Liquidation policy and credit history in financial contracting: An experiment

LIU, Jia and RIYANTO, Yohanes E (2019). Liquidation policy and credit history in financial contracting: An experiment. Journal of economic behavior & organization.

[img] PDF
liquidation 2018-12-15 proofread.pdf - Accepted Version
Restricted to Repository staff only until 14 January 2022.
Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.

Download (400kB)
Official URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/...
Link to published version:: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.025

Abstract

In the presence of contract incompleteness and asymmetric information, liquidation policy plays an important role in financial contracting. Liquidation is a double-edged sword. It deters borrowers from defaulting strategically, but it could be harsh to borrowers experiencing short-term liquidity problems. This paper presents an experimental analysis of the impacts of (1) liquidation policy on borrowers’ incentive to engage in strategic default and (2) disclosure of credit history information on lending relationships and borrowers’ behaviors. We show that liquidation policy deters borrowers from defaulting strategically. The availability of credit information softens the liquidation policy when the equilibrium liquidation policy is relatively lenient and helps to reduce strategic defaults.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: 1402 Applied Economics; Economics
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.025
SWORD Depositor: Symplectic Elements
Depositing User: Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited: 24 Jan 2019 11:24
Last Modified: 24 Jan 2019 11:30
URI: http://shura.shu.ac.uk/id/eprint/23835

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics