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Inter-organisational Relations and Central-Local Interactions in Tourism Planning in Belek, Turkey

Fisun Yuksel

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Sheffield Hallam University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

December 2002
Abstract

Successful tourism planning depends on there being effective relationships between central and local government, non-governmental organisations, the private sector and other affected parties. Inter-organisational analysis can be used to examine these relations. While this type of analysis is quite common in other disciplinary fields, its application is less usual in the field of tourism planning. Moreover, most such analysis in tourism has concentrated on a single spatial scale rather than on several scales, and the specific relationships between central and local government have been the subject of little sustained research. This research gap is surprising when the application of tourism plans often depends quite crucially on supportive central-local government relations.

This study examines the nature of inter-organisational relations around the development and implementation of a tourism development plan for Belek, a coastal area in Turkey's Antalya region. This case study is of an area experiencing substantial tourism development in a rapidly developing country with a centralised system of governance. The study develops a conceptual framework and seven key conceptual themes that are applied to tourism planning in Belek. The conceptual themes and the related assessment focus on inter-organisational relations, and in particular on relations between central and local government, in a multi-scale network that links the private and public sectors, non-governmental organisations and local communities. There is consideration of inter-organisational communication, stakeholder involvement and consensus building, resource sufficiency and exchange, inter-organisational co-ordination, the relative roles of central and local government, and the potential for devolving tourism planning powers to the local area.

Various participants in Belek's tourism planning process were interviewed in the study order to evaluate their views about inter-organisational relations, notably about relations between central and local government. The strengths and weaknesses of the tourism administrative system were considered, together with the potential to change its character. It was found that the inequalities in power and resources between stakeholders, and their differences in interests, ideologies and values, meant that it was difficult for them to reach mutual agreements about tourism policies. Resource scarcity had actually increased conflict rather than cooperation between organisations. There was much distrust and other negative mutual perceptions between the relevant parties. The study identified numerous barriers to cooperation and coordination. There were differing perceptions of the potential for more decentralised forms of administration, with various types of decentralisation also being considered, such as devolution, deconcentration and delegation. Many obstacles to effective decentralisation were noted.

The study, including the conceptual framework and conceptual themes, is intended to assist other tourism researchers examining inter-organisational relations, administrative structures, and the relative merits of centralised and decentralised forms of governance in other developing countries.
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Chapter 1. Research Context and Aims

1.1 Introduction

National level and local public/private organisations operating in the tourism environment should no longer be seen in an isolated way, since their success tends increasingly to be linked to their interaction with the surrounding environment. This includes their ability to cope with the pressures, uncertainties, and turbulences that frequently occur. While difficult to define and measure, the surrounding environment relates to other organisations and those conditions external to an organisation, which directly or indirectly, influence its activities, efficiency, effectiveness and behaviour. To Tjosvold (1986: 517), the organisational environment is crucial to the success of an organisation, because “interdependence pervades organisations and is fundamental to understanding them. Individuals within a group, work groups within departments, and departments within organisations all depend upon each other. Even persons who work independently at their own job typically require others to provide information and supplies to complete their work”. Organisations similarly need to obtain resources to accomplish their specific objectives. Typically, acquiring resources to fulfil their organisational objectives means that the organisation must interact with other organisations operating in the environment.

Planning is an interactive process undertaken in a social context, rather than a purely technical process of design, analysis and management (Healey 1997, cited in Hall 2000: 55). Thus, successful interorganisational relationships are critical to the implementation of development plans. The processes of formulating and implementing a development plan are conducted in an ever-changing environment, of economic, political, cultural, technological and geographical realities and events (Liu 1994), and of a varied set of national level (central) and local organisations, each of which controls a variety of resources to a differing extent, including capital, technology, personnel and knowledge. Organisations are likely to search for an adequate supply of resources (authority, information, labour and money) from the political and economic system in order to fulfil their programme requirements, maintain their domain authority, maintain an orderly and reliable flow of resources, and to defend their way of doing things (Pearce 1992). While one can have the best
planning model in the world, the development plan will have little chance of success unless it is carefully tuned with existing policies and institutional arrangements for tourism, which may change over time. It is also necessary to understand the structural dimensions of the environment and the complex web of interrelations among various parties involved in the plan, as well as to manage the interdependencies between various sectors and their policies and plans (Ackoff 1974), and to envisage the dynamics involved in the implementation process (Hall 2000). In other words, to bring success in any planning initiative, the programmes and activities must be in keeping with the wider values, missions, principles, goals and objectives of the managing organisation. In addition, any development programme must be monitored and evaluated in terms relevant to the wider values, vision, mission, goals and objectives; and all relevant variables must be considered in its design (Hall and McArthur 1998). Successful implementation is thus closely tied to whether different central and local organisations involved in the development initiative interact and co-ordinate their fragmented activities effectively so that all decisions and activities are consistent and coherent and not at cross-purposes (Hall 1994). Building, maintaining and managing harmonious interorganisational relations, between central/local public and private organisations will depend heavily on the degree of equilibrium present among these organisations.

Despite relations between tourism organisations at the central and local levels being a key element, to date the nature and the extent to which this balance in relations can affect the formulation of local level tourism development plans and their implementation has not been examined. More specifically, the nature and extent of the relationships between different management tiers, their effects on tourism administration, and their implications for local tourism development and planning have attracted scant attention from researchers. Central-local relations and their consequences for public policy have been given much more attention in political science, public administration, regional and urban planning, and geography. The neglect of these issues for tourism in general, and tourism planning more specifically, is curious. Little is known in relation to tourism planning about: the costs and benefits of intergovernmental relationships, the reasons behind the development of intergovernmental relationships, or the conditions that either facilitate or inhibit interorganisational relationships around tourism development projects. Much more
empirical and qualitative work on intergovernmental co-ordination and co-operation is warranted.

1.2 Research context

Planning is necessary to co-ordinate and synchronise the development of the different sectors, to balance competing and sometimes conflicting claims on the same limited resource base, to maximise the positive impacts of tourism development and to minimise its adverse effects (Pearce 1981). While planning is taken as a requisite to minimise the negative effects of tourism, its formulation and implementation are complex processes that are fraught with difficulties. As Pearce (2000: 202) observes “no matter how thorough the initial preparation and how comprehensive the scope of the plan, it is unlikely that planners will envisage all eventualities in implementation of changing exogenous conditions, which may necessitate modifications to the original goals and strategies”. This is especially likely to be the case with newly emerging tourist destinations, particularly in the developing world where the capacity for implementation may be largely untested (Pearce 2000). In less developed countries the resources may be scarcer (Morah 1996), the planning process may lack pluralism, democracy and the involvement of key local community institutions (Burns 1999), public participation may be viewed as unnecessary, unwieldy, time consuming and an idealistic dream (Haywood 1988), the tourism development planning may not be backed by appropriate tourism-related legislation and regulations (WTO 1993), the implementing bodies may be weak or yet to acquire years of experience (Morah 1996), and there may be limited authority because the implementing officials often have different goals to those of the initiators (Morah 1996). In addition, in the context of less developed nations the uncertainties existing in the political and socio-economic environment may be high (Morah 1996; Tosun 2000), powerful bureaucracies may dominate the legislative and operational processes (Tosun 2000), high staff turnover, due to political interference, may undermine organisational morale, and the central administrative tutelage may curb the capabilities and willingness of local government (Tosun 2000). Further, there may be hostility among the population toward tourism development because of such potential problems as: increasing crime, segregation of locals from tourists, overcrowding and overloading (Brohman 1996), the success of tourism development may be measured only in terms of increasing tourist numbers and revenues and not host satisfaction (Brohman 1996),
organised and powerful business interests may become power centres that serve their
own self interests at the expense of indigenous people, and a strong local planning
authority may be absent (Tosun 2000).

The outcome of plan formulation and implementation processes may be
affected adversely by the existence or absence of a number of other factors. They
include: (1) a lack of incentives to co-operate and the existence of various blocks to
collective action, (2) a vagueness about the proposed goals, (3) a lack of crucial
information about goals, means and actors, (4) an absence of important actors, but the
inclusion of other actors that may discourage participation by the necessary actors,
and (5) an absence of commitment from some actors. In addition, tourism planning
may be negatively impacted because of the (6) main characteristics of a centralised
approach to tourism management, which might include coercive decision-making,
ambiguous balances between responsibility and authority, a distant bureaucracy,
limited participation in decision-making, and uneven power relations (Syrett 1997).

Plan implementation may also suffer from a misuse of resources, a lack of
accountability, non-transparency in decision-making, excessive rules and regulations,
priorities set which are inconsistent with appropriate development, a high degree of
concentration of political power, and incompetent administration. All stakeholders
may not be on an equal footing at the planning table, and not all participants may
work co-operatively to achieve common goals. Finally, some stakeholders might be
unwilling to share their entrenched power (Williams et al 1998). An alternative form
of management, that of decentralisation, has been suggested in order to overcome the
potential problems of centralised tourism planning. The concept of decentralisation
basically implies the transference of power from central government to local
government. It has received growing support from researchers as a means for
achieving improved implementation outcomes. However, the application of this type
of administrative system, particularly in developing countries seems to be problematic
too, which raises questions about the suitability of this approach. While tourism
authorities are advised to switch to relatively decentralised forms of tourism
administration, there is no information readily available to guide them in this
transition. The question remains unexplored as to whether decentralised
administration can be applied to developing countries due to their different
institutional and constitutional contexts. There is also limited understanding of whether top-down (centralist) or bottom-up (decentralist) perspectives on planning and management are likely to be more or less effective in handling the complex interactions between various parties with differing perceptions, preferences and strategies. The decentralisation concept supports the retreat of central government from the public domain, but at the same time central government is urged to give more attention to the problems of local organisations, to provide them with more resources, and to co-ordinate the system as a whole. Thus, one could dispute the extent to which decentralisation represents a realistic alternative to the centralist model. It seems that whatever approach is adopted, there is a need for greater understanding of relations between the multiple actors involved in plan formulation and implementation, as well as of their interdependencies, and also of the way in which these interdependencies influence management processes (Kickert and Koppenjan 1997).

According to Costa (1996), the success of tourism programmes may depend on the improvement of four elements. First, there is a need to improve the way in which the planning and development process is carried out (the procedural component). Second, there is the need to pay more attention to the organisational framework in which planning is undertaken (the administrative component), since this strongly effects the effectiveness of planning activity. In this context the organisational structure of tourism administration and the legislation and regulations for tourism development are important considerations. Third, there is a need for governments to pay more attention to local level administration, since the success of the planning activity and the profitability of the tourism industry increasingly depend on the effectiveness of planning and on the co-ordination delivered locally (the local component). Fourth, account needs to be taken of the potential role of developing networks to improve tourism planning and the co-ordination of the tourism sector (the network component).

Co-ordination and co-operation between tourism organisations at different spatial scales is imperative in order to formulate and implement effective local tourism development plans. The multiplicity of agencies involved in the tourism planning process is well known. It is thus necessary to understand the dynamics of the
interactions (co-ordination, co-operation and conflict) between institutions and stakeholders in order to promote a successful outcome (Jamal and Getz 1995). Because society is more complex, and the economy more interdependent, organisations nowadays find it difficult to act unilaterally to achieve their objectives (Selin 2000). Rapid innovations in technology, global interdependence, and the blurring of boundaries between government, industry and the voluntary sector have given rise to a diverse array of collective responses to gain access to new technologies or spread the cost of marketing innovation over several parties (Selin 1993). Because no one business or government agency can operate in isolation (Gunn 1988), it is obvious that co-operation and co-ordination between government agencies are essential if tourism is to operate smoothly (Timothy 2000). Private-public sector initiatives are considered vital as the public sector depends on private investors to provide services and to finance the construction of tourist facilities. By the same token, private tourism projects require government approval, support and infrastructure development (Timothy 2000). Co-ordinated effort between agencies at different governmental tiers (central and local) may decrease misunderstandings and conflicts related to overlapping goals and missions. They may help eliminate redundancy resulting from parallel or duplicate research and development projects by different agencies (Timothy 2000). Co-ordination both within and between the different levels of government tends to improve efficiency in time and money (Timothy 1998) by eliminating overlapping services and duplication of resources (Hall 1994).

Organisations taking part in the formulation or implementation of tourism plans should be taken as more or less interdependent stakeholders, involved in medium to long-term relationships. Each organisation is likely to interact with others in order to acquire the resources necessary for goal achievement, since no organisation can possess or generate independently all the necessary resources (Klinj 1997). The inevitability of needing to secure inputs, to disperse outputs and of attempts to regulate, inextricably links the members of any focal organisation with the members of its environment (Dawson 1986). The nature of these interorganisational interactions is likely to be influenced by the structural dimensions of the environment, including the degree of concentration or dispersal of resources, power and of autonomy or dependence (Pearce 1992). The power to formulate and implement
policies between the national and local levels of public sector tourist organisations is likely to influence the balance in relations, which in turn will affect the practice of local level tourism planning. The external regulations will shape the nature of relationships, which may take the form of either formally established laws, rules, and procedures, or the attitudes and values of the organisation (Dawson 1986). The political culture of the country, its general economic condition, and broader government policies will also determine plan outcomes by laying the foundation for the nature of the relations between different levels of governmental agencies, including their interdependencies, strategic perspectives, and problem solving capacities (Klijn 1997; Pearce 1992). The relationships between central and local organisations and the context within which they develop and operate can be conceptualised as a multi-scale network which links national, provincial and local scales of operation and which is set within a broader socio-economic and political system. Thus, it is necessary to understand the elements of the tourism environment, the patterns of relations among interdependent parties involved in plan formulation and implementation, and the factors determining these relationship patterns.

Given the limited level of attention that this subject has attracted from tourism scholars, this research assesses inter-organisational relationships, and notably central-local government relations, in tourism planning in a multi-scale tourism development network. It does this in the specific context of tourism development in Belek, a rapidly expanding tourist resort in Antalya, Turkey. An assessment is made of central-local relations in the multi-scale network that links the public, private and voluntary sectors and the national, provincial and local spatial scales, relevant to tourism development in Belek. The approach taken to this study of central-local relations in Belek stresses the structural dimensions of the environment, including the constitutional, institutional, and operational arrangements, the power relations and patterns of resource dependency, as well as the processes of communication, resource exchange, and co-ordination. Particular attention is paid to the rules and procedures that apply across the range of state institutions that influence tourism planning in Turkey’s municipalities. Assessment is made of the boundaries to the actions of public officials and to the discretion they exercise. The balance of power between central and local institutions is considered in relation to their statutory and discretionary authority, financial resources, expertise, and their human resources.
Attention is paid to the degree of co-ordination or fragmentation between central and local tiers and between actors and agencies at the same level in the hierarchy. Fragmentation can be a considerable obstacle to effective tourism planning. For example, overlapping responsibilities, bureaucracy and fragmentation among government departments and public authorities have been identified as major shortcomings in tourism planning in Pamukkale, Turkey (Yuksel, Bramwell and Yuksel, 1999). Finally, decentralisation processes are examined in relation to the balance of power between the upper and lower tiers of government.

1.3 Research aims and objectives

Tourism researchers have paid limited attention to administrative systems and their impact on plan formulation and implementation processes. The main thrust of this present research is to explore the nature and the extent of influence of centralised and localised administration on the development and implementation of a tourism development plan. Focusing on the Belek Development Initiative in Turkey, this study focuses primarily on (1) the elements of the present organisational environment in which planning is undertaken, (2) the ways in which the planning and implementation process is carried out, (3) the areas of interdependency and exchange of resources among agencies involved in the decision-making process concerning tourism development, and (4) the elements that either facilitate or inhibit the building and management of interorganisational relationships formed among the public and private sector organisations. Further, this study sets out to provide insights into (5) whether the use of alternative administration forms, such as decentralisation, could help to enhance the management of tourism at the local level.

Hence, this research has four overall objectives.

1. To develop a conceptual framework in relation to inter-organisational relations in tourism planning, including between central and local government. This includes consideration of tourism planning issues in Belek, inter-organisational communication, stakeholder involvement and consensus building, resource sufficiency and exchange, inter-organisational co-ordination, the roles and activities of the organisations, and the delegation of power. The framework will draw on an extensive critical review of relevant literature.
2. To apply the conceptual framework and key conceptual themes to the case study of Belek in Turkey, chosen as it is in a rapidly developing country with a centralised system of governance and as the area is subject to a major tourism development initiative.

3. To evaluate the patterns and processes, and strengths and weaknesses of inter-organisational relations around tourism planning in Belek using the identified conceptual themes.

4. To evaluate the relations between central and local government levels in relation to tourism planning in Belek, to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the tourism administration system, and to examine views on the potential to change its character.

1.4 A synopsis of the conceptual framework and methodology

A conceptual framework was developed to ascertain inter-organisational relations, and notably central-local relations, within the tourism planning context, with specific reference to the Belek Management Plan but also with wider potential applicability. This framework draws on and integrates existing research literature on public administration, tourism planning and decentralisation, and also on systems, inter-organisational relations and network theories. Within the literature, four main types of influence can be identified which affect central-local relations in tourism management, including the formulation and implementation of local tourism development plans. These are the environmental context, the administrative structures, the geographical scales of the administrative structures, and the nature of the interorganisational interaction. Each of these influences can then be broken down into related elements which can affect central-local relations in tourism management and planning. The framework is based on the premise that central-local relationships should not be conceptualised along one dimension alone. The linkages are multiple, and arise in particular from the possession by each organisation of certain resources and powers. These resources and powers may be, for instance, constitutional, legal, financial, professional, informational and administrative (Jones 1980; Rhodes 1981). The framework provides a means to evaluate how tourism management and tourism plan development and implementation depend on interactions between organisations at national, provincial and local levels. It also helps to evaluate how these organisations relate to their surrounding environment. More specifically, the
framework can help to examine the character of a centralist approach, where a few central actors bring about policy proposals on their own, and of a localist approach, where local capacities and suggestions are prominent. The framework recognises that the collective action by actors at all geographical scales can play a central part in tourism policy-making and implementation. Seven conceptual themes used in the study were developed from the study's conceptual framework. These themes were planning issues in Belek, inter-organisational communication, stakeholder involvement and consensus building, resource sufficiency and exchange, inter-organisational co-ordination, the roles and activities of the organisations, and the delegation of power.

The Belek case study was conducted using interviews with representatives who had participated in the formulation and implementation of the Belek Management Plan, with the research consisting of four interrelated phases. These are: desk research, preliminary site visits, a pilot study, and a main field visit phase. First, an extensive desk consultation was undertaken of secondary data about Belek and of published information about tourism administration, planning and implementation in the area. This built up background information about the case study area. The desk research was consolidated through preliminary site visits prior to the main field visit. The preliminary visits were helpful to identify and make initial contact with potential informants. From the early informants the researcher acquired information about other informants who were interviewed in the main field visit phase. The site visits assisted in several other ways. For example, they helped to familiarise the researcher with the case study area (which facilitated a more effective use of the field research time), to build a rapport with some key informants (who continued to provide indispensable information about the case study during the preliminary site visits and the main field work), and to gain insights into how the research should be conducted in practical terms. These two preparatory phases, as well as consultations with the research supervisors and fellow researchers provided background for the pilot phase. This phase assessed the adequacy of the methods to be used in the research, notably of the semi-structured interviews and of the questions they contain. Revisions were made to the interview questions based on the responses and reactions of respondents. After the careful translation of the interview questions (from English to Turkish and from Turkish to English by bilinguals), the interviews were conducted with selected
participants in two phases. The resulting qualitative information was transcribed, coded and analysed. In order to reduce “researcher bias” and to achieve a form of triangulation, the elicitation of themes and categories from the data was undertaken by the researcher and one other independent researcher. The data was then analysed using a computer software programme designed for the qualitative analysis of interview transcripts (NUD.IST). Finally, the findings were evaluated in the light of previous research studies.

1.5 Study area and background information

The relationships between central and local government tiers and their implications for tourism development and tourism plan implementation are examined in the Belek region, a rapidly growing tourist destination in Antalya, Turkey (Figure 1.1). This region was chosen as the study area for several reasons. These include: a growing national concern to reverse environmental degradation in the area; the complex interorganisational relations between multiple actors involved in the area’s tourism planning; the delegation of some national powers to a private organisation in the area; and concerns about the potentially negative impact of present institutional arrangements on the implementation of the area’s tourism plans.

Figure 1.1 Belek’s location
Belek is a coastal area with important habitats for varied endemic plants and animals. It is located 30 km east of Antalya. It forms a coastal strip of 23 km surrounded by umbrella pine forests (Temimhan, 1999). The region lies between the Aksu and the Acisu rivers (see Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2 Map of Belek

There are four settlements: Belek, Kadriye, Karadayi, and Kumkoy. Until 1993, these were villages in Serik municipality, but since then Kadriye, Belek and Karadayi were reorganised as municipalities (Adaman, 1995). Only Kumkoy is still a village, being located within Serik municipality. Fishing, agriculture, transportation and trading are important local sources of employment. The inclination to work in tourism enterprises is quite low in Belek and Kadriye, and hardly exists at all in Kumkoy. There are very few workers with high educational qualifications in these towns (DHKD 1998). Additionally, as the residents of Belek and Kadriye make a fairly good living from agriculture, they are not enthusiastic to abandon farming unless tourism offers a clearly better source of income. Because of these
circumstances, most well-qualified tourism staff originate from areas other than Belek and Kadriye (DHKD 1998).

In the late 1980s the Ministry of Tourism (MOT) designated Belek as a Tourism Investment Area (TIA). Based on the Tourism Encouragement Law of 1982, and to promote tourism development, central government leased land in the area to tourism investors for forty-nine years. The region boasts many tourist attractions and activities, including river rafting, mountain trekking, historical sites and marine turtle breeding grounds. It has plenty of spring water, a broad sand dune system with attractive forests, and parts of the area produce high quality agricultural products. Scientists refer to Belek as one of the last major nesting grounds of the marine turtle. In 1995, Belek was designated as a Specially Protected Area (SPA), owing to its unique environmental and wildlife features.

Intensive tourism investment aimed at immediate financial returns has led to an increase in the area’s bed capacity. At present, there are 26 first class holiday villages, 15 five star hotels and 4 golf clubs in Belek’s Tourism Centre. The Centre is geared to accommodate up to 28,000 tourist beds (Temimhan 1999). A parallel increase in environmental degradation has been observed. Growth in the number of hotels particularly threatens the area’s most fragile and unstable zones, such as the beaches, sand dunes, and watercourses. A new road running between the low inland flatlands and the coastal dunes acts as a dam that prevents natural drainage and produces heavy winter floods. Water pollution from untreated sewage from tourist accommodation has a detrimental impact on the aquatic life, and the use of speedboats threatens the marine turtles. Intensive development has taken place, and it is suggested that the local inhabitants feel somewhat alienated and discontented in relation to the tourism development as they have been insufficiently integrated into the development process (DHKD, 1995).
In order to reduce Belek’s environmental problems, the Belek Management Plan (BMP) was designed in 1995 by specialists in planning, geomorphology, civil engineering, marine and land-based ecology, sociology, economics, tourism, public awareness and education, local community organisations, institutional participation and legislation. The BMP was also developed based on research involving a document and bibliographical search and interviews carried out in the Belek and Serik region. The BMP aims at "making human uses compatible with the environment, reducing the unnecessary impact of tourist and other human activities, while enhancing the beauties and values of Belek and improving socio-economic conditions in the region" (DHKD, 1995: 15).

The plan was designed to address several issues, including land use planning, tourist activities, the use of the beaches and forests, water quality, urban development, nature conservation, the protection of sea turtles, landscape maintenance, the diversification of economic activities, community participation in development, training, and also building consensus about policy aims, institutional arrangements and legal enforcement. The BMP provides guidelines for decision-makers at the national and local levels in relation to the sustainable use of the coastal ecosystem, and, unlike many other tourism plans, it recommends an institutional framework for implementation.
The plan’s implementation relies on co-ordinated effort by various actors, including central government ministries, local authorities, tourism investors and local residents. However, at present the co-operation between central and local government organisations in relation to the plan is very limited and there is some local resentment toward central government as it is felt that decision-making has not sufficiently taken into consideration the views of Belek residents (DHKD, 1995). There is evidence of serious tensions between central and local government in the region, as well as between organisations in the public and private sectors. These tensions appear to result from legislative confusion, the coercion from centrally imposed decisions, ambiguities over responsibilities and autonomy, and the delegation of some central powers to a private sector organisation (Betuyab) formed by tourism investors in the area.

The Investors Organisation (Betuyab) was established through the support of the Ministry of Tourism (MoT) and it attained shareholder status in 1990. Its prime goal is to assist the MoT to supervise and fund investment in tourism infrastructure, but it has become a focus for local residents’ resentment. Although Betuyab plays an intermediary role between central government and the region, it is perceived by locals to be a counterpart of central government. Betuyab has taken over the enforcement of tourism development rules and standards and it aims to create a “model international resort” to be emulated by other Mediterranean countries. Betuyab is portrayed as an environmentally friendly association by such central government organisations as the MoT and the Ministry of Environment (MoE) and some international organisations concerned with environmental protection (Betuyab 1999). The production of awareness-raising studies and publication of books publicising Belek’s unique natural environment illustrate Betuyab’s aspirations to be perceived as one of Turkey’s most environmentally sensitive organisations. The organisation of bird watching, ecology and culture tours, together with the efforts to protect and present the marine turtles, also promote Betuyab’s desired image.

Betuyab was “highly endorsed” as an environmental agency in 1999 in an international tourism and environment competition sponsored by British Airways, the “Tourism for Tomorrow Awards”. Environmental projects at the Belek Tourism
Centre were also awarded a prize in a United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs competition. Finally, Belek's beaches have been awarded Blue Flags. Betuyab appears to have realised that by presenting aspects of eco-tourism and environmental preservation, this might give them a national and international competitive advantage (Betuyab 1999).

Locals criticise Betuyab for being run by investors who are mainly from Istanbul and Ankara and who largely prioritise short-term profitability, and also for its limited commercial linkages and business transactions with local population (DHKD 1995). Despite the existence of local government, Betuyab exercises many of the powers of local government in the Belek coastal region. This organisation derives its power from its financial strength, which is the main reason for its recognition, and it provides diverse public services and infrastructure in the area. At present, there is a lack of co-ordination of activities and of co-operation between Betuyab and local government. Although important decisions may be taken in relation to the region's future, the local authorities do not attend the meetings organised by Betuyab where these decisions are made (DHKD 1995). This non-participation exemplifies the tensions between the local authorities and Betuyab. However, the local authorities had previously provided unspoken support for the delegation of power and authority in the Belek region to Betuyab. Subsequently, they have stressed that Betuyab should limit its activities to its real function, that is the protection of the interests of the tourist investors in the association (Soybay 1995). For the local government authorities the tourist investors exert economic, political and other forms of power that they feel powerless to counteract (Soybay 1995). The provision of security and infra-structural services such as roads and sewage systems by Betuyab instead of the municipalities, also illustrates the financial weakness of the region's local government.

There are also conflicts of authority among the local government authorities and between local government and central government. Until 1990, Belek was part of the Serik Municipality, which included Kadriye village. When the population of Kadriye exceeded 2000 it gained Municipality status, but it has experienced urban disorganisation due to the inexperience of the officials involved in urban development and due to clientelism (Adaman 1995). Belek also suffers from legislative confusion, with at least ten laws significantly related to environmental issues in Belek, and which
consequently influence tourism. These are: the National Parks Law, the Law for Protection of Cultural and Natural Wealth, the Law for the Protection of Coastal Zones, the Construction Law, the Municipalities Law, the Law for the Protection of General Health, the Law for the Encouragement of Tourism, the Law of Forestry, the Law of Aquatic Products, and the Decree Concerning the Usage of Agricultural Lands. In addition, although the Turkish Constitution of 1982 and subsequent legislation provides mainly legal guidelines for land-use planning and environmental protection, notably in coastal areas, they are not applied consistently.

The range of institutions involved in tourism related issues in Belek add to the difficulties of plan implementation. At the ministerial level, these include the Ministry of Agriculture and Village Affairs, the Ministry of Public Works and Resettlement, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Culture, and the Ministry of Forestry. The Ministry of Public Works and Resettlement (PWR) is responsible for planning urban development and infrastructure in relation to tourism, such as the construction of roads. The (PWR) fulfils its functions by means of the delegation of powers from other ministries. The Ministry of Environment (MOE), formed in 1991, aims to protect and improve the environment in general, to use natural resources in rural and urban areas in an efficient way, and to prevent pollution. Based on the Tourism Incentive Law of 1982, coastal zone planning and management are largely under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Tourism (MOT). It is claimed that this Ministry has full ownership of several coastal areas under its authority, either through the transfer of government lands via the Treasury or through expropriation. This ministerial arrangement removes the authority and responsibility of municipalities in coastal areas to determine the planning, development and management of their urban areas. As well as the potential conflicts between relevant central government ministries and between local and central government, the fact that the Belek coastal zone remains within the borders of the Serik and Kadriye Municipalities also results in conflicts between these two authorities.
1.6 The organisation of the thesis

The thesis has been organised into nine chapters. Extensive literature reviews are provided in Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five. Chapter Two, the first literature review chapter focuses on the notion of tourism planning. Following an historical review of the evolution of planning, a detailed consideration is given to four major factors prompting failure at the implementation phase of development initiatives. Chapter Three considers why organisations need to interact, and it explains the notions of systems, interorganisational theory and network theory. Two approaches used to evaluate interorganisational relations are presented, along with their limitations. Four major variables affecting the nature and the extent of interorganisational relations are discussed. Chapter Four deals with the concepts of co-ordination, co-operation and partnership. These forms of relationships can assist central and local organisations to decrease their mutual misunderstandings and conflicts. A number of influences that facilitate or obstruct interorganisational co-ordination, co-operation and partnership are discussed. Chapter Five examines the benefits of decentralisation, and whether decentralisation can be a successful alternative approach to plan implementation.

Chapter Six introduces Turkey's public administration system and its implications for tourism development. More specifically, this chapter examines how Turkey's tourism administration has changed over the past five decades, as well as the structural problems faced by this administrative system. The conceptual framework and the research methodology are presented in Chapter Seven. This chapter explains, first, the reasons why a case study approach was employed. The next section focuses on two potential methods to use in interorganisational relations research, those being the survey questionnaire and in-depth interviews. Their strengths and limitations are touched on, and the preference in this study for a semi-structured and two-phased interview technique is justified, including support found in other studies. The phases followed in the development and implementation of the main research are presented next. The analytical framework employed is explained, together with a justification of the involvement of another independent researcher in the analysis. Finally, the practical difficulties encountered in the course of the research, and the limitations regarding the research findings are discussed.
Due to the broad scope of the findings, the chapter presenting and discussing the results (Chapter Eight) is organised into seven interrelated sections: Planning issues in Belek, Inter-organisational communication, Stakeholder involvement and Consensus Building, Resource Sufficiency and Exchange, Inter-organisational Co-ordination, Roles and Activities of Organisations, and Delegation of Power. In each section, the findings are discussed in the light of results in previous studies. The first section identifies factors that respondents considered affect tourism development in the region. Many comments corroborated the propositions in the literature that the political, legislative, institutional and economic environment, together with local conditions, have important implications for tourism planning. The next section presents a number of structural and situational factors identified in the study that facilitated or obstructed effective communication between central and local organisations in Belek. The next section attempts to explain what the stakeholders involved in the BMP thought about the decision-making process, notably whether they felt able to raise their concerns and whether they considered their concerns were incorporated satisfactorily in the decisions. The fourth section compares respondents’ views about the adequacy of the organisational resources held by different parties involved in the BMP, including their financial, legal, informational and political power. The subsequent section examines the extent of co-ordination and co-operation between parties involved in the BMP, and considers the influences on, and barriers to co-ordination and co-operation. The next section presents the perceptions of respondents about the responsibilities, competence, and performance of their own and of other organisations. The last section (Section Seven) examines the forms of decentralisation that stakeholders from different public, private and non-governmental organisations might consider suitable, if any.

Finally, Chapter Nine, the conclusion chapter, provides a summary of the major research findings, their implications for Belek and for other academic researchers, and it proposes new avenues for further research.
Chapter 2. Tourism Planning

2.1 Introduction

A review of appropriate literature is undertaken in the next five chapters in order to identify useful concepts and gaps in research, to appropriately conceptualise the research within the existing knowledge, and subsequently to construct the study's conceptual framework. Understanding what has been learned in previous studies and the research gaps is needed so that the present Belek case study can fill selected research gaps and can draw on the concepts and conceptual frameworks identified. In the paucity of prior attempts to integrate the interorganisational relations, and notably central-local relations, literature into tourism planning, the intent of this review is to provide an insightful view of several factors germane to the development and management of interorganisational relations in the context of local tourism planning. More specifically, based on their relevance, (1) tourism planning and conditions under which tourism plans are likely to fail; (2) power and network relations within varied environment sets and organisational strategies employed; (3) different interorganisational relationship forms, such as co-ordination, co-operation and partnership, and their causes and consequences; (4) strengths and limitations of the decentralisation concept; and (5) evolution of the tourism industry and administrative structure of Turkey are evaluated to provide sufficient background information to the research.

The review of theoretical literature is divided into four inter-connected sections due to the scope of the pertinent issues. This first section looks at issues in tourism planning. Compared to the extent of attention given to the formulation phase of tourism development plans, the implementation phase has received scant attention. Numerous planning paradigms, with slightly different considerations, have been proposed to guide stakeholders involved in tourism plan formulation. But, despite the clear guidelines and goodwill that stakeholders have at the formulation phase, the majority of tourism plans either fall short of the ideal or are never initiated. Following an historical review of planning approaches, this chapter critically reviews factors that can inhibit successful plan implementation. More specifically, there is discussion of the effects of top down
management, as well as consideration of organisational interdependence, the distribution of power, and the extent of co-ordination and co-operation. Awareness of these factors should not be taken as potentially overcoming all of the problems that may arise. Rather, it should constitute a framework for the pre-planning of a participatory strategy or for its alteration during implementation.

2.2 Tourism planning

Planning is a vital approach to guide future tourism development rather than just letting things happen (Gunn 1994; Inskeep 1991; Murphy 1985). It is “the direction and co-ordination of relations in the expansion of the social production capacity” (Ceslajas 1989: 34) and the linkage between knowledge and organised action. It has been described as “a process of formulating goals and agreeing the manner in which these are to be met. It is a process by which agreement is reached on the ways in which problems are to be debated and resolved” (Cullingsworth 1997: 25). Tourism planning is concerned with anticipating and regulating change in a system to promote orderly development so as to increase the social, economic, and environmental benefits of tourism development (Murphy 1985). It is a decision-making process aiming to guide future tourism development actions and solve future problems (Harssel 1994).

Proper planning “brings the advantages of tourism to the society and reduces its disadvantages. Appropriate and comprehensive planning of physical, legal, promotional, financial, economic, market, management, social, and environmental issues will help deliver the benefits of tourism development” (McIntosh et al 1995: 335). Similarly, Pearce (1981) suggests that planning is necessary to co-ordinate and synchronise the development of the different sectors, to balance competing and sometimes conflicting claims on the same limited resource base, as well as to maximise the positive impacts of tourism and to minimise its adverse effects. Three conditions need to be met for successful planning initiatives (Hall and McArthur 1998). These are: the programmes and activities must be in keeping with the wider values, missions, and objectives of the managing organisation; they must be monitored and evaluated in terms relevant to the wider values, vision, and objectives; and all relevant variables must be considered in their design. Hall (2000) notes that even the best planning model is of little practical
value unless there is the capacity to operate it, which may involve arguing the case to politicians and those to whom they are responsible.

2.2.1 Tourism planning approaches

Many tourism planning scholars contend that tourism has developed as an unplanned activity during the last four or five decades in most areas of the world (Inskeep 1991). Tosun and Jenkins (1996) argue that until the 1960s tourism development planning was not prepared at all systematically. According to Murphy (1985), tourism planning has developed from a site-oriented and physical emphasis to a more regional and systems approach. In the course of its evolution, tourism planning has changed somewhat (Gravel 1979; Gunn 1994; Inskeep 1991; Murphy 1985; Pearce 1981). The early considerations in tourism planning were the economic or physical aspects associated with particular projects. In the early years of the concept, tourism planning was an isolated and site-specific venture, with no or little concern about possible spin-off effects on adjacent areas or environments. Early tourism plans tended to focus on a specific site, with little effort to assess the wider implications (a non-integrated approach) (Gravel 1979). This period was followed by a more “integrated approach” whereby tourism planning began to recognise the wider regional and environmental context.

Tosun and Jenkins (1996) note six different tourism planning approaches. These are a sustainable development approach, a systems approach, a community approach, an integrated planning approach, a comprehensive planning approach, and a continuous and flexible approach. The WTO (1998) divides approaches to tourism planning into six quite similar categories: a continuous and flexible approach, a comprehensive approach, an integrated approach, an environmental and sustainable approach, a community-based approach, and a strategic approach. Hudson (1979) provides five categories, namely rational comprehensive planning or synoptic planning, incremental planning, transactive planning, advocacy planning, and radical planning (SITAR). According to Getz (1987), approaches to tourism planning can be broken down into four categories. These are: boosterism; an economic industry-orientated approach; a physical/spatial approach; and a community-orientated approach. A review of these and other typologies demonstrates that the tourism planning approaches have taken many forms, and while they are
labelled differently, the differences between the typologies are quite subtle. Each of the planning traditions that scholars have proposed can be considered to be relatively internally consistent, with self-reinforcing networks of methods, professional skills and working styles. They are now considered in more detail, within six categories.

2.2.1.1 **Comprehensive planning.** Rational comprehensive planning serves as the centrepiece in the classification scheme proposed by Hudson (1979). This approach is the point of departure for most other planning approaches and it has four elements: goal setting, identification of policy alternatives, evaluation of means against ends, and implementation of decisions. This approach looks at problems from a systems viewpoint. Comprehensive planning can be reflected in the form of master plans.

2.2.1.2 **Incremental planning.** Many previous master plans failed due to their rigidity in the face of rapidly changing socio-cultural factors and other conditions, and this taught planners the lesson that planning is an ongoing process (Baud-Bovy 1982) and that it should be flexible in order to cope with changing conditions. O'Donovan (1998) terms this a process approach. Gravel (1979) labels this form of planning as systems planning, where the process is a continual one aimed at partial development, constant monitoring and revision. This means that “the scope of the plan can evolve over time and such flexibility will enable it to adjust to changing circumstances, producing long term results which are more complete and of superior quality than a series of master plans” (Murphy 1985: 160). In this approach, planning is incremental with continuous monitoring and feedback based on the effects of previous development and the evaluation of new trends, both of which may influence decision-making in the next development stage (Inskeep 1991).

2.2.1.3 **Interactive planning.** Gunn (1994) argues that tourism planning has become more interactive. While conventional planning of the past included some interactions and a little consultation, this was usually very limited (Gunn 1994). By contrast, interactive planning incorporates information collected through consultation, negotiation and feedback. Interactive planning also involves interactions that occur early on and throughout the planning process, and with the full range of stakeholders. With conventional planning the affected parties are not involved until late in the process, if at
all. Interactive planning assumes that open participation leads to better decisions, whereas conventional planning assumes that better information leads to better decisions. The fundamental distinction between conventional and interactive planning is that interactive planning is based on "what we agree to do", while conventional planning is based on "what we should do".

Interactive planning suggests that better results can be achieved by means of a participatory process, even though it is likely to be more difficult (Inskeep 1991). This shift in emphasis does not necessarily mean that the expertise of professional planners is abandoned. Rather it signifies that many other constituencies other than planners have experiences, opinions and constructive recommendations. Hence, if all stakeholders are involved, then the decisions have a better chance of being implemented (Gunn 1994). Lang (1988: 90) depicts this as a "learning adaptive model of planning", and he comments that it is capable of fulfilling two important needs: to create a sense of community which may then motivate actors to seek new forms of collaborative action, and to build capability in order to respond effectively to changes and to generate change when that becomes necessary.

2.2.1.4 Integrated planning. This approach recognises that planning of a specific project calls for inputs from different sectors, agencies or disciplines (Tosun and Jenkins 1996). With integrated planning, the tourism sector is integrated into the overall development policies and plans of the area, and local plans are integrated into the national and regional tourism plans. It is an interactive or collaborative approach, which requires participation and interaction between the various levels of an organisation or unit of governance and between the responsible organisation and the stakeholders in the planning process (Hall and McArthur 1998). Integrated planning recognises that tourism involves people as well as places, and planning a facility in harmony with its environment is only part of the success story (Murphy 1985). Inskeep (1991: 27) suggests that "in order to achieve effective development patterns and not to generate serious environmental or social problems, all aspects of the area or development sector being planned must be understood and carefully integrated, and the environmental and social implications of development taken into account". Pearce (1981: 64) states that "problems arise and costs are increased when the different sectors of the tourism
industry do not develop harmoniously or when the motives and capabilities of different development agents conflict”.

2.2.1.5 **Sustainable planning.** The sustainable development approach seeks to ensure that developments take place in such a manner that future generations are not left worse off (Tosun and Jenkins 1996). Tourism is planned in an environmentally sensitive manner so that its natural and cultural resources are conserved, it does not generate serious adverse environmental or socio-cultural impacts, the benefits of tourism are widely spread in society, and tourist satisfaction levels are sustained (WTO 1998). Pearce (1981) suggests that sustainable tourism development facilitates culture exchange rather than culture shock. It ensures forms of tourism which do not destroy the host environment and last for a long time with proportionately greater economic benefits. This approach involves a long-term goal of sustaining the three elements of the host areas, the holidaymakers, and the tourism operators (Davidson 1991; Eber 1992). An important feature of sustainable tourism development is that the pace of tourism development is gradual as this gives local people time to adjust to new environmental, social and economic conditions, and helps prevent the adverse results of rapid uncontrolled ventures (Eber 1992). Valls and Porta (1997) point out that no tourist destination, product or business can be truly competitive if it is incapable of benefiting not only the business community but also of protecting and enhancing the natural, socio-cultural and environmental assets of the entire area.

2.2.1.6 **Community–based planning.** This approach entails the maximum involvement of local communities in the planning and development of tourism, with increased benefits gained by local communities, including minority and disadvantaged groups. Community planning implies a high degree of public participation in the planning process (Haywood 1988). Public participation may mean that the local community will have a degree of control over the planning and decision-making process (Arnstein 1969). Indeed, it is contended that socially responsible and environmentally viable tourism cannot be fostered without community involvement (Brandon 1993). As tourism planning is intended to benefit the residents of an area, they should be given the opportunity to participate in it and to express their views on the type of future community they want to live in (Inskeep 1991). Through this involvement,
“tourism development will reflect a consensus of what the people want” (WTO 1994: 3). It is suggested that only through their involvement can residents grasp the idea of what benefits tourism can bring, and therefore can fully support it. Dowling (1993: 53) asserts that, “since local people have much to lose or gain from policy decisions, tourism planning should always be carried out in close collaboration with the local inhabitants who are most likely to be affected”. Public participation in the shaping of tourism planning provides a more balanced approach than traditional development planning, and can help to recognise the needs and views of both tourists and residents.

Failure to involve relevant stakeholders in decision making processes can lead to formidable obstacles to realising the goal of sustainable development (Inskeep 1991; Ioannides 1992). Community involvement in decision making for a tourism plan can play a significant role in the plan’s successful implementation, for example by increasing the local community’s sense of ownership of the project (Brandon 1993). This involvement can make the local community more supportive, confident and productive (Eber 1992). Local participation may provide a way to make sure that greater benefits remain in the community.

Tosun and Jenkins (1997: 526) argue that “experts from outside the local community, or non elected government officers and the central authorities, may not know which policy combination can increase the socio-economic welfare of the residents and what will be the appropriate combination of factors to stimulate economic growth. The local community may be the only body which can decide the type and scale of development which will be appropriate for themselves. Experts outside the local community may decide on a type of tourism development but this may not be compatible with socio-cultural norms and therefore it may not be an appropriate or sustainable development”.

Different goals and forms of public participation have been suggested in the literature. Painter (1992) distinguishes between pseudo, partial and full participation. Arnstein (1971) depicts a ladder of participation with seven rungs which ascend from manipulation through therapy, information, consultation, placation, partnership and delegated power, to full citizen control. In an extensive review of these forms, Tosun
(2000) proposes alternative typologies of public participation in tourism planning. In essence, these different forms of participation mean that participation may range from a feeling of participation without its substance to the genuine exercise of power to determine outcomes (Painter 1992). Based on Syme (1992), Pearce et al (1996) provide a list of issues that may determine the outcomes of public participation in tourism development. These are the type of argument, the level of energy among participants, the preparedness to negotiate from the most powerful party, the ongoing environment of relationships around negotiation, and the effect of environmental context. The perceived need for public involvement will vary within the community. Some community members may not be interested in participation, while others may actively oppose participation. There may be some community members wishing to be kept informed at certain stages, and others looking for consultation at all stages.

The success of each planning approach discussed above depends on the existence of many desirable conditions (Tosun and Jenkins 1996). To move from a list of desirable conditions to a realistic agenda for action is a major problem (Lea 1988). Having explained the specific character and strengths of each approach, it should be born in mind that each has its own environmental settings (such as a state of crisis or rapidly changing situations versus a stable and predictable environment). Planning is itself already a complex process, a situation made worse by an unstable environment. Regardless of the approach selected, the relationship elements of ownership and commitment and of willingness to collaborate, co-operate and share information are prerequisites for the successful implementation of a plan. Tourism development plans will not be implemented unless these relationship elements are taken into account by all actors. In some cases relationship elements on their own may not be sufficient for a successful plan implementation. Resource scarcities may also create obstacles in the way of implementation. As Pearce (2000: 202) observes, “no matter how thorough the initial preparation and how comprehensive the scope of the plan, it is unlikely that planners will envisage all eventualities in implementation or in changing exogenous conditions, which may necessitate modifications to the original goals and strategies”. In conclusion, envisioning of all possibilities in the environment settings is not practically possible. This is particularly the case for newly emerging destinations in developing countries.
2.3 Obstacles in tourism planning

The most elaborately formulated projects will come to naught if the implementation of their components is overlooked or is carried out in a diffuse manner (UN 1980). According to the World Tourism Organisation, planners are not very successful in this respect - only half of the tourism development plans out of 1619 examined were implemented (WTO 1980 in Choy 1991). Since that estimate was made, the situation probably has not changed radically. Thus attention needs to be directed to the realistic means to achieve implementation, as preparing a plan alone will not guarantee that the recommendations will be implemented (Inskeep 1991).

The outcome of plan formulation and implementation processes may be affected adversely by several factors. These include: (1) lack of incentives to co-operate and the existence of blocks to collective action, (2) vagueness of proposed goals, (3) lack of crucial information about goals, means and actors, (4) absence of important actors, or the inclusion of other actors that may discourage participation by the necessary actors, (5) the absence of commitment from some actors, (6) a centralised approach to tourism management which may also potentially hamper the process of formal planning. This list is certainly not exhaustive. According to Costa (1996), the success of tourism plans may depend on the provision and improvement of a number of elements. First, there is a need to improve the way in which the planning and development process is carried out (the procedural component); and, second, there is a need to pay more attention to the organisational framework in which planning is undertaken (the administrative component), since this strongly affects the efficiency and effectiveness of planning activity. The organisational structure of tourism administration and the legislation and regulations for tourism development may both impact on tourism development. There is also a need for governments to pay more attention to local level administration, since the success of planning activity and profitability of the tourism industry depend on the efficiency and effectiveness of the planning and the co-ordination delivered locally (the local component). Account also needs to be taken of the potential role which may be developed by networks in the improvement of tourism planning and in the co-ordination of the tourism sector (the network component).
Another important point to stress is that many of the planning approaches discussed so far generally reflect Western perspectives. It is probable that one may encounter formidable challenges in putting the principles behind these approaches into practice in developing countries, which arguably have dissimilar administrative procedures and cultures. In most developing countries the large majority of implementing bodies are either relatively weak or have yet to acquire many years of experience in checks and balances. Administrative control is argued to present a particular problem to successful implementation in developing countries (Morah 1996). "Rampant bureaucratic and political corruption is frequently among the weaknesses presented by this lack of administrative control culture. In these countries affluent opponents of a specific policy who lose in the policy formulation stage often find bribery in the execution stage an especially easy way to neutralise undesirable policy intents" (Bierstekker 1978, in Morah 1996: 82). "Remedying the problem of implementation becomes primarily a question of controlling discretion and maximising routine and compliance in the bureaucracy, through incentives and sanctions, with the limits to control tending to depend on the statutory power and amount of resources an organisation possesses vis-à-vis those it is seeking to influence" (Morah 1996: 82).

The issue of control in a bureaucracy is perhaps the oldest and most prevalent explanation for the implementation problem (Morah 1996). According to Downs (1967) the traditionally recalcitrant behaviour of lower-level bureaucrats not carrying out the instructions of higher level officials, originates from the leakage of authority inside a bureaucracy, a leakage that often occurs because implementing officials have different goals, and each uses their discretion in translating orders from above into commands going to those lower in the hierarchy (in Morah 1996: 82). In the implementation environment found in many developing countries, flexibility in policy implementation is viewed as part of a deliberate technique for policy-wide accommodation and conflict resolution (Morah 1996). This is often related to the fact that ethnic ties and factions, nepotism and an extended family network system, and personal coalitions and patron-client relations, form the basis of political activities in these countries, and are well suited to individualised interventions at the execution stage. From the point of view of government officials, community control may be seen as a loss of their power together with their control over the planning process. Thus the level of public involvement in
tourism planning may be limited to a form of tokenism where decisions have already been made by government (Hall 1998).

Plan implementation may also suffer from the misuse of resources, a lack of accountability, non-transparency in decision-making, excessive rules and regulations, priorities which are inconsistent with appropriate development, a high degree of concentration of political power, or from an incompetent administration. All stakeholders may not be on an equal footing at the planning table and not all participants may work co-operatively to achieve common goals. Some stakeholders might be unwilling to share their entrenched power (Williams et al 1998). Williams et al (1998) observe that major challenges associated with implementing the Cariboo-Chilcoting CORE project in Canada included a lack of commitment to shared decision-making by some participants, weak government support for tourism stakeholders, and a lack of resources to conduct the required negotiations. There are many stakeholders involved in tourism plans, each pursuing interests that might not be easy to reconcile (UN 1980). These and other potential issues which can affect plan implementation are discussed next under four broad headings.

2.3.1 **Top-down or centralist management.** Tourism programmes may be formulated at the top and implemented by people at the bottom who do not achieve the outcomes they desire. One reason for this is that the policies of central government are out of touch with the needs of local people and are not based on detailed knowledge of the local environment. It can be difficult to implement policies if they are unrealistic: "like some tourism development plans which can express more the ideals of professional planners than actual possibilities" (Elliott 1997: 100). Tourism programmes developed by a centralised administration, may tend to overlook the knowledge, skills and goals of local tourism organisations, in their design phase, and subsequently there may be resistance from the implementing bodies, such as from local government. The success of the planning activity and profitability of the tourism industry is likely to depend on the efficiency and effectiveness of the planning and co-ordinating activities of local government. The absence of this important actor in the plan formulation phase, or the lack of commitment from this actor to common purposes at the implementation stage, is likely to be a key reason for tourism plan failure.
Programme implementation and administration are often problems with development plans in developing nations where there is a centralist administration (Morah 1996). Quick (1980: 40) observes, “public policies do not get implemented at all, and those that do manage to get through the tortuous process of implementation often look very different from what their framers originally intended”. It has been suggested that the comparatively low level of implementation in developing countries is mainly due to many policies only become involved in the political system at the implementation stage, rather than before their adoption, as is generally the case in the West (Morah 1996). Consequently the resolution of conflicts and the adaptation of policies occur at the output stage, thus altering both the original content and intended impact of policy. Moreover the implementation process in developing countries can involve unusually intense competition and rivalry, simply because their needs are far more pronounced and resources are scarcer than in developed nations (Benson 1982).

There is growing agreement that long-term success can only be achieved when planners have a thorough knowledge of the views of the host population. Community involvement in the decision-making process is recognised as an important aspect of sustainable tourism planning (Harsel 1994). According to McIntosh and Goeldner (1986), it may provide a framework for raising the living standard of local people through the economic benefits of tourism, it can help develop an infrastructure and provide recreation facilities for both residents and visitors, it can help ensure that the types of visitor centres and resorts are appropriate, it can help establish a development programme that is consistent with the social and economic philosophy of the government and host population; and it may help to optimise visitor and host satisfaction. Since satisfaction of locals also ensures that visitors are satisfied, such arguments may exemplify a win-win position, which is desirable for tourist destinations (Hall 2000). Public participation has the potential to provide new bargaining arenas that can turn conflicting views into a more integrated awareness of the wider implications of the issues (Haywood 1988). By directing tourism planning toward the probable, the desirable and the achievable, this can improve the quality of community life, and tourism can be properly integrated into the community (Haywood 1988). Williams, Penrose and Hawkins (1998) note that direct and meaningful participation in tourism
plan decision-making may generate a sense of ownership over the resulting decisions: "With this sense of ownership comes support for its implementation and ultimately, the achievements of an efficient decision" (Williams et al 1998: 865).

Resident involvement can significantly increase the time and effort required by professionals to complete a project (Murphy 1985). However, the cost of involving the public in decision-making can help to avoid the more significant costs of continued conflict and the need to change decisions that prove to be inadequately informed (British Columbia 1995 in Williams et al 1998: 865). Where the public and private sectors are granted the chance to take part in the early stages of planning process it is possible that there will be enough consensus of opinions to reach shared planning objectives (Murphy 1985). Williams et al (1998) argue that plan objectives resulting from shared decision-making processes have more potential of being implemented than those taken through conventional planning models. Shared decision making is based on consensus-building, which refers to a situation in which all parties seek to agree on decisions. Williams et al note that a consensus process is qualitatively different from processes using a vote or through administrative or judicial proceedings. They state that “adjudication and voting defines winners and losers, thereby, lessening the support for implementation of agreements. Consensus building aims to produce win-win solutions. They can help to reduce, or eliminate, power imbalances between parties because each effectively has a veto over decisions and is thus free from the tyranny of the majority” (1998: 864).

Williams et al enumerate a number of conditions that influence the success of consensus-based approaches. These include the willingness of all parties to reach decisions through a consensus, the perception of all parties that conventional decision-making is less acceptable, and the political will on the part of the government to see the process through to the end. Amy (1987 in Williams et al 1998: 877) notes that, while a consensus-based process should be inclusive, the number of parties should also be manageable. The number of representatives involved should be appropriate to minimise cost, sustain a productive dialogue and increase the likelihood of building trust and consensus. The status, capacity, power and experiences of the representatives are important considerations. For example, in their research Williams et al (1998) found that it was difficult to discuss issues and engage in problem solving because the tourism
representatives were volunteers, and most of them had little experience in public speaking or negotiation.

2.3.2 Lack of recognition of mutual interdependency. The neglect of other factors can contribute to plan failure. One relates to a limited understanding of the wider tourism environment and of the relations among the interdependent parties involved in plan formulation and implementation. The tourism environment is made up of a varied set of organisations. Each of these organisations controls resources, such as capital, personnel and knowledge, and each organisation has to interact with others in order to acquire the resources necessary for goal achievement since no organisation can generate independently all the necessary resources (Klijn 1997). The interorganisational network is thus linked to a larger environment consisting of several organisations, authorities, legislative bodies, bureaux, and publics. These participants (organisations and officials) are linked in interaction patterns focused on the governance of a given network. Implementation involves the joint efforts of various parties, often located at different tiers of government. It requires careful consideration of interdependencies and of the relations between parties in the tourism environment. Thus, there should be an understanding of the way these organisations interact, and of the means used to coordinate these interactions. Hence, attention needs to be paid to the nature of, and extent of, the relations between central and local government tourism organisations and other agencies.

Institutions are increasingly interrelated and, as the process of government becomes more intertwined, more dependent on each other. This organisational interdependence gives rise to a major problem of implementation. One organisation finds that its aims are not achieved and blames others for impeding the realisation of its objectives, by failing to follow its guidance and direction or by erecting restraints and obstacles. As government intervenes more in society, discretion is increasingly conferred on low-level officials or on other organisations, which thus have more scope to act in ways that may frustrate the goals of the initiators. They tend to respond by devising mechanisms of control to curb discretion and thus cramp implementation. Thus there merges a paradox of both growing discretion and increasing controls. Increasing governmental interdependence and a more complex organisational environment makes
the formulation and implementation of public policy more hazardous, since it becomes
more difficult to trace clearly the connections between goals, policy proposals, measures
to achieve them, and outputs and outcomes (Jones 1982).

2.3.3 Institutional arrangements. The tourism policy process takes place
within a certain institutionalised context and tourism programmes have little chance of
success unless this context is considered and arranged carefully. The institutional
arrangements may either facilitate or inhibit the plan implementation process. Tourism
programmes involve interactions between government agencies and quasi-government
and private organisations, and information, goals and resources are exchanged in these
interactions. An institutional process forms as a result of frequently recurring
interactions among the participants and as a consequence of the development and
formulation of interaction rules (Kickert et al 1997). An understanding of the
institutional context and of related changes are imperative for the successful
management of the complex interactions between various actors involved in the process
(Klijn 1997).

Tosun and Jenkins (1997) suggest that highly centralised tourism policies are an
alienating factor for local participation in tourism developments. They (p. 527) claim
that “the Ministries of Tourism (in Turkiye) and the bodies responsible for authorisation
of tourism investment and incentives are accessible to the rich and educated elite and not
to the majority of indigenous people in tourist regions. In this sense there is a big
communication gap between communities and decision-makers. In short, centralisation
has intensified formidable bureaucracies. Even the physical distance from Ankara is a
barrier for poor people who may not be able to afford to travel to the capital city”.
Acknowledging the obstacles emanating from bureaucratic organisations, Haywood
(1988: 107) states that: “Extensive bureaucratic organisations across diverse tiers and
levels exist in connection with tourism. In many countries or regions, tourism planning
suffers from fragmentation and overlapping interests, which in turn dilutes the integrity
of the network of national, regional, and local governments unit, and precludes co-
operation and collaboration. Many areas are content pursuing an unmanaged adaptation
policy toward tourism or may believe that the individual and collective planning
activities of local hotels, attractions and visitor and convention bureaux are adequate.
Public participation may be viewed as unnecessary, time consuming, and an idealistic dream. These burdens include the possible dilution of power, the lack of time to interact with citizens, the patience to educate others, the forbearance to be educated by outsiders, the determination to improve negotiating skills, the courage to risk some loss of control over matters previously internal to the industry, and ultimately the danger of failure and the pain of bad publicity. In addition, “the biggest obstacle is the fact that public participation usually begins without a legacy of collegial interaction. Many of the participants who come together do so as strangers. In an undertaking calling for openness and agreement, a lack of prior dialogue is a considerable liability” (Haywood 1988: 108).

2.3.4 Uneven distribution of power and responsibilities and conflictual relations. The ability to impose one’s will or advance one’s own interests (Reed 1997) involves "power" and this is a central concept in resource dependency and network management. The extent to which power is distributed equally or is concentrated in a relatively small group who dominate the decision processes, can be an important influence on plan success or failure. During the implementation process the definition of power relationships is likely to become a major contentious issue among the various groups (Alterman 1982). Reed (1997) and Jamal and Getz (1995) assert and empirically verify that power relations may alter the outcome of collaborative efforts or even preclude collaborative action. Where some decision-making authority is assigned to representatives of the public, then inter-group conflict may arise around the degree to which the representatives are perceived to be truly authorised to voice the opinions of the various groups (Alterman 1982).

There has been growth in decentralised tourism administration in order to empower local government to deal with local tourism development issues. To some, decentralisation needs to be adopted in order to provide an equitable distribution of the benefits of tourism development. The concept of decentralisation basically implies the transference of power from central government to regional and local government, and it involves the rearrangement of internal capabilities, responsibilities, and resources, notably the devolution of power from upper to lower tiers of government. It is a long-term process, which aims to reduce central supervision and control, and to enable local
government to have increased autonomy and power. However, it is important to consider why central government becomes willing to distribute or share its power with others (Reed 1997). It is often assumed that the governance institutions are neutral arbiters in the development process. But these institutions have their own agendas in the formulation and implementation of policy. Conflicts are likely to emerge between those who seek to maintain the status quo and those who seek to change the nature of local economic activities (Reed 1997). In a study of Squeamish, Canada, Reed found that the conventional elites, that is the municipality and the proponents of ski-hill development, were successful in using the planning process for their own ends. She also identified that the traditional elite was unwilling to relinquish its hold on the organisation and coordination of tourism in the municipality. Thus power relations must be addressed at all stages of planning initiatives, and in this context collective action can help to settle conflicts with minimum damage (Reed 1997).

Conflicts of interest and hidden agendas are likely to exist in all initiatives bringing together diverse individuals and institutions with varying ideologies, perspectives, and power. Reed (1997) argues that the introduction of tourism in communities introduces conflicts over the substance of economic development, the allocation of public funds between residents and tourists, and over the processes by which decisions are made. Conflict is therefore an inseparable part of any development initiative. Conflict over tourism issues may persist despite the best of intentions, and despite a clear outcome from the consultation process (Pearce et al 1996). This requires an understanding of the dynamics in conflict situations as well as the application of new types of resolution techniques depending on the type of conflict.

In their search for an alternative explanation to the implementation problem, Barret and Fudge (1981) come back to policy as the key issue. Depending on the kind of policy that is pursued, different types of pressures and conflicts are brought to bear on the policy-making process. Lowi (1964) postulates three types of policy: distributive, redistributive and regulatory, and the last induces the highest levels of conflict, as it involves the participation of numerous groups of clear winners and losers. Hence certain policies, by virtue of their nature, are candidates for certain types of implementation problem.
2.3.5 Other influential factors. Overlooking the requirements of implementation can be very costly. "Insufficient consideration of implementation of outputs within the planning process, may result in settlements that create devastating precedents that may result in reluctance to negotiate in the future; damage interpersonal relationships; and financial, time or resource loss" (Moore 1986, cited in Hall 2000: 89). In order to avoid such consequences one should give consideration to the development of suitable implementing mechanisms. Such mechanisms include the logical staging of development, an effective organisation of the public and private sectors in tourism, maintaining close co-ordination between the public and private sectors and with NGOs, and the adaptation and application of appropriate legislation and regulations for tourism development (WTO 1998). The results of recent studies indicate that key pre-conditions for the successful implementation of a tourism development plan may include participative decision-making, the delineation of clear balances between responsibility and authority, and co-operative relations between stakeholders. Undoubtedly, coercive decision making, ambiguous balances between responsibility and autonomy, a distant bureaucracy, and uneven power relations between public and private agencies are among the factors which can undermine the legitimacy of planning decisions and their implementation. Factors that are likely to influence tourism plan outcomes in developing countries are summarised in Table 2.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.1 Reasons for tourism planning failure in the developing world</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ The capacity for implementation may be largely untested (Pearce 2000).</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Resources may be scarce (Morah 1996).</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ The planning process may lack pluralism, democracy and the involvement of key local community institutions (Burns 1999).</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Public participation may be viewed as unnecessary, unwieldy, time consuming and an idealistic dream (Haywood 1988).</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Planned tourism development is not backed by appropriate tourism-related legislation and regulations (WTO 1993).</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Implementing bodies may be weak or have yet to acquire years of experience (Morah 1996).</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Leakage of authority may occur because implementing officials have different goals to those of the initiators (Morah 1996).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Uncertainties may be high in the political and socio-economic environment (Morah 1996; Tosun 2000).</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ A powerful bureaucracy may dominate legislative and operational processes (Tosun 2000).</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ A high and disruptive staff turnover rate may undermine morale. Central administrative controls may curb local government's capabilities and willingness to take the lead (Tosun 2000);</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ There may be hostility among the population toward tourism development because of potential problems such as increasing crime, the segregation of locals from tourists, and overcrowding and overloading (Brohman 1996).</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ The success of tourism development may be measured only in terms of increasing tourist numbers and revenues and not in relation to host satisfaction (Brohman 1996).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Organised and powerful business interests may become power centres serving their own interests</td>
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at the expense of other local people. A strong local planning authority may be absent (Tosun 2000).

According to Baud-Bovy (1982: 308), “Obstacles to implementation can be overcome in the planning stage itself by taking account of a range of factors e.g. the socio-economic, political, socio-cultural and environmental context of tourism developments and the spread of activities and actors involved in the tourism sector”. However, taking account of these factors may still not ensure successful implementation. All too frequently, plans or programmes are based on a great deal of goodwill and good intentions, but few resources (Alterman 1982). Little can be achieved in practice where the resources of personnel, finance and management skills are not available and where there is no commitment from political and administrative leaders (Elliott 1997). Even where resources are allocated at the outset, they may be insufficient for an ongoing programme or may not be renewed as necessary. Moreover, where some attention is devoted to the resources needed, it may be focused only on the resources of the agency in question, and may neglect the resources of the participants (Alterman 1982). This oversight is a stumbling block frequently encountered by participatory planning programmes.

Time is an important resource in tourism planning (Alterman 1982). A participatory programme might be successful in drawing a relatively large number of residents for one or two meetings, but may fail if the strategy calls for the repeated investment of time by the public (Alterman 1982). If an ongoing participatory programme is sought, it is important that the planner takes into account the problems of securing budgetary allocations from year to year (Alterman 1982). Political support to see policy initiatives through is another resource with great importance (Morah 1996). It often takes the form of a fixer or a legislator or other person in authority who is personally interested in a policy and who will guide it through the playing out of the various implementation games until the goals are realised (Morah 1996). It would be futile to proceed with planning and assigning resources to a process without first securing the support of participants and government (Williams et al 1998). Another resource is the space required for meetings or other participatory activities (Alterman 1982). “This is often not merely a budgetary question, but may also entail a symbolic
element associated with the location of the meeting place. Often as minor as this
question might seem, it may become a major hurdle if no adequate large spaces (or small
spaces) are to be found in the neighbourhood” (Alterman 1982: 309-310). There is also
the question of the human resources of experience, skills and knowledge, which both the
planners and participants are expected to bring to participatory programmes (Alterman
1982). But, at times no matter how prepared in advance, “no amount of resources
applied to projects will produce good results. It is the use of right means to achieve
wrong ends” (Morah 1996: 83).

