of literal statements the question of why some predicates come to be applied rather than others is posed and Goodman's answer is that it is a matter of habituation. Thus he counters the charge of arbitrariness with an insistence on the routine, familiar nature of literal usage. But it is precisely in contrast to this that metaphorical usage is defined. Metaphor is novel and surprising. It transgresses established boundaries and is by its nature non-routine. Consequently the argument provided by custom and

habit against the charge of arbitrariness seems not to be available for metaphor. But for metaphor to be completely arbitrary would be an uncomfortable conclusion given Goodman's general and specific aims, and its conflict with our everyday experiences of metaphorical usage. As we shall see he holds that metaphorical application is not arbitrary because it is 'patterned after' the literal use established prior to the metaphorical use.

He is then, in the position of having to explain this process of 'patterning'-a problem common to all theorists of metaphor. He answers in terms of simile but in a way which emphasises the act of 'likening' one thing to another rather than by referring to some pre-existing resemblance. In fact it is an answer which, although crucial, requires considerable supplementation from his general system. He answers question with question as follows.

> *If we are pressed to say what sort of similarity must obtain between what a predicate applies to literally and what it applies to metaphorically, we might ask in return what sort of similarity must obtain among the things a predicate applies to literally (6).*

This is another oblique invitation to consider his previous work. It will be an important task of this thesis to see whether he does have an acceptable answer to these questions.

The Actual

As mentioned above, Goodman brings to his account of metaphor a view of the operation of language that assimilates the metaphorical and the literal to the actual. In other words where a predicate applies metaphorically the property attributed by that predicate is actually possessed by the object just as it is when a literal predicate applies.

> *Metaphorical possession is indeed not <u>literal</u> possession; but possession is actual whether metaphorical or literal. The metaphorical and the literal have to be distinguished within the actual (7).*

However there is a strong case for arguing that the actual is most plausibly defined in terms of the literal and in contrast to the fictional or figurative. It is well established in

common usage and seems intuitively warranted. In addition most previous theorists of metaphor have taken this view. If this definition is to be denied how is the actual to be characterised? A definition of actual literal possession given by Goodman is as follows:-

> *An object is gray, or is an instance of or possesses grayness, if and only if 'gray' applies to the object (8).*

This leaves the all important word 'applies' unanalysed. What is meant by it? The answer given by Goodman's close philosophical predecessors is that the world just is gray in parts and these parts are denoted by the term ' gray'. We know that we correctly apply the predicate 'is gray' because we perceive, as sense-data, such things as gray patches. Correct application is ensured because the nature of sense-data is such that our perception of a particular sense-datum at a particular time cannot be doubted - it is certain. This inherent indubitability of sense-data is the reason why they have been taken as the foundation of philosophical systems similar in aim and spirit to Goodman's (9). Such a view implies that we are given direct and immediate experience of the world and it has been a matter of controversy as to what form this sense-data is given to us. Is our direct experience of the world the immediate perception of objects or of qualities or of something else? Part of what has been at stake in these debates is the status of epistemological priority, that is, what are the most primitive units of our knowledge of the world which go to make up all other forms of knowledge, Goodman asserts that since there is no dispute about the context of the 'given', constructed by analysis or synthesis, then the dispute reduces to not *what* is given but *how* it is given – what the world's 'given as'. But this phrase 'given as', he argues, has no sense.

> *That an experience is given as several parts surely does not mean that these parts are presented torn asunder; nor can it mean that these parts are partitioned off from one another by perceptible lines of demarcation. For if such lines of demarcation are there at all, they are there within the given, for any view of the given- The nearest we could come to finding any meaning to the question what the world is given as would be to say that this turns on whether the material in question is apprehended with a kind of feeling of wholeness or a feeling of broken-upness. To come that near to finding a meaning for given-as is not to come near enough to count (10).*

Indeed he concludes that there is no one way the world is. There are only descriptions of it and no one of them has a privileged relationship with some direct experience of the world, 'their truth is the only standard of their faithfulness' (11).

We should be clear as to what Goodman has renounced by such root and branch policies. Firstly the notion of objectivity derived from appeal to non conceptualised or mind-independent experience of the world. Secondly, any choice between systems based on degrees of verity unrelated to a system. An important effect of such renunciation is to accept that if no one version of the world is absolutely correct then many versions may be equally good accounts. The choice between systems as to which is better and which worse now focuses on questions of coherence, accommodation with a system we would not want to revoke, simplicity and explanatory force. Clarification of the status and interrelations of modes of description and categorising consequently becomes a prime philosophical task.

A sense of discomfort may well remain. The foundations of previous systems on the assumed indubitability of senses seemed to offer that system a firm and certain base. Raw sensations of colour, sound, taste etc. were beyond doubt and therefore unassailable. They could consequently, provide the necessary material from which a description of our world could be constructed. But if, as Goodman does, the indubitability of senses is denied how can we ever get any systematic description started or provide it with any degree of certainty? In *Sense and Certainty* (12) Goodman argues that certainty is a matter of 'knowledge without possibility of error - or, in practice, of judgement immune to subsequent withdrawal for cause.'(13) Neither a judgement concerning a sense-datum nor any content of an immediate experience fulfils this criterion. We often find it necessary to change our minds on such judgements if further presentations conflict with them and we are led to accept the subsequent rather than the first judgement. It may still be insisted that there must be 'something there in experience, some element not manufactured but given' even though we cannot capture it in statements or point to instances. But, whilst the existence of such content or raw material may be conceded this in no way affects what we take to be true or certain or indubitable.

*To such content or materials or particles or elements the terms 'true',
'false', and 'certain' are quite inapplicable.........For truth and falsity and
certainty pertain to statements or judgements and not to mere particles or
materials or elements (14).*

By thus separating the issue of empirical certainty - as-given, from questions of truth, falsity and doubt he is rejecting the former as a philosophical issue and locating the answers to the latter in a study of ways in which the world can be taken. Truth and falsity will come from any rules and structures discovered in such practices. He makes two further points in *Sense and Certainty* which are of importance in understanding his analysis. Firstly that certainty is not necessary as a foundation for a workable structure of statements only initial credibility is required. Secondly, the relation of language to the world as perceived by sensation is best regarded as a matter of signalling. The first point relates to his theory of truth and distinguishes it from a clear coherence theory. Goodman concedes that,

*Somewhere along the line some statements, whether atomic sense reports
or the entire system or something in between, must have initial credibility
(15).*

That is, credibility that is not transmitted from one statement to another *within the system* and thereby generated by it, but credibility derived in some way extra to such systematic deductions. Initial credibility is made available he thinks by the fact that there are always some statements that will be preserved at the expense of others. Whilst no statement is immune to withdrawal the real conflict between statements means that we are to opt for some rather than others and hence there are degrees of credibility. This he says is sufficient. In *The Structure of Appearance* he called observation statements decrees and added,

*A decree by itself....may be unchallengeable; and any decree, however
unnatural, can be maintained by giving up enough others. But in practice
our choice, when a conflict arises is influenced by two factors. In the first
place, we favor the more 'natural' decree, the one best supported by an
instinctive feeling of hitting the mark, as when we select a remembered
color. In the second place, we favor the decree that makes necessary the
least adjustment in the body of already accepted decrees. Normally, we
have not a conflict of two decrees, but a conflict between a new decree and*

a whole background of accepted decrees. We could uphold the discordant newcomer, but only at the exorbitant price of reconstructing our whole picture of the past (16).

and in Sense and Certainty,

In the 'search for truth' we deal with the clamoring demands of conflicting statements by trying, so to speak, to realize the greatest happiness of the greatest number of them. These demands constitute a different factor from coherence, the wanted means of choosing between different systems, the missing link with fact; yet none is so strong that it may not be denied. That we have probable knowledge, then, implies no certainty but only initial credibility (17).

Whilst accepting that such a relationship between systems constitutes a way of discriminating degrees of credibility the claim that it provides 'the missing link with fact' may be surprising. Goodman is meaning by 'fact' here a construal of a relationship between systems. The nature of such 'facts' can only become clear as we understand his concept of projection and to become clear about what is meant by 'fact' is to become clear, in some way, about what is meant by 'actual'.

The second point made in *Sense and Certainty* concerns the relation of language to the world. He describes a dilemma faced by a common version of pragmatism as being an instance of a general difficulty with this relation. The meaning and truth of a statement are located in the predictive consequences of that statement (18). But only *statements* can be such consequences and so the 'meaning' and 'truth' of these first statements can only lie in further statements. The infinite regress thus threatened is made to come to rest in statements concerning immediate experiences whose meaning and truth are said to be directly perceivable without recourse to the predictive criterion. But this is to ground the statements in a systematically inexplicable relation and from Goodman's point of view one that is without sense. What is really the nub of the problem is the,

…directness and immediacy and irreducibility of this relation between sensory experience and sentences describing it (and not the) certainty of these sentences (19).

In other words this relationship is so fundamental, elementary and irreducible that its recognition is instantaneous and so gives rise to that sense of immediacy and certainty as a by-product of recognition. The immediacy is not an effect of, nor evidence for certainty, but only of

> *...the root relation between language and the non-linguistic experience it describes (20).*

This root relation is, Goodman argues, that between a signal and what is signalled. The relation of a genuine signal to that which it signifies is immediate and direct in so far as the particular relation is understood.

> *A toot may warn of an oncoming train or......a ray of dawn foretell the approach of daylight (21).*

Goodman thinks that the simple relation illustrated here is, with recognition of greater complexity, equally present between sensory experiences and other non-linguistic experiences. The complexity arises when say a signalling relation is assumed between a visual and a tactual phenomenon. The tactual experience will often only signal a condition of certain kinds of behaviour, for example putting out one's hand to touch. This can be accommodated if individual presentations are regarded as 'partial' or 'incomplete' signals. They combine with others to effect the signalling function (22).

If such a relation exists in non-linguistic experience then according to him

> *...there is no mystery about how an irregular black patch or a brief stretch of sound may function in the same way... Just as a blue patch and some presentation may signal the coming appearance of a red patch, so also does a statement-event - let us name it 'F' - saying in advance that there will be a red patch in the visual field at the time in question, t (23).*

In this way Goodman subsumes linguistic symbols under the general relation of signalling. Goodman argues further however that statements about the present can also be explained in terms of signalling. They are not, admittedly, signals. Signals always forecast and hence a statement such as P

There is now a red patch in the visual field

cannot signal the simultaneous occurrence of the red patch.

> *Nevertheless, we know that P is true if and only if F is true. Hence P is true just in case F is a genuine signal. Although P does not itself signal the occurrence of the red patch, the truth of P is explained in terms of the truth of the earlier statement F, which does signal this occurrence (24).*

This requires some reflection, for the proposal is obviously circular. A statement F, signalling that there will be a red patch in the visual field at a (future) time t is a signal of this occurrence if and only if the statement P,

There is now a red patch in the visual field

is uttered at time t and is true. The truth of F is dependent on the truth of P. But the only explanation that is offered of the truth of P is the truth of F. The strategy is clear. If we cannot find a good way explaining the truth of statements of present experience we should take a step back and try to explain how true forecasts come to be made.

> *A key point of the present proposal lies in its radical departure from the usual attack, which rests the truth of all statements upon that of statements in the present tense and leaves us at a loss to deal with these. After all, a thoroughly predictive theory can be carried through only by basing all truth upon the truth of statement-events concerning later events (25).*

On this view it is to be accepted as a fact that at least some true statements concerning present experiences are uttered. The problem is to give a satisfactory account of such truth. In the same way it is to be accepted that some true statements about the future are uttered and the issue to be clarified is how reliable forecasts can be made.

In context the circular nature of the argument is not emphasised. He is attempting, quite specifically to assimilate the sense of immediacy and directness to a general relation namely signalling. That is, to show that it is possible to conceive of a relationship between statements that has the effect of certainty and formal irreducibility without implying formal certainty of a kind that Goodman thinks impossible. With this general aim in view he assumes the existence of true forecasts and does not feel the need to give a

detailed explanation of how P statement, whilst true by virtue of being forecast, seem manifestly true. To maintain the idea of signalling as fundamental he must eventually give a detailed account. It is to be found in his *Fact, Fiction and Forecast* (26).

The statement,

> *There is now a red patch in the visual field.*

involves, among others, the predicate 'is red'. If we could see how Goodman characterises this predicate it would go some way to clarifying his approach to that which is 'actual'. Goodman regards such a predicate as dispositional. In addition,

> *....almost every predicate commonly thought of as describing a lasting objective characteristic of a thing is as much a dispositional predicate as any other (27).*

Dispositional statements are, he argues, predictive statements.

> *To find non-dispositional, or manifest, predicates of things we must turn to those describing events - predicates like 'bends', 'breaks', 'burns', 'dissolves', 'looks orange', or 'tests square'. To apply such a predicate is to say that something specific actually happens with respect to the thing in question; while to apply a dispositional predicate is to speak only of what can happen (28)*

The problem is to explain how the application of such a predicate as 'looks red', is related to the application of the dispositional 'is red' A problem of past cases in some way determining future cases. In doing this the actual application of predicates is taken as the fundamental thing to be explained not a psychological state nor the world conceived as an entity independent of our ways of describing.

The initial manifest predicates 'flexes' and 'fails to flex' (29) together exhaustively sort the realm of things under suitable pressure which in turn are actual events. Within this realm (that is of the actual events of things being under suitable pressure) the two schemata

A flexes/fails to flex

and

B flexible/inflexible

sort exactly the same things. The extensions coincide exactly. However, whilst the initial predicates (A) are applicable only to things under suitable pressure the second set of predicates (B) are, Goodman asserts, applicable to the universal class of things. The realm of things under suitable pressure is one, but not the only, realm to which the dispositionals are deemed to be applicable. Where they are admitted they effect an exhaustive sorting - a thing is either flexible or inflexible. It cannot be both but it must be one.

If I am interpreting Goodman correctly this seems to imply that the dichotomy

A flexes/fails to flex

is taken as primarily established and the terms

B flexible/inflexible

transport that dichotomy to a wider extension. The whole of the realm of the initial manifest predicates is included, in the realm of the dispositional predicates but, further, this included primary realm has a determining influence on the extension of the dispositional terms. In this sense the 'projection' which intuitively implies some strong determination by one thing on another is explicable. The nature of this determining influence is still very unclear.

At this point in *Fact, Fiction and Forecast*, Goodman does not attempt to account for the fact that we intuitively feel that the schema (B) is not literally applicable to the universal class of things nor for that matter metaphorically so. It may be taken as a weakness of his argument here that this formulation seems to ignore the subtleties with which concessions of applicability are actually made. As we shall see, it is precisely this subtlety that his

theory of projection of schemata, both metaphorical and literal, captures. It finds theoretical form in various modes of indeterminacy resulting from symbolic characteristics and also in the reliance on context and interest to provide determination of reference. It should be noted however that the centrality of context and interest emphasise the concessionary nature of projection. Whether a particular predicate or set of predicates applies is a judgement. Concession of applicability will be the result of balancing 'clamouring demands not least of which will be our perception of our interests.' The active play of interest in any judgement concerning projection is therefore fundamental to Goodman's position. It will be important to remember this fact when we come to consider his characterisation of artistic activity as a pure pursuit of knowledge.

After having considered the problem of possibles in a phenomenalistic system he concludes that possible events that *could have* but *did not* happen can be described in terms of the actual application of predicates which are projected from other primary predicates.

> *To say that p + t is actually green but is possibly (i.e. under circumstances C) blue is in effect to ascribe to p + t in addition to the predicate 'green', some such predicate as 'C - blueable' (30).*

Now circumstances C did not happen. Consequently what is being described is a fictive event. But this fictive event is being described in terms of predicates which are still applicable to the individual p + t. What he is attempting to do is to show a way in which predicates, ostensibly about fictive non-actual events can be interpreted in terms that apply to perceivable events which we would normally call actual entities. In the above case the predicate

is C-blueable

applies as much as the predicate

is green

In the phenomenalistic system adopted by Goodman an individual can be made up by the sum of other individuals. Over this individual various predicates can be projected but so long as, say in p + t, an actual place and an actual time are denoted by p and t then that sum is actual. Depending on which place and which time have been chosen to constitute that sum certain predicates will be applicable others will not. Among such predicates are those normally taken as describing actuality for example

is a place-time.

This may be taken as asserting that the actual entity is a sum of a visual place that occurred at a particular time. Goodman holds however that it is quite possible to make a sum of two individuals to which this projection of 'place-time' is inapplicable. Goodman still regards these as actual and it is important to take note of this special sense in his system. These conclusions, derived from phenomenalistic examples are, he argues, applicable in physicalistic terms. It is simply a matter of finding a suitable dispositional predicate.

> *The fictive accident to a given train under the hypothetical circumstances that a given rail was missing can be taken care of, for example, by saying that the train at that time was 'accidentable' or, more fully, 'rail-missing-accidentable' (31).*

In this way he attempts to retain the dispositional nature of these predicates which refer to a possible but not actual state of affairs whilst avoiding admitting anything but actual entities into his system.

How far has this taken us? The predicate 'is red' is dispositional in so far that whenever it is applied at time t it forecasts that 'looks red' will later be applicable at time t,. This means that the initial manifest predicate 'looks red' is being projected over cases not as yet determined but which we have good reason to believe will turn out to be denoted by 'looks red' at certain future times. Although the ascription 'is red' seems therefore to refer only to possible and not actual occurrences we have seen that Goodman argues that the

dispositional can be interpreted to apply to an actual place-time and not to non-actual possibilities.

Projection was described earlier as a projection of a dichotomy yet here we seem to be talking of a projection of a single predicate. I am not guilty of departing from Goodman's usage in my exposition nor does Goodman use the word in two radically different ways. He often writes of the projection of single predicates although his first description of projection took the dichotomy

A flexes/fails to flex

as projected (32). This apparent double usage indicates an important aspect of Goodman's system introduced in *The Structure of Appearance* and applied more explicitly in *Languages of Art*. That is, to apply the single predicate is at the same time necessarily to apply a particular kind of sorting. That kind is constituted by an ordered set of alternative labels - a schema. In the above case of 'red' the alternative labels are for example other colour names and the ordering is of colours. It is possible however for the inscription 'red' to be used with a different set of alternatives, say other political terms such as 'conservative' 'liberal' etc. and in this case the realm ordered would be people involved in political activities. The implication in Goodman's system of a kind of sorting with any application of a predicate follows from the way in which the single label achieves significance. It does so by reference to an ordered set of qualia. This passage is important and requires full quotation.

> *Now qualia obviously do not come to us all neatly labelled with names. We do not have them before us like a set of lettered blocks, which we then proceed to compare and arrange. Rather, facts concerning the matching of qualia may be thought of as first expressed by statements in which the qualia compared are picked out by description; e.g., "the color of the left-hand one of the two round patches now near the center of my visual field matches the color of the right-hand one". On the basis of all such information at our command we construct a map that assigns a position to each of the described qualia. Quale names may then be treated as indicating positions on this map. Indeed, to order a category of qualia amounts to defining a set of quale names in terms of relative position, and*

thus eventually (in our system) in terms of matching. When we ask what color a presentation has, we are asking what the name of the color is; and this is to ask what position it has in the order - or in other words to ask which of the ordered qualia it matches. After a map has been considerably used and repeatedly amplified and corrected, we may hardly ever have to alter it again; for although we are constantly having new presentations of qualia, the qualis presented are not by any means always new (33).

Since the kind of sorting is necessarily entailed in this way when any application of a predicate is made there is also a tacit application of another predicate identifying the category. For example when,

<div align="center">It is red.</div>

is given in answer to the question,

<div align="center">What colour is it?</div>

Then the implicit predicate,

<div align="center">It is coloured.</div>

is assumed (34). In other words aspects of the context indicate which categories are being named and therefore what the meaning of the term is. Without knowledge of the category implied, no determinate meaning can be given to any single term.

Goodman talks of a dispositional predicate being applied. We should remember that, in his system the connections of the application remains to be confirmed. Projection is putative application and later presentations may prove it right or wrong. This central fact focuses attention on how we can make warranted projections and how we can later confirm them. The problem of dispositionals is, on this interpretation, the problem of action. Before going into his confirmation theory, however, it will be useful, now the nature of projection is a little clearer, to compare the two notions of 'projection' and 'signalling'.

It is tempting to assert that the two are one and the same thing but there are some differences. Actual projection seems to be a matter of putative application whereas signalling has no room for error. Projection is to be determined to be true later instances whereas a genuine signal is one that is necessarily followed by that which has been signalled. If the toot is an-oncoming-train-signal then the appearance of the train will necessarily follow. It was this necessity which allowed Goodman to use the signalling relation to explain the irreducibility, immediateness and directness of certain statements concerning sensations. The application of the predicate

is red at time t

is part of a signal complex (F) forecasting the appearance of a red patch in the visual field at time t, or, more accurately, the truth of the statement (P) uttered at time t,

there is a red patch in the visual field now.

It is possible for us to make an utterance which we have good reason to think is a genuine X-signal but in fact X fails to appear. We would then be forced to admit that it was not a genuine X-signal. But unlike signalling because projection is putative application such a change in the status of the original F-statement is not forced We are able to project a predicate over an entity, forecasting certain future presentations. If these do not occur, from that moment we no longer consider that predicate projectible. This does not mean that it was not projectible at the earlier time. We were not wrong, either practically or logically, to project it at time.

As we have seen 'is red' is interpreted as a dispositional and this latter in terms of projection. But 'is red' is one of the F-statements in the signalling relationship. Goodman needs to reconcile the necessary status of signalling with the putative status of projection. He does this, largely following Hume, by arguing that projection is the more fundamental but that some predicates and their categories have so often been projected, and found to

be true that the relation has come to be habitually expected. The projection becomes a signal when the projection is indubitable. This does not however mean that the truth of the projection is ever certain. It is always putative to some degree. In other words a signified event necessarily follows after a genuine signal but there is no guarantee that a signal that has always been found to be genuine will be so again.

But there is a further point that bears on this crucial necessary relation. Namely that it seems that projection of labels constitutes .matters of fact. In the passage quoted above (note 33 for reference) he explains that 'descriptions' picks out certain qualia which are then asserted to match. From such decrees a 'map' is constructed that assigns a position to each of the described qualia. A category is created made up of a set of alternative labels. To name a quale with such a label is to decree that it has a particular position within the category. Successful projection (of the predicate 'matches') created the category, and the true assertion that any one of these alternative labels applies constitutes a fact. The necessary link between signal (true projection) and signified seems less likely to constitute a vicious circle under this interpretation. However the charge of arbitrariness is, as we shall see, inevitable. Judgement as to such truth is a matter of ascertaining whether the quale identified does actually belong to that position in the ordered set. This, as we have seen, is a matter of decree, not of comparison with the world as it is for there is no given way the world is and no direct verification is possible. This seems to imply that we can assert that such and such is the case and then sit as judge and jury when its truth is impugned. The accusation that this leads to gratuitous and unrestrained fact-mongering is countered only by the assertion that there are differentially valued decrees. This claim of Goodman's we will investigate below. I want to look first at what sense can be given to the idea of bringing facts into existence by ordered labelling. In doing so we may discover some underlying commitments necessitated by this position.

There is a familiar experience that seems to illustrate the way a new fact may come to be constituted. For example, from the first moment that I am faced with an unfamiliar picture, say Piero della Francesca's 'The Baptism of Christ' (Fig.5), I receive the same physical input of light waves as a sensitive art critic standing beside me. But *my*

description does not include aspects of the painting that would be noted in a description by the informed critic. If he points things out I begin to see things that were not 'there' for me before - that the dove's beak marks the exact centre of the circle produced by continuing the line of the semi-circular arch through the painting, that the arm of St. John, the loin-cloth of Christ, the head of a man preparing for baptism all mark this undrawn line in the structure of the composition (35). Insofar as I consider that these observations either correct my own mistaken views or enrich and amplify my inadequate or primitive description. I accept them as authoritative decrees. In this sense, in relation to what I take them rightly to depose, I acknowledge them as new facts. From this moment I see these assets in the picture, in that I am ready to assert the priority of this aspect and will make some attempt at justifying and explaining their presence to a third person. The less organised material by becoming more organised through the projection of labels now presents more facts to me than it did before. Such aspects as mentioned above are readily perceived when pointed out but other categories may not be so easily constituted. If the critic had added that this painting displayed great theological insight in the way it exploits the metaphorical relationship of circle and square representing heaven and earth, then it might take some considerable time and mental effort before this 'fact' could be confidently asserted of the picture.

Musical and many other artifacts, afford similar examples of this kind of creation, of facts, as does any realm initially perceived as semantically opaque. To a young child who cannot read, a page of words is an undifferentiated whole. No relevant die joint elements are perceived. As they become initiated into the use of labels that name elements these 'stand out'. They are 'picked out' from the previously dense mass.

To see a consistent set of aspects of a picture is to take the picture in a certain way, to interpret it in one way rather than another. Just as there is not *one* way the picture is, there need not be *one* way the world is. Goodman's pluralism is closely related to the aspect seeing we have just described (36). Goodman's analysis has the effect, however, of emphasising the pervasiveness and structure of the 'substratum' of experience (as Wittgenstein puts it) (37). In addition: in generalising such seeing to whole world views

he considers systematically constructed ways of taking the world. In this context the aspects acknowledged have a fundamental ontological role - they constitute what things are to be taken to be. From a pluralistic point of view it follows that there are more and less differentiated world views as well as more and less compatible ones.

In the kind of experience illustrated by the above examples there are 'things' not acknowledged by us in any inventory we may make, 'things' which we are not yet as tyros *capable* of acknowledging, even though their presence is a 'fact' for a more authoritative person. It is possible to hold, therefore, both that it can legitimately be asserted that certain things are presented to us to experience even though we do not initially perceive them, and that successful labelling on the part of the initiate leads to the acknowledgement of these facts by him or her when before they were absent from this person's description of the world. In this sense we may say that facts are constituted by the successful application of labels, for if a different system of labels were successfully applied a different set of facts would be acknowledged. The elements of this model of our relation to these aspects of our experience are as follows:-

a) relatively undifferentiated unit

b) an agent intent on particular aims (greater comprehension, perhaps, in the case of the above examples)

c) an already existent differentiation or structure effected by the application of ordered labels (38).

d) a means by which the agent is made aware of successful and mistaken projection (i.e. the assent or dissent of the authoritative person)

In these examples a convenient, limited unit of our experience – a picture, a piece of music, a page from a book - is 'given' to undergo organisation. How well does this view provide an account of the constitution of facts not within the limits of an artificial unit but in our total experience? There is in Goodman's system no one way the world is given. He does assume however that we undergo presentations of qualia at successive moments. These undifferentiated presentations are the units within which some structure is created by decree. We make these decrees as agents of our interests. The concept of a revocable decree was intended by Goodman to account for our sense of certainty or indubitability concerning knowledge of relations between fleeting presentations even in the absence of any possibility of directly comparing them (39). At the same time the concept avoids the conclusions that we can never be in error in judgements of this sort. A decree, whilst

never actually proven wrong, is always subject to withdrawal in favour of a further decree. But if this is so, Goodman queries, it may be asked why we ever do revoke our decrees since we need never be faced with necessarily contradictory presentations. His answer to this question is as follows,

> ....admitting that we can so change our decisions, why do we ever change them if we are never faced with negative test results. In part, no doubt, because of a new impulse of the same sort that led to the original decision. But this is not all. More important are the consequences, actual or prospective, of a given decree. When a decree causes us too much trouble, we abandon it; and our decrees can lead us into such serious trouble as outright inconsistency (40).

He assumes, then, that an individual is subject to pre-categorical and therefore initially undifferentiated presentations to sense, and that there is an impulse of some kind to make judgements of comparability even if they are on a primitive level. He significantly does not elaborate on this idea of an impulse to make a decree. All this suggests that our ability to experience and apprehend develops when we become capable of acknowledging greater differentiation and complexity in our presentations. We are constantly increasing this differentiation. The impetus comes from our needs and interests and we increase our knowledge and understanding by learning to use an already structured system of labelling both verbal and non-verbal into which we are initiated (41).

The similarity with the model found to be implicit in the earlier examples is perhaps more striking when applied to our pre-linguistic state in infancy. Here differentiation is at its most primitive although not, we assume, absent even from birth. An infant is clearly an agent with interests and is part of a highly coded environment, a coding which differentiates by both verbal and non-verbal labels. Regularities abound, and a child is constantly made aware of correct and incorrect projection. But if this is true in what way is the baby made so aware? We saw in our earlier examples that the enrichment of our experience was achieved by accepting an alternative and more elaborate description as authoritative. In the ease of pictures or music the assent or dissent of an authoritative source shows us whether we have correctly or mistakenly applied a label. How can this apply to a baby without language? It may be objected that whilst it may be conceded that

it is the assent and dissent of people that initiates us into a sophisticated vocabulary and hence an understanding of high level facts, for a baby it is 'the world', the things that are the core, 'reality', which offers resistance or facilitates its interests and it is 'the world' therefore that provides regularity in the form of brute facts. The child encounters the world not labels.

