Contextualising Apartheid at the End of Empire: Repression, ‘Development’ and the Bantustans

EVANS, Laura <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2471-7439>

Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/23925/

This document is the author deposited version. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.

Published version


Copyright and re-use policy

See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html
Contextualising Apartheid at the End of Empire: Repression, ‘Development’ and the Bantustans

Laura Evans
Department of Humanities, Sheffield Hallam University and
International Studies Group, University of the Free State

Abstract

This article examines the global dynamics of late colonialism and how these informed South African apartheid. More specifically, it locates the programmes of mass relocation and bantustan ‘self-government’ that characterised apartheid after 1959 in relation to three key dimensions. Firstly, the article explores the global circulation of idioms of ‘development’ and trusteeship in the first half of the twentieth century and its significance in shaping segregationist policy; secondly, it situates bantustan ‘self-government’ in relation to the history of decolonisation and the partitions and federations that emerged as late colonial solutions; and, thirdly, it locates the tightening of rural village planning in the bantustans after 1960 in relation to the elaboration of anti-colonial liberation struggles, repressive southern African settler politics and the Cold War. It argues that, far from developing policies that were at odds with the global ‘wind of change’, South African apartheid during the 1960s and 1970s reflected much that was characteristic about late colonial strategy.

Keywords: apartheid; bantustans; homelands; decolonisation; empire; development; relocation; villagisation; counter-insurgency.
Introduction

This article analyses the South African apartheid project of repression and containment in relation to the end of empire. In response to the emergence of a mass anti-colonial movement during the 1950s, from the early 1960s the government intensified political repression significantly and embarked on a thoroughgoing project of social engineering to relocate black South Africans - particularly women, elderly, the unemployed and those deemed politically ‘undesirable’ - to rural dumping grounds in the so-called ‘homelands’. This concerted effort to impress state power, impose labour controls and bring about racial segregation was justified in the rhetoric of ethnic national self-determination: ten ethnic ‘homelands’ or ‘bantustans’ were to be led to a flimsy political independence. The mass relocation of black South Africans to rural relocation areas in the bantustans was a cornerstone of this policy. In the twenty year period from 1960 to 1980, more than 3.5 million South Africans were relocated, while at least a million people (likely many more) were moved to rudimentary townships in the bantustans. These relocations were widely condemned by activists and scholars, who described them as the ‘dumping grounds’ of apartheid. In spite of its concerted efforts, the South African government eventually failed to gain international acceptance for its bantustan scheme at the United Nations, where it was widely rejected as a farce.

The bantustan scheme and apartheid population relocation have been understood by historians as a product of the racial and class project of the white supremacist state, designed to cement the migrant labour system underpinning white prosperity; to entrench the project of racial segregation and to undermine African nationalist mobilisation. While the continued assertion of settler colonial racism in South Africa after 1960 diverged clearly from the
emergence of African nationalist regimes to the north, the policies of relocation and partition that the South African government pursued from the early 1960s are much less peculiar to this context than the existing literature on apartheid might suggest. This article places these policies in their global milieu, while considering them in relation to the regional dynamics of southern African settler colonialism.

It is not the intention of this paper to flatten local specificities in favour of an homogenising global narrative, but, rather, to trace the ‘global in the local’, connecting South Africa’s history of segregation and apartheid to the global histories of the end of empire and late colonial ‘repressive development’. A full explanation of the multiple global influences on South African apartheid demands thorough research in archives across the world including the United Nations (and League of Nations), other international organisations, and, of course, state archives in Pretoria, London, Washington and Lisbon. This article is the result of a more modest project. By bringing primary research and the South African historiography into conversation with an illuminating swathe of literature on late imperialism and the history of colonial development planning that has emerged over the last decade, this article locates the characteristic policies of ‘high apartheid’ - mass relocation and the ‘grand apartheid’ bantustan scheme - and their antecedents in a global frame. Inevitably, it leaves loose ends and raises new questions.

I argue that South African apartheid drew much more on global ideas about colonial development and imperial statecraft than has generally been recognised. It has been well documented that state policy and practice were shaped by competing domestic interests within the settler alliance - of ‘maize and gold’, farming and industry - and by a blundering praxis that weighed Afrikaner nationalist ‘visionaries’ against ‘pragmatists’. While these influences at the national level have been relatively well examined, the moulding of state policy and practice by global processes and imperial debates has been little explored.
The ‘high apartheid’ policies of ‘separate development’ and ethnic self-determination that characterised the administrations of H. F. Verwoerd (1958-66) and B. J. Vorster (1966-78) were not novel: they picked up a policy trajectory of indirect rule and trusteeship that had been set out during the interwar years under Jan Smuts (1919-24; 1939-48) and J. B. M. Hertzog (1924-39).14

There is little evidence to suggest that the two supposed South African ‘traditions’ of segregation - liberalism and Afrikaner nationalism - developed as distinct ways of thinking or in isolation from one another. Apartheid was not a monolith, and historians should remain cautious of ideological determinism as an explanation for apartheid policy. We must be wary of historical explanations that place too heavy an emphasis on ideologies and their ‘origins’: ideologies are rarely coherent or unchanging; nor are they secluded from external (global) influences. The philosophical and theological traditions of the Dutch Reformed Church have underpinned dominant historical explanations for apartheid policy: Giliomee argues that the philosophy of apartheid was distinct from earlier segregationist ideas and policies.15 Meanwhile, Dubow argues that ‘Christian National theory, volks nationalism, and cultural relativist ideas’ supported and justified the ‘ideology of apartheid’ that was pursued by Verwoerd, yet he rightly argues that historians should be careful not to assume that there was continuity between Afrikaner nationalist policy pronouncements of the 1940s and the promotion of ‘self-governing homelands’ in later decades.16 Historians have tended to emphasise the role of Verwoerd, the ideological coherence of his project and its centrality in shaping state praxis.17 Yet, as the work of Deborah Posel has shown, analyses of ideological justifications for state policy do not necessarily offer the most revealing window onto blundering state praxis: the two are not inextricably or even necessarily connected.18 Governments do not do as they say they do, nor do states (in all their complex forms, institutions and guises) necessarily do what their governments say they do. As Dubow
tellingly states: ‘what was novel [about the apartheid idea] was its presentation as the
distinctive product of Afrikaner thought.’\textsuperscript{19} The connected world of the mid-twentieth century
presents a further challenge to the notion of a distinctly Afrikaner nationalist vision, as the
changing politics of empire operated imprinted indelibly on the projects of state-making that
they pursued. In the light of an analysis of the prevailing ideas concerning population,
partition and trusteeship in the interwar years, and set in the context of the late colonial praxis
of repressive state planning, South Africa’s bantustan project appears much less unique - and
less distinctly emblematic of Afrikaner nationalism - than has been previously assumed. A
global analysis suggests that apartheid ideologues - including Verwoerd and Eiselen -
reproduced the central contradiction in ‘liberal’ thinking on colonial rule in the interwar
years: trusteeship.

South African segregation, reserve policy, rural planning and villagisation initiatives
were informed by global debates and policies of colonial development, population
management and the post-war ‘high modernism’ of the ‘second colonial occupation’\textsuperscript{20}. These
idioms, policies and practices were imbued with new impetus in the context of the Cold War
and the collaborative efforts of the southern African settler states, with the support of the
United States, to stamp out ‘communism’ and to preserve white supremacy.\textsuperscript{21} Work on the
history of late colonialism and the dirty wars waged by imperial states at the end of empire
reveals how counter-insurgency and villagisation strategies circulated within and among
empires.\textsuperscript{22} In turn, these traditions shaped the repressive state planning that emerged in South
Africa’s rural areas.

It is now no longer possible to maintain - as a group of ‘liberal’ imperial historians
used to - that British imperial paternalism and its apparent use of ‘minimum force’ was
distinct from the racialist and ‘peculiar Afrikaner concoction’ of apartheid.\textsuperscript{23} Extensive
research on the murderous brutality of British late colonial strategy has overturned the
enduring myth of ‘minimum force’ with a new historical consensus that ‘coercion and counter-terror, not kindness and development’ were ‘the cornerstones of most British counter-insurgency campaigns.’  

In the light of this historiography on colonial violence, little insight can be gained from upholding a distinction between English ‘liberal’ segregationism and Afrikaner nationalist policy. Imperial post-war villagisation strategies drew on a long and multi-linear genealogy of imperial policy: they may be traced in their earliest forms to imperial wars at the end of the nineteenth century in which the concentration camp emerged as a crucial means to ‘pacify’ anticolonial resistance.

Just as the history of concentration camps in South Africa informed the emergence of new modes of imperial population containment, so late-imperial statecraft informed the character of apartheid practice. After 1945, somewhat paradoxically, modernising postcolonial states also took up the developmentalist baton from late colonial regimes, employing many of the same strategies to govern and control their populations and to bring about the unfulfilled promises of colonial development through authoritarian forms of resettlement planning.

Apartheid mass relocation and the elaboration of the bantustan scheme must be understood against the backdrop of the growing influence of colonial counter-insurgency strategies upon rural ‘development’ planning (and, indeed, vice-versa), while Verwoerd and Vorster re-imagined and propagandised South Africa’s apartheid project through an explicit mimicry of British decolonisation.