Planning is an interactive process, undertaken in a social context rather than a
purely technical process of design, analysis and management (Healey 1997, cited in Hall
2000: 55) and thus successful interorganisational relationships are critical to the
implementation of all development plans. The implementation process is conducted in
an ever-changing environment, a mixture of economic, political, cultural, technological
and geographical realities and events (Liu 1994) and of a varied set of organisations,
each of which controls various resources to a differing extent, including capital,
technology, personnel and knowledge. These organisations will search for an adequate
supply of resources (authority and money) from the political and economic system in
order to fulfil their programme requirements, maintain their domain authority, maintain
an orderly and reliable flow of resources, and to defend their way of doing things
(Pearce 1992). The implementation success is thus closely tied to whether these
organisations interact and co-ordinate fragmented activities effectively so that all
decisions, policies and activities are consistent and coherent and not at cross-purposes
(Hall 1991). Building, maintaining and managing harmonious interorganisational
relations will depend heavily on the degree of equilibrium present among these
organisations.

2.4 Summary

This discussion has reviewed tourism planning, its definition, benefits, and
approaches, as well as the major obstacles likely to inhibit the implementation of
tourism plans. Needless to say, planning is a fundamental activity. It helps to organise
the future, rather than letting things happen chaotically. During the course of its
development, the focus of tourism planning has shifted from physical planning to
consideration of socio-cultural and environmental issues. Researchers have proposed different approaches to tourism planning. These approaches differ, but they are also considered to form an internally consistent, self-reinforcing network of methods and working styles. Community participation, which entails the involvement of individuals in a tourism-oriented community in the decision-making and implementation processes (Pearce et al 1996), has become a widely espoused contemporary approach to tourism planning. However, it is not free of limitations and there are arguments for and against its use. For instance, Minnery (1985 in Pearce et al 1996) reports that, while general public involvement seems to be important in the early stages of plan development, it is evident that strong opinions are often held about different alternatives, and that compromise can be difficult. Seeking comments on alternative plans can escalate community conflict and confusion, and it may lessen the commitment to proceed with the final plan.

Whatever approach is adopted, an awareness of the possible dynamics during the implementation process is indispensable. However, this phase has not received as much attention as has the formulation phase of tourism plans. Hence, detailed consideration has been given to four main obstacles causing implementation failure. These are the problems of top-down management where decisions are taken centrally, neglect of the interdependencies between multiple organisations involved in tourism management, obstacles related to the network of institutional arrangements, and problems related to the uneven distribution of power and responsibilities. The notion of equilibrium and other concepts, including organisational environment, interorganisational interdependence, relations, and networks, are addressed in the next chapter.
3. Interorganisational Relations

3.1 Introduction
Organisations tend to form joint arrangements to cope with growing complexity of their environments, notably the complex problems that are beyond the capabilities of any one organisation to solve single-handedly (Jamal and Getz 1995). The success of an organisation is often determined by its ability to form and manage relations with other organisations operating in its business environment. There are often interdependencies between organisations because they do not possess or control important resources which influence their future, such as human, political, structural or symbolic resources. It is necessary to understand the elements of the tourism environment and of the relations among interdependent parties involved in plan formulation and implementation in the specific political and institutional context of a country. This chapter reviews relevant literature on systems theory, interorganisational theory, and network theory. This literature is evaluated in order to provide a framework for the examination of relationships between organisations and of the administrative deficiencies in tourism plan implementation, with these being examined subsequently for Belek in Turkey.

3.2 Systems theory
The concept of a system is a very valuable, powerful and influential analytical tool, which has been conceptualised in different ways (Hall 2000). At its simplest, a system can be viewed as an integrated whole, whose essential properties arise from the relationships between its constituent parts (Hall 2000). It comprises a set of elements, the set of relationships between these elements, and the set of relationships between those elements and the environment (Hall 2000). As Mill and Morrison (1985: xix) note, “the system is like a spider’s web, touch one part of it and reverberations will be felt throughout”. Systems are embedded within systems, and each system has strictly defined boundaries and operates within an external environment. According to general systems theory, a system’s environment encompasses all factors both inside and outside the system that can influence progress toward the attainment of its objectives. The environment is a result of the interplay of many complex and continually changing forces (Liu 1994).
Early rational organisation theory generally depicts organisations as entities without relations with their environment, whereas the systems approach views the organisation as part of an open system, having connections with its environment, which in turn suggests that an organisation is dependent on its environment for its survival (Klinj 1997). Hence, the organisation is no longer a unity, but consists of sub-systems which need to be co-ordinated. Researchers adopting an open systems approach recognise that the interorganisational network may be affected by environmental conditions, which provide a social context within which network relationships take place (Pearce 1992). The environment consists of “anything external to the organisation” (Ahmed and Young 1974) or “those events, circumstances and factors which occur outside the boundaries of the organisation and which may happen within it” (Bryson and Crosby 1992: 54).

Systems theory recognises that the behaviour of a system is constrained by the needs and conditions of its setting (micro and macro environment). Changes in one component of the system and the ways in which its internal subsystems and processes are linked, affect the entire system. A vast range of policies influence tourism, and changes in economic, social and environmental policies can have direct and indirect effects on the way the tourism industry behaves (Robinson 1996). Such elements in a country as its legislation, competition and politics, and its policies for environmental and cultural preservation may affect the nature of tourism management and development (Taylor 1994). Political stability is a hygiene factor in that it will not necessarily promote tourism development but its absence will certainly damage or even destroy it (Liu 1994). Numerous studies demonstrate that tourism business can be curtailed by political upheaval, war or terrorist activity in different parts of the world.

Political ideologies are significant influences on the way tourism develops. Liberals may be more likely to support tourism development, while conservatives may attempt to retain the existing economy (Liu 1994). “The ways in which tourism is organised, and its impacts, can be expected to differ considerably in countries with a different political structure” (de Kadt 1979: 32). Government ideologies will also impinge directly on tourism management policies (IUOTO 1974). The goals of
tourist organisations may be influenced by the extent to which government supports interventionist or free market policies. This may also influence the ways in which they pursue their activities. The *interventionist* approach aims to control the market, the tourism sector and its development, whereas the *laissez-faire* approach aims to allow the market to create competition in a free market environment (Airey 1983; Akehurst *et al.* 1994; Hayward 1989; Mansera 1998; Taylor 1994). Countries with a more centralist system may tend to demonstrate an *interventionist attitude* (for example, Ireland and Greece) toward tourism management policies, whereas countries with decentralised systems may tend to have a *laissez-faire attitude* (for example, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany). By the same token, the economic environment of a country impacts, to a great extent, on the nature of tourism administration and the relations between organisations at different scales. The level of economic development will largely determine the availability and adequacy of infrastructure, superstructure, capital and technology in a country (Liu 1994). Poor access and inadequate infrastructure have been cited as major obstacles to tourism development in developing nations (Tosun 2000).

### 3.3 Interorganisational relationship theory

The interorganisational approach has evolved out of the systems concept. Interorganisational relations involve connectedness, dialogue, co-operative efforts and other types of interaction between interconnected agencies (Easton 1996). Interorganisational theory focuses on the relations and communication networks among organisations, including between the different levels of governmental agencies. It also examines their interdependencies, their strategic perspectives, and their problem solving capacities (Klijn 1997). This theory, as distinct from rational organisation theory, recognises (1) the effects of environmental factors on organisational structure and behaviour, and (2) the notion that other organisations are a critical part of the environment of any organisation (Hall *et al* 1978).

Hewitt (2000) provides a list of several practical reasons for setting up interorganisational relationships. These include gains in scale and scope (such as in research, services, products), information sharing, the building of complementary skills and resource synergies, the strengthening of competitive position, and improved access to new technologies and new markets. Oliver (1990 in Hewitt 2000: 53)
provides a different set of reasons why interorganisational relationships may emerge. It is suggested that such relationships may result from *necessity* (when mandated through regulation or law), *reciprocity* (in the pursuit of common or mutually beneficial goals), *efficiency* (where co-operation produces higher input/output ratios or economies of scale), *stability* (to overcome uncertainty through risk sharing) and *legitimacy* (by enhancing the prestige and reputation of those co-operating). There are different forms of interorganisational relationship (such as conflict, co-operation, competition, co-ordination, partnership and mergers), and the necessary conditions for each of these forms of relationship are somewhat different.

A key issue emerging from the above discussion is that tourism organisations are part of an open system and can no longer be seen in an isolated way. Their success tends to become increasingly linked to elements of the surrounding environment. While it is difficult to define and measure, the surrounding environment refers to other organisations and those conditions external to an organisation which directly or indirectly influence its activities, efficiency, effectiveness, and behaviour. The environment (and the organisation’s connections with it) is crucial to the survival and success of an organisation because “interdependence pervades organisations and is fundamental to understanding them” (Tjosvold 1986: 517 in Costa 1996). The “structure of the environment” has important implications for interorganisational relations. This structure involves patterned relations between the participants, on the one hand, and the network, on the other hand (Emery and Trist 1965; Terrebery 1968). There are three key dimensions to this structure. First, *concentrated environments*, where resources are channelled through one or a few outlets. Second, *dispersed environments*, where resources flow through multiple channels. While some networks may be composed of organisations that all depend on a single funding source or domain-validating channel, other networks may be supplied by multiple channels. (Benson 1975). The third structural dimension relates to power, and specifically to *power concentration and power dispersion*. This relates to the extent to which some participants in the environment dominate others. While some environments are characterised by clear-cut patterns of dominance in which some participants control others, in other environments power is dispersed among many or all participants. These three structural dimensions of the environment, have a
considerable bearing on the supply of money and resources (Benson 1975) and on the
distribution of power within the network (Pearce 1992).

3.3.1 Approaches to interorganisational relations

Two alternative approaches to the study of interorganisational relations have
received considerable attention in the literature. A number of researchers view
interorganisational relationships from an exchange perspective, in which
organisations are assumed to interact voluntarily to achieve mutual organisational
goals (Levine and White 1961). However, other researchers adopt a power-
dependency approach when studying interorganisational relations. In this approach,
organisations are thought to be induced to interact by a more powerful organisation
(Aldrich 1976). Various organisational players seek to achieve their goals and to
avoid becoming “dependent” on the other players. These two approaches are
generally regarded as dissimilar, with research attention devoted to different elements,
components, and levels. However, while each approach has a distinct formulation,
they are also closely associated (Selin and Beason 1991). Among the common
elements recognised by both approaches are the concepts of domain consensus and of
interdependence, and a recognition of the importance of shared resources for
organisational survival.

3.3.1.1 Resource exchange theory

Levine and White’s (1961) resource exchange theory bases itself on systems
theory in that organisations are regarded as a system with individual organisations
varying in the kinds and frequency of relationships with one another. Other key
premises of the resource exchange model are the concept of resource scarcity and of
relations being formed with other organisations in order to acquire necessary
resources. Each organisation has objectives (such as, to make profit, to expand its
market, to survive, and to increase customer or employee satisfaction), and it needs to
possess certain resources in order to realise its specific objectives. The resources
necessary to meet these objectives can include equipment, specialised knowledge, or
funding. However, few, if any, organisations have enough resources in the above
forms, or enough access to these elements, to enable them to accomplish their
objectives completely. There are two options for organisations facing resource
The organisation could narrow the number and range of its functions in order to use scarce resources more effectively for fewer functions. Alternatively, the organisation could turn to other organisations, usually those controlling the necessary resources, to form voluntary relations with them in order to carrying out the functions. The basic assumption of the model is that interorganisational exchanges are necessary for goal attainment. Exchange involves a voluntary agreement involving the offer of some form of present, continuing, or future utility in exchange for other utilities offered in return (Weber 1948).

According to Levine and White (1961), there are three preconditions for organisational exchange: (1) the accessibility of each organisation to necessary resources from the system; (2) awareness of organisational functions; and (3) the existence of some domain consensus among the various organisations. Obviously there would be no exchange of elements between two organisations that do not know one another and their functions. There would also be no exchange without some level of agreement or understanding, even if it is only implicit. Thus, exchange agreements are contingent upon the organisation’s domain as well as the specific goals that an organisation wishes to pursue and the functions it undertakes in order to achieve its goals. In operational terms, the organisational domain refers to the claims that the organisation stakes out for itself in terms of its functions, the population it serves and the services rendered. In other words, the organisational domain embraces what the organisation seeks to do, for whom, and how it does it. For instance, a Tourism Ministry may strive to achieve balanced development for the satisfaction of residents, tourists and entrepreneurs, and may do this by issuing and enforcing development-related legislation and regulations. The delineation of the organisational domain within the wider system is highly desirable, because without at least minimal domain consensus there will be no exchange among organisations.

In essence, resource exchange theory assumes that organisations form relations when they perceive mutual benefits or gains from interacting. The management of each organisation is motivated to form relationships because they perceive that the organisation will be better able to attain its goals by interacting than by remaining autonomous (Schmidt and Kochan 1977). This type of relation is more likely to emerge in periods of resource scarcity or of declining resources. The exchange
approach also implies that the nature of the interactions between the participants is characterised by a high degree of co-operation and problem solving as opposed to high levels of conflict and bargaining. This is largely because the parties are motivated to co-ordinate their efforts to maximise their benefits (Schmidt and Kochan 1977). Four dimensions are considered to be influential in determining the nature of exchange relations. These are the parties that are involved, the kinds and quantities of exchange relations, the agreement underlying the exchange (it could be informal or formalised), and the direction of the exchange. The direction of the exchange could be unilateral, where elements flow from one organisation to another and no elements are given in return, it could be reciprocal, where elements flow from one organisation to another in return for other elements, and it could be "joint", where elements flow between two organisations acting in unison to ward off a third party.

3.3.1.2 The power and resource dependency model

The resource exchange model has received growing criticism, and this gave rise to the development of an alternative approach to the study of interorganisational relations. Proponents of this approach argue that the interactions between organisations are motivated less from anticipated mutual benefits than from a desire to obtain resources, frequently at the expense of other organisations (Rhodes 1981; Gamm 1981). Similarly, others have challenged the basic assumption that organisations engage in exchange relations because they need resource elements to fulfil their specific functions (Cook 1977). By contrast, the power and resource dependency model states that organisations operate in an environment of scarce resources (Yutchman and Seashore 1967) and they enter into exchange relations in order to achieve negotiated and relatively predictable environments (Thompson 1969). By pursuing scarce resources, organisations develop differing power and resource dependence levels relative to one another (Gamm 1981). In other words, one of the organisations is being instigated to interact by a more powerful organisation. This theory implies that the motivation to interact is asymmetrical (Schmidt and Kochan 1977). That is, interorganisational relationships only emerge when the motivated party is powerful enough to force or induce the other to interact. Two of the basic assumptions of the resource dependency model are (1) that environmental resources are in short supply because of interorganisational competition, and (2)
organisations survive and prosper to the extent that they are able to out-manoeuvre 
other organisations in the acquisition of scarce resources.

According to Thompson (1967: 29-30), an organisation is dependent upon a 
specific element of its task environment (1) in proportion to the organisation’s need 
for resources or performances which that element can provide, and (2) in inverse 
proportion to the ability of other elements to provide the same resource or 
performance. Thompson argues that organisations seek to maintain alternative sources 
because when the capacity that is needed is dispersed through the task environment 
this minimises the power of any single task environment element. The availability of 
alternative sources increases an organisation’s power and autonomy by decreasing its 
dependence upon other organisations. Levine and White (1961) also viewed the 
availability of alternative sources as a primary influence on the character of 
terorganisational exchange. They argue that an organisation is less dependent upon 
exchange relations with other organisations in its local environment to the extent that it 
has access to the elements it needs from outside sources, although it must still 
negotiate some form of exchange with these sources.

Resource dependency occurs frequently in the tourism field (Selin and Beason 1991). For example, “regional tourism planning often breaks down when a powerful 
destination refuses to participate and co-operate” (Smith et al 1986, in Selin and 
Beason 1991: 642). From the perspective of likely relations between central and 
peripheral organisations, one can argue that peripheral organisations are economically 
dependent on central organisations. While this is true, the state is also dependent on 
local institutions and people for knowledge, political support, and policy commitment 
and ownership. In fact a similar type of dependency relationship may exist between 
the public and private sectors in tourist destinations (Timothy 1998). This is that the 
public sector is normally dependent on the private sector to provide services and to 
finance, at least in part, the construction of tourist facilities. And without co-operative 
relations then tourism development programmes may stall because private investors 
require government approval of, and support for, most kinds of projects (Timothy 
1998).
3.3.2 Organisational interdependence and power relations

A key assumption in interorganisational relations is that relations among organisations grow out of the interdependencies among them. The recognition of an organisation's domain by other organisations leads to interdependencies. The task environment of organisations (that is the organisations, groups and persons with which an organisation interacts directly) is pluralistic. This means that each organisation must relate to a number of different groups, each of which is itself involved in networks of interdependencies. Another reason for interdependency is the uncertainty caused by the task environment. Depending on the amount of resources belonging to an organisation, it may choose to use competitive or co-operative strategies to help reduce uncertainty. With sufficient power, organisations may choose to follow competitive strategies, but if the acquisition of power is difficult then organisations are more likely to choose co-operative strategies, including contracting for services, and co-opting and coalescing (which refers to a combination or joint venture with other organisations). Organisations faced with external resource constraints are likely to make interorganisational arrangements if they can not obtain help from the government or support from social or political elites (Aldrich 1979).

Organisations or individuals often have power because of their position and leadership ability, and they can use this to help implement policy (Elliott 1997). Some see power as distinct from exchange (Blau 1964 a,b), while others view power as a kind of exchange (Homans 1974). Broadly defined, power refers to “all kinds of influence between persons or groups, including those exercised in exchange transactions, where one induces others to accede to his wishes by rewarding them for doing so” (Blau 1964 a: 115). Power in Max Weber’s classic definition (1948: 152) is “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests”. Power is the capacity to overcome resistance, the capacity to change the behaviour of others and to stop them getting what they want (Elliott 1983). It determines who gets what, when, and how (Elliott 1983). While exchange relations can be considered a subset of power relations, power dependency differs from resource exchange in that exchange, it is argued, is voluntary, while power involves A getting B to act against his (B’s) will (Homans 1974). Thus, power relations are
characterised more by conflicts than co-operation, which is the general characteristic of exchange relations.

Power derives to some extent from structures in society and from resource dependencies (Cook 1977). To the extent that alternative sources are available to an organisation in an exchange relationship, dependence is less and the organisation has more bargaining power in terms of influencing the exchange ratio. The more power an organisation has, the more influence it has to determine the nature of the interorganisational exchange; that is its ability to determine the form of the interaction and the ratio of exchange. Hence some parties are in dominant positions that permit the imposition and enforcement of their own conceptions of reality. Others are in positions of relative weaknesses and must act in conformity with the definitions of others (Benson 1977). Organisations with power will inevitably use that power. Organisations with a power advantage in an exchange relation will usually exploit the situation to alter the exchange ratio to make it more favourable.

Authority pertains to the legitimisation of activities, and the right and the responsibility to execute programmes. (Benson 1975). Administrators seek authority to implement specific types of activities and this authority is often derived from legislative mandates. When such authority is granted, the domain of the organisation is validated. In addition, the domain accounts for the organisation's requests for state funding. The ownership of a domain permits the organisation to operate in a certain sphere, to claim support for its activities, and to define proper practices within its environment (Benson 1975). Furthermore, authority is important in a restrictive way, such as by determining the types of activities which can not be undertaken by the agency. Administrators seek and defend authority due to the crucial role of authority in legitimating the work of agencies (Benson et al 1973). In some cases, administrators abuse their authority to gain funding for personal benefit rather than for public needs.

3.4 Network theory

The initial power and resource dependency model (Rhodes 1981) views relationships between organisations (such as between central and local government) as a game in which participants from both organisations manoeuvre for advantage.
They deploy the resources at their disposal - constitutional, legal, organisation, political and information - to maximise their influence. The game takes place in the arena of policy networks, each with different structures of dependency (Stoker 1995). A close look at these resources suggests that, with the exception of political resources, the primary resources are legal. That is, the framework of legal powers and duties shapes the allocation of financial resources, determines duties to provide access to information, and is the key determinant of the hierarchical character of relationships (Laughlin 1996). However, this early model's emphasis on the rules of the game perhaps gives insufficient emphasis to the less formal but no less important rules which largely define the institutions of society. Moreover, the model's emphasis on organisations possibly downplays the diverse interests of individuals within organisations (Stoker 1995).

The foregoing discussion suggests that the survival of organisations depends largely on their ability to cope with environmental contingencies, negotiating exchanges to ensure the continuation of needed resources. Morgan (1988: 94) claims that, "gone is the old-fashioned notion of hierarchy in which one member (for example, the focal organisation) directs the activities of other members. In comes the notion of a network which must be managed as a system of interdependent stakeholders". The term network refers to two or more organisations or actors involved in long-term relationships (Thorelli 1986, in Costa 1996). Johnston and Lawrence (1991: 193-195) define network as a "set of independent companies that work closely together to manage the flow of goods and services along the entire value-added chain in which each player has a stake in others success". A network, according to Aldrich and Whetten (1981), is the totality of all the units connected by a certain type of relationship, whereas Scharpf (1978) defines networks as the ensemble of direct and indirect linkages defined by mutual relationships of dependency. Benson (1982: 148) views networks as "a complex of organisations connected to each other by resource dependencies and distinguished from each other by breaks in the structure of resource dependencies". To Hall (2000) network means a wide range of cooperative behaviour between otherwise competing organisations and between organisations through social and economic relationships and transactions. Based on these definitions, three important characteristics of networks can be observed: (1) networks exist because of interdependencies between actors, (2) networks consist of a
variety of actors each with their own goals, and (3) networks consist of relations of a more or less lasting nature between actors (Klinj 1997).

Networks involve organisations of all sizes in various combinations. They can be locally, regionally or internationally based, can occur at all stages of the value chain, and they range from highly informal relationships through to contractual obligations (Hall 2000). Among the advantages of network relationships are that they can help to pool resources in order to increase competitiveness, to draw up strategic management and marketing plans, to reduce operating costs, and to increase know-how (Buhalis and Cooper 1998: 338).

The idea that actors are dependent on each other because they need each other’s resources to achieve their goals lies at the core of network theory. Networks develop because of the interdependency between actors. The division of work in a network means that firms are dependent on each other. Therefore, “their activities need to be co-ordinated. Co-ordination is not achieved through a central plan or an organisational hierarchy, nor does it take place through price mechanisms, as in the traditional market model. Instead, co-ordination takes place through interaction among firms in the network, in which price is just one of several influencing conditions” (Harris 2000). Powell (1990: 272) observes that “A basic assumption of network relations is that one party is dependent upon resources controlled by another, and that there are gains to be had by the pooling of resources. In essence, the parties to a network agree to forego the right to pursue their own interests at the expense of others” (Powell 1990: 272). Similarly, Mondragon (1998) notes that there exists a situation of interdependence between different government levels and institutions, and it is this situation of interdependence which will give rise to intergovernmental relations. Importantly, successful network relations rely on the existence of trust.

Network theory suggests that a policy is a result of interaction between a number of actors, and there is no single actor who has enough power to determine the strategic actions of the others. The theory also stresses the fact that more or less stable, lasting relational patterns develop between actors, which influence the interaction patterns taking place within networks. The position of actors can be calculated through the assessment of the regularity of communication and interactions
(frequency, directness and centrality) (Klinj, 1997). Several classifications of network relationships have been developed and one classification is now presented which is of particular value for this study (Harper 1993; Whetten 1981; Hall 2000).

3.4.1 Network relations

(1) A dyadic linkage is the simplest form of interaction (Benson 1975). A dyadic linkage is formed when two organisations find it mutually beneficial to collaborate in accomplishing a common goal. A less formal type of dyadic interaction entails simple co-ordination of various aspects of two organisations' production activities. These dyadic linkages differ from joint ventures since a unique organisational entity or project is not created. Instead organisations simply agree to co-ordinate their respective activities to increase efficacy. Because the commitment of organisational resources is modest, the dyadic relationship is typically less formal and consequently more difficult to maintain. It is generally dependent on the informal agreements between the initiators and, as a result, it is vulnerable to turnover in organisational personnel. Dyadic co-ordination is the most fundamental form of interorganisational relations and a great deal of research has examined the antecedents and consequences of these relations.

(2) Organisation sets refer to interorganisational linkages that are clusters of dyadic relations maintained by a focal organisation. They refer to the sum total of interorganisational linkages established by the focal organisation. Hence it is not a true network because, although all the dyadic linkages between the focal and interacting organisations are examined, the other relations between the interacting organisations are ignored.

(3) The third form is called an action set, which is essentially a purposive network. That is, it is a coalition of organisations working together to accomplish a specific purpose. The concept of action set refers to an interacting group of organisations, whereas the concept of organisation set is explicitly centred on a single focal organisation. Philips (1960) identifies four conditions that affect the degree to which an inter-firm action set will be able to achieve co-ordinated behaviour. First, the number of organisations in the action set; second, the extent to which a single powerful organisation assumes a leadership role; third, the degree of similarity in
values and attitudes among the members; and, finally, the impact of behaviour in other action sets.

(4) The final form is the network. Network relations involve a group of organisations that share common organisational ties and among which can be recognised a bounded interorganisational system. Network relations can be seen as a form of steering aimed at promoting joint problem solving or policy development (Kickert et al 1997). According to this concept, a central organisation is no longer seen as occupying a superior position to other parties, but as being on an equal footing with them (Kickert et al 1997). Thus, the formulation and implementation of policies within networks is about co-operation between interdependent parties with different and often conflicting rationality, interests and strategies. Implementation processes are not seen as ex ante formulated goals, but as an interaction process in which actors exchange information about problems, preferences and means, and also trade-off their goals and resources. The pattern of interaction represented in this form becomes most instructive to an investigator when s/he understands the dynamic processes that have generated the configuration (Whetten 1981). This requires an in-depth understanding both of the contextual factors impinging on the entire network and the evolutionary processes occurring within the dyadic and action set components of the network. Hall (2000) notes that in order to improve the potential contribution of network development it becomes essential that network relationships move from dyadic relations and organisation sets to action sets and formal networks. He further notes that the success of networks depends on their structure in that they should be internally driven rather than maintained by government. According to Hall, like any other organisational structure, networks are goal driven and they will go through an organisational lifecycle. It is also impossible to assume that every network will succeed. However, the creation of co-operative arrangements between multiple organisations will undoubtedly achieve more than when they are focused on a single organisation (Hall 2000).

3.4.2 Strategies in network management

Various strategies are utilised in network management. Four will be considered here as they are particularly relevant to this study.
The most frequently used strategies are co-operative strategies (Benson 1975). In co-operative strategies, change is sought through agreements and joint planning in which each affected party participates and exercises options. Network alterations coming out of such a process are typically compromises agreed upon by the affected organisations. Such compromises usually involve a process of negotiation and exchange through which each party has voluntarily given up some valued condition in exchange for similar concessions on the part of others. Despite the frequency of co-operative strategies, the conditions for their success are restrictive. Such strategies are limited to situations in which each party has some minimal degree of power vis-à-vis other parties. Each party must hold something of value for the other party and be capable of resisting the others' demand. Only then can co-operative strategies be effective.

If a party cannot withhold something of value from another, there is no basis for the latter to make concessions. Agreements reached where the minimal conditions for co-operative exchange are absent simply express and formalise the clear-cut dominance of one party over the other. This does not mean that equality is a precondition for co-operative strategies. On the contrary, exchange between unequal parties is common. Each party must be capable at a minimum of sustaining itself as an operating concern despite opposition or harassment by other parties. Agreements may cover a wide variety of products or behavioural patterns by the organisations. Exchanges of funds, personnel, facilities, and clients are among the more obvious. Of equal importance are agreements to cease disruptive or harassing activities. Thus, agencies often enter into agreements to stop interfering with each other. Such an agreement may permit each party to fulfil its programme requirements more effectively and assure itself of a continuing or increasing flow of resources. Many programmes intended to produce enhanced co-operation between agencies fail because co-operation is sought without attending to underlying power relations (Aldrich 1976).

The second major strategy is a disruptive strategy. This involves purposive conduct which threatens the resource generating capacities of a target agency. Such activities are undertaken in order to force change on the target agency, including altered relations with other participants in the network or environment. Such tactics
must effectively attack vital resource-maintaining functions in order to be successful. This can be accomplished in a number of ways, including (1) domain violations - the invasion of the target agency's domain by the conduct of programmes falling clearly within its domain, (b) fund diversion - the acquisition of funds which might otherwise have gone to the target agency, and (c) programme circumvention - activities which interfere with the programme effectiveness of the target and thereby diminish its capacity to compete for funds and authority (Benson 1975).

Disruptive tactics are varied but each involves a tendency to undermine the position of the target agency in its political economy and to use this as means of producing change (Benson 1975: 242). Two conditions of the political economy appear to favour disruptive tactics: (1) a substantial power imbalance between agencies, such that the more powerful agency can largely disregard non-disruptive requests and demands from the weaker one, and (2) substantial fragmentation in resource channels, such that one agency may sustain disruptive actions despite the objections and resistance of another even though the other is more powerful. In the first instance, disruptive strategies are chosen where normatively prescribed communications and pressures are not effective. In the second, breaks in the resource channels and a certain disconnectedness are necessary if disruptive tactics are not to be quickly stifled by the countermoves of a powerful target agency (Aldrich, and Jeffry 1976).

*(3) Manipulative strategies* involve the purposeful alteration of the environmental constraints affecting the flow of resources. Such action is undertaken as a means to produce change in interorganisational networks, in the programme priorities, and in the technological commitments of agencies. This type of strategy is analogous to governmental regulation of the economy thorough the manipulation of interest rates, tax rates, and supply. Manipulative strategies of particular importance in inter-agency relations include the alteration of the total volume of resources flowing into a network. Resource flows may be increased or decreased as a means of changing the probabilities of network events. Another manipulative strategy is the alteration of resource channels. Resource flow may be diverted from existing channels and into new ones as a means of changing the priorities operative within a network. Such a strategy involves changing the fundamental connections between a network of
agencies and the supportive sectors in its environment. Manipulative strategies require a certain minimal degree of network autonomy or decentralisation. Understanding must include the bases of power and influence among relevant organisations, publics, and offices in the network (Benson 1975).

(4) Authoritative strategies involve the authoritative alignment or realignment of network relations. In this case, an authoritative participant, such as an executive office or legislative body, precisely specifies the relations between agencies. It establishes negative and positive boundaries of the inter-agency relations, specifying what must and must not be done. Authoritative strategies may stem from a wide variety of participant bodies. Government bureaux, legislators, executive offices, and judicial bodies and publics may utilise authoritative strategies (Benson 1975: 244). Such strategies would be utilised provided that the participants have a dominant position in the flow of resources in terms of money or authority to identify the nature of programmes and linkages at subordinate levels. These strategies are authoritative in the sense that the directing agent uses its power to mandate precise activities and not merely to encourage or reward those activities. The option of choosing an authoritative strategy lies only with a particularly powerful participant, while other strategies may be selected by a variety of actors (Litwak and Hylton 1962). Another example relates to the formalisation of relations. Power may be used to tighten up relations between agencies by precisely specifying linkages, which have been previously left informal or variable. Mutual obligations and boundaries may be precisely set in such a process. Such a formalisation process appears often to be a response at high levels to problems generated by coercively formed relations at lower levels (Whetten and Leung 1979). A third example is the comprehensive reorganisation of relations. Power may be used to rearrange inter-agency boundaries and linkages in an entire system.

3.5 Factors affecting interorganisational relations

An inter-organisational network is in equilibrium to the extent that participant organisations are engaged in highly co-ordinated, co-operative inter-actions based on normative consensus and mutual respect. In research by Benson, Kunce and Thompson (1973) four dimensions of inter-organisational equilibrium have been identified. These are: (1) domain consensus, (2) ideological consensus, (3)
interorganisational evaluation, and (4) work co-ordination. Equilibrium is defined as “a condition that occurs when the relationship between two or more organisations consists of harmonious, non-conflicting, collaborative interactions” (Benson et al 1973). Work co-ordination is defined as patterns of collaboration and co-operation between organisations. Work is co-ordinated to the extent that programmes and activities in two or more organisations are geared into each other with a maximum effectiveness and efficiency. Domain consensus refers to the agreement between participants regarding the appropriate role and scope of an agency. Ideological consensus refers to agreement among participants regarding the nature of the tasks confronted by organisations and the appropriate approaches to those tasks. Interorganisational evaluation refers to the judgement by participants or workers in one organisation of the value and quality of the work conducted by another organisation.

These four variables are used to define and measure the degree of equilibrium present among the agencies. When the relationship between a pair of organisations is characterised by the presence of each of these phenomena, a condition of interorganisational equilibrium is said to be present. To the extent that these characteristics are absent, the relationship lacks equilibrium. These four components are thought to comprise an interorganisational system in the sense that a stable interrelationship between these factors tends to be maintained. When one component is present, the others also tend to occur (Benson et al 1973). These variables should be balanced. If one component of an inter-agency relationship is inadequate, then the other components are also expected to be inadequate. A network or a group of agencies are regarded as in equilibrium if these four variables were at relatively high levels. External forces to an inter-agency network may however lead to unbalanced conditions, such as when there is a high level of work co-ordination in the presence of low domain consensus (Schmidt and Kochan 1977). The distribution of funds and authority may influence the domain and ideological components of agencies. Hence, the degree to which agencies have a co-ordinated relationship rests upon the frequency with which they communicate, the division of their labour in a well articulated fashion, and the flexibility or adaptability of their relationships (Ackoff 1974).
The equilibrium components tend toward balance in the sense that an increase (or decrease) in one component is likely to produce a corresponding increase (or decrease) in other components (Benson et al 1973). Domain consensus directly influences the co-ordination of work (i.e., the greater the agreement between organisations regarding the appropriate role and scope of each, the greater the co-ordination of work between them). Domain consensus directly influences ideological consensus (i.e., the greater the agreement between organisations regarding the appropriate role and scope of each, the greater their agreement regarding the nature of and appropriate modes of activities). Domain consensus directly influences interorganisational evaluations (i.e., the greater the agreement between organisations regarding the appropriate role and scope of each, the greater their tendency to evaluate each other positively). It should be noted that the tendency for disagreements about agency role and scope aggravates ideological differences. In other words, the tendency for domain dissensus intensifies ideological dissensus (Benson et al 1973).

Ideological consensus directly influences the co-ordination of work. That is, the greater the agreement on the nature and appropriate modes of attack upon common tasks, the greater the degree of co-ordination of work. Ideological differences between organisations have many sources. For instance, ideological differences are rooted in the legislative mandates of agencies, and therefore a certain formulation of the agency’s approach to its task may be important for legitimating its activities (Litwak and Hylton 1953). Ideological consensus directly influences interorganisational evaluation, i.e., the greater the agreement on the nature and appropriate modes of attack upon common tasks, the higher the level of interorganisational evaluations. Interorganisational evaluation directly influences co-ordination of work, the higher two or more organisations evaluate each other, the greater the likelihood of co-ordinated activity between them (Whetten and Leung 1979).

Interorganisational evaluation is affected by domain consensus and by ideological consensus. First, in defending domains, established or proposed participants often disparage the performance of an opposing agency. That is, the participant is more likely to perceive and to report a negative evaluation of an agency, with which his own organisation is in conflict or competition. Conversely, the participant is likely to evaluate more highly the services of agencies with which a
normalised and mutually agreeable set of domains have been negotiated. Partly, this results from rationalisation or distortion associated with the defence of vested interests. However, it is likely that agencies with incompatible definitions of domains will become involved in interactions, which participants will regard as evidence of poor quality service by the other organisation. That is, because of incompatible definitions of roles, the participants in two organisations will experience problems in dealing with each other and will, therefore, develop negative judgements of each other (Benson 1977). To summarise, positive interorganisational evaluation of other organisations operating in compatible domains is important as this increases the likelihood of co-ordinated activity between organisations (Benson et al. 1973).

Based on these arguments, Aldrich (1979) remarks that an organisation attempting to establish a domain would establish an ideology concerning how it will approach the task or a justification for its claims. Notably, where other organisations are already operating in or near the proposed domain, the participants in the domain-proposing organisation tend to sharpen and emphasise ideological differences with established organisations (Benson 1982). Consequently, organisations already operating in the environment with established domains are not very comfortable with the entry of other organisations in the same field. Therefore, they tend to be critical of the ideological differences of the newly entered organisation in the subject by claiming that its approach to the task is inappropriate. Inevitably, conflict in the domain expansion gives rise to domain defence and eventually leading to some degree of ideological dissensus (Benson et al. 1973).

### 3.6 Summary

This section has examined why organisations interact with one another. The notions of systems theory, interorganisational theory and network theories were explained. The types and structures of task environments were reviewed, and two approaches used to explicate interorganisational relations were presented. Factors affecting the nature and the extent of interorganisational relations were also discussed.

From this review, it is obvious that organisations need to interact with other organisations in their task environment in order to acquire the resources needed to realise their specific objectives. The environment of an organisation is made up of
other organisations and each of these controls resources, such as capital, personnel and knowledge. Each organisation has to interact with others in order to acquire resources necessary for goal achievement, as no organisation alone can possess all the necessary resources. These interdependencies create networks of organisations (Benson 1975; Pearce 1992). Organisations will search for an adequate supply of authority and money from the political and economic system in order to fulfil their programme requirements, maintain their domain authority, maintain an orderly and reliable flow of resources, and to defend their way of doing things (Pearce 1992). When resources are scarce and there is substantial disparity between organisational goals, preferences and strategies, conflict between organisations are likely to occur. The existence of conflict and its extent is more than likely to inhibit effective interactions between organisations.

The survival of organisations depends largely on their ability to cope with environmental contingencies, negotiating exchanges to ensure the continuation of needed resources. When a number of organisations engage in recurrent, extensive interaction with each other, as in the case of central and local tourism organisations, they may be considered to form a network (Aldrich 1976, Aldrich and Jeffry 1976, Benson 1975, Litwak and Hylton 1962). The interactions that occur in such a network may consist of exchange of funds, sharing of information, and collaboration and sharing of personnel. The interactions may also include expressions of criticism or opposition, competition for funds, and even purposeful disregard between agencies. Such interaction may at one extreme include extensive, reciprocal exchanges of resources or intense hostility and conflict at the other. The organisations in a network may be linked directly or indirectly. Some networks may consist of a series of organisations linked by multiple, direct ties to each other. Others may be characterised by clustering or centring of linkages around one of a few mediating or controlling organisations. Networks may be quite varied in scope and in degree of interaction. In other words, the networks may be composed of varying degrees and types of positive and negative interactions.

The tourism organisation network is composed of a spectrum of public and private sector tourist organisations (national, regional, and local) that seek a variety of goals and undertake a range of functions. In most cases, these organisations have
different values, ideologies, goals and interests and this will give rise to different interpretations of the problem at hand and therefore of solutions. Pearce (1992: 20) observes that “as tourism is a relatively recent and in many places a far from dominant sector of the economy, it is likely that the tourist organisation network will heavily reflect established political and administrative frameworks, boundaries and division of power”. It is also evident that the political culture of the country, its general economic conditions, as well as the broader government policies may influence the structure, goals, and the functions of the tourist organisations and the network. Pearce, for instance, states that the extent to which the government supports interventionist or free-market policies will influence the goals of the tourist organisations, as well as the ways in which they pursue their activities. The state of the economy will impinge on the resources available to them. This implies that tourist organisations will act like other organisations and will interact with the broader environment in order to acquire resources while also being regulated by the law.

Organisations form relationships with other organisations in order to secure possible gains from increased scale and scope (in research, services, products), from information sharing, from building complementary skills and resource synergy, from strengthening their competitive position, and from access to new technologies and or new markets. Two main approaches have been examined that help to understand interactions between organisations - the exchange and the power-dependency approaches. The first is based on exchange theory (Levine and White 1961), which assumes that organisational exchange is a voluntary activity between two organisations, which has consequences, actual or anticipated, for the realisation of their respective goals or objectives. According to this approach, organisations view the chances of realising their goals in some domains to be greater by performing jointly rather than by acting independently (Pearce 1992). The emphasis is on voluntary, goal-oriented behaviour, not just on the transfer of material goods (Pearce 1992). The power-dependency approach views the interorganisational network as a political economy, emphasising the importance of resource acquisition in the analysis of interorganisational interactions, specifically the acquisition and defence of money and authority (Pearce 1992).
While some researchers argue that these two theories are dissimilar, they are nevertheless closely related. Each of these theories shares the view that the recognition of an organisation's domain by other organisations (domain consensus) leads to interdependencies. Organisations conduct their work according to a set of norms about which agencies can appropriately carry out certain activities, which agencies can appropriately receive certain kinds of resources, which agencies have a certain right to existence, and so on. These norms form an interrelated set of domains. Stated differently, each organisation learns about the set of boundaries and linkages between agencies.

Regardless of the approach adopted, a review of literature suggests that building, maintaining and managing interorganisational relations depend heavily on the degree of equilibrium present among organisations. The degree of equilibrium is determined by the level of agreement between organisations regarding: (1) the appropriate role and scope of an agency (domain consensus); (2) the nature of the tasks confronted by the organisations and appropriate approaches to those tasks (ideological consensus); (3) the judgement by workers in one organisation of the value of the work of another organisation (positive evaluation); and (4) patterns of collaboration and co-operation (work co-ordination) (Benson 1975, Whetten and Leung 1979, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).

It is also important to note that organisations search for an adequate supply of authority and money from the political and economic system in order to fulfil their programme requirements, maintain their domain authority, maintain an orderly and reliable flow of resources, and to defend their way of doing things (Pearce 1992). The extent to which organisations can carry this out depends on two power bases: the characteristics of the internal network structure, and the external linkages of the network organisations. The chapter that follows reviews different forms of interorganisational relations (co-ordination, co-operation, and partnership), and also seeks common factors either facilitating or inhibiting the effective formation and maintenance of these forms of relationships among organisations.
4. Inter-organisational Co-ordination

4.1 Introduction

The concept of co-ordination, which includes co-operation, partnership and collaboration, has been a topic of interest to scholars and practitioners for several decades in different academic fields (e.g., in sociology, organisational behaviour and community studies). A long list of arguments could be drawn up from studies in these fields illustrating why it is beneficial for organisations to co-ordinate their activities. However, only a limited amount of empirical research has been conducted on interorganisational co-operation, partnership and collaboration specifically in tourism. Little is known about the costs and benefits of these interorganisational relationship forms in the tourism sector. This chapter therefore aims to critically review co-ordination, including co-operation, partnership and collaboration, as forms of interorganisational relations. These specific concepts and related interpretations are used subsequently in the evaluation of processes and patterns of co-ordination of the tourism planning process, and their impact on the relationships and outcomes of tourism planning in the Belek case study.

4.2 The benefits of co-ordination

Co-ordination is a central issue for organisations. Employees within the same department must co-ordinate to avoid duplication, to complement each other’s efforts and to help each other solve problems to complete departmental tasks (Tjosvold 1988). Similarly, people from different work groups and departments must share their experiences and expertise to capture synergy and create new services and products (Tjosvold 1988). Co-ordination is a way to bring together disparate agencies to make their efforts more compatible (in the interest of equity, effectiveness and efficiency). Without co-ordination, the danger of lapsing into chaos and inefficiency is great (Robinson et al 2000). There are several other reasons for co-ordination, and the approach taken to co-ordination depends upon what one is trying to achieve, and what the diversity of interests is (Robinson et al 2000). These include a need to manage the range of interests, capacity, and activity, which have their own implications for the form of interorganisational co-ordination. Oliver (1990 cited in Hewitt 2000: 53) summarises the reasons for co-ordination as follows. The potential reasons could be
for reciprocity (in the pursuit of common or mutually beneficial goals), efficiency (where co-ordination produces higher input-output ratios or economies of scale), stability (to overcome uncertainty through risk sharing), and legitimacy (by enhancing the prestige and reputation of those co-ordinating).

Another important incentive for interorganisational co-ordination is shared learning, which is of particular relevance in developing countries where knowledge resources are scarce. Benefits of shared learning fostered by co-ordination between organisations may include the potential for challenge and structural critical reflection from different perspectives, which can bring in concepts that are new to the learner; shared experimentation can reduce the risks and maximise the opportunities for trying out new things; and the shared experiences can be supportive (Bessant and Francis 1999, in Hewitt 2000: 63). Shared experience also helps to explicate the system's principles and to see the patterns, thus "separating the wood from the trees". Shared learning provides an environment for revealing assumptions and exploring mental models outside of the normal experience of individual organisations (Bessant and Francis 1999, in Hewitt 2000: 63).

Co-ordination between the private and public sectors is vital in tourism (Jamal and Getz 1995; Timothy 1998). For example, the public sector depends largely on the private sector to provide services and to finance, at least in part, the construction of tourist facilities (Timothy 1998). Tourism development projects may be stalled without co-ordination, since private investors require government approval of, and support for most projects (Timothy 1998). In most developing countries government agencies compete among themselves for scarce operating funds. In some cases the competition between private and public sector tourism initiatives may result in the deterioration of relations between these sectors (Timothy 1998). Efficiency could be improved if various agencies would co-operate by co-ordinating their efforts in tourism development projects (Timothy 1998). Less money would have to be spent and more funds could be allocated to other purposes.

In a participatory tourism development project several actors usually are involved in the tourism development process and interact with other agencies. Any lack of co-ordination is likely to frustrate the potential opportunities for the
community to involve itself in tourism development (Tosun 2000). This would be a missed opportunity. Tourism projects involving collective arrangements are likely to have more leverage if they arise out of the local knowledge of the participants (Healey 1997). However, despite the benefits that co-ordination can offer, some individuals or organisations may prefer not to be involved in co-ordination because of the inherent difficulties and costs involved. Indeed, extensive co-ordination between members of a service delivery system may reinforce the status quo by hindering the entrance of new organisations, technologies and ideologies. These issues will be dealt with later in this chapter.

4.3 Describing co-ordination

The academic literature provides no universally accepted definition of the concept of co-ordination, and the meaning of co-ordination is likely to differ from individual to individual. The concept is also often used interchangeably in the literature with such concepts as co-operation, partnership and collaboration. The similarities and differences between these concepts will be dealt with subsequently.

Rogers and Whetten (1982: 12) provide a general definition of the concept of co-ordination as “the process whereby two or more organisations create and/or use existing decision-rules that have been established to deal collectively with their shared task environment”. Schermerhorn (1975) defines co-ordination as deliberate relations between otherwise autonomous organisations for the joint accomplishment of individual operating goals. Mott (1968) proposes that co-ordination leads to adjustments among the organisations in their respective outlooks, objectives and methods of operation. According to Hall et al (1978), co-ordination is the extent to which organisations attempt to ensure that their activities take into account those of other organisations. Others, such as Aiken et al (1975), define co-ordination as the articulation of elements in a service delivery system so that the comprehensiveness, compatibility, and co-operation among the elements are maximised. Similarly, Warren et al (1974) describe co-ordination as a process of concerted decision-making or actions where the decisions or actions of two or more organisations are made simultaneously in part or in whole with some deliberate degree of adjustment to each other. Spann (1979: 411, cited in Hall 2000) notes that “co-ordination usually refers to
the problem of relating units or decisions so that they fit in with one another, are not at cross-purposes, and operate in ways that are reasonably consistent and coherent”.

Co-ordination can be seen as a structure or a process (Rogers and Whetten 1982). From a structural perspective, the relationships of co-ordination between the participants can be described in relation to the relative power of each, the formal rules guiding their efforts, and the degree to which participants lose autonomy. However, when co-ordination is viewed as a process, the emphasis is often placed on joint decision-making (Rogers and Whetten 1982). In this process, the behaviour of participant organisations is adjusted because of the influence of other organisations and the wider environment (Warren et al 1974 in Rogers and Whetten 1982: 17).

One school of thought equates co-ordination with control, either in the form of an imposing authority or in the form of a stifling bureaucracy. However, for others co-ordination represents empowerment - it is a liberating ideal where mutual exchange and reinforcement encourage further co-operation (Bennet 2000). However, co-ordination can be depicted as being about power, including power to determine the allocation of resources and to exert influence over conflicting parties. In this view, co-ordination is generally agreed to be desirable, though many organisations are not in favour of it. In relation to the nature of co-ordination, Bennet (2000) further suggests that most relationships of co-ordination are short-term, ad hoc, and based on self interest. And, more importantly, he suggests that most parties do not think hard enough about the reasons for co-ordination. In fact in most cases organisations still want their autonomy and freedom to act as they choose. A further important point is that co-ordination in different sectors may be extremely different. Moreover, appreciation of the value of co-ordination between the public and private sectors or between different levels of the public sector tends to vary greatly from country to country (Rogers and Whetten 1982).

4.4 Co-operation and co-ordination

The concepts of co-ordination and co-operation are often mixed up not only in the literature but also in reality (Hall 2000). In fact, there are some quite distinct differences between these concepts. (Hall 2000). There are dissimilarities in terms of the decision rules, degree of formalisation, kinds of goals emphasised, amount of resources involved, primary actors, and the implications for vertical and horizontal
ties (Aiken et al 1975; Warren et al 1974). In general terms, co-ordination often refers to “formal institutionalised relationships among existing networks of organisations, interests and or individuals”, while co-operation is characterised by “informal tradeoffs and by attempts to establish reciprocity in the absence of rules” (Mulford and Rogers 1982: 13).

Two distinguishing characteristics of co-operation are that it is usually characterised by voluntary actions and purposes (Schermernhorn1975). Six other major distinguishing characteristics can be derived from the literature. (1) As mentioned earlier, co-ordination is usually more formal than co-operation and it may require contractual agreements (Davidson 1976; Morris 1963). (2) The goals when organisations co-operate are likely to be vague and the tasks less clearly delimited. Further, “co-ordination occurs where there is agreement on a set of allocative criteria with respect to the resources controlled jointly by the organisations. In contrast, co-operation is more likely to be characterised by informal trade-offs and by attempts to establish some reciprocity in the absence of rules” (White 1974 in Rogers et al 1982). (3) Co-ordination includes interdependent decisions (Lindblom 1965; Mott 1968; Thompson 1967) and the outcomes from co-operation and co-ordination are different. With co-operation, one organisation works with another to achieve their different individual goals, whereas with co-ordination joint decisions or actions give rise to joint outcomes that may be quite different from their initial preferred outcomes (Rogers and Whetten 1982). (4) Linkages among organisations that stem from co-operation are temporary and not formalised and they are less likely to have a permanent effect on the horizontal and vertical structure of a community (White 1974). By contrast, co-ordination, motivated by desires at the local level to avoid duplication or redundancy, can affect these horizontal dimensions. Moreover, co-ordination mandated by higher levels to bring local, state, and federal programmes into close arrangement may have even more permanent effects. (5) Since the relationships in co-operation are more temporary and informal, and involve relatively few resources, co-operation is less likely to alter the relationships between organisations at the local level or relationships with the state levels (Rogers and Whetten1982). The relatively temporary and loose efforts are less likely to require substantive resources from organisations. By contrast, co-ordination is more constant and more difficult to end. Hence, co-ordination requires a larger commitment of
various kinds of organisational resources, including personnel and money (Rogers and Whetten 1982). (6) There may also be a divergence in terms of the status of personnel involved in co-operation and co-operation. Higher-ranking persons are more likely to be involved in co-ordination, as decisions that modify organisations are under consideration. More importantly, when joint decisions are made that influence resources or programmes or goals, higher-ranking persons are especially likely to interact with their counterparts in other organisations (Rogers and Whetten 1982). Co-operation is more likely to involve persons from lower ranks.

While conceptually they are different concepts, they are both about the collective action of organisations. The factors contributing to the success and failure of co-ordination do not appear to be substantially different from those of co-operation. These factors will be examined following a discussion of the various forms of co-ordination.

4.5 Forms of co-ordination

While various definitions of co-ordination have been presented, this section deals with the different forms of co-ordination identified in the literature. The phenomena included within the concept of co-ordination are extremely broad (Whetten 1981). Most of the literature on co-ordination actually focuses on a limited part of this spectrum, namely two or more organisations coming together periodically to plan future activities or to work on joint projects. The more ad hoc side of this continuum is often conceptualised as interorganisational co-operation, and it happens in a loose fashion that does not require formal arrangements.

In general, co-ordination can be separated into two major types: managed and unmanaged co-ordination (Mott 1968). Managed co-ordination is different from unmanaged, with the latter happening in a random or self-regulating fashion. Unmanaged co-ordination embraces the unanticipated consequences of working together as the organisations adjust and adapt to each other's policies in an unplanned way. In unmanaged co-ordination, a shared recognition of, or identification with a common issue or problem is less apparent.
Whetten (1981) also classifies co-ordination into *mutual adjustment, alliance* and *corporate* (Van de Ven and Walker 1984, Zeitz 1980, Mott 1968). These forms of co-ordination vary in terms of the intensity, form of operational social power, formalisation and scope of the co-ordination activity. *Mutual adjustment* is the weakest but the most general form of co-ordination, while the corporate form is the strongest. On the other hand, alliance is relatively stronger than mutual adjustment as the participating agencies have more than a few shared goals. The *mutual adjustment* form typifies the type of co-ordination that occurs in a competitive market. Consequently, the focus in mutual adjustment situations is on the participating agencies, and there are few if any shared goals toward which they work. When common goals do emerge these are apt to be only temporary. Co-ordination tends to focus on specific cases rather than on the development of a comprehensive delivery system. The agency representatives in such situations are generally professionals or staff at the supervisory rather than the top administrator level. Individuals who are involved in the day-to-day activities of any agency often attend meetings or make phone contact with their counterparts in other agencies as the need arises. Since there are few if any resources being committed through the joint activity, it is unnecessary for those with higher authority to get involved. The rules used in this form of co-ordination are developed *ad hoc* in the process of interaction. They are likely to grow out of interpersonal as well as organisational concerns. Consequently, the violation of rules and norms is not regarded as severely as in other co-ordinating strategies, nor are the types of punishment or sanctions for violation nearly as severe. Further there is no central unit to monitor or detect violations. In this context differences of opinions regarding goals and programme administration can only be resolved through negotiation and bargaining between participants (Van de Van and Walker 1984, Davidson 1976, Klonglan et al 1975, Lehman 1975).

Whetten (1981) further distinguishes between *voluntary* and *mandated co-ordination*, and argues that their antecedents differ. According to Whetten, there are actually five basic conditions that must be met in order for voluntary co-ordination to occur. However, when the law mandates that co-ordination should occur, only three conditions must be met. In the case of *voluntary co-ordination*, it is necessary (1) first of all for administrators to have a positive attitude towards interorganisational co-ordination. Otherwise they will define their organisational problem in such a way that
co-ordination does not appear to be a useful solution. (2) Next, they must recognise an organisational need for co-ordination that is salient enough to justify absorbing the costs inherent in co-ordination. The recognition of partial interdependence is a necessary prerequisite of interorganisational co-ordination. When organisations share the same client pool, the same resource base or provide the same type of services, the need for co-ordination becomes apparent. If organisations share too little in common then they have little incentive to collaborate. On the other hand, if they share too much, then they may perceive one another as strong competitors, and they might refuse to work together.

(3) Once this positive attitude has been articulated then the search for potential co-ordination patterns is initiated. However, co-ordination is not going to occur unless two organisations become aware of their complementary needs. (4) After the pool of candidates has been assembled the members are evaluated in terms of their desirability and compatibility. Organisations are sought that have roughly equal status, have common definitions of the problems to be addressed, have an encompassing professional ideology, do not present a threat to respective domain claims, and have compatible organisational structures and procedures. (5) Finally, after deciding to co-ordinate, the participating organisation must assess their capacity to adequately manage the ongoing co-ordination process. This is particularly important because successful co-ordinating programmes often break down because one or both of the partners are incapable of maintaining the relationship. This could result from a resource cutback, a small staff overloaded with internal administrative responsibilities, staff inefficiency or ineptitude, inadequate internal or interorganisational communication channels, or a lack of flexibility in organisational policies for dealing with exceptions (Van de Van and Walker 1984, Zeitz 1980, Davidson 1976, Lehman 1975).

4.6 Facilitators and inhibitors to collective action and the influences on success or failure

Next, it is instructive to examine the factors influencing an organisation’s decision to enter into or avoid such collective arrangements as co-ordination, co-operation and partnerships (Whetten 1981). The decision can be analysed within the framework of a general cost and benefit analysis, for inherent in every
interorganisational agreement are both assets and liabilities. The principal asset is access to the resources controlled by other organisations. However, in return for an enlarged resource base, organisations give up some of their autonomy since resource exchange agreements with other organisations also represent obligations that restrict their degree of freedom. The more agreements that are in force, the more commitments and obligations must be considered in making subsequent decisions. “With this in mind administrators must be convinced that the benefits of entering into a new co-ordination agreement outweigh the inherent costs” (Whetten 1981: 14).

From an organisation’s point of view, to become involved in co-ordination implies that (1) it will lose some of its freedom to act independently when it prefers to maintain control over its domain and affairs. (2) It must invest in scarce resources and energy to develop and maintain a relationship with another organisation when the potential returns on this investment are often unclear or intangible. Thus, the parties may prefer not to become involved in an interorganisational relation (such as co-ordination) unless they are compelled to do so, either because of scarcity, or because of specialisation, which requires the organisations to fulfil their obligations. Benefits may be outweighed by a greater cost if either organisation is perceived as a competitor (Jamison 1971).

Organisations may calculate the difference between benefits and costs, and if the latter outweighs the former it is unlikely that co-ordination will occur (Davidson 1976). It has been revealed that the costs of co-ordination increase as organisations increase in differences. Differences that involve greater costs are: (1) different tasks and or resource asymmetry (Hooyman 1976); (2) different modes of operation and priorities (Black and Kase 1963; Alexander 1969); (3) different goals (Reid 1964; Charters and Pellegrin 1972); and (4) lack of functional interdependence of services (Wright 1979). Also co-ordination is unlikely when the other organisation is viewed as lacking exchange items (Lewis 1969; Wright 1979), or having inadequate resources such as money or personnel to exchange (Baker and O’Brien 1971; Grass and Umansky 1971). In short, parties will deem co-ordination too costly if their own organisations are weak in resources.
Several factors appear to be critical for successful collective endeavours (Table 4.1). These include an enabling environment, domain similarity, shared goals and complementary resources, geographical closeness, information sharing, frequency and quality of contact, high trust, and appropriateness of partners. The most important of these will now be explained in turn. The definition of partnerships suggests that participants must work within an agreed-upon set of norms and rules to develop mutual orientation. The study does not focus on collaboration as other studies in tourism field investigate the issue in depth.

**Table 4.1 Factors contributing to the success or failure of different forms of collective arrangements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forms of Relation</th>
<th>Success Factors</th>
<th>Failure Factors</th>
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<td><strong>Co-ordination</strong></td>
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<td>A Communication gap</td>
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<td>Domain similarity</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
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<td>An enabling environment</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Weak institutional culture</td>
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<td>High trust</td>
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<td>Information sharing</td>
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<td>Quality and frequency of contact</td>
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<td>Shared goals and complementary resources</td>
<td>Power disparity</td>
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<td>Power struggles</td>
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<td>Resource inadequacy</td>
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<td><strong>Co-operation</strong></td>
<td>Benefits outweigh costs</td>
<td>A centralised approach</td>
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<td>Common and complementary goals</td>
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<td>Communication</td>
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<td>Low trust</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Recognition of benefits of co-operation</td>
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<td>Resource scarcity</td>
<td>Traditional bureaucracy</td>
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<td><strong>Partnership</strong></td>
<td>A convenor with enough status and authority</td>
<td>Bureaucratic procedures</td>
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<td>Accessible and acceptable decentralised management</td>
<td>Discontinuity (withdrawal of key partners)</td>
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<td>Active dialogue and communication</td>
<td>Divergent goals</td>
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<td>A common vision and understanding</td>
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<td>Compatible interests and goals</td>
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<td>Confidence in implementability</td>
<td>Lack of initial understanding and agreement</td>
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<td>An enabling environment</td>
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<td>Establishment of legitimacy and trust</td>
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<td>Recognition of mutual benefits</td>
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<td>Right level of representatives</td>
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<td>System/staff continuity</td>
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4.6.1 An enabling external environment

Collective action is fostered when enabling laws and management systems empower the formation and continuance of partnership agreements (Selin 1998). An enabling environment involves the necessary legal, economic and political conditions for co-ordination (Robinson 2000). With sufficient power, organisations may choose to follow competitive strategies; but if the acquisition of power is hard, organisations are more likely to choose co-operative strategies, including contracting for services, and co-opting (Rogers and Whetten 1982). According to Aldrich (1979), organisations faced with external resource constraints are likely to make interorganisational arrangements when they can not get help from the government or support from a social or political elite.

4.6.2 Domain similarity

Another issue important for understanding what kinds of organisations are likely to engage in co-ordination is domain similarity, defined as the degree to which the organisations have the same services, clients, and personnel skills (Van de Ven and Walker 1984). Three factors are crucial (Hall et al. 1977). First, the parties need to be sure that their organisations are equal in status. Second, they have to perceive that they are equal in social status. Finally, they have to reach a consensus on the exclusive right of each organisation to its specific domain.

However, the evidence is conflicting on whether domain similarity helps or hinders the establishment of interorganisational co-ordination (Van de Ven and Walker 1984). At the low extreme of domain similarity, organisations have little in common and are not likely to initiate communication with one another. When organisations have moderately similar domains, they are likely to have complementary resources, which tends to motivate them to communicate more frequently in order to negotiate arrangements that are mutually beneficial. Furthermore, organisations with moderately similar professional skills, clients and services represent a common culture of shared meanings, which facilitates communication. But, as the domain similarity increases, the potential for territorial disputes and competition increases (Van de Ven and Walker 1984). If organisations have highly similar domains, they are also likely to need the same kinds of resources, which reduces the potential benefits of making exchanges. Thus, having highly
similar domains may hinder the potential for effective co-ordination to emerge between organisations.

4.6.3 Shared goals and complementary resources

Three conditions must be present before co-ordination of any substance can occur (Reid 1964). Agencies must have shared goals, complementary resources, and also efficient mechanisms for controlling whatever exchanges are involved. When agencies are seeking similar or identical goals, a major force for co-ordination is brought into play. Each agency has a stake in the goal attainment of the other, and both therefore may become willing to enter into exchanges to further mutual objectives. Moreover, sharing of goals leads to logical divisions of responsibility and labour, which can reduce the burden of each. With co-operative goals, people realise that they can be more successful together and it is in their own self-interest to assist each other (Tjosvold 1986). As one person moves towards accomplishing their goals others move towards reaching theirs. Consequently they will help each other and manage conflicts.

However, people with competitive goals develop very different dynamics. They believe that their goals are negatively related, so that as they move toward goal attainment then the others will find it more difficult to achieve their goals. They are in a win-lose situation in which their success is incompatible. They fail to assist each other and either avoid or escalate their conflicts. People with independent goals believe that they can attain their objectives whether others do or do not achieve their goals: their success is unrelated. As a result, they minimise their interaction (Tjosvold 1988). In a study of public health organisations in Western Canada, Tjosvold (1988) found that goal interdependence affected co-operation both within and between groups. Employees who stated that their goals were co-operative had trusting expectations, exchanged information and resources, worked efficiently and productively, and developed confidence for further collaboration. However, interactions with competitive goals were characterised by suspicion, little exchange, and low productivity and morale. Tjosvold identifies that productive co-operation was prevented by failure to give assistance, avoiding discussing problems, and solving problems from just one perspective. By contrast, co-operation was encouraged by exchanging resources, giving assistance, and discussing problems and conflicts.
constructively. However, while the sharing of goals may be a necessary condition for interagency exchanges, it is not in itself a sufficient condition. In addition, for exchange to occur, each agency must be able to provide the other with the resources it needs to achieve its goals. In other words there must be complementary resources.

4.6.4 Geographical closeness

Effective co-ordination requires direct relations between organisations and individuals operating in close proximity, usually ones involving face-to-face contact (Robinson 2000). This is largely because this proximity enables informal interactions between key decision-makers and communication between staff of the organisations. Such interaction facilitates recognition of: (1) similarities in orientation, (2) similarities in staff training, (3) possible matches between goals and resources, and (4) a dependence on each other for scarce resources.

4.6.5 Information sharing

Information sharing is another important issue in co-ordination. Without the sharing of information, there will continue to be ambiguity in the aspects of the organisational agendas and approaches that can be used as the starting point for co-ordination. In the context of tourism development, for instance, tourism agencies responsible for authorising tourism investment and incentives are not generally accessible to the majority of people in local tourist destinations due to their physical remoteness (Tosun and Jenkins 1996). This lack of communication not only increases the knowledge gap between local communities and decision-makers but also accelerates the isolation of the local community from the tourism development process. Consequently, knowledge gaps between centralised authorities and local communities make it difficult for host communities to participate in joint arrangements in relations to the tourism development process (Tosun and Jenkins 1996).

Information sharing is critical because, although some groups may have more access to information than others, shared agreements are unlikely to emerge unless there is provision for sharing information and for agreeing on its value (Gray 1989). "The inequality of information is particularly relevant to disputes involving complex or scientific facts......disputes are often characterised by one side controlling the
The exchange of intangible resources, such as communication and information, can improve organisational performance (Njoh 1993). There are several cases around the world which show that the lack of interagency communication in the development policy field can lead to undue costs and frustrations. In Jamaica, for instance, the lack of communication between two major development organisations (Department of Housing and Ministry of Agriculture) resulted in the former scheduling the construction of a housing project on a parcel of land which the latter had designated for irrigation purposes (Njoh 1993). In Thailand, a similar lack of communication amongst the country's six semi-autonomous electric power agencies resulted not only in high costs to clients, but imperfect co-ordination and lack of uniformity with respect to standards, equipment and technical practices in the country. The list of such cases is infinite. Njoh (1993) suggests that interagency interaction can be encouraged by (1) locating complementary agencies within close proximity of each other; (2) ensuring that the representatives involved from the agencies are of equal professional ranking; and (3) ensuring that agencies operating in common policy fields are familiar with each other's activities and programmes.