Apart from the familiar problems of assuming one given empirical base, behind this objection is also an unwillingness to accept that non-linguistic symbol systems facilitate our first judgements in infancy. The concept of 'decree' must be assumed to include the kind of judgements a non-speaking child makes in responding to its parents when it recognises them as familiar. We cannot have any inkling of what pre-linguistic categorisation a child may deploy as a result of its first triumphs and defeats, or of its early experiences of pain and pleasure. Their 'world' whatever it may have been like, passes with the imposition of our categories (both verbal and non-verbal) into our 'world'. It passes presumably by the same process of decree and change of decree. Certain decrees will be rejected because they are incompatible with other categories and these other categories are deemed more important to maintain than the rejected ones. The child does not encounter the world it only encounters a world, a world that soon (and not surprisingly) gives way to the authoritative description provided by the adults around it. Just because the child's first categorisations, whatever form they may take, are uncontaminated by our ontological commitments purveyed through an inherited language, it does not mean that the child is in any more direct contact with the one way the world is than we are. It does however emphasise how crucial the stage of language acquisition is when we realise that it is a matter of transference and imposition and presumably involves emotional investments of great intensity (42).

I began this section by saying that Goodman's analysis implies that projection of labels leads to the constitution of facts. If this is so the above discussion shows that he must be committed to something like the following assertions.

    a.   we continuously undergo changing presentations to sense.

    b.   we are, from the start, agents in the world to secure our interests.

    c.   our first decrees effect less differentiation relative to our subsequent decrees.

    d.   we inherit and are initiated into a way of ordering our world.

The exposition also makes clearer the reason why Goodman consistently rejects questions as to the nature of reality independent of some imposed order. For what could this mean? Facts we take to be fundamental and direct are dependent on categories which are themselves created by successful decree. To move backwards to the apparent innocence of a pre-linguistic state is to attempt to adopt a way of taking the world as little affected by imposed structures as possible. But this is as futile as it is unintelligible. An inherited structure would be exchanged for an ad hoc structure. Neither affords the contact with 'reality' that it sought. The only step beyond this is to wish for an unstructured and undifferentiated flow of presentations that is at the theoretical absolute zero of conceptualisation. This is to equate the apprehension of 'reality' with unconsciousness. For Goodman, consciousness begins with categorisation and so consciousness of 'reality' without differentiation is impossible.

Some may still object that such an account deprives all and every decree of any privileged relation to an empirical reality and so deprives any account, including Goodman's, of authority. All accounts are equally bad. As a justification or argument for his own description it is therefore, self-defeating, so the objection might run, since it denies that any independent support can be framed since all language involves categorisation. How are we ever able to gain *any* support for a decree or system of decrees independent of the categorisation imposed when we use language?

If behind such a criticism is a demand for support independent of *any* system we have seen that Goodman considers this meaningless. He holds that support can only come from other statements or affirmations that labels (either linguistic or non-linguistic) apply. In either case categorisation is imposed. But this denial of access applies as much to every

other explanation as it does to Goodman's. None can claim direct support from an uncategorised reality. This does not mean however that support, independent of any particular system in question, is not available and in ranging degrees. For fundamental to Goodman's whole thinking is the assertion that the denial that we get any direct support from one way that the world is does not mean that we cannot supply adequate support for our decrees.

To show that a decree is adequately supported is to show that it is not arbitrary. We can now return to an earlier point. We noted above that arbitrariness in the fabrication of facts is avoided by the assertion that decrees are differentially valued. Goodman must show how such differential value can be provided and this is the aim of the last chapter of *Fact, Fiction and Forecast*. Before this however he considers the problem of induction where he formulates the same problem of differential value in slightly different terms.

We noted that he holds that to predicate an endurable quality is to apply a dispositional predicate and that to apply a dispositional predicate is to project an initial manifest predicate. This involves putative application. It is a forecast of future occurrences. Goodman sees this as intimately related to the problem of induction since both involve predictions from past to future cases.

He poses the problem of induction as the problem of distinguishing law-like hypotheses from accidental hypotheses. For example, he compares these two statements.

(1) All emeralds are green.

(2) All emeralds are grue

(Where 'grue' applies to all things examined before t just in case they are green but to other things just in case they are blue.)

We cannot appeal to past instances of examination of emeralds to distinguish these two hypotheses since every past instance of a green emerald supports (2) as well as (1). Here we have a projection of the initial manifest predicates 'looks green' and 'looks grue'. We know, Goodman says, that one is more projectible than the other. The problem is to show precisely how.

We may note that a law-like hypothesis seems like the genuine signal complex encountered earlier. Certain consequences necessarily follow in so far as the hypothesis is law-like. For example the law-like statement,

(1) All emeralds are green.

uttered at time t, as part of a signal complex which involves the subsequent examination under daylight of an emerald at time t , predicts the truth of the assertion.

(3) This emerald looks green.

By assimilating law-likeness to projectibility the putative and therefore revocable aspect of law-like statements is acknowledged. There is no guarantee that what we assert as a law-like hypothesis will always turn out to be so however long it has been established as reliable. Its being regarded as a genuine signal does not mean that it will remain so. But this does not invalidate the projection of some hypotheses as law-like prior to a discontinuing instance. The discontinuation of the prediction does not show that we were unjustified in promoting certain decrees to the status of true signals even if they are subsequently found not to be so. It shows only that we were wrong. Neither does it deny the fact that there are some decrees promoted to this status which remain unviolated despite continual projection.

To return to the definition of 'projectible'. Projectibility depends on the legitimacy of two steps; one effecting a limitation of certain cases belonging to the extension of the original manifest predicate and another effecting an expansion by the addition of other cases not

belonging to the extension of the modified manifest predicate derived from the first step. These two steps together describe the intuitive restrictions and applications that we make in ordinary usage. When we say that something is flexible we are projecting from the manifest predicate 'flexes' or rather from the extension of this and the co-extensive predicates such as 'bends'. But some things that bend (e.g. under extraordinary pressure) are not flexible and so we limit the extension of 'flexes' to exclude such extensions. This is the step from 'bends' to 'flexes'. Also however there are many things that we feel justified in believing would flex under suitable pressure but, since they do not actually flex then 'flexes' does not yet apply to them and may never apply since they may never be under suitable pressure. This is the addition of other cases, the step from 'flexes' to 'flexible'.

In the same note he gives a further example namely 'is orange'. This is much closer to the predicate 'is red' that we are attempting to understand in Goodman's terns. The dispositional predicate 'is orange' is projected from the initial manifest predicate 'looks orange'. But since many things look orange but of which we do not want to predicate the enduring quality of being orange, our first step toward projection of 'is orange' is to eliminate such extensions. So extension is denied to things that are orange only under an orange light or through an orange transparency etc. This step is from 'looks orange' to, say, 'looks orange in daylight'. The next step is to apply it to undetermined cases by the prediction that 'looks orange in daylight' will apply to a thing denoted by 'is orange'. This is the step from 'looks orange in daylight' to 'is orange'. The finding of precise rules governing the nature of such steps is the main problem in the definition of 'projectible'.

> *We face the twofold task of ruling out actually projected hypotheses that are not to be countenanced as projectible, and of bringing in legitimately projectible hypotheses that have not been actually projected - the twofold problem of projected unprojectibles and unprojected projectibles (43).*

In tackling this problem Goodman restricts himself to actual projections. This follows from the way the problem has been formulated. He has defined the task of understanding dispositionals (and along with this, induction and counter-factual conditionals) as clarifying what we mean when we say a predicate is 'projectible'. But 'is projectible' is in

turn a dispositional predicate, the initial manifest term being 'is projected'. So the problem is to show how the two steps of elimination and expansion applied to 'is projected' make 'is projectible' a projectible predicate (44). The extension of the initial manifest predicate 'is projected' must first be identified so that the operations of elimination and expansion can be performed. This initial extension is that of 'actual projection'. An actual projection is 'the actual prediction of the outcome of the examination of further cases.'(45) The discussion is confined to the relationship between actual utterances.

> *What we have to work with at any given time, then is a record of projections of a mass of heterogeneous hypotheses at various times. Some of these hypotheses have been violated since the time when they were projected. Others have successfully passed such further tests as they have undergone; but among these are some hypotheses that, since they have by now had all their instances examined and determined to be true, are exhausted and can no longer be projected. Some of the hypotheses projected are false. Some are bizarre. And some are at odds with others. Such is our raw material.(46)*

We may also note in passing that conflict can only arise between incompatible assertions and conflict is, as already mentioned, the mechanism by which differential valuation comes about.

Goodman is clear which among the kinds of actual projections he wants to discard.

a. those that are violated i.e. whose predictions have been found to be false.

b. those that are exhausted i.e. which have no cases left to be determined and therefore the assertion of which involves no prediction or retrospective determination.

c. those that are non-law-like i.e. utterances such as, 'All emeralds are grue'.

The first two can be eliminated with little trouble but the justification for eliminating the third is more difficult for reasons touched on above. He resolves the problem by declaring that since both

(1) All emeralds are green

and

(2) All emeralds are grue

are both actually projected they are in conflict with each other. But (1) is more acceptable, has a greater value than (2) because the predicate 'is green' is better entrenched that the predicate 'is grue'. A predicate becomes more entrenched as a direct result of past actual projections. The more often the predicate is projected the more often actual prediction of the outcome of the examination of further cases are made on the basis of the predicate and the more entrenched it becomes. Goodman does not talk of the success of the past projections. This is already part of the definition of actual projection. An actual projection cannot be made if any violation of the prediction has occurred. Goodman thereby avoids the need to make past confirming instances crucial to the definition of entrenchment. This, as we have seen, is necessitated by the fact that in terms of such instances as much support can be mustered for (2) as for (1). Admittedly this is only true if some sense can be given to the phrase 'could have been projected' which would be ruled out on a strict base of actual projection. Goodman later wishes to introduce this term as part of his formulation of 'presumptive projectibility' (47).

So, when actual projections are taken into account the 'is green' clearly has a better record when compared to 'is grue'. This, in part, makes up that 'whole background of accepted decrees' (48) which prevents the gratuitous acceptance of new decrees. Goodman seeks to strengthen the concept of entrenchment still further. It is not only the projection of the inscription 'green' that leads to its entrenchment but also the projection of predicates co-extensive with it. Thus it is not so much the inscription 'green' that becomes entrenched but the *extension* of that inscription. As we saw earlier an individual predicate cannot be projected without the sorting it effects being projected. This sorting is effected by a set of alternative labels applicable to a realm. Among these alternatives are a number that are co-extensive with 'green'. They occupy the same 'place' in the sorting and wherever they

are projected the extension of 'green' becomes more entrenched. In addition, in the same way that the projection of the label 'green name' supports the projection of specific green-names like 'sea green', 'olive-green', etc. so does the projection of 'colour name' support the projection of 'green'. In this sense 'green-name' can be regarded as the parent of 'sea-green', 'olive-green', etc. and 'colour-name' as the parent of 'green', 'red', 'orange', 'gray' etc. In this way a pattern of support is described which, according to Goodman, leads to entrenchment of these categories.

To say that what becomes entrenched is the extension of a number of co-extensive predicates is to say that this is the way kinds of things are constituted. Earlier it was noted that this was the interpretation of the signalling relationship and here we find it once again only more explicitly stated.

> *….in the case of our main stock of well-worn predicates, I submit that the judgement of projectibility has derived from the habitual projection, rather than the habitual projection from the judgement of projectibility. The reason why only the right predicates happen so luckily to have become well entrenched is just that the well entrenched predicates have thereby become the right ones.*
>
> *If our critic is asking, rather, why projections of predicates that have become entrenched happen to be those projections that will turn out to be* <u>*true*</u>*, the answer is that we do not by any means know that they will turn out to be true (49).*

Goodman goes on to refine the theory in some detail dealing with predicates appearing as antecedents and as consequents in hypotheses. A hypothesis with a better sum of entrenchment will override one with a lesser sum. Difficult cases where no direct conflict is evident can still be ruled out by being seen as non-projectible if a hypothesis that could have been projected conflicts with the actually projected one.

This first stage of the theory applying and elaborating the primitive relation of 'greater entrenchment' issues in three definitions of presumptive projectibility.

D1   a hypothesis is projectible when and only when it is supported, unviolated, and unexhausted and all such hypotheses that conflict with it are overridden.

D2   a hypothesis is non-projectible when and only when it and a conflicting hypothesis are supported, unviolated, unexhausted and not overridden.

D3   a hypothesis is non-projectible when and only when it is unsupported, violated, exhausted or overridden.

The next problem he turns to is to attempt to give an indication of how differential value may be formally given to projectible hypotheses. He sketches the way in which different patterns of support from parent hypotheses and over hypotheses lead us to resolve conflicts. To go into this in detail is unnecessary for our purposes. Suffice it to say that Goodman tells us that he is not describing a procedure but attempting a definition and in practice we would not need to go through formal detail, since our intuitions lead us more directly and speedily to look for circumstances significant for judging degrees of projectibility. He does however sketch the logical structure of the pattern of support.

We began this section hoping to find clarification as to how Goodman characterises what is actual and on the way we asked a subsidiary question as to what constituted actual possession. We may now summarise Goodman's position as follows. To assert that a thing is red is to make a certain projection of the predicate 'looks red'. The determination of the particular kind of projection involved requires the recognition that it is projecting a particular sorting, in this case that effected by alternative colour names. The enduring nature of possession is asserted by the fact that 'is red' implies a prediction that 'looks red' will apply to the thing in suitable circumstances in the indefinite future.

To say that the predicate 'is red' applies does not guarantee the truth of the implied prediction since it does not name an immutable feature of a world independent of our ways of sorting. The fact that things are red is fabricated by habitual projection. It means

that the extension of inscriptions co-extensive with 'red' is well entrenched and that the particular ordering that its application projects is almost universally accepted.

A property is actually possessed if the predicate projecting that property has the thing denoted in its extension. A particular projection is a decree stating that this is so, and a decree will be accepted or rejected according to a judgement based on its value derived from its pattern of entrenchment. In the case of decrees asserting that a thing is in the extension of the predicate 'is red', conflict with other projectible predicates is rare or at least easily resolved. The actual is that which can be denoted by a projectible predicate. If we have clarified the question of what Goodman means by 'actual', we have also seen that he identifies mechanisms of linguistic practice that work against acceptance of gratuitous assertions. This goes some way towards answering the question concerning the arbitrariness of metaphor posed at the beginning.

Two other comments are in order concerning possible weaknesses in Goodman's system. First, nothing other than projections actually made determines which extension will become entrenched. They select that class of the extensions of co-extensive predicates. The process seems open to the criticism that what is actually determined is so in an accidental and indeterminate manner. Since Goodman has a well marked out theory of how projections are made and judged this kind of indeterminacy cannot be regarded as a structural weakness and gratuitous projection is effectively ruled out. The second point is not so easily dismissed. The identification of schemata is not formally determined. We know/that 'red' is being used say as a colour word only from the context of its utterance. For example when it is part of an answer to the question, 'What colour are you painting your house?' In many cases the identification of the schema causes little trouble but it is not at all clear that definite boundaries can be set to a schema. This in some cases might mean that a determinate identification is difficult and perhaps even impossible. And yet, as we saw, determination of the extension of any particular projected predicate awaits the identification of the schema to which it belongs. The way in which schemata are identified will be something we will need to consider carefully in subsequent sections.

The Literal/Metaphorical Distinction

Goodman wishes to hold that both the literal statements,

The picture is gray.

and the metaphorical statement,

The picture is sad.

are assertions of actual possession. The distinction between what is literal and what is metaphorical cannot therefore be between what is actual and what is figurative. The distinction, according to Goodman, lies in the act that the one is surprisingly novel in some way and the other is not. It may be novel only in the sense of being newly coined.

The surprise is generated by the breaking of bounds. A metaphor is applied where it is initially not applicable. The bounds of normal usage are transgressed by a metaphorical statement whereas a literal statement respects them. But if an initially improper usage asserting possession is conceded to be an acceptable assertion the assertion becomes metaphorical and is not therefore simply a mistake. An acceptable assertion of possession, although on first usage its impropriety is striking, can become so familiar that all sense of transgression is absent and it becomes an unsurprising and therefore literal assertion.

How does Goodman express this more carefully in formal terms? A label is always a member of a schema. A schema is the set of alternative labels. Each alternative label has a particular range of extension and the aggregate of these ranges of the schema is the realm. The realm consists of the objects sorted by the schema.

> *Thus the range of 'red' comprises all red things while the realm in question may comprise all coloured things (50).*

This statement has important implications. Even if we assume that the range of 'red' is consistently of all red things the realm may not remain all coloured things. For if 'red' is being used as part of a schema to sort people active in politics then the range will consist of just red people and not say reactionary or fascist people. We have seen earlier that identification of the schema of which the label is a part (we may also say the realm in which it operates or again the sorting it projects) is necessary before determination of the extension of the label is possible. That is, an identifying projection is necessarily assumed along with a particular projection of 'red'. The identifying projection in this case may be either 'is a coloured thing' or 'is a politically active person'. Thus whilst labels retain their syntactic form their extensions are permutable. Goodman characterises metaphor as involving a change both of range of extension and of realm for a syntactic apparatus.

> *A label along with others constituting a schema is in effect detached from the home realm of that schema and applied for the sorting and organizing of an alien realm (51).*

By use of the terms 'home' and 'alien' Goodman hopes to convey the sense of an ordered and familiar custom of usage being breached. There is a breach of custom in two ways. Firstly in relation to a habit of usage that prior to any metaphorical use, has established that the schema applies only to a certain realm and is the dominant sorting within that realm. Take for example the labels 'red', 'orange', 'blue', 'purple', 'yellow', 'green'. The established primary use of this schema is to sort coloured things. It is into this use that we are initiated when we first learn the words. Another way of putting it is that it is most often projected when the determining projections 'is coloured' also applies to the realm and 'is a colour-name' applies to the alternative labels of the schema. This established primary projection leads us to a greater expectation of this usage rather than another. With some schemata perhaps no kind of projection other than its primary use may ever have been made. Secondly, not only is there a negative sense of a custom unobserved there is also a positive sense of transgression in that the schema is applied where its applicability is customarily denied. This tacit denial that the schema applies makes the realm alien. A label is used literally when it is part of a schema used for sorting its home realm. A label is metaphorical when it is part of a schema that is used to sort an alien realm. So,

<p style="text-align:center">The picture is gray.</p>

is a literal statement if, as would in normal utterance be supposed, 'gray' is being used as one of a set of alternative colour-names. It is literal because pictures are part of the primarily established extension of the schema of which it is a part. The statement,

<p style="text-align:center">The picture is sad.</p>

is metaphorical in that the primary established extension of the schema of which 'sad' is assumed to belong has as its extension only sentient beings and so its application to an insentient picture is tacitly denied.

It should be noted that *utterances* are either metaphorical or literal. The context of the utterance provides the information on the basis of which assumptions are made as to whether a term and. its associated schema are being used in their home realm or in an alien realm. These assumptions themselves are revocable assertions. However, given custom and habit and the wish to maintain a given order between our decrees, a particular utterance is metaphorical or literal in a non-arbitrary sense.

Let us consider this position more closely. We have seen earlier that the projection of a sorting effected by a schema establishes an extension which through entrenchment constitutes a kind of thing that can be truly denoted by the projection of the schema. In this sense the projection of the schema fabricates the facts. If this is the case, and there is no element of experience independent of such sorting, why doesn't the projection of the same schema fabricate the same facts? How does there come to be a difference between metaphorical projection and literal projection albeit in a different realm?

The question is already answered of course in terms of 'home' and 'alien' realms. But to ask the question in this way emphasises that to describe metaphorical application as has been done is to make it dependent on what it sorts already being differentiated by literal

schemata. The schemata that makes this primary differentiation are part of the ordered set of schemata by which our presentations are categorised and according to this regimentation they are exclusive of one another. Thus to be a metaphor is to stand in a relation of dependence on an already established relation between schemata in the alien as well as the home realm. This point is one that is not sufficiently emphasised by Goodman considering its crucial role in his system. The kinds of things a schema is put to sort is determined by the differentiation primarily effected in the alien realm. This determines metaphorical application just as much as associations of the transferred schema with its home realm. Since metaphor is usually used only when the usurped schema is seen as inadequate in some way its influence tends to be ignored. The fact that metaphor depends upon there being an already existent differentiation of the alien realm is important for it is often in respect of a need generated by some perceived inadequacy in the already existing differentiation that metaphor is used. It also gives substance to the 'bounds' which it is in the nature of metaphor to break. Such mutual exclusions of literally used schemata are necessary for us to order our experience. It is as inconceivable that every statement we make could be metaphorical as it is that application of a previously used schema to an entirely new and undifferentiated realm could be metaphorical.

Projection of the same schema does not result in the constitution of the same kind of fact. The things to which the schema is metaphorically applied do not belong to the set of things to which the schema applies literally. When a metaphor 'freezes' the extension of the literal term thus produced is not part of the extension of the original literal term. Ambiguity is the result. Not an identity of extension but a distinction. Only a syntactic apparatus is transferred. It is an apparatus that has characteristics of any different kinds all of which become available as a resource when some pattern is looked for to guide the sorting to be effected in the alien realm. Patterns that being perceived may well have prompted the transfer and which can be appealed to in justification of it.

How does Goodman relate the literal usage to the metaphorical?

By transference of a syntactic apparatus from one realm to another a metaphor offers an alternative differentiation within an already constituted realm.

> *A schema may be transported almost anywhere. The choice of territory for invasion is arbitrary; but the operation within that territory is almost never completely so. We may at will apply temperature-predicates to sounds or hues or personalities or to degrees of nearness to a correct answer; but* <u>which</u> *elements in the chosen realm are warm, or are warmer than others, is then very largely determinate. Even where a schema is imposed upon a most unlikely and uncongenial realm, antecedent practice channels the application of the labels (52).*

Goodman uses a number of phrases to describe this relationship; metaphor springs from or is guided by the literal (p.7l) metaphor is applied under the influence of the habit established in literal application (p.71) metaphor is deferential to, if separate from, the literal (p.71) the literal precedes and informs the metaphorical (p.7l). The nature of this influence is very important for the establishment of metaphor as a process of reorganisation. Goodman does not want to describe metaphor as gratuitous labelling. That is easy and useless, whereas the re-organisation effected by a good metaphor is almost never so.

By use of the phrase 'antecedent practice' Goodman intends to include every characteristic of the transferred syntactical apparatus – every aspect that has become associated with it prior to its metaphorical use. The most explicit example he gives of how antecedent practice might channel application emphasises this inclusive intent.

The application of the schema Ping/Pong is not metaphorical since the labels have no previously established extension. It is perhaps slightly surprising then that we can label things as either Ping or Pong. There is even considerable agreement as to which range things belong. For example most people would classify a mosquito as Ping and an elephant as Pong. Goodman explains this by asserting that the 'operant precedent' is the fact that these terms have the characteristic of being able to exemplify certain properties. 'Ping' exemplifies terns co-extensive with 'quick', 'light', 'sharp'; 'Pong' exemplifies terms co-extensive with 'slow', 'heavy', 'dull'.

The application of these words looks back not to how they have been used to classify anything but to how they have themselves been classified - not to what they antecedently denote but to what they antecedently exemplify (53).

What a transferred schema exemplifies might likewise be an important influence on the metaphorical applications. Added to this is the prior use as labels and the habits of practice developed around this use.

Thus the transferred apparatus offers a rich resource of associations and characteristics not restricted to the literal denotation of the schema. From this galaxy of precedents some are operant and others not. The distinction implicit in the phrase 'operant precedent' is crucial. Some aspects influence metaphorical application others do not. Precisely how is the choice made? Goodman seems merely to have rephrased the question as to how metaphor is related to literal usage but not made us any wiser.

The obvious difficulty of trying to identify which of the associations of a given schema of a home realm constitute the operant precedent in any particular ease is conceded by Goodman. He rejects as incomplete explanations in terms of a re-application of a present label to things to which it applied in an earlier linguistic stage. He is led to accept that in some way metaphor likens one thing to another. They are alike, however, only in that they are both denoted by the sane term.

Whether the locution he 'is like' or 'is', the figure likens picture to person by picking out a certain common feature: that the predicate 'sad' applies to both, albeit to the person initially and to the picture derivatively (54).

In this case the assertion that 'sad' applies, is a decree that is subject to the same tests of truth as any literal assertion. In both the justification will come from its relation to other decrees and whether the metaphorical assertion is found to be true will, as in cases of literal truth, depend on how we resolve the 'clamoring demands of conflicting statements' (55). In his argument he answers the question, 'what sort of similarity must obtain between what a predicate applies to literally and what applies to metaphorically?' with another question.

How must past and future things be alike for a given predicate, say 'green', to apply literally to them all? Having some property or other in common is not enough; they must have a <u>certain</u> property in common. But what property? Obviously the property named by the predicate in question; that is, the predicate must apply to all the things it must apply to. The question why predicates apply as they do metaphorically is much the same as the question why they apply as they do literally. And if we have no good answer in either case, perhaps that is because there is no real question (56).

With this argument we are back with the familiar point about the constitution of facts by projection. Goodman's refusal to countenance any similarity of objects, independent of the way they have been categorised is fundamental to his account and has been discussed by him at length in other articles and books (57). What counts as similar depends on being 'closely confined by context and circumstance' (58) In line with his theory of projection the application of a term in an alien realm constitutes the similarity, if any, rather than the existence antecedently shared characteristics.

This means, in effect, that we are justified in saying that metaphorical use is guided by the literal in that the associations of the syntactic apparatus which constitute the similarity and make the transfer worthwhile are chosen from those established by use in the home realm. Both the metaphorical use and the literal use in some way share these associations as in the Ping/Pong example. In this way they are similar. But *which* associations will be shared is entirely dependent on particular context and circumstances. Only when it is asserted that a particular term applies in a particular instance can this decree be judged in the way described earlier. Only after an initial classification of both a picture and a person as sad does an assertion of similarity have any meaning. Goodman is, I think, quite prepared to accept this use of 'similar' at this later stage even though he clearly feels more comfortable if the term were not used at all. Indeed there is some point in not wanting to use the concept of similarity to explain metaphorical applications where, because the transferred schema is very restricted the shared associations barely warrant such a description.

This still leaves us in some difficulty in understanding his account. If it is granted that projection of a schema is logically prior to any assertions of similarity, the question still remains as to how certain associations are chosen rather than others. We may presume that a particular schema is chosen for metaphorical projection because it is believed that it has certain characteristics that will be of use in the alien realm. Metaphors are not manufactured carelessly but with an eye to being successful. Whilst nothing makes it certain that a given term will apply in the alien realm, since this depends on how such decrees will be judged, skill in making metaphors guards against failure. If it is not a matter of spotting existent similarities in what can such a skill consist?

Not only does his account here seem inadequate to the task of a full explanation, it also seems to be inconsistent. It was pointed out earlier (Section III 3) that the metaphorical projection and the literal projection of a label although replicas of the same inscription are semantically distinct. When the metaphor 'freezes' the result is ambiguity. The labels denote such different kinds of things that their assimilation as the same kind is impossible. But in the passages last quoted (59) he seems to be saying just this (60). Goodman seems here to assimilate the similarity of two things to which the label 'sad' applies literally, to the similarity of two things to which the label 'sad' applies to the one literally and to the other metaphorically. He does, I think, avoid outright inconsistency but his account remains seriously ambivalent and obscure on this crucial point. Firstly he states that in metaphor (as well as simile) 'the figure *likens* picture to person by picking out a certain common feature....' (his emphasis). Secondly he refers us to the similarity holding between two objects literally denoted by the same inscription, as the model for the similarity now in question. The only substantiation provided for this similarity is that the same label applies. There is, in addition, a vagueness in the use of the emphasised term 'likens'. It could mean that the fact that a common label applies constitutes the similarity to that extent and no further. Or it could mean that the decree that a common label applies entails an assertion of some similarity between the two extensions. A third interpretation is that there is an identity of parts. That is that the same label applying as it does both metaphorically and literally denotes the same kind of thing in different realms in addition to asserting similarity. Goodman seems sometimes to be trying to hold all

three interpretations at the same time. By holding to the first he dismisses accounts of metaphor based on the existence of common features ante-dating the metaphorical assertion. Thus he remains consistent with his views concerning the way enduring qualities are constituted by projection. By holding the second and third he would maintain a sufficiently intimate relationship between the literal and the metaphorical; a relationship that seems to be demanded by his assertion that metaphorical application is patterned after literal application. *This* assertion of likeness cannot be given any content until the definite context provides it. We have already seen that the third interpretation is inconsistent with the interpretation of metaphor as the projection of a schema. The *same kind of thing* is not constituted in both realms.

Goodman is aware that this may be considered an unpersuasive account of the relationship, but having taken the assertion of likeness as the basis of it he can only reiterate the argument that the projection of a label fabricates the things that it describes. This has the unfortunate effect of seeming to make the metaphorical projection of a label the same as the literal projection (the third alternative above) and this would be, I suggest, disastrous to his account. But, he does not quite assert this. He says,

> *The question why predicates apply as they do metaphorically is much the*
> *same as the question why they apply as they do literally. (61)*

Inconsistency is avoided by changing the focus of the argument. Now the question of the *nature* of the similarity has been fused with the taking of similarity as the basis for application of a label. This last is answered from his general theory of projection but the earlier question as to the exact nature of the relationship of metaphorical and literal projection is not answered in this way.

The problem is, I believe, in trying to hold both the second and third interpretation of 'likeness'. The assertion of similarity, I argue, is not necessarily entailed by a metaphorical application. It is possible successfully to use a transferred schema without implying an assertion of sameness. Such an assertion plays no part in the metaphorical operation of the schema. The interpretation of Goodman's concept of schema transference

and the idea of literal usage as a resource go some considerable way towards a fuller explanation of the patterning of the metaphorical after the literal. If some further explanation could be given of the intuitively warranted assertion of similarity, one that was consistent with Goodman's theory of projection, then the equivocation and threatened inconsistency on this crucial point can be avoided. In the next few pages I shall elaborate a formulation of grounds for the assertion of similarity often associated with metaphor and I propose to introduce that elaboration by way of Scheffler's acute criticisms of Goodman's account.

