



*Eroticism, narrative and cultural renewal: The writing of Salvador Dalí 1928-1945*

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**Eroticism, Narrative and Cultural Renewal: The Writing of Salvador  
Dalí 1928-1945**

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## **Abstract**

This thesis looks at how eroticism, literary narrative, and cultural renewal intersect in the written works of Salvador Dalí. Whilst much work has been carried out on his painted *oeuvre*, less has been said about his writings. I am going to highlight Dalí as a writer of Modernist texts, taking a contrary stance to Finkelstein (1998) and Lubar (1999) who have argued that his *oeuvre* shows anti-Modernist tendencies. I am going to investigate his relationship with Surrealism, using his explorations of hysteria and the political *milieu* of 1930s Europe to look at how his aesthetics intersect with, and depart from, the Movement. I will also look at the way in which Dalí eroticises writing/artistic creativity. Finally I am going to explore Dalí's relationship with fascism. Many scholars and journalists take it as a given that Dalí sympathised with Hitler. I take a different approach, arguing that he critiqued Hitler both before and during WW2, but at the same time had sympathies with fascist ideologies. This, I will suggest, is reflective of his relationship with Communism in the late 20s, early 30s, and Surrealism, in that he favours the values, ideologies, and aesthetics over their figureheads. This thesis looks in depth at texts that have received very little scholarly attention. In particular, his novel, *Hidden Faces* (1944). The text is central to an understanding of Dalí's relationship with fascism during WW2, but is also a text which brings together the three focuses of this thesis: eroticism, literary narrative, and cultural renewal. Thus, this thesis makes a contribution to knowledge in Dalí studies by looking at texts which have received little scholarly attention, situating him as a Modernist, and also by taking a new approach to his relationship with fascism.

## **Candidate's Statement**

This thesis is my own work. It was carried out with the help of a studentship from Sheffield Hallam University. My Director of Studies was Professor Chris Hopkins, and my Secondary Supervisor was Dr. Harriet Tarlo.

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## **Preface: Notes on the Chosen Texts**

In his introduction to Joseph-Lowery's critical edition of Salvador Dalí's 'autobiography', *La Vie Secrète de Salvador Dalí: Suis-je un Génie?* (2006), Spector declares "What difficulties confront us in reading the texts of Salvador Dalí!"<sup>1</sup> (7). This is no overstatement. The researcher who approaches the written works of Dalí is confronted with problems regarding both the original manuscripts of his works and those which have been officially published.

The publication and translation histories of Dalí's *The Secret Life of Salvador Dalí* (1942)<sup>2</sup> and *Hidden Faces* (1944) are somewhat unusual. They are puzzles which need investigating and decoding, a task from which Sherlock Holmes himself might have shied away. To start with a statement of fact, both texts, despite the manuscripts having been written in French, were originally published in English. The translations were produced by Haakon Chevalier during the writing process of both manuscripts with the constant input of Dalí. In the translator's foreword to *Hidden Faces*, it is suggested that at least some of the translation was written through dictation. Chevalier states that his "problem was to temper the native exuberance of [Dalí's] expression and reduce it to written language without losing its essential qualities" (vii).

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<sup>1</sup> Unless otherwise stated, all translations are my own.

<sup>2</sup> Here-on referred to as *Secret Life*.

Arguably, Chevalier would have had ‘problems’ translating Dalí’s written French without the presence of the man himself. It is no secret that Dalí’s spelling was atrocious, and his ability to write grammatically correctly had its limitations. One can see this quite clearly in his hand-written manuscript of *La Vie Secrète*<sup>3</sup> where he writes “ge ne suis heureusement pas de ses homes” (62), rather than ‘Je ne suis heureusement pas de ces hommes’. It can also be seen in his draft letter to Breton (c.1933) where he denies sympathising with Hitler and spells Hitlerian as “Itletirient” (4)<sup>4</sup>. In that instance, Gala, Dalí’s wife, made corrections to the spelling and turn of phrase as she produced a written-up version as a separate document. She also made corrections to spelling and grammar in *Secret Life* and Spector sees these corrections as disruptive to the meanings which Dalí intended to be manifested through his wordplay. Spector draws a direct relationship between Dalí’s mind and the text, suggesting that the text is an example of the Paranoiac-Critical Method (8). I, however, take a different stance regarding the text. In the early 1940s, Dalí was in the position of valuing public opinion extremely highly, but also wanting to shock it. He had gained considerable popularity in the United States of America. A text constructed with Dalí’s ‘misspelled’ French may or may not be a Paranoiac-Critical text, dependent upon whether or not one agrees with Spector, but it would also have been unreadable. The Dalí manuscript of *La Vie Secrète* is an intriguing artefact that scholars might study, but it would not have given Dalí the popularity he desired. Dalí wanted readers to understand, be distressed, and potentially titillated by the strange and often fabricated sexual escapades featured in his *Secret Life*, something which could not have happened if the words on the page had been unreadable and the text had been incomplete.

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<sup>3</sup> Printed in Joseph-Lowery’s critical edition, *La Vie Secrète de Salvador Dalí: Suis-je un Génie?* (2006).

<sup>4</sup> I would like to thank the Scottish National Gallery of Modern Art for access to their archives. As a result of their friendly and diligent attention I was able to access this draft letter.



These considerations contribute to my stance within this thesis of using the texts as they were originally published. In the case of his *Secret Life* and *Hidden Faces*, this would mean the original English translations. These will be treated as the definitive texts. Studying the *urtext* has value when one is exploring the development of a text, and the process through which it was created. However, the originally published work will be the focus of this thesis as it is the finished product I am focusing upon, not the work-in-progress. One can assume that as Chevalier went on from *Secret Life* to provide the translation for *Hidden Faces*, and Dalí did not publish a French version, *Visages Cachés*, until 1973, Dalí was satisfied with the English translation as the definitive version of his novel as well. Focusing on the texts as they were originally presented to the public gives an indication of how Dalí intended his works to be presented.

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*Secret Life* and *Hidden Faces* were originally published in English in 1942 and 1944 respectively, and there have been numerous editions since. It is in this territory of editions and various translations that the puzzle of Dalí's publication histories is complicated, especially in regards to his novel, *Hidden Faces*. After all, even though the text was originally published in English, if a French version had been published since that was based on the original French manuscript, then a case could be made for that being used as one of the texts in this thesis if it was a complete text. Whilst I have defended above my use of the originally published English translations of both *Secret Life* and *Hidden Faces*, it is important that I explain why I have not used French versions of *Hidden Faces* published post-1944 at all in this thesis.

There is a strong possibility that the English translations were the base texts for future translations of both ‘autobiography’ and novel, rather than the French manuscripts, further indicating that the English versions should be perceived as the definitive texts. Rasilla (2009) notes that Michel Déon’s abridged French language version of *Secret Life*, which in the front cover is designated as an ‘adaptation’, had its source as the English language edition (20). Furthermore, the turn of phrase in *Visages Cachés* is remarkably close to that of *Hidden Faces*. It would appear then that the first French publication of *Visages Cachés* was a translation into French from the English. This is suggested further by *Le Figaro*’s (2004, np) classification of the novel as foreign literature (‘roman étranger’). If the published French novel was taken from a French language manuscript, then surely it would not be classified in this way<sup>5</sup>.

There is no textual difference between the initial French edition of 1973 and the republication in 2004, the latter edition being that which *Le Figaro* was advertising. However, *Le Figaro* claimed that the French manuscript of *Visages Cachés* had not been found until 1983 (np). If *Le Figaro*’s claim was true, it would have been impossible for the 1973 edition to have been based on the original manuscript. Correspondence with Sabine Wespieser, the publisher of the 2004 edition, confirmed that the most recent edition is a reprint of the 1973 edition<sup>6</sup>, but numerous attempts to contact the publisher of the 1973 edition, *Editions Stock*, regarding whether their edition has a French manuscript as its basis, have not resulted in a response. Whilst Watthee-

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<sup>5</sup> Although, Watthee-Delmotte (2003) points out that Dalí was Catalanian, not French, and perceived in France as an interloper of the Surrealist Movement (345). Thus, any text produced by him, no matter in what language it was composed, may be considered ‘foreign’. There is irony in aligning Dalí’s alleged encroachment upon the Surrealist Movement with the invasion of a Catalan artist upon France, considering Surrealism was concerned with disrupting ideological notions of nationalism.

<sup>6</sup> This email correspondence occurred 27-28 July 2015.

Delmotte (2003) states that “*Visages Cachés* did not appear in its *original* French version until 1973” (344, my emphasis), it is unclear whether or not she means here that the text was based on the original French manuscript or that the 1973 edition was the ‘original French version’ in that it was the first edition published in French.

From the evidence available, then, I am treating the English version of *Hidden Faces* as the definitive text. Latter translations, even French ones, appear to have been based upon it. Given the linguistic closeness between them, and given Dalí’s desire to reach a large readership it is likely that he considered the English translation to be the definitive text.

### **Dalí’s other written works**

The publication histories of Dalí’s shorter texts which were published in such journals as *Le Surréalisme au service de la révolution* (1930-1933) and *Minotaure* (1933-1939) are considerably less complex, as during the 1920s and much of the 30s they were published in the language in which they were originally written. Towards the end of the 1930s, his works started to appear in their initial publications in English translation. This is an indication of how Dalí wished his works to be read in and by the English-speaking world.

In this thesis, in the same fashion as for his *Secret Life* and *Hidden Faces*, the shorter texts will be analysed from the language in which they were originally published. Thus, for the most part, I will be using the French language versions of the texts which

originally appeared in French<sup>7</sup>, and the English language versions of those which originally appeared in English. Any references I make to the texts which were originally published in Catalan, however, will be from the English translations. This is due to the practical consideration that I can read English and French, but not Catalan.

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<sup>7</sup> I would like to thank the Scottish National Gallery of Modern Art for access to the French language versions of Dalí's shorter texts.

## **Introduction: Thesis in Brief**

The overarching aim of this thesis is to explore the ways in which Dalí's written works of the late 1920s to 1945 conceptualise notions of eroticism, literary narrative, and cultural renewal, and to suggest that these conceptualisations exist upon the edges of Surrealism. Under this main aim, the following research questions will be explored: in what ways were eroticism, literary narrative, and cultural renewal central to Dalí's late 1920s to 1945 *oeuvre*? In what ways was cultural renewal so important to Surrealism and how did Dalí engage with those notions? Why is it important that we still engage today with those notions of cultural renewal? What was Dalí's relationship to Modernist aesthetics? Can he be considered a Modernist? Do Dalí's aesthetic theories regarding 'the Classic' and the way he applied them to an all-encompassing theory of cultural renewal intersect with a more general fascist ideology? If so, what does this mean in terms of the theoretical *milieu* of the interwar period in which theories of renewal abound but not all were fascist? What was the purpose behind the fascist rhetoric employed by Dalí in his novel, *Hidden Faces* (1944)? Can we take Dalí seriously? This introduction will look at how I mean to answer these questions and will outline the structure of my thesis.

Before I embark upon a discussion of the trajectories of Surrealist and Dalinian thought in the first chapter, I will submit some initial thoughts on the value of this thesis. This thesis focuses upon the written works of Salvador Dalí. Dalí's painted works are a much explored field of academic inquiry, as are biographical and psychological investigations of the artist himself. In the preface to his *Dalí and Postmodernism* (1997), LaFountain

claimed that a rereading of Dalí is necessary as a counterbalance to the myriad biographical and psychological works carried out on the artist (xv). It has been two decades since LaFountain's claim, and there still appears to be a disproportionate number of biographies and psychological accounts concerning the author in a variety of languages. Scholarship centring *primarily* upon his written works has been less prevalent. Although, notable studies have been carried out by Finkelstein, who in his *Collected Works of Salvador Dalí* (1998) brought together Dalí's short written works in translation with commentary, making these works available to a wider audience. He also focused on Dalí's writing in his *Salvador Dalí's Art and Writing 1927-1942: The Metamorphoses of Narcissus* (1996). Work has also been carried out by Ades (1995) and, more recently, Rothman (2007; 2012). None of these scholars, however, focus on Dalí's novel, *Hidden Faces* (1944), in any depth.

Referring to that novel, Wathee-Delmotte (2003) contends that the lack of scholarship, especially in France, is due to two principle reasons: how Dalí is viewed in that country in relation to Surrealism and the way in which French scholars are hesitant to pay attention to the writings of someone primarily considered an artist (344-345). She contends that whilst Surrealism is still much-loved and invites much serious scholarly debate, Dalí is considered to occupy the role of the jester (344-345). A case in point regarding how seriously Surrealism is still taken is the Jean Clair scandal of 2001 where in an article in *Le Monde*, Clair made a conceptual link between Surrealism's views on insurrection and al-Qaida (Read, 2007, 29-45). The article attracted a large number of responses in defence of Surrealism, many of which were collected into a book (29-45). Wathee-Delmotte's claim regarding Dalí suggests then that his novel is not considered as valuable or worthy of analysis due to how he is perceived negatively in connection

with that Movement, and as such by extension this offers an explanation as to why Dalí's written works in general have received little scholarly attention in France (344-345).

Wattthee-Delmotte's claim that Dalí is perceived as a 'jester' and thus not worthy of scholarly attention is an important one, and I will return to it within this thesis as it suggests that serious academic enquiry should not be carried out on someone who is not being serious. In posing the question of whether we should take Dalí seriously, Finkelstein (1975) and Radford (1997) have also drawn attention to the notion of Dalí-as-jester. Finkelstein takes a more ambiguous stance compared with Radford, concluding that it is difficult to tell whether Dalí is serious or not. Through his *Collected Works of Salvador Dalí* (1998), *Art and Writing* (1996), and 'Dalí's Paranoia-Criticism or The Exercise of Freedom' (1975) he continuously attributes to Dalí a calculating character, suggesting that Dalí's motivations behind his artworks, theories, and rhetoric fall within the following remits: to be taken seriously and to give his work the appearance of "scientific validity" (1975, 61); to cement his place in the Surrealist Movement or any other group (61); and parody (69). The latter point he finds particularly troublesome as he notes that in such a case one cannot tell whether Dalí wants to be taken seriously or is joking (69). However, he also claims that "the rigor with which [his tongue-in-cheek] is sustained may imply some hidden seriousness" (1975, 68-69), a claim which he reiterates in all three of the aforementioned works. Radford sees Dalí's role as 'jester' primarily as a conduit for the artist to "provoke and annoy" (327). He sees the role as a reaction to "a well-policed art world" in which "subversive" behaviour was subsumed "into the structures of the new official culture" (327). He goes on to suggest that irony is the best means of reading Dalí's behaviour

and works after his visit to America in 1934 (327). The idea that Dalí was reacting to a reduction in subversiveness in the art world is an interesting one as it suggests that Dalí's role as 'jester' can be viewed seriously as a commentary on his artistic *milieu*. Whereas the scholars to whom Watthee-Delmotte refers saw his antics as reason not to take him seriously, Radford's view seems to suggest that those same antics are one of the reasons why he should be studied as they offer a window on the artistic world which he occupied.

The question of whether or not we should take Dalí seriously has not stopped critical attention being paid to his 'autobiography', *The Secret Life of Salvador Dalí* (1942), a text which has fascinated scholars since its publication. The lack of in-depth scholarly attention paid to his novel, on the other hand, is notable, the only exceptions, until the account in this thesis, being by Watthee-Delmotte (2003) and Cate-Arries (1995). Caws (2008) points out this lack in her informal and sometimes distractingly flippant biography of Dalí, and claims that, combined with her reading of the novel, it inspired her to undertake her text (117). Having acknowledged this "precious little discussion" (117) and its influence on her biographical endeavour it is strange that she then settles for providing little more than a description of some of the imagery, providing a one-sentence, reductive, and inadequate definition of one of the key concepts, Clédalism, in the process. Cate-Arries focuses on the importance of Dalí's friend, the poet Garcia Lorca, to the text, claiming that he is "the most significant textual presence in the novel" (19). She connects the presence of Lorca to what she sees as "the overriding theme of the novel, that of death and resurrection" (19). I too see renewal and rebirth as the central tropes of *Hidden Faces*. Unlike Cate-Arries, however, I link them to Dalí's exploration of fascist ideology and his engagement with Modernist aesthetics. Gibson



(1997), in his brief, but more in depth than Caws', analysis of *Hidden Faces*, also focuses primarily on the presence of Garcia Lorca, offering a biographical interpretation (424-430), and Morris (1972) mentions the biographical in his suggestion that there is anger towards Garcia Lorca in the novel, before referring, without analysis, to Clédalism (31-32). Indeed, other than in Watthee-Delmotte's analysis, the biographical and Clédalism are most often highlighted.

The shortage of lengthy, scholarly, critical response to the novel in English is surprising considering that it was originally published in the English language and reviewed in the British and American national presses upon its re-publications. Indeed, the reviews often say more than scholarly accounts. Reynolds (2007, *The Times*), for instance, takes a positive stance towards the novel and also pursues the position of taking the novel seriously, locating its importance in its representation of "the extremes of experience forced by war" (14). She draws attention to the density and difficulty of the language, as does Kavanagh (1973, 14) and Wilson (1944, 61), the latter parodying the writing style. Kavanagh mocks Dalí's turn-of-phrase, but implies that this style is confined to the preface and acknowledgements. It is worth noting that it most assuredly is not. She sings the praises of the novel itself, calling it "an old-fashioned baroque novel, intelligent, extravagant, as photographically precise as his paintings but not so silly" (14). Indeed, Kavanagh does not hide her antipathy towards Dalí's paintings, but finds many things to appreciate in the novel. Melly (1973), however, takes a different evaluative stance towards the novel, and, indeed, the artist himself in his review. After making some surface reflections upon the themes and content of the work he embarks upon a scathing attack on the artist, claiming that "[i]n the final analysis... he is not a genius, but a clown of prodigal talent dedicated to one end only, the betrayal of his few

years of authentic delirious inspiration at the end of the twenties and during the first half of the thirties – a period which coincided with his adherence to the Surrealist movement” (37). One wonders, at this point, why a quotation from this review was used on the back of the republication of the novel in 2007, especially as he goes on to accuse Dalí of sympathies with “Mediterranean Fascism” (37). He sees the novel as reflective of Dalí’s elitism, condemns it as “rigidly conservative”, and claims that it induces physical symptoms of sickness: “the book, despite its considerable qualities as an entertainment, left me feeling that I had just woken up after a night of elaborate but meaningless excess with a bad headache and a filthy taste in my mouth” (37). Thus, for Melly, the novel is both meaningless and reflective of Dalí’s fascist sympathies; it is elitist, conservative, and thoroughly sickening. It is also entertaining. The vitriol of Melly’s attack on Dalí and *Hidden Faces* illustrates perfectly the emotional response that Dalí’s works, both aesthetically and ideologically, can produce. It also demonstrates how some of Dalí’s works have been dismissed on the grounds that they reflect the alleged fascist views of their creator.

As a response to the dismissive attitude to which *Hidden Faces* has sometimes been subjected, one of the reasons I am focusing upon Dalí’s fiction in discussing his formulations of ‘cultural renewal’ and eroticism is that I wish to foreground his importance as a writer. On an episode of the American panel show, ‘What’s my Line?’, in 1957, Dalí answered ‘yes’ to the question of whether he was a writer<sup>8</sup>, much to the hilarity of the audience. After the host discussed the matter with him, he finally agreed that Dalí had the right to call himself by such an appellation. The fact that an American, popular audience on the whole did not seem to be aware that he had published written

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<sup>8</sup> Dalí also claimed that he could be considered a “performer” and a “leading man”. The host contested the latter point and agreed with one of the panellists that he is “a misleading man”. This, I feel, is an accurate description of Dalí.

works suggests that his novel was relatively unknown, as were his other writings. The narrative complexity of his written works has often been buried beneath a focus upon his eccentricity, and as such I wish to refocus attention upon the actual writing.

More scholarly attention has been paid to Dalí's shorter written works than *Hidden Faces*. These texts were originally published in journals such as *Surréalisme au service de la révolution* (1930-1933) and *Minotaure* (1933-1939). As noted above, Finkelstein (1998) has produced a collection of these works in English translation, split up conceptually into sections, and with introductory essays to each section. These essays focus upon the theoretical tenets of Dalí's work whilst at the same time bringing in considerations of motivations, biography, and psychology. I have found this collection to be an invaluable source for translations of Dalí's early written works in Catalan<sup>9</sup>. Where possible, however, I have worked from the original French of Dalí's texts from 1930 onwards<sup>10</sup>. The shorter texts which will be discussed in depth in this thesis are: 'Poetry of the Mass-Produced Utility' (1928)<sup>11</sup>, 'L'Ane pourri' (1930), 'La Chèvre sanitaire' (1930), and 'Rêverie' (1931). Both 'L'Ane pourri' and 'La Chèvre sanitaire' are most commonly studied in attempting to understand the early phase of Dalí's Paranoiac-critical method. Whilst I have used them for the same purpose in this thesis, they also form an important part of my exploration into whether Dalí can be considered a Modernist. I have used 'Poetry of the Mass-Produced Utility' primarily for this latter purpose also. 'Rêverie', despite marking an important point in the relationship between the Surrealists and the French Communist Party, and the relationship between the

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<sup>9</sup> When referring to the Catalan texts in this thesis I have worked from Finkelstein's translations.

<sup>10</sup> I am indebted to the Scottish National Gallery for allowing me to view the original French language texts of Dalí's written works.

<sup>11</sup> This text was originally published in Catalan. I have thus used Finkelstein's English translation.

Surrealists themselves<sup>12</sup>, has received little attention. I will be discussing it in terms of Dalí's explorations of hysteria in chapter 2 and erotic 'narrative inquisitions' in chapter 3.

## Chapter Outlines

In the first chapter, 'Trajectories of Surrealist and Dalinian Thought', I will use a selection of Dalí's short written texts of the late 1920s to 1945 to explore the ways in which Dalí's theories regarding aesthetics, eroticism, and politics intersected with, and departed from, Surrealist thought. Looking at these texts allows me to study the ways in which his thought continuously evolved and developed over his pre-1945 career. Post-WW1, cultural renewal became a national concern in France where there had been excessive loss of life (Gascoigne, 2007, 9-10, n. 1). Gascoigne describes the war as an "[a]rmageddon of the trenches" (10), depicting in apocalyptic language the destruction of Enlightenment metaphysics, resulting in the need to recoup them or to renew society on different lines. It was the latter target upon which the Surrealists focused by exploring how the irrational, the unconscious, and dreams could disrupt conventional modes of thinking and thus change society (10). My thesis takes its point of departure to be how Surrealism engaged with the impulse for renewal, and then how Dalí did so both within the remit, and on the edges, of Surrealism.

In chapter 2, 'Dalí's Hysteric Performance and the *Fin-de-Siècle*', I look at Dalí's representation of hysteria in 'Rêverie' (1931), and how Gordon's (2001; 2004) work on performing hysteria in late 19<sup>th</sup>, early 20<sup>th</sup>, century cabaret and other stage productions

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<sup>12</sup> Breton (1969, 168-170), Finkelstein (1996, 122), and Gibson (1997, 296) have offered accounts of the consequences of 'Rêverie's' publication. This will be discussed in chapter 2.

helps us to understand it. I then look at how Dalí's representation of hysteria changed by *Hidden Faces* (1944). I discuss the ways in which he engaged with *fin-de-siècle* narratives of hysteria in the portrayal of one of the main female protagonists of the novel, Solange de Cléda.

In chapter 3, 'Narrative Inquisitions' and the Erotic Text', I carry out a three-text exploration of Dalí's deployment of what I call 'narrative inquisitions', using 'Rêverie' (1931), *Hidden Faces* (1944), and *Unspeakable Confessions of Salvador Dalí* (1976). I also investigate the relationship he draws between eroticism and writing/artistic creation.

Chapter 4, 'Dalí the Modernist', explores Dalí's relationship to Modernist aesthetics. Taking a broad definition of Modernism, I will look at whether Dalí can be positioned as a Modernist within a plural of Modernisms. Previous studies into Dalí's relationship with Modernism have used a narrow definition of Modernist aesthetics, whereby such aesthetics are seen in terms of style, technique, form, and medium over content and psychology. Rothman (2007; 2012), Lubar (1999), and Finkelstein (1998) have all used a definition of this variety and discussed Dalí in terms of how he critiqued Modernist aesthetics. I look at how Dalí engaged with the concept of the 'new' and how from the mid-30s onwards he keyed into a 'Classicist' thread of Modernism. I draw parallels between Dalí's theories on 'the Classic' and T.E. Hulme's exploration of the relationship between 'Classicism' and 'Romanticism' in the latter's 'Romanticism and Classicism' (1911), and I also draw parallels between Dalí's notion of 'freedom within limits' and T.S. Eliot's 'historical sense' outlined in the latter's 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' (1920b). In so doing I am departing from those scholars who position

Dalí purely in a Spanish or French cultural, political, and aesthetic *milieu*, and positioning him in a broader field of Modernist endeavour which crosses further national boundaries.

Chapter 5, ‘The Rise and Fall of the ‘Great’ Narcissists’, looks at the figure of the Narcissist in Dalí’s work. I argue that Dalí uses the Freudian theory of how Narcissistic personality develops, outlined in Freud’s ‘On the Introduction of Narcissism’ (1914), to critique the notion of the fascist leader. I then suggest that in *Hidden Faces*, the rise of the fascist leader is dramatized and critiqued through the Narcissistic figure, the Comte de Grandsailles.

Chapter 6, ‘The Charge of Fascism’, explores Dalí’s relationship to fascist ideology. From the mid-1930s onwards Dalí claimed he was apolitical and ahistorical, but commentators have expended much energy on discussing whether Dalí had fascist sympathies. Klein (2009) appears to take as a given “his right-wing sympathies” that amongst other factors “conspired to dim his reputation” (np), and, as noted earlier, Melly (1973) accused him of having sympathies with “Mediterranean Fascism” (37). In keeping with Orwell’s (1944) claim that Dalí’s emphasis on obscenity was a means to be provocative rather than for any profound philosophical reason (np), however, Millet (cited in Klein, 2009) argues that his “political statements”, such as those in favour of General Franco, are “like much of his art,... mostly provocation” (np). Here, then, we return to the idea that Dalí said and did things for the sake of provocation. Whilst Millet appears to be suggesting that the provocation should not be taken seriously, as Radford (1997, 327) noted his provocative statements can be considered serious in themselves as a form of social commentary. Dalí himself drew attention to the fact that he was often

provocative, recounting an occasion in his *Secret Life* where he claims that he said things to the Surrealists for the sole purpose of “annoying everyone”: “I tossed a certain number of bold slogans into the bosom of the surrealist group in order to test their demoralizing effect during my absence... All this, I knew, would suffice for several years, and I purposely gave very few explanations” (257). These provocative statements, however, are unlike the theories he expounds in the late 30s, that he eventually goes on to call ‘Classic’ in 1941. The theories are consistent, elaborated upon, and maintained for years, even post-WW2. And it is these theories, as outlined in depth in *Secret Life* (1942), and then dramatized in *Hidden Faces* (1944), that I suggest adhere to fascist ideology. I am thus claiming that Dalí was neither apolitical<sup>13</sup> nor ahistorical. I am not merely joining those scholars in the ‘Dalí was a fascist’ camp, however. I am contending that Dalí critiqued the nature of the fascist leader<sup>14</sup> and thus did not have sympathies with Hitler or the Nazi Party, but that he supported elements of fascist ideology, most importantly Griffin’s (2012) notion of “the centrality of ‘palingenetic myth’ to fascism” (7), i.e. a “form of ultra-nationalism that attempts to realize the myth of the regenerated nation” (1). I further suggest that Dalí’s stance towards fascism takes the same form as his stance towards Communism in the late 20s, early 30s, and Surrealism in the 30s: supporting ideology over the leadership. I argue, then, that *Hidden Faces* is central to an understanding of Dalí’s relationship to fascism, and that it must be read in combination with *Secret Life*.

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<sup>13</sup> Both Radford (1997) and Pine (2010) have discussed ways in which Dalí was political. Radford states that “[n]o matter how much he would have preferred to close his mind to the crude political realities surrounding him, by 1935 he could no longer ignore the inexorable build-up of oppression and conflict in Europe” (184). Pine claims that some of Dalí’s paintings of bread carried out in the 30s make a social commentary that has much in common with Communist interests (93; 94).

<sup>14</sup> Greeley (2006) has also argued that Dalí critiqued Hitler, but she uses Lacan and a discussion of masochism to make her point (80-89). I use the Freudian notion of Narcissism. See footnote 120 for more on this.

## Situating Dalí on the Edge of Surrealism

I have positioned Dalí on the edge of Surrealism as a means of highlighting his contentious relationship with the Movement. Even though he did not officially depart from the Movement until 1939, there was a constant tension between himself and André Breton from the late 20s onwards. Throughout his career, as a member of the Movement and post-1939, he adhered to elements of the Movement's aesthetics but continuously provoked Breton with his behaviour, writings, and paintings. For instance, Dalí recounts in his *The Unspeakable Confessions of Salvador Dalí* (1976) that in 1934, whilst defending his *The Weaning of Furniture-Nutrition* against charges of fascist sympathies, he declared that "if tonight I dream I am screwing you, tomorrow morning I will paint all of our best fucking positions" (126)<sup>15</sup>. Breton was famously homophobic, and the artist's words had infuriated him (126)<sup>16</sup>. That painting along with Breton's dislike of *Lugubrious Game* (1929) will be discussed in further detail in chapters 6 and 1 respectively, and their content and reception can be seen as evidence of the contentious relationship between Dalí and Breton. Dalí's association with Surrealism, then, should be seen in terms of a continued interest in Surrealist aesthetics but an ambivalence, if not at times outright antipathy, towards the leadership of the Movement.

Dalí always had one foot in and one foot out of the Movement. The way in which Dalí engaged with Surrealism showed a 'double-allegiance' to it. Here I am co-opting a

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<sup>15</sup> Radford offers a toned down version of Dalí's words: "If I dream tonight that I made love to you, tomorrow morning I would paint our best amorous positions" (151). This toned down translation fits in with Radford's claim that the words "goad[ed]" Breton (151), compared with the violent and confrontational tone in *Unspeakable Confessions*.

<sup>16</sup> For primary evidence of Breton's homophobia, see (ed.) Pierre, J. (2011), *Investigating Sex: Surrealist Discussions*. This contains transcripts of the discussions on sex which the Surrealists held between 1928 and 1932 and originally published in their journal, *La Révolution surréaliste*. See in particular pages 27 and 28.



phrase coined by Suleiman (2003) which she used to describe one of the ways in which women associated with Surrealism engaged with the Movement. I am not, of course, using it in the same way, as the term used by Suleiman relates to how women “situate[d] their work in relation to the work of dominant males” (5), of whom Dalí, of course, would be one. I am, however, suggesting that there were common strategies used by artists and writers on the edge of Surrealism when engaging with the Movement, albeit strategies that were being used for different ends. Suleiman argued that there were three main ways in which female artists engaged with the Movement: ‘Mimicry’, where Surrealist tropes and themes were ironically repeated as a means to critique the representation of women; ‘Internal polemic’, where works offered an “[e]xplicitly hostile parody or critique of Surrealist males and their views”; and ‘Assimilation’, where no difference, aesthetically or critically, can be discerned between the work and similar ones by male Surrealists (5). The first two strategies, according to Suleiman, offer a ‘double allegiance’ to the Surrealist Movement as they are using the aesthetic strategies and forms found in Surrealist works, but at the same time are demonstrating “allegiance to the feminist critique of sexual ideologies” (5). She further claims that ‘double allegiance’ can be described as “ambivalence, simultaneously positive and negative feelings directed towards the same object” (5), and it is this latter point which has strong significance for Dalí’s stance towards the Surrealist Movement. At different points in his career, one can discern all three of Suleiman’s terms; he ‘mimics’ Surrealist rhetoric in a way in which one is not always certain whether he is being critical or not; he openly critiques Surrealist views, which can be seen most clearly in his *Secret Life* (1942), *Hidden Faces* (1944), and *Unspeakable Confessions* (1976); and there are occasions when there is no real distinction to be made between his works and those of other Surrealists. This latter point, in the case of Dalí, I would argue is also an instance of ‘double allegiance’. As I demonstrate in my discussion of

‘Rêverie’ (1931), Dalí enacts a *performance* of Surrealism and its concerns in that text, a performance which straddles the line between authentic Surrealist expression and inauthentic replication without critique of the Movement. Thus, I would argue that Suleiman’s three strategies of mimicry, hostility, and assimilation offer a better interpretation of Dalí’s work than Finkelstein’s (1975; 1998) sometimes cynical classification of Dalí’s motivations as self-interested.

Going forward into the first chapter, then, this thesis positions Dalí on the edge of Surrealism. This is one of the primary focuses of the first chapter which looks at the ways in which Dalinian thought intersected with, and departed from, Surrealist thought from the late 1920s to 1945. Positioning Surrealism as a political Movement as well as an artistic and literary one, I will be suggesting that the way in which Dalí’s aesthetics intersect with political concerns is a point where his aesthetics both converge with, and depart from, Surrealist interests.

## **PART 1: SURREALISM AND DALI**

## **Chapter 1: Trajectories of Surrealist and Dalinian Thought**

### **Surrealism as Political**

To refer to Surrealism as *just* an artistic or literary Movement is to miss the point of Surrealism. Whilst it *was* an artistic *and* literary Movement which offered a way of viewing the world intended to disrupt the viewer or reader's conception of reality, such a definition on its own ignores the political direction which the Movement took in the 1930s. Franklin Rosemont noted this in 1970, drawing an integral relationship between Surrealist art and revolutionary ideology and activity. "Forty-five years after the appearance of the first Surrealist Manifesto," he states, "the revolutionary aims and principles of surrealism remain almost completely misunderstood in the English-speaking world" (1). Indeed, more recently, as Read (2007) has noted, at an exhibition in Paris entitled *La Révolution surréaliste*, the Movement was defined in terms of its aesthetic output. In this instance, a group surreptitiously replaced the official exhibition literature with "an unauthorised facsimile which emphasised Surrealism's anti-fascist, anti-capitalist and anti-clerical credentials" (30, n. 2).

Ninety four years have expired since the *Manifeste du surréalisme* (1924) first saw the light of day, and when defining Surrealism in scholarly criticism or on museum websites and catalogues, the terms 'artistic' and 'literary' are still those which appear most often. On the *Musée Magritte* site, for instance, it is described as "an artistic movement," but "[o]riginally, ... essentially literary" (np). The introduction to the Movement offered by this site overlooks the political aspects. A reason for this

omission could be that outlining a political stance might be more alienating to potential visitors than referring to the Movement's artistic output. Interestingly, however, on that same page, one of the pictures used to illustrate the text is the front cover of Breton's 'What is Surrealism?', a pamphlet for a lecture Breton gave in 1934 to the Belgian Surrealists which focused heavily on Surrealism as an instrument for political revolution. The only mention of artistic technique in that lecture was in retrospective discussion of Surrealist texts written in the years previous. Whilst the Magritte Museum no doubt chose this text because the cover features a painting by Magritte, it essentially effaces the text's revolutionary content. The text discussed dialectical materialism as the theory which underlies Surrealist endeavour, a far cry, Breton admits, from the idealist standpoint of mind over matter which characterised early Surrealism (116; 117).

The classification of Surrealism as purely an artistic Movement was also an issue during the Movement's heyday in the 1930s. Radford (1997) describes how, much to the chagrin of Dalí, the New York Museum of Modern Art's 'Fantastic Art, Dada, Surrealism' exhibition of December 1936 to January 1937 presented Surrealism as just an "artistic movement, completely devoid of any socially disruptive, indeed revolutionary, intention; this perception of Surrealism as being more entertaining than threatening dominated its public reception in the United States" (168). Looking at British newspaper reports on the Surrealist exhibitions of 1937 in London also reveals the Movement being presented predominantly in terms of entertainment, and indeed in some instances being dismissed for that reason. Newton (*Sunday Times*, 1937) emphasises the escapism provided by the entertainment value of Surrealism, and compares "[t]he true Surrealist exhibition" to joke-shop hijinks. He does not deny that the Surrealist artists have talent, but rather that they need to use this talent for more

serious ends as “[t]here’s no harm in the Surrealists having their bit of fun, but fun is rather less than half of art” (7). By 1946, Newton is accusing Surrealism of ‘Mannerism’ (*Sunday Times*, 6), a term he defines in 1950 as an aesthetic which uses form and content for the sake of it, “art that reflects nothing but art, and, in doing so, verges on parody” (*Sunday Times*, 4). It is a form of imitation, getting caught within the visual trappings of an art Movement; and the imitation which Newton sees Surrealism as carrying out is the juxtaposition of strange and disparate objects, a manoeuvre no longer carried out to say anything of importance (1946, 6).

Not all of the British newspaper reports from the 1930s showed a complete disregard for the revolutionary and political aims of Surrealism, however. Whereas Radford noted that the New York Museum of Modern Art’s 1936-1937 exhibition presented the Movement as ‘more entertaining than threatening’, there were British journalists who perceived the potentially threatening nature of Surrealism and tried to defuse it. An article without by-line in the *Sunday Dispatch* (‘Red Gallery of Art Horrors: Insulting Union Jack’, 1937) sensationally draws attention to the perceived threat from the revolutionary content of some of the Surrealist paintings at a 1937 exhibition in London, some of the organisers of which were “‘red’ in [their] ideals” (np). Indeed, the article makes numerous attempts to defuse the perceived threat: it draws attention to the notion that some of the painters exhibited were there to make money and actively distanced themselves from the political content of the other paintings; it reiterates the notion that the artists could not explain what their paintings meant, and uses this to undermine the works; linked to this latter point, it uses viewer bewilderment as a form of critique; it questions how much talent was actually required to create some of the

works of art, claiming that they are not worth the price tags; and it re-positions the threatening paintings as humorous, thus taming them.

Taking a different approach to revolutionary content within Surrealist art, Hugo Porterhouse (1937, *New English Weekly*) acknowledges that Surrealism at least once had revolutionary content, but he adopts a cynical and mocking tone to argue that the days in which they had any revolutionary impact is gone: “This riotous movement, which twenty years back nearly set the Seine on fire, has settled down in London as a quiet, respectable parlour game for tired painters and tired revolutionaries... Surrealism, that was to be a way of life, brought no surrealist dresses, no Surrealist behaviour” (np). He thus does not use ridicule defensively or as a means of defusing a perceived threat, but rather as what he sees as a legitimate means of presenting the Movement.

What these accounts of Surrealist exhibitions in Britain demonstrate is that the Movement was primarily seen in the popular reports of the time as artistic, an entertainment, and humorous. When revolutionary intent was noted, it was either defused through mockery or brushed aside as a previous iteration of Surrealism which by 1937 was over. There was very little middle-ground in stance towards the Movement. It provoked strong responses of either support or denigration, but even those who showed support did not mention its revolutionary content. In a Letter to the Editor (‘Don’t Laugh at Us: Protest Against ‘Pulling Legs’ of ‘SubConscious’ Surrealists’, *Sunday Times*, 1937, np), for instance, a concerned citizen defended Surrealism “in the face of almost universal ridicule”. The writer shows an understanding of the Movement’s interest in the subconscious and suggests that it is because Surrealist art is difficult to understand that it receives criticism, but does not touch upon politics.

Considering how it was in fact the 1930s that André Breton made his strongest foray into political rhetoric, it is interesting how little interest or indeed knowledge there was of the details of this in the articles. There are some possible explanations for the ignorance of the Movement's revolutionary leanings in the British articles, however. It could be symptomatic of how the Movement was 'sold' and marketed in exhibitions. People visiting exhibitions presenting Surrealism as solely an artistic Movement could be forgiven for not being aware of their political leanings. After all, the exhibition criticised for its 'red ideals' contained paintings which openly engaged with politics. A second explanation could be that at a time where many thought that war was imminent, the few years leading up to 1939 being filled with anticipation of such an outbreak, perhaps it was considered too alienating to the viewing public to emphasise politics. A further explanation could be that copies of Surrealist texts espousing their political views were not available in English translation in the 1930s. Even the first and second manifestoes of Surrealism were not widely available in translation until 1969<sup>17</sup>.

My intention in this chapter is to show how for the Surrealists political, revolutionary, and artistic considerations all intertwined with the aim of cultural renewal through art. The progression of Surrealist and Dalinian thought was characterised by these interconnections. In this chapter I will introduce Dalí's relationship to politics. Whilst this subject will be discussed in more depth in chapters 4, 5, and 6, my engagement with Dalí in this chapter will be to position him in relation to Surrealism and discuss the ways in which aesthetics and a notion of cultural renewal intersect within his works. I will now briefly outline my position regarding Surrealism, Dalí, and politics.

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<sup>17</sup> The earliest edition on Worldcat.org is Breton, André (1969), *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, tr. Richard Seaver and Helen R. Lane, University of Michigan Press.



My position in regards to Surrealism, as developed within this chapter so far, is that it was not just an artistic and literary Movement, nor was it just a political or revolutionary Movement. It was all of these things. Even Apollinaire's original use of the term '*sur-réalisme*' in 1917, which Breton appropriated for his own ends, signified the intersection of politics and aesthetics. '*Sur-réalisme*' was coined by Apollinaire in the program for Jean Cocteau's ballet, *Parade* (1917) (Schloesser, 2005, 144). One of Cocteau's intentions with his play was to bring together the aesthetic 'right' and 'left' (143-144). The aesthetic 'left' was considered as sympathetic with the Germans and thus unpatriotic, and the 'right' "now seemed to represent anarchic and decadent disorder" (143), thus demonstrating that aesthetics had already been aligned with political stances. Cocteau attempted to bring the two sides together with the intention of "reawakening' ... the 'French spirit'" (144). Thus, politically imbued aesthetics was seen as the best way of accomplishing a political intention. The combination of the 'right' and the 'left' was intended to "redefine the real", and Apollinaire used '*sur-réalisme*' to denote this (144). Whilst Breton appropriated the term for his own use, he maintained Apollinaire's definition of an aesthetic "'more real than the real'" (144), and maintained the subtext that aesthetics and politics were intertwined. Aesthetics and art for the cause of social change.

The idea that aesthetics and politics were intertwined could also be found in the Movement out of which Surrealism emerged in the early 1920s: Dada. Much like the Dadaists, the Surrealists saw this intersection as being put to the cause of ensuring the forces which had led to the Great War would not develop again (Nicholls, 2009, 246-247). The description, art for the cause of social change, however, cannot be so

comfortably applied to the Dadaists, as they rejected the notion of art in favour of anti-art. They saw the notion of ‘art’ as one of the forces which had led to WW1, and over great positive theories of progress and reconstruction favoured negation and rejection (247; 250)<sup>18</sup>. The methods the Dadaists used in their rejection of art included the unhinging of words from signification (Nicholls, 248), the use of hypnotic rhythms and chants to separate the listener and interlocutor from the usual uses of language (248), “primitive spontaneity” (248), and the “gymnastic poem” (Tzara, cited by Nicholls, 249), a term which emphasises the contortions and acrobatics to which language and words were subjected by the Dadaists. To this, Hopkins (2004) adds photomontage (76-77) and Duchamp’s ‘ready-mades’ (86). Whilst Surrealism took a more positive approach to art, choosing to redefine art’s traditional source from representing the outside world to representing the world which resides within, rather than rejecting art completely, influences of Dada continued into the Surrealist Movement<sup>19</sup>. The Surrealists, too, were interested in separating the signifier and signified, putting this to use in the mid-late 20s in what Nicholls (2009) has identified as a critique of Literary Realism (305). They were interested in how language constructs and perpetuates metaphysics, and wished to disrupt the post-Enlightenment metaphysic of reason and cause and effect by experimenting with language. As Nicholls has stated, they “set... out to undermine our power to recognise the world in language” (306). Hopkins argues that Dadaist aesthetics were diluted within Surrealism (76), and indeed this reading has credence when you consider that the anti-theory, anti-philosophy stances of Dada were replaced by the theorisations in Breton’s attempted recordings of the unconscious and Dalí’s Paranoiac-Critical Method. This thesis, after all, portrays Dalí as a theorist. Favouring theory over negation does not necessarily diminish the radicalism of a text, however. As I will show in chapter 2, Dalí’s ‘Rêverie’ (1931) is radical in its approach

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<sup>18</sup> In chapter 4 I argue that Dada could not maintain such a radical approach to art.

<sup>19</sup> Both Nicholls (2009, 301) and Hopkins (2004, 76) also see a Dada influence in Surrealism.

to sexuality whilst being underpinned by theories regarding hysteria and ‘physiological readership’. Furthermore, in chapter 4 I demonstrate that there is a Dadaist influence, combined with a positive, theory-inflected Surrealist influence, in his ‘Poetry of the Mass-Produced Utility’ (1928), which produces a text which effectively calls for anti-art over elitest notions of art.

Whilst Surrealism did not embrace the negation of Dada, its political stance in regards to ensuring nothing like WW1 happened again grew out of the earlier Movement. Later in this chapter I discuss how Surrealism went about this aim through literature and art. Dalí also intermingled aesthetics and politics; in the late 20s, early 30s, when he openly argued in favour of Communist ideology and the need for Surrealist involvement within that ideology, and even in the late 30s onwards when he began to claim that he was both apolitical and ahistorical. His aesthetic of the ‘Classic’, announced by Dalí himself in 1941 in ‘The Last Scandal of Salvador Dalí’ as being the aesthetic which would supercede all that which he had done before, contained values of unity and form which in *Secret Life* (1942) and *Hidden Faces* (1944) are aligned with fascist ideologies. Whilst this is discussed in far more detail later in chapters 4, 5, and 6, my aim here is to introduce the ways in which aesthetics and politics intersected in Dalí’s *oeuvre* up until 1945, and how they intersected with Surrealist aesthetics which had political change as one of their main intentions.

### **Setting the Scene: Aesthetics and Social Change**

In the mid-30s, and beginning roughly with the *Second manifeste du surréalisme* (1930), Surrealism had taken on a much more aggressive tone regarding the

Movement's aim to change society, and it was often expressed using Communist rhetoric. "[T]oday, more than ever," Breton states in his 1934 lecture, 'What is Surrealism?',

[T]he liberation of the mind... demands as a primary condition, in the opinion of the surrealists, the *liberation of man*, which implies that we must struggle against our fetters with all the energy of despair; that today more than ever the surrealists rely entirely, for the bringing about of human liberation, on the proletarian revolution (115).

For Breton, then, Communist ideology and Surrealism did not just coincide, they could work together for 'the liberation of man'.

In that same lecture, Breton asserted that a "coherent political or social attitude" did not appear in Surrealism until 1925 with the Moroccan war (117), the year which for Read (2007) "inspired the Surrealists' ill-fated alliance with the French Communist Party" (36). The Moroccan war, Breton claimed, triggered recollections of how war impacts upon humankind (117). Breton had experienced first-hand the effects of war, having worked at the Val-de-Grâce hospital during WW1 (Read, 34). He had encountered maimed and dismembered soldiers returning from the battlefields (Lyford, 2007, 47). Whilst Breton experienced the fragmenting effects of the war first-hand, we must not conclude that the memories provoked by the Moroccan War were solely related to his own personal experience in the hospitals, and thus relate primarily to bodily fragmentation. France suffered loss of life during the war which succeeded that of Britain, Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Russia and Italy (Gascoigne, 2007, 9-10, footnote 1), and Gascoigne implicitly links the psychological impact of the "ground fighting [taking] place on French soil" to a distressed "national consciousness" (10). The memories triggered by the Moroccan war would be a combination of personal

experience and the reminder of an agitated ‘national consciousness’, an agitation which would still have been prevalent in 1925<sup>20</sup>.

Arguably, Surrealism’s use of dialectical materialism and Communist rhetoric was continuously provoked by the threat of war. In the ‘Avertissement pour la réédition du second manifeste’ (1946), Breton admits that the manifesto was written in a year, 1930, when “unfettered minds became aware of the inevitable return of world catastrophe” (63), and he blames the aggressive and vindictive way he speaks of his erstwhile colleagues in his *Second manifeste* upon this. Furthermore, in both his 1934 lecture and an interview from 1941, he speaks of new intellectual growths emerging from war (1941, 201). He claims that “[i]t is certain that whatever persists, under the present circumstances, in growing as if nothing were happening stands self-condemned” (201). Art, then, must have a historical/political aspect. It must be created within specific historical conditions and reflect them. His development of rhetoric from early Surrealism with its light-hearted tone, to the rhetoric of Revolution in the 30s, then to a much calmer tone post-WW2 can be mapped in relation to the threat and/or presence of war.

When he places the beginning of a “coherent political or social attitude” at 1925, however, Breton does the *Manifeste du surréalisme* (1924) a disservice in the service of laying the ground for his Communist views. Regardless of his argument that the

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<sup>20</sup> With strange prescience, Breton declared in his ‘Lettre aux voyantes’ (1925) that he “sais ce que me réserve l’année 1939” (‘[I] know what 1939 has in store for me’) (22). This suggests that even in 1925 he was expecting further war. The full quotation translates as, “There are some people who claim that the war has taught them something; they are all the same less advanced than me, who knows what 1939 has in store for me” (22). This was not the only occasion when someone associated with Surrealism demonstrated strangely accurate prescience relating to WW2. In *Hidden Faces*, Dalí predicts that the war will end with Hitler’s suicide in his bunker (301-304).

Movement is an evolving endeavour and the *Manifeste du surréalisme* contained “much too general theses,” (‘What is Surrealism?’, 120) Breton is overstating the case when he claims that 1925 “marked the breaking away from a whole way of thinking” (117).

Firstly, the mind over matter idealism of early Surrealist orthodoxy, contained within the first manifesto, continued until the late 1920s before a more dialectical<sup>21</sup> approach gained traction. Furthermore, Breton’s claim regarding 1925 undermines the revolutionary tenets pre-1925, suggesting that they were disordered and lacking direction. One of Surrealism’s intentions pre-1925, much like post-1925, was cultural renewal, which in itself was political as it sought to disrupt Capitalism. In his *Manifeste du surréalisme*, Breton characterises his society as structured upon a capitalist ideology which controls behaviour to the extent that one would find it extremely difficult to survive outside of it (14). He claims that this situation has led to the imagination, once used to transcend one’s position in life, now being absorbed into capitalist ends: “This imagination which knows no bounds,” he states, “is only allowed to be exercised according to the laws of an arbitrary utility” (14). The imagination is only valued with regards to its use-value within a capitalist structure, and as such loses its ability to be radical and disrupt – it is used to market goods, supporting ideologies of consumerism, and is a means to an end. For Breton, one’s individuality also becomes absorbed into Capitalism. In his *Traité du Style* (1928), Aragon draws attention, in an article regarding his alleged involvement in stealing religious objects from a church, to how the writer notes Aragon’s job status as ‘no occupation’. He then goes on to declare: “I must warn the editor of *Paris-Soir* that I am *also* the author of several capital books beyond the scale of old porcelain windowboxes to that of the future history of the human mind”

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<sup>21</sup> Nicholls (2009, 305), Read (1936, quoted in Stockwell, 2000, 29), and Stockwell (2000, 29) also note that within Surrealism there was a dialectic between the conscious and unconscious. Breton speaks of this dialectic in his ‘What is Surrealism?’ when he says that “we have attempted to present interior reality and exterior reality as two elements in process of unification, of finally becoming *one*” (116, his emphasis).

(168)<sup>22</sup>. Breton argues that you cannot succeed at “discovering the heights of an exceptional situation such as love” because you “henceforth belong body and soul to an imperious practical necessity which does not allow [you] to lose sight of it” (14). Breton places ‘love’ above the demands of Capitalism but you cannot devote yourself to the endeavour of seeking it due to needing to spend one’s energy maintaining one’s existence within society.

Here then we see that pre-1925 Surrealism had the political intention of disrupting the “imperious practical necessity” (14) which structured society. It is then possible to argue that Surrealism had political intentions from its beginnings as well as during the 1930s when Breton adopted the rhetoric of Communist Revolution. From the very beginning, cultural change was the main aim of Surrealism: to disrupt the ‘practical necessity’ and to ensure that the accumulation of forces that led up to WW1 did not happen again. Their approach to this aim developed over the 20s and 30s, but the aim remained intact. Indeed, Breton’s antipathy towards Capitalism had not changed by his ‘What is Surrealism?’ (1934) where he argues that it had led to the threat of fascism (115).

What was Dalí doing during the 1920s and early 30s? Gibson (1997) and Greeley (2006) have both noted how during the 1920s Dalí showed support for a number of politically Communist groups, although notably without ever becoming a member of any of them. Greeley highlights his friendship with the “political activist” Miravittles who had a revolutionist father (62), and Gibson cites a diary entry by Dalí in 1920, when he was fifteen, in which he had become impassioned whilst recounting a

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<sup>22</sup> My translation combines my own with Waters, A. (1991), *Treatise on Style*, 85.

conversation he had had with the father (67). By 1930 he was speaking in public in favour of the intersection of Communist ideology and Surrealist aesthetics. I specify ‘ideology’ here because as I go on to argue in depth in chapter 6, Dalí consistently avoided pledging his allegiance to the leadership of groups and political Parties for long periods in favour of espousing their ideologies for his own ends. At the gathering of a Catalan communist group, the BOC, in 1931 (cited by Greeley, 63), Dalí spoke vehemently in favour of the combination of Surrealism and Communist ideology, suggesting that the Communist Revolution would be more successful if it adhered to the Surrealist focus on human desire (63). Thus, contradicting Finkelstein (1998), who argues that Dalí’s claims to support Communist ideology whilst a member of the Surrealist Movement were intended to increase his rapport with its other members (147), evidence shows that Dalí legitimately supported Communist ideologies during the 20s and early 30s. Indeed, Pine (2010), in her argument that social commentaries can be discovered in Dalí’s paintings of bread, called his relationship with Communism, “ardent” (94)<sup>23</sup>.