4.6.6 Frequency and quality of contact

The performance of organisations in any given setting can be severely hampered when the agencies know nothing about one another (Njoh 1993). Such ignorance may lead to the unnecessary duplication of functions as well as compound the problem of organisational uncertainty. It is therefore reasonable to expect that agencies that interact are in a better position to know one another, and hence to respond better to the needs of their clients and adapt to the larger environment within which they operate (Njoh 1993). This holds true even when such contacts mean that agencies are doing no more than simply talking to one another. This is because by talking to one
another, agencies are likely to exchange vital information about their activities, thereby ensuring that these activities are tailored to avoid conflicts and/or unnecessary duplication of effort.

4.6.7 High trust

Another important component is the establishment of legitimacy and trust (Syrett 1997). Trust is essential for co-operative behaviour within emerging networks of governance (Rhodes 1999). “Rebuilding trust between central and local government is seen as vital in establishing a new and productive working relationship, replacing the suspicion -even downright hostility, which characterise the transactions between central and local governments” (Logsdon 1991: 116). Trust, it is argued, constitutes the key organisational glue within networked organisations. Trust lubricates economic exchange and organisational transactions of all sorts; it reduces the costs of communication and relationship building, and facilitates risk taking and innovation. The business case for fostering relationships of trust bolsters the moral argument.

As Hirschman (1958) points out, trust is a unique and peculiar source: it is increased rather than depleted by use. Trust refers both to the specific expectation that another’s action will be beneficial rather than detrimental to one’s own interest; and the generalised ability to take for granted, or to take on trust, a vast array of features of the social order. Trust in relation to central-local relations might thus refer to expectations that central and local government have regarding the effects (and motivations) of each other’s actions, and to the degree of acceptance by both parties of the underlying rules of the game. The greater the level of trust, the less the need for negotiation over matters or detail (and a reduction in friction or transaction costs) and the greater the opportunity for long-term planning, risk-taking and innovation.

The downside of trust is what makes individuals or organisations vulnerable, it involves constantly having to think about whether or not the other parties will do something beneficial or detrimental (Logsdon 1991). Individuals or organisations are open to exploitation, to being taken advantage of. Decisions about whether to trust other parties involves trade-offs between autonomy, certainty and control on the one hand, and potential gains of efficiency and innovation on the other. In central-local
relations it is not too strong to say that the two parties are often used to expecting the worst of each other in terms of both motivations and tactics. And for the "cat and mouse" to learn to trust each other is a huge challenge. To keep on trusting each other may be even harder (as circumstances and priorities change), and yet a long-term perspective is vital to building trust (Logsdon 1991).

4.6.8 Representation

Consideration must be given to the level from which partner representatives are drawn. One key to successful collective arrangements is having individuals present in the forum that can make on-the-spot decisions. This is critical since the lack of a structured hierarchy makes it imperative that participants are able to commit their organisations to action without the delays of having to seek permission (Waddock 1989). Gaining management commitment is important to the coalition-building process, if the activities of the partnership are to go beyond a single organisation's domain. During coalition building, the partners must bring together organisations whose domains overlap around the problem, as well as the right level of representatives from those organisations, and this helps them to ensure organisational commitment to the partnership. It also helps them to act on the spot, and also to educate the representatives about the issues at hand and the norms, values, and behaviours of the other partner organisations (Waddock 1989).

4.7 Conditions inhibiting co-ordination

A number of pitfalls may exist to the building of co-ordinating relationships (Feyerherms 1994). These include: (a) a lack of clear hierarchy and limited organisational structures; (b) organisations being brought together which have different backgrounds and may have complex previous relationships which have involved conflict or lack of understanding; and (c) relationships starting without an initial common goal. In this respect, co-operating leaders can play a role both in elucidating the interests and positions of all the parties, and in helping to create new meanings. According to Thompson and McEwen (1969), any role or programme ambiguity needs to be alleviated prior to co-ordination. Additionally, lines of authority need to be clear between organisations, as well as within them. Finally, a mutual need or purpose, and common or complementary goals, tend to reinforce co-ordination between organisations (Schermherhorn 1975). Other forms of obstacles may
include political instability, negative evaluations and stereotyping, past adversaries and conflicts, power disparities, power struggles, authority fragmentation, gaps in communication, and physical distance and red tape. These issues are detailed next.

4.7.1 Political instability

Political instability may constitute a formidable obstacle to forming and sustaining joint arrangements between public and private sector businesses or among government agencies at different levels. For instance, since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, 56 governments have been in power (Tosun 2000). The average span of duty of each government is 1.3 years. Similarly, from its foundation in 1963, 30 ministers served in the Ministry of Tourism until 1996, with an average span of duty of 1.1 years (Tosun 2001). This is too short to achieve anything at national level in general and at local level in particular. Moreover, ministers and even chief civil servants have the custom of replacing the personnel in their department when they are appointed to a new post. As expected, high personnel turnover rates decrease efficiency and continuity, and thus the effectiveness of joint arrangements for tourism development. Brotherton et al (1994 in Tosun 2000) observe that changes in government often gave rise to a political hiatus and re-ordering of priorities and changes in personnel. These unstable policies cause uncertainty, which can lead to the emergence of a laissez-faire approach to tourism development. Bramwell and Sharmann (1999) also view discontinuity as one impediment constraining the outcomes of collective initiatives.

4.7.2 Negative images

As organisations interact over a period of time, particular images of each other take form and are institutionalised. These images become difficult to change. For instance, if one organisation interprets the other as a threat, whether it be well founded or unfounded, future attempts at co-ordination will generally fail (White 1968; Caroff 1977; Schmidt and Kochan 1977). Finlay argues that when decision-making by parties to a conflict adheres to rigid images of each other, then there is little likelihood that even genuine attempts to resolve the issue will have the desired effect.

Strongly held stereotypes may exist that inhibit productive interactions in collective arrangements. For example, private sector members may perceive public
sector members to be lazy and unproductive, whereas public sector participants may perceive their private sector counterparts to be greedy and irresponsible (Waddock 1989). An effort aimed at breaking down stereotypes or lack of trust among participants is often needed.

Organisation leaders may perceive that co-ordination threatens a loss or fragmentation of their authority, and also that it may even lead to a total loss of identity or of programme identity (Levine et al. 1963). Similarly, organisational leaders may fear that co-ordination could give rise to a loss of organisational prestige or a loss of strategic position (Schermerhorn 1975). This is notably true when they perceive the other agency to be: (1) lower in status and legitimacy, or (2) incompetent in dealing with clientele (Levine et al 1963).

4.7.3 Historical relations of conflict

According to McAvoy, Schatz, and Lime (1991), bitter historical relations are one key factor working against improved co-operation between public and private sector business groups. These groups might take opposite sides in conflicts over the management of resources. While some conditions engendering conflict may change, historical conflicts may still limit the potential for co-operation between groups. One possible explanation for the persistence of conflict between managers and private businesses is offered in the literature on community conflict. Coleman (1957) describes "a dynamic of controversy", which suggests that a single initial dispute can disrupt the equilibrium of community relations. Eventually such disputes can become generalised and independent of the initial issue. Coleman further suggests that a generalisation of conflict can impede communication between groups, which, in turn exacerbates and perpetuates conflict. The continuation of historical conflict is an impediment to communication, which in turn perpetuates the conflict. To promote co-operation among a group it is necessary to overcome, or at least circumvent, such persistent conflict. Several authors suggest that the first step in conflict resolution lies in opening channels of communication between groups (McAvoy, Schatz and Lime 1991, Francis 1987, and Coleman 1957).

4.7.4 Power struggles
Collective actions between organisations are fragile. The fragility is a direct result of the interorganisational context out of which the collective arrangement develops, the lack of hierarchical controls on actions by members, and the implicit power struggles that exist among organisations varying to have their own needs met. Power struggles may become more apparent if a key group is left out of the decision-making process. Should the linkages binding the partners break down or a power struggle emerge, the very existence of partnership is in peril. Depending on the nature of the partnership, the withdrawal of a partner, the resolution of a problem, or the diminishing of an environmental issue may mean an end to the collective arrangements.

4.7.5 Power disparity

Rogers et al (1982: 55) note that “agencies are particularly vulnerable to those organisations having more power in a hierarchical system such as government. Consequently, they are caught in a Catch-22 when commanded to co-ordinate. If they co-ordinate, it is very possible they may lose their autonomy and at the same time witness the creation of internal havoc to the structure and process of their organisation. If they don’t, they will not survive because of their dependence upon society for legitimacy. Agencies have been found to deal with this problem by interpreting the command to co-ordinate in such a manner that the parameters of the constraints are as broad as possible, enabling them to maintain a certain level of organisational autonomy with a minimum amount of internal disorganisation”.

Collective action is likely to be hindered when significant power differences exist among parties or when certain parties are not perceived as having a legitimate claim to participate in the consensus building (Selin and Chavez 1995). Power relations are likely to determine which people join collective arrangements and who has the most influence on decisions (Bramwell and Lane 2000). Fox (1982: 402 in Gray 1989) notes “the weaker party may view collaboration as an attractive alternative to the current situation, but the stronger one will see no value in negotiating away any of his or her strength. Thus powerful stakeholders who perceive little or no interdependence with other stakeholders will resist collaborative efforts that seek to balance the power differences among the stakeholders, unless they can be persuaded that their own interests will be jeopardised by not participating”. For
example, large tour operators may feel threatened by a potential loss of control over
decision-making, while small environmental groups and residents may feel that
collaboration will not empower them to be able to influence decision-making over the
tourism domain’s future (Jamal and Getz 1995).

Concerns about preserving an institutional power base pose a formidable
obstacle to collective arrangements. Parties will be understandably reluctant to co-
ordinate or co-operate if they are at a disadvantage in representing their interests or if
they believe their interests will be deemed secondary to more powerful ones (Gray
1989). “Those who represent minority or less powerful interests may see little value in
a negotiated solution to a dispute because they believe that the only possible outcome
will be an appeasement that could blunt attempts to raise more fundamental issues,
more pervasive problems, or new principles. For some parties in some instances, the
public awareness created by continued conflict may have greater value than the
benefits to be gained by resolving a particular dispute. Thus resolving that specific
dispute without achieving more sweeping change in precedent policy may be viewed
not as a success but as a failure” (Bingham 1986 in Gray 1989: 250). Nevertheless,
“interactions during problem setting have the potential to shake up entrenched power
dynamics and to restructure existing power relationships with respect to the domain in
question” (Gray 1989: 126).

4.7.6 Fragmentation of authority

The word turf protection is generally referred to in the literature as a catchall
phrase to capture the barriers to interorganisational co-operation or co-ordination.
The fragmentation of the environment in terms of the relationship between
governmental structures on the federal, state, and local levels is viewed as another
barrier in the way of co-ordination (Glass 1976). Not only does fragmentation exist
between levels, but it also exists within levels. Separate missions, competing legal
mandates, distinct constituencies, and competition for resources are obstacles to
effective co-ordination of the activities of diverse organisations. Overlapping political
and geographic domain designations exist between and within governmental levels.
Duplication of administration, services, and funding sources, and an inequitable
distribution of funding generate further problems (Gardner and Snipe 1970; Schmidt
and Madoff 1977). The potential difficulties for mandated agencies can be further
exacerbated by ambiguity in the roles of federal and state government agencies in relation to their mission and accountability (Colt 1970; Widner 1973). Mandated agencies can be confronted with inadequate information, diffuse and contradictory missions and roles, a lack of clear programme legitimacy and, quite frequently, programme uncertainty (Glass 1976; Tropman and Dluhy 1976).

4.7.7 Communication gaps

If organisations have communicated very little, it is likely that there will be few grounds on which to build any type of co-ordination (Torrens 1969; Gardner and Snipe 1970; Hooyman 1976). Therefore, qualitative and quantitative levels of communication are salient factors in co-ordination. Increased bureaucratisation also works against communication. It results in increased communication costs with other organisations, and the fragmentation and possible breakdown of communication (Shermorhorn 1975).

4.7.8 Physical distance

In addition to communication problems, physical distance may be another significant factor in hindering co-ordination. Decision-makers in highly centralised organisations generally are located far from the area to be co-ordinated (White and Vlasak 1971; Akinbode and Clark 1976). Consequently, any attempt at collaboration may involve poor local administrative support and large quantities of red tape (Levy 1969), role ambiguity (Baker and O'Brien 1971; Ahmed and Young 1974), fragmentation of authority (Vladeck 1977), and authority ambiguity and conflict (Levine et al. 1963; Alexander 1969; Gardner and Snipe 1970).

4.8 Collective arrangement practices in tourism

Cross-sectoral co-operation, co-operation between administrative levels, and co-operation between autonomous polities are strongly advocated in the tourism planning literature. However, in practice such co-operation occurs only occasionally (Timothy 1998: 64). Several tourism case studies reveal that the tourism project did not benefit from full co-ordination or co-operation between local and tourism planners, sometimes because of a traditional powerful bureaucracy, and dominating legislative and operational processes (Tosun 2000). Any approach, particularly in developing
countries, which conflicts with a traditional bureaucracy is perhaps unlikely to be acceptable. There is also often bureaucratic jealousy among official authorities. And, further, "Third world politicians can... be very opportunist, offering sops where political pressure is the greatest. Such serving incrementally can be very damaging to co-ordinated policy making" (Jones 1980: 204).

In a study of tourism policies in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, Timothy (1998) identified several issues that worked against co-operation. The traditional and political hierarchy in the country was found to be a major factor producing sectoral and political boundary-restricted planning practices. Political and social power in the country rested in the hands of central government or a few key socio-political figures. According to tradition in the country: “power generates its own authority in that those who attain positions of dominance are assumed to have deserved it because of their skill and moral virtue. Therefore it is believed that the centre of power, whether at the national, provincial or village level, will make decisions that are for the good of everyone, including lower levels of government. Local tourism planning authorities were found to be simply unaware of the need for and do not understand the possible benefits of co-operative tourism planning" (Timothy 1998). Local leaders were also sometimes unaware of their jurisdictional rights, such as that they are permitted to establish cross-border ties with other jurisdictions (Timothy 1998).

Tourism development can bring powerful and organised business interests into relatively powerless, unorganised indigenous communities (Tosun 2000). In time, business people can become dominant power holders and who often serve their self-interest at the expense of less well-off indigenous people. In a study of collaborative tourism planning in the Hope Valley, Bramwell and Sharmann (1999) argue that unequal power relations remained among the stakeholders, with the distribution of power weighed towards the authorities rather than the residents. Reed (1997: 589) suggests that stakeholders in tourism planning “who traditionally hold power may resist its redistribution thereby hindering attempts for collaboration”.

Reid notes obstacles that tend to reduce the effectiveness of tourism partnerships, including turf protection, lack of awareness, bureaucratic procedures, and limitations of staff and funds (Reid 1988). Selin and Beason (1991) in a study of
collaboration between the Forest Service and local tourism service providers in the USA found that domain consensus, a sense of interdependence, goal similarity, and goal knowledge were significant predictors of the level of co-operation. Selin and Chavez (1994) categorise the characteristics of successful partnerships into four groups: personal factors, interpersonal factors, organisational factors and operational factors. Based on their empirical study they suggest that to foster successful partnerships there should be flexible personnel and financial accounting systems, staff continuity over the life of a partnership, and partnership incentive programmes for the partners. The participants in their study frequently attributed the success of a partnership to the unique mix of personalities represented in the group. The combination of having the right people involved in the project and strong leadership were among the most frequently raised qualities for successful partnership programmes. Other qualities identified by the respondents for successful partnership included a strong community spirit, active listening, honesty and directness, a shared vision, and the ability within the group to adjust to each other and to reach consensus on difficult decisions. Another frequently mentioned encouragement to success was having support from senior level management. Interestingly, meeting environments were also identified as an influential factor for the success of partnership programmes (Selin and Chavez 1994).

Selin and Myers (1991; 1995; 1998) and Jamal and Getz (1995) identify improved communication, strong leadership, trust, and personal investment as positive contributions to partnerships. Constraining factors identified in the literature include turf protection, restrictive accounting procedures, lack of formal agreements, and a loss of momentum when tasks are delegated to people not on the steering committee (Selin and Myers 1995). In a study of one regional alliance, Selin and Myers (1991) report that individual and organisational leadership, personal benefits, administrative support and level of trust were strong correlates of partnership effectiveness. Their findings corroborated findings from several other studies. Selin and Myers (1998), however, state that effective collaborative planning efforts require more than strong leaders and administrative support. Success depends on a number of other interpersonal factors such as adequate representation of interests, a shared vision, goal accomplishment, and good working relationships and open communication. The participants considered organisational characteristics such as
hidden agendas and special interests and divergent goals as constraints. Selin and Myers (1998) suggest that managers should recognise that effective coalition building (Waddock 1989) requires a great deal of attention and effort on the part of all members. Coalition leaders must pay close attention to how other members perceive the coalition and its purpose and also work to create an atmosphere for open communication. All members need to feel that their inputs are important and to be provided with opportunities to utilise their influence and talents (Selin and Myers 1998).

4.9 Summary

The discussion has shown that there are different definitions of co-ordination, each having something to offer but none being entirely satisfactory on their own. Examining the elements emphasised in these definitions, it is appropriate to state that in co-ordination (1) decision rules can be established by a third party or they can be created by the participants. Other features frequently emphasised in definitions are (2) the composition of the shared task environment and its importance, (3) the role of the collectivity and the attainment of its distinctive goals; and (4) the deliberate degree of adjustment within the joint decisions. Another important principle is that co-ordination cannot occur without some level of internal adjustment to the structure of the organisation. Thus, co-ordination can be viewed as the process whereby two or more organisations create and/or use existing decision-rules that have been established to deal collectively with their shared task environment.

Co-ordination between two or more individuals or organisations may take different forms, ranging from voluntary co-ordination to mandated co-ordination. Different forms of co-ordination require differing structural arrangements and have differing conditions enhancing co-ordination. For instance, in voluntary settings there is increased potential for co-ordination when there are positive assessments of the competence and performance of the other parties, compatible operating philosophies, higher frequencies of contact, and when there are negotiations affecting power (Gray 1985). Regardless of the form, it must be recognised that co-ordination is a dynamic process in that participants may have common interests at the beginning of co-ordination arrangements, but these interests may change or be redefined as the co-ordination progresses (Wood and Gray 1991).
Co-ordination offers several advantages to individuals and organisations. The reasons why individuals or organisations engage in co-ordination include: to survive in turbulent business environments; to avoid duplication; to complement one’s efforts with others to develop synergy; to increase one’s knowledge and expertise through shared and collective learning; to penetrate into and or maintain new/existing customer bases; to cope with new demands of changing realities; and to avoid the danger of lapsing into chaos. However, despite the potential benefits, the practices of co-ordination are rare, particularly between public and private organisations and amongst government agencies at different administrative levels. Although administrative and policy reformers often urge co-ordination as the key to more effective delivery of public services, there is little beyond anecdotal evidence to suggest that most approaches to co-ordination actually improve public services in multi-organisational delivery systems (Jennings and Ewalt 1998). Accounts of bureaucratic behaviour suggest that it is quite difficult to get organisations to co-ordinate or co-operate with each other, much less to do so effectively. While joint arrangements between the public and private sectors may offer advantages to participating bodies, their development in tourism may give rise to formidable challenges. For example, the resource allocations, policy ideas, and institutional practices embedded within a society may often restrict the influence of particular partners on joint arrangements. The power of participants are often unequal, and it is suggested that power governs the interaction of individuals, organisations and agencies influencing, or trying to influence, the formulation of tourism policy and the manner in which it is implemented (Hall 1994: 52).

The notions of co-steering, co-production, co-ordination, collaboration, co-operative management, and public-private partnerships on national, regional and local levels have been embraced by many. However, such joint arrangements have produced mixed results in different countries due to several either facilitating or inhibiting conditions (Göy men 2000). The development and implementation of joint arrangements in developing countries are likely to meet several obstacles, such as those of traditional bureaucratic paternalism and of political instability (Tosun 2000; 2001). Any approach that conflicts with the traditional bureaucracy prevailing in
developing countries is unlikely to be acceptable to powerful bureaucrats (Tosun 2001). Joint arrangements are likely to confront several other difficulties in developing countries, often because democracy has not been fully institutionalised and a supportive democratic political culture is only in a formative stage (Göymen 2000). The relative absence of a pluralist and participative culture might constitute a formidable obstacle (Yüksel, Bramwell and Yüksel 1999). The political will to implement decisions is often lacking in developing countries because of the implications for the distribution of power and resources (Desai 1996). The common difficulties include a lack of clear hierarchy and limited organisational structures; organisations with different backgrounds and ideologies; an absence of common initial goals; negative images and stereotyping; unmanageable disparities in status; different priorities and goals; a lack of knowledge; low empowerment; lack of legal mandates, competition for resources; political instability; staff discontinuity; low trust and confidence; turf protection; communication gaps; lack of exchange; and resource asymmetry.

Despite the plethora of factors working against co-ordination, the literature reviewed here has suggested that co-ordination is not impossible. Effective voluntary co-ordination can be achieved through the creation of a more enabling environment; the assignment of clear roles and responsibilities commensurate with capabilities; a recognition of interdependencies and the identification of organisational contexts; the identification of common ground for discussion; and the promotion of person-to-person interaction. In addition, co-ordination is encouraged when there are shared goals, complementary resources, compatible backgrounds, equality in status, geographical closeness, information sharing, a common language, professionalism, strong leadership, and so on.

The dominant model of a centralised, rational and comprehensive planning process can be criticised as it tends to impede collective initiatives which involves joint working with several local and regional interest groups (Selin and Chavez 1995). Highly centralised public administration systems in many developing countries appear to hinder the emergence of more participatory, approaches inductive to tourism development (Tosun 2000; Syrett 1997). The next chapter turns to the notion of
decentralisation and it critically examines whether decentralisation might be a way forward for more effective and equitable tourism planning.
5. Decentralisation

5.1 Introduction

The concept of decentralised management has gained growing support from researchers, as it is thought to offset problems emanating from centralised tourism management. While tourism authorities are advised to switch to relatively decentralised forms of tourism administration, no research has attempted to ascertain whether this form of administration is viable and applicable given the prevailing constitutional and institutional contexts of centralist countries. At present, there is inadequate understanding of whether top-down (centralist) or bottom-up (decentralist) administrative forms are likely to be more or less effective in handling complex interactions between various organisations and parties, with different perceptions, preferences and strategies. Building on the administration literature, this chapter discusses the potential limitations of centralist tourism administration and it questions whether decentralisation represents a realistic alternative to the centralist model. The first part of the discussion reviews the concept of governance, a term interchangeably used with administration or management, and explicates the dimensions of effective governance. An analysis of centralist tourism administration and of its potential limitations follows this. The concept of decentralisation and its various forms are evaluated, and its potential benefits are presented. Obstacles in the way of decentralised tourism management are highlighted, and there is discussion of whether or not it can be put into practice. The evaluation of decentralisation concept will guide the investigation into the strengths and weaknesses of the prevailing tourism administrative forms affecting the Belek region, and into reactions of local and central level organisations to different administrative systems.

5.2 Administration

Previous tourism research has generally focused on tourism planning and development issues and on tourism impact assessments. Despite its central effect on the success of tourism planning activity and the profitability of the industry, limited attention has been paid to tourism administration systems, their efficiency and effectiveness, and their potential limitations and implications for tourism plan
formulation and implementation. Two administrative frameworks, the centralised and decentralised administrative structures, are often used in tourism management. In general, the centralised form supports the notion of a central steering agency having all the information, resources and solutions at its disposal, whereas the decentralised form involves the transference of power from central agencies to local government, and it takes the interests of local actors as the point of departure.

The success of tourism increasingly relies on the effectiveness and efficiency of the administrative framework. A framework which promotes participative decision-making, delineates clear balances between responsibility and authority, promotes cooperative relations and effectively co-ordinates the fragmented activities carried out by different public and private sector organisations undoubtedly enhances the chances of success. By contrast, a framework endorsing coercive decision-making, resulting in ambiguous balances between responsibility and autonomy, and inducing a distant bureaucracy and uneven power relations between public and private agencies can undermine the legitimacy of policy decisions and their implementation. Thus, successful tourism administration requires democratic and transparent participation in decision-making, and it promotes a greater accountability of institutions to the people they are instituted to serve, it increases the availability of information, and it optimises the use of resources by clarifying responsibilities, authority and standards.

5.3 Centralised forms of tourism administration (CTA)

Centralisation means that the authority, responsibility and ability to perform the basic functions of the state are concentrated in central governing organisations (Ocampo 1991: 193). These elements can be concentrated in the central government of a country so that it can command and control the behaviour of more localised organisations, and notably local government. It can do this by setting limits on or dictating their goals, by directing or otherwise guiding their decisions and actions, by substituting their judgement with their own through prior or post-hoc approval or by their own direct action, by monitoring and evaluating their performance, by instituting corrective measures, and by imposing sanctions for local deviations from central guidelines (Ocampo 1991). Centralisation may be justified as necessary to define a comprehensive and coherent framework of goals and norms for the government and nation as a whole.
and to ensure there is consistency and compatibility of local activities within that framework. It may be needed not only to co-ordinate local decisions and actions, but also to aggregate and distribute resources and capacities and to focus them according to national standards and priorities that transcend those of local units. Foreign relations, environmental standards, human rights and social justice are often considered beyond the competence of local units to undertake without central guidance and assistance (Ocampo 1991: 194).

The centralised tourism administrative model (CTA) assumes that a central steering agency has at its disposal the necessary information about existing public problems and preferences and about the available resources and solutions (Kickert et al 1997). The CTA is generally adopted by developing countries where there is no system to allow decisions to be taken by the people most immediately affected and in such countries tourism is usually considered to be an industry of national concern which should be centrally planned and controlled (Wahab 1997).

However, this form of tourism management has certain limitations. When goals, targets and priorities are promulgated by the central government in a top-down fashion, there is usually little opportunity for local contributions to their formulation. Central government tends to put a premium on a strict instead of a liberal interpretation of local powers, to require prior clearance of local decisions, to closely supervise local performance, and to penalise departures from norms. In order to ensure goal-achievement, central government may even pre-empt implementation, such as by directly taking on policy making and planning roles and by allocating the resources necessary to perform them. There is very limited local autonomy under a centralist regime. Central control tends to stifle any initiative, discretion, or self-reliance that local units may want to exercise. Local units may not be self-aware to begin with, their identity having been suppressed by the primacy of central government. Most of the powers and resources as well as responsibilities may be concentrated at the centre and top. While there may be local government and local representatives of national agencies, they may be under-endowed in many respects and look to central government for resources and support. However, these conditions are argued to work against the whole system. For example, it is argued that centralism is likely to overload central
government with unessential tasks, hierarchical overgrowth, and unnecessary resources. Staff and line units are likely to proliferate near the top. The ability of central authorities to make sound decisions and to command and control local actions will be impaired because of the sheer volume and complexity of functions that they have to perform or direct. The information that local units get might be fragmented and distorted by crowded and convoluted communication channels, their decisions delayed or derailed by confused lines of command, and implementing actions may lag far behind and become incongruent with changing environmental conditions.

There are numerous cases where tourism plans formulated at the top and implemented by people at the bottom have not achieved the desired outcomes. One reason for this consequence is that the formulation and application of plans by central government might be out of touch with the needs of local people and is not based on detailed knowledge of the local environment (Baud Bovy 1982). CTA results in local tourism development decisions being taken by central rather than by local authorities, and decisions are inevitably made at a distance from the location of local administrative units. The existence of this physical distance can impact on the willingness of local stakeholders to participate in decision-making process. Barry (1965: 56 cited in Stoker 1996) points out that "if bureaucracies are too large or too distant from the people affected by decisions then people become alienated". When individuals do not have access to decision-making, this brings about a substantive breakdown in the flow of communication. This alienation from participation, whether as a result of distance or bureaucracy, may impair the legitimacy of the resulting policy decisions (Almond and Powell 1966; Barry 1965). Building on a study conducted in Turkey, Tosun and Jenkins (1996) point out that “the Ministry of Tourism and bodies responsible for the authorisation of tourism investment and incentives are accessible to a rich and educated elite and not to the majority of indigenous people in tourist regions. In this sense, there is a big communication gap between communities and decision-makers. In short centralisation has intensified formidable bureaucracies. Even the physical distance from Ankara is a barrier for people who may not be able to afford to go to the capital city” (p. 527).
CTA seems likely to reduce the legitimacy of decisions. It can also hinder plan or policy implementation in local areas distant from the centre. Tourism plans developed by a mono-actor form of centralised administration generally overlook the knowledge, skills and goals of local public and private sector tourism organisations, in their design phase. Subsequently, there may be resistance from the implementing bodies, such as from local government. The centralist model appears to neglect the values and interests of implementing bodies, fails to utilise the resources and capacities of local actors, and promotes the bureaucratisation of the public sector, which therefore diminishes management effectiveness and efficiency (Kickert et al 1997). The main characteristics of the CTA, such as coercive decision-making, ambiguous balances between responsibility and authority, a distant bureaucracy, limited local participation, and uneven power relations can clearly thwart the effectiveness of tourism administration.

5.4 Decentralised tourism administration (DTA)

An alternative form of administration, decentralisation, has been suggested in order to overcome the potential problems that may ensue from CTA. Decentralised tourism administration (DTA) involves a transfer of authority to perform some public service from an individual or an agency in central government to some other individual or agency which is closer to the public to be served (Turner and Hulme 1997). Smith (1985: 1) describes this concept as “the delegation of power to lower levels in territorial hierarchy, whether the hierarchy is one of governments within a state or offices within a large-scale organisation. Thus decentralisation refers to territorially-based delegation not to purely functionally based delegation”(in Turner and Hulme, 1997).

Alderfer (1967: 53) defines decentralisation as “the transfer of powers to locally elected authorities where policies are both made and carried out on the local level”. Somewhat differently, Rondinelli (1981: 133) views decentralisation as “the transfer of planning, decision making or management functions from the central government and its agencies to field organisations, subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous public corporations, area-wide or regional development organisations, specialised functional authorities or non government organisations. Decentralisation contributes to such norms by taking local opinions as well as information into better account, giving more authority and freedom as well as “voice” to local institutions and communities, and
extending to their members the opportunities to participate in or “exit” from governance, development, and their benefits” (Hirschman 1958).

Although slightly different definitions of the concept exist in the literature, these definitions share a similar key notion that decentralisation involves power transference from upper governmental levels to lower levels or functionally designed bodies. It is important to note that decentralisation does not imply that all authority should be delegated. The central government may retain a core of functions over essential national matters and ultimately has the authority to redesign the system of government and to discipline or suspend decentralisation units that are not performing effectively. However, “how extensive this core of central government functions remains a major ideological and intellectual debate of the late twentieth century” (Turner and Hulme 1997: 154).

According to some, DTA needs to be adopted in order to “emphasise an equitable distribution of the benefits of development which have required programmes that need the support and involvement of local level administrators and the citizens. It has been necessary to develop the administrative capacity of local organisations to provide services in the remote areas as well as to improve the effectiveness of central government” (Rondinelli 1978: 45 in Huque 1986). The reasons for decentralised administration are varied. The process may be resorted to in order to overcome difficulties and constraints that are faced in centralised planning. Administrators may prefer decentralisation to emphasise an equitable distribution of benefits of development which have required programmes that need the support and involvement of local level administrators and citizens. Decentralisation may help to accelerate the pace and spread the benefits of growth, integrate diverse regions in internally heterogeneous countries, and use scarce resources more efficiently to promote development in economically lagging or relatively poor areas (Rondinelli 1981).

5.4.1 Potential benefits of DTA

Decentralisation affects the way state and society interacts, and it has potential to enhance the legitimacy, perceived fairness and accountability of local government in the eyes of the public (Crook and Manor 1994). According to Turner and Hulme (1997),
decentralisation, "when implemented properly", could offer greater efficiency and effectiveness in a number of different areas. Through decentralisation, plans can be tailor-made for local areas using detailed and up-to-date information that is only available locally, and interorganisational co-ordination can be achieved at the local level. Experimentation and innovation can be fostered by decentralisation, and this can increase the chances of generating more effective development strategies. Decentralisation may also help enhance the motivation of field level personnel, as they have greater responsibility for the programmes they manage. Workload reduction of agencies at the centre of government will relieve them from routine decision-making and give them more time to consider strategic issues so that the quality of policy should improve.

Rondinelli (1979; 1981), Rondinelli and Nellis (1986), Rondinelli et al (1989) identify a number of potential advantages arising from transferring more responsibilities for development planning and management from central government to lower administrative levels. Some of the potential benefits of decentralisation are presented in Table 5.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.1</th>
<th>Potential benefits of decentralisation</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Decentralisation is a means of overcoming the severe limitations of centrally controlled planning by delegating greater authority for development planning and management to officials who are working in the field, closer to the problems.</td>
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<td>- Decentralisation to local levels allows officials to tailor development plans and programmes to the needs of different areas and people within a country.</td>
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<td>- Decentralisation is useful in cutting through red tape and highly structured procedures, common characteristics of central planning in developing nations, and which can result from an over-concentration of power, authority and resources at the centre.</td>
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<td>- Central officials can be reassigned to local levels, thus increasing their knowledge of and sensitivity to local level problems and needs.</td>
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<td>- Decentralisation offers closer contact between government officials and the local population, thus allowing them to obtain better information with which to formulate more realistic and effective plans for government programmes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Decentralisation can pave the way for greater political and administrative penetration of national government polices into areas remote from the national capital, where central government plans are often unknown or ignored by the populace or hampered by local elites.</td>
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Decentralisation might allow greater representation for various political and other groups in development decision-making, and this could lead to greater equity in the allocation of government resources and investments.

It might lead to an enhanced administrative capability of local government and private sector institutions in the regions or provinces. It may help to expand their capacities to take over functions that are not usually performed well by central ministries, such as the maintenance of roads and infrastructure investments in areas remote from the national capital.

The efficiency of central government could be increased by decentralisation. The time released from routine administration can free political and administrative leaders to plan more carefully and supervise more effectively the implementation of development policies.

Decentralisation may provide a structure through which the activities of various central government agencies involved in development can be co-ordinated more effectively both with each other and with local leaders and non-governmental organisations.

A decentralised government structure can facilitate the exchange of information about local needs and channel political demands from the local community to national ministries.

By proving alternative means of decision-making, decentralisation can offset the influence or control over development activities by entrenched local elites who are often unsympathetic to national development policies and insensitive to the needs of the poorer groups in rural communities.

Decentralisation can lead to more flexible, innovative and creative administration. Local government can have greater potential to experiment with new policies in selected areas. If experiments fail, their impacts will only be on small jurisdictions.

Decentralisation can allow local leaders to deliver services more effectively within communities, to integrate isolated or lagging areas into regional economies, and to monitor and evaluate the implementation of development projects more effectively than central government.

Decentralisation can increase political stability and national unity by giving groups in different parts of the country the ability to participate more directly in development decision-making, thereby increasing their stake in maintaining the political system.

It is important to note that the assertions underlying the potential advantages shown in Table 5.1 have not all been empirically verified. Rondinelli (1981) admits that in reality, the results of decentralisation policies in many developing countries are often disappointing. Huque (1986: 91-92), for instance, insists strongly that “judging from the existing conditions, it might be wise to abandon efforts directed at complete decentralisation in Bangladesh and concentrate on limited decentralisation”. However, there are also cases where some of the potential benefits of decentralisation listed in Table 5 have been observed. Crook and Manor (1994) argue that some countries, such as
India, have benefited from the practice of decentralisation. They suggest that in India decentralisation has resulted in a clear division of responsibilities between central and local government. Through India’s decentralisation policies, community needs have been taken into account better and benefits have sometimes been channelled more effectively to vulnerable groups. Other achievements have included an improved effectiveness in project delivery, a better mobilisation of local resources, and improved horizontal co-ordination. In addition, political awareness has been created among local residents, and better information gathering networks have been established in local constituencies. Similarly, they argue that through decentralisation, the completion rate of local projects has increased and the distribution of resources in localities has sometimes become fairer. Decentralisation has also prompted improvements in the institutional response to the problems identified.

5.4.2 Forms of decentralisation

Decentralisation can take a number of forms. It must be noted that each form of decentralisation has different implications for institutional arrangements, the degree of transfer of authority and power, local participation, preconditions for successful implementation, and advantages for the political system (Rondinelli 1981). Depending on how authority is transferred, the forms of decentralisation could be classified into two types, these being *territorial* and *functional* decentralisation (Turner and Hulme 1997).

*Territorial* decentralisation means that authority is placed at a lower level in a territorial hierarchy, and hence it is geographically closer to service providers and clients. It aims to transfer responsibility for public functions to organisations within well-defined sub-national spatial or political boundaries, such as a province, district, or municipality (Rondinelli 1981). The transfer is usually to an institution that may legally perform those functions only within a specified geographical or political boundary (Rondinelli 1981). *Functional decentralisation* implies that authority is transferred to an agency that is functionally specialised. It focuses on the transfer of authority to perform specific tasks or activities to specialised organisations that operate nationally or at least across local jurisdictions (Rondinelli 1981). Functional decentralisation is further divided into three different forms. First, functional decentralisation may involve delegation within formal political structures, such as when central government delegates additional authority to local government. Second, functional decentralisation can take the form of power
transfer within public administrative or parastatal structures, such as from the headquarters of a ministry to its district offices. Finally, functional decentralisation may occur when the transfer of power is from an institution of the state to a non-state agency, such as when a parastatal national airline is sold to private shareholders.

Based on its degree, the decentralisation concept can be divided into three other forms: deconcentration, delegation and devolution (Rondinelli 1981; Rondinelli and Nellis 1986; Rondinelli et al 1989; Crook and Manor 1994). The least extensive form of decentralisation is deconcentration (Rondinelli 1981). Deconcentration is the transfer of functions within the central government hierarchy through the shifting of workload from central ministries to field officers, the creation of field agencies, or the shifting of responsibility to local administrative units of central government. Deconcentration tends to extend the scope or reach of central government and to strengthen its authority by moving executive agencies controlled by the centre down to lower territorial levels in the political system. This type of decentralisation includes delegating responsibilities for functions within specific territories to field level civil servants. “Deconcentration can pursue the objective of technical efficiency leading to greater effectiveness but not popular participation” (Turner and Hulme, 1997: 161-162). Deconcentration may merely involve the shifting of workload from central government ministry headquarters to staff located in offices outside of the national capital. The staff may not be given the authority to decide how those functions are to be performed (Rondinelli 1981). This form of decentralisation may not be regarded as real decentralisation, as it only removes workload out of the national capital; nonetheless for developing nations with an entrenched centralist system, it may constitute a first and crucial step toward decentralisation. It is therefore the most frequently used form of decentralisation in developing countries (Rondinelli and Nellis 1986). It is interesting to note that the recent work of Destan (1998) and Kocdemir (1998) exemplify such form of decentralisation in Turkish context. They argue that the administrative structure of Turkey is characterised by a strong central government whose territorial administration is governed by the system of provinces which functions according to the principle of deconcentration.

Delegation represents a more extensive form of decentralisation than administrative deconcentration. Delegation of decision-making and management
authority for specific functions to organisations that are only under indirect control of central government ministries is another form of decentralisation (Rondinelli 1981). Delegation implies the transfer of powers to, or creation of a separate authority to plan and implement decisions concerning specific activities. The organisations to which public functions are delegated have semi-independent authority to perform their responsibilities, and they may not even be located within a regular government structure (Rondinelli 1981). Delegation includes the transfer of functions to regional or functional development authorities, parastatal organisations, or special project implementation units.

Devolution is the most extreme form of decentralisation and it involves transfer of functions or decision-making authority to legally incorporated local government. It is the creation of, or the strengthening of (financially and legally) sub-national units of government, whose activities are substantially outside the direct control of central government (Rondinelli and Nellis 1986). The devolution type of decentralisation involves “transferring powers to special bodies endowed with their own legal personalities, and separate from the state, its central ministries, and local authorities” (Alderfer 1967: 53). Devolution has the opposite effect of deconcentration since it cedes legal control of agencies and resources to political actors and institutions at a lower level (Crook and Manor, 1994). With devolution, power is relocated by central government to sub-national government units, and it embodies enhanced local democracy and local technical capability. Local and provincial government and state government are typical sub-national units. In terms of their responsibilities, they may have a number of significant functions or just a few minor functions. Certain characteristics of devolution include: local government is given autonomy and independence; it is perceived as a separate level over which the central authorities exercise little or no direct control; it must have clear and legally recognised geographical boundaries over which it exercises authority and within which it performs public functions; it must be given corporate status and the power to raise sufficient funds and resources to perform specific functions; it must be perceived by local citizens as providing services that satisfy their needs and as a level of government over which they have some influence; and there must be mutual benefits and co-ordination between central and local government (Rondinelli 1981). Riggs (1964: 342) views devolution as an “alternative mode of
decentralisation in which full responsibility for policy determination in regard to specified subjects is transferred to the recipient of authority” (in Huque, 1986). Many newly independent countries adopted this classical model of devolved local government in the 1950s and 1960s (Maddick, 1963).

Another form of decentralisation is a transfer to non-government institutions, which involves shifting responsibilities for activities from the public sector to private or quasi-public organisations that are not part of the government structure. It is important to note that, while the devolution form of decentralisation is highly desirable in developing countries, a review of examples reveals that devolution practices do not generally meet all the identified requirements. For instance, while local government is given responsibility for certain functions, in most cases central government retains some, and often large-scale, supervisory powers and plays a strong financial role.

It is important to note that the specific structures of the administrative system in a country are likely to impact on the form of decentralisation that may be applied.

5.4.3 Obstacles to decentralisation

The transition from a centralised to a decentralised management system is likely to encounter a number of problems. Research indicates that the successful implementation of decentralisation policies depends heavily on political, organisational, and behavioural factors, as well as financial and human resources (Rondinelli et al 1989). Many of the problems stem from long-established operating practices embedded in a centralised system. For example, some politicians may be reluctant to share their power and authority, and this can be a severe obstacle to the success of decentralisation. Crook and Manor (1994), for instance, argue that the implementation of decentralisation policies can be hampered by the historical legacy of centralist attitudes and interests from both politicians and bureaucrats. Turner and Hulme (1997: 172) note that with a transition toward decentralisation it may be the case that “national politicians are reluctant to cede power; central bureaucracies resist the delegation of responsibilities; when responsibilities are transferred there is rarely a corresponding transfer of financial resources; and those resources that are available at the local level are often poorly deployed by inexperienced, ill-trained and underpaid field staff”. Rondinelli (1981)
identifies a continuing resistance by central government bureaucrats as a strong obstacle to the implementation of decentralisation policies in East African countries. He notes that political commitment to decentralisation has been relatively shallow in Tanzania, Kenya and Sudan, despite the strong advocacy of this government reform. The unwillingness of government officials to transfer power in practice and their desire to retain control over local administration has also been observed by Huque (1986) in a study of Bangladesh.

Opposition to decentralisation may also come from the deep mistrust that central officials may have of local administrators and leaders. It may also come from traditional elites and some local leaders (Rondinelli 1981). Turner and Hulme (1997) also state that "authentic decentralisation policies (particularly devolution) are likely to be manipulated by local elites that may use decentralised power to strengthen their position at the expense of lower income groups" (p. 172). Griffin (1981: 225) further observes that "it is conceivable, even likely in many countries, that power at the local level is more concentrated, more elitist and applied more ruthlessly against the poor than at the centre... greater decentralisation does not necessarily imply greater democracy let alone "power to the people"- it all depends on the circumstances under which decentralisation occurs". Rondinelli (1981) notes that in Kenya local leaders and landowners formed alliances with ministry officials and members of parliament to protect current patterns of decision-making or to resist changes proposed by district development committees that are adverse to their interests.

Decentralisation may be difficult to implement because of the centrist attitudes of many government officials, which leads them to be scornful of participation by local residents in development activities. Huque (1986) suggests that such scornful attitudes have led to a situation in which local people could not demonstrate their interest in, or capacities to run local administration on their own. That local government in developing countries tends to suffer from serious shortages of trained manpower and financial resources to carry out decentralised responsibilities constitutes another barrier to successful implementation. It is also often the case that central government in developing countries transfers functions and responsibilities to local government without a commensurate transfer of resources or adequate legal power to raise resources.
However, this situation is not unique to developing countries. For example, Hentic and Bernier (1999) cite different cases. For example, in Hungary local political autonomy preceded the establishment of a local budgetary system. Due to an inadequate revenue base, local government was unable effectively to fulfil its new responsibilities. While these problems are almost universal in developing countries, they often combine with other problems, such as the inadequate state of the physical infrastructure, transportation and communication facilities, which make co-ordination among decentralised units even more difficult (Rodninelli 1981). Weaknesses in supporting institutions might also induce disappointing results. Jones (1999) identifies twelve types of shortcoming in the attempts by Liverpool council to decentralise its activities. These included fragmentation of the organisational structure, the creation of winners and losers, the development of tunnel vision, and a duplication of resources.

One important point is that decentralisation policies may often yield very limited or negative outcomes at a high cost (Turner and Hulme 1997). Experience of decentralisation in less developed countries has almost everywhere fallen short of expectations and the declared objectives of policy-makers (Smith 1985). The pronounced preference that governments have shown for deconcentration and converting locally elected bodies into mixed authorities has meant that the participative quality of decentralised institutions has been especially prone to erosion (Smith 1985). There has also been a mistaken copying of administrative models of decentralisation that were developed predominantly from Western perspectives, without them being tailored to the specific conditions of developing countries.

5.4.4 Preconditions for successful DTA

There are certain conditions which are essential for the success of decentralisation. Local government must be autonomous and independent and clearly distinguished as a separate level over which the centre can exercise little or no direct control. There must be clearly defined geographical boundaries. Power to raise adequate resources for their functions must be given. Local government must be developed in such a way as to be perceived by its citizens as providing services that satisfy their needs and over which they have some influence. There must be reciprocal and mutually beneficial relationships between the centre and local government. For successful decentralisation,
it is necessary that government decides at the beginning what are to be the objectives and methods for transferring power to local authorities (Huque 1986). While it is almost impossible to obtain all the preconditions specified by Rondinelli, care must be taken to secure at least some of the requirements. According to Mowforth (1998) devolution should involve five major components. First, it should be a local body that is constitutionally separate from central government and responsible for a range of significant local services. Second, it should have its own treasury, budget and accounts, along with substantial authority to raise its own revenue. Third, it should employ its own competent staff who can hire, fire and promote. Fourth, a majority-elected council, operating on party lines, should decide policy and determine internal procedures. And, finally, central government administrators should serve purely as external advisors and inspectors and have no role within the local authority.

Rondinelli et al (1989) lay down four conditions for decentralisation to be successful in developing countries. They argue that the ability of governments to implement decentralised policies depends on the existence of, or ability to create a variety of political, administrative, organisational and behavioural conditions, and to provide sufficient resources at the local level to carry out decentralised functions. (1) Strong political commitment and support must come from national leaders to transfer planning, decision making and managerial authority to field agencies and lower levels of administration. These leaders must show acceptance of participation in planning and management by other organisations that are outside the direct control of central government. (2) Organisational factors that foster successful decentralisation include the appropriate allocation of planning and administrative functions among the levels of government and local organisations, with each set of allocated functions related to the decision-making capability of each organisation. For decentralisation to succeed, appropriate laws, regulations and directives are needed which clearly specify the relationships among different levels of government and administration. Consideration must be given to the allocation of functions, the roles and duties of officials, and the limitations and constraints. A clear constitutional framework may provide a strong foundation for decentralised administration to be carried out in localities. There is some extra protection when decentralisation is embedded in a nation’s constitution rather than merely in legislation, as the law then gives people sufficient power to encourage them to
be assertive in representing their interests (Crooks and Manor 1994). However, even this may not have effect in countries where the constitution is taken less seriously. The features of normal bureaucracy, which include the centralisation of authority (especially of financial control and the standardisation of rules, recommendations and actions), may not facilitate the empowerment of decentralised local administration. (3) The attitudes and behaviour of central and local level officials towards decentralisation must be appropriate and there must be a willingness on their part to share authority with citizens and to accept their participation in public decision-making. (4) The success of decentralisation hinges on financial and human resources. It has also been suggested that success with decentralisation policies requires that changes in policies should be incremental (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986). This is largely because the complexity of changes, notably in terms of changes in financial and human resources, necessitates incremental steps. However, in addition to incrementalism, some argue that fundamental social change is essential prior to the use of decentralised policies to achieve developmental goals. For instance, Hyden (1983) argues that enhancements in government performance generally depend on the transformation of society.

5.4.5 Decentralisation: is it really a realistic alternative to CTA?

While decentralisation has received growing support from researchers, the application of this type of administrative system appears to be problematic. This raises the question of whether adopting decentralisation is a productive strategy at all. In spite of the lip service paid to the concept of decentralisation, no research has attempted to ascertain whether this concept can be applied to a given country's current institutional and constitutional context. Although tourism authorities are advised to switch to relatively decentralised forms of tourism administration, there is no information readily available for authorities that can help to guide this transition. While the decentralisation concept supports the notion of central government retreating from the public domain, central government is also being urged to give more attention to the problems of local organisations, to provide them with more resources, and to improve co-ordination. Thus, the extent to which decentralisation represents a realistic alternative to a centralist model, may be disputed.
While the concept has been taken as a theoretical panacea to solve administrative problems, in practice this is not necessarily the case. The poor outcomes obtained from decentralisation practices suggest it would be naive to believe that decentralised management will resolve all the problems stemming from centralised management (Bienen et al. 1990; Chitere and Monya, 1989; Hyden, 1983; Oberst, 1986). It should be conceded that centralised management, despite its shortcomings, might be more effective and economical than decentralised administration in many or some cases, and that it might be more suitable particularly in poor countries (Alavi, 1971; Bienen et al., 1990; Ray and Kumptala, 1987). In such countries skilled manpower as well as material and financial resources are scarce, and governments have a particular responsibility to utilise optimally the resources available to them (Huque 1986). Such governments are often unwilling to decentralise because the amount of resources at their disposal does not permit this luxury. Additionally, there may be political reasons behind this unwillingness to share power. For political convenience, governments find it essential to retain effective control over the localities through local councils and their leaders (ibid.).

Some argue that it may be more suitable to incorporate a combination of principles adapted from both centralised and decentralised management approaches (Turner and Hulme 1997). However, while it might appear easy to achieve this in theory, implementing a combination of central control and local autonomy that responds to administrative needs and popular participation is still a puzzle for governments. The excessive concentration of decision-making and authority within central government continues to represent an obstacle to the effective performance of public administration in most developing countries (ibid.).

A decentralised governance structure may also become difficult to operate when political parties which are not in power at the central level run the local administrations. The production and delivery of certain goods and services may still be controlled by the central state administration. Conflicts are likely to occur in such cases when the centre wants to impose its decisions on local tourism administrations. The features of normal bureaucracy, which include the centralisation of authority (especially of financial control) and the standardisation of rules, recommendations, and actions, may not facilitate the empowerment of local administrations, and thus it is possible that the
benefits of decentralisation cannot be harvested. One must recognise that centralisation and decentralisation are not mutually exclusive or dichotomous arrangements for governance (Rondinelli and Nellis 1986). Both administrative models have merits, and in some cases one would be more effective and economic than the other. Thus the challenge for most governments is “to find a balance between centralised and decentralised arrangements and to link them in ways that promote development most effectively” (Rondinelli and Nellis 1986: 11). What is the optimal mix is a challenging question.

5.5 Summary
A major characteristic of centralised management which can cause management inefficiency, is that public sector institutions are often geographically and socially remote from local people. It is often the case that the decisions taken in centralised management do not reflect or address local needs and problems. This is largely because of a lack of consultation with local people or with their representatives. Centralised management is often found to be ineffective and slow as a result of lengthy bureaucratic procedures, prompted by laws regulating interactions between government agencies at different levels and by conflicting responsibilities and authorities. In order to overcome the difficulties and constraints of centralised management a more decentralised management approach has been adopted by a number of governments around the world.

Decentralisation conventionally has taken three forms: (1) deconcentration, which refers to transferring resources and decision-making from headquarters to other branches of central government; (2) devolution, which refers to the devolution of resources and power to autonomous units of governments, such as municipalities and local government; (3) and delegation, meaning the delegation of resources and power to organisations outside the regular bureaucratic structures, such as public corporations and development agencies. When carried out properly, the forms of devolution and delegation can make development programmes more effective. However, decentralisation in developing countries has generally taken the form of deconcentration, which implies that the potential benefits are likely to be enjoyed by the dominant power groups of the ruling political party, and not by the local people.
At least in theory, decentralisation is a relatively straightforward process of the transfer of powers originally held by the centre to various units of local government. In addition, although it may have theoretical appeal, the policies produced by a bottom-up model of tourism administration often seem to take the interests of local actors only as the point of departure, and therefore they are likely to be one-sided and they may also be inconsistent with national policies. In contrast, the top-down or centralist model may well disregard the values, interests and strategies of local actors by labelling them as “uninformed”, and it may also fail to capitalise on the resources and capacities of local government. Thus, both centralist and decentralist models may suffer from significant limitations. Both administrative forms fail to consider tourism management from a network perspective, which recognises that the multiple actors involved in plan formulation and implementation are essentially interdependent stakeholders. In other words, actors are dependent on each other because they need each other’s resources (of capital, technology, labour, expertise, and information) for goal achievement, as no organisation can generate independently all the necessary resources. Thus consideration needs to be given to a framework which endorses co-operation and co-ordination between interdependent parties with different and often conflicting rationality, interests and strategies. This may help to ensure that all decisions, policies, and activities are consistent and coherent and not at cross-purposes.

The next chapter briefly introduces the evolution of tourism administration and planning in Turkey. This is necessary background to understand the context to tourism administration and planning in the case study of Belek. The subsequent evaluation of the Belek example uses many of the concepts and frameworks which have been identified and evaluated in the large-scale literature review in chapters two to five.
6. Tourism and Public Administration in Turkey

6.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the character and evolution of tourism administration in Turkey, with particular attention paid to the patterns of central-local relations in public sector management. An explanation of Turkey's tourism administrative system is necessary in order to understand the administrative context to the Belek case study. The historical evolution of the administrative system is an important context to the Belek case as it helps to explain difficulties rooted in Turkey's highly centralised, fragmented and bureaucratic public administration. It also helps to explain the more recent trend to greater decentralisation in public policy and decision-making. It is placed here early in the study as the discussion draws very largely on published secondary literature.

The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. First, there is a discussion of key features of public administration and its main organisational units in Turkey. Second, there is an assessment of the main developments in Turkey's tourism administration that have taken place over the past five decades. Changes in the organisation and activities of tourism administration are discussed chronologically. The 1960s marked a period of transition in the country's approach to tourism development with the formation of five-year development plans formulated by the State Planning Organisation, an organisation which was itself established in this period (Aksoy 1996; Karakaya 1995; Toledo 1985). The most significant developments in Turkey's tourism administration during the 1980s included its increasing liberalisation, reflected in the introduction of the Tourism Encouragement Law (TEL), and also the establishment of a Tourism Ministry (Goymen 2000; Toledo 1985). The structural problems faced by tourism administration at the local level in Turkey are also outlined.

6.2 Public administration in Turkey

Turkey is a unitary republic with a centralised structure and there has been a tendency towards deconcentration (delegation of power from central administrations to their provincial units) and decentralisation (increasing powers for local
administrations) over the past two decades (OECD 1993). The country's territorial administration is governed by the system of provinces, which are in turn divided into districts. The creation of new territorial divisions (more than 15 new provinces and more than 300 districts since 1986) is continuing at present. Overall, legislative powers in Turkey are vested in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), which is composed of six hundred deputies, who are elected nationally by universal suffrage. In accordance with the Constitution the executive functions are entrusted to the President and the Council of Ministers. In 1982 the Ministries in Turkey were reorganised and the principles behind the organisation and functions of the Ministries were restructured (Korzay 1994; Toledo 1985). The Ministry of Tourism and Information (MTI), which was established in 1963, was linked with the Ministry of Culture in the early 1980s to become the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT), which in 1989 was divided into two independent ministries: the Ministry of Tourism (MoT) and the Ministry of Culture (MoC).

In general the administrative structure of Turkey is characterised by a strong central government whose territorial administration is governed by the system of provinces which functions according to the principle of deconcentration (Kocdemir 1998; Destan 1998) (see chapter five for further details on deconcentration). Municipalities, Special Provincial Administrations (SPA), and Village Administrations are the three main public administrative entities established to meet the local needs of inhabitants of provinces, municipal districts, and villages. The Law relating to local administration (the Municipal Law 1580) regulates the formation, duties and powers of these entities. At the provincial level, the governor is the representative of the State, of the government and of each of the ministries separately; he is also their executive agent (OECD 1993). The tasks entrusted to SPAs come under the following headings: public works, training and education, health and social assistance. The tasks entrusted by law for municipalities may be grouped under the following headings: urban infrastructure work, organisation and control of commercial activities, preventive and curative health measures, social security and assistance, control, by a municipal police force, of the services provided by companies and individuals, and organisation of cultural and sports services (OECD 1993).
In the provinces, there are currently more than 80 governors representing the central administration, and these are appointed by the Ministry of the Interior. In all settlements with more than 2,000 people the inhabitants elect a municipal governor (mayor) every five years. For both the provinces and municipalities there are councils with members elected every five years. The functional framework for the municipalities was established under the Municipalities Act of 1930 and, along with many other Acts, they assign to them a wide range of responsibilities. These include urban planning and implementation, surveys and mapping, the regulation of construction and construction permits, land development and the opening of new settlement areas, the construction and maintenance of parks, and urban roads, the provision of water, sewage and gas services, the collection and disposal of garbage, and the cleaning of public spaces (Unal 1992; Yeter 1993).

6.2.1 Administration problems in central-local relations

According to article 127 of the 1982 Constitution, the central administration has the power of administrative control over local government in the framework of principles and procedures enshrined in the law. The administrative control over local authorities is exercised over their activities, decisions, actions, and personnel (Donmez 1999). This supervision can take the form of the approval, postponement and even cancellation of some decisions. This is usually done through judicial control of the administrative acts of local authorities (Yalcindag 1997). Administrative prerogatives and their limits are prescribed by the Constitution and by law. Administrative control over the local authorities is generally applied by the Ministry of the Interior, and in the regions by the provincial and district governors (Kocdemir 1998; Toledo 1985; Unal 1992). In 1994 the Minister of the Interior delegated some of its supervisory powers to provincial governors in order to reduce the excessive concentration of power at the centre.

There are a number of other causes that prevent local authorities from working more efficiently and more effectively, which also undermine the workings of the overall administrative structure (Yalcindag 1997). Lack of proper distribution of functions between the central and local authorities is one of the major causes leading to administrative inefficiency (TID 1995 cited in Donmez 1999). Although the Constitution prescribes that local duties are, in principle, to be carried out by local
authorities, this has not been realised (Tortop 1988). A great deal of local duties are still being performed by provisional and regional units of the centre. That central government is carrying out local services prompts inefficiency in service delivery, as the needs of the public are unlikely to be catered for appropriately due to the fact that their needs are not identified accurately (TID 1995). The local authorities’ share of public expenditure in Turkey is around 13%, which is far behind than that of developed countries (Yalcindag 1997).

Insufficient financial resources also add to the problems. Local authorities have not been in possession of sufficient incomes in proportion to their duties and responsibilities, despite the Constitution prescribing otherwise (Tortop 1988). Moreover, their capability of creating new incomes is restricted; they can charge taxation and other financial obligations only within the limits set by legislation (TID 1995). Insufficient organisation and personnel are among the other significant reasons. Local authorities generally lack the full capability of creating organisations and employing personnel, required by their functions (Yalcindag 1997). They can only set up organisations, employ personnel, and fix their payments within the limits of regulations made by the central administration and of legislation. There is also a great deal of unnecessary administrative tutelage by the central administration over local authorities, which results in inefficient functioning. Another contributor to the administrative inefficiency is the lack of a transparent administrative system and of public participation in local decision-making processes (TID 1995). The role of civil organisations, as well as local communities in the public management decision-making process is rather limited. The administrative system is described as being non-transparent and control-laden. Local authorities are unable to levy taxes or other financial obligations on organisations in their localities (TID 1995). Hence, local authorities seem to have been over-dependent on the centre owing to financial dependence and too much administrative tutelage. The centralist and bureaucratic tradition of Turkish administration causes many other problems, including an increase in formalism in administration, an unnecessary increase in the number of personnel, delays in the realisation of local projects and plans, difficulties of co-ordination, and so on. Additionally, the lack of an active, sensitive, and responding citizenship in relation to local affairs and authorities constitutes another serious problem for the Turkish local government system (Yalcindag 1997).
6.3 Administrative changes affecting tourism

In general it is helpful to distinguish between three stages in the development of tourism in Turkey: the period pre-1960, the 1960s and 1970s, and the 1980s and onward. The changes in tourism administration occurring in each period are discussed.

6.3.1 The period pre-1960

Official attempts to include tourism in public administration started in the early 1930s with the publication of law no. 2450 in 1934 relating to the organisation and duties of the Ministry of the Economy. Before then and for more than a decade, the Touring and Automobile Club of Turkey was responsible for tourism affairs (Aksoy 1996). Changing the name of the General Directorate of Press and Publications into the Ministry of Press, Publications and Tourism in 1957 was a major step forward, as for the first time tourism affairs were to be dealt with at ministerial level. In this period, the government took several actions to stimulate tourism, such as laying down legislation for credits and making arrangements for tourist tariffs and also custom taxes (Aksoy 1996). The Act for Encouragement of the Tourism Industry (1953) prepared the way to boost investment in tourism and also to spread the idea that tourism development was desirable for the country. The Act for Co-operation in Tourism (1955) promoted the idea that for the national interest, all public and private interests should co-operate in the development of tourism. The importance of planned development had been realised by the government, and in this period there were a few attempts to draw up tourism-related plans (Toledo 1985; Sezer and Harrison 1994).

6.3.2 The 1960s-1970s

An important turning point in relation to tourism in the public sector was the establishment of the Ministry of Tourism and Information (MTI) in 1963, followed in 1964 by the establishment of local tourism units and overseas offices of the MTI, and by the assignment of tourism-related responsibilities to various government and voluntary bodies (TYD 1992). Tourism-related issues were to be co-ordinated only by the MTI. The National Co-ordination Committee, which was established in 1969 within the State Planning Organisation (SPO), was transferred to MTI, marking
another turning point in the growing powers of MTI in Turkey's government in relation to planning for tourism (DPT 1997).

In the provinces, tourism management was linked to general public administration through a provincial tourism committee and a district (administrative section of a province) tourism committee (chaired by the respective governor) in each province. In this way, the organisation of bodies responsible for tourism management within the country was divided into two separate branches: the Regional Directorate of the MTI and the provincial government under the Ministry of the Interior. An important feature of tourism administration in Turkey was the lack of power resting with local tourism bodies, with most power focused on the central MTI office in Ankara (Toledo 1985). One of the main characteristics of the distribution of functions and roles within central and local administrations was that the central government institutions, such as the State Planning Organisation and the central MTI in Ankara, were given the powers for policy-making and planning and also the co-ordinating role for the tourism affairs of the Government. As in government more generally, the MTI and the Provincial Governor were the bodies ultimately responsible for tourism affairs; in Ankara the central body of the MTI runs tourism affairs and in the provinces the Provincial Governor has the final word (not the Regional Director of Tourism) (Tourism Ministry 1993).

The country entered a period of strongly planned development after the formation of the State Planning Organisation in 1960, which was reorganised in 1994 by the Council of Ministers (DPT 1997). The State Planning Organisation had the authority to request all the necessary information related to its tasks directly from public institutions. The State Planning Organisation comprises the High Planning Council, the Money Credit and Co-ordination Committee and the Under-Secretariat of the State Planning Organisation (Ates 1999). The State Planning Organisation advises the Government in determining economic, social, and cultural policies and targets for the country, which take into account all types of natural, human and economic resources. It prepares long-term development plans and annual programmes in connection with the targets determined by the government (DPT 1997).
Since 1963, all sectors of the economy, including the tourism sector, have followed a systematic planning policy laid down in five-year development plans (FYDPs). The development plans were intended to channel human and financial resources to different economic sectors. A new constitutional law passed after the military coup in 1961 further intensified state intervention in the economy by tying economic development matters into these five-year development plans (Karakaya 1995). The State Planning Organisation formulated these plans, which were mandatory for the public sector but stimulative for the private sector. The First Five Year Development Plan (FYDP) ran from 1963 until 1967, the Second from 1968 until 1972, the Third from 1973 until 1977, with 1978 being a year of “transition” because of political strains in the later 1970s. The main objective of these five-year development plans had been to earn significant amounts of foreign currency in order to finance Turkey’s imports (Ors 1991, 1998; Taner 1978).