Scheffler concentrates his criticisms on the passages discussed above. He too rules out the possibility that metaphor uses the same label in the same way as literal use since he (and on my interpretation Goodman too) sees metaphor as a sub-case of ambiguity. Goodman however states that the same 'predicate' applies and this is inconsistent with metaphor having distinct extensions as in ambiguity. Scheffler here has pin-pointed the equivocation in Goodman's account. To put it in our own terms, in so far as Goodman uses 'predicate' to mean 'label replica with same projection' he courts inconsistency. In so far as he uses 'predicate' to mean 'label replica with different projection' he is not inconsistent. But, Seheffler argues, not only is the first use not available to Goodman but the second will not do either so long as he insists on there being some necessary likeness between the two denoted things. For the second use of 'predicate' makes the simple application of a label replica the only, but still sufficient, grounds for asserting similarity. Being denoted by a replica of a label provides likeness enough for metaphor to be achieved. The trouble is that even accidental ambiguities would then have to be taken as similes or metaphors and this is absurd.

> The child camper would properly be said to be like an elephant, since each
> is correctly described by some replica of 'has a trunk', the garment would
> be considered like the stretch of coastline, each being rightly labelled 'a
> cape' (62).

In defence against this criticism of Scheffler's Goodman might argue that the schema projected by 'cape' in its two separate uses contain no sub-schema shared by transference by the two projections. Thus in its geographical use 'cape' projects the set of alternative

literal terms describing coastal characteristics; 'peninsula', 'promontory', 'spur', 'headland', 'spit', 'reef, 'cape', etc. In its sartorial use 'cape' projects the set of alternative literal terms describing items of clothing; 'cloak', 'sou-wester', 'anorak', 'cape', etc. In neither case is 'cape' part of an identifiable sub-group recognised as having been transferred from a home realm. It is just this lack, it might be said, of an identifiable sub-schema which makes this use of 'cape' merely ambiguous and not even remotely metaphorical. In a metaphor such as,

This electrical component is male.

the Male/Female dichotomy is projected and is identifiable as a sub-schema parallel with but separable from the primarily established literal schema. The sub-schema sorts a particular kind of electrical equipment (63).

But this is no defence. In retort it can be pointed out that the dichotomy cape/non-cape is a sub-schema in just the same way as the metaphorical example, which sorts and is identifiable and is shared by both projections. No difference can be found in this direction.

Persisting in interpreting Goodman's meaning of 'predicate' as 'label replica with different projection' we might concede the above point but argue that it is still a fact that in metaphor, but not in simple ambiguity, there is awareness of transfer. There is a connection between the schema applied in one realm and a previous application in another realm. But what sense can be given to this 'awareness of transfer'? A knowledge that the one is patterned after the other? That one precedes and informs another? That one is in some way like the other? We are forced to use the very terms we set out to explain. This is the damaging result of taking likeness as the model of the relationship between metaphorical and literal uses. Even restricting that likeness to the use of a label replica does not save it. Such criticisms score so long as the second interpretation is held, namely that an assertion of likeness is entailed by metaphor.

Whilst Goodman does, so far as I can see, hold this interpretation (albeit equivocally) I do not believe that he *needs* to do so. It is possible to deny it and the third alternative and still produce an adequate account entirely consistent with Goodman's main tenets. Goodman's failure persuasively to elaborate what he means by saying that the metaphorical is patterned after the literal must be seen as a weakness in his account as it stands. However since the derivation is from one linguistic usage to another there may be a way of clarifying the issue which does not resort to absolute similarity or other 'world dependent' concepts. As we have seen Goodman leaves us in confusion as to the precise relationship that the literal extension has to the metaphorical extension. A fundamental aspect of Goodman's analysis is the fabrication of kinds of fact. The habitual projection of a schema constitutes the entrenchment of a kind of thing. At the heart of the problem of metaphor is the consequent status of such kinds when a schema is projected in an alien realm. It is on the basis of these two points that we shall proceed.

It has already been pointed out that the projection of a schema from the home realm in an alien realm does *not* result in an identity of extension. With habitual projection of a metaphorical use its connection with the home realm may fade and eventually be forgotten thus providing an independent literal usage; a frozen metaphor. The result is ambiguity not identity of extension. But if the projection of a schema constitutes the kind of thing that it denotes how does this difference of extension occur? We answered this by pointing out the fact that the home and alien realms are part of a regimentation that separates things as kinds. So, for example, 'sad' is part of a schema used for sorting sentient things and is therefore not literally applicable to pictures (64) Pictures in addition belong to another highly differentiated realm and therefore for both these reasons application of 'sad' to a picture is clearly different from its literal application. It takes its place, on metaphorical transfer, as an alternative label in a schema used for sorting pictures. Goodman's imperialistic metaphor which talks of invasion and taking over of a territory has the effect of minimising the role of the existing schema. As we have seen the invading forces, whilst having an initial shock effect by being openly 'opposed' to the indigenous organisation only works by finding a place in relation to that organisation. The invading schema is absorbed by it and does not exterminate or expel it. This is the

source of the problem for the application of 'sad' is still related in some special way to the literal application. Goodman replaces 'is similar to' with 'is patterned after', 'is guided by' etc. but the problem is still the same. How, if the two kinds are strictly regimented as to exclude each other can we at the same time assert identity?

The question can be confronted, I think, by properly recognising the variability of the schemata involved. The schema transferred is a *selected* group of labels from a much larger set. The larger set is the schema that determines the home realm. It is in this sense that the selected labels can be said to have a home realm *although this new schema may never have been projected as that schema.* The transferred schema does not strictly have a home realm if by that is meant a primarily established use as that selected set. Rather the labels that make up the transferred schema have operated in another larger schema which does have a home realm and an established usage.

How does the selection occur? The metaphor of transportation is a little misleading on this point. To talk of a 'transferred' schema suggests that the labels are neatly packaged and identified prior to their 'journey', i.e. before application. This is not the case. Goodman states that whether a label applies or not depends upon the decree that assertion of applicability is acceptable.

> *Neither the status of initial credibility nor the process of verification by maximising total credibility over all our judgements is different in the two cases (of metaphorical and literal application J.C.) (65)*

So prior to application there is no determinate set of applicable labels to constitute a projectible schema. Those labels that will apply are not known before their actual projection. Their projectibility depends upon whether particular projections are decreed to be applicable. Only by trial and error can the labels that make up the transferred schema be identified. These may of course be as few as two. The initial application of labels from another realm is, presumably, made on the basis of there being a good chance that some of the labels will sort the alien realm in a useful way but we can always make a misjudgement on this point. It does not imply that the determinate schema is available prior to application. An example might help here. Within the practical context of rigging

stage-lighting the schema Male/Female has come to be used to differentiate plug and socket type electrical components (66). Application of this schema in this realm is clearly metaphorical. Only the two labels are used. Their home realm, where they operate as part of a much larger schema is sorted by alternative labels applicable to live beings. Trial and error following initial projection has selected only these two labels from that home realm. Only these are projectible in the alien realm. During this trial and error operation, every resource of the applied syntactic apparatus is available. The schema is thus determined by sorting according to the simple dichotomy Male/Female and the trial and error has resulted in the ranges of extension of the two labels being established. Their use becomes clear, their denotation determined. By being projected this schema constitutes a kind of thing namely the set of electrical components to which either 'Male' or 'Female' is applicable. Components to which neither term applies do not belong in the category constituted by the schema. We may label this projection of the schema M/F_{ECP} where the suffix stands for Electrical Component Projection. The projection of the labels in the home realm we may label M/F_{LBP} where the suffix stands for Live Being Projection. What then is the relation between MF_{LBP} and $M/F_{LBP?}$

What this kind of analysis has done is to emphasise the *difference* between the two projections. There is a strong distinction between the two uses. We have stated that all the resources of the syntactic apparatus were available to guide application in the alien realm. This means any, not just semantic, aspect associated with the syntactic apparatus through previous practice. How can we go further towards formally characterising the context of precisely those resources that among all those eligible actually influence the metaphorical application? What makes us want to say that objects sorted by M/F_{ECP} and M/F_{LBP} are similar in some respect. So much so that we even *feel* that we can at least partly *explain* in what ways they are similar.

Perhaps we will gain some insight into the relation between the two projections if we imagine M/F_{ECP} set to categorise in the realm of M/F_{LBP}. Clearly although they share inscriptions the schemata sort different things. Indeed since the realm of M/F_{ECP} is

antecedently established as that of certain electrical components its application in the realm of live beings must be regarded as metaphorical on Goodman's criteria.

> *When one use of a term precedes and informs another, the second is the metaphorical one (67).*

To characterise this re-application as metaphorical does not make for a circular argument. Nothing in this account depends on the re-organisation being called 'metaphorical'. We are only interested in how it is actually operating to sort. The important point about this actual sorting is that it constitutes a different projection to that of the label replica in use in the realm of re-application and in the original alien realm where they were first used metaphorically.

As we know, according to the present analysis, whether a metaphorically transferred label applies or not is theoretically open. Decrees asserting application may be denied. But in this case this openness is so drastically reduced as to be all but eliminated. It seems almost certain that M/F_{ECP} will be projectible in the realm of live beings and further that the objects that M/F_{ECP} sorts in this realm will be those that exemplify the characteristics that guided the original metaphorical application of the schema. I suggest that this relationship is at the foundation of our wish to assert similarity. Our assertion of similarity has an additional and perhaps stronger ground. An important difference between this metaphorical re-application of M/F is that the re-imported schema is *wholly* applicable. No labels need to be rejected since *all* of the labels will almost certainly find application. This was not the case with the original transfer. The fact of complete applicability is another strong foundation for the assertion of similarity (68). Further, the re-imported schema effects a reorganisation in the original home realm by having a different extension to the replica inscriptions not so re-imported.

The assertion of similarity is, on this interpretation, an elliptical assertion that the originally transferred schema metaphorically applies intact in the original home realm. A re-sorting is made in both home and alien realms because the M/F_{ECP}, applied, back to the

realm of live being, makes a new kind of differentiation. Thus an advantage of this explanation is that it shows how when we assert;

Man is a wolf.

our view of both men and wolves may be modified. I shall call M/F$_{ECP}$, when so re-applied an affinitive projection of M/F$_{LBP}$ and the schema of M/F$_{ECP}$ an affinitive schema. The M/F$_{LBP}$ I shall call the stock (i.e. source) projection and the schema the stock schema. It should be noted that the stock schema does not only consist of the labels 'Male' and 'Female' but of many other labels applicable to Live Beings. An affinitive schema has the following characteristics; it shares some labels with the stock schema; replicas of all of the labels of the affinitive schema are to be found as *part* of the stock schema; when metaphorically projected in the realm of the stock schema all of the labels of the affinitive schema are almost certain to be applicable.

The distinction between mere ambiguity and metaphor now becomes clear. Ambiguity is distinguishable from metaphor in that on application to the realm sorted, by a replica of the inscription the merely ambiguous schema has no greater assurance of application than any other term whereas a re-applied metaphorical schema (an affinitive schema) has. When trunk$_{CP}$ (where CP means 'camping projection') is applied to the realm of pachyderms (69) no obvious application springs to mind. Association would have to be searched for and may have little plausibility when found. This is in sharp contrast to an affinitive projection. This analysis is not affected, by the fact that many ambiguous terms were once projections of transferred, schemata. The establishment of independence is exactly proportionate to the lessening of assurance of re-application.

It may seem that the analysis outlined, above applies only where the schema is as severely restricted as is M/F$_{ECP.}$ How might it apply to the metaphorical application of such terms as 'sad' to pictures? When we apply 'sad' in this way we imply that all the syntactic apparatus used to sort sentient beings is available for such projection. By trial and error certain aspects are selected and others are rejected. Of course many, although

theoretically available, are barely considered. With such a large syntactic apparatus possessing many and subtle associations together with an alien realm consisting of items which are semantically dense, the task of precisely determining the applicable schema is impossible. As when attempting to define the umbra and penumbra of a shadow we can only be sure when we are well into each region. But, that a shadow has indeterminate boundaries does not mean that we cannot identify the area covered. Well within the umbral region of the approximately determined transferred schema to which 'sad' belongs are feeling-words. They are often applied to pictures and other art works - such labels as 'sad', 'gay', 'happy', 'light hearted', 'melancholy', 'hopeful'. These feeling words have at least two projections. One is F/W_{SBP} where SBP stands for Sentient Being Projection and another is F/W_{AWP} where AWP stands for Art Work Projection. F/W_{SBP} is a sample of the whole available syntactic apparatus (the stock schema) from the realm of sentient beings and F/W_{AWP} is a sample of the schema actually selected by trial and error metaphorically to apply in the realm of art works.

As before F/W_{AWP} differentiates an entirely different kind of object and by being actually projected establishes ranges of extension. Such established projection constitutes this kind of object. Thus when F/W_{AWP} is subsequently applied as an affinitive schema to the realm of sentient being, its realm (aggregate of ranges of extension) will be different to the realm of F/W_{SBP} since this last applies the replica inscriptions as part of a different schema namely the stock schema. For example 'happy' as part of the schema F/W_{AWP} when metaphorically projected in the realm of sentient beings applies under the influence of its application to happy art works. It is part of an affinitive schema.

The complete applicability of the affinitive schema F/W_{AWP} in the realm of sentient beings is assured since every label in it established its prior range of extension (in the realm of art works) on the basis of associations accrued by antecedent operation of the syntactic apparatus F/W in the realm of sentient beings. These associations are still available as characteristics of the syntactic apparatus to help guide the affinitive projection of F/W_{AWP}. In addition they are exemplified by certain objects in the realm of sentient beings. To assert that F/W_{AWP} is not applicable may on the one hand be to deny

that there are *any* associations that could be used to pattern its metaphorical re-application. This is to ignore the availability of the most obvious and natural associations described above. On the other hand a denial could mean that such an application serves no purpose. But if no other purpose were admitted the application serves to give grounds for an assertion of similarity. Often the new kind of sorting effected by an affinitive projection is illuminating and. one way of drawing attention to this re-sorting is to assert similarity of the kind described above.

I have distinguished two operations. The first is the establishment of F/W_{AWP} metaphorical projection of labels from the home realm of sentient beings. This is an assertion that F/W_{AWP} applies to art works. The second is an assertion that art works are similar to people. This is an elliptical statement saying that F/W_{AWP} is an affinitive schema; this means that it is wholly applicable in the realm of sentient beings and that the objects in its extension exemplify the associations which channelled the original application of F/W_{AWP} Such an assertion of similarity *is not necessitated* by the first assertion that F/W_{AWP} applies to art works. They are logically independent albeit closely related. Sometimes we feel the need to state the similarity, at others not. With M/F_{ECP} an assertion of similarity is perhaps rarely required and achieves little of importance after the initial learning process. We may assume that the achievement of independence and hence of ambiguity would be fairly rapid in such cases. With F/W_{AWP} the assertion may be of considerable significance. It may indeed have been in order to generate such connections that the metaphor was uttered.

Having reached this point we can characterise Goodman's account of metaphor in the following way.

1. Metaphor is creative but no more nor less so than any initial projection.

2. Its status as truth or falsity is assessed in the same way as the truth or falsity of literal projections and therefore it is neither more nor less stable.

3. It is a kind of projection and as such it has importance as one of the ways in which we categorise.

4. The degeneration from metaphorical to literal truth is natural since metaphorical possession is actual possession.

5. It is not possible to give a full literal paraphrase of any metaphor. It is not so reducible.

And, if the expansion of Goodman's theory proposed above is accepted then,

6. It is capable of giving the grounds for asserting similarity between the metaphorical and literal extension of a term.

7. His account of metaphor uses and is entirely dependent upon his previously worked out account of projections and decrees.

Some final points concerning some of Scheffler's comments are in order. His criticism of the determination of the simile by reference only to contained predicates is seen to miss the mark when the full implications of projection are understood. A single contained predicate 'projects' a dichotomy, a set of alternative labels, onto the realm and consequently provides opportunities for elaboration. This is a major advantage of Goodman's account. Secondly Scheffler's elaboration of 'contextualism' is very much in the direction I have outlined here. The difference is that I show that it is a natural development from Goodman's own account whilst Scheffler gives the impression that his and Goodman's accounts are different and incompatible.

Good and Bad Metaphors

If the previous discussion serves to clarify how any metaphorical application must be related to its previous literal use and its status as an actual projection it does not

illuminate a characteristic of metaphor that we, intuitively perceive namely its 'weight' or 'emphasis'. Max Black raises the point when he says,

> *To know what the user of a metaphor means we need to know how 'seriously' he treats the metaphorical focus. (Would he be just as content to have some rough synonym, or would only that word serve? Are we to take the word lightly, attending only to its most obvious implications - or should we dwell upon its less immediate associations.) (70)*

There are two different points made in the above passage one of which is met and explained by Goodman in his account as we have interpreted it and one which is not. When Black makes the point that we sometimes take a metaphor 'lightly' and at others 'dwell upon its less immediate associations' he is concerned, I would argue, with the plausibility of extending the metaphor. At one time many associations will be evoked, at another very few and it is a matter of judgement when expansion or limitation is appropriate. In Goodman's account, dwelling upon 'less immediate associations' would amount to the determination through actual projection of a larger schema. That is, a more extensive set of alternative labels would be decreed to apply. Taking the metaphor 'lightly' in this sense would be to accept only a very limited schema.

The second of Black's points however is different. It asks about how crucial the organisation effected by the metaphor is. Importance of this kind is not affected by how extensive or limited the schema is and Goodman does not deal with this aspect in any detail in *Languages of Art*. His comments are more or less contained in one paragraph and perhaps even in this single line:-

> *But where an unaccustomed organisation results, new associations and discriminations are also made within the realm of transfer; and the metaphor is the more telling as these are the more intriguing and significant (71).*

For him every metaphor effects a new labelling. Where it also effects a new re-organisation the importance and durability of that re-sorting are characteristics determined by things beyond the formal nature of metaphor. He specifically rejects any attempt to make this part of his brief for reasons we have noted earlier. In other words his formal analysis does not distinguish between a good metaphor and a bad metaphor prior

to its establishment as 'good' or 'bad' by subsequent projection. Even then he gives metaphor only a kind of presumptive projectibility but does not provide an account of *degrees* of projectibility or (again to use the term from *Fact, Fiction and Forecast*) 'comparative projectibility'. Yet some such account would provide some explanation of the weight of a metaphor which is an intuitively perceived aspect of metaphorical usage. What follows is an attempt to see how far similar patterns of support can be discovered for metaphors. If such patterns can be identified then they will provide grounds for giving differential value to metaphor. This may go some way toward providing formal justification for our intuitive acceptance or rejection, expansion or restriction of the metaphors we encounter.

I shall try to present clearly the issues involved by the use of the following scenario. A student agrees to take part in an experiment for which he will be paid the going rate. He will be taken to a room on four consecutive days. He is told that on each day he will receive a simple instruction which he must do his best to carry out.

<u>FIRST DAY</u>
On entering the room he sees three separate areas A, B and C labelled respectively A, MALE; B, FEMALE; C, NEITHER MALE NOR FEMALE. In another part of the room are some people and some objects each with a number pinned to them. They are;-

        (1) A man called Tom

        (2) A woman called Joanna

        (3) A Cindy Doll

        (4) A photo of Yoko Ono

        (5) A photo of John Lennon

        (6) The part of an electric plug with prongs

        (7) The part of an electric plug with sockets

        (8) A green paper square

        (9) A purple paper square

        (10) A black and white paper square

(11) A gray paper square

(12) An orange paper square

(13) A black paper square

(14) A white paper square

His instruction is to classify each object by putting it into one of the three marked and labelled areas.

First response - In (A) object 1, In (B) object 2, In (C) all other objects. This sorting was achieved with no hesitation.

SECOND DAY

Same room, same instruction but 'objects' 1 and 2 are no longer there to be classified.

Second response - After only a little thought and a quick glance over all of the objects, (A) 5, (B) 3 and 4, (C) all other objects.

THIRD DAY

Same room, same instruction but objects 1 to 5 are no longer there to be classified.

Third response - A little puzzled. Looks to the instructor for further guidance but gets none. After some thought he fairly confidently places the objects as follows, (A) 6, (B) 7 (C) all other things.

FOURTH DAY

Same room, same instruction but objects 1 to 7 are no longer there to be classified.

Fourth response - Exclaims that it is impossible. The instructor reminds him of his contract. After considerable thought and some trial sorting he places them tentatively into a final classification. He looks thoughtfully at each grouping to see if he is satisfied and, sighing, says that this is the best he can do. As he leaves the room he is heard to comment

that it is strange the things people get paid to do. His classification was as follows, (A) 9 and 10, (B) 11 and 8, (C) 12, 13 and 14.

What can we conclude from these classifications? Firstly, we must note that the syntactic apparatus, the schema, was the same throughout. Clearly on the first day the student applied the schema literally – it was our familiar like-beings-projection (M/P_{LBP}). On the second day we had the same projection (M/F_{LBP}) but applied to objects that represented in some way items in the literal extension of the schema. Although it may raise some subtle and intriguing questions it was, for our purposes, a modified literal classification and one the student did not hesitate to apply. On the third day the student acknowledged the changed circumstances. The instruction is no longer obvious but requires reflection although in the end classification was confident enough. Here the schema has a different projection, namely $M/F_{ECP.}$ On the fourth day although the classification is made it is an extremely unfamiliar projection of the schema. We may baptise it M/F_{CSP} where CSP stands for Coloured Square Projection. Did we not know that the student seemed to spend considerable thought on the problem we may have been tempted to think that he classified them quite arbitrarily. We have three ways of understanding the projection further. We can (a) ask the student for his reasons for the classification (b) hypothesise reasons which may have guided the classification and then test these against further sortings of coloured squares according to this schema and relevant related use or (c) we can suspend any judgement on the grounds that there is nothing as yet to interpret and await further projections. Perhaps the most natural response is some combination of (a) and (b) since (c) would be in effect not to progress at all in understanding.

Let us assume that on asking the student why he made that classification on day four he explained that he associated purple with royalty and therefore power. Black and white with contrast and variety, and therefore as an exemplification of *lack* of monotony. These he then took as representing respectively the position of power men hold in our society compared to women and the consequent greater opportunity for a varied work career for the majority of men compared to women. Green was associated with nature and gray with monotony. Women he felt were, 'closer to nature' and led a more tied, monotonous

existence. He could find no associations to exploit in the case of orange and black and white seemed too contrasting.

There are two clearly metaphorical projections in this scenario namely these made on days three and four. Why then might we feel, as I assume we might, that when these projections were made on day three and day four that the former was more projectible than the latter? I think we can list the reasons as follows:-

a) M/F_{ECP} has been projected and has an established use.

b) Its established projection entails that it has been found sufficiently compatible with other projections to be accepted as applicable.

c) M/F_{CSP} has never been projected until Day Four.

d) The affinitive projection of M/F_{ECP} is more readily applicable in the stock realm than is $M/F_{CSP.}$

e) Understanding M/F_{CSP} will involve learning a new kind of sorting since we cannot find a projection like it in our experience. Even the sorting on the basis of 'pink' and 'blue' for girls and boys is not available and provides no help.

The last point is important for if we had been used to this kind of projection then M/F_{CSP} would have been more projectible. Without some way of assessing the value of new projections we are in danger of denying in theory to *any* new applications the status of projectibility. Indeed we can assume that M/F_{ECP} was such a new application but, as common experience reminds us, projection of the schema M/F to an incidence of penetration is common. Thus M/F_{ECP} *inherited* considerable support which gives it a high index of projectibility - that kind of projection is well known. In the case of M/F_{CSP} the artificially created circumstances have led to a projection being made with little, if any, inherited support. This does not mean that it cannot be projected. It may even become a

sorting that, because it is found useful in some way is more often projected and then it would become more entrenched and later projections of M/F$_{CSP}$ would be more projectible than this first projection.

It seems natural that his theory of comparative projectibility should be applicable in this way to metaphorical projection. But how does it work with less trivial examples? Take Shakespeare's sonnet number seventy-three.

That time of year thou mayest in me behold
When yellow leaves, or none, or few, do hang
Upon those boughs which shake against the cold,
Bare ruined choirs, where late the sweet birds sang.
In me thou see'st the twilight of such day
As after sunset fadeth in the west;
Which by and by black night doth take away,
Death's second self, that seals up all in rest.
In me thou see'st the glowing of such fire,
That on the ashes of his youth doth lie,
As the death-bed whereon it must expire,
Consumed with that which it was nourished by.
This thou perceivst which makes thy love more strong,
To love that well which thou must leave 'ere long.

TABLE ONE

LIFE IS LIKE ANYTHING THAT MOVES INEVITABLY TO A CONCLUSION

a) Life as the waves towards the pebbled shore,
   So do our minutes hasten to their ends (Sonnet 60)

b) Out, out brief candle! (Macbeth V. v.17)

c) We are such stuff as dreams are made on,
   And our little life is rounded with a sleep. (Tempest IV i.148

LIFE IS THE PROCESS THAT RISES TO A PEAK AND THEN SLOWLY FADES

a) Nativity, once in the main light,
   Crawls to maturity , wherewith being crowned,
   Crooked eclipses 'gainst his glory fight.
   (Sonnet 60)

b) In me thou see'st the glowing of such fire,
   That on the ashes of his youth doth lie.
   (Sonnet 73)

c) ....I perceive that men as plants increase,
   Cheered and checked even by the self-same sky,
   Vaunt in their youthful sap, at height decrease,
   And wear their brave state out of memory; (Sonnet 15)

LIFE IS A BRIEF EPISODE

a) Life's but a walking shadow, a poor thing,
   That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
   And then is heard no more: (Macbeth V V.17)

b) After life's fitful fever he sleeps well. (Macbeth III ii.22)

LIFE IS LIKE THE ROUND OF THE SEASONS

a) For never-resting time leads Summer on,
   To hideous winter and confounds him there;
   Sap checkt with frost, and lusty leaves quite gone,
   Beauty o'er snowed, and bareness everywhere. (Sonnet 5)

b) I have lived long enough: my way of life
   Is fallen into the sear, the yellow leaf.

I AM IN THE AUTUMN OF MY LIFE

That time of year thou may'st in me behold
When yellow leaves, or none, or few do hang
Upon these boughs which shake against the cold,
Bare ruined choirs, where late the sweet birds sang.

The base metaphorical assertion of the first quatrain may be characterised as;

I am in the late Autumn of my life,

The tradition of likening the passage of human life to the course of the seasons was well established when this sonnet was written (72). Even if old age had never been called the winter of a person's life before this sonnet, this projection would have inherited support whenever the other season words were projected in the realm of human existence. In addition, other labels may have been metaphorically or literally applied projecting other schemata in which season words are alternative terms. For example, schemata identifying the category of things that move inevitably towards an end; schemata identifying brief episodes; and schemata determining the category of processes that grow to a peak and then decline. Table One illustrates just some of the ways in which the final metaphor is supported by prior projections. Such a tabulation fails to approach the actual subtlety, complexity, and richness of the allusions but it does show the way in which the web of meaning is capable of being built up. We can see how the metaphor inherits support from prior projections of season words to the course of human life; by projections to human life of schemata in whose realm Autumn may also fall, namely the categories of 'brief episodes', 'peaking processes', and 'inevitably progressing processes'. Thus whenever it is asserted, either literally or metaphorically, that human life inevitably progresses towards its end, or is a process of growth to strength, maturity and decline, or that life exemplifies brevity, then this provides support for the assertion that a particular time of life can be described as 'late Autumn'.

I do not profess to have listed all of the kinds of projection that might support the original metaphor. This would be impossible. I have only given some examples of the different levels from which a metaphor gains support to make it projectible. It follows the lines of Goodman's distinctions in his theory of projection in *Fact, Fiction and Forecast*. From what has so far been said it is clear how a poet, artist or composer can construct patterns of allusion that are more or less independent of earlier projections of schemata. To make this point more forcibly I have chosen all the examples from Shakespeare's work. Thus,

even if no other person had ever used these particular figures, his own work could have provided the support needed to make the metaphor in question intelligible.

To have given an account of how two different metaphorical projections can be seen to have different 'weights' or comparative projectibility, does not tell us whether one is a 'better' metaphor than the other. As we saw even a projection with a very low projectibility such as $M/_{FCSP}$ may, by being projected, come to be entrenched. A metaphor is not good or bad in itself but good for sorting or bad for sorting particular things in particular ways. A judgement as to the value of the sortings is an issue beyond the nature of the syntactic and semantic facts. Such a judgement will however be informed by our earlier experience and guided by previously acknowledged interests. These interests are embodied in existing patterns of articulation. Judgements will be made as to the value of particular projections in relation to such patterns and will be favoured if they extend some acknowledged positive aspect or usefully fill a vacuum identified only negatively. We cannot readily discern beforehand what interests will be operative in any particular case. Goodman wishes to define the *way* a metaphor comes to be accepted with reference to particular operative interests.