Peace, population and colonial development, c.1920-1945

The policies adopted by the National Party after 1948 drew heavily on those laid down in the making of the South African settler state after the Act of Union (1910). Like many
‘revisionists’, Marian Lacey criticised the focus of ‘liberal’ historians on the racial doctrines of Afrikaner nationalists as an explanation for apartheid policy and instead located the ‘roots of apartheid’ (a common project among successive generations of historians) in an earlier context: the interwar administrations of Smuts and Hertzog. She argued that the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act, and the ‘Stallardist’ doctrine that was pursued under Hertzog (which rejected assimilation and African urbanisation in favour of segregation and indirect rule), formed the basis of the racialised system of ‘super-exploitation’ perfected under the National Party regime. The 1936 Native Trust and Land Act formed the keystone in the consolidation of state policy to address the co-called ‘native question’, while the expansion of the Department of Native Affairs (NAD) in this period underpinned the elaboration of this project of indirect rule and colonial trusteeship. The Native Urban Areas Act (1923) reflected the ideas of population ‘stabilisation’ that were present in imperial policy: drawn up by the NAD, it emphasised the role of the state in the protection of the welfare and residence rights of urban Africans. However, the Stallard Commission made recommendations to the contrary: that Africans should be no more than temporary urban workers, to ‘minister to the white man’s needs’. The passing of the 1936 Acts has often been understood as a victory for those in favour of the ‘Stallardist’ doctrine, but this interpretation should be revisited in the light of a more global perspective.

If the ‘roots’ of apartheid’s bantustan system were to be found in the interwar years, these South African policies were also cultivated by the circulation of ideas among imperial elites and politicians. In the making of international peace after the First World War, population management and settlement, self-determination and colonial trusteeship were at the heart of the work of the League of Nations Mandates Commission and its imperial members, while, as one of the white settler dominions, South Africa occupied a central place in Britain’s vision of imperial trusteeship. These dynamics had a profound impression on the
formulation of South African policy, while, through Smuts, South African concerns were also imprinted onto the international regime. Alongside his central role in the making of the South African state, as ‘the promoter of the transmutation of the empire into commonwealth’, Smuts was the key proponent of the South African imperial project and highly influential in shaping global political concerns after the First World War. The 1936 Land Act mirrored the shift in British imperial thinking after the First World War away from assimilation and towards indirect rule and trusteeship. This legislation reflected dominant ideas about native administration among British colonial thinkers and their equivalents in the United States, where the so-called ‘Indian New Deal’ of 1934 emulated British policies of indirect rule and trusteeship. The Paris Peace Settlement of 1919 had enshrined colonial trusteeship in the parcelling out of territories to be governed under the ‘mandate’ of the League of Nations. South Africa’s de facto government of South West Africa under this provision was thus also influential in connecting global (or, rather, imperial) principles to the concerns of domestic governance, and in testing the limits of imperial ‘liberalism’.

Smuts regularly cited Lugard’s ‘dual mandate’, advocating ‘parallel institutions’ and indirect rule for the ‘native’ population in South Africa. Similarly, Hertzog emphasised the importance of ‘moral responsibility’ in defending the 1936 provisions for further land transfers to Africans against the criticisms of Malan and his ‘purified’ National Party. In so doing, he echoed the ideas of development and trusteeship that dominated imperial discourse and appealed to Smuts and his contemporaries, while also refusing to commit funding for the purchase of land for Africans. The passing of the 1936 Land Act was therefore inconsistent and contradictory: while the Act echoed the idioms of ‘development’ and trusteeship espoused by Lugard and enshrined in the League of Nations mandates system, Hertzog also failed to commit the state to any significant investment in the reserves. This contradiction mirrored the ambivalence of British colonial welfarism in this period, which was weightier in
rhetoric than it was in substance, being geared as it was towards repositioning the imperial project amid the growth of anti-colonial nationalisms after the First World War.\(^41\) This paradox of hollow paternalism set a precedent for the policy of ‘independent homelands’ adopted by the National Party in later decades.

The question of global stability - or, more accurately, the stability of the imperial order - was foremost in the minds of imperial administrators and reformers in the 1930s.\(^42\) The management of population displacements and refugee resettlement after the First World War came to be dominated by concerns to prevent further conflicts. By the end of the Second World War, ‘the idea of minority rights had vanished as if it had never existed’, Mazower argues: ethnic homogeneity became ‘a desirable feature of national self-determination and international stability.’\(^43\) According to this thinking, exemplified in the 1937 ‘Peaceful Change’ meetings held in Paris by the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, population pressures and ‘surplus’ refugee populations threatened social and political stability. The imperative of protecting minorities was overwhelmed by the belief in geopolitical solutions: by the middle of the century, the dominant view among global politicians was that conflicts could be prevented only through controlled migration, population transfers and political, territorial partitions.\(^44\) The emergent acceptance in the interwar period of ethnic ‘unmixing’ and population transfer as a pragmatic policy for the protection of imperial stability informed the partitions and federations of the postwar period, most notably in India and Palestine.\(^45\)

British colonial administrators in the late-1930s were alarmed by the growth of proletarianisation, urbanisation and ‘surplus populations’ in various parts of the empire and the political challenge that this represented. The expansion of colonial development in Africa (marked by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940) was thus aimed at ameliorating the social effects of industrialisation and rural-urban migration, to safeguard the
profitability of colonial economies and the future of the imperial project. Through the provision of funding for welfare in their colonies, French and British imperial regimes weighed the ‘delicate balance of exploitation and development.’ Informed by the structural functionalism of Malinowski’s anthropology, colonial development planners demonstrated a strong ‘agarian bias’. They aimed to restore the stability of rural African societies, seen to be threatened by ‘detribalisation’ and the apparent social disorder created by rural-urban migration, while improving the productivity of African agriculture and its capacity to ‘absorb’, or ‘carry’, growing rural populations. African agriculture had been widely undermined and, it was supposed, urbanisation was precipitated not by the growth of colonial capitalism but by population pressures and environmental degradation in rural areas.

Thoroughgoing resettlement initiatives to ‘rationalise’ rural populations were thus to become central to rural development schemes in a variety of colonial contexts during the following decades.

Administrators, economists and politicians in America and across the British empire circulated in a global network of ideas, which encompassed the Soviet imperial state. In the late-nineteenth century, Russian imperial administrators and officials looked to European empires for models and methods of governance, contributing to a ‘family resemblance’ of imperial practice. Later, American intellectuals and radicals demonstrated a similar admiration for Russian policies, not least because of the way in which the Soviet state embodied an ostensibly post-imperial, ‘modernising multinational state’. The Bolsheviks’ nationalities policy was an ‘affirmative action empire’, designed to disarm nationalism by granting controlled forms of nationhood. During the interwar years, thousands visited the Soviet Union to see for themselves the ‘model’ policies of economic modernisation pursued there. They praised the Soviets’ dogged commitment to industrialisation and some explained the human suffering that resulted as the necessary costs of modernisation.
not least the example of the special settlements, thus came to inform British and American paradigms of development and models of industrialisation both before and after the Second World War. Seen in the light of the circulation of ideas and practices within global empires, the apparent resemblance between British imperial methods (employed in Kenya and elsewhere) and the Soviet gulag makes better sense.

South Africa’s own policy trajectory reflected the shifting patterns of international debate, policy and practice in the passing of the 1936 Land Act, its provision for the expansion of the reserves (however academic this became) and the emergence of early ‘betterment’ planning. Meanwhile, South Africa’s racist settler politics further eroded the welfarist element of ‘trusteeship’ as these policies were translated in the local context. During the interwar period, as agricultural production in the reserves collapsed and with mounting white concern in the face of rapid African urbanisation, ‘South Africa’s “agrarian question” [came to be] at once a “native question”’, Tischler argues. While domestic policy undoubtedly shaped the implementation of rural planning, as it was adopted and refracted in the prism of South African settler politics, the policies associated with South African segregation nevertheless closely echoed the concerns and ideologies of imperial administrators, their ‘agrarian bias’ and emphasis on trusteeship. During the interwar years, the South African regime was no less interested than other imperial governments in reconfiguring and recasting its colonial project amid the growing challenges to white rule. Indeed, as Mazower’s work on Smuts demonstrates, South Africa was an important node in the consolidation of imperial thinking about ‘civilised’ governance in the turbulent 1930s.

The ‘late colonial’ apartheid state
High apartheid South African policy - typified by political repression, mass relocation and the bantustan scheme - was thus no ‘peculiar Afrikaner concoction’. ‘Separate development’ was not invented in South African isolation by H. F. Verwoerd, who has been popularly understood as the primary ‘architect of apartheid’. Nor was the scheme of independent ‘homelands’ foreseen or fully imagined when he came to power: it was developed under his successor, B. J. Vorster, as Miller has shown. Far from being an exception, South African apartheid displayed many of the characteristics and adopted many of the common strategies of the ‘late colonial state’ identified by Darwin. As South Africa’s white supremacist regime clung to power in the face of local resistance and decolonisation, apartheid policy and practice was not immune to the pressures for change. The white regime’s internal policies reflected its continued efforts to reposition itself in a changing world; to reimagine and sustain the future of the white settler regime. ‘High apartheid’ policy and planning fed on imperial and global debates about population transfer, on the political and military strategies of the late colonial empires (as the Cold War set in), and on the networks of colonial development planning that were being remoulded with the emergence of the postcolonial world. The apartheid state employed all of the characteristic means of late colonial statecraft described by Darwin: (1) proactive modernisation; (2) the concession of power to ‘para-political institutions’ and the formation of alliances in ‘native’ organisations; (3) the centralisation of governance; (4) the expansion of the military and security apparatus; and (5) the use of idioms of self-determination to justify holding onto power in the face of mounting political opposition. The following discussion locates South African bantustan policy and planning in relation to global dynamics at the end of empire and these characteristics of late-colonial statecraft.