Turkey also adopted this “planned development” approach in the tourism sector (Goymen 2000; Korzay 1994; Toledo 1985). This approach was based on the mixed economy principle. The first FYDP defined the basic principles of this approach for tourism policy, and it encouraged investments in tourism mainly because of its impact on the balance of payments. It proposed that the state should shoulder the responsibility for building infrastructure, while the private sector should develop the superstructure. The state also interfered directly with the development of facilities through the Tourism Bank (Tourism Bank Chain) and the State Pension Fund (Emek Chain). In addition, the state provided other services in order to guide the industry’s development, such as marketing and promotion and financial incentives for the private sector (Toledo 1985). The First FYDP also emphasised the need for legislation to facilitate investment and to create a tourism ministry. The Second FYDP endorsed the objectives of its predecessor and in addition it introduced the notion of physical planning, the concept of an internationally competitive pricing policy, and the principles of mass tourism (Sezer and Harrison 1994). The Third FYDP proposed the intensification of skill-based training programmes in tourism, the extension of physical planning activities in order to prevent haphazard development, and renewed efforts to develop a superstructure required for mass tourism.
Despite all these policy decisions and the clear encouragement given to tourism, the expected improvements in bed capacity and in the number of tourists did not materialise, and by and large the plan targets were not achieved during the 1960s and 1970s (Sezer and Harrison 1994). The public bureaucracy and frequent changes of Government during these years were two of the factors negatively affecting the development of Turkey's tourism. There was very little consistent tourism policy in these years, with continuing changes in policy as each government came to power (Ilkin and Dincer 1991).

6.3.3 The 1980s and onward

The involvement in tourism development issues of the new government formed after the coup of 1980, far surpassed the efforts of previous governments. Important changes included the establishment of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT), the new Tourism Encouragement Law, and the formation of an inner cabinet for tourism chaired by the Prime Minister (the High Co-Ordination Council for Tourism Affairs). Another striking development taking place in this period was the inclusion of tourism among the country’s high priority development sectors and also the introduction of further financial incentives (TYD1992).

The establishment of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the new Tourism Encouragement Law (TEL) in 1982 brought about a series of changes in tourism administration in Turkey. Up until this period the power of the Ministry responsible for tourism had not been significant in comparison to other Ministries (Toledo, 1985). In 1980 it was claimed that “Tourism in Turkey has until recently played a second fiddle to the country’s industrial ambitions and agricultural heritage. Despite upgraded ministerial representation since the 1960s, tourism still plays the poor neighbour to the demands of more heavyweight Ministries. It has received no more than 0.5 percent of the Government budget in any of the last 18 years (until 1980), and less than 1 percent of all capital expenditures. Just as importantly it has lacked full autonomy, and has been dependent on administrative decisions and financial allocations in other sectors” (International Institute of Tourism Studies 1991: 18 in Toledo 1985). For instance, the MTI had to obtain approval from other Ministries for the construction of tourism-related infrastructure, such as from the Ministry of Transportation for the construction of roads and from the Council of
Ministers for tourism investments. These procedures usually took a long time, which negatively influenced the development of tourism. Subsequently, limited improvements were made in these procedures and in the power of the MCT (formerly the MTI). However, the organisation of the MCT remained largely the same, other than an increase in the number of its departments. The role of guiding and coordinating public sector involvement in tourism was to be executed by the MCT, which also supervises and encourages business activities in the sector.

### 6.3.3.1 The Tourism Encouragement Law

The effectiveness of tourism management was improved somewhat by the new Tourism Encouragement Law (TEL) (law number 2634, 1982). This law introduced a new more liberal era by trying to overcome some of the previous hindrances, such as the weak co-ordination among tourism-related organisations (Tarhan 1996 in Goymen 2000). “The purpose of the present law is to ensure that necessary arrangements are made and necessary measures are taken in order to regulate, develop and provide for a dynamic structure and operation of the tourism sector. The present law comprises provisions governing the tourism sector, including definitions of tourist regions, areas and centres, establishment and development of such regions, and encouragement, regulation and inspection of touristic investments and facilities” (Ministry of Tourism and Culture in Var 2001: 101). According to this law, tourism investments are to be channelled to priority zones so that maximum benefits would be gained from Turkey's scarce resources being concentrated geographically. The formal legal requirements for the allocation of state-owned land were simplified through reducing the number of relevant bodies. Other important elements of this law were that the MCT was given powers over other Ministries in the tourism priority zones, such as over the Ministry of Finance (which holds land that belongs to the State); and also the introduction of a Tourism Development Fund, operated by the Tourism Bank.

### 6.3.3.2 Establishment of the Ministry of Tourism (MoT)

An important development for tourism was the establishment of the High Co-ordination Council for Tourism Affairs, which is intended to facilitate improved co-ordination within the tourism sector. It comprises the Ministries involved in the development of tourism, and it is chaired by the Prime Minister. The Tourism Implementation Council, consisting of the Under-Secretaries (mustesar) of the various
Ministries, was then concerned with the implementation of the decisions of this council (SPD 1997). Another turning point in this period was the establishment of a separate Ministry of Tourism. In January 1989 the Council of Ministers resolved to establish the Ministry of Tourism (MoT) on the basis of the authority granted by Laws number 3268, 3347 and 3479. Article one of Decree-law 355 sets out the principles for the establishment of the Ministry. The Ministry was formed to ensure that the use of the country's resources suitable for tourism made an optimal contribution to the national economy and met the recreational needs of the Turkish people. It is intended to take measures for the development and marketing of tourism, to steer government agencies concerned with tourism, and to co-operate with these agencies.

6.3.3.2.1 The structure of the MoT

The organisational structure of the MoT and the functions and roles of its various units have changed over the years. At present the structure of the MoT consists of a central organisation, provincial and overseas organisations, and affiliated and related agencies. The central organisation of the MoT consists of three main service units: the advisory, inspection and the auxiliary units. The Minister is head of the MoT and has the duty of conducting the Ministry's activities in accordance with government policies, including legislation and national security policies. The Ministry's development plans and annual programmes promote co-ordination and co-operation with other ministries that fall within its area of activity. The main services of the MoT are outlined in the amended Decree-law number 411. These relate to the five MoT directorate generals: for investment, tourism establishments, promotion, tourism training and external relations (Kalkan 1995).

The main responsibilities of the directorate generals for investment (DGI) are to evaluate the country's resources that might be used for tourism, to determine priorities for their use, to evaluate and protect natural resources affected by tourism and to work on these matters with other governmental agencies and private sector organisations (Kalkan 1995). The DGI also carries out research in order to formulate tourism policies and to steer investment in accordance with changes in the demand for different types of tourism. The DGI is also responsible for steering investment in tourism infrastructure and superstructure by the public and private sectors, and for the preparation of annual investment plans (Ors, 1991; Karakaya, 1995).
There are several advisory and inspection units within the central organisation of the Ministry: the Board of Inspection, the Research, Planning and Co-ordination Board (RPCB), the office of Legal Counsel, Advisors to the Minister, and the Office of the Press and Public Relations advisor. The Board of Inspection was set up to investigate the activities of the Ministry and of organisations associated with the Ministry. Among the duties of this Board are the preparation of proposals to the Minister with a view to ensuring that the Ministry fulfils its objectives more effectively and operates in accordance with the legislation and relevant plans and programmes (article 14). The Research, Planning and Co-ordination Board undertakes research and develops the activities and measures deemed necessary to be included in the Ministry's long-term development plans and annual programmes, with those proposals being sent to the State Planning Organisation, after the approval of the Tourism Minister has been obtained (article 15). Another important duty of this Board is to determine measures at ministerial or inter-ministerial level that are needed to solve problems or bottlenecks during the implementation of the Ministry's development plans.

An Intra-Ministerial Commission (IMC) was established within the Ministry of Tourism in order to define the locations and boundaries of Turkey's tourism zones, taking into account their natural assets and tourism potential. The IMC contains the representatives of the Tourism General Directorate under the co-ordination of the Head of the Tourism Planning and Investment Department of the Ministry. The IMC acts in conjunction with the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement. The commission members also include representatives of the General Staff, the State Planning Organisations, the Under-Secretariat of the Prime Minister, the Environment General Directorate, and the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Finance, Public Work and Settlement, Transport and Communications, Agriculture and Rural Affairs, Forestry, Industry and Trade, Energy and Natural Resources, and of Culture.

The auxiliary units within the central organisation of the MoT are the Personnel Department, the Department of Administrative and Financial Affairs, the Defence Secretariat and the Office of Chef de Cabinet. The advisory body to the Ministry is the Council of Tourism (CoT), which normally meets once every three
years to discuss relevant tourism matters, and they may also meet extraordinarily on
the invitation of the Minister. Decisions of the CoT are consultative in nature.

Under current legislation, the Ministry has the duty and powers to determine
principles that must be observed in relation to tourism issues by other ministries and
government agencies, including the power to ensure that they work in co-operation
(article 30). When its activities overlap with the activities of other ministries, the MoT
is responsible for consulting with the concerned ministries and ensuring there is the
necessary co-operation and co-ordination, within the framework of principles set out
by the Prime Minister. The Tourism Minister, the Under-Secretary, and staff at all
levels of the MoT and affiliated bodies, may delegate some of their powers to lower
level organisations provided that they expressly specify the limits of the powers so
delegated.

The MoT is also authorised in Law number 3046 to establish tourism
organisations in the provinces, where this is deemed necessary. The Tourism
Directorates (TDs) are administrative bodies responsible for the Ministry’s tourist-
related services and for the development of tourism within the provinces and regions
(Article 27 of the Decree-law number 355). The TDs obtain data for the preparation
of provincial and regional tourism plans, determine the specific measures to
implement these plans, and also inform the Ministry of their work. The TDs also
implement the State Development Plans and Annual Programmes relating to regional
tourism, and they also monitor progress in tourism investment made within the
specified State Development Plan periods (Article 8). The TDs also facilitate co-
operation at the provincial scale between government agencies and organisations, and
the private sector and local people, in order to channel the investment capacity of the
provinces into tourism and to ensure that they contribute to the effective development
of tourism. The TDs represent the MoT in the province where this is authorised by the
provincial Governor.

6.4. Local government and the current state of tourism planning and
development

The government strategy incorporated into the Fifth and the Sixth FYDPs
(1990-1994) focuses on public sector privatisation and on the deregulation of the
industry (Sezer and Harrison 1994). Prior to this, in the 1980s, the state had already adopted a more decentralised and liberal attitude to tourism, involving the transferral of some responsibilities for planning to local government and providing incentives to encourage the private sector to take a leading role. Despite these attempts to modernise the tourism administration, many of the administrative problems remain unresolved. As Sezer and Harrison note, “the lack of sectoral planning, ineffective control, the lack of participation by local people, the abuse of political power, the get-rich-quick mentality coupled with dubious practices, inconsistencies in the planning criteria and procedures, and the general lack of tourism culture resulted in missed opportunities and inadequate and inappropriate tourism development” (1994: 82). For example, during this period there was an increasing regional imbalance in tourism development in favour of the west and southwest of Turkey at the expense of the north and east. This has produced irrecoverable environmental damage as well as aggravating economic discrepancies between regions (Sezer and Harrison 1994). A number of actions were proposed in order better to realise the government's policy objectives of the 1980s: (1) A tourism sector development plan (TUSAP) was to be devised by university experts in order to create a more dynamic planning system whereby the goals, strategies and policies could be revised and adapted according to the changes and developments in the sector. (2) The budget of the MoT was to be increased and a new category of skilled personnel was to be created of “tourism specialists” who were mainly graduates with special training in tourism. (3) New legislation was to be introduced to reorganise the structure of both the public and private sectors in relation to tourism (Aksoy 1996; Karakaya 1995; Korzay 1994; Sezer and Harrison 1994).

One current difficulty relates to conflict and confusion between the organisations responsible for the design and implementation of plans. In tourism zones, master plans should be approved by the MoT and the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, and preliminary permission to prepare these plans must also be obtained from these Ministries. The Municipal Board of the municipality examines the plans in cases where they are submitted to the municipality because they concern areas within the boundaries of the municipality or else neighbouring areas. For the provinces the Provincial Board carries out the same duty in cases where they are submitted to the Provincial Governor’s office (article 12, amendment 20197).
However, a new law on Construction (Decree law number 3194) was introduced in 1985, which has transferred some authority for planning to local government.

Settlement development plans (Imar Planlari) are designed to ensure that there is balanced and controlled urban development. These apply in coastal and rural areas where relevant legislation applies. However, the legal authority for planning in relation to these plans is divided, with the municipalities responsible for the implementation of both master plans and settlement development plans within their boundaries, while authority for such plans outside municipality boundaries rests with the Provincial Governor. Interestingly, while central government institutions develop these plans, local government is expected to put them into practice, despite them being excluded from many decision-making processes. The authority to make plans concerning tourism is vested by Article 7 of the Act for Encouragement of Tourism, and the Article 10 of the Act on Coasts jointly controlled by of the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Public Affairs. The plans, formulated by the Ministry of Tourism or by a contracted tertiary organisation, are expected to be put into practice and monitored by the municipalities. As Soybay (1995) observes these plans and policies can be inconsistent with local requirements and characteristics, with them being developed and implemented by units producing nation-wide policies, so they may not meet the social and economic requirements of local people. This can lead to burdens that are difficult to overcome. Further, the fact that 24 institutions and organisations along with 20 regulations are involved in land-use planning means that there are many problems concerning the delegation of power and co-ordination, and these problems have often thwarted local government in their attempts to implement tourism plans (Coker 1996; Pirler 1996; Unal 1992; Yeter 1993).

While the 1980s saw unprecedented tourism growth in Turkey, the structural problems characterising tourism administration have continued during the 1990s. The relevant organisations have not been given the appropriate power and responsibility to achieve the desired tourism development objectives. These organisations have been thwarted by both the haphazard organisational structure and the piecemeal development of legislation (TEK 1992). Over-centralisation, ambiguous responsibilities, imbalances in authority, and an uneven distribution of duties and resources have given rise to a vague organisational framework. Co-ordination
between the public and private sectors is almost absent and the boundaries of legal jurisdictions and responsibilities are not clearly defined (Coker 1996). Although a High Tourism Co-ordination Council was established in the early 1980s, this council lacked appropriate legislation to enable it to operate adequately. Reforms in tourism administration are widely thought to be a priority because of the difficulties resulting from Turkey’s centralised tourism administration (Sezer and Harrison 1994).

In the context of these structural problems, the seventh FDYP (1996-2000) proposed a more decentralised approach to tourism administration and emphasised reform in tourism administration, particularly in the role of local government. Some key objectives relevant to the present study are summarised in Table 6.1 (SPD 1996-2000).

Table 6.1 Some key objectives of the seventh Five Year Development Plan

| 1. | The restructuring of local administration to be implemented in parallel with a greater decentralisation of administration. |
| 2. | To achieve more decentralised administration, the organisational structures of villages, municipalities and provincial special authorities are to be reformed so that they are more self-sufficient, both financially and administratively. |
| 3. | The financial, technical and organisational structures of local administration are to be rearranged. |
| 4. | The duties, authority, and resources are to be redistributed between central and local government in the context of these reforms. |
| 5. | Improved co-ordination and co-operation is to be achieved in accordance with the new frameworks. |
| 6. | Some of the responsibilities of central government are to be transferred to government representatives in the provinces, notably to Provincial Governors. |
| 7. | The union of local authorities in Turkey will be given greater attention and more support. |
| 8. | New arrangements will be made for local people to participate more in decision-making processes and in the implementation of programmes. |
| 9. | Local government will work in collaboration with central government in drawing up plans and programmes for their localities. |
| 10. | In the context of these objectives, the dependency of local government on central government is to be reduced. |

Decentralised administration has been suggested as a remedy for the structural problems facing tourism administration of Turkey. The Seventh FYDP is the first radical recommendation with respect to decentralising the administration, being based on the principles of institutional restructuring, redefining the state's role, and the redistribution of some authority and resources. There is, however, a lack of evidence on the impact of decentralisation for the success of tourism planning and management.
6.5 Summary

In this chapter an attempt was made to introduce the main characteristics of Turkey's administration and the organisational structure of tourism in the country. The key characteristics of the administrative system likely to impact on tourism management and development include its highly centralised structure, administrative control by central government over local government decisions, a disorganised institutional framework for tourism planning, and weak local government. The organisational structure of tourism at national level appears to be chaotic, which is also not very different at the local level (Agaoglu 1989). There are a diverse number of institutions and legislation concerning the development and implementation of tourism policies. In addition to the Ministry of Tourism, the following ministries can also intervene indirectly in the decision-making and implementation process: the Ministry of Agriculture and Village Affairs, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the Ministry of Public Works. At the local level, the local organisations of the Ministry of Tourism and the local governments (municipality and the SPAs) are given responsibilities for implementing policies, and there exists ambiguity and imbalances concerning their autonomy and responsibilities. In addition to the Tourism Encourage Law (TEL), there are also a number of other regulations having a direct effect on the implementation of tourism policies. These include the National Parks Law, the Law for Protection of Cultural and Natural Wealth, the Law to Protect Coastal Zones, the Construction Law, the Municipalities’ Law, the Law to Protect General Health, the Environment Law, the Law of Forestry, the Law of Water Product, and the Decree for Using Agricultural Lands. This legislation authorises different institutions and organisations, and thus gives rise to clashes of authority and responsibilities (SPO 1997).

The TEL was supposed to simplify the regulations for the private sector and local public sector in relation to tourism planning and development by reducing the number of relevant bodies. However, to date this has not been realised. The centralist administration system and ambiguities in the sharing of powers and responsibilities of organisations related to tourism at different government levels are posing difficulties
for tourism management and planning. Operating within a very centralised administration, many national and local tourism organisations are often frustrated in performing their mandated duties. While there are recent attempts to "modernise" the country's tourism administration, they appear not to have been backed by appropriate legislation, and the frequent changes in government have also led to further inconsistencies in tourism policies. The reviewed literature showed that local municipalities have rather limited authority over local tourism planning, and central government (mainly the MoT and the governor) applies administrative tutelage over local decisions. The administrative tutelage means that municipalities do not have autonomy in many cases to put into practice their decisions under their own initiative. By this power, central government keeps its authority to interfere with local affairs, deciding what services should be rendered for local communities and how they must be performed. The partial exclusion of local government and their limited authority in the face of decisions dictated by central government are likely to reduce the success of local tourism development plans, including that of Belek.

Another major inhibitor to tourism management and development in the country, including the Belek plan, is the political instability resulting from frequent government changes. Var (2001: 108) observes that "the frequent changes of coalition governments and turnover of the top-level administrators have resulted in discontinuity. Political stability is essential for achieving a sustainable national tourism policy". There is thus a need for better planning on a national level based on clear and realistic objectives that do not change substantially as governments change. There is also a clear need for the government to recognise that the past strategies cannot be sustained for the longer term and require fundamental rethinking (Var 2001). In sum, tourism policy in Turkey seems to have been handled in a fragmented way and hence responsibilities for policy determination, implementation, and control are spread too wide (Var 2001). These problems are likely to be mirrored in the Belek case study area.
7. Conceptual Framework and Methodology

7.1 Introduction and study objectives

This chapter explains the multi-stage research process that was followed to meet the study's research objectives. While generic descriptions of the research process vary in terms of the number and detail of the stages or steps involved, their general sequencing remains almost universal (Saunders et al 1997; Ryan 1995). These stages include formulating and clarifying the research topic, reviewing the literature, choosing a strategy, collecting data, analysing the data and writing up. In parallel with the general sequence suggested in the literature, the researcher started by investigating the overall domain of the research subject. At this stage, the value of the research was established, the specific research topic was identified, and it was related to existing knowledge and theory. An exploratory review of the relevant literature was undertaken in order to clarify the theoretical rationale behind the specific research problem, and to identify what research had and had not been done previously. The subsequent sustained literature review facilitated an assessment of key parameters behind the case study research. A conceptual framework was then developed to identify and assess the inter-organisational relations in tourism, especially between central and local government organisations, as well as between the private sector and NGOs. This conceptual framework was partly derived from ideas and concepts identified in the literature review.

Next, a strategy was selected in order to advance the research. An eclectic approach was adopted in the choice of data collection and analytic methods. The next step was the generation of interview themes and questions which captured the research issues and themes as previously specified. The researcher refined the research instrument through pilot tests and consultation with other researchers in order to retain questions that effectively capture the constructs under investigation. Following the reduction of the interview questions and consideration of their validity, the detailed field research was conducted. Following the systematic collection of the data, the Nud.ist software programme was utilised to analyse the data. Each research stage is detailed in the following sections.
The first section of this chapter recaps on the study's research aims and objectives and explains the reasons why a case study approach was employed. Next, the conceptual framework developed for the study is described and explained. There is then an assessment of the strengths and limitations of two key potential data collection methods - survey questionnaires and in-depth interviews. The phases followed in the implementation of the fieldwork and in the analysis of the resulting interview transcripts are explained next. Finally, there is discussion of the practical difficulties encountered in the course of the research and of possible limitations regarding the research findings.

7.1.1 Research aims and objectives

Two key issues in tourism planning are the balance of power in policy formulation and implementation between the national and local levels of public sector tourist organisations, and also how this balance in relations affects the practice of local level tourism planning. Tourism planning is likely to be affected by the administrative system and by the balance in relations between national and local levels in related policy areas, such as land-use planning and economic development. The co-ordination of activities, that is the fitting together of administrative arrangements, policy decisions, and policy implementation so that all are consistent and coherent and not at cross-purposes, is a precursor to successful tourism planning and development (Hall 1994). Previous researchers have generally focused on tourism planning techniques, and tourism impact assessments, while tourism administrative systems and their impact on tourism plan formulation and implementation have received inadequate attention. Given this limited previous research, the study aims to explore the nature and the extent of influence of centralised and localised tourism administration on the development and implementation of a tourism development plan. Focusing on Turkey, this study seeks to ascertain the elements of the organisational environment in which the planning is undertaken; to examine the ways in which the planning and implementation process is carried out; to identify the areas of interdependency and exchange of resource among agencies involved in the decision-making process concerning tourism development; and to identify elements that either facilitate or inhibit the building, maintenance and management of interorganisational relations formed among public and private sector organisations involved in the Belek Tourism Development Plan. Further, this study seeks insights
into whether the use of alternative administration forms, such as decentralisation, might have helped to enhance the management of tourism at the local level. The study draws on a critical review of the literature on inter-organisational relations, notably on central-local relations and on tourism planning, as well as of relevant literature in such disciplinary areas as political science, public administration, regional and urban planning and geography.

The research has four specific objectives.

1. To develop a conceptual framework in relation to inter-organisational relations in tourism planning, including between central and local government. This includes consideration of tourism planning issues in Belek, inter-organisational communication, stakeholder involvement and consensus building, resource sufficiency and exchange, inter-organisational co-ordination, the roles and activities of the organisations, and the delegation of power. This draws on a substantial review of relevant literature.

2. To apply the conceptual framework and key conceptual themes to the case study of Belek in Turkey, chosen as it is in a rapidly developing country with a centralised system of governance and as the area is subject to a major tourism development initiative.

3. To evaluate the patterns and process, and strengths and weaknesses of inter-organisational relations around tourism planning in Belek using the identified conceptual themes.

4. To evaluate the relations between central and local government levels in relation to tourism planning in Belek, to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the tourism administration system, and to examine views on the potential to change its character.

7.2.1 Selection of the case study area

The Belek region was selected in order to study the patterns of inter-organisational relations, notably those between central and local tiers of government, and their implications for tourism development and plan implementation. There are several reasons behind the choice of Belek as the case study area and these were considered in detail in chapter one. Among the reasons explained in chapter one were that there is
growing environmental awareness and related concerns to reverse environmental degradation in the area. The Belek project also aims to establish sustainable tourism in the region and it marks perhaps the first time in Turkey that the development of a tourism management plan has been more substantially devolved to civil society. Further, there has been limited research on the extent to which the goals within the Belek Coastal Management Plan (BMP) have been realised in practice. Additionally, the unofficial delegation of some central powers to a private organisation (Betuyab) is an unprecedented and interesting practice in a centralised administrative context. The Belek case study is intended to enhance our understanding of whether top-down (centralist) or bottom-up (decentralist) approaches to tourism planning and management are likely to be effective in handling the complex interactions between various parties in a developing world context. Previous research reports that there are ambiguities and conflicts in the sharing of authority and responsibility in relation to tourism management in the area (Soybay 1995). The success of the BMP will thus be related to a type of co-ordination and co-operation between public and private sectors and NGOs that is new and different in the Turkish context. The Belek case study is expected to provide insights into factors working for and against co-ordination in an environment where there are multiple relevant organisations that develop rules and monitor and supervise tourism planning and management.

7.3 Research design and methodology

A research design is simply the framework or plan that guides how to ask research questions and how to collect and analyse data (Churchill 1983). Terminology describing approaches to research design abound in the literature and are conventionally expressed in a dichotomous manner (e.g., theoretical-applied, descriptive-explanatory, qualitative-quantitative, exploratory-causal, experimental-non-experimental, cross sectional-longitudinal, and inductive-deductive) (for an extensive review see Clark et al 1998; Churchill 1990; DeVaus 1995; Pizam 1994; Ritchie and Spencer 1994; Robson 1993; Tull and Hawkins 1993; Veal 1997).

The choice of research design is contingent upon the nature of the research problem and its fundamental objective (Churchill 1990). It is important to note that there is not a single, standard or correct method of carrying out research. Simon (1969: 4 in Yuksel 2000), for instance, notes "Do not wait to start your research until you find
out the proper approach, because there are many ways to tackle the problem - some good, some bad, but probably several good ways. There is no single project design. A research method for a given problem is not like the solution to a problem in algebra. It is more like a recipe for beef-stroganoff, there is no one best recipe". Unlike the pure sciences, the development of a research design in tourism is normally affected by the researcher being unable to exercise control over the variables involved (Ryan 1995). In such situations, *ex post facto* design is required, which is defined as "the systematic empirical enquiry in which the scientist does not have direct control of independent variables because their manifestations have already occurred or because they are inherently not manipulative" (Kerlinger 1973: 379 in Pizam 1994).

A case study approach, drawing on both secondary and primary data (Yin 1993), was taken in order to highlight linkages between the realities of the tourism plan formulation and implementation processes and the theoretical context of this research (Williams et al 1998). Robson (1993: 40) defines a case study approach as "the development of detailed, intensive knowledge about a single case", or a small number of related cases. Yin (1993) regards it as a method of choice when the phenomenon under study is not readily distinguishable from its context. This strategy was particularly suitable for the research, as the aim was to gain a rich understanding of the context of the tourism development initiative and the processes being enacted (Morris and Wood 1991). Yin (1993) notes that this method is particularly appropriate when researchers desire to (a) define topics broadly and not narrowly, (b) cover contextual conditions and not just the phenomenon of study, and (c) rely on multiple and not singular sources of evidence. Another reason why a case study strategy was adopted is that it has considerable ability to generate answers to the question of “why”, as well as what and how (Robson 1993; Yin 1993), which tend to be the questions addressed by the survey method. It has to be noted that empirical findings from a case study are not necessarily transferable to other tourism or land use planning contexts, but should be taken as a foundation for more empirical testing elsewhere (Williams et al 1998).

When designing a case study it is necessary to have a conceptual framework, a set of research questions, a sampling strategy and appropriate methods and instruments for data collection (Robson 1993; Yin 1993). To answer the research
question and meet the objectives, in congruence with suggestions in the literature, the researcher has consulted extensively relevant secondary data that had been collected for other reasons (Selin and Myers 1995). This secondary data provided a useful source from which to answer preliminary research questions. Secondary data were gleaned from previously published reports on the Belek Coastal Management Plan (BMP) by the Nature Preservation Society (NPS), newspaper cuttings, internet sources, as well as reports published by other relevant planning, tourism and environment authorities in Turkey. Locating and using secondary data provided enormous saving in resources and helped to build a general understanding of the context within which the planning processes were undertaken in the country.

Given the specific objectives of the research, the use of secondary data was not adequate on its own. Hence, primary data were also collected, which involved purposeful discussions or interviews with relevant people (Table 7.3), focusing on seven specific conceptual themes identified in a theoretical framework (Figure 7.1). The conceptual themes covered in these interviews include: the planning issues in Belek, inter-organisational communication, stakeholder involvement and consensus building, resource sufficiency and exchange, inter-organisational co-ordination, the roles and activities of the organisations, and the delegation of power. The interviews were carried out with selected representatives from organisations and other relevant stakeholders. In all cases the most directly involved and knowledgeable individual about the BMP within each organisation was interviewed (Selin and Chavez 1994). The interview technique was chosen in preference to mailing questionnaires for several reasons, which are discussed more fully shortly (Keogh 1990). Among the key reasons for this preference was that the interviews obtained a sufficient return from the limited population, and thereby helped ensure the validity of the results. The technique was also used to create an informal atmosphere in which respondents were encouraged to freely express their feelings on the Belek Plan. Further, the technique allowed the respondents to state their opinions in their own terms, thus ensuring that issues that they considered important were not overlooked. Open-ended questions were used to stimulate conversation on the limitations and strengths of the planning and implementation processes. All interviews, with few exceptions, were tape recorded and later transcribed word-for-word for subsequent analysis. The data were
coded to reflect major themes and then recoded into specific sub-themes to reflect its specific content, as explained subsequently (Strauss 1987).

The next section (7.4) presents and explains the conceptual framework developed for the study, and the subsequent section (7.5) explains why qualitative techniques in the form of semi-structured interviews were preferred to quantitative techniques.

7.4 The conceptual framework

This research uses a case study of one area in Turkey in order to identify and assess the patterns and processes of inter-organisational relations between tourism-related organisations, and particularly between central and local government, as well as between the public and private sectors and NGOs. These relations are examined in relation to the formulation and implementation of a tourism development plan. A conceptual framework was developed specifically in order to fulfil this research objective. The framework was devised to analyse the nature and extent of the relationships between the public and private sectors and NGOs, their implications for the formulation and implementation of the Belek development plan, and to provide a better understanding of the elements of the tourism environment and of the relations among the parties involved in the plan. In the following discussion of the conceptual framework, the terms depicted in the summary in Figure 7.1 are shown in italics. Reference is also made to the literature that was reviewed in chapters 2-5 that is related to the ideas in the framework. The relevant section in the literature review chapters is indicated.

The conceptual framework puts emphasis on the roles of the public and private sectors, as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in tourism planning and development, on the nature and extent of the interdependencies and interactions among the various parties, and on the social, economic, technological and political environment within which they operate (Hall 1994; Burkart and Medlik 1981; Lickorish et al 1991; Sharpe 1970) (Figure 7.1). Attention is given to the relationships between public and private sector organisations and NGOs, and also to the links between organisations at different scales, notably, the national, provincial and local scales (Pearce 1992). The framework recognises that central government,
particularly in developing countries, has critical functions to fulfil in terms of co-
ordination, planning, legislation, entrepreneur regulation, and the stimulation of
tourism development (Jenkins and Henry 1982; Mill and Morrison 1985). "Problems
arise and costs are increased when the different sectors do not develop harmoniously
or when the motives and capabilities of different development agents conflict...
uncontrolled growth of tourism can destroy the very source base on which it was
built" (Pearce 1992: 12).

Government involvement is often necessary to achieve a united action to draw
together the different operators and agents of development within a given destination
(Hall 1998; Pearce 1992). Central government plays an arbiter role in serving
competing interests in tourism planning. The defence of local and minority interests,
notably the role of balancing various interests and values, in order to meet national or
regional public interests rather than private interests has traditionally been a central
government duty. The provision of infrastructure is also a widely accepted activity for
public authorities - one which can facilitate tourism development and selectively
direct it to particular areas (Pearce 1992).

The conceptual framework notes that local government is likely to be
indispensable for both tourism planning and development. Local government is “a
conductor, facilitating and leading a complex range and variety of organisations in
civil society. The active civil society needs to be sustained and nurtured and local
authorities would have a key role in establishing a framework for interest expression
and co-operative problem solving” (Frazer and Lacey 1993: 28). "Local government
is no passing luxury. It should be a guardian of fundamental values. It represents, first
and foremost, a spread of political power...Local authorities represent the dispersion
of legitimate political power in our society” (Jones and Stewart 1985 in Stoker 1996:
12). Local government should be appreciated, as it can impair the anchored power of
more central authorities (Stoker 1996). The private sector is another major influential
actor in tourism planning and development, as it is responsible for most commercial
development and the operation of most tourist facilities and services, along with much
marketing. Additionally, some activities depend on voluntary relationships between
individuals and groups often motivated by affectivity or ethical commitment (Brett
2000). This is related to civil society, a third sector which can consist of families,
professional associations, political parties, participatory organisations and NGOs. Their characteristics are different to those of state or commercial organisations. That is, they are private in that they do not depend on the coercive power of the state, and unlike private sector firms, they do not depend on self-interest where success is determined primarily by the measuring rod of money. Nowadays, voluntary organisations at international, national and local scales are involved in different aspects of tourism, such as conservation of the natural, historic, and cultural resources that tourism can use, and development of eco-tourism and community based projects. In the past, these organisations have often not been taken particularly seriously in policy circles, as they tend to have a limited role in service delivery (Brett 2000). However, this has altered for both practical and ideological reasons. The building and maintaining of close relations of co-operation and co-ordination among public, private and voluntary sector organisations and the community throughout the planning and implementation process is increasingly recognised as important in order to ensure that development achieves common objectives. The balance of power and extent of co-ordination between these organisations are central issues, effecting the outcomes of planning and development. As discussed in chapter 2 sections 2.3 and 2.4, due to the multi-faceted nature of the tourism industry and diverse activities engaged in by these organisations, the questions of co-ordination and interorganisational interactions are critical in the analysis of tourism development initiatives. Hence, these relationships are central concerns of the conceptual framework.

This framework shown in Figure 7.1 draws on and integrates existing research literature on public administration, decentralisation, systems, interorganisational relations and network theories, and on the concepts of resource exchange and power-resource dependency (see chapters 2 to 5 for more details). Within the literature, four main types of influence can be identified which affect central-local relations in tourism planning and management, including the formulation and implementation of local tourism development plans. These are: the environmental context, the administrative structures, the geographical scale of the administrative structures, and the nature of the interorganisational interactions. In the framework each of these influences is broken down into related elements which can affect central-local relations in tourism planning and management (Figure 7.1).
This model takes into consideration the role of the external environment and existing networks between organisations, and it adopts a domain level focus, which includes, "the set of actors (individuals, groups, and/or organisations) that become joined by a common problem or interest" (Gray 1989: 912). The model shown in Figure 7.1, proposes that tourism organisations at the same or different spatial scales operate in a dynamic environment, composed of micro, task and macro environment sets. It should be noted that each environment set has its own elements and there are reciprocal relations between the elements within each environment set, as well as between environment sets. Hence, these sets are not necessarily separate entities and they will exert more or less force on one another.

The arrows in Figure 7.1 emphasise this dynamic and cyclical nature of relations between the three sets of environments. As discussed in chapter 3 section 3.3, different forms of interorganisational relations, such as co-operation, co-ordination, competition or conflict begin in the context of broader social, economic, political or technological forces that cause a relationship to be initiated (Selin and Chavez, 1995). The nature of these relationships is also to be determined and shaped by the absence or existence of microenvironment elements. The arrows in Figure 7.1 indicate that an organisation's proclivity to enter into a co-operative relation with another organisation will be heightened when the resources necessary to meet its organisational objectives are scarce. Similarly, high levels of competitive uncertainty will force organisations to enter into collective arrangements (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976). When there is no respect of one another's identities (interorganisational evaluation), or there is insufficient information and consultation (communication network), the organisations are unlikely to form co-operative relations. Drawing on propositions reviewed in chapter 3 section 3.5, this model notes that organisations may know one another through working together on other projects in the past (existing network) or they might not have worked together previously (new network). Hence, the organisation's experiences with the same, similar or other organisations in the past may play an important role in interorganisational relations. These issues are now considered in more detail in the following paragraphs.

The framework is based on the premise that relationships between organisations should not be conceptualised along one dimension alone. Interorganisational
relationships in tourism planning and implementation involve relations between central and local government, NGOs, the community and the private sector. As the arrows in Figure 7.1 illustrate, the linkages are multiple, and arise in particular from the possession by each organisation of certain resources and powers. These resources and powers may be, for instance, constitutional, legal, financial, professional, informational and administrative (Jones 1980; Rhodes 1981). In other words, each organisation is interdependent and operates under the condition of partial autonomy (Gamm 1981). In other words, no organisation alone can perform its functions or tasks without at some time requiring resources controlled by other organisations or actions taken by them. Consequently, organisations within the system are likely to attempt to gain the necessary resources, and to do so they will employ various strategies.

The framework provides a means to evaluate how tourism management and tourism plan development and implementation depend on the nature of the interactions (e.g., conflictual, competitive, and co-operative) between organisations at national, provincial and local levels. The framework recognises that interorganisational relationships take place in contexts where some organisations will be co-operating with each other for mutual benefit, while others are competing for the same political, financial and informational resources or locus of power. As discussed in chapter 3 section 3.5, integral to the framework is the contention that peaceful and harmonious interactions based on mutual agreement are only viable where each organisation respects the rights of all the others, and where viable institutions exist which embody and enforce the rules which allow them to exchange scarce resources on a secure and equitable basis.

The framework helps to evaluate how these organisations relate to their surrounding environment. As reviewed in chapter 3 section 3.3, it assumes that the nature of these interorganisational interactions is likely to be influenced by the structural dimensions of the environment, including the degree of resource concentration or dispersal, the concentration or diffusion of power, and extent of autonomy or mutual dependence (Benson 1975). In this environment the external regulations may take the form of either enacted laws, rules, or procedures or of the attitudes and values of the organisations, and these then shape the nature of the
interorganisational relationships (Dawson 1986). The political culture of the country, the general economic conditions, as well as broader government policies are also likely to influence the plan outcomes by laying the foundation for interorganisational relations, including the communication networks, between the different levels of government agencies. They also affect the organisational interdependencies, their strategic perspectives, and their problem solving capacities (Klijn 1997; Pearce 1992). This framework sees institutions as integrated within sets of rules that structure social interactions in particular ways, based on the knowledge shared by the members of the relevant community or society (Brett 2000). In other words, institutions both are affected by and affect the norms, rules, habits, customs and routines, both formal and informal, which govern the society at large. They influence the function, structure and behaviour of organisations and groups of individuals bound by some common purpose and who come together to achieve joint objectives (Brett 2000).

The framework helps to assess the character of centralist approaches to government where a few central actors develop and apply policy proposals on their own, and of localist approaches where local capacities and suggestions are much more prominent. The framework recognises that collective action by actors at all geographical scales can play a central part in tourism policy-making and implementation. Certain rules and procedures tend to regulate the processes of exchange between organisations (Laughlin 1996; O'Toole, 1997). For example, the legal and institutional framework strongly influences the allocation of financial resources, determines the duty to provide access to information, and is an important determinant of the hierarchical character of relationships in the organisational network. An analysis of interorganisational relations needs to be placed in the context of this institutional framework in order to understand its effects on system outcomes.

In essence, the conceptual framework developed for this study identifies the influences and processes affecting inter-organisational relations relevant to tourism, notably central- local government relations. Drawing on the concepts identified in the Literature Review chapters, this framework suggests that, in a tourism administrative context, consideration needs to be given to the character of the interactions between various actors in the system (patterns of interaction), the distribution of roles and duties between and within sub-systems, the extent of communication and co-
ordination between the actors, the characteristics of the environmental context of the system and the related constraints, and the delegation or devolution of power (power distribution). Moreover, there needs to be an understanding of the interdependency between the different actors in the system in which tourism operates.

In order to enhance understanding of inter-organisational relations in relation to tourism-oriented policies, and notably of central-local government relations, this framework suggests that the research should identify:

- The range of public, private and voluntary institutions involved in tourism management and in tourism plan formulation and implementation and also their overall and more specific aims and objectives.
- The extent to which different public, private and voluntary organisations influence tourism planning decisions at the local level (including the legal power to do so).
- The formal and informal rules and procedures that regulate the interactions between these institutions (notably the legislative framework and the “rules of the game”), and their effects on the power of these organisations.
- The extent of dependency between these institutions, notably between state and local level organisations, such as in relation to resource dependency.
- The forms of instruments (e.g., regulatory, financial, communicative, etc.,) used in managing relations between organisations, and their effects on the balance of power between those institutions.
- The overlapping responsibilities and autonomy of the institutions involved in tourism management and in the formulation and implementation of tourism plans.
- The extent of interorganisational communication and the ways in which the organisations communicate with one another.
- The extent of conflict, if any, between organisations, the sources of this conflict, the ways in which conflicts are resolved, and the effects on power relations between organisations.
- The extent of resource exchange, if any, between organisations.
- And, the extent and effectiveness of co-ordination between the organisations.
This framework is evaluated subsequently in the context of Belek's management plan. The following section now details the methodology employed in the data collection for this case study.

### 7.5 Qualitative versus quantitative research

There are two distinct trends in research styles, which have been extensively used in interorganisational relationship research (Selin and Beason 1991; Walle 1997). First, a quantitative approach, which is considered here in relation to scientific research method, and, second, the qualitative approach, which usually employs more flexible tools of investigation. Punch (1998: 4) refers to quantitative research as “empirical research where the data are in the form of numbers, and qualitative research where the data are not in the form of numbers”. Henderson's (1990:169-188) characterisation of the differences between qualitative and quantitative research are summarised in Table 7.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design Characteristics</th>
<th>Quantitative</th>
<th>Qualitative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>Pre-ordained design</td>
<td>Emergent design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>Impersonal, controlled, manipulative</td>
<td>Natural, interactive, personal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with theory</td>
<td>Confirming theory</td>
<td>Developing theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process and procedure</td>
<td>Rational</td>
<td>Intuitive</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

These two approaches are generally treated as rivals in the literature. Proponents of quantitative research argue that it is superior to qualitative research, while advocates of qualitative research insist that qualitative research offers richer insights than quantitative research. It is suggested that qualitative methods work better in examining phenomena in tourism. Several attempts have been made to demarcate and highlight the differences between these two approaches. According to some, quantitative approaches test theories, whereas the other generates theories (Finn et al 2000). While there are distinctions between the two, these two methodological approaches are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, quantitative and qualitative methods have their own strengths and weaknesses. Most researchers therefore tend to combine these two approaches so as to maximise the strengths and minimise the weakness of
each method (Finn et al 2000). Conventionally, quantitative research is sometimes preceded by qualitative research in an attempt to confirm the validity of the questions being included or to ensure that all key variables within a situation have been identified.

7.5.1 Quantitative research

From an "empiricist" perspective, quantitative research, such as questionnaire-based surveys, has a number of advantages. Notably, it is suggested that there is some assurance about the validity and reliability of the findings. This is because carefully established questionnaire-based surveys are considered to lend themselves to the possibility of generalising the findings (Robson 1993). Questionnaire-based surveys are relatively low cost per person contacted and they provide a way of collecting large amounts of information and obtaining a high accuracy of results (Pizam 1994). Data obtained from surveys can be used to explore aspects of a situation, to seek explanation, or to provide data for testing hypotheses (Robson 1993). The fact that samples in questionnaire-based surveys tend to be large requires considerable attention to be paid to how their samples are drawn, typically on a representative and/or random basis. Unlike qualitative techniques, where the researcher can begin data collection in a tentative way and returns to the subjects for additional information in order gradually to build up the concepts, questionnaire-based surveys require researchers to be very specific about their data requirements from the beginning, since they are committed irrecoverably to the responses collected (Veal 1997).

Survey research is one of the two main methods of collecting data on interorganisational relations (Richins and Pearce 2000; Selin and Beason 1991; Schmidt and Kochan 1977; Waddock and Bannister 1991). Survey research is comparative in orientation. It is however seldom conducted on a longitudinal basis in this field. The reported advantage of using such a method is the generalisation of results. The researchers can draw inferences to a larger population, and therefore it is very efficient. Selin and Beason (1991) used this method in their research on interorganisational relations between the U.S. Forest Service, chambers of commerce and tourism associations adjacent to the Arkansas National Forest. Such quantitative research however is not without limitations. The first limitation relates to the scope for the questionnaires to incorporate all of the relevant and salient attributes to
respondents (Yuksel and Yuksel 2001). The majority of studies using questionnaires seem to have relied either on secondary sources of attribute information (literature reviews, brochures, previously used questionnaires), expert opinions, or the researcher’s own judgement. Relying merely on attribute lists obtained from secondary sources of information (literature reviews, brochures) as the complete list to study a given phenomenon might be considered inappropriate. The list might be incomplete by failing to incorporate all of the relevant features, attractions, facilities, and services of a given organisation.

Other researchers using questionnaire surveys use focus groups, in-depth interviews, or a mix of these in order to develop a complete list of attributes that are considered relevant and salient to the respondents. Hence, a qualitative technique involving a fairly small number of people in some depth is used to develop the attributes to include in closed questions used in a questionnaire survey. Although the use of focus groups is a powerful technique to obtain views when conducted properly (Ryan 1995), their use also has limitations (Morgan 1997; Hines 2000 in Yuksel and Yuksel 2001). There is a real concern that the moderator, in the name of maintaining the interview’s focus, will influence the group’s interaction. The composition of the group (e.g., cultural backgrounds) also may influence the nature of the data it produces. The concerns about focus groups include both a tendency toward conformity, in which some participants withhold things they might say in private, and a tendency toward polarisation, in which some participants express more extreme views in groups than in private (Yuksel and Yuksel 2001). The presence of a group may affect what participants say and how they say it. The level of participants’ involvement in discussion is another important issue. If the participants have little involvement with the topic, the researcher may only collect scattered information. In a typical focus group, six to ten people discuss a topic for an hour or two. Each person may only have a limited number of minutes of interview time (Blaxter et al 1996). More importantly, another concern is whether the attributes considered to be relevant by focus group participants, or in-depth interviews, would also be seen as relevant to a wider sample of people with different cultures (values, norms) and evaluation criteria.

Although quantitative methods allow a much larger sample size and range of questions to be addressed, and they are deemed to be rigorous, they also result in a
corresponding loss in data richness (Ballantyne et al 1998). Additionally, a number of the individual elements of the population might not match the behaviours and character of the aggregated population profile; it may even be the case that no one single element matches the generalised character of the population (Hyde 2000). Moreover, the way in which questions are ordered in a research instrument like a questionnaire, the number of questions, and the scales used (Likert, semantic differential, etc.) may dictate a respondent’s response to a survey item (Drew and Bolton 1991). In quantitative methods, it appears that the process is constructed in large part by the researcher (Drew and Bolton 1991: in Yuksel and Yuksel 2001). Survey research does not produce a deep and sensitive understanding of the issues being measured (Sellitiz et al 1959, Glock 1967). This causes an important problem with interorganisational analysis because survey research on this social process is conducted using a large total of actors; there is a tendency to depend on gross models and extremely general measures of human beliefs and behaviour. Consequently, the further we get away from face-to-face interaction, the more susceptible we are to errors of improper interpretation or inference (Hannon 1970). While the dominant methodology in interorganisational relationship analysis is clearly survey research, many suggest that it would be useful to expand this approach with more qualitative data (Rogers and Whetten 1982).

7.5.2 Qualitative research

While quantitative techniques are often considered rigorous and statistically credible, given the complications, some researchers argue that qualitative methods fit better in examining the largely human and social phenomena involved with tourism. Conducting qualitative research, such as interviews, may offer several advantages over other data collection techniques. An interview offers the possibility of modifying the line of enquiry and the opportunity to follow up interesting responses, and it allows the investigation of underlying motives in a way that postal or other self-administered questionnaires cannot (Robson 1993). It allows for in-depth investigation of the subject and has a higher response rate than that of self-administered questionnaires. It is more appropriate for revealing information about feelings and emotions regarding different subjects (Pizam 1994). An interview is suggested to be the most advantageous approach to attempt to obtain data where there are a large number of questions to be answered; where the questions are either complex or open-ended; and where the order and logic of questioning may need to be varied (Healey 1991; Saunders et al 1997). The qualitative
method is argued to be better able to encompass change over time than quantitative research, with the latter tending to look only at current behaviour related to current social, economic, and environmental circumstances, ignoring the fact that most people's behaviour is heavily influenced by their life story and experience (Veal 1997). However, while qualitative research can be a source of ideas, insights and new perspectives on a problem, it has limitations such as cost and the time involved in comparison to other data collection methods. The lack of standardisation inevitably also raises concern for the reliability and generality of the findings. Interviews may also be contaminated by the eagerness of the respondent to please the interviewer (Bailey 1978). Although interviews offer a substantial number of advantages, making profitable use of interviews calls for considerable skill and experience from the researcher in the interviews.

The lack of standardisation is one of the conventional concerns relating to the rigour, reliability, and generality of findings derived from qualitative techniques. Quantitative research is often preferred, as it is believed that it provides a statistical generalisation. That is, one takes a sample of elements by a probability selection method, a sample that allows estimation of the properties of the population of interest with a known degree of accuracy. However, the goal in qualitative research is to expand and generalise theories, not to establish the frequency with which a phenomenon is likely to occur in a population (Hyde 2000). Thus, if undertaking research is not a question of numbers but of reasoning, then a qualitative study, when studied sufficiently in-depth and with sufficient insight, can be as sound as a quantitative one, if not more so (Christy and Wood 1999; Decrop 1999; Hyde 2000; O'Donnel and Cummins 1999). The goal of this research was to explain and understand the content of inter-organisational relations rather than to predict and measure things. Statistical generalising from the sample findings to the whole population was not vitally important for this research.

An additional debate over the use of a qualitative technique is that its analysis is often said to be subjective. In contrast, the analysis and interpretation of quantitative research is deemed to be entirely "objective". However, there are several reasons why this may not be the case. For example, some statistical techniques, such as factor analysis and cluster analysis, permit researchers to rotate data almost to the point where they get the answer they are looking for (Ryan 1995). Some sources of subjectivity in the analysis of qualitative research might also be reduced by the use of computer-aided qualitative data.
analysis techniques and by use of the inter-rated reliability method (Yuksel and Yuksel 2001). This method assumes that if two or more observers reach the same conclusion regarding the characteristics of one or several participants, then this conclusion is more likely to be an objective observation rather than a personal subjective opinion. Unfortunately, the role of qualitative enquiry has generally been regarded as secondary to that of quantitative research, with qualitative research simply advised as a first step to be taken before the quantitative enquiry. A qualitative study, however, can be as sound as a quantitative enquiry, and can lead to valid research findings in its own right, and it has its own strengths and also limitations.

There are various methods to assess opinions, including questionnaire-based surveys, group interviews, and individual interviews, and it seems that choosing the most appropriate method often involves compromises (Ballantyne et al 1998). While personal interviews allow individual responses to be explored and probed in depth, and thus they can provide a more complete understanding of opinions, they involve significant cost in the time and effort involved in data collection and analysis. As a result, interview surveys tend to be limited to small sample sizes and relatively few research questions. Review of debates over the suitability and credibility of qualitative and quantitative techniques indicates that both qualitative and quantitative techniques can lead to valid research findings and may serve different research objectives. Neither approach needs to rely on the other for its respectability, reliability and validity (Yuksel and Yuksel 2001). What was required in this research was not qualitative research followed by quantitative research for triangulation purposes, but an approach to provide in-depth insights into inter-organisational relations in Belek within the confines of the sample size and the research resources. It is accepted that method triangulation, perhaps involving a combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques, is helpful to increase the soundness of research findings. Triangulation allows for the examination of a research question from different perspectives and hence for cross-validation of the data (Decrop 1999). However, there are many other ways for achieving this, such as using (1) different qualitative techniques, (2) secondary as well as primary sources of data, and (3) different researchers to interpret the data. In fact this particular combination of triangulation methods is the formula used for this present examination of Belek.
7.6 Semi structured interviews

In this study two-phased, semi-structured interviews were conducted with five different groups of stakeholders involved in the formulation and implementation of the BMP. The reason for involving five groups of stakeholders and a common interview schedule was to have comparable information related to the research questions under investigation. These five stakeholder groups include central government officials (ministry levels, provincial and district levels), local government officials (municipalities and villages), local people, voluntary sector organisations (or NGOs), and the private sector organisations. An investigation into the extent of involvement of these five stakeholder groups in decisions related to the preparation and implementation of the Belek Management Plan was warranted. It is well documented that achieving the objectives of sustainable tourism development, such as economic health, subjective well-being of locals, unspoiled environments and protection of resources, relies heavily on the identification and reconciliation of various attitudes of different stakeholders toward tourism development.

The reason why two-phased interviews were carried out is simply that a broad array of issues needs to be addressed. Undertaking a long, single-phase interview could have reduced the reliability and quality of the data due to possible respondent fatigue (Neuman 1997). Robson (1993: 229) warns that "anything under half an hour is unlikely to be valuable; anything going much over an hour may be making unreasonable demands on busy interviewees; and could have the effect of reducing the numbers of people willing to participate, which might in turn lead to biases in the sample...". In order to prevent this, the researcher obtained the co-operation of the interviewees, remained vigilant to any sign of boredom on the part of the interviewee during the actual interview session, and, if this happened, then terminated the interview and resumed it on a later agreed date. All interview sessions were carefully planned. Visit arrangements were agreed, necessary permissions were gained in advance, and when the need arose due to the unavailability of the interviewee on that day, the appointment was rescheduled. The guidance suggested in the literature in relation to conducting interviews was strictly observed during the interview sessions (Robson 1993; Saunders et al 1997; Veal 1997). These are to listen more than you speak, to put questions in a straightforward, clear, and non-threatening way, to eliminate clues which lead interviewees to respond in a particular way, to avoid
double or combined questions, and not to include questions involving jargon and bias. Probes were used to get the interviewee to expand on a response. The conventional sequence of interviewing (introduction, warm-up, main body of interview, cool-off, and closure) was followed in both phases of the interviews. The majority of interviewees were willing to be interviewed partly because the interview topic was interesting and relevant to their own current work, and because they allowed them to reflect on current and past events.

Semi-structured interviews were preferred because, while the interviewer had worked out a set of questions in advance, they were also free to modify their order based upon their perception of what seemed most appropriate in the context of the structured conversation. They could change the way they are worded, give explanations, leave out particular questions which seem inappropriate with a particular interviewee, as well as being able to include additional questions (Robson 1993). Semi-structured interviews have been used by other interorganisational relationship researchers (Bramwell and Sharman 1999; Selin and Chavez 1994, Yuksel 1998). Semi-structured interviews potentially yield rich insights on people's experiences, opinions, aspirations and feelings. This was a flexible and adaptable way of finding things out in relation to the present research. It gave the researcher opportunities to seek clarification and elaboration on the answers given (May 1997).

Semi-structured interviews are suitable in qualitative research in order to conduct exploratory discussions to reveal and understand not only the "what and how", but also to place more emphasis on exploring the "why" (Saunders et al 1997). The conduct of interviews requires considerable skill and experience (Robson 1993; Saunders et al 1997; Ryan 1995). Its success also depends in part on the extent and quality of the preparatory work, which precedes the interviews.

7.6.1 Development and implementation of the semi-structured interviews

The research was organised into four interdependent phases. These were: desk research, site visit, pilot study and the actual study phases.

7.6.1.1 Desk research
An extensive review was undertaken of the secondary data published about Belek in different media and of existing research knowledge with regard to tourism administration, planning and implementation. This helped to build adequate information about the case area and to understand what has been done and what has not been done in the academic literature. The desk research commenced in 1998. It involved a review of relevant books and periodical journals, of a large number of domestic and international dissertations, theses, reports and conference proceedings, and of information available on the world-wide-web. This desk research process continued until the end of the research in order to keep abreast with new developments in the subject and also to develop and refine a workable conceptual framework. Study was made of research areas covered in previous interorganisational research, of the methodologies they employed, and their major findings and limitations, and this helped to refine the research objectives and questions. It also helped to highlight research possibilities that have been overlooked, to avoid repeating work that has already been done, and to gain insight into research strategies and methodologies that would be appropriate for the present research (Borg and Gall 1989). Additionally, a careful review was made of tourism legislation in the country, particularly the Investment Law, the 1982 Constitution, and the Municipality Law. Advice was also gained from key bureaucrats and directors, with this helping to develop a general understanding of tourism-related administration processes and organisations in the country. A list of libraries and organisations visited in the course of the desk research in Turkey is given in Table 7.2. This on-going desk research was extremely helpful as it provided the researcher with an awareness of the current state of knowledge on the subject area, its limitations and of how the present research fits into this wider context (Gill and Johnson 1991).

Table 7.2 Organisations and libraries visited in Turkey for the desk research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation/Institution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilkent University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baskent University</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Association of Tourism Development Investors (Betuyab)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Planning Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ministry of Tourism</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Ministry of Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Union of Mediterranean Municipalities (Antalya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provincial Government of Antalya</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Organisation of Middle East Public Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Society for the Protection of Nature (NPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Union of Ankara Municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Library</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.6.1.2 Site visits

The knowledge building process was consolidated through site visits made prior to the conduct of the main data collection phase. Saunders et al (1997) note that the researcher's ability to collect data will depend on gaining access to appropriate sources. Failing to gain physical and social access is not uncommon in social research, and the reasons for this could be that individuals may not be prepared to engage in additional, voluntary activities because of the time and resources required. Other reasons for failing to gain access include a lack of interest due to a low valuation of the worth of research in relation to the work of the organisation or the individual, the sensitivity of the topic, concerns about the confidentiality of the information sought, and low perceptions about the credibility or competence of the researcher. Hence problems might occur in gaining permission for physical access, maintaining that access, and being able to create a sufficient scope to the access to address the research objectives fully. In order to overcome these potential limitations, the researcher used site visits to build up contacts and to use these early contacts again during the main research phase (Buchanan et al 1988). Buchanan et. al. (1988: 56) say, "we have been most successful where we have a friend, relative or student working in the organisations". These initial contacts were also used in this research to establish a track record, with these contacts then referred to in the approaches to other organisations and individuals. This approach was easier to adopt in this research as it is based on case study and non-probability sampling. These contacts were used in relation to the purposive (and snowball) sampling process used in this study. Building personal contacts is essential in Turkey, where the importance of personal contacts forms a part of the "research conditions or culture". For this reason site visits to three different localities were made prior to the main research. The site visits were helpful in terms of identifying and making contact with the initial informants about the case, and in establishing other contacts to meet in the main research phase. The site visits in Belek also helped the researcher to become familiar with the case study area, to build rapport with key informants who continued to provide indispensable information about on-going developments, to gain invaluable insights into how the actual research should be conducted, and to make practical arrangements for the main data collection phase.
A preliminary field visit to the case study area of Belek was undertaken in order to understand the broad nature of the problem, identify organisations involved in tourism management (notably in the formulation and implementation of the Belek plan), gain access to these organisations, convince them to participate in the study, review published material concerning tourism administration in Belek and in Turkey as a whole, and to identify and refine issues and themes to be pursued in the main interviews. The preliminary visit was undertaken between June and July 1999.

During this visit, preliminary interviews were conducted with a number of conveniently selected representatives of key organisations involved in the formulation and implementation of the Belek Management Plan (Table 7.3). The respondents were categorized by organisation type and the geographical scale at which they had strongest interests. This was important given the focus on central-local relations. Among the public sector organisations there is a broad spread across central, provincial and local spatial scales. At the central or national spatial scale there is representation from the ministries, and planning and statistical institutions, and at the provincial scale there are representatives with administration, planning, and coastal development interests. At the local scale, there are more representatives with legal, administration, and environmental interests. In Table 7.2 the private and voluntary sector organisations were categorized as "others" as the study was less interested in spatial scale issues outside the public sector.

It was appropriate to use information obtained from the preliminary interviews in planning the subsequent semi-structured interviews within the main phase. It encouraged greater qualitative depth by allowing the interviewees to talk about the subject in terms of their own frames of reference and it provided a greater understanding of the subjects' point of view (May 1998; Veal 1997). The use of such preliminary interviews is valuable in the formulation of a research problem, in the articulation of dimensions and hypotheses, and in the detailed development of a key research instrument (Blaxter, Hughes and Tight 1996; Oppenheim 1992). The use of these initial exploratory interviews was of particular value for this research, as significant issues affecting the subject under investigation were identified, and these were then followed up during the later stages of the research (Chisnall 1992). Other researchers examining interorganisational relations have used similar methodologies.
in order to build valid research questions and instruments. To develop a valid and appropriate interview schedule, Tjosvold (1988) used a critical incident method, Selin and Myers (1995; 1998) made personal visits to key members of a partnership organisation, and Williams et. al. (1998) used the observation of preliminary meetings and a review of secondary data.

In the preliminary interviews, there was no tightly structured list of questions to work through, as the intent was to develop a clear idea about the aspects to be explored subsequently. The informants were given the opportunity to talk freely about events, and about their behaviour and beliefs in relation to how tourism planning was undertaken in the area. They were also free to discuss what successes and mistakes had occurred, how the implementation of the initiative was progressing, and so on. These interviews were tape recorded and later verbatim transcribed and then content analysed in order to uncover themes that needed to be addressed in the following phase. The research steps of transcribing and content analysis were relatively onerous and time consuming (Ritchie 1999). Although many decisions taken in later stages of the research were equally demanding, it was gathering and analysing this initial information as the basis for key subsequent research decisions that consumed a particularly large share of the research effort.

Table 7.3 The respondents involved in the preliminary interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical scale</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type of organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>State Planning Department</td>
<td>Ankara Central</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>The Ministry of Tourism</td>
<td>Ankara Central</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>City Planner</td>
<td>The Ministry of Tourism</td>
<td>Ankara Central</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>City Planner</td>
<td>The Ministry of Tourism</td>
<td>Ankara Central</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Economist</td>
<td>State Statistics Department</td>
<td>Ankara Central</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>State Statistics Department</td>
<td>Ankara Central</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Tourism Statistics Department of the Ministry of Tourism</td>
<td>Ankara Central</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>Planning Coordinator</td>
<td>Provincial Government of Antalya</td>
<td>Antalya Provincial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>Director General</td>
<td>Tourism Directorate of Antalya Province</td>
<td>Antalya Provincial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>Marine Life Engineer</td>
<td>The Authority for Specially Protected Areas</td>
<td>Antalya Provincial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Attorney</td>
<td>The Union of Mediterranean Municipalities</td>
<td>Antalya Local</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Executive Secretary</td>
<td>The Union of Mediterranean Municipalities</td>
<td>Antalya Local</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>The Union of Mediterranean</td>
<td>Antalya Local</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.6.1.3 Pilot test

The information from the two preparatory phases, as well as from extensive consultations with the research supervisors and fellow researchers, was used to help structure the main interview questions. An initial set of seven themes and 59 interview questions were determined. Then pilot tests were run to identify and eliminate problems associated with the research strategy and with these questions before the main research was carried out (Johns and Lee-Ross 1998). Pilot testing is the process of trying out the research techniques and methods that the researcher has in mind, seeing how well they work in practice, and, if necessary, modifying them accordingly (Blaxter, Hughes and Tight 1996). It is an exploratory but essential stage in the development of effective questions (Callan 1997), as “no amount of intellectual exercise could substitute for actually testing an instrument” (Bennet and Krebs 1994: 170). Blaxter et al (1996: 122) stress that “You may think that you know well enough what you are doing, but the value of pilot research cannot be overestimated. Things never work quite the way you envisage, even if you have done them many times before, and they have a nasty habit of turning out very differently than you expected. So try a pilot exercise”. Others also point out that, “Well-organised piloting reveals possible misinterpretations owing to ignorance or misunderstanding of questions, and indicates differences in the frames of reference between the researcher and respondents” (Chisnall 1992: 118). In the quantitative field, Oppenheim notes how “Questionnaires do not emerge fully-fledged; they have to be created or adapted, fashioned and developed to maturity after many abortive test flights. Pilot work can be of the greatest help in devising the actual wording of questions, and it operates as a healthy check, since fatal ambiguities may lurk in the most unexpected quarters” (1992: 47). It is important to note that there are no general ground rules on the size and the arrangement of the pilot surveys, and it is stated that the size (and
arrangement) are a matter of convenience, practicability, time and money (Chisnall 1992; Moser and Kalton 1989). The adequacy and the appropriateness of the research questions were assessed in five test interviews (mainly with academics, fellow research and Turkish graduate students studying in the UK, and representatives from the Nature Preservation Society). The number of questions was reduced from 59 to 42, as there were similarities. The order of questions was slightly modified based on comments and observations. Upon the completion of the pilot tests and revision of the questions, they were translated into Turkish to overcome language problems. In this procedure, two bilinguals translated the questions from their original in English to Turkish. In order to ensure the conceptual equivalence in meaning the translation process was repeated twice, with the translated versions also being interchanged between the two translators.

7.6.1.4 Interview questions

The questions for the main interviews were structured to explore the perceptions of the interviewees, who were all directly involved in the formulation/implementation of the management plan, on seven interconnected conceptual themes. These questions drew on the earlier preliminary interviews. The preliminary interviews were tape-recorded, with only a few exceptions, and they were subsequently transcribed word-for-word for later content analysis. Two academicians coded the interviews, with the codes intended to reflect major themes, and also re-coded into sub-themes to reflect more specific content. Additionally, a wide range of literature on tourism planning, interorganisational relations, network management, coordination, co-operation, collaboration, public administration, and decentralisation was also scanned prior to the construction of the main interview questions. The researcher established a question bank through the analysis of the preliminary interviews and the literature review (e.g., Benson et al 1972; Schmidt and Kochan 1977; Taner 1978; Costa 1996; Selin and Beason 1991; Selin and Chavez 1995; Selin and Myers 1994; Wiliams et al 1998). Based on the whole research process, but especially the conceptual framework shown in Figure 7.1, seven key conceptual themes were identified, and these were used to structure the questions in the interviews. These are shown in Table 7.4. These conceptual themes are the planning issues in Belek, inter-organisational communication, stakeholder involvement and consensus building, resource sufficiency and exchange, inter-organisational co-
ordination, the roles and activities of the organisations, and the delegation of power. These conceptual themes bring together the many issues raised by the conceptual framework, and provide a useful thematic approach for other researchers. They simplify and give coherence to the many issues identified in Figure 7.1, offering a clear, sequential structure for the interview questions and a set of themes which may be of value for other academics interested in understanding inter-organisational relations, and especially central-local government relations, around tourism planning in other areas. Due to the broad scope of the study findings, these seven conceptual themes are used to structure the seven different sections in the results chapter (chapter 8).