> *Truth of a metaphor does not, indeed, guarantee its effectiveness. As there are irrelevant, tepid, and trivial literal truths, there are farfetched, feeble, and moribund metaphors. Metaphorical force requires a combination of novelty with fitness, of the odd with the obvious. The good metaphor satisfies while it startles. Metaphor is most potent when the transferred schema effects a new and notable organisation rather than a mere re-labeling of an old one (73).*

Some concerns, such as the need for economy may be taken to be common. An organisation may be 'new and notable' in that it effects an economy in the alien realm. By the use of a transferred schema a sorting can be effected more easily. An alien realm is always already differentiated and it may be objected that this claim to economy cannot therefore make sense since the transferred schema only takes over from a literal differentiation already in existence, or one that could be projected by use of the available literal terms. Such an objection also attacks the claim that metaphor is creative. But to assert that the alien realm must always be differentiated prior to the metaphorical transfer

says nothing about the 'level' or 'thoroughness' of such differentiation. For example, a literal application of 'sad' projects a schema that contributes to the entrenchment of the dichotomy 'sentient/non-sentient'. This schema sorts the universal class of things, but the extension of 'non-sentient' is very wide and there is no necessity that it be finely differentiated (although we know as a fact that it is). It is simply that class of things not denoted by the term 'sentient'. Metaphor involves the projection to the category of non-sentient things the schema normally contributing to the identification of the category of sentient things. Just in this lies the transgression. The identification of the alien realm is a necessary condition for it to occur. Such identification, however, does not necessitate further internal differentiation and it is just this that the particular metaphor in question seeks to achieve. If that differentiation were one already effected by a combination of literal terms then economy may be a matter of replacing compound labels with simpler ones. This may have been the case for example with the projection of Male/Female to electrical plugs (M/F$_{ECP}$). The sorting may previously have been effected by some such cumbersome label as

The component with the prongs designed to fit the component with the sockets

To replace this by 'male component' is a simplification worth making. The need for economy is extensive in our discourse.

> *......incessant use of metaphor springs not merely from love of literary colour but also from urgent need of economy. If we could not in reality transfer schemata to make new sortings and orderings, we should have to burden ourselves with unmanageably many different schemata, either by adoption of a vast vocabulary of elementary terms or by prodigious elaboration of composite ones (74).*

If a metaphor neither effects an economy nor a completely new sorting within an alien realm it may still serve stylistic ends making an utterance bombastic, humorous or florid. If a metaphor achieves a new classification, however, the effect may be more powerful especially when it serves the purposes of persuasion. Re-classification of one thing as another is a potent source of humour, iconoclasm or enlightenment. When Bertolt Brecht wrote *The Resistable Rise of Arturo Ui* in 1941 he achieved all three effects by

classifying Hitler and his fellows as Chicago gangsters fighting for control of the cauliflower trade. Shakespeare moves us to a profound understanding and compassion in the way he describes his time of life as the penultimate season, the end of a day, the slow dying of a once bright fire.

In the next section I want to consider the concept of expression as it has been formulated by earlier theorists. Before passing on to that task I pause here to consider a point made earlier. There I said that there seemed to be an accrual of formal indeterminacy within his system such that it might weaken his general position. I particularly mentioned the apparent impossibility of precisely determining the schema that is metaphorically transferred. We found however that although the schema may remain controversial and therefore indefinite *at its boundaries* a core of labels remained which made a workable schema. They projected a determinate dichotomy. Such a schema is determined by trial projection in the alien realm and only *after* this is the schema identified.

There is though another indeterminacy. On our interpretation Goodman places the act of *concession*, the *acceptance* of a decree, as the final support of any assertion. Even though he has characterised such concession as far from being arbitrary it is a fundamental tenet of his system that the choice between acceptance and rejection of any decree is always open. In addition the exercise of this essential freedom is informed by personal interest. We may perceive our interests as allied to larger groups whom we take as sharing our view of life and therefore as, together, articulating our pattern of decrees. It follows that two groups may disagree over whether a metaphor applies. Neither can be charged with arbitrariness since both can look to support from a pattern of consistent assertions. This theoretically characterises the common enough fact of ideological conflict in our everyday world. The indeterminacy arises from the fact that there is no ultimate process by which opposing decrees arising from conflicting patterns of articulation can be resolved. We could choose many examples that highlight the important practical implications of categorisation and re-categorisation. We should not forget that a great deal can be at stake when groups have the opportunity to enforce their version and what it entails upon other people. It is this area as well as the more mundane sorting (which may

not be so controversial) that Goodman refuses to enter, other than simply to acknowledge that there are many legitimate world-versions. His system thus gives equal status to all world-versions which are capable of sustaining themselves in the context of all other statements. They maintain their status only by asserting statements projectible within their own version. Any particular assertion should not conflict with other assertions that they would wish to uphold. There is no doubt that differences of degrees of consistency, subtlety, simplicity and explanatory power will be found between conflicting systems. A critique of systems can be achieved by an examination and systemising of the implicit decrees on which the systems rest. But even assuming that world-versions are constructed and held with the same attention to self-consistency shown by Goodman there is still no need for anyone to abandon any version. It does however make such tenacity more difficult to justify. It remains that choice of system depends upon which assertions we wish to deny or revoke and which we wish to accept or retain, and consistency, subtlety and fit can all be adjusted. Where there's a will there's a way. As Goodman says,

> ....*any decree, however unnatural, can be maintained by giving up enough others (75).*

Given the inevitable lapse of self-consistency and the practical importance for groups to maintain certain world-versions many of our systems of decrees will in practice fall far short of the standards set by the philosophic conscience. They will inevitably be in conflict with each other. The theoretical inability to refer to any absolute criterion of truth to resolve these ideological conflicts is a strong factor in the rejection of radical relativism. We must however take due note of the effect of Goodman's strictures upon decrees. He identifies the legitimacy, the acceptability of any decree, with consistency with our whole past and future decrees and at the same time links the language we use to make those decrees with inherited entrenched patterns. This effectively debars arbitrariness and ensures that when two world versions come into conflict there will be important issues of interest at stake.

Goodman does not reject on principle the possibility of a theory explaining why we make certain choices between decrees which ultimately determine our world versions. He

accepts the possibility of a theory of psychological determinism but argues that it is unworkable in practice (76). If psychological determination is accepted in principle then a theory of radical *social* determination might be acceptable and offer a better explanation for some choices of classification. A theory that traced operant interest would be compatible with the formal analysis of symbol systems that Goodman develops in his work. I think some such link with existing work on theory of interests would be an important extension of Goodman's account and provide rigour and illumination in cultural theory. Goodman, I suggest, offers a subtle and mature characterisation of 'truth'. It is one that acknowledges the awful freedom from any absolute and emphasises our utter and ineradicable responsibility.

4) Expression

Introduction

Having analysed referential possession as exemplification and developed an account of metaphor that accommodates metaphorical exemplification as a sub-species of that mode of possession Goodman is in a position to formulate a referential relationship that subsumes the particular example with which he started, namely,

This picture is sad.

I shall shortly discuss in detail this formulation and the way in which Goodman wishes to apply it to actual instances of art works. I shall also compare this reformulation of the concept of expression with alternative historical accounts. In order to do the latter a look at what is and what was meant by 'expression' is necessary.

The concept of expression has a complex historical background which leads to different if pervasive uses of the term today. It plays an important role in critical discourse. A number of traditions inform modern usage among them neo-Kantian, Romantic, neo-Platonic. Any one application of the concept is likely to give evidence of being influenced by more than one such source. A coherent account of the parenthood of the concept is both necessary and difficult. I propose to categorise four main aspects that are variously emphasised in different theories involving expression. These are,

Expression as Language or Articulation
Expression as Access to the Inaccessible
Expression as Emotion
Expression as Self-Expression

Each aspect is not independent and is to be found intimately related with one or all of other aspects within a particular theory.

If these four aspects usefully *distinguish* important characteristics in different theories the concept of *immediacy* can be seen as a common feature of all theories that class art as expression. To understand quite how immediacy is characterised in particular accounts is an important aim of the following sections.

I shall first trace the historical background of each of the four aspects distinguished above and then examine some of the most influential theorists in the light of this brief historical survey. It is hoped that by understanding something of history of the concept we may apprehend its sometimes varied import in these different accounts.

Imagination and Articulacy

When used to imply articulacy expression is that act of mind by which some primary sensation is transformed into object of which we are capable of being conscious through time. In this way it is a mode of knowledge.

When the British empiricists assumed that mind was a receiver of impressions which were subsequently associated together the problem of how fugitive physical sensations could be the stuff of enduring ideas became central. Hume concluded that from isolated impressions we construct a permanent object by the action of imagination. This act of imagination is neither sensation nor reason but habit of mind that we slip into irrationally. But without this habit our lives would be impossible. This unreasoning 'fancy' was not a welcome concept to Hume who believed that it supported a radically sceptical view of human knowledge.

> *Without this quality, by which the mind enlivens some ideas beyond others (which seemingly is so trivial, and so little founded on reason), we could never assent to any argument, nor carry our view beyond those few objects which are present to our senses. Nay, even to these objects we could never attribute any existence but what was dependant on the senses, and must comprehend them entirely in that succession of perceptions which constitutes our self or person. Nay, further, only admit of those perceptions which are immediately present to our consciousness; nor presents us, be ever received as true pictures of past perceptions. The memory, senses and understanding are therefore all of them founded on the imagination, or vivacity of our ideas.*

We wonder a principle so inconstant and fallacious should lead us into errors when implicitly followed (as it must be) in all its variations (1).

However unwelcome it may have been it was, as the passage above states, that which makes it possible to be conscious of objects beyond the sensations of an instant. It transforms, joins together, the radically separate impressions. This transformation constitutes the immediate apprehension of enduring objects which are seen to interact in a world according to our laws of cause and effect (2). The imagination for Hume was both fickle and fundamental.

The philosophical disintegration of objects of the world into our impressions and the practically necessary synthesis effected by imagination was admitted by him to be at the foundations of our thought. Hume saw in this contradiction between sense and reason which only the reprehensible tendency of human nature to live by unreflective habit could make bearable.

The philosophical scepticism concerning cause and effect and the identity of objects through time was forced on Hume by his insistence that all knowledge must be seen ultimately to proceed from experience. Neither belief in causation, nor the endurance of objects could be grounded in experience. Hence they could not be justified at all. Kant agreed with Hume that they cannot be shown to proceed from particular experiences but he argued that our beliefs in them could be justified by reference to experience as a whole. That is they could be shown to be necessary conditions of experience in itself. Thus they are constantly part of our thinking not because of a rather dubious habit of mind but because they were a prior condition of experience. The notion of imagination plays an important part in this transcendental argument.

Kant agreed that by an act of synthesis we are able to produce in our individual minds (the apperception of the thinking being 'I' is a basic concept in his theory) intuitions of particular phenomena. A manifold of sensations is held together as one form. This is an operation of the mind that necessarily precedes all other mental activities.

> *It is an operation of the understanding of sensibility, and the first application of the understanding to objects of possible intuition, and at the same time the basis for the exercise of the other functions of that faculty (3)*

In particular this synthesis performed by the imagination is essential to the faculty of judgement - the,

> *distinguishing whether this or that does or does not stand under a given rule (4).*

The subsumption of an object under a conception is an act of judgement in this sense. Here, Kant argues, there is a problem. For an object to be subsumed under a concept the representation of the object (the intuition) must be homogenous with the conception. But the conception is a pure product of the understanding and as such is heterogeneous, and can never be discovered in any intuition (5). The two things are quite different in kind and the one cannot be contained in the other,

> *Now it is quite clear that there must be some third thing, which on the one side is homogenous with the category, and with the phenomenon on the other, and so makes the application of the former to the latter possible. This mediating representation must be pure (without empirical content) and yet must on the one side be <u>intellectual</u>, on the other <u>sensuous</u> (6).*

It is the imagination that produces this 'third thing'. It conjoins many images of sensuous intuitions to produce a transcendental schema which is not a particular intuition or image. Like the primitive intuition this product also exhibits characteristics of directness, irreducability, unity, immediacy, particularity and homogeneity with what it is unlike but is capable of subsuming. He concludes,

> *.....the schema of a pure conception of the understanding is something that cannot be reduced into any image – it is nothing else than the pure synthesis expressed by the category, ...(7)*

Insistence on the irreducible nature of the product of imagination, its priority in the process of consciousness and its ambivalent relationship to blind sensation on the one hand and the conceptualisation of the understanding on the other, is the key element in theories of expression as articulation of experience. These qualities, typical of the

products of imagination recur as aspects of the artistic product in expressive theories. In particular they characterise a crucial aspect of their immediacy. Conjunction and hence the prior process of imagination is special and pervasive.

> *Of all mental notions that of conjunction is the only one which cannot be given through objects, but can be origination only by the subject itself, because it is an act of its purely spontaneous activity. The reader will easily enough perceive that the possibility of conjunction must be grounded in the very nature of this act; and that it must be equally valid for all conjunctions; and that analysis, which appears to be its contrary, mast, nevertheless always presuppose it, ...(8)*

Hume bewailed the fact of imagination being at the basis of our thoughts and the necessity it implied to live by unreason. Kant tamed the concept but still has to concede its priority in experience and a pervasive presence in our mental lives. The expressive theorists exploited this germ of unreason to counter what they took to be analytical and rational dominance.

Access to the Inaccessible

The inaccessibility of reality to mortal knowledge has an ancient history. The Platonic and Neo-Platonic traditions taught that knowledge of reality is either impossible or at least extremely rare and therefore extraordinary. A radical disparity was assumed between reality and our worldly apprehension (9).

Consequently no means of gaining worldly knowledge could be adequate for knowledge of the realm of forms or Divinity. Our time on Earth is to be considered as a temporary exile from that mode of being which is as different from this life as is perfection from imperfection. Plato argued that when we momentarily glimpse reality this is to be understood as a reminiscence of that state of being from which we were torn in becoming mortal. The Christian Neo-Platonists either rejected or reinterpreted this concept of reminiscence in favour of an explanation whereby the earthbound soul occasionally penetrated the veil of matter to come closer to God. The mode of this penetration or revelation of God was a matter of dispute. For example some held that the material world, although the lowest level in the hierarchical universe, is still inspired by a divine

flow. By absorbing this inspiration from the physical world through sensory perception and sense-controlled imagination man can hope by using it to transcend it and move upwards toward union with God. Others argued that through contemplation of the scripture and holy things the soul can attain partial revelations. Still others held that it could be achieved by contemplation of the ancients whose wisdom was vouchsafed to them by Adam himself whose wisdom in turn was derived from direct acquaintance with God. By this path the knowledge of Adam is embodied by the ancients in their myths, riddles and legends the truth of which can, like the bible, only ever be partially penetrated through interpretation.

No matter how it is explained the nature of this intuitive apprehension is always mystical and unearthly as is vividly described by Panofsky in his discussion of Ficino.

> *This road is open to every one who 'seriously devotes his Mind to the pursuit of the true, the good and the beautiful; but consummate happiness comes only in those exquisite moments when contemplation rises to ecstasy. Then the Mind "seeing with an incorporeal eye, calls itself away not only from the body but also from the senses and the imagination", and thus transforms itself into a "tool of the divine". This ineffable bliss...... is, of course, what Plato describes as the θειαμαγια or furor divinus: the "fine frenzy" of the poet.......; the ravishment of the diviner; the rapture of the mystic; and the ecstasy of the lover (10).*

Against the background of such beliefs it is not surprising to find that newly created artifacts (aesthetic objects as we might call them) that utilised the form of metaphor and analogy, the dramatis personae of the biblical or ancient texts and the ancient symbols, were felt to have a special power of providing access to the otherwise inaccessible. Nor is it surprising that material objects were shaped and placed in contexts that would make clear that hint of God each shares with all creation. Thus real knowledge, knowledge of the true reality behind worldly appearances is both mysterious and necessarily unmediated by our worldly ways of achieving knowledge tied as they are to our embodied reason and sense-bound understanding. The main activities of reason, systematic categorisation, definition and conceptualisation, are all minimised in the face of revelation. Partial truth could be glimpsed by never ending interpretation of the wisdom embodied in what would now be called aesthetic forms.

This embodiment is not conventional but essential. The meaning inheres in the symbol not by agreement (which would be arbitrary) but as a property of the symbol itself. Thus contemplation of *every* aspect of the physical symbol might bring to light differing and, to mortal minds, incompatible interpretations. So long as the authenticity, and therefore authority of the symbol is assumed any plausible interpretation is acceptable as a part of the revelation the symbol affords.

> *Where symbols are believed not to be conventional but essential, their interpretation in itself must be left to inspiration and intuition........The symbol that presents to us a revelation cannot be said to have one identifiable meaning assigned to its distinctive features. All its aspects are felt to be charged with a plenitude of meanings that can never be exhaustively learned, but must be found in the very process of contemplation it is designed to engender (11).*

Contemplation is necessary to gain fuller (but never perfect) understanding, but this contemplation is of the physical symbol, the presentation of wisdom in the relationships of matter or sensations of matter. It was not regarded as a decoding but a sensitising; not a reference to agreed significations but an opening of the mind to possible interpretations none of which is final and exhaustive. The faculty that has to be sensitised however is intellectual not sensual. Access to God's wisdom is *immediately* granted to intellectual intuition. The presence of the divine in the physical symbol was a crucial mystical element. The symbol itself could be a powerful magical sign which, in authentically re-presenting, actually partook of the power attributed to the presence of the thing symbolised. A Gothic cathedral, built as the house of God, presented through such symbols the actual presence, the experience of his divinity. Through the Neo-Platonic symbol of light and the *actual* transformation of white into coloured illumination the light inside a cathedral was God's light released from earthly form. Facing north, in constant shadow, are placed statues of the Old Testament prophets in the darkness that presided before the coming of Christ. On the south those of the New Testament with Christ centrally positioned between the two doors so that the light of the sun catches the Messiah who, when it stands out dramatically against the blackness of the open doors is *actually* radiant. The entrance itself is representative of the passage from the material

world into the presence of God. Consequently this physical inlet is charged with meaning. At Chartres this hint is made clearer by lining the entrance with the figures of the New Testament, a line along which we must pass to enter the Kingdom of God. Christ between the two doors physically presents, the way, the truth and the light (12).

A Gothic cathedral is a representation of Christian truths but this representation is not one, according to the Neo-Platonic tradition, that can be fully understood simply by knowing the intensions, say of Suger at St. Denis. The Abbey at St. Denis stands to provide a way of experiencing the presence of God along with other divine truths. As an embodiment of the Christian mysteries it both affects us *as* divine and makes those mysteries available for contemplation and interpretation.

This role of art as a direct knowledge of an ultimate reality which was otherwise unknowable was affirmed by post-Kantian philosophers, notably Schelling. Kant's enlightenment philosophy would seem to leave little room for mysticism and yet Schelling developed his view of art as a mode of access to a reality beyond the reach of reason, from Kant. The Critical works of Kant had demonstrated the failure of the understanding in the presence of reality. The realm of things-in-themselves can never be apprehended by us since our very perception of the world involves an act of synthesis. This formative act of mind presents objects to our consciousness which are its own products and thus are inevitably different from things-in-themselves. In this way Kant in effect reaffirmed, in a different form, the Platonic belief in the inadequacy of mortal apprehension, but he also eschewed mysticism and therefore denied the Platonic promise of extraordinary moments of intuitive perception of the divine reality of things.

This last Schelling argued to be incorrect. The veil could be penetrated, the gap closed, by any man of exceptional capacity, a genius. He found confirmation of this assertion in. art. In our aesthetic response to art he found the needed example of immediate perception of ineffable knowledge, intellectual intuition.

> All philosophy proceeds and must proceed from a principle which, as the
> absolute principle, is at the same time the identical purely and simply.

> *What is absolutely simple and identical cannot be interpreted or communicated through description, nor through concepts at all. It can only be intuited. Such an intuition is the organ of all philosophy. But this intuition, which is an intellectual and not a sensory one, and which has for its object not the objective or the subjective but the absolutely identical, in itself neither subjective nor objective, is itself merely an inner one which can only become objective through a second intuition. This second intuition is aesthetic intuition.......This generally acknowledged and wholly undeniable objectivity of intellectual intuition is art itself. For aesthetic intuition is nothing other than intellectual intuition become objective (13).*

This privileged glimpse is vouchsafed only to a chosen few and its appreciation in aesthetic form is only possible for those with equally developed intellectual sensibility. Penetration of the veil was achieved in aesthetic activity by men of genius and only understood by those spectators capable of the same uncommon apprehension (14). This characterisation of art by Schelling purveys the notions of an aristocracy of sensibility over and above the common people and a fundamental devaluation of reason since it is, by its nature, incapable of achieving this higher knowledge. This latter was now to be understood as the property not of the multitude but of a handful of geniuses. Concepts, notions, ideas, are in principle understandable by anyone with speech. They are consequently potentially democratic. Intellectual intuition on the other hand is vouchsafed only to those graced to achieve the sensibility required. Such a view is inherently exclusive and individual.

It is important to recognise the political dimension of this aspect of the theory of art, a dimension which plays its part in the account of later theorists as much as in Schelling. Schelling opposed the Enlightenment philosophy of understanding because in his opinion it paved the way for revolution. His polemic was openly against democracy and he saw the Job of philosophy as opposing its development. He says,

> *The elevation of common understanding to an arbiter in rational matters inevitably produces ochlocracy in the domain of the sciences and with it, sooner or later, a general uprising by the mob (15).*

and

If anything is capable of stemming the inrush - whose mixing of higher and lower values has become more and more visible since even the mob has begun to write and every plebian has promoted himself to the rank of a judge – then it is philosophy, whose natural motto is the phrase, 'Odi profannum vulgus et arceo.'

Emotion and Self-Expression

The effect of divorcing art so completely from thought made the conception of both the artist's and spectator's relationship with art works somewhat difficult. The real content of a work is an intellectual intuition. This is defined as an extraordinary feat of apprehension which, even when achieved, can never be expressed in words. Being extraordinary it is not a commonplace occurrence, it does not usually happen, it does not automatically follow on the perception of a work of art. Making aesthetic awareness a special event deprived our everyday encounters with artistic form of any readily understood meaning. Some 'sublime' works of art may easily qualify for this very special category but many fit less neatly. This difficulty affects the creation of art as much as the appreciation of it. A vacuum was created in our relationship with works of art, a vacuum that could not remain empty.

The notions of an aristocracy of sensibility and of individuality were strong themes of romantic thought. The combination of these two ideas provided a more commonplace content of art than the awesome direct access to the inaccessible. This content was at the same time compatible with the ineffable nature of intuition and so was uncontaminated by a lowly reason. A successful artist is, according to the above accounts, a man of superior sensibility. It is by virtue of this that he can achieve intellectual intuition. Such achievement is manifested by his feelings, by the emotions felt during the 'fine frenzy' of inspirational revelation. The feelings the artist feels during creation and the feelings felt by a properly appreciative spectator are the guarantees of superior creation and they are inherently subjective. To deepen and extend the revelation the individual artist attended more and more to his personal feelings. In this way the artist found a more accessible content for his work in the exploration of a superior sensibility partially independent of the great task of revelation. This act of self-expression is one that a spectator could

appreciate and share on a more humble level than that of genius. To appreciate a work of art was to identify with the emotions expressed and this was self-expression by the spectator of the same kind as the self-expression of the artist. But since the artist provided the form and he is a superior sensibility the act of appreciation is also an act of revelation for the spectator.

Wordsworth reveals something of this pattern of thinking when he says in *The Recluse*,

> *Of ill-advised Ambition and of Pride*
> *I would stand clear, but yet to me I feel*
> *That an internal brightness is vouchsafed*
> *That must not die, that must not pass away...*
> *Possessions have I that are solely mine,*
> *Something within, which yet is shared by none,*
> *Not even the nearest to me and most dear,*
> *Something which power and effort may impart:*
> *I would impart it, I would spread it wide,*

This clearly illustrates the very close relationship between the view of art as self-expression and the content of art as emotion. Wordsworth is talking of feelings not of ideas, concepts or thoughts.

The close association of emotion and art has of course been acknowledged by philosophers from the Greeks onwards. The Rhetorical tradition recognised the power of art to persuade by engaging the affections. Gravina, against the dominant cognitive view which minimised the place of emotion in art, saw art as delirium, and strong emotion as the mark of inspiration in its full sense of being entered by the spirit (16). But it wasn't until the time of the Romantics that emotion on its own could be seen as an aim or content of art. The nature of even commonplace emotion is readily characterised as absolutely individual, incompatible with reason and indescribable in words. As such it was eminently suited as a vehicle for the notion of intellectual intuition. In addition the rebellious strain of the Romantic Movement expressed itself in the comparative reinstatement of the sensuous and the sexual against the constraints of society. Strong emotions of friendship, love, nostalgia, nature worship, were all affirmed in opposition to

the formality of a courteous society. Above all what was most important was to be true to one's self - to be sincere.

Art as self-expression had its roots in the individualism inherent in the philosophy of the time and was embraced by the Romantic artists. Accessibility to reality was only possible through the agency of the individual sensibility. This sensibility therefore became valued for itself and all of its expressions became more significant and valuable. As the individual was taken as a unit over and against the entity of society a tension between the two was recognised. It became important for an individual to distinguish himself and hence he was led to claim *right* of expression. Some art, of then and now, is specifically and simply an exercise of that right.

A further important ingredient in some modem uses of the concept of self-expression is that of depth psychology. In psycho-analytic theory the individual psyche is assumed, under the influence of taboos largely created by society, to repress certain ways of feeling. Like dreams art is capable of gaining access to this level which by its nature is inexpressible in any form consciously recognised and accepted by the subject. It is therefore immediate in the sense that it must be perceived in a way unmediated by any concepts accepted as rational.

These two ingredients, the individual against society and access to a repressed self are combined in the activity of the Surrealists. They declared that society was rotten, oppressive, repressive and all pervasive. The individual was betrayed and stifled by all social forms of life. It was necessary for the true, healthy being to express itself. This would make possible a wholesome society which would be an aggregate of individuals uncorrupted by a false consciousness. Such self-expression could not be achieved through any form which was in any way contaminated by the social. But this excludes all means of communication, even the language in which they spoke. Any expression would have to be immediate again in the sense of being unmediated by any inadequate vehicle. It was the imperative that led them to experiment with automatic writing and accidental art (17).

Tolstoy

Tolstoy's essay, 'What is Art' is a distillation of the views of a great artist. He states his belief in the moral importance of art as an expression of feeling that can unite mankind in one humanity. Each of the modes of expression discussed above can be discerned in Tolstoy's theory with the notable exception of the mystical. Tolstoy promises no access to the inaccessible. This gives his theory a comparatively down to earth character, a sense of humility, which also distinguishes his fictional writing. For him art is first and foremost the expression of emotion. The concept of expression is taken to be unproblematic. It denotes the external manifestation of a personal feeling. The paradigm may be taken as those expressions of joy and sorrow well known to every person namely laughter and tears.

Art is the deliberate exploitation of the fact that on perceiving another person's expression of emotion we are capable of experiencing the same feelings that moved that person say to laugh or to weep. This is so strong a tendency that he describes it as being *infected* by the same emotion. Just as we are willy-nilly infected by another's disease we may well be powerless to prevent the passing on of expressed emotion (18). We have no choice but to be infected by the emotion and the external expression facilitates or rather effects that infection. The merit of the artwork is judged on the basis of its relative effectiveness in facilitating infection *and* the relative moral worth of the feelings transmitted.

The artist is apparently in a different position from the spectator. The intention to communicate is essential to the activity of art:

> *Art begins when one person with the object of joining another or others to himself in one and the same feeling, expresses that feeling by certain external indications (19).*

The artist sets out with an end in mind namely to join another person to him by making him share the artist's feeling. He intends to communicate to the best of his or her ability a feeling once or presently felt by him or herself. It is this decision to communicate which marks for Tolstoy the distinction between 'the expression of man's emotions by external signs', which is not art and the 'means of union among men joining them together in the

same feelings' which is (20). This distinction, emphasising as it does the intention of the artist, is intended to mark a qualitative difference, a logical break between simple expression of emotion and the expression of emotion which is art. It seems to prefigure the distinction in Suzanne Laager's work between sign (or symptom) and symbol and to take a step towards separating emotional expression from self-expression; from dependence, that is, on the limited source of individual experience. It is an independence also required to justify the social content of the variety of emotions he claims can be expressed by art. This direction of his thought is blocked however by two other aspects of his theory – the necessity for the artist to be 'sincere' in his expression and the demand for 'originality' in the art work. How these two concepts are deployed by him needs to be explained.

As part of his attack on the empty upper class art of his and earlier times he argues that the notion of beauty being the characteristic 'content' of art has taken the place of emotions expressed as manifestation of a deeply held religious world view. The 'appreciation of beauty' reduces to the mere pursuit of pleasure and then hedonism replaces conviction. Many works that are called art are in fact objects made to produce pleasure of this trivial kind. Even worse the artists may not even be expressing their own feelings but simply be pandering to their clients desires. Such 'art' he equates with mere craft. It lacks sincerity. That work is sincere when,

> *....the artist is infected by his own production and writes, sings, or plays, for himself and not merely to act on others... (21)*

A work is insincere when,

> *....the author is not writing, singing or playing, for his own satisfaction - does not himself feel what he wishes to express, but is doing it for him (the recipient)... (21)*

If the artist genuinely feels these emotional pleasures and succeeds in expressing them then, although it is art, it is a very low and unworthy form. If on the other hand the artist perceives a wish on the part of his clients to be amused he may well resort to borrowing features generally considered 'artistic'. He may for example dazzle the spectator with

minute detail, produce striking effects or trick out his work in puzzling intricacies. These would be counterfeits of art not art proper. They can be done well or ill but they do not have their source in the sincerely felt emotions of the maker. Tolstoy joins together the idea of unworthy art and counterfeit by referring to the source of a 'real work of art' as in the kind of life that is lived.