Strong continuities in imperial strategy and development planning spanned the years before and after the Second World War. Those who had deliberated and defined the
geopolitical solutions of the interwar years came to be influential figures in the ‘high modernist’ expansion of development planning in the ‘second colonial occupation’ after 1945. Population activists including Alexander Carr-Saunders, Julian Huxley and C. P. Blacker bridged the ‘overtly racist colonialism of the early twentieth century and the more seemly neutral development project of the postwar era’, Ittman argues. Meanwhile, ideas about population that emerged in the interwar years were crucial in informing development theory during the 1950s and 1960s.

The South African trajectory of rural planning after the Second World War was in step with British imperial thinking around ‘development’ and reconstruction. In a 1945 speech to the Ciskeian General Council regarding the Transkei territories in 1945, Secretary for Native Affairs, D. L. Smit, argued (as Tomlinson would the following decade) that even if the ‘Released Areas’ (the areas of land demarcated for addition to the reserves in 1936) were purchased for African occupation that the land would not be sufficient for Africans to become full time farmers. Therefore, he argued, either further land should be acquired, or industrialisation should be encouraged to ‘absorb’ the landless. These proposals reflected longstanding concern among racist administrators with the ‘problem’ of ‘squatters’ on white-owned land and the clamour among white farmers who wanted to see black tenants removed from the land. So-called ‘squatters’, the term laden with the racism of settler land politics, were considered by the state to be part-time and thus ‘inefficient’ farmers and a destabilising force for rural society. Smit argued that settlement planning should distinguish between ‘efficient’, ‘modern’ farmers and landless people, and proposed that three types of ‘native villages’ should be established in the reserves: peri-urban villages to house a commuter workforce of farm labourers in ‘white’ South Africa (a practice already well established); industrial villages to house landless workers in new rural industries in the reserves; and rural villages in the reserves to accommodate long-distance migrant workers and their families.
These so-called ‘native villages’ and ‘closer settlements’ formed the basis of the mass resettlement initiatives that characterised high apartheid planning in the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, as Mager shows, the politics of land in the Ciskei and ‘Border’ region was at a critical juncture on the eve of the 1948 election, as farmers pressed the state to intervene more decisively to limit African access to land, evict African tenants and exercise control over African labour. For Smit and the officials of the NAD, the question of the management of the Ciskei reserves was central to the future of racial segregation in the Cape and was no doubt a significant driver in the making of ‘native’ policy. Smit’s proposals also reflected late-colonial and early-postcolonial thinking around rural development and the new interest in rural industrialisation to absorb ‘surplus population’.

In line with the preoccupation of the National Party government with African urbanisation, during the 1950s, under the leadership of Verwoerd, the NAD set out to transform and elaborate the system of urban governance for Africans. It extended the state’s control over African movement and labour through the extension of influx controls to women; through the regimented planning of segregated urban townships and by introducing a system of labour bureaux designed to facilitate and ‘rationalise’ the employment of African migrant labourers. The expansion of the NAD under Verwoerd in this decade comprised its transformation ‘into an authoritarian leviathan’, which exerted ever-growing control over the labour and everyday lives of Africans. This transformation served the interests of farmers who lamented the flight of rural labour to the cities; assisted industrialists who profited from cheap migrant alongside settled urban labour, and mollified obsessive segregationists (the so-called ‘visionaries’ in the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs -SABRA) who called for thoroughgoing racial segregation. The expansion of this super-department also reflected the ‘authoritarian high modernism’ of development planning in the ‘second colonial occupation’ and the characteristic centralisation of governance by late colonial states. Verwoerd’s
expanded NAD became ‘a state within a state’ and developed the regime’s ‘perception of itself as the organizer of social life in every sphere of African affairs.’

Through the NAD, apartheid planning was a critical way of reimagining the future of white supremacy in South Africa. Plans and maps cemented the logic of apartheid and offered a set of discourses to underpin and legitimate segregation in the post-war language of self-determination and trusteeship, while simultaneously promising to impose order on an uncertain future and perceived social disorder. The 1950s were marked by a mammoth investigation into the question of social and economic planning in the African reserves. The Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas, led by Frederick Tomlinson (the Tomlinson Commission) produced its seven-volume report in late 1954. Its recommendations echoed those made by previous government commissions, most notably the Native Affairs Commission (1932) and the Fagan Commission (1946). The extent of African land dispossession in South Africa was so extensive, and the pressure of population on the reserves so intense, that, even if further land were purchased according to the 1936 provisions, Tomlinson believed it was an impossible task to foster agricultural economies in the reserves that would be capable of supporting their dense populations. In the light of this, and in addition to agricultural and settlement interventions, he favoured the growth of industrial capacity and employment in the reserves. Tomlinson’s recommendations echoed many of the central tenets of development thinking in the late colonial period (and the interventionist welfarism that characterised postwar states more generally), as colonial authorities experimented with more audacious schemes to reorganise land tenure and rural societies. Indeed, the report’s vision for rural social restructuring was vast. It recommended: the separation of full-time farmers from non-farmers and the removal of ‘inefficient’ farmers from the land; the implementation of a land ‘rehabilitation’ programme and major resettlement interventions; the industrialisation of the reserves; and the promotion
of ‘tribalism’ (considered a ‘stabilising’ force in rural society) according to the provisions of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951.\textsuperscript{78} It is well known that Tomlinson’s recommendations for industrial development in the reserves were rejected by Verwoerd: instead, the government encouraged private investment in border industries on the fringes of the reserves. Yet, in an effort to bolster the political project of independent ‘homelands’, the policy would later be reversed to reflect Tomlinson’s initial proposal, indicating the enduring influence of the Report many years later.\textsuperscript{79}

Tomlinson’s scheme for industrial rural development drew on emerging global orthodoxy around rural ‘community’ development. In many aspects, his recommendations mirrored the scope of the Swynnerton Plan (1954) in Kenya. Both commissions were concerned that the state should intervene decisively and comprehensively to manage the proliferation of rural people considered to be unemployed or underemployed - so-called ‘surplus’ populations - and to ‘absorb’ and utilise their labour in ‘modern’ agriculture and industry.\textsuperscript{80} Tomlinson’s recommendations reflected the growing interest in rural industrial development at the end of empire. Caribbean-born Arthur Lewis, who had earlier worked for the British Colonial Office and under Alexander Carr-Saunders at the London School of Economics, came to be one of the most prominent development economists of his generation. In 1979 he won the Nobel Prize for his influential 1954 article, ‘Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour’.\textsuperscript{81} Drawing on the context of the late colonial Caribbean, Lewis argued that development through industrialisation demanded the fuller exploitation of the labour of the rural unemployed. Known as the ‘Lewis model’ (the ‘Lewis labour surplus module’ or the ‘dual sector model’) this article came to be a key text in development economics and was transplanted to inform planning contexts across the ‘Third World’. The principles of ‘community development’ that were central to Lewis’ work dovetailed with the imperatives of racial segregation in South Africa. They informed the way that ‘separate
development’ was later conceived, as well as the spurious narration of apartheid as a project of ethnic self-determination and national flourishing.

In the wake of the Tomlinson Commission, attempts to modernise South African rural ‘betterment’ planning through the policy of ‘Stabilisation, Reclamation and Rehabilitation’ (1954) echoed Smits’ proposals for thoroughgoing resettlement planning a decade earlier. The discursive and schematic practices of planning for the resettlement of refugees after the Second World War provide an important context for understanding the framing of this policy.82 Peter Gatrell has shown how the ‘institutional vocabulary’ of ‘rehabilitation’ emerged in the course of refugee resettlement in Europe after the First World War and how, after 1945, the doctrine of ‘rehabilitation’ became central to conceptions of state planning and post-war recovery. The UN Relief and Rehabilitation Act (UNRRA) envisaged the ‘total rehabilitation’ of the economy, agriculture, transport and industry and saw work as central to the restoration of individuals. These ideas were taken up by Nehru in India following the upheavals of the partition; in Palestine following the Nakba, and in a variety of other contexts.83 The discourse of rehabilitation, Gatrell argues, ‘offered a road map for the restoration of a “property” or “capacity” that had been lost in the course of displacement’ and was central for the promotion of ‘self-government’.84 The global postwar rhetoric of displacement, resettlement, village-level rural development and self-government informed South African rural planning and its discourse of ‘rehabilitation’. The developmental kudos of the latter was employed to endorse South Africa’s cynical scheme of racial exploitation and exclusion. The planning of what the government called ‘self-contained Bantu towns’ in the bantustans was a convenient and cynical packaging of its programmes of forced relocation, which externalised poverty to the bantustans and disenfranchised the black population. More than this, however, the discourse drew on global ideas about ‘self-development’ and self-determination that were influential in a range of global contexts. To
argue that such developmental discourse was just ideological ‘window dressing’ misses some of the substance of this rhetoric.