### Table 7.4 The seven conceptual themes derived from the conceptual framework and used to organise the questions in the interview schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning issues in Belek</th>
<th>Section 8.1 of Results chapter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-organisational communication</td>
<td>Section 8.2 of Results chapter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder involvement and consensus building</td>
<td>Section 8.3 of Results chapter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource sufficiency and exchange</td>
<td>Section 8.4 of Results chapter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-organisational co-ordination</td>
<td>Section 8.5 Results chapter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The roles and activities of the organisations</td>
<td>Section 8.6 Results chapter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation of power</td>
<td>Section 8.7 Results chapter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In each section in the results chapter, the findings for Belek are discussed in the light of the relevant theory and concepts in the academic literature. The first section of the results chapter identifies factors that respondents considered affected tourism development in the region. The next section presents the structural and situational factors identified as facilitating or obstructing effective communication between central government and local organisations in Belek. The subsequent, third section attempts to explain what the stakeholders involved in the BMP thought about the decision-making process, notably whether they felt able to raise their concerns and whether they considered their concerns were incorporated satisfactorily in the decisions. The fourth section compares respondents' views about the adequacy of the organisational resources held by different parties involved in the BMP, including their financial, legal, informational and political power. The subsequent section examines the extent of co-ordination and co-operation between parties involved in the BMP,
and considers the influence on, and barriers to co-ordination and co-operation. The sixth section examines the perceptions of respondents about the responsibilities, competence, and performance of their own and of other organisations. The last section considers the forms of decentralisation that different stakeholders might consider suitable.

Based on the seven conceptual themes, the initial list of 59 questions was later reduced to 42 questions following the pilot interviews and discussions with supervisors and fellow researchers. The prepared list was then re-piloted with two respondents from the Belek Management Plan to identify and address potential problems. The list of questions used for the main semi-structured interviews, with headings based on the seven conceptual themes and which are highlighted in bold, is shown in Table 7.5.

**Table 7.5 Interview questions and related seven conceptual themes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning issues in Belek</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What inhibits or facilitates the effectiveness of the BMP for the development of tourism in the Belek region?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you aware of the Belek Management Plan (BMP) and the tourism planning proposals it contains? If yes, do you support these proposals? Why?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inter-organisational communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In designing and implementing the BMP, with which organisations did you communicate most?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What reasons did you generally have for communicating with these organisations when designing and implementing the BMP?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From your organisation's perspective, was communication with central government organisations or local organisations more important in relation to the BMP? and why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were there barriers to achieving effective communication in the design and implementation of the BMP? If yes, what were they?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How might improvements be made in communications between national and local organisations in relation to the BMP?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would communication between organisations be improved if tourism planning decisions for Belek were left more to local or national organisations?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder involvement and consensus building</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Which parties with an interest in the Belek region have participated most or have been excluded from making decisions about the BMP? Why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have the concerns of all relevant parties, including your own concerns, been taken into account during the design and implementation of the BMP? If not, which parties' concerns have not been taken into account in the design and implementation of the BMP?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How well were differences, if any, worked out between all parties involved in the design and implementation of the BMP?

Which national and local organisations, if any, have had most influence on the design and implementation decisions of the BMP? Why?

Has there been any change in the authority and responsibility of national or local organisations between the design and the implementation phases of the BMP? If yes, what were the implications of this on the design and implementation of the BMP?

If local organisations and national organisations have disagreed about how tourism is managed in Belek, what has been the cause of this disagreement? How has this been resolved, if at all?

Would it be likely to help or hinder reaching agreement about tourism planning decisions affecting Belek if these decisions were left more to local or national organisations?

Resource sufficiency and exchange
Which organisations participating in designing and implementing the BMP, if any, have lacked sufficient financial resources to make a success of implementing the Plan?

Which organisations participating in designing and implementing the BMP, if any, have lacked sufficient legal authority to make a success of implementing the Plan?

Which organisations participating in designing and implementing the BMP, if any, have lacked sufficient information and understanding of the issues affecting tourism in Belek to make a success of implementing the Plan?

Which organisations participating in designing and implementing the BMP, if any, have lacked sufficient political power or influence to make a success of implementing the Plan?

Which specific national and local organisations have contributed most resources to implementing the BMP?

Are there any specific national or local organisations that have not contributed as many resources as they should to implementing the BMP? Why?

Did some local and national organisations compete with each other for funds or authority? Why?

Would it be likely to help or hinder the Plan implementation if the control of resources was left more to the local or national government organisations?

Inter-organisational co-ordination
Are there any tourism related services that your organisation would like to provide but is not able to under the present legislation?

Which other local or national organisations, if any, have similar responsibility and authority in relation to tourism planning in Belek to that of your organisation?

Are all national and local organisations involved in tourism planning in Belek working together effectively to achieve the objectives of the BMP? If not, which local and national organisations are not working together effectively to achieve the objectives of the BMP, and why is this the case?

Is there anything about the ways things are done which tends to limit co-ordination and co-operation between national and local organisations involved in the BMP?

Can you suggest changes in the procedures and polices, which would encourage greater co-ordination and co-operation between national and local organisations in relation to Belek?

Would it be likely to help or hinder the co-ordination of tourism planning for Belek, if tourism planning decisions were left more to local or national government organisations?
The roles and activities of the organisations
How does the division of authority and responsibility between national and local organisations in relation to tourism planning in Belek affect the implementation of the BMP, if at all?

Do you believe that some parts of the implementation work of central government in relation to the BMP could be done more effectively by a different organisation? If so, then what parts and what organisations would you suggest?

Do you believe that central government should expand or reduce present activities in the Belek region? Why?

What tasks to implement the BMP do you believe should be the prime responsibility of the municipality, if any?

Do you believe that currently the municipalities carry out their tasks effectively in relation to the implementation of the BMP?

Do you believe that some activities of local government could be done more effectively by another organisation? If so, then what parts and what organisations would you suggest?

Do you believe that local government should expand or reduce some of its present activities in the region?

What specific changes would you like to see in their tasks? Why do you think those changes are needed?

What tasks to implement the BMP do you believe should be the prime responsibility of provincial government, if any?

Do you believe that currently the provincial government carries out its tasks effectively in relation to the implementation of the BMP?

Would the relationship between your organisation and other local and national organisations be improved if current political, economic or legal systems and procedures were changed?

Delegation of power
What would you think if central government passed the planning authority in relation to tourism in Belek to

- the municipalities
- a non-government organisation, such as Betuyab?
- an independent agency set up jointly by the relevant national and local organisations?

What would you think if the central government retained its planning authority in relation to Belek?

The interview questions were structured to evaluate four main types of influences identified within the literature which affect inter-organisational relations, and notably central-local relations, in tourism planning and management. These are the environmental context, the administrative structures, the geographical scales of the administrative structures, and the nature of the inter-organisational interaction. Drawing on the research aims and objectives and on the Conceptual Framework, interview questions sought to elicit information about the planning issues in the case
study area, the extent of communication among participants, level of participation of the respondents, sufficiency of resources, the distribution of roles and duties between organisations, the extent of co-ordination and co-operation between the actors, and the delegation of power.

It is emphasised within the literature that the linkages are multiple, and arise in particular from the possession by each organisation of certain resources and powers. These resources and powers may be, for instance, constitutional, legal, financial, professional, informational and administrative (Jones, 1980; Rhodes, 1981). The extent to which these resources and powers are distributed equally or they are concentrated in a relatively small group of organisations who dominate decision processes, can be an important influence on plan success or failure. Each organisation will control some resources, and each organisation has to interact with others in order to acquire the resources necessary for goal achievement since no organisation can generate independently all the necessary resources. Specific questions were thus developed to seek the extent of interdependency, resource exchange and power relations between the different actors in the tourism planning system. Additionally, as was emphasised in the Conceptual Framework, implementation involves the joint efforts of various organisational parties, often located at different tiers of government. And, the existence of co-ordinative relations between tourism organisations at different spatial scales is considered imperative in order to formulate and implement effective tourism development plans and to accomplish harmonious tourism development. Co-ordination cannot be achieved without communication. Hence, questions were developed to understand the extent of interorganisational communication and the ways in which the organisations communicate with one another and how fragmented activities of different public and private sector agencies are co-ordinated. To address the specific objectives of the research, further questions were constructed to understand the overlapping responsibilities and autonomy of the public, private and voluntary institutions involved in tourism planning in Belek, the extent of conflict between organisations, the sources of this conflict, the ways in which conflicts are resolved, and their effects on power relations between organisations. Questions were also developed to elicit information on different forms of decentralisation and their strengths and limitations in addressing the potential problems of centralised tourism management.
More specifically, the first two questions in the semi-structured interview schedule (Table 7.5) are partly a warm-up section for the interview and they deal with general planning and development issues affecting the Belek area (planning issues in Belek). The focus of the second set (inter-organisational communication) is on the extent and quality of interaction among participants involved in the formulation and implementation of the management plan. These questions examine the extent of communications among organisations and how these communications were conducted. Any existing barriers and how they could be overcome are also investigated. The third section (stakeholder involvement and consensus building) focuses on the level of participation of the respondents in the plan formulation and implementation, also on whether all relevant stakeholders with an interest in Belek could raise their concerns, and whether these concerns had been successfully incorporated into the plan objectives. The fourth section (resource sufficiency and exchange) explores the perceptions of interviewees on the sufficiency or insufficiency of the resources that the organisations possessed to make a success of the management plan. The fifth section (inter-organisational co-ordination) examines the extent of co-ordination and co-operation between parties involved in the BMP, and reflects the influences on, and barriers to co-ordination and co-operation. The sixth section is analysed by the next set of questions (the roles and activities of the organisations). These questions seek to discover the participants’ perceptions as to their own and other organisations’, authority, responsibility, competence and performance. Consideration is also given to the extent of any interorganisational equilibrium among organisations. The seventh and final section (delegation of power) addresses the respondents’ opinions on whether leaving planning authority to different organisations - whether local, national and private - would produce better results.

7.6.1.5 Sampling procedure

Sampling is "the activity of selecting a few from the total and using the characteristics of the few to estimate the characteristics of the total"(Cannon 1994: 132). Drawing on a review of literature on sampling methods, this research adopted the combination of snowball and purposive (judgemental) sampling in selecting the representatives to be interviewed. Snowballing was used as a valuable technique to identify respondents for the interviews in the Belek case study. This technique
required asking respondents for the names of the participants involved in the BMP. The named respondents were then also asked to single out other relevant parties, and this process carried on until no new names were mentioned. It is suggested that this type of sampling is often used when working with very small samples, such as in case study research, when the researcher wishes to select cases that are particular informative about the research issue being studied (Neuman 1991).

The principle of selection in purposive sampling is the researcher’s judgement as to typicality or interest. Robson (1993) suggests that by employing purposive sampling a sample is formed which enables the researcher to satisfy their own specific needs for a project. Whether the selected sample represents the population is arguable, but purposive sampling is suggested as being an acceptable kind of sampling for special case studies (Neuman 1991).

The researcher used a “participant list” included in the BMP document of the 28 representatives who had been involved in meetings for the formulation of the plan. Fifteen individuals in this original "participant list" were contacted and interviewed. The researcher was unable to contact the remaining individuals due to changes of address or their appointment to new tasks in other places. Two of them were foreign consultants, and hence they were not accessible. Based on these fifteen, a snowball sampling technique was employed, whereby each of the respondents provided more names for potential inclusion in the sample (Finn et al 2000), based on who they considered had also been involved in the preparation or implementation of the Belek Coastal Management Plan (BMP). This helped to identify key informants who might otherwise not be included, as they were not in the original "participant list", but who were considered by the participants to have taken an active role in the Plan. First, contacts were made with a few central government officials. They were then asked to identify other participants involved in the plan design or implementation that were not included in the original "participant list". They identified a number of private sector members, local government officials and locals who were not listed. These people were then asked to identify other relevant participants. Using this snowball process, a total of 32 respondents were identified, this number being considered satisfactory for the study objectives. The researcher met with two refusals to be interviewed due to their feeling that they had insufficient knowledge about the plan. The resulting total
size of the sample (N= 30) is similar to many other studies using in-depth interview techniques (e.g., Bramwell and Sharman 1999; Schmidt and Kochan 1977; Timothy 1998; Yuksel 1998).

These people were grouped into five stakeholder groups: central government officials, local government officials, local people, voluntary sector organisations, and private sector organisations. It was imperative to obtain the opinions of officials in local government, provincial government, and in the private and voluntary (or NGO) sectors, as well as local people, as they were key actors with reference to the BMP. They also reflect the study's interest in spatial scale and the relations between central, provincial, and local scales. The Central government officials in the "participant list" consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Resettlement, the Provincial Government, and the State Planning Institution. The Local government officials consisted of mayors, ex-mayors and union members of the four municipalities. The private sector representatives were from the Association of Tourism Investors (Betuyab), Antalya Culture Preservation Association (ANSAV) and GATAB (Union of South Antalya Infrastructure). Finally, there were voluntary sector (or NGO) representatives, including from the Society for Natural Preservation (NPS), and academics from two universities. There were also some local people included in the list.

7.6.1.6 Research implementation

The main field research was carried out between June and October 2000. This was followed by the verbatim transcription of the interviews, identification of common themes (including the involvement of an independent researcher for triangulation), analysis of the qualitative data using NUD.IST software, interpretation of the findings, and final writing up.

Details of the 30 interviewees are provided in Table 7.6. The respondents were categorized by organisation type category and the geographical scale at which they had strongest interests. As is seen in Table 7.6, many of the actors involved in the BMP were public sector organisations. However, among these public sector organisations there was a broad spread across central, provincial and local spatial scales. At the central scale there was various representation from the ministries and
state planning institution, and at the provincial scale there were representatives with administration, planning, and tourism interests. At the local scale, however, there were representatives with legal, administration, and resident interests. In the table the private and voluntary sector organisations were categorised by type of interests and in accordance with the geographical scale at which their interests were focused. Among the private sector respondents there are representatives with cultural, environmental and infrastructural interests, and among the voluntary sector respondents there were representatives with education and environmental interests.

Interviews took place in seven different locations in Turkey, namely Antalya, Belek, Serik, Bogazkent, Kumkoy, Ankara and Istanbul. Seven interviewees were from central government institutions, ten were from local and provincial government, six were from private sector organisations, five were from voluntary sector organisations, and two were local people. It is important to note that the interview conducted with villagers of Kumkoy (one headman and ten villagers) was in the form of a focus group, this being due to several convenient reasons. All other representatives were interviewed either at their work places or homes. A recording device was used, where permitted, to provide an uninterrupted flow in the conversation and a complete report. Only two of the interviews were not recorded, due to the uneasiness of the interviewees. Two interviewers were present at the interviews, and one of the interviewers took notes in the two unrecorded interviews. A full record of each interview was assembled as soon as it was completed. The recorded interviews were then transcribed and prepared for analysis.

Table 7.6 List of interviewees who were involved in the preparation or implementation of the BMP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical scale</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type of Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Co-ordinator</td>
<td>State Planning Institution</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>City Planner</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Culture</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Ministry of Environment</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Antalya Governorship</td>
<td>Antalya</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>Planning Coordinator</td>
<td>Antalya Governorship</td>
<td>Antalya</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Provincial Tourism Directorate</td>
<td>Antalya</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>District Governor</td>
<td>Serik</td>
<td>Serik</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Attorney</td>
<td>The Union of Mediterranean Municipalities</td>
<td>Antalya</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Great care was taken in administering the interviews. First, carefully constructed invitation letters were sent to the interviewees, stating the purpose of the interview, the themes of the interview questions, and they were cordially invited to be interviewed (Appendix A). A reminder was sent to interviewees who failed to reply the first invitation letter, and interview dates and times were scheduled and confirmed.

The researcher did not encounter serious problems at this point due partly to the previous site visits and the quality of contacts built then. The interviewees were informed in advance that the information from this research would only be used as part of an academic investigation. Appointments were made that were convenient for the respondents, which is important because questions asked at inconvenient times “may result in misunderstanding or attract a series of rapid replies designed to get rid of the interviewer as quickly as possible” (Chisnall 1992: 150). Interviewees were provided with a list of interview themes in advance, as “providing participants with a list of interview themes before the event promotes validity and reliability through
enabling the interviewee to consider the information being requested and allowing them the opportunity to gain the supporting organisational documentation from their files” (Saunders et al 1997: 220). Assurance was given that any confidential information provided would remain confidential in order to make the interviewee more relaxed and the discussion more open (Healey and Rawlinson 1994). This was intended to increase the level of confidence in the trustworthiness of the researcher and reduce the possibility of interviewee response bias (Healey and Rawlinson 1994). It was made clear to respondents at the interview start that their own name would not be revealed in the research. In addition, the clearly phrased and appropriately worded questions were asked in a carefully neutral tone. The interviewer avoided the use of comments and non-verbal behaviour such as gestures, as the literature review suggests that the researcher's posture or tone of voice might bias or inhibit the flow of discussion (Torrington 1991). Consideration was given to developing the trust of the interviewee, to ensure the information given was as valuable as possible, and to avoid doubts about its validity and reliability. The researcher was aware that an interview could be an intrusive process, where the interviewee may not like to discuss an aspect of the topic.

Based on the literature on interview design and implementation, importance was placed on the length of the interviews. Interviews lasted on average two hours. In most cases, two-phase interviews were conducted and single-phase interviews were only carried out for two of the 30 interviewees. Based on difficulties experienced previously in qualitative research undertaken by the researcher in Turkey (Yuksel et al 1999), two interviewers were present during the interview sessions. Having had two researchers in the field facilitated many aspects of the fieldwork. For example, the research areas were dispersed throughout the country. Safety, particularly driving at night, was less of an issue with two people travelling together. Moreover, having male and female researchers assisted the accessibility issue for the interviewees. The interviewees were able to establish better rapport with the researchers in different situations and cases. For example, when the researchers went to Kumkoy for the interview, the residents had a negative attitude towards the female researcher. This is largely because one of the respondent organisations (NPS), whose majority of employers were female, had raised the expectations of the residents with regard to tourism development in the region, and then they were unable to fulfil those
expectations. Hence, having another researcher of a different gender was beneficial in conducting the research. Furthermore, in cases where the use of recording device was not allowed, one of the researchers asked the questions and led the interview, and the other took detailed notes. Thus, eye contact with the interviewee continued uninterrupted throughout the session. In line with suggestions in the literature, the interviewer explained to the interviewee approximately how long the interview would take and determined whether or not they wanted to continue to the second part of the interview on another day. In practice, only two interviewees wanted to continue with the second part of the interview on the same day. The interviewers were observant as to any signs of tiredness, which may impose difficulty in terms of acquiring quality and extensive information. On the few occasions when tiredness was observed, the suggestion was made to continue the remaining questions on another day. In addition, one interviewee said that his schedule was unexpectedly tight, and hence the second phase of their interview was postponed to another date.

A focus group interview was carried out with ten volunteer local people and the headman of Kumkoy village at a local café. The main reason why a group interview was used rather than an individual interview was because these respondents were generally reluctant to speak individually because of their fear of resentment and reprisals. This specific problem is not peculiar to this case study area. Medeiros de Araujo (2000) similarly observes in the case of Brazil that there may be quite distinct cultural barriers to research interviews in developing countries, including a low level of importance attached to scientific investigation, and a rejection of the presence of the researcher as an unwanted nuisance. While the researcher gave a full explanation of the purpose of the research, the villagers were still quite sceptical about the role and intentions of the researcher. At first, the researcher was confused with a government official or journalist who had came to the village some months previously, had sympathised with their problems, had promised to solve their problems but had not done so. The villagers were resentful about unethical researchers taking advantage of their goodwill and honesty simply to gain information for their own agenda. The researcher had to contact them several times before the group interview took place, and it was through the help of the village headman and the district governor, that the focus group interview was arranged. This form of interview was found to be insightful, with single comments or statements eliciting a
whole range of additional revealing statements (Hines 2000; Morgan 1997; Ryan 1995). It allowed more unconventional views to be stated and the members of the group stimulated each other (Ryan 1995).

7.7 Data analysis

Depending on the purpose of the research, a wide variety of analytical techniques have been employed in interorganisational relationship research. These techniques range from multiple regression (Turk 1973), sociograms, diagraphs (Reicker et al 1976), block modelling (Knoke and Rogers 1978; Van de Ven et al 1979) to multidimensional scaling (Levine 1972; Reicker et al 1976). The principal objective of these techniques is to cluster organisations together on the basis of their interactions. Most of the studies with the above approaches have utilised “0” and “1” data, representing the presence of, or absence of a linkage between organisations. However, such approaches have a major deficiency in that they do not take into account the intensity of a relationship. Therefore, most of the variations in interorganisational relationships are lost, such as in terms of frequency of interaction, number of different forms of interaction (such as communication) and the degree of equality in the interaction (Rogers and Whetten 1982).

This research collected qualitative data and employed a number of complementary techniques to meaningfully explain the nature of the relationships between organisations, their extent and their implications. The framework approach (Ritchie and Spencer 1994) was employed in the analysis of the interview transcripts. Two academicians coded the interview transcripts, with the help of Nud.ist, a software package for qualitative analysis, to reflect major themes, as well as sub-themes to illustrate the specific content. There are increasing numbers of qualitative software programmes available to researchers (Anderson and Shaw 1999), with Nud.ist 4.0 chosen as it is a leading programme for coding-oriented qualitative analysis (Weitzman and Miles 1995).

The analysis of qualitative data is argued to be problematic (Anderson and Shaw 1999), with some suggesting that much of the superiority of qualitative research is lost when it comes to analysis (Hong 1984). Often large amounts of qualitative data are collected, but frequently this leads to the analysis of the qualitative data being
truncated prior to the end of the analysis (Wolfe et al 1993). Substantial difficulties are often reported in reducing the extensive quantity of data into manageable quantities (Popham 1993). Moore et al (1995: 34-39) share this view and state that "one of the most difficult things about using qualitative data is wading through the masses of text produced.... because of time constraints and limited resources, researchers using traditional coding procedures often solve the problem by ignoring the data altogether". One logical solution to the inherent problems in the analysis of qualitative data is computerisation (Hong 1984). The computer package programme has a number of benefits, such as it enables non-numerical, unstructured data to be indexed, searched and theorised. The computer package has the ability to retrieve vast quantities of data quickly and efficiently (Hall and Winchester 1997), and it provides a consistent method for selecting, condensing and transforming data, displaying data in an organised fashion, and drawing and verifying conclusions from the condensed displayed data (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Nud.ist is suggested to be among the most advanced of the packages available, as it includes a malleable "node-tree" structure that assists with qualitative data management and theory building. While it took time to learn the software programme fully and master it, Nud.ist radically reduced the time involved in the mechanical manual processes of analysis. Each stage of analysis involved constant re-evaluation of each respondent’s answer, and discussion between the two researchers encouraged an in-depth focus on the data (Anderson and Shaw 1999).

The analytical framework involved five inter-connected systematic steps, which will now be explained (Ritchie and Spencer 1994). Two academicians were engaged in the analysis of the data in order to provide inter-rated reliability, that is categorisation is not simply a judgement of one researcher. This method assumes that if two or more researchers reach the same conclusion regarding the characteristics of the data, then this conclusion is a more objective observation and less pure subjective opinion. It also allowed for more discussion and reflection in relation to the interpretation of the interview transcripts. (1) Following the completion of the interview transcripts, each researcher read them, became familiar with the range and diversity of the data, and gained an overview of the body of material that had been collected. (2) Then, each researcher independently prepared a thematic framework of issues and concepts arising from the recurrence or patterning of the responses. Each
response was analysed and the researchers, experienced with the software, developed categories inductively by using Nud.ist’s “free node” capabilities, and then these were coded hierarchically to create an index tree with general categories and sub-categories. When developing these categories, each researcher attempted to ensure each was clear, had a logical correctness, was adapted to the structure of the situation, and was appropriate to the respondents’ frame of reference (Lazarsfeld and Barton 1955). (3) The identified categories, issues and concepts were then rearranged into a more general analytical framework. Each researcher built a broader picture of the data as a whole by identifying key characteristics of the data based on the range of views and attitudes expressed by the interviewees. (4) At this stage, the academicians discussed and refined the resulting issues and concepts. It was observed that the researchers shared much commonality in the categories that they developed inductively. When there were differences they were discussed and a compromise reached or one position was adopted in preference to another after discussion. The developed categories were considered less biased because of the approach adopted. (5) The last step of the framework approach related to the final interpretation of the findings. A narrative approach, using direct quotes from the interviews, is adopted in the presentation of the study findings in order to produce a multi-vocal text that offers the reader an opportunity to engage with the data and the narration of the participants (Jamal and Getz 2000). This technique has been applied by Jamal and Getz (2000: 162), as “it recalls readers, scholars and managers to the human and ethical dimension of planning, the concerns and issues of those who are impacted by such processes, those who are studied by planning researchers and theorists, those who are managed by the writings and actions of researchers, planners, politicians, destination managers and other stakeholders”.

7.8 Research difficulties and limitations

The researcher encountered several problems during the fieldwork stage of the research. First, due to the economic crises and political instability in the country, many tourism development projects had either been completely abandoned or halted. Because of this discontinuity, the researcher had to change the case study area twice. This needs to be remembered when considering the wider applicability of the study findings for Turkey as whole. Another problem was the difficulty in locating a number of individuals involved in the formulation of the plan. Some of them had
moved elsewhere, including some who had changed country for work purposes. The lack of a habit of “working by appointment” in Turkey was another real obstacle. The lack of co-operation with the research by a few informants was disheartening. Unfortunately, this is common in the country, where a low level of importance is attached to academic research. Consequently, it is difficult undertaking social science research in an extremely politically polarised environment where tolerance for others is sometimes quite low. Gaining access and objective information proved difficult in some cases because of the low trust that some organisations and individuals held for one another. One of the local Mayors even claimed that the interviewers might be working for the opposition party, or could be agents of the British government (!). In addition to these ideological and practical problems, moving from one place to another to conduct interviews was difficult because of the climatic conditions (up to forty-five degrees in the shade) and the sometimes reckless habits of drivers. Finally, the general limitations of case study research apply to this study. As stated earlier, the empirical findings for this case study are not necessarily transferable to other tourism or land use planning contexts, rather they should be taken as a foundation for more empirical enquiry elsewhere.

7.9 Summary

In this chapter, the issues relating to the design and implementation of the research were discussed. Figure 7.2 illustrates the research process. The starting point of this research was a review of the appropriate literature and consultation with experts and supervisors. At this stage, key issues from the literature review were linked together, and their interactions and relationships were evaluated. This conceptualisation improved the researcher's understanding of the subject and highlighted gaps in the published literature.

At this stage, a case study approach, drawing on both secondary and primary data, was chosen as the research strategy in order to highlight linkages between the realities of the tourism plan formulation and implementation processes and the theoretical context of this research. Two of the most common methods used in interorganisational relations research, these being the survey questionnaire and in-depth interviews were evaluated next and their strengths and limitations were
A semi-structured, two-phased interview technique was adopted in this study due to its appropriateness.

![Figure 7.2 The research process](image)

A site visit to the case study area and a series of preliminary interviews were then carried out. The data from this stage helped the researcher fine-tune and add to the conceptual framework, the conceptual themes and the related interview questions. Seven conceptual themes were identified based on this research process. These are planning issues in Belek, inter-organisational communication, stakeholder involvement and consensus building, resource sufficiency and exchange, inter-organisational co-ordination, the roles and activities of the organisations, and the delegation of power. The main fieldwork was then undertaken. Each conceptual
theme was discussed in chapter eight which reports the results. As can be seen from Figure 7.2, this cycle of the fieldwork and refinement of conceptual thought was continued until the desired level of understanding was reached. This integrative process allowed for greater understanding of the research area and also helped the researcher to further develop expertise in data collection and analysis. The data were examined in depth and width to understand the key components of the research topic in the context within which it occurred. The study findings are presented in the next chapter according to the seven conceptual themes that have been identified.
8. Results Chapter

Section 1. Planning Issues in Belek (The Effective Use of the Belek Coastal Management Plan)

8.1.1 Introduction to Chapter 8

The overall aim of this research is to examine interorganisational relations, notably central-local relations, in tourism planning. It does this in the specific context of tourism development in Belek, a rapidly expanding tourist resort in Antalya, Turkey. A central focus is to assess central-local relations in the multi-scale network that links the public, private and voluntary sectors and the national, provincial and local spatial scales, relevant to tourism development in Belek. The approach taken to this study in Belek stresses the structural dimensions of the environment, including the constitutional, institutional, and operational arrangements, the power relations and patterns of resource dependency, as well as the processes of communication, resource exchange, and of co-ordination.

The "Study Findings" presented in chapter 8 investigate the organisational environment in which the tourism planning for the Belek Coastal Management Plan (BMP) was undertaken. It examines the ways in which the tourism planning and implementation processes were carried out to identify the areas of interdependency and exchange of resources among the agencies involved. This chapter also considers the elements that either facilitated or inhibited the building, maintenance and management of interorganisational relations among the public and private sector organisations involved in the BMP. It also provides insights into whether the use of alternative administration forms, such as decentralisation, might have enhanced the management of tourism in Belek.

The results of the case study (Yin 1993) are presented in this chapter. It serves to highlight linkages between the realities of the formulation and implementation processes and the theoretical context for this research (Williams et al 1998). Seven conceptual themes were determined and used to organise the questions in the interviews. The primary data collection involved semi-structured interviews with
relevant respondents, focusing on these seven conceptual themes identified in the theoretical framework. The researcher established a question bank through the analysis of the preliminary interviews and the literature review. The methods used to identify the 30 interviewees who were involved in the design and implementation of the BMP were explained in chapter seven. These respondents were in five stakeholder groups: central government officials (ministries, provincial and district level), local government officials (municipalities and villages), local people, voluntary organisations and the private organisations. The conceptual themes covered in the interviews with these respondents included: the planning issues in Belek, inter-organisational communication, stakeholder involvement and consensus building, resource sufficiency and exchange, inter-organisational co-ordination, the roles and activities of the organisations, and the delegation of power.

The results of the study are discussed in the seven interconnected sections which make up chapter eight. Each section presents the findings and discusses them in the context of the reviewed literature. The analysis starts by reproducing the specific questions asked in the interview. This first section (section 1) examines the opinions of participants involved in the design and implementation of the BMP about what facilitated or inhibited the effectiveness of the BMP, and about whether the participants were fully aware of the BMP and its proposals, and the extent to which they supported these proposals. The detailed findings on the first two interview questions are now discussed.

8.1.2 Factors facilitating or inhibiting the plan's effectiveness

1) “What inhibits or facilitates the effectiveness of the BMP for the development of tourism in the Belek region?”

Plan formulation and implementation are complex processes fraught with difficulties. As Pearce (2000: 202) observes: “no matter how thorough the initial preparation and how comprehensive the scope of the plan, it is unlikely that planners will envisage all eventualities, either in implementation or in changing exogenous conditions, which may necessitate modifications to the original goals and strategies”. This is especially likely to be the case with newly emerging destinations particularly
in the developing world. When the participants in this study commented on variables either facilitating or inhibiting the effectiveness of the BMP and tourism development, the identified variables were multi-faceted, as might be expected from the literature reviewed in chapter two. Some of these variables were locally based, whereas others were part of a broader system (Table 8.1.1). The variables included difficulties arising from the legislative, institutional, political and economic environment, a lack of civic consciousness and commitment, a lack of local resources, the rapid growth of second houses, and inadequate local infrastructure (Table 8.1.1).

These variables were categorised into two major groups based on the dominant scale of their influence. The variables that belong more to the immediate local environment constitute "local forces," and variables associated more with the larger environment are labelled "macro forces" (Table 8.1.1). The existence of two different but interlocking environments suggests that a change in one of the environmental variables is likely to create reverberations affecting the functioning of others (Liu 1994; Elliot 1997). The following section will now discuss these forces in turn.

**Table 8.1.1 Factors affecting the BMP's effectiveness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macro Forces</th>
<th>Number of respondents mentioning the factor</th>
<th>Local Forces</th>
<th>Number of respondents mentioning the factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative environment</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Level and form of local support</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional environment</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Inadequate local resources</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political environment</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Local infrastructure (financial and human capital)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic environment</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Rapid second home development</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local apathy</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**8.1.2.1 Macro forces**
The most frequently mentioned macro forces were general characteristics of the legislative environment, this being mentioned by 16 of the 30 respondents (Table 8.1.1). Comments related to, for example, the appropriateness and adequacy of legislation, the distribution of responsibilities, resources, and power. The nature of the institutional environment (e.g., multiplicity of institutions, institutional rivalry, intolerance, incompatible organisational goals and ideologies, conflicting interests and expectations, low levels of institutional commitment, and staff discontinuity) was another frequently mentioned influential macro variable. Respondents also repeatedly brought up characteristics of the political environment (e.g., political instability, and discontinuity of political support). Another commonly mentioned macro variable was the economic environment. The following paragraphs examine these variables in detail.

8.1.2.1.1 The legislative and institutional environment

Tourism develops and functions within a legal framework (Liu 1994). The consensus in the literature is that collective action is fostered when enabling laws and management systems encourage the formation and continuance of partnership agreements (Selin 1998). As argued in the study's conceptual framework, in addition to the legislative environment, the tourism policy process takes place within a certain institutional context, and tourism programmes have little chance of success unless this context is considered and arranged carefully. The institutional arrangements may either facilitate or inhibit the plan implementation process.

As many as 16 of the 30 respondents mentioned that the organisational and legislative frameworks had not facilitated the design of appropriate tourism development programmes due to the fact that the country's needs and potential were not substantially taken into account. Frequently mentioned obstacles included an absence of interorganisational co-ordination, over-bureaucratisation of programmes, the low technical and administrative capability of several participating organisations, political ineptness, and an inadequate monitoring and evaluation of programme results. A private sector representative said that “too many” organisations tended to intervene in tourism-related decisions. He went on to comment that “an acquaintance of mine, an ex-director of the MoT, once said in a meeting that there were two subjects which everyone likes meddling with: taxation and tourism. Everyone has
something to say about these two issues in the country". These respondents also pointed out that the current institutional framework has serious pitfalls that impede the effective use of the BMP for tourism development in the region. The specific arguments relating to the legislative and institutional influences on the effectiveness of the BMP are now considered. The next sections evaluate respondents' comments on the Tourism Encouragement Law (TEL), the enforcement of tourism-related legislation in the region, the problems and conflicts due to legal overlapping, the influence of varied interests and expectations of parties involved in the design and implementation of the BMP, and on the role of a centralist administration which has led to resource imbalances for the BMP.

8.1.2.1.2 The legislative framework

It was noted by respondents that a strong and clear legislative framework was necessary for the successful implementation of the plan. More than half of the respondents (16), however, complained that at present the legislation was in quite a shambles, producing too many conflictual relations between central and local units, so that it was almost impossible to put plans into practice effectively. Four central and two provincial government officials specifically mentioned that the current tourism-related legislation gave rise to fertile grounds for institutional problems. These respondents argued for a revision in the law. In contrast, eight private, voluntary and local government respondents argued that the current legislation was not to blame. For them, the tourism legislation was appropriate and adequate, and the problem was that the enforcers were not applying the laws properly.

8.1.2.1.3 Flaws in the Tourism Encouragement Law

Several central and local government officials, and private and voluntary sector respondents heavily criticised the Tourism Encouragement Law (TEL). While this law had been intended to regulate tourism, it had actually encouraged an increase in the number of beds. The TEL was condemned because it had led to mass tourism. It had also encouraged the leasing of valued public land and of agricultural and forested land for tourism investments. Three voluntary sector respondents noted that this had given rise to very rapid construction, a haphazard development in coastal regions and environmental degradation.
Seven central and local government officials and two private and voluntary sector respondents criticised the transfer under the TEL of planning and construction authority in tourism areas to the Ministry of Tourism (MoT). The subsequent changes in laws had also created much confusion. An experienced consultant noted, “in 1983 a regulation was promulgated that defines how authority for regulating development ought to be used. According to this regulation, in order that the Ministry approves such construction plans, the Municipal Committee is empowered to suggest its own opinion to approve or reject. This enables municipalities to assess a construction proposal and state their opinion. However, another regulation came in to existence in 1989 that waived this condition. The new regulation introduced a limit of 30 days for municipalities to state their views about a proposal... otherwise it would be assumed that the municipality has accepted the proposal. In the same year, the planning authority in tourism regions was given to the Ministry of Work and Resettlement (MoWR) and the MoWR has become the body that has the right to endorse or veto all development plans”.

Five local and provincial government officials stated that such legislation and regulations support the omission of municipalities and their local committees from having an influence, and in effect frustrates the effective functioning of local government. These respondents indicated that this had inevitably led to wrong decisions being made and had thwarted the establishment of good links between the municipalities and the tourism sector.

8.1.2.1.4 An inadequate enforcement of laws

While some respondents held the legislation responsible for problems, eight respondents argued instead that the problem was that the legislative framework had not been applied adequately. There appears to be two underlying reasons for their argument. The first relates to the custom of “getting round” the legislation. Many participants stated that the legislation could not achieve much on its own, due to the mentality of the officials responsible for enforcing the laws. They complained that there were countless ways to get round the legislation to exploit the environment for personal advantage, and that people tended to exploit this management weakness for their individual benefit. It was suggested that a sign of efforts to get round legislation could be the large number of people who visit members of the national assembly in
the capital. Hence, members of the national assembly often by-pass local
government's decisions in land-use related issues. They commented that the gaps
between the law and its implementation should be closed and regulations concerning
the use of natural resources should be applied to their full extent.

8.1.2.1.5 Conflict between different authorities

Several respondents complained that there are too many organisations,
perhaps “more than a dozen”, that have some right to intervene in tourism-related
decisions. This corresponds with the findings of other studies of Turkey. The present
author’s research on the heritage site of Pamukkale in Turkey (Yuksel, Bramwell and
Yuksel 1999) reached a similar conclusion. As discussed in chapter six, according to
the current institutional set up, the Ministry of Tourism has management authority
over vast sections of the coast, where the goal is to organise and promote the
establishment of tourist facilities. However, it was shown in chapter six that the
Ministry of Environment also has authority to protect the environment, to use natural
and land resources in rural and urban areas in an effective way, and to protect and
enrich natural beauty and wildlife. The management of forested land in coastal areas
is also under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Forestry (see Chapter Six).

Several respondents commented that, despite the existence of the Ministry of
Tourism (MoT) which is intended to promote and develop tourism, the de facto
situation was that the MoT could not act independently on implementation issues.
With specific reference to Belek, a voluntary organisation respondent pointed out that:
“the owner of the land [in the Belek region] was the Ministry of Forestry, the tenant
of the land became the Ministry of Tourism, the planners of the zone were the
Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Tourism, and the agent that brought
forward the planning proposals first was the Nature Preservation Society”. Given this
framework, respondents noted that the current institutional and legislative
arrangements had given rise to serious conflicts between different central and local
organisations. This had undermined the building of interorganisational co-ordination
and trust.

Fourteen of the 30 respondents stated that there was competition for prestige
among a number of central government organisations. Many of these organisations
tended to have incompatible goals and institutional ideologies, conflicting expectations, and differing degrees of commitment to tourism. The habit of sharing responsibility and resources among the central institutions was said to be almost absent. One of the consultants stated: “each [institution] attempts to cut the cake on its own. The municipalities try to cut a big piece for themselves, the MoWR does the same, so does the MoC”. Four central government officials complained that when the MoT wanted to make and enforce a decision on any subject in relation to tourism, the MoT was confronted with a spate of other ministries that were ready to thwart their efforts. One Tourism Ministry official conceded, “it is quite acceptable to expect the MoT to be poised to stop or at least take punitive actions against illegal second house development. However, this is beyond our current power. We admit that we are powerless in the face of many other central government organisations”. Seven private, voluntary and local government respondents shared this view about the MoT. They broadly argued that the MoT could not enforce measures adequately in relation to tourism because of its limited power in the face of other central institutions. The MoT’s activities are subject to tampering by other institutions, and approvals have to be gained from many central institutions before they can move on any case.

8.1.2.1.6 Differing interests and expectations

Eleven respondents noted that differences in organisational and individual objectives and expectations had stifled progress to a great extent. Respondents often commented that the implementation of the BMP was rather unsuccessful because of the involvement of many agencies with different interests. Prominent differences in attitude were found between what local people had in mind and what Betuyab thought of the issues. Significant differences also existed between Betuyab and the Nature Preservation Society (NPS) in terms of how natural resources should be utilised. Additionally, there were clear differences in perspectives between local people and the NPS, between the NPS and the municipalities, between the municipalities and provincial government, between the municipalities and central government, and among the municipalities.

The NPS was concerned that central and local government and local people were converting fertile agricultural lands for second home development. A voluntary sector respondent stated, “they [locals] thought that selling their lands would bring
them the tranquillity and prosperity that they dream of for their retirement. The land around Kadriye is first class agricultural land, but this land has been lost with government incentives and encouragement. This is the greatest sin that a government can commit”. Two private sector respondents and three provincial government officials contended that economic gains should be considered in parallel with protective measures in order to secure healthy tourism development. These respondents stressed that the utilisation and protection of resources should be balanced in order to bring prosperity to the region. One of the officials stated, “if you insist that resources should just be protected, they will remain idle... just protection of resources will not contribute anything to the local economy”.

Five respondents commented that the views of some organisations changed during the process, as a result of goal displacement or because of interest conflicts. These respondents noted that co-operation achieved at the very beginning of the BMP talks withered away when the activities of organisations started to clash with each other. This was particularly the case between the NPS and Betuyab, between the NPS and the municipalities, and between the central government organisations.

8.1.2.1.7 The centralised administration

Ten of the 16 respondents were critical of the key role enjoyed by physically distant central organisations in the delivery of local services. According to these respondents, the delivery of local public services by central organisations, with different hierarchical arrangements and structures, makes it extremely difficult to achieve co-ordination and the execution of effective control.

8.1.2.1.8 Resource imbalances

Three voluntary sector respondents, two local government officials and the representative of the villagers were critical of Betuyab for exploiting gaps in the legislative and institutional framework to its advantage. They felt it had acted like an intermediary or counterpart that simply carried out the tasks of central government. Respondents from the voluntary organisations thought that Betuyab had firmly established itself due to the absence of strong local government in the region. Almost all relations between the central government and the region were carried out and controlled by Betuyab, with much of its authority being based on its substantial
financial power. The comments of one local person clearly illustrates the effect of financial power and imbalances on the relations: “our mayor has to get along with Betuyab very well as he knows that they are powerful and influential in relation to the central authorities; he doesn’t want to contradict with them in any way”. Two of the mayors were clearly opposed to the presence of Betuyab in the region. Distrust of this organisation was reflected in the comment that: “although Betuyab, in collaboration with Hacettepe University, is claiming that they are making rigorous research on marine turtles, I do not believe in the reliability of their research results. All the factors having an adverse effect on turtle nests and breeding are still continuing today. However, when you look at their results, you see an increase in the population of marine turtles, which is in total contrast to the reality. The marine turtles do not have space for breathing let alone breeding”.

8.1.2.2 The political environment

The political context is depicted in the tourism literature as a key influence on tourism development (Liu 1994; Tosun 2000, 2001). Respondents’ comments indicated that the country's political system was seen as an important influence on the effectiveness of the BMP. The most frequently mentioned features of the political environment were the recurring shifts in the political arena and the uncertainty and instability that it created, the strong control imposed by central government, and partisanship and favouritism in return for political support. This is not a surprising finding. Decisions about tourism are taken in the context of a political system, so the political cultures, structures and situations will affect how tourism is organised and its development is controlled (deKadt 1979; Elliot 1997). Tourism is often manipulated for political purposes, and political forces can alter the bases of comparative advantage (Dicken 1986). The dominant ideological and philosophical values of the political system will determine how far governments will intervene in tourism development and planning. As was mentioned in chapter four, a shifting political climate may severely hamper implementation efforts by limiting the power of parties to take the actions they desire. Gray (1989) notes that successful implementation requires political skills to ensure that sufficient support can be sustained for agreements. Subsequent sections explored specific arguments related to the effects of the political environment on the BMP's effectiveness.
8.1.2.2.1 Political instability

The frequent changes in the political environment in Turkey, characterised by short-lived political parties coming to power were discussed in chapter six. These changes were mentioned by many respondents as destabilising the political support for specific policies and organisations. Other observers have also noted this problem in Turkey. For instance, Tosun (2001) notes that from its foundation in 1963 up to 1996, 30 ministers had served in the Ministry of Tourism, with an average span of duty of 1.1 years. This is too short a time span to achieve much either at national or local levels. Moreover, ministers and even chief officials have a custom of replacing the personnel in their department when they are first appointed to the post, and this can decrease continuity and efficiency. Brotherton et al (1994 in Tosun 2000) also observe how changes in government in Turkey can give rise to something of a political hiatus and a re-ordering of policies and priorities and changes in personnel.

Because of the recurrent political shifts, a voluntary sector respondent argued that, “unfortunately, the majority of plans (including the BMP) are stillborn in the country”. Many respondents stated that when the party leading the central government changed, so did the ministers and their staff. An official in the Ministry of Tourism stated that, “if the new minister has got a different view on an issue from that of his predecessor, then this ignites new debates [operational and power] between the institutions and significantly slows down the implementation process”. In relation to political influences and changes, a local stated that “Belek is a very curious place in many respects...every minute in Belek is destined for surprises”.

Two voluntary sector respondents indicated that they had tried to plan for all eventualities affecting the progress of the BMP, and they had striven to take appropriate measures. However, when they tried to implement the plan, they realised that problems that they had assumed to be small or medium in scale during the plan formulation stage had then turned out to be unmanageable. This was due to shifting political, social, and economic conditions. Eight respondents from both central and local institutions expressed concern that the legitimate planning decisions made for the protection of zones from development might be contradicted in the longer-term. One factor behind this was the constant changes in the politicians. Four local respondents expressed their scepticism that their designation of one area as a specially
protected zone (SPZ) would subsequently be over-turned. This area had initially been considered for a marina development. A voluntary organisation representative expressed her concern that a change of politicians may adversely affect this area's future, "The area [Kumkoy] may still face deterioration as a result of political changes. A new person coming to power and under the influence of Betuyab, may take a decision that supersedes all other decisions thus far taken in that area. Unfortunately, it cannot be protected for ever".

8.1.2.2 Central government control

Several respondents from local community institutions and the private and voluntary sectors held the central government to be responsible for "the minimal results achieved" in their region. Five local government officials complained that the central government was enthusiastic to transfer its responsibilities to local government agencies at the same time that it wanted to retain their authority and powers. The tradition of retaining authority at the centre, particularly with respect to financial resources and decisions, was argued to put local government under tremendous pressure. One local government official indicated that this political convention had led to a strong central government and a relatively weak local government structure growing in the country. Morah (1996) has observed a similar problem in Kenya. In both Kenyan and Turkish cases, central control is likely substantially to curb the local government's capabilities and willingness to take the lead in tourism development.

8.1.2.3 Change in the municipalities

Twelve of the respondents commented that changes in the number and authority of organisations with an influence on Belek had affected the effectiveness of the BMP. In particular, the change in the number of municipalities was an important factor that had overwhelmed the effectiveness of the BMP. When discussions about the plan had started, there were only two municipalities in the region, but due to the rise in population to over 2,000 inhabitants in two of the villages in 1998, the number of municipalities had increased to four. A by-election had also taken place in 1998 and this had brought a different party to power, and had resulted in municipal staff being replaced. The new municipalities had changed not only their physical borders but also the distribution of resources in the region. For instance, the declaration of Belek village’s new status as a municipality altered the balance of resources and
power in the region. The respondents also mentioned that the effect of this compartmentalisation was that resources and authority had become more fragmented. For instance, the Serik municipality had to hand over its management authority over the coastal zone to the newly established Belek Municipality. This was a thorny process, which had sparked hostility between the two towns. Achievement of coordination had also become rather difficult in the region because of the different political parties of new mayors, which meant they differed ideologically from one another quite substantially.

Political wishes and connections had important implications for tourism planning in the region. A striking example of this was the water treatment plant which had been completed by the ex-mayor of Serik but had not been put into operation by his successor of an opposing party. The municipality that supported the ruling political party appeared to have certain advantages. Eight local and provincial government officials noted that if the mayor was a politician of the ruling party then this facilitated them gaining municipal resources and revenue controlled by the central government in a timely way. According to two voluntary sector representatives, the municipalities controlled by the opposition parties were marginalized by their financial or technical requests being given a low priority by central government. Six officials from local and provincial government and two voluntary sector representatives contended that those having the power due to their party allegiance had exploited this connection with central institutions to their advantage. As one voluntary sector representative claimed in relation to the BMP: “many public organisations have pulled their political strings and steered the political balance in order not to lose their influence and status in the area”.

8.1.2.2.4 Economic forces

A final "macro force" influencing the effectiveness of the BMP was economic. As Van Doom (in Pearce 1989: 12) claims “tourism cannot be considered outside the context of the different stages of development countries have reached”. Tourism is likely to flourish best when it fits into the context of general economic policies and programmes designed to lead to the optimum growth of the country as a whole (Bhatia 1986). The economic environment affects virtually everything, from the availability and adequacy of tourism resources to the impacts of tourism development
In line with this literature, almost all respondents mentioned that deficiencies in infrastructure or in local capital for investment were key obstacles to tourism development in the region. For example, five local government officials and three local people pointed to the problems of energy supply in the region, with this being insufficient to meet demand, particularly when tourist numbers increased during the summer. Others highlighted the lack of municipal revenue and its implications. A provincial government official stated that the “municipalities receive funds from central authorities [in proportion to the population of the town]. In the summer, these funds cannot meet the demand [as the population increases through immigrants and incoming tourists]. In this case, municipalities apply different "solutions" to bridge their deficits, such as encouraging more summer house development in the area [thus improving municipal levies and estate taxes]. Their financial problems induce visual as well as environmental pollution”. While there was no economic crisis at the time of the interviews, subsequent contacts with informants indicate that two such crises have more recently adversely affected the implementation of the BMP through substantial cuts in provincial and municipal budgets.

### 8.1.3 Local forces

Comments made by the respondents about what inhibits or facilitates the effectiveness of the BMP were categorised as "macro" and more "local" forces (Table 8.1). The later responses are now examined. The first category of these responses relates to local support.

#### 8.1.3.1 Level and form of local support

Literature on tourism planning often indicates that socially responsible and economically viable tourism depends on securing community involvement (Brandon 1993). This involvement may help to make the local community more supportive, confident and productive (Eber 1992).

Nine central, provincial, and local government officials and three voluntary and private sector respondents in this study commented that the support of the community was necessary for the BMP to succeed. However, it was generally felt that this support had not been secured. According to the investors, the underlying reason
for the limited support from the community was their widespread misconceptions about tourism. A private sector respondent explained that the most notable problems that they had experienced in the area related to the villagers. When they first met with the villagers in the early 1990s, the villagers were extremely wary and apprehensive about the new tourism development proposals. According to investors, the proposals "would re-shape their physical environment and lifestyle for the better". They felt that ignorance and lack of awareness about what tourism development was all about had fuelled this local reaction to the tourism development proposals. One Betuyab member stated that "villagers of that time used to think that they would be losing their forest and would not be able to use the sea and the beaches as a result of the proposed development". Five central and provincial government officials shared similar points of view. According to the investors, there were "unwarranted local concerns" regarding the protection of local customs and traditions. One of them stated that "those people holding negative attitudes towards the proposed development carry traces of the old Anatolian culture and concerns. People stated that the main reason why they disagree is that they are concerned about opening their land to outsiders coming, especially from Europe, who they believe could rapidly alter their social structure and customs".

The local respondents' perspective was very different from that presented by the investors and planners. The locals had been resentful about the priorities put forward by the developers and planners during the preliminary meetings for the BMP. One of the locals argued that there was more emphasis on the protection of wildlife than on helping local people. He felt that because the socio-economic dimension was absent, planners were "putting too much care and emphasis on turtles rather than people". Other locals also commented that the prioritisation of wildlife (turtle) protection over the improvement of living conditions had contributed to local resentment. One of the respondents, speaking on behalf of Kumkoy villagers, quoted a local saying that captured the views of all the villagers interviewed: "a turtle should live like a turtle and a human should live like a human". The locals had also complained that they had been accused of harming the turtles. From their point of view they were far from being the predator, indeed they believed they were the real protector of the turtles and other wildlife in the region. One local person stated that they never damaged the turtles and had even helped the hatchlings by hand to reach
the sea. (Unfortunately, they are unaware that this "unnatural help" may mean the hatchling will not return to the place where it was born).

The level of local support appears to have changed between the various phases of the BMP. Local support reached its peak following the initial meetings targeted to inform locals about the development. But, it then started to recede when locals began to realise that things that had been accepted or pledged during these meetings did not materialise. An ex-Mayor described this as a process of "window dressing". The limited contacts that occurred at this time between local people and the "outsiders", notably the investors and planners, probably assisted in the deterioration of trust and heightened tension between these two parties.

The villagers claimed that they had been cheated by the outsiders and also that they had become physically segregated from the visitors. One local commented, "initially when meetings were held [these being organised by Betuyab, the NPS, and various ministries] we had been told that the proposed development would benefit the area in economic terms. We had been advised that we could set up co-operatives to run taxi services in the region. Due to our economic conditions and main source of income [agriculture which tends to fluctuate due to the climate conditions] we quite liked the idea of income stability...[and] we were all in favour of tourism development [in its proposed form]. However, we had not realised then that we had to compromise on other things to benefit from the proposed development". Locals had faced several restrictions, generally imposed by Betuyab, which they felt had segregated them from the tourists. One villager commented that "we [locals] used to have full access to our beach, but today there are several restraints on its use. For some reason they insist that the beach belongs to the hotels. You cannot imagine what it means to have been excluded from using the beach that you have used since your childhood. However, the beach should be open for public use [by law] for the sake of fairness. But, to be frank, tourists are more privileged than locals". The restrictions on the use of beaches in the area had given rise to local protests and pressure: "when we step on the beach, security guards immediately force us to leave it! We have fought for a long time to regain our constitutional rights, and following the establishment of the municipality our right had been reinstated, though still only partly. Now there are
zones designated for public use and with facilities, and since then conditions and tension have improved relatively”.

Not only the restricted access to beaches but also the restricted access to forest areas infuriated the locals. The locals were upset by rumours that forest fires had been started deliberately by local people. One villager encapsulated their resentment of this: “They [Betuyab] claimed that we set the forest on fire deliberately since we are angry with them. That’s right. We were furious with them, but this doesn’t mean that we would harm our own land. Contrary to their claim, it was the developers who wanted to build a hotel here who set fire to one particular part of the forest. There were also fires started by the hoteliers last summer. Sometimes it happens three or four times a year...ironically enough you see that a new hotel is later underway in the burnt part. But they always cunningly put the blame on us”. A few villagers admitted openly that they had stopped participating in meetings because they had realised that they were not being told about the real facts. One described this as seeing “the real faces behind the masks of the investors and planners”.

8.1.3.2 Inadequate local resources

Fourteen of the 30 respondents indicated that the nature of resources, and extent to which they are available for local people and local decision-makers, had had a substantial influence on tourism development in the region. They mentioned several resources, and these can be categorised into human capital, environmental resources, financial resources and expertise. They also identified that the region did not possess any of these resources in the required quantity or quality. A voluntary organisation respondent argued that, “due to the social and economic shock following the opening up of the region to tourism, the local people, as well as their representatives, have found themselves far from being equipped to cope with the much aggravated social and environmental problems. Most of them were and still are not ready [mainly in terms of human capital] to take part in the newly opened tourism sector”. According to this respondent, although the region has a relatively young population, eager to take part in the tourism sector, “the lack of proper education and training forms a formidable obstacle in their pursuit of this aim”.

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As many as nine of the 30 respondents were in favour of investing in programmes in order to improve the skills of local people to help them gain more benefits from tourism. In contrast, four central and provincial government officials criticised local people as being lazy and reluctant to participate in such activities, and being resistant to change. A central government official was very critical of the local populace. She claimed that the “opportunistic and exploitative approach” to tourism of local people had obstructed the region's development. Another mainly criticised a “growing greed for rent”. He argued that “to be perfectly honest with you, although these people used to live in a region surrounded by sea, there were not many local fishermen because the main livelihood of the region was agriculture. Now that they have realised that tourism offers more prosperity than the very traditional agriculture...they claim that the declaration of the forests and beaches as protected zones prevents them from fishing. How many of them regularly go swimming or fishing is debatable. Once neighbouring towns flourished due to tourism-related activities, the locals [in Kumkoy] realised that there was an under-utilised sea behind the forest”. Interestingly, respondents representing the municipalities of the region were much more likely to mention the scarcity of their own financial resources than the problems related to deficiencies in the region’s human resources.

8.1.3.3 Local infrastructure and development of second homes

Eleven of the 30 respondents specifically mentioned the rapid construction of summerhouses and its implications for infrastructure. The region seems to have attracted many domestic immigrants due to the increase in the number of tourist facilities. This has greatly multiplied the population, and the subsequent disorganised attempts to accommodate the growing population have transformed these small villages into inadequately developed towns with insufficient infrastructure. Seven local respondents stated that the success of development would not only rest on the infrastructure of the development zone but also on that of neighbouring towns and villages.

Five central and provincial government officials pinpointed that the natural resources were not being used rationally and great mistakes were made through the urbanisation of the coastal belt. However, three local respondents stressed that rapid urbanisation was not a problem peculiar to this particular region. They depicted it as a
“malignant plague widespread across the country”. They were conscious that abuse of resources would have great repercussions for the long term health of the tourism industry. The continuation of damaging activities on the environment has been connected to an absence of local environmental consciousness and to infrastructure deficiencies. For example, a provincial government official conceded that one of the municipalities discharges its collected garbage into a nearby valley because of the absence of a solid waste treatment plant. This location is not very distant from the town. An ecologist warned that if the detrimental activities went on at its current pace then in the near future the ecological equilibrium, including the reproduction of some species of birds and sea turtles as well as underground water supplies, would be in great jeopardy.

The development of second homes in the region was regarded as a particularly destructive consequence of tourism development. These new second homes created two important problems. First, the second homes had devoured the area's natural resources through the conversion of fertile agricultural lands into building sites. Second, they added extra pressure on the region's already deficient infrastructure. A Tourism Ministry official stated that, "the development of second homes, many of which are idle at the moment, crippled the progress of development in the centre, since attention was being diverted to dealing with their problems rather than those of the centre". He explained "the second-houses (summerhouses) are paralysing the infrastructure. We built two water abatement plants in order to address a demand from a capacity of thirty thousand. In order to address the problems emanating from the existence of second-houses we are now trying to improve the capacity of these water abatement plants".

8.1.3.4 Local apathy

Another factor undermining tourism development in the region was the apparent apathy of local people about local decision-making. The level of civic engagement in a community is often depicted as having a strong influence on the success of development initiatives. "Communities with strong civic engagement have residents that participate actively in the life and politics of the community and state-joining associations and publicly advocating for quality of life improvements. Conversely the residents of communities lacking a strong tradition of civic
engagement tend to develop dependencies on the state or corporations to provide for them" (Selin 1998:12). According to Tosun (2001), the administrative control of local government by central government in Turkey has encouraged non-participation or pseudo-participation by local people in their own affairs.

The responses in the interviews provide some degree of support for the influence of local apathy or inertia as an important influence on the BMP. One local government official commented, “traditionally local participation in the decision-making process has been low to non-existent”. There seems to be a widely held perception in the local community that such participation would be ineffective and unproductive. A typical comment by a villager was: “Why do we need to participate? Will they really listen to us?”. For one voluntary sector respondent, the limited participation was largely “because local authorities are not empowered to be active in serving public needs, local people find participation to be inconsequential”. One local government official argued that “not only is local participation almost non-existent in the municipal decisions, but the public also tends to expect that almost everything should be carried out by central government, even the construction of a fountain”. Other local officials stated that the local population had got into the habit of expecting central government to meet their every need and it was felt that this habit was too well established.

The level of genuine commitment to implementing the BMP was also seen as an important influence on the effectiveness of the BMP. According to nine respondents, there were different levels of commitment during the formulation and implementation phases, with some suggesting they varied from “pseudo” to “real” commitment. The type of commitment may be linked with the forms of participation, proposed by Painter (1992), that range from a feeling of participation without its substance to power to determine the outcome of decisions.

8.1.4 Plan awareness and support

2) "Are you aware of the Belek Management Plan (BMP) and the tourism planning proposals it contains? If yes, do you support these proposals? Why?"
This section examines the extent to which respondents in this study were aware of the BMP and its proposals and whether they supported these proposals. It was found that the respondents were all aware of the BMP, but there were variations in the extent to which they fully knew of its specific content and planning proposals. In general, local, central and provincial government officials, and respondents from the private and voluntary sectors, were comparatively more knowledgeable than local people about the details in the plan. Villagers complained that, while there had been few contacts and little consultation during the formulation phase, they did not think that subsequently they had been given sufficient detailed information on the plan. They stated that to date they had yet to be provided with a final version of the plan.

The degree of support for the plan also varied among respondent groups. Three local and provincial government officials, two respondents from the voluntary sector, and one respondent from the private sector expressed full support for the plan. However, local respondents were much less supportive. While local people tended fully to support the “environmental objectives”, they questioned the proposals in relation to whether they would ensure economic and social diversity and stability, and as to whether they would reduce the conflicting uses of the area’s land and forest. Several said that their economic hopes were raised but later dashed. One of the local respondents complained that “…on top of everything, they [the hoteliers] have introduced a new scheme called 'everything included' [all-inclusive] in the area. Because tourists paid for everything they prefer to stay in their hotel and do not go out and shop around in the town as they used to before. As a local businessman, how on earth do they expect my support for this illogical thing in which there is nothing for us [the locals]?” A provincial government official sympathised with such reservations, stating that “the plan does not help to achieve economic regeneration. Tourists do not dine out and do not shop outside of their accommodation”.

There appears to be competition for prosperity between the inhabitants of different towns. For example, a representative of the villagers stated, “we wonder why Kumkoy has been declared a specially protected area [where no physical development could take place]. We do not want to remain as we were in the past. Look at Belek [transformed from being a village to a town]. They [inhabitants of
Belek] are in comfort, whereas our villagers are hard up [because of the specially protected area status]. We have every right to be and live like Belek villagers”.

8.1.5 Summary

This section has identified factors that the respondents considered have affected tourism development in the region, as well as the degree of their awareness of and support for the BMP and its proposals. As suggested in the academic literature, the political, legislative, institutional and economic environments have important implications for tourism planning. Awareness of the plan appeared to be high among the public and private sector representatives, but knowledge about its specific details among the local population was relatively low. The BMP was considered to have been only partly effective in developing the region’s tourism industry. According to respondents, the aspects of the BMP which were ineffective were due to one or more of several factors. These included difficulties in the current legislative and institutional framework, frequent changes in the political environment and subsequent staff discontinuity, the influence of political games, involvement of multiple organisations and the clash of their different interests and expectations, the appointment of inappropriate staff, imbalances in the distribution of power and resources, the poor enforcement of regulations, a lack of knowledge about legal requirements, problems related to the credibility of some organisations, and the improper enforcement of rules and regulations.
8. Results Chapter

Section 2. Interorganisational Communication

8.2.1 Introduction

In chapter two it was shown that communication and information sharing are important aspects of tourism planning. Without information sharing, the differences and similarities between organisations will remain ambiguous, together with the aspects of their agendas that can be used as the starting point for co-ordination. The performance of organisations in any given setting can be severely hampered when they know little about each other (Njoh 1993). Such ignorance may lead to an unnecessary duplication of functions as well as compounding the problems of organisational uncertainty. It is therefore reasonable to expect that agencies that interact are in a better position to know one another, and thus to respond better to the needs of their clients and to adapt to the environment within which they operate (Njoh 1993). Interorganisational communication has the potential to provide a number of benefits for management (Davidson 1976; Francis 1987). When successful, it gets people pulling in the same direction, makes it easier to introduce changes, gives people the information they need to do their jobs, helps managers control what is going on, shows people that what they do is worthwhile, and reduces the chance of enormous blunders. People from different organisations can share their experiences and expertise through effective communication in order to capture synergies and complement each other’s efforts (Tjosvold 1988).

Six questions in the interviews were structured to explore the frequency and quality of communication between organisations involved in the Belek Coastal Management Plan (BMP), and to evaluate the elements either facilitating or hindering interorganisational communication. In support of the propositions in the academic literature, the respondents almost always considered that communication was helpful in order to inform concerned parties about the work they were doing, partly to ensure that there would be no duplication. Some respondents considered that if two or more organisations were communicating, then they were doing more than talking together. It was felt that communication was important because only then could human energy and resources be channelled in the same direction. Communication was also broadly perceived as a kind of emotional glue, binding people.
8.2.2 Communication between organisations

3) "In designing and implementing the BMP, with which organisations did you communicate most?"