Overt support of Communism in the 20s and early 30s was not the only way in which Dalí’s aesthetics aligned with political interests, however. Nor was it the only way in which his aesthetics aligned with Surrealist interests. In the late 20s, Dalí engaged with Surrealist aesthetics as outlined and developed from Breton’s *Manifeste du surréalisme* (1924), the text which had called for a disruption to the Capitalist ‘practical necessity’. In that text Breton summed up Surrealism as seeking access to an ‘objective’ reality of thought which could be accessed by our mind alone rather than sensory perception:

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<sup>23</sup> For more on Dalí’s relationship with Communism see chapter 6.



SURREALISM, n. *m.* Pure psychic automatism, through which one proposes to express – verbally, through the written word, or in any other manner – the actual functioning of thought. Dictated by thought, in the absence of all control exercised by reason, outside of any aesthetic or moral concern. (36).

To understand what Breton meant by ‘objective’ reality at this point, it is important to look at the importance of Freud to the Surrealist Movement. Indeed, the centrality of Freud to the early development of Surrealist and Dalinian thought should not be underestimated. ‘Objective’ reality was, for Breton at this time, a co-option of the Freudian unconscious. In his case history of ‘Dora’, Freud states that “I handle unconscious ideas, unconscious trains of thought, and unconscious impulses as though they were no less valid and unimpeachable psychological data than conscious ones” (1905a, 154). This idea of a separate reality outside of conscious control (but of equal value as conscious reality), full of repressed sexual impulses and perversions, was of endless appeal to the Surrealists. It explains why the Surrealists saw their attempts at unconscious narratives as narratives of desire and also why they saw the unconscious as an ‘objective’ reality rather than subjective – it operated outside of conscious thought.

During Breton’s aforementioned role at the Val-de-Grâce during WW1, he had first read Freud and tested the theories on the patients (Hopkins, 2004, 68). By *Manifeste du surréalisme*, he had departed from Freud’s methods of accessing this ‘objective’ reality and embraced psychic automatism. The development of this method was outlined by Breton in his ‘The Mediums Enter’ (1922). In this earlier text we can discern a precursor to the definition of Surrealism found in the *Manifeste* in that he claims that “[Surrealism] designate[s] a certain psychic automatism that corresponds rather well to the dream state, a state that is currently very hard to delimit” (90). In explaining how ‘automatism’ as a method developed, Breton states that at first he was entranced by the

hypnagogic state where on the verge of sleep he would hear voices and phrases without point of reference (90). Such half-heard phrases disappeared as soon as he concentrated upon them, but he would attempt to write them down. A problem developed in that “by heeding voices other than that of our own unconscious, even in fun, we risked compromising this self-sufficient murmur in its essence” (91). Concerned about the purity of what he was recording, he then moved on to recording “dream narratives” (91), but realising that this involved the intercession of memory, he moved on from this method also. Finally, inspired by the practice of mediums, he adopted the method of an induced trance-state, introduced by René Crevel’s visit to a psychic (92). The purpose of the trance-state was to record one’s experiences, without focusing upon them, and without any reference to aesthetic or moral conventions or considerations.

This progression of methods shows a number of important things in relation to Freud. The Surrealists were interested in accessing the unconscious through dreams, much like Freud was. For Freud, the unconscious contained repressed material, and “[t]he dream... is one of the *détours by which repression can be evaded*” (‘Dora’, 44, his emphasis). However, Breton was clearly concerned that in talking about and recounting these dreams consciously, they were being diluted. Furthermore, there is no attempt, at this point in Surrealist thought, to interpret them. The emphasis on writing down the unconscious was not intended as an ‘intepretation’ or an understanding of its content. As Hopkins (2004) and Nicholls (2009) have noted, Breton’s interests were aesthetic rather than therapeutic (71; 303-304), in stark contrast to Freud. Whilst Freud, like the Surrealists, sometimes showed a lack of compassion for the lived experience of hysteria, referring to “the strange and wonderful phenomena of hysteria” (‘Dora’, 54), his psychoanalysis and interpretation of dreams had understanding and curing as their

aims. In his *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1899), for instance, he states that without understanding dreams we will not be able “to understand and possibly treat the phobias, obsessions, and delusions” (5). Here we can perhaps identify a lingering aspect of Dada in Surrealist thought. As Hopkins (2004) has noted, “[t]he Dadaists distrusted Freud for wishing to tame the unconscious rather than allowing it free play in the service of social critique” (71). Interpretation, contextualisation, and ‘curing’ were forms of creating order from the unconscious. Whilst the Surrealists were the antithesis of Dada’s antipathy towards Freudian psychoanalysis, this notion that the unconscious should be allowed to play free was central to Surrealist thought, and they resisted any critiques, even from Freud himself, on this score.

Freud noted the problem with ‘interpretation’ when he was asked by Breton to contribute to his *Les Vases communicants* during its creation in the early 30s: “[A] mere collection of dreams without the dreamers’ associations, without the knowledge of the circumstances in which they occurred, tells me nothing, and I can hardly imagine what it would tell anyone” (Freud, quoted by Davis, 1973, 128). Indeed, Freud was in general less enthusiastic about Surrealism than the Surrealists were about him, which could have been down to Breton’s manner as much as disagreements about theory. Upon the publication of *Les Vases communicants* (1932), Breton sent a copy to Freud and a correspondence ensued (Davis, 128). In these letters, Freud took umbrage with the fact that within the text Breton had questioned the psychoanalyst’s referencing methods and implied that he was plagiarising another theorist’s work<sup>24</sup>. Davis (1973) convincingly suggests that Breton’s claim could have been due to offense taken when Freud would not contribute to the work (133), and, indeed, Breton himself claims that Freud’s own criticism of the Surrealist Movement could have been intended to “pay me back” (*CV*,

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<sup>24</sup> Correspondence reprinted in Breton, *Communicating Vessels*, 1990, 149-155.

154) for that. Freud had stated: “And now a confession, which you will no doubt treat with tolerance! Although I have received many testimonies of the interest that you and your friends show for my research, I am not able to clarify for myself what Surrealism is and what it wants. Perhaps I am not destined to understand it, I who am so distant from art” (152). Breton would have been aware that this was a loaded statement: the irony of the opening sentence, considering Breton’s temperament, and the amusing claim that Freud is ‘distant from art’. In 1910, Freud published *Leonardo da Vinci, A Memory of his Childhood*, and it is well-known that he was a collector of pieces of art and sculpture<sup>25</sup>. Furthermore, Freud referenced literary texts and myths as integral parts of his theories (Schaffner, 2011, 479). He was not ‘distant from art’, he had a substantial interest in it. However, the *aims* of his work were not artistic, and in saying he was ‘distant from art’ he could have been reiterating this difference between his own psychoanalytic technique and Surrealism<sup>26</sup>.

Breton’s relationship with Freud and his theories actually mirrors Dalí’s in many ways. They both had a contentious relationship<sup>27</sup> with either the man or his theories. Freud had never shown any real interest in Surrealism and, as Nicholls (2009) rightly notes, Breton had co-opted his theories for his own ends, taking what he wanted and discarding the rest (303). Despite this, Breton asked Freud to contribute a dream narrative to *Les Vases communicants* and then sent him a dedicated copy of the finished text (Davis, 128). Breton *wanted* Freud to be aware of his work and what the Movement was doing. Dalí

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<sup>25</sup> See HD’s *Tribute to Freud* (1956) for an account of this.

<sup>26</sup> Nicholls (2009) cites Freud’s statement that “I am unable to clarify for myself what Surrealism is and what it wants” as a sign that Freud did not understand Surrealism (303-304). I, on the other hand, suggest that Freud understood Breton but was highlighting the difference between his own work and that of the Surrealists’.

<sup>27</sup> Davis (1973) defines the relationship between Breton and Freud as having an “ambivalent quality” (133).

also wanted Freud to be aware of, and impressed by, his work<sup>28</sup>. In 1938, he met the psychoanalyst in London, taking his painting, *The Metamorphose de Narcisse* (1937) with him (Gibson, 382). Like Breton, Dalí did not provide a straightforward use of Freudian psychoanalysis in his works. As I will discuss further in chapter 5, he took what he wanted and then created his own theories<sup>29</sup>.

Thus, despite Freud being so central to Surrealist and Dalinian thought, they both had a contentious relationship with psychoanalytic theory. They embraced it, but altered it for their own ends. This can be seen in Breton's interest in the 'objective' reality of the unconscious in 1924 which resisted 'interpretation', and also going into the 1930s with his *Les Vases communicants* (1932). As for Dalí, in his 'At the Moment...' (1929), he provided his own definition of Surrealism, one which shows a remarkable debt to Breton's, and also inspired by the Surrealist co-option of Freud at this time:

[T]he particular constitution of the psychic apparatus which... obtains the reality of a simple and organic figuration (such as in dream images), making possible for our spirit... to arrive before these same FACTS, being able to subject them TO THEIR OWN FREEDOM and make a record in addition – in the absence of any system and with the automatic aid of the NEW TRISEXUAL DRIBBLING FLOWERS – of the ONLY possibilities beyond any combination, beyond any skilful and exquisite vaudeville of LYRICISM (102-103, his emphases, my ellipses)<sup>30</sup>.

Dalí's definition of Surrealism is in less coherent terms than Breton's to-the-point definition. Breton helpfully formulates his definition in the form of a dictionary entry, whereas Dalí's definition requires much more unpacking than Breton's does. We can see, however, that for Dalí Surrealism allows us to use our 'psychic apparatus' to

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<sup>28</sup> The account of Dalí's visit to Freud in Gibson's (1997, 381-383) biography of the artist implies this.

<sup>29</sup> Finkelstein (1996) also claims that Dalí altered Freudian theory for his own ends (227).

<sup>30</sup> Finkelstein's translation from the Catalan.

discern 'FACTS' and 'record' them whilst maintaining their complete freedom in not adding any aesthetic devices.

Dalí's need to record the 'objective', along with a disinclination towards metaphor, can be seen as early as 1927 in his 'Saint Sebastian', a text which, in Finkelstein's (1998) words propounds his "aesthetic of objectivity" (14). Both Finkelstein and Rothman (2012) have noted Dalí's aversion to metaphor at this time, Finkelstein claiming that his texts of 1928 and 1929 are characterised by an "almost complete rejection of metaphors and a continuous insistence on the presentation of 'facts' " (19), and Rothman noting that for Dalí metaphor was "artificial and misleading" (38). Finkelstein (1998) explains how in 'Saint Sebastian' Dalí reduces phenomenon to that which can be scientifically measured (14), and this can be seen where Dalí states, in describing the saint's statue, that "[e]ach drop of water, a number. Each drop of blood, a geometry" ('Saint Sebastian', 22)<sup>31</sup>. Dalí's method of writing in this piece focuses on what he views as the 'facts' (Finkelstein, 1996, 29). He uses fact-metaphors, in that what we would usually read as a metaphor is being presented as a fact: "[t]he extremely thin line of blood is a silent spread-out plan of the underground railway" (22); the 'thin line of blood' as 'a silent spread-out plan of the underground railway' is being stated as a fact, not a metaphor. As Stockwell (2012) has noted regarding Surrealism more generally, metaphors were intended to be taken literally: "In our rational world, the two sides of a metaphor are conceptually separate; in the surreal consciousness, they are identical and can be exchanged" (60). Indeed, there were members of the Surrealist Movement who shared Dalí's dislike for metaphor. In his *Traité du Style* (1928), Aragon argued against figures of speech which form connections between the images in objective reality when there are none: "carps are not fish of melancholy... These things are said as easily as

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<sup>31</sup> Finkelstein's translation from the Catalan.

fiddlesticks... Melancholy, the carp? I can't get over it! It was the person who first said it who was melancholy" (27)<sup>32</sup>. There is the notion here that metaphor says more about the person who is writing than what is being described.

As Dalí's association with Surrealism developed, his aversion to the traditional notion of metaphor and his fascination with 'objective' facts intersected with the Surrealist animosity towards methods of art and literature which relied upon sensory perception. Literature which relied upon sensory perception was viewed by the Surrealists as perpetuating an overlay on reality constructed from the Enlightenment metaphysic of logic and reason. We have been socialised into experiencing our Symbolic world in terms of logic, reason, and cause and effect. We see logical and rational connections between things where those connections do not objectively exist; whereas when we are witnessing the 'objective' world, and we see logical connections, those can be said to objectively exist. In the 'external' world, we have been socialised into a particular understanding of what order is, but that understanding benefits the hegemony which maintains it in order to sustain social cohesion. This view of a metaphysic constructed to maintain order was not original to the Surrealists. Nietzsche had expounded a similar view in his *The Gay Science* (1887) where he stated that "[w]e have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live – by positing bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content; without these articles of faith nobody now could endure life" (177). Breton's critique of the Capitalist 'practical necessity' bears a rhetorical similarity to this. As noted above, he claims that you "henceforth belong body and soul to an imperious practical necessity which does not allow [you] to lose sight of it" (14). The 'practical necessity', like Nietzsche's false metaphysic, is an 'article of faith' which people cannot live without, and for Breton it is the Surrealist's aim to

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<sup>32</sup> Translation by Waters.

disrupt these articles. The Surrealists saw the ‘articles of faith’ within the non-objective Enlightenment metaphysic as having led to WW1, and thus there was an urgency in their need to disrupt them.

The quintessential example of a genre which perpetuated this Enlightenment metaphysic for the Surrealists was Literary Realism, and, as Nicholls (2009) has argued, a number of the Surrealist texts of the 1920s carried out a direct assault upon it (305-306).

Literary Realism takes on the imposed values of logic and order, and attempts to create an accurate representation of the ‘real’ world by presenting a fictional world which functions via this metaphysic. Earnshaw (2010) has shown how Literary Realist texts reflect the method of empirical observation, so central to nineteenth-century thinking, and the sociological notion that a person’s environment reflects upon that person by using long descriptive passages of houses and streets in order to tell the reader something about who lives in them (23). Literary Realism was a form of anthropology, achieving human characterisation by means of describing their surroundings (23). In his *Paris Peasant* (1926), Aragon parodies such descriptive passages (75-88), and even portrays them as a punishment: “this little sugar bowl which I will describe to you if you don’t behave yourself” (88)<sup>33</sup>. In his *Manifeste du surréalisme*, Breton claims that writers try to engage the reader by offering them a familiar metaphysic (7-8). But, of course, just because something is familiar does not mean that it represents the truth. Dalí, arguably, goes even further in mocking Literary Realist expression by questioning why some things are described at great length and others are not, thus pointing out that as much as a realistic presentation of reality is sought by Literary Realist fiction, concerns of plot and narrative are imposed upon it, thus disrupting the realism. He declares:

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<sup>33</sup> Translation by Watson-Taylor.



Is there a more absolute misunderstanding than the conception underlying the words reality and realism! Let us analyze no matter what extract by the writer most unanimously considered a realist. He describes and speaks of a character and that which surrounds him. Why is it that he never notes things that are as simple as those that follow? The oscillations informing the distance between the heel of a shoe worn by a person, during a period of time determined by his conversation, and some object, a sponge, for instance; establishing the existence of a match lying on the ground, at the furthest point in the room, that has no relation whatsoever to this person (no relation that is psychological, argumental, etc.); the type of geometric figure formed by connecting the following points: the match, this person's heel, the sponge. No one could object that these examples are lacking in objective and real value... In the first place, insignificance and importance in terms of reality are of no account; secondly dream analysis has demonstrated beyond doubt that all that is considered to be insignificant is precisely what affects our mind in the MOST VIOLENT AND VIVID MANNER (106, 'Documentary – Paris – 1929' (Part 1), his emphasis)<sup>34</sup>

One could again here highlight the earlier point that Literary Realism had the sociological feature of attempting to draw parallels between individuals and their social surroundings. Thus, only what is significant in elucidating a character influenced by their surroundings will be included. Plus, as relations between characters and background details in Literary Realism are based upon the concepts of logic, rationality, and cause and effect, Dalí's 'match' will only be mentioned if it is deemed to have any impact or influence upon the characters or plot. However, as Dalí notes, when one replaces these concepts with psychoanalysis, for instance, the match may in fact be important in a realist sense. Thus, in critiquing Realist narrative convention, Dalí reiterates the difference between the Surrealist notion of 'reality' and surface reality, the latter of which is built upon the Enlightenment metaphysic and underpins the Literary

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<sup>34</sup> Finkelstein translation.

Realist aesthetic. Dalí goes on to make a point much to this effect: “What then have [sic] his writing to do with reality? Very little. On the other hand, they have to do above all and almost exclusively with the intellectual system, with the complicated and dense tissue spun from aesthetic and moral prejudices and conventionalities of all kinds and forms” (107)<sup>35</sup>. Dalí thus seems to be suggesting that the Surrealist stance on reality is not based upon prejudice, but rather it is a recognition of true reality; the ‘match’ demonstrates the lack of objectivity, and thus truth, in Literary Realist expression. When Dalí speaks of a prevailing ‘intellectual system’ then, he appears to be referring to a mindset which maintains the Enlightenment metaphysic of logic and reason and which, in turn, supports the notion that art should be inspired by sensory perception.

Thus, for the Surrealists, engagement with Literary Realist texts relies on the reader experiencing external reality in a particular way and the text perpetuating that experience by being structured via the Enlightenment metaphysic of reason, order, and logic. As Nicholls (2009) notes, for the Surrealists there was “a sense of determinism and fatality [in Literary Realism],... a species of logic which leaves us subservient to reality as it is” (306). In this way, the language in Realist texts becomes translucent. It does not draw attention to itself. You are in a sense supposed to lose yourself in the fictional world without being constantly reminded that it is indeed a fictional world.<sup>36</sup> The language of Surrealist texts, on the other hand, does exactly the opposite. It draws attention to language through strange juxtapositions and non-sequiturs. It questions the existence of cause and effect. The concept of causality claims that things happen as a direct result of something else precipitating them. This contributes to a view of reality where there are laws which science and philosophy can discover. Zola’s Naturalism is

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<sup>35</sup> Finkelstein translation.

<sup>36</sup> Literary Realist texts adhere to notions of cause and effect, logical action sequences, and linearity of narrative to achieve this.

an extreme example of this, wherein he claimed that the motivations of his characters are all scientifically discoverable and determined by the environment in which they occur (Zola, 1893, 8).

In his *Traité du style*, Aragon outlines the ways in which narratives can be disruptive: “Faulty or erroneous sentences, lack of adaptation between parts, forgetting what has been said, a lack of regard for what is to come, disaccord,... putting one’s elbows on the table,... then breaking the mirror, not wiping one’s feet, thus is my character” (28-29)<sup>37</sup>. These ‘faults’ are presented as the language equivalent of bad manners, akin to ‘putting one’s elbows on the table’ and ‘not wiping one’s feet.’ Breton, in his *Soluble Fish*, implements some of these ‘faults’, an example being the non-sequitur, “I do not know her yet because the phantom too often brings on nice weather around him” (52)<sup>38</sup>. Furthermore, causality is disrupted: “A great number of cosmetics came, incomprehensibly, to be there” (108)<sup>39</sup>. At one point “a plaster bath” materialises and a scientist pushes a reporter into it (70)<sup>40</sup>. This confuses the reader as he/she has assumptions about how texts work in accordance with certain principles of external reality. He/she assumes that causality holds and that reason and logic will prevail. This becomes especially disorienting when, as Nicholls (2009) notes, the often ‘correct’ “syntax [in Surrealist texts]... leads us to anticipate an order and causality which are not there” (306). In his *Manifeste du surréalisme*, Breton complains that “experience itself has been assigned limits” (20)<sup>41</sup>.

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<sup>37</sup> My translation.

<sup>38</sup> Translation Seaver and Lane.

<sup>39</sup> Translation Seaver and Lane.

<sup>40</sup> Translation Seaver and Lane.

<sup>41</sup> My translation.

In his 'New Limits of Painting' (Part 1) (1928), Dalí explains how

the *lives* of the creatures that populate the surfaces of canvases and the world of poetry obey conditions quite unlike those of the creatures populating the surface of the earth... [T]he plastic and poetic physiology is not the physiology of living beings... [A] monster ceases being one the moment certain relations have been established between the lines and colors [sic] shaping it... [A] decapitated figure, in the world of the plastic arts or of poetry, is not a figure without a head (79-80, my ellipses)<sup>42</sup>.

In other words, art conforms to different rules than those of external reality. The concept of a monster in the world of sensory perception does not need to be the same in 'the world of poetry'. There is nothing *necessary* about the way we have conceptualised objects. Magritte's *Les Trahisons des images* (*Ceci n'est pas une pipe*) (1929) is an example of this. A pipe in the world of sensory perception has been conceptualised in a certain way. However, a picture of one is not a pipe in that it is both a picture rather than an actual pipe and also because a picture does not have to conform to the same conceptualising constructions. Thus, just like Magritte's pipe is not a pipe, monsters and decapitated figures are not monsters and decapitated figures in 'the world of poetry'. Here, then, Dalí and Magritte are drawing attention to the fact that our concepts are social constructions.

Dalí's much later claim that he adhered more closely to Surrealist aesthetics than the Surrealists (*Unspeakable Confessions*, 1976, 112) can be linked to the alleged autonomy of the poetic over surface reality. In 1929 Breton took umbrage against the scatology in Dalí's painting, *The Lugubrious Game* (1929). Dalí responded that the scatology was "merely a simulacrum" (*Secret Life*, 219), and thus not the real thing, i.e. the world

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<sup>42</sup> Finkelstein translation from the Catalan.

which his painting represented did not function within the same conventions that the world of sensory perception did. By responding in such a way, Dalí was pointing out to Breton that the latter was taking a position from which to judge the painting at odds with the notion that Surrealist painting and literature should disrupt conventions and representation in order to focus on the ‘objective’. However, Breton’s response could be indicative of the fact that the metaphysic underpinning Surrealism had started to change around 1929 to emphasising a dialectic between the unconscious and the conscious, and mind and matter. The move from an idealistic focus on mind over matter to the dialectic between mind and matter did not happen from one year to the next, nor with the emergence of a particular text. It is arguably, however, with the dialectic in mind that Breton expressed his views on Dalí’s *Lugubrious Game*.

Dalí’s advocacy of art as operating under conceptualisations separate from the conceptualisations within external reality results in the question of whether Surrealism can be a means for social change. If the content of painting is not to be connected with the moral concerns of the external, social world, how is it to affect change? The question of whether Surrealism and its stance on the ‘poetic world’ could actually provoke social change was something which perplexed the French Communist Party and coloured the way in which the Movement was received by that group. In the *Second manifeste du surréalisme* (1930), Breton described the difficulties he experienced entering Communist circles. He bemoaned the fact that two years previously he was arrested and “interrogat[ed]” by the Party whilst “such undesirable individuals as policemen and others have the right, however, to frolic and come and go at will” over “the threshold of the French Party headquarters” (91, 92). According to Read (2007), Breton was jettisoned from the Communist Association of Revolutionary Writers and

Artists (A.E.A.R) in 1933, but not wholesale from the Party, due to the fact that the Surrealists would not toe the Party line (38). In 1935 the French government formed an agreement, “a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union”, which meant that the Communist Party would not act in dissent of the government (Browder, 1967, 34). Breton, however, wished to maintain autonomy of thought. For Breton, “[t]he revolutionary artist had to preserve his freedom *as* an artist. If not he was likely to be lost not only as an artist but as a revolutionary” (Short, 1966, 17, his emphasis). The irrevocable split with the Communist Party occurred that same year when Breton slapped Ihra Ehrenburg, a Russian writer, across the face. Breton had been annoyed with Ehrenburg’s claims that “[t]he Surrealists are perfectly willing to accept Hegel and Marx as well as the revolution, but what they will not do is work. They have their own concerns. They study pederasty, for instance, and dreams” (Ehrenburg, cited by Dalí, 1976, 124, n. 1). The altercation occurred a week before the ‘Congrès des Ecrivains pour la Défense de la Culture’, an event at which Breton and the Surrealists had been denied a prominent opportunity to speak (Browder, 1967, 34). Unbeknownst to Breton, Ehrenburg was “a member of the Soviet delegation to the Congress”, and his actions resulted in them being denied a place altogether (34). They were eventually only allowed to speak at all due to fellow Surrealist René Crevel committing suicide at this time (34).

Whilst the Communist Party clearly had concerns regarding whether Surrealist aesthetics were compatible with Communist ideology and action, I would argue that they could not have disagreed wholesale with the Surrealist interest in how art and language could bring about revolutionary change. Indeed, Movements which have the revolution of society as their intent use rhetoric and visual propaganda in their spoken

and written materials to rally and educate people, and the Communist Party was no different in their use of Socialist Realism. According to Radford (1997), “[Dalí] passionately objected to Socialist Realism, which the Communist Party demanded as the official ideological approach to art, because of the stylistic banality which it promoted and its crippling effect on the artist’s freedom of imagination” (156). In this sense, Dalí and Breton were in agreement about the importance of artistic freedom and autonomy, although it should be noted that in 1934 they clashed on that very subject in regards to Dalí’s painting *The Weaning of Furniture-Nutrition* and later in the decade with *The Enigma of Hitler* (1938). Returning to the importance of language to revolution, Gascoigne (2007) has outlined ways in which it can bring about violence: it can be used to cast the Other as non-human and create an “us/them mentality” (25); and comparing the potential effects of language to physical violence, he claims that it can “deprive the Other of any power of discourse or even right of utterance” (26). Thus, language, and by extension literature, can be used as a powerful tool in the ambition for revolution. Both the Surrealists and the Communist Party knew this.

The conflict between the Communist Party and Surrealism was thus not a disagreement about the importance of art and literature to social change, rather it was that the Party did not consider artistic activity holding the poetic as *autonomous from external reality* as able to result in social change. Even though, around the 1930s, as noted above, the Surrealist metaphysic had started to move from lauding the unconscious on its own to a dialectic between the conscious and the unconscious, Breton did not alleviate the Communist Party’s concerns by espousing how it was through the means of intellectual activity, rather than practical action, that the Surrealists would help the Communist cause. This can be seen in their response to a telegram allegedly from Moscow which

begins the first issue of *Surréalisme au service de la révolution* (1930). The telegram asks, “International Bureau of Revolutionary Literature. Please respond to the following question. What will be your position if Imperialism declares war against the Soviets?”(1)<sup>43</sup>. The Surrealists respond:

Comrades. If Imperialism declares war against the Soviets our position will conform to the position of the members of the French Communist Party.

If it is estimated in such a case that a better possible employment of our faculties is to your disposition for a mission, make clear any usage of us in the capacity of intellectuals. To submit to you suggestions would be presumptuous of our role and circumstances.

In the current situation of non-armed conflict, we believe it unnecessary to wait to put in the service of the revolution the methods which are more particularly ours (1)<sup>44</sup>.

Here, the preference for ‘intellectual’ action is clear, as those are the “methods which are more particularly ours”. Considering the emphasis the Surrealists place on language and its disruptive potential, it seems clear that experimentation with language is part of the ‘intellectual’ action to which they refer. For the Surrealists, if language in Literary Realist texts is perpetuating our notions of how the world works and thus of what experience consists, disrupting language would mean disrupting the underlying metaphysic. Indeed, as noted before, Nicholls (2009) claims that the Surrealist’s use of language “sets out to undermine our power to recognise the world in language” (306).

As noted above, in the 1930s Surrealism took on a dialectical understanding of the relationship between the unconscious and the conscious, and mind and matter. I am now

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<sup>43</sup> My translation.

<sup>44</sup> My translation.



going to go into more detail on this dialectical relationship, its relation to politics, and how Dalí incorporated the dialectic into his own aesthetic. In the *Second Manifeste* (1930), the desire to express the unconscious mind through art was still an integral feature of the Surrealist Movement, in that “we still know as little as ever we did about the origin of the *voice* which it is everyone’s prerogative to hear, if only he will, a voice which converses with us most specifically about something other than what we believe we are thinking” (158)<sup>45</sup>. However, by this point, Breton had moved away from an idealist stance. No longer focusing on the unconscious mind as separate from the external world, Surrealist technique aimed at discovering the point at which the unconscious and conscious intersected (72-73)<sup>46</sup>. This allowed them to claim a stronger basis from which to argue that Surrealist experimentation could influence the social world, although not strong enough, as demonstrated earlier, to convince the French Communist Party or indeed some members of the Surrealist Movement itself. A noteworthy example of this is the disagreement between Dalí and Aragon regarding the use of milk in a piece of art: Whilst Dalí was expounding on a Surrealist use of milk, Aragon solemnly declared that it should be delivered to the starving children of the proletariat rather than used in an artistic piece (Radford, 1997, 154). Aragon was acknowledging what he saw as a complete divorce between Surrealist artistic experimentation and political action. Thus, as can be discerned by now, the tension between Surrealist artistic tenets and political motivation was something which could not be reconciled.

The Surrealist dialectic between the conscious and unconscious ostensibly has parallels with the stream of consciousness technique, a concept coined by William James and

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<sup>45</sup> Translation by Seaver and Lane.

<sup>46</sup> My own translation.

used to great effect by writers such as May Sinclair and James Joyce during the Modernist period. Breton addresses this in his 'On Surrealism in its Living Works' (1953). For Breton, the technique had an aesthetic purpose, a pre-decided end point towards which the text was heading. Using James Joyce as an example of this technique, which he refers to as the "inner monologue," and admitting that he, Joyce, and Surrealism had "a common wish of insurrection against the tyranny of a thoroughly degraded language," he nonetheless claims that both are based on different metaphysics. Whereas Joyce controls the flow of his writing to create a "*novelistic* illusion" (166, his emphasis) of a stream of consciousness, Surrealism advocates a technique, automatic writing (thus demonstrating that he has returned to advocating automatic writing here), the flow of which "one cannot try to direct, for if one does it is sure to dry up immediately" (298).<sup>47</sup>

'Stream of consciousness' does still have relevance for Surrealism in the 1930s, although it might more accurately be referred to as 'stream of (un)consciousness.' The reason I present the phrase in such a way is due to how Breton conceptualises thought at this time. In his *Second manifeste*, he posits thought as being "at once unconditioned and conditioned, utopian and realistic, finding its end in itself and aspiring only to serve" (104)<sup>48</sup>. In other words, thought is not pure unconscious, separated from and having no relation to the outside conscious world. There is no clear demarcation point between the conscious and unconscious. In his 'Preface to the Catalogue of the International Surrealist Exhibition, London, 1936,' Breton backs up the notion that the unconscious and conscious are dialectical by claiming that "Surrealist painters could not

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<sup>47</sup> The translations here are a combination of my own and Seaver and Lane (298). This does not mean that he has returned to advocating a passive method of recording an autonomous unconscious. His conceptualisation of 'thought' had become a dialectical relationship between the conscious and unconscious by this point.

<sup>48</sup> My translation.

bring even the most evidently free of their creations to light were it not for the ‘visual remains’ of external perception” (149). Herbert Read (1936) also explicitly sees Surrealist endeavour as dialectical, stating that “[i]n dialectical terms we claim that there is a continual state of opposition and interaction between the world of objective fact<sup>49</sup> ... and the world of subjective fantasy... [The artist] resolves the contradictions by creating a synthesis, a work of art which combines elements from both these worlds” (quoted in Stockwell, 2000, 29-30). In other words, then, Surrealist endeavour of the 1930s intends to create texts which represent the ‘synthesis’ between the conscious and unconscious.

In his ‘What is Surrealism?’ (1934), Breton links the dialectical relationship between the unconscious and conscious to the Proletarian Revolution. In that text he is extremely keen to align his thought with the theory of dialectical materialism; so keen in fact that he claims dialectical materialism to be the new theoretical underpinning to the Movement: “[Surrealist activity] suddenly experienced the necessity of crossing over the gap that separates absolute idealism from dialectical materialism” (117). For almost the entirety of his lecture, he couches Surrealist theory in terms of dialectical materialism. He claims that “interior reality and exterior reality... [are], in the present form of society, in contradiction” (116), and that “*the liberation of the mind*, the express aim of surrealism, demands as a primary condition, in the opinion of the surrealists, the *liberation of man*...; that today more than ever the surrealists rely entirely, for the bringing about of human liberation, on the Proletarian Revolution” (115). In other words, we should seek the liberation of Man via the Proletarian Revolution, and then the mind will be liberated and form a dialectical relationship with external reality. The success of Surrealism depends on the Proletarian Revolution.

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<sup>49</sup> Here Read is using ‘objective fact’ to refer to external reality.

Marxist theory claims that under capitalism mankind is unaware of the “underlying forces and relationships which structure human interaction and determine the social dynamic and history” (Lovell, 1980, 67). Breton had outlined some of the ways in which Man is unaware that he is being controlled by these ‘underlying forces and relationships’ in his *Manifeste du surréalisme* (1924), and he posits idealism as a solution. Ten years later, however, espousing Marxist theory, he claims that only the proletariat have a class interest in gaining knowledge of this underlying structure, and thus our hopes for liberation lie in the proletariat and ensuring that that class gains knowledge of the manifestations (reification) of these underlying structures within society (116). Breton espouses a view of dialectical materialism in keeping with Lukács here in that

dialectical materialism, according to Lukács, posits for art and for science the same goal, that of ‘showing things as they really are’. All reflection rests upon a contradiction between general and particular, appearance and essence, immediate and conceptual. Each form of reflection has to resolve those contradictions in order to produce knowledge (Lovell, 71).

For Breton, the liberation of man is brought about by bringing together ‘the general and particular’, the underlying structures and the particular instantiations of them in society. The downfall of capitalism will free Man and his mind, bringing about another dialectical relationship, as opposed to a contradictory, oppositional one, between the unconscious and the conscious world (Breton, 116).

He goes on to explain the link between Surrealist endeavour and dialectical materialism in more detail:

[W]e have assigned ourselves the task of confronting these two realities [interior and external] with one another on every possible occasion, of refusing to allow the pre-eminence of the one over the other, yet not of acting on the one and on the other both at once, for that would be to suppose that they are less apart from each other than they are (and I believe that those who pretend they are acting on both simultaneously either are deceiving us or are a prey to a disquieting illusion); of acting on these two realities not both at once, then, but one after the other, in a systematic manner, allowing us to observe their reciprocal attraction and interpenetration and to give this interplay of forces all the extension necessary for the trend of these two adjoining realities to become one and the same ('What is Surrealism?', 116).

This appears to argue that the conscious and unconscious are *currently* separate, but interpenetrate one another. One of the Surrealist aims is to investigate and carry out research into these interpenetrations as a means of driving forward the Proletarian Revolution. One cannot *currently* act upon both at the same time, i.e. one cannot enter a state in which both the conscious and unconscious are entirely amalgamated; much like *currently* one cannot view the underlying forces and structures of reality and their particular manifestations at the same time. However, "[t]his final unification [of the conscious and unconscious] is the supreme aim of surrealism" (116), and this will come about via the Proletarian Revolution. In 1926, Naville had asked, "Do the Surrealists believe in liberation of the mind before the abolition of bourgeois conditions of material life, or do they comprehend that a revolutionary spirit can only be created after the Revolution is accomplished?" (quoted in Greeley, 2006, 57). I suggest that by 1934, Breton had formulated a double position in relation to the Proletarian Revolution. Surrealism's work and research into how internal and external realities interpenetrate will help the cause of spurring on the proletariat to revolt, and on the other hand, the main Surrealist aim of bringing together the unconscious and conscious into a full unification is dependent upon that revolution.

By claiming that the current aim of Surrealism was to investigate how interior and external realities interpenetrated, Breton was positioning Surrealism here as a form of social realism. Surrealism would produce art that is intrinsically political because its aim is to motivate and enlighten the proletariat<sup>50</sup>. However, what cannot be ignored is that Breton was bourgeois. By investigating how internal and external realities interpenetrated as a means of spurring on the Proletarian Revolution, he was either aligning himself with the proletariat as a sort of honorary member, or he was placing himself and Surrealist endeavour as epistemologically superior to the working classes, placing himself almost in the position of a prophet or visionary who would lead them to freedom.

In the 1930s then, the main Surrealist technique shifted away from ‘automatic writing’ as a means of accessing an autonomous, objective reality, and towards a dialectical stance on the conscious and the unconscious, and matter and mind. Breton incorporated this dialectic into his views on the Proletarian Revolution. The 1930s was also characterised by Dalí’s move to a dialectical stance on the conscious and the unconscious in the form of his Paranoiac-criticism<sup>51</sup>. In his ‘L’Ane pourri’ (1930) and ‘La chèvre sanitaire’ (1930), Dalí provided an in depth outline of his Paranoiac-Criticism claiming that its primary manifestation was in multiple-images (‘L’Ane pourri’, 15). Within such images the viewer witnesses the intersection of external reality and Dalí’s own desire, which would constitute a disruption to materialist metaphysics (15-16). The purpose of Paranoiac-criticism was to “systematize confusion” and bring

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<sup>50</sup> Schloesser (2005) claims that “Scholars have noted a kinship between socialist realism and surrealism, especially that of Salvador Dalí. They both shared this dialectical synthesis of ‘what is given’ by factual reality and ‘what we desire’ but do not yet possess” (115).

<sup>51</sup> I discuss Paranoiac-criticism in more depth in chapter 4.

about the downfall of ‘reality’ (‘L’Ane pourri’, 11). Finkelstein (1998) claims that Paranoiac-criticism can be seen in an inchoate form as early as 1928 and 1929 (76). He argues that in his late 20s works Dalí experiments with multiple ideas and that parts of these experiments constitute the beginnings of Paranoiac-criticism (76; 77). This would suggest, much like in the wider Surrealist aesthetic, that there was an overlap between Dalí’s focus on accessing the ‘objective’ unconscious and his interest in the intersection of the unconscious and external reality. Indeed, his essay on his film project *Un chien andalou* (1929) provides an example of Dalí having questioned whether it is actually possible to express ‘objective’ fact. Dalí claims that the aim of the film is “a simple noting down, recording of facts” (134). He is not, however, suggesting that the film unproblematically presents the ‘objective facts’ which underlie ‘reality’. Rather, he is suggesting that the film offers a simulacra of these ‘facts’: “*these facts*, instead of being conventional, fabricated, arbitrary, gratuitous, are real facts, *or appear to be real enough*” (134, his emphasis). Whereas Breton had shunned simulacra with his ‘automatic writing’ in that such writing was supposed to record unconscious thought as it happens, Dalí instead focuses here on the *representation* of ‘objective fact’. This is clearly a different position to that taken in his aforementioned critique of Literary Realism, as there it was the ‘objective fact’ he wanted to record, not a simulacra. This suggests that the essay on *Un chien andalou* (1929) was a mid-point between his focus on ‘objective’ fact and the merging of the unconscious and the conscious, not chronologically, but theoretically.

The overlap also complicates his aforementioned response to Breton’s criticism of his *Lugubrious Game* (1929). As noted, Breton had objected to the scatological element in the painting and Dalí had responded that it was a simulacrum. Given that Dalí was

interested in the *representation* of ‘objective fact’ along with the recording of ‘objective fact’ around this time, this complicates Dalí’s meaning. Was Dalí, as previously suggested, claiming that the excrement should not be considered in the same way as excrement in the external world, because art conforms to different conventions? Or was he making the simpler claim that it was a representation of excrement which “*appear[s] to be real enough*” (SL, 134, his emphasis) but is not actual excrement? Dalí responds to the situation by making statements that pose more questions than answers. In *Secret Life* he claims that after he had told Breton it was a ‘simulacra’ “[n]o further questions were asked. But had I been pressed I should certainly have had to answer that it was the simulacrum of the excrement itself” (219, footnote 1). He then goes on to state that “[b]etween the excrement and a piece of rock crystal, by the very fact that they both sprang from the common basis of the unconscious, there could and should be no difference in category” (219, footnote 1). This suggests that the ‘simulacrum’ in question is an expression of an unconscious fascination, which further suggests that the excrement in the painting cannot be considered under the same conventions as that in external reality because it has been birthed by the unconscious. This appears to give credence to the original point, then, that Dalí was telling Breton that the excrement in the painting should be considered under different conventions than excrement in the external world. At the same time, though, the excrement is recognisably excrement. The same kind that can be seen in the external world, which is what Breton was responding too. As such, even though Dalí may not have meant it when he called the excrement a ‘simulacrum’, it could be considered as a representation which ‘appear[s] real enough’ but is not actual excrement.



The incident of the *Lugubrious Game* was one of the earlier examples of tension between Dalí and Breton. The beginning of the end<sup>52</sup> for Dalí's association with the Surrealist Movement, however, came in 1934 when Breton accused him of incorporating "the glorification of Hitlerian fascism" (quoted by Dalí, 1976, 126) into his painting, *The Weaning of Furniture-Nutrition* (1934)<sup>53</sup>. Bear in mind that this was the same year as Breton's lecture, 'What is Surrealism?' Breton can be viewed as in a highly troubled state of mind regarding the rise of fascism and the inability of Surrealism to have prevented it. This could explain why even though, as Greeley (2006) notes, Dalí argued that one of the tenets of his Paranoiac-criticism, and indeed Surrealism, was to create without moral consideration, Breton disapproved of the painting on moral grounds, stating that "he valued moral rigor and integrity above all else" (81). Indeed, I would argue that such a strong reaction to *Weaning of Furniture-Nutrition* can be compared to the insults Breton levelled at his erstwhile Surrealist colleagues in his *Second manifesto*. Much like later, in 1953, when he explained that his antagonism towards them had been due to the political climate (163), I would put his reaction to the painting in this category too<sup>54</sup>. Greeley (2006) argues that the painting itself featured what Dalí identified as a "hitlerian wetnurse", her back to the viewer (Greeley, 54). The 'nurse' originally wore a swastika armband, but this was later painted out (54). Greeley claims that one of the reasons Breton disliked the painting so much was because it appeared to make a comment about middle-class upbringings being 'Hitlerian' (54). It is possible that Breton would have been sensitive about being bourgeoisie given that it arguably gave him a difficult position within the Communist

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<sup>52</sup> Jeffett (2004) claims that the straw which broke the camel's back in regard to Dalí's ejection from the Surrealist Movement was the 1939 painting *The Enigma of Hitler* (434).

<sup>53</sup> I specify Surrealist Movement, because he continued to claim adherence to the spirit and aesthetics of the Movement even after his departure. The implications of this will be discussed in more depth in chapter 6.

<sup>54</sup> I would argue that Breton had more cause to question Dalí's fascination with fascist ideology, albeit not regarding whether he supported Hitler, in the 1940s with the publication of *Hidden Faces*. To my knowledge, Breton never made any direct reference to the novel.

Party. The painting, then, could have been perceived by Breton as indirectly personally attacking him on numerous fronts: his middle-class background and his own Movement having been unable to stop the rise of fascism.

Notably, after this ‘incident’ Dalí began to claim that he was apolitical and ahistorical, and indeed always had been (*Secret Life*, 357; *Diary of a Genius*, 1964, 29)<sup>55</sup>, despite the fact that in the 1920s, as noted above, he had been associated with the Catalan communist group, BOC, and in the late 20s, early 30s, had openly supported Communism alongside the Surrealists. As Greeley (2006) notes, his “run-in with Breton... that year had momentarily scared the painter off politics” (88). His claims to be apolitical and ahistorical show that he was attempting to distance his work from any political standpoint. He had already distanced himself from Communism by no longer referring directly to their ideological tenets in his written works post-1931, and his claim to be ahistorical merely cemented the distance he now wanted between himself and the Party. In no longer referring to Communism in a positive light, Dalí also stopped referring to intersections between Surrealist aesthetics and the ‘Revolution’. This did not mean that his work actually became apolitical, however. Nor did it mean that he stopped advocating Surrealist aesthetics or Breton’s works. In the French edition of ‘*Metamorphose de Narcisse*’ (1937), for instance, Dalí gives a block quotation of Breton, although it is notably a quotation extolling his own Paranoiac-criticism (5)<sup>56</sup>.

Breton continued to advocate the political nature of Surrealism throughout the 1930s, and in a different way Dalí continued to advocate the intersection between art and

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<sup>55</sup> Dalí’s claims to be apolitical and ahistorical in *Secret Life* will be discussed in depth in chapter 6.

<sup>56</sup> The layout of Finkelstein’s (1998) translation of this text gives the impression of the quotation floating in mid-air (324). The original French version has the quotation as an epigraph to a subsection of the text.

politics in his own works. Both Radford (1997) and Pine (2010) have noted how a number of Dalí's painted works in the 1930s can be considered political. Radford directs attention to paintings engaging with the Spanish Civil War, such as *Soft Construction with Boiled Beans (Premonition of Civil War)* (1936) (187), and Pine writes of Dalí's painted bread which she claims makes a social commentary (94). In 1941, in his 'The Last Scandal of Salvador Dalí', Dalí claimed that he had "BECOME CLASSIC" (337). This aesthetic, which lauded unity, form, and tradition, aligned with values associated with fascist ideology, in particular Griffin's (2012) notion of "the centrality of 'palingenetic myth' to fascism" (7), i.e. a "form of ultra-nationalism that attempts to realize the myth of the regenerated nation" (1). The aesthetic and its concomitant values, as dramatized in *Hidden Faces* (1944), share the aim of renewing society post-war. I am being purposefully brief here as I go into much more detail in chapters 4, 5, and 6 regarding Dalí's 'Classicism' and his stance towards fascist ideology. Suffice to say that at the end of the period upon which this thesis focuses, indeed by September 1, 1939, 6 years previously, Breton had failed in his attempts to prevent another war through the intersection of aesthetics and politics. Dalí, still claiming that he was apolitical, had embraced an aesthetic which intersected with fascist ideology. For both Dalí and the Surrealists, politics had been a central aspect of their aesthetics.

## **Conclusion**

In this chapter I have discussed the ways in which art and politics intersected for both Surrealism and Dalí from the 1920s to the end of WW2. From its idealist beginnings, through its use of Communist rhetoric and support of dialectical materialism, to the beginning of WW2, politics was an integral feature, and motivator of, Surrealism. It was

thus not *just* an artistic or literary movement. I have looked at the ways in which Dalí's explorations of aesthetics and politics intersected with Surrealist endeavours before departing in the 1930s towards advocating values that can be seen in fascist ideologies. In chapters 5 and 6 I go into more detail in countering Dalí's claims that he was apolitical and ahistorical. I argue that in fact Dalí was political in that he advocated fascist ideology whilst at the same time critiquing the fascist authority figure<sup>57</sup>.

In the next chapter I continue looking at how Dalí's aesthetics intersected with, and departed from, Surrealism by exploring the ways in which he engaged with the Surrealist fascination with hysteria.

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<sup>57</sup> Greeley (2006) refers to the fascist authority figure as the "fascist persona" (85). See footnote 120 for more on this.

## **PART 2: EROTIC NARRATIVE AND** **PERFORMANCE**

## **Chapter 2: Dalí's Hysterical Performance and the *Fin-de-Siècle***

Hysteria was of considerable interest to the Surrealists. In 1928, in *La Révolution surréaliste* (issue 11), Breton and Aragon published an article in celebration of what they saw as the fiftieth anniversary of the 'illness', illustrating it with photographs of 'hysterical' women in seductive postures (20-22). This chapter examines how hysteria was also of central importance to Dalí. I will look at how he explores the 'illness' in two texts, 'Rêverie' (1931) and *Hidden Faces* (1944). It is my contention that in 'Rêverie' hysteria should be primarily understood as a performance, whereas in *Hidden Faces* Dalí uses *fin-de-siècle* medical narratives of hysteria to explore his notion of 'mutual devouring'<sup>58</sup>. In regards to 'Rêverie', I am going to look at how we can understand the performance of hysteria. Do we view it in terms of Surrealist theatre whose characteristics have been outlined by Matthews (1974)? Do we view it in Finkelstein's (1996) terms as an example of "an active simulation of a paranoiac state" (186-187; 297 n.14)? I will discuss the merits of these two approaches which foreground performance in Surrealist and Dalinian aesthetics, and then propose that Gordon's (2001; 2004) work on hysteria in late 19<sup>th</sup>, early 20<sup>th</sup>, century cabaret and other stage productions can help us to better understand Dalí's performance of hysteria and its relationship to Surrealist aesthetics. I will then go on to discuss how Dalí's approach to hysteria changes by *Hidden Faces* where he represents the character, Solange de Cléda, in the midst of

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<sup>58</sup> Both Markus (2000) and Finkelstein (1996) note the importance of 'cannibalism' between men and women in Dalí's *oeuvre*. Markus refers to a "cannibalistic love relation" in which the man and the woman devour each other (35). She draws attention to how in Dalí's works the female "is both loved and feared" and represents "anxiety about being eaten or castrated" (36). Finkelstein writes of a "sexual cannibalism" in which the female is portrayed as the threat (214). My stance is a combination of the two, but also an extension. Dalí portrays 'cannibalism' as mutual, with both individuals experiencing pleasure and pain from it. Hence why I refer to it as 'mutual devouring'. However, I also see the relation as positing the female as a threat which must be tamed by the male. Importantly, especially for my arguments later in this chapter and in chapter 5, the female enjoys being violently tamed.

hysteric convulsions. Here I will suggest that Dalí explores *fin-de-siècle* narratives of hysteria, bringing together what Harris (2004) refers to as a “link... between femininity [sic], hysteria, and religion” (336).

Dalí’s uses of hysteria tie-in to his interests of the time: in 1931 negotiating the Surrealist aesthetic and in 1944 exploring his own notion of ‘mutual devouring’ and its relation to his aesthetic of ‘the Classic’. Importantly, however, in regards to ‘Rêverie’ I am not in agreement with Finkelstein’s (1998) claim that the text should be understood as one of Dalí’s “continuous efforts to be accepted into the ranks of the Surrealists, but this on his own terms, with full recognition of his originality and, indeed, uniqueness” (146-147). I suggest that Dalí performs the Surrealist view of hysteria, and in doing so actually positions himself ambiguously towards the Movement.

### **Introducing ‘Rêverie’ (1931)**

It is strange that so little work has been carried out on ‘Rêverie’ (1931) as in his *Entretiens* (1969) André Breton places the publication of the text as a key moment in the contentious relationship between the Surrealists and the Communist Party; a moment also remembered as key to the ‘rupture’ between himself and Louis Aragon<sup>59</sup>. Aragon had written an inflammatory poem by the name of ‘Front Rouge’ which was accused, according to Breton, of “incitement to military disobedience” (168-169) and “provocation to murder for the purposes of anarchist propaganda” (169)<sup>60</sup>. By 1932, there was the possibility of him being imprisoned, and it was with the aim of avoiding

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<sup>59</sup> Finkelstein (1996, 122) and Gibson (1997, 296) have offered brief accounts of the consequences of ‘Rêverie’ recounted here. Indeed, the antagonism between Surrealism and the French Communist Party is the most noted thing about ‘Rêverie’. Considering this, it is strange that more scholars have not gone on to write about the text itself.

<sup>60</sup> All translations mine unless otherwise stated.

this that Breton began writing *Misère de la poésie* (169). However, whilst Breton was writing this text, Aragon, along with four others, had been called by the Communist party to account for Dalí's 'Rêverie', which had been published in *Surréalisme au service de la révolution* no. 4 the previous year, and to "formally disavow the collaboration with Dalí" (169).

The Surrealist exploration of sexuality and the erotic was a constant irritation for the Communist Party who did not keep their distaste a secret. Ehrenburg, a Russian writer, wrote that "the Surrealists avoided political action in favor [sic] of 'onanism, pederasty fetishism, exhibitionism, and even bestiality'" (Ehrenburg quoted by Hopkins, 2016, 123), and Breton attacked him on the street for these claims (123). There was an incompatibility between the Surrealists' sexually explicit works and Communist revolutionary aims, an incompatibility which furthermore led to the Movement's expulsion from the AEAR (Communist Association of Revolutionary Writers and Artists) in 1933 (Read, 2007, 38). According to Greeley (2006), Dalí was aware of this incompatibility as the artist believed that "the Communist Party fell into the trap prepared for it by capitalism, that is, it defined reality so as to exclude desire and to credit solely the objective and the tangible" (63). This would have been an incendiary argument as it amounts to Dalí arguing that he can produce Communist ends (using what he saw as Communist ideology) better than the Communist Party<sup>61</sup>. Furthermore, as Greeley notes, Dalí questioned the Communist Party's vision of reality, rejecting its materialist basis in favour of a view which included individual desire (63)<sup>62</sup>. In order to

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<sup>61</sup> This distinction between ideology and Party is important for understanding Dalí. He claimed he was more Surrealist than the Surrealists, i.e. he could adhere to what he saw as the aesthetics and theory better than the actual Movement (*UC*, 112); and during his pre-1945 'Classic' period I contend that he adhered to fascist ideology whilst refuting claims that he had sympathies with any particular leaders or groups.

<sup>62</sup> Dalí's denunciation of 'materialism' is a constant theme throughout his career, although what he means by 'materialism' often changes.



take an active approach to disturbing bourgeois morality, instead of waiting for such a disruption to be the passive “consequence of the economic and social revolution” (Greeley quoting Dalí, 63), there needed to be a thorough disruption to the way sexuality and the erotic were represented and experienced; individual desire would bring about the disruption of bourgeois morality, preparing the way for Revolution (63). ‘Rêverie’, a text published the same year as he was espousing these views in lectures, can be deemed as an expression of those theories. It is no wonder then that the Communist Party disapproved, as it was both highly sexually explicit and underpinned by a different theorisation of ‘reality’ than they themselves espoused.