Verwoerd’s articulation of ‘apartheid’ employed a language that was strikingly reminiscent of Smuts’ ‘parallel development’. Smuts had envisaged a ‘Greater South Africa’: a regional powerhouse of white settler influence, which would come to encompass South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the British-governed High Commission Territories (HCTs, comprising of Basotholand, Swaziland and Bechuanaland; modern-day Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana). Smuts’ imperial imagination was deeply imprinted on the South African state inherited by the regimes presided over by Verwoerd and then Vorster. Even while the Tomlinson Commission realised early in its work that it was unlikely that Britain would cede the HCTs to South Africa, the geopolitical project that the Commission envisaged was nevertheless built upon a longstanding imperial vision for the region. While the creation of a ‘Greater South Africa’ was stymied by Britain’s refusal to hand over the HCTs, following the declaration of a Republic and South Africa’s departure from the Commonwealth in 1961, Verwoerd’s bantustan scheme took up the baton of Smuts’ project in many of its rhetorical and strategic aspects. Verwoerd explicitly linked his policy of ‘separate development’ to Britain’s imperial project. As Ivan Evans has shown, the rapid crystallisation of Verwoerd’s thinking on the subject became apparent in a series of speeches in late 1958 and early 1959 in response to Britain’s announcement of imminent self-government for the HCTs. In a speech in January 1959, Verwoerd compared self-governing bantustans in South Africa to Britain’s role in the ‘Commonwealth of Nations’. By the end of May, with potential opposition among chiefs in the Transkeian Bunga having been stifled, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act was passed, setting out the intention for self-government in eight ethnic national units. As the largest and most contiguous geographic entity among the reserves, with a long-established advisory African council, the Transkei was
to become the first experiment in bantustan self-government. Verwoerd responded to Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’ speech in 1960 by declaring that his ‘homeland’ policy ‘was not in variance with the new direction in Africa, but is in the fullest accord with it.’ He regarded South African whites as the ‘link’ between the ‘white nations of the world and the nations of the new African states.’ Verwoerd echoed Eiselen’s recently-published perspective on ‘multi-community development’, in which South Africa would play the role of ‘mother country’ in a local reworking of trusteeship in the British Commonwealth. In January 1961, Verwoerd was further encouraged to develop the bantustan policy by the UN General Secretary, Dag Hammarskjöld, on his visit to South Africa to investigate human rights violations. The men met six times in as many days. While Hammarskjöld was critical of any attempt to deny black South Africans the rights of citizenship, he encouraged the government to develop the ‘homelands’ policy as a ‘competitive alternative’ to integration. Giliomee argues that Hammarskjöld’s untimely death later that year deprived the South African government of a critical international interlocutor for their project.

The bantustans represented an ‘illusion of decentralisation’ by the South African government, as it forged alliances with indigenous elites while elaborating parapolitical ‘native’ institutions and invoking ‘self-government’ to justify colonial rule. As British colonial rulers ‘looked over their shoulders at the new claimants to power waiting in the wings’, federalism came to emerge as a common imperial solution to demands for democratic political change. British politicians and administrators continued to justify colonial rule by invoking a transition to ‘responsible government’ or ‘self- government’, invoking the language of self-determination and promising local control over local affairs while never conceding to a change in the imperial administration and its control over foreign policy and defence. As Ivan Evans has argued, the South African Department of Native Affairs ‘remade
itself in the image of British decolonizers’ as it withdrew its authority from the Transkei reserve leaving in place ‘self-government’ under a system of ‘tribal’ authorities.97

Britain’s withdrawal from India was undoubtedly an important example in the development of imperial policy, not least South Africa. The British had never envisaged having to retreat so quickly and chaotically from colonial India. Stafford Cripps’ proposals for an Indian federation of princely states aimed to dilute the influence of the Indian Nationalist Congress by establishing alliances with local elites.98 Subsequently, the British government’s enduring racism shaped its adoption of the Fabian rhetoric of racial ‘partnership’ as it redeployed the civilising mission in ‘guiding’ colonies to ‘self-government’.99 Proposals for political federations during the late colonial period were shaped by the demands of colonised peoples, as well as by the paradoxical imperial ideas of trusteeship and ‘civilisation’.100 During the 1950s, Britain experimented with and planned for federations in Central Africa, East Africa, the West Indies, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.101 The Central African Federation (1953-64) emerged as an important experiment in what Collins has described as a post-war ‘federal moment’, which, he argues, represented a ‘new civilising mission’.102 This episode of Britain’s ‘developmental imperialism’ no doubt schooled South African administrators in the possibilities of reconfiguring settler dominance.103 Meanwhile, federalism occupied a significant place in debates on the left in Europe after 1945;104 even Hannah Arendt advocated a federal multi-ethnic solution in Israel-Palestine.105

Anti-colonial visions for change also identified the democratic potential of federalism. The Garveyite vision of a United States of Africa was taken up by Pan-Africanists and was the focal concept in the formation of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963. The remarkable mobilisation of black South African migrant workers by the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) under Robert Sobukwe in 1959-1960 forced the South African state to
temporarily lift the pass laws and led to thoroughgoing political repression across the country following the declaration of a State of Emergency. The PAC saw its struggle as intimately linked to the global politics of African liberation, envisaged a rapid timetable of political change and employed a millenarian Pan-Africanist rhetoric. While the evidence is incomplete, it has been suggested that the iKongo movement, which emerged simultaneously against Bantu Authorities in the Eastern Cape, also connected its endeavours with Pan-Africanist struggles and Lumumba’s vision in the Congo. The armed struggle against white settlers in French Algeria was at its peak in 1960, and in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, non-violent movements were giving way to armed struggles. Belgium’s unexpected withdrawal from the Congo, where it had still envisaged a distant timetable for independence, inspired anticolonial movements and marked the fragility of colonial rule - not least in South Africa, where the Congo crisis became common source of metaphor for African nationalists and white supremacists alike, as they sought to make sense of the politics and possibilities in South Africa. Set against this backdrop, it is not hard to see how the protests generated by the PAC’s campaign in South Africa’s cities in 1960 were perceived by the white minority as a significant threat to the status quo. The launch of uMkhonto we Sizwe (‘Spear of the Nation’, the armed wing of the African National Congress- ANC) the following year further underscored white fears of change. Apartheid politicians drew increasingly on the idioms and strategies of the ‘federal moment’, seeking to shore-up the global credibility and political legitimacy of the South African settler project by recasting the geopolitics of segregation in the form of an ethnic national federal solution. Verwoerd’s early scheme for self-government cruelly echoed the language of democratic federal projects while emulating imperial strategies to remould white rule.

Throughout the 1960s, in a variety of outward-facing government publications by the Department of Information, South African spin doctors employed a longstanding discourse,
now being deployed by Verwoerd, of Smuts’ ‘parallel development’ and imperial trusteeship. Throughout the glossy pages of the *South African Digest*, apartheid publicists marketed South Africa as a leading light of ‘civilisation’ in the postcolonial world. South Africa would serve the post-imperial ‘West’, so this publication claimed, as an agent of ‘civilisation’ in Africa, by leading the ‘homelands’ to a ‘peaceful’, ‘orderly’ independence, in contrast to the ‘chaos’ of events in the Congo and Nigeria and ‘dictatorship’ in Ghana.\(^\text{111}\) In making this argument, the apartheid mouthpiece of the Department of Information was no doubt pointing to the judiciousness of South African policies of ‘retribalisation’ in the bantustans, designed to instil compliance and order through ‘tradition’, while ‘modern’ metropolitan elites had come to be at the forefront of (the supposedly dangerous) nationalist politics in South Africa and across the continent. As much as the bantustan project was designed to contain dissent and divert nationalist opposition, partition and ethnic separation were projected outwardly as an acceptable solution for ‘durable’ peace in South Africa.

Upon South Africa’s reapplication to the Commonwealth after the Republic referendum, Verwoerd withdrew when it became clear that the application would be rejected.\(^\text{112}\) Verwoerd underestimated the effect of widespread opposition to apartheid among newly independent African and Asian nations, both in the Commonwealth and in the Non-Aligned Movement at the United Nations. A rapid and panicked retreat from empire ensued after 1960, ‘as British and French governments came to realise that hanging onto power would be too painful and costly’.\(^\text{113}\) As Darwin argues, the project of self-government ‘was a runaway train that refused to stop at the stations [that Britain’s colonial administrators had] built or to pick up the passengers they meant it to carry’: colonial rulers could not contain escalating demands for equality.\(^\text{114}\) In this context, and with the withdrawal of British support for white settlers in Kenya and the Central African Federation, South Africa shifted its alliances towards Portugal.
South African politicians feared diplomatic isolation. As South Africa became subject to deepening criticism of its racial policies at the UN, the regime further adapted the semantics of segregation and trusteeship. In his role as Prime Minister, Vorster preached ethnic self-determination and independence, while upholding the belief in South Africa’s regional imperial role. During the mid-1960s, it was believed in South African foreign policy circles that the federal aims of ‘separate development’ might be further pursued through the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia into South Africa’s formal ambit. South Africa’s imperial expansionism was thus described in an ANC paper to the UN Special Committee in 1968:

The attainment of independence by Zambia, Malawi, Botswana and Lesotho has occurred side by side with the implementation of an expansionist policy by the Pretoria regime, which has for its aim the establishment of an empire ruled over by the white master-race, and consisting of a large number of small black bantustans extending over the whole of southern Africa from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean.

By the end of the 1960s, following rapid imperial retreat from many colonies and the proliferation of newly independent nation-states, federalism had failed as an intra-imperial solution. Britain’s independence for the HCTs at the end of the decade (Lesotho, 1966; Botswana, 1966; Swaziland, 1968) paved the way for the promotion of ‘homeland’ independence in South Africa with the passing of the Homeland Citizenship Act in 1970. Britain’s withdrawal from the HCTs and the independence of Lesotho gave misplaced hope to Vorster that independent ‘homelands’ might be accepted internationally. Transkei compared favourably for the South Africans with tiny Lesotho: neither had significant domestic economies, while both were profoundly reliant on migrant labour to the South African mines. Yet Vorster’s renewal of ‘homeland’ policy was not popular: it was rejected by those on the Afrikaner far right. Denouncing the ‘creeping liberalism’ they perceived,
Afrikaner nationalist ‘purists’ in the *Herstigte Nasionale Party* were clamorous opponents of both Verwoerdian ‘separate development’ and Vorster’s expanded scheme for independent ‘homelands’. These schemes spoke more to distant audiences around the world than to the Afrikaner electorate or, of course, the African majority.