This question sought to identify the other organisations with which each organisation had communicated most, with the results summarised in Table 8.2.1. The Nature Preservation Society (NPS) respondents indicated that they had most contact with the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Environment, followed by local people, local government organisations, Betuyab, the provincial government, other national institutions, universities and voluntary organisations. Betuyab had most contact with the Ministry of Tourism during the formulation of the plan. Other parties frequently contacted by Betuyab included the Ministry of Forestry, the provincial government, NPS, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Culture, municipalities and local people. Officials in central government provincial units indicated that they had the most contacts with their own Ministry in Ankara due to the legislation that regulates their relations. A provincial unit official explained that "we have to report development in the region to Ankara, so we are in constant communication with the MoT. We do not have frequent contacts with the municipalities, unless they address anything to us... we are not the body that they need to contact. If an issue arises, they contact the governor. The governor then dispatches the subject to the concerned unit".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation responding</th>
<th>Contacts mentioned during the formulation of the BMP</th>
<th>Contacts mentioned during the implementation of the BMP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature Preservation</td>
<td>MoT, Municipalities, Local Associations, Local People, Betuyab</td>
<td>MoT, MoC, MoE, MoF, SPAB, Municipalities, Local People, Betuyab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society (NPS)</td>
<td>Provincial Government, MoE, MoC, MoF, MoAVA, MoENR, Universities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities</td>
<td>NPS, Local People, Betuyab, Provincial Government, MoT, MoE, MoF, MoC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoT, Betuyab, Local People, Provincial Government, SPAB, MoE, MoWR, MoC, MoF, NPS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Government</td>
<td>Betuyab, Provincial units, MoT, MoE, MoWR, Municipalities, Local people, SPAB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betuyab, Provincial government, MoC, MoE, MoF, SPAB, MoWR, NPS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism Ministry</td>
<td>NPS, Betuyab, Provincial Government, Provincial units, MoE, MoC, MoF, Universities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betuyab, Provincial government, MoC, MoE, MoF, SPAB, MoWR, NPS, Local people</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Four local government officials commented that there was a legal requirement that they consult with central institutions to gain approval for decisions taken by their municipal council. Geographical distance also appears to affect the frequency and quality of contacts between local and central organisations. The relationship and thus frequency of contact between Betuyab and local government also differed from municipality to municipality. Compared to other municipalities, Belek municipality seems to have communicated most frequently with Betuyab. This municipality had most contacts with Betuyab as a result of the special management arrangements and financial relationships between this municipality and Betuyab. For example, the president of Betuyab and some of its members are also active members of the municipal council of Belek municipality. Additionally, the frequency of contact between Belek municipality and other municipalities was not relatively high. The comparatively low frequency of contact among the region’s municipalities could be ascribed to their differing and often opposing political views.

The frequency of communication among organisations sometimes changed between the formulation and implementation phases of the BMP. A member of the NPS noted that “our communication with the Ministry of Culture (MoC) gained importance later. Our contacts intensified particularly after the declaration of one area as a protection zone. We built a strong relationship with the MoC and stood against Betuyab and the Ministry of Tourism in order to resist the Kumkoy Marina Development project”.
8.2.3 Reasons for communicating with organisations

4) “What reasons did you generally have for communicating with these organisations when designing and implementing the BMP?”

This question determined the reasons for various types of communication. Organisations might have a single or multiple purposes in communicating with others (Francis 1987), and the results in this case are shown in Table 8.2.2.

Table 8.2.2 Reasons for communication between organisations involved in the BMP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Respondents mentioning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information exchange</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation and sending of activity reports</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordination</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of environmental awareness</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict resolution</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voicing complaint</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two provincial government officials stated that they contacted other organisations to disseminate information, find and discuss solutions and their feasibility, and to ask for more staff or expertise. Similarly, two respondents from the NPS stated that they had contacted national and local organisations to discuss the legal aspects and feasibility of the BMP. The reasons why local people from Kumkoy had contacted national organisations and other local organisations were to explain how they were adversely affected by the bans on public use of the beach and the continuing litigation with the Ministry of Forestry over the forest. The local respondents complained that they had petitioned over these issues for a long time but they had achieved almost nothing. Hence, the locals had approached major hoteliers in order to convince them to consider their region as an alternative development zone.

Some respondents explained that there was a formal relationship between the district government (the administration level between villages and cities, which is called district) and
the municipalities based on monitoring the municipal activities and providing assistance when required. One reason given as to why national organisations contacted local government was to increase their environmental awareness. For example, a Ministry of Environment respondent stated that their main reason for local contacts was to instil and promote environmental concern. Respondents from Betuyab said that they contacted the municipalities to encourage them to develop infrastructure to a high standard so that the region would not suffer from negative publicity.

8.2.4 Relative importance of local and central organisations

5) “From your organisation’s perspective, was communication with central government organisations or local organisations more important in relation to the BMP, and why?”

Different parties viewed different organisations as more important in terms of their communication. There was a clear pattern in that central and provincial government officials viewed national organisations as more important for their communication (Table 8.2.3). In contrast, respondents from the voluntary sector and local organisations mentioned other local organisations as more important. Central and provincial government officials stated that central institutions were most important as they are the main tourism regulators in the country and are more knowledgeable and experienced in tourism and environment-related issues. One national organisation respondent also noted that “The involvement of the Ministry of Forestry (MoF) in the communication process was important because the area designated for tourism development had been approved by the MoF and because the MoF is more experienced than others in the preparation of preservation plans”.

From the perspective of the NPS respondents, effective communication with central institutions was essential. This was mostly to gain the support of other organisations involved in the formulation of the plan. One NPS respondent commented that “we had to gain the full support and trust of this Ministry [MoT] in order to acquire the respect of other institutions. This was also necessary to ease access to the field and to conduct the research”. This respondent considered that “persuasion of the MoT and its subsequent involvement in the chairing of meetings was necessary in order to provide more formal recognition to the meetings. Thus any party coming to the venue at the Ministry, becomes more attentive”.

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These two NPS respondents also explained that it was important to keep effective communication with local government and Betuyab. According to one NPS respondent, “they [Betuyab] have been operating in the area for a long time, at least longer than we have...We were aware of the fact that if a consensus could be gained with Betuyab and the local actors towards preserving the region, then central government would have a clear incentive to respect the work and be more likely to give full support to the implementation of the management plan”.

Members of Betuyab stated that gaining local community support was essential. They claimed that they frequently met up with the villagers in order to inform them about the proposed developments and the benefits there would be for the region. Respondents from five local organisations viewed communication with other local parties as more important. They felt that establishing good contacts with local government was crucial because local parties are best placed to identify local needs and wishes. One local Mayor maintained that quality communication particularly with the MoT and other central institutions was important. He explained that “we limit our communication with other municipalities unless they are from our political party. Our communication with the central institutions is more important. This is largely because the MoT and the SPAB provide us with grants”.

**Table 8.2.3 Organisations perceived as most important for communications**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent's own organisation</th>
<th>Organisation mentioned as important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central government officials</td>
<td>MoT, MoE, MoC, MoWR, SPAB, Provincial government, Betuyab, Municipalities, NPS, Universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial government</td>
<td>MoT, MoE, MoC, SPAB, MoWR, Betuyab, Municipalities, NPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>Provincial government, NPS, Betuyab, Local associations MoT, MoE, MoC, MoWR, Universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betuyab</td>
<td>MoT, MoE, Provincial government, NPS, Municipalities, Gendarme, Universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature Preservation Society</td>
<td>MoT, MoC, MoE, Municipalities, Betuyab, Local associations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four local respondents and two from Betuyab stated that planning necessitated an integrated and collective approach and thus all parties are important in terms of communication. According to these respondents, everyone involved in the plan had to
communicate with one another in order to share information. Taking the overall pattern of respondents, they felt that both national and local organisations were important for effective communication. The national organisations were important because of the need for higher level approvals and also due to their expertise. Local organisations were important because they were thought to know more about local problems and workable solutions compared with institutions remote to the region. Another conclusion that can be drawn from the comments is that the specific issues that arose during the formulation and implementation phases of the plan helped to determine who had to be contacted.

8.2.5 Communication barriers

6) "Were there barriers to achieving effective communication in the design and implementation of the BMP? If yes, what were they?"

A number of structural and situational constraints to effective inter-organisational communication have been discussed in the literature. These include geographic and organisational fragmentation, long decision-making chains, jurisdictional boundaries, ideological differences, centralised government decision-making, competitive rhetoric, and an emphasis on one-way communication (Selin 1993). In the Belek case, as many as 28 of the 30 respondents stated that there had been obstacles hindering effective communication, with only two provincial government officials suggesting that there had been no such barriers. The barriers to effective communication identified by the respondents are shown in Table 8.2.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barrier</th>
<th>Respondents mentioning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional administrative culture and related red tape</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional rivalries and jealousy</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences in organisational interests and values</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff discontinuity</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low commitment to communication</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low trust</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical distance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal differences</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-recognition of interdependence</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of a communication plan</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tit-for-tat strategies</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8.2.4 shows that the most frequently mentioned barrier slowing down communication between organisations (with 15 mentions) was the traditional administrative culture and related red tape. Respondents from the voluntary and private sector and local people often mentioned that institutional rivalries and jealousy, and an under-recognition of interdependence as obstacles to effective communication. Five respondents brought up not only organisational rivalries but also personal differences as having substantially blocked communication. Other obstacles that were frequently mentioned were different organisational interests and values (14 mentions), staff discontinuity (13), low commitment to communication (9), and low trust (9).

Local respondents regularly noted that physical or geographical distances between the offices of organisations often dictated the extent of their communication. Notably, the speed of communication with provincial and local units was seen as faster than communication with the centre. This is a consistent finding with contentions in the research literature. Geographical closeness also encourages informal communication channels to form (Francis 1987). Gray (1989) argues that geographic dispersal, increases the cost of face-to-face communication and introduces more possibilities for cultural differences between the initiators. These barriers are explained more fully subsequently.

8.2.5.1 Administrative culture as a barrier to communication

Administrative culture has long been recognised as an influence on inter-organisational communication (Francis 1987). Unique cultures develop within administrative systems, and they become strong informal behavioural codes that shape relationships, attitudes and policies. As many as 15 of the 30 respondents were critical of the present centralised administrative system and its communication customs. Two local government respondents suggested that effective communication could not be achieved through a one-way, downward flow of information, arguing instead for a communication culture built on openness, active listening and information sharing. They complained that such a communication culture is absent in the present administrative system. Communication was generally understood by central government as giving orders in a written form from top to bottom. One complained that “because of the authority vested in central institutions, sometimes communication took the form of intimidation”, and “some attempts by local government to communicate with central government departments are looked upon as a nuisance and are classed as nosy inquiries”. The absence of a two-way communication
culture appears to have meant that there are virtual "walls" between locals and central government (Francis 1987).

Very many of the 15 respondents stated that red tape, which Francis (1987) depicts as a "tortuous and wasteful" form of communication, had consumed too much time, generated frustration, and made decision-making sluggish and inefficient. One local government official explained that "each document has to be registered...being kept in the pigeonholes for ages and signed by tens of people, thus hugely extending the response time for communication". These respondents concurred that red tape needs to be fought, but as one argued: "like weeds in a garden, it easily grows again". The inequality of the power relations involved in communicating with central organisations had also alienated the local representatives from sharing information with central government agencies. Past experience of central interference in local decisions about construction plans and the expropriation of land for development, had meant that the municipalities were not keen to build or maintain effective communication with central government. By contrast, one central government representative complained that the municipalities had deliberately not followed legally prescribed communication procedures. She complained that the "municipalities view us as a barrier that can block them from obtaining large amounts of rent and taxes. Although the existing construction plan only allows two storey buildings in the region, these mayors used to, and still do, condone the illegal construction of five-and six-storey buildings. The higher the number of storeys the higher is the tax that they [the municipalities] would earn from the housing. If we had seen the draft construction plans, we would definitely have stopped their development...This is why they never like communicating with the centre".

8.2.5.2 Institutional rivalry and jealousies as a barrier to communication

Respondents from the NPS and Betuyab complained that national and local institutions were keen not to be seen as at the beck-and-call of another institution, fiercely guarding their independence. One of the biggest hurdles hindering effective communication was that the central agencies were highly suspicious of organisations in civil society undertaking a planning task that normally they themselves would lead. The central government respondents often commented that not only was the creation of a coastal zone management plan very new for Turkey, but the designation of an organisation in civil society as undertaking a leading role in this process was also unprecedented. The credibility of the NPS seems to have been very adversely affected by its position in civil society. Respondents
from the NPS stated that some institutions were apprehensive and extremely disturbed about their leading role. They complained that the administrative system was not ready to accept the presence of a confident voluntary sector organisation. There was also prejudice against the presence of foreign members in the consultant team, with this team recruited by the NPS to conduct research and produce guidelines for new development. One NPS respondent commented that “It would have been better if we had not been presented as an organisation having strong ties with international institutions. This has disturbed the nationalistic sentiments of some agencies. Following the new coalition, with the Nationalist Party running the government, the nationalist pressure was felt even more”. Some central officials directly expressed critical views about the NPS. One MoT official cynically commented that “the NPS likes talking and promising a lot. It has become a commercial [rather than voluntary and non-profit seeking] organisation in recent years. The preparation of a management plan involves fewer resources than actually doing something tangible. The NPS was able easily to swallow up international grants by suggesting that this or that should be done and this would benefit the area”.

The existence of rivalries largely promoted by past conflicts or by loyalties to political party have also hindered effective communication between organisations. It is evident from the comments that there are overt institutional rivalries between different national organisations, as well as between the municipalities. This has substantially clogged the flow of information and undermined the benefits likely to arise from sharing knowledge. An official from the District Government (the administrative level between villages and cities) noted “that conciliation between the different interests of parties through establishing a common vision is almost impossible because of the traditional rivalry between local and central organisations or even between central organisations”. The opposing political loyalties of the municipalities have also exacerbated the rivalries between these organisations. One mayor admitted that his municipality had not communicated with one other municipality because of political differences. The municipalities also held negative opinions about Betuyab's role in the region. The considerable power of Betuyab was severely criticised. One respondent complained that Betuyab communicated easily with ministries and national organisations, but they could not contact them with the same ease, and their requests had taken far longer to be dealt with.

A relative prejudice against the municipalities by central agencies was also often
noted. One municipal respondent commented that the central government officials see local government as inefficient, extravagant, and oppressive toward their local inhabitants. Some felt that central government treats local government simply as an extension, and that it considers itself superior to local government, and this attitude appears to alienate local government officials from sharing information with the centre. This specific problem is also evident in the literature. For instance, Gray (1989) cites the study of Gricar (1981) in which local officials were found to be sceptical about the ability of some stakeholders, questioning the need to include citizens at all.

8.2.5.3 Staff discontinuity as a barrier to communication

One problem creating difficulties for communication is the regular changes in central government officials, often due to frequent changes in the party in government. This was mentioned by thirteen respondents. One respondent from Betuyab stated that they had no problem in terms of initiating communication with central government-appointed staff, but they found it very difficult to maintain this communication. This respondent complained that “conventionally, the staff of many institutions change due to changes in the government. It takes up too much time for these new staff to adopt to their environment, build up information about what is happening to local planning issues, and to comprehend their legal authority and responsibilities in respect to local issues. You then have to restart the communication process from the beginning, re-explaining things, and building up new relations”. And, because “many new staff know that they will be appointed elsewhere when there is a change in the government”, they tend to work reluctantly, not according to rules or are not committed enough to achieve things quickly.

Respondents from the NPS also drew attention to a problem that staff involved in the communication process sometimes lack adequate status and power. According to these respondents, many of the participants in the BMP were not empowered to make the formal decisions needed at the end of their meetings. One respondent from the NPS stated that “the majority of representatives had to consult with, and debrief their superiors before they could reach a decision”.

8.2.5.4 Low commitment as a barrier to communication

Low commitment was mentioned by nine respondents as a barrier to communication. It was felt that some national and local parties lacked a commitment to communication and
that this had substantially undermined the communication process. These respondents stated that the breakdown in the communication process resulting from low commitment had eventually undermined co-operative working in relation to the BMP. Two respondents from the NPS complained that there was a deliberate institutional slowness in making the reports available before crucial meetings. The meetings were thus unproductive. One respondent noted that “all we were doing was coming to a meeting, discussing the same issues which had already been discussed several times in earlier meetings, and setting up a date for the next meeting to discuss almost similar things”. Another private sector respondent argued that “many new staff [a result of frequent changes] work reluctantly and were not preparing reports on time, as they know that they will be appointed elsewhere when there is a change in the government”.

8.2.5.5 Low trust as a barrier to communication

Eight respondents mentioned that the low level of trust between organisations had substantially curtailed communication. According to a provincial government official, “some agents, because they do not trust others, do not communicate with other organisations”. A private sector respondent stated specifically that “particularly the municipalities deliberately did not communicate with one another, believing that information released in the communication process might be used against their own organisation in the future”.

8.2.5.6 Historical relations and personal dislikes as barriers to communication

Personal dislikes of other people were mentioned five times as creating a big obstacle in the way of achieving steady and effective communication. One voluntary sector respondent noted that “there were also personal dislikes among the participants from the NPS and Betuyab. This was also the case with central units. Two of the representatives of different central units had had a personal conflict years ago, and this was the reason for their disagreements over each other's suggestions in the meetings”.

8.2.6 Improving communication

7) “How might improvements be made in communications between national and local organisations in relation to the BMP?”
Empirical research suggests that good communication contributes to the effectiveness of partnerships (Selin and Myers 1998). However, when communication is viewed narrowly as not a good thing, then a spate of issues will arise that will constrain the effectiveness of partnerships. In their research, Selin and Chavez (1994) found that active listening, honesty and directness were important indicators of partnership success. Similarly, respondents in this study suggested several features that could improve communication in relation to the BMP, ranging from building trust to having permanent staff (Table 8.2.5). These suggestions for improving communication in relation to the BMP will now be addressed more fully.

Table 8.2.5 Summary of suggestions for improving communication in relation to the BMP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suggestion</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater trust</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition of the importance of information sharing</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective listening and active dialogue</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-way communication</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More commitment to communication</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater recognition of mutual interdependence</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More positive evaluations of each other</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More use of simple and everyday language in discussions</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement of appropriate staff, and their continuity</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontinuity of partisanship</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced bureaucracy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More professionalism</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More work to establish a common vision</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fourteen respondents mentioned that managing and maintaining communication was a matter of competence and trust. According to this group of respondents, the parties involved in implementing the BMP should be engaged in communication based on trust in order to develop good legislation or regulations. A voluntary sector respondent stated that “other organisations should not be seen as an opponent attempting to interfere with their operation. There must be a mutual trust and reliance”. One ex-Mayor suggested that “they [national organisations] need to give up the traditional conception of viewing municipalities as an organ operating under their strict order and control. They need to show a bit of confidence in local governments’ capacity in bringing local solutions to local problems. Once this mentality
replaces the conventional coercive attitudes, I believe the communication will be improved”. One local government official wished that “there had been a couple of Betuyabs here”, as they trusted it more than other local organisations.

Active dialogue was mentioned as leading to better understanding and mutual confidence and reliance. Some locals suggested that such mutual confidence could foster a more participative, two-way form of communication. This would allow the actors to make full use of each other's expertise and to get more benefit from advisers and experts. Some locals felt that effective communication was a function of the characteristics of the people assigned to manage the communication process. Another frequently mentioned variable affecting communication was geographical closeness. One local government official noted that “I know it would make a difference if we were located nearer to the central government organisations in Ankara”. This problem is also observed in the research literature. Tosun and Jenkins (1996) argue that in most cases, the agencies responsible for the authorisation of tourism investment are not accessible to the majority of indigenous people in local tourist destinations due to their physical remoteness. This increases the knowledge gap between local communities and decision-makers and it also accelerates the isolation of local communities from the tourism development process. Consequently, the knowledge gaps between centralised authorities and local communities make it difficult for a host community to participate in joint arrangements in the tourism development process (Tosun and Jenkins 1996).

Eight respondents mentioned that effective two-way communication between the relevant parties could not happen only through legislation and specified procedures. Active participation by high-ranking officials both from local and central government was also necessary for effective communication. These respondents stated that staff with a low status rank may be committed to communication, but their status substantially reduced their ability to get a timely response from their superiors.

It is apparent from the comments that past personal conflicts should not be allowed to influence meetings. Additionally, good communication between central and local government policy makers was less likely to be reached without a common vision and language. A provincial government official stated that “I think for effective communication, parties should agree on some common vision and individuals should try to cultivate the importance of
knowledge-building through consultation with one another”. Some respondents also suggested that the language used in planning meetings and reports should be as simple as possible. It was felt that if an authority presented planning techniques and objectives in a hardly understandable form to non-specialists, then this could easily alineate this authority. Five respondents suggested that effective communication would never be attained unless the cross-sectoral intolerance among the main central institutions was eradicated.

8.2.7 Effects on communication of more centralised or decentralised decision-making

8) “Would communication between organisations be improved if tourism planning decisions for Belek were left more to local or national organisations?”

This question was designed to identify views as to whether communication between organisations would be improved if planning decisions were left more to national or to local organisations. Here the respondents diverged in their opinions. Seven local respondents felt that national and local organisations were both unlikely to meet the requirements of this task. For instance, one of the ex-mayors noted that “I do not think that it would have made any difference if it had been left to any of the organisations. Communication is something that can only be achieved through commitment, and it is sort of a cultural thing”. Five respondents mainly from the private sector and national organisations expressed their concerns about leaving planning decisions to the municipalities. A private sector respondent expressed his reservations due to partisanship being rife: “as municipalities are supporters of different political parties with opposing ideologies, whether or not you have excellent legislation about communication, that cannot be achieved because of partisanship. When you look at the municipalities of different political parties, all they do is erect impassable hurdles in order to sabotage each other's activities”. One respondent from Betuyab noted that “as for the current local government, I do not think that they would handle the responsibilities of communication properly, as they would be inclined to give more priority to working with organisations that they think will benefit their own interest”. This respondent doubted that the municipalities would be effective at promoting fair and effective communication because of the fundamental problems inherent in the planning and implementing process, the variability of situations and governments, and the dynamics of social and economic change. His comments suggest that political interests and conflicts strongly influence the agendas of the municipalities.
Many of the respondents did not trust the municipalities in relation to improving communication, on the grounds that the municipalities currently use communication in order to get benefits for themselves. By contrast, respondents from the municipalities argued that this task should not be given to Betuyab as it might exploit communication relations to their advantage. They suggested instead that local government should carry out communication-related tasks in the region, because local organisations know regional forces and balances. An ex-mayor stated that "one must admit the fact that implementation requires a fast circulation of information in order not to have overlapping duties and to produce more efficient coordination. In order to do that, local government, I guess, because of their closeness to the area, would be considered more suitable to undertake the communication work regarding planning decisions and their implementation". However, five other respondents from different organisations felt that tourism planning decisions should not be left largely to only one type of government organisation, as this would not be democratic and might lead to severe problems.

8.2.8 Summary

This section investigated the frequency and quality of interorganisational communication in relation to the BMP. Overall, the analysis showed that respondents considered interorganisational communication to be important. However, it is apparent from the comments that the inter-organisational communication had been hampered substantially by behavioural factors, shifting political interests, and the unfavourable perceptions that parties often had of each other. The dissimilarity in values and attitudes between organisations (e.g. while one supports protection, the other supports utilisation), and prejudice about the credibility of particularly organisations in civil society were notable obstacles to effective communication. Some national and private sector organisations were found to be reluctant to communicate with agencies with a perceived lower status. Perhaps inevitably when an agency has had very little contact with another organisation, this seems to have encouraged mutual distrust.

Communication problems appear to have been greater due to the absence of a common language. Additionally, the involvement of junior staff with little decision-making power emerged as another factor that slowed interorganisational communication. Gray (1989) also notes that individuals may participate in a collaborative initiative because of their technical
expertise or local knowledge but that they may not have decision-making authority for their organisations. If an organisation is not represented at senior staff level, it is possible that policies subsequently will be forgotten or disavowed (Bramwell and Sharman 1999). It is evident from the evidence here that delays in the preparation of reports had resulted, and this had constituted another barrier to effective communication.

Respondents generally considered that effective communication could not be achieved through laws and regulations. They supported the view that for effective communication to occur some institutional practices should be abandoned and recognition of the importance of information sharing should be cultivated. It seems that negative stereotypes about other organisations also restricted co-operation. Finally, the analysis demonstrated that the intensity and form of communication between organisations varied depending on the history of the relationships between organisations. It seems that communication tends to become stronger or weaker by being reinforced through joint or co-operative activities or by being undermined through conflictual relations. The respondents suggested several ways to improve communication. They generally concluded that leaving communication to either national or local organisations would not improve communication as much as desired.
8. Results Chapter

Section 3. Stakeholder Involvement and Consensus Building

8.3.1 Introduction

This third section examines the opinions of participants involved in the Belek Management Plan about four aspects of the planning process.

• The organisations that participated most in the formulation and implementation of the Belek Coastal Management Plan (BMP).

• The extent to which relevant stakeholders with an interest in Belek were able to raise their concerns, and the extent to which these concerns had successfully been incorporated into the plan objectives.

• Whether there were disagreements between the parties involved in the BMP, their causes, and how these disagreements were resolved, if at all.

• Finally, participants were also asked for their views on whether leaving planning decisions more to local or to national organisations would help or hinder the making of agreements about tourism planning in Belek.

8.3.2 Parties that participated or were excluded from decision-making

9) "Which parties with an interest in the Belek region have participated most or have been excluded from making decisions about the BMP? Why?"

When asked about which parties participated or were excluded from the BMP, almost all respondents mentioned there needed to be some local or community involvement in decision-making. This is consistent with the propositions presented in chapter two section 2. Locals in particular stressed the need for wide participation, one justification being that this would create the sense of ownership necessary for the successful implementation of the Belek Coastal Management Plan (BMP). One of the locals maintained that “…such involvement would mean that decisions reached would be yours. And what is yours would be more acceptable and supportable than those imposed by someone else”. His comments and others support several arguments identified in chapter two. It is suggested in the literature that, despite many potential difficulties, decisions will have a better chance of being implemented
when taken through an interactive or “communicative” planning process, which involves gathering the experiences, opinions and constructive recommendations of a wide spectrum of constituencies (Gunn 1994; Inskeep 1991; Lang 1988; Pearce 1981).

Table 8.3.1 Stakeholder views on the level of participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisations that considered there was wide participation</th>
<th>Organisations that considered there was narrow participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provincial government</td>
<td>Betuyab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Tourism</td>
<td>NPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Environment</td>
<td>Universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Culture</td>
<td>Local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Forestry</td>
<td>Local people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder mentioned as excluded from decision-making</th>
<th>Organisation that mentioned the excluded stakeholder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local people</td>
<td>Betuyab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local community</td>
<td>NPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities, local societies and associations, and local community</td>
<td>National organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local people, municipalities and academicians</td>
<td>Local people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Universities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Responses to Question 9 identified a divergence between respondents in relation to whether there was wide participation in the BMP. Table 8.3.1 show participants’ opinions about the participation level and about the parties that they felt had been excluded from participating. A fairly large number of respondents from national organisations -seven - considered that there was broad participation. By contrast, as many as 12 of the 30 respondents, particularly from the municipalities and the local community, considered that participation was limited and some of them also claimed that there was only token participation. These respondents complained that particularly local people, local associations and municipalities were excluded from participating properly in the decision-making process. This suggests that some stakeholders were not well informed about the specifics of the project or felt it had not been sufficiently inclusive.

A voluntary sector representative, who believed that participation was limited, conceded that “...just looking at the numbers of participants might be deceptive. At first, you might think that wide participation was achieved and all concerns were harmonised in the decision-making process. However, this was not the case...”. By contrast, one government official, who considered that participation was open to all of the region’s relevant
stakeholders, explained that “this was a very ambitious project [BMP]... and we contacted almost all the relevant parties in order to achieve wide participation”.

Locals considered that they had the right to participate in the project planning, and they offered several explanations as to why they had been isolated from the decision-making process. Some respondents offered more than one explanation. Table 8.3.2 shows these explanations, together with the stakeholders who mentioned them. Local stakeholders frequently mentioned how the current administrative system or else geographical distance had affected their level of participation in the decision-making process (Table 8.3.2). Locals complained specifically that they were not able to participate in meetings held in Ankara because of the geographical distance. It is evident from some locals’ comments that political distance or political polarisation was another barrier that hindered broader local participation in BMP meetings. One municipal official conceded that, because of political opposition between his and another municipality and the past history of party-related conflicts, he had not attended some meetings in order not to confront publicly with the other mayor. Based on direct observation by the researcher and on the interview results, it appears that the low level of trust in the current administrative system and the traditional approach to decision-making by which bureaucrats make decisions on behalf of local people had led to a feeling of isolation among local people. Some local respondents suggested that they were more capable than the planners of producing valuable, workable solutions to their existing problems. They felt that the political system favoured central decision-making and nepotism, and this appears to have stifled participation and increased the distance between the local community and other parties. It appears that there was also a difficulty for locals accessing responsible central agencies, a problem noted more generally in the tourism literature (Hall and Jenkins 1995; Tosun and Jenkins 1996). Some local respondents indicated that the responsible agencies were more accessible to local elites and entrepreneurs with political and financial power. Eight local respondents suggested that many participants were not keen to listen to other parties. Additionally, there were numerous parties who were unconvinced that all affected parties would agree on a shared vision.
Table 8.3.2 Perceived barriers to wider participation and to reaching a consensus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Perceived barriers to wider participation and to reaching a consensus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Betuyab</td>
<td>Legal structure, geographical distance, political fragmentation,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>inappropriate staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>Legislation, geographical distance, local elite, low commitment to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>meeting responsibilities, inappropriate staff, inadequate knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local community</td>
<td>Central administration, legislation, geographical distance, attitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of bureaucrats, local elite, power imbalances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>Central administration, power inequality, attitude of central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>officials, geographical distance, political fragmentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>Legislation, political fragmentation, geographical distance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Six local interviewees were resentful that some public and private sector representatives involved in the BMP did not put more value on community participation. They felt that they did not have the opportunity to express their views fully and that some central government officials saw public participation in decision-making as unnecessary and time-consuming. This finding provides support for the arguments in the literature reviewed in chapter two, section 2.3.1. Some respondents from the Nature Preservation Society (NPS), Local Associations and Betuyab, also believed that some public sector representatives were unreceptive to new ideas and that this, together with the current legal system, did not encourage local people to participate and instead it tended to put a distance between the formal authorities and local people. As suggested more generally by Desai (1985, 314), it appears that "there was lack of political will to implement participation because of the implications for the distribution of power and resources". Local people generally felt that they had the right to be kept informed and consulted on matters that affected their way of living, but they did not consider that their views were given adequate consideration by either the public or private sectors. Four local interviewees identified the influence of power differentials as an obstacle to respectful listening of local views due to a supposed superiority. It was felt that they were marginalized because of their limited resources in the face of local elites and powerful tourism entrepreneurs.

As many as five of the seven representatives from national and provincial government considered that there was broad participation in the BMP. However, the respondents from NPS and Betuyab questioned the form of participation. This issue also emerged in the analysis of variables affecting the effectiveness of the BMP, presented in section 2 of chapter eight. Here the Betuyab and NPS respondents complained that some national organisations lacked a
"genuine commitment" to the BMP, arguing that they did not contribute to the planning efforts properly, equally or as much as required. One of these four respondents contented that “if you take participation as the numbers being present in a meeting, in that sense yes, there was wide participation in the meetings. However, if you take the meaning of participation as taking an active role, spending resources, taking responsibility, then I must admit that such a form of participation was non-existent”. Three respondents agreed that there was a large number of stakeholders involved in the plan's formulation, but they felt this was rather deceptive and should not be taken to suggest there was extensive participation, claiming that the inclusion of a name in the list did not meant that that organisation was a genuine participant. Two NPS representatives also shared this view, arguing further that full participation should mean active involvement in a project, the allocation of resources when necessary, avoiding undue conflict with the other participants. One of the NPS respondents stressed that, once organisations were required to contribute tangible resources, few were willing to do so, explaining that “I think people, including institutions, were committed to formulating the plan as long as the only resource that they had to provide was only their time. When we [NPS] saw the initial enthusiasm, we naively thought that this would continue at the implementation stage. However, this has proven wrong. The attitude rapidly changed when the resource that they had to allocate changed from time to tangible materials, especially money”. Eleven respondents were very critical of national and local organisations because they felt that they did things that contradicted their promise in the meetings. One of them gave the following example: “in meetings they [the municipalities] tend to agree that pollution, both environmental and visual, is a real threat that needs to be addressed immediately. However, when they go back to their area they tend to stimulate the growth of greedy second-home development in order to increase rents, or they buckle under the political pressure. Inclusion of their name in the list does not qualify them as genuinely committed, does it?”. Another respondent mentioned a different example: “in these meetings the Ministry of Environment recognised and endorsed the view that marine turtles needed to be protected. However, they did not spend money or appoint staff for projects relating to their protection. However, they did not spend money or appoint staff for projects relating to their protection, so how can this count as real participation?”.  

8.3.3 Incorporation of interests and concerns

10) “Have the concerns of all relevant parties, including your own concerns, been taken into account during the design and
implementation of the BMP? If not, which parties’ concerns have not been taken into account in the design and implementation of the BMP?"

It is argued in the literature that reaching a consensus involves a discursive process where participants might learn about and respect each other and their different points of view, come to reflect on their own point of view, work together with this combined local knowledge to establish a new discourse about the issues and the policy direction, and come to value and respond to the new policy direction (Healey 1997 in Bramwell and Sharman 1999). It should be recognised that reaching consensus can be difficult due to potential fractions among stakeholders, based on the wider cultural, social, economic and political environment, and that stakeholders need to be committed to understanding each other’s concerns and reaching out across their differences (Bramwell and Sharman 1999). Inequality in power and resource allocations, and differences in the interests and values of stakeholders, may mean that a consensus and a shared ownership of the resulting policies will not emerge between all stakeholders. Ritchie (1993) observes that there might be fundamental differences in the values systems that diverse stakeholders bring to the process, and thus reaching a consensus and obtaining endorsement is a challenging and often delicate task.

As many as 24 of the 30 respondents indicated that it was difficult for the BMP process to ensure that the concerns of all parties were taken into account due to the wider contextual influences. Responses to Question 10 are shown in Table 8.3.3, and they indicate a divergence between the respondents in relation to the extent to which they felt that the BMP encouraged the participants to listen to each other and to take each other’s views into account. Respondents from Betuyab and the NPS felt that there was an adequate attempt to understand the concerns of relevant parties during the plan formulation phase. By sharp contrast, all the local community stakeholders felt that their concerns were just listened to, but not incorporated adequately in the plan’s objectives (Table 8.3.3). One of the ex-Mayors who was quite concerned about how tourism development had taken place, claimed that their economic concerns were largely overlooked: “the extent to which our concerns had been reflected in decisions about the plan is disputable”. In research on Pamukkale World Heritage Site in Turkey, the researcher also reported a similar finding that the economic well-being of locals had not been incorporated into the plan (Yuksel, Bramwell, and Yuksel 1999). Importantly, the exclusion of local needs from planning consideration was likely to have reduced local
support for the project. It is argued in the literature that if local populations do not participate actively in all aspects of developing and managing natural resources for tourism and do not also benefit from this development, then locals may choose to use the natural resources in other, perhaps less sustainable ways (Boo 1991). For example, in Kenya when officials gave more importance to preservation of the environment and wildlife than to local people’s needs, this resulted in a serious decline of wild animals as a result of poaching by residents (Olindo 1991). Although it was to a lesser extent, the examination of disagreements in the following section of this study shows there was a similar tendency for local parties to disrupt the plan's progress.

Participants offered several explanations as to why their concerns had not been listened to or taken account of adequately. Differences between the priorities of national and local organisations was the most prominent issue, this being mentioned by 11 respondents. Two local respondents stated that some of the environmental issues raised by the Nature Preservation Society (NPS) in the early meetings of the BMP did not receive sufficient attention from the national organisations. These two respondents had agreed that the public and private sector participants in Belek were not prepared to support collective decisions which are against their own best interest, and they claimed that, while the NPS tried to draw to the attention of the national organisations the environmental degradation caused by illegal construction of tourist facilities in fragile zones, the Ministry of Tourism (MoT) seemed largely indifferent to this and they did nothing to stall the construction of these facilities. The NPS representatives, who thought that the public and voluntary sector priorities were very different, complained that they had emphasised countless times that the development of second houses must be stopped, but that so far nothing had been done. However, three other respondents, who shared the view that the MoT was largely unconcerned about environmental protection, felt that the MoT subsequently came to realise that this was stance was self-destructive. In the view of these respondents, this reaction came late in the day and it eventually forced the Ministry to spend substantial amount of its resources to reverse the environmental degradation.

Table 8.3.3  Stakeholder views on whether the concerns of all relevant parties had been taken into account in the BMP

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As many as seven of the local participants argued that raising concerns in the discussion sessions did not mean anything resulted from it. This problem is also identified in the literature on partnership working (see chapter two section 2.2.1.6). Locals offered more than one explanation for this problem, including hidden agendas, changing personal, or shifts in institutional values, beliefs and attitudes. One of the ex-Mayors conceded that “while they seem to have listened to our [local] concerns during the meetings, I do not think that they had made adequate effort to incorporate our views and expectations into actions. You know how planning works. In order to play the cards according to the rules, they always strive to achieve wide participation so as to show how attentive they are to the local problems and how keen they are to come up with a solution through agreement with the local players. However, the show is over when the plan starts to be implemented”. Another ex-Mayor, complained that many of the central officials in the meetings were short on patience and were not keen to change the decisions that they had already made. In particular he felt that “they thought that local participation was an unwarranted, long and tedious process. I believe that they would rather carry out the more comfortable and traditionally paternalistic approach to making decisions on behalf of the local people”. This respondent appreciated the level of knowledge of the planners, but he maintained that local plans decided by central units are generally based on official perceptions of local needs and on official standards and values, and “in many cases they are determined with the political and other conveniences of central government agencies in mind”.

Despite the generally negative local responses, three of the respondents in national organisations were reasonably positive about the BMP’s approach. They conceded that it was necessary to hear all views, but also concluded that in practice it had been rather difficult to get everyone involved in the preparatory discussions. In the view of these respondents, the involvement of too many respondents would extend the time scale unnecessarily, and thus this was not generally favoured. One respondent who subscribed to this view, explained that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent group</th>
<th>Concerns had been fully taken into account</th>
<th>Concerns had partly been taken into account</th>
<th>Concerns had not been taken into account</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Betuyab</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National organisations</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial government</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“while I am for wider participation in decision-making processes, in my opinion the preparation of plans should still be carried out with the participation of just a few people. Why? The reasons why I am saying is are that there are only a few people who have the qualifications necessary to prepare plans in the industry”. Three respondents from the private and voluntary sectors and from a national organisation argued that it was impossible to realise the wishes of all relevant parties, and that the harmonisation and incorporation of very diverse preferences was a difficult task. One respondent thought that all the parties had been able to voice their concerns but that the plan simply couldn't address adequately everyone’s differing concerns. This person explained that there were many parties involved, with varying degrees of political influence and power, and hence those finally preparing the plan had to disregard the expectations of some groups in order to satisfy the expectations of others.

Despite the significance of local participation, the interviews indicate that the public officials were perceived to be reluctant to seek local people’s views (Ioannides 1992). Two reasons for the limited involvement of residents in the early stages of developing such a plan can be that this requires a good deal of time and this involvement may result in considerable debate over the implications of various types of development. The interviews indicate that the planners thought that the comments and variety of opinions so revealed might have escalated the conflicts and confusion and may have lessened the commitment to proceed.

The results indicate that a few meetings with wider participation were organised by central government and this might help explain why the government officials insisted that local participation was achieved in the plan decision-making process. However, these meetings were not seen as productive by the local stakeholders, as their views were not then taken into consideration. The academic literature suggests that a community’s willingness to participate in planning programmes may indeed depend on the outcome of earlier interactions with the developer or government agency over planning issues. The responses to Question 10 show that some relevant stakeholders did not want to participate in subsequent meetings because of the outcomes of earlier meetings. Thus the history of participants' experiences with the major players sponsoring the participation work does seem to have influenced the level of subsequent participation. Local responses further suggest that the concept of tokenism identified by Arstein in his Citizen Participation Ladder (1969) has relevance to this case. Arstein recognises that meetings can be used only for one-way communication by the simple
device of providing superficial information, discouraging questions and giving irrelevant answers. Arnstein also points out that there is no certainty that citizens concerns and ideas will be taken into account because they lack the power to ensure that their views are heeded by the powerful. The present findings indicate that participation did not occur where each participant in decision-making meetings had equal power to determine the outcomes. However, there was tokenistic or “pseudo” participation in many instances which was restricted to such processes as providing information, and seeking endorsement, and this offered a feeling of participation more than its substance (Pearce et al, 1996).

8.3.4 Influential organisations

11) “Which national and local organisations, if any, have had most influence on the design and implementation decisions of the BMP? Why?”

This question examined the national and local organisations that were considered to have had most influence on the design and implementation of the Belek Coastal Management Plan (BMP). As with the results of previous questions, there was some divergence between the respondents concerning the organisations perceived as most influential. It is interesting that some of the responses varied between the design and the implementation stages. Table 8.3.4 shows respondents' opinions as to the most influential organisation during the design and implementation stages of the BMP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Most influential during the design of the BMP</th>
<th>Most influential during the implementation of the BMP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Betuyab</td>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>Betuyab, MoT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS and voluntary organisations</td>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>Betuyab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National organisations</td>
<td>MoT, MoE, MoF</td>
<td>Betuyab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local community</td>
<td>Betuyab, MoT, NPS</td>
<td>Betuyab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>NPS, Betuyab, MoT</td>
<td>Betuyab, MoT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two respondents from the voluntary sector stated that the NPS was most influential during the plan formulation phase, while five central and provincial government officials thought that the Ministry of Tourism (MoT) was the most influential in that phase, although
the extent of its influence was perceived as decreasing during the implementation phase. According to central government officials, Betuyab was the most influential organisation during the implementation phase. As many of seven of the local respondents agreed that Betuyab was most influential and they claimed that this was due to its financial power and political ties. One voluntary sector representative who shared this view explained that: “because of their wealth of resources, the staff of Betuyab work effectively...Whenever they want to go somewhere they would go, but we cannot due to our limited resources. Their resources provide them with freedom of mobility and of speech, etc. They are recruiting presentable staff with a good educational background, in expensive clothes, and consequently their influence over relevant bodies and decisions is greater than ours”. Three local government officials conceded that they had hardly any influence at all, and they identified the central government agencies and Betuyab as most influential. An ex-Mayor commented rather revealingly that “it is he who pays the piper that calls the tune...we were not strong enough to make a stand against central government organisations”.

8.3.5 Changes in authority and responsibility and their implications

12) “Has there been any change in the authority and responsibility of national or local organisations between the design and the implementation phases of the BMP? If yes, what were the implications of this on the design and implementation of the BMP?”

This question examined whether there were changes in the authority and responsibility of organisations and whether they had implications for the BMP. Twenty of the respondents pinpointed several changes that occurred in the political environment, as well as in the number and the roles of institutions involved in the plan since it was first drawn up in 1995. These changes seem to have affected the relations between national and local government. Following the general elections in 1998, a new government was formed, and ministers and ministerial staff were replaced (see chapter 6), and as a result new mayors and a new governor were appointed. In the view of the majority of respondents, these changes had a tremendous effect on the plan's implementation. One Nature Preservation Society representative explained that “when I first came here, only Kadiyre enjoyed the status as a town, and Belek and Kumkoy were very small villages. The area was under the complete jurisdiction of Serik Municipality, as there were no other municipalities at that time. The Serik Municipality regulated the
operation of all facilities on the beaches and they enjoyed the income from renting out those facilities. As soon as the Belek Municipality was established, authority over these facilities and areas was given to this new municipality, because the facilities were within its borders. This has given rise to serious conflicts between the new municipality and that of Serik. Now Serik has got no physical connection with the seashore and they are on weak ground in fighting over the income that once used to belong them. This, of course, has led to an observable deterioration in their relations”. The declaration of Kumkoy reserve as a Specially Protected Area (SPA) was another change that has led to the involvement of different organisations. One central official explained that “their involvement [Specially Protected Area Board (SPAB)] has created another confusion [in relation to Kumkoy]...because they [SPAB] wanted to develop their own plan for the area rather than going ahead with the existing one”.

8.3.6 Disagreements and their causes

13) “If local organisations and national organisations have disagreed about how tourism is managed in Belek, what has been the cause of this disagreement? How has this been resolved, if at all?”

The aim of Question 13 was to identify any issues causing disagreement about how tourism is managed among the parties involved in the BMP. It was argued in chapter three that conflict is a normal consequence of human interaction in periods of change, the product of a situation where the gains or new activities of some parties are perceived to involve sacrifices by others (Milman and Pizam1988). Conflict is frequently equated with fighting, and is often seen as destructive, unpleasant and undesirable. It affects morale, communication and productivity, and it can bring organisations to a virtual standstill (Waddock and Bannister 1991). Conflict is dynamic and unmanaged conflicts seldom remain constant for long (Carpenter and Kennedy 1988). They may stay dormant but then resurface in a more complicated and virulent form, making them even more difficult to manage. The reasons for disputes vary greatly. It is often the case that conflicts over natural resources are rarely exactly what they seem. Amy (1987 in Hall 2000) observes that “What appears to be a simple collision of purposes is usually a combination of issues, past history, personalities, and emotions” (Amy 1987). Opposition to the growth of tourism in an area or to specific tourism developments often arises partly because access to common resources, such as scenic
qualities, water or open spaces, is coveted by other users with different, often incompatible interests (Milman and Pizam 1988).

Quite a high proportion of respondents -18- mentioned differences of opinion or disagreements between the various parties affected by the Belek plan. Table 8.3.5 summarises the specific disagreements or the conflictual issues about tourism that they identified, and Table 8.3.6 lists the more fundamental causes of the conflicts that they mentioned. The marina development project emerged as by far the most prominent specific issue causing conflict, having been mentioned by all the representatives of organisations included in the study. The main specific issues mentioned by local parties were the proliferation of large-scale, five star hotels in the region, the introduction of all-inclusive holidays, the ban on hunting, and the frequent interventions into traditional ways of life. Other issues frequently mentioned as causing conflict about tourism management in the region included the development of second homes, the use of beaches in neighbouring towns, measures for turtle protection, the water treatment plants, and the management of facilities in buffer zones. These specific issues are examined in detail later in this section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause of disagreement</th>
<th>Stakeholder mentioning the issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marina development proposal in Kumkoy</td>
<td>Nature Preservation Society (NPS), Ministry of Tourism (MoT), Belek Tourism Investors’ Association (Betuyab), Local people, Specially Protected Area Board (SPAB), Provincial Government, Municipalities, Ministry of Culture (MoC), Ministry of Environment (MoE), Ministry of Forestry (MoF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-scale hotels</td>
<td>Local people, Betuyab, MoT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All-inclusive holidays</td>
<td>Local people, Betuyab, NPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional ways of life</td>
<td>Local people, Local public officials, Betuyab, Provincial Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of second homes</td>
<td>Municipalities, Betuyab, NPS, MoT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of beaches in neighbour towns</td>
<td>Bogazkent Municipality, Betuyab, MoT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban on hunting and use of forest areas</td>
<td>Betuyab, Local people, NPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turtle nests and lighting</td>
<td>Betuyab, NPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water treatment plants</td>
<td>Betuyab, Serik Municipality, NPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of facilities in the buffer zones</td>
<td>Betuyab, Serik Municipality, Kadriye Municipality, MoT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By far the most frequently mentioned more fundamental cause of conflict mentioned by respondents was the current legislative and institional framework, which led to imbalances in resources and power (Table 8.3.6). For example, one provincial government respondent, argued that: “every organisation wanted to do plans on their own... the Ministry of Public Resettlement urged that according to the Construction Law [see chapter six] they have jurisdiction over the formulation and approval of Constructions Plans, and other organisations should consult with them...[But] the Authority for Specially Protected Areas also claimed that they had the right to formulate their own plan in the same area. Accordingly, in a 30 square km of land, literally thirty institutions got involved”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder offering the explanation</th>
<th>Cause mentioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local government, NPS, Betuyab, Local government, Universities, Local people</td>
<td>Imbalances in resource and power allocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS, Betuyab, Local government, Universities, Provincial Government, Local people, National organisations</td>
<td>Different goals and values or the involvement of too many organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government, Betuyab, NPS,</td>
<td>Constraints on access to local resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoT, MoE, Betuyab, NPS, Universities, Local government</td>
<td>Institutional practices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As many as 14 of the 30 respondents suggested that conflicts were related to different organisational philosophies, priorities, and objectives. For example, while some organisations favoured the protection of natural resources, others were in favour of their exploitation. This finding suggests that there was not a great deal of common ground for the stakeholders participating in the BMP to reach a shared vision. Even when they appreciated their mutual interdependence, there were likely to be difficulties in practice in engaging in shared decision-making.

The interviewees provided several examples of the differences in priorities between organisations. A local association representative considered that the MoT was essentially a business-oriented organisation, while the MoC, as well as the MoE and the NPS, were more protection-oriented. A private sector respondent, who was dissatisfied with a perceived over-emphasis on environmental protection, accused the NPS and the other institutions it worked
with as “mistakenly giving more emphasis to the preservation side of the sustainable tourism terminology. They have, however, largely overlooked the rational and sustainable use of natural resources”. By contrast, one local respondent agreed that the NPS and other voluntary sector organisations were more concerned with preservation of social, natural and historical assets, and accused the national organisations of focusing merely on economic development at the expense of the depletion of irrecoverable natural resources. One NPS representative claimed that “there is no other country that accelerates the destruction of its beaches, forests and historic places for a far-fetched expectation of obtaining big returns. We are having cultural, economic and environmental erosion, and nobody at ministerial level really seems to care about this”. A private sector respondent felt that this economic bias could be attributed to the concept of sustainable tourism development not being well understood. Another respondent explained how people operating in the industry had had a stormy decade with frequent bankrupts and litigation, and it was felt “it is not yet in their horizon or agenda to pay attention to the more sustainable development of tourism in the area, and particularly to minimising the negative impacts on natural and cultural assets”.

The next section focuses on a detailed analysis of the specific issues identified in Table 8.3.5 as having led to disagreements between the stakeholders about the management of tourism in the area. First, disagreements over the proposed marina development in Kumkoy will be evaluated.

8.3.6.1 Marina development proposal in Kumkoy

As many as two respondents from the NPS, five from national organisations, and two from private sector organisations mentioned significant disagreements in relation to the marina development proposal for Kumkoy. Several respondents in national and private sector organisations felt the marina development in Kumkoy bay was essential, in order to help revive and diversify the local economy, to provide an additional attraction in the region, and to differentiate the region from competing regions with similar features. The NPS representatives expressed a contrasting view, arguing that this project, proposed by the MoT and supported by Betuyab, would destroy an environmentally sensitive area. They also felt that this project would not bring as many benefits as expected. One NPS respondent contended that the marina proposal was incompatible with the proliferation of large-scale hotels in the region: “while they are trying to develop a marina to attract yachters, I doubt that a tourist travelling on a
yacht will stay over-night in a hotel”. In her opinion the marina would help to diversify the economy but it would put extra pressures on the environment. The respondents from the national organisations were critical of the NPS because, together with other voluntary sector organisations, it had lobbied against the marina proposals of the Ministry of Tourism (MoT), and subsequently they had successfully used legal procedures to halt the execution of this project.

8.3.6.2 The proliferation of large-scale hotels

The researcher’s direct observation and the interviews suggest that the locals felt discontented about the growing number of large-scale hotels in the region. Three locals contended that five-star hotels were unwanted as they damaged the local environment and did not make a real impact on the local economy (Figure 8.3.1). They maintained that most tourists visiting their region no longer wanted a mass tourism experience, rather they wanted to travel independently in order to gain insights into the local culture and history. They also complained about the pricing policies of the five-star hotels, as the prices were not within the affordable range for most tourists. Locals were also dissatisfied with current package tour arrangements, as they were totally controlled by external tour operators. This meant that tourists were not free to do as they wished, having instead to comply with itineraries determined by the tour operator. One local representative claimed that “even the shops for purchasing souvenirs or other items have already been pre-determined by the tour operator”, and he went on advocate the development of lodging facilities for independent tourists as it was felt they are growing in number and that they would contribute more to the local economy than the package tourists. This preference for more lodging for independent tourists appears to have been shared by almost all the locals interviewed.
8.3.6.3 All-inclusive holidays

A related issue on which there was much disagreement between locals and Betuyab was the “all-inclusive” holidays that had been promoted by hoteliers in the region. Seven local and voluntary sector representatives expressed real concerns about their long-term adverse impacts on the local economy. Many of them felt that tourists coming for all-inclusive holidays are unable to make their own decisions about what to do in the area as they largely comply with what is staged for them: “tourists in all-inclusive packages cannot get a real taste of the region”. The greatest concern for locals was not the related lack of promotion of their culture but the decrease in commercial transactions with visitors. One local complained that “if I was an all-inclusive customer, I would not want to go outside the hotel. Why bother, as everything is free and provided in the facility?”. The locals believed that this system was geared merely to benefit hoteliers, with this being seen as against the local community's best interest. Some considered that, should the all-inclusives continue to be promoted, then tourism and the locality would decline substantially. One of the locals explained that “the shopkeepers will suffer great losses, and eventually they will end up being bankrupt, as long as the hoteliers continue to sell their rooms all-inclusive”. He felt that “if local resources are depleted at the expense of making outsiders [hoteliers and developers] richer, then I would call this [the BMP] an unjust development".

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8.3.6.4 Traditional ways of life

Many mentioned the frequent conflict between locals and public sector officials over traditional ways of life. For example, it has been traditional for locals to move to huts along the beach during the summer due to the hot and humid climate, but three public sector respondents argued that these huts were built in a disorderly fashion because there was no legislation in relation to where and how they should be constructed, and that they visually polluted the beach (see Figure 8.3.2). These respondents reported that there had been physical conflicts between officials and villagers when the Provincial Government decided to demolish the huts. The villagers were dissatisfied with government interference in their traditional practices, and they complained that they could not afford to buy “air-conditioners”, as “cynically” suggested by some public officials as an incentive to staying in the beach huts. They were also annoyed about not being allowed freely to use the beach in front of the hotels. While there are no physical barriers preventing their entry to the beach, it appears that in practice the hotel security staff do not let locals use the beach. The locals were also infuriated by jokes that the hotel staff have made about local women swimming in their daily attire, including calling them "jelly fish".

Figure 8.3.2 View of deserted huts

8.3.6.5 Second home development
Another source of conflict mentioned by many respondents was the issuing of permits for second home development in the region (Figure 8.3.3). Two Betuyab representatives and two from the NPS stated that the increased construction of second homes was the result of the municipalities seeking extra income. One of these respondents complained that “it is incomprehensible why these buildings had been permitted to occupy such fertile land, and why they had been developed in such a haphazard style”. These interviewees and those from the national organisations were critical of the municipalities in this respect. Three central government officials also pointed to wider differences between national organisations and municipalities in relation to how residential tourism should be managed in the region. One of them explained that “we [the ministry] strongly resist the development of second homes in the region ... such development is detrimental to the region’s success. However, the municipalities are indignant and indifferent to our concerns, and they have deliberately accelerated the development of second homes in the region”.

Figure 8.3.3 Second home development along the coast of Kadriye

8.3.6.6 Use of beaches in neighbouring towns

Another issue shown in Table 8.3.5 is the conflict between Bogazkent municipality, Betuyab and the Ministry of Tourism about the use of the beaches in the two neighbouring...
towns of Belek and Bogazkent (see Figure 8.3.4). The conflict focused on the building of a bridge connecting beaches in these neighbouring towns. Two respondents from Betuyab said that they favoured the construction of the bridge so it was possible to cross Acisu river dividing the two beaches. They expressed resentment with the Mayor of Bogazkent for imposing difficulties on this: “the Mayor of Bogazkent has taken a very strange attitude, issuing an order to demolish the already completed bridge on the basis that the construction violated the Coastal Zone Management Law and that it was illegal”. These Betuyab representatives explained that they had tried to confer with the mayor, and complained that the Mayor had obstinately refused to step back from his initial stance. They maintained that the decision to construct the bridge over the river was not taken by their organisation: “before the tourist facilities had been built there, the Ministry [of Tourism] had issued a permit to construct the bridge and we told the Mayor that we were not the person to contact on this issue. This problem should concern the Ministry and not our organisation”. However, from the perspective of the Mayor of Bogazkent, the construction of a bridge was an open violation of the relevant law and what he had done was right and legal. He claimed that if another attempt was made to build the bridge he would not hesitate to do the same, even this time in the high tourist season.

8.3.6.7 The ban on hunting and use of the forest

The ban on hunting and a regulation that restricts use of the forest appear to have created conflicts between Betuyab and the villagers. The Betuyab representatives complained that despite the ban the villagers did not cease their traditional hunting activities, explaining that in order to restrict the illegal hunting they had worked together with the Military Police. There were also conflicts between villagers and Betuyab over the fence that was built to regulate entrance to the forest. One Betuyab member complained that “we [Betuyab] managed to fence 40 km of the forest, and built entrance gates with master keys kept by us, by the Military Police and by the Ministry of Forestry. However, we encountered a negative response from local people. One night they broke these gates into pieces...what they wanted was to collect pinecones [for burning in their stoves]. The maintenance of the fence and gates has proven to be extremely costly and disruptive to our other functions”.

It is interesting to note that the NPS representatives were also critical of the attitude of Kumkoy villagers in relation to these issues. In addition, these respondents suggested that the
Kumkoy villagers were indifferent to their warnings about the incremental impacts of eco-tourism, and claimed that they were blinded by the prosperity that tourism could deliver for them at one go and that they were not ready for tourism. The findings here are similar to those discussed earlier. It was stated that the educational level in the region was relatively low and the locals lacked the prosperity to enable them to make the investment needed to make the area internationally competitive (Soybay 1995). The NPS representatives felt that the region should be declared a protected zone and should remain as such. However, their suggestion went strongly against what local people wanted. They sought the supposed prosperity that tourism is reputed to bring. One NPS representative expressed his dissatisfaction with the locals’ understanding of tourism, explaining that the “locals associate the presence of bulky five-star hotels in their region with tourism development. Countless times, we struggled to get across the fact that even if hotels are not built here they can still attract tourists to the region through eco-tourism. They can earn money, at the same time as preserving nature”. This respondent also contended that if investors succeeded in constructing five-star hotels in the protected area, their operations would fail due to the standard of service being too low as a result of the limited skills of local people.

8.3.6.8 Turtle nests and lighting

Turtle nests and lighting was another specific issue over which Betuyab and the NPS disagreed markedly (Table 8.3.5). The Betuyab representatives were critical of the NPS for the inflexible application of their approach to sustainable tourism development, and in particular in relation to their attitude to lighting and nesting turtles. According to the NPS, the tourist facilities should switch their lights off at night when the marine turtles start nesting, as the lights can disturb their hatchlings and attract predators. The Betuyab representatives explained how “at first sight, this is a very reasonable recommendation. However, we cannot order every hotel proprietor to switch off their lights due to their need for security. When you turn off the lights of a thousand-bed hotel, you are up against a very serious security problem”. They said that when the lights were switched off, then the Military Police or the State Police Department would order them to switch the lights back on immediately for the safety of their guests and of the property. They maintained that they had brought up this issue in their meetings with the NPS to formulate the BMP, and had suggested that, rather than insisting strictly on a "total switch off", they could try to devise another lighting system which would not affect marine turtles in their nesting season (see Figure 8.3.4).
One Betuyab representative explained that “we had devoted a large amount of money to experiments in order to assess the extent to which the turtles are disturbed by the lights and to calculated the light angles which would give them the least disturbance...In our experiments we found that hatchlings were affected by light coming through at 15 degrees to the ground. When the angle was changed about five degrees, the disturbance is over”. The NPS respondents were also in disagreement with the practices of Betuyab in relation to the turtles. It seems they were dissatisfied with the practice whereby Betuyab fenced off the turtle nests during the breeding season became they thought that this then flagged up where the nests were and drew the tourists to these places, which eventually disturbed the hatchlings (see Figure 8.3.5).
8.3.6.9 Water treatment plant

The management of the water treatment plant in Serik Municipality was another specific issue mentioned by some representatives of Serik Municipality, Betuyab and the NPS. The Betuyab and NPS respondents argued that the Serik Mayor had left the water treatment plant idle as a negotiating weapon in political debates. One of the ex-Mayors explained that “everything about that collector (plant) is ready to use, but due to political jealousy it has not been used by the current Mayor”. These respondents expressed concern that as a result of the actions of the Serik Mayor the wastewater is flowing untreated to the sea. One of them explained that “water discharged into the river is not a real concern as long as this plant is working properly, is in good condition and is well maintained. However, if it is ill-maintained, then it will constitute a great risk for seawater quality”.

8.3.6.10 Management of facilities in buffer zones

Betuyab and the municipalities seem to have disagreed with each other over the designation and management of the environmental buffer zones in the Belek area, and particularly over the facilities for public use that are provided in them (Table 8.3.5). Figure 1
in chapter one shows that there are five development zones in the Belek area and between each there is a buffer zone designated to protect the native fauna and flora. The Betuyab representatives claimed that the municipalities did not manage these areas according to the regulations issued by the Ministry of Tourism, and one explained that “because of their ill-management and hygiene-related problems, the Ministry has cancelled the permit for the management of these facilities given to Serik municipality, and it has also closed the facilities run by Kadiye municipality”. In the view of another respondent, these problems were related to the fact that “these people [the Mayors] view themselves as being dependent on their electors and they cannot withstand the often illegal requests of their voters. This mentality prompts numerous mistakes”. Perhaps surprisingly, one respondent described how they had spoken to the mayor and suggested to him that his actions violated the Coastal Zone Management Law, and the Mayor then "confesses: well, what could I do? These people are my voters, and I cannot say No to them”. The Betuyab members considered that these beach facilities were both illegal and unsuitable for the sale of food and drink. One of them explained that the “tourists coming to the region on a half-board basis want to use low-cost eating places and they frequent these places under the mistaken impression that they are hygienic. Due to the unhygienic food consumed at these places they come down with upset stomachs and then prosecute the hotel they are staying in rather than these proprietors. These guests are provided with medical reports indicating they have suffered food poisoning, and consequently we are obliged to pay compensation for the mistake of someone else”.

8.3.7 Quality of conflict resolution

The research literature suggests that conflicts should be dealt with as soon as possible with appropriate approaches and tools (Waddock and Bannister 1991). According to Burton (1979 in Tillet 1991: 9), conflict resolution means “terminating conflict by methods that are analytical and get to the root of the problem. Conflict resolution, as opposed to mere management or “settlement”, points to an outcome that, in the view of parties involved, is a permanent solution to the problem”. It can take a number of forms, including information exchange, mediation involving a neutral third party, and binding arbitration whereby there is agreement to give the decision-making over a particular issue to a third party (Hall, 2000). The forms of resolution may include fighting (even involving violence), adjudication, negotiation or bargaining, and withdrawal (Tillet, 1991). Hall (2000) argues that simply hosting a public meeting, which is a common consultation strategy, often does not lead to the
conflict being resolved. Indeed, “it may well give rise to greater conflict between parties. Public meetings may well assist to identify conflict, however, they cannot resolve or manage them. This is largely because they allow everyone to have his or her say, but the causes of the conflicts are often overlooked” (Millman and Pizam1988: 123).

Apparently, stakeholders involved in the formulation and implementation of the BMP had disagreements about several issues (Table 8.3.6). Based on the researcher's direct observation and the interviews, it appears that very many of these conflicts had gone unmanaged, and they had often resurfaced later in different forms which made them very difficult to manage. One of the most frequently mentioned means to overcome disagreements was information exchange. However, the extent to which such information exchange helped to resolve disagreements is debatable. The Ministry of Tourism (MoT) organised public meetings to inform key parties, and particularly the NPS and local inhabitants, about the proposals for the Kumkoy Marina development. Similar public meetings were also employed by the NPS to inform local people about the adverse effects of the Kumkoy Marina. However, these public meetings were treated with considerable suspicion by both the Kumkoy villagers and by Betuyab. Caught up in the dynamics of conflict, the Ministry of Tourism, Betuyab and NPS had reached a point where they had stopped talking with each other and instead they used public meetings to disseminate information that promoted their own position.

Another method of conflict resolution, that of legal adjudication and litigation, was used by the NPS and MoT in order to resolve the Kumkoy conflict. However, while winners (the NPS) and losers (the MoT) had been determined through this legal process, the conflict continued unabated and it even escalated further because the loser (the MoT) felt further alienated from the rules of the game. The Kumkoy villagers had also opted to use legal adjudication in relation to the dispute around the declaration of the forest area as a specially protected zone. It is likely that conflicts between the public sector organisations and Kumkoy villagers over their traditional ways of life will recur in the future unless the fundamental causes of these disagreements are addressed. The involvement of the Special Protected Areas Board (SPAB) in the management of these forests might be taken as an attempt to reduce the continuing conflicts over how these environmental resources could be used in the region. Compared to many other parties, the NPS considered that the SPAB was relatively more
credible and impartial and could act as a mediator or arbitrator on issues causing conflict in
the area. Even fighting as a method of conflict resolution had occurred over the management
of facilities provided for the public in the buffer zones. Infuriated by the closure of the
facilities in Serik Municipality, a number of interested parties had rushed down to the beach
and had confronted the managers from Betuyab and other public officials. A similar incident
involving some physical confrontation had also taken place between Kumkoy villagers and
public sector officials over the proposal for the marina development.

In short, many of the attempts to resolve conflicts in the region had not been fully
successful. This situation was likely to be a formidable barrier to co-operation between the
parties and the co-ordination of their activities in relation to the BMP. The academic literature
reviewed in chapter four section 4.7.6 suggest that parties involved in conflicts are often
reluctant to give up their territory, and they will continue to be uncooperative and engage in
turf protection if there is low trust, little commitment to conflict resolution, and if their
organisational goals are incompatible.

8.3.8 Leaving planning decisions to local or national organisations

14) "Would it be likely to help or hinder reaching agreement about tourism
planning decisions affecting Belek if these decisions were left more to
local or national organisations?"