Breton was satisfied with not immediately engaging with the Communist Party’s concerns regarding ‘Rêverie’, but his lack of response helped the rift between Surrealism and the Party to grow. Breton had been frustrated at a comment made by a Communist Party member regarding ‘Rêverie’, that: “You are looking... to complicate the simple and healthy relations between man and woman” (*Entretiens*, 169). Breton wished to include this phrase in *Misère de la poésie*. Aragon, however, objected to this, claiming that the disagreement between Surrealism and the Communist Party should not be made public (169). According to Breton, Aragon “signalled to [him] that the insertion of that phrase... would render [their] rupture inevitable” (169-170). Whilst Aragon was primarily referring to the fractured relationship between himself and Breton, he may as well have been referring to the relationship between the Surrealist Movement and the Communist Party, the ‘Rêverie’ incident being one more nail in its coffin. On this account, then, ‘Rêverie’ is central to two key moments within the development of the Surrealist Movement: the division between Surrealism and the Communist Party, and the broken friendship between Breton and Aragon. It is thus

surprising that so little has been written about it, as it would be of interest to Surrealism scholars as well as Dalí academics.

Surprise at the lack of scholarly attention paid to 'Rêverie' decreases when you consider the text's content. It is extremely sexually explicit and at times a very uncomfortable read. It is an easy text to dismiss as being purposefully provocative and meant to offend. However, there are numerous contexts in which we can place the text, and in so doing it becomes much more interesting. In the context of the development of Dalí's theories on eroticism, it becomes an important example of the construction of a 'narrative inquisition' and also an example of him negotiating Sadeian archetypes as a means of constructing more solid boundaries for this 'inquisition'. This context for 'Rêverie' will be discussed in depth in the next chapter. Another way of reading 'Rêverie' is as a performance, and this is the context in which I will discuss the text for the first half of this chapter. In particular I am looking at his performance of hysteria. I suggest that Dalí's stance towards Surrealism becomes ambiguous through this performance. The text appears at times to be a collage of Surrealist concerns placed together in an inauthentic way; there is a falsity, un-naturalness, to the narrative that other Surrealist texts do not have. In terms of my aforementioned co-option of Suleiman's terms in the Introduction, I would suggest that Dalí enacts a stance in between 'mimicry' and 'assimilation': the ironic replication of Surrealist aesthetics as a form of critique and the use of Surrealist aesthetics in a way indistinguishable from Surrealist use (Suleiman, 2003, 5). He 'mimics' Surrealist aesthetics without critiquing them, *but* their falsity and un-naturalness prevents 'assimilation'. In 'Rêverie' he celebrates Surrealist aesthetics in regards to hysteria, but the gesture is too overt to feel authentic. He draws attention to the fact that he is using those aesthetics, much like in *Secret Life* where he draws

attention to his knowledge of Freudian theory by using the psychoanalytic style of discourse in analysing his own childhood. 'Rêverie' is thus a very self-conscious text, and its un-naturalness makes it unsettling for reasons other than its explicit sexual content. 'Rêverie' performs Surrealism, drawing attention to tropes one associates with the Surrealist Movement and then acting them out. This makes Breton's claim that the text has "a very unrestricted character" (1969, 168) so intriguing, because at one and the same time the text gives the impression of being unrestrained in its explicit depictions of sexual activity and yet keeps referring to Surrealist methods in order to ground the content.

At the same time, however, there are elements of the hysterical performance which give the text an air of authenticity, separate from an emulation of Surrealist concerns. The way in which the narrator's hysteric performance channels the theoretical concerns outlined by Gordon (2001; 2004) surrounding cabaret performances of hysteric convulsions in the late 19<sup>th</sup>, early 20<sup>th</sup>, century helps the text achieve an authenticity of expression. Furthermore, I will argue, this channelling allows the text to achieve access to the experience of mental illness in a way which surpasses those attempts by the Surrealists. The text, then, has an ambiguous relationship to Surrealism, in that at one and the same time it appears to be inauthentic, an overt emulation of Surrealist concerns, and authentic, surpassing Surrealist attempts at accessing the experience of mental illness.

Before embarking on my exploration of Dalí's performance of hysteria in 'Rêverie', I will enlarge upon some thoughts regarding Dalí's position within the text which will help in providing a *précis* of the narrative. 'Rêverie' is a first-person narrative narrated

predominantly in the present-tense by what I will refer to as ‘Narrator-Dalí’. It is clear that the narrator is constructed as a *version* of Dalí, and that we are supposed to infer things about ‘Writer-Dalí’, by which I mean the individual by the name of Dalí outside of the text, from the text. There are parallels between Dalí’s own life and ‘Narrator-Dalí’s’ life to aid this reading. For instance, the house in which the daydream events of ‘Rêverie’ take place is called the ‘Moulin de la Tour’ (‘Rêverie’, 33). The ‘Moulin de la Tour’, in Catalan the ‘Molí de la Torre’, was a place which ‘Writer-Dalí’ visited as a child (Gibson, 1997, 48-49). And Gibson claims that the main female character of the text, Dulita, is the representation of a girl Dalí knew at the ‘Molí de la Torre’ when he was a child (50; 295).

Similarly, in *Secret Life* (1942) there are parallels between ‘Narrator-Dalí’ and ‘Writer-Dalí’, and I would suggest that the narrator in both texts is constructed to be the same one. I would further suggest that the falsehoods in both texts, those times where claims made about ‘Narrator-Dalí’ do not match the life history of ‘Writer-Dalí’, should not be seen as Dalí lying, but rather as constructing the Dalí persona. For instance, in *Secret Life* ‘Narrator-Dalí’ claimed that his brother “died at the age of seven from an attack of meningitis, three years before I was born” (2). Gibson has shown that ‘Writer-Dalí’s’ brother actually died at 22 months old and that Dalí was born 9 months later rather than 3 years (1997, 21; 22). ‘Writer-Dalí’ also claims that his brother’s death affected him considerably, and positions himself in relation to him (*SL*, 4). Later, in his *Unspeakable Confessions* (1976), ‘Writer-Dalí’ claimed that his parents loved his brother through him, that he was thus double (13), and further claimed that his parents kept a picture of the dead brother “next to a reproduction of Christ crucified as painted by Velázquez; and this image of the cadaver of the Saviour whom Salvador had without question gone

to in his angelic ascension conditioned in me an archetype born of four Salvadors who cadaverised me” (241). I argue that Gibson misses the point when he states that “[m]ost of what Dalí has to say about his brother appears to be make-believe masquerading as true history and intended to supply the curious with an arresting but spurious justification for the artist’s eccentric behaviour” (23). ‘Writer-Dalí’ is purposely creating a fictional version of himself, one which occasionally intersects with his life history. Both ‘Rêverie’ and *Secret Life*, along with his ‘autobiographical’ works post-1945, combined with his public appearances/performances can be viewed as constructing this persona. Thus, a distinction between ‘Narrator-Dalí’ and ‘Writer-Dalí’ needs to be made.

To return to ‘Rêverie’, then, I argue that the narrator should be viewed as ‘Narrator-Dalí’, different from but intersecting with ‘Writer-Dalí’, and it should be viewed as the same narrator as *Secret Life* and *Unspeakable Confessions*. Situating the writer’s position in relation to the text helps to provide a *précis* of the narrative. The narrative focuses on ‘Narrator-Dalí’, lying on his bed, having an erotic daydream in which he casts himself as a romantic hero in a farmhouse. The daydream centres upon his desire for “the woman [that he] love[s]” (32), who highly problematically transforms into an 11 year old girl before transforming back again, and his desire to “sodomize” her (32). ‘Narrator-Dalí’, having the daydream, indulges in bodily contortions akin to those associated with the *fin-de-siècle* hysteric; contortions which were glorified by the Surrealists.

## Performing Hysteria in 'Rêverie'

Firstly, we need to look at the way in which the exploration of hysteria in 'Rêverie' can be viewed as a self-conscious performance. 'Narrator-Dalí', having the daydream, claims that "I would lift my buttocks in a quite inexplicable way" (33), but then writes of "the convulsive process" which "several times, after painful efforts, it was necessary to relinquish in order to sit up on the couch" (33). This suggests that he has control over his movements, something further suggested in his end notes where he writes that "I pursue the daydream whilst keeping my hands immobile behind my thighs, a very uncomfortable attitude which gives me cramp in the arms. I remain however without moving, and for ten minutes more after the end of the dream" (36). This description gives no indication that he is not in control of his bodily movements, which enables 'Narrator-Dalí's' contortions to be viewed as a performance.

In what way are we to understand this performance though? Can we understand it in terms of the characteristics of Surrealist theatre? In his study of Dada and Surrealist theatre, Matthews (1974) suggests that there are a number of characteristics to the medium. There is a critique of 'character' and 'characterization', dislike for "[t]he realistic prejudice of conventional drama", and an interest in the 'latent' and 'manifest content' of a play (9). Despite the fact that Matthews' categorisations apply predominantly to plays written during the late 1910s, Surrealist aesthetics were still concerned with 'character', 'identity', critiquing realism, and 'latent' and 'manifest content' in the late 20s, early 30s. And, indeed, these characteristics can be seen in 'Rêverie'. Dalí plays with the idea of 'character' by self-consciously inventing the characters as he goes along, which at the same time disrupts realist conventions of representation. The reader is constantly aware that the scenario is a construction and

aware of the elements from which it has been constructed. Furthermore, ‘latent’ and ‘manifest’ content intersect, as ‘Narrator-Dalí’s’ unconscious motivations are known to him within the creation of the daydream. However, whilst this shows that Surrealist theatre and ‘Rêverie’ have shared characteristics, this does not necessarily mean that the text can be seen in terms of theatre. Nor does it show that the depiction of hysterical convulsions is theatrical. After all, the aforementioned characteristics can be seen in other Surrealist mediums: writing, paintings, etc. In other words, they are not purely characteristics of Surrealist theatre, but Surrealist aesthetics as a whole.

Matthews takes as a given that in Surrealist theatre there is a stage, a script, and a dividing line between the audience and the play, even though those elements are often disrupted. Are there such elements of ‘staging’ in ‘Rêverie’, and if so, can Matthews’ characteristics of Surrealist theatre be seen as part of them? In what way can we see Dalí’s exploration of these characteristics in ‘Rêverie’ as theatrical, and how do they relate to the performance of hysteria? In his study of theatricality in Dalí’s paintings, Finkelstein (nd) looks at the inspiration of Baroque and Mannerist theatricality on Dalí. He links Dalí’s paranoiac-criticism to the presence of theatrical elements in his paintings, claiming that “[t]he aspiration to verify the reality of the paranoiac idea for others, a dominant theme in Dalí’s evolving theory, is often associated with the notion of theatre or the stage” (223). He outlines numerous devices Dalí uses within his paintings to evoke theatre, including “spatial subversion” (223), laying out “a circumscribed space as an arena on which his motifs would be distributed” (223), “stage-like effects such as the excessive tilting up of the ground behind the foreground figures in a pronounced diagonal recession” (224), and in terms of theatrical communication with an audience, Finkelstein claims that “Dalí’s ambition with regard

to his theories speaks of demonstration, indication and persuasion as the means of verifying the reality of the paranoiac idea for others” (224). For Finkelstein, the theatrical and the theatre-stage are central *formal* elements of Dalí’s painted *oeuvre* of the 1930s (223; 224). But what of ‘Rêverie’? Can formal characteristics of theatre be seen there? Matthews argued that Surrealist theatre subverted theatrical conventions as a means of unsettling and “outrag[ing]” the audience (10). Does Dalí subvert conventional characteristics of theatre in ‘Rêverie’, or does he embrace the conventions of staging as Finkelstein suggests he does in his paintings?

Referring directly, but briefly, to ‘Rêverie’, Finkelstein (2004) sees the text’s theatricality in terms of “the control of affect through arrangement” (132). He draws attention to how ‘Narrator-Dalí’ moves elements of the setting to create a stage upon which his fantasies are played out (132). Thus, again, Finkelstein focuses on the formal aspects of theatricality, suggesting that Dalí’s theatre lies in incorporating aspects of formal theatre convention into his work. However, I think with ‘Rêverie’ that a distinction needs to be made between ‘high’ and ‘low’ theatre. The comparisons used within Finkelstein’s investigation into theatrical elements in Dalí’s paintings and ‘Rêverie’ are those from ‘high’ theatre. I would suggest that ‘Rêverie’ is better understood, and indeed its portrayal of hysterical convulsions is better understood, in terms of ‘low’ theatre. In particular, cabaret performances of the late 19<sup>th</sup>, early 20<sup>th</sup>, centuries.

In her work on hysteria in French cabaret and cinema of the late 19<sup>th</sup>, early 20<sup>th</sup>, centuries, Gordon (2001; 2004) claims that their aesthetics purposely reproduced hysteric contortions: “These movements could be seen nightly on cabaret and café-



concert stages; mechanical tics, angularity, and jerky, frenetic gesture were the keys to stardom and the essential characteristics of the cabaret and café-concert aesthetic” (2004, 103). She argues that the theory of “physiological spectatorship” was central to the period (124), and that there was much research into this idea that in perceiving something one’s body is physically stimulated. The theory was that “perceiving the aesthetic object not only produces specific sensations, but also corporeal reactions that retrace the form and movement of that object” (98). Furthermore, there was the notion that “every movement of the body corresponds to and expresses an emotion” (99). Thus, in replicating a certain movement you would theoretically be experiencing a certain emotion. These theories are important to Dalí’s portrayal of hysteria in ‘Rêverie’ in a number of ways. As Finkelstein (nd) noted, getting other people to experience the paranoiac idea was of great importance to Dalí (223). The notion of ‘physiological spectatorship’ combines this aim with the Surrealist’s over-arching aim of disrupting the mental state of their audience and readers by bringing the unconscious into the conscious world. Dalí could be attempting to inspire the ‘hysterical’ movements that he describes in detail into his readers through a form of ‘physiological (reader)ship’. And the detail of his description is important in terms of the idea that every movement corresponds to experiencing a certain emotion. If Dalí’s contortions do inspire such ‘convulsions’ in the reader then, they, theoretically, would be experiencing ‘hysterical’ emotions. This, then, suggests that Dalí, in performing those ‘hysterical’ convulsions is *actually* experiencing hysteria. Notably, over a decade later in *Hidden Faces*, Dalí draws a direct association between simulation and actually experiencing a specific emotion. Grandsailles explains to Solange that, “[t]he floods of tears that great actresses are able to shed at will seem to produce nervous releases corresponding in every respect to those of true grief” (134). And continuing the reference to performance and theatrics, Grandsailles states that “[t]he hysteric arch... has the same spiritual origins, so to speak,

as the spasms so well known to Chaplin” (133-134). Thus, I am proposing that cabaret and other ‘low’ theatre performances of the late 19<sup>th</sup>, early 20<sup>th</sup>, centuries had a profound effect on how ‘Rêverie’ communicates with its audience. In effect, Dalí is attempting to break down the dividing line between his audience and the narration by inspiring bodily movements in the reader.

Finkelstein (1996) has noted how in the early 1930s, the Surrealists were attempting to simulate mental illness in an effort to experience the illness under controlled circumstances. Throughout the 1920s, the Surrealists were fascinated by hysteria. In *La Révolution surréaliste* (issue 11, 1928), amongst excerpts from Breton’s *Nadja* and Aragon’s *Traité du style*, they published an article authored by Breton and Aragon entitled, ‘The Fiftieth Anniversary of Hysteria 1878-1928’ (20-22). Captioned with ‘The Passionate Attitudes in 1878’, this article notably only included pictures of ‘hysterical’ women that they considered seductive. The article shows that for the Surrealists the anniversary was a cause for celebration. Hysteria was “the greatest poetic discovery of the end of the nineteenth century” (20). In 1930, Breton and Eluard published *L’Immaculée conception*. The theory behind the text was that mental illnesses have a “latent existence in the human mind” (Breton and Eluard quoted in Finkelstein, 1996, 184), and by actively bringing them forth one can use them for ‘poetic’ purposes before returning them to their latent state. The text thus included narratives purportedly written whilst in the mindset of numerous mental illnesses. It is interesting that the Surrealists saw these forays into mental illnesses as “simulations”. All the narratives are defined as ‘simulations’, ‘Essai de simulation du délire d’interprétation’ and ‘Essai de simulation de la démence précoce’ being two such examples. One can only assume that it is their “controlled use” (Finkelstein, 184) that makes them simulations. The

Surrealists thus undermine their method, because they are not *actually* experiencing mental illnesses as they have active control over them. Conley (1996) has noted how these ‘simulations’ are ultimately “playful” (58), and that accounts by female Surrealists such as Leonora Carrington and Unica Zürn, who actually suffered from mental illnesses and did not have the luxury of active control over them, can be viewed as more Surreal, “because surrealism itself demands acknowledgment of the reality of the irrational within consciousness” (59).

Given that paranoiac-criticism was an ‘active’ mental state, over which the individual has control, Finkelstein (1996) argues that *L’Immaculée conception* attracted Dalí as it purportedly demonstrated that individuals could turn on and off, like a tap, certain mental states (184). We see how important this is to hysteria in ‘Rêverie’ when we note that Breton had defined paranoiac-criticism as the individual “participat[ing] in these events as actor and spectator simultaneously” (185, Finkelstein summarising Breton). Whilst not referring to the hysteric convulsions directly, Finkelstein claims that ‘Rêverie’ is an example of a simulated paranoiac-criticism narrative, as it is “a ‘guided’ and ‘controlled’ daydream experience” (297, n. 14). If we look at ‘Narrator-Dalí’s’ hysteric convulsions, the idea of him being both ‘actor and spectator simultaneously’ explains why he has control over the convulsions whilst at the same time experiencing those convulsions. We should also bear in mind that ‘Rêverie’ was published only one year after *L’Immaculée conception*, and thus could be seen as Dalí’s attempt at the same idea.

Looking at ‘Rêverie’, then, in terms of the dual influence of ‘low’ theatre cabaret performances and the Surrealist attempts to ‘simulate’ mental illness can help us to

understand ‘Narrator-Dalí’s’ hysterical performance. These dual influences, however, create a tension within the text between authenticity and non-authenticity of expression. As previously noted, Dalí’s attempt at rendering a text with the ideas found in *L’Immaculée conception* positions the text in between Suleiman’s notions of ‘mimicry’ and ‘assimilation’. There is no indication within the text that he is *ironically* using Surrealist ideas, but at the same time the overtness of those ideas prevents it from being ‘assimilated’. The text is inauthentic in this sense. However, the influence of ‘low’ theatre cabaret performances and the theories of ‘physiological spectatorship’ add an authenticity to ‘Narrator-Dalí’s’ hysterical performance. This is because of the idea that in performing certain movements you are accessing certain emotions. This thins the line between simulation and actual experience of mental illness, as it could be argued that ‘Narrator-Dalí’ is not *just* simulating hysterical contortions. Despite the fact that he is in control of them, he is still experiencing hysteria in a substantial way. The text’s authenticity, as a text apart from merely emulating or imitating Surrealist concerns, can also be found in the relationship of the reader to the text. This is also explained in terms of ‘physiological spectatorship’. The Surrealists wanted the readers and viewers of their works to be mentally affected by what was before them. If ‘physiological spectatorship’ stands, the readers of ‘Rêverie’, reading of ‘Narrator-Dalí’s’ convulsions, could be inspired to adopt those positions themselves, and thus experience hysteria themselves.

‘Narrator-Dalí’s’ performance of hysteria in ‘Rêverie’, then, creates a tension between the authentic and inauthentic; an emulation of Surrealist concerns and also a more successful outing for those concerns. Whilst ‘Rêverie’, as a text, and its use of hysteric convulsion are *meant* to be discussed in relation to Surrealism (it was, after all, first published in *Surréalisme au service de la révolution*), the link between hysteria in

*Hidden Faces* and Surrealism is far weaker. In *Hidden Faces*, Dalí engages further with *fin-de-siècle* medical narratives surrounding hysteria in order to explore his notion of ‘mutual devouring’ through the ‘sexual possession’ of the protagonist, Solange de Cléda. The reader’s relationship to *Hidden Faces* is not the same as in ‘Rêverie’, and, I would argue, he/she is not being encouraged to engage bodily with the representation of hysteria in the same way as in the earlier text. As such, hysteria in the novel has a different purpose than in ‘Rêverie’, and I intend to explore the ways in which it links to other themes within the novel, such as cultural renewal and ‘the Classic’.

### **Hysteria and the *Fin-de-Siècle***

Hysteria was the quintessential *fin-de-siècle* malady. Studied by the reductive materialist Charcot in the Salpêtrière and the more therapeutically-minded Bernheim at Nancy, the medical narratives regarding the ‘disorder’ did not just remain within the province of the medical establishment, rather they became embedded in public consciousness (Micale, 2004b, 71). This was in no small part due to the creation of what Harris (2004) has termed “a visual canon for the study of hysteria” with Bourneville and Régnaud’s *Iconographie photographique de la Salpêtrière* (1877), in which were published photographs of the ‘hysterical’ women treated in the Salpêtrière (340). Whilst Micale (2004a; 2004b) has demonstrated at length the intersections between fiction and other medical texts on hysteria, *Iconographie* highlights superbly the linkages made at the time between hysteria, eroticism, and female sexuality. As Harris (1989) notes, “sexual allurements, demonic contortions, and convulsive attacks were all caught by the probing eyes of the camera” (162), thus highlighting the sexualisation of the female patients (163).

Women's sexuality has traditionally been deemed mysterious, unknowable, or hidden, predominantly by male commentators. Freud (1933) famously declared an intention in his 'Lecture 33 – Femininity' to investigate the "riddle of the nature of femininity" (146). Acknowledging that there would be women attending his lecture, he stated that "to those of you who are women this will not apply – you are yourselves the problem" (146), flippantly dismissing women from a conversation about them and relegating them to the status of a puzzle to be solved. This was also a tactic in the Surrealists' discussions of sex published in *La Révolution surréaliste*, although before leaving the second session Aragon noted that their discussion had been "up to a point overturned" by there being no women present (*La Révolution surréaliste* 11, 39). Bourneville and Regnard's *Iconographie* does the same thing. As Harris (2004) notes in her study of the text, it never actually engages emotionally with the women depicted, and uses case studies only as a means to describe the origins of their pathological condition (341-342). It should be noted that *Iconographie* is not entirely devoted to hysteria, rather it looks at the various conditions 'treated' at the Salpêtrière (Harris, 1989, 162). Many of those pictures under the heading 'Attaque Hystéro-Epileptique', however, depict the patients in sexualised positions, arched in posture (*Iconographie*, 280; 282) or dreamily smiling (278). As Harris (1989) notes, the 'hysteric' becomes merely titillation, a recipient of fascination by men, and the pictures invite more than an objective, medical eye (163). In these pictures the viewer is invited to voyeuristically witness something usually not on public show, the manifestation of female sexual desire. As Harris (1989) states, we should be under no misapprehensions about what these pictures are: they are exploitative pictures under the guise of scientific progress (159).

The archetypal posture assumed by hysterics in the later nineteenth century was the *arc de cercle* and has its quintessential representation in an illustration of 1885, 'Phase des contorsions (Arc de cercle)' by Richer. One of the 'hystéro-épileptiques' in *Iconographie* is also depicted in the pose (280 and 282, Planche III), shown with her back arched and her face covered by a pillow. Dalí's own illustration, *L'arc hystérique* (1937), bears an extremely close resemblance to Richer's illustration, albeit with his characteristic distortions. Dalí heightens the sexualisation of the contorted woman through the naked buttocks and their rounded contours. Her arms and legs lose their solidity, however, suggesting the ethereality and lack of substance of the dream. The combination of solidity and ethereality in this way suggests the dream (desire) manifesting itself in reality, which was an integral part of his paranoiac-criticism and indeed Surrealist aesthetics from the early 1930s onwards. It is also an integral part of the understanding of 'hysteria', desire manifesting itself in reality through the body. In *Hidden Faces*, Dalí brings together the contorting, sexualised hysteric with demonic possession in a way which recalls the *fin-de-siècle* fascination with the two. It is my contention that Dalí uses the 'sexual possession' of Solange to explore further his notion of 'mutual devouring'.

Harris (2004) has noted how at the beginning of the French Third Republic (1870-1940), adherents of the philosophies of materialism and Positivism, supported by a government willing to advance these philosophies, attempted to push out, and in many ways succeeded in doing so, religion and clericalism from the medical field (337-338). The most famous example of this is the way in which Charcot reclassified behaviour considered to be demonic possession in the seventeenth century as hysteria (342-343). The incident he used was that of the nuns of Loudon, which, as outlined by Finn (2009,

131-133), goes as follows: In 1617, Urbain Grandier arrived in Loudon and became *curé*. Popular with the women there, and indulging in a number of affairs, he nevertheless declined to be the confessor for the new Ursuline order when it was created in 1626. The mother superior, Sister Jeanne des Anges, was extremely angry about this. She and the other nuns “began to have erotic visions in which Grandier appeared to them” (133). Accompanying these visions, the nuns were convulsed by violent bodily contortions and obscene language. An exorcist, Barré, was called for and he claimed that Grandier was the figure behind these women being possessed by devils. In 1634 the *curé* was burned at the stake (131-133).<sup>63</sup>

That the nuns of Loudon, with their alleged “pent-up [sexual] desire” (133), became a common theme in literature and medical texts of the period demonstrates the interconnection between medical sciences and literature at the time, an interconnection which Micale (2004a) has argued was “*reciprocally enriching*” (3, his emphasis). I also wonder, however, if the nun’s popularity in fiction could partly be explained by the fact that they are nuns. I have already noted the voyeuristic position in which the reader/viewer of Charcot’s *Iconographie photographique de la Salpêtrière* finds themselves, witnessing the bodily manifestation of women’s hidden sexual desires<sup>64</sup>. The women in the pictures were scantily dressed, if dressed at all. This is a far cry from the layers of confining clothing women of the period would usually wear. Transpose the idea that the women represented in those pictures are nuns and an extra titillation is added. It is no surprise that one of the more extreme pieces of visual imagery from the account of Loudon can be seen in cinema, media, and music even today: the incident described by Richer of a nun inserting a crucifix under her skirt and inside herself “to

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<sup>63</sup> Harris (2004, 342) provides a shorter account of the nuns of Loudon than Finn’s.

<sup>64</sup> Harris (1989) poses that the bodily manifestations could be theatrics (165).



satisfy her obscene desires” (Richer, cited by Finn, 133). To name but a couple of examples, this imagery can be seen in the film, *The Exorcist* (1973), and on the front cover of the Marduk demo, *Fuck me Jesus* (1991), which depicts a woman satisfying herself with a crucifix. I suggest that it is the fact that these women are nuns, and thus notions of sacrilege, corruption, and the sacred are involved to a greater degree than ordinary women succumbing convulsively to their desires, that made the nuns of Loudon a popular reference point in medical and literary narratives of the time and to a lesser extent obliquely today.

Huysmans’ reference to the nuns in *Là-Bas* (1891) has particular relevance to Dalí’s *Hidden Faces*. Diving right into the debate of whether science, Positivism in particular, should be elevated above religion in regard to its explanatory strength and value, Durtal’s friend, des Hermies, asks whether the reframing of the convulsive behaviours of the nuns as ‘hysteric’ “invalidate[s] possession” (128, Kindle edition). He further states that “it remains still to resolve this insoluble question: is a woman possessed because she’s hysterical, or is she hysterical because she’s possessed?” (128), a question I will be returning to in relation to Solange’s hysteric convulsions. Taking the contrary position to Charcot, des Hermies declares that “the Church alone can answer, science cannot. No, when you think about it, the self-assurance of the Positivists is discomfiting” (128). By name-checking the Salpêtrière and Richet in his discussion (148), Huysmans gives his novel considerable contemporary relevance. The aforementioned debate highlighted by Harris, regarding the removal of religion and clericalism from medicine, is being directly referred to. This was a debate which was ongoing at the time of writing. Dalí, on the other hand, is writing his novel, *Hidden Faces*, in 1944, when this debate is over fifty years in the past. Yet he uses extremely

similar phrasing to writers around the *fin-de-siècle* such as Huysmans when Grandsailles muses upon scientific underpinnings to occult and mystical phenomena. He revives those narratives. M. P. Shiel, in his *The Purple Cloud* (1901), writes that

The veriest fledgling in psychical science will now sit and discourse finically to you about the reporting powers of the mind in its trance state – just as though it was something quite new! This simple fact, I assure you, which the Psychical Research Society, only after endless investigation, admits to be scientific, has been perfectly well known to every crone since the Middle Ages, and, I assume, long previously. What an unnecessary air of discovery (3).

Over forty years later, Salvador Dalí writes in his novel that Grandsailles, surrounded by alchemical preparations within a study filled with esoteric texts and ‘magical’ artefacts, is musing upon how his contemporary world offers a revival of concerns of the Middle Ages:

What, indeed, was the most up-to-date pharmacopeia doing if not reactualizing under other names the mysteries that for a long time were attributed to the credulity of the Middle Ages? The influences and therapeutic virtues which the alchemists accorded to the mineral world of gems and precious metals had been so much laughed at! Well, was the use of gold salts not looked upon in our day as a powerful curative? And what about the direct application of certain living animals on an afflicted part of the body? Was not a toad or a chrysalis a charged and panting congeries not only of unknown electrical phenomena but also, and especially, of the still elusive ones of radio-activity, since their secretions and salivas seemed more and more to be proved to be in direct connection, not with the NBC short waves, but with the interplanetary ones of the music of the celestial spheres? (128-129).

Like Shiel, Dalí engages with the notion that concerns of the Middle Ages have been revived under the aegis of science. Both writers appear to suggest that this revival

should encourage us to re-evaluate those aspects of ‘knowledge’ that we had assumed were long dead. Grandsailles is taking an ambiguous stance, however, regarding whether the revival is due to the credence which scientific advancement now gives to occult phenomena, or whether science has merely discovered what scholars of the occult already knew: that such phenomena is real and should be taken seriously. This ambiguity can also be seen in Dalí’s dramatization of the question posed by des Hermies in *Là-Bas*: “is a woman possessed because she’s hysterical, or is she hysterical because she’s possessed?” (128). Is Solange ‘hysteric’ and suffering from excessively inhibited desire or is she possessed by Grandsailles?

The next two sections explore the ways in which Solange is constructed as a ‘hysteric’ figure. Using Conley’s (1996) interpretation of the thematic importance of the Virgin Mary in Surrealist works, I will explore the ways in which Solange is characterised as occupying a space between the earthly and the divine. This is of importance to her ‘hysteric’ behaviour when ‘sexually possessed’ by Grandsailles, and forms a part of my argument that Dalí uses *fin-de-siècle* narratives of hysteria in his portrayal of Solange’s behaviour. I will further suggest that the ambiguity as to whether or not Solange is actually possessed becomes part of Dalí’s exploration of ‘mutual devouring’ through ‘sexual possession’.

### **Solange de Cléda, Hysteria, and the Divine**

Conley (1996) has convincingly shown how the Virgin Mary was an important metaphorical figure for the Surrealists, in their creation of the ‘automatic text’ in the 1920s, and the ‘automatic text’ itself. The Virgin “mediates between the human and the

sacred” (46), a fitting analogy for the Surrealist who creates the ‘automatic text’ in that he occupies a position between the conscious world and the unconscious; and a just as fitting analogy for the text itself which “mediates between their conscious selves and their more sacred, and powerful, unconscious beings” (46). She claims that in Breton and Eluard’s *L’Immaculée Conception* (1930), there are “five thematic references to the Virgin” (34), the first three of which I contend are particularly relevant for an understanding of the character of Solange de Cléda in Dalí’s *Hidden Faces*. Firstly, the Virgin is seen “as a feminine archetype”; secondly, she “disrupt[s]... chronological time”; and thirdly, she is seen “as a being at once natural (i.e., a mother) and unnatural (i.e., a mother who conceived, and was conceived, immaculately, the way a thoroughly ‘modern’ machine might reproduce)” (34). I contend that Dalí uses these tropes in his characterisation of Solange to represent her as a hysteric figure within which the sacred and the earthly manifest.

Early in the novel, Solange is presented as manifesting a dialectical relationship between the earthly and the divine. Indeed, this is even present in her name: in French, ‘Sol’ means ‘Ground’ or ‘Earth’, and ‘Ange’ is ‘Angel’. Grandsailles and Girardin are sitting at dinner, and the latter describes Solange in the following terms:

She was dressed so scantily that there was no mistaking the sovereignty of her body, yet she would often keep her arms crossed over her bosom, as though she felt chilly, suggesting at one and the same time the pose of a sculptured nude coming out of her bath and that of a saint listening to a message from heaven (52).

On the one hand attention is drawn to her materiality: her earthly body inspires desire in men and she experiences the sensation of coldness. On the other hand, her mind is depicted as being far away from earthly concerns and focused upon the spiritual. She is

graspable, as demonstrated by the emphasis on her physical body, and beyond them at the same time. Here then she represents the simultaneous presence of the sacred and the earthly.

Conley argues that there is a tension in Surrealist references to Woman. They often represent Woman as an abstraction, but they also sometimes disrupt that image by having the woman revolt at such a representation (35). In the description of Solange above, Girardin depicts her as holding “the pose of a sculptured nude coming out of her bath”. He is freezing her in motion: stepping out of a bath requires movement, and the image transfixes her. She becomes a Classical abstraction of female beauty. And this continues in her looking like “a saint listening to a message from heaven”. Here she becomes a Renaissance abstraction of female beauty. Thus both terms of comparison used by Girardin freeze her into an abstraction. Unlike those Surrealists who, as Conley notes, occasionally presented women as having a modicum of independence outside of male Surrealist metaphors (35), Dalí is presenting Solange as an abstraction.

In the same scene as above, the paleness of Solange’s lips makes Girardin think of a nun in an old ballad based upon a local legend. The nun “had been famous for her beauty” and in her grave only her head remains, her body having disintegrated and been replaced by thistles and clover (52). A nun being ‘famous for her beauty’ is odd given that one would expect her to be celebrated for her devotion and chosen vocation rather than her appearance. This again draws attention to the desirability of the body of the earthly yet saintly, much like in the description of Solange as the saintly sculptured nude. Furthermore, the materiality of the body is again drawn attention to in the head being the only thing that remains. This emphasises how the body can be taken apart; a

dissection which continues when the different parts of her body, those transformed and those still intact, are listed: “Her breasts were two live stones,/ Her legs were the green grass,/ And jasmines were her lips” (52). Again, then, through the comparison with the nun, Solange is transfixed as an abstraction of female beauty. To use Conley’s phrasing, she is being frozen as “a feminine archetype” (34). This ballad also uses another one of the aforementioned “thematic references to the Virgin” as Solange is associated with a temporal disruption. The association of Solange with an old ballad based on a legend positions her as transcending the historical moment occupied by Grandsailles and Girardin. Indeed, Grandsailles continues throughout the novel to speak of Solange’s “[l]ips of jasmine” (226).

Solange being likened to a nun continues after Grandsailles’ and Girardin’s conversation at dinner. Five weeks later, the Count follows up on the strong effect the evening has had on him by sending Solange a bouquet of flowers in a nun’s head-dress: “Inside an immaculate starched nun’s head-dress serving as a vase was a homogenous mass of tightly packed jasmines filling it to the brim, and in the centre of this fragrant blinding whiteness, the Count of Grandsailles’ card, with nothing on it but his own engraved name” (77). Not knowing what inspired the Count to send such a gift, as she was not privy to the conversation regarding the ballad, Solange “attached no other symbolic significance to it than that of purity, if indeed there were any other reason than the Count’s original taste” (77). That she reads ‘purity’ into the arrangement is interesting. At this point in the novel, it has already been established that Grandsailles perceives Solange as a sexual threat (48), and she has a son from a previous marriage. By reading purity into the flowers she is objectifying herself, casting herself in the role of the virginal and saintly. And here we see another “thematic reference to the Virgin”,

as Solange is presenting herself as “being at once natural (i.e., a mother) and unnatural”. She is ‘natural’ because she is a mother, she is earthly, and she has a material body. She is unnatural, not because of any implications of an ‘immaculate conception’, but rather because she is deified, she is ‘saintly’, pure. And this natural/unnatural amalgamation is tested by Grandsailles when he “always a little crude[ly],... tap[s] her to test the solidity of her body before taking her in his arms” (77). It is interesting that Grandsailles should test her solidity in this way, as it is a form of objectification in itself. As she has been compared with a statue before, it is like he is testing whether that statue is really of this world. Thus, both sides of the dichotomy, natural/unnatural, are objectifications of Solange, carried out by Grandsailles, Girardin, and herself.

Conley has noted how the metaphorical figure of the Virgin Mary in Surrealism leaves out “any hint of [Woman’s] own experience” (48) and asks “where does the distinction between her role as ‘possessed’ medium or mediator and the exercise of her own autonomy lie?” (44). This is a question I will return to in more depth later in relation to Solange’s ‘sexual possession’ by Grandsailles, but it is pertinent now in regards to the objectification of Solange during the dinner scene and with the flowers in the head-dress. There is a card included at the centre of the flowers upon which is printed Grandsailles’ name alone. As those jasmines are supposed to symbolically represent Solange as the nun of the ballad it is as if he has taken ownership of her, both through reducing her to a symbol and also by putting his name on her. There is no room for Solange to exercise her own autonomy in Grandsailles’ view of her. She is draped with what he no doubt views as the finery of female archetypes: Classical sculpture, Renaissance art, and characteristics of the Virgin Mary. She is trapped within male symbolisations of Woman.

Interestingly, Dalí himself labels Solange with his own name too. In the preface, we are introduced to the notion of Clédalism: “pleasure and pain sublimated in an all-transcending identification with the object” (*HF*, xii). As Gibson (1997) has quite rightly pointed out, Clédalism contains ‘clé’ or *key* and ‘Dalí’. He goes on to argue that Dalí had claimed that “Clédalism was a system containing the key... to Dalí... and that Solange de Cléda was created to embody it” (425). Solange, then, ‘embodies’ a philosophical system and bears the names of both Dalí and Grandsailles.

So what have we learned so far of Solange de Cléda? Her characterisation can be seen in terms of “thematic references to the Virgin” which Conley (1996, 34) finds more commonly in Surrealist works of the 1920s. She embodies the amalgamation of the earthly and the divine, she transcends linear time, she is portrayed as both natural and unnatural, and she occupies the realm of artistic representation in that she is remoulded in the form of particular artistic mediums and aesthetics. She is objectified by Grandsailles with no room for her own autonomy within his view of her. Her characterisation as occupying a space between the earthly and divine is a fundamental aspect of her ‘hysteric’ behaviour when ‘sexually possessed’ later in the novel. It is to this behaviour that I now turn.

Much later in the novel, the subject of ‘sexual possession’ is introduced. Solange receives a letter from Grandsailles declaring his love for her. The two had become separated as Grandsailles had accused Solange of trying to force him to marry her by buying part of his ancestral lands. In this new letter, he states that though he loves her



he has married Veronica, an American socialite (225-226). Thus, Solange has finally gained the love she longed for but believes it will never be physically consummated. Solange tells d'Angerville that the Count 'visits' her, "just as surely as you are here beside me, holding me... And his coming, each time it occurs, is preceded by a long period of signs and portents which seem progressively to take possession of all my senses, to benumb and bind them, without my will being able to do anything about it" (238). She claims to be able to sense when he is going to 'visit' her as she first descends into a "torpor" of "intoxication" (238) which is then followed by her starting to see everything around her in a new way. Everything becomes transformed; colours change, things she had formerly disliked become beautiful. As Finkelstein (1996) notes, in Dalí's 'Le Phénomène de l'extase' (1933) there is the notion that "during ecstasy, every image 'changes in a sensational manner,' and that there are images that provoke ecstasy while ecstasy, in its turn, provokes certain images" (144). This can be seen in Solange's account of her 'visitations', as her new state involves perceptual changes. Solange, then, enters an 'ecstatic' state, a state which is associated with aesthetics and also, potentially, creativity. 'Ecstasy' inspires a new, but temporary, way of seeing.

However, she has no control over when and where Grandsailles 'visits' her:

It doesn't matter where, nor when, nor in what circumstances. There's no way of foretelling it. If at least I could prepare myself for him – but no! He is implacable, inflexible, and it is as a captive that I must submit to a pleasure which becomes as inexorable and categorical as this same inscription<sup>65</sup>, which I could translate, 'Love is rigid and rigorous' (*HF*, 239).

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<sup>65</sup> The inscription is beneath a statue of Christ.

Here we can see parallels with the claims made by the Ursuline nuns at Loudon: a known male individual possessed them and subjected them to erotic pleasures. There are even superficial similarities between the names of the *dramatis personae* in both narratives: Grandier and Grandsailles, and Jeanne des Anges and Solange. Furthermore, much like with the experience of the nuns, the ‘visitations’ by Grandsailles force Solange into physical contortions. She experiences rigidity and loss of control. Unlike ‘Narrator-Dalí’s’ *performance* of hysteric contortions in ‘Rêverie’ (1931), this loss of control characterises Solange’s contortions as *unambiguously* authentic. She is not self-consciously performing them. I emphasise *unambiguously* because as I have argued above there is a tension in ‘Rêverie’ between the authenticity and inauthenticity of the text in general and the representation of hysteria. The authenticity of Solange’s convulsions, I argue, is unquestionable, regardless of whether she is actually being possessed, because it is not a performance.

One of the characteristics of hysteric experience that Solange and ‘Narrator-Dalí’ share is the amalgamation of pleasure and pain, although it should be noted that part of the pleasure and pain for ‘Narrator-Dalí’ comes from the performance. The ‘captive pleasure’ to which Solange is subjected is represented in an illustration on the frontispiece to the first edition of the novel and reprinted in the 2004 French version. A woman is bound to a tree, in a pose reminiscent of the crucifixion, with an expression of ecstasy upon her face. Above her head is a banner emblazoned with the words ‘Je suis la dame’. This immediately identifies her as Solange as early in the novel she is looking at the Count’s escutcheon, above which a banner reads “Je suis la dame” (45). Later, when she buys part of Grandsailles’ land, part of her motivation is to become part of that land: “I shall be his forest, I shall be ‘la Dame’” (139). Thus, in the first edition of

the novel, the frontispiece introduces Solange in an attitude of amalgamated pleasure and pain.

This attitude has religious connotations which are elaborated upon in the preface where Dalí refers to St Teresa de Avila: “Solange de Cléda re-establishes true normal passion: a profane Saint Teresa: Epicurus and Plato burning in a single flame of eternal feminine mysticism” (xii). Here again we have the admixture of the earthly and the divine:

‘profane Saint Teresa’; but also there is the suggestion that being female she is closer to the transcendent by nature, a timeless quality that belongs to her due to her sex, ‘eternal *feminine* mysticism’ (my emphasis), and that this quality should be lauded. One of the key facets of Surrealism was the notion that women were closer to the irrational and could access the unconscious more easily than men. According to the Surrealists, this was a trait that should be celebrated and not be considered an insult to women<sup>66</sup>. For Dalí, this all forges a conceptual nexus between religion, femininity, and the irrational, linkages which Harris (2004) has argued were central to the *fin-de-siècle* exploration of hysteria (336).

This would at first glance seem to reinforce a distinction between performed hysteria in ‘Rêverie’ and Solange’s contortions in *Hidden Faces*. The conceptual nexus appears to highlight how hysteria was primarily a ‘female malady’, which could be used to explain why Solange can authentically experience hysteric contortions without self-consciously performing them, but ‘Narrator-Dalí’ cannot. Even though I have argued above that the line between simulation and authentic experience of hysteria in ‘Rêverie’ is thinned due

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<sup>66</sup> See Breton, A. 1953. *Du surréalisme en ses oeuvres vives*. 168-170. Here Breton celebrates ‘Woman’ as “incarnating the highest chance of man” (168) and as the other half of an ideal androgynous whole (170).

to the theory of ‘physiological spectatorship’, *Hidden Faces* does imply that experiencing hysteria is easier for women than men, simply because they are women. ‘Physiological spectatorship’ is less relevant to the representation of hysteria in *Hidden Faces* as the novel is not a part of an aesthetic *milieu* in which the reader is encouraged to bodily engage with the text. The depiction of Solange’s contortions is not intended to provoke those contortions in the reader. Rather, the contortions in the novel are part of an exploration of the intersections between the irrational, eroticism, and religion, intersections which Harris (2004) explains were central to the *fin-de-siècle* (336).

Solange’s ‘captive pleasure’ is described in terms of Christ on the cross, which has the effect of emphasising the link between hysteria and religion. In his *The Trauma of Birth* (1924), Rank<sup>67</sup> claims that as depicted in Cranach’s *Crucifixion* (16<sup>th</sup>C), “Christ’s idealized position on the cross in art indicates a mechanism of defence or punishment similar to that of the *arc de cercle*” (141), the *arc de cercle* being the paradigmatic hysteric contortion<sup>68</sup>. Dalí makes the same comparison between Christ on the cross and hysteric contortion in Solange’s bodily position after death: “her arms were spread out wide like the branches of a tree, her head was thrown back and her face remained taut, her lips parted in a beatific smile” (311). This not only refers back to the aforementioned picture in the frontispiece, but is also reminiscent of Huysmans’ description of another Master’s painting of the Crucifixion in *Là-Bas*. Huysmans’ Durtal recalls how Grünewald’s “Christ rose, formidable, on the cross, the upright of which was traversed by way of a brace with the branch of a tree”<sup>69</sup> (11); and referring to

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<sup>67</sup> See chapter 5 for more on Rank’s influence on Dalí.

<sup>68</sup> For an application of Rank’s theories of hysteria on Dalí’s *Soft Construction with Boiled Beans: Premonition of Civil War* (1936), see Finkelstein (1996, 159). Finkelstein does not discuss the importance to Dalí of Rank’s theories regarding how imagery of hysteria, and its concomitant symbolism, manifests in Classical crucifixion paintings.

<sup>69</sup> The translation here is a combination of my own and King’s, 22.

Christ's face, he notes that "the mouth, hanging open, grinned, the jaw contorted by excruciating, tetanic<sup>70</sup> spasms"<sup>71</sup> (23). In the drawing in the frontispiece of *Hidden Faces*, Solange's arms merge into the branches of a tree, and her 'beatific smile' recalls Huysmans' 'grinning, contorted jaw', associating erotic ecstasy with hysteria and religion. Thus, whilst other commentators such as Chevalier (1973, vi) have drawn attention to the importance of the myth of Tristan and Isolde to *Hidden Faces*, which can be seen most clearly in Solange's transformation into a tree, equally important is Huysmans' description of Grünewald's Crucifixion and Rank on Cranach.

It is clear that by *Hidden Faces* Dalí had read Huysmans' *Là-Bas*, as he refers directly to the novel's main character, Durtal (*HF*, 129). It is also clear that he had read Rank, as two years previously he refers to him and his theories directly in his *Secret Life* (1942, 26). The debt to Huysmans is stronger than just referring to the main character and emulating his description of a Crucifixion, however. One of the books in Grandsailles' library is the text on Gilles de Rais which Durtal is writing in *Là-Bas*. This suggests that the events in *Hidden Faces* and *Là-Bas* occur in the same fictional world. This assertion is backed up by my aforementioned claim that the relationship between hysteria and possession is a central theme in both texts. Furthermore, Dalí's prose style can be seen as influenced by Huysmans'. Richpin's (1880) description of Huysmans' style could very comfortably be applied to *Hidden Faces*: "rare nouns, curious adjectives, unexpected combinations of words, archaisms, neologisms, mutilated syntax, splashes of colour, flashes of wit, assonance and discord – everything under the sun, in fact!" (cited by King, 2001, 15). These intersections between Dalí and Huysmans, and Dalí

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<sup>70</sup> According to the OED, this is an archaic term for "pertaining to, or of the nature of tetanus". The OED also cites 'tetanically' as "by, or as by tetanus; spasmodically".  
<http://www.oed.com.lcproxy.shu.ac.uk/view/Entry/199774?redirectedFrom=tetanic#eid> [Accessed: 27 January 2018].

<sup>71</sup> I have used King's translation here.

and Rank, add credence to my argument that Solange's bodily and facial contortion after death are inspired by Huysmans' description of a Crucifixion by Grünewald and Rank's work on Cranach's Crucifixion.

The similarities between Solange's death-*tableau* and Masters' paintings of the Crucifixion continue with mourners huddled around the Christ-like figure: "Génie wept in silence, her two hands joined, and the older of the Martin brothers, like a faithful Saint Bernard dog, watched his mistress with a look of grief more ancient than tears" (310). Rank argues that although Christ is denied the "embryonal position" by being nailed to the cross, the mourners at the base of Cranach's painting are allowed to adopt it (141). He argues that the death of another reminds us of the separation we ourselves experienced traumatically at birth, and thus reminds us of the womb (24). It is worth noting that people huddled in an 'embryonal position' can also be seen in 16<sup>th</sup> century paintings of the Resurrection and the Nativity. From a Rankian perspective, this would suggest that events symbolising birth and rebirth also recall to our mind being within the womb. Adopting such a position at a birth, rather than a death, would possibly also invoke a tension between pleasure and 'trauma', in that birth unconsciously reminds us of being within the womb, but also reminds us of the 'trauma' of being born.

Solange's Christ-like bodily position is a development of one she adopts earlier in the novel. Having acquiesced to Grandsailles' sexual 'experiment'<sup>72</sup>, Solange has entered the bedroom in darkness and taken her position upon the bed:

[She] lay motionless, trying to moderate her breathing that seemed to rent her sides. She held herself with her head lifted toward the ceiling and her arms crossed on her chest,

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<sup>72</sup> See Chapter 3 on 'Narrative Inquisitions' for more on Grandsailles' 'experiment'.

struggling to calm the tumult of all her senses, stubbornly imposing upon herself the fixed idea of thinking about her own death; it was thus that she was able to push back, step by step, the pleasure that she felt so close to the threshold of her immobility (147).

Solange's various bodily positions throughout the novel closely parallel descriptions of mystical experiences. As Solange lies upon the bed in the quotation above, she experiences her sides as 'rent'. A 'wounding in the side' is present in mystical works, such as the 16<sup>th</sup> century mystical poem 'The Obscure Night of the Soul' by Saint John of the Cross, in which during the narrator's spiritual ecstasy God "Did wound me in the side,/ And in my body all my senses died" (ll. 34-35). This contact with the divine spirit has a cleansing effect for Saint John of the Cross, the 'I' being associated with "cares and shame" (ll. 39). He has lost this 'I' – "All ceased, and I was not" (ll. 38) – to a divine Other and in so doing become temporarily at one with that divine Other.

There are further parallels here with Solange's 'sexual possession' by Grandsailles. Her experience of this 'possession' has all the hallmarks of a mystical experience much like that depicted in the poem of St John of the Cross. She is made aware of the Other's coming which she cannot resist, and her sense of self, her 'I', is subsumed into an amalgamation of pleasure and pain much like the experience of spiritual ecstasy described by Saint Teresa de Avila. Indeed, Dalí's description of Solange as a 'profane Saint Teresa' in his preface does not just emphasise her earthly and divine qualities, but also the fact that her ecstasies *have not* been brought on through joining with the divine spirit: this is a secular experience.

Even though Dalí himself had turned towards Catholicism by the time he wrote *Hidden Faces* in 1944, and after WW2 painted his own Crucifixions as part of his aesthetics of

the ‘Classic’ and ‘Nuclear Mysticism’, it would be misleading to suggest that he is advocating Catholic Mysticism in the novel. I would suggest that the novel occupies the midpoint in the development of Dalí’s engagement with religion from atheist to Catholic adherent. At one extreme there is his *Sometimes I Spit for Pleasure on the Portrait of my Mother (The Sacred Heart)* (1929), which depicts the outline of the sacred heart statue with the titular words emblazoned within it. For this painting he was exiled from his family by his father (Ades, 2004, 108; Gibson, 1997, 238-240). At the other extreme you see Dalí’s post-WW2 religious paintings celebrating Christ as part of his ‘Classicism’, the most famous of which are both versions of *The Madonna of Port Lligat* (1949 and 1950) and *The Christ of Saint John of the Cross* (1951). In *Hidden Faces*, one finds an amalgamation of the secular and the sacred, and an exploration of how the sacred can be experienced through the secular. Regardless of whether we view Solange’s ecstasies as a result of pent-up desire breaking out into hysteric convulsions or Grandsailles ‘possessing’ her like an incubus, at no point are we to believe that she is accessing the divine Spirit. Her ‘ecstasy’ has all the hallmarks of religious ecstasy, but it is not occasioned by God.

Speaking of Grünewald’s Crucifixion and Huysmans’ description of it, Hanson (1997) claims that the spiritual experience is one in which the spiritual erupts from beneath the surface, contorting Christ: “Christ, already literally the irruption of the Real on earth, appears as the Word incorporated in the flesh” (121-122). We find this notion of an ‘irruption’ into the flesh mirrored in both Surrealism and Dalí. For both of them, that which resides beneath the surface (the contents of the unconscious) was synonymous with the Real, and in its manifestation within surface reality we experience *a dialectical relationship* between them. Whilst to begin with the Surrealists placed in opposition the



unconscious and the conscious, by the 1930s they were more concerned with the dialectical relationship between the two. Thus, for the Surrealists, ‘hysterical’ experience must have seemed the ultimate manifestation of the dialectical relationship between the unconscious and the conscious: the ‘hysteric’ body could be deemed a form of ‘Surrealist Object’. This is especially the case with the hysteric body in ‘Rêverie’, as part of the theory behind the ‘Surrealist object’ was that the viewer should see themselves in that object too (Dalí, 1932, ‘The Object as Revealed in Surrealist Experiment, 242). As I have already argued, part of the point of ‘Narrator-Dalí’s’ performance of hysteria was to encourage the viewer to bodily engage with the text. In *Hidden Faces*, however, we do not find that purpose in Solange’s hysteric convulsions, nor do we just see an ‘irruption’ forming a dialectical relationship between unconscious desire and the conscious. We also see a religious aspect. Hanson draws a connection between spiritual experience and that of the hysteric, claiming that we would find hysteric symptoms to be irruptions of the Real too, the Real incarnating itself in the flesh: “For the hysteric also experiences through the symptom an irruption of the Real on the body, a fragmentation of the familiar fantasy of the body to make way for another, more occult fantasy” (Hanson, 122).