Jamie Miller’s work reveals how, in the face of looming isolation and the political pressure of black nations to the north, Vorster’s regime recast the apartheid imaginary to protect its racialised political economy of white privilege. Vorster’s premiership was characterised by novel efforts to promote ‘homeland self-government’ as a durable solution in a changing world. He took the rhetoric of ‘separate development’ spearheaded by Verwoerd and reformulated it in the language of self-determination and racial equality: the ‘homelands’ would be guided to independence and supported in their national development by Afrikaners—the ‘white Africans’. His outward policy pursued diplomatic relationships with anti-communist African states, while using these relationships to sell the idea of independent ‘homelands’ to white South Africans as a durable vision for change in the postcolonial world. Vorster’s attempt to recast apartheid in the idioms of the post-war world (i.e. self-determination, ethnic nationalism and ‘homeland self-government’) was more than mere ‘window dressing’. Following the Portuguese coup in 1974, which left South Africa exposed (dependent as it had become on this alliance), Vorster made a concerted effort to reposition South Africa diplomatically, to pursue relations with anti-communist African states, while cultivating support for this new language of legitimisation among white interest groups. For a time, at least within the circles of ‘verlichte’ Afrikaner politicians, it seemed possible that Vorster might succeed in repackaging the apartheid project in a form that was more palatable on the international stage. Under an expanded profile and headed by apartheid spin doctors and evangelists, Connie Mulder and Eschel Rhoodie, the Department of Information modernised the existing rhetoric of South Africa’s civilising mission by
promoting the developmental merits of the ‘homelands’ policy; marketing ‘Bantu self-government’ in glossy brochures selling ‘African tradition’ in ‘modern Bantu states’. Their diplomacy became increasingly desperate, as an enlivened internal movement and the global anti-apartheid lobby exposed the realities of apartheid and the duplicity of this paternalist discourse.

By 1978, following the massive repression of the 1976-7 Uprising; the revelations regarding South Africa’s involvement in Angola’s civil war; and the failure of the Kissinger initiatives, Vorster retreated from his modernising project, realigning himself with the Afrikaner hard-right. His hopes of South Africa achieving acceptance among postcolonial states faded rapidly. The collapse of South Africa’s alliance with Portugal, and its floundering failure to appease African nationalists with the ‘homelands’ scheme drove the radicalisation of state security (and the militarisation of the state) from the late 1970s in the form of Botha’s ‘Total Strategy’. The Muldergate information scandal of 1978 also undermined the propaganda machine of the Department of Information.

**Cold War in southern Africa: villagisation and counter-insurgency**

American development planning in early postcolonial India was influential in sharpening the focus of planning on the village, Nicole Sackley argues. The American architect Albert Mayer’s pilot project for rural reconstruction in Etawah, India, centred on the village as the site for the preservation of the disciplining forces of ‘tradition’ amid rapid social change. While its foreign policies angered those in Washington, Nehru’s government was nevertheless regarded by the Truman administration as the vital conduit for stemming the rise
of communism in India and Asia. Village-level rural development, based on the Etawah model, promised to bring self-sufficiency and a non-radical ‘peaceful revolution’ to the Indian countryside. These ideas circulated across fields of reconstruction and development planning throughout Asia (and indeed Africa) during the 1950s. As the Cold War escalated, Mayer’s pilot project in Etawah came to embody a set of Indian and American aspirations for development: it became an American model for rural reform. The experiment at Etawah was stripped of its local emphases and employed explicitly by Truman as a method in winning ‘hearts and minds’ in Asia. Sackley’s account of Etawah reveals how global fixation with the village as the site of social transformation was given a new impetus in the context of the Cold War. By the end of the 1960s, coercion had replaced paternalist developmentalism: the ‘international enthusiasm’ for ‘peasant relocation and the construction of fortress villages’ (in, for example, Mozambique, Angola, India, Vietnam, Malaya, Algeria and Southern Rhodesia) revealed the widespread influence of coercive counterinsurgency doctrines in development thinking.

If development planning in India became the site of the American search for hegemony in the postcolonial world, Central Asia was the Soviet equivalent. Modernisation, development planning and ‘self-government’ in Central Asia became an important nexus for Soviet engagement with the non-aligned states after Bandung, as Krushchev sought to differentiate Soviet self-government from British colonial policy. As Kalinovsky argues, Central Asia came to be at the heart of the Soviet project, demonstrating to Soviet citizens ‘that they were beneficiaries of and participants in the Soviet drive for material achievement’, while confirming to the wider world ‘that whereas the “imperialist powers” offered only domination, the Soviet model offered development without domination and inequality.’

Amid mounting opposition South Africa continued to protect the interests of the white minority electorate. It did so by seeking acceptance in the international arena through the
rhetorical project of ethnic national independence; by pursuing diplomatic relations with independent African regimes; by entrenching the security state (under Vorster and later P. W. Botha); by advancing white settler alliances in southern Africa; and by gaining diplomatic protection from the U.S., becoming its proxy and protector of western ‘civilisation’ in southern Africa.\textsuperscript{132} During the 1960s, the apartheid government pursued strategies that were characteristic of the late colonial state, developed in relation to the experiences of British, French and Portuguese late colonialism. South African resettlement policy displayed the characteristic qualities of the late colonial ‘repressive developmentalism’ described by Bandeira Jerónimo in Portuguese Angola, as counter-insurgency strategies were overlaid onto colonial forms of rural planning.\textsuperscript{133} Relocation as a form of apartheid statecraft coupled the discourses of paternalist ‘modernisation’ and ‘development’ with the imperatives of control and repression. As Feichtinger has argued, resettlement villages served a ‘double function as disciplinary spaces and laboratories of social transformation.’\textsuperscript{134}

South Africa’s deepening regional alliance with the Portuguese colonial regime in Angola and Mozambique impressed upon its policies of rural planning and relocation. From the mid-1960s, following the collapse of the Central African Federation in 1964, South Africa became increasingly reliant on political and military alliances with Portugal. South Africa supported Portuguese colonial military strategies as a settler bulwark against anti-colonial movements in the southern African region, funding Portuguese counter-insurgency campaigns in its African territories, Mozambique and Angola, to prevent the cross-border activities of black liberation movements. Nascent forms of co-operation through the mid-to-late 1960s were solidified in the secret alliance of Exercise ALCORA (1970-74), through which South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia collaborated in political and military operations against African nationalist mobilisation in the region.\textsuperscript{135} Dependence on this political and military alliance meant that in 1974, South Africa found itself exposed.\textsuperscript{136} The
United States, meanwhile, protected South Africa diplomatically at the UN and elsewhere, while relying on South Africa’s military campaigns as a proxy for its geopolitical strategy of anti-communism in the southern African region. While the US foreign affairs department did not believe that the bantustan scheme of ethnic self-determination was a viable alternative to majority rule, it remained ambivalent about this policy in open forums, defying the UN. All the while, South African politicians were ‘delusional’, believing their project to be simply misunderstood: if they could only sell the policy of ethnic self-government more effectively to America and the western world, South Africa would overcome its isolation and win the support of the West in favour of its solution to decolonisation.

If the rhetorical project of independent ‘homelands’ ultimately failed to win international acceptance for the apartheid regime, the praxis of repressive planning - equally shaped by external forces - had profound consequences. South Africa’s growing cooperation with Portugal in Angola and its intervention in the Angolan conflict from 1966 shaped the strikingly similar rural planning policies that emerged in each of these contexts. More broadly, the regional collaborations of the white settler regimes in southern Africa during the 1960s and 1970s help to explain the strategies of ‘repressive developmentalism’ that were pursued throughout the region in South Africa, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia; and South West Africa. Bandeira Jerónimo highlights the significance of the ‘Uíge model’ in Portuguese colonial policy after 1961. In response to the 1961 uprising in northern Angola, the repressive and violent counter-insurgency strategies adopted by the Portuguese involved mass resettlement into rural villages (aldeamentos/ reordenamento rural); the fostering of ‘rural communities’; the establishment of ‘tribal’ administration (regedorias) and rural schools. These strategies, developed in the northern region around Uíge, became the ‘model’ for counter-insurgency operations that cohered during the late 1960s (1966-8) in Angola. In Portuguese Africa, as in South Africa, colonial social spending became focused on rural
settled.\textsuperscript{145} Bandeira Jerónimo argues that colonatos and aldeamentos ‘characterized the social engineering imagination of the late colonial State’ in Portuguese Africa. These resettlement programmes were ‘the exemplary model of the core premises of late colonial development.’\textsuperscript{146} Portugal’s low cost, ‘low-intensity’ colonial warfare, with rural population relocation at its heart, was perceived by military strategists to have had considerable success in repressing the anti-colonial struggle.\textsuperscript{147}