This question examined stakeholders’ views as to whether leaving decisions more to
local or national organisations would be likely to help or hinder agreements being reached
about tourism planning decisions affecting Belek. The majority of respondents appear quite
concerned that neither municipalities nor national organisations on their own would be able to
make decisions about tourism planning that would be acceptable to other parties (Table 8.3.7).
Six respondents from Betuyab and national organisations maintained that leaving decisions to
the central government organisations or the municipalities alone would not work due to the
fact that they would continue to tussle over power with each other. The Betuyab
representatives thought that the municipalities would be unsuitable because of their
partisanship and they considered that this would unnecessarily extend the time spent in
reaching decisions and may introduce arbitrariness and biases. These respondents also felt that
the transference of decision-making to local government may lead these municipalities to use
this as a weapon due to the widespread corruption, claimed that the people running the municipalities were yet to grasp the real responsibilities of their role. The NPS representatives, generally shared this view, albeit a little less extremely, and they felt decision-making authority should not be left to a single organisation as this would risk decisions being made arbitrarily or behind closed doors, and that this might further harm the environment and society.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation of respondents</th>
<th>National organisations</th>
<th>Local organisations</th>
<th>A union or combination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Betuyab</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS and other voluntary sector organisations</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National organisations</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial government</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local community</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
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</table>

Several of the respondents from local organisations maintained that as long as both national and local organisations doubted each other’s ability, it was unlikely that they would accept decisions made exclusively by the other. There were many respondents who supported the idea of shared working in a union. Sometimes it was argued that local government was deficient at some tasks, partly because of resource deficiencies, but good at other things. Hence, they felt that, rather than leaving decisions to a single organisation, it would be wiser to link these institutions to use their individual strengths and counterbalance their weaknesses. Some of those who argued for a union or combination suggested that it was necessary to identify which organisations are good or bad at specific activities and to fuse their strengths together.

8.3.9 Summary

In this section six questions were evaluated to ascertain whether the stakeholders felt that the various parties had participated fully in the decision-making involved in formulating and implementing the BMP, whether they considered they could raise their concerns, and whether they felt their concerns had been incorporated in the decisions. There was found to be an interesting divergence in respondents’ opinions on the extent and nature of participation in the decision-making process. The respondents from NPS and Betuyab thought that the number
of people present at meetings was less important than the extent of commitment and cooperativeness. It was argued that reaching consensus was almost impossible during the meetings. This may be partly because many of the representatives regularly attending these meetings lacked the power to make decisions on behalf of their organisation. Several local participants indicated that there was only token participation, and that they were particularly disadvantaged by their status and lack of power. Because of the largely centralised administration in the country, they felt that their concerns about development were unlikely to be addressed. The literature on tourism planning also highlights the problems of unequal access to power in decision-making (Hall 2000).

There were divergences in respondents' opinions about whether full consideration was given to the views and priorities of all participants in the planning process. Several public sector officials were concerned that community participation takes time and resources. By contrast, the local parties often suggested that effective public participation could prevent the significant costs resulting from continued conflicts and the need to change decisions that proved to be poorly informed. The majority of respondents felt that there was little mutual respect and trust among the parties in their interactions around the planning process. This suggests that there was only a limited recognition of the stakeholder interdependence in relation to the problem-domain and of their need to work with others. This was exemplified by the national organisations being relatively unreceptive to listening to the multiple local organisations.

A number of conflicts between organisations were identified. There is clear evidence that the parties were largely unsuccessful in resolving domain-level problems and many of these conflicts appear to have gone unmanaged other than occasionally through litigation. Given the limited communication between parties that was identified previously, it is perhaps easier to understand why conflicts have generally not been settled successfully. Because many issues leading to conflicts between organisations had not been dealt at a deeper level, it had become almost common to use litigation as a form of conflict resolution. However, conflicts are likely to continue in the future and may become more destructive.
8. Results Chapter

Section 4. Resource Sufficiency and Exchange

8.4.1 Introduction

The literature suggests that often little is achieved when organisational resources, such as finance, labour, and management skills, are not available, often due to a lack of commitment from key political and administrative people (Elliot 1996). Based on the study's conceptual framework, the aim of section four is to elicit views on the adequacy of the financial, legal, informational and political resources for the parties involved in the Belek Coastal Management Plan (BMP). More specifically, the questions in this section:

- Identify which of the national and local organisations were perceived to lack resources to make a success of implementing the BMP.
- Identify how many resources the national and local organisations contributed to implementing the Plan.
- Examine whether there was institutional competition between the organisations for funds and authority.
- Solicit the preferences of respondents about whether leaving control of resources to local or national organisations would help or hinder plan implementation.

8.4.2 Stakeholder organisations identified as lacking financial resources

15) “Which organisations participating in designing and implementing the BMP, if any, have lacked sufficient financial resources to make a success of implementing the Plan?”

The responses to this question are summarised in Table 8.4.1. When asked about the adequacy of the financial sources of organisations involved in the BMP, respondents indicated that only a few organisations had enough such resources to fulfil the plan-related tasks successfully. Financially strong institutions were said to
include the Special Protected Area Board (SPAB), the Ministry of Tourism (MoT), the Ministry of Environment (MoE), and Betuyab.

Two respondents from Betuyab argued that the Betuyab investors had greater financial resources than many of the other organisations involved in the BMP. They felt that Betuyab had never confronted financial problems due to, for example, having monthly membership fees from its members. It was also explained that new Betuyab members had to allocate a small percentage of their initial construction capital for the use of Betuyab. Another organisation with sufficient resources was identified as the Ministry of Tourism (MoT). However, the adequacy of the resources allotted by central government to MoT was criticised by the Betuyab and NPS representatives. Two Betuyab respondents considered that central government was mean to the MoT: “although each year the country earns billions of dollars from tourism, central government does not transfer the necessary funds to the Ministry [MoT], which undeniably is playing the most important role in the creation of the income. This is very controversial”.

Table 8.4.1 Views on the financial resources of different stakeholders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financially Strong</th>
<th>Financially Weak</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belek Tourism Investors' Association (Betuyab)</td>
<td>Nature Preservation Society (NPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Tourism (MoT)</td>
<td>Municipalities and local community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Protected Area Board (SPAB)</td>
<td>District government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Environment (MoE)</td>
<td>Provincial units of national organisations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Betuyab respondents, the organisations that most lacked financial resources were the municipalities. The municipalities were considered to lack financial resources not only because their centrally-determined funds were insufficient, but also because these funds were spent unwisely or were siphoned off somewhere or to someone else. Chapter six highlighted that this is a particular problem in Turkey. These Betuyab representatives, together with five others from the public and voluntary sectors, also reported that there were flaws in how central funds were distributed among municipalities in different regions. One respondent explained specifically that the financial burdens on municipalities operating in a tourist region were greater than those on a municipality operating in region detached from tourism. This respondent went on to explain that “the Provincial Bank allocates funds in
proportion to the population of municipalities. An important point that they [the Provincial Bank] are missing is the population rise in the summer. A town of ten thousand inhabitants becomes a city accommodating two hundred thousand people. With the allocated funds for ten thousand inhabitants, how on earth can a municipality provide its services satisfactorily?” She added that the depletion of natural resources within the region could have been reduced if the municipal revenue system had been reformed.

Eleven of the 30 respondents, from both national and local organisations, contended that almost all organisations found it difficult to allocate adequate financial resources for the requirements of the BMP. One respondent from provincial government admitted that lack of financial resources had impeded the delivery of an effective inspection service in the region: “the coastline to be inspected is about 300 km long, and effective inspection of facilities, guides, travel agents, etc., in this vast territory involves much travel. When we travel from one spot to another [Alanya is 135 km and Kas is 235 km away from Antalya] the cost of petrol consumption is unaffordable”. The District government official also indicated that they lacked adequate financial resources to fulfil their assignments successfully. He explained that the district government was dependent on funds provided by provincial government, which itself relies on funds allocated by central government.

Respondents from the NPS stated that with respect to technical equipment, financial resources, and also authority, they were among the least powerful organisations compared to government organisations and Betuyab. However, they felt that the municipalities were the weakest. Two Betuyab respondents stated that the NPS only had enough financial resources to start the management plan, and subsequently they lacked the funds to carry out their functions in the region. The financial difficulties of the NPS were seen in the closure of their office in the region.

Four local government officials felt that the kinds of control over finance exercised by central government had a damaging effect on local government’s independence and initiative. This issue was also identified in chapter six. It appears that local government was far too dependent on central government for it to be fully responsive to local interests. But, while the local authorities bemoaned the central
interference in local affairs, they were not above requesting specific policy guidance and financial aid from central departments. The four local government officials also stated that the municipalities lacked sufficient financial resources to make a success of implementing the plan objectives. One of the ex-Mayors pointed out that historically they had always lacked financial resources, and he criticised the Municipality Law that holds the municipality responsible for such a wide range of activities in the region. He claimed that the current financial resources were inadequate to meet these services, let alone to meet the growing tourist-related requirements. It appears that the inadequacy of financial resources made them resort to other means to raise funds. For example, financial donations were sought from hoteliers and other proprietors operating tourist facilities in the region. One of the ex-Mayors explained, “we were working closely with co-operative owners and hoteliers. When the municipal budget was tight, we summoned these people [investors, proprietors] to see us to explain the situation, and to ask them for their generous donations. Without them we would not have been able to deliver the services within the budget allocated by central government. Of course the contribution of these people to the municipal budget was not unconditional. The process was like you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours”. Another ex-mayor considered this approach to funding to be legitimate. While three private sector respondents expressed their reservations about its repercussions, it appears that the financial problems suffered by most municipalities had forced them to use such approaches, with their potential for misuse of power and authority. As one respondent explained: “they [the municipalities] allow the illegal construction of an additional storey or extensions to buildings, and then levy taxes on these extensions to raise funds”. Another complained that “collecting funds from bars, shops or restaurant owners through issuing them an operating permit is a rampant practice…but later the municipalities accede to the illegal wishes of these individuals”.

8.4.3 Stakeholder organisations identified as lacking legal authority

16) “Which organisations participating in designing and implementing the BMP, if any, have lacked sufficient legal authority to make a success of implementing the plan?”

As with other questions examining the resources of organisations involved in
the BMP, there were differences among the groups of respondents in their views on which organisations lacked legal authority. The stakeholders identified as legally strong and legally weak are shown in Table 8.4.2. Eight respondents from both the public and private sectors felt that the Nature Preservation Society (NPS) lacked most legal authority as they are a voluntary sector organisation. Four central government and one provincial government officials maintained that, despite the scale of Betuyab's contribution, it did not have authority over other central and local government organisations. It was stated that Betuyab acted under the vigilance of the MoT. The comments of locals and local government officials indicated that they felt that national organisations had adequate legal authority, whereas they felt this did not apply for local government. According to one ex-Mayor, the municipalities lacked sufficient legal authority, explaining that according to the Municipal Law a municipality could not encourage new development before a construction plan was drawn up and approved by the relevant ministry (see chapter six for more details). He found this practice to be time-consuming and he complained that the “preparation and approval of construction plans could take up to five years. What can you do now? If you wait for five years, the viability of the investment will be jeopardised”. Because of this, he admitted that work had begun on putting the draft construction plans into practice despite them not having been approved. Three local government officials and the villagers considered that the problem was not the lack of authority but conflicts over the use of this authority. These conflicts appeared to have substantially postponed the plan objectives being put into practice. Three central government officials thought differently about the municipalities, considering some local institutions had more than adequate legal authority, and that this had blocked success more than a lack of authority.

Table 8.4.2 Stakeholder organisations identified as lacking legal authority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legally Strong</th>
<th>Legally Weak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Work and Resettlement</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism (MoT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MoWR)</td>
<td>Municipalities and local associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Protected Area Board (SPAB)</td>
<td>Belek Tourism Investors' Association (Betuyab)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial government</td>
<td>Nature Preservation Society (NPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Culture (MoC)</td>
<td>Universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Environment (MoE)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Two NPS respondents pinpointed differences in relation to the legal authority among national organisations. They argued that some ministries could act
independently, while others could not in relation to a particular issue. For example, the Ministry of Tourism (MoT) and the municipalities are authorised to control the operations of hotels, whereas the Ministry of Environment does not have direct control over hotel operations. Further, it was stated that, unlike the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Work and Resettlement, the MoT was not authorised to use central funds without gaining the approval of other institutions. It was sometimes argued that the MoT had become “an imploring ministry” rather than a doer, due to the Ministry lacking authority to use funds as it wished. An MoT official explained the implications of its need to get the approval of other ministries: “When we send a plan for approval it can be kept waiting for approval for more than two years. But, this is really sluggish, and tourism demand is a fashion. When you miss the right time, you cannot gain the same lucrative development. While our contribution to the national economy is far greater than many other industries, even the SPAB has got more authority than the MoT. They [SPAB] do not have to consult with other institutions on matters of development. We are trying to get authority to make construction plans from the size of 1:25,000 to 1:500 in tourism development regions, but so far this has been denied. There is great competition to get the credit for developments. When you ask people about who developed the Belek Centre, everyone [other ministries] will claim that they did it. Interestingly, the MoT never crosses anyone’s mind”. It appears that the dependency of the MoT on other institutions for approvals and funding has recently given rise to discussion at national level. Even the Minister admits that it would be better to abolish the ministry and set it up again as an institution represented by an under-secretary in the Council of Ministries.

8.4.4 Stakeholder organisations identified as lacking information

17) “Which organisations participating in the BMP, if any, have lacked sufficient information and understanding of the issues affecting tourism in Belek to make a success of implementing the Plan?”

The overall pattern of responses to this question are summarised in Table 8.4.3. Respondents from the NPS claimed that although the NPS was financially weak
and pursued its projects through national and international donations, it had got the most qualified and experienced staff in relation to environmental issues in Turkey. Indeed, they felt that almost their only resource to combat other organisations was their environmental experience and local knowledge. According to the Betuyab respondents, their organisation, together with the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Environment, stood out as having most knowledge about planning issues and about tourism development in the area.

Table 8.4.3: Stakeholder organisations identified as lacking information and understanding of issues affecting Belek

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Adequate information and understanding</th>
<th>Inadequate information and understanding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature Preservation Society (NPS)</td>
<td>Municipalities, Local associations, Nature Preservation Society (NPS), Ministry of Environment (MoE), Provincial government, Universities, Betuyab</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism (MoT), Special Protected Area Board (SPAB), Ministry of Culture (MoC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belek Tourism Investors’ Association (Betuyab)</td>
<td>Betuyab, MoT, NPS, MoE</td>
<td>MoC, municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local people</td>
<td>Local people, Local government</td>
<td>NPS, MoT, Betuyab, MoC, MoE, Ministry of Forestry (MoF), Ministry of Work and Resettlement (MoWR), SPAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>Local people, Local government, Provincial government, NPS</td>
<td>National organisations, Betuyab</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One Betuyab respondent commented that the most important resource that many institutions lacked was know-how, with this applying particularly to the municipalities and the Ministry of Culture (MoC), which he considered had little understanding of the real issues affecting tourism in Belek. Many locals felt that the national organisations lacking sufficient information and understanding of issues affecting their region. This view was supported by one provincial government official: “While the central government is striving to determine its priorities as accurately as
possible, the local priorities never match these central priorities. I believe that if local
government had been given adequate power it would have paid due attention to the
improvement of the most serious problems through mobilising local resources. The
tourism industry is their livelihood. It is natural that they will make mistakes during
the course of their actions, but they would learn much from their mistakes”.

8.4.5 **Stakeholder organisations identified as lacking political power**

18) “Which organisations participating in designing and implementing the
BMP, if any, have lacked sufficient political power or influence to make a
success of implementing the plan?”

Table 8.4.4 shows that, while local respondents considered that they lacked
most political power, they usually stated that the actor with the most political power
was Betuyab. It was commented that the members of Betuyab ran large-scale
businesses and included some of the wealthiest people in the country. Betuyab was
seen to have strong personal and business relations with politicians as well as
bureaucrats. Two respondents from the NPS admitted that they lacked political power,
especially in relation to Betuyab: “Betuyab is the king of the area at the moment.
While they do not have authority in legislation, through using their political ties, they
act as if they have been thus empowered. They have already undertaken another
responsibility, this being in relation to the promotion of Belek abroad”. Two Mayors
considered that they had almost no political influence because their own political
party was not among the coalition of parties ruling the national government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Stakeholder organisation with strong political power</th>
<th>Stakeholder organisation with weak political power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature Preservation Society (NPS)</td>
<td>Belek Tourism Investors' Association (Betuyab), Ministry of Tourism (MoT), Special Protected Area Board (SPAB), Ministry of Environment (MoE), Provincial government</td>
<td>Nature Preservation Society (NPS), municipalities, local people, local associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belek Tourism Investors' Association</td>
<td>National organisations</td>
<td>Nature Preservation Society (NPS), Belek Tourism Investors' Association (Betuyab), local</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One of the ex-Mayors felt that every participant involved in formulating the BMP could secure some political influence. This respondent maintained that all involved had some political power and know something of how the system worked. He felt that a good manager could acquire power not only from their legal and financial resources but also from their knowledge of the administrative system and of how to work within it: "everything depends on your personal skills, ties, and ability to mobilise other influential people. Let's assume that you are dealing with trade but have little money at the moment. If you know how to find your way in the trade world, though you haven't got money, you will succeed in purchasing the goods". This participant also argued that if one worked strictly within the regulations then one would achieve little in Turkey. This perhaps helps to explain why there are thousands of people visiting members of parliament in the capital, Ankara (see chapter six).

8.4.6 Stakeholder organisations identified as contributing most resources to the BMP

19) "Which specific national and local organisations have contributed most resources to implementing the BMP? Are there any specific organisations that have not contributed as many resources as they should to implementing the BMP? Why?"

When asked about organisations that contributed most resources to the BMP, there was some variation in the responses, as shown in Table 8.4.5. According to two NPS members, their organisation made the most contribution of resources, but this was particularly in relation to the formulation rather than implementation of the plan. One of them claimed that no other institutions had put money into the formulation of the plan, with the expense of the planning activity all being met through NPS funds allocated by the World Bank. While Betuyab had hosted a number of meetings, they
maintained that this cost little by comparison with the money they had spent on the consultation team and the data collection and analysis.

Table 8.4.5 Stakeholder organisations identified as contributing most resources to the BMP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Stakeholder organisations that contributed most resources</th>
<th>Stakeholder organisations that contributed least resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belek Tourism Investors' Association (Betuyab)</td>
<td>Belek Tourism Investors' Association (Betuyab)</td>
<td>Nature Preservation Society (NPS), municipalities, Ministry of Culture (MoC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Tourism (MoT)</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism (MoT), Belek Tourism Investors' Association (Betuyab)</td>
<td>Nature Preservation Society (NPS), Ministry of Environment (MoE), Ministry of Culture (MoC), municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature Preservation Society (NPS)</td>
<td>Nature Preservation Society (NPS), Ministry of Culture (MoC)</td>
<td>Belek Tourism Investors' Association (Betuyab), Provincial government, Ministry of Tourism (MoT), Ministry of Environment (MoE), Ministry of Work and Resettlement (MoWR), municipalities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By contrast, two Ministry of Tourism officials claimed that their organisation had contributed most to the project as a whole (Table 8.4.5). And two Betuyab respondents and five public and private sector representatives claimed that Betuyab had contributed most resources, such as labour, finance, technical support and information. According to one private sector respondent, Betuyab contributed most "because it had to. It spends over 700,000 DM every year on the environment and related projects. If this sum of money were spent on the promotion of the region in foreign exhibitions, I believe that the hotels of the area would reach full room occupancy. Betuyab is also conducting a project to prevent mosquito proliferation in the area...for its own good, as Betuyab has to find a radical solution that will eliminate the larvae in swamp areas". A provincial government official argued that: "Betuyab is the only organisation in the region which can put in money and take prompt decisions, and which can have these decisions put into practice. It is because of their structure and the influence of their members. For example, last year when we [the provincial government] were confronted with tensions due to the arrest of a terrorist leader in the region, Betuyab in collaboration with our organisation moved swiftly to organise a press conference in the region. Through our overseas branches, they were able to contact prominent journalists in different countries and invite them to the region. Betuyab was able to meet their accommodation and other expenses."
This was done to counteract the potential adverse effect of the tensions on the local tourism industry. This was an important press conference to show that the rumours were not true”.

Two Betuyab respondents claimed that some other institutions, apart from the Ministry of Tourism, tended to shirk their responsibilities in relation to resourcing the BMP. Respondents from the NPS also considered that the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Work and Resettlement had not contributed as many resources as they ought. These respondents commented that they did not consider that the municipalities had contributed too little because they were only newly established and had only very limited budgets allocated by central government. A Betuyab respondent mentioned that the Ministry of Culture (MoC) had not contributed enough to implementing the plan despite its considerable resources, depicting this as a major obstacle. In his view, the MoC was empowered to designate valuable but sensitive natural and historical assets as Specially Protected Areas (SPA), but in doing so it had ignored the social structures and economic activities that had existed prior to the area's designation. A respondent from the Ministry of Tourism contended that the MoC, together with the NPS and the municipalities, had contributed the least. In relation to the NPS he claimed that it "suffered from discontinuity and inadequate human, technical and financial sources. Thus they were unable to contribute as many resources as they desired to implementing the plan”. Three participants from the private sector noted that most of the contributions promised by the national institutions had yet to be realised.

8.4.7 Organisations that competed with each other for funds and authority

20) “Did some local and national organisations compete with each other for funds or authority? Why?”

As many as 16 of the 30 respondents claimed that there were organisations competing amongst each other for funds, authority or prestige in the region. Eight respondents, from the private and voluntary sectors and from provincial government, indicated that the municipalities were competing fiercely and overtly with each other
for the funds allocated for infrastructural development for the region. The fund is granted commensurate with the amount of infrastructure completed by the municipality, but some municipalities were alleged to be demanding more funds compared to how much work they had completed. Three provincial government respondents maintained that the municipalities were in overt competition for authority in the region, and that this inter-municipal competition had gained considerable extra momentum after the area’s governance was divided between new municipalities. Some municipalities claimed authority in the management of the protected zones, and there were arguments about the wielding of power there by the Ministry of Tourism. One respondent pointed to competition between the old and new municipalities, claiming that “the mayor of Kadriye is sad, affronted and resentful because Belek has been arranged as a municipality and it is no longer within the boundaries of Kadriye”.

It appears that provincial government’s relations with the municipalities also entered a difficult period because of this competition among the municipalities for authority and central funds: “… when we attempt to accommodate a need of Belek municipality, the Municipality of Kadriye tends to resent us. On the other hand, when we resolve a problem for Kadriye, then Bogazkent municipality feels neglected”.

Two Betuyab respondents suggested that the central government institutions did not compete with each other for funds, but that this did not apply to the municipalities. However, they claimed that the government institutions were in covert competition for credit and prestige from projects, which was provoked by competition among them for political authority. The local respondents also felt there was competition for authority between the MoT and the MoC around the area designated as a nature reserve (Kumkoy). It appears that there was also competition for prestige between the NPS and Betuyab. According to members of the NPS, Betuyab was determined not to lose its monopoly powers in the region. One respondent explained, “Betuyab is aware of the fact that adherence to the guidelines contained in the plan is instrumental for its existence, and this provides a cutting edge for them. I do not think that they are ‘turtle lovers’: they are as fond of turtles as much as they are of stray dogs and cats. In the end they are businessmen, and they have to think and act like businessmen. Everything becomes an instrument for making money. If they are building bird watching towers, the underlying reason is not because they are sensitive to birds but because they want to make money”.
It was suggested in the interviews that, while many organisations involved in the BMP had few resources, there was still little or no exchange of those resources between the organisations. Two respondents from the NPS argued that there was no tradition of voluntary exchanges of resources among national organisations and between national and local organisations in order to accomplish a common goal. One of them claimed that “there is no way that a municipality, civil society, a university and a ministry could combine their resources. This is unprecedented in Turkey”. She maintained that the pooling of their resources was impossible partly because of legal restrictions. A private sector respondent explained, “Central government units could not exchange resources with one another in order to realise a common goal, without going through a lengthy bureaucratic process involving several meetings and much paper work”. Similarly, a respondent from the district government (the government level between villages and provincial government) admitted that exchanges of equipment between central government departments was very unusual in Turkey. He complained that “institutions, will not give equipment to another institution in need even if they don’t use it. They would even let the equipment corrode, rather than hand it over to another institution”.

Four respondents from local organisations claimed that the limited exchange of resources between municipalities, and particularly of money, was frequently discussed among local people. One respondent explained that some municipalities possessed equipment that in combination would be enough to provide adequate services for the entire region. He suggested that “people seem to agree that a more effective and satisfactory service could be provided if these resources were combined. In practice, people disagree about how this assemblage should occur”. Several respondents criticised the prevalent culture of individualism, which some identified as an obstacle undermining co-operative action among the region's municipalities. Political fractions and historical partisanship also appear to have blocked the exchange of resources. For example, it was observed that due to partisanship it tends only to be municipalities from the same party that exchange resources.

Other barriers that appear to have impeded the exchange of resources between participants included negative perceptions of other organisations and institutional
rivalry. One private sector respondent complained that “Because of municipal jealousies, some services are duplicated, which eventually leads to waste of resources”. He illustrated this with the following example: “assume that a municipality at the far end of the road is operating a bus service to transport people in and out of town. However, other municipalities cannot stomach the fact that the far municipality stops over within their border to take on or let off passengers. Despite the introduction of an additional bus service for the same route not being viable, jealous municipalities start bus services on the same route in order to undermine the profits and operation of the far municipality”. These arguments rather contradict the propositions of resource exchange theory, which indicate that organisations tend to exchange resources when they are scarce (see chapter three). In reality, resource scarcity in the study area was not sufficient on its own necessarily to result in exchange relationships between organisations, with factors such as political and institutional rivalry obstructing exchange relations.

8.4.8 Views on local or national government control of resources

21) “Would it be likely to help or hinder the Plan implementation if the control of resources was left more to the local or national government organisations?”

Respondents differed as to whether the Plan's implementation would be helped if control of resources was left more to local or national government organisations. Two respondents from Betuyab noted that responsibilities of the municipalities in the development of tourism in the country could not be understated. However, these respondents also felt that a transference of control of more resources to the municipalities would be irrational, if not very destructive. One of them explained that “they [municipalities] are either incompetent or greedy. Look at the deterioration of the natural environment occurring in the majority of areas opened to tourism development in the country. In my opinion, the greatest responsibility for this problem rests with our municipalities and their unlimited authority in relation to building construction”. He went on to state that “second-homes are the main cause of visual pollution. I am asking you, who has given permits for their construction? How is that areas without sewage systems or water distribution infrastructure were opened
to construction? How is it that construction plans and areas were changed within only 15 days? We have often experienced these plan changes, especially in areas with a small population. A mayor elected with only 15 votes has the authority, though he may lack sufficient knowledge, to decide on the nature and extent of alterations in a construction plan!”. A private sector respondent also expressed serious reservations about giving most authority to municipalities: “when you give them the full authority of resource control, then you will have to put up with dire consequences, as resources will be wasted in order to get individual gains”.

By contrast, locals considered that local or provincial government should be given more discretion over the control of resources. However, local support for local government was not unconditional. Notably, many locals also felt that local government needed more financial resources, and some felt that they needed to adopt "modern" management techniques. Some also felt that competition for funds should be tackled, as competition had caused long delays in implementation. One ex-Mayor argued that local government should only be given extensive new controls over resources if the whole municipal structure was reviewed and re-structured. This was because “resource utilisation requires great skills, and unfortunately the employment strategies imposed by central government means that the municipalities are unable to recruit qualified staff”. According to local stakeholders, if more of the region's funding had been given to local government, then the area's infrastructural development might have been completed much earlier.

Two respondents from Betuyab were very concerned that, while greater local government control of resources might help speed the working process of local activities, there were substantial dangers: “money is sweet and this is a trap... The mayors might be very honest and sensitive initially about public spending. However, unfortunately as the conventional wheel of the administration system starts to turn, the grants are generally spent on other activities [politically influenced]”. Officials from the MoT shared a similar concern, with one stating that “there are strong local forces, which a mayor cannot stand up to”.

The respondents from Betuyab and the national organisations generally supported resource control remaining with central government. Four respondents in
national organisations stated that personal greed was a real problem in the region and
this could only be neutralised by power being retained by central government. On the
other hand, others from local organisations were cautious about central government
retaining its resource control. Three of them were particularly concerned that, while
central government was striving to determine appropriate priorities, the local priorities
rarely matched these priorities. One respondent considered that if local government
had more resources it would have paid due attention to tackling the area's most
serious problems through mobilising more local resources. However, one ex-Mayor
noted that, because there were several municipalities in the area, there was likely to
have been much tension if the municipalities had more control of resources due to the
different political parties of the mayors. He stated that “every municipality would
insist that its share of the resources should be increased, or they would engage in
political games to reduce the power of municipalities run by an opposing party, or
they would form an alliance with municipalities sharing similar political views in
order to exert pressure on an opposing municipality”.

Two NPS respondents held the view that a union established through the
participation of local and central government, neighbouring municipalities and
villages might provide a better solution for the control of resources.

8.4.9 Summary

The conceptual framework developed for this study recognises that there are
interdependencies between organisations, as no organisation alone can perform its
function or task without at some stage requiring resources controlled by other
organisations or needing actions by these organisations. Consequently, organisations
within the system are likely to attempt to gain the necessary resources, and to do so
they will employ various strategies. Problems related to resources are often the
mainstay of explanations for policy-implementation gaps, especially in the developing
world where resources are generally scarcer and the dead weight of population much
greater (Morah 1996). “However, limited time and other resources, as well as
scepticism by groups that have been involved in conflict over tourism development,
may tend to make potential participants wary about joining; unless they perceive that
the collaboration decisions will be implemented” (Jamal and Getz 1995: 197).
A threshold of resources is probably necessary for there to be any possibility of realising policy objectives, and the level of resources above this threshold, up to some saturation point, is likely to be proportional to the probability of optimally achieving those objectives (Morah 1996). Obviously there would be no exchange of elements between two organisations that do not know one another and their functions. There would also be no exchange without some level of agreement or understanding, even if this is implicit. Thus, it could be argued that exchange agreements are contingent upon the organisation's domain, which relates to the specific goals that the organisation wishes to pursue and the function it undertakes in order to implement its goals. Certain rules and procedures tend to regulate this process of exchange between organisations (Laughlin 1996; O'Toole, 1997). For example, the legal and institutional framework determines duties to provide access to information and it is an important determinant of the hierarchical character of relationships in the organisational network (Laughlin 1996).

In this section, an attempt was made to identify organisations that lacked resources for the implementation of the Belek Coastal Management Plan. It is apparent from the analysis that most national and local organisations lacked some financial, legal, political and informational resources, and that these deficiencies were likely to have reduced the plan's success. The type of environment in Belek seems to correspond to one of resource scarcity, as suggested by Benson (1975). Based on the respondents' comments it can be argued that resources were centrally concentrated and scarce, and that this has led to conflicts between organisations competing for the same resource, notably funds and authority. Factors mentioned by the respondents as impeding resource exchange between organisations involved in the BMP included the unequal distribution of existing resources, managerial incompetence in their use, institutional jealousies, limited levels of perceived interdependency, the political partisanship of organisations, and differences in ideology and organisational values.

It is also apparent that the environment affecting the participants in the BMP was not at all stable. For example, the balance in the distribution of resources and the quantity of these resources were seen to have changed as new actors entered or left the system. The NPS was an example of the latter, and the municipalities of the
former. It is not surprising to find that organisations implementing the BMP were in competition and that there were clearly asymmetric relations (Logsdon 1991), with each organisation attempted to achieve its own interests at the expense of others. It appears that there was a distinctly individualistic ethos, in which stakeholders viewed their own organisation's priorities as far more important than that of others. Finally, respondents differed in their views about whether resource control should be transferred more to national or to local organisations. While some felt that resource control should remain with the national organisations, others argued that local government was better placed to carry out the tasks effectively. On both sides there were concerns about control resting with a single organisation as this concentration of power carried significant risks of misuse.
Section 5. Inter-organisational Co-ordination

8.5.1 Introduction

Previous studies emphasise that co-ordination is essential in order to produce effective tourism strategies and to avoid duplication of services across different levels of government. It is argued in the literature that tourism projects developed by co-ordinated efforts are likely to have more leverage (Healey 1997). Efficiency would be decreased, more expense would be incurred, and tourism development projects would be stalled if relevant agencies failed to co-ordinate their efforts on development projects (Timothy 1998). While co-operation and co-ordination offer numerous potential benefits to organisations, they are political activities and thus difficult to achieve, particularly in the tourism sector, where diverse parties are involved in decision-making (Hall 2000).

This section examines the level of co-ordination and co-operation between parties involved in the Belek Coastal Management Plan (BMP). Specific issues explored in this section include:

- Whether there were any restrictions imposed by existing legislation on the range and delivery of services provided by the organisations.
- Whether there was any overlapping of responsibility or authority between the parties involved in the BMP.
- The nature and the extent of co-operation and co-ordination between parties involved in the BMP and the reasons for this.
- The barriers in the way of achieving co-ordination, and the factors that might foster effective co-ordination and co-operation.
- And, whether leaving planning decisions to local or national organisations would hinder or help the co-ordination of Belek's tourism planning.
8.5.2 Legislation and the tourism services provided by stakeholder organisations

22) "Are there any tourism-related services that your organisation would like to provide but is not able to under the present legislation?"

Quite a high proportion of stakeholders involved in the BMP felt that the existing legislative framework had hindered the provision of new attractions and services and development of new economic activities for local people, this being the view of 14 of the 30 respondents. Some of these respondents also stated that the legislative framework had complicated the designation of recreational areas, such as picnicking areas, and the planning for tourist facilities within Belek region. Table 8.5.1 shows the responses of these 14 respondents, and it shows that they tended to mention several tourism services hindered by the legislation.

Table 8.5.1 Tourism services hindered by the legislative framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services that were considered to be hindered</th>
<th>Stakeholders who mentioned that this service was hindered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishment and management of a botanical garden</td>
<td>NPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of recreational areas around Kumkoy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversification of economic activities for local villagers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathways for jogging</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment and management of a theme park</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over tourists facilities run by the Ministry of Tourism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over activities of Betuyab</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of cohesive and complementary services</td>
<td>Betuyab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over second home development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversification of attractions (such as a marina development)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of bridges to facilitate access to the beaches of neighbouring areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversification of attractions (such as a marina development)</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Two respondents from the Nature Preservation Society (NPS) explained that they were planning to open a botanical garden in the region in order to preserve fragile native vegetation and provide the region with an additional attraction. They contended that they had confronted problems in relation to the park management as the legislation states that park management is under the jurisdiction of municipalities and that municipalities cannot delegate park management to an NGO. One NPS representative claimed that instituting a partnership between a municipality and civil society was frowned upon within the current administrative system. The NPS representatives also identified other tourism-related services they could not put into practice due to legislative blockages. They stated that the existing legislation stopped them from establishing recreational areas in the Kumkoy reserve, from helping diversify economic activities, and from designating zones where tourists could jog safely. They also complained that the uncertainties of the legislation, and the frequent changes in politics and power balances in the region, meant that they were uncertain whether the proposed marina development project in Kumkoy reserve would be reviewed because of its adverse environmental impacts.

One ex-Mayor claimed that the existing legislative framework hindered the provision of some municipal services, and his strongest complaint was that the municipalities were not allowed to inspect some of the tourist facilities operating within their boundaries as these are controlled by the Ministry of Tourism. In the view of this ex-Mayor, inspection of tourist facilities by two different organisations (some by the MOT and some by the municipalities) was also impeding service standardisation in the region. Based on the researcher's own observation and on the interviews, it appears that the central control of resources and intervention in decision-making, as prescribed by the constitution, as well as the financial dependency of municipalities on central government, are important factors inhibiting the provision of timely and adequate infrastructure by the municipalities in the region.
The Betuyab representatives complained that even their operations were severely constrained by the current legislation. It appears that current legislation prohibits the close working of a limited company, in this case Betuyab, with a central government organisation for joint action. The two Betuyab representatives agreed that their organisation was inhibited from joint working not only by the law but also by misconceptions that private and public sector co-operation was being used to provide favours to a few individuals or "cronies". While some respondents argued that legislation should be eased to allow partnership working, two representatives expressed reservations in that public-private sector partnerships would fail in Belek largely due to the lack of resources of central government organisations. This can be illustrated by the proposal for partnership working to fight mosquitoes in the area. Here Betuyab sought to co-operate with the Ministries of Health and of Environment in order to ensure that the mosquito battle could be expanded well beyond the borders of Belek town. One respondent explained that harnessing their joint resources was essential because "a mosquito flies over a 12 km distance". The respondent, who thought that central government organisations were inadequately resourced, asserted that "we [Betuyab] offered that Betuyab would provide technical equipment and staff and they [the Ministry of Environment] should provide the pesticide. We even suggested that they would have controlling authority over our activities...but this offer was turned down by the Ministry...what they said was that they were not able to allocate funds for buying the pesticide". Additionally, the Betuyab representatives argued that some of the problems related to second home development in the area stemmed from legislative ambiguities, this being largely under the jurisdiction of the municipalities.

8.5.3 Similar responsibilities and authority between organisations

23) "Which other local or national organisations, if any, have similar responsibility and authority in relation to tourism planning in Belek to that of your organisation?"

As many as 14 of the 30 respondents indicated that there were national and local organisations with similar responsibilities and authority in relation to tourism
planning and management. A government official considered that “there is certainly an abundance of organisations with similar responsibilities, that have authority in tourism. They clog our [Ministry of Tourism] progress due to the powers resulting from their higher position, and we try to offset their effect whenever and however possible”. Another provincial government respondent who thought there were jurisdictional overlaps and ambiguities, particularly between central government environmental and tourism organisations in the region, explained that the provincial units of the Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Culture provide almost identical services in Belek. While their duties are clearly specified by relevant laws, Betuyab had taken over some of their responsibilities because of changing politics and resource constraints. Betuyab representatives explained that they were fulfilling almost similar duties to those of normal municipalities, such as garbage collection, monitoring in the region, fire fighting, and infrastructure development. Taking over some of these responsibilities was said to be necessary, in order to facilitate municipal growth and because these municipalities had been established very recently and thus they lacked basic equipment, including a municipal headquarters building. Similar views were expressed by three locals who noted that there were specific responsibilities falling into the jurisdiction of both provincial and local governments. According to these locals, the unbalanced allocation of functions between tiers of government had led to a fragmentary provision of public services at the local level and had given local governments no basis from which to stimulate tourism development.

A significant proportion of the respondents -twelve- attributed the overlap of responsibilities between national organisations partly to the process in Turkey by which new responsibilities for national organisations came into existence, without old ones being stopped. A central government official who thought that the Ministry of Environment (MoE) and the Ministry of Culture held similar responsibilities, explained that “prior to the establishment of the Ministry of Environment, there has been an article stating that the Ministry of Culture (MoC) can do protection and conservation work in tourism zones... despite our establishment [MoE], this article has not been changed yet”. The official concluded that the “declaration of protection zones shouldn’t be within the jurisdiction of the MoC because they don’t know what
criteria there are for the strictly protected zones or for recreation zones. In fact, it should only be under the jurisdiction of MoE so as to clarify the confusion”.

8.5.4 Stakeholder organisations working together

24) “Are all national and local organisations involved in tourism planning in Belek working together effectively to achieve the objectives of the BMP? If not, which local and national organisations are not working together effectively to achieve the objectives of the BMP, and why is this the case?”

In chapter four section 4.2 it was argued that co-ordination and co-operative relations between national and local organisations were central to successful tourism development. In this survey, many respondents – eleven - felt that the most elaborately formulated policies and projects would come to a naught if the implementation of their components was carried out in a diffuse manner. One provincial government official stressed that co-ordination was a major problem in the region. The direct observations of the researcher and the interviews suggest that it is a real challenge in the Belek area:

- to get relevant organisations to inform each other of their activities;
- to agree on measures to prevent an overlap of work and to co-ordinate the timing of activities, so that they complement rather than duplicate or negate one another;
- to agree on measures to prevent competition between one another; and
- to orchestrate their efforts to achieve the goals of the BMP.

Seven of the 30 respondents indicated that there were times when organisations involved in the (BMP) would work together effectively, this not being an insignificant proportion. However, their comments and that of others also suggest that there were occasions when the organisations worked together extremely disjointedly, for several reasons. One Ministry of Environment representative thought that in the formulation stage, the atmosphere between parties was easy-going. According to him: “all parties had goodwill and good intentions to make a success of
the plan, and they worked in harmony”. But he argued that at the implementation stage, the national organisations in particular were not eager to compromise on their authority. A local, who referred to a number of different implementing organisations claimed that: “the more diverse the orientations the more difficult the planning and implementation process becomes”. He identified conflicting organisational expectations which had not been successfully settled at the start of the plan as a key factor inhibiting co-ordination. Similarly, four local respondents claimed that organisations at the local level were not working together in harmony. A local remarked that “none of the municipalities were getting along with one another, or with other local organisations, because of the so-called battle for rent and due to partisanship”. Another respondent agreed that there were uncooperative relations between the municipalities, illustrating this with the following example: “when one of the municipalities needed a space where they could dispose of their rubbish, then the one [municipality] behind the shoreline, despite its availability, didn’t want to provide the other with the available space”. The Mayor of the town that was claimed to have this space for dumping and processing waste, admitted that “the [other] municipality will reap the benefit, so why should I deal with its litter problem?”

Two Betuyab representatives stated that not only were they unable to work effectively with several national organisations, but also they had disruptive arguments with the Nature Preservation Society (NPS) over the protective measures taken in the early 1990s. However, a local respondent who agreed that Betuyab and the NPS opposed each other on many occasions, also gave examples of joint co-operative action between them: “there was hostile publicity put out by the Greek Nature Preservation Society. At that time, the NPS stood behind Betuyab and they gave a joint counter-attack to that hostile publicity”. Another indication of some co-operative relations between these two organisations is when Betuyab offered a furnished office to the NPS officials after the closure of their office in Belek due to them having a financial crisis at that time. In response to this generous suggestion, the NPS officials stated that Betuyab was carrying out activities of interest to the NPS very successfully, and thus the NPS did not need to occupy an office in the area and it should concentrate its efforts on another area. Further, the Betuyab representatives explained that, although the NPS had withdrawn partly from the area lately, the relation between NPS and Betuyab continued. For example, in light of proposals by
the NPS, Betuyab had embarked on a marine turtle project and it carried out this project in collaboration with Hacettepe University. They considered that the project had been a success and they had shared the information with the NPS.

Representatives of Betuyab considered that their liaison with the Military Police was essential because the region wanted to provide a safe environment for visitors and to enforce environmental measures to conserve the area's natural richness. A Betuyab respondent viewed this as “an excellent example of public-private sector partnership”. He explained that “for the first time in Turkey, a joint effort with the gendarme and the Ministry of Forestry was made to install an emergency communication system (wireless radio system) (WDS), in order to react urgently and swiftly to fires and other problems”. This system appears to have quickened the response time to fires and other security-related problems in the region: “If the problem concerns safety, burglary, or a traffic accident, thanks to the WDS we can inform the relevant bodies, and this network of communication allows us to respond more quickly to problems. This network of communication is really functioning well, and helping our work to a great extent”.

8.5.5 Barriers to co-ordination and co-operation

25) “Is there anything about the ways things are done which tends to limit co-ordination and co-operation between national and local organisations involved in the BMP?”

The literature reviewed in chapter four, section 4.3 suggests that three conditions must be present before significant co-ordination can occur. Parties must have shared goals, complementary resources, and efficient control mechanisms for whatever exchanges are involved (Reid 1997). Similarly, in a study of employment training and development partnerships, various correlates of effective partnerships were identified (Waddock 1991). According to this study, partners need to trust other parties, have adequate power to make decisions for their organisation, and recognise that they are interdependent in order to resolve issues. Waddock’s list of correlates also includes the clarity of organisational objectives, a balance of power among participants, and strong leadership within the partnership. A common goal is often
identified as a necessary condition for co-ordination and co-operation. However, Reid (1997) argues that, while sharing a goal may be a necessary condition, it is not in itself sufficient. Each party must also be able to provide the others with the resources they need to achieve their goals in order for co-operative exchange to occur. The literature suggests that to accomplish co-ordination much more may be needed than bringing agencies together, developing channels of communication between them, and providing mediation. Whetten (1981) identifies some other conditions that must be met in order for voluntary and mandatory co-ordination to occur (Whetten 1981). First, it is necessary for decision-makers to have a positive attitude towards inter-organisational co-ordination. Next, they must recognise an organisational need for co-ordination that is salient enough to justify absorbing the costs inherent in co-ordination. And, finally, the participating agencies must assess their capacity to adequately manage the on-going co-ordination process.

In response to this question, the stakeholders interviewed for this study did identify some of these barriers reported in previous research. Many respondents identified more than one barrier. Table 8.5.2 shows the stakeholder organisations and the barriers that they identified in the way of an effective co-ordination of activities related to the Belek Management Plan (BMP). Perhaps not surprisingly (see chapter six), quite a significant proportion of respondents from both national and local parties - seven - considered that policy-making and programme implementation, was even more complex than usual in the Belek case. The process demanded an unusual degree of multi-sectoral involvement and inter-institutional linkages. Quite a high proportion of the stakeholders involved in the BMP felt that managing a tourism development programme within the current administrative system was a challenge and they offered several explanations in support of this contention. Among the most frequently mentioned difficulties were the absence of inter-organisational co-ordination, the bureaucratisation of the programme, a low technical and administrative capability among the parties, political ineptness, and an inadequate monitoring and evaluation of the programme. Local representatives also identified bureaucratic traditions, a lack of understanding of the value of co-operation and co-ordination, and an unwillingness to devote time and resources to giving the assistance required for co-ordination, as other barriers (see Table 8.5.2). National institutions were blamed for not being able clearly to set out their objectives for their provincial organisations. Other barriers identified
by the respondents were a lack of information circulated among the institutions, a lack of resources necessary to put an organisation's responsibilities into action, and the absence of an organisation set up to co-ordinate the activities in Belek. These barriers are now examined in more detail.

### Table 8.5.2 Barriers to co-ordination and co-operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived barriers to co-ordination and co-operation</th>
<th>Stakeholder organisation that mentioned the barrier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The institutional set up</td>
<td>NPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of communication</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Different organisational ideologies</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Inter-organisational perceptions, rivalries and jealousy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Low inter-organisational trust</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic traditions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Uneven resource distribution</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A difficult external environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-recognition of the need to work with each other.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The institutional set up</td>
<td>Betuyab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different organisational ideologies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-organisational perceptions, rivalries and jealousy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of communication</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Low inter-organisational trust</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The institutional set up</td>
<td>Municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of communication and geographical distance</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Different organisational ideologies</td>
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<td>Inter-organisational perceptions, rivalries and jealousy</td>
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<td>Low inter-organisational trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>The institutional set up</td>
<td>National organisations</td>
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<td>Bureaucratic traditions</td>
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<td>Lack of communication</td>
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<td>Interorganisational perceptions, rivalries and jealousy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Under-recognition of the need to work with each other.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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8.5.5.1 The institutional set up as a barrier to co-ordination

The term "turf protection" is used in the literature as a catchall phrase to capture many of the barriers to inter-organisational co-operation or co-ordination. The literature suggests that the problems are accentuated in a pluralistic political system that generates a plethora of programmes and agencies over time in order to address similar and often overlapping needs. And the growing use of a broad array of service providers complicates matters further. Associated barriers to co-ordination include separate missions, competing legal mandates, distinct constituencies, competition for resources, overlapping political and geographic domains, duplication of administration, services, and funding sources, and an inequitable distribution of funding.

Perhaps not surprisingly, in the Belek case the division of authority between organisations was one of the most frequently mentioned barriers stopping parties from engaging in co-ordinative and co-operative relations. As many as fourteen respondents mentioned that the clashes over authority and overlapping of responsibilities stemming from the current institutional set up were a generic problem that applied not only to Belek but also to other tourism centres in Turkey. Conflicts over authority were said to happen between central and local government and also between central ministries and their local branches. The Betuyab representatives also considered that co-ordination between the national organisations was poor. One respondent referred to the Kumkoy marina development project in Belek as a typical example of co-ordination failure. The area had already been designated as a tourism centre by the Ministry of Tourism, but he explained that the Ministry of Culture then declared the area a first degree Specially Protected Zone in order to pre-empt a marina development project. In the view of this respondent, this had not only prohibited any kind of physical development within the specified borders, but it had also thwarted any potential co-ordination and co-operation between these two ministries in the future.

A significant proportion of these respondents -eleven- described the institutional set-up as too fragmented, complex or ambiguous, particularly in the delegation of responsibilities. The low level of co-ordination between national and local organisations reflected the limited cross-sectoral approach to problem solving.
which characterises Turkey's administrative culture (see chapter six). With specific reference to Belek, it was stated that there were more than thirty organisations entrusted with various responsibilities related to coastal protection and management. Additionally, there were at least ten laws concerning tourism, environment and culture. Many stakeholders interviewed in this study stated that co-ordination of tourism development planning and implementation was difficult to achieve because of the very practical nature of these problems, and because of the complexity and scale of the institutional system. From their point of view, the main obstacle tended to be the management culture, which should be characterised by co-operation, joint decision-taking, and the sharing of information. It appears that the current Turkish context of central-local relations lacks this administrative culture, and instead there is only a limited and largely one-way dialogue between central and local government organisations.

A district government (the administration level between villages and cities) respondent considered that the unofficial transference of power from the Ministry of Tourism to Beutuyab had caused a major problem in terms of co-ordination and co-operation in the region. A national organisation official, who shared a similar view on the transference of power to Beutuyab, thought that in addition to there being ambiguous authority in the legislative framework, such arrangements were actually preventing tourism development in the region. Another telling example of ambiguous authority and poor co-ordination in the area was the complex case of the Kumkoy marina development. A local government official explained it thus: “...by law, the Ministry of Tourism (MoT) has to implement all decisions taken by the Higher Planning Commission (HPC). The HPC had decided that the Ministry should develop a marina in Kumkoy. The ministry is obliged to fulfil this decision, since a higher authority orders it. They [MoT] designated the area for marina development. In the face of such development, quite rightly the NPS, the Ministry of Culture (MoC) and the Ministry of Environment (MoE) had lobbied together and disagreed with the designation. The MoT was telling them that they were executing a decision given by a higher authority, so they [NPS, MoC, MoE] should be lobbying against this authority. To cut the long story short, an investor who qualified for work in the earmarked area, started to construct the proposed project. However, the MoC declared the area immediately as a first degree Specially Protected Zone, as this was under their
jurisdiction. The construction project had to be stalled. As the investor had acquired the land from the MoT, the Ministry was pressurising him to finish the construction before the deadline. Otherwise they [MoT] would start litigation. The Ministry of Culture was making statements...claiming that he [the investor] could not dare to hammer in even a single nail...all the affected institutions attacked the investor. The poor investor was saying that he was not guilty. He was a qualified investor and the Ministry had given him an earmarked area, and everything was legal. He was not told that he should be extra careful, as some other central organisations could develop obstacles. The controversy and conflict of authority over the area made the investor suffer bad consequences. In short, his investment had been wasted because of the lack of co-ordination among these national institutions”.

8.5.5.2 Organisational rivalries and jealousy as barriers to co-ordination

It is argued in the literature that as organisations interact over a period of time, particular images of each other take form and are institutionalised. These images become difficult to change. When an organisation interprets the other as a threat, whether it be founded or unfounded, future attempts at co-ordination will generally fail (Schmidt and Kochan 1977). Fox (1982) argues that “when decision-making for both parties to a conflict adheres to rigid images of each other, there is little likelihood that even genuine attempts to resolve the issue will have the desired effects. Such an argument suggests that communication with adversaries remain almost impossible”. Organisations remain reluctant to co-ordinate with the parties with lower status and that allegedly may be incompetent. However, the fear of losing organisational prestige and strategic position may have very little to do with the competency and legitimacy of the other party.

Based on direct observation by the researcher and the interviews, it is apparent that some organisations had negative perceptions of other organisations involved in the BMP. A significant proportion of local respondents – seven – were critical about central officials having preconceptions about the capabilities of local organisations. One local respondent explained that local government activities were generally being considered extrinsic to central concerns. Several of these respondents felt that central government had ignored the opportunity to work through local authorities, and thus it was likely that the chances of achieving widespread participation in the development
effort was weakened and mistrust could develop. The NPS representatives also complained that the central organisations had an institutional prejudice toward their organisation. Another local respondent who represented a municipality in the region encapsulated the attitudes of central government in this way: “They [central government] act always like this. Be suspicious. Say what you want. Drag your feet and keep doing what you have always done”. Five local respondents felt that a major barrier to orchestrated co-ordination was that the Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of Environment, and the Ministry of Culture had strong historical perceptions of one another as competitors. This appears often to have resulted in a refusal to work together. One respondent from a local organisation remarked that “I guess that coordination is not regarded as a useful solution to the remedy of institutional problems... the directors of these [national] organisations do not hold a positive attitude toward the accomplishment of inter-institutional co-ordination... it is a cultural thing”.

As was found for local respondents, a similar number of central government officials also commented on the institutional competition and jealousy among central government organisations. Some stated that certain central institutions tended to disallow projects developed by another institution for no sensible reason, and this undermined the work of the other institution and reduced its prestige among the public. One Ministry of Tourism official explained that “there is an enormous dispute and conflict between the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Work and Resettlement (MoWR). The Ministry of Tourism (MoT) formulates and draws up plans but the MoWR does not ratify these plans. When the MoWR does something without consultation with relevant parties, including the MoT, this time the Ministry of Tourism disapproves their plan concerning tourism development sites”. The responses in the interviews also suggest that organisational rivalry has characterised relationships between the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Culture. It appears that the main issue giving rise to conflicts between these two is authority over the designation of cultural and historical assets for the use of tourism. One Ministry of Tourism (MoT) official explained that when the MoT wanted to designate a region as a tourism centre, it was usually the case that after a month of its declaration, the Ministry of Culture declares the same region as a specially protected zone (SPA). According to another official from the MoT, this was very unproductive: “designation
of a zone for tourism involves painstaking work...first, we make several visits to the area in order to assess its conditions (economic, social, environmental, etc) with a number of staff (city planner, economist, landscape designer, geophysical engineer, etc)." His main dissatisfaction was that "other ministries (including the Ministry of Culture) have recently been established and they lack sufficient information and knowledge about the area which is proposed as a development zone... but after its declaration they make visits to the area...and then declares it as an SPZ...the result is a waste of organisational resources". In the view of this respondent, while the MoT appears to advise other relevant ministries to make an inventory of sensitive regions in Turkey and to help establish criteria about what sorts of development would be allowed within those locations, these ministries do not respond.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the Betuyab representatives agreed that a big hindrance to co-operation was the "wall" that was put up by the municipalities in the region. One Betuyab member complained that "although the wall of Berlin has been abolished, we are unsuccessful in demolishing the "wall" between our organisation and the municipalities...This does not result from our incompetence, rather it arises from their stubborn attitude". According to another Betuyab member, "they [municipalities] have not been able to stomach the existence of our organisation. To be honest with you, they take our organisation as a mine from which they can take away resources necessary for their existence any time they want. Their relation with us is strongly based on our financial aid". From Betuyab's point of view, this attitude played a crucial role in inhibiting co-operation between the two. A local respondent, also remarked how the "Municipalities are tussling over power with each other, and the situation in Ankara [the capital city] is not that different at all".

8.5.5.3 Different organisational ideologies as a barrier to co-ordination

Quite a high proportion of stakeholders -ten- involved in the BMP identified differences in organisational ideologies, philosophies and expectations as a factor curtailing the establishment of co-ordination and co-operative relations among the participants. Clearly, as one local Mayor conceded, it is likely that the more diverse the objectives, the more difficult the planning and implementation becomes. The Mayor who thought there were simply far too many institutions involved, compared the situation to "the law of nature whereby striking two unlike substances together
produces a spark". A similar view was expressed by a private sector respondent, who noted that “there is no collective mentality in the region and each institution wants to cut the cake on its own... the municipalities try to cut a big piece for themselves, the Ministry of Work and Resettlement do the same... so does the Ministry of Culture”.

Based on the interviews and various documents, it is apparent that the Nature Preservation Society (NPS) seeks a more sustainable form of tourism development in the area which directly benefits the local community. They wish to tap the vast tourism potential while also preserving the cultural and natural environment, and with these resources enhancing the visitors' stay. In the interviews the NPS respondents explained that they wanted a form of tourism that respects local wishes and that provides real economic opportunities for the local community. They felt that their organisation would benefit the local community, but agreed that they had failed to achieve a large part of their objectives because of the ideological differences between the locals, the NPS and Betuyab in terms of how best to use the tourism assets of the region. These ideological differences between the NPS, local people and other organisations involved in the BMP were encapsulated thus by one NPS respondent: “Our [NPS] purpose was not to get buildings demolished in the area. As you know, infrastructure development in the area had started already in 1986 and had finished long before we started on this management project. Neither was our purpose in Belek to create a turtle heaven. Our main aim was to take measures to prevent deterioration in the area, including taking measures to maintain water quality ... we were aiming at the sustainability and viability of tourism in the region... we did not have any sanctioning power, as the villagers themselves had to become convinced”. She considered that the NPS lost its prestige and support from the local community because it had objectives that are not compatible with those of the community. For example, this representative thought that the NPS had different priorities from Betuyab and local people on the matter of bridge construction, conceding that “we resisted the idea of constructing a bridge over the Acisu River, as it would threaten the ecological system... but since we had gained an image as an organisation resisting every development, we had lost favour among local people”. Such comments do suggest that parties that are unshakably on opposite sides ideologically on tourism-related issues can find it very difficult to form relations for co-ordination and co-operation.
8.5.5.4 Lack of communication and low trust as barriers to co-ordination

It is argued in the literature that the performance of organisations in any given setting can be severely hampered when the agencies know little about one another (Njoh 1993). Without the sharing of information, then the differences and similarities between organisations and the aspects of their agendas and approaches which can be used as the starting point for co-ordination will remain unrecognised. A lack of communication increases the knowledge gap between local communities and decision-makers, and it also accelerates the isolation of local communities from the tourism development process. Consequently, the knowledge gaps between central authorities and local communities make it difficult for a host community to participate in joint arrangements for tourism development.

While stakeholders involved in the BMP agreed that information sharing was an important issue for co-ordination, their interview responses suggest that in practice there had been limited communication between some parties. Nine of the 30 respondents identified limited communication, such as between the public and private sectors and between national and local organisations, as a major obstacle to achieving effective co-ordination and co-operation. Two local respondents stated that the level of communication between the municipalities and local people was not at all encouraging, concluding that this was partly because local people were traditionally not much inclined to participate in municipal decision-making processes. Six respondents thought that the national institutions hardly communicated among themselves and much less with the public. Some of these respondents had lost confidence in the BMP as a result. The municipalities and other local institutions felt somewhat powerless in relation to Betuyab and the tourism investors, and this might help explain why they seldom met or communicated with each other. Two Betuyab representatives agreed that communication was poor, but attributed this to specific local circumstances, including the newness of the municipalities. As many as five respondents in national organisations agreed that the region’s municipalities were not very keen to communicate with national organisations. One Ministry of Tourism official explained that “no municipality has approached our ministry to say that they want to do such-and-such things to improve the appearance of their location and environment...no mayor stated that five-six storey buildings were eye sores and they
wanted have a new regulation, or at least adhere to the existing legislation”. By contrast, three of the mayors identified Betuyab as a barrier preventing communication and they accused Betuyab of holding on to much relevant information and not sharing it with the municipalities. While there seems to have been some level of agreement among respondents as to conservation of the environment, quite a few local respondents, five, felt that many organisations, including Betuyab, had hidden agendas in this respect which they had not explained at the early BMP meetings. Despite there being little indication that exchanges of information occurred between the municipalities, one Mayor thought that “Betuyab breaks the harmony between organisations. They don't inform us about their operations. Besides, they don't take into account our views in any way”.

According to the literature (see chapter five), when a party has had little contact with another organisation, perceptions of each other have not had time to form and become institutionalised, and distrust may then arise. However, vested interests play a crucial role in hindering moves toward co-ordination. Related differences in organisational ideologies can generate conflict, rather than co-operation. Building trust is increasingly seen as fundamental to good management of inter-organisational relations. Trust constitutes the central organisational glue within networked organisations. The greater the level of trust, the less the need for negotiation over matters or detail (and a reduction in friction or transaction costs), and the greater the opportunity for long-term planning, risk-taking and innovation. The interview responses indicate that trust was relatively low among the respondents, this specifically being stated by six of them. The Betuyab respondents clearly felt very little trust in relation to the region's municipalities. A Betuyab representative, who had worked in the area for more than eleven years, was critical of the abilities of the local mayors: “at the moment, these elected mayors do not have the capability, management experience, or the skills that are required for the position they occupy. They all come from different backgrounds unrelated to tourism. For example, the Kadriye Mayor used to be a bus driver, the Mayor of Belek was a taxi driver, the Mayor of Bogazkent was dealing in trade, and the Serik Mayor is an engineer... as you can see they have no relation with tourism whatsoever. The only relation that they have with tourism is the rent created by the tourism development that has taken place in their environment”.

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Representatives of the Nature Preservation Society (NPS) remarked that local people had lost their trust in their organisation due in part to inaccurate rumours: “Fishermen in Kumkoy were made to believe that we [NPS] were operating in their environment to prevent them from fishing. Locals said to us that we had stopped the fishing in Dalyan [another area under environmental protection] and had the police confiscate fishing boats. I do not know where they got this information, but this is not true”. One of the NPS representatives noted also that rumours indicating that the villagers had started forest fires had led to growing mistrust between the villagers and other organisations: “the villagers are blamed for the current fires. However, the same villagers could have burnt the area several years ago. It is curious why it did not happen then, but happens now”. These representatives felt that Betuyab might have been behind these rumours in order to weaken the image of NPS: “Such incidents spoiled our communication and contacts with Betuyab for a long time, as these two institutions viewed each other as enemies. As there was no confidence in one another, we were not able to co-operate”. She further added: “To what extent can you trust in Betuyab, an organisation observing investors’ interests”, a comment which hints at deep ideological fractures and dissent.

8.5.5.5 Partisanship as a barrier to co-ordination

As many as nine of the 30 respondents stated that the municipalities were not working co-operatively with each other, and this was usually explained as due to different political opinions and to partisanship. Several of them thought that each of the municipalities in the region had tried to undermine each other’s activities because of partisanship and misconceptions between the political parties. One local respondent felt that “the partisanship really does hinder the building of co-operative relations, as a mayor becomes reluctant to press the button of a facility [water treatment plant] built by the ex-Mayor of the opposing party. This is ridiculous, but true”. Additionally, in the view of five local participants, municipal ambitions and greed were related major factors inhibiting co-operation among the municipalities.

8.5.5.6 Under-recognition of interdependence as a barrier to co-ordination

Seven respondents noted that under-recognition of the need for organisations
to work with each other had significantly hampered co-ordination and co-operation. For example, an official from the Ministry of Tourism complained that each party involved in the BMP assumed itself to be more important than others. Observation by the researcher and the interviews both suggest that the organisations often viewed themselves as independent, regularly acting alone and sharing few or no common goals.

8.5.5.7 Abuse of power as a barrier to co-ordination

Four respondents from national organisations stated that there was a tendency, particularly among the municipalities, to abuse their authority, and they felt this had generated antagonism and alienation among other parties. One respondent from Betuyab also indicated that, when the municipalities could not obtain what they wanted from Betuyab, they would try to coerce Betuyab through other means. He supported his assertion with the following example: “although there are no obvious visible faults [with the tourist facilities] they [the municipality officials who have the right to inspect tourist facilities within their municipal borders] come up with reports indicating faults, in order to complicate and stifle our progress, and force us to accept other things they wanted”.

8.5.5.8 Low commitment as a barrier to co-ordination

Two NPS representatives contended that inter-organisational co-operation between national and local parties involved in the BMP was weak due to their being insufficient commitment. One NPS representative drew attention to differences in the degree of commitment of different organisations to the BMP, and she illustrated her point with the following comparison: “It is like when your tutor assigns you to a team of five students and gives you an assignment to be prepared within a deadline. There is only one student who is diligent and who studies hard to get the assignment completed on time. The rest are lazy and lean on the industrious student, and are not concerned about who needs to do what, when, where, how and why...But they are ready to take all the credit, or to put the blame for failure on the single hard-working student when things go wrong”. Local respondents shared similar views to that of the NPS respondents, and there was a sense that, if tourism had become difficult to administer in the region, this was partly because of the indifference of the national organisations.
8.5.6 Suggestions for improved co-ordination

26) "Can you suggest changes in the procedure and policies, which would encourage greater co-ordination and co-operation between national and local organisations in relation to Belek?"

In response to this question, as many as 22 respondents who had participated in the BMP suggested conditions that needed to be met for there to have been more successful co-ordination and co-operation. Seven conditions or issues were mentioned, and they are shown in Table 8.5.3. Many of these suggestions add support to those identified in the research literature, as reviewed in chapter five. A common view among the respondents was that changes were needed not only in procedures and policies, but also in how people viewed co-operation and co-ordination. Half of the respondents- fifteen of the 30 - indicated that there was a need for mandatory forms of co-ordination. The suggestion being mentioned by the next largest number of respondents was a need for parties to exchange and share information. An enabling environment was mentioned as being important for co-ordination by eleven respondents. Two other suggestions mentioned quite often were that the parties needed to recognise the need to work with others, and that they should have positive attitudes and a commitment to co-ordination and co-operation. The need for parties to hold similar beliefs and expectations was mentioned by nine respondents. The academic literature also suggests that if organisations share little in common then they will have little incentive to co-operate (Whetten 1981). On the other hand, the theory suggests that if they share too much, then they are likely to perceive one another as competitors and refuse to work together. The suggestions identified in Table 8.5.3 are now evaluated further.