This idea of bodily integrity being a fantasy is present in both ‘Rêverie’ and *Hidden Faces*. The idea that through ‘physiological spectatorship’ someone watching a stage performance of hysteria unconsciously starts to imitate those movements suggests that we do not have complete control over our bodies. As ‘Rêverie’ tries to emulate that effect through ‘physiological (reader)ship’, that text also suggests that bodily integrity may be a fantasy. In *Hidden Faces*, the idea of such integrity being a fantasy is seen in the question of whether Solange is actually being ‘visited’ and ‘sexually possessed’ by

Grandsailles. Solange believes that she is ‘possessed’. Her bodily integrity is at the whim of the Count, a dark mirror of Grandsailles’ perception that his bodily integrity is at the whim of Solange. From the beginning of the novel, Grandsailles’ lands are represented as an extension of his body. As she buys part of those lands, and personally hopes to “be his forest” (*HF*, 139), he perceives this as a threat to his bodily and psychic unity<sup>73</sup>. The ‘possession’ of Solange can be read as a way of taming the threat she poses. Dalí is wrapping up what amounts to sexual and psychological assault in the language of rape fantasy, spiritualism, and hysteria. Whilst women in the past, such as St Teresa de Avila and St Julian of Norwich, used mystical terms to explore their experiences of the spiritual, Dalí imprisons Solange in that language, and she is eventually killed by it.

Rape-fantasy is an important part of Dalí’s notion of ‘mutual devouring’. ‘Mutual devouring’, mutual sacrifice within the sexual embrace, is *not necessarily* demeaning or abusive to women. Whilst I go into more depth in chapter 5, it suffices to say here that Dalí’s notion of ‘mutual devouring’ implies that women are a sexual threat to men and must be tamed through “the annihilating sexual embrace” (*HF*, 65). He forms his version of ‘mutual devouring’ through the nexus of ‘taming Woman’, ‘Woman-as-threat’, and the notion that women enjoy being ‘tamed’ in this manner. Solange, despite using the language of rape (she claims that Grandsailles prevents her from stopping him), is presented as deriving a secular ecstasy from her treatment, imagined or actual, by Grandsailles.

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<sup>73</sup> For more on the symbolic relationship between Grandsailles and his lands, see chapter 6.

In the next section I will look in more depth at the way in which Dalí explores the ‘sexual possession’ of Solange. I will also explore the question of bodily integrity as a ‘fantasy’ in *Hidden Faces* in terms of *fin-de-siècle* concerns regarding female sexuality. In the foregoing chapter I have explored how Dalí brings together a conceptual nexus of religion, femininity, and the irrational, a nexus which Harris (2004) claims is an integral part of how the *fin-de-siècle* conceptualised hysteria (336). I have suggested that by posing the question of whether or not Solange is being ‘sexually possessed’ by Grandsailles, the novel explores a discussion point of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, one which Huysmans’ *Là-Bas* engages as well: is hysteric behaviour a result of being possessed, or is behaviour akin to being possessed a result of being hysteric? Thus far I have predominantly spoken of the ‘sexual possession’ as if Solange is actually being possessed by Grandsailles. This is because from Solange’s point of view she is possessed, and this helps me to explore the notion of ‘mutual devouring’ from the point of view of the woman who believes she is being raped but is still portrayed as ‘wanting it anyway’. In the next section I will examine the evidence regarding whether or not Grandsailles is actually ‘sexually possessing’ Solange.

### **‘Sexual Possession’ and Grandsailles’ Occult Powers**

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, discussions, accounts, and dramatisations of ‘hysteria’ were carried out by disciplines such as spiritualism, the paranormal, and psychism. To demonstrate how open the minds of revered figures of the period were, both Freud and Jung were members of the British Society for Psychical Research (Micale, 2004a, 14), and Arthur Conan Doyle was not only a proponent of Spiritualism but also, most famously, believed in the Cottingley Fairies. One of the questions of most interest in regards to hysteria was that of the relationship between hysteria and

hypnotism. The Charcot school believed that hypnotic suggestibility was a symptom of hysteria, whereas Bernheim, at the Nancy school, argued that hypnotism and hysteria were separate and that hypnotism could be used for therapeutic purposes (Harris, 1989, 178; 2004, 347). For Bernheim, Charcot's stance diagnosed a large proportion of the population as "latent hysterics", suggested by the success of popular hypnosis performances (1989, 175). For Charcot, because hypnotic suggestibility and a pathological personality were linked, hypnotism was dangerous as it could bring pathological tendencies to the fore (175). This may seem hypocritical on Charcot's part as he himself staged theatrical demonstrations of the 'hysterical woman' falling into an 'hysterical' state at his instigation. As Harris has noted, Charcot staged demonstrations of hysteria to the public. He would show that by touching certain parts of the 'hysterical's' body, they would exhibit hysterical movements and gestures (164). Concern regarding the ability of someone being able to take advantage of a susceptible mind, however, is important.

As Harris (1989) notes, concerns regarding the ability of men to control the female mind were indicative of the concerns of the period regarding female sexuality and the fascination with the question of the unity of self-identity (176). These concerns were not only confined to hypnotism, however. There were many disciplines at the time which delved into the loss of, or amalgamation of, consciousness to another entity: mediumship, for instance; and this form of interference with consciousness could be described under the term 'possession'. Finn (2009) notes, for instance, how the Decadent author Rachilde's mother and grandfather believed her to be possessed by the spirit of a Swedish nobleman and thus not to be the creator of her own novels (122-123). They also deemed her to be possessed by the spirit of a werewolf, a result of a

hereditary curse originating from her great-grandfather (124). Whilst these particular beliefs in possession seem excessive they are on the extreme end of the scale of concerns of the late-nineteenth century: loss of consciousness and will, and the nature of female sexuality. As Finn notes, the sexually charged works of Rachilde would have been considered unusual for a woman to pen, thus an acceptable way of looking at it would be that she was possessed by a man (123).

In the ‘sexual possession’ of Solange, Dalí engages with these *fin-de-siècle* preoccupations regarding bodily integrity, the loss of consciousness and will, possession, mystical concerns, and female sexuality. Solange experiences her ‘possession’ by Grandsailles as out of her control. She is described as losing willpower and her senses being heightened. It is ultimately an erotic experience for her. Losing control of her body and being invaded by another consciousness is experienced as highly sexual. Whilst we may read the mystical experiences of St Teresa, St John of the Cross, and St Julian of Norwich with a wry, knowing smile<sup>74</sup>, they were not intended to evoke the erotic. *Hidden Faces*, on the other hand, overtly associates ‘possession’ by an Other as erotic. And, for Solange, it is *inescapably* erotic, in that she is “captive” to the “pleasure” (*HF*, 239). Much like during the *fin-de-siècle*, then, in *Hidden Faces* ‘possession’ is related to female sexuality. Only this time the focus is not on a moral concern of women being susceptible to ‘possession’. Rather, it is on exploring how ‘possession’ can be used to tame women through ‘mutual devouring’.

Whereas in Charcot, as Harris (1989) notes, we can detect a worry that female “latent hysterics” are in danger from rogue hypnotists (175), in the ‘sexual possession’ of

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<sup>74</sup> This is something which Hanson (1997) also cannot help but do (111).

Solange the rogue hypnotist Grandsailles is reacting to the notion that women are in fact the threat, and this threat must be combatted with bodily interference. And from where does Grandsailles' hypnotic powers derive? Apparently occult magic; a subject of inquiry that, as noted above, received a revival of interest in the *fin-de-siècle* as it was seen to have a scientific underpinning. His interest in 'sexual possession' is aligned with the occult early in the novel when his Canoness finds "an open book exposing an abominable engraving of a succubus scene that illustrated the treatise written by Durtal on Gilles de Rais' satanic practices" (*HF*, 129). However, the novel is ambiguous as to whether his occult powers are actually authentic or a sign of madness.

Late in the novel he appears to use what he calls 'blood magic' successfully. He has been attempting to renew himself through Betka's son. He cannot renew himself through having his own child as he is impotent and thus has resorted to magic. The boy has become ill and developed the Count's limp (308), thus implying an occult link between the two of them. However, there is some ambiguity as to whether the boy's state is due to the Count's occult practices or if it is in fact Grandsailles' Canoness who has drained him. Returning from California, the Count "was frightful to behold" and the boy is described in terms of a sickly, Decadent child, straight from a Poe narrative. However, "behind them followed the canoness of Launay, and it was she who was the most horrible to behold, for she seemed rejuvenated" (308). The implication here is that whereas the Count and the boy have deteriorated in health, the Canoness has improved, as if she had taken the life from them. Furthermore, she is described as "perfidiously demonic" (308), linking her to the theme of 'possession' which runs through the novel.

Another reading of the boy's illness is that it is not due to any occult intervention. Rather, there is the implication that Grandsailles has been sexually abusing him. Referring to the boy, the Canoness shouts at the Count: "The poor martyr who is sleeping upstairs? You old lunatic! You've made a cripple of him! And you might be locked up in prison for the rest of your life if it was found out" (316). The combination of 'the not said' and Grandsailles reading about Gilles de Rais, who was notorious for abusing children, draining them of their blood, and then killing them as part of his occult practices (Huysmans, *Là-Bas*, chapter 11, np, Kindle edition), creates this possible reading. Dalí using restraint and implying sexual abuse rather than spelling it out might seem an odd interpretation given how explicit 'Rêverie' (1931) was, but it is important to keep in mind who the intended audiences were for the two texts. 'Rêverie' was intended to impress the Surrealists, and André Breton was certainly not disappointed with the resulting text. It was published in a Surrealist journal, in French, and was intended to provoke both moral shock and a bodily reaction through 'physiological (reader)ship'. *Hidden Faces*, on the other hand, was intended for a much wider audience. It was published in English, in America. As such, he did not want to provoke the reading public to the extent that they would become alienated. Provocation, yes; alienation, no.

## Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed how Dalí's explorations of hysteria changed from 'Rêverie' (1931) to *Hidden Faces* (1944). One can see in these changes how Dalí's relationship to Surrealism had changed in those thirteen years. In the earlier text, 'Narrator-Dalí' performs hysteria, and in doing so creates a tension between authentic and inauthentic emulations of Surrealism. The performance of hysteria, along with the

text as a whole, is so overt in its debts to Surrealist theoretical concerns that it comes across as inauthentic. However, the text can also be seen as succeeding in closing the gap between simulated hysteria and actual hysterical experience where Surrealism failed. By providing a detailed description of the performance of hysteria, I suggest that Dalí taps into the theories of ‘physiological spectatorship’ which Gordon (2004) has noted were so prominent in the *fin-de-siècle* (124). I am by no means suggesting that Dalí closed the gap entirely, but I am suggesting that in making the attempt the text becomes authentically Surrealist. In *Hidden Faces*, Dalí uses *fin-de-siècle* medical narratives of hysteria to form a conceptual nexus between religion, femininity, and the irrational, a nexus which Harris (2004) argued was central to the *fin-de-siècle* (336). I have discussed the ways in which Solange de Cléda is portrayed as the divine and spiritual, sexualised hysteric, characterised by an amalgamation of the earthly and the divine, and I have explored how her hysterical contortions can be read in terms of narratives of mystical experience. I have also looked at how her hysterical behaviour takes the form of a ‘sexual possession’ by the Comte de Grandsailles. The text is ambiguous as to whether Solange is actually ‘sexually possessed’, thus leaving in question the *fin-de-siècle* debate mentioned in Huysmans’ *Là-Bas*: is she hysteric because she is possessed, or is she behaving like she is possessed because she is hysterical?



### **Chapter 3: ‘Narrative Inquisitions’ and the Erotic Text**

In this chapter I will be looking at the ways in which eroticism is conceptualised within ‘Rêverie’ (1931), *Hidden Faces* (1944), and *The Unspeakable Confessions of Salvador Dalí* (1976). I do this predominantly by exploring Dalí’s use of ‘inquisitions’ within the texts, but also by investigating how Dalí builds a relationship between eroticism and writing/artistic creation. Dalí’s ‘inquisitions’ are constraints produced within the formal structure of the texts and the scenarios, the former primarily in ‘Rêverie’ with its multiple framing devices, Sadeian archetypes, and assumed reader-knowledge, and the latter in Grandsailles and Solange’s ‘experiment’ in *Hidden Faces* and the ritualistic ceremonies in *Unspeakable Confessions*. These constraints are related to Dalí’s interest in the “inquisitorial process of matter” which produces “originality of reaction” (*Secret Life*, 1942, 2). In the late 30s, going into the 40s, he believed that through the pressure of form and structure one can create new works of art<sup>75</sup>. ‘Rêverie’ demonstrates that he was interested in the importance of creating within boundaries in the early 30s, considerably before he publicised his turn to an aesthetics of ‘the Classic’ which emphasised form, unity, and tradition in 1941. I call the constraints in the formal structure of ‘Rêverie’ ‘*narrative inquisitions*’ as these are ‘inquisitions’ produced within a written text using specifically literary devices. Finkelstein (1998) has quite rightly noted that ‘Rêverie’ “exposes... the mechanisms underlying some of [Dalí’s] most scandalous obsessions” (146). Whereas he goes on to offer a brief Freudian and biographical reading of the text, I will be emphasising how the text creates ‘*narrative inquisitions*’ and explores the erotic nature of writing. I am presenting my analyses in

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<sup>75</sup> This will be discussed further in chapter 4.

chronological order to explore the ways in which Dalí's notion of an 'inquisition' develops as his career progresses from European artist associated with the Surrealist Movement to internationally-recognised 'Renaissance Man'.

### **'Rêverie'<sup>76</sup>, 'Inquisitions', and the Relationship between Writing and the Erotic**

In the previous chapter I expressed surprise at the lack of scholarly attention paid to 'Rêverie', but also noted that the text's sexually explicit content could explain this lack. I suggested that there were contexts in which the text could be read beyond that of a "masturbatory fantasy", as Gibson (1997, 50; 295) has labelled it. I argued that the representation of hysteria within the text can be viewed as a performance in which there is a tension between an authentic and inauthentic adherence to Surrealism. Another way of looking at 'Rêverie' is as an important example of Dalí constructing 'narrative inquisitions'. He does this through the formal structure, characterisation through Sadeian archetypes, and also through assumed reader-knowledge. In this way, the text performs the 'inquisitions' upon the characters, direction of plot, and the reader. I will discuss this in this section, along with how Dalí forges a relationship between eroticism and writing/artistic creation.

'Rêverie's' narrative begins with 'Narrator-Dalí' having just finished dinner. He wants to lie-down so he can contemplate a study of Böcklin with which he is engaged. He is interested in the representation of death in the artist's *Isle of the Dead* (1880-1886), a representation which puzzles him due to what he sees as a contradiction between the

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<sup>76</sup> Unless otherwise stated, I will be using my own translations in reference to the text.

theme of death and the spatial arrangements of the painting (31). The thought of spending his time in this way in his bedroom gives him an erection. Despite having ensured that there will not be any external disruptions to his contemplation, he is disrupted by bodily distractions, such as needing to urinate. Once he has urinated and then got up a second time to close the curtains, he feels “disenchanted” (31). In the space of a few paragraphs, then, he has created conceptual links between scholarly pursuits, aesthetics, death, sexual arousal, and conflict, the latter demonstrated by the fact that his arousal wanes the moment all distractions are resolved.

His ‘disenchantment’ and uneasiness only dissipate once he has found a new distraction. He remembers that during lunch he had mused upon a burned crust of bread, imagining hollowing it into a vase shape and then chewing it, manipulating it in his mouth. Bread usually symbolises male genitalia in Dalí<sup>77</sup>. If we look at his painting *Catalan Bread* (1932), for instance, we see a phallic baguette, half shrouded like one of Magritte’s faceless figures, a shrouding also present in ‘Rêverie’ when ‘Narrator-Dalí’ describes his penis as being “enveloped” by “laundry” (36). One of Dalí’s trademark soft clocks is draped over the shroud, and a thread connects the tip of the shrouded end to the uncovered part, keeping it precariously erect. It is ambiguous as to whether the erection is keeping the soft clock aloft, or if the clock is weighing it down and producing the necessity for the thread. Nestled within the uncovered part of the loaf is an ink pot containing a pen. Thus, the pen, and by metonymic extension, writing, is associated with the penis, with male sexuality. The ‘baguette-penis’ being kept erect at the one end by a thread suggests that it is a perilous arousal associated with writing; it could be brought to a halt at any moment, as it is only a thread keeping it erect, and that thread is

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<sup>77</sup> Pine (2010) has argued that there are other ways of viewing Dalí’s uses of bread, one such example being as a form of social commentary on “the discrepancies between privilege and poverty, that is, between gross abundance enjoyed by the moneyed and the poor’s lack of access to bread” (94).

not securely tied at the tip. Interestingly, if you view the painting in person<sup>78</sup>, you can see a black bulge emanating from the shrouded tip of the baguette as if the bread stick had originally been longer and more exaggeratedly pulled by the thread before being painted out by Dalí. This would have made the erection seem even more precarious, but also painful, perhaps highlighting the notion that writing is painful.

The representation of writing as perilous and linked with the erotic in *Catalan Bread* has its precursor in 'Rêverie', where 'Narrator-Dalí' feels that he cannot write down his thoughts on Böcklin "for reasons not very clear – in the notebook containing my preceding notes" (31). He feels that he needs a new notebook because his new notes would become "confused by the previous notes" (31). He eventually decides that he will write up his thoughts after he has finished his contemplation (31). This can be viewed as fear of performance, which has an associative link with another theme in *Catalan Bread*: impotence. The presence of the soft clock over the erection could signify the threat of this, in that it is soft and potentially pulling the baguette down from its erect position. Indeed, Pine (2010), in her exploration of the use of bread in Dalí's works, has argued that this painting "mobiliz[es] various images of the flaccid in a metaphor of sexual impotence" (90). In her analysis she points to the erect position of the pen in the ink pot as a counterpoint to the softness of the clock (90), and summarises the loaf as "an impotent loaf" (91). There is definitely a tension between hard and soft forms within the painting, but I would argue that the ambiguity as to whether the erection is lifting the clock or the clock is weighing down the penis, along with the tension between pen and clock, suggests a battle between virility and impotence, rather than *just* impotence. Importantly, in Pine's argument that the painting symbolizes impotence, she is comparing it to another painting of bread, *Anthropomorphic Bread* (1932), in which

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<sup>78</sup> I viewed the painting at the Royal Academy of Arts, *Dalí/Duchamp* exhibition, on 2 December 2017.

an extremely rigid baguette is propped upright against a wall and slipped into a condom-like covering. This painting seems to avoid the battle between virility and impotence, opting for virility, something which Pine acknowledges when she describes the baguette as “undeniably erect” (89). However, I would argue that despite *Catalan Bread* bringing in strong themes of impotence that are not present in *Anthropomorphic Bread*, those themes do not outweigh those of virility. There is a battle between the two. This battle is of particular importance to the three texts I discuss within this chapter, as all three could be said to dramatize such a battle.

Thus far, then, we have seen that ‘Narrator-Dalí’ creates conceptual links between sexual arousal and writing, and his fears of impotence are mirrored in the way he delays, for vague reasons, his writing until later. However, this delay due to fear of impotence is only one of the forms which delay takes within the text, the other being motivated by prolonging pleasure. The prolongation of pleasure through interruptions is a central feature of Dalí’s exploration of eroticism, the most familiar example being in Dalí and Buñuel’s film, *Un Chien andalou* (1929), where one of the male protagonists, in order to get to the female protagonist who is rebuffing his advances, picks up two ropes from the floor and with them drags across the room two grand pianos topped with rotting donkeys. In ‘Rêverie’, the difference between the delays through fear of impotence, and those to prolong and increase pleasure, is that ‘Narrator-Dalí’ has no control over the former, but control over the latter. The dual forms of delay, then, highlight a vacillation between impotence and virility within the text.

It is possible to read the burned crust of bread in ‘Narrator-Dalí’s’ reminiscence in the same manner as the ‘baguette-penis’ in *Catalan Bread*, i.e. symbolising the tension

between virility and impotence. It is hard, but it has been cut. The tension here is further emphasised by the bread taking on both feminine and masculine traits. The imagined act of hollowing out the crust and then chewing it into paste suggests sexual domination over the female, as the vase-shape signifies the female genitals.<sup>79</sup> He draws attention to *his own* “front teeth” (31) in chewing up this vase, manipulating it and moulding it. In Dalí’s works of the 30s and early 40s, he draws attention to women’s teeth as a means of symbolising the sexual threat they pose to men. In *Hidden Faces*, for instance, Solange de Cléda’s mouth is associated with the *vagina dentata* (HF, 48). Here in ‘Rêverie’ the threat of the female genitals is symbolically annihilated as he chews them into paste. Thus, his reminiscence on the crust of bread at dinner has associations with virility. Furthermore, he dwells upon how long he would have kept the chewed bread in his mouth, “in order to make the crust last longer” (31)<sup>80</sup>. He has control over his pleasure and is choosing to prolong it.

Breaking from his recollection, he rushes to the kitchen, but instead of just fetching the bread he has been dwelling upon, he slices off another piece of crust, one “different... from that which I prefer” (32). This at first appears to be a controlled delay on the part of ‘Narrator-Dalí’, prolonging pleasure by choosing a different crust of bread to that which he has been thinking about. However, the reason he takes this one is because it is shaped like a horn; the type to be found on an animal, not the musical instrument. This is a masculine symbol as horns not only have a phallic shape, they are also used by male animals in battle for females. However, it is described in a strange way, as “a very sweet little horn” (32), which in effect removes any sense of threat which the crust might pose. Along with this new piece of bread, he fetches the crust from his reminiscence. He now

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<sup>79</sup> Finkelstein (1996) has also noted that hollowing out the bread “is tantamount to revealing its hidden feminine character” (148). He goes on to suggest that this reveals “Dalí’s anal and oral fantasies” (148).

<sup>80</sup> My translation agrees with Finkelstein’s (1998, 152) here.

has two crusts of bread, both with strong symbolic associations with male sexual dominance and also feminine traits. Furthermore, they vacillate between symbolising virility and impotence; the ‘bread-horn’ has traits of sexual dominance, but is also ‘sweet’ and not as hard as the other, suggested by it not being burned (32).

The possession of these two crusts allows ‘Narrator-Dalí’ to concentrate on his study of Böcklin, thus again suggesting that sexual arousal is necessary for artistic/scholarly pursuits. After making some remarks on the spatial arrangements of *Isle of the Dead*, his thoughts lead him to mull over a painting by Vermeer, referred to as *La Lettre*, which has a curtain “in the foreground (on the left)” (32). Whilst there is no Vermeer painting by that name, Finkelstein (1998) has convincingly argued that Dalí is referring to *Lady Writing a Letter with her Maid* (c. 1670), as this is the only Vermeer painting with ‘letter’ in the title where the curtain is on the left (401, n.9). ‘Narrator-Dalí’ considers how he cannot write with “all the clarity that I desire” on that painting due to “the emotive significance arising from the curtain” (32). This is an important remark, as it implies that this ‘emotive significance’ is going to interfere with his scholarly pursuits. Indeed it does as he begins to masturbate and his “efforts to return to [his] thought” are described as “sterile” (32). However, “an absolutely involuntary daydream begins” (32). In his mind, a previous dream and Vermeer’s curtain become amalgamated, and, it could be argued, the daydream which follows is a response to the painting and an unconscious effort by ‘Narrator-Dalí’ to explore the ‘emotive significance’ of the curtain. Ironically, then, despite the ‘emotive significance’ being a distraction from an artistic pursuit, a text has been created through that distraction.

Whilst focusing on his Böcklin study, he had been “hollowing out” one of the crusts (32). With his mind now on Vermeer’s curtain, he puts this aside and starts to play with his genitals with the one hand and with the other “amass[es] a part of the bread lifted from the crust” (32). As he refers to this crust as “small”, and the second crust he picked up was described as “quite small”, the crust hollowed out is most likely the one “different... from that which I prefer” (32). He is thus feminising the ‘bread-horn’ by ‘hollowing it out’. This could be viewed as making this crust into ‘that which he prefers’.

He has been having a recurring dream for the previous few days and he “locate[s] the curtain of the painting of Vermeer” within it (32). The curtain has the same “affective and moral significance” as the curtain in the dream which “served to hide many small cows, at the bottom of a very gloomy stable, where, lay down, amongst the excrement and rotting straw, I sodomize the woman I love, very aroused by the stench of the place” (32). This harkens back to the claim he makes in ‘L’amour’ (1930), that one should want “to eat the beloved woman’s shit” (67)<sup>81</sup> as she is “a dream which is made flesh” (66) and such a desire would show that all mechanisms of repression have been overcome (67)<sup>82</sup>. In this instance, being surrounded by the smell of excrement and decomposition without feeling revulsion, and instead finding it arousing, suggests the same thing. Indeed, later on ‘Narrator-Dalí’ declares that the combination of smells produce a “state of ecstasy” (32). A ‘daydream’ then begins with this *tableau* of ‘sodomizing the woman he loves’ as the intended culmination.

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<sup>81</sup> My translation conforms to Finkelstein’s (1998, 191).

<sup>82</sup> This has clearly been inspired by Freud’s *Three Essays on Sexuality* (1905b) where the psychoanalyst writes of “the construction of mental forces which later appear as obstacles in the path of the sexual drive, and which will later narrow its direction much after the fashion of dams (disgust, the feeling of shame, the aesthetic and moral requirements of the ideal)” (157).



The narrative up to this point – i.e. the scenario of ‘Narrator-Dalí’ musing upon Böcklin’s *Isle of the Dead* amidst various distractions – has constituted the outer frame of the narrative. It is a complete and cohesive frame as it is returned to at the end. It is also flashed back to in the middle of the narrative to keep the reader up to date with ‘Narrator-Dalí’ in his bedroom. So far, the themes that have been introduced are the associations between scholarly pursuits, aesthetics, death, and sexual arousal, and the relationship between the latter and conflict. I have also outlined intersections between the text and some of Dalí’s other films, texts, and paintings of the time, namely *Un Chien andalou* (1929), ‘L’Amour’ (1930), and *Catalan Bread* (1932). Themes which I will go on to explore as associated with the Marquis de Sade have also been introduced: the comical nature of eroticism (the absurdity of ‘Narrator-Dalí’s’ arousal being interrupted by a slight need to urinate), and what Carter (1979) has identified in Sade as a rejection of myths surrounding sexual activity (1; 16-17). This latter aspect of the text is something which escalates and is expanded upon in the remainder of the narrative. In the ‘daydream’ which follows, which constitutes a framing device in itself for a further shorter narrative, supplementary themes relating to Sade are introduced. These, along with the framing devices themselves, are used in the construction of ‘narrative inquisitions’ which are necessary for ‘Narrator Dalí’s’ desires to grow.

As the daydream begins, ‘Narrator-Dalí’ casts himself as the romantic hero, modelling his appearance on the Count of Monte-Cristo (32). It is apt that he takes the Count as a model considering that the Count was imprisoned on his wedding day, thus symbolising interrupted desire. He also casts ‘the woman that he loves’ as a romantic heroine: “After these ten days, I must return to Port-Lligat where I will reunite with the woman I love,

who, during this time was in Berlin, occupied in the adventures of love, as was mentioned in a previous daydream” (32). Emphasising the romantic genre here, he nods at the way in which romantic, adventure tales were often presented in instalments: “as was mentioned in a previous daydream”. It is strange that ‘Narrator-Dalí’ should endow ‘the woman I love’ with so much agency in her ‘adventures’ abroad considering that the girl he substitutes for her within the second frame of the narrative, Dulita, is given so little. Indeed, Dulita bears no resemblance to a romantic heroine.

‘Narrator-Dalí’ has been loaned a large farm house by some friends, a house which he holidayed in as a child and is called ‘The Moulin de la Tour’ (32), a house which ‘Writer-Dalí’ also visited as a child<sup>83</sup>. Continuing some of the themes from the narrative outside of the daydream, in a way which emulates the logic of dreams, ‘Narrator-Dalí’ considers that returning to the house would provide an opportunity to finish his study on Böcklin. Notably, Böcklin is only mentioned twice more in the daydream. Once in relation to “the Böcklinian cloudy and stormy skies” (32), and secondly in the study in which ‘Narrator-Dalí’s’ writing takes place (34). Events of the outer frame of the narrative relating to Böcklin are continued in the daydream, i.e. ‘Narrator-Dalí’ becomes distracted from his work whilst thinking about the erotic occurrences behind the curtain.

At the beginning of the daydream he is alone in the farmhouse, wandering around, breathing in the scent of excrement from the courtyard, and rearranging elements of the grounds. There is a row of phallic objects, cypress trees, separating the house from the

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<sup>83</sup> See chapter 2 for more on this in my discussion of distinguishing between ‘Narrator-Dalí’ and ‘Writer-Dalí’.

meadow wherein lies a large pond. He feels a surge of emotion regarding the tips of these trees as he makes a sudden association between them and the cypress trees surrounding a fountain he visited as a child with his family, the 'Fountain of the Log' (33). He decides that in order for the daydream to continue, the cypresses that separated him from the pond must become those surrounding that fountain. The pond, then, ceases to be a part of the narrative, replaced by the fountain, and in so doing he has replaced an object of female symbolism, i.e. the pond, with that of masculine symbolism, i.e. the ejaculating fountain.

Finkelstein (2004) has argued that the way in which 'Narrator-Dalí' moves elements of scenery around in the daydream is an example of staging; he becomes "a *metteur en scène* of his own masturbatory daydream" (132). For Finkelstein, this staging forms part of the 'obsessive' nature of the narrative, focusing on details and ensuring that everything is in its correct place. He claims that 'Narrator-Dalí's' concern is with "[c]ontrol of affect and mastery over his materials" (132). As noted earlier, there are two forms of delay of sexual pleasure in 'Rêverie'. Unintentional delay, associated with impotence and creative block, over which 'Narrator-Dalí' has no control. But then there is intentional delay and prolongation of pleasure, and I would suggest that the way in which he moves the scenery around ties-in with this aim of intentional prolongation. This ties-in with Finkelstein's claim that "the circumscribed space could be viewed as a manifestation of Dalí's overriding desire for mastery over his small stage of the libido, and, furthermore, over his body image" (133).

Whilst he has been enjoying the scent of the courtyard and moving the cypress trees, in the outer frame of the narrative 'Narrator-Dalí' has been playing with the bread

extracted from the crust. The way in which he does this takes the form of an eroticised interdiction, i.e. one does not culminate one's desire until something else has been done, and the prolongation of the desire is pleasurable. It is noteworthy that a non-eroticised form of this argument is taken by parents towards their children: 'No, you cannot watch Netflix until you have done your homework'. Whilst the aim here is to get the homework done, at the same time there is the implication that the child will enjoy Netflix more if their work is completed first. 'Narrator-Dalí' has eroticised that form of interdiction.

The eroticised interdiction in which pleasure is prolonged can be seen in the way 'Narrator-Dalí' plays with the bread. He writes:

Several times I introduced the bread, which I had for a long time amassed, into my nostrils. I took it slowly out with my fingers, *simulating* some difficulty, as if it was dirt in the nose. Occasionally, on the contrary, I contented myself in breathing out in order to project the bread. It was predominantly pleasurable when I had the illusion that it was dirt in the nose, an illusion which, almost always, was in direct relation with *the greatest lapse of time* between the introduction of the bread into my nose and its expulsion (33, my emphasis).

The use of 'simulating' and 'the greatest lapse of time' suggests a built-in conflict and prolongation. At this point, then, 'Rêverie' is drawing attention to the importance of prolongation of desire and pleasure through built-in conflicts. The way in which this is described in 'Rêverie' is prescient of the blackhead scene in Dalí's 'Aerodynamic Apparitions of Beings-Objects' (1934). Removing the blackheads is a thinly-veiled description of masturbation and prolongation of pleasure:

The pleasure, in this comical and mysterious game, manifestly arises out of the genuine ‘neurotic ceremonial’ brought into play for the purpose of voluptuously prolonging, through ‘deft failures’ and ‘hurried slowness’ in the handling, the culminating moment of extracting the enigmatic pleasure (207-208)<sup>84</sup>.

And once the blackheads have burst we are “plunge[d]... into genuine regret” (208). Much like the manipulation of the bread in ‘Rêverie’, removing blackheads is a task full of ‘simulated difficulties’ intended to prolong the pleasure. The pleasure being prolonged is further exemplified by the fact that ‘Narrator-Dalí’ claims to be manipulating the bread with his left hand whilst handling his penis with the other, “without however reaching the state of erection” (33). To prolong things further, as soon as he experiences “a light erection” he inserts the bread from his nose “under [his] foreskin” and it “ceases straight away” (33).

Up to this point, the daydream has been starting to create a *setting* for the ‘narrative inquisition’ in which ‘Narrator-Dalí’s’ desires can grow. The *scenario*, the actual *narrative* of the inquisition, has not been formed yet, and does not start until the third part, ‘Continuation of the Daydream’. Whilst what he calls “the general daydream” (33) is framed by the Böcklin and bread scenario, there is a further daydream, a “sub-daydream” (33), within the general one. Consideration for the reader, and a need for communication, is demonstrated here, as he claims that “the general daydream... would be much more difficult to follow” without “general details” of the sub-daydream (33). He does not narrate the sub-daydream as such, rather he just provides the relevant details which are then moved into the general daydream. Consideration for the reader is demonstrated further through his use of signposting which addresses the reader directly: “This is the one which I have adopted” (34).

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<sup>84</sup> Finkelstein’s (1998) translation.

Finkelstein (1996) has claimed that ‘Rêverie’ should be seen as an “answer to the Surrealist automatic writing and dream narration”, as by this point the Surrealists had realised that dream accounts did not access the full experience of the dream (297, n. 14). The narrator in ‘Rêverie’ is a “constant... observer of himself” (297, n. 14), and as noted in the previous chapter, I agree with Finkelstein that this would tie-in to the Surrealist experimentations of simulating mental illness in *L’Immaculée conception* (1930). Consideration for the reader feeds into a new approach to dream narration. One of Breton’s original interdictions regarding ‘automatic writing’ was that there should be no consideration for the reader: no title, no sub-headings, nothing added after the fact of writing. The text was written within the trance, and it was a record of the unconscious. Dalí’s ‘Rêverie’ has a title, subheadings, and consideration for the reader in that it guides the reader through the narrative ensuring that he or she does not become lost<sup>85</sup>. Stockwell (2016) has claimed that “[t]he surrealists would have it that their work is the depiction of thought rather than the communication of thoughts”, but that in fact communication is central to how the reader engages with the Surrealist text (18). Dalí grasps the importance of communicating with the reader in ‘Rêverie’, encouraging the reader to engage with the text, as he or she is led to understand the trains of thought which lead to each area and alteration within the daydream. I would argue that the reader is encouraged to *share* in ‘Narrator-Dalí’s’ experience, which, considering the shocking nature of the text, is intended to disturb and make the reader feel uncomfortable. Finkelstein (1996) has argued that the text “falls well within the scope of the assertions made later with regard to Paranoia-Criticism” (297), and indeed one of the aims of Paranoia-Criticism was to allow other people to experience Dalinian desire

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<sup>85</sup> Furthermore, ‘Narrator-Dalí’ makes it clear at the beginning and end of the narrative that it has not been written whilst the daydream is in progress. It is written after the fact.

manifested in external reality, which would encourage them to view elements of their own unconscious<sup>86</sup>. The text, however, for the very same reason, is in keeping with traditional Surrealist intentions, in that one of the initial aims of the Movement was to allow the collective to experience the unconscious. ‘Rêverie’ does this through reader consideration, acting as a guide to the reader, and through shock, the latter being a traditional Surrealist method.

Returning to the sub-daydream, then, in the most disturbing part of ‘Rêverie’, it substitutes “the woman that I love... [for] a young girl of eleven years, named Dulita, that I have known for five years” (33). “Sodomising” (34) Dulita is positioned as the culmination of the daydream, but this does not mean that it is its *purpose*. As we can see in the manipulation of bread in the outer frame and the description of bursting blackheads in ‘Aerodynamic Apparitions of Beings-Objects’, the journey is in fact the narrative purpose. ‘Narrator-Dalí’ begins to form the ‘narrative inquisition’, the boundaries of which will form the confines within which his desires will grow: “In order to carry out the fantasy..., it would be necessary to *invent a few stories* which would create the conditions of dream, a similitude indispensable to the development of my daydream” (33-34, my emphasis)<sup>87</sup>. The ‘few stories’ are thus not intended to mimic external reality and be realistic in that sense. Rather, they must have a dream-like quality. For the Surrealists, this (conveniently as well, given the content) would bypass “aesthetic or moral concerns”, an intention so central to Breton's definition of

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<sup>86</sup> For more on Paranoia-Criticism see chapter 4.

<sup>87</sup> Finkelstein (1998) translates that sentence as, “In order to carry out the fantasy..., I had to invent a few stories that would create conditions propitious for the dream, such a similitude being essential to the development of my daydream” (156). It is not altogether clear what is meant by this. My translation fits in better with the phrasing actually used by Dalí, and takes into consideration the way in which he, along with the Surrealists, was fascinated with representing the dream.

Surrealism in his *Manifeste du surréalisme* (1924, 36), because it would be a representation of the dream.

The ‘invented stories’ are extremely Sadeian in their construction. Sadeian archetypes would have been a known quantity to the contemporary Surrealist reader, as the Surrealists were fascinated by the Marquis de Sade, keeping track of new publications of the libertine’s work and reporting upon them in *Surréalisme au service de la révolution*. Indeed, in issue 4, in which ‘Rêverie’ was first published, the journal begins with a piece entitled ‘News of Sade’. Gibson (1997) has noted how Dalí most likely got his first taste of the Marquis’ work through Luis Buñuel in 1929 whilst working on the script for the film, *L’Age d’or* (235). Through discussions with Buñuel, Dalí became acquainted with Sade’s works that were not then available to openly buy (235). There was also a manuscript of *120 Days of Sodom* available for them to view through a friend who was descended from Sade (235)<sup>88</sup>.

The known quantity of Sadeian archetypes creates boundaries for the reader in ‘Rêverie’, but also for the narrator who needs boundaries within which his desire can grow. A reading of certain authors and texts is necessary, then, for a *full* understanding of ‘Rêverie’, and a certain type of reader is expected by the text. This is not to say that people would not be able to understand ‘Rêverie’ at all without knowledge of Sadeian archetypes. Sade was not widely available at the time in which the text was written. Plus, as I argued at length in the previous chapter, one of the purposes of the text is to encourage the reader to engage bodily with the narrative through ‘physiological

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<sup>88</sup> That manuscript, written in hand on one long scroll of paper, is possibly the same one which was pulled from auction in 2017. As reported by both the *Guardian* (Agence France-Presse in Paris, 2017) and *Reuters* (2017), the French government called the manuscript “a national treasure” and refused to allow it to be “sold to a foreign buyer” (Reuters, np).



(reader)ship', for which an understanding of Sade is not necessary. Arguably, then, the text has a dual audience: the everyday person who will be shocked by the text but still encouraged to engage bodily with the hysteric contortions through 'physiological (reader)ship', and the reader in-the-know who understands the Sadeian references and engages with the text through them.

Sadeian archetypes are used within the text as follows. 'Narrator-Dalí' has enlisted the help of the child's mother, Mathilde, who has "[fallen] foolishly in love with me and accepts, through masochism, my fantasy of sodomising her daughter, even offering, in all her ardour and devotion, to help me carry through this act" (34). He also calls upon the assistance of Gallo, "an old prostitute that I have known in the past, who is extraordinarily vicious and experienced and who appears to me indispensable to put in contact with Dulita for her upcoming initiation" (34). Thus, 'Narrator-Dalí' introduces the Sadeian archetypes of the innocent child who will be the victim of sexual whims, the cruel but ineffectual mother, and the vicious and experienced prostitute.

The combination of these Sadeian archetypes and the emphasis upon the 'few stories' being dream-like is intended to introduce the characters of the 'narrative inquisition' and start to form its content. By making such an obvious nod to the Marquis de Sade, it situates the contemporary Surrealist reader and grounds them within the narrative. This helps to solidify the boundaries of the 'inquisition', which is interesting as the themes give the impression of a narrative which has gone *beyond* the boundaries. Theatricality is drawn attention to as Gallo and Mathilde are playing roles: "Gallo, occupying the owner's seat" and "Matilde..., doing her knitting, occupying the wife's place" as they sit at the dining table (35). This again emphasises the lack of reality, in terms of external

reality, to the piece. This forms a tension within the text between being intentionally provocative whilst at the same time trying to draw attention away from that provocation by making it look like a performance.

However, the success of drawing attention away from external reality through Sadeian archetypes and themes is limited. As in many of Sade's works, the purported innocence of the victim is problematized and cast in doubt. In one scene in 'Rêverie', Dulita is depicted as innocently sitting at the dinner table with her homework. She is surrounded by objects associated with childhood: an exercise book and a pencil case<sup>89</sup>. At the same time there is the implication that under the surface there is the potential for emasculating sexuality. The design on her pencil case is that of a lion, and attention is drawn to her teeth on numerous occasions (36)<sup>90</sup>. Furthermore, later when she is shown an album of pornographic postcards, her face shows a "mixture of shame and attention" (36). Arguably, then, 'Narrator-Dalí's' intentions with Dulita are being cast as taming dangerous female sexuality, much like hollowing the crust into a vase and chewing it into a paste in the outer frame of the narrative symbolised the same thing. The implications here are not entirely removed from external reality. As noted above, in 'L'Amour' Dalí claimed that the woman one loves *in external reality* is "a dream which is made flesh" (66). In other words, the way in which Dulita is characterised in 'Rêverie' impacts upon women in external reality, as Dalí would be attributing elements of his unconscious onto them.

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<sup>89</sup> These objects also symbolise education, suggesting the Sadeian theme of an education in sex.

<sup>90</sup> Finkelstein (1998) has noted how the image of the lion in Dalí's works is a "symbol of desire" (150).

Returning to the formation of the ‘narrative inquisition’ in the general daydream, the content of the ‘inquisition’ is *written down* rather than spoken aloud: “It is at this time of the evening, in a complete and contemplative silence, that I transmit, in writing, all my decisions regarding the accomplishment of my fantasies, with the most microscopic detail and nuance” (34). Having them written down sets them in stone, emphasising them as an ‘inquisition’. This representation of writing as solidification is in juxtaposition with the perilousness of writing both at the start of the narrative and also in *Catalan Bread* (1932). The writing down of the ‘inquisition’ is also related to Sade’s stance on writing and the erotic. As Cox (2001) has noted, “Sade... regard[ed] his writing as a medium through which his sexual energy was released” (249). For Dalí, the writing is as much about the development and prolongation of arousal as the release.

‘Narrator-Dalí’s’ rules require an “accomplishment (fanatically exact)” (34)<sup>91</sup>, and take the form of a set of instructions which must be followed. He outlines Dulita’s ‘initiation’ as follows:

Here is how things will happen during the next five days. Dulita *must not*<sup>92</sup> suspect anything... On the fifth day, Dulita will be led to the fountain of the cypresses, two hours before the sun sets. There she *will* taste some bread and chocolate, and Gallo, aided by Mathilde, will initiate Dulita in the most brutal and coarse way. She *will* make use of a profusion of pornographic postcards, which I myself will have chosen beforehand with *great precision* (34, my emphasis).

He follows this by noting that

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<sup>91</sup> I have adopted Finkelstein’s (1998) translation of “jusqu’à la manie” as ‘fanatically’ here.

<sup>92</sup> Dalí’s use of ‘il faut que’ emphasises the imperative nature of the order here. This is why I have translated it as ‘must not’, rather than Finkelstein’s (1998, 156) “should not”.

On the same evening [as her ‘initiation’], Dulita [will] learn... everything from Gallo and her mother, namely that I was not a deaf-mute, and that in three days I will sodomise her amongst the excrement of the cowshed. For three days, it will be *necessary* for her to pretend as though she knows nothing of it all. It is *rigorously forbidden* for her to make the least allusion to all that we reveal to her (34, my emphasis).

By using the words ‘must not’ (in the original French, the strong ‘il faut que’ is used), ‘will’, ‘great precision’, ‘necessary’, and ‘rigorously forbidden’, ‘Narrator-Dalí’ sets down the rules as unnegotiable. The rules create a pressurising ‘inquisition’ within which behaviour must be modulated in order to prolong pleasure. And there are further rules which ‘Narrator-Dalí’ follows. Whilst Dulita is doing her homework, he takes on the role of the owner of the farmhouse, behaving paternally, and emulating the behaviour that the owner had carried out towards him. He dips a sugar cube in cognac and gives it to Dulita who takes it in her teeth. Dulita’s movement is not mere whim on her part. Indeed, the sugar cube and her movement are “the signal to go to bed” (36). Every movement of this scene is described in great detail, as if presenting a *tableau*: “Dulita is slowly eating (one mouthful of chocolate, one mouthful of bread). She is swinging her right leg which is nearest to Gallo” (35). A child-like mannerism is combined with eroticism, perhaps suggesting the double nature which ‘Narrator-Dalí’ has assigned to her (i.e. that she has the innocence of a child, but also an underlying threat of emasculation). The minutia gives both the impression of critical distance, as if it is a painting within a frame, and also immediacy and closeness, something to which a present-tense narrative contributes.

Following through the content of the ‘inquisition’ enables ‘Narrator-Dalí’s’ pleasure and desire to grow, and built into this content are difficulties that need to be overcome,

as overcoming these difficulties increases the pleasure. An example of this is that ‘Narrator-Dalí’ cannot see the ‘initiation’ site, the fountain, from the dining room window. In a voyeuristic move, ‘Narrator-Dalí’ is not going to be present whilst Dulita is ‘initiated’, rather he is going to watch from a distance. He is aware that just moving the fountain within view would be too easy (34). Overcoming the difficulty must require effort and imagination, but it must not be insurmountable. He needs a solution of his own making to a conflict of his own making. He thus creates “a new fantasy, which appeared particularly exciting, [providing] a solution to this major conflict” (34). He imagines that a fire has burned down a section of the cypresses that surround the fountain, but that the conflagration has left a branch ever so slightly concealing his view. He then notes that the wall of the cowshed also interrupts the view, so he decides that the fire also destroyed that part of the wall, “permitting ‘a very direct communication between the stable and the fountain of the cypresses’” (34)<sup>93</sup>. However, this does not solve the problem of the view from the dining room window because the fountain is still out of sight from there. He decides that he will sit in his chair and watch the ‘initiation’ through the reflection in “the large mirror in Dulita’s bedroom, contiguous to the dining room” (35). This offers a view which is distant, blurry, and “particularly unsettling” (35), which is exactly what appeals to him. Thus, the obstacle has been overcome with much difficulty, leaving only a slight problem in its place, one which only increases his pleasure. All this, of course, proves to be pointless, as Dulita has not even reached the fountain before ‘Narrator-Dalí’ “run[s] to the window of Dulita’s room, wanting to see in all its details their path to the fountain, across the burned foliage” (35). One can read this much like the blackhead description in ‘Beings-Objects’: a metaphor for masturbation; he settles down, he speeds up, he settles down

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<sup>93</sup> I am unsure why Dalí encases this in quotation marks. I have maintained Finkelstein’s (1998, 158) translation of “la communication toute immédiate entre l’écurie et la fontaine aux cyprès” as “a very direct communication between the stable and the fountain of the cypresses”.

again, and so forth. At one point he does not even hide that this is what he is doing, stating that he is happily masturbating whilst watching through the mirror (36). Watching the ‘inquisition’ come to pass allows his pleasure to grow.

On the day of the planned culmination of the daydream, Dulita transforms into “the woman that I love” (36). With a euphemistic quality that has been missing from the rest of the text, ‘Narrator-Dalí’ writes that “the dream [ends] with the same images from the memory of the dream” (36), i.e. sexual intercourse in the stable. The sudden euphemistic distancing here is strange given the candid nature of the rest of the narrative. The candidness makes it unlikely that the euphemism is a device with which the narrative distances itself from objectionable themes. In terms of the structure of the text, however, the ending offers a culmination in keeping with the rigidly structured framing of the narrative, suggesting that the culmination comes as a result of the ‘narrative inquisition’ and pleasure growing within it. The narrative ends back in the outer frame of the narrative with ‘Narrator-Dalí’ writing out the text.

This analysis of ‘Rêverie’ has focused upon the way Dalí’s notions of eroticism are developed within the text. It has explored the concept of ‘narrative inquisitions’ in keeping with later explorations of eroticised ‘inquisitions’ in ‘Beings-Objects’ (1934). The main ways in which ‘narrative inquisitions’ are created within the text are through multiple framing devices, Sadeian archetypes, built-in prolongations, conflicts to be overcome, directives, and imperatives. Juxtaposed against the solidity of the structure of the ‘inquisition’ and the framing devices is impotence, suggested at the beginning of the narrative when he delays writing. This forms part of the relationship which ‘Narrator-Dalí’ creates between eroticism and writing/artistic creation. Throughout the text,

writing and artistic creation in general have taken on an erotic character. ‘Narrator-Dalí’ writes down his instructions for Dulita, Mathilde, and Gallo; and arguably, moving around elements of the backdrop of the daydream can be considered as artistic creation as well. Furthermore, the narrative ends with the intended culmination of the ‘inquisition’: sodomy. Arguably, then, the text created after-the-fact by ‘Narrator-Dalí’ is underpinned by virility. Finkelstein (1996) has described the way in which ‘Narrator-Dalí’ masticates the bread at the start of the narrative “in terms of the dialectics of the soft and hard” which can be found in Dalí’s *oeuvre* (148). I, however, would argue that an overarching way of describing the text is as virility triumphing over impotence, a description which cannot be applied to many of Dalí’s texts. In the next section I will explore the way in which eroticised ‘inquisitions’ are created in *Hidden Faces* (1944) in the ‘experiment’ between the Comte de Grandsailles and Solange de Cléda. In that text I will suggest that it is in fact impotence that wins over virility.

### ***Hidden Faces: Grandsailles’ and Solange’s ‘Love Spell’***

The ‘experiment’ which the Comte de Grandsailles proposes to Solange is linked to his fascination with occult and alchemical experimentations of the Middle Ages. When he returns to Paris in 1939, his Canoness precedes him to prepare his house for his arrival. She arranges his bedroom and dressing room, which are “cluttered with intricate and esoteric pharmaceutical preparations that an alchemist would have envied” (127). He has “heavy roots tumefied with purplish excrescences and black warts” (128), and “cat skins marinating in opaque glass crocks under a thick bed of mercury” (128). Along with these, the Count has two flasks, red and blue, of liquid which when combined produce an aphrodisiac and a stimulant (128). He considers this mixture to be a ‘love spell’, and claims that it has its origins in texts of the Middle Ages (128). As such,

Grandsailles believes himself to be taking advantage of occult knowledge, and continuing work of the Middle Ages, by using this potion.

The Count invites Solange de Cléda out for dinner, during which he tells her that he does not love her. Despite this, however, Solange is aware that he is about to “impose his plan on [her]” (128). It is this plan, and its imposition, which forms the ‘inquisition’ within which Grandsailles believes his feelings will grow into love. He sees this ‘plan’ as a love spell, the outcome of which will be the simultaneous orgasm of both subjects without them touching one another. He outlines a love spell that he has read about in an occult text (132-133): Two people are chosen, after which they are not allowed any sexual contact with each other or anyone else. Over a number of months they are fed aphrodisiac food, and “their imaginations are kindled by appropriate tales”, after which the two subjects are allowed to meet for the first time. They are naked, apart from gems which align with their horoscopes. They must not talk to one another during this meeting, nor must they touch one another. If they do not follow these rules the ‘spell’ might not work. In subsequent meetings they encounter one another wearing more and more clothes, and their movements and gestures are “regulated in advance as for a ballet”. At the end of the ‘spell’, both subjects are alone in the same room, “bound separately to the branches of a myrtle tree” so they cannot move at all, and the spell is a success if they then orgasm simultaneously. This success “is almost always accompanied by tears” (132-133).

The ‘inquisitorial’ nature of this ‘spell’ can be seen in the fact that there are a set of rules which must be followed in order for the ‘spell’ to be a success. Some of these rules include actual physical restraint, in that the subjects are actually tied to a tree and



made unable to move. Their movements are dictated to them beforehand, and any movements outside of these threaten disaster for the ‘spell’. As the ‘spell’ progresses, the “regulated” movements “become more pure, expressive of delicate feelings, unctious and humility” (133). This relates to a point I made in the previous chapter about Gordon’s (2004) description of late 19<sup>th</sup> century cabaret and stage performances where it was thought that certain movements and gestures aligned with certain emotions, and if these movements were mimicked then the emotion would be felt (99). In the ‘love spell’, the movements are ‘regulated’ to encourage certain emotions in the subjects. As this is also a theme in *Hidden Faces*, it adds credence to my reading of ‘Rêverie’ in which I suggested that ‘Narrator-Dalí’s’ ‘hysterical’ convulsions were a performance intended to encourage the reader to bodily engage with the text through ‘physiological (reader)ship’.

Much like with the ‘inquisitions’ created by ‘Narrator-Dalí’ in ‘Rêverie’, then, where he wrote down the rules and instructions which he, Dulita, Mathilde, and Gallo had to follow, in the ‘love spell’ outlined by Grandsailles there are a set of rules that create the boundaries within which desire and pleasure will grow. The ‘inquisitorial’ nature is highlighted by the use of the words and phrases, “rigorous ceremonial”, “must”, “constraint”, “regulated” (132), “bound”, “prevent”, and “immobility” (133). Similar words and phrases were used in ‘Rêverie’: “necessary”, “rigorously forbidden”, “great precision” (34).