It is no accident that in South Africa, a similar trajectory simultaneously emerged during the mid-late 1960s, with the centralisation of influx control measures under the Department of Bantu Administration of Development during the mid-late 1960s; the extension of mass resettlement programmes and Vorster’s further elaboration of the bantustan strategy. The southern African regimes were co-operating in their mutual project of rural repression. In 1968, an ‘International Meeting of Technicians for Community Development’ was hosted in Angola, comprising a tour of the territory by delegations from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia to share expertise in rural planning, population relocation and ‘community development’. The visitors were little impressed: they had not been shown around the northern district of Uíge, where resettlement policy was considered to have been a resounding success in stemming resistance and re-establishing colonial control. Van Rensburg, at the centre of South African policy-making on influx control and bantustan relocation, mocked the Portuguese efforts at community co-operatives in the south of Angola.\textsuperscript{148} If the precise ideological preoccupations and colonial concerns of the southern African settler states differed to a degree, their primary objectives were shared: to control, contain and discipline African societies through forms of rural resettlement. While rural planning and ‘development’ had long been employed to extend the control of colonial states,\textsuperscript{149} militarised control and coercion came to eclipse colonial social science in the project of colonial ‘modernisation’.\textsuperscript{148}
It was not until the 1960s that the South African state turned its full attention to the question of rural administration. The tightening of urban influx controls (pass law restrictions) over the African population throughout the 1950s, and in even more draconian ways after 1960, revealed the discontinuous connections between rural and urban colonial governance. In the Cape during the mid-1950s, administrators had lamented the slow pace of the provision of ‘native villages’ in the rural Ciskei bantustan which would expedite the removal of Africans from the Cape metropolitan area. Through the expansion of the euphemistically-renamed Department of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD), the state centralised its control over urban influx controls and rural planning in the bantustans. The South African state thus displayed the centralising tendency of the late colonial ‘big state’, as described by Darwin. From the mid-1960s, the BAD planned a swathe of new ‘native villages’ and ‘bantu towns’ in the bantustans. In reality, the rudimentary provisions for these settlements were even more scarce than the planners had envisaged, with tragic consequences for those forcibly relocated to these areas. People were forced, in their thousands and often at gunpoint, to leave their homes and board a ‘GG’ (Government Garage) truck taking them to a resettlement site. They were accommodated in tents and temporary, prefabricated structures. Water and sanitation were scarce, food was short and many people - particularly children and the elderly - died of malnutrition, exposure and infectious diseases. The other consequence of establishing such sites for relocation throughout the mid-1960s, was to significantly speed up the removal of Africans from designated ‘white’ areas: the towns, cities and white-owned farmlands of the Republic. After 1967, the pace of such removals quickened, while these ‘dumping grounds’ proliferated across the Republic.

‘Rapid resettlement’ into rural and peri-urban villages served multiple imperatives in apartheid South Africa: it facilitated the urban pass system and contributed to the
tightening of movement controls over African people; it enabled landowners to expedite the removal of labour tenants and farm dwellers living on white-owned farms, dispossessing them and in the process further commodifying farm labour, and it imprinted the authority of the white minority regime through repressive villagisation. The latter, while often acknowledged, has not been examined in a sustained way in the historical literature. From the mid-1960s, population removals were shaped as much by the imperatives of collective punishment and ‘pacification’ as they were by the priorities of racial segregation promoted by National Party ‘ideologues’ or the demands for labour controls made by white farmers and industrial elites.

The turn to armed struggle by the ANC and PAC and the rise of the migrant organisation *Poqo* (which aligned itself with the PAC) gave rise to a wave of ‘black peril’ discourse among South Africa’s white communities during the early 1960s. State initiatives of control and containment reflected this anxiety and, amid the growing influence of the Cold War, drew on well-established colonial strategies of colonial pacification. In November 1962, two whites were murdered at a march in Paarl, outside Cape Town, by members of *Poqo*. The English and Afrikaans press depicted *Poqo*’s violent protests as evidence of African savagery and cried of the dangers of urbanisation and ‘detribalisation’. The Paarl march was followed by a significant state crack down, involving the arrest and detention of thousands of activists and suspected *Poqo* members. The Snyman Commission of Inquiry was then appointed to investigate the November events at Paarl. Early in the investigation, Snyman argued that it was “vitally important to know why a situation such as that existing at Paarl could exist so long without being cleared up,” so as to “prevent repetition of what happened in Paarl, to punish the culprits and to remove the element of violence.” As Van Laun has argued, ‘the march had invoked underlying white fears of a Mau Mau-like black revolt in South Africa and… the Commission came to stage the entire
“Native Question”. Van Laun’s analysis of the Snyman Commission reveals how political repression and segregationist settler colonialism were conjoined in the forms of governance and statecraft pursued in South Africa after 1960. The Commission conflated Poqo - a social movement of migrants - with the PAC, and, as in the emergencies in Malaya, Kenya and Nyasaland, it formulated a narrative of an insurrectionary plot by Poqo as a pretext for a thoroughgoing purge. The Snyman Commission deployed the ‘colonial myth’ of African ‘savagery’ to call for a more stringent segregationist colonial order and for the removal of Africans from the Western Cape.

Through the mid-1960s the security state embarked on a political purge of the Eastern Cape, the heartland of support for the ANC and PAC. While this repression centred on Port Elizabeth, where the ANC was deeply rooted, it radiated into the rural towns of the region. Sham political trials were held in rural police stations and courthouses across the Eastern Cape, with investigations and interrogations carried out by Special Branch police. The charges largely fell under the sweeping Suppression of Communism Act; they were related to involvement with the ANC and PAC and acquittals were rare. As the lawyer John Jackson recalled, ‘allegations of torture were plentiful… conviction followed conviction.’

The Ciskei’s resettlement areas, and others like them established throughout the bantustans during the 1960s, became ‘nodes’ in apartheid’s late colonial carceral regime. A great number of political activists arrested in this purge were banished to relocation sites in the Ciskei: Sada, Dimbaza, Ilinge and Mdantsane. In a valley, surrounded by mountains and accessible only via a long dirt track, Ilinge became a key site of political banishment. By 1969 at least forty ex-political prisoners had been confined to Ilinge under banning orders: they were members of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and many had been incarcerated on Robben Island. The number of political prisoners
banished to the township - and others like it in the Ciskei - continued to rise through the following decade.

The families of known activists and their communities in the small towns and cities of the Eastern Cape were also targeted in this repression. The Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1964 provided a veneer of legality for the forcible removal of African men, women, and children to undeveloped sites in the rural reserves. Many of the people removed to the Ciskei from across the Cape during the mid-1960s came from towns in the region where the PAC had established underground cells, including Aliwal North, Burgersdorp, Cradock, East London, Molteno, Steynsburg, Middelburg, Graaff-Reinet, King William’s Town and Queenstown. The townships around Port Elizabeth and Cradock, where the ANC had well-established underground networks, became subject to forced removals and relocations to the Ciskei. The families of arrested ANC and PAC members were targeted by members of the Special Branch police and closely monitored once in their place of exile. The sites that emerged in the Ciskei in the early 1960s, including Sada, Dimbaza and Ilinge, were some of the earliest of their kind in apartheid South Africa, as the Western Cape led the way in the emerging removals strategy and as the state embarked on its campaign of repression in the Eastern Cape.\footnote{165}

By the late 1960s, the concerns of the late colonial ‘security state’ had come to assume greater importance in the blend of overlapping imperatives that drove Apartheid-era population planning.\footnote{166} During the mid-1960s, South African military and government elites were engaged in the study of imperial counter-insurgency texts that traced the ‘successful’ strategies of anti-communist repression employed in Malaya, Kenya and elsewhere.\footnote{167} Daniel argues that these counter-insurgency doctrines started to shape South African security strategy in explicit ways from 1966.\footnote{168} While ‘the emerging predominance of the Cold War paradigm did not eclipse nor replace the long-held racist paradigm’ of apartheid,\footnote{169} he argues,
security concerns were embraced by senior National Party politicians and the elite security establishment, particularly under the premiership of Vorster from September 1966. The growing influence of colonial counter-insurgency doctrine in South Africa from the mid-1960s; the regional political and military cooperation of southern African settler colonial states; and the global securitisation of rural planning amidst the dynamics of the Cold War all inform an understanding of rapid population relocation to the bantustans in this period.

**Resistance and the failure of resettlement as ‘anti-politics’**

If South Africa’s segregationist policy was shaped by the global circulation of governance strategies among imperial elites, state praxis was also a response to and limited by ‘everyday resistance’. From the 1930s to the 1980s, pass law contraventions, peri-urban ‘squatter’ movements and labour organisations all forced the state to find new methods to achieve its aims. The tightening of urban influx controls and the state’s resort to forced removals during the 1960s were a direct response to black South Africans’ tenacious pursuit of urban livelihoods and their unwillingness to be shoehorned into the state’s vision of colonial governance and domicile in the reserves. As Legassick argued in 1984, before the pass laws were lifted in 1986, the most critical impediment to the South African state in its implementation of a coercive labour regime was ‘the resistance of its victims… [through the] spontaneous determination to find every small escape route from the imposition of controls.’ These everyday refusals to abandon urban livelihoods compelled the regime to regiment more stringent, centralised and coercive forms of influx control in order to realise its vision of colonial order.
Those who were relocated to the bantustans became subject to the violence and coercion of repressive apartheid planning. Nevertheless, they exercised agency amid the oppression of displacement and local authoritarianism, making strategic alliances to improve everyday circumstances while carving out lives in the most challenging circumstances.¹⁷⁴ Facing dislocation, widespread unemployment and destitution, some people sought new patrons in the local representatives of tribal authority and were able to benefit from the limited concessions of housing and access to education that the system provided. These experiences cannot simply be dismissed as ‘collaboration’ with the widely hated apartheid authorities.¹⁷⁵