> *A real work of art can only arise in the soul of an artist occasionally, as the fruit of the life he has lived, just as a child is conceived by its mother. But counterfeit art is produced by artisans and handicraftsmen continually, if only consumers can be found.....(22)*

The metaphors of the growth of a fruit and the conception of a child drastically qualify the kind of decision that an artist can make as to the production of a work - a decision that Tolstoy regards as essential to art. The making follows a natural path, a direction ordained without present human intervention, and leads step by step to its conclusion unhampered by the inevitably limiting specific consciousness of the artist. The character of Platon Karatayev in Tolstoy's, *War and Peace* illustrates this unconscious production of insight as the 'fruit of the life he has lived.'

> *Platon Karatayev knew nothing by rote except his prayers. When he opened his mouth to speak he appeared to have no idea how, having once begun, he would finish up.*
>
> *Sometimes Pierre, struck by the force of his remarks, would ask him to repeat them, but Platon could never recall what he had said a moment before, just as he could never tell Pierre the words of his favourite song. MOTHER, LITTLE BIRCH-TREE, and MY HEART IS SICK came in but they made no coherent sense. He did not understand and could not grasp the meaning of words apart from their context. Every utterance and action of his was the manifestation of a force, uncomprehended by him, which was his life. But his life, as he looked at it, held no meaning as a separate entity. It had meaning only as a part of a whole of which he was at all times conscious. His words and actions flowed from him as smoothly, as inevitably and spontaneously as fragrance exhales from a flower. He could not understand the value or significance of any word or deed taken separately (23).*

Tolstoy has here described the essence of the Romantic concept of the artist. Despite the fact that this person is a peasant he is a person of special sensibility, a spiritual aristocrat

if not a social one. And although the content has change Tolstoy has adopted the *form* of the mysticism described earlier. Platon provides to his expressions a revelation of his way of life instead of a divide reality more conventionally defined. This revelation is absolutely contrasted with the apprehension of reason which is mediated by words as independent units of meaning or general concepts. For Platon words, like any other discursive symbol, are entirely absorbed into the unity of a single, particular expression. This process becomes more and more like the direct expression of emotion. Tolstoy does not though, as Croce does, provide a saving distinction between emotion expressed (24) and expression *chosen* to be embodied in external form. So on the one hand Tolstoy's argument describes the act of artistic expression as virtually unwilled and on the other he makes the *intention to express* the essential distinction separating art from simple expression of emotions.

The distinction between original and unoriginal takes this qualification of the decision-making power of the artist even further than does that between counterfeit and genuine. Tolstoy says,

> *...that is a true work of art which transmits fresh feelings not previously experienced by man. As thought-product is only then real thought-product when it transmits new conceptions and thoughts and does not merely repeat what was known before, so also an art-product is only then a genuine art-product when it brings a new feeling (however insignificant) into the current of human life (25).*

A sincere act of making a work of art on this account implies that the artist *believes* that he or she is expressing his or her own feelings. To assert that a genuine art-product, as well as sincerely produced, must also be original is to imply that an artist must believe his expression is his own and that the belief is true. Although Tolstoy introduces this condition apparently to counteract the routine and the basely limited nature of art of his time it is a condition which is forced upon him by the individualism which is at the basis of his theory. Anything less than complete originality would involve taking the meaning of words (or expressions) from their context and accepting their generality. That is, utilising completed expressions that are not one's own and therefore necessarily involving

preconception of one's own emotion. This would be incompatible with a sincere and particular act of expression. The moral characterisation of art as a means of union can be seen as a response to the prior conception of individuals condemned to isolation within themselves. An isolation philosophically reinforced, as we have seen. Whilst accepting this characterisation of the human condition Tolstoy, (along with other theorists of his time) could not conceive of the idea of a social determination of the self. Unless one had come to an apprehension oneself then an expression of it would necessarily borrow someone else's thoughts or feelings. Only concepts and categories, or base or hackneyed feelings can be borrowed. The former are not, as Kant emphasised, the stuff of the world and the latter are corrupt. Only contact with one's own experiences unmediated by borrowings of previous forms of thought or feeling but formed by living with good things and in good ways, can give assurance of not being led astray. True and good art is the immediate expression of emotions of such a life.

Tolstoy was deeply troubled by, on the one hand the separateness of individuals and on the other by his awareness that this separation is often bridged by the transmission of emotions both good and bad. He found in feelings a trace of unity. In the fact that feelings can be transmitted he saw hope of communication and in communication he divined the achievement of union between people.

> *A real work of art destroys in the consciousness of the recipient the separation between himself and the artist, and not that alone, but also between himself and all whose minds receive this work of art. In this freeing of our personality from its separation and isolation, in this unity of it with others, lies the chief characteristic and the great attractive force of art (26).*

Self-expression, the expression of one's own feelings is the means by which people come together in one humanity. By an individual acting to express his unique feeling everyone is capable of sharing that individual's particular emotion. This being the case Tolstoy claimed that only worthy emotions should be so transmitted and he spent some time attempting to identify these. If then Tolstoy did not seek in art access to the inaccessible he did find attainment of the unattainable.

Tolstoy seems to take feelings as that part of human experience that is entirely personal. It is for this reason that its expression is *self*-expression and amounts to the kind of communication described above. He enters into no analysis of the status of these feelings and is content that since no one else can feel *my* feelings they must be entirely the *product* of my self - an argument analogous to that concerning sensations of the external world with the important difference that feelings seem to originate *in* us not *outside* of us. This makes their status as absolutely personal seem unassailable and Tolstoy needs them to be so if their being shared is to effect a union between separate individual personalities. Yet when he lists the emotions and feelings that art is capable of transmitting there are some which seem, either partially or wholly, to rely on the existence.

> *The feelings with which the artist infects others may be most various.....: feelings of love of one's country, self-devotion and submission to fate or to God expressed in a drama, raptures of lovers described in a novel, feelings of voluptuousness expressed in a picture, courage expressed in a triumphal march, merriment evoked by a dance, humour evoked by a funny story, the feeling of quietness transmitted by an evening landscape or by a lullaby, or the feeling of admiration evoked by a beautiful arabesque - it is all art (27).*

To lump such a variety of human responses together under a single unanalysed term and then to take that term as if it named something we all so well understand that it can serve as the basis of a complex theory is to beg many questions. Tolstoy does so because the idea of our feelings not being our own was for him unthinkable. It remains so for many in our present day.

Croce

Tolstoy, as Langer was to do, differentiated language and art but emphasised their equal importance as two modes of communication. Croce *identified* them by making language as immediate as art. He argued that intuition or expression was the essential nature of both. When, he argued we hear and understand an interlocutor we are not receiving and. decoding a set of signals with rigid conventional meanings. What we do, by use of the external signs of verbal expression, is to reconstruct the meaning in our own minds. That is we intuit or express for ourselves the original intuition that constituted our

interlocutor's expression. The unit of meaning is therefore the sentence, a whole meaningful expression, not the dictionary meanings of single words. In effect, the mode of expression exemplified by Karatayev, is defined by Croce as the *only* mode of expression and the attempt to find meaning in a generalisable unit, a meaning independent of a unique expression, is destructive of the wholeness of the indivisible 'complete meaning'.

> *Expression is an indivisible whole. Noun and verb do not exist in it, but are abstractions made by us, destroying the sole linguistic reality, which is the <u>sentence</u>. This last is to be understood not in the way common to grammars, but as an organism expressive of a complete meaning, which includes alike the simplest exclamation and a great poem (28).*

This refers back to the mysterious synthesis of Kant's and in Croce's account it assumes a place not only of priority, but also of superiority before all other modes of apprehension and underlies all of our mental activity. It is the fundamental act of apprehension, and this act is the act of expression itself. Apprehension and expression are identical. As with Kant even the identification of objects is dependent on this act of synthesis between our sensations and our expression of identity.

> *The world of which as a rule we have intuitions is a small thing. It consists of little expressions which gradually become greater and more ample with the increasing spiritual concentration of certain moments. These are the sort of words which we speak within ourselves, the judgements that we tacitly express: "Here is a man, here is a horse, this is heavy, this is hard, this pleasures me, etc." (29)*

Croce's theory is of expression as articulacy. In emphasising this aspect the immediacy of the experience is brought to the fore. Concepts and intuitions are seen as incompatible. A concept is necessarily general, an intuition is necessarily particular. Intuitions furnish the world with things, concepts relate things to each other. A thing and a relation are radically different entities. An intuition or expression is an apprehension of a particular unmediated by general concepts. But intuitions and concepts are not merely differentiated by Croce they are related as prior and subsequent, support and supported. Of expressions and concepts he says:-

> *....the first can stand without the second but the second cannot stand without the first (30).*

This gives genetic priority to the expressive activity. Art is a paradigm of the expressive activity but Croce's best description of this act, which stresses its non-conceptual, particular and immediate nature, is given in a description of history.

> *History does not seek laws nor form concepts; it employs neither induction nor deduction; it is directed ad narrandum, non ad demonstrandum; it does not construct universals and abstractions, but posits intuitions (31).*

To work towards a previously conceived end Croce argues is a technical process which necessarily puts conceptualisation before the act of formation. In such a process the form is determined by the conceptualised end in view. Putting conceptualisation before the act of formation is not intuition, it is intellect. This argument of Croce's informs three other developments in his theory. In the first he argues strongly against any conventions of form imposed on artists. In the second be distinguishes sharply between technique (or craft) and expression. The technical view of art is according to him unviable since it is incompatible with art's essentially expressive nature. A craftsman is capable of achieving a given aim within his chosen medium. The nature of that aim, its relationship to his life or consciousness is irrelevant to the perfect achievement of a pre-conceived task. However much there is to admire in such a skill it is not art. In the third Croce's account implies an emphasis on the spontaneously personal nature of artistic activity. Expression is necessarily self-expression since it is an intuition in an individual mind. A pre-conceived task can be set by and imposed upon any person. An intuition is entirely free of such external imposition. The expression is innocent in the sense that judgements concerning its moral worthiness, political expediency or general usefulness are totally inappropriate. Such judgements cannot decree, 'This should not have been expressed.' The innocence of expression stems from the independence of such standards of judgement given in Croce's account. It is for him logically inappropriate to stand in judgement on whether an expression should have been expressed or not, whether a thought should have been formed in the artist's mind or not. Such judgement coming after the fact has no power over it. Even the artist cannot control his expressions by an act of

his own judgement. The expressions, Croce continues, arise spontaneously, unwilled, beyond the control of any judgement.

Collingwood as we shall see was to modify this innocence of expression and talk of false consciousness whereby error infiltrated even to this sanctum of the individual mind. Collingwood could do this because he possessed a modified concept of 'choice' as 'selective attention'. For Croce however choice necessarily implied an intellectual activity incompatible with expression and, as we have seen above, he argued that the artist had no choice in the matter.

> *We cannot will or not will our aesthetic vision (32).*

This appears to contradict our actual experience of the place of art in our lives and the activity of artists where choice seems clearly to play a part in the making of their works. Croce realises this and the quotation above continues,

> *We can however will or not will to externalize it, or rather, to preserve and communicate to others, or not, the externalization produced (32).*

The subtlety of Croce's argument is that although judgement is inappropriate to the act of expression it is wholly pertinent to the act of selection an artist makes. He may choose which expressions to communicate and which not. Therefore any work of art as distinct from any expression is at the same time both expressive and subject to judgements of the kind described above.

We have demonstrated above that art

> *as art is independent both of utility and of morality, as also of all practical value....but....if by art be understood the externalization of art, then utility and morality have a perfect right to enter that is to say, the right to be master in one's own house (33).*

In this way he captures in his theory this aspect of our relationship with works of art, and goes some way to explain why we consider art so important. Nevertheless the price of making art an entirely theoretical activity is to make it empty. Tolstoy tried to capture

feelings in his notion of expression and feelings were either good or bad. They are, ambivalently, products intimately related to a moral outlook and produced for their own sake. They are spontaneous expressions of a life's spirit but they are not wholly independent of the artist's will. If the unbreakable connection of art and life is thus only ambiguously upheld in Tolstoy's theory it is all abandoned in Croce's. Feeling or the 'economic' activity of the will companies every expression but is never part of it for 'economic' activity according to Croce, necessarily involves the conception of a desirable and a particular outcome conceived beforehand and taking familiar pre-established form. The process of expression for Croce is independent and spontaneous and creates its own new and particular form. The pleasure and pain it affords as expression is either an aesthetic pleasure in the knowledge of achievement of the expression or pain in the knowledge of an imperfect form.

> *The individual A is seeking the expression of an impression which he feels or anticipates, but has not yet expressed. See him trying various words and phrases which may give the sought-for expression, that expression which must exist but which he does not possess. He tries the combination M, but rejects it as unsuitable, inexpressive, incomplete, ugly: he tries the combination N, with a like result. He does not see at all, or does not see clearly. The expression still eludes him. After other vain attempts, during which he sometimes approaches, sometimes retreats from the mark at which he aims, all of a sudden (almost as though formed spontaneously of itself) he forms the sought-for expression, and lux facta est. He enjoys for an instant aesthetic pleasure or the pleasure of the beautiful. The ugly, with its correlative displeasure, was the aesthetic activity which had not succeeded in conquering the obstacle; the beautiful is the expressive activity which now displays itself triumphant (34).*

Collingwood

Croce's theory is one of articulacy first and foremost with self-expression as a necessary corollary. Neither expression as the expression of feeling nor as access to the inaccessible features at all. The immediate nature of expression is heavily stressed. In contrast Collingwood's account in The Principles of Art (35) draws on all the four traditions identified earlier, and for this reason his book stands as a more powerful statement of the expressive theory. In it he has woven significant threads from each tradition into an intricate and ingenious whole.

Collingwood, like Croce, relates directly to the tradition of expression as articulacy stemming from the British Empiricists and Kant. Thus for him all mental activity derives its content from that act of imagination which plucks from the incessant flow of sensation enduring objects or things. These, being held before our minds, are capable of being objects of thought, that is they can be thought of as being the same as or different from other things. The act of synthesis performed by the mind as imagination is the act of expression.

Collingwood however attempted a more intricate analysis of this mysterious act of synthesis than Croce. The flux of sensation Collingwood characterises as 'feeling' and he deliberately uses both meanings of that word. Feeling is sensation as received through our body and also emotion unavoidably felt *with* that sensation. Even at the lowest pre-conscious level of mere physical experience we 'express' this emotion by the physical reaction of our bodies.

Collingwood believes that 'every sensum has its own emotional charge.'(36) By this he means that a particular sensation is always accompanied by a particular emotion. Each colour for example, when sensed, produces at the same time an emotion peculiar to itself. The fact that we do not continually verify this fact is explained in two ways. Firstly, he argues, we very rarely attend to one sensum at a time but rather to a very large number at once. Secondly,

> *The habit of 'sterilizing' sensa by ignoring their emotional charge....... (is) especially characteristic of adult and 'educated' people in what is called modem European civilization.....(37).*

But children, because their sensations are less 'educated' and artists because they train themselves to resist the conventions of society, are more sensitive to this emotional charge (38). This surprisingly crude and, by his own admission, unwarranted assertion is at the foundation of his account of art.

These feelings (sensum/emotion) flow in upon us according to Collingwood through our physiological channels and we react to them automatically. We are entirely swamped by our 'feelings' in this sense. But, by an act of attention we can isolate certain feelings from the flux and hold them for a moment before our minds. This action of attention posited by Collingwood is identical with consciousness because in it we become aware not only of a particular feeling but also of our experience of that feeling - we become self-conscious. However, he continues, we cannot hold still something that is by its nature always in flux. A feeling once felt is instantly replaced by another feeling. Therefore what we attend to is a product of our mind created by the act of attention or a series of such acts upon evanescent feelings. The product is imagination or idea. An idea is a feeling isolated from the flux of all other feelings. It is not abstracted from the field of perception but that field is divided in such a way that a person can say, 'This is what I feel.' and mean a particular part of his or her experience.

For Collingwood our ideas and thoughts are generated from our experience but, he realised, our experience is by nature an incessant flux of instantaneous feelings. If he wished ideas to provide the intellect with those things between which it perceives relations then ideas must be taken as different from mere feeling. They must be products of thoughts. On the other hand if they are to preserve a link with experience they must, he realised, be products of sensation (39). Collingwood accordingly defined these fundamental ideas as primary acts of intellection. They are not produced by the secondary action of intellect, namely the perception of relations between things. The primary form is a necessary first step.

> *We must know what each is in itself before we can decide how they are related (40).*

For Collingwood these primary acts of intellection present things in all their particularity, as individuals. An experience entirely un-conceptualised. They are not however direct, immediate experiences of preconscious feelings. Like Kant and unlike Schelling, Collingwood believed that such experience is forever beyond us. They are he argued direct in the sense of being unmediated by general or abstract concepts. This they must

be, for to apply a concept is to relate the idea to other ideas of the same kind, to order it in relations of similarity and dissimilarity. But the primary object of intellection is not sorted into a kind but merely attended to as a thing in itself. If an idea is a form of thought, he continues, it must have that characteristic essential to thought namely the possibility of error. A thought may be true or false but if an idea is not categorised as one thing or another how can a mistake arise? How can an assertion of having a particular feeling, a feeling entirely peculiar and personal, ever be made in error? Collingwood thus acknowledges that error is ruled out in the sense of a mistake of judgement of categorisation and in this he is in line with Croce. But he holds that there is a polarity in imagination as in conceptualisation. He argues that, in addition to the primary act of consciousness, i.e. attention, there is a further stage of acknowledgement of the objects so attended to. This act of acknowledgement can be whole (the further implied term 'whole-some' is not inappropriate) or partial and incomplete. If an assertion such as, 'This is how I feel' is directed at only part of the object of attention it is only a partial truth. In this sense an assertion concerning one's own feelings can be wrong or mistaken and it follows, he argues, that imagination has a potential bi-polarity since a whole acknowledgement is different from and opposite to a partial one and, Collingwood goes on to say, has a profound effect on our mental health. The passage in which he states this point is important and I quote it in full.

> *Consciousness is the activity of thought without which we should have no terms between which intellect in its primary form could detect or construct relations. Thus consciousness is thought in its absolutely fundamental and original shape.*
>
> *As thought, it must have that bi-polarity which belongs to thought as such. It is an activity which may be well or ill done; what it thinks may be true or false. But this seems paradoxical; for since it is not concerned with the relations between things, and hence does not think in terms of concepts or generalizations, it cannot err, as intellect can by referring things to the wrong concepts. It cannot, for instance, think, 'This is a dog,' when the object before it is a cat. If as we said above the kind of phrase which expresses what it thinks is something like, 'This is how I feel,' such a statement might seem incapable of being false, in which case consciousness would have the peculiar privilege of being a kind of thought not liable to error, and this would amount to saying that it was not a kind of thought at all.*

> *But the statement 'This is how I feel', does imply, bi-polarity. It has an opposite: 'This is not how I feel;' and to assert it is to deny this opposite. Even if consciousness never actually erred, it would still have this in common with all forms of thought, that it lives by rejecting error. A true consciousness is the confession to ourselves of our feelings, a false consciousness would be disowning them, i.e. thinking about one of them - 'That feeling is not mine.' (41)*

I am not concerned here to assess the validity or otherwise of this rather obscure claim. What I want to draw attention to is that it is at this point that Collingwood combines three traditions of expressive theory. Expression as articulacy and as self-expression are fused with the expression of feeling. He further elaborates the notion of true and false consciousness as follows. The acknowledgement of a feeling produces an idea. If that acknowledgement of a feeling is only partial and involves the denial and consequent repression of a feeling that is actually there then the idea, the very form given to things, is corrupt since by claiming wholeness it both masks the repressed feeling *and* denies that any censorship has taken place. Ideas are the primary material out of which our minds construct systems of concepts. These too will be affected by the fundamental deceitfulness inherent in the ideas. Our mental health will consequently be affected. The unacknowledged feeling cannot go away. It is a feeling that belongs to the subject but which he or she refuses to own. It is therefore not under his or her conscious control. The subject is instead partially controlled by it since instead of acting on our being through consciousness it acts at the level of unconscious or psychic feeling and at this level our responses are automatic and un-thought. An antagonism is therefore created between a feeling within us which must find expression only in unconscious forms and a conscious system of ideas which is built on the basis of disowning that feeling.

Collingwood does not relate directly to the tradition whereby art provides access to the inaccessible. He has no desire to see a revelatory role for art where access is provided to an eternal reality of the Platonistic or Christian kind. He specifically denies the other possibility of access to any empirical reality unmediated by consciousness. On the other hand the concepts within the theory of depth-psychology can be taken as providing a variation within this tradition. The Surrealists provide us with an example as was noted above. On the basis of a false consciousness is constructed a set of concepts and ways of

thinking which because of their corrupt origin systematically ignore and repress certain feelings. Consequently there is no way in which that set of concepts can be used to express that repressed feeling. Access, the variation says, is in principle impossible so long as those ways of thinking are the instruments of expression. Access (which is another way of saying expression) can only be provided, either by adopting another set of concepts that does recognise that feeling or by some method which does not use the mediation of the corrupt concepts. Since a feeling is personal and unique there cannot be another system of concepts that has not been developed by that individual that adequately expresses the feeling. On the other hand art (and dreams) can and may provide the needed direct expression and through them therapy can be administered. In this way Collingwood's account can be seen to support a view of art as therapeutic, an idea that has some influence in educational discussion today.

As in Croce's account language and art are seen to be built on the same foundations. They are both modes of feeling. Collingwood widens the term 'language' to include any bodily gesture that expresses a thought. Bodily gesture can include non-verbal as well as verbal expressions. Language for Collingwood is a subtle and highly differentiated means of expressing thought. This expression he argues does not consist of finding conventional signs whose agreed meaning fits the peculiar feeling which we wish to express. There is no separation of feeling and expression. The expression and the feeling are one and the same act, and consequently an understanding of the expression by an audience, be the expression verbal or otherwise, consists in reconstructing in each person that peculiar feeling which is expressed. Collingwood believes this to be so even of intellectual discourse for even there he says, statements are made which can only be understood by sharing the peculiar emotion of that statement, a specific emotion attaching to that intellectual experience. So language in its broadest sense is for him a matter of the expression of emotion. He thinks we are blind to this fact because we ignore the necessity of understanding the 'tone of voice' in which all statements are made and without which language is incapable of communicating meaning.

He has, then, characterised both art and language as an act of imagination that assimilates feelings into an apprehended whole. The act of imagination is necessarily a unique, creative act of an individual. It is unmediated by concepts or techniques. His deep commitment to the distinction between art and craft is supported by this position. To take art as a process involving a technique as a means to a pre-conceived end is entirely incompatible with the imagination which must remain logically prior to any conceptualisation.

There is the problem however that we do seem to be acquainted with a great many examples of works of art which are created for a purpose other than just the act of creation. Collingwood relegates all activities that have an end in view as not art and exhaustively categorises these things that are like art as either Magic or Amusement (42). Both are *designed* to create in their audience pre-conceived feelings. These feelings can range from emotions of devotion and awe to a mild thrill or sexual pleasure. In certain strong forms they can be classified as propaganda or pornography. In neither case do they facilitate self-discovery through free expression since this is subordinated to a pre-determined end.

Another aspect of Collingwood's 'Principles of Art' should also be noted and that is the crusading tone betrayed in certain passages. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that he considered it necessary to develop a theory of art which could 'rout' (to borrow his own battle metaphor) any concept of art which attempted to minimise the creative contribution of the individual artist in favour of responsibility to some perceived prior moral commitment. The main target of this attack seems to have been socialist theorists and those artists who questioned the role of art in society. Croce had been concerned to stress the individuality of expression, the utter impossibility of any social mediation in the particular syntheses performed by each unique mind. Tolstoy was driven by his insistence on sincerity and originality to affirm the absolute individuality of artistic expression. The traditions of philosophy on which these theories of expression were based were individualistic and the theories themselves leave no room whatsoever for the social determination of expression. This aspect of their theories was perceived as politically

significant by both Croce and Collingwood and used in the intellectual battles whose 'tone of voice' was unavoidably political. This is a fact that should be acknowledged concerning these theories of expression.

Dewey

In John Dewey's account of art (43) his view of the relation of the individual to the world is one of a biologically active entity whose paramount purpose is survival or, less dramatically, life enhancement. This pragmatic and vitalistic outlook leads to the view that all of our perceptions are determined by this natural necessity. In this sense we participate strongly in determining the character of our experience.

> *Mind is primarily a verb. It denotes all the ways in which we deal consciously and expressly with the situations in which we find ourselves (44).*

An existence that met with no obstruction would be harmonious and literally uneventful. A disharmony, a disturbance or threat of disturbance produces a perturbation. This internal experience of obstruction of our own interests by our environment is felt as emotion. We become aware of a need, an impulse to meet a challenge, and in our striving to regain harmony we conceive of the objects of interest.

> *......primitive need is the source of attachment to objects. Perception is born when solicitude for objects and their qualities brings the organic demand for attachment to consciousness (45).*

So, like Collingwood, Dewey links emotion with perception from the very first. However in Dewey's account emotion is defined as a response to the object perceived as having a value in relation to our interests. The emotional charge has its genesis in the life-interests perceived in the objective sensation.

When an individual is forced by some sense of disharmony to order his or her activities in such a way as to re-establish harmony with the environment then past experiences are reviewed and a judgement taken to act in a certain way to produce a certain consequence. This act of review leading to conscious participation is an act of expression. The thing expressed is wrung from the producer by the pressure exercised by objective things on his

natural impulses. Such expression is a synthesis, an articulation. Past experience is joined and modified to present perceptions to conceive an action that achieves a satisfactory result. In addition, consciousness of the synthesising effect of the expressive act presents the act as a further store of experience ready to be used in further syntheses. Expression is experience and art is expression because it involves this same process of articulacy in the meeting and overcoming of resistance.

This participation in the creation of experience provides the foundation for Dewey's reconciliation of form and content in the art work. Primary participation played the same role in Grocer and Collingwood's theories but led them to identify content with form. Unlike them, Dewey describes the individual's creative contribution as a means to an end – in Croce's and Collingwood's terms as 'economic' and 'practical' - and it is thoroughly vitalistic. It is always, according to Dewey, a means to serve the vital needs of the individual to overcome obstacles encountered in his or her environment.

He was however just as convinced as they were that art would not be a means to any practical end. It is in some sense appreciated for itself. This meant that within his theory of art there must be a step, not found in Croce and Collingwood, which distances the art product from an ordinary product of primary articulation. The two things must be qualitatively distinguished. To see how he accomplishes this we should look more closely at how he defines the primary form of expression. He states:

> *While there is no expression unless there is urge from within outwards, the welling up must be clarified and ordered by taking into itself the values of prior experiences before it can be an act of expression. And these values are not called into play save through objects of the environment that offer resistance to the direct discharge of emotion and impulse. Emotional discharge is a necessary but not sufficient condition of expression (46).*

The meeting of some resistance is essential to expression. It is obstruction of an impulse arising from the original recognition of a need that forces the 'organism' to reflect on past experience in relation to the present problem. Obstruction, and *only* obstruction can bring about the fusion of past knowledge and present need. The successful relation of both results in a further impulse toward the perceived aim. Every achieved result is a

consequence of a series of such impulsions and resistances which move rhythmically to the desired consummation. A crucial aspect of this process is the inevitable change that takes place in the original state of the individual. The aim may have been modified, past experience will retrospectively be altered and the perception of the objective conditions constituting the individual's environment will have been modified. All this is expressed by consciousness of the achievement and is an experience to be used itself to overcome future resistance.

In this way objective change is the result of reflection caused by resistance. In the changing of things lies the essence of expression of our emotions as opposed to direct emotional discharge.

> *A gust of tears may bring relief, a spasm of destruction may give outlet to inward rage. But where there is no administration of objective conditions, no shaping of material in the interest of embodying the excitement there is no expression (47).*

The perception of the whole achievement is experience. Aesthetic perception is different from ordinary perception in so far as the changes it undergoes in the process of reflection and impulse are distinctive, and as a result the crucial separation from specific practical ends is achieved.

> *By their means, a particular incident ceases to be a stimulus to direct action and becomes a value of a perceived object (48).*

Ordinary perception is emotionalised seeing. Every object has meaning for us as a value of our own interests only when they enter our environment as direct obstruction or help towards achieving an aim.

Aesthetic perception is also emotionalised seeing but the objects of this perception are specifically not related to a *practical* end but to the heightening of our perception of their inherent value.

All objects, Dewey holds, have inherent value which can be focused upon by aesthetic perception. Dewey ascribes our perception of it to two things. Firstly through a strong form of 'association' and secondly by the existence of motor dispositions previously formed. It is a strong form of association because he does not recognise the implication of separateness between the feeling and the object supposed to be previously associated with it. As described earlier his view of the individual as an active participant in the creation of form on the basis of emotional impulse .leads to the view of emotionalised seeing which very much minimises contingent association. Every object, being part of our stock of previous experience, carries with it associated feeling in this sense.

> *....material of reflection is incorporated into objects as their meaning (49).*

To think of objects having inherent value because of this strong form of association does not prevent Dewey from recognising the weaker form whereby different forms by being habitually experienced in association come to signify one another.

The second way in which value is perceived in an object, Dewey argues, is related to a further distinctive feature of aesthetic experience and production, namely restraint. By the existence of previously formed 'motor dispositions' the impulse to a direct emotional discharge in a practically related action is diverted, subordinated, channelled. Although Dewey is reluctant to use the word it involves a metaphorical transformation and is very like the process that Langer calls the finding of the same logical form.