The actual ‘experiment’ begun by Grandsailles and Solange does not follow exactly that which the Count describes over dinner. It is a different version. However, it has the same ‘inquisitorial’ nature, as Grandsailles explains to Solange a few days later that she

is “going to obey and carry out the laws of my perversion to the last detail” (145). She will arrive at his isolated house, ring the bell (despite the fact that there is no real need as the door will be open), go upstairs alone to the second floor, get undressed in a certain room, then move naked to the Count’s room and lie on the bed. She must lie there for fifteen minutes in the dark, and she must not move, after which she must leave. Grandsailles will be in the room too, but they must not touch or talk to one another. They will not talk about it afterwards. It will happen that night, at one thirty, and she must arrive wearing furs (145-146).

This is the only stage of the ‘love spell’ that is actually carried through. After this, Grandsailles discovers that Solange has bought part of his land, and writes her a letter ending their ‘friendship’ (154). Their relationship after this letter vacillates between Grandsailles ignoring her entirely and then occasionally making admonitions of love only to then retract his affection again. The ‘inquisitorial’ ‘love spell’ never reaches its culmination. In ‘Rêverie’, on the other hand, the ‘inquisitions’ are built-up and carried through all to a successful culmination, i.e. the ‘sodomisation’ of ‘the woman that I love’. Despite the initial tension between virility and impotence in that text, ‘Narrator-Dalí’ maintains control over his daydream, controlling the speed and gestures of his masturbation in the outer frame, and the surroundings and actions of the characters in the middle frame. Virility can thus be seen as winning over impotence. In *Hidden Faces*, however, the ‘experiment’, the ‘love spell’, leads nowhere, arguably due to an excess of that need for control at the centre of ‘Rêverie’. Grandsailles, at the least sign of Solange gaining a modicum of control over his body or lands, immediately rejects her. It is important that the first meeting in which Grandsailles and Solange discuss ‘love spells’ is around the same time that World War Two erupted with Germany

invading Poland on September 1, 1939. Grandsailles returns to Paris in “late August, 1939” (127), and after nine days arranges to meet Solange (130). Arguably, the fact that they first discussed the ‘love spell’ at a time where chaos was about to rupture Europe suggests that the ‘experiment’ was doomed from the beginning. Unlike ‘Rêverie’, then, in which virility overcomes impotence, Grandsailles’ fear of Solange gaining control over him and his inability to stop it implies a fear of emasculation<sup>94</sup> and impotence, suggesting that in the ‘inquisition’ built to bind the relationship between the two of them, it is impotence that wins over virility.

In chapter 5 I discuss in depth Markus’ (2000) claim that in Dalí’s *oeuvre* there is a development from masturbation as a defensive act preventing castration (35) to the amalgamation of the subject and object of fear in “the formation of a unity” (Dalí, cited by Markus, 36). The proposed ‘love spell’ between Grandsailles and Solange could be viewed as just such an attempted unity, an attempt which ultimately fails. The focus on masturbation in ‘Rêverie’, however, should not be viewed in the same light as some of Dalí’s other nods towards masturbation at the time, in which the act is imbued with shame or seen as a defensive act. In ‘Rêverie’ there are none of Dalí’s standard depictions of masturbatory shame, such as the red, veiny hand in *Gadget and Hand* (1927), which Gibson (1997) has noted symbolises the shame of masturbation (166). ‘Rêverie’ revels in the depiction of masturbation, going into detail, and using it to draw a relationship between eroticism and artistic creation. It is indeed the case that Dulita is cast as harbouring a threatening sexuality, and the annihilation of the ‘vase-bread’ suggests antagonism towards the female genitals and the need to tame them, but masturbation is not presented as a defence against those things. As such, I maintain that

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<sup>94</sup> For more on emasculation in *Hidden Faces*, see chapter 5 where I discuss the *vagina dentata* scene.

the emphasis on masturbation in 'Rêverie' does not undermine the theme of virility conquering impotence in the text.

In the next section I am going to discuss the formation of an 'inquisitorial' *tableau* in *The Unspeakable Confessions of Salvador Dalí* (1976). Even though this text is outside of the dates stated as being of interest to this thesis, briefly exploring the nature of the *tableau* will allow me to comment upon how the phenomenon of the 'inquisition' remained a central aspect of Dalí's thought throughout his career and throughout numerous changes in his aesthetics and theoretical outlook.

### ***The Unspeakable Confessions of Salvador Dalí: A Ritualistic Tableau***

The description of Dalinian eroticism in *Unspeakable Confessions* is a development of the 'love spells' described in *Hidden Faces*. "My eroticism is a game with precise rules and a discipline as rigorous as an initiation rite," he explains (222). He chooses a number of individuals and then divides them up into couples. These couples consist of people who have never met before, and they are brought together "through a network of contacts, dialogue, and situations that little by little will surprise, seduce, and convince the actors to submit to the rules of the Dalinian game, ... in which they will be consenting and submissive slaves" (222). Unlike in *Hidden Faces*, then, the couples meet before they are subjected to rules and regulations. Furthermore, there is emphasis on the 'game' here. It is an erotic game that Dalí and his followers are playing, one in which fun is had and everyone consents. This is quite different to 'Rêverie' where Dulita never consents, and at numerous times appears in distress. Consent is also problematized in *Hidden Faces*, as there is much ambiguity as to whether Solange

actually wants to take part in the ‘experiment’. Despite consent being foregrounded in *Unspeakable Confessions*, however, it becomes problematized as the description of the ‘game’ continues.

Next, Dalí highlights the ‘ritual’ nature of the ‘game’. His participants “become the center [sic] of a sort of Mass, as in magical anticipation” and take part in “a truly erotic ceremony” (223). And this is where the ‘inquisitions’ begin to take shape. He “impose[s]”, he “convince[s]”, and he dictates rules: “you lie down like this, let yourself be stroked like that, with your legs at such and such an angle, the whole thing to start by the insertion of a straw that will be lighted and which you will withstand without blinking until the last possible limit” (223). In a similar fashion to the Middle Ages ‘love spell’ outlined in *Hidden Faces*, the participants are brought together in a room where the decorations and their clothing have all been decided upon to the last detail. Their movements and gestures are orchestrated, and when Dalí enters the room he does so as “a master of ceremonies” (223). However, it is at this point that the progress of the actions within the ‘inquisition’ differs from both ‘Rêverie’ and *Hidden Faces*. Dalí *expects* that there will be something out of place, someone who has not followed the rules; and the implication is that if there is not, then he will pretend that there is (223-224). At which point he calls the proceedings to a violent halt, shocking everyone (224). As everyone leaves, the culmination of the ‘inquisition’ having not been carried out, “I fall to my knees overwhelmed with joy, weeping over this sublime setback” (224). How do we understand this?

In ‘Rêverie’, the purpose of the ‘inquisitions’ was his own sexual pleasure, pleasure which is achieved within the narrative by following the rules that were laid out. In

*Hidden Faces*, the purpose of the ‘love spell’ was to create boundaries within which Grandsailles’ desire for Solange could grow and in which he could tame her. That ‘inquisitorial’ construction fails. In *Unspeakable Confessions*, however, the purpose is for the ‘inquisitorial’ structure to *fail*, for it all to collapse. This constitutes the ultimate pleasure for Dalí, along with the fact that he can orchestrate the individual desires of his participants, enlist the help of others to encourage those participants, and convince people to arrange the furnishings and clothing for the upcoming ‘ritual’. This problematizes the aforementioned consent of the participants, as Dalí’s influence seems to enter the realms of hypnotism. The ‘inquisitorial’ structure has gone from being described as a sado-masochistic game in which everyone gains pleasure from the rules and regulations, to an almost demonic ceremony. Whilst Dalí draws attention to what he sees as the ‘mystical’ nature of his ‘ceremony’, one cannot help but wonder whether he has at least partially been influenced in his description by horror films of the time. The outline of his ‘ceremony’ bears more than a little resemblance to ‘rituals’ dramatized in Hammer Horror films<sup>95</sup>. In chapter 6, I suggest that there is potentially a reference to Bela Lugosi’s *Dracula* (1931) in a painting Dalí executed in 1943 of Ambassador Cárdenas. And, as noted in the previous chapter, Charlie Chaplin is directly referred to in *Hidden Faces* when Grandsailles claims that “[t]he hysteric arch... has the same spiritual origins, so to speak, as the spasms so well known to Chaplin” (133-134). Thus, it does not seem too far-fetched to suggest that Dalí might have been influenced by horror films of the time in his depiction of his ‘inquisitorial ceremonies’.

He goes on to claim that demonstrating his ultimate control, and bringing everything created to his standards crashing down, propels him into “a totally irrational universe in

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<sup>95</sup> I am particularly thinking of the rituals in *The Devil Rides Out* (1968), a film released in the previous decade to *Unspeakable Confessions*.

which everything is sublime and transcended... There is no longer any vice or virtue, good or evil, flesh or spirit – orgasm becomes ecstasy and fulfillment of mind. I attain a harmony that is located in the very space of my soul” (224). After this he merely needs to “pick up my brush and allow it to channel the outpouring of my genius which flows from the sources of the absolute” (224). Thus much like in ‘Rêverie’ he aligns eroticism and artistic creation. As Dalí claims that in bringing the ‘inquisition’ crashing down he gains a ‘harmony’, this suggests that unity and form are at this point the aim of his ‘inquisitions’, thus positing a tension between chaos (calling an abrupt halt to actions within the ‘inquisitorial structure’) and order (the ‘inquisitions’ themselves and the ‘harmony’ he experiences afterwards).

## **Conclusion**

In this chapter I have explored the ways in which Dalí conceptualises eroticism through ‘inquisitions’. ‘Inquisitions’ are at the heart of Dalí’s eroticism, and can be summarised as the creation of rules, instructions, and boundaries within which pleasure and desire can grow. In ‘Rêverie’, these ‘inquisitions’ occur at the formal level in terms of what I call ‘narrative inquisitions’: multiple framing devices and Sadeian character archetypes. They also occur in regards to content, in that ‘Narrator-Dalí’ builds conflicts into his daydream that he has to overcome in order for his pleasure to grow. He writes down rules and regulations for Dulita, Mathilde, and Gallo to follow, and these rules take the form of imperatives from which the characters must not depart. In ‘Rêverie’, the ‘inquisition’ is successfully followed through and the narrative ends with virility overcoming impotence. In *Hidden Faces*, on the other hand, impotence wins over virility. Grandsailles and Solange’s ‘love spell’ takes the form of an ‘inquisitorial’ structure based on one that Grandsailles found in a book from the Middle Ages.

However, Grandsailles ends his association with Solange as she has bought a part of his ancestral lands. As fear of emasculation has resulted in the 'inquisitorial' structure failing, impotence has overcome virility. In *Unspeakable Confessions*, the ceremonial nature of the 'inquisitorial structure' introduced in *Hidden Faces* is continued, only this time the purpose of the structure is not for sexual pleasure to be culminated within it. Whilst he gives the impression that his 'inquisitorial' eroticism has become a Society 'game', as opposed to a show of male dominance underpinned by the taming of threatening female sexuality, 'Narrator-Dalí' coerces his participants to carry through his whims, only to then destroy the edifice and make them leave. This creates a tension between chaos and order as Dalí feels 'harmony' after leaving his participants in a mentally chaotic state. The development of Dalí's notion of 'inquisitorial' eroticism from 1931 to the 1970s, then, demonstrates that 'inquisitions' remained at the heart of Dalí's eroticism throughout his career.

In this chapter I have also discussed how Dalí creates a relationship between eroticism and writing/artistic creation. This can be seen in both 'Rêverie' (1931) and, over forty years later, in *The Unspeakable Confessions of Salvador Dalí*. This is a point which will be continued in the next chapter where I argue that Dalí's fascination with 'inquisitions' is present in his theory of creating written and artistic works within a tradition. Using his notion of 'freedom within limits' outlined in his *Secret Life* (1942), I suggest that this 'inquisitorial' approach can be seen as one of the numerous ways in which Dalí can be considered a Modernist.



**PART 3: MODERNISM, 'BECOMING CLASSIC',  
AND FASCISM**

## **Chapter 4: Dalí the Modernist**

This chapter looks at Dalí's relationship with Modernity and Modernist aesthetics, a relationship which takes many forms from the late 1920s to the end of WW2. From his excitement over what he saw as the possibilities inherent in the Modern world of mass-production to a seeming *volte-face* with his advocacy of what he called 'the Classic', Dalí explores the relationship between aesthetics, cultural renewal, and politics. I will be exploring the two main impulses in Dalí's *oeuvre* of this period, the desire to express the 'new' and the 'Classic', and I will look at how these two impulses relate to Dalí's engagement with Modernist aesthetics. King (2010) implies that the 'classic' and the 'modern' were two separate impulses working together for Dalí, that "the simultaneous influence of tradition and modernity would guide much of his work throughout his life" (16). I argue instead that his advocacy of the 'classic' can itself be considered Modernist. There was a 'Classicist' thread in Modernism, which, for instance, can be seen in T.S. Eliot, T.E. Hulme, and HD. Dalí keys into this thread, especially from the late 1930s onwards.

It is useful at this point to define what I mean by Modernism, Modernist, and Modernity. Bradbury and McFarlane (1976) see Modernity as "the modern situation", and the impact this situation had on art as plural (21). The 'situation' was one in which there was not just an emphasis on the 'new', but people were *experiencing* things as being 'new' also. It was a time of rupture and anxiety, and it was felt that there had been a "Great Divide" between the present and the past (20). Indeed, we must not

underestimate how difficult many people found adjusting to the Modern world to be, and this difficulty was an intrinsic part of the Modern experience. Huysmans, in the late 19th century, portrayed characters in his *En Rade* (1887) and *Là-Bas* (1891) who resisted adjusting to the industrialised Modern world. His scathing and cynical attacks on Modernity are filled with ironic uses of the rhetoric of the Modern age, such as “with the aid of progress” (*ER*, Chapter 9, np, Kindle edition) and “What a beautiful thing... is science!” (Chapter 9, np). For Huysmans, the Modern world was one in which stable values had been replaced with a mad dash for progress at any cost. The world was in chaos, the individual had become alienated, and science had replaced God at the top of the table of values.

There is much discussion, however, as to when Modernism emerged from the ‘modern situation’, and indeed how Modernism should be defined as different to other forms of art at that time. Spender (1963, cited in Bradbury and McFarlane) puts this in terms of a distinction between “the ‘moderns’ and the ‘contemporaries’” (24). Bradbury and McFarlane take a position which has become popular in contemporary Modernist studies, that there is no single Modernism but a plurality of Modernisms.<sup>96</sup> They argue that “few ages have been more multiple, more promiscuous in artistic style; to distil from the multiplicity an overall style or mannerism is a difficult, perhaps even an impossible, task” (22-23). This is at odds with those definitions of Modernism which only focus upon the High Modernists, generally seen as consisting of such luminaries as T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, and Virginia Woolf. It is this broader scope of the terms Modernism (a form of art reacting to the ‘modern situation’) and Modernist (a practitioner of Modernism) that are adopted in this thesis.

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<sup>96</sup> See also, Nicholls, P., 2009. *Modernisms: A Literary Guide*, Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, for this position.

So how is Modernism to be defined? What constitutes Modernist art? Bradbury and McFarlane claim that even though finding ‘an overall style’ is nigh on impossible, “there seems to be a discernible centre to [Modernism]: a certain loose but distinguishable group of assumptions, founded on a broadly symbolist aesthetic, an *avant-garde* view of the artist, and a notion of a relationship of crisis between art and history” (29). Indeed, expressions of this latter point can be seen in the Modernist tendency to reject erstwhile realist aesthetics and complain that there needs to be new aesthetics and new language in which to represent the ‘modern situation’. This tendency is borne from the ‘crisis’ felt ‘between art and history’. As will be discussed further later in this chapter, some artists turned away from representational aesthetics in favour of a focus on style and medium; art which created its own inner space of meaning. This was linked to “the doctrine of impersonality” (45), primary examples of which are found in T.S. Eliot’s *The Waste Land* (1922) and his ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ (1920b), the latter of which will be discussed in relation to Dalí’s aesthetics later in the chapter. Other artists maintained representation as an aim, but disrupted language as a new means of representation. The Surrealists, for instance, relocated the source for representational art by redefining reality as residing in the unconscious. Automatism was then used as the artistic method by which that reality would be expressed.<sup>97</sup>

Along with the need to create new language and aesthetics to express ‘the modern situation’ there was the “consciousness of disorder, despair, and anarchy” (Bradbury and McFarlane, 41), “fragmentation [and] discontinuity” (47). In other words, there was a palpable sense that something was broken. However, unlike in Postmodernism,

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<sup>97</sup> See chapter 1 for a discussion of how the Surrealists subverted the conventions of Literary Realism.

despite the tumult of old truths being questioned, values and indeed bodies in WW1 being fragmented, there was a sense that a new truth could be found, and a new order could be forged. From destruction came “new juxtapositions, new wholes; ... an infinity of new relationships” (48-49). And it is this aspect of Modernism that can be found in Dalí’s ‘Classicism’, an aesthetic and political stance which I argue is a response to the political disorder Dalí experiences in the 1930s.

To sum up, Modernity was ‘the modern situation’ and Modernism is a retrospective signifier of the multiple artistic responses to that ‘situation’; responses which have certain characteristics in common. A Modernist is a practitioner of Modernism. Based on these definitions, this chapter holds that Dalí was a Modernist in many ways, but the focus will be on his attitude towards the ‘new’ and his advocacy of what he termed ‘the Classic’. I contend that there are parallels between his theory of ‘freedom within limits’ and T.S. Eliot’s ‘historical sense’, and that advocacy of the ‘classic’ does not mean dismissing the ‘new’. Whilst many scholars focus on situating Dalí within either a Spanish or French artistic *milieu* during different phases of his career, especially up until his first visit to America in 1934, by drawing parallels between Dalí and T.S. Eliot I am situating him within a broader international understanding of artistic influence. This is not to say that Dalí was *directly* influenced or inspired by T.S. Eliot, rather I am arguing that there are parallels between the theory behind Dalí’s Modernist works and T.S. Eliot’s.

By arguing that Dalí’s ‘classicism’ is a part of his Modernism, I am running counter to Rothman (2012) who claimed that Dalí had an “ambivalent response to the imperative of modernism” and sought a “path... outside both tradition and modernity” (204). He

claims that Dalí's use of 'tradition' and the 'new' was intended to result in the breakdown of both (204). On the contrary, I argue that Dalí's fusion of the 'new' and the 'classic' was intended as a *resolution* to fragmentation and disorder, and had political motivations. This latter point runs counter to Finkelstein (1996) and King (2010), the former of which saw Dalí's 'classicism' as having aesthetic and personal motivations (248), and the latter seeing the 'classic' as being motivated by a further engagement with Freud (18-21). I will discuss these points further later in the chapter.

### **Dalí's Early Views on Modernity and 'the New'**

In 1928, Dalí published 'Poetry of the Mass-Produced Utility'<sup>98</sup>, a text heavily influenced by Futurist rhetoric<sup>99</sup> and his contact with the *Ultraistes* of Madrid in 1922<sup>100</sup>, a group described by Gibson (1997) as believing that

art should now express the spirit of an age represented by the Eiffel Tower, machines, skating rinks, dynamos, ragtime and foxtrots, streamlined motor cars, radio and cinema, aeroplanes, telegraphy, transatlantic steamers, svelte girls on beaches and Kodaks (95).

In other words, art should express all things characteristic of the Modern world, particularly things which have a mass appeal. This call to break down elitist hierarchies within art, where traditionally works that appeal to mass sensibilities are denigrated, is echoed in 'Poetry'. One of the purposes of that text was to bring the everyday, the prosaic, into the realm of art and culture. This simultaneously disrupts the notion of 'high art', and reduces the gap between art and the world it is intended to represent.

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<sup>98</sup> References will be to Finkelstein's (1998) translation of the Catalan text.

<sup>99</sup> Gibson (1997, 79) has noted that in the early 1920s Dalí received a book of Futurist texts. By 1952 Dalí had changed his stance towards Futurist aesthetics claiming that he had taken the "childish" Futurist experiments with speed and made them 'Classic' (Dalí, 1952, quoted in Gibson, 471).

<sup>100</sup> Dalí never became a full member of the *Ultraistes*, but he was influenced by them (Gibson, 104; Finkelstein, 1998, 43). Just how important the *Ultraistes* were to Dalí in the first half of the 1920s can be seen in him stating in 1970 that "the most important memories of my life [were in Madrid] – the years with Lorca, Buñuel, the *ultraistas*" (quoted in Gibson, 139).

Indeed, the text does not make clear the distinction between Modern objects and what Dalí calls ‘anti-art’, a term which inverts the hierarchy which saw art as the preserve of the elite, an elite which would also decide what constituted art. Dalí calls for the elevation of the aesthetic value of the “[t]elephone, wash-basin with a pedal, white refrigerators burnished with ripolin paint, bidet, little phonograph... objects of the purest and most authentic poetry!” (57, his ellipsis). For Dalí, Modernity was ‘anti-artistic’: “Modernity... means hockey pullovers of anonymous English manufacturing, it means film comedies, also anonymously made, of the *loony* type” (58). ‘Anti-art’ was everywhere and available to everyone.

It was the Modern world of speed, chaos, and mass-production that Dalí lauded in his ‘Poetry of the Mass-Produced Utility’. He heads one of his paragraphs with the declaration, “Antiartistic world of advertisements!” (58), and refers to them as “magnificent invitations to the senses” (58), invoking how their colours and newness draw the eye, producing excitement. He is extolling the sentiments and emotions, the hypnotic power, invoked by Modern objects. He describes “[t]he latest useful tool just invented, with eight fragmentary photographs explaining its mystery; a graded succession of sizes; the play of light on the huge thread of the photographically enlarged tiny screw” (58). With mechanical objects of the Modern world, everything is explained. There is nothing to discover. There is only surface. As such, their effect is instantaneous. The viewer does not need to reflect upon the symbolism of the object or consider possible meanings. The way he lists the objects’ surfaces reflects the bombardment of advertised objects in Modern cities.

Magnificent invitations to the senses and to the voyage of discovery of unknown objects, the gray [sic] rubber of tires, the clear glass of windshields, the soft tones of

enchancing filter-tipped cigarettes the color [sic] of lips... [A]literations of diverse qualities, smooth surfaces, rough surfaces, polished surfaces, speckled surfaces (58).

Simmel (1903) described this bombardment upon the senses, arguing that it resulted in a rational and calculating psychology as a defence mechanism (14-15). Dalí, however, is revelling in the sights of the new city, and he critiques Modern objects upon which “man has intervened artistically” (‘Poetry’, 58). This is a precursor to the comments he makes regarding Literary Realism. In representing objects ‘realistically’, the Literary Realists used various conceits and narrative conventions, which for Dalí was not representing the object ‘as it really is’. What Dalí is ostensibly arguing in his ‘Poetry’, then, is that mass-produced Modern objects by-pass artistic conventions and, to put it awkwardly, are what they are. He asks, “Can one be so blind not to see the spirituality and nobility of the object that is beautiful in itself, by its unique, necessary and harmonious structure, bare of any ornamental artifice?” (59).

Some of Dalí’s other written texts around this time bear a similar tone and content. In ‘Yellow Manifesto’ (1928)<sup>101</sup>, co-produced with Sebastià Gasch and Lluís Montanyà, Dalí declares that “MECHANIZATION has revolutionized the world” (60), and that “THERE ARE automobile and aeronautics trade shows[;]... THERE IS the naked performer under electric lights in the music-hall” (61). The emphasis on Modern objects in both of these texts highlights the experience of how ‘new’ everything seemed in the Modern world. The objects listed in ‘Poetry’ are all brand new, just manufactured, and they are juxtaposed against objects that are “pure macabre leftovers from ages that were almost always absurd and uncomfortable, sought amidst the anti-hygienic and necrological refuse of antiquarians” (57). This expresses the Modern sentiment that

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<sup>101</sup> All capitalizations in this text are Dalí’s.



Modernity is a rupture from the past, but rather than experiencing it negatively, Dalí is embracing it. He is reacting against Realist aesthetics by lauding the object ‘as it is’, in effect advocating a stronger form of realism, free of any artifice.

Along with the influence of Futurism and the *Ultraistes*, there is also here a re-emergence of thinking found in Dada. Whilst Dalí did not engage directly with the Dada Movement, Gibson (1997) has noted that whilst Dalí was studying at the *Residencia de Estudiantes* in 1922-1923 there were “Dada-type games” with which he involved himself (103). Dalí was thus aware of Dada thinking. There are parallels between Dalí’s ‘Poetry’ and what Nicholls (2009) refers to as Dada’s ‘depthlessness’. Nicholls argues that Dada’s ‘depthlessness’ relates to a rejection of “the narrative logic of authority”, and in place of this “the discontinuous forms of popular culture” were embraced” (258). Dada ‘texts’ often lacked direction, continuity, and causality, all staples of narrative convention. They also overtly rejected texts which wield symbolism and theory (258; 262). They were, in other words, what they were. Much like for Dalí, mass-produced Modern objects were what they were. Tristan Tzara, in his ‘Dada Manifesto 1918’, states that “I am against systems, the most acceptable system is on principle to have none” (39), and in his *In-between - Painting (as we approach the point de tangence)* (1919) he lauds Picasso as “[h]e didn’t philosophise” (54). For Tzara, artistic creation was wholly subjective. There was no objectively good nor objectively bad art: “Views of painting are relative and personal” (54), and in a statement which can refer to writers, painters, and critics, he claimed that “after all everyone dances to his own personal boomboom, and... the writer is entitled to his boomboom” (‘Dada Manifesto 1918’, 39). This is how the anti-artistic was constituted for Dada. It rejected the idea that art must symbolise something else, that it must theorise something, and that there was good

and bad art. It rejected an elitest hierarchy. In place of a text teeming with “hidden presences” and motivations, Dada created texts, stage productions, and objects where there were no hidden depths (Nicholls, 258).

This ‘depthlessness’ is what Dalí is referring to when he extols the “Antiartistic world of advertisements!” (‘Poetry’, 58). There is no symbolic depth, no hidden motivations; the object just *is*. Dalí is lauding the ‘depthlessness’ of these objects as a way of rejecting notions of what art is and what form it takes. Does this mean, however, that his version of anti-art was at this time a wholesale rejection of art? Or was he rejecting a certain notion of art so it could be replaced with something new? Returning to the Dada variety of anti-art will help us to understand Dalí’s version. Nicholls writes that the group had a characteristically contradictory approach to ‘art’, that “Dada rejects not art *per se* but art which supplies an egotistical bourgeois culture with its halo of metaphysical, quasi-religious meanings” (250). He adds that its contradictory approach was “not one from which Dada necessarily suffered” (250). Whilst I do not disagree that Dada was contradictory, by suggesting that Dada did not ‘necessarily suffer’ from it Nicholls tones down the radical approach which Dada took to art and the group’s ultimate inability to maintain it. The ‘Twenty-Three Manifestos of the Dada Movement’ (1920) is the text which emphasises this the most. On the one hand, the Dadaists rejected everything which made art art, and steadfastly defined as ‘not art’ the creative projects in which they engaged. This would leave them with projects which could not be defined as ‘art’, and as they were defined in contradiction to ‘art’, they were by definition negative. They were aware of this, and to a certain extent embraced it. In the introductory statement of the text, it is stated anonymously, after a list of things they want to see abolished (“No more painters, no more writers, no more musicians”, etc.),

“no more anything, no more anything, nothing, *nothing, nothing, nothing*” (181, text’s emphasis). This defines their works as ‘nothing’. Only the ‘negative’ underpins them. They are not expressions of something, rather an expression of negation. On the other hand, however, this is then followed by, “We hope something new will come from this, being exactly what we no longer want” (181). This vacillation between embracing negation and yet wanting a positive presence suffuses the ‘Twenty Three Manifestos’. André Breton returns more than once to the origins of the word Dada (186; 192); Louis Aragon writes of how spending time with his Dada friends is a waste of time and makes him “abominably sad” (195); and Picabia makes the equivocal statement that “We don’t believe in *God* any more than we do in *Art*... *Art* is, and can only ever be, the expression of our contemporary life” (188, his emphasis), the italics suggesting that he is rejecting certain notions of ‘art’ and ‘God’, but then redefining that of ‘art’. Dada wants negation and vacillation, solidity and definition. Whilst as a conscious aim in the early years of Dada this contradiction seemed almost joyful and suffused with ‘black humour’, in ‘Twenty Three Manifestos’ in 1920, this seems more like a descent into hell.

Dada’s move from *controlled* disarray and negation to disillusion helps us to understand the anti-art in Dalí’s ‘Poetry’, which is of a much more joyful nature. It has much in common with Picabia’s aforementioned suggestion of a re-definition of ‘art’, *but* is much more purposeful and is underpinned by theory regarding how artists ‘view’ the world. In other words, it has been influenced by a more positive Surrealist approach to art, an approach which chronologically intervenes between Dada and Dalí. This intermingling of both Dada and Surrealist influences can be seen in the opening sentence of ‘Poetry’ where Dalí states that, “knowing how to look is a wholly new

system of spiritual surveying” (57). He is redefining what it means to ‘look’ in art, rather than just rejecting a conventional standard, whilst at the same time using a notion of the spiritual which can be seen in the early years of Dada. As noted by Nicholls, Hugo Ball, the originator of Dada’s ‘Cabaret Voltaire’ in 1916, saw experiments with language as “a means of achieving spiritual regeneration through art” (249).

In the notion of anti-art within ‘Poetry’, then, we see a Dada influence (‘depthlessness’, direct and angry language, a focus on the anti-artistic and the anti-poetic, and emphasis upon contemporary mass-produced objects) intermingled with a more Surrealist inflected turn towards redefinition and theory. Indeed, I would suggest that one of the primary ways of reading ‘Poetry’ is as a theoretical piece. It is important to clarify here that Dalí is weaving a theoretical piece around objects which he sees themselves as anti-theoretical. Thus, I am not arguing that Dalí sees, in ‘Poetry’, a theory underpinning mass-produced Modern objects *themselves*, rather he is creating a theory *about* them. Dada, on the other hand, often claimed to eschew theory in both senses: theory underpinning a text, and about that text, in favour of a more all-encompassing negation. Dalí’s approach to mass-produced Modern objects and their surfaces in ‘Poetry’ forms part of a much larger theory regarding the ‘objective’, as I will go on in this section to discuss further.

Rothman (2007) has argued that Dalí’s treatment of surface appearance is contrary to the main motivator of Modernist endeavour, i.e. ‘authenticity’, getting *under* the surface of things<sup>102</sup>. For Rothman, the Modern experience was one of fear of being deceived

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<sup>102</sup> Rothman’s argument that a plurality of modernisms developed in relation to “a hegemonic mainstream of modernist production that no historical revision can decenter without... fundamentally misrepresenting

(492-493). Modernist artists were “hostile to superficial appearances”, looking instead to represent the reality of something, rather than its appearance (492). For Rothman, mass-produced objects were based solely on surface appearance, as that was where their commercial value lay in a Capitalist society (493). Modernists thus tried to maintain the division between art and the everyday by positioning the former as looking to represent the truth beneath the surface, and the everyday object as focusing on a ‘false’ surface appearance (493). As, for Rothman, Dalí focused on the surface and the ‘superficial’, he should be viewed as contrary to the Modernist aesthetic which sought depth (494). Rothman (2012) goes on to argue that a focus on surface rather than depth can be discerned throughout Dalí’s pre-war *oeuvre*. He claims that for Dalí “the world of mere appearance was indeed the one that mattered” (121), a position that is counter-intuitive in the extreme.

Rothman overstates his case by claiming that Dalí was in fact primarily interested in surface appearance through his career pre-war. The emphasis on the surface of Modern objects in ‘Poetry’, for instance, is anything but advocacy of ‘mere appearance’ and the ‘superficial’. ‘Poetry’ was written at the time in which he was interested in accessing ‘objective’ reality<sup>103</sup>, an interest which Finkelstein (1998) also identifies as being present in other works of 1927-1928 (40-41), and should be seen as part of his theoretical thinking on this. What was so fascinating about Modern mass-produced objects was that their ‘objective’ truth could be discerned just by looking at them. There were no conceits, and no intervening aesthetic conventions that distance the viewer/holder from the object. Thus, the surfaces of Modern objects were not superficial; they told you everything you needed to know. ‘Poetry’ can be seen as a

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the events as they occurred” is based on “the visual arts”, which he then applies to “literary modernisms” (489).

<sup>103</sup> For more on Dalí’s interest in ‘objective’ reality see chapter 1.

precursor to Dalí's extended critique of Literary Realism in his 'Documentary – Paris – 1929' where he argued that that genre's version of realism consists of narrative conventions which do not access the 'objective' truth. Thus, the focus on surface in 'Poetry' should not be seen in terms of the surface/depth dichotomy which Rothman places at the heart of Modernism's distinction between the everyday and art. Rather, it should be seen as part of the Modernist impulses to break away from the past and find more 'real' ways of representing reality. In 'Poetry', Modern objects are pure expressions/extensions of the Modern world.

Regarding the tendency of Modernist writers and artists to concern themselves with finding new language and visuals in response to Modernity, Bradbury and McFarlane (1976) have argued that "[t]he search for a style and a typology becomes a self-conscious element in the Modernist's literary production; he is perpetually engaged in a profound and ceaseless journey through the means and integrity of art" (29). Dalí throws himself into this endeavour wholeheartedly with 'Poetry', stating in the opening line that "We have said elsewhere: knowing how to look is a wholly new system of spiritual surveying" (57). Dalí's search for a style is an endeavour that does not start here in 'Poetry', however. As King (2010) has shown, Dalí used a mixture of "neoclassicism and analytical cubism" in a 1926 exhibition, and in the catalogue to that and a 1925 exhibition there were quotations from Ingres, the nineteenth-century neoclassical painter (17). In the same year as 'Poetry' and 'Yellow Manifesto', Dalí published 'The New Limits of Painting' (1928), a text originally published in three instalments (Finkelstein, 1998, 73-74) and bearing a considerably different tone to those two texts. In attempting to explain the difference between these texts, Finkelstein suggests that we should read the works between 1927 and early 1929 "in view of Dalí's

desire to entrench his position as a critic and theoretician on the forefront of the avant-garde movement in Barcelona, as well as in terms of his own experimentation as an artist” (71). Given Finkelstein’s repetitive insistence that Dalí’s sincerity should be questioned on the grounds that he did things purely to be part of a Movement or group or to obtain popularity, it is difficult to read his former point without the subtext that we should question whether Dalí meant his assertions in those texts. Whilst I agree that Dalí’s works in the 1920s can be seen as exercises in experimentation, whether or not he was sincere in his assertions here is actually irrelevant to my argument. The point is that Dalí’s experimentations with different styles and fusing different periods in the 1920s were Modernist in that they actively sought a new style in which Modernity could be expressed. Furthermore, he engaged with the experience of Modernity as rupture, and questioned the boundaries between art and the external world.

### **Paranoia-Criticism, the ‘Gratuitous Point’, and ‘the New’**

Dalí’s interest in the potential of ‘the new’ continues in the introductions of his Paranoiac-Criticism in ‘L’Ane pourri’ (1930) and ‘the gratuitous point’ in ‘La Chèvre sanitaire’ (1930). These texts continue Dalí’s interrogation of what it means to ‘see’. Underpinning this interrogation is a characteristically Modernist critique of Positivist and materialist views of reality.

One of the purposes of ‘L’Ane pourri’ is to explore the nature of “the new images of Surrealism” (19), the newness of which he emphasises multiple times in the final section of the piece. These new images have an aesthetic, psychological, and political

purpose, although the latter in this text seems tacked on at the end<sup>104</sup>: “The ideal images of Surrealism at the service of the imminent crisis of consciousness, at the service of the Revolution” (20). On the aesthetic and psychological import of ‘the new images’, Dalí writes of how their creation will not only challenge the “pigs of contemporary aesthetics, defenders of the execrable ‘Modern art’” (19), but also potentially result in “the ruin of reality, to the profit of all which, through the infamous and abominable ideas of all kinds, aesthetics, humanitarian, philosophical, etc., will bring us back to the clear sources of masturbation, exhibitionism, crime, [and] love” (20). It is worth discussing here what Dalí means by ‘Modern art’ as it is one of the reasons why he is considered anti-Modernist. As Rothman (2012) argues, Dalí’s style and technique have often been overlooked in favour of the content of his works (6-8). Given that definitions of Modernist art have often focused on style, technique, form, and medium over content and psychology, it is no wonder that Dalí has been consistently viewed as anti-Modernist whilst Surrealism has generally been seen as Modernist<sup>105</sup>. A broader definition of Modernism, as outlined at the beginning of this chapter, helps us to identify the ways in which Dalí *was* Modernist, and, as such, this runs counter to how Dalí was defining his own artistic output in relation to Modernity at this point. He sees his work as an expression of Modernity<sup>106</sup> but not as Modern art.

‘L’Ane pourri’ introduces Dalí’s notion of Paranoiac-Criticism. Whilst in this text he does not actually outline a method through which one reaches a ‘Paranoiac state’, Dalí defines such a state as necessary in order to create ‘the new images’. Paranoia, for Dalí,

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<sup>104</sup> Finkelstein (1998) claimed that Dalí’s political statements were in general aimed at gaining favour with the Surrealist Movement (147). Greeley (2006), on the other hand, has argued that Paranoiac-Criticism had political implications (82).

<sup>105</sup> See Rothman (2007; 2012), Lubar (1999), and Finkelstein (1998) for claims that Dalí was anti-Modernist and critiqued Modernist art. In his *Collected Works* (1998), Finkelstein claims that Dalí’s writings were “a critique of modernist aesthetic consciousness” (1). See Nicholls (2009) for a positioning of Surrealism within a plurality of Modernisms.

<sup>106</sup> As we will see later in this chapter, this stance changes as he ‘becomes Classic’.



is a mechanism through which we “systematize confusion”, the overarching aim of which is to disrupt ‘reality’ and bring about its downfall (11). The ‘reality’ referred to here is conscious reality, the Symbolic world, and by ‘systematize confusion’, Dalí aims to “create a new order or system from elements taken in the external world which otherwise would be unrelated to one another” (Finkelstein, 1975, 60).

The ‘new images’ Dalí writes of in ‘L’Ane pourri’ are multiple images: when an identifiable aspect of an image morphs into something else without it ceasing to be that original aspect. Examples of Dalí’s multiple images are *Apparition of Face and Fruit Dish on a Beach* (1938), and *Slave Market with the Disappearing Bust of Voltaire* (1940). In the former, a face dissolves into a seated figure on a beach, an overturned pot, a figure in repose, and the titular fruit dish, whilst an elderly-looking dog appears and disappears in the background. In the latter painting, the face of Voltaire comes in and out of focus within a gathering of figures. Dalí argues that multiple images can produce a “mental crisis” (15) because you are witnessing the intersection of desire and reality. He challenges materialist metaphysics here, “submit[ting] to [them] the still more complex problem of understanding which of these images has the highest possibility of existence, if one admits the intervention of desire” (16). By not distinguishing between the creator of the image or the viewer, and not indicating whose desire is intersecting with the picture, Dalí emphasises the confusion such a picture is supposed to inspire. And this is especially the case when applied to the world around us. We may look at an object which becomes multiple through the intersection of our desire. By pointing the multiple aspects of the object out to other people, they are witnessing the intersection of *our* desire and reality (16).

Central to an understanding of Paranoia in both ‘L’Ane pourri’ and ‘La Chèvre sanitaire’ is the ‘simulacra’. Dalí does not use ‘simulacra’ here in the same way as in his defence of *Lugubrious Game* (1929) against Breton. In chapter 1 I noted that Breton had disliked the representation of excrement in the painting. Dalí had responded that the excrement was a ‘simulacra’, and “[n]o further questions were asked. But had I been pressed I should certainly have had to answer that it was the simulacrum of the excrement itself” (*Secret Life*, 219, footnote 1). I proposed two interpretations of what Dalí meant by this, that Dalí was pointing to the notion that the world of the painting does not function under the same conceptions as does the external world, so the representation of excrement in the painting should not be read in the same way as excrement in the external world, or that he could just be making the simpler suggestion that the excrement looks real but is in fact just a representation. Neither of these interpretations seem to match the way ‘simulacra’ is used in ‘L’Ane pourri’ and ‘La Chèvre sanitaire’. Conceptual shifts are not unusual in Dalí’s *oeuvre*. Indeed, Finkelstein (1975; 1996) has charted the way in which Paranoiac-Criticism itself changed through the 1930s. Dalí had a tendency to alter his views on things and then claim that he had thought that way all along. This is particularly common in his late 20s written works as, as noted above, the 20s was very much a time of artistic experimentation for Dalí. It can also be seen, however, to a great extent in the late 30s and in his *Secret Life* (1942) and *Diary of a Genius* (1964). This is, in itself, a characteristically Modernist thing to do. Levenson (1986) has noted the polemical nature of Modernism; how Modernist writers would make divergent claims over the years, never admitting that they had changed their mind, and giving the impression each time that it was their last word on the matter (viii-ix). In a similar fashion in ‘L’Ane pourri’, Dalí expounds upon the importance of the ‘simulacra’ without explaining how it differs from his previous understanding of the term, or indeed how it differs from

standard definitions. The standard understanding of ‘simulacra’ is of an image which offers the likeness of something, but is essentially a copy, not the real thing (See OED entry for ‘simulacrum’). This is very much akin to my second interpretation of Dalí’s response to Breton regarding *Lugubrious Game*. In ‘L’Ane pourri’, however, Dalí defined ‘simulacra’ as the image produced by the paranoiac mechanism<sup>107</sup>.

Dalí states that, “It is by their lack of congruity with reality, and for what may be seen as gratuitous in their existence, that the simulacra so easily assume the form of reality while the latter, in its turn, may adapt itself to the violence of the simulacra” (225)<sup>108</sup>. By ‘lack of congruity’, Dalí means the way in which there is no connection in ‘reality’ between the images which constitute the multiple figuration of the multiple image. For example, I may look at a rock which exists in external reality. The rock then takes on the appearance, without it changing in any physical way, of an elephant. This double-image is the simulacra in which there is a vacillation between the rock and elephant: Reality has ‘adapted to the violence of the simulacra’, and the simulacra has ‘assumed the form of reality’. There is no connection between the rock and the elephant. Thus, much like in the Surrealist appropriation of Lautréamont’s *tableau* of “a chance meeting between a sewing machine and an umbrella on a dissecting table” (Kindle edition, np, Chant 6), the rock and the elephant are incongruous. The only connection between them is through our desire. There is no connection in external reality.

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<sup>107</sup> Similarly, Greeley (2006) sees the ‘simulacra’ as “paranoia-induced” (61).

<sup>108</sup> This is Finkelstein’s (1998) translation. The title of ‘La chèvre sanitaire’ in English is ‘The Sanitary Goat’.

‘La Chèvre sanitaire’ also explores the nature of the ‘simulacra’. Reiterating what he outlined in ‘L’Ane pourri’ regarding how we interpret ‘reality’ and the concomitant confusion, Dalí writes that:

it is equally valid, from the point of view of the faculty of understanding, to adopt as criterion the psychological sensory reactions (whose reality becomes suspect – so much so that we discern in them, once again, the clever language of the simulacra), or take for criterion any other thing, that is to say, another kind of evidence of a more independent nature; a gratuitous evidence, for example, one that is alien to us – and thus so much more formidable – and, as a result (if this is in fact what I wish to say), more subjective (228)<sup>109</sup>.

Reality as given to us via ‘sensory reactions’ is ‘suspect’. It morphs into ‘simulacra’ produced by Paranoia. We need to accept Paranoia as a means of understanding reality. This means of understanding reality is of ‘a more independent nature’ because the images produced within the simulacra are not connected to one another; and it seems ‘alien to us’ because we are not used to accepting it as a means of viewing the world. Dalí elaborates more upon this through his exploration of the ‘gratuitous point’, and he uses the example of a piano player:

This gratuitous point (which could provoke at least as much disorder as any other that would crop up in geometry or in the firmament), ... would be strictly concrete and significant to the extent that it might take shape in the gesture, generally taken to be erratic, of a person who, without knowing how to play the piano, imitates (perfectly) on a marble table the confident fingering of a true pianist, convinced of the absolute similarity of his imitation. I have said that this geometric point would be... something strictly concrete, and I am going to finish proving this by adding that this point, in the case under consideration, would materialize precisely at the moment when the fake

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<sup>109</sup> Finkelstein’s (1998) translation.

pianist would lose for a moment his absolute faith in his imitation, but would continue with it nonetheless with no less enthusiasm (229)<sup>110</sup>.

In breaking this down we see that someone is pretending to play the piano. She thinks she is imitating the gestures ‘perfectly’, although an outside observer sees the gestures as ‘erratic’. In a sudden moment, ‘the fake pianist’ loses faith in her movements. This only happens for a moment, and then she continues the movements ‘with no less enthusiasm’. The ‘fake pianist’s’ gestures and belief that she is playing perfectly are formed through Paranoia: desire intersecting with external reality. For her, reality has morphed via a simulacra, a ‘paranoiac image’. For a split second, at the ‘gratuitous point’, the paranoiac vision and external reality in which her movements are ‘generally taken to be erratic’, separate, and she thus loses faith in the reality of what she is doing. But after this moment, she continues, suggesting that the two have re-converged. This emphasises the ‘confusion’ regarding the nature of reality which Paranoia produces. In ‘L’Ane pourri’, in a very confused manner, Dalí claims that “the gratuitous” can be seen in the comparison of two things which have no connection. And he links this to the aforementioned “lack of congruity” between the simulacra and “reality” (225). In ‘La Chèvre sanitaire’, the ‘gratuitous point’ is when the ‘fake pianist’ realises the ‘lack of congruity’. And Dalí calls this ‘gratuitous point’ “*The Sanitary Goat*” (229). The name ironically illustrates what he has been theorising regarding ‘the gratuitous’, as he claims that “I have not found any conscious or unconscious relationship between this name and that which it serves to designate” (229). In other words, he claims there to be a ‘lack of congruity’ between the name and the theory.

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<sup>110</sup> Finkelstein’s (1998) translation.

My understanding of the ‘gratuitous point’ diverges from Rothman’s (2012). Rothman focuses on the ideas of copying and fakery, and claims that the ‘gratuitous point’ is the moment when “representations... detach... themselves from the world of reality to which they had once been connected (at least thought themselves connected)” (135), i.e. it is the moment we realise that a representation is separate from the Symbolic world (135). He uses two of Dalí’s photo-realistic paintings to illustrate his point. He claims that the ‘gratuitous point’ is when you realise that the paintings are not photographs but you continue taking pleasure in them: “This is the moment in which the pianist feels the pleasure of the *phantasma*” (136, his emphasis). However, I argue that the pianist does not perceive her actions as fake after the ‘gratuitous point’. As Dalí notes at the start of ‘La Chèvre sanitaire’, “it is equally valid, from the point of view of the faculty of understanding, to adopt as criterion the psychological sensory reactions... [and] a gratuitous evidence” (228)<sup>111</sup>. The simulacra is a ‘gratuitous evidence’ and is not considered fake but rather an equally valid way of viewing the world. The simulacra is not ‘unreal’, but an expansion of ‘reality’. Rothman claims that according to the example of the pianist, “Dalí’s paintings... are not to be understood as faithful representations of a dream world or an unconscious fantasy. In fact, they are to be understood as altogether false representations, that is, as *phantasma*, or ‘bad copies.’” (135-136). Given, however, that Paranoia is the intersection of desire and reality, simulacra would arguably be a more authentic expression of ‘reality’.

Rothman claimed that the ‘gratuitous point’ was an example of Dalí acting contrary to “the modernist imperative to unveil the true world beyond the superficial particularities of appearance” (134). My reading, however, sees it as in keeping with Modernist aesthetics. Paranoiac-Criticism was intended to create “the new images of Surrealism”

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<sup>111</sup> Finkelstein’s (1998) translation.

(‘L’Ane pourri’, 19). As Greeley (2006) notes, these images were “formulated in response to contemporary society” (61). Thus, the ‘new images’ were produced via an intersection of desire and the Modern world, and as such, any art or visions produced through this means were an engagement with Modernity. Furthermore, Dalí’s Paranoiac-Criticism critiques materialist and Positivist assumptions about how we engage with reality, and it embraces confusion. Indeed, the confusing nature of ‘L’Ane pourri’ and ‘La Chèvre sanitaire’ is not just a by-product of a complicated theory. Dalí actively goes out of his way to make understanding ‘simulacra’ and the ‘gratuitous point’ more difficult (‘La Chèvre sanitaire’, 29; 32). And at times one wonders if he himself knows what he means: “if that is indeed what I mean” (29). That he is clearly having fun – “It is easy, much too easy to enjoy oneself” (32) – suggests that he embraced the fact that the Modern world and how we understand it, engage with it, and intersect with it was perceived as confusing and difficult. Both Rothman (2012) and Finkelstein (1975) have noted how confusing ‘La Chèvre sanitaire’ is, but neither have suggested that its purposeful confusion can be seen as Modernist and reflective of how complicated the Modern world was perceived as being.

### **Dalí’s ‘Classicism’**

The second half of this chapter looks at the way in which Dalí’s ‘Classicism’ can be situated within Modernist aesthetics. First I will discuss the nature of Dalí’s ‘Classicism’ and what he meant when he declared that he had ‘become classic’, and then I will explore the ways in which his ‘Classicism’ can be considered Modernist.

Through the 1930s, Dalí had been exploring the themes he went on to call ‘Classic’, but it was not until 1941 that he actually used the term and insisted that his works be analysed according to those themes<sup>112</sup>. As King (2010) has noted, what exactly Dalí meant by ‘classic’ is difficult to define (16), but I argue that it is a mixture of aesthetic theory and political ideology as borne out by his 1941 pronouncement:

during these chaotic times of confusion, of rout and of growing demoralization, when the warmed over vermicelli of romanticism serves as daily food for the sordid dreams of all the gutter rats of art and literature, Dalí himself, I repeat, finds the unique attitude towards his destiny: TO BECOME CLASSIC! (337, ‘The Last Scandal of Salvador Dalí’, his capitalisation).<sup>113</sup>

In other words, Dalí positions ‘becoming classic’ as a *response* to the ‘confusion’ and ‘demoralization’ of the political climate and as a response to what he sees as ‘romanticism’ in art and literature. He sees “history” as having “squeezed out from the bottom of its entrails a bloody torrent of mechanical catastrophes” and in response to this he is going to “isolate himself” (337) from ‘history’ through a return to “FORM, FORM, FORM” (338). He thus appears to align ‘Classicism’ with ahistoricism and apoliticism, and with responding to the political climate by stepping away from it into aesthetics. We can also see that he is distancing himself from the pro-mechanisation claims he made in ‘Poetry of the Mass-Produced Utility’ (1928) and ‘Yellow Manifesto’ (1928).

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<sup>112</sup> There have been many attempts to nail down exactly when Dalí ‘became Classic’. Pine (2010) claims that the specific date was 1939 (98), and even though King (2010) discusses how Dalí experimented with past styles as early as the 1920s (17-18), the two important years for him are 1938 when Dalí met Freud and 1941 when he made his declaration that he had ‘become Classic’ (18-20). Watthee-Delmotte (2003) sees the triggering event for Dalí’s emphasis on synthesis and order as the beginning of the Spanish Civil War (347). Dalí himself places it in the late 30s when he emerged ‘Classic’ from a metaphorical cocoon (SL, 349-350).

<sup>113</sup> Much like with the preface to *Hidden Faces*, Dalí is telling the audience how his paintings in the exhibition to which ‘The Last Scandal of Salvador Dalí’ is an introduction should be ‘read’.



Dalí goes on to elaborate more upon what his ‘Classic’ aesthetic consists of. It is not a complete departure from his works carried out before and during his time as a member of the Surrealist Movement. He states that he is “capable of continuing the best of the irrational merely by becoming classic and pursuing that research in *Divina Proportione* interrupted since the Renaissance” (338)<sup>114</sup>. Dalí’s ‘new’ aesthetic then is positioned as a combination of Surrealist and what he calls ‘classic’ concerns. What has the Renaissance been interrupted by, however? It seems clear here that Dalí is referring to Romanticism. There are two reasons for this interpretation: firstly, Dalí references romanticism in ‘Last Scandal’ as nourishment for the ‘gutter rats of art and literature’, in response to which he is ‘becoming Classic’; secondly, during the first half of the twentieth century there was the ‘Classicism’ vs ‘Romanticism’ debate, something which Dalí here appears to be keying into. It was a debate that T.E. Hulme discusses in his ‘Romanticism and Classicism’ (1911). Hulme places Romanticism and what he refers to as ‘the Classic’ in opposition (116-117). He claims that the Romantic is coming to an end, that all aesthetics must come to an end when they have run out of steam, when their adherents have run out of new things to create (121-122). He foresees that there will be a return to Classicism (125), an aesthetic within which Man is aware of his connection to the earth, aware of the limits which bind him (116; 117). Hulme expands Romanticism and Classicism beyond aesthetics and the world of art into the world of politics. He claims that one’s stance regarding Romanticism or Classicism dictates which political stance one holds (115). This is echoed in ‘The Last Scandal of Salvador Dalí’ where Dalí links together the chaotic political climate and ‘romanticism’ in ‘art and literature’. Thus, contrary to Dalí’s intention, his ‘Classic’ aesthetic, as outlined in his first pronouncement, is not apolitical. It is not until his *Secret Life* (1942) a year later, however, that we see greater detail regarding Dalí’s link between ‘Classicism’ and

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<sup>114</sup> Finkelstein (1998) notes that *Divina Proportione* is a reference to “the work of the Renaissance monk Luca Paccioli” who valued “harmony and proportion” (432, n.32).

political ideology, despite the fact that he continues to announce his ahistoricism and apoliticism.