Village planning and resettlement-as-counter-insurgency did not always have the effects that government planners desired. While the authoritarianism and technicism of bantustan resettlement planning no doubt strengthened the hand of ruling bantustan elites, they also had unintended consequences.¹⁷⁶ Following the massive state repression of the early 1960s, the Ciskei’s resettlement areas became important locations for the development of rural underground political networks. After having served custodial sentences on Robben Island and in other prisons across the Republic, political prisoners were sent under banning orders to live in resettlement areas in the Ciskei and other bantustans.¹⁷⁷ Some activists were subject to house arrest and they were monitored closely by the South African Special Branch police and the Ciskei’s police force. Nevertheless, these activists ‘turn[ed] camps into classrooms’,¹⁷⁸ engaged in underground activities, and sought to politicise a new generation of activists. While control measures prohibited public meetings, sports and social clubs became an opportunity to educate younger people in the aims, objectives and strategies of the ANC and PAC. Through their underground networks, these activists housed political exiles who attempted to cross the border into Lesotho.¹⁷⁹
After 1976, the proliferation of resistance to the bantustan regime in the densely populated resettlement areas of the Ciskei testifies to the failure of the state’s efforts to contain dissent. The state’s limited vision of paternalism and ‘development’ in the bantustans, and the paltry provision of welfare for the people who lived in them, gave the project a short shelf life. By the middle of the 1980s, the deep and inescapable contradictions of the ‘homelands’ had led to widespread rejection of this phoney apartheid project and the corrupt local bureaucrats and politicians who benefited from the patronage of state funds.180

The local dynamics of resettlement on the ground also shaped the evolution of state policy at the centre.181 The starkest evidence of this is in the government’s about-turn on its policy of spatial segregation in the Western Cape. Black South Africans denied formal residence in the Western Cape and forced to reside in the Ciskei and Transkei were compelled to seek work elsewhere or languish in rural deprivation in the bantustans. While influx controls and migrant labour bureaux channelled men into migrant labour contracts in mining and industry, many people defied these controls and went to urban areas in search of work. In Cape Town, as elsewhere, state authorities set about removing the thousands of people living in shack settlements on the fringes of the city, while denying urban residence rights to those classified as ‘African’.182 Most famously, the Cape Town city authorities sought repeatedly to remove those who had settled at Crossroads, many of whom had built livelihoods across the urban-rural nexus between Cape Town and the rural bantustans of the Eastern Cape.183 The strident resistance of women at Crossroads contributed to a reassessment of Cape Town’s urban policy: the creation of the vast African township of Khayelitsha represented a shift in the segregationist geopolitical strategy for the Cape, where permanent African residence had been denied. This was due in no small part to the refusal of black South Africans to be denied access to the city or to be cowed by the violent and repressive policies of the government.184
Conclusion

This article began with the premise that the policies of ‘grand apartheid’ need to be understood in relation to developments beyond South Africa’s borders. It has argued that the forms of population control and relocation pursued in South Africa after 1960 drew on imperial efforts to exert control and contain dissent during the end of empire. The bantustan project of ethnic self-government was more than mere window dressing: it was developed under the influence of prevailing global strategies of population transfer and partition and was projected internationally as, South African politicians believed, an acceptably ‘modern’ solution to their ‘problem’: holding onto white power and privilege in the face of mounting opposition.

Rural resettlement and villagisation served multiple and overlapping imperatives for the South African settler colonial state. Villagisation underpinned and promised to extend the segregationist regime of land governance under apartheid by facilitating removals from ‘white’ areas. It promoted the interests of ‘modernising’ farmers by ‘commoditising’ farm labour and facilitating ‘accumulation by dispossession’. The eviction of tenants and their relatives from farms removed the last remnants of the paternalist contract from farm labour relations. Village planning also promised to transform and discipline rural societies, in the dual project of ‘pacification’ and ‘development’ that characterised imperial counter-insurgencies.

Rural planning cemented the future of white supremacy in South Africa, amid growing challenges to colonialism, within and beyond South Africa. South African bantustan resettlement was not well planned or methodically orchestrated: it was piecemeal, yet the role
of planning was critical. The discourse of development and the praxis of planning lent
legitimacy, vision and order to a ‘blundering’ apartheid project, as the National Party regime
entrenched the settler colonial order amid imperial retreat. Planning offered a rhetoric of
modernisation, given new impetus by the promise of development in the postcolonial world,
and facilitated the continued re-imagination of the white settler project in the era of
decolonisation. Discourses of ‘community development’ and ‘self-development’ offered
ways of legitimating white supremacy and apartheid to the rest of the world through the
promotion of ethnic nationalism. While the notion of ‘self-governing homelands’ took shape
under Verwoerd and was given new impetus by Vorster in an effort to further modernise
apartheid, South Africa’s bantustan scheme was nevertheless an imperial vision, which drew
on Smuts’ interwar notion of ‘parallel development’ and rested heavily on the belief in South
Africa’s imperial role in ‘civilising’ southern Africa.

In particular, British and Portuguese imperial strategies of ‘development’ and
resettlement were adopted and adapted by the apartheid state and were employed to pacify
resistance as well as to extend and entrench the settler colonial project as it came under
increased pressure. Along with its network of prisons; the multiple police stations where
political activists were detained without trial under the ninety-day law; and the common
practice of political banishment; bantustan resettlement sites became nodes in South Africa’s
late colonial carceral regime. The bantustan policy of ‘separate development’ was indeed
aimed at deflecting opposition to the white regime and ‘externalising’ conflict from ‘white’
South Africa to the rural bantustans, but the global politics of late colonialism and southern
African settler alliances played critical roles in shaping the content and the form of South
Africa’s strategies of villagisation and ‘repressive development’.

(Word count: 11,613)
Notes


2 It is difficult to arrive at an accurate estimate of this figure. The Surplus People Project estimated that between 1960 and 1980, approximately 1 million farm tenants had been evicted, most of whom were sent to a bantustan resettlement areas. This figure thus does not encompass the thousands of people who were forcibly removed from urban areas. Surplus People Project, Forced Removals in South Africa, Volume 1, p. 6. Other estimates suggest a significantly larger number. Simkins estimates that in the same period, the total population of the Bantustans grew from 4,739,855 to 11,338,308 as a result of the proliferation of closer settlements and (to a lesser extent) the re-drawing of borders to encompass urban townships within the bantustans. C. Simkins, ‘The Economic Implications of African Resettlement’, 6-7.


4 While Bantustan independence was widely condemned, that these ethnic national units would fail to gain international recognition was ‘not always obvious or inevitable’. Ferguson, Paradoxes of Sovereignty’, p. 128.


6 Nolutshungu, ‘South Africa and the Transfers of Power in Africa’.

7 This project builds on earlier my earlier critique of the ‘exceptionalist’ argument in Evans, ‘South Africa’s Bantustans’.

8 There is a growing literature that addresses the South Africa’s global history, for example, Breckenridge, The Biometric State; Skinner, Modern South Africa in World History.

9 Hopkins (ed), Global History.

10 Feith, ‘Repressive Developmentalist Regimes’; Bandeira Jerónimo, ‘“A Battle in the Field of Human Relations”’.

11 Trapido, ‘South Africa in a Comparative Study of Industrialization’.

12 O’Meara, Volkskapitalisme; O’Meara, Forty Lost Years; Legassick, ‘Legislation, Ideology and Economy’.


14 Lacey, Working for Boroko.


16 Dubow, Apartheid, 111, 63-65.

17 A recent account emphasises the role of Verwoerd as theorist, while pointing to his ‘failed logic’: Moodie, ‘Separate Development.’


19 Dubow, Apartheid, 17 (my emphasis).

20 On ‘authoritative high modernism’ see Scott, Seeing Like a State, Chapter 3; also Mitchell, Rule of Experts.

21 On the ‘second colonial occupation’ see Low and Lonsdale, ‘Towards the New Order, 1945–63’.


25 French, cited in Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency, p. 3.


27 Sackley, ‘The Village as Cold War Site’; Feichtinger, ‘“A Great Reformatory”’; Bandeira Jerónimo, ‘“A Battle in the Field of Human Relations.”’
76 centralisation see Darwin, ‘What was the Late Colonial State?’, 78.
77 also
78 Making
79 its regime of
80 Hopki
81 second colonial occupation
82 dream[ed] of social transformation
83 United Nations see
84 Hendricks, Evans,
85 On
86 Lazar, ‘Ibid.
87 Evans,
88 Sackley describes the
89 Ibid.
90 Evans,
91 Iyer,
92 Ittmann,
93 Bas
94 Ibid.
95 Darwin,
96 Miller,
97 Hepple,
98 Hyam, ‘Ibid.
99 Mazower,
100 Hodge, ‘Colonial Experts’, 304.
101 Cooper, ‘Reconstructing Empire.’
103 Ibid., 302–306.
104 Sunderland, ‘The Ministry of Asiatic Russia’; Beissinger, ‘Soviet Empire as “Family Resemblance”’.
105 Beissinger, ‘Soviet Empire as “Family Resemblance”’, 296.
107 Engerman, ‘The Price of Success’.
108 Engerman, Modernization from the Other Shore.
109 Elkins, Britain’s Gulag.
112 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, 28–65.
114 Hepple, Verwoerd.
115 Miller, An African Volk.
116 Darwin, ‘What Was the Late Colonial State?’.
117 Ibid.
118 Bashford, ‘Population, Geopolitics’.
121 Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, 203-5
122 Ibid.
123 Mager, Gender and the Making, 32-33.
125 Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, 56–159.
126 Ibid., 62.
127 Lazar, ‘Verwoerd versus the “Visionaries”’.
128 On ‘authoritarian high modernism’ see Scott, Seeing Like a State, Chapter 3; Mitchell, Rule of Experts. On the ‘second colonial occupation’ see Low and Lonsdale, ‘Towards the New Order’, 12–16. On late colonial centralisation see Darwin, ‘What was the Late Colonial State?’, 78-9.
129 Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, 63, 67.
130 Huber, ‘Introduction’.