> *In its beginning an emotion flies straight to its object. Love tends to cherish the loved object as hate tends to destroy the thing hated. Either emotion may be turned aside from its direct end. The emotion of love may seek and find material that is other than the directly loved one, but that is congenial and cognate through the emotion that draws things into affinity (50).*

It is only in so far as an indirect embodiment of the emotion is found that the process produces an aesthetic object. In using unrelated form for its emotional connotation the original impulse is enriched by the subtle meanings of its own brought by the enlisted object. When those connotations and the original impulse combine in a unified form the object richly realises expressive form and is apprehended as a whole. As this aesthetic

whole it does not directly express the original emotion. *That* served to detect material in many different objects and brought them together. Rather the object serves to express the *search for* and *process* of realisation itself as it specifically attaches to this expression. This process and resultant exemplifies the rhythms of life, of resistance and accommodation, consummation and failure, hunger and plenitude. In this sense the art object exists as the embodiment of expressive form but the art work, the aesthetic fact, only exists when that object is used to stimulate a new experience in each and every observer. There is no way in which this experience can be the same experience but it relates to, or is stimulated by, the same expressive form. It is a pregnant symbol capable of any interpretation compatible with its form.

> *The enduring art-product may have been, and probably was, called forth by something occasional, something having its own date and place. But <u>what</u> was evoked is a substance so formed that it can enter into the experiences of others and enable them to have more intense and more fully rounded out experiences of their own (51).*

In this sense the original synthesis, as the unique experience of the artist, was *self-*expression. Art is not however according to Dewey self-expression in the sense of passing on an individual's experience to others. For the spectator is stimulated to his own experience and no relation to the artist is necessary or implied.

By thus distancing the special aesthetic emotion and by generalising the value inherent in the content, works of art are characterised by Dewey as *qualitatively* different kinds of expression from the practical expressions of everyday life. Dewey was aiming to overcome the difficulty, as he saw it, of other aesthetic theories which made the aesthetic emotion so different from ordinary emotions of everyday life that a radical schism was created between art and life. He felt that because, in his theory, that which was expressed aesthetically was only a transformation, not a replacement of life-emotions, he had overcome this problem. By virtue of the transformed nature of art, aesthetic emotion is a response directly to experience as it is, not to experience perceived in relation to our specific interests.

> *Music for example gives us the very essence of the dropping down and the exalted rising, the surging and retreating, the acceleration and retardation, the tightening and loosening, the sudden thrust and the gradual insinuation of things (52).*

Immediacy remains essential to the aesthetic form but, as with Croce and Collingwood, Dewey likens the immediacy of art to important aspects of communication even in the most abstract of disciplines. But aesthetic form is entirely immediate. The pre-conception of an end product or achievement is totally incompatible for Dewey with art as a living *process* of articulacy. The aesthetic lies in the articulation of the end through the struggle with material. Indeed the act of synthesis involved is so far from being directly determined by the intellect that its most important stage is achieved unconsciously:

> *Subconscious maturation precedes creative production in every line of human endeavour. The direct effort of 'wit and will' of itself never gave birth to anything that is not mechanical.... (53)*

Dewey's account is a pragmatic variant of expressive theory which is informed by similar concerns and traditions of thought as the others so far considered. As articulacy his idea of expression is derived from primary perception and emphasises the non-mediation of intellectual forms. An important place is accorded to sub-conscious processes. The mode of expression as manifested emotion serves to emphasise that value and emotional significance inheres in objective form. Expression as self-expression is implied by the individualistic nature of synthesis and therefore of experience, and as before truthfulness to your own emotions, i.e. sincerity, is a necessary attribute of the creation of true art.

Langer

The account of expressive form and the role of art put forward by Susanne Langer (54) involves a radical break with aspects of the expressionist tradition trace so far. Her treatment is informed by that concern with the relation of symbolic expressions to the world which emerged in the positivist and pragmatic traditions. Positivists had been concerned, like Hume, to distinguish between statements that can be tested by experience and those that cannot. We could have knowledge of what was given to us in observation but could not gain any knowledge beyond this boundary. All genuine human knowledge is, they argued, contained within the boundaries of science defined as the systematic

study of phenomena and the discovery of laws applicable to them. It thus purposely distinguished itself from speculative attempts to answer 'metaphysical' questions.

This assimilation of knowledge to science and science only, denied art any justification as a form of knowledge, that is as access to a non-scientific reality. It was at best an expression of emotion logically equivalent to spontaneous exclamations of pain or pleasure.

This crude expressivism and the inferiority that that relegation implied was a result that Langer could not accept. She took as her aim the re-instatement of art to a position of equal importance with science, a task she believed she could accomplish whilst accepting the description of scientific knowledge provided by the logical positivists and sharing their disdain for mystical claims.

She agreed that the logical positivists were correct in their assertion that scientific language is the only form in which scientific facts can be expressed. They were right to admit that this language is not capable of articulating the realms of human emotional experience. They were right to reject attempts to make that which is ineffable, strictly unknowable, and wholly mysterious, the only reality. Where they were mistaken was in assuming that the language of science is the only symbolic form of articulation. A state of affairs may be literally ineffable in one symbolic system whilst being readily expressible in a different form. Art is one of those alternative modes of symbolism eminently suited to express human emotions. As such, she argued, it is equally as important and sophisticated as science, but distinguished from it as clearly as the positivists would wish.

How does she attempt to establish this claim that art is an equally important kind of symbolism? She draws a distinction between what she calls discursive and presentational symbolism. The language of scientists is pre-eminently discursive in form. The form of the state of affairs they wish to express is copied in the relationships of units with discrete and definite meanings. It is the logical form that is common to both state of affairs and expression - a certain pattern that can be pictured in the relationships of a proposition.

Any expressions that share the same logical form will state the same fact. In a presentational expression on the other hand the logical form is apprehended as an indivisible whole. It is not a whole made up of parts with discrete meanings but a single symbol apprehended immediately and as itself, that is any and every relationship that it embodies in its physical form is significant. Both discursive and presentational expressions work, as any symbol must according to Langer, by picturing the logical form of the state of affairs expressed. They do so, however, in different ways. Although both are forms of articulating facts Langer thinks it confusing to talk of presentational symbolism as a language since this carries so many connotations of discursiveness that are difficult to exclude.

If discursive symbolism is evident in our scientific apprehension of the world where does the other kind operate? The primitive operation of our senses, she asserts, provides symbols in presentational form. When we recognise the same thing or kind of thing we are perceiving the same logical form in different presentations to sense. We see the abstracted form apprehended as a whole, an object. This abstraction of form is achieved by the operation of our sense organs which can do no other than conceive whole forms.

> *......the activity of our senses is 'mental' not only when it reaches our brain, but in its very inception, wherever the alien world outside impinges on the furthest and smallest receptor. All sensitivity bears the stamp of mentality. 'Seeing', for instance, is not a passive process, by which meaningless impressions are stored up for the use of an organizing mind, which construes forms out of these amorphous data to suit its own purposes. 'Seeing' is itself a process of formulation; our understanding of the visible world begins in the eye (55).*

Langer's answer to the pervasive problem of the synthesis between concepts and sensation is to evade it by assuming that the recognition of a logical form capable of being related to other logical forms is automatically supplied in sensation. This ability to form ideas (to use the more traditional terminology) is, according to her, physiologically given.

A tendency to organize the sensory field into groups and patterns of sense-data, to perceive forms rather than a flux of light-impressions, seems to be inherent in our receptor apparatus...(56)

These direct perceptions whilst being symbolic are nevertheless very much like the 'ideas' of Croce and Collingwood. They are totally independent of (discursive) language in that they are immediate; they are a pre-requisite for all other acts of mind} they will serve as the model for artistic expression and they are a form of articulation. What Langer has apparently avoided however is the need to assert that because this form of expression is primary then all forms, including scientific and linguistic, must be essentially immediate and direct. She avoids this inference by holding that different symbolisms express different aspects of the same thing.

The world of physics is essentially the real world construed by mathematical abstractions, and the world of sense is the real world construed by the abstractions which the sense-organs immediately furnish (57).

The presentational symbols of sentience are, Langer argues, wholly rational but at the same time intimately related as discursive symbolism is not, to those activities of life that are instinctive, emotional, impulsive. The order of perceptual forms imposed on and simultaneously conceived by our sense-organs (the outposts of the mind) provides the principle for the conception, expression and apprehension (58) of these activities.

Discursive language, she holds, has developed through naming plus metaphor. Metaphor for Langer is the use of any symbol to hand that although it has already been used differently is capable of naming a novel experience. Indeed such second-hand use may, at a particular time, be the *only* way of naming this experience. By such methods we have developed the immense structure of language.

Our articulation of feelings, Langer thinks, followed a different kind of development. They were most adequately expressed by presentational forms. Because the primary forms of sentience are symbols, they too can be used metaphorically. They can take on a secondary meaning. This illustrates another important distinction in Langer's account,

that between signifying and symbolising. If an image or abstracted form operated as a sign it would herald the appearance of the thing it signified. It would be a symptom of the object's presence. As a symbol however it is an abstracted form that can express the concept of that object without signalling its appearance. As such we can borrow the symbol of a thing, its concept, when we could not take its symptom or sign.

Like Dewey, Langer assumes that our first emotions are related to being and staying alive. In the active attempt to order and comprehend our experience in relation to our well-being we perceive our world emotionally. A kind of metaphorical transformation is characteristic of even our earliest perception. A presentation whose concept was also accompanied by the forms of feeling we would call 'fear' may be used, because of this association, to symbolise another presentation whose identity is not necessarily known but which is also fearful. Since the emotional relation is our primary response to the world our perceptions are saturated with feelings. Only later do we come to subsume them under a general name in a discursive symbolism. Whilst all our perceptions are to some extent emotional there are certain objects that by their naturally appropriate form are perceived as especially emotive. These are the sacred things or sacra of individuals and communities. They are objective forms imbued with special emotional significance. If these things embody sacred forms the human response to the perception of sacredness is, Langer argues, the expression of emotion in a bodily act of self-expression. The act is a sign of a sacred emotion, a symptom of personal feeling which is carried through until the feeling is exhausted. In becoming ritual, however, it undergoes a profound change.

> *......soon the outburst becomes a habitual reaction and is used to <u>demonstrate</u>, rather than to relieve the feelings of individuals. Lively demonstration makes an emotion contagious. Shout answers shout, the collective prancing becomes dancing. Even those who are not compelled by inner tension to let off steam just at this moment, fall into step and join the common cry.*
>
> *But as soon as an expressive act is performed without inner momentary compulsion it is no longer <u>self-expressive</u>; it is expressive in the logical sense. It is not a sign of the emotion it conveys, but a symbol of it,.......(59)*

With this denial of self-expression and the consequent denial of the need for sincerity Langer is preparing for the denial of self-expression and sincerity in art. But this denial follows from her insistence on the symbolic nature of art which is contrasted with signification. So long as self-expression is taken to mean that the artefact is directly caused by a feeling in the artist, like a pin-prick causes a shout of pain, it has the status of a sign. Langer's socially related account offers in embryo a more sophisticated concept of self and consequently of self-expression.

If the expression of emotion in ritual is not the symptom of an inner feeling what is it?

> *........it is primarily an <u>articulation</u> of feelings. The ultimate product of such articulation is not a simple emotion, but a complex, permanent attitude. This attitude, which is the worshipper's response to the insight given by the sacred symbols, is an emotional pattern, which governs all individual lives...... A rite regularly performed is the constant reiteration of sentiments toward "first and last things"; it is not a free expression of emotions, but a disciplined rehearsal of "right attitudes." (60)*

Myth takes the development of emotional expression a stage further than ritual by identifying symbols of life in natural forms. This constitutes a generalisation of emotional articulation. It is not just an individual that undergoes processes analogous to the great rhythms of life but a representative of mankind or womankind. When these relationships are expounded in a form that emphasises their inter-relationships, and use is made of devices of poetic form to heighten their symbolic import we have the epic. This, in her developmental account, is the first appearance of truly artistic form.

The ritualising and mythologising of the human once served, according to Langer, to furnish an indispensable treasure house of expressive form. It was always tied to another purpose than to exhibit its form for its own sake but, like in the epic, the expressiveness of the form was salient to the performance of the ritual or mythological task. Because of this, form itself became an object of attention. These many presentations to sense of expressive objects have resulted in the abstraction of a form we call art. Since music is less bound to purposes and its nature lends it to a greater transparency it is the epitome of pure artistic form.

Music at its most developed signifies nothing. It is for Langer a symbol which articulates forms of feeling. Expressive forms that are not art, symbolise particular directed emotion. Music (and abstract artistic form in general) symbolises that conception created by the perception of several presentations of particular emotions. Its articulation is modelled on primary symbols of sentience. It is achieved by finding (or creating) a conception by abstraction. It is a comment upon feeling, a contemplation of emotions, of the ways of feeling. Langer gives this abstracted form the vitalistic significance that has pervaded her whole account.

> *The tonal structures we call 'music' bear a close logical similarity to the forms of human feeling - forms of growth and attenuation, flowing and stowing, conflict and resolution, speed, arrest, terrific excitement, calm or subtle activation and dreamy lapses - not joy and sorrow perhaps, but the poignancy of either and both – the greatness and brevity and eternal passing of everything vitally felt. Such is the pattern, or logical form of sentience; and the pattern of music is that same form worked out in pure, measured sound and silence. Music is a tonal analogue of emotive life (61).*

So, in Langer's account, music is devoid of any specific emotional content and it does not express the individual feelings of the artist. The only proper way of achieving greater understanding is by a more profound discrimination of the form of the symbol. Even when understanding is achieved there is no way in which this understanding can be communicated, or even for that matter 'held' or retained for oneself, except by directing attention to the musical form (62). Only when understanding has been reached will the relation of the musical work to the world we already know become apparent. This esotericism is the price Langer is prepared to pay for making art a special kind of symbol that can achieve equality with the sophisticated symbolism of science.

As to the special aesthetic emotion that so many people claim to feel in the presence of art she asserts this to be the sense of elation that accompanies consciousness of the achievement of expression.

> *Aesthetic pleasure, ..., is akin to (though not identical with) the satisfaction of discovering truth (63).*

How does Suzanne Langer's theory of art relate to some of the issues raised in the earlier discussions of expressive theories? Hers is an account which takes expression as articulation. But the articulacy is achieved through symbolism, concept and abstraction - three terms avoided by the other expressive theorists. However her concept of presentational symbolism preserves both the immediacy and particularity of the form of knowledge. She denies that self-expression is part of artistic expression. Although she rejects such theories of self-expression, even the more sophisticated forms held that sincerity and truth to oneself were *essential* to art. By her denial she deposes this concept from its central position and provides a less individualistic and more social process of artistic production. Hers is not a theory of art as the expression of emotions. It is a theory of art as *about* the emotions. The forma of feeling are articulated, and. expressed, not the specific emotions themselves.

It is a theory which rebels against the positivist dismissal of art and indicates why it should be valued as an important mode of knowledge equal to science. In doing this it accepts the divorce of art and science and results in an obscure description of art as purely abstract form. In addition, as though to offset the inescapable sense of emptiness, she invokes a dubious and limiting vitalism in the sense of a relation to 'life-rhythms' and vague 'vital-forms'.

In one sense hers is a theory which accepts that there is an inaccessible realm and that art is a means of access to it. It is *formally* inaccessible to one particular mode of expression, namely discursive language. It is not in principle inaccessible, since the appropriate presentational symbolism is available. But whilst the case against mysticism was partly that it was obscurantist her own description of artistic form is mysterious enough.

What is original in Langer's account is the insistence that the main problem of aesthetics is to distinguish those modes of symbolism distinctive to the arts. This arose from the application of the belief that there is a plurality of modes of apprehension of our world.

Working on the basis of these principles the distinctions she draws between signification and symbolisation, presentational and discursive forms, provided a new way of approaching the analysis of the artistic process. The problem is recast as one of explicating symbolic transformations. Consequently the idea of metaphorical transfer came to play a crucial part in her theory and, not for the first time, became a basic concept of aesthetic thinking.

Art and Therapy

Each of the theorists discussed above has assimilated past traditions in different ways. For each, however, art is a form of articulacy. Without art, some argue, we would be ignorant of ourselves. Art provides an understanding of our own and of other's affective life. Not only this, but it provides the only access to this most important aspect of our experience. Self-expression is a necessary act of every individual to preserve freedom, individuality, and self-awareness. In this *need* for self-expression variously explained in the different accounts, there is another aspect of expression theory which we may now add as a fifth aspect. This is Expression as Therapeutic.

For Tolstoy the act of expression was partly a spontaneous sign or symptom of a whole life and partly the deliberate attempt to allow others to share the feeling that was the outward manifestation of that life. Thus the expression could not be therapeutic for the individual artist. There is the implication, however, that expressions flowing from wholesome lives would, through contagion, have a wholesome effect on others and ultimately on society itself as an aggregate of those individuals. Good art could be therapeutic in this sense just as contact with Platon Karatayev proved therapeutic for Pierre Behuzov.

In Croce's theory there is little that indicates a therapeutic role for art as expression but in Collingwood it is fundamental. In his assimilation of primary forms (or ideas) to thought he describes their bi-polarity as being either right or wrong about our own feelings. Fully to acknowledge one's feelings is right, partially to disown a feeling you 'know' to be yours is wrong. Full acknowledgement *is* self-expression and from this flows a

wholesome mental life. Partial acknowledgement is the opposite of *self*-expression and this leads to mental disorder resulting from the suppression or non-expression of our emotions. Art, the expression of feeling, can provide a way of making oneself whole again. It administers therapy.

The original impulsion toward expression described by Dewey is caused by an individual organism's recognition of a disharmony between his own interests and his environment. Aesthetic expression is a celebration of the achievement of harmony between these two things. It expresses the undergoing and overcoming of experience itself. But this can only be expressed as the transformation of a direct emotional expression. Without the ability to express in some aesthetic form frustrated, direct emotion can be painful and harmful.

> *Many a person is unhappy, tortured within because he has at command no art of expressive action. What under happier conditions might be used to convert objective material into material of an intense and clear experience, seethes within in unruly turmoil which finally dies down after, perhaps, a painful inner disruption (64).*

In Langer's work there is little that can specifically be labelled therapeutic. However, expressive form is for her *constitutive* of a particular quality of affective life. Without the forms, those ways of feeling would be impossible. But in her account of the history of expressive form each development of a new form is required by the *need* for a new 'name' or symbol for the experience. A metaphorical transformation occurs as the result of a felt inadequacy. This is not a cure for a disease but it does make the discovery of aesthetic form a necessary pre-condition for fuller development.

5) Expression as Metaphorical Exemplification

The Formal Definition

From the tentative description of expression as figurative possession Goodman firstly developed the concept of exemplification which furnished a mode of reference that involves the symbol possessing that which it symbolises. This possession-plus-reference preserves the sense of intimate, non-arbitrary association of a sample and what it stands for. Possession was defined as correct denotation by a label and the reference of a sample is to a label which correctly denotes it. Secondly he defined his use of metaphor as the correct denotation by a transferred label, correctness being conceded in a non-arbitrary way. Transference is from a home realm to an alien realm involving the transgression of established limits of use, but through such transgression a different but applicable syntactic apparatus is made available which provides a potentially fruitful new organisation of the alien realm. Thus metaphor is taken strictly as a novel assertion of possession and is not logically but only temporally distinct from assertions of literal possession. Both literal and metaphorical possession are a function of the correct denotation by a label within a schema and both assert *actual* possession.

Exemplification is reference by a sample to one of its properties, or rather to a label that correctly denotes it. Since there are these two ways of possessing a property (or being correctly denoted) there are also two species of exemplification, literal and metaphorical. Goodman thinks that metaphorical exemplification is a serviceable formulation of the concept of expression in the arts and elsewhere.

> *What is expressed is metaphorically exemplified. What expresses sadness is metaphorically sad. And what is metaphorically sad is actually but not literally sad, i.e. comes under a transferred application of some label co-extensive with 'sad' (1).*

and more formally,

> *.......if <u>a</u> expresses <u>b</u> then: (1) <u>a</u> possesses or is denoted by <u>b</u>; (2) this possession or denotation is metaphorical; and (3) <u>a</u> refers to <u>b</u> (2).*

By making actual possession, whether literal or metaphorical, a matter of labels he is able to define the expressive symbol as both referring and possessing. Thus the expressive content is emancipated from speculation that might give rise to limiting or mystical or obscure assertions of origin, whilst the immediacy of the expressive symbol is retained. Nothing can be more immediate or intimately connected with a symbol it seems, than properties it actually possesses.

It is important to realise how thorough this emancipation is. The emphasis on what is expressed being the property of the expressive object frees it, as does Langer's account, from the assumption that expression necessarily involves self-expression. What the artist was feeling or wishing to communicate at the time of making a picture is not necessarily related to what the picture actually expresses. Likewise what a spectator feels on looking at the picture is not necessarily related to what the picture actually refers to through metaphorical exemplification.

Just as importantly, since expression is the metaphorical exemplification of labels, *any* labels can be so exemplified - not just labels related to feelings. Expression has previously been predominantly linked to the expression of emotion but Goodman's formulation sets no such limits as to what can be expressed. This is a radical departure from features of the expressivist tradition including important aspects of Suzanne Langer's account. She, we remember, whilst jettisoning self-expression as a necessary characteristic of artistic activity, assumes that what is expressed is forms of feeling.

But if *any* labels can be referred to, how are the correct ones identified from the apparently infinite number that *can* correctly denote a sample or expressive object? We know, according to Goodman, which *kind* of labels are referred to by identifying the symbol system in which a sample operates.

> *A square swatch does not usually exemplify squareness, and a picture that*
> *rapidly increases in market value does not express the property of being a*
> *gold mine. Normally a swatch exemplifies only sartorial properties while*
> *a picture literally exemplifies only pictorial properties and metaphorically*
> *exemplifies only properties that are constant relative to pictorial*

properties.......Only properties of the appropriate kind, metaphorically exemplified in the appropriate way, are expressed (3).

This assertion that the prior existence of a symbol system is necessary before identification of what a symbol exemplifies or expresses can take place relates to the indeterminacy noted earlier. Three points may be made here concerning indeterminacy. Firstly, the fact that exemplification required the prior existence of a symbol system does not, of itself, contribute to the particular indeterminacy of art. The identification of which symbol system is in operation is a pre-requisite of determining the reference of any character not just characters in artistic systems. Both notational and exemplificational reference require that a set of characters be correlated with a field of reference (4). Certain correlations are habitually made and so become identified as enduring systems whilst others may be ad hoc and, never being used again, are forgotten. An example of a related set of enduring systems is the correlations of pictorial characters with literal and metaphorical labels in varying ways to exemplify, represent and express. If determinate reference in art awaits the establishment of an operative symbol system it does so too in other categories of communication. This source of indeterminacy is not specific to art.

Secondly the activity of making and appreciating art works heightens our awareness of the limits of the symbol systems within which they are assumed to operate. It may be that it is a characteristic of artistic activity throughout history (it is certainly true of more recent times) not only to focus attention on these limits but also to try to extend them. This tendency imports an instability of correlation that affects determination of reference. An example from recent painting is the extension by Picasso of two-dimensional characters to correlate with the tactual three- dimensional experience of a lover's embrace (5). From recent drama Peter Handke's, *Offending the Audience* explicitly extends the theatrical symbol system to include the way the audience are conducted to their seats from the moment that they enter the theatre. By implication every act that then takes place both on stage and in the audience becomes a character in the system and takes part in making rich and surprising new allusions (6).

Thirdly the semantic and syntactic features of artistic systems contribute to the complex and subtle use artists make of characters and systems at their disposal to articulate thoughts, feelings, gestures and statements. It is these features which are the main source of the indeterminacy characteristic of those systems associated with artistic activity. Following his exposition of the theory of notation in chapter 4 of *Languages of Art*, Goodman applies it to the description of exemplificational systems including expression (7). The relation of a character to the field of reference is broadened from compliance (appropriate for denotational systems) to reference. With this adjustment the semantic properties of ambiguity, disjointness, differentiation, density and discontinuity are made applicable to exemplificational systems and can be used accurately to ascertain the formal source and extent of their determinacy or indeterminacy. Whilst each art form be it painting, sculpture, music or literature (both oral and written), may have characters with different syntactic characteristics, Goodman finds that all refer to a semantically dense set of properties or predicates. Further, the semantic density of such exemplification when added to the fact noted above that the artistic systems of exemplification are some-what unstable, means that absolute determination of reference is impossible. Consequently

> *.....the search for accurate adjustment between symbol and symbolised calls for maximal sensitivity, and is unending.... (8)*

and

> *.....endless search is always required.....to determine precisely what is exemplified or expressed (9).*

If emotion is deposed by Goodman and made to take its place as one kind of content (or label) among others it is given another form of authority at this point in his theory. Feeling, he argues, is one of the most important and effective *means* by which the unending search described above can be successfully conducted. To feel aright points us in the right direction. It guides us towards an adequate interpretation of the sample's reference.

Whatever place this 'emotion' holds (and this is a little difficult to understand from his account in *Languages of Art*) it is not that of the *source* of expression nor its *purpose*. It

is precisely those functions of emotion in art that Goodman has attempted to banish through his reformulation of artistic meaning. We shall have to consider, in more detail later, what he means by 'emotion' and how he sees it operating in the realm of art.

Expression, Arbitrariness and the process of Interaction

The formulation of expression as metaphorical exemplification is built on the primacy of the act of labelling. The process of labelling in the form of correct projection is for Goodman, the fundamental act by which actuality is constructed. Collingwood and Croce saw ideas as emerging somewhat magically from primary acts of the mind. Dewey characterised them as necessary responses to a hostile environment, responses later structurally incorporated into our apprehension of the world. Langer considered ideas to be physiologically given and therefore prior to any other act of mind. Goodman attempts to resolve the issue in a similar way to Langer. For him the kinds of objects of our world are 'given' but only in the sense that we *inherit* a system of categorisation. The systematic activity of labelling is the process by which categories are generated. Such labelling avoids the difficulty, found in Croce's and Collingwood's accounts, of understanding how the act of an individual mind upon particular and changing sensations can produce an idea which must, of necessity, be both general and enduring to some degree. It avoids the individualism of Dewey's account whilst accepting that the structures and interrelations of our categories or ideas are built in response to felt needs. Goodman does not however attempt to make fundamental rhythms of life or basic biological requirements formal parts of his account. Equally he does not take over the vitalistic aspect of Langer's account. He also rejects Langer's assertion that *forms* of things, the kinds of objects to be found, are physiologically determined. To accept this is to accept a biological and therefore presumably unchangeable system of categories. By taking labelling as constitutive and 'given' in the sense of inherited by any individual, he has aimed to achieve a theory of ideas that accounts for both change and stability. In the exposition of his theory of projection he had to contend with the charge of arbitrariness. Crudely stated such a charge asserts that if labelling constitutes actuality and fabricates facts, then there is no way of distinguishing on the grounds of truth between one label or set of labels and another since neither is based on correspondence with an un-labelled reality.

Entrenchment is the all-important mechanism by which projection in both metaphorical and literal application is made non-arbitrary. It shows how there comes to be strong reasons for applying some labels rather than others, without reference to a given 'reality independent of the process of labelling. If there was the problem of arbitrariness at the comparatively straightforward level of the application of say, colour predicates then the nature of expression makes it even more vulnerable to the charge. As Goodman says

> *....by explaining expression in terms of metaphorical exemplification of labels, I have risked the charge of making what a symbol expresses depend upon what is said about it - of leaving what a picture, for example, expresses to the accident of what terms happen to be used in describing the picture, and hence of crediting the expression achieved not to the artist but to the commentator (10).*

A metaphorical application, whilst it can spring from well established 'parent' uses is still new and its usefulness is never fully tested. Determination as to its fecundity involves consciousness of choices that make the charge of arbitrariness more plausible. The indeterminacy of reference common to expression as an exemplificational symbol system calls forth various and possibly contrasting interpretations of a work. The possibility of any final detection forces the admission that any interpretation can be at best only partial. Nevertheless Goodman insists that.

> *'Sad' may apply to a picture even though no one ever happens to use the term in describing the picture; and calling a picture sad by no means makes it so (11).*

The defence against the charge here is exactly the same as before. The projection of the term 'sad' in a literal context is powerfully governed by the entrenchment of that term. Given this the term is, as it were, locked into a recognised and customary set of relationships with alternative words. 'Sad', when correctly applied, is the *only one among these possible alternatives* that applies. The thing it denotes *is* sad, it possesses sadness. To assert that 'sad' applies literally in a particular case is to affirm the whole set of relationships which make up the schema to which 'sad' belongs in its literal projection. To assert a different literal application of sad is to apply 'sad» as part of a different schema and hence to disaffirm a whole set of customary relationships and to affirm a set

of unusual ones. If this is done consistently it amounts to a radical re-categorisation of the kinds of things that are to be recognised in the world. But since there is no one way the world is there is no absolute ban on any such re-categorisation. However, the sheer immensity of the task of maintaining an arbitrary or thoroughly novel re-categorisation against the accrued authority of that which is being displaced guards against whimsical decrees.