My claim that Dalí's 'Classicism' is not a complete departure from his previous aesthetic and theoretical concerns and that it stemmed from the political climate of the 1930s, as evidenced by 'Last Scandal', runs counter to Finkelstein's (1996) view and in partial agreement with King (2010). Finkelstein sees a change from what he calls an aesthetics of regression in the early 30s to a limbo period in the early 40s in which Dalí "recycled" symbols and images from earlier works without any theoretical underpinning (251). This limbo period was then followed by a turn to 'the Classic'. Finkelstein saw a number of reasons for these changes, and they were aesthetic, biographical, and calculating. Firstly, he claims that Dalí wanted to appeal to "the tastes of his new American collectors" (248); secondly, he claims that Dalí was aware that the aesthetic of regression was no longer working because it was no longer representative of his mental state. Something new was needed, and the limbo period marks uncertainty as to what that 'something new' was going to be (248). For Finkelstein, then, whilst Dalí claims in the early 40s that he has 'become Classic' and that his contemporary and late 30s works should be considered as such, those works should be classified as part of a limbo period. They do not adhere to a 'Classical' aesthetic<sup>115</sup>.

King (2010) offers a different stance regarding the motivation behind Dalí's move to 'Classicism'. He claims that Dalí's declaration that he had 'become Classic' in 1941

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<sup>115</sup> Finkelstein is not the only person to question whether Dalí's painted works of the early 40s actually exhibit a 'Classical' aesthetic. McBride (1941), referring to an exhibition of paintings specifically advertised and marketed by Dalí as 'Classical', stated that "Salvador Dalí has gone Classical. Did you know that? So he says. But you'd never notice it. As far as you and I are concerned it's the same old Salvador" (cited in King, 14).

was motivated by an engagement with Freud's theory of the relationship between art and the subconscious (19-21). He argues that the impetus was Freud's claim that paintings of the Renaissance and pre-Renaissance are more able to exhibit the subconscious than Surrealism because "the classical artist did not have his or her subconscious drives in mind while executing the work" (19). Thus, Dalí's 'classical' works are a *progression* from his earlier works rather than something entirely different. He has not abandoned the subconscious (21), as Finkelstein claims he has done. He has just found a new means of exploring it. The use of double-images and the repetition of symbols from the early 30s, or from what Finkelstein refers to as the regressive aesthetic, would not be "recycling" but rather a continuation of the exploration of the subconscious.

I take a different approach from both Finkelstein and King. Unlike Finkelstein who sees Dalí's 'Classicism' as motivated by aesthetic and biographical reasons, and unlike King who sees Freud's theories on art and the subconscious as the ultimate triggering factors (although I do agree that Dalí's 'Classicism' is not a complete departure from his earlier concerns with the subconscious), I see Dalí's 'Classicism' as motivated by the cultural and political *milieu* of the 1930s. I also question Finkelstein's claim that Dalí's re-use in the late 30s, early 40s, of previous symbols associated with regression had no theoretical underpinning (1996, 251). I argue that the repetition of these symbols can be seen as indicative of a world in which for Dalí order is sought but fragmentation is maintained, and thus is not reflective of a limbo period in which he had no theoretical underpinning. The theoretical underpinning is a critique of the fragmentation and disorder which Dalí sees as integral parts of the 1930s.

In his *Secret Life*, Dalí expands upon the cultural and political landscape of the 1930s and how it relates to ‘the Classic’. Dalí claims that the 1930s was a period of uncertainty characterised by an “anarchy of ‘isms’” (*SL*, 351); an excess of political and artistic Movements resulting in “lack of form, lack of synthesis, lack of cosmogony” and lack of unity (351). By listing political and artistic Movements side-by-side in his list of ‘isms’ (351, footnote 1), he perceives art and politics as having an equal impact on the 1930s *milieu*. He continues that faith had been replaced by materialism<sup>116</sup> and this combined with such ‘anarchy’ had led to the Spanish Civil War and WW2: “The responsibility for the war which was to break out would lie solely on the ideological poverty, the spiritual famine of this Post-War [WW1] period, which had mortgaged all its hope on bankrupt materialistic and mechanical speculations” (*SL*, 352). Dalí uses the form of a parable, set in 1936, to deliver his views on how the “anarchy of ‘isms’” will lead to war and in particular has led to fascism. In this parable a number of workmen, who are taking a break from building another level to Dalí’s house, are discussing politics. Each workman has a different political view, and the dialogue of each man is a generalisation of that view. The parable ends with the moral message being given by “[t]he master mason” who delivers ‘wisdom’: ““Do you want me to tell you how all this is going to end? It’s going to end with a military dictatorship that will make all of us shrivel up and won’t allow any of us to breathe”” (355).

And what is Dalí’s solution to the wars and chaos brought about by this ‘anarchy’ and ‘ideological poverty’? A return to ‘the Classic’. He claimed that Modern art focused in on the fragments that Classic works formed into a cohesive whole:

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<sup>116</sup> In this instance, by ‘materialism’ he is referring to the need to acquire wealth, rather than the metaphysical theory.

To be classic meant that there must be so much of ‘everything,’ and of everything so perfectly in place and hierarchically organized, that the infinite parts of the work would be all the less visible. Classicism thus meant integration, synthesis, cosmogony, faith, instead of fragmentation, experimentation, scepticism (354).

Here again we see an echo of Hulme’s conceptualisation of ‘Classicism’, and, in particular, his distinction between the ‘intellect’ and ‘intuition’. Hulme claims that the ‘intellect’ analyses things which are separate from one another and is confused by ‘synthesis’ (139). Art works cannot be comprehended by the ‘intellect’, only the ‘intuition’, because the ‘intuition’ comprehends ‘synthesis’: “A powerfully imaginative mind seizes and combines at the same instant all the important ideas of its poem or picture, and while it works with one of them, it is at the same instant working with and modifying all in their relation to it and never losing sight of their bearings on each other” (139-140). For Hulme, ‘intuition’ and ‘synthesis’ over the ‘intellect’ and separation were integral to Classicism. Notably, Dalí too denigrates the ‘intellect’ and ‘intellectual art’ in favour of synthesis. And, like Hulme, although considerably more bombastically, he draws a connection between ‘the Classic’ and politics:

while my country was interrogating death and destruction, I was interrogating that other sphinx, of the imminent European ‘becoming,’ that of the RENAISSANCE. I knew that after Spain, all Europe would sink into war as a consequence of the communist and fascist revolutions, and from the poverty and collapse of collectivist doctrines would arise a medieval period of reactualization of individual, spiritual and religious values. Of these imminent Middle Ages I wanted to be the first, with a full understanding of the laws of the life and death of aesthetics, to be able to utter the word ‘renaissance.’ (*SL*, 361).

This expresses, in its strongest form, the notion that art and aesthetics can impact upon the world and politics. He envisions that the rules he has ascribed to aesthetics will constitute the form which post-WW2 Europe takes.

Dalí oscillates between vehemently critiquing the notion that revolution should bring about the return of the 'Classic' and seeing the benefits of revolution. In his discussion of the 'Classic' in *Secret Life* he states that "[t]he Spanish Civil War changed none of my ideas. On the contrary it endowed their evolution with a decisive rigor. Horror and aversion for every kind of revolution assumed in me an almost pathological form" (360). However, in discussing the actions of people during the Spanish Civil War who dug up bodies and paraded them around the streets, he cites revolutions as interesting as "they disinter and recover fragments of the tradition that was believed dead because it had been forgotten, and that needed simply the spasm of revolutionary convulsions to make them emerge" (360). Presumably, the return of the 'Classic' would act as a prevention of revolutions in the future, as everything in a Classic whole has its place, including "the sense of death, the sense of the libido materialized in each colored [sic] fragment, the sense of the instantaneity of the moral 'commonplace'" (354). Everything becomes synthesised and ordered.

Another important component of Dalí's 'Classicism' is his notion of 'freedom within limits'. It receives one of its most clear elucidations in his *Secret Life* (1942) where he brings it together with his notion of 'becoming Classic' to create a theory which embraces artistic, literary, metaphysical, and political concerns. Much like Dalí's notions of Paranoiac-Criticism in the 30s (Finkelstein, 1975, 68) and the 'simulacra' in the early 30s, 'freedom within limits' underwent a conceptual shift from the early 30s to

the early 40s. It can be seen, for instance, in the construction of ‘Rêverie’s’ (1931) narrative world, as being intended as primarily an erotic concept. In *Secret Life*, however, it has developed from an emphasis on erotic anticipation to a theory of how to resolve what he saw as the fragmented world in which he was writing his ‘autobiography’. The scope of the theory has expanded considerably, although it maintains an element of the erotic.

Using a culinary metaphor, Dalí ascribes “values of a moral and esthetic order” (*SL*, 9) to food based on its relation to solid and confining spaces. It is through confined growth that things attain their “nutritive delirium” (9). Thus, he will eat lobster and oyster, because their form has been limited to their shell. However, he will not eat spinach because it has not grown within a confined space. For him, it is formless. He declares

We know today that form is always the product of an inquisitorial process of matter – the specific reaction of matter when subjected to the terrible coercion of space choking it on all sides, pressing and squeezing it out, producing the swellings that burst from its life to the exact limits of the rigorous contours of its own originality of reaction. How many times matter endowed with a too-absolute impulse is annihilated; whereas another bit of matter, which tries to do only what it can and is better adapted to the pleasure of molding [sic] itself by contracting in its own way before the tyrannical impact of space, is able to invent its own original form of life (2).

Beauty for Dalí at this point, then, resides in order, cohesion, and form; and ‘the new’ becomes the “originality of reaction” to pressure, as not everything reacts the same way. For Dalí, ‘Classic’ art would be produced through ‘the terrible coercion of space’, which recalls Hulme’s claim that ‘Classicism’ means the artist is aware of the limits and confines which bind him (1911, 116; 117). Romanticism would be the equivalent of the

aforementioned formless spinach. Examples of artists which helped constitute the limits of creation against which Dalí worked are Leonardo da Vinci, which he mentions with a high frequency, and in his ‘Dalí, Dalí!’ (1939) he adds Piero di Cosimo, Arcimboldo, Palladio, the Baroque artist Bracelli, and the Symbolist Böcklin (335-336). King (2010) adds “Diego Velázquez, Johannes Vermeer, and the Pre-Raphaelites to Nicolas Ledoux, Antoni Gaudí, Georges Mathieu, and Antoni Tàpies” (16) to the list of artists which influenced Dalí and were considered influential to his ‘Classicism’.

Dalí’s ‘Classicism’ drew upon the aesthetic past and we can view this past as the pressurising limits squeezing the artist. In the above quotation he speaks of ‘annihilation’ when one creates outside of the confines, implying that anyone who tries to create something entirely new, outside of artistic tradition, is not creating something of “moral and esthetic [sic] value”, but rather creating within an abyss. Their work is unmoored. Looking back upon becoming a student at the Madrid School of Fine Arts in 1922, he criticises his tutors on the grounds that “I was expecting to find limits, rigor[sic], science. I was offered liberty, laziness, approximations!” (SL, 161)<sup>117</sup>. The concepts of ‘limits’, ‘rigor’, and ‘science’ have contents developed over time, creating a tradition within which Dalí wishes to work. He is advocating a canon of art which works with these concepts and this canon would thus exist on a historical continuum. Works of art are thus constantly ‘renewing’ the past. North (2013) highlights a branch of Modernism which saw revolution as “rediscover[y]” (186). For these Modernists, “[t]he purpose of novelty... is not to defeat but to reinstate tradition” (186). Revolution in terms of works ‘renewing’ the past has parallels with T.S. Eliot’s ‘historical sense’,

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<sup>117</sup> This is an example of the reader needing to maintain a healthy scepticism of claims Dalí makes about the past, in this instance two decades in the past. Whether or not he was disgruntled by the teaching at the Madrid School of Fine Arts in 1922, however, the story in *Secret Life* highlights his position in the early 40s, i.e. that art should be created within limits, rules, and with “rigor [sic]” (SL, 161).



and now I will look at these parallels in depth as a means of returning to and exploring further Dalí's relation to Modernist aesthetics.

### **Salvador Dalí and T.S. Eliot**

There was a thread within Modernist aesthetics that looked backwards for style and value. These artists did not look back to the period which directly preceded them, however. As noted above, the experience of Modernity was that there had been a rupture in time; a break with what had come before it (Bradbury and McFarlane, 1976, 20). Some Modernist artists called for a break from even older aesthetics, those of Old Masters, on the grounds that they were "superficial" and 'new' art needed to look beneath the surface (Rothman, 2007, 492), but other Modernists used these past aesthetics to create something new that can still be considered Modernist. T.S. Eliot, for instance, in his Classicist conception of using a tradition out of which the meaning of one's literary works is constructed, used Homer as the originary point at which literary history and tradition began ('Tradition and the Individual Talent', 1920b, 49). There are considerable parallels between Dalí's 'freedom within limits' and Eliot's 'historical sense' and 'mythical method', parallels which have never been discussed, and exploring these not only helps us to situate Dalí within Modernist aesthetic tendencies and concerns, but also helps us to understand more fully the scope of Dalí's intentions with his 'Classicism'. By no means am I suggesting that there is complete agreement between Dalí and Eliot's aesthetics and theories. There are major diversions between the two. Indeed, an important point which needs to be made before I begin my discussion is that Dalí's version of the 'Classic' primarily looked back at what he saw as 'Classical' aesthetics in Renaissance art (although, as already noted, his pool of

influence was much wider than that), whereas Eliot looked back to Classical antiquity. Dalí's 'Classicism' is thus a renewal of a renewal, a renaissance of a renaissance.

In his 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', Eliot claims that when we assess a work, we tend to look for its uniqueness, for what makes it, and its creator, different from other works of art and artists (48). He flips this on its head by claiming that it is in fact the presence of tradition, the influence of previous works, which gives a work of art its meaning and value. This tradition is invoked by the poet's possession of "the historical sense" (49), which is the perception of the past in the present, of how the past has led up to and constituted the present. Providing a dialectical approach of his own, then, Eliot claims that "[t]his historical sense, which is a sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and of the temporal together, is what makes a writer traditional. And it is at the same time what makes a writer more acutely conscious of his place in time, of his own contemporaneity" (37). This creates a dialectic between the past and the present. Applied to literature, it is the notion that the present of literature would not be the present without the past having been the way it was; literary tradition is a unified whole that readjusts itself when something new is created (50). Thus, the past is not disrupted or fragmented, rather it adjusts to encapsulate the new. The new work can thus be read in terms of works which have gone before, and the old works can be read in terms of the new work. There is thus a symbiotic relationship between the past and the present.

Venegas (2006) has claimed that the relationship between the past and the present in Eliot is one way (240; 244), and indeed Eliot's claim in his 'The Perfect Critic' (1920a) that "[t]he end of the enjoyment of poetry is a pure contemplation from which all the

accidents of personal emotion are removed; thus we aim to see the object as it really is” (14-15) does seem to suggest this. Seeing an object ‘as it really is’ suggests that there is a stable meaning which ‘the perfect critic’ can access if he eschews his personal emotion and looks backwards. However, Eliot upsets the notion of a stable meaning to a text by claiming that engaging in reading results in “new impressions modify[ing] the impressions received from the objects already known” (14). So if a critic analysed a text just after it was published and then attempted another analysis forty years later, the latter criticism would be based on a combination of her further reading altering how the critic engages with the work, and also the work’s place in literary tradition would be altered by forty years of literary history. This suggests, then, that *how an object really is* alters. It is not stable. The critic is aiming to identify how the work fits into the structure formed by literary tradition at the particular moment at which they are writing. In a sense, then, the poem is never under the complete control of the poet. As soon as it is written its meaning is dependent upon literary tradition. Eliot elaborates upon this in ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, stating that

[t]he existing order is complete before the new work arrives; for order to persist after the supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered; and so the relations, proportions, values of each work toward the whole are readjusted; and this is conformity between the old and the new (50).

To put it more succinctly, “the past should be altered by the present as much as the present is directed by the past” (50). Eliot is careful to point out that he is not advocating the copying of past works. Rather, he is advocating the inclusion of the poet (as that is the type of creative he focuses upon) within a tradition, rather than a poet merely taking an external position from that tradition and choosing bits and pieces from other works of poetry.

Similarly, from Dalí's perspective, the artist occupies a space within the boundaries of artistic tradition and works within them, pushing against them, but never breaking them. He uses the metaphor of 'inquisitorial pressure'. The artist is squeezed by the pressure of artistic tradition, and out from this pressure, this contraction, is birthed the work of art. Dalí posits 'Modern art' as at odds with this endeavour as he sees it as using fragments of previous artistic works and trying to make a work out of that fragment. He claims that

The analytical and short-sightedness of the Post-War period had in fact specialized in the thousand parts of which all 'classic work' is composed, making of each part analysed an end in itself which was erected as a banner to the exclusion of all the rest, and which was blasted forth like a cannon-shot (*SL*, 353).

However, he goes on to suggest that this tendency in 'Modern art' will one day be absorbed into tradition (353). He elaborates that whilst this fragmentation will one day be formed into a larger unity, the fragmented pieces can never be viewed as a whole work of art in and of themselves. Dalí suggests that this fragmenting tendency is due to the prevalence of war, stating that "[a]fter a long diet of nitro-glycerine, everything that did not explode went unperceived" (353). Eliot also posits the interwar period as one of chaos and disorder, and for him the 'mythical method' was a solution. He suggested, in his 'Ulysses, Order, and Myth' (1923) that it "is simply a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history" (177). The 'mythical method' appears, by this definition, to be that which Eliot outlined in his 'Tradition and the Individual Talent': the expression of a temporal amalgamation of the past and the present, the expression of

the past in the present, the possession of- and wielding of- ‘the historical sense’, in order to create something new.

There is a religious subtext to Eliot’s ‘historical sense’, and not just in the religious language he uses in describing “[t]he progress of an artist [as] a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality” (53). In his ‘Perfect Critic’, in regards to the role of the critic, he claims that “without a labour which is largely a labour of the intelligence, we are unable to attain that stage of vision *amor intellectualis Dei*” (15). He makes a distinction between intelligence and personal emotion, claiming that ‘intelligence’ gives us a way of seeing which is different to that which is guided by emotion. With this way of seeing, the critic sees beneath the surface to the structure of tradition within which the work of art is situated. Using this ‘intelligence’ has a spiritual quality. One casts off the burden of the ‘self’ and looks with the ‘intelligence’, with the eyes of God. As Schloesser (2005) has noted, there were other artists in the Modern period who saw the value of casting off the veil of surface appearance to unveil the ‘tradition’ which lay beneath and then saw this act as “an imitation of divine creation” (142). T.S. Eliot tries to temper the force of his religious rhetoric in his ‘Perfect Critic’ and ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ by claiming near the end of the latter that “[t]his essay proposes to halt at the frontier of metaphysics or mysticism, and confine itself to such practical conclusions as can be applied by the responsible person interested in poetry” (59). This pulling up short is not at all convincing, especially the notion that he is halting before engaging with mystical concerns; he aligns poetic and critical vision with the divine and then states that he has not stepped into the realm of mysticism. Arguably, though, the notion of seeing with divine eyes has an element of

Romanticism to it, which is why he could be avoiding further elaboration, especially as he renounces one of the key elements of Romantic aesthetics: the primacy of the artist.

In 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', Eliot talks about how poetic creation must involve the depersonalisation of the poet, a point at which Eliot and Dalí diverge. He claims that "[t]he progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality" (53). For Eliot the personality of the poet should play no part in the 'artistic process', indeed must not, in order for the poem to have value – meaning does not reside in the poet, but rather in the tradition of which the poem is becoming a part. There appears to be an underlying suggestion of such a thing as artistic purity, then, for Eliot; for "[p]oetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality" (58). With a somewhat melancholic touch, which cannot help but imbue everything he has previously argued with a touch of the personal, Eliot ends the second part of the essay by stating that "of course, only those who have personality and emotions know what it means to want to escape from these things" (58). This statement resonates with the historical and aesthetic context in which it was written, in which the fragility of post-war society was felt, in which everything seemed to be constantly changing; in this context, the need to go beyond personality to a poetic faculty which would create poetry without having touched the impure surface of the external world can be understood. Eliot's cry is one of distress, and can be compared with Breton's distress at a fractured sense of identity at the start of his *Nadja* (1928). Whereas Eliot's response to this distress was to eschew personal identity in art, however, Breton's was to seek it: "Qui suis-je?", he asks at the start of *Nadja*, overtly placing the 'I' of the writer within the

narrative. Both Breton and Eliot ultimately have the same aim, though: to discover unity within chaos.

In contradistinction to Eliot's stance on the poet being depersonalised, Dalí labelled his works as 'Dalís' and 'Dalinian'. In the foreword to his novel, *Hidden Faces* (1944), for instance, he claims that the text is "a strictly Dalinian book" (xiii). One might ask how it is possible to reconcile the absorption of a work of art into a tradition whilst at the same time maintaining that it is an individual work by a particular artist. For Eliot, this is not possible; a work becoming part of tradition requires that the poet is depersonalised.

However, for Dalí the reconciliation occurs in two ways. Firstly, the artist is the particular person who has wielded the pen or brush in conjunction with the 'historical sense' in a particular way. As Dalí notes at the beginning of his *Secret Life*, there is an "originality of reaction" to 'inquisitorial pressure' (2), and thus that 'reaction' can be attributed to the artist in some sense. Secondly, the artist's psyche becomes part of the work of art. In Dalí's works he draws attention to how the symbols present are obsessions in his own psyche. The psyche is an integral part of the work. In both his early and later works of the thirties, then, we can see Dalí's use of Paranoiac-Criticism in conjunction with 'the historical sense': Desire breaks through into artistic and literary tradition and creates a work which is a reworking of past tradition through desire. Desire thus becomes part of artistic and literary tradition because of the symbiotic relationship between the past and the present.

The presence of Dalí within his works can particularly be seen in *Hidden Faces* (1944) in his determination to nail down meaning in his allusions so that the reader understands exactly what he is referring to. The way in which Dalí calls the readers' attention to his

allusions has the same purpose as when he tries to universalise his Paranoiac-Critical visions and interpretations by making them visible to other people ('L'Ane pourri', 16). However, the concretisation of meaning is problematised by his 'mistakes'. For instance, he claims to make an allusion to Stendhal's *La Chartreuse de Parme* (1839). The Comte de Grandsailles calls his governess "the Canoness of Launay" in reminiscence of Stendhal's *The Charterhouse of Parma*" (HF, 54). However, there is no Canoness de Launay in Stendhal's lengthy novel. The Canoness Anne-Propère de Launay, on the other hand, was the mistress and sister-in-law of the Marquis de Sade (2010, Anon.). It might be supposed that as Dalí had a considerable regard for the Marquis de Sade, he got the name wrong. There is a canoness in *La Chartreuse de Parme*, but her name is Canoness Clélia Conti, and she bears no resemblance to Grandsailles' governess who is described as "almost diabolically ugly" (HF, 54). It might be suggested at this point, then, that the intention was to be ironic. Grandsailles calls his governess the Canoness de Launay because she is 'diabolically ugly', but incorrectly uses the name of the mistress of the Marquis de Sade instead.

Another example of a 'mistake' in *Hidden Faces* is a mangled reference to the collapse of the walls of Jericho. Veronica's health is deteriorating due to an all-pervasive uncertainty combined with her continuing obsession with "the man with the hidden face" (215): "[I]t was as though the towers of her soul had suddenly crumbled at the sound of war, just as the walls of Jericho had collapsed at the sound of the trumpet of Maccabee" (215). Here Dalí is conflating Joshua 6: 20-21 with Maccabees 2: 15-16. In the latter the collapse of the walls of Jericho is used as a point of comparison to Judas' assault upon Caspis: "Wherefore Judas with his company, calling upon the great Lord of the world, who without any rams or engines of war did cast down Jericho in the time



of Joshua, gave a fierce assault against the walls” (Maccabees 2: 15). As that states, the collapse of the walls of Jericho are recounted in Joshua, and it is here that a trumpet precedes the fall: “So the people shouted when the priests blew down with the trumpets: and it came to pass... that the wall fell down flat, so that the people went up into the city, every man straight before him, and they took the city” (Joshua 6: 20). And much like Jericho without its walls, Veronica is vulnerable to attack.

It is tempting to compare the route the reader takes in understanding Dalí’s ‘referential’ mistakes to the labyrinths of meaning in Postmodern literature, in particular the one in Danielewski’s *House of Leaves* (2000) where the reader is invited to chase the Minotaur through the maze of footnotes. Whereas in Danielewski’s text it is impossible to find the Minotaur, however, it is possible to find meaning in Dalí’s text after having been sent in various directions. This difference between Dalí’s referential ‘mistakes’ and Danielewski’s labyrinth highlights Dalí’s position as a Modernist. There is always meaning to be found in his ‘mistakes’, an end point where the path to meaning is intended to stop. In the case of Veronica, the reference to Jericho’s walls collapsing signifies that she is vulnerable to attack. Modernist literature, despite its emphasis on rupture, fragmentation, and disruption in meaning and values, tended to suggest that there was a new unified meaning to be found. As noted earlier, Modernists sought “new juxtapositions, new wholes;... an infinity of new relationships” (Bradbury and McFarlane, 49). Postmodern literature, on the other hand, characteristically tended to accept the notion that there was no single unified truth to be found.

To sum up the last two sections, there are considerable parallels between Dalí’s notion of ‘freedom within limits’ and Eliot’s ‘historical sense’ and ‘mythical method’. These

parallels help us to explore the ways in which Dalí's 'Classicism' can be seen as keying into a 'Classicist' tendency in Modernist aesthetics. I have also highlighted similarities between Dalí's approach to the 'Classic' and T.E. Hulme's engagement with the 'Romanticism' vs 'Classicism' debate. The way in which Dalí departs from Eliot can be seen as characterising his Modernist tendencies as well, in that his attempts to pin down meaning in *Hidden Faces* are confused but ultimately have unity and an overarching meaning as their intention. Indeed, one of the key themes in *Hidden Faces* is the creation of order and meaning out of chaos and disorder. To return to the example of Veronica, whilst in New York she enters a state of limbo: "A year thus flowed by, and Veronica's mental state gradually became stabilized, sinking into a misty confusion of her memory and her imagination" (215). For Veronica, the relationship between the past and the present has become confused; uncertainty has besieged her, 'the walls of her soul collapsing' (215) have been given biblical significance, and she enters a state where reality is questionable. By the end of the novel, however, the past and the present have become entwined in to a new order which is intended to stabilize not only Veronica but also Europe. This, along with its implications regarding fascist ideology, is discussed further in the next two chapters.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter argues that Dalí should be considered a Modernist, and that from the late 1920s to 1945 Dalí occupies various aesthetic positions *within* Modernism. In the late 1920s he embraced the rupture integral to Modernity and emphasised the 'new'. He took part in the Modernist desire to find a new way of expressing what was perceived as a new 'reality'. In the early 30s he continued the Modernist critique of Positivist and materialist metaphysics by claiming that desire intersected with external reality creating

‘simulacra’. This is in keeping with what Micale (2004a) refers to as psychological Modernism, the interest within Modernism in unconscious mental states (15). Whereas some scholars have not included this aspect of Modernist interest in their definitions of Modernism<sup>118</sup>, and use this as a reason for precluding Dalí from being a Modernist<sup>119</sup>, I have used a broad definition of Modernisms which includes psychological Modernism. In the late 30s onwards Dalí keyed into a ‘Classicist’ thread of Modernism which looked backwards for style and value. This is not to say that Dalí was no longer interested in the ‘now’. I have argued that Dalí saw that it was possible to create something ‘new’ from the ‘inquisitorial pressure’ of tradition, as the pressure produces an “originality of reaction” and the work has “its own original form of life” (*SL*, 2). I have also claimed that his ‘Classicism’ was a response to the political climate of the 1930s. Much like Eliot saw his ‘mythical method’ as a way to organise the chaos and disorder of Modernity, Dalí saw the concepts of order and synthesis as central to a reorganization of reality into a unified whole; the past was being brought to bear on the present.

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<sup>118</sup> Micale (2004a) has noted that “[a]s Husserl, Moore, and Frege saw it, a psychological perspective was inimical to the essence of Modernist aesthetic culture with its characteristic belief in the autonomy of art” (16); and he further states that “[w]riters as diverse as Kafka, T.S. Eliot, and Marcel Duchamp included a repudiation of the emergent mental sciences in their aesthetic worldviews” (16).

<sup>119</sup> Rothman (2007; 2012), Lubar (1999), and Finkelstein (1998) all do this.

## **Chapter 5: The Rise and Fall of the ‘Great’ Narcissists**

This chapter focuses upon Dalí’s exploration of the figure of the narcissist in his ‘*Metamorphose de Narcisse*’ (1937) and *Hidden Faces* (1944). Underpinning Dalí’s exploration is the Freudian understanding of Narcissism, from his ‘On the Introduction of Narcissism’ (1914), and Otto Rank’s theory of ‘the trauma of birth’ from his *The Trauma of Birth* (1924). I argue that the figure of the narcissist is introduced in ‘*Metamorphose*’ as a means to explore rebirth. In *Hidden Faces* the exploration of narcissism is two-fold. We find the Narcissistic Woman, Veronica Stevens, and also the Narcissistic Man, the Comte de Grandsailles, both understood in terms of Freud’s ‘On the Introduction of Narcissism’. Both are part of Dalí’s interest in the nature of cultural renewal post-WW2 and are a means of critiquing the rise of the fascist, authoritarian leader<sup>120</sup>. Finkelstein (1996) claims that ‘*Metamorphose*’ evidences Dalí’s turn from regressive to sublimating impulses (242). Contrary to this, I will suggest that both of Dalí’s texts propose a theory of rebirth which *combines* regressive and sublimating/unifying impulses.

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<sup>120</sup> In her discussion of masochism, narcissism, and alienation in Dalí, Greeley (2006) also argues that Dalí critiqued the fascist leader, and she refers to it as the “fascist persona” (85). Greeley’s emphasis is on how Dalí uses Lacan’s notions of the masochist in relation to Hitler: “Through imaging Hitler and the fascist persona as bent on self-destruction (as much or more than on destruction of others), Dalí defined certain connections between masochistic tendencies and the narcissistic phase of ego development, between self-hate and self-love, close to those proposed by Lacan in his 1932 doctoral thesis” (85). My argument in this chapter regarding Dalí, *Hidden Faces*, and fascism agrees with Greeley that Dalí critiques the fascist leader. However, my argument is based upon how Dalí implicates the Freudian notion of Narcissism in this, rather than Lacan. Whereas Greeley writes of Lacan’s ‘Mirror Stage’, “narcissistic misrecognition” (86), and the “imaginary identification with the father” (Greeley quoting from Lacan, 87), I focus upon the Narcissist’s ability to fascinate and the ways in which both males and females can exercise that fascination in accordance with how Freud conceptualised Narcissism. Furthermore, in chapter 6 I discuss the ways that Dalí supported fascist ideology whilst he critiqued the leaders, which Greeley does not do. Greeley argues that there is ambivalence in Dalí’s relationship with fascism, but locates this ambivalence in how other artists have responded to his work by creating paintings in support of fascism (89).

Of further interest to this chapter is the question of *why* Dalí used a psychoanalytical underpinning to these texts. It should be noted, however, that unlike Freud and Rank's approach to using literary texts as a basis for developing theories, my analysis of *Hidden Faces* (1944) does not claim to evidence any truths about the human psyche that psychoanalysis alone can discover. Both Freud and Otto Rank illustrated their theories with references to literary texts (Schaffner, 2011, 479), analysing fictional characters and using the analyses as evidence for their own theories. The most well-known example of this is Freud's analysis of Oedipus, a myth after which he named an integral part of his theory of male psychological development, the Oedipus Complex. This thesis *does not* have a psychoanalytical underpinning: rather, Dalí's texts actively *invite* the application of psychoanalytic theory<sup>121</sup>, he himself referring overtly to both Freud and Rank. Freud's 'On the Introduction of Narcissism' and Rank's *The Trauma of Birth* are integral to the Dalí-approved understanding of both 'Metamorphose' and *Hidden Faces*. Whilst I cordially accept Dalí's invitation to read them through the lens of these theorists, that does not mean I am going to behave myself as his guest. Whilst I am using psychoanalysis as an interpretive tool handed to me by Dalí, I will also reflect upon *how* he constructs his psychoanalytically underpinned world, for what purposes he does so, and what effect this blatant emphasis on psychoanalysis hopes to achieve. Furthermore, it is questionable whether Dalí himself behaves at his own party and to what extent he moulds psychoanalytic theory to his own ends<sup>122</sup>. What those ends are will be discussed in due course.

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<sup>121</sup> See Markus (2001), 'Sex and Gender in Giacometti's Couples', 89, for another instance of an artist inviting a psychoanalytic reading. Referring to Giacometti, Markus claims that "[he] turns us into voyeurs, placing us next to the psychoanalyst's sofa beside the patient (he himself)" (89). Orwell (1944) makes a similar claim regarding the positioning of the reader in relation to Dalí's *Secret Life* when he claims that "his autobiography is simply a strip-tease act conducted in pink limelight" (np).

<sup>122</sup> Finkelstein (1996) has also suggested that "[w]e should not look for a consistent following of Freud's theory" (227).

Finkelstein (1996, chapter 16) has carried out an in depth exploration of ‘Metamorphose’ focusing on Freud and Lacan. The poem being short, there are times when his examples intersect with mine, and in some ways my reading of the poem can be seen as a response to his. However, I come to a different conclusion regarding the importance of Freud to the poem, and also highlight the centrality of Rank over Lacan<sup>123</sup>. Furthermore, my intention in discussing Freud and Rank in relation to ‘Metamorphose’ is to introduce concepts central to *Hidden Faces* and its exploration of the Narcissistic Man and Woman. Finkelstein does not do this. As Finkelstein focuses on aesthetic and biographical reasons for the development of Dalí’s theories and aesthetics, he does not touch upon how Dalí’s treatment of narcissism relates to an engagement with the political situation of the late 30s, early 40s. Thus, my reading of ‘Metamorphose’ departs from Finkelstein’s in terms of context, focus, and conclusion.

As I will be beginning with an analysis of ‘Metamorphose’ I will first introduce the poem before outlining Freud’s theory of narcissism and Rank’s theory of ‘the trauma of birth’. ‘Metamorphose de Narcisse’ marks the first mention of narcissism in Dalí’s writings. It is a text which combines prose and poetry, and accompanies a painting by the same name. Both the text and the painting, Dalí claims in the prose section, have been created through Paranoia-Criticism, and it is this method which gives the pieces “the same exactness as mathematics” (6). At this point, Dalí is still speaking of Surrealism in a positive light, although he notably describes Surrealist orthodoxy in terms of his own thought, a tendency which Finkelstein (1998) identifies as early as in Dalí’s early 30s works and into the late 30s (213; 321-322). Dalí positions himself as

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<sup>123</sup> Finkelstein (1996) only briefly mentions Rank’s relation to Dalí’s ‘Metamorphose’ (233; 303, n.8). He claims that Dalí may have been influenced in his notion of regression by Rank (233) and also refers to the direct reference to Rank in his *Secret Life* (289, n.22; 303, n.8). I go into more detail on Rank’s influence on Dalí in order to highlight the importance of that theorist to Dalí’s thinking.

the guiding light of the Movement whilst at the same time conspicuously quoting from André Breton. Quoting the founder of the Surrealist Movement, he situates his Paranoiac-Criticism as an analytical tool which can be used in varying fields, “[from] painting, to poetry, to the cinema, to the construction of typical surrealist objects, to fashion, to sculpture, to the history of art and even, if needs be, to all kinds of exegesis” (5). The broad application of Paranoia-Criticism acts as a counter to the theme of cultural and intellectual fragmentation, a counter which Dalí tries to enact in his late-30s works onwards. Dalí homes in on the fields of mathematics and science, critiquing them for fragmenting into smaller fields instead of forming one large system of interpretation<sup>124</sup>, a system which he considers himself to have provided with his Paranoia-Criticism. Thus, within the first few pages of his ‘*Metamorphose de Narcisse*’ he has elevated his theory of Paranoia-Criticism to a level above prevailing systems of metaphysical, intellectual, and scientific interpretation, and aggrandized himself by drawing attention to himself as its creator. By quoting Breton he has performed the double act of trying to maintain the support of the Surrealist Movement and also marketed himself as one of its key figures. The year 1937 may seem quite late for him to be marketing himself as such, but Dalí did not officially leave the Movement until 1939, and even after then he often claimed to be an adherent of Surrealist aesthetics.

Finkelstein (1998) sees one of the main themes of the poem as the “movement from fragmentation to unity or wholeness” (320), and indeed, the idea that Paranoia-Criticism is acting as a counter to cultural and intellectual fragmentation appears to support this. However, Finkelstein underpins his claim with the notion that the movement is from a ‘regressive aesthetic’ to sublimation (323), a claim that I suggest is not entirely

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<sup>124</sup> Dalí was not the only writer at the time who noted the lack of theoretical unity within the sciences. See Dorothy L. Sayers’ *The Documents in the Case* (1930, 58). She does not take the same stance as Dalí, but the fact that it is mentioned suggests that Dalí was reacting to an actual cultural issue of the time.

supported by the text. In the prose part of ‘Metamorphose’, Dalí, in his inimitable way, states that “[t]he paranoiac-critical method is beginning to establish the indestructible pudding of the ‘exact details’ that Stendhal demanded for the description of Saint Peter’s Church in Rome, and it is doing this in the domain of the most paralyzing surrealist poetry” (324, ST<sup>125</sup>). I suggest, and I go into more detail on this in the previous chapter as well as this one, that as Dalí moves into the late 30s and embraces an aesthetic which lauds unity and form, he *does not entirely* move away from the more Surrealist concern with regression. King (2010) has claimed similarly that Dalí’s ‘Classic’ works are not a complete “abandonment of his earlier proclivities, Surrealist or otherwise” (21). It would be incorrect to state that ‘Metamorphose’ functions under the ‘Classic’ aesthetic, but it can be seen as a precursor to Dalí ‘becoming Classic’ in 1941.

Thus, in introducing his poem, Dalí highlights a movement towards form and unity whilst maintaining Surrealist interests. Even though Dalí’s quotation of Breton has the feel of paying lip service, I do not think it necessarily follows that he is merely paying lip service to Surrealist aesthetics also. As I argue in the next chapter, Dalí had a tendency to adhere to the aesthetics or ideologies of Movements whilst critiquing their leadership. As this chapter progresses I will elaborate more upon the ‘grand’ political purpose Dalí has in store for a combination of regressive and unifying impulses, and how he applies them to his notion of cultural renewal post-WW2 through his narcissistic characters in *Hidden Faces*.

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<sup>125</sup> Both the English translation and French version of this text were published at the same time (Finkelstein, 1996, 303, n. 1). I am working from both versions, but quotations from the English translation will be marked with ST. This is because the English translation I am using is by Francis Scarpe, 1937 (Reprinted in Finkelstein’s *The Collected Writings of Salvador Dalí* (1998)). My own translations have no such designation and will just have a reference to the page number in the French text.



## Freudian Theory of Narcissism

The Freudian theory of Narcissism, outlined in his ‘On the Introduction of Narcissism’, is central to ‘Metamorphose’ and *Hidden Faces*. As such, it is important to begin with an outline. Not unexpectedly, Dalí makes some departures from, and variations upon, the theory, but providing it in brief situates the rest of the chapter<sup>126</sup>.

As an infant the ego-interests and libidinal interests are united<sup>127</sup>. The infant is a “polymorphous pervert” gaining pleasure from all sensations, especially those that relate to self-preservation: satiation of hunger, thirst, and the need to defecate (Edmundson, 2003, x; Freud, 16). The ego-interests and the libidinal interests then separate with the latter being transferred to the mother who ensures that self-preservation needs are met (16). Thus, the primary narcissism of the male infant ends with the separation of ego-interests and libidinal interests, and the creation of the mother as the first love-object. There is an alternative developmental route which male infants can take, and it is clear that Freud deems this alternative as ‘abnormal’ as he characterises it as being present in those “whose libidinal development has been disturbed in some way” (16). This route creates the self as the first love-object, “thereby exhibiting what we can call the narcissistic type of object-choice” (16). Secondary narcissism rather than the transference of libidinal interests to the mother in males, then, is deemed ‘abnormal’.

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<sup>126</sup> Finkelstein (1996) also provides a brief outline of Freud’s theory of Narcissism (232-233). His focus is on the development of primary and secondary narcissism, and he claims that “it was the infant satisfaction associated with primary narcissism that Dalí sought to recover in the early 1930s” (233). Whilst I agree with this latter point, I do not think that this regressive tendency ended for Dalí in the late 30s.

<sup>127</sup> My understanding of Freud’s ‘Narcissism’ comes from Freud’s ‘On the Introduction of Narcissism’ (1914) and Edmundson’s (2003) ‘Introduction’ to Freud’s (2003) *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

It is important to note that this applies primarily to the male infant as Freud's theory of psychosexual development centres upon male development as the norm and female as a deviation. According to Freud, there is a significant difference between male and female development where Narcissism is concerned<sup>128</sup>. For Freud, only men are capable of "full object-love" (17). This is because only men position their mothers as the first love-object, thus betraying a heteronormative bias on the part of Freud. In girls, an 'object-cathexis' is not formed with the mother, rather "puberty appears to be accompanied by an intensification of her original narcissism unfavourable to the forming of any proper love-object with its due complement of sexual over-valuation" (17). 'Over-valuation' is when the balance of the libido regarding the self and the 'sexual-object' tips in favour of the latter and one can only think of the latter, over-valuing their qualities (5). To suggest that it is normal for this not to happen in women suggests that women are only capable of thinking of themselves and are too self-obsessed to sacrifice themselves for love.

Acknowledging the lack of freedoms women have in society, Freud claims that this narcissistic self-sufficiency is compensatory (17), thus making the strange claim that the psychological development of women coincidentally compensates them for the mores of contemporary society rather than contemporary society having an effect on their psychological development. These Narcissistic women have only the need to be loved rather than love "and they deign to tolerate any man who fulfils this condition" (17), which could problematically be used to justify unwanted male persistence and the 'playing hard to get' trope.

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<sup>128</sup> This difference is dramatized in *Hidden Faces*, as we shall later see.

Seemingly referring to the *femme fatale* archetype, Freud claims that such narcissistic women ‘fascinate’ men. They “become... magnetically attractive to those who have altogether relinquished their own narcissism, and who are casting around for object-love” (17-18). The fascination exacted by the Narcissistic woman is compared to that of a child and of animals that are indifferent to humans (18), thus both infantilising and de-humanising women at the same time and casting the ‘normal’ male as human and the ‘normal’ female as Other. Such women are also compared to criminals (18), thus comparing them to deviants. These men who are looking for object-love are more open to over-value women and sacrifice themselves as the Narcissistic woman symbolises the primary narcissism which they themselves have lost: “It is as though we envied them their retention of a blissful psychic state, of an unassailable libido position, that we ourselves have since relinquished” (18). In other words, Narcissistic women remind men of the state of polymorphous perversity, when, as Edmundson (2003) notes, they had the omnipresent love of the mother and protection of the father (x). Given that this state is ‘relinquished’ by ‘normal’ men during puberty, this again infantilises women and implies that men are more developed than females. Furthermore, the fascinating qualities of such women, their alleged openness to become sexual objects, and their infantile qualities results in the extremely problematic idea of the sexual-female-child, an idea taken to the extreme by Dalí in his ‘Rêverie’ (1931)<sup>129</sup>. The Surrealists accommodate the idea with the lauding of the infantilised woman, the *femme-enfant*, who is closer to the irrational and thus closer to that psychological state which the male Surrealists wish to experience (Conley, 1996, 1). For Freud, and indeed for the Surrealists, women do not just symbolise the infant, they *are* infants psychologically.

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<sup>129</sup> For more on ‘Rêverie’ see chapters 2 and 3.

Thus, they can naturally access a realm which the male Surrealists have to access artificially.<sup>130</sup>

Freud ignores the problematic impact that such notions could and in fact still do have upon women by bemoaning how such Narcissistic women affect men: “the powerful fascination of the narcissistic woman is not without its darker side; the lovelorn male’s frustration, his doubts about the woman’s love, his lamentations on her enigmatic nature” (18); suggesting that Freud is romanticising the male beset by the pains of potentially unrequited love. He does go on, however, to acknowledge that there are women who do not develop as Narcissistic, although he characterises this route as male. Such women *are* capable of “sexual over-valuation” (18), *but* “prior to puberty, feel themselves to be male and manage up to a certain point to develop in a male way”, a development which has to be “abandoned once female sexual maturity comes upon them” (18). This feeling that they were male is transformed into a “yearning for a male ideal” (19), which is, one assumes, a sublimation of the desire to be male. Furthermore, Narcissistic women are not fated to only ever have their libido centred upon themselves, but object-love can only be achieved through them having a child (18). Because a child is both part of the woman’s body and separate from it, loving the child becomes an extension of their narcissism and “they can now bestow full object-love” (18).

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<sup>130</sup> It is important to note that it was not only the male Surrealists who adopted the notion of the *femme-enfant*. Female artists associated with Surrealism, such as Leonora Carrington and Dorothea Tanning, also venerated and idealised the *femme-enfant* as a source of the irrational. See Belton, R., 1991. ‘Speaking with Forked Tongues: ‘Male’ Discourse in ‘Female’ Surrealism’ for more regarding the problematic use of male discourse of the female by female artists.

## Dalí's 'Metamorphose de Narcisse' (1937)

In Dalí's, 'Metamorphose de Narcisse', Freud's theory of Narcissism is combined with Rank's theory of 'the trauma of birth' which was developed in his *The Trauma of Birth* (1924).

Rank claims that all anxiety felt in childhood is a result of "birth anxiety" (17). If this anxiety continues into adulthood one has developed a mother-fixation, and thus the purpose of analysis is the rebirth of the patient, a rebirth which allows a thorough separation from the mother (9; 11). Whereas Freud claims that unconsciously males wish to return to the pre-genital state of motherly love and fatherly "protect[ion]" (Freud, 1914, 19), Rank goes a chronological step further and claims that they in fact unconsciously want to return to the mother's womb (Rank, 17-18). There is anxiety, however, attached to the mother's vagina because that is "the place of the birth trauma" – i.e. the moment we were jettisoned from the comforts of that place – and this is then transferred to all female genitals, resulting in shame attached to sexual desire in boys (20). Dalí's interest in Rank's theory of the desire to return to the womb can clearly be seen in Chapter 2, 'Intra-Uterine Memories', of his *Secret Life*. Referring to Rank by name, he claims that "my personal memories of the intra-uterine period, so exceptionally lucid and detailed, only corroborate on every point Doctor Otto Rank's thesis" on "the traumatism of birth" (26-27). Whilst this situates Dalí's further claims relating to rebirth in terms of Rank's theories it also makes a claim that Dalí has a level of conscious access to his unconscious of which the Surrealists could only dream (pardon the pun), thus aggrandizing himself in a similar manner to that at the start of 'Metamorphose'. He goes on in *Secret Life* to claim that in recounting his experience of the womb he will trigger memories in the reader (26). Like Rank, he associates 'the

trauma of birth' with "the myth... of the 'Lost Paradise'" (26-27)<sup>131</sup>, and makes the further claim that one of the most prevalent images in his paintings, that of "a pair of eggs fried in a pan, without the pan", was first seen in the womb (27), thus suggesting that the subconscious images which inhabit his paintings had their origin in the mother's womb. This suggests that the experience of the womb remains in one's subconscious, and Dalí, 'the genius', has special access to his subconscious, an access which the reader can also be endowed with if she listens to him, thus positioning himself as an oracle.

Considering Dalí's fascination with Rank's theory of the 'trauma of birth' and the importance of returning subconsciously to the womb in artistic creations, it is difficult not to read Rank's theories as a strong influence upon 'Metamorphose'. The primary motif within the text is rebirth, starting with violent dissolution and turbulent reconstruction and then settling into a less bombastic but no less effective metamorphosis. Destruction turns to reconstruction and then a process of flowing change. As Finkelstein (1996) notes, the poem begins with the arrival of Spring (229), the season traditionally associated with rebirth. The snow on the mountain is thawing and with the loosening of the snow's compactness, "the whole high plateau/ pours itself out,/ crashes and crumbles/... while its dead weight/ raises the entire swarming and apothéosic/ plateau from the plain" (326, ST). Here then we have violent destruction which results in reconstruction, thus introducing the theme of rebirth.

"[T]he god of the snow" is associated with Narcissus, as "his dazzling head [is] bent over the dizzy space of reflections" (325, ST). Whilst it is his own desire which begins

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<sup>131</sup> Finkelstein (1996) also notes Dalí's link between Rank, 'paradise', and the womb (303, n.8).

the process of the snow melting (8), the poem does not clearly indicate whether this desire is for himself or not. Given that the melting snow is associated with the characteristic Narcissus pose, however, one could sensibly presume that it is self-desire. As Finkelstein (1996) notes, the poem is suggesting that a Narcissistic psychology, focusing on one's own desires, results in a chaotic loss of form (230; 231). Evidence for this can be found in other Dalí texts, in particular *Secret Life*, where 'Narrator-Dalí' describes the way in which constantly focusing on his own desires resulted in psychological chaos and the belief that he was going mad (79-80). As the melting of the snow in the poem is associated with Spring, one can interpret this form of destruction and reconstruction as repetitious<sup>132</sup>, similar to the way in which 'Narrator-Dalí' in *Secret Life* would experience the chaos of his own desires and then create order to try to contain them (the compact snow of 'Metamorphose') only to have it all crash down again. He explained that as a child, "I learned an essential truth, namely, that an inquisition was necessary to give a 'form' to the bacchic multiplicity and promiscuity of my desires" (80). This form was created through "the rigorous apportioning of the precious time of my days" (86) to the extent that "I traced out for myself in advance the plan not only of the events but also of the kind of emotion I was to derive from them" (80). The 'order' which he had created, however, always had a tendency to crash down with the self-serving nature of his desires, much like the repetitious destruction and reconstruction in 'Metamorphose'.

The snow atop the mountain is compact, pressed together, much like how Dalí describes the experience of the foetus in the womb (*SL*, 27). The collapse of the snow could be

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<sup>132</sup> Finkelstein (1996) also draws a connection between "the metamorphosis [and] the cyclical framework of the changing seasons" (232).

read as reliving the aforementioned anxiety relating to the ‘trauma of birth’. In his ‘autobiography’, Dalí writes that

I have often imagined and represented the monster of sleep as an immense and very heavy head, with a single thread-like reminiscence of the body, which is prodigiously maintained in equilibrium by the multiple crutches of reality, thanks to which we remain in a sense suspended above the earth during sleep. Often these crutches give way and we ‘fall’... You may be sure that this is a case of a brutal and crude recall of birth, reconstituting thus the dazed sensation of the very moment of expulsion and of falling outside (*SL*, 29).

Thus, whilst the “dazzling head” of “the god of the snow” in ‘Metamorphose’ echoes that of Narcissus “bent over the dizzy space of reflections” (325, ST), it also recalls the drooping head of the sleeping figure<sup>133</sup>. His slow descent into sleep is suggested by the imagery of “melting”, and the sudden falling sensation, reminiscent of birth, is suggested by the verticality of the “cataracts” (8) and the ‘annihilation’ he feels (8).

The reconstruction after the dramatic fall of snow in ‘Metamorphose’ has a sexual character, in that “it... / raises the entire... / plateau from the plain/ from which already thrust towards the sky/ the artesian fountains of grass/ and from which rise,/ erect,/ tender,/ and hard,/ the innumerable floral spears/ of... the narcissi” (326, ST, my emphases). I agree with Finkelstein (1996) here as he also claims that the plants “thrust[ing] towards the sky” and the following example of the “heterosexual group”

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<sup>133</sup> Finkelstein (1996) claims that in the early 30s one can see that Dalí had read Rank. He states that “Dalí noted... that the attitudes during sleep are those of the annihilation implied by the intrauterine curvature, with the implication that such regressive attitudes are associated with some form of death impulse” (303, n.8). In ‘Metamorphose’ the ‘intrauterine curvature’ has been replaced with the drooping head of the sleeping figure.



suggest a “sexual dimension” to the theme of rebirth in ‘Metamorphose’ (230-231)<sup>134</sup>. The ‘rising plateau’ and ‘floral spears’ echo both the awakening after the sensation of falling in sleep, with the concomitant morning erection, emphasising again the male focalisation of the poem, and also signifies the tension between anxiety (terrifying falling) and desire regarding women, which *Secret Life* later roots in the birthing experience. ‘Narcissi’ refers to narcissus flowers, a Spring plant, reiterating and concretizing the connection with rebirth. One could also argue that in giving the sexual nature of the rebirth a masculine character here with images relating to erection, rebirth is being reconceptualised as masculine rather than feminine. This again suggests the anxiety surrounding women’s bodies and the need to defeminise the process.

Giving rebirth a sexual content continues as Dalí places in opposition “the heterosexual group” (‘Metamorphose’, 11) and that which is “far from the heterosexual group” (13). Freud notably argued that turning the libido upon the self is an act of the ‘homosexual libido’: “Large quantities of essentially homosexual libido are drawn on for the purposes of forming the narcissistic ego-ideal, and achieve discharge and gratification through keeping it going thereafter” (1914, 25). I would argue that this is what the poem is referring to when “Far from the heterosexual group... cold pervades the nakedness of the adolescent delayed at the water’s edge” (13). It should be noted here that the poem in French states that ‘the adolescent’ is “attardé au bord de l’eau”. *Attardé* in French can mean delayed mental development, in the sense of the highly problematic term, ‘mental retardation’. The use of *attardé* by Dalí is a play on words, in that it is used to mean that the ‘adolescent’ is retained or delayed at the water’s edge, but is also caught in an earlier stage of psychological development. This earlier stage is Narcissism, symbolised

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<sup>134</sup> However, I examine the importance of Freud’s notion of the ‘homosexual libido’ and also highlight the importance of Rank in the construction of this sexual element, whereas Finkelstein does not.

by him being by the water's edge looking at his own reflection. The tone suggests that this Narcissistic state is something which needs to be overcome. He is cold by the water's edge, he is *attardé*, and his loss of form and reconstruction repeat themselves as suggested by their association with the Spring cycle<sup>135</sup>. To use Rank's terminology, he is constantly repeating the rebirth trauma.