28 This article thus continues Hopkins’ project to address the former dominions in the history of decolonisation: Hopkins, ‘Rethinking Decolonization’.
29 Lacey, Working for Boroko. The importance of this period in establishing the South African legal order and its regime of ‘native’ governance is now widely acknowledged. Dubow, Racial Segregation; Chanock, The Making of South African Legal Culture; Freund, ‘South Africa: The Union Years’.
30 Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, 56–85; Dubow, ‘“Holding a Just Balance”’.
31 Rich, ‘Ministering to the White Man’s Needs’.
32 J. Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century, 83.
33 For a discussion of Smuts’ ‘imperial internationalism’ (Mazower) and his role at the League of Nations and United Nations see Mazower, No Enchanted Palace; Hyslop, ‘“Segregation has Fallen on Evil Days”’; Dubow, ‘Smuts, The United Nations’.
34 Hyslop, ‘“Segregation has Fallen on Evil Days”’, 442.
36 Hauptman, ‘Africa View’. The Peel Commission of 1937 is another key example of proposals for ethnic partition under trusteeship in this period.
37 Pedersen, The Guardians.
38 Lugard, The Dual Mandate; Smuts, ‘Native Policy in Africa’.
39 Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, 206.
40 Ibid.
41 Manela, The Wilsonian Moment
42 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace
43 Ibid., 141, 143.
45 This is the subject of work in progress by Arie Dubnov. See also Robson, States of Separation, 7-34.
46 Cooper, ‘Reconstructing Empire.’
48 Ibid., 302–306.
49 Sunderland, ‘The Ministry of Asiatic Russia’; Beissinger, ‘Soviet Empire as “Family Resemblance”’.
50 Beissinger, ‘Soviet Empire as “Family Resemblance”’, 296.
51 Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, 3.
52 Engerman, ‘The Price of Success’.
53 Engerman, Modernization from the Other Shore.
54 Elkins, Britain’s Gulag.
57 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, 28–65.
59 Hepple, Verwoerd.
60 Miller, An African Volk.
61 Darwin, ‘What Was the Late Colonial State?’.
62 Ibid.
63 Bashford, ‘Population, Geopolitics’.
64 Ittmann, ‘Demography as Policy Science’, 442. See also Ittmann, ‘The Colonial Office’.
66 Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, 203-5
67 Ibid.
68 Mager, Gender and the Making, 32-33.
70 Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, 56–159.
71 Ibid., 62.
72 Lazar, ‘Verwoerd versus the “Visionaries”’.
73 On ‘authoritarian high modernism’ see Scott, Seeing Like a State, Chapter 3; Mitchell, Rule of Experts. On the ‘second colonial occupation’ see Low and Lonsdale, ‘Towards the New Order’, 12–16. On late colonial centralisation see Darwin, ‘What was the Late Colonial State?’, 78-9.
74 Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, 63, 67.
75 Huber, ‘Introduction’.
African organisations of the PAC and SWAPO, which, through the Congo Alliance [1963'

Momen, Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, 240.


Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, 241.

Gatrell, ‘Refugees and the Doctrine of Rehabilitation’.

Gatrell, ‘Refugees’, 11. Gatrell argues that as Roosevelt reasoned in 1943, the challenge was to ‘restore to a normal, healthy and self-sustaining existence’ those people living in the oppressed countries: assistance in economic ‘rehabilitation’ was essential for the successful return of exiles to their home nations. Gatrell, 4.

Hyslop, ‘“Segregation has Fallen on Evil Days”’, 442. See also Torrance, ‘Britain, South Africa and the High Commission Territories’; Hyam and Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok, 102-117. In the 1940s, in articulating the justification for the formal annexation of South West Africa, South African economists had even envisaged the settlement of ‘surplus’ populations from the country to the northern deserts of the mandated territory. Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, 54-5.


Hyam and Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok, 102-117.

Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, 274-5. This reference to the Commonwealth of Nations was a throwback to the longstanding project of South African imperialism developed first by Milner and then by Smuts.


Eiselen, cited in Dubow, Apartheid, 106.

Gilomee, The Last Afrikaner Leaders, 78-79; Gilomee, The Afrikaners, 531-532.

Gilomee, The Afrikaners, 531.

Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, 16.

These were characteristic modes of the late colonial ‘dense’ and ‘self-destruct’ state, described by Darwin. Darwin, ‘What Was the Late Colonial State?’, 77-80.

Ibid., 79.

Ivan Evans argues that the agreements made at Lancaster House were instructive for South African policy.

Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, 246.

Darwin, ‘What Was the Late Colonial State?’, 80.

O’Leary, ‘“From Birmingham to Bulawayo”’, 52-3.

On the role of Indian elites in shaping the debate on federalism in India see Pillai, ‘Fragmenting the Nation’.

O’Leary, ‘“From Birmingham to Bulawayo”’, 66. See also Collins, ‘Decolonisation and the “Federal Moment”’.


Rubin, ‘From Federalism to Binationalism’; Klusmeyer, ‘Hannah Arendt’s Case for Federalism’.

Lodge, Sharpeville; Lodge, The Cape Town Troubles; Lodge, Black Politics, 201-230; Lodge, ‘Insurrectionism in South Africa’.

Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), ‘We Will Win’.

Fidler, ‘Rural Cosmopolitanism’, 39-40. See also Kepe and Ntsebeza (eds), Rural Resistance in South Africa.

Independent Congo became an important supporter of African liberation movements, not least the southern African organisations of the PAC and SWAPO, which, through the Congo Alliance [1963-4], gained organisational and military refuge. Passemiers, ‘South Africa and the “Congo Crisis”’, 83-106.


Passemiers, ‘South Africa and the “Congo Crisis”’, 166-208.


Cooper, Africa Since 1940, 66; Stockwell, ‘Ends of Empire’, 276-77.

Darwin, The Empire Project, 625.

Onslow, ‘“Resistence to “Winds of Change””’, 223.


This is the subject of ongoing work on partitions by Arie Dubnov.
and counterinsurgency points to the perceived success of this discussion of the centrality of rural resettlement as counterinsurgency strategy.

McNamara, *The Limits of Counterinsurgency*, 78.

Feichtinger, *A Great Reformatory*, 4. See also Scheipers *The Use of Camps in Colonial Warfare*.


Miller, *Things Fall Apart*; Ribeiro de Meneses and McNamara, *Exercise ALCORA*.

Miller, *Things Fall Apart*, 190-1.

Miller, *Things Fall Apart*, 192, 190-192.

Evans, *Survival in the 'Dumping Grounds'*.

Ribeiro de Meneses and McNamara, *The Origins of Exercise ALCORA*, 1122-1123. For an account of resettlement strategies in Angola (1960s), see Bender, *The Limits of Counterinsurgency*.

Bandeira Jerónimo, *A Battle in the Field of Human Relations*.


The distinction between fenced strategic villages (aldeamentos) and rural resettlement villages (reordenamentos rural) was, in practice, minimal, Bender argues. Bender, *The Limits of Counterinsurgency*, 336.

Bandeira Jerónimo, *A Battle in the Field of Human Relations*.


Jeronimo, *The States of Empire*, 90. The *Payssants* in the Belgian Congo is another relevant example for this discussion of the centrality of rural resettlement as counterinsurgency strategy.


Darwin, *What Was the Late Colonial State?*, 78.

This history is examined in more detail in Evans, *Survival in the 'Dumping Grounds'*. 

Hendricks, *Rapid Resettlement*.

Evans, *Gender, Generation*.

Morris, *Apartheid, Agriculture and the State*.

van Laun, *Of Bodies Captured*, 44-5.

Van Laun, *In the Shadows of the Archive*; van Laun, *Of Bodies Captured*.
160 van Laun, ‘In the Shadows’, 120.
162 van Laun, ‘In the Shadows,’ 121.
164 Badat, The Forgotten People; Evans, Survival in the ‘Dumping Grounds’.
165 Evans, ‘The Makings and Meanings’; Evans, Survival in the ‘Dumping Grounds’.
166 Darwin characterises the late colonial ‘security state’ as ‘a bloated superstructure resting on a resentful and rebellious colonial society’; the colonial state, was, he argues, ‘transformed into an army of occupation.’ Darwin, ‘What Was the Late Colonial State?’., 79.
167 Texts by Clausewitz, Beaufre and Thompson were of special interest to South African personnel. Daniel, ‘Racism’, 37-40.
168 Ibid., 39.
169 Ibid., 40.
170 Ibid., 41. See also Ribeiro de Meneses and McNamara, ‘The Origins of Exercise ALCORA’, 1122.
171 Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine.
172 Scott, Weapons of the Weak.
174 Evans, Survival in the ‘Dumping Grounds’.
175 Evans, ‘Resettlement’; Evans, ‘South Africa’s Bantustans’. The work of Tara Zahra is instructive for understanding political ‘indifference’. See her ‘Imagined Noncommunities’.
176 Re. the effects of resettlement in bolstering bantustan authorities see Evans, ‘Resettlement’ and Peires, ‘Ethnicity and Pseudo-Ethnicity’.
177 The history of banishment under apartheid is examined in Badat, The Forgotten People.
178 Elkins, Britain’s Gulag, 195.
179 Evans, Survival in the ‘Dumping Grounds’.
181 This dynamic is explored in Murray-Li’s work on Indonesia. Murray Li, ‘Compromising Power’; The Will to Improve.
182 Ellis et al., The Squatter Problem; Western, Outcast Cape Town, 277- 308.
184 Cook, ‘Khayelitsha’.
185 Harvey, ‘The “New Imperialism”’.
186 Evans, ‘Resettlement and the Experiences of Farm Dwellers’.
189 Bandeira Jerónimo, ‘“A Battle in the Field of Human Relations”’.

References


Darwin, J. “What Was the Late Colonial State?” Itinerario 23, nos. 3-4 (1999): 73-82.


Lugard, F. D. The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa. London: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1926.