Categories become established by serving the manifold interests of those who categorise and it is important to remember that so long as such interests, consolidated and strengthened by the very categorisation they brought into being, abide then any re-categorisation that does not serve the stronger interest will not easily succeed in becoming established overall. Many sub-cultures in our society exist in virtue of and at least partly in order to facilitate the sharing of an 'unofficial' re-categorisation of our world. Only by some measure of isolation and group reinforcement can their view of the world be maintained. Artists can be seen as performing the same act of re-categorisation. But the very possibility of such groups and of individual artists testifies both to the stability of the inherited view of the world and to its capability for change. Under the stress of conflicting interests, or the pressure of inner contradictions or the need for individuals to feel free in the face of inherited forms of thought, feeling and action, new but related descriptions of the world are forged.

The weight of authority of literal terms that guards against arbitrary projection is to some extent shared by metaphorical terms. As we saw in our consideration of Goodman's view of metaphor, a projection of a word involves the application of a term as part of a schema. The schema itself which determines the *kind* of object, is projected to sort the realm of application. Metaphorical projection can in this sense be called a re-categorisation of the world but it need no more be an arbitrary re-categorisation than is the application of a new literal term. Firstly, it may not be all that new. Whilst the term 'sad' is certainly a transgression of literal limits of use its application to pictures and other works of art is well established. It is against this history not the history of the literal term that new application is tested. We have noted above the confusion in Goodman's

argument concerning the relationship of literal and metaphorical projections of a term. He says when talking of expression:

> *This is not to say that whether a picture is sad is independent of the use of 'sad' but that given, by practice and precept, the use of 'sad', applicability to the picture is not arbitrary (12).*

This apparently simple and straightforward statement is in fact highly ambivalent. It is not explicit as to whether the 'practice and precept' is associated with the literal or the metaphorical use or both. If it refers only to the antecedent literal use then it is a potentially misleading formulation. For one thing it is not only the use to which the syntactic apparatus has habitually been put that can pattern its metaphorical application. Other properties influence it too and choice as to which property will indeed have influence is comparatively open. Appreciation of metaphor involves sensitivity as to exactly which property or properties of the transferred syntactic apparatus is or are significant. If understanding of what is aimed at by the metaphorical application involves sensitivity to the syntactic apparatus then a concession that it actually applies depends on the recognition that it effects a sorting into kinds that can and will be acceptable as actual categories. That is, the categories grow out of antecedent practice and serve present need. In this way they require or inherit authority and applicability. This reduces the claim of non-arbitrariness to the assertion that the categories thus accepted as actual are useful because they serve enduring interests. In other words they are useful because they are found to be useful. Arbitrariness on this account is a negative relationship to our interests, non-arbitrariness a positive relationship. Thus the source is not antecedent practice and precept associated with the syntactic apparatus but the context of interest in which it finds itself. A person who coins a startling new metaphor may or may not be aware of its full potential. But it would seem plausible that artists afford us enlightenment by having consciously identified metaphors which *do* sort in ways which extend our ability to articulate new, actual relationships between things. Relationships that matter to us, perhaps in a new way.

If the antecedent practice referred to is the metaphorical use or even more narrowly the previous application to other works of art then, as already mentioned, this is well

established in the case of ' sad' and as long as we remember to keep the two projections - literal and metaphorical - separated this is a clear and obvious argument against arbitrary application to certain expressive objects. It remains of course to explain the relation felt between the two projections.

The third possibility is that Goodman means that practice and precept governing both metaphorical and literal uses helps determine in a non-arbitrary way the term's applicability to the picture. The first response to this interpretation must be that it would be another example of the same confusion of literal and metaphorical projection already discussed. Goodman's account as it stands does not warrant the assertion that literal and metaphorical projections interact so closely. Although this passage does not unequivocally show Goodman's belief that his account does substantiate such a claim only two pages further on he makes the point explicitly.

> *Expression relates the symbol to a label that metaphorically denotes it,*
> *and hence indirectly not only to the given metaphorical but also to the*
> *literal range of that label (13).*

This relation is characterised by Goodman as one of similarity but it is a description that, as we have seen, cannot be maintained. This is not a serious problem for Goodman's account since the amendment whereby assertion of similarity is seen as logically separable is readily accomplished consistent with his general system. Whilst it is not formally implied it would seem to be the case in expressive activity that part of the important interaction between the metaphorical projection in expression and the patterning literal projection is effected by the assumption of the assertion of similarity. A similarity which is grounded on the all-but certain applicability of an affinitive schema. Only little reflection is required on how the literal realm, re-sorted by the affinitive schema would then interact with an object metaphorically exemplifying some label literally applied to it, to appreciate the complexity and subtlety of the interactions that can take place between art works and our literal description of the world. Although Goodman's account is deficient at this point the whole of *Languages of Art* supports this description of a constructive complexity and leads one to suppose that Goodman would welcome the richness with which it credits artistic activity. The whole of Goodman's

work exhibits a sensitivity to interaction between many aspects of our symbolic life. An interaction that is dynamic and responsive to interests, habits, customs, diversity of symbol systems and variety of associations all of which are part of the raw material out of which we 'make' our worlds (14). However, although he takes the very specific example of a 'sad' picture with which to illustrate his concept of expression he nowhere clearly explains how our understanding of sadness in life and our understanding of sadness in art interact, and by extension we have no explanation of the interaction of any expressed property in art with its literal counterpart. In the paragraph on pages eighty-seven, eighty-eight and eighty-nine, he approaches the issue more closely than anywhere else and in the process imbues the role of criticism with great importance as the midwife of artistic significance.

> *....what is actually said about a picture is not always altogether irrelevant to what the picture expresses. Among the countless properties, most of them usually ignored, that a picture possesses, it expresses only those metaphorical properties it refers to. Establishment of the referential relationship is a matter of singling out certain properties for attention, of selecting associations with certain other objects. Verbal discourse is not least among the many factors that aid in founding and nurturing such associations (15).*

The critic and commentator, evincing a greater sensitivity to the possible interaction of expressive objects presents plausible interpretation of their significance which, if found to be acceptable can help to found associations. In this partnership between creator and interpreter the artist is, conventionally, afforded the greater respect but it should not be forgotten that the commentator plays an important role.

> *If nothing more than selection takes place here, still selection from such a multitude of eligible amounts.......to virtual constitution (16).*

No preference is implied for official critics whose statements are often held up to ridicule nor for any one source of comment. Rather what is meant is the *process* of criticism, whereby different plausible interpretations are advocated, tested, adapted, assumed and even forgotten after playing their part, in combination, towards developing a temporarily accepted view by some or all of a relevant community as to the significance of an expressive symbol. Such views in turn have their influence on works subsequently made

and associations may be nurtured or annulled by later artists in the process of artistic activity (17).

A further subtlety of interaction and one which Goodman's system is alone in capturing is that provided by the expression of non-verbal labels. Goodman advocates a broad extension of the term 'label' to include non-linguistic labels. A representation of an object or person, in Goodman's account, is to be regarded as a non-verbal label under which the thing represented is classified.

> *Just as objects are classified by means of, or under various labels, so also are objects classified by or under various pictorial labels......objects are classified under 'desk', table', etc. and also under pictures representing them (18).*

Consequently, since exemplification is of labels, the non-linguistic kind may be exemplified or expressed as well as the linguistic kind. The Sutton Hoo longship literally exemplifies historical illustrations of Viking sea-vessels because the exemplified pictorial label literally denotes that which it represents. There is no sense of a transgression of limits, no new ascription of properties. The way in which it represents is customary and habitual. If on the other hand the picture had been of a sea-snake (19) and yet was clearly intended to denote a longship then the pictorial label would apply, if at all, metaphorically and the Sutton Hoo longship would express i.e. metaphorically exemplify, the pictorial label. The fact that sea-snakes are fictitious limits the interaction between the metaphorically related realms. To transfer the image of a sea-snake *as* a label denoting longships would make it a metaphorical label applicable to the realm of sea-snakes but effecting perhaps only a marginal influence on our categorisation of the world. However in Goodman's example of the same process the interaction has been significant. Here the pictorial label is of Churchill as a bulldog. That is, a bulldog picture clearly meant to apply to Winston Churchill (20). Goodman comments,

> *...he may stand as a symbol that exemplifies the picture and expresses the bulldoggedness thus pictorially ascribed to him (21).*

The label (Churchill-as-bulldog) may then be transferred to the realm of bulldogs and as a metaphorical label would sort them according to this new categorisation. Assuredly we would find bulldogs that exhibited Churchillian-bulldoggedness and this interaction may well have an influence on what we would consider to be a 'true' British Bulldog. Any account of the complex process by which images of Bulldogs now come to symbolise among other things, the British contingent to the finals of the nineteen eighty two World Cup, a business that tries to attract trade by purporting to be patriotic by selling British goods only, and a Neo-Fascist Youth newspaper, would have to trace the interaction of many things. It would have to take note of the qualities literally exemplified, or thought to be exemplified, by bulldogs and by the British people. The genesis of the symbol in Arthur Reece's music hall song 'Sons of the Sea, All British Born' where the earliest recorded use of the image is to be found in the line, 'Boys of the bulldog breed;' the way Churchill became a symbol of British response to war; and the route by which the British people were doubly referred to by ascribing Bulldoggedness to Churchill; and not least the impact of cartoons of Bulldogs exhibiting courage, tenacity, pugnacity as traits of the British people. After such a process the fecundity and vitality of the symbol is not to be wondered at.

Expression and the Freezing of Metaphor

This interactionist position which goes some way toward capturing the subtle relationship that seems to exist between our everyday lives and the categorisations established by expressive objects, seems hampered by another aspect of his account. It is to be found in the section on Expression in *Languages of Art*. His notion of expression depends heavily on his account of metaphor. It was, as we have seen, an important part of Goodman's strategy of re-formulation that expression should involve the actual possession by the symbol of the properties it was seen to express. Since the properties do not literally but only metaphorically possess the properties, metaphorical possession was assimilated with literal possession into actual possession. This was made possible by taking possession to be correct denotation by a label. It also meant that there could be no fundamental distinction between literal and metaphorical possession. Thus Goodman argued that metaphor 'freezes' with habitual and customary usage to literal denotation and the result is

ambiguity. This position is at the heart of his construction of the concept of expression and he assumes that metaphorical exemplification must follow the same pattern.

> *The difference between expression and Literal exemplification, like the difference between more and less literal representation, is a matter of habit - a matter of fact rather than fiat (22).*

Literal representation is representation in the standard system (23) and less literal representation involves the use of a system that is to some extent distinct from this standard. Whilst it may represent it does so not in a way recognised as standard or literal but using a symbol system that strikes us as unusual and therefore 'unrealistic'. As time passes the unusual use may become familiar and there is a lessened sense of strain in recognising the denotation of the representation. Since representation is a matter for Goodman of classification under certain pictures acting as labels the comparison with metaphor and with metaphorical exemplification is clear. Metaphor is the counterpart of non-literal representation because both involve non-standard classification under a label, which in either case may be pictorial or verbal. As we have seen both metaphor and non-standard representation can, with use, become habitual and familiar. Since metaphorical exemplification crucially involves metaphorical denotation Goodman is forced to hold that this too displays a change towards literality proportionate to growth in its familiarity. Goodman passes on from the assertion in the passage quoted above to discuss the fact that habits differ widely and does not discuss the implications of asserting this tendency. Yet it seems to pose some embarrassing problems for his account.

It is arguable that if any metaphorical ascription to art is familiar it is 'sad' and along with it the whole set of labels literally applied to human feelings. But this is the very example that Goodman takes as the paradigm of the relation of expression. His own example seems more to support the view that there is an irreducible element of metaphor in even the most habitually used expressive predicates.

But there are deeper difficulties if the tendency towards literality is conceded in this instance than if it does not. For once again the unwanted gap between 'life' and 'art' is threatened. The subtle interaction between expressive symbol systems and our literal

categorisation which is so valuable an aspect of Goodman's position seems entirely untenable if expression can freeze to literal exemplification without some further explanation of the interaction involved. Goodman would presumably hold that no threat exists since the link between the home and alien realms of a metaphorical label is forged by the similarity created between them. This as we have seen is not the case and no significant similarity has been established by Goodman to exist beyond the sharing of parts of a syntactic apparatus. But even this constitutes an entirely new projection, strictly inapplicable to the original home realm. Consequently, if the exemplification of the term 'sad' by music was to become so familiar as to be properly described as literal exemplification Goodman's account as it stands would have to see the two uses of 'sad' (one for sentient beings the other for music) as ambiguous and as entirely separate. As he says of metaphors,

> *As time goes on......the two uses tend to achieve equality and independence; the metaphor freezes, or rather evaporates, and the residue is a pair of literal uses – mere ambiguity instead of metaphor (24).*

The consequent weakening of the interactionist position is an implication that Goodman would, I think, find extremely unwelcome. He may of course argue that the kind of interaction that makes art important to us has already taken place prior to the freezing of a metaphor and so no threat is contained in holding that metaphorical exemplification eventually becomes literal exemplification; it is simply part of the growth of knowledge facilitated by art that originally unusual categorisations come to be accepted and then fade in importance. But this still leaves obscure the process of interaction, we may retort, between two projections whose relationship on his account is more readily conceived as repulsion than attraction and whose action over time is not to lessen this separateness but to strengthen it. So not only is it hard to grasp the original influence of the metaphorical projection on the literal but we are to assume an inevitable decline in such an effect. Later in *Languages of Art* Goodman wishes to emphasise that the activity of making and appreciating art is a cognitive activity. Not least important for this claim is the way in which he has tried to show the complexity of interaction between the various symbol systems - both those characteristic of art those characteristic *and* of other activities in our everyday lives. Metaphorical exemplification is a powerful tool for effecting a re-

categorisation, a re-emphasis, a re-perception of our standard categorisations, emphases and perceptions. As such it plays a major role in fruitfully relating to our everyday concerns. Goodman comments,

> *What a Manet or a Monet or Cezanne does to our subsequent seeing of the world is as pertinent to their appraisal as is any direct confrontation. How our lookings at pictures and our listenings to music inform what we encounter later and elsewhere is integral to them as cognitive. The absurd and awkward myth of the insularity of aesthetic experience can be scrapped (25).*

If the way in which this relationship is achieved is obscured or incompletely described then the claim of art as an activity that has cognitive significance beyond itself is proportionately weakened.

For these reasons his account requires some further account of interaction which the concept of an affinitive schema was intended to provide. How though does it apply to expression? The metaphorical label gains precision by being exemplified in works of art. This projection becomes separately established as a special artistic projection which we may call Art Projection. In order to become established as properly applicable, Art Projection must invoke the determination of its own schema which will use a part of the syntactic apparatus usually projected in Literal Projection. If Art Projection is then re-applied to the standard realm of the full syntactic apparatus of Literal Projection the schema of Art Projection is then strictly transferred from its home realm to an alien realm and is consequently metaphorically applied. The metaphorical sorting it effects stands as subsequent to the antecedent classification it effected in Art Projection. We have called this third projection the Affinitive Projection (26). The Affinitive Projection is so likely to be conceded that the assumption of 'similarity' between the two realms is warranted. No material similarity is posited, only the existence and applicability of an Affinitive Projection. The interactive and potentially cognitive role of art is enhanced by the fact that a metaphorical application to art is more likely to become established if the effect of the Affinitive Projection is felt to be significant.

Goodman's account, together with the amendment, readily explains the variation of expressive predicates applied to works of art in different cultures. Expressive objects do not metaphorically possess and exemplify their properties independent of the patterns of association and significance historically established in a community. Such patterns are, as we have noted, built up as a result of complex interactions between many and varied symbol systems. It is therefore not surprising that societies with different cultures should find that the same feelings are metaphorically exemplified by different objects and that similar forms may express diverse properties.

Contributing to the emphasis on the subtlety and complexity of artistic activity is the fact that expression must be seen as only one among a variety of systems that can establish patterns of association and reference.

> *In these varied ways, a symbol may select from and organise its universe*
> *and be itself in turn informed or transformed (27).*

On this issue alone Goodman parts company with all those theorists considered earlier who took expression as they defined it as the only true artistic feature. This is not true of some more recent theorists who have concentrated on intimate analyses of concepts such as expression and representation but have not attempted to set such analyses into a general *systematic* account of the concept of art (28).

Equally clearly he distinguishes himself from any theory of art that asserts an obscure or mystical source for expressiveness. The concept of expression has provided the basis for a number of theories of art which have tried to come to terms with the complexity and subtlety of artistic activity. As we saw, these may be seen to grow out of and variously to combine a number of trends of thought. In various combinations those traditions ascribed the following predominant properties and characteristics to art under the influence of particular analyses of the act of expression.

    a)   the property of displaying emotions.

b) the property of displaying, communicating, articulating, identifying or venting thoughts or feelings of the artist i.e. self-expression.

c) the property of having a therapeutic effect.

d) the property of providing access to the inaccessible.

e) the property of being independent of any arbitrary or conventional system of symbolism, particularly conceptual or discursive forms i.e. art is immediate.

f) the property of articulating experience.

It will be useful to consider Goodman's relation to each of these trends.

Art and the Expression of Emotions

In different and complicated ways, Tolstoy, Collingwood, and Langer all held that the display of emotion was an essential characteristic of art, Tolstoy and Collingwood were led to this conclusion because they conceived artistic significance as individualistic and (for Tolstoy) intentional. They therefore both made an absolute distinction between conceptual (i.e. communal and non-individual) forms of symbolism and art. This meant that the significance of art was an ineffable meaning. The difficulty of delineating the character of this ineffable meaning in their theory of art was solved by explaining it as an expression of an emotional state of the individual. A state either so fundamental (Collingwood) that it necessarily pre-cedes and informs our conceptual articulation or so total (Tolstoy) that it includes theoretical concepts as parts thus making them subordinate to the felt whole.

Langer, whilst rejecting an individualistic explanation of art, also held that art was a mode of symbolism entirely distinct from science. Science discursively symbolised thoughts and facts whilst art presentationally symbolised forms of feeling.

Goodman denies that art necessarily involves a display of emotion either presentation or expression. Any label may, according to him, be metaphorically exemplified. His account of our relationship to works of art as a response to a complex set of symbolic relationships takes neither the individual nor intention as a fundamental theoretical

assumption and so it avoids the dilemma of having to identify the substance or content of artistic meaning whilst denying any social origin to that meaning. Equally it has no place for the dichotomy between discursive and presentational symbols, replacing it by a more sophisticated set of distinctions among symbol systems which does not depend upon a severance of thought and feeling.

He does however respond enough to the tradition that binds art and emotion together to spend some time justifying the relegation that emotion undergoes in his account. His view of the relation of emotion to art is out-lined in the latter part of the book where he turns his attention to the characterisation of aesthetic activity in general. His overall strategy in *Languages of Art* has been to develop a theory of symbolism which specifically described and accounted for artistic experience and which, by implication, rendered art capable of being subsumed with science and other symbolic modes of apprehension under a general theory of symbolism. In doing this he was taking issue with those who would classify art and science as in some sense opposites. There are a number of contrasts that serve to support this opposition and Goodman set himself the task of dismantling these structures of classification and of re-building his own categorisation involving new sets of contrasts.

> *The difference between art and science is not that between feeling and fact, intuition and inference, delimit and deliberation, synthesis and analysis, sensation and cerebration, concreteness and abstraction, passion and action, mediacy and immediacy, or truth and beauty, but rather a difference in domination of certain specific characteristics of symbols (29).*

One of the contrasts that purveys a deeply entrenched schema and which is an integral part of the structure of this separation is that between feeling and knowing, between the emotive and the cognitive. This he attempts to dismantle in the following ways. He has already described representation, exemplification and expression as symbolic relations. He has also developed an elaborate technical theory of notation which serves as a powerful source of descriptive terms for art works, entirely consistent with their operation as different kinds of symbols in various systems. This implies that our relation to any work of art is active rather than passive. We 'read' the symbols in various complex

ways. However, on this basis alone, art is not distinguishable from any other intelligent behaviour that involves a sensitive and informed response to symbols. How then should aesthetic experience be distinguished?

He considers various possible answers. He rejects independence of practical ends as a distinguishing criterion since this, given his view of science, still includes pure science with art as an equally disinterested enquiry. He rejects the suggestion that it is distinctive of artistic activity that it yields pleasure or satisfaction whilst such benefits are not an essential property of the scientific (30). The next suggestion to be considered is that if the positive emotions of pleasure and satisfaction are too narrow and restrictive adequately to account for artistic experience then at least it must be admitted that art is more concerned with emotions in general than is science. This too he rejects. Not all art, he argues, need arouse emotion. The emotions we do feel need not be strong or overwhelming and are most likely to be very pale, weak or even inverted compared to our responses to non-aesthetic events (31). The notion of welcoming in art emotions that we normally avoid he considers dubious (32).

Having shown to his own satisfaction that all those attempts to account for the dominant place of emotion in artistic activity fall short he puts forward his own.

> *....in aesthetic experience the emotions function cognitively. The work of art is apprehended through the feelings as well as through the senses. Emotional numbness disables here as definitely if not as completely as blindness or deafness.....Emotion in aesthetic experience is a means of discovering what properties a work has and expresses (33).*

Emotions are deliberately likened to sensations. They are properties of the art object just as their colour or their shape is possessed by them. Just as sensations are differently classified under the influence of different interests, information and purposes so is emotion differently felt under different circumstances or 'lights'.

> *Pity on the stage may induce pity in the spectator; but greed may arouse disgust, and courage admiration. So may a white house look white at noon, but red at sunset; and a globe looks round from any angle (34).*

Emotion is being taken here as, at one and the same time, the property of the work *and* the feeling of the spectator just as a colour is the property of the work and the sensation of the spectator. Clearly in understanding what Goodman means by emotion playing this role we must remember that he is deploying the whole of his complex and sophisticated nominalistic system when making and justifying these statements.

By subsuming emotions, with sensations, as modes of apprehension he shows that he sees an emotion as an act of placement, a re-cognition. Sensations, we remember were constituted only by a process of identification achieved by the projection of a schema to sort the flux of sensation. Fundamentally it is the act of labelling which makes identifiable sensations possible. Emotions too, if they are like sensations, must undergo this process of identification through labelling.

Each subsequent sensation or emotion is an act of re-cognition, of placement by decree, the source of whose authority is the relation it holds to other decrees. Just as there are some decrees concerning sensations which are so well entrenched that to challenge their correctness is all but unthinkable, and some whose legitimacy is suspect, there will equally be a variation in the authority of decrees concerning emotions.

If emotions function cognitively in general then they also function cognitively in the specific case of aesthetic experience. To take emotion as cognitive in art does, Goodman claims, clarify some important problems concerning emotion in the aesthetic realm. In particular, he feels, it explains how the relation of the emotive content of a work of art to the emotive response of a spectator can sometimes be an inversion or other drastic alteration (35). His explanation of this issue seems to be as follows. The spectator feels an emotion (say admiration). He is aware of having this feeling towards the object. The awareness, together with many other kinds of information and impulse, leads him to know that what he admires is courage i.e. 'courageous' correctly denotes the object. In this sense the courage exemplified by the object can be said to cause the admiration of the spectator but equally the emotion of admiration can be said to have led to the discernment

of that property of the object. In addition, the emotion involved is somehow the same thing under different circumstances.

> *..... the frequent disparity between the emotion felt and the emotive content thereby discovered in the object is now readily understood. Pity on the stage may induce pity in the spectator; but greed may arouse disgust, and courage admiration. So may a white house look white at noon, but red at sunset; and a globe looks round from any angle (36).*

This suggestive and provocative account seems to me to be incomplete. He leaves many questions unanswered (even unasked?) that it cannot be regarded as a successful resolution of the problem of this relation of emotions. For example, is the feeling of admiration directed at the 'courage' because it exemplifies behaviour considered morally good in real life? Or is the admiration a metaphorical admiration reserved for fictional courage? If it is admiration spontaneously evoked by the metaphorical exemplification of courage how does that admiration relate to admiration evoked by witnessing a real act of courage? How much room is there for our judgement in such a spontaneous evocation of admiration? And what is gained by implying that there is a thing that underlies both the emotion of the spectator and of the art object? Goodman himself takes refuge in the complexity of interaction and excuses the lack of clear analysis.

> *Sensory and emotive experiences are related in complex ways to the properties of objects. Also, emotions function cognitively not as separate items but in combination with one another and with other means of knowing. Perception, conception, and feeling intermingle and interact; and an alloy often resists analysis into emotive and non-emotive components (37).*

It is unfortunately not in the brief of this thesis to follow through the implications of Goodman's statements on this issue. I suspect, however, that it may be possible to develop a theory of emotion in both aesthetic and non-aesthetic experience based on Goodman's general account which would successfully explain the inversions. It would mean the abandonment of Goodman's view of the innocence of cognition and replacement with a mode of apprehension more powerfully and explicitly affected by interest. This view of engaged apprehension would also provide an explanation of the considerably violent emotional responses to art. This however cannot be discussed here

and the lack of analysis on Goodman's part is perhaps only excused by him because he feels it does not affect his main point. It is possible to accept the assertion that emotions function cognitively in general. So whilst it is not clear exactly how this can be applied to art it is possible to show that emotional response is not a mode of apprehension peculiar to art. If emotions can function cognitively the dichotomy of knowing and feeling is effectively dismantled. His account of the nature of emotion, his insistence on dismantling the above mentioned dichotomy, and his attempt to show that emotion has no special place in the definition of the aesthetic marks a considerable break with the theories of expression discussed earlier.

Art and Self-Expression

Tolstoy, Collingwood, Croce and Dewey all held that art was the articulation or expression of an individual. This, I proposed, implied that art was self-expression. More profoundly, Collingwood linked artistic activity with the therapeutic effect of articulating the 'true' self over and against a false consciousness of self corrupted by suppression of feelings.

Goodman's denial of an intentional and individualistic explanation of artistic significance allows him to avoid the assertion that art is necessarily self-expression. Indeed it is not obvious how the common assumption that in doing art an artist expresses him or herself is to be accounted for in his system. There is no attempt to show how the construction of the self would be achieved. Since all of the materials for such a task are taken to be inherited and therefore socially provided it must involve a radically different concept of self-hood from those who take individuality as a primary assumption.

Pre-systematically, self-expression through art seems to suggest the existence of some close involvement of the artist with the metaphorical or literal content of a work. This might be accounted for in Goodman's system if that which was expressed in a work was a label or set of labels that the artist felt was metaphorically applicable (as an affinitive projection) to him or herself.

The rejection of the direct expression of the self leads to speculation concerning a more complex and sophisticated involvement of an individual artist with the works he produces or helps to produce. It is very clear that, over and above the basic needs of survival, we are strongly involved with many aspects of our world. We feel actively engaged. These moral positions are felt as ours in so far as we are in a position to commit our future actions to achieve their fulfilment. Any articulation or attempt to achieve those objectives will involve an investment of interest on the part of the individual. Artistic activity involves this kind of investment certainly as much if not more than any other. Furthermore, the deliberate seeking out of the need to make choices can be seen to facilitate the discovery or rather construction of one's own character. Never to make a choice would be never to know oneself. Contexts of choice that offer unlimited alternatives do not lead to such characterisation for only by conceivable contrast is the particularity achieved. Clearly some artistic activities provide a wide (sometimes too wide) set of alternatives and others, for various reasons do not. In collaborative arts such as theatre some members of the team have more power of choice than others. In painting, a commission may drastically limit the choice left to the painter. The choice may be restricted by the medium as in pottery. Where there is a systematic restriction of choice the subtle differences that do emerge are easily perceived and can take on a considerable significance. Where there is complete freedom difference is plentiful and there is more difficulty in achieving significance

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These comments are only suggestions as to the way the close involvement of an individual may be developed on the basis of Goodman's account and so provide some explanation of the pre-systematic assumption that art necessarily involves self-expression. Enough has been said I hope to show that Goodman provides no traditional account of self-expression. In this he follows Langer who previously theoretically excluded the concept.

Art as Therapy and as Access to the Inaccessible

Goodman's account turns away from both of these notions of art. The concept of art as therapy is, historically, closely connected with the direct expression of the self in art. Indeed it was, as we have seen, the direct access to deeper and more integral aspects of our articulation of experience that was thought to maintain our mental and social health threatened by false consciousness. Goodman in rejecting direct self-expression rejects this kind of therapy. He does not claim any more therapeutic value for art than for any other cognitive activity. But he does, I think, hold that the free exercise of the mind to engage in disinterested enquiry is essential to any healthy community (38). Art perhaps more than any other (apart from philosophy) is for him a paradigm of sensitive and wholesome discovery.

The notion of art as access to the inaccessible is not one that Goodman upholds either in its mystical form or its variation involving inaccessible depths of human consciousness. He has specifically attempted to provide an explanation of the nature of expression which would undermine any attempt to use the fact of *technical* ineffability to posit a mystical or mysterious source or one so fundamental as to acquaint us with an empirical reality that can never be 'caught' conceptually (39). Whilst he has been very much concerned to purge artistic theory of obscurantism it is necessary for us to realise that his system does characterise aesthetic modes of symbolism as capable of 'saying' things that no other systems can. Significance is relative to system and some things are untranslatable. The untranslatability is however as much a result of the complexity of interaction as of technical features associated with the symptoms of the aesthetic.

Art as Immediate

He clearly rejects any assertion of immediacy which implies a mystical intuition. He also rejects any assertion that assumes the epistemological inadequacy of all conceptual forms of communication or posits a neat dichotomy between thought and feeling. He does not accept, for example, the category of presentational symbol which was Langer's attempt to account for the immediacy of artistic form.