Whilst Narcissus is transfixed at the water's edge, "the heterosexual group, in the famous poses of preliminary expectation, conscientiously considers the imminent libidinous cataclysm, the carnivorous birth of their latent morphological atavisms" (11). This is an oblique reference to his obsession with Millet's *L'Angélu*s (1867)<sup>136</sup>, a painting in which he sees the pose of the couple as "expectant" ('L'Angélus de Millet', 1934, 280 FT). Dalí interprets the pose as symbolically depicting the female mantis about to decapitate the male who is bowing his head in expectation and covering his crotch with his hat as a symbol of imminent emasculation (Gibson, 1997, 311-312). 'Atavism' means a return to previous traits, and in the context of 'Metamorphose' is another reference to rebirth. Noting the association Dalí draws between 'twilight' and 'atavisms' in his *Mythe Tragique* (1964), Finkelstein (1996) suggests that Dalí associates the twilight with "the extinction of the flora and fauna of this epoch" as well as rebirth, so that rebirth and annihilation intersect (213-214).

Finkelstein (1996, 214) observes that a further example of rebirth and 'extinction' intersecting within an atavism in Dalí's *oeuvre* comes in the form of a daydream in his

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<sup>135</sup> Finkelstein (1996) also notes that "the metamorphosis [is] within the cyclical framework of the changing seasons" (232).

<sup>136</sup> Finkelstein (1996) also explores the relationship between 'atavisms' and Dalí's understanding of Millet's *L'Angélu*s (212-217). He does not note a link to the *L'Angélu*s at this point in the poem, though. He favours a link to "the female praying mantis" (231) instead.

*Mythe Tragique* wherein Dalí visits “the Museum of Natural History at twilight time” (1963, FT, 285) with Gala. This example has a stronger sexual character and the motif of the praying mantis (1996, 214). Within “the hall of insects” he sees “the disturbing *L’Angélu*s couple” towering above him. He then violently “sodomize[s] Gala right in front of the museum’s entrance”, after which “[w]e both bathed in our perspiration, at the asphyxiating end of this twilight of a burning summer with its deafening frenzied song of insects” (1963, 286, FT). The *L’Angélu*s pose is perceived as a threat as it symbolises the emasculation of the male by the threatening female (Finkelstein, 214), and in the daydream it is of an intimidating size. However, it simultaneously inspires desire. Whilst Finkelstein only focuses upon the threat of the woman in *L’Angélu*s, and the threat of Gala in the museum example (214), I would suggest that the violent ‘sodomization’ in the latter is both a means of *combating* the threatening female – i.e. sexually overpowering her before she can do the same to the male – and an atavistic act, a return to primal behaviour equal to the threat of the female. As this ‘atavistic’ behaviour is depicted as natural for women but something that men have to actively acknowledge in order to carry out, this again, much like in Freud’s theory of Narcissism, presents women as exemplifying a less ‘developed’ state.

The “heterosexual group”, depicted in ‘Metamorphose’ in the form of the *L’Angélu*s pose, however, is preferable to the ‘homosexual’, Narcissistic state. It is this Narcissism which must be sublimated into heterosexual ‘mutual devouring’. Markus (2000) sees a “cannibalistic love relation” in Picasso’s *The Kiss* (1931), in which both the male and the female devour one another (35). She goes on to claim that this variety of ‘love relation’ can be seen in Dalí’s works during the 30s in the form of terror of being consumed and fear of his own “cannibalistic impulse” (36). I agree with Markus that

this dynamic between the male and the female can be seen in Dalí's works of the 30s, but I am referring to it as 'mutual devouring' as this emphasises more clearly that the 'cannibalism' is not one-way and also the idea that both parties are *supposed* to get pleasure and pain from the dynamic.<sup>137</sup>

Narcissus leans over the water, and much like the snow at the beginning of the poem he loses his form, again suggesting a repetition of the return to the trauma of birth. Narcissus' "white torso [is] folded forward/ fixes itself, frozen,/ in the silvered and hypnotic curve of his desire" (327, ST). This pose evokes the embryonal pose one associates with being in the womb, and it is of no surprise that following this transfixing moment he experiences his fall and loss of form: "The body of Narcissus flows out and loses itself/ in the abyss of his reflection" (327, ST). However, unlike the snow's loss of form repeating itself in a cycle, Narcissus' loss of form is "like the sand glass that will not be turned again" (327, ST). There is no turning back from this fall, which suggests that he is on his way to a Rankian rebirth in which anxiety of the 'birth trauma' is overcome. His body drifts "down to the unglazed mouths of the night/ on the edge of which/ there sparkles already/ all the red silverware/ of dawns with veins broken in 'the wharves of/ blood.'" (328, ST). In his *Secret Life*, Dalí writes that "the intra-uterine paradise was the color of hell, that is to say, red, orange, yellow and bluish, the color of flames, of fire" (27). The place in which Narcissus drifts, then, is an intra-uterine space, indicating his coming rebirth, the imminence of which is indicated further by the phrase, "your approaching metamorphosis" ('Metamorphose', 17). It is interesting that in *Secret Life*'s description this place is associated with hell, especially when it has already been

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<sup>137</sup> Finkelstein (1996) also refers to "sexual cannibalism", emphasising the threat of the female towards the male (214).

designated a 'paradise'. It perhaps indicates the tension between fear and comfort which Dalí associates with the womb.

Narcissus' drifting in an intra-uterine space is followed by another fall. Repeating a movement from earlier in the poem, it is followed by construction, "the great metamorphosis" (328, ST), but is not preceded by the same tumult and destruction. It is Narcissus' head that has fallen: "The seed of your head has fallen into the water" (18)<sup>138</sup>, and much like in English, *semence*, 'seed', also means semen in French. This statement is given a page all to itself in the French publication, highlighting its significance. Narcissus is now "immobile" and "asleep" (19). The fall this time has not resulted in a reawakening only to be repeated. Rather, he has fallen into sleep and then slumbered. The fact that he is described as "sleep[ing] like a water flower" (19) evokes a floating sensation, again suggesting the experience of being in the womb, and, of course, as water flowers bloom, it again implies the imminence of rebirth.

The poem ends on a suspenseful note, as it describes what will happen when the head/seed "bursts" but does not actually depict it as happening. The head will "burst" open to reveal "the flower,/ the new narcissus,/ Gala – / my narcissus" (21). It also does not indicate how long it will be until it happens, thus leaving Narcissus in that floating womb-like state. In the description of what will happen when the seed "bursts", the "new narcissus" is depicted as 'bursting' through a "slit" which has "split" (21), which could not be more evocative of birth through a tearing vagina. 'Bursting', however, is more evocative of the masculine. Furthermore, the narcissus flowers have earlier been

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<sup>138</sup> The significance of Narcissus' head falling, in terms of the praying mantis theme, will be discussed in due course.

characterised as male, their hardness and erectness suggesting male sexuality. Can this be seen as a continued masculinisation of the feminine, thus going some way to erase the feminine? Or in attributing both feminine and masculine evoking words to the seed and flower is it a move away from the earlier masculinisation of the feminine in favour of an androgynous being in which both the male and female are present? Finkelstein (1996) sees the figure of the androgyne as important to 'Metamorphose'. Outlining the myth of the androgyne (238-240), he claims that "[a]ndrogyny... represents wholeness and autonomy – traits that are of the highest significance to Dalí's conception... Dalí's graphic representation of this unity encompasses both the sense of perfection and wholeness, in which no division is perceived, with the composite image implying the movement from the split image towards this wholeness" (240).

To use a looser sense of 'androgyny', i.e. the presence of both male and female traits, one can also see how important such a concept was to Surrealism. Conley (1996) has argued that in the unconscious trance so central to early Surrealism, the coming together of the 'masculine' (reason) and 'feminine' (the irrational) was one of the "theoretical" aims of the Movement and betokened their notion of true love – a state wherein the boundaries of male and female were blurred, leaving a reciprocal relationship between 'masculine' and 'feminine' instead of one being deemed superior to the other (54). Has Dalí adopted something akin to this stance in the late 30s? In his exploration of the aforementioned museum daydream recounted in 1963, Finkelstein (1996) cites Dalí as implying that both himself and Gala participate equally in "resuscitating in some way this ancestral act in all its original animality" (214). There would thus, arguably, be a reciprocal relationship between the male and the female. And, indeed, the combination

of the 'masculine' and the 'feminine' in Narcissus' newly metamorphosed state seems to suggest a potential amalgamation of the male and female.

Markus (2001) has noted that in the late 1920s many artists' works show a "confusion of sexual signs" (87), which suggests that any exploration of androgyny by the Surrealists and Dalí is part of a larger cultural and artistic interest in androgyny during the interwar period. It should be noted, however, that Markus does not think the male Surrealists as a whole were successful in representing the male and female as being of equal worth. Using the artist Giacometti as an example, she shows how only after his separation from the Surrealist Movement did he take on a position which acknowledged the worth of both the male and the female. She suggests that the Surrealist theoretical stance encouraged the positioning of the female as a threat and the male as the victim of this threat (98). From this perspective, even if there was the intention of equality regarding the sexes in Surrealism, it did not succeed.

I take a line of argument which is in agreement with both Conley and Markus. In line with the former I regard the coming together of the male and female to be an integral concern of the Surrealist Movement and its methods. Dalí's androgynous being created at the end of 'Metamorphose' can be seen in terms of the wider artistic focus on androgyny and also the Surrealist focus in that he too saw the combination of the male and the female as comprising the ultimate love relation. However, as Markus (2000) has argued, the positioning of women as a sexual threat to men, rather than human beings with equal rights to men, can be seen in the prevalence of certain imagery in Surrealist art and writing; praying mantis imagery, in particular. She claimed that "[t]he Surrealists' fascination with the mantis is an indication of their attitude toward woman,

which was ambivalent, if not misogynistic” (37). Thus, I suggest that the being created by the metamorphosis in ‘Metamorphose’ does not exhibit a reciprocal relationship between the male and the female.

I have argued so far that rebirth in ‘Metamorphose’ is explored in terms of Rank’s theory of the ‘trauma of birth’. Repetitious destruction and reconstruction symbolised anxiety of the ‘birth trauma’ repeating itself. Only through a Rankian rebirth can one overcome this anxiety. Narcissus does this and is to be reborn as a unified figure which ostensibly exhibits male and female characteristics. In terms of Freud’s theory of Narcissism, Narcissus was trapped in an earlier stage of psychosexual development and needed to overcome this by becoming capable of ‘object-love’. This is achieved through becoming one with Gala at the end of the poem. This appears to give credence to Finkelstein’s (1996) claim that the poem dramatises a move from regressive to sublimating impulses (242). However, the presence of the atavism complicates his reading. ‘Mutual devouring’ is conceptualised as an atavistic rebirth. This is the case in the museum account of 1963, but also earlier in 1937 as suggested by the phrase “latent morphological atavisms” in regard to “the heterosexual group” (‘Metamorphose’, 11). As the male/female being at the end of ‘Metamorphose’ represents ‘mutual devouring’, as all ideal relations between men and women do in Dalí, it also represents a combination of regressive and unifying impulses. The atavisms are regressive as they are traits we have forgotten through civilising and socialising forces. Thus, the poem presents the means of overcoming a Narcissistic state as heterosexual ‘mutual devouring’, but this ‘mutual devouring’ consists of a combination of regressive and unifying impulses.



The nature of this ‘atavistic’ ‘mutual devouring’ would benefit from some deeper exploration. As mentioned previously in regard to Dalí’s analysis of Millet’s *L’Angélus*, the preying mantis was an important part of his thinking (Gibson, 1997, 311-312). As Markus (2000) notes, mantis imagery traditionally signifies both rebirth and death (34), and such imagery is used with that signification in ‘Metamorphose’ and indeed later in *Hidden Faces* (1944). This demonstrates that unlike Giacometti, Dalí did not take on a less problematic stance towards women as he became separated from the Surrealist Movement. It is worth spending some time here exploring Dalí’s use of mantis imagery as it signifies rebirth in different ways: on an individual scale; on a grand scale, implied by the aforementioned ‘atavistic’ aspect; and on a cultural level, in terms of bringing about cultural renewal post-WW2. In the next section I will look at mantis imagery in both *Secret Life* and *Hidden Faces*. Then I will look at how Dalí combines mantis imagery with the Freudian notion of the Narcissistic woman in his novel. In the final section I will look at how Dalí explores the figure of the Narcissistic man in politics in *Hidden Faces*, and how this figure dramatises the importance of ‘mutual devouring’ for cultural renewal post-WW2.

### **The Threat of Woman: ‘Metamorphose de Narcisse’ and the *Vagina Dentata* scene in *Hidden Faces***

Markus (2000) notes a development in Dalí’s *oeuvre* from masturbation as a defensive act preventing castration (35) to the fusion of the subject and the object of fear in “the formation of a unity” (Dalí, cited by Markus, 36). This development, I argue, can be seen dramatized in ‘Metamorphose’ where the head is “held up by the tips of the water’s fingers,/ at the tips of the fingers/ of the insensate hand,/ of the terrible hand,/ of the excrement eating hand,/ of the mortal hand/ of his reflection” (329, ST). I suggest

that this ‘terrible hand’ can be seen as a masturbating hand. Gibson (1997) has argued that in Dalí's *Gadget and Hand* (1927) the red, veiny hand is associated with the shame of masturbation (166). This hand ties in with the notion of the Narcissist, as one’s desire is focused in on the self. Furthermore, the hand in ‘Metamorphose’ is described as ‘excrement-eating’. In his ‘L’Amour’ (1930), Dalí states that “[o]ne loves completely when one is ready to eat the beloved woman’s shit” (67)<sup>139</sup>. Repugnance is felt when you desire something socially unacceptable that has been repressed (Freud, 1905b, 157). Through desiring the beloved’s excrement, you are overcoming that repression (‘L’Amour’, 67). As, I argue, “the terrible hand” in ‘Metamorphose’ is the masturbating hand of the Narcissist, one can only assume that it would be his own excrement that he would be eating. However, the hand is referred to as “insensate” and “mortal”, which suggests that through the process of rebirth he is going to transcend the masturbatory hand. This is borne out through the rebirth which follows wherein he forms a unity with Gala, thus depicting a movement from masturbation to unity.

Markus (2000) sees “the formation of a unity” in terms of a “cannibalistic love relation” (35). In relation to Picasso’s *The Kiss* (1931), Markus claims that this type of ‘formation of a unity’ “contradicts those classical psychoanalysts who claim that fear of castration is a formative part of the male definition of gender, with the female the castrator” (35) because both parties are devouring one another which “liberates the woman from her role as the sole aggressor” (35). This implies that Picasso’s depiction of ‘mutual devouring’ is a more progressive stance to take on sexual relationships. I think that interpreting Picasso in that way lets him off the hook, so to speak, as he is still positioning violence, both verbal and physical, as an integral aspect of sexual

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<sup>139</sup> My translation conforms to Finkelstein’s (1998, 191).

relationships. It is the same with Markus' interpretation of Dalí's move from fear of women and the defensive act of masturbation to the formation of a unity. She argues that *The Great Masturbator* (1929) contains fear of being "castrated by Gala" (36), and claims that his focus on cannibalism is "a wish to unify with the object of our love" (36). However, she does not fully engage with how problematic this really is. I have no intention of letting Dalí off the hook. It is clear that the threat of emasculation is associated with women and their genitals even after he has moved to a focus on 'mutual devouring'. This is especially clear when we look at how female characters are presented in his 'autobiography' and novel. And moreover, it is dubious as to how successful this move from fear to unity actually is. Whilst presented in an optimistic tone in 'Metamorphose', it seems apparent in the works that came after that even with the unity formed there is still a constant threat of female sexuality which needs to be quelled, a constant battle between the sexes.

The threat of the female genitals and female sexuality is spelled out in the 'False Memories of Childhood' chapter of *Secret Life*. Dalí outlines a 'false memory' of his ideal woman, Galuchka, in which

[a] shadow soft as a dream submerged the upper end of her thighs which were obliterated in the absolute black beneath her little white skirt and in spite of the darkness in which her anatomy completely vanished I felt that she was naked underneath (58).

In 'The Laugh of the Medusa' (1976), Cixous refers to "the shadow [which Man] throws on [Woman]; the shadow she is" (67). Dalí has cast this shadow on his symbolic ideal woman, concealing that she is a sexual being in her own right. The shadow cast is "soft as a dream", thus providing a gentle taming effect which is juxtaposed with the

violence of “obliterated”. The latter suggests that her sexual power has been completely eradicated, thus castrating the threat which her genitalia might pose. She has been made benign. Atop the shadow, as if it might very well be casting it, is a white skirt, a colour which traditionally symbolises innocence, virtue, and the angelic. Thus there is a double agency casting the shadow: ‘Narrator-Dalí’ ‘submerging’ her genitals in darkness, and the veil of innocence and the angelic which conceals women. The juxtaposition of black and white also has the effect of suggesting the alleged double aspect of women – innocence and evil. Considering this juxtaposition is in the genital region, this double aspect is being associated with female sexuality.

By casting ‘Galuchka’s’ genitals in darkness, he is associating Woman’s unknowableness and untrustworthiness with them. This is very much in keeping with his fascination with Rank’s theory of the ‘trauma of birth’ in which women, their genitals, and the unconscious anxiety which they create are aligned. The alleged untrustworthiness of women, as related to their genitals, can be further seen in Dalí’s conception of ‘mimesis’, outlined in *Secret Life*. He discovered a species of leaf-insect which could camouflage itself to such a degree that it could not be located in a particular plant without close inspection. He called the leaf-insect, “morros de con” (69), a derogatory term for the female genitalia. In the accompanying footnote, he explains that the term “designates a part of the female pudenda and is used by fishermen and peasants to refer to someone or something prodigiously cunning and sly” (69).

Notably, in Dalí’s description of ‘Galuchka’s’ shadowed body, he had the impression that she was naked despite not being able to tell for sure. This implies that despite all the shadowing placed on female genitals in order to “obliterate” Women’s place as

sexual beings, female sexuality is still strong enough to draw men to it. The threat of being ‘devoured’ by the unknown then is something men fear but also desire, but it is the female’s fault for being desired because she has drawn men to her.

‘Mutual devouring’ in Dalí’s works from the late 30s onwards is a concept which attempts to diminish the threat of the female genitals whilst at the same time maintaining it. As Markus (2000) argues, “[c]annibalism, as a wish to unify with the object of our love, could also explain Dalí’s idea about the sexual appeal of the edible woman” (36). It is a ‘love relation’ in which both individuals devour each other. However, the diminishment yet maintenance of the threat allegedly posed by women ensures that the male is in complete conceptual control of the woman for his own sexual ends. It is not difficult to envision how this theory of ‘mutual devouring’ could be used to psychologically torment a woman. Women could easily be blamed for the male violence aimed towards them, and in fact Dalí’s notion of ‘mutual devouring’ can be seen as perpetuating and supporting the notion that women provoke men. In Dalí’s ‘love relation’, men are portrayed as always needing to be on their guard to ensure they are not completely devoured, and the fear provoked by this danger is manifested as fear of castration. Indeed, if the female genitals are in shadow, then a penis would be encapsulated in that shadow as soon as it gains proximity.

In *Hidden Faces*, Dalí portrays the danger of being ‘devoured’ by the laughing female with glistening teeth. Markus (2000) writes of how the Surrealists combined images of menacing teeth and the preying mantis to explore the idea of the *vagina dentata* (35). Because of the common belief that the praying mantis “eats her sex-partner, the teeth have come to symbolize both cannibalism and castration” (35). She goes on to explain

that there were myths that the *vagina dentata* could be tamed through the removal of the teeth (35). Dalí takes this further, and in his *Hidden Faces* depicts violence as a means to remove the teeth.

The Comte de Grandsailles and Solange de Cléda's relationship is introduced in *Hidden Faces* as taking the form of a power struggle. As the novel begins, it has been a number of months since their last meeting, and this period has prolonged their desire for one another. Rochefort, who had bought part of the Count's lands because of the latter's money problems, had destroyed an area of cork oaks and replaced them with vines. This was something which obsessed the Count, and in order to get the upper hand in his power struggle with Solange, he tells her that he cares more for this than his mere 'flirtation' with her – "[o]ne... forgets five years of stupid and snobbish flirtation – but a single claw-mark in the heart of one's property, no! That one never forgets" (48). In response, "Solange suddenly gave vent to a great theatrical burst of laughter", accompanied by "a contemptuous smile" (48), which Grandsailles perceives as threatening. He shouts, "I don't want to see that smile on your face" (48), and attacking her, "his little finger slipped into the wet slit of Solange's mouth in such a way that his large gold ring struck savagely against her gums, which immediately began to bleed" (48). Thus, like in the myths cited by Markus, Grandsailles enacts a symbolic attempt to remove Solange's teeth and prevent emasculation by the threatening woman. Her mouth is symbolised as a vagina through it being described as a "wet slit", and one could further suggest that the 'slit' being 'wet' indicates that the symbolic vagina is aroused, and thus even more sexually threatening.

Grandsailles only makes her gums bleed, however, and he falls “to his knees at the foot of the bed and beg[s] forgiveness” (48). This suggests that Solange’s emasculation threat has been maintained through his inability to tame her. Much like in Dalí’s reading of Millet’s *L’Angélu*, Grandsailles is bowed down before the female who has adopted the mantis stance, thus suggesting that he is expecting mantis-Solange to strike. However, her position of power over him is almost immediately diminished as she bursts into tears, and “taking her face this time with infinite gentleness, [he] kisse[s] her on the mouth”. This suggests that Solange has been partially tamed there as her mouth is safe to kiss.

To sum up, I argue that the *vagina dentata* scene in *Hidden Faces*, the shadow on Galuchka, and the combination of masculine and feminine terms throughout ‘Metamorphose de Narcisse’, especially in the rebirth scene, do not indicate a move away from seeing women in terms of a threat to men. In ‘Metamorphose’, the mantis imagery comes in the form of Narcissus’ “head... fall[ing] into the water” (18), after which he is reborn into a unification with Gala. The beheading in this instance symbolises the loss of form necessary to create a unification with a woman, suggesting an ideal formation in which the male and female are amalga(mated). However, the mere presence of the mantis imagery implies a more sinister undercurrent as it automatically casts the woman as a threat. The scene in *Hidden Faces* represents an attempted taming through violence. It results in a partial taming of Solange with a kiss to the mouth and an averted full emasculation of Grandsailles. Both texts use praying mantis imagery to position the woman as a sexual threat to men.

In 'Metamorphose', one is left to wonder whether the female threat is still present post-unification; whether, to use Markus' phrasing, the male has moved from the infantile to 'maturity' by becoming part of the female (2000, 35; 36). Finkelstein (1996; 1998) conceptualises this alleged move from the 'infantile' to 'maturity' in terms of a move from regression to sublimation, and sees it as the theoretical underpinning of Dalí's 1930s *oeuvre* (1998, 319; 320). As noted in the previous section, I am not convinced by the *volte face* nature of this claim. If the unification indicating a move from the infantile to 'maturity' maintains, and indeed seems to require as an integral part, a fear of female genitals, then the rebirth, in Rank's terms, has not been successful. For Rank the fear of the female genitals comes from a fear of the mother's genitals. Thus, the male psyche has not overcome its mother-fixation.

I partly agree with Finkelstein's claim though in that an acceptance of the benefits of sublimation over infantile regression can be recognised in Dalí from the late 1930s onwards. However, I see this as an evolution of a tendency towards unity developing throughout that decade, spurred on by the chaotic cultural and political *milieu* of the time. For Dalí, the solution to this chaos was a unifying impulse, an impulse which his notion of 'mutual devouring' harnessed. 'Mutual devouring' is Dalí's version of the object cathexis which Freud saw as one of the socially acceptable means through which one overcomes regression and Narcissism. This is an indictment of the social acceptability of violence towards women, and violence within relationships, in the 1930s and 1940s. Regarding Finkelstein's argument, then, I would say that instead of a *volte-face* move from regression to sublimation, a unifying impulse becomes a central feature of Dalí's aesthetic in the late 30s but the regressive impulse does not vanish.



In the next section I will look at the way in which the Freudian Narcissistic Woman features in *Hidden Faces* in the character of Veronica Stevens, and how that figure is associated with the praying mantis and rebirth on an individual and grander cultural scale. After a discussion of her, the implications of the Narcissistic man on politics, and the grand scale of WW2 Europe, will be discussed in relation to the character of the Comte de Grandsailles.

## **Veronica**

In Veronica Stevens we see presented a nexus of concepts: the Narcissistic Woman, the mantis, and rebirth. Whereas the rebirths in ‘Metamorphose de Narcisse’ and the chrysalis scene in *Secret Life* were very much on an individual scale, despite the mythological overtones, in *Hidden Faces* rebirth takes on a larger societal import. As mentioned above, Dalí universalised his theory of individual rebirth by claiming in *Secret Life* that recounting his memories of the womb would “provoke” such memories in the reader (26). In *Hidden Faces*, the processes of individual rebirth, through the characters of Grandsailles, Veronica, Solange, and Randolph, are mapped on to the grander historical stage.

When we are introduced to Veronica Stevens, she is presented in contrast to her mother, Barbara, who is an expert at masking in order to create specific and frivolous effects. She “had succeeded in composing for herself a special facial expression by virtue of which she made it apparent when she entered Schiaparelli’s that she had just come from the Ritz, and another whereby she showed on returning to the Ritz that she had just left Schiaparelli’s” (56). She is only concerned with the surface appearance of things,

obsessing over the facial expressions which her appearance and behaviour will elicit. She is described as having “theatrical abandon” (62), but even though she is constantly calculating and self-aware over which effects and responses she wants to create, she has started to wonder where the distinction lies between herself and her mask: “Am I perhaps not altogether a bluff?” (59).

Barbara’s masking is partly an element of the satirical portrayal of ‘frivolous’ Society people throughout the novel, but also serves as a counterpoint to her daughter. For Veronica there is no mask, and indeed she is one of the very few characters in the novel who does not mask. There are occasions when Veronica, much to the chagrin of her mother, wanders around the apartment naked: “[s]he purposely and negligently spread her legs open with an air of candour” (76). Barbara, on the other hand, goes to great efforts to mask in order to distance herself from herself, as suggested by her masking being described in terms of “depersonalization” and “keeping of herself only what was strictly necessary to remain alive” (61).

Not concealed by a mask, Veronica has a “river-like and golden exuberance!” (61). She is depicted as unearthly, transcendent, and closer to the cosmos than her mother who is closer to the earth: “[Veronica’s] pupils were of a blue so pale that they blended into the whites, and it was only in their depths and on the horizon of their translucent vista that a bit of moonlight and gold-dust shone” (61). Her smile gives off “celestial gleams” and its warming effect on the recipient is compared to when “one approaches the gates of Paradise” (67), a description which creates a deifying effect. Veronica transcends human emotion and her body is compared to that of a goddess. She also transcends good and evil; she is beyond moral values or censure: “Without being cruel, Veronica

was neither good nor bad, like the gods of ancient Olympus” (61). Whilst only being ‘*like* the gods of ancient Olympus’ (my emphasis) she *is* “the praying mantis that devours its love through a biological need for the absolute” (61). Again then, as in ‘Metamorphose’, here we have the use of mantis imagery in relation to a woman, and this time teeth are not the only threatening aspect of her anatomy, but rather her eyes as well. There is nothing frivolous about Veronica’s “inquisitorial gaze” (61), and given the importance of ‘inquisitions’<sup>140</sup> in Dalí’s *oeuvre* one can read into this description the idea that it transfixes and squeezes. One of the reasons her gaze is transfixing is that within it “one saw absolutely nothing” (61), a characteristic of the Narcissist according to Edmundson (2003) in that “A narcissist... tends to be void, in that he has never had to cultivate anything but the capacity to fascinate” (xvi, his emphasis).

Veronica, then, is characterised as a being who transcends the contemporary human obsession with the surface appearance of things and also human definitions of good and evil. She is the praying mantis, fascinating her prey with her eyes, transfixing them. The mantis as a symbol of both death and rebirth (Markus, 2000, 33) can be seen in Veronica’s need for the ‘ideal’ love relation of ‘mutual devouring’ that underlies why she has had little success in relationships up to that point. She awaits “the annihilating sexual embrace”:

For she was preparing herself to be the immolated victim... and her paralysing immobility became like that which precedes aggression. She was getting ready for the great ordeal of giving her life, she was arming herself with a dangerous force, for at the least flinching of her partner in the accomplishing of the rite – that of tearing out her heart, she knew herself capable of sealing the climax of their absolute embrace with the

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<sup>140</sup> See Chapter 3 for an in-depth look at ‘inquisitions’ in Dalí.

force of her own jaws, and thus by the death of one of them concluding her pact of conformity with the grandiose rules and laws of the nature of her love (65).

There is a tension between Veronica being the ‘victim’ but at the same time the aggressor. If her beloved will not annihilate her, she will not hesitate in doing so to him. Her characterisation as the aggressor is part of the mantis imagery throughout the passage. She has taken up the pose of the female mantis, ‘her paralysing immobility... like that which precedes aggression’. The ‘embrace’ is presented as a battle in which if her partner ‘flinches’ in ‘annihilating’ her, she will bite off his head, which implies that if men allow women too much sexual power they will emasculate them. It also implies that women want to be tamed; they want a man more powerful than them. There is also again the association of Veronica with the transcendent; the ‘nature of her love’ has ‘grandiose rules and laws’, perhaps implying that ‘her love’ is an atavistic rebirth. By referring to the act as an ‘ordeal’ it associates it with the phenomenon of the rite of passage. Markus (2000) has noted how in many cultures there are rites of passage which involve “maturity and teeth”. These rites generally involve the removal of teeth as the entrance into maturity (35): a rebirth. This is from the male point-of-view, a male rite of passage. In *Hidden Faces*, however, it is a woman speaking of this ‘ordeal’, and Dalí endows it with a distinctly feminine aspect.

The ritualistic nature of Veronica’s ‘ordeal’ can be seen in her desire for a female friend who will be “the priestess of her faith” and “the virgin-flower of the ritual of her sacrifice” (65). Whilst this suggests that the ‘friend’s’ role will be to guide and prepare Veronica for her ‘annihilation’, the narrative progression of the novel indicates that in fact the relationship between them will be more like that between dominator and dominated. The female friend must have “a big mouth” and “no frivolity”, but she must

not be a threat to her, as indicated by the criteria of her being “as feeble as [Veronica’s] own mother” and entirely “devoted” to her (65). This ‘friend’ comes in the form of Betka, a Polish immigrant with a tyrannical mother towards whom she feels admiration. She has an ample mouth with teeth that are displayed when she laughs. Her teeth are often referred to in terms of their prominence and force: “her pure teeth savagely crunched stalks of celery that broke in her mouth like icicles of spring” (68). There is never any concern that Betka might try to ‘devour’ Veronica though, as in keeping with her criteria, she is also ‘feeble’ (65). Betka is utterly fascinated by Veronica, “lulled by the intoxication which Veronica’s personality communicated to her” (68), and soon defers all considerations over to her. Much like in Freud’s description of the male response to the female Narcissist, Betka over-values her. Expecting a phone call which never came from Veronica she ignores all the arrangements and job interviews she had organized for the day (72-73) and then waits two hours for her at a party at which she never arrives (83). Veronica’s concerns never abandon what is good for herself, whereas Betka at this point, to use Freud’s turn-of-phrase (1914, 5), has completely cathected her libido onto Veronica.

To continue with the reference to Freud, in his ‘On the Introduction of Narcissism’ he claims that Narcissistic women who fascinate men “become... magnetically attractive to those who have altogether relinquished their own narcissism, and who are casting around for object-love” (17-18). Betka embodies this variety of psychology perfectly as she is described as “so feeble, without any other resources than her hunger for affection, her readiness and eagerness to give her heart” (*HF*, 86). Furthermore, Freud compares the fascination exacted by the Narcissistic woman to that of animals that are indifferent to humans (18). Veronica is overtly referred to as a praying mantis, and she is often

completely indifferent to humans and their feelings; not to mention the fact that her aggression is animalistic too: “like all combative creatures belonging to an élite she was pitiless, vindictive and subject to irretrievable passions” (61).

Returning to the ‘ritualistic’ implications of Veronica’s sought for ‘ordeal’, then, we can see elements of the Freudian notion of the Narcissistic woman, especially when we discover her longing for a child. In describing the lead-up to the ‘ordeal’, it is declared, “like the legendary beings of the ancient sanguinary religions of the Aztecs, Veronica sitting in the shadow of the fertile coolness of the great tree of *her blood* waiting” (65, my emphasis). Freud claimed that the only way in which the Narcissistic woman could experience object-love is through having a child (1914, 18). Thus, Veronica’s ‘ordeal’ is characterised as having both the qualities of ‘annihilation’ and rebirth; and the rebirth which results from the ‘rite of passage’ is distinctly female and in keeping with Freud’s notion of the female Narcissist.

Veronica had already foreseen the meeting between Betka and herself. One of her transcendent attributes was the gift of foresight (63; 65). There is notably, however, a sentence which may or may not intentionally undermine Veronica’s powers of foresight. The sentence reads as a piece of foreshadowing, but there is uncertainty as to whether it is meant for the reader alone or if it is something psychologically felt by the characters. Upon meeting, “Betka and Veronica each silently watched in the depths of the other’s eyes the receding wake of the laughing foam of illusion, which the little they had lived together already stirred behind the rudder encrusted with blackish barnacles and dark algae” (67-68). Has it been an ‘illusion’ that Betka would live up to Veronica’s exacting standards regarding a ‘friend’? Are they stuck with each other now they have

embarked on this journey? It is difficult to say. As the novel progresses, the ‘friendship’ does not continue in line with the importance which Veronica initially endows it, and it is difficult to say whether this sentence foreshadows that or if it is more indicative of Dalí’s shortcomings as a writer. If it is a foreshadowing then it undermines Veronica and her foresight, an undermining which at this point in the novel is not in keeping with her characterisation.

To sum up, Veronica embodies the characteristics of the Freudian Narcissistic woman. She fascinates Betka in the latter’s search for “object-love”, she has animalistic qualities in that she is presented as the praying mantis, and she yearns to be a mother; motherhood is the form that rebirth takes with her. She is both the aggressor and the longed-for victim. She longs to be dominated, and will aggressively dominate any man who does not ‘annihilate’ her. She has the abilities of a Paranoiac in the form of foresight, and she is described as a “combative creature... belonging to an élite” (61). She is one of the few characters in the novel who actually achieves rebirth, the others being Randolph (the father of her child) and, arguably, Solange. Even though Betka gives birth to a child of her own, it is Veronica’s child which is lauded at the end of the novel in that it fulfils a prophecy. This ‘prophecy’ is described as relating to “‘the Beast of Blood’... be[ing] subdued by a young people come from beyond the seas to redeem and deliver with its new blood the faults of the ancient people that has spent itself in the excesses of science and of sin” (312). This variety of rhetoric can be found in anti-semitic and racist tracts of the time and casts a pall over the latter stages of the novel. This rhetoric will be discussed further in the next chapter, but for the remainder of this one I will discuss the importance of the Narcissistic man, the Comte de Grandsailles, his place in politics, and his role in cultural renewal in *Hidden Faces*. This discussion will

pave the way for my exploration in the next chapter of the claims that Dalí had fascist sympathies.

### **The Comte de Grandsailles**

In *Hidden Faces*, Dalí places the figure of the male Narcissist into the world of politics through the character of the Comte de Grandsailles. After WW2 has broken out he is sent to North Africa by the Vichy government to negotiate a trade agreement (171). However, Grandsailles has other plans in mind and he heads to Malta. As part of a continuing theme of disillusion in the French government's inability to prevent the outbreak of WW2, Grandsailles decides to carry on intrigues that are defined as anti-German. The reader is never directly told what his plans are (190-191), but s/he is informed unambiguously that they are anti-Nazi – the Nazis are referred to as “the invader[s]” (176). The fifth chapter of the novel depicts Grandsailles rallying people to his cause, uniting the Royalists and the Communists for his own ends so he can play them against one another and be sure of their loyalty to him. Furthermore, he has with him from France the “pederast” (82), Cécile Goudreau, and his friend, the Prince d’Orminy. Up to this point they had both been portrayed as incurable opium addicts, but they now have “a rôle to play” as “Africa will decide everything!” (166). This sets up Grandsailles and his retinue as characters who believe themselves to be central to the writing of history and the progress of the war. It also presents the war and service to Grandsailles as the road to redemption for both Goudreau and d’Orminy, elevating the Count to the status of redeemer.



The representation of Grandsailles in the fifth chapter explores the inter-relation of Narcissism, Paranoia, and political power. In his introduction to Freud's *Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Other Writings*, Edmundson (2003) draws a link between Narcissism and political power. He claims that our attraction to authority figures stems from our pre-genital development to which we regress "where and when we can" as adults (xi). The specific period of pre-genital development to which he is referring is that directly after birth when we are "polymorphous pervers[s]" (x) experiencing the "perfect authority and love" of the father and mother respectively (xi). Love activates within us pre-genital fantasies to which we want to regress and be absorbed with the mother and father again (xii). When we perform an object-cathexis we 'over-value' the loved one and assign authority to them in a way which "takes the place of the super-ego" (xvii). As noted above, the Narcissist has the ability to fascinate us and remind us of our pre-genital experience. If the Narcissist was in a position of power, when we over-value them through casting our love upon them, we would imbue them with ultimate authority (xvii-xviii). As Edmundson notes, the Narcissist activates in people that yearning for pleasure and authority characteristic of the pre-genital sexual state (xv).

In *Hidden Faces*, the ease with which Grandsailles encourages people to follow him as their leader, and the manner in which they think about their condition, could be seen in terms of them making this regression to the pre-genital state. Examples of characters being critical of Grandsailles but not being able to prevent themselves from following him abound. As the Prince d'Orminy states, "No matter how hateful you make yourself, you still remain just as fascinating" (*HF*, 174). Freud argued that the Narcissist has the ability to bewitch and fascinate, and it is these qualities that Grandsailles manifests.

Whilst recruiting Baba to fly the Count to Malta, Cécile draws direct attention to his ability to fascinate:

He fascinates people who, won over to his cause and prepared to join him in action, will enable him to sow in every French heart the ancestral germs of the forces of resistance which must in the end bring about the country's liberation. And the seed of Grandsailles is the very seed which produced the noblest and oldest oak-trees on earth (185).

Critiquing what is portrayed as the contemporary French lack of power, she advocates a regression, an 'atavism', which will bring about freedom. She identifies Grandsailles with this 'atavism', as the embodiment of what is being returned to, glorifying him as a leader who quite literally has his roots in 'Old France', roots which "also tear down walls in the end" (185). Thus, even though Cécile violently criticises Grandsailles, noting that his methods, despite seeking different ends, are very similar to those of 'the enemy', she declares to Baba that "it's the combination of people like the Count of Grandsailles and you that will win us this war in the end" (184).

Edmundson claims that "[t]he narcissist is the one who can transport us away from the standard vision of the day-to-day and convince us that extraordinary things are possible" (xiv-xv). This characteristic can be seen in Grandsailles. Prince d'Orminy declares that Grandsailles "know[s] that everything [he] wish[es] must be realized" (174) after having admitted that despite how horrible the Count can be he is still drawn to him. And on the plane to Malta, Grandsailles' "presence reassures" Fouseret, the Royalist (187). Fouseret declares, "you are the only authority to have succeeded in gaining the confidence of all political groups, and yet you have no well-defined policy. Does any of us really know why we are obeying you?" (187) After which he listens to him "full of admiration" despite not hearing half of what he says over the noise from the

plane, and says to himself, “There is no resisting this man’s ascendancy!” (188). This all suggests that Grandsailles has a hypnotic effect on those around him, convincing them that they will play a part in the incredible things he will achieve despite the fact that they do not know what those things are. As Edmundson notes, “we believe that by gaining the narcissist’s love or at least his recognition, we might share in his numinous life” (xv).

It is not only external figures to the Count who over-value Grandsailles. He is more than eager to over-value himself, which is in-keeping with Freud’s notion of the ‘over-valuation’ of the self characteristic of the Narcissist viewing him/herself as the love-object. He sees himself in the same mythic terms with which Cécile invests him. As the Count has no knowledge of law, the Prince d’Orminy offers his own expertise, to which Grandsailles responds by shouting, “I don’t need to find out about the laws!... I know everything! I have three thousand years of experience, I’m as old as the world!” (171). This self-aggrandizement continues throughout the novel and he constantly associates himself with the ‘Old France’ which is to be reborn through his efforts in Malta. Considering Brousillon’s, the Communist’s, plot to sabotage the Nazi’s plans to industrialize the Count’s acres of land, he thinks to himself:

And at last the myrtles and honeysuckle might grow again on the spot where they had bloomed for three thousand years, healing over the scars in the mutilated earth with their perennial greenness. Sabotage! And the snails might again slowly glide over the backs of the same stones, that had remained in the same place since the period of the Romans! (181).

He is seeing the rebirth of his land, of ‘Old France’, in terms of the rebirth of himself: On the very first page of the novel it is made clear that Grandsailles’ lands are an

extension of the Count himself. Girardin, Grandsailles' notary and friend, declares, "The Count is the living incarnation of one of those rare phenomena of the soil that elude the skill and the resources of agronomy – a soil moulded of earth and blood of an untraceable source, a magic clay of which the spirit of our native land is formed" (17); and the damage done to the Count's lands by his nemesis, Rochefort, is depicted in terms of damage to "the horizon and stability of his childhood" (19). The 'scars in the mutilated earth', then, can be understood as scars upon the body and psyche of Grandsailles. The Count himself conceptualises his lands in hallowed terms, using a staircase form of narrative description most commonly found in biblical texts: "For of all the continents of the globe Grandsailles esteemed only Europe, of all Europe he loved only France, of France he worshipped only Vaucluse, and of Vaucluse the chosen spot of the gods was precisely the one where was located the Château de Lamotte where he was born" (17). He was born in 'the chosen spot of the gods', and the fact that this 'spot' is endangered by the industrialization of the Nazis gives the narrative a mythic quality at the centre of which is the Count of Grandsailles, whose name, translated into English as 'Great Wings', adds to that quality.

The narrative voice of the novel, however, undermines the over-valuation of Grandsailles performed by both himself and those around him. Early in the novel he is portrayed as an almost ridiculous figure, capricious to the extreme, and capable of concentrating on the most important political concerns only to then jump to considering the most frivolous. He ponders his future return to politics, "[a]nd while he was impatiently waiting for war to break out, the Count of Grandsailles was thinking of giving a grand ball..." (19). The ellipsis which ends this statement gives it a comical effect, especially as it is then followed by the refocusing of his mind on the plight of his

lands. Later on as well he moves from the serious to the frivolous with ease. After he has returned from Malta, having succeeded in his unspecified plans, he is walking back to d'Orminy's yacht when he finds a kite: "Grandsailles, whose capricious character tended to manifest its eccentricities in an exaggerated form when under constraint, could not resist the temptation to pick it up", claiming it "with childish avidity" (192). At times a combination of the narrative voice and the Count himself has an undermining effect. In describing the Count's potential role in North Africa, the narrative declares that it

required a special man, inflexible and fanatical in his decisions, suspicious of everything, trusting no one, possessing the science of provocation, as capable of concealing the ever-precise motives of his actions as the vague ones of his sympathies, and combining with the flashes of his anger the distant fog of an effaced and superlative elegance. This man was Count Hervé de Grandsailles, or at least he believed himself to be he, inasmuch as for a short time he really was (169-170).

Whilst to begin with this description of Grandsailles' traits appears to be lauding him, the last sentence emphasises the fact that the Count sees *himself* as 'a special man' and his short-lived success may in fact be more down to chance than the attributes which the Count has ascribed to his success. Furthermore, his traits have directly led to his successes being short-lived: "Grandsailles succeeded in imposing himself, but his lack of sympathy immediately caused the objectives of his successes, too quickly attained, to crumble" (170). What the narrator grants, he taketh just as quickly away. The narrative continues its slow-dissection of Grandsailles by presenting him as not particularly self-aware. He has an interest in alchemy through which is channelled his fascination with a return to the Middle Ages. When he admits to himself that he wishes to marry Solange de Cléda he immediately categorises his interest in the occult as 'infantile', pushing his interest away in favour of the sublimation of his desires through marriage. This suggests

an embrace of both regression and sublimation through ‘mutual devouring’. The Count’s governess had previously criticised his occult ‘experiment’ with Solange<sup>141</sup>, the setting of which had been strewn with flowers. She declared that “it’s not with flowers that one gets children!” (149), suggesting that having children is a sublimating impulse through which one can renew oneself instead of remaining Narcissistically focused on the self. Much like the case with Veronica, having children is represented as a means of departing from Narcissism. Thus, in *Hidden Faces*, ‘mutual devouring’ and having children are portrayed as means of overcoming Narcissism in both men and women. However, when Grandsailles discovers that Solange has bought the contested part of his lands, he interprets it as a means by which to *force* him into marrying her and returns to his interest in the occult, bringing his alchemical preparations to Africa with him (170). The threat which he perceives as posed by Solange prevents him from embracing the ‘mutual devouring’ of procreation, an embrace which Veronica accepts and renews herself through. Grandsailles’ complete lack of self-awareness *vis-à-vis* what has happened with Solange is demonstrated by the fact that whilst he himself is fixed upon the ‘infantile’, he accuses d’Orminy of behaving “like a child” (172).

The manner in which Grandsailles’ character is undermined and ridiculed, combined with his Narcissistic fascination on people, contributes to the construction of the Count, and the Narcissistic individual in politics, as highly dangerous. At one and the same time we are laughing at the Count and his overblown regard for himself, and terrified of the tyrannical behaviour he exacts upon those around him. The pinnacle of the danger that Grandsailles poses comes when he is compared with Hitler. The narrative juxtaposes a description of Hitler in his bunker with a description of Grandsailles. Both are pounding their fists, Hitler on the arm of his chair (301) and Grandsailles on the

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<sup>141</sup> See chapter 3 for details on this ‘experiment’.

table (304), and the latter is “that other madman” (304). The narrative foresees the death of Hitler in his bunker, and as the Count and Hitler are presented as similar characters at this point, one could argue that the narrative is suggesting a similar end for Grandsailles. Hitler is consistently portrayed throughout the novel in an unsympathetic light, being referred to as “sucking the energy of all like a vampire” (123). He is also described as “the great paranoiac of Berchtesgaden” (123). Considering that Paranoiac-Criticism is so central to Dalí’s theoretical and creative method, it would be easy to argue that he is showing admiration for Hitler here. I would instead claim that through the characters of Grandsailles and Hitler, both Paranoiacs, he is suggesting that Paranoia and Narcissism can lead to dangerous individuals, especially when they take on roles in politics, and that a unifying renewal through ‘mutual devouring’ is an alternative. This renewal also has a regressive element, however, via atavistic tendencies in the mantis-battle of ‘mutual devouring’.

One could ask at this point, given how central psychoanalysis is to *Hidden Faces* and the characterisation of the figures that populate it, why Dalí chose psychoanalysis as his theoretical underpinning? Dalí was not the only artist/writer to engage with Freud as a means of examining their cultural moment. Outside of the Surrealist Movement, May Sinclair’s *Life and Death of Harriett Frean* (1922) is one such example. Dalí’s fascination with Freud and psychoanalysis began as a means for him to explore his own life and from there it developed into a way for him to examine the world around him, developing his own versions and applications of Freud and Rank’s theories. For Dalí, psychoanalytic theory could be used not only as a way to describe reality but also as a way of changing and improving reality. In *Hidden Faces*, the over-arching message we

seem to be able to draw is that a balance between sublimating and regressive impulses is necessary for individual and cultural renewal.

The form which individual renewal takes within the novel, i.e. having a child and overcoming narcissism, is easier to identify than the form of cultural renewal advocated. The latter is portrayed at the end of the novel as regressive and ambiguous.

Grandsailles' wishes regarding his lands, thwarting the industrialization threatened by the Nazis, come to pass: "while the methodical Teuton in his rapacity was turning the course of the streams to wrench the metals of war from the bowels of the earth of Old Libreux and empires were crumbling...[,] the wood of young cork-oaks that Solange de Cléda had planted on the morrow of the Count of Grandsailles' ball had been growing" (313). This regrowth in the Count's lands must surely, if we want to make a claim of coherency in the novel, be associated with the healing of Grandsailles' psyche and a renewal of the values of 'Old France' which the Count himself represents. This is a combination of unifying and atavistic impulses. However, after Solange dies she manifests in one of the cork oaks. Considering that throughout the novel she has been characterised as threatening and chaotic to the Count, one could interpret this as disrupting both Grandsailles' psyche and the cultural unity of the return of 'Old France' produced by the regrowth of the forest. This ending is foreshadowed near the beginning of the novel when Solange appraises Grandsailles' escutcheon, formed of the double-image of a woman and a tree, containing the motto "Je suis la dame" (45). The novel ends with an illustration of this double-image with the Latin word 'RENOVABITUR' emblazoned beneath. 'Renovabitur' is conjugated from 'renovō', which means "to renew, restore;... revive" (Collins Dictionary, 185).



The fact that 'Renovabitur' is the final word of the novel emphasises its importance, but Grandsailles' 'renewal' can only be interpreted as unsuccessful. The merging of the image of the woman and the tree could be interpreted as 'mutual devouring' between Solange and Grandsailles, but against such a reading is the fact that the Count remains impotent to the very end of the novel. There could still be the possibility of an individual renewal of the Count, though. One of the final acts Grandsailles performs is attacking his governess, a woman who symbolises the mother-figure. The Count never goes anywhere without her, which, amongst all his other 'infantile' tendencies, symbolises a regressive mother-fixation. Attacking her could represent his surmounting of such regressive tendencies, thus paving the way for renewal. On the other hand, the novel ends with Grandsailles bowing his head, hiding his face in his hands, and refusing to look out of the window at his lands. The image of the man with his head in his hands is common within Dalí's painted works and, according to Ades (1995) and Gibson (1997), can represent sexual shame (75; 217). This therefore acts against the possibility that Grandsailles may undergo a successful renewal. When compared with the unequivocally successful personal and cultural renewal of Randolph and Veronica, Grandsailles' renewal appears an abject failure. In the next chapter I will explore the efforts towards personal and cultural renewals made by Grandsailles, Randolph, and Veronica in the context of fascism and ask the question of whether *Hidden Faces* actually advocates fascist ideology.

In this section, however, I have explored the intersection of narcissism, paranoia, and political power in *Hidden Faces*, arguing that Dalí portrays the narcissistic political leader as threatening, fascinating, and regressive. Sublimating and regressive impulses vie for attention in the novel, a combination of the two through 'mutual devouring' and

procreation ultimately being positioned as preferable to regression alone. Ultimately, this section has shown how *Hidden Faces* dramatizes the way in which the narcissistic and authoritarian leader-figure, in the form of Grandsailles, fascinates and controls those around him to the extent that they are willing to die for him. Given that the novel was written and published in 1944, clear parallels can be drawn between Grandsailles' behaviour and Hitler's, a parallel overtly made at the end of *Hidden Faces*. In the next chapter I will investigate the relation of such a narcissistic figure to the novel's stance on fascism.

## Conclusion

This chapter explores the importance of the figure of the narcissist to Dalí's thinking in the late 30s and early 40s as he uses it to investigate the chaotic cultural and political *milieu* in which he finds himself. In 'Metamorphose de Narcisse', Dalí uses Rank's theory of the 'trauma of birth' to explore the rebirth of the narcissist through unifying and regressive impulses. In *Hidden Faces*, he uses an amended version of the Freudian theory of narcissistic personality development to suggest that the narcissistic individual can be dangerous in a position of political power and that narcissism is something which must ultimately be overcome through a combination of sublimating/unifying and regressive impulses. This reading runs counter to Finkelstein's (1996) contention that in the late 1930s Dalí made a *volte-face* away from regressive concerns to sublimation (242). In *Hidden Faces*, the combination of regression and sublimation takes the form of 'mutual devouring' and procreation, and thus for Dalí the means of overcoming Narcissism is the same for both males and females.

## **Chapter 6: The Charge of Fascism**

In the 1930s, Dalí was adamant that he was neither Hitlerian nor had Hitlerian sympathies. His defences against being deemed a fascist or a “fascist element”, as Breton phrased it in 1934 (quoted by Dalí, *Unspeakable Confessions*, 126), always seemed to revolve around alleged support for a specific individual, in the case of the 1930s, Hitler. And indeed the more recent charges against Dalí regarding fascism have revolved around the leader of a Movement too, notably Hitler and Franco, and whether Dalí might have supported them.<sup>142</sup> My question of whether Dalí had fascist sympathies is not related to his support or non-support of the leader of a fascist Movement. Rather, I am looking at the ways in which his aesthetic theories regarding ‘the Classic’ and the way he applied them to an all-encompassing theory of cultural renewal intersect with a more general fascist ideology during the late 1930s and the war years.