Table 8.5.3 Suggestions for the improvement of co-ordination and co-operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suggestions for improved co-ordination and co-operation</th>
<th>Number of respondents mentioning the suggestion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forms of co-ordination need to be made mandatory</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Parties need to exchange and share information with others 14
An enabling environment needs to be created 11
Parties need to recognise the need to work with others 10
Parties need to have trust in each other 10
Need for a positive commitment to co-ordination 9
Parties need to have similar beliefs and expectations 9

8.5.6.1 The need for some forms of co-ordination to be mandatory

As many as fifteen of the 30 respondents felt that it would be beneficial for some forms of co-ordination to be made mandatory in the region. Several of them mentioned that it might be useful to have an independent body, empowered with veto power, to deal with issues related to development plans in areas of environmental importance. Some of these respondents argued that co-ordination would need to be backed up by strong legislative support. It was also commented that the existing legislative confusion about organisational responsibilities and authority needed to be cleared up, such as in relation to the Provincial Bank, the Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Work and Resettlement, and the municipalities. For example, one ex-Mayor considered that central government needed to review the legislation in relation to the tasks that the municipalities now perform, the kind of functions they could undertake in the future, and the resources that they would need to fulfil those functions.

8.5.6.2 The need for more information exchange

As many as fourteen respondents considered that the exchange of information in an active dialogue would promote more effective co-ordination. Again this finding supports assertions in the literature on inter-organisational relations, as discussed in chapter five. Their view of this information exchange appears to have extended to the whole relationship, both formal and informal, such as joint preparation of plans, joint decision-making, and co-operation between different local and central government organisations. These respondents also often indicated that co-operation is about making optimum use of resources, including each other's knowledge and experiences. One respondent indicated that “to ensure co-ordination and co-operation, I think managers should be committed to engage in negotiation and conciliation through consulting with one another. They have to try to settle their conflicting objectives, and find a solution to institutional rivalry”.

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8.5.6.3 The need for an enabling environment

Eleven of the 30 respondents commented on the need for an enabling environment for co-ordination. A Municipal Association representative who identified that a conducive external environment was important, made the following complaint: "look at the political problems we have now...Do you think that this is an enabling environment for collective action and development?". The conceptual framework for this study similarly identifies the need to examine the wider environment. Some respondents specifically mentioned that attention must be paid to resolving past conflicts between the parties involved in a management plan, and to understanding the real forces influencing the planning process. There was a belief that tourism development plans could not work without full participation by the local authorities, and by other local institutions. Some respondents seem to have recognised that an underestimation or negligence of the institutional forces influencing the planning process can produce unwanted consequences. One Betuyab representative agreed that legislative support is necessary for collaboration in tourism planning, but he felt this was simply a matter of exercising existing powers and responsibilities.

8.5.6.4 The need for a positive commitment to co-ordination

Nine of the 30 respondents considered that effective co-ordination depends on having a political culture which encourages a commitment to co-ordination, and it was seen as still being uncommon in Turkey to find national and local organisations working together on a joint project. Two respondents depicted co-ordination as a coalition between government organisations where one needs to recognise and settle the differences of interests and values of the participating parties in order to maintain unity. In the view of one local respondent, when one works painstakingly to find out a common benefit, then the "bundle easily got disentangled". It was felt that in order to promote co-ordination in its various dimensions, it was important to have commitment and also to institutionalise the appropriate inter-organisational relationships.

8.5.7 Whether co-ordination would be helped by local or national organisations having greater influence on tourism planning decisions
27) "Would it be likely to help or hinder the co-ordination of tourism planning for Belek, if tourism planning decisions were left more to local or national government organisations?"

Responses to this question suggest there were different views as to whether leaving tourism planning decisions to national or local organisations would help or hinder the co-ordination of tourism planning in Belek. Among the 30 respondents, a very slight majority, that is 16, stated that they would have preferred it if national organisations had more influence on tourism planning decisions in order to help co-ordination. More specifically, as seen in Table 8.5.4, national organisations are preferred for a bigger role in tourism planning primarily by central government representatives (4 out of 5), provincial organisations (2 out of 2), the majority of private sector organisations (5 out of 6), one third of local organisations (4 out of 12) and one of the five voluntary sector organisations. The priority for national organisations having this co-ordinating role was for several reasons. For example, this was felt appropriate as tourism makes a major contribution to Turkey's economy, because the state was felt to have a key co-ordinating role, and because the central and provincial governments were thought to be best placed to see the big picture in order to balance national and local interests. On the other hand, other individual organisations, such as local organisations or private sector organisations, were not preferred above central organisations as on their own they were not considered capable of representing a wide range of public interests. Almost half of the respondents (14) preferred the setting up of a statutory organisation in which local government was represented. This idea was favoured by more than half of the representatives of local organisations (6 out of 10), almost all of the voluntary sector respondents (4 out of 5), a minority of private sector representatives (1 out of 6), local people (2 in total), and one of the five respondents from central organisations.

Table 8.5.4 Preferences for organisations having a bigger role in tourism planning in order to aid co-ordination

281
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The organisation preferred for a greater role</th>
<th>Number of respondents by type favouring this organisation</th>
<th>Number of respondents favouring this organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National organisation</td>
<td>Central organisations (4)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provincial organisations (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private sector organisations (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local organisations (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary sector organisations (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A statutory organisation in which local government is represented</td>
<td>Local organisations (6)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local people (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary sector (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private sector (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central organisations (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local organisations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector organisations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary organisations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eleven respondents, from both the private sector and national organisations, expressed concern that leaving decisions to local organisations would hinder co-ordination and co-operation. Two Betuyab respondents agreed that leaving the co-ordination function to municipalities would not produce the desired results because of their current management mentality, the political pressures that they suffer, and because of the links between the mayor and the voters. Respondents from the Ministry of Tourism generally also shared this view. An official from the Ministry of Tourism complained: “Look, they [municipalities] are making decisions concerning the construction plans. Who is doing it? Make a guess...the local hairdresser, local butcher, greengrocer, etc. [the members of the municipal board], who have the right vested in them to make decisions on construction issues and the development of the region. What about their experience, what about their understanding of planning..?”.

This respondent considered that a central government organisation, empowered with adequate authority might help in the co-ordination of tourism planning for Belek.

By contrast, seven respondents from local organisations and the municipalities were sceptical about the suitability of national organisations for the task of having a stronger co-ordinating role. Respondents in this group felt that the co-ordination of activities by central government might not yield the expected results as long as the
national political culture remained the same, which they depicted as characterised by nepotism, cronyism and favouritism. But these respondents also agreed that the municipalities would be unable to carry out such a task unless the legislation was changed. A major concern was that the distant central elite would be replaced with a local elite if co-ordination were left to local organisations without legal amendments. Four respondents from the municipalities suggested that it was imperative to understand what precluded co-ordination among Turkey's public institutions before a new model for co-ordination could be devised. They felt that the municipalities could undertake such a co-ordination task, provided that the problems inherent in the present system were identified. They were against co-ordination being undertaken by a central institution and they expressed concern that central officials will always have different priorities and goals, as well as different views on how to attain them, compared with those of local organisations. These local respondents also argued that decision-makers should not be geographically distant as that inevitably creates communication problems. They were concerned that all attempts at co-ordination would be challenged by large quantities of red tape, poor administrative support, and authority conflicts, those being the characteristics of Turkey's present administrative culture (as examined in chapter six).

However, five respondents, from provincial and national organisations, stated that they would not support more authority being given to any single organisation on its own. In their view, whatever organisation was to gain extra powers, be it the Ministry of Tourism or the Ministry of Environment, this would simply increase the irrational use of power and resources. One respondent explained that “...it may do more harm than good. If you hand the authority for tourism development to the Ministry of Environment, it may be disastrous, as the Ministry of Environment will definitely restrict the use of environment resources for tourism. And if you handed over authority for environmental management to the Ministry of Tourism, this time the Ministry of Tourism would obliterate the environment resources at the expense of a thriving tourism industry”. One district government (the administration level between villages and cities) respondent, who was dissatisfied with the parties complaining about each other's incapacity, explained that “despite all of their weaknesses, these institutions [municipalities] do have different strengths that may complement one another. My opinion is that these two organisations (central and
local) should be fused under one vision and a shared goal, and should assemble all their strengths to collect information and adapt development policy to the local conditions”.

8.5.8 Summary

This section examined views on the co-ordination and co-operation between parties involved in the BMP. The interview results indicate that certain conditions were required for improved co-ordination and co-operation to have occurred between parties involved in the Belek Management Plan (BMP). As was discussed in chapter five, co-ordination and co-operation can be a good thing as inter-organisational co-operation can help organisations to get jobs done more effectively and efficiently. In this study the respondents agreed that co-ordination and co-operation could assist in preventing the duplication, overlaps and fragmentation of services between parties in the region. They also indicated that in practice the co-ordination of activities in relation to the BMP was poor.

It was argued in the literature that organisations tend to be more receptive to inter-organisational co-operation and co-ordination when they are faced with situations of resource scarcity. Resource scarcity can force organisations to enter into more co-operative activities in order to stretch their resources to meet rising expectations. Interestingly, while there was resource scarcity in Belek, the comments suggests that co-ordination and co-operation were not common among the parties involved in the BMP. It appears that some parties wanted to benefit without contributing to the solution. Respondents gave several explanations as to why co-ordination was limited in the region. They suggested that co-ordination and co-operation between the parties largely failed because of the diverse range of public organisations involved, each with their own political agendas, and each seeking to increase their power. In line with Whetten (1981), it seems that the commitment of organisational resources to the BMP was modest for most organisations, and consequently the relationships between the different parties were typically less intense and less formal, and thus these relationships were difficult to maintain, especially in the implementation phase (see chapter five).

Co-ordination between parties was significantly hindered by the strong
opposition to the policies of some national and local parties. Respondents suggested several ways to overcome the barriers in the way of co-ordination. Several argued that the parties should commit themselves to joint action and that they should communicate this commitment to the other parties. Co-ordination was likely to entail some national (e.g., the Ministry of Culture) and local organisations (Betuyab) relinquishing a degree of control over elements of their responsibilities and power. But the literature suggests that these organisations are unlikely to relinquish their control without receiving in return some concessions to compensate for any negative consequences that might result (Davidson 1976). Interestingly, the NPS appears to have decided that due to its financial problems it was in its own best interest to relinquish its responsibilities and to pass them to Betuyab, even though its position was not enhanced and Betuyab has gained more. In accordance with the responses in previous sections, the respondents again felt that giving greater authority for the BMP to a single organisation would have its own limitations. Many felt it might be better if the national and local organisations could be unified in a single organisation so as to fuse their strengths and to reduce their individual weaknesses.

This section examined whether there was co-ordination between the organisations and activities involved in the BMP. As indicated in the study's conceptual framework, the next section now examines what stakeholders think about the roles of the other organisations involved in the BMP. Identifying differences and similarities in opinions assists in determining the degree of equilibrium between the parties involved in formulating and implementing the BMP.
8.6.1 Introduction

The conceptual framework developed for this study is premised on the assumption that the formulation and implementation of tourism plans is affected by interactions between organisations at national, provincial and local levels. It is usual for inter-organisational relationships to involve some organisations co-operating with each other for mutual benefit, and for others to compete for the same political, financial, informational resources or power. The literature reviewed in chapter three suggests that peaceful and harmonious interaction based on mutual agreement and the exchange of scarce resources will only be viable where each organisation respects the rights of others and where there are viable institutions which embody and enforce the rules. These issues are important for the study of central-local government relations.

Inter-organisational interactions can be in equilibrium when the relationships between two or more organisations are harmonious, non-conflicting, and collaborative. As discussed in chapters three and four, there are four interrelated components of this equilibrium: work co-ordination, domain consensus, ideological consensus, and inter-organisational evaluation. An increase or decrease in one component is likely to produce a corresponding increase or decrease in other components. For example, domain consensus influences the co-ordination of work, that is, the greater the agreement between organisations regarding the appropriate role and scope of each, the greater the likely co-ordination of work between them. Domain consensus also influences the ideological consensus, that is, the greater the agreement between organisations regarding the appropriate role and scope of each, the greater their likely agreement regarding the nature of their activities. Domain consensus can also influence inter-organisational evaluations, that is, the greater the agreement between organisations regarding the appropriate role and scope of each, the greater their tendency to evaluate each other positively. Similarly, understanding how organisations evaluate the work of each other is important, as the more positive the evaluation, the greater the likelihood of co-ordinated
activity between them. All of these evaluations are relevant to relations between central and local government.

The discussion now evaluates the views of the various organisations involved in the Belek Coastal Management Plan (BMP) regarding the appropriate roles and scope of the other parties in the work related to the plan. This is related in particular to the relative roles of central and local government. More specifically, this section aims to identify:

- The views of the stakeholders concerning the work conducted by the other organisations involved in the BMP, including the extent to which there was agreement regarding the appropriate roles and activities of central and local organisations.
- And, the views of the various parties as to whether inter-organisational relations in Belek would be enhanced if changes were made in the contextual environment, notably in the roles of central and local government.

8.6.2 Division of authority and responsibility

28) "How does the division of authority and responsibility between national and local organisations in relation to tourism planning in Belek affect the implementation of the BMP, if at all?"

Responses to Question 28 suggest that many respondents thought there were flaws in the current division of authority and responsibilities between the concerned organisations. Such dissatisfaction with the current situation perhaps should not be surprising given the highly political nature of tourism in the country and the proliferation of state institutions. Quite a high number of respondents - 17 of the 30 - from both national and local organisations, agreed that the current division of responsibility and authority between different governmental tiers was a major obstacle preventing the BMP's successful implementation. In the view of these respondents, land use planning and development authority and related responsibilities were divided inappropriately among various sectoral ministries and agencies, and between national, provincial and local authorities. This finding lends additional support to the contentions discussed in chapter six. A district government official who was dissatisfied
with the multiple organisations interfering with tourism-related issues, each with differing levels of authority and responsibility, explained that this had resulted in a spate of problems and brought about unnecessary inter-organisational disputes. A substantial number of respondents – 14 – expressed views suggesting that they felt that integrated activity was almost impossible given the current distribution of responsibilities and authority. The current situation was considered to produce management ineffectiveness, and to undermine accountability, as each party tended to put the blame on each other when things went wrong.

Five respondents, from the Nature Preservation Society (NPS), Betuyab and the Ministry of Tourism (MoT), argued that the MoT was relatively powerless in the face of other ministries. Despite feeling that the MoT was important due its resources and accumulated experience in tourism planning, one Betuyab member conceded that “…the Ministry of Tourism, which has been set up to manage, develop and promote tourism in the country, is now earning more hard currency than any other ministry…sadly it ranks as the 16th ministry in the government protocol”. The respondent argued that this substantially hampers its ability to influence decisions taken by higher ranked institutions, such as the Ministry of Interior, or the Higher Planning Council. This view was shared by a respondent from the Nature Preservation Society (NPS), who suggested that personal political favours were used by these higher institutions to block the work of the MoT, and that this had caused substantial delays. Others also indicated that similar problems apply to relationships between the MoT and other central institutions and also the municipalities.

Ten of the 17 respondents who were negative about the division of authority and responsibility argued that local government suffered from a lack of authority. Many of these felt that the boundaries to municipal authority in relation to the designated tourism development areas had not been defined clearly. It was felt that local government lacks autonomy to put decisions into practice under its own initiative due to central intervention in decisions (see chapter six). Many of them felt the municipalities were aware of the significance of tourism for the economy, but they had insufficient powers to develop the industry, and this had caused them to feel alienated. Two respondents from the association of local authorities thought that central government was extremely interventionist and acting largely on political and economic concerns. The interviews suggested that in principle central government is enthusiastic to transfer its responsibilities to local government, but that in
8.6.3 Suggested organisation to undertake some of the implementation activities of central government

29) “Do you believe that some parts of the implementation work of central government in relation to the BMP could be done more effectively by a different organisation? If so, then what parts and what organisations would you suggest?”

A substantial 16 of the 30 respondents considered that some of the implementation work by central government could be done more effectively by another organisation. It should be noted that in response to Question 29, many respondents interpreted the central government as being the Ministry of Tourism (MoT). Thus, in the remainder of this section, it should be noted that the MoT was widely interpreted as the relevant central government representative. Sixteen of the 30 respondents found the MoT relatively ineffective compared to another potential organisation, and several explanations were put forward in support of this response. Table 8.6.1 presents the explanations offered by these stakeholders. Eleven of them attributed the ineffectiveness of the MoT to the current legislation and regulations that have marginalized the MoT relative to other ministries. Six respondents from national and local organisations felt that the Ministry of Tourism had become subservient to other national organisations because of on-going amendments in regulations and legislation and because the MoT could not enforce decisions on its own without the approval of other institutions. For example, the Ministry had to gain the approval of the Ministry of Work and Resettlement when altering construction plans. A central government official explained that “unlike many other institutions, such as the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Work and Resettlement, the Ministry of Tourism is unfortunately not authorised to spend or channel central financial resources without securing other institutions’ approval…Ironically, due to the regulations the
Ministry [MoT] has to make a request to the Treasury for the transfer of funds for such developments. This is an unacceptable practice, considering the amount of hard currency that the MoT earns”.

**Table 8.6.1 Perceived causes of the ineffectiveness of the Ministry of Tourism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived cause of ineffectiveness</th>
<th>Number of respondents mentioning the cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current legislation and regulations</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other national organisations with more power</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical distance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure and size of the Ministry</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of resilience to political pressures</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Six respondents considered that the ineffectiveness of the Ministry was closely related to its relatively small size in terms of the number of employees or the size of its regional units. Three of these respondents suggested that the ministry could be more effective if it reduced its size centrally and increased the size and influence of its regional units. Four respondents felt that political pressure from the National Assembly contributed to the ineffectiveness of national organisations, including the MoT, an issue that was discussed in chapter six. It was felt that central government had become an institution that dealt with almost every small detail, and that this meant that central government could not perform its real duties and responsibilities adequately. It is evident in the comments that this situation was the source of much public disappointment and dissatisfaction.

The 16 respondents who considered that some central government work could be done more effectively by another organisation were asked about what organisations should undertake these duties in relation to the BMP, and their responses are shown in Table 8.6.2. In the view of NPS respondents, the best organisation to undertake these duties was the Specially Protected Area Council. They considered that this organisation would carry out the coordination task effectively because it would be “resilient enough to withstand political and other forms of pressure”. Quite differently, perhaps because of their current positive relations with the Ministry, the Betuyab representatives suggested that the Ministry of Tourism could take on more of the diverse activities of other ministries in relation to tourism. By contrast, three respondents from other national organisations, but not the MoT, considered that
geographical distance precludes the central government from functioning effectively at the local level and suggested that a local union could be set up involving participation by the provincial government, private sector and municipalities. However, they felt this would only work if it was backed up with sufficient legal power, a view also shared by the municipal representatives.

Table 8.6.2 Suggested organisation to undertake some of the work of central government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Organisation suggested for the task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>Specially Protected Area Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betuyab</td>
<td>MoT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoT</td>
<td>Local union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities</td>
<td>Local union</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.6.4 Expansion or reduction of central government activities

30) “Do you believe that central government should expand or reduce its present activities in the Belek region? Why?”

When respondents were asked about whether central government should expand or reduce its present activities, seven of them felt that it should reduce its activities, and six stated that it should expand its activities. These respondents offered differing explanations in support of their view. While the NPS representatives were in favour of a reduction in the role of central government, by contrast, five respondents from national organisations and provincial government argued that the MoT should increase its activities, particularly its control over the allegedly arbitrary practices of land expropriation by the municipalities. Local respondents appeared to be dissatisfied with the relationships between the MoT and Betuyab. Four of the local respondents indicated that the MoT should reduce its over-dependency and reliance on Betuyab, and that it should stop seeing Betuyab as their only counterpart in the region. It was felt that national organisations should step back from “making plans for local people and start making plans with the community”, an argument which was discussed in chapter two. Two local association respondents considered that central government should act as a facilitator rather than service provider, and that the role and authority of local government should be increased in tourism-related issues. An official from the MoT considered that if
there was an active local union in operation then central government could reduce some of its activities, but he still advised that control of tourism development should remain under the jurisdiction of central government in order to facilitate development that is integrated with that of other tourism regions in Turkey.

8.6.5 Municipal responsibilities

31) "What tasks to implement the BMP do you believe should be the prime responsibility of the municipality, if any?"

Responses to Question 31 indicate that it was widely felt that the municipalities should undertake a number of responsibilities, including securing a clean and a healthy environment for tourism, the provision of effective services for the satisfaction of local people and tourists, and the completion of the infrastructure needed for the subsequent development of superstructure. A substantial proportion of local respondents — five — considered that the municipalities should be more involved with health and safety issues, explaining that poor standards in these areas are likely to deter visitors. These respondents, commented that the municipalities should avoid rent-oriented actions and should not compromise general interests at the expense of individual interests. According to the NPS representatives, the municipalities needed to protect and manage the environmentally sensitive areas much better, as well as adopt a better management style in their operation of the facilities provided there. They contended that the first task of a municipality should be to find ways of using scarce resources more rationally. Many of the central government officials involved in the BMP thought that the municipalities should put a priority on enhancing local people’s living standards, and in particular on taking care of the environment. They considered that the municipalities should avoid engaging in inter-municipal conflicts and strive to ignite the spirit of co-operation. In addition, it was suggested that the municipalities should create educational opportunities for young people to work in tourism and attempt to reduce the distrust of local people towards both central institutions and the municipalities.

The Betuyab representatives considered that the region's municipalities should work harder to apply sanctions to stop the conversion of fertile agricultural land into real estate development land. According to these respondents, the municipalities should refrain from
encouraging the development of second homes in order to secure votes at the next election. They also thought that the municipalities should be more careful about the construction and operation of facilities in designated areas on the beaches, as well as give priority to the improvement of the local infrastructure: "overall they [municipalities] must be more strategic in the area...they are extremely active when it comes to defending their financial interests; however, when it comes to environmental preservation they are not as enthusiastic as they should be".

8.6.6 Municipal effectiveness

32) "Do you believe that currently the municipalities carry out their tasks effectively in relation to the implementation of the BMP?"

As many as 17 of the stakeholders involved in the BMP considered that the municipalities were ineffective. A private sector respondent criticised the municipalities for indulging in some actions that it was felt might damage the future of tourism. While this respondent considered she was broadly supportive of the municipalities, she complained that "I have never believed that they [the municipalities] carry out these tasks effectively. Can you give me one reason why a tourist would leave the region satisfied? The pavements are a shambles...the garbage collection is disorderly...the area is over-crowded with both people and buildings...water is insufficient and power cuts are happening... the roads are not safe as the traffic is dangerously uncontrolled...and noise pollution is at incredible levels". In defence of municipalities, a local association member argued that their so-called ineffectiveness did not only apply to the municipalities. In the view of this respondent, the central government attempted to produce some services, without giving real thought to what they are doing, and local government is in turn almost paralysed with inactivity. Nine of the respondents suggested that both local and central government had thwarted the provision of quality services in the region.

Table 8.6.3 summarises the six most common explanations given as to why respondents thought the municipalities were ineffective. Many of them indicated that the centralist administration or central control were important causes of this problem. Another cause that was often mentioned was the multiple responsibilities assigned to the municipalities
by the relevant laws. Linked to the last point was the limited financial resources of the municipalities. Other causes often mentioned were a scarcity of human resources, and the lack of a collaborative culture between organisations. These causes will now be evaluated in more detail.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centralist administration</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central control</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple responsibilities</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited financial resources</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited human resources</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited collaboration between organisations</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.6.6.1 Centralist administration and central control

As many as 16 respondents considered that the centralist administration was a barrier to municipal effectiveness. As was discussed in chapter six, local services were generally planned according to the priorities of numerous central organisations. The respondents saw this as frustrating the meeting of local needs and preferences as well as undermining the more effective use of local resources. They often mentioned the imposition of restraints by central government on local government and the expansion of central bureaucracy as slowing down the speed of municipal decision-making. One example was provided by a local association respondent: "sometimes a decision that could be taken in a day might take months or more, and consequently, this delays the completion of initiatives and increases service costs".

Another local respondent, who disagreed with the suggestion that central government should retain a veto over final decisions, explained that the centralised administration had prevented public involvement in decision-making, which in turn had alienated the public and reduced their engagement in implementing decisions.

As many as seven of the local respondents were unhappy with the extreme concentration of executive power in Ankara, which they considered had obliged both local politicians and citizens to go to Ankara to put their case. As indicated in chapter six, these respondents concluded that local people regularly have to resort to visiting their members of parliament to solicit their help, often by taking the case to the various central agencies,
including ministries. The result is that many organisations in Ankara are almost overwhelmed every day with visitors. This unique problem eventually obstructs the national politicians and bureaucrats from engaging in their own duties effectively and efficiently. The local respondents argued that MPs in Ankara have to expend too much of their time to meet individual electors' wishes so that they cannot perform their main duties competently. They complained that the central bureaucracy had been enlarged and new departments had mushroomed in order to deal with the numerous small enquiries. Some local respondents also noted that there was much redundant employment in both municipal and central government departments, and they claimed this was due to political favouritism.

Fourteen respondents identified the concentration of power at the centre as a cause of municipal ineffectiveness. Two NPS representatives complained that central government retained the authority to interfere with local affairs and to decide what services should be rendered for local communities and how they must be delivered. They contended that power to determine the priorities for local services and their realisation should rest with local communities as this would be more democratic. The local respondents shared a similar view and thought that central administrative control was a major problem. The interviews suggest that the kinds of control exercised by central government had a damaging effect on the independence and the initiative of local government in the region. Perhaps partly because they were newly established, the local government appeared to be far too dependent on central government to be adequately responsive to local interests.

8.6.6.2 Multiple responsibilities

Twelve of the 30 respondents attributed the municipal ineffectiveness to the number of responsibilities that each municipality had to fulfil. One Betuyab representative illustrated this problem thus: “the Municipal Law lists over 80 responsibilities for a municipality... in a seminar I attended, a lawyer who had been working on public management in Turkey confessed that he had been working for over 20 years on this topic and he still could not draw up a full list of the duties and responsibilities of a village headman in Turkey. In contrast to the array of responsibilities, the headman has got only one authority, which is to take the minutes”. Interestingly, he explained that the headman is meant to take with him someone who is esteemed in the area when handing in these minutes to the head official of the district. This interpretation was also applied to the multiple responsibilities of municipalities.
8.6.6.3 Limited financial resources

Limited financial resources were mentioned by 12 respondents as another factor that restricted the development and delivery of effective municipal services. Hence, while local government was expected to contribute to the development of tourism in the area and to take an active part in the preparation of development plans, this was not fully practical due to their limited resources. According to one ex-Mayor, this represented an unfair distribution between the scale of the assigned tasks and the resources allocated to local government. This respondent felt that a restructuring of public administration could not be achieved unless this imbalance in resources and responsibilities was rectified. Others also criticised the central government’s system to allocate funds, which failed to recognise big increases in population in the summer in the municipalities providing services in tourist regions. One municipality representative was offended by the attitude of central government to the problems of the summer population increases. Another local respondent noted that a town of ten thousand inhabitants could become a city accommodating two hundred thousand people, and asked “with the allocated fund for ten thousand inhabitants, how on earth can a municipality provide its services satisfactorily?” Three respondents from local organisations identified the absence of a nationally established system of resource distribution as a critical problem. They disapproved of the current uneven share of financial resources between municipalities in touristic and non-touristic regions, and they felt that the central provision of financial resources to local government had impeded their sense of responsibility, and participation and had hampered the civic consciousness of local citizens. As explained earlier, the mayors conceded that they resorted to pestering Ministers, Member of Parliaments, and party leaders with frequent visits in order to secure the funding needed for local services.

8.6.6.4 Limited human resources

Twelve respondents from the public and private sectors and the municipal association also mentioned the problem of the scarcity and quality of human capital in municipal government. It appears that many of the practices of the municipalities in the fields of personnel selection, appointment, promotion and human resource planning are also restricted by central intervention. The Betuyab and NPS representatives in particular considered that the limited qualifications of the mayors was a further related factor limiting the effectiveness of their service provision. They suggested that to improve municipal effectiveness in the region
they needed far-sighted and open-minded mayors who would not sacrifice the general interest to private interests. These respondents suggested that the mayors currently acted impulsively, and without long-term thinking, and they were pre-occupied with retaining votes.

### 8.6.6.5 Limited collaboration

Ten of the 30 respondents identified the limited collaboration between municipalities as a factor inhibiting the effective provision of services. Three central government officials stated that a division of resources between the local municipalities, particularly after the creation of new municipalities in 1995, had created a spate of issues that had limited their effectiveness. A Betuyab representative, who argued that there should be a more consistent quality of services provided by municipalities in the Belek region, complained that “there is no consistency whatsoever in the nature of the work and services implemented in the area...two bordering municipalities are providing incompatible services. One of them is doing sewage work underground, while the bordering municipality is providing asphalted roads. However, the cost of doing sewage or asphalt work will decrease considerably when they do them together. Instead of seeking co-operation, the two municipalities are in conflict about authority over the same area”. The problem seems to have stemmed from the incompatibility of the nature of work done and its timing, and also from political problems. A central government official described how “…when infrastructure development starts, it can only progress to the point of the neighbouring municipality’s border. The mayors will not permit you to maintain the road, as it may benefit his opponent”. He elaborated how: “they [mayors] are from different political parties,…and succeeding in getting them together in a room is as difficult as making a camel pass through the eye of a needle”. This respondent also argued that only a few municipalities sought to work with the help of expert public agencies and private sector firms.

### 8.6.7 An organisation that could undertake some local government activities more effectively

33) “Do you believe that some activities of local government could be done more effectively by another organisation? If so, then what parts and what organisations would you suggest?”
A total of 16 of the 30 respondents considered that a single statutory organisation might be necessary to undertake some of the activities of local government in the region. It was generally felt that this organisation could fulfil some roles of local government more effectively since its structure could give it more autonomy and independence from central bureaucratic procedures. Four municipal respondents seemed to favour a “Local Municipality Association” that would lead and monitor the tasks of the municipalities in the region. However, this Association would only succeed if the problems related to the duties and powers of local government and to the administrative controls imposed on the municipalities were addressed.

8.6.8 Expansion or reduction of local government activities

34) “Do you believe that local government should expand or reduce some of its present activities in the region?”

Twelve respondents supported the expansion of local government activities in the region, and fourteen favoured a reduction. Respondents favouring expansion were careful to specify how the municipalities should execute their enlarged duties. Two NPS representatives who did not directly support the expansion of local government activities still considered that the municipalities needed to be more resilient against the political pressure and other influences being exerted, in particular by the private sector, and including Betuyab. One respondent suggested that the municipal staff lacked awareness of the relevant legislation, arguing that they needed to study this legislation and to initiate co-operative relations with national and other local institutions so that scarce resources can be combined to generate improved benefits. It was also contended that the municipalities should look for long-term benefits and should be more careful when awarding construction licences.

By contrast, five respondents in national organisations argued that municipal authority should not be expanded, rather it needed to be reviewed. These respondents were particularly dissatisfied with the qualities of mayors, suggesting that a similar approach followed in presidential elections should be adopted in the nomination and election of mayors. These respondents believed that the municipalities had all necessary resources, but that they had weakened themselves as a result of the mismanagement of resources. The Betuyab representatives put forward similar arguments and considered that the problems meant
authority over construction planning should be taken on by the Ministry of Tourism rather than by the municipalities. One Betuyab member depicted the municipal authority over construction activity as the biggest weapon of the municipalities, and he suggested that: “what has to be done is that...the list of tasks assigned to municipalities should be reduced down to four or five. They should be directed so that they are only responsible for garbage collection, street cleaning, the maintenance of roads, etc...they should be watched over closely”.

8.6.9 Proposed changes in the tasks of local government

35) “What specific changes would you like to see in their tasks? Why do you think those changes are needed?”

As many as nine respondents supported the view that powers over construction planning should be taken from the municipalities and handed over perhaps to the governor. It was stated that this was needed in order to prevent patron-client relations and other sources of corruption. They considered that construction plans needed to be carried out in a more disciplined manner and the authority should not be given to small municipalities, as they can easily be manipulated by powerful local elites. According to four local respondents, the problem with local government was that it had little scope to raise sufficient revenue to meet their responsibilities relating to tourism development in the region. It appears that local government budgets are often exhausted once their primary duties were met for education, infrastructure, and public health. These respondents argued that local government should be given greater flexibility in raising revenue, which may be changed depending on the circumstances.

8.6.10 The responsibilities of provincial government

36) “What tasks to implement the BMP do you believe should be the prime responsibility of provincial government, if any?”

Responses to Question 36 suggested that provincial government should have prime responsibility for the tasks of monitoring, co-ordination, enforcement of laws, public safety, health, education, the generation and distribution of revenues, and of controlling the
municipalities.

8.6.11 Provincial government effectiveness

37) "Do you believe that currently the provincial government carries out its tasks effectively in relation to the implementation of the BMP?"

It is notable that none of the respondents from the local associations, private sector or the municipalities considered that the provincial government was effective. By contrast, respondents from the national and provincial government did consider that the provincial government was effectively carrying out its responsibilities. The two NPS representatives argued that Antalya provincial government acted in a very undisciplined way, and the policies they pursued had paved the way for a proliferation of second homes in the area. They also claimed that this institution was rather remote from local people with no ordinary citizens appearing to visit provincial government officials unless there was litigation. The locals depicted the provincial government as the watchdog of central government, being seen as the extension of central government. As noted in chapter six, it is apparent that the provincial government and villages have lost many of their duties and responsibilities for local services over recent years. The majority of the public services under the jurisdiction of these units have gradually been transferred to central government. As a result, these local government units were depicted as merely "empty shells".

There was often ambiguity about the jurisdiction and duties of local government, including that of provincial government, and for some services it was not unusual that there was duplication with central government. It was argued that the most complex patterns of authority and responsibility related to those of the provincial government, as they had many of the same responsibilities as those given to provincial units of central government. Additionally, it appears that the provincial government has become an institution whose responsibilities increased or decreased according to the political party in power and to the change in governor. The large size of the province was also considered as a factor that limited their effectiveness in the region. Table 8.6.4 summarises the causes of ineffectiveness that were mentioned by the stakeholders.
Table 8.6.4 Perceived causes of the ineffectiveness of the provincial government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Perceived cause of ineffectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Betuyab</td>
<td>Large size of the province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited resources available to provincial government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ambiguous division of authority and of responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People bypass the provincial government in matters concerning tourism in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities</td>
<td>The personal capabilities of the governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Excessive central control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interference by other national organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>Frequent changes of governors and related changes in provincial projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial dependence on central funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People bypass the provincial government in matters concerning tourism in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The personal capabilities of the governor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The perceived causes of the ineffectiveness of provincial government share some similarities with those of municipal government. One ex-Mayor considered that the most important causes included the attitude and commitment of the governor, centralised control and orders from central government superseding provincial decisions. Another factor was thought to be that local government organisations and people often bypass the provincial government and try to seek solutions in the capital. Many respondents agreed that the central government controls on provincial government were as tight as those imposed on the municipalities. One local association member, who supported local government having more powers, conceded that the central controls made “the governor extremely impotent...his decisions are likely to be superseded by a higher authority at the centre because of the political favouritism in decisions”.

8.6.12 Potential changes in the political, economic and legal systems and procedures and their effects on organisational relations

38) “Would the relationship between your organisation and other local and national organisations be improved if current political, economic
When asked this question, the respondents identified several changes in relations in the system and procedures that they believed would improve their relationships with other organisations. These changes ranged from alterations in the current legislative system to the termination of political games and arbitrary decision-making in relation to the region's planning. Seven respondents felt that the centralist system was creating difficulties, and it was suggested that: “politics and public sector management need to be de-coupled”. A local association representative, who considered that many difficulties experienced in inter-organisational relations were caused by the centralist system, explained that “bureaucrats are extremely reluctant to devolve their power, and none of them would completely agree with the idea of devolving power …Article 127 emphasizes that central government is bestowed with controlling authority over local government and this authority should have been used in a positive manner to facilitate and guide local development issues. However, what we see today is that this authority has become one of the biggest barriers in the way of the work and services that have to be implemented locally”. This respondent felt that determination of local budgets by central government should be abandoned and local government should be allowed to collect their own financial resources. It was felt that this would lead to enhanced accountability for local government and central government, as the public would know who collected and spent the tax revenues. Five local government respondents also agreed that the administrative controls imposed by central government over local government should be carefully reviewed, suggesting that they should be reduced so that local government could raise revenue and provide better services to the public.

The views of the Betuyab representatives were rather different. They wanted more strategic planning for the tourism sector and for this to be administered by one organisation only, and also felt that incentive schemes needed to be revised and more appealing incentives needed to be introduced to help the economy prosper. The Betuyab respondents even suggested that there was a need to abolish the municipalities in tourist areas. Five respondents considered that the practice of central government control over local government should be stopped, or at least decreased, and local government should be strengthened to enable it to make decisions through its own committees. Three local association respondents suggested that there needed to be changes in the management structure of local government as it was
ineffective in distributing resources, slow to make decisions, coercive, and non-participatory. One respondent felt that such a restructuring of local government was only part of the solution as central government structures also needed reform.

As many as nine respondents, representing Betuyab, the NPS, provincial and national governments, and local people, thought that the legal frameworks were appropriately conceived, and that the problems largely arose from the partial application of the law. For example, an NPS member explained that “when you review the relevant legislation, their excellent logic and thoroughness will amaze you. The nature and content of the legislation does not lie at the root of the problem...the problem is its misapplication by the enforcers”. She claimed that if everything was pursued in accordance with the legislation, there would not be any environmental problems in the coastal zones. A similar view was expressed by a provincial government official, who agreed that “you can find solutions within the legislation; however, it is not being effectively implemented. For example, the law states explicitly that sand mining is an illegal activity and there are sanctions for use against the people violating the law...but people make up many excuses to get around the legislation”. A local respondent and the members of Betuyab also shared this view, and they argued that there was no need to change the law. By contrast, other respondents did support revision in the current legislation, partly because it dated back to the early 1980s when different conditions prevailed.

8.6.13 Summary

This section has examined the roles and activities of organisations involved in the BMP. It seems that many interviewees were dissatisfied with the way in which authority and responsibility were divided between central and local government. The interviewees made frequent suggestions about the benefits of reductions in the authority of central or local organisations and there is evidence of dissent in the domain among central institutions, between central and local organisations, and also between local organisations. It was argued in the literature (see chapter three) that inter-organisational relations are affected by the extent of domain consensus (i.e., the degree of agreement between organisations regarding their appropriate roles and activities). The findings of this study provide strong support for this contention. In response to Question 28, the local representatives accused the central government of being interventionist and acting merely in relation to their own political and economic concerns. The central institutions were also accused of trumpeting visitor numbers
as an indication of success and overlooking the real cost of tourism for the area. Based on the interviews, it would be naive to think that it would be easy to build effective inter-organisational relations under circumstances where each organisation viewed itself as more important than the others, and also disparaged the work undertaken by the others.

Responses to Questions 28-36 suggest that the stakeholders were dissatisfied with the current division of power, as it was not distributed evenly among the central and local organisations and there was considerable monopoly of power where one party dominated others. While local government had been required to carry out certain tourism-related tasks, Betuyab appears to have concentrated the power to do this, largely through its own organisational resources, its network of personal connections in Ankara, and its unofficial transference of power from the Ministry of Tourism, in the name of decentralisation. The fact that Betuyab has more organisational resources than many other organisations involved in the BMP, might help to explain why they were happy for the Ministry of Tourism to have a stronger role. This transference of powers from the Ministry to Betuyab was assumed to be illegal by the local representatives, as it is not based on a legal framework. Many local stakeholders claimed that the local government was powerless in the context of this informal arrangement and that they were dissatisfied with the way in which Betuyab exercised its power. That one organisation, in this case Betuyab, held so much authority and had an orientation that differed from that of the other local organisations and voluntary sector was likely to have had important implications for the nature and the extent of inter-organisational relations (Benson 1975). It is relevant to note Pearce’s (1998) suggestion that it is usual for organisations to search for an adequate supply of authority and money from the political system in order to maintain their domain and defend their way of doing things.

The respondents were critical about the effectiveness of provincial government and local government, and the respondents provided many explanations for their view. It was suggested that the administrative incapacity of both provincial and local government was influenced by such problems as a high staff turnover (including of the governor), the centralised interventions and control, the multiple responsibilities, and the lack of financial and human resources. Other factors mentioned as influencing their administrative effectiveness were political pressure, nepotism, favouritism, and clientelism. When asked about what should be changed to improve relationships between the organisations, the
respondents made a number of suggestions. While some concentrated on changes to the current legislation, others argued that the legislation was appropriate, but there were problems in relation to its implementation. The next section examines whether changes in the form of administration could address the problems of centralised tourism planning and management in this developing country.
Section 7. Delegation of Power

8.7.1 Introduction

It was argued in chapter two that the long-term success of tourism increasingly relies on the effectiveness and efficiency of the administrative framework within which it operates. Two alternative administrative models were identified in the literature and were studied in depth in chapter five. The first model, Centralised Tourism Administration (CTA), assumes that a central steering agency has at its disposal the necessary information about existing public problems and preferences and about the available resources and solutions (Kickert et al. 1997). The CTA is generally adopted by developing countries where there is no system allowing decisions to be taken by the people most immediately affected by them, with tourism usually considered to be an industry of national concern which should be centrally planned and controlled (Wahap 1997). This administrative form of tourism management has certain advantages, but also limitations, and there are numerous cases of tourism plans formulated at the top and implemented by people at the bottom that have not achieved the desired outcomes. One explanation for this is that centrally formulated plans may be out of touch with local people's needs and may lack a detailed knowledge of the local environment.

The second model, Decentralised Tourism Administration (DTA), involves the transfer of power from central agencies to local government and it takes the interests of local actors as its point of departure. It is argued that “when implemented properly”, decentralisation could offer greater efficiency and effectiveness in various areas (Turner and Hulme 1997). Decentralisation plans can be tailor-made for local areas using detailed, up-to-date information which is only available locally, and inter-organisational co-ordination can be achieved more effectively at the local level. Experimentation and innovation can also be fostered, which can increase the chances of establishing more effective development strategies (see chapter five). Decentralisation may also help enhance the motivation of field level personnel, as they will have greater responsibility for the programmes they manage. It is argued in the literature that a reduction in the workload of central government will relieve
them from routine decision-making and give them more time to consider strategic issues so that the quality of policy should improve.

The discussion now examines the views of respondents as to whether administrative frameworks based on decentralisation might enhance local-level tourism management in the Belek region. Based on different forms of decentralisation reviewed in chapter five, the analysis considers stakeholder opinions as to:

- Whether passing planning authority in relation to tourism in Belek to the municipalities (devolution), provincial units of central government (deconcentration), non-government organisations (delegation) or an independent body set up jointly by the relevant national and local organisations will enhance tourism management in the area.
- Whether retaining this authority within central government would produce better results in terms of tourism planning in the country.

8.7.2 Transferring planning authority

39) “What would you think if central government passed the planning authority in relation to tourism in Belek to (1) the municipalities, (2) a non-government organisation such as Betuyab, (3) an independent agency set up jointly by the relevant national and local organisations?”

Responses to Question 39 suggested that stakeholders interviewed in this study had different preferences and they provided several explanations in support of their preference. Table 8.7.1 presents these stakeholder organisations and which organisation that they considered most appropriate for tourism planning in relation to Belek.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The type of models</th>
<th>Number of people who preferred the model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partnership model</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devolution</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deconcentration</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Quite a significant number of respondents – twelve - supported a partnership model that could be established through the involvement of representatives either from national and local government or else cross sectorally from the public and private sectors and NGOs. As many as ten of the 30 respondents favoured devolution - passing the planning authority to local government (see Table 8.7.2), whereas a moderate number of respondents – five - considered that a central government unit in the region should retain the planning authority - deconcentration. Only three of the 30 respondents agreed that delegation - leaving the entire planning authority to a private sector organisation - would be more beneficial. While stakeholders interviewed in this study differed in their preferences, they almost always shared the same opinion – that the planning authority should only be transferred gradually to any of these organisations after they meet certain conditions. Responses given to each of these models are evaluated in the subsequent sections.

Table 8.7.2 Who should have the planning authority?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation favoured for tourism management in Belek</th>
<th>Stakeholder organisation considering the suggested organisation appropriate</th>
<th>Stakeholder organisation considering the suggested organisation inappropriate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities</td>
<td>Nature Preservation Society (NPS)</td>
<td>Betuyab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Municipalities</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism (MoT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Municipal Association</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture (MoC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private organisation</td>
<td>Betuyab</td>
<td>MoT, MoC, MoE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Municipal Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provincial government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Provincial government</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Municipalities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Municipal Association</td>
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<td>Betuyab</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NPS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>MoT, MoC, MoE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central government</td>
<td>MoT, MoC, MoE</td>
<td>NPS</td>
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<td>Municipal Association</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Betuyab</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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8.7.2.1 Partnership

Quite a significant number of respondents -12 of the 30- considered that different tiers of government, both local and central, should usefully work together in a public sector partnership as this might be more beneficial than local or central government acting alone. These twelve respondents provided as many as six different explanations as to why an independent body, set up jointly by local and central government organisations, should undertake tourism management in Belek. The majority of these respondents thought that central government might bring feasible solutions on some occasions, whereas in other cases local government could suggest better solutions. These respondents felt that both national and local organisations have individual strengths, and they suggested that a dialogue between them could be promoted in order to encourage them to work together and muster their differential capabilities for a common goal. In the view of these respondents, both central and local government needed one another and they should abandon their present subversive activities.

Eight of the twelve respondents thought that the benefits of the tourism industry for the region could best be enhanced by the participation of all actors affected by, or whose activities affect tourism, suggesting that a suitable model would involve cross-sectoral working by the municipalities, provincial units, and the private sector. They suggested that a steering committee could be instituted, and that in setting this up the existing powers and influence of each organisation should be carefully balanced. A provincial government official, who agreed that a partnership would help to achieve healthy tourism development, argued rather unusually that the reason for the partial exclusion of local government from decisions about national development plans was not because central government did not want to share its power. He felt that most bureaucrats and politicians were aware that centralisation had frustrated the distribution of benefits to local people, and that a good number of them considered it politically expedient to strengthen local government and thereby reduce the inability of the centre to meet local needs effectively. He considered that the so-called reluctance of central government bureaucrats to share power with the local authorities was not the real problem. The main concern he expressed was that decentralisation is often politically motivated and poorly planned, and that the current form of decentralisation which is in use - deconcentration - had failed to provide sufficient resources to enable provincial government to meet local needs. Two Nature Preservation Society (NPS) representatives shared a similar
concern, and they felt that the current institutional and legal context meant that in practice it was doubted that a partnership model could work.

8.7.2.2 Municipalities

Responses to question 39 suggest that ten respondents favoured devolved form of decentralisation, in which the municipalities manage tourism. However, the same respondents expressed concerns about leaving tourism management in the hands of the municipalities. The NPS representatives favoured tourism management being left to local organisations, but they conceded that the municipalities in the Belek region may be less able to manage tourism adequately than the Ministry of Tourism (MoT), due partly to their newness as a municipality and their lack of experience. They suggested that one of the major limitations of the municipalities was staff incompetence: “they [the municipalities] do not have competent staff...it is questionable how much the decision-makers in the municipalities know about the planning prerequisites...whereas the MoT is a ministry that has mobilised the resources to create the most competitive exporting activity in the country over the past thirty years”. The second limitation that the NPS representatives identified was the arbitrariness of the municipal decision-making processes. Despite feeling that handing over tourism management completely to local administrators is much to be desired, one of these representatives conceded that this would bring about formidable difficulties. Her main concern was that local interests might be exaggerated and pursued at the expense of national interests, as the objective of local government would be to defend their own interests. Additionally, she noted that frequent changes in local government in Turkey generally might change the municipal objectives, and the new local government leaders might well simply replace the objectives and initiatives that were agreed by the previous leaders.

One private sector representative agreed that decentralisation would relieve central government of some of its duties and that this could pave the way for democracy to prosper more in the country. But he also claimed that the country was not ready for decentralisation. He considered that, while central authority had not yet been decentralised, the municipalities in the region still do largely as they wish, which he felt had caused unnecessary conflicts of interests. He suggested that municipalities operating within a tourism zone should have a different organisational and functional structure to municipalities elsewhere and that they should abide by the prescribed objectives of the relevant tourism plans. According to another
private sector representative, the majority of mayors lacked the capacity to understand the requirements of sustainable tourism development. The main complaint of this representative was that because the municipalities lacked financial resources they sought various ways of generating income for their activities, often at the expense of the environment: “on most occasions the municipalities concede to the illegal wishes of local people and there is a rampant practice of collecting donations from bars, shops or restaurant owners by issuing them with operating permits”. He was also concerned about the allegedly widespread partisanship and nepotism in municipal administration: “if a mayor from the True Path Party comes to power he replaces the staff to employ his own people. He lays off all partisans of the Republic Party recruited in the municipality by the former mayor”. A central government official, who was opposed to leaving tourism management to local government, argued that “when you transfer to them [the municipalities] the responsibility for controlling and using resources, this would be equal to throwing an atomic bomb in the region”.

By contrast, a respondent from the Union of Mediterranean Municipalities, who criticised central government, contended that “central government makes up some stories in order to mask their failure in the provision of services. They tend to put the blame on alleged corruption and nepotism supposedly rampant in the municipalities. This is hardly true…there is wide-spread corruption and nepotism in central government, and it is not in the municipalities”. According to this respondent, the municipalities are examined frequently by the Municipal Association, as well as by the local press and local people. He remarked that if nepotism was a culture throughout the administrative system, then it is not the problem of the municipalities alone. He suggested that local communities should compel the municipalities to be more transparent in order to eliminate the expansion of corruption, and he argued that more work was needed to improve public awareness of the issues. Another Municipal Association respondent agreed that local government was close to the area and was best placed to carry out services that were satisfactory. He agreed with the NPS representatives that when central government carried out local services they were often not provided according to local priorities, but priorities determined by central government. These three respondents were also unhappy about their geographical distance from Ankara, arguing that it was impossible to plan and steer all the tourist regions of Turkey from the capital. They felt that this led to wasted resources, as many plans had been destined to fail even before they were put into practice. While they believed that the municipalities should be authorised for tourism management,
they saw this as insufficient on its own. Their main concern with specific reference to Antalya region was the multiplicity of existing municipalities and the potential conflicts of interests between them: “there are more than sixty municipalities in Antalya province. If you let each of them manage and develop tourism on their own, then you will end up with chaotic development”.

The Betuyab representatives concluded that transference of administrative powers for tourism management and development to the municipalities would be like “playing with fire”. One of them explained that “…sometimes actions speak louder than the words. Look at their current practices. Would you make such a transference of administrative power to local government? I doubt it. I am very fanatical about the total removal of the municipalities from this administration. As long as they are not empowered, I can put up with an administrative model that is under the complete dominion of central government”. A Ministry of Tourism official, who accused the local administrators of being extremely greedy, explained further that in an ideal world the best thing to do would be to decentralise all the authority and responsibility since this would allow for the gradual downsizing of central government, bring more local autonomy, and force administrators to become more responsible and accountable. However, he added that “what we have seen after planning authority for construction was devolved to local government is very frightening”. This respondent was concerned about the authority related to construction resting with the municipalities as the mayors lack planning knowledge, and they seek to gain greater rent by expropriating land for construction. He gave the following example in support of his concern: “the construction of three or more storey buildings is generally prohibited [by law] in areas where the ground is unsuitable…[the mayors], disregarding this fact, issued permits for buildings with five or six storeys…Why? Because each additional storey means extra rent…there is nothing that these greedy people [the mayors] would not do to gain extra money”. Another government official mentioned the inadequate number of qualified staff working in the municipalities, explaining that “…you would be giving the planning authority to municipalities. However, there are no staff equipped with the required qualifications and skills to undertake such a huge and sensitive task as planning. They [the municipalities] do not employ a city planner, landscape designer, environmental engineer, etc. The mayor, a graduate of a primary school, is a literate individual who could only do mathematics...he was in agriculture but nothing else during his entire life....and you are telling him that he is the authority for planning in a location neighbouring
the most important tourism centre in Turkey [Belek]. Is this sensible? He will certainly enjoy this authority and gain as much as possible until the next elections by permitting illegal buildings”.

8.7.2.3 Private sector

As many as eight of the 30 respondents from the national and local organisations were against leaving the entire authority for tourism management to the private sector. The usual explanation related to the risk that the private sector would prioritise maximising their profit levels rather than considering the general public benefit. Three provincial government respondents suggested that leaving planning authority to a private sector organisation might be a viable option, but they also agreed that it was not free of shortcomings. According to one district government official, the Betuyab model constitutes one of the best examples in the region; however, “because of its structure, which does not involve local people, there is a kind of distrust toward this organisation in the region”.

By contrast, two Betuyab representatives thought that the private sector alone was a suitable option as this sector has some superior characteristics compared with the other national and local institutions. In their opinion, “the private sector is not as clumsy as the central administration. It is capable of thinking and moving more quickly as a result of their management techniques and accrued business experience... in comparison with some organisations in the central administration. The private sector is always face to face with emerging problems ...[and]it has the capacity to produce solutions and mobilise resources faster than central government”. These Betuyab representatives considered that an administrative re-arrangement of this kind would benefit the region, although they thought that the private sector managers should be qualified people, who are highly experienced in management techniques, observant, and not detached from the real world. They also suggested that if the private sector concentrated only on issues in the tourism centre, but ignored the issues beyond the borders, then this management would fail.

8.7.3 Retention of planning authority by central government

40) “What would you think if central government retained its planning authority in relation to Belek?”
Question 40 divided the respondents into two different groups. The NPS representatives, four local government officials, two municipal association members, villagers, and two academicians were against the complete retention of planning authority by central government; whereas five central government officials preferred the central government retaining this authority. Several respondents against central government planning authority argued that plans drawn up by central government tended not to match the local realities and priorities.

The explanations provided by respondents who were against central planning control are similar to arguments discussed in the academic literature. Some of the respondents complained about the implications of distant bureaucracy. As discussed in the literature: "if bureaucracies are too large or too distant from the people affected by decisions then people become alienated" (Barry 1965: 56 in Stoker 1996). The responses of the interviewees reflected local concern about lack of access to decision-making, a breakdown in the flow of communication, and alienation from participation. As discussed in the literature, this may impair the legitimacy of the resulting policy decisions (Almond and Powel 1966; Barry 1965). Similar problems were found in other research by Tosun and Jenkins (1996: 527) on Turkey: "the Ministry of Tourism and bodies responsible for the authorisation of tourism investment and incentives are accessible to a rich and educated elite and not to the majority of indigenous people in tourist regions. In this sense, there is a big communication gap between communities and decision-makers. In short centralisation has intensified formidable bureaucracies. Even the physical distance from Ankara is a barrier for people who may not be able to afford to go to the capital city". The respondents in this Belek study were often concerned that the central officials lacked sufficient local information, and many felt that local organisations are better placed to understand local needs and wishes and to find appropriate solutions to local problems.

Two of the municipal association representatives felt that the problems concerning tourism planning could not be resolved through a centralist form of administration. According to these respondents, the central government should only undertake advisory and guiding roles, rather than exerting more restrictive controls over local government. Perhaps more surprisingly, one of the ex-Mayors thought that if planning authority were left entirely to the
municipalities, then environmental devastation might ensue, claiming instead that central
government control was essential. He argued that “although I am for strengthening the power
and finances of the municipalities, I still want to see the control of central government or
another independent inspection unit over local government in order to prevent any
misuse... Without the constructive intervention of central government, I do not think that it
will be sensible to authorise a single organisation to be responsible for the management of the
region... we are human beings, and if not controlled, we might be tempted to use resources to
our own advantage”.

While the Betuyab representatives appeared to prefer central government retaining
planning authority, they also had reservations. On the one hand, they considered that the
involvement of the state in planning administration would foster trust and confidence among
local people. In their view, local people would then know that the private sector was
conducting things in line with the state’s close monitoring and it was not exploiting local
resources solely for their own benefit. On the other hand, these respondents also noted that
there were problems associated with centralist management: “with the interference of central
government in tourism planning decisions, the development will either be stalled or continue
in a piecemeal fashion”. This problem he attributed to the frequent changes in the party in
government: “changes in the central government bring about frequent changes in the context
of the policies pursued in the country. With a change of the director the whole perspective of
an organisation changes, and thus the administration becomes more or less authoritative, or
bureaucratic, or manipulative or laissez-faire... all of these alterations do have an impact on
the management practices”.

A local government respondent felt that plans drawn up by central government were
generally associated with acute bureaucracy so that actions were very difficult. She expressed
concern that the central planning authorities were sometimes detached from the real world,
arguing that their powers should be carefully restricted and their freedom of action should be
subject to defined constraints. Similarly, one of the Betuyab representatives suggested that
central institutions should not view themselves as the prime actor, rather their task should be
to act in such a manner that initiatives broadly conform with the pattern they propose: “they
should remember that it is not the central planner who implements the plan, but individuals
and organisations drawn into it in various ways”.

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8.7.4 Summary

This section has examined the respondents' views as to whether administrative frameworks based on decentralisation might help to enhance the local level management of tourism in the Belek region. The concept of decentralised management has attracted growing support from researchers as it is thought to offset the problems of centralised tourism management. While tourism authorities are advised to switch to relatively decentralised forms of administration, no research has attempted to ascertain in any depth whether this form of administration is likely to be more viable and applicable given the prevailing constitutional and institutional contexts of centralist countries. At present, there is inadequate understanding of whether decentralised forms are likely to be more or less effective in handling the complex interactions between parties with differing perceptions, preferences and strategies, especially in developing nations. The responses to Questions 39 and 40 indicate that in the Belek context any administrative model involving the delegation of power to a single level of organisation might suffer from major limitations. The main reservation of the present stakeholders was that a new concentration of control might lead to an expansion of favouritism, which was allegedly already widespread in the administrative system. Local respondents in particular felt that local officials were more informed about local problems, and better able to mobilise local resources. By contrast, the central government officials usually feared that handing over power to local organisations would have adverse consequences, including uncoordinated developments between regions. Another concern of central officials was the continuity of projects, arguing that mayors might not resume the projects commenced by their predecessors, particularly if they were initiated by an opposing party.

Thus the current administrative customs, such as of corruption, bureaucracy, and clientelism, were identified as obstacles to the success of decentralisation in the country. Despite the feeling that decentralisation is favourable, the responses indicated that in Belek it risked arbitrary decision-making. One NPS representative contended that “if you hand over planning authority to a single organisation, whether it is central or local, this authority may be misused for organisational or individual gain”. Several other respondents from the national organisations felt that, while decentralisation is debated, the human infrastructure of the country is not ready yet for this process. One of them explained that “there are more than 5,400 municipalities across the country. This means that these municipalities would have to
recruit 5,400 city planners. There are however only 2,500 city planner graduates in the
country". In sum, it appears that the different forms of potential decentralisation in Belek all
involve limitations, and that these forms may or may not be effective in overcoming the
structural and behavioural obstacles identified by the stakeholders.
9. Conclusions and Research Implications

9.1 Introduction and study objectives

There has been some previous research to identify and understand elements of the environment which influence the structure and behaviour of tourist organisations, as well as the relations and communication networks among them, their interdependencies, their strategic perspectives, and their problem-solving capacities (Pearce 1992). The need to analyse the form of interaction (co-ordination, co-operation, competition and conflict) between institutions and stakeholders in order to ensure successful outcomes from such activities has also recently been established (Jamal and Getz 1995). However, only a few studies within the current tourism planning literature have assessed the barriers to inter-organisational relations (Selin and Beason 1991). Clearly a more substantial and systematic study of tourist organisations in an interactive framework is needed (Pearce 1992). Drawing on a conceptual framework which takes account of the wider features of the planning environment, this study examined the nature and extent of inter-organisational relationships between different management tiers, their effects on tourism administration, and their implications for local tourism development and planning.

Tourism planning involves relations between multiple organisations, including central and local government, NGOs, the private sector, the community and so on. Understanding the balance of power in the formulation and implementation of policies between tourist organisations at national and local levels, and how this balance in relations affects the practice of local level tourism planning are key issues. However, there has been comparatively little research on interorganisational relations between national, provincial and local levels in the tourism literature. Previous research on central-local relations in tourism is generally descriptive and simply outlines the nature and role of tourism organisations without much analysis of how they work to accomplish objectives that require collective action (Pearce 1992). To date the extent to which the balance in relations between central and local levels can affect the formulation of local level tourism development plans and their implementation has not been examined in any depth. Relationships between central and local organisations and the context within which they develop and operate can be
conceptualised as a multi-scale network linking national, provincial and local scales of operation and which is set within a broader socio-economic and political system. Thus, it is necessary to understand the elements of the tourism environment, the patterns of relations among interdependent parties involved in plan formulation and implementation, and the factors determining these relationships. This research addressed some of these gaps or lacunae in current tourism research. More specifically, it had the following four objectives:

1. To develop a conceptual framework in relation to inter-organisational relations in tourism planning, including between central and local government. Drawing on a review of related literature, this includes consideration of tourism planning issues in Belek, inter-organisational communication, stakeholder involvement and consensus building, resource sufficiency and exchange, inter-organisational co-ordination, the roles and activities of the organisations, and the delegation of power.

2. To apply the conceptual framework and key conceptual themes to the case study of Belek in Turkey, chosen as it is in a rapidly developing country with a centralised system of governance and as the area is subject to a major tourism development initiative.

3. To evaluate the patterns and process, and strengths and weaknesses of inter-organisational relations around tourism planning in Belek using the identified conceptual themes.

4. To evaluate the relations between central and local government levels in relation to tourism planning in Belek, to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the tourism administration system, and to examine views on the potential to change its character.

The research used a case study of one area, Belek, to identify inter-organisational relations, and notably central-local relations, within the highly centralised, fragmented and bureaucratic public administration and planning system in Turkey, where local government has limited power to use its own initiative for coastal development. The study considered how these problems influenced the structure and behaviour of tourism organisations in the Belek case, the relations between them in the communication network, their inter-dependencies, and their problem-solving
capacities in relation to formulating and implementing the Belek Coastal Management Plan (BMP). The study examined the centralised administrative system and the ambiguities in the sharing of power and responsibility among the organisations related to tourism planning at different government levels in the Belek case. It is intended this may assist other countries that have similar administrative structures, and also help them to restructure the relations among their different management tiers and to increase their problem-solving capacities by taking preventive actions.

This concluding chapter provides, first, a review of the conceptual framework and the related conceptual themes that were developed in this study. It is hoped that the framework and themes will be of value for other researchers. Hence, there is a consideration of the value of the conceptual framework and of the themes for other researchers and practitioners. Consideration is also given to the major findings of the study based on the application of the concepts to the Belek case study. Finally, the chapter examines some key implications of the study for researchers and practitioners in the field of inter-organisational relations, and notably those interested in central-local relations, around tourism planning. The study has relevance for studies of such relations in both developing countries and developed countries.

9.2 Conceptual framework and conceptual themes

The study developed a conceptual framework and a set of related conceptual themes and has applied them to understand the nature of inter-organisational relations in Belek. The framework and themes are intended to have value for other researchers in the field. Key aspects of both are now summarised.

The conceptual framework developed for this study identifies influences and processes affecting central-local government relations relevant to tourism. Drawing on concepts identified in the Literature Review chapters, this framework suggests that, in a tourism administrative context, consideration needs to be given to the character of the interactions between various actors in the system (patterns of interaction), the distribution of roles and duties between and within sub-systems, the extent of communication and co-ordination between the actors, the characteristics of the environmental context of the system and the related constraints, and the delegation or devolution of power (power distribution). Moreover, there needs to be an
understanding of the interdependency between the different actors in the system in which tourism operates.

In order to enhance understanding of central-local relations and of their relevance to tourism-oriented policies, this framework suggested that research identifies:

- The range of public, private and voluntary institutions involved in tourism management and in tourism plan formulation and implementation and also their overall and more specific aims and objectives.

- The extent to which different public, private and voluntary organisations influence tourism planning decisions at the local level (including the legal power to do so).

- The formal and informal rules and procedures that regulate the interactions between these institutions (notably the legislative framework and the “rules of the game”), and their effects on the power of these organisations.

- The extent of dependency between these institutions, notably between state and local level organisations, such as in relation to resource dependency.

- The forms of instruments (e.g., regulatory, financial, communicative, etc.,) used in managing relations between organisations, and their effects on the balance of power between those institutions.

- The overlapping responsibilities and autonomy of the institutions involved in tourism management and in the formulation and implementation of tourism plans.

- The extent of inter-organisational communication and the ways in which the organisations communicate with one another.

- The extent of conflict, if any, between organisations, the sources of this conflict, the ways in which conflicts are resolved, and the effects on power relations between organisations.

- The extent of resource exchange, if any, between organisations.

- And, the extent and effectiveness of co-ordination between the organisations.

Inter-organisational analysis has been a tool for understanding and restructuring relations among organisations in the real world. This form of analysis is concerned with networks of organisations, consisting of “a number of distinguishable
organisations engaged in a significant amount of interaction with each other” (Benson 1975 in Pearce 1992: 15). Scholars have examined interorganisational relations in many fields. However, there have been only a few attempts to explain this phenomenon in detail from a tourism planning point of view. Previous researchers have generally focused on tourism planning and development issues and on tourism impact assessments. Tourism administration systems and their impact on tourism plan formulation and implementation processes have received inadequate attention (Pearce 1992; Selin and Beason 1991). Most research is concentrated on a single spatial scale but not on interorganisational relations at multi-level scales. However, successful tourism development requires the different activities of organisations at different scales to be closely matched and co-ordinated (Pearce 1992). While dyadic relationships between only two organisations have been examined in the literature (Selin and Beason 1991), a network level of analysis is much less usual. There is a need for studies examining the nature and direction of the interactions occurring among organisations (national, provincial, local) in the network, and also of which functions are most appropriately undertaken at what scale and by which organisation (Pearce 1992).

The research used a case study of one area in Turkey in order to identify and assess the patterns and processes of relations between central and local government tourism-