The pre-systematic assumption that the art work must be appreciated for itself unmediated by any form of translation and that only the properties immediately perceived

are important, excludes the notion of the work as a symbol signifying anything other than itself. Goodman insists that the aesthetic symbol operates, as all other symbols, by referring to what it applies to or denotes. Exemplification however is that mode of reference where properties possessed by the art work refer to labels that denote it. This is enough, Goodman believes, to account for the sense of 'intimacy' between the symbol and that to which it refers.

> *....exemplification, like denotation, relates a symbol to a referent, and the distance from a symbol to what applies to or is exemplified by it is no less than the distance to what it applies to or denotes. As ' ineffability' upon analysis turns into density rather than mystery, 'immediacy' becomes a matter of exemplification rather than of intimacy - a function of direction rather than of distance (40).*

There is another source of the sense of intimacy between symbol and referent. It is the constitutive relationship between categories (or ideas or kinds) and our perception of the world. The tradition which saw a primary act of the imagination as the link between blind sensation and structured thought led to Croce's concept of expression and Collingwood's act of thought which is the acknowledgement of one's true feelings. Both saw this process as fundamental to all our thought and as unmediated by judgements of relationships between things and their consequent categorisation. It was this synthesis of particular sensuous experiences into ideas, the work of the imagination, which served as the paradigm of individualistic mental activity which was of central importance in their theory of art. All art resulted from this process, unmediated by conceptualised thought and was pure expression. Art, expression, was the articulation of our most fundamental layer of experience and the basis of all our conscious thought.

This concern with the relationship between experience and though, sensation and categorisation, is at the heart of Goodman's thinking. His answer to the problem is that the way we categorise determines the kinds of things that we perceive. The appearance of our world is of our own making. The symbols participate in constituting the facts. Goodman does not accept the individualistic account of expression but his general system leads to the conclusion that there is a discontinuity between the way we see the world under one set of categories and the way we see it under another. Nothing does or can

mediate between two incompatible world-descriptions. The duck-rabbit figure exemplifies the perceptual switch that can be involved in going from one to another. Art often involves re-categorisations. Some as startling as the duck-rabbit. It may be that when the discontinuity described above is achieved by artistic symbol systems it is perceived as a kind of immediacy and contributes to the traditions that emphasise those aspects of art which can be set against the conceptual. This element of immediacy can readily be explained as a result of the lurking of symbols and consequently can be shown to offer no grounds for mystical interpretation.

Art as Articulation

A major pre-occupation of the expressive theorists considered earlier was to show how sensation was related to thought and feeling to cerebration. They considered art, like language, as involving a process by which we articulate raw experience and make it accessible to consciousness. This led them to offer explanations of such controversial issues as the status of imagination, how ideas come to be formed, the nature of feeling, the relation of language to reality. The various answers that were given contributed to that tradition of artistic theory which sees expression as articulation.

Goodman inherited the concern with these fundamental issues of philosophy, in particular the problem of constructing an adequate model of our perception and knowledge which assumed a given empirical base. His solution is to forego the notion of any empirically given element to knowledge and perception but he still provides answers to questions concerning the nature of experience, the role of language and the relation of the particular to the general. Although he does not make of art the paradigm of *all* ways of structuring our perception he does find in the full range of artistic modes of symbolism an important model of kinds of non-verbal reference. Only after the analysis of these forms is it possible to develop a general theory of symbolism. This general theory constitutes his explanation of the nature of experience, the concept of knowledge, and the relation of language to both which he discusses in *Ways of Worldmaking*.

His theory of art is then part of a general strategy of constructive thought aimed at providing a workable, systematic explanation of many of the questions central to the earlier expressive theories. Art is as much a way of articulating experience as other ways of symbolising. All ways are linked by the consistent set of technical distinctions constructed by Goodman through analysis. A kind of inversion in the tradition has taken place however. Before, a certain obscure view of art was taken as the paradigm of cognition. Now, a particular view of cognition is made to describe art.

> *Symbolization.......is to be judged fundamentally by how well it serves the cognitive purpose: by the delicacy of its discrimination and the aptness of its allusions; by the way it works in grasping, exploring, and informing the world; by how it analyses, sorts, orders, and organizes; by how it participates in the making, manipulation, retention, and transformation of knowledge. Considerations of simplicity and subtlety, power and precision, scope and selectivity, familiarity and freshness, are all relevant and often contend with one another; their weighting is relative to our interests, our information, and our inquiry..... the general excellence just sketched becomes aesthetic when exhibited by aesthetic objects; that is, aesthetic merit is such excellence in any symbolic functioning that, by its particular constellation of attributes, qualifies as aesthetic (41).*

Concluding remarks

How successful is Goodman's account of expression? At the beginning of this thesis I suggested two criteria of success; how does it stand as a systematic set of distinctions and how fruitful is the system as a whole and the formulation of expression in particular? That is, how far does it clarify, resolve, or redirect problems and concerns in the tradition of aesthetic?

As a set of systematically distinguished concepts Goodman's account of art is notably self-consistent. In particular it seems that the concept of metaphorical exemplification can, with some modification, be seen to be compatible with the more general system. His view of metaphor was found not to give an adequate account of the relationship to literal projection of the syntactic apparatus and his untenable (or at least ambiguous) appeal to similarity had to be rejected. This difficulty can be overcome by providing an account of the literal-metaphorical relationship that does not involve appeal to similarity but does

explain the grounds for the sense of sameness that is so important if there is to be fruitful interaction between art works and other aspects of our lives.

His concept of emotion proves obscure and incomplete and as such does not make clear his interesting and provocative claim that in art they function cognitively.

The concept of a 'symbol system' is very complex and may ultimately be too vague and too wide, locating an unmanageable or too pragmatic a notion at the very centre of his account. This is related to a more general but still substantial criticism of his account. This is as follows. He gives a fundamental theoretical place to operant interest and at the same time declines to offer any substantive theory of interest. Consequently he *intimates* a final appeal to pragmatic considerations which, not ever being specifically granted, leaves a sense of incompleteness. This aspect of his work can however be seen as a positive benefit where it is a way of acknowledging the symbolic richness of the phenomenon under consideration, an abundance of referential relationships that defies analysis.

There is no doubt that *Languages of Art* has contributed a great deal to the discussion of traditional concerns of aesthetics. It is a most ambitious attempt to clarify or resolve major questions concerning art. And, as we have seen, within its own terms it works remarkably well. Concerning the specific concept of expression it is a major contribution to artistic theory. It has firmly established the plausibility of an explanation of expression as a mode of reference and by doing so has shown how the concept may be freed from much obscurantism. In this he continues and improves the work of Langer. By embedding it in a well marked out system of general symbolism the power and fruitfulness of his account of expression is augmented. It sets a formidable challenge to those who would criticise it. Further, the analysis and application of the general concept of exemplification is a profound and valuable new insight into the activity of art. In addition there is no better theory of metaphor developed from a nominalist standpoint.

Much of the success recounted above is a result of his construction of a *system* of concepts. In this way he is able fully to clarify the issues on the basis of radical pluralism. Some may find such foundations unacceptable either because of the ontological assumptions involved or because the resultant intellectual permissiveness is considered too high a price to pay for the explanatory power of the distinctions he constructs.

Nevertheless, the fact that his system is so tightly knit means that we are presented with a viable version of the way the world is. We are faced therefore with a considerable challenge if we wish to criticise or modify any aspect of that position. A challenge that forces us to be at least as consistent, to show equal virtuosity in drawing fruitful distinctions and to attempt to match his ability to account for the facts of artistic life.

To have attracted such a response would, in Goodman's own estimate, be success enough. In the sections of *Languages of Art* entitled The Question of Merit, he clearly reveals how radically his pluralism pervades his view of human enquiry. If there is no one way the world is then there is no absolute truth in relation to which various descriptions may be assessed. The question of merit, Goodman argues, can only be pertinent to how far an argument or assertion or any product of human enquiry, including art works, improves the present state of understanding. But understanding is deemed to be improved only by some cognitive streamlining bringing greater formal simplicity, consistency and explanatory force as described in the last quotation. Almost as an afterthought he adds that these formal improvements have some relation to our interests.

There is here a virtual elimination of interests as an element affecting enquiry. Like emotion cognitive activity is being described as predominantly innocent and non-tendentious. In assimilating art and cognitive activity he says,

> *....the drive is curiosity and the aim enlightenment. Use of symbols beyond immediate need is for the sake of understanding, not practice; what compels is the urge to know, what delimits is discovery, and communication is secondary to the apprehension and formulation of what is to be communicated. The primary purpose is cognition in and for itself;*

> *the practicality, pleasure, compulsion, and communicative utility all depend upon this (42).*

Goodman excludes absolute truth. It has no legitimate role to play in guiding human enquiry. In doing so he does not consider that the relativity of enquiry thus achieved may be drastically reduced in practice by the fact that perceived interests can lead to the *assumption* of the same dichotomies of right and wrong, false and true. This can happen in any field of enquiry where different outcomes are seen to work for or against perceived interest. It is in the nature of systematic enquiry to attempt to eliminate this tendency although it is arguable that even here it is never possible so to do. In art, however, with its often highly charged content, its indeterminacy that invites speculation and commitment and a nature that according to Goodman can only be fully appreciated by means of an emotional response, this *sense* of right and wrong, the true and the false is likely to play an important part. Thus, even in his own terms, the relegation of the way that interests operate leads to a denaturing of art making it difficult to explain the power of the activity to move people in the way that it does. His attempt to marry the emotional and the cognitive nature of art seems to fail firstly because of his incomplete account of emotion in art and secondly through an unsuccessful attempt to eliminate the operation of interests in cognitive activity in general and in art in particular.

This attempt to establish what I have called the 'innocence' of cognitive activity both in art and elsewhere runs counter to a pragmatic assumption at the foundation of his work, namely that the act of labelling and the structures of perception that we develop, are a response to and are measured against our perceived needs. There is a constant tension in Goodman's work, noted at various points in this thesis, between the achievement of near autonomy by these formal structures and the continuing operation of interest. Goodman constantly attempts only to show the *process* by which structure may be developed and reuses even to speculate as to the refuses even to speculate as to the *reason*. This judicious evasion is successful so long as the disinterestedness of modes of cognition is not overstressed. This however is exactly what he does do in attesting to make art cognitive and non-emotional.

Such work as is necessary fully to demonstrate the strength of these criticisms and to amend Goodman's account to render it more effective is testimony to the rich vein of thought to be found in his work. It is one that will be mined to great advantage for some time to come. That our objections can be more precisely formulated than before is perhaps the most important mark of a successful account. As Goodman himself says,

> *The inspiration of poetical metaphysicians like Bergson will always be as well-grounded as they ever are. But in science and scientific philosophy the great man is one like Galileo or Descartes who provides or reinforces the means by which his own discoveries will be superseded (43).*

Notes and References

Introduction

1. Goodman, N., *Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols* (1976) p.265

   Hereafter all references to this work will be noted as LA followed by the page number.

2. LA Introduction p.XI

3. Goodman, N., *Problems and Projects* (1972) p.134

4. LA VI. 6 pp.255-262

5. Black, M., Caveats and Critiques (1975) p.196

6. LA Introduction p.XI

Exemplification

1. LA p.46 (my emphasis)

2. LA p.50

3. LA p.46 and Chapter One.

4. LA p.50

5. LA p.50

6. LA p.51

7. LA p.53

8. LA p.53

9. It is of note that this is just one of the issues whose focus of difficulty is the provision of an account of a process of the selection of the labels that apply.

10. LA p.53

11. LA p.143

12. LA p.54

13. LA pp.54-55

14. LA pp.55

15. LA p.55

16. LA p.55-56

17. Goodman, N., *On Likeness of Meaning* (1949) pp.1-7

18. Brentlinger, A.F., *Exemplification of Predicates* (1970) pp.285-293

19. See Goodman, N., *Fact, Fiction and Forecast*

20. LA p.57

21. LA p.57

22. Goodman, N., *The Epistemological Argument* (1967) and *The Emperors New Ideas* (1969)

23. Goodman, N., *The Epistemological Argument* (1967)

24. LA p.58

25. I give the actual example for comparison from LA p.63.

    The gymnastics instructor....gives samples. His demonstrations exemplify the requisite properties of the actions to be performed by his class, whereas his oral instructions prescribe rather than show what is to be done. The proper response his knee-bend is a knee-bend; the proper response to his shout 'lower' (even if in a high voice) is not to shout 'lower' but to bend deeper. Nevertheless since the demonstrations are part of the instructions, are accompanied by and may be replaced by verbal directions, and have no already established denotation, they may – like any sample not otherwise committed as to denotation – also be taken as denoting what the predicates they exemplify denote, and are then labels exemplifying themselves.

26. LA pp.64-65

27. I use the example of a non-figurative painting but of course the fact that the work also has denotative functions in no way precludes that fact that it may also exemplify.

28. LA p.127

29. I hope nothing here distorts the theory, only familiarity with the two chapters IV and V is adequate for a full appreciation of all the technicalities of the theory.

30. LA p.128 'Work' and 'performance' should be read as denoting more than simply *musical* works and performances. Goodman takes musical notation as a paradigm.

31. Max Black gives this as an alternative in his discussion of *Languages of Art* in 'Caveats and Critiques' cited earlier.

32. As is noted below and in *Languages of Art*, the existence of boundaries does not guarantee finite differentiation. For in the case of schema with two characters,

namely 'marks one inch long' and 'all other linear marks' there are many characters such that it will be impossible to determine whether they belong to one or the other. See LA pp.133-135.

33. LA p.135

34. LA p.136

35. Goodman says; LA p.143-144

   ....'denotation' must be taken somewhat more broadly than is usual to cover a system where scores are correlated with performances complying with them, or words with their pronunciation, as well as a system where words are correlated with what they apply to or name. Partly as a way of keeping this in mind, I shall use 'complies with' as interchangeable with 'denotes' and 'compliance class' as interchangeable with 'extension'.

36. LA p.152

37. This phrase is used by T.G. Roupas in his article *Information and Pictorial Representation* to be found in *The Arts and Cognition* edited by Perkins and Leondar (1977)

38. LA p.153

39. LA p.147

40. LA p. 234

41. LA p.233-244

42. of. Fig.2

43. LA p.236

44. LA p.238

45. LA p.240

46. LA p.236

47. Peltz, R., *Nelson Goodman on Picturing, Describing and Exemplifying* (1972)

48. Peltz op.cit. p.82

49. Ibid., p.82

50. Ibid. The quotation of Berkeley is from *A Treaties Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* ed. Turbayne (1957) p.12.

51. LA p.63

52. Peltz op.cit. p.83

53. Ibid., p.84

54. Ibid.

55. LA p.63

56. Jensen, H., *Exemplification in Nelson Goodman's Aesthetic Theory* (1973)

57. LA pp.88-89

58. Goodman, N., *Problems and Projects* p.132

59. LA p.65 It is also worth noting the passage just after this quotation on p.66.

> *I have been contrasting exemplification with other relations, especially with possession (which is not reference at all) and with denotation (which runs in the opposite direction). But the contrasts must not be overdrawn. That a swatch exemplifies texture but not shape, or that a given picture exemplifies plain enough; but just which among its properties a thing exemplifies can often be hard to tell. Also, we have already seen that in some cases reference cannot be identified as denotation or exemplification, that in others the identification is arbitrary, and that in others a symbol and a predicate it exemplifies may be co-extensive.*

60. Novellos Edition edited by Ebenezer Prout.

61. Harman, A., and Milner, A., *Man and His Music – Part Two: Late Renaissance and Baroque Music*

It is interesting to note that the earlier composers were sometimes much more literal and often the symbolic relationship is more a matter of denotation that exemplification since the feature exemplified is so obscure. A Harman and Milner comment, p.21 op.cit.

> *In order to give some idea of the variety of means used by Marenzio and others here are some typical examples of word painting; 'sea' – a wavy melodic line; 'sigh' – short rest like a catch of the breath, either after the first syllable of the work ('so-spiro') or else separating the word from the previous one; 'arch' – an ascending and descending 'curved' melody; 'night' – black notation; 'day' – long, white note values; 'suffering' – chromatic changes or major chords in which the roots usually lie a third apart, or have at least one not in common, e.g. C major to E major..........*
> *These examples while only constituting a fraction of those that can be found, were inevitably duplicated; thus black notes are also used when the Devil or Hell is mentioned; slowness or length of the time is also indicated by long notes, and undulating lines represent 'flying' as well.*

62. See Beardsley, M.C., *Languages of Art and Art Criticism* and Goodman's reply. Both in *Erkenntnis Vol.12.No.1.* (Jan. 1978)

Metaphor

1. I am thinking here of some historical accounts and explanations of metaphor as reducible to some form of simile or complete literal paraphrase. See the index of theories of metaphor compiled by W.A Shibles.

2. See Black, M., *Models and Metaphors* (1962)

3. See particularly Chapters I and VI.

4. LA p.80. He comments,

   If we could not readily transfer schemata to make new sorting and orderings, we should have to burden ourselves with unmanageably many different schemata, either by adoption of a vast vocabulary of elementary terms or by prodigious elaboration of composite ones.

5. Goodman, M., *Ways of Worldmaking* (1978) p.102

6. LA p.78

7. LA p.68

8. LA p.51

9. e.g. Carnap and Lewis

10. Goodman, N., *The Way the World Is* (1960)

11. Ibid.

12. Goodman, N., *Sense and Certainty* (1952) in Problems and Projects p60-68

13. Ibid. p61

14. Ibid. p62

15. Ibid. p63

16. Goodman, N., *The Structure of Appearance* (1951) pp.98-99

17. Goodman, N., *Sense and Certainty* (1952) p63 in Problems and Projects p60-68

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid. p64

20. Ibid. p65

21. Ibid. p65

22. I shall subsequently refer to a combination of such partial signals as a 'symbol complex'. This is not a term that Goodman uses.

23. Ibid. p66

24. Ibid. p67

25. Ibid. p67

26. *Sense and Certainty* was read as part of a symposium on Dec.29th 1951. The lectures that make up the main part of *Fact, Fiction and Forecast* were delivered in May 1953.

27. Goodman, N., *Fact, Fiction and Forecast* (Harvester 1979) p.41

Note the slight hedging in this formulation. This distinction between manifest and dispositional predicates, Goodman thinks, *might* best be considered relative to system. See his Note 7 on page 41.

28. Ibid, p.41

29. Where 'flexes' is to be read as 'bends under suitable pressure' and 'fails to flex' as 'fails to bend under suitable pressure' See ibid., p.44.

30. Ibid., p.53

31. Ibid., p.54

32. See examples the citing of 'crimson' and 'place-time' on page 52 and in the same section he says,

> *And other questions, such as our question about what colour occurs at p + t (or, as we may now frame it, the question which colour predicate is to be projected over p + t).....*

and again

> *This predicate simply projects the predicate 'blue'....*

33. Goodman, N., *The Structure of Appearance* pp.200-201

34. If there is no verbal label of the category then the set of predicates exemplifies the category and can act as a label that exemplifies itself.

35. All of these points concerning this picture I owe to Malcolm Wren, Fellow in Religion and the Arts at St. Martin's College Lancaster during the year 1980-1981.

36. See Wittgenstein, L., *Philosophical Investigations* II xi pp.193-229 (1953); also Ayer, A.J., *The Central Questions of Philosophy* Ch.V (1973); and Hester, M.B., *Metaphor and Aspect Seeing* (1966)

37. Wittgenstein, L., op.cit. p.208

38. We should remember that labels can be both verbal and non-verbal and both participate in structuring our worlds.

39. Goodman, N., *The Structure of Appearance* IV 3 p.93.

40. Ibid., IV 3 p.98

41. This model of how our experience becomes richer and deeper should not lead us to think that such desirable articulacy is directly proportional to the number of physically distinguishable characters capable of being deployed by a person. I have heard it argued by academics at conferences and most recently in an article by David Aspin in the Journal of Aesthetic Education (Spring 1982) that education improves the quality of life because it allows those who receive it to feel and acknowledge more subtle and more differentiated aspects of their world. So barely stated this is a crude and mistaken view. One of the great advantages of Goodman's account is that it shows how representation, exemplification and expression can use anything as a character in a schema and can make layer upon layer of meaning available even within a limited syntactic apparatus. We do not need to assume that a cosmopolitan multi-linguist understands and feels any more richly than a parochial, uni-liguist. It cannot be assumed that a peasant's parochial existence is necessarily devoid of any particular feeling or experience familiar to another person. Nothing in theory supports any judgement as to the quality of life judged as a function of the extent of the syntactic apparatus available.

42. An interesting and related account of our construction of the physical world is to be found in A.J. Ayer's – *The Central Question of Philosophy* Ch.5. Ayer here deals with the question of privacy and self-identification by showing in a similar way to Goodman how these concepts are developed from the attempt to organise presentations. He prefers to take objects as primitive but he shows how from the need to make decrees a concept of self with the capacity for private thoughts can be constructed.

43. Goodman, N., *Fact, Fiction and Forecast* p.92.

44. Goodman believes that there is no need to be inhibited by the apparent inability to get started by having to define 'projectibility' before it can be applied in clarifying itself. See pp.86-87 Ibid.

45. Ibid., p.88

46. Ibid., p.92

47. Ibid., p.100

48. Goodman, N., *The Structure of Appearance* p.99.

49. Goodman, N., *Fact, Fiction and Forecast* p.98.

50. LA p.72

51. LA p.72

52. LA p.74

53. LA p.75

54. LA p.78

55. Goodman, N., *Problems and Projects* p.63.

56. LA p.78

57. See *Seven Strictures on Similarity* (1970) in *Problems and Projects*. This gives the different sources of his distrust of 'similarity' as a philosophical concept. Earlier accounts can be found in *The Structure of Appearance* and *Languages of Art.*

58. Goodman, N., *Problems and Projects* p.444.

59. LA p.78

60. Israel Scheffler uses this fact as the basis of his criticism of Goodman's account. See his *Beyond the Letter: a philosophical inquiry into Ambiguity, Vagueness and Metaphor in Language.* (1978) p.124.

61. LA p.78

62. Sheffler op.cit. p.125

63. See below for an elaboration and explanation of M/F schema.

64. See LA p.70

65. LA p.79

66. It is also used, of course, in other situations where this type of electrical component is frequently referred to. I have specified this particular context to keep the example as concrete as possible.

67. LA p.71

68. It should be remembered that I am talking about grounds (psychological and formal) for the assertion of similarity. Thus this is a conceptual analysis which

aims to understand the use of the term 'similarity' given that it precludes that there can be grounds in any material identity.

69. That is, the realm made up of the aggregate of the ranges of extension of pachyderm descriptions.

70. Black, M., *Models and Metaphors* pp.29-30.

71. LA p.80

72. Kemp Shakespeare's Sonnets

73. LA pp.79-80

74. LA p.80

75. Goodman, N., *The Structure of Appearance* p.98.

76. Goodman, N., *Problems and Projects* pp.408-409.

Expression

1. Hume, David, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Everyman) p.250.
   See also Warnock, M., *Imagination* Part One.

2. Part of the distaste Hume felt for this conclusion concerning imagination was that the concepts of causation and of enduring objects were contradictory. cf. Treatise: Part IV – Of the Modern Philosophy.

3. Kant, I., *Critique of Pure Reason* – Transcendental Deduction paragraph 20.

4. Ibid., Transcendental Analytic: Introduction.

5. Ibid., Transcendental Doctrine of the Faculty of Judgement. Ch.1. Of the Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding.

6. Locus cit.

7. Locus cit.

8. Kant, I., *Critique of Pure Reason*. Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding. paragraph 11.

9. For an account of this specifically related to its effect on art see Gombrich, E., *Icones Symbolicae: Philosophies of Symbolism and their Bearing on Art* in *Symbolic Images* (Phaidon) 1948.

10. Panofsky, E., *Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance* (1972) p.159

11. Gombrich op.cit. p.159

12. These observations I owe to Malcolm Wren, formerly Fellow in Religion and the Arts at St. Martin's College, Lancaster, now of Avery Hill College, London.

13. Schelling Collected Works (Stuttgart) Part, Vol.III p.265.

14. In his later life Schelling attempted to unify the modes of intellectual intuition in the intuition of God. It was the religious rather than the aesthetic form that provided access to reality which was God rather than the more limited thing in itself. He also argued that human history showed a fall from God and that our perception of the world is imperfect and becoming more so. He says,

> *The extremely crepuscular fronts of known history (already evinces) a culture that had sunk from an earlier height and disfigured remnants of earlier science, symbols whose meaning seems to have been long forgotten.*

This is striking evidence of this philosopher's belief in the myth of the Golden Age; the myth that, as Gombrich pointed out, influences the philosophies of symbolism which had an important bearing on art.

15. Schelling op.cit. Part 1, Vol V p.261.

16. Tatarkiewicz – *A History of Six Ideas* (1980)

17. See Nadeau, M., *A History of Surrealism* (1964)

18. This is reminiscent of the Rhetorical tradition of oratory as persuasion. Numerous examples from the novel *War and Peace* come to mind as illustrations of the involuntary nature of the response. For example, Natasha at the opera, Nicolai and Natasha at their uncle's after the hunt, Pierre at the execution and so on.

19. Tolstoy, L., *What is Art and Essays on Art* (1929)

20. Ibid., p.123 (both quotations)

21. Ibid., p.229

22. Ibid., p.229

23. Tolstoy, L., *War and Peace* (Penguin) Book 4 Chap.13.

24. Croce does not strictly talk of 'emotion' expressed but it seems clearer not to try to insist on this distinction here but to explain it below.

25. Tolstoy, L., *What is Art and Essays on Art* (1929). It is worth repeating here that Tolstoy, whilst rejecting the idea of a small elite of people with the special

sensibility required to perceive 'reality', still has an elect. It so happens that Tolstoy's elect are the more numerous and humble but still a special sensibility is vouchsafed to them.

26. Ibid., p.228

27. Ibid., pp.122-123

28. Croce, B., *Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic* (Owen 1962) p.146.

29. Ibid., p.15

30. Ibid., p.26

31. Ibid., p.27

32. Ibid., p.111

33. Ibid., p.116

34. Ibid., p.118

35. Collingwood, R.G., *The Principles of Art.* (O.U.P 1965)

36. Ibid., p.162

37. Ibid., p.162

38. Given the fundamental place later afforded to emotion by Collingwood this sensitivity can be seen as giving a 'healthy' foundation to mental activity and leads to the view of art as therapeutic. It can also be seen as informing the view that children's art is expressive and emotional and not to be tampered with by education.

39. This is the duality of the products of the imagination that pervades all of the theories that we are considering.

40. Ibid., p.212

41. Ibid., p.216

42. These categories are reminiscent of Tolstoy's description of client art.

43. Dewey, J., Art as Experience (1934)

44. Ibid., p.263

45. Ibid., p.256

46. Ibid., p.61

47. Ibid., p.62

48. Ibid., p.97

49. Ibid., p.15

50. Ibid., p.76

51. Ibid., p.108

52. Ibid., p.208

53. Ibid., p.73

54. Langer, S., *Philosophy in a New Key* (1942)

55. Ibid., p.90

56. Ibid., p.89

57. Ibid., p.92

58. Ibid., p.98

59. Ibid., p.152

60. Ibid., p.153

61. Langer, S., *Feeling and Form* (1953)

62. Langer, S., *Philosophy in a New Key* p.244

63. Ibid., p.260

64. Dewey op.cit. p.65

Expression as Metaphorical Exemplification

1. LA p.85

2. LA p.95

3. LA pp.86-87

4. LA p.143

5. See Leo Steinberg's comments on the series of painting after Delacroix in *Other Criteria* – Steinberg O.U.P. (1972)

6. Handke, P., *Offending the Audience*. Originally published in German (in 1966)) as *Publikumsbeschimfung*

7. LA, II 2 – Searching and Showing.

8. LA p.236

9. LA p.240

10. LA pp.87-88

11. LA p.88

12. LA p.88

13. LA p.92

14. See Goodman, N., *Ways of Worldmaking* (1978)

15. LA p.88

16. LA p.88

17. Lawrence Gowing comments in his stimulating essay on Cezanne,

   One might write the history of that order of originality which this century identifies as the essence of art – and eventually it must be written – as a history of inveterate misunderstanding. We cannot claim that the view of Delacroix that inspired Cezanne represented a true evaluation of him.

   In Gowing, L., The Logic of Organized Sensation in Cezanne: the late work Thames and Hudson (1977)

18. LA pp.30-31

19. The Vikings called their longships 'sea-snakes'.

20. Exactly how this is achieved does not affect any of the points made here. It could be by being entitled 'Churchill', or by displaying visual props associated with Churchill, or more subtly by providing the bulldog with caricatured features that have become associated with him.

21. LA p.89

22. LA p.89

23. LA p.38

24. LA p.71

25. LA p.260

26. Some care was necessary in choosing a name that captured what might be called the homoiousia involved in the process of re-transference. COMMUNATIVE carried the sense of interchange but CONGENERATIVE and AFFINITIVE stressed the importance of the close 'family' ties of the various schemata. In the end AFFINITIVE seemed preferable for its slightly broader meaning.

27. LA p.92

28. See Bouwsma, Tormey, Beardsley, Wollheim, Wittgenstein.

29. LA p.264

30. LA pp.241-244

31. LA pp.245-246

32. LA p.246

33. LA p.248

34. LA p.249

35. LA p.249

36. LA p.249

37. LA p.249

38. See his *Definition and Dogma* reprinted in *Problems and Projects* (1972)

39. LA p.253 and 264

40. LA p.253

41. LA pp.258-259

42. LA p.258

43. Goodman, N., *Descartes as Philosopher* reprinted in *Problems and Projects* (1972)

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