It is important to delimit here what I mean by ‘fascist ideology’. Central to the definition I will be using in this chapter is Griffin’s (2012) notion of “the centrality of ‘palingenetic myth’ to fascism” (7), i.e. a “form of ultra-nationalism that attempts to realize the myth of the regenerated nation” (1). Combined with this I will be using Frost’s (2002) description of “articulations of fascist ideology” that have been identified in Modernist texts:

anti-Marxism, anticapitalism, xenophobic nationalism, antidemocracy, racism, a belief  
in natural social hierarchy, a combination of nostalgia for a romanticized preindustrial

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<sup>142</sup> Melly (1973) focuses his discussion of whether Dalí was fascist on the artist’s alleged support for fascist leaders. He claims that Dalí did not support Hitler, but that he did support General Franco (37).

past and an infatuation with a technologized future. The fascist modernists also give voice to fascism's rhetoric of eroticized antagonism, glorified violence, and masculine virility, as well as its fear and oppression of women and homosexuals (4).

Frost distinguishes between fascist Modernists who incorporate fascist ideology into their texts and non-fascist writers who use fascist ideology "alongside a rejection of fascist politics" (4). I contend that Dalí does not fit comfortably into either of those camps. This chapter looks at how *Hidden Faces* critiques 'fascist leaders' and Parties but at the same time advocates fascist ideology as part of a notion of cultural rebirth via 'the classic'.

Regarding Hitlerian sympathies, Dalí had many opportunities to defend himself, the most famous of these being when the Surrealists considered his painting, *The Weaning of Furniture-Nutrition* (1934), to contain such sympathies. Originally, the seated figure in the foreground, identified in 'La Conquête de l'Irrationnel' (1935) as a "Hitlerian wet nurse" (8), wore a swastika armband, but due to the furore of the Surrealists this was painted out (Greeley, 2006, 54). The charge made against Dalí by Breton regarding the painting was worded as follows:

Dalí having been guilty on several occasions of counterrevolutionary actions involving the glorification of Hitlerian fascism, the undersigned propose – despite his statement of January 25, 1934 – that he be excluded from Surrealism as a fascist element and combated by all available means (quoted by Dalí, *Unspeakable Confessions*, 126).

This charge formed part of a Surrealist tribunal called for February 5, 1934 where members of the Movement would decide whether to expel Dalí. The accusations that he had Hitlerian sympathies dogged him throughout the 30s, and despite his flippant tone towards recounting the 'tribunal' in his *Unspeakable Confessions* in the 1970s, there is

evidence that in the 1930s he took these charges seriously. In a draft letter to Breton (c. 1933) he takes on a more serious tone than is his wont, claiming that neither the Nazis nor the Communists would approve of his works. He states that he sees his work as “antagonistic for Germany and unfortunately also for Russia” (4), suggesting the double-meaning that neither the Nazis nor the Communists would approve and that Dalí was actively creating artworks that would antagonise them. He does, however, demonstrate a desire to understand “Hitlerism”, claiming that “[n]o explanation known appears to me to resolve nor explain the Hitlerian phenomenon” (4).<sup>143</sup> Greeley (2006) has shown how such a desire was perceived as a threat by Breton and led to the aforementioned tribunal (81).<sup>144</sup>

For the majority of the time, from the mid-30s onwards, when faced with the accusation that he might have sympathies with Hitler, Dalí reiterated that he was apolitical and ahistorical, as if that would assuage any doubters. In his *Secret Life* (1942) he claims that “I was definitely not a historic man. On the contrary I felt myself essentially anti-historic and a-political” (357). With his claims to be apolitical and ahistorical, Dalí intended to position himself outside of contemporary political events, an observer who could hover over the course of history commenting upon its twists-and-turns but ultimately not becoming involved. Being ‘ahistorical’ distanced himself from Communism<sup>145</sup>, and being ‘apolitical’ distanced himself from the charges of having fascist sympathies. As noted in the previous chapter, however, his ‘commentary’ belies a clear bias. In *Secret Life*, he notes how his painting, *Soft Construction with Boiled*

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<sup>143</sup> Draft letter held in the archives of the Scottish National Gallery of Modern Art. Item 11. Ref. number: GMA A42/1/GKA008 [Accessed: 14-18 July 2014].

<sup>144</sup> Greeley herself appears to have sympathy with Breton’s stance, claiming that Dalí’s stance on fascism is “suspect” (56). She also, however, claims that it is important to comprehend Dalí’s work on fascism as it helps us to understand “the Surrealist political imagination” (56).

<sup>145</sup> His continual critique of ‘materialism’ in the mid-late 30s does not only relate to his critique of Charcot’s ‘materialism’ of the nineteenth century. It also, like Dalí’s claims to be ahistorical, relates to his aversion to Communism’s ‘historical materialism’.

*Beans (Premonition of Civil War)* (1936), was painted in response to the events in Spain. His description of the painting makes a political comment about the utility of Revolution: “As a background to this architecture of frenzied flesh devoured by a narcissistic and biological cataclysm, I painted a geological landscape, that had been uselessly revolutionized for thousands of years, congealed in its ‘normal course.’” (357). Indeed, throughout that chapter he continuously makes comments about the political events in his home-country, what has caused them, and how they can be resolved through the world ‘becoming Classic’. Dalí has a clear bias despite resisting stating an affiliation with any particular Party politics: “I believed neither in the communist revolution nor in the national-socialist revolution, nor in any other kind of revolution. I believed only in the supreme reality of tradition” (360).

In the 1960s, Dalí allowed a more ambivalent stance towards apoliticism and a potential Hitlerian sympathy. In his *Diary of a Genius* (1964), in discussing how the Surrealists were so suspicious of him during the 1930s, he declares that,

No matter how often *I assured myself* that my Hitler-inspired vertigo was apolitical, that the work generated by the feminised image of the Führer was of *a scandalous ambiguity*, that these representations were tinged with the same degree of morbid humour as those of William Tell or Lenin – no matter how often I repeated all this to my friends, it was no use. This new crisis in my painting aroused greater and greater suspicion among the surrealists (28, my emphasis).

Here Dalí seems to be trying to convince himself as much as anyone else that he was not betraying Hitlerian sympathies by suggesting that his representations of Hitler were an expression of playfulness, ‘morbid humour’. ‘Black humour’ was an important part

of the Surrealist aesthetic, indeed Breton dedicated a book to it<sup>146</sup>, and Dalí is claiming that he was keying into this aspect of Surrealism with his representations of Hitler. Dalí's argument appears to be that 'morbid humour' resided in the 'scandalous ambiguity', and that as such we should view those works as provocative rather than betraying political bias<sup>147</sup>. Notably, this is the only occasion that Dalí allows overt ambiguity regarding Hitlerian sympathies<sup>148</sup>.

Greeley (2006) has convincingly shown that prior to joining the Surrealist Movement, Dalí was anything but ahistorical and apolitical<sup>149</sup>. He was affiliated with the Catalan communist group, BOC, although he never formally joined (211, n. 62), and at meetings spoke in favour of Communist ideology with the vehemence for which he became famous (62-63). It is important to note, though, that Dalí's support was primarily for Communist ideology rather than the Communist Party, and he often took the opportunity of critiquing the Party for not adhering closely enough to their own ideology. At a BOC gathering in 1931, Dalí declared,

Basing themselves in an obscurantist interpolation of Marxism, [the Communist Party] claim that the new proletarian morality will be a vigorous consequence of the economic and social revolution. This... is the equivalent of not wanting to prepare this social

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<sup>146</sup> André Breton implied in his *Anthology of Black Humour* (1979) that he coined the term 'black humour' (17). However, its meaning of depicting the morbid or the dark in humorous ways has been noted earlier in 1916 (OED, <http://www.oed.com.lcproxy.shu.ac.uk/view/Entry/282814?redirectedFrom=black+humour#eid>. [Accessed on 31 July 2017].

<sup>147</sup> Both Millet (cited in Klein, 2009) and Caws (cited in Klein, 2009) have argued that Dalí's political statements should be viewed as primarily provocative.

<sup>148</sup> Dalí was decidedly less ambiguous in his support of General Franco towards the end of the Franco dictatorship. His stance is not within the remit of this chapter, but later I will dwell upon his position during WW2. For an authoritative account of their relationship see Jeffett, W. 2008. *The Artist and the Dictator: Salvador Dalí and Francisco Franco*. In: M. R. Taylor, ed., 2008. *The Dalí Renaissance: New Perspectives on His Life and Art after 1940*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 128-152.

<sup>149</sup> Pine (2010) and Radford (1997) also claim that Dalí engaged with his political moment. Pine argues that there is evidence of Communist sympathies in his representation of bread (93; 94), and Radford outlines the ways in which Dalí's paintings of the later 1930s explored the Spanish Civil War and the imminence of WW2 using "[t]he imagery of food and cannibalism... as a metaphor of a nation literally consuming itself" (187).

revolution because fate deems that it will arrive at its proper moment. It is necessary to flee from such fatalism (quoted by Greeley, 63. My ellipsis).

For anyone introduced to Dalí through his late 1930s works and afterwards, when he had already started to advocate with vehemence his apoliticism and ahistoricism, such an engagement with Communist ideology would appear startling. The evidence for Dalí's support of Communist ideology in the 1920s allows us to question Finkelstein's (1998) claims that Dalí's Communist rhetoric whilst a member of the Surrealist Movement was calculated to gain him support (147). He already held those views and incorporated them into the Surrealist rhetoric of how the Movement would help bring about the Revolution.

His relationship to Communism in the 1920s and early 30s prefigures his relationship with Surrealism, i.e. much like with Communism, he stated that he could do Surrealism better than the Surrealists, supporting the aesthetic and theory but questioning the authority of the Movement. In his *Unspeakable Confessions* (1976), in relation to the aforementioned 1934 'trial' for his alleged "glorification of Hitlerian fascism", he states that "I assimilated the letter and spirit of the movement which indeed corresponded so exactly to my deeper nature that I embodied it most naturally... I was probably the most Surrealist of the whole group – perhaps the *only* Surrealist – and what I was being accused of in essence was being too much so" (112, his emphasis). I contend that his stance towards both Communism and Surrealism, i.e. ideology over Party/Movement, is an intrinsic aspect of his relationship with fascism pre-1945.<sup>150</sup> He critiques specific fascist groups, such as the Nazi Party, but espouses the fascist ideology of the "palingenetic myth" (Griffin, 1). Nowhere is this more apparent than in his novel

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<sup>150</sup> I specify pre-1945 because after the war he shows support for General Franco.



*Hidden Faces*, where it is depicted through two rebirths, one attempted and the other successful. The Comte de Grandsailles' attempted cultural and personal renewal is an attempted rebirth of 'classical values' via a narcissistic, tyrannous, and charismatic leader: himself. Grandsailles is compared with Hitler and his renewal ultimately fails. Randolph and Veronica, however, usher in a cultural rebirth replete with fascist rhetoric revolving around a Catholic, ethnic renewal of blood. There is no celebration of the cult of the fascist leader within this renewal, but there is the elevation and glorification of motherhood. As it is my contention that Dalí critiques particular fascist groups whilst nonetheless advocating fascist ideology, this chapter continues my argument from previous chapters that Dalí does not succeed in being apolitical. Pre-1945 he seems to believe that not showing open support for a particular political Party makes him apolitical. However, *Hidden Faces* is a highly political novel and takes a political stance.

Whether we can attribute political stances in a novel to the author who wrote that novel is a notoriously vexed question. In the case of *Hidden Faces* the question is just as complicated. In chapter 2 I made a distinction between 'Narrator-Dalí' and 'Writer-Dalí', claiming that 'Narrator-Dalí' is a fictional version of the latter. The two intersect, but in Dalí's 'autobiographical' works there are events and behaviour recounted that apply only to 'Narrator-Dalí'. I suggested that this 'Narrator-Dalí' is the Dalí persona. The voice of the 'Author's Foreword' to *Hidden Faces* can be identified as 'Narrator-Dalí', and he tells the reader that the narrative should be linked with the Dalinian persona. He declares that "those who have read my *Secret Life* attentively will readily discover beneath the novel's structure the continual and vigorous familiar presence of the essential myths of my own life and of my own mythology" (xiii). Here, 'Narrator-

Dalí' is attempting to control the reader's interpretative position by not only claiming that this is the way in which the novel *should* be read, but it is the way in which he *wants* it to be read, i.e. together with *Secret Life*. In drawing our attention to the myths of *Secret Life*, we note that the primary one is that of Dalinian rebirth through 'inquisitorial' pressure and the way in which that myth is proposed as a means of renewing European society as a whole. As noted in chapter 4, he applies an instance of personal renewal through 'the classic' to society: After cocoon-like pressure he emerges with the knowledge that the "important thing was to render the experience of my life 'classic,' to endow it with a form, a cosmogony, a synthesis, an architecture of eternity" (*SL*, 350). The Dalinian persona is integrally tied up with 'the classic' and 'classical rebirth'. Thus, by suggesting in the 'Author's Foreword' that the Dalinian myth of renewal underlies the narrative of *Hidden Faces*, 'Narrator-Dalí' is suggesting that one of the hidden faces of the title is his own<sup>151</sup>, and thus by extension we should associate the ideology of the novel with the Dalinian persona. In which case, if the novel is shown to incorporate fascist ideology in a non-critical way, there is potential for suggesting that Dalí had fascist sympathies before his pro-Franco rhetoric of the late-40s onwards because of the way 'Narrator-Dalí' and 'Writer-Dalí' intersect. However, as I have suggested that 'Narrator-Dalí' is a fictional version of 'Writer-Dalí', there is also potential for suggesting that any fascist ideology in the novel can be attributed to the persona and not 'Writer-Dalí'. It is worth pointing out, however, that 'Writer-Dalí' never attributes opinions to 'Narrator-Dalí' that he then declines to defend. This combined with the fact that 'Narrator-Dalí' and 'Writer-Dalí' intersect suggests that 'Writer-Dalí' *wants* the views espoused by 'Narrator-Dalí' to be associated with himself. Thus, the stance taken in this chapter will be that any non-critical adherence to fascist ideology found in the novel can be attributed to 'Writer-Dalí'.

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<sup>151</sup> Gibson (1997) also suggests that Dalí is one of the hidden faces in the novel (426).

Dalí's claim that he was apolitical and ahistorical suggests that he wanted his vision of renewal to be read as separate to the fascist myths of national renewal circulating during and prior to WW2. However, the intersections are at times so clear that it is difficult not to read them as related. As such, whilst my reading of *Hidden Faces* is in keeping with the stated wish in his 'Author's Foreword' of keeping *Secret Life* in mind, I am reading counter to his repeated claims that he was apolitical and ahistorical, and his claim that he did not have fascist sympathies.

In discussing *Hidden Faces*, I will begin with Grandsailles' failed attempt at cultural and personal renewal before moving onto Randolph and Veronica's success. The novel sets up the threat to 'tradition' defined in Dalí's terms of the 'classic' – i.e. "form, ...cosmogony, ...synthesis, [and] an architecture of eternity" (*SL*, 350) – via the symbolic relationship between Grandsailles and his lands: "The Count is the living incarnation of one of those rare phenomena of the soil that elude the skill and the resources of agronomy – a soil moulded of earth and blood of an untraceable source, a magic clay of which the spirit of our native land is formed" (17). Grandsailles and his lands are of the same origins, and these origins are of a spiritual, ahistorical nature. Class struggle has no role in the nature of the soil or Grandsailles, rather they are both maintained via adherence to hierarchy. The lands are described in terms of 'the classic'. They are "melodic", "flowing" (18), "fertile", "noble" (17), and inspire "patriotic feelings" (18) within Grandsailles. However, the integrity and unity of the lands have been disrupted, "a section about three hundred metres square where the trees had been cut away, leaving a peeled and earthen baldness which disagreeably broke the melodic and flowing line of a great wood of dark cork-oaks" (18). As there is a symbolic

relationship between Grandsailles and his lands, any threat to the unity of the land is also a threat to his unity.

The dynamic of order and classicism vs chaos as dramatized by the disruption to the unity of Grandsailles' lands can also be seen in the relationship between Grandsailles and Solange de Cléda, the latter person representing chaos. A strong example of this is in the organisation of their respective salons. Grandsailles' societal gatherings do not occur spontaneously, and "everything [is] held together so well that since there was nothing that could change places, nothing was 'out of place'" (81). This is stated in the same terms as Dalí's ideal of artistic creation in his *Secret Life*, where he claims that "[t]o be classic meant that there must be so much of 'everything' and of everything so perfectly in place and hierarchically organized, that the infinite parts of the work would be all the less visible" (354). Every individual feature has its own place and fits in with the rest of the picture. Solange's salon, on the other hand, is described by d'Angerville in the following terms:

Just look around: no one seems to be completely finished! And most of the time it's even worse. They all seem to be made up of parts, rented, subrented, from other persons and put together with a thousand pieces not one of which goes with the rest... It's even more pitiful when they try to create an ensemble (82).

It is not just the salon here which is fragmented. It is the people themselves. Fragments within fragments. D'Angerville presents the solution to this fragmentation to be a return to the values of 'oneness' in Renaissance art, using Renaissance equestrian statues as an example: they "had class only if they were cast, horse and horseman, in a single mould" (82). He associates this 'oneness' with Grandsailles' ordered salon. In the same way, then, as in Dalí's amalgamation of past and present in his philosophy of growing within

limits<sup>152</sup>, Grandsailles' salon exemplifies aesthetic order by being associated with a return to the Renaissance emphasis upon classical values of order.

As with his lands, however, Grandsailles' order and synthesis are not stable. His order is consistently juxtaposed with encroaching disorder. Having been in a car accident, he has a limp as a result of his "leg [being] badly set" (22). He notably attempts to incorporate that limp into a 'classical' unity: "by giving a slower and more serene inflection to the rhythm of his defective walk Grandsailles only added to his perfectly proportioned and manly physique a note of melancholy and refined distinction" (22). Indeed, the notion that he is 'perfectly proportioned' is continued in his comparison to the Greek God, Apollo: "The Count's body was perfect, tall and handsome, and to visualize him one may recall the famous drawing of Apollo in the Milan museum, executed by Raphael" (53). However, due to the injury to his leg, he later develops "rheumatism" and "ha[s] recourse to a cane" (218). Thus, disorder is brought upon Renaissance unity.

The cane here has the same purpose as the crutch in Dalí's *Secret Life*: to both literally and figuratively prop up the aristocracy. In his 'autobiography', Dalí writes of the way in which "society people" attract 'hangers on' to prop themselves up, and explains how in order to further his own career as an artist he enthusiastically took on the role of "the group of invalids whose snobbism propped up a decadent aristocracy which still stuck to its traditional attitude" (260). He is aware that the relevance and integrity of the aristocracy is crumbling, and that "quantities and quantities of crutches [are needed] to give a semblance of solidity" (261). These crutches result in propping up the aristocracy into an almost grotesque tableau in which movement is at a minimum and even the

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<sup>152</sup> See chapter 4 for more on this.

slightest gesture requires a prop: “I even invented a tiny facial crutch of gold and rubies. Its bifurcated part was flexible and was intended to hold up and fit the tip of the nose” (261). He then tests whether these crutches have been successful and gives aristocracy a kick to the leg. It does not fall (261-262). In both *Secret Life* and *Hidden Faces*, then, aristocracy is portrayed as being unstable and in need of propping up. Most importantly, however, is how in both texts a Catholic, monarchic, and ‘classic’ rebirth post-WW2 is portrayed as a crutch with which aristocracy can be propped up.

Through Grandsailles, Dalí dramatizes the relationship he draws in *Secret Life* between aristocracy and cultural renewal post-WW2:

The aristocratic regime has in fact been one of my passions, and already at that period I thought a great deal about the possibility of giving back to this class of the elite a historic consciousness of the role which it would inevitably be called upon to play in the ultra-individualist Europe that would emerge from the present war (*SL*, 262).

In *Hidden Faces*, Grandsailles “was sure that the approaching war with Germany was inevitable and that its coming was mathematically demonstrable. [He] was waiting for this moment to enter into politics again, sincerely wishing that it might come as quickly as possible, for he felt his country day by day growing weaker and more corrupt” (19). By extension, Grandsailles is growing weaker as well. He needs a crutch. In *Secret Life*, Dalí makes the ridiculous assertion that he predicted in 1929 that after Communism had abolished democracy in favour of totalitarianism<sup>153</sup>, there would be “a European war out of which... only an individualist tradition that would be Catholic, aristocratic, and probably monarchic could arise anew from the bosom of an impoverished society” (262). From the discussion of crutches which preceded this declaration, it is not

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<sup>153</sup> There are strong parallels here between Dalí’s prediction and fascist rhetoric of the 1930s.

unreasonable to assume that Dalí would enthusiastically take on the role of helping to place that particular crutch under the aristocracy. Why, then, is Grandsailles' cultural and personal renewal at the end of *Hidden Faces* unsuccessful? Grandsailles is the embodiment of the aristocracy described in *Secret Life*, the aristocracy that Dalí takes pleasure in propping up. Why is the crutch of Catholic, monarchic, and 'classic' rebirth represented as failing?

I argued in chapter 5 that Grandsailles is represented as having the characteristics and influence of a fascist leader. Through that character Dalí explores the dangers of a narcissistic individual in such a position of power. Grandsailles' attempted post-war cultural renewal is described in terms replete with fascist ideology: "Beneath the Germans' yoke Europe was rediscovering the tradition of its ancient catholic unity through the community of suffering, and in Libreux the Middle Ages were being reborn with their springtime of superstitions" (*HF*, 295). The language used is in keeping with Griffin's definition of fascist ideology as containing a 'palingenetic myth' (2012, 7) – an 'ultra-nationalistic' "myth of the regenerated nation" (1) – and Frost's (2002) notion of "a romanticized preindustrial past" (4). Grandsailles' beliefs, motivations, and behaviour also adhere very closely to the definition of 'fascism' provided by Lyons (2016).<sup>154</sup> Grandsailles "emphasizes a myth of national... rebirth after a period of decline or destruction"; he calls for a "spiritual revolution" via mystic/occult Catholicism; and he advocates "mystical unity", eroticizing it in his 'experiment' with Solange. He also speaks of "hierarchies" and "romanticize[s] the past as inspiration for

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<sup>154</sup> I became aware of this definition of fascism through Griffin's (2012, 7-8) 'Studying Fascism in a Postfascist Age. From New Consensus to New Wave?' At the time of Griffin's article, the definition was on a website known as publiceye.org. That site has now been renamed, and the new URL is: <http://www.politicalresearch.org/2016/12/12/what-is-fascism-2/#sthash.NiJ9adAK.dpbs>.

national rebirth” (np). Grandsailles does not believe in democracy, but rather he believes in hierarchy, order, and tradition.

The version of cultural renewal that Grandsailles represents combines fascist ideology with Dalí’s theorisation of ‘classical’ rebirth through ‘inquisitorial pressure’. The “ancient catholic unity” is produced by “suffering” within “the Germans’ yoke” (*HF*, 295). In his *Secret Life*, Dalí’s own rebirth is through the ‘inquisitorial pressure’ of anxiety within a metaphorical cocoon, after which he is reborn ‘classic’ (350). He thus applies the mechanism of this rebirth to an overarching theory of cultural renewal; one which he advocates. *However*, and most importantly, the architect of the attempted renewal in these terms in *Hidden Faces* is a failure. This, I would argue, is because Grandsailles is a narcissistic leader, comparable with Hitler, a comparison which the novel makes twice. In his *Unspeakable Confessions* (1976), Dalí writes of the phenomenon of the ‘gratuitous act’<sup>155</sup>, which Hitler exemplifies: “Hitler embodied the perfect image of the great masochist who would unleash a world war solely for the pleasure of losing and burying himself beneath the rubble of an empire: the gratuitous act par excellence” (125). That Grandsailles is comparable to Hitler in this manner can be seen when his metaphorical insect form is described as “the grey nocturnal sphinx butterfly, the middle of whose hairy back is marked with a death’s head” (*HF*, 124). The second comparison between Grandsailles and Hitler in *Hidden Faces* is more overt. Towards the end of the novel, Hitler is sitting in his bunker, banging his fist against the arm of his chair, shouting to himself about how he is “in the blood of the German people” (303). After a paragraph break comes a narrative focusing on “that other madman, the Count of Grandsailles” (304). He too is shouting about blood and banging

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<sup>155</sup> Greeley (2006) writes of the ‘gratuitous act’ and its relationship to Dalí, Lacan, and Hitler in great depth (85-87).



his fist down upon a table (304). Thus, it is not Catholic, monarchic, ‘classic’ renewal that is being critiqued, it is the type of figure Grandsailles represents.

In his ‘La Conquête de l’Irrationnel’ (1935), Dalí argues that due to “ideological disorder”, people turn to “any Hitlerian wet nurse” for “the spiritual and symbolic nourishment that Catholicism had offered throughout the centuries for the appeasement of the cannibalistic frenzy of moral and irrational hungers” (8-9)<sup>156</sup>. Also quoting passages from ‘La Conquête de l’Irrationnel’, Greeley (2006) argues that through the image of a ‘nursemaid’, Dalí posits the turn towards a fascist leader as a regressive act; seeking comfort within the body of the ‘nursemaid’ (81). The mother-figure is a source of pleasure and terror in Dalí’s *oeuvre* (Finkelstein, 1996, 53). In *Hidden Faces*, it is the breast-feeding mother-figure which has this effect. Betka’s son reacts with delight and fright whilst being fed:

For a moment the baby seems frightened by the sudden shadow on his face, but as soon as his mother’s breasts graze him he no longer moves... [H]e accepts the warmth of this heavy caress with a voluptuous immobility so ecstatic that the sight brings tears of tenderness to the two women’s eyes – tears that immediately turn to those of wild laughter when Betka’s son, choking, suddenly reacts with the baffled movements of a drowning creature, struggling with all the energy of his precociously muscular arms (121).

These dual characteristics of the breastfeeding mother-figure (pleasurable/terrifying, comforting/cruel) are repeated in Dalí’s figure of the fascist, who, as Greeley (2006) rightly notes, offers “an illusion of meaty sustenance” rather than the literal nourishment of breast milk (81), but is at the same time suffocating those he ‘nourishes’. In *Secret*

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<sup>156</sup> The latter part of my translation agrees with Finkelstein’s in his *Complete Works of Salvador Dalí*, 263.

*Life*, there is a parable in which the master mason states that the “ideological disorder” of ‘La Conquête de l’Irrationnel’ will lead to “a military dictatorship that... won’t allow any of us to breathe” (355).

The image of the nursemaid from *The Weaning of Furniture-Nutrition* (1934) and ‘Conquête de l’Irrationnel’ is replicated in *Hidden Faces* after the Nazis have taken occupation of Libreux. They have set up “machine-gun nest[s]” and “zone[s]” of “war industrialization”, and a Nazi soldier is described as

sitting patiently, his plump back squeezed by the leather belt and looking from under his helmet at the rain falling on the road full of that earth, muddy, precious as gold, the secret of the fertility of the plain, but which he must have been considering with contempt as a disgrace to any civilized country as he contemplated it with his sky-blue eyes stained by the absence of mud, eyes sterilized and castrated by the savage cleanliness of fascist motor highways. It was really odd, and even hallucinatory, to watch that Nazi, so out of place, sitting slumped before his weapon like a fat nurse busily knitting and mending the stockings of the invasion and the occupation (227).

The Nazi soldier is described as representing values of the complete antithesis of those represented by the Creux de Libreux. He represents industrialization vs a ‘romanticized past’, and sterile feminization vs the virility of the plain. In the ‘Author’s Foreword’, Dalí claims his novel will be slow and contemplative; the experience must be of “a slow travel by cart in the epoch of Stendhal” (xii). The Nazi soldier on the other hand represents modern “motor highways”.

The novel is making its antipathy towards the Nazis clear. They are clearly not seen as the harbinger of renewal via ‘the classic’; after all, the Nazi soldier’s ‘sky-blue eyes

[are] stained by the absence of mud'. The novel dramatizes two approaches to fascist leadership: taking on its traits and becoming like them (as Grandsailles does) or bringing about renewal without them (as Randolph and Veronica do). Despite Grandsailles being overtly anti-Nazi, the threat he perceives them as making to his bodily and psychic unity is a threat he ultimately cannot resist. As discussed in the previous chapter, he takes on the traits of the narcissistic, fascist leader. Grandsailles accused Solange of collaborating with the Nazis by allowing them onto his land, but it was himself who became most like the Nazis by taking on the traits of a fascist leader.

Grandsailles becoming like a fascist leader can be further understood through Greeley's (2006) claim that Dalí saw fascism to be comprehended "as a sexual perversion whose bases were also those of so-called normal human behavior [sic]" (82). In other words, *anyone* can become sympathetic to fascism. This can be seen most clearly in the striking similarities between Hitler's obsessive compulsive behaviours in *Hidden Faces* and Dalí's depiction of his own anxiety-ridden episodes in *Secret Life*. Hitler, trapped in his bunker, is obsessing over his own cleanliness: "He lived in horror with the thought that death might overtake him while any part of his body had not been washed and washed again several times" (302). He is concerned whether "his mucous parts had the least suggestion of an odour", and he frantically rushes around, washing his feet by resting them in an awkward position under the tap (302). In *Secret Life*, Dalí has entered one of his anxious episodes and is frantically applying "salves" and "disinfectants" for fear he might die (365). He requires the toilet to be clean and is obsessed with mucus (365-366). Further comparisons come in the form of artworks surrounding Hitler in *Hidden Faces*. Hitler has a Vermeer to hand, a painting described as "the most beautiful painting in the world, according to Salvador Dali" (302); and looking out of his window

he thinks of Böcklin's *Isle of the Dead* (303), a painting which obsessed 'Narrator-Dalí' in 'Rêverie' (1931)<sup>157</sup>. Through drawing these similarities between his own behaviour and Hitler's, Dalí is suggesting that there is a very fine line between those who are fascist and those who are not; anyone can become fascist. Indeed, Greeley (2006) argues that this was something of which Breton was very much aware and could explain why he was so reticent to allow Dalí's investigations of fascism under the label of Surrealism (83). However, the difference between Dalí and Hitler is that every time the former had one of these manic episodes in his *Secret Life*, the solution was the reassertion of 'the classic', of unity, a reassertion that neither Hitler nor Grandsailles could make.

Catholic, 'classic' renewal for Dalí would not be via the leader of a fascist Movement or Party, but does involve a mythic rebirth of values, a rebirth described in terms of fascist ideology. This can be seen in the fates of Veronica and John Randolph. Veronica achieves motherhood by the end of the novel, not through Grandsailles, whom she has married, but rather through Randolph. Grandsailles, like the 'sterile' and 'castrated' Nazi-soldier, has become impotent. The descriptions of Randolph's 'heroic' fate and Veronica's motherhood are replete with the fascist rhetoric of continental rebirth. Randolph's journey to America is given mythic status as the fruition of prophecy: "[J]ust as it seems on the point of dominating all, the Beast [the Nazis] will be subdued by a young people come from beyond the seas to redeem and deliver with its new blood the faults of the ancient people that has spent itself in the excesses of science and of sin" (312). These young people, "with their own women will bring forth children of a new breed" (313). Veronica is one of these women. This 'new breed' will be the children of America, a country for which Dalí was full of enthusiasm and in which he wrote *Hidden*

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<sup>157</sup> For more on 'Narrator-Dalí' and 'Rêverie' (1931) see chapters 2 and 3.

*Faces*. Using Veronica as the example of the fulfillment of prophecy through motherhood, however, adds to the fascist rhetoric, as she is pale, blue-eyed, and blonde-haired.

The ‘subdual’ of the Nazi ‘Beast’ is a response to a much earlier section of *Hidden Faces* in which for the three years prior to the outbreak of war in 1939 “the heart of Paris simulated death beneath the dangerously close jaws of the panting beast” (123). Paris had been in a state of anticipation, knowing that the war was “inevitabl[e]” (123). This knowledge encouraged people to form a cocoon, within which they developed a resistance to “the great ordeal” to come (123). The cocoon would break at “the first cannon shot” (123), the outbreak of war; but the “beings” who emerge are malformed, barely human:

an unheard-of-being, unheard-of-beings, will be seen to rise, their brains compressed by sonorous helmets, their temples pierced by the whistling of air waves, their bodies naked, turned yellow by fever, pocked by deep vegetal stigmata swarming with insects and filled to the brim with the slimy juices of venom, overflowing and running down a skin tiger-striped and leopard-spotted by the gangrene of wounds and the leprosy of camouflage, their swollen bellies plugged to death by electric umbilical chords [sic] tangling with the ignominiousness of torn intestines and bits of flesh, roasting on the burning steel carapaces of the punitive tortures of gutted tanks (124).

The ‘swollen bellies plugged by... umbilical chords’ at first seem to suggest regression: war as the manifestation of a return to an infantile state<sup>158</sup>; as suggested by Dalí’s earlier claim in ‘La Conquête de l’Irrationnel’ (1935) that people seek nutrition from the “Hitlerian wet nurse” (8). However, the regression here goes back even further into an

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<sup>158</sup> See chapter 5 for more on the motif of regression in *Hidden Faces*.

entomological atavism as the upcoming war is compared to “the kingdoms of the articulated orthopterans and apterous locusts” (124). It is not only “the fighting masses” which undergo this entomological transformation but also “the protagonists of this novel” (124). Whereas ‘the fighting masses’ are described in terms of disease, mutation, and decay, however, ‘the protagonists’ are beautiful, although not without potential for the disruption of unity. Veronica and Randolph are praying mantises and Betka is a moth, but Grandsailles has the death’s head on his back (124). The distinction between ‘the fighting masses’ and ‘the protagonists’ can be understood in terms of an amalgamation of Dalí’s understanding of ‘the Classic’ and his brief reference to Gobineau, a nineteenth-century French writer best known for his racist theories. Dalí declares that “the six protagonists... will perpetuate the eternal myth of the rising of the Pleiades” (124). And then he adds in a footnote, “[t]he myth immortalized by Gobineau in ‘Les Pléiades’” (124).

*Hidden Faces* has been strongly influenced by *Les Pléiades* (1874) in both content and tonal progression. Both texts put forward the notion of a hierarchy underpinning order and cohesion within society; a hierarchy that if maintained will keep society ordered and stable. At the top of this hierarchy is the aristocracy, but the understanding of ‘aristocratic’ signifies more than just those who belong to the upper classes and hold a title. ‘Aristocratic’ refers to those who hold a specific value system. Thus, as *Les Pléiades* demonstrates, members of the upper class can be unsympathetic to aristocratic values. In Gobineau’s novel, both aristocracy and the order of society as a whole are threatened by socialism and “ideological disorder”, to use Dalí’s phrase from ‘La Conquête de l’Irrationnel’.

In keeping with many French Literary novels of the nineteenth-century, *Les Pléiades* has an ironic tone to which all the characters are submitted, regardless of their standing within the hierarchy or their stance towards aristocratic values. This has the effect of casting all of the characters as faintly ridiculous. Both Gobineau and Stendhal, the latter of which, as already noted, was also a strong influence on *Hidden Faces*, were masters of this variety of ironic tone. *Hidden Faces* is replete with this form of irony which simultaneously elevates and undermines characters. The clearest example of this is the ironic tone to which Grandsailles is submitted as an attempt to critique the ‘fascist leader’. Much like in *Les Pléiades*, the ironic tone in general becomes less scathing as the novel progresses (although importantly the critique of Grandsailles continues), paving the way for a more elevated tone constructed from dense language and such spiritual motifs as the nobility of suffering and the value of devotion. In *Les Pléiades*, this tonal progression indicates characters embracing aristocratic values, not for the benefit of society as a whole but for the elevation of themselves. It is important to note that in Gobineau’s novel, the decadence of Modernity is not presented as resolvable. *Hidden Faces* takes a different stance, however, in suggesting that the aristocratic, ‘classic’ values will experience a rebirth post-WW2. The notion of a hierarchy is maintained in the form of a ‘new’ American aristocracy, the ‘new breed’ ‘from beyond the seas’ who will head this hierarchy. Thus, even though the prop of ‘classic’ renewal cannot hold up Grandsailles, aristocracy will still be maintained in the form of a ‘new’ American aristocracy.

Hierarchy is maintained throughout the entomological rebirth at the outbreak of WW2 in *Hidden Faces*. The ‘beings’ described in such terrifying terms are akin to “those multitudes who swarm and amass” described by Wilfrid in *Les Pléiades*. They have an

“ugly savagery..., which will kill everything and create nothing” (Kindle edition, chapter 2, np), compared to the protagonists, around which the narrative orbits, who wish for cohesion and order to be maintained. Indeed, Dalí makes it clear in *Hidden Faces* that it is these ‘leaders’ who are focused upon rather than the ‘multitudes’ by stating regarding the former that “[t]here then remains for the faithful chronicler of these lives only to describe their physical embraces with the objectivity of an entomologist and the conjunctions of their destinies with the mathematical coldness of the astronomer” (125). Whilst Dalí appears to be channelling Zola’s Naturalist approach to literature here, he is also attempting to concretise his alleged apolitical credentials. He is an astrologer (thus conflating astronomy and astrology), watching for the stars to reveal the fates of his characters, observing what is before him supposedly without bias or comment. We are supposed to see the rise of these ‘pléiades’ then, specifically Randolph and Veronica, in fighting the Nazi ‘beast’, as apolitical. And their rise will re-order and create unity in Europe with a new aristocracy at its head.

This new order will also mark the end of Modernity. The “young people come from beyond the seas” will “redeem... the excesses of science and of sin” (312). Dalí’s earlier claim of being like an astrologer fits in smoothly here, as that discipline would have been associated with the Renaissance rather than early twentieth century progress in science. The declaration “That is man!” (124) beseeches the reader to see what ‘man’ has become; the terrifying and malformed insect masses have Modernity within them, “chemical hearts of the televisions of blood” (124). On the other hand, the protagonists are beautiful insects, without trace of Modernity in their insectoid forms. The horrific beings have “hidden faces” (124), but the “young people” (312) of whom Randolph and Veronica are a part will uncover these faces: “All were becoming visible again, who had



been creatures without faces, creatures of dissimulation, of camouflage and treachery” (313). ‘Camouflage’ and hidden faces direct the reader back to that horrific scene at the outbreak of war, and we see that much like the ‘new breed’ will ‘subdue’ the Nazi ‘beast’, it will also uncover the hidden faces. Randolph himself had a hidden face earlier in the novel. Fighting in the Spanish Civil War, he crashed his plane and broke the bones in his face, after which a special helmet was created for him which would reset the bones (141-143). Notably, after he is able to remove the mask he begins to embrace ‘classical’ values, at first those embodied by Grandsailles; but then after he rejects the Count he redirects those values towards the successful cultural renewal embodied by himself and Veronica at the end of the novel. Again here, then, we see the motif, and Dalinian myth, of rebirth through ‘inquisitorial’ pressure and the way in which such rebirth propels the renewal of European society. Returning to Rothman’s (2007) claim that Modernity was characterised by deception and distrust of surface appearance (492-493), Randolph and Veronica’s renewal ushers in an epoch where the “dissimulation” and “treachery” (*HF*, 313) of Modernity are erased.

Whereas pre-1945 Dalí had critiqued fascist leaders and Parties whilst advocating fascist ideology at the centre of which was a “palingenetic myth” (Griffin, 2012, 7), post-WW2 Dalí moves to unequivocal declarations of support for General Franco. Dalí’s relationship with Franco post-WW2 is not within the remit of this thesis, but it is worth mentioning his stance towards the General *during* the war. Both Gibson (1997) and Jeffett (2008) claim that Dalí actively sought Franco’s approval post-war, but Jeffett goes further in claiming that he in fact demonstrated his approval during WW2 as well. He notes that Dalí painted a commission of the then American Ambassador to Spain in 1943, Ambassador Cárdenas. This painting features El Escorial, the palace of Philip II,

“the Spanish king who ushered in the country’s Golden Age” (130). As Jeffett notes, the building is also featured in Dalí’s painting of the General’s daughter in the early 1970s, which was intended to be a wedding present (143). I suggest that there are considerable differences between the two paintings in terms of whether we can judge Dalí’s stance towards Franco from them.

Firstly it is worth noting that there is precedent for irony in Dalí’s commissions. The same year as his painting of the Ambassador, Dalí produced a painting of Mona Bismarck, in which she appeared in rags when she was considered “one of the most beautifully dressed women in the World” (Brown, 2013, np). An ironic tone can also be detected in the painting of the Ambassador, and it is of a considerably more scathing variety. Dalí gives the Ambassador a vampiric appearance, bearing more than a little resemblance to Bela Lugosi of *Dracula* (1931), with his slicked back hair and pale hand. Continuing in this vein, the black cloud over El Escorial gives the palace a gothic air. The vampiric quality of the Ambassador is in keeping with the way in which Hitler is portrayed as demanding blood in *Hidden Faces* (1944, 303) and the way in which the Nazi leader is portrayed in Dalí’s painting, *The Enigma of Hitler* (1938)<sup>159</sup>. In that earlier painting the representation of Dalí from *The Great Masturbator* (1929) is being dragged off a plate by a bat. Left on the plate is a photograph of Hitler, over which a bat hangs asleep. The painting suggests that whilst the bats are a threat to Dalí, they are not to Hitler, perhaps implying kinship. Using the same vampiric tropes in his painting of the Ambassador suggests that the painting is not singing approval for Franco-led Spain. Furthermore, only a year earlier in his *Secret Life*, Dalí had written the aforementioned

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<sup>159</sup> Interestingly, the painting was pilloried by the Surrealists. Jeffett (2004) notes that its display in 1939 was probably the reason Breton finally ejected Dalí from the Surrealist Movement (434), as the Surrealists saw *The Enigma of Hitler* as containing fascist sympathies.

parable in which the moral was that the “anarchy of ‘isms’” (351) would lead to “a military dictatorship that... won’t allow any of us to breathe” (355).

It is also worth noting that the painting of Ambassador Cárdenas is far below the standard of Dalí’s other works, and in fact I would go so far as to say it is poor. In general, Dalí’s commissions are of a low quality, but this is a particularly poor example. It is unlikely that Dalí would produce such a low-quality painting intended to be supportive of Franco’s regime. I would suggest that with this work Dalí is *giving the impression* that he is supportive of Franco, an undoubtedly safe option, whilst at the same time disparaging the regime. The painting of Franco’s daughter, on the other hand, thirty years later, is of a different and higher standard and appears devoid of irony. El Escorial is not a gothic mansion there. I would suggest that whilst support for Franco can be garnered from this later painting, we cannot glean a sympathetic stance towards the General during WW2 from the painting of the Ambassador.

Even though Dalí’s relationship with Franco post-war is beyond the remit of this thesis, it is worth discussing briefly, as he explicitly brings together Catholicism, fascism, and his aesthetic of ‘the classic’. There is little doubt that Dalí wanted people to think he was pro-Franco, including Franco himself, post-war. He linked his own aesthetic and Catholicism to Franco’s ideals. In a lecture in 1951, Dalí declared

Before Franco,... every politician and every new government only increased the confusion, the lies and disorder of Spain. Franco broke violently with this false tradition, imposing clarity, truth and order in the country at a time when the world was experiencing its period of greatest anarchy (Dalí, ‘Picasso and I’, quoted in Gibson, 467).

In his *Secret Life*, Dalí had written of the “anarchy of ‘isms’” (351), the “ideological disorder” (8-9, ‘La Conquête de l’Irrationnel’) which he saw as having led to WW2 and the only solution as a return to ‘the Classic’. These ‘Classic’ values included ‘clarity’, ‘truth’, and ‘order’. For Dalí, Classicism, Catholicism, and anti-democratic government were formed into a conceptual nexus, and aesthetics were not merely there to support such an ideology, but rather to help create it. Thus, unlike when he was publishing pieces in *Surréalisme au service de la révolution* in the early 1930s, this is more like ‘Dalí in the service of subduing the Revolution’.

## Conclusion

Whilst fascist leaders and Parties, specifically Hitler and the Nazi Party, are undermined and critiqued in *Hidden Faces*, the novel still supports the “palingenetic myth” (Griffin, 7) central to fascism, combining it with the notion of ‘the classic’. In this way, Dalí takes the same stance towards fascism as he had done towards both Communism and Surrealism: supporting the ideology but not the Movement. The successful rebirth in *Hidden Faces* has white, aryan characteristics, and it is Catholic and American, the latter reflecting how Dalí felt about America and its potential role in the post-WW2 world. Thus, whilst Grandsailles does not succeed in his attempt at cultural and personal renewal, renewal is still achieved through Veronica and Randolph, and it is expressed in the rhetoric of fascist ideology. This chapter thus argues that *Hidden Faces* does not demonstrate Hitlerian sympathies, nor does it elicit any evidence that Dalí himself was pro-Hitler. It also argues, however, that the novel supports a major element of fascist ideology. Dalí does not recontextualise that ideology or rhetoric in the name of subversion, as Greeley (2006) has suggested he does in the 1930s in his treatment of “patriotism and patriarchy as... social myths” (82); rather, without irony or critical

distance, and through the rhetoric of mythic, ethnic rebirth, he elevates the notion that America will bring about the renewal of Europe postwar.

## **Thesis Conclusion**

The aim of this thesis was to look at the ways in which eroticism, literary narrative, and cultural renewal intersect in Dalí's written texts. Whilst a considerable number of scholarly works have been written on Dalí's painted *oeuvre*, much fewer have focused on his written works. When talking about Salvador Dalí in public, with friends, with students, or even at academic conferences, there is always surprise when I mention the scope of his written texts: articles, essays, 'autobiographies', a novel. One of the purposes of this thesis was to draw attention to these works and their importance in the intellectual *milieu* in which they were created; the influences, the parallels between Dalí's works and other Modernists, how his works explored the historical and political context in which they were written. I wanted to draw attention away from all the biographical readings of his works which focus upon his eccentricity and his characteristic moustache, and look in depth at what the texts themselves were doing, placing them in the contexts of Surrealist aesthetics, Modernist aesthetics, Renaissance revivals, and the *fin-de-siècle*. The influences on Dalí's works are wide and varied, and whilst Dalí encourages a light-hearted approach to his *oeuvre*, I wanted to take his works seriously whilst keeping this light-heartedness in mind. Indeed, one of the questions I posed in the Introduction was, can we take Dalí seriously? Having now completed this thesis, I can see the reasoning behind Finkelstein's (1975) claim that with Dalí there is always the sense of some "hidden seriousness" behind "the tongue-in-cheek" (68-69). Indeed, Dalí seems to encourage such a reading. 'La Chèvre sanitaire' (1930) comes to mind where he acknowledges that he is having fun confusing the reader. As I noted in chapter 4, the 'hidden seriousness' here is an acknowledgement

that understanding the world in the interwar period seemed particularly difficult and confusing, something which is self-consciously reflected in that text and its companion article, 'L'Ane pourri' (1930). In this sense I concur with Radford's (1997) claim that Dalí's role as 'jester' can be taken seriously as a commentary on his artistic *milieu* (327). Whereas Radford focuses on Dalí's reaction to 'modern art' allegedly becoming less subversive, however, I focus on humour as a comment upon the condition of Modernity and the means of expressing it.

There are parallels here between Dalí's written works and other works of the early and late Modernist period. To quote Bradbury and McFarlane (1976), there was a sense that there had been a "Great Divide" between the past and the present (20), a "crisis between art and history" (29), the "consciousness of disorder, despair, and anarchy" (41), "fragmentation [and] discontinuity" (47). All these things are seen reflected in the formal structures and content of written works of the time, and Dalí's works are no different. Even when Dalí's approach to this chaos changes over the 1930s into the 1940s, there is still the subtext of societal upheaval. In the late 20s, early 30s, Dalí embraces Modernity, embraces the changes, the upheaval, the new technologies. This can be seen in 'Poetry of the Mass Produced Utility' (1928), in which he lauds the Modern world and the surfaces of the new Modern objects. As the 1930s progress, he embraces the aesthetics of order, form, and unity, and in a Freudian sense accepts an aesthetic which combines regressive and sublimating impulses. This argument is against Finkelstein (1996), who claims that in his poem, 'Metamorphose de Narcisse', Dalí dramatizes a complete turn from regressive to sublimating impulses (242). In embracing order and unity, Dalí appears to reject those aspects of the Modern world which he celebrated in the late 20s, early 30s, expressing a horror at mechanical inventions. In

*Hidden Faces* (1944) he aligns Modern mechanical invention with the industrialization carried out by the Nazi Party, implying that Modernity had led to the rise of fascism. Indeed, in his novel he suggests that with the end of WW2, with Hitler dead in his bunker, Modernity will be over, and he proposes that its replacement will come in the form of a rebirth of aristocratic and ‘Classic’ values, in which order, form, and unity will be lauded. A “young people come from beyond the seas”, from America, will come and re-order Europe (*HF*, 312-313). Whilst this is an example of the high regard in which Dalí held America, it also suggests an adherence to fascist ideology.

In chapter 6, using Griffin’s (2012) definition of ‘fascist ideology’ as consisting of “the centrality of ‘palingenetic myth’” (7), i.e. a “form of ultra-nationalism that attempts to realize the myth of the regenerated nation” (1), I argued that whilst Dalí critiques the figure of the fascist leader, he embraces fascist ideology. In making my argument I noted intersections between *Hidden Faces* and *Secret Life* (1942), in the latter of which his outlines of ‘Classic’ aesthetics paralleled arguments for a ‘palingenetic myth’. Furthermore, in *Hidden Faces*, Dalí drew direct attention to Gobineau’s *Les Pléiades* (1874), in which society is deemed as falling into decadence due to socialism. This text, written by an author known for his racist theories, posits a set of elite, aristocratic values held by a few; values which are threatened by the masses.

Contrary to many of Dalí’s detractors, I argued that he did not have sympathies with Hitler. I have, however, argued that he had fascist sympathies. In making this argument I countered Dalí himself, who claimed from the mid-30s up until his dying days that he was both apolitical and ahistorical. I noted countless times where he explored the political moment in which he was writing in his *Secret Life* (1942), *Hidden Faces*



(1944), and *Diary of a Genius* (1964). In regards to his paintings, to name but a few, he engaged with the political moment in his *Soft Construction with Boiled Beans (Premonition of Civil War)* (1936), as Radford (1997, 187) has noted, and *The Enigma of Hitler* (1938), a painting which I argued actually critiques Hitler rather than supporting him, contrary to a number of scholarly and Surrealists views.

In my Introduction I asked, Why is it important that we still engage today with Dalinian and Surrealist notions of cultural renewal? The foregoing exploration of Dalí's support of fascist ideology will help in answering this question, especially with the rise of 'alt-right', fascistic views in our contemporary society. There are speeches given by Donald Trump which use the 'palingenetic myth', as they call for a cultural, ethnic rebirth in the form of 'Making America Great Again'. This is a slogan which in itself does not necessarily have 'palingenetic' qualities. However, when you consider how Donald Trump conceptualises 'Making America Great Again', by building a wall between North America and Mexico, and attempting to prevent people from certain nations visiting the country, you can see the isolationist and xenophobic elements to be found in fascistic groups. Studying how Dalí engaged with theories of cultural renewal in the interwar period, and how he associated these theories with his formal aesthetics, allows us to see how easy it can be to embrace fascist views, especially in periods of upheaval and uncertainty<sup>160</sup>. The need for order and unity can easily become a desire to expurgate the perceived Other. This is why studying the nature of such beliefs is so important, so we can recognise those discourses in ourselves and leaders of political groups and question them. Dalí himself acknowledged how easy it was to embrace the fascist

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<sup>160</sup> Indeed, this seems to be a concern of Greeley's (2006), although she uses this train of thought to question Dalí's stance towards Hitler (55).

authority figure<sup>161</sup>, dramatizing and, importantly, critiquing in *Hidden Faces* the Narcissistic power that such a figure has over people. Using Freud's theory of Narcissistic personality development from his 'On the Introduction of Narcissism' (1914), I suggested that in *Hidden Faces* Dalí dramatizes the rise of Grandsailles as a Narcissistic leader, and Veronica as the Narcissistic woman. Whilst Dalí critiques fascist leadership through Grandsailles, however, he still embraces fascist ideology.

From the work carried out in this thesis, and the conclusions drawn, further work can be carried out in the future. There has been little done on the relationship between Surrealism and Catholicism. Given the intersections in the late 30s onwards between Dalí's use of Surrealist aesthetics, his theories of cultural renewal, his 'Classic' aesthetic, and his Catholicism, he makes an interesting case in relation to a Movement which from the beginning was vehemently anti-clerical. Dalí was not the only person associated with the Surrealist Movement with religious proclivities, however. There was also Jean Genbach, who attended the fourth session of the Surrealist discussions on sex in 1928. According to Nadeau (1973), he was a defrocked abbot who discovered the Surrealists just as he was thinking about committing suicide (cited in Pierre, 2011, 209-210). He wrote two supernatural horror novels, and enjoyed scandalising people with his womanising. He eventually parted ways with the Surrealists, calling Breton "the living incarnation of Lucifer" (cited in Pierre, 210). Notably, Genbach tried "to reconcile Christianity and surrealism" (210), something which, it could be argued, Dalí also tried. In *Secret Life*, in announcing his personal rebirth into the 'Classic', he declares, "I must incorporate surrealism in tradition" (350). Given that 'Classic' values

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<sup>161</sup> Greeley (2006) also argues that Dalí's approach to fascism highlighted how easy it can be to embrace the fascist authority figure. In her view, it is because Dalí treated fascism as "a particular twist on 'normal' human behaviour [sic]" (83).

intersected with Catholic values for Dalí, he could be said to be trying to reconcile Surrealism and Catholicism.

Returning to the overarching aim of the thesis, i.e. that is to look at Dalí's conceptualisations of eroticism, literary narrative, and cultural renewal, and to explore how they intersected, I have shown that all three are intimately connected. Dalí merges eroticism and literary narrative in 'Rêverie' (1931) in the construction of 'narrative inquisitions' and the relationship he builds between eroticism and writing/artistic creation. In his theory of 'freedom within limits' he combines the notion of 'inquisitorial pressure' eroticised in 'Rêverie' and a view of creating within an artistic and literary tradition. This is combined with cultural renewal as 'freedom within limits' contains the values of unity, order, and form which he extends into a theory of how society will be renewed post-WW2.

Word Count: 77,110.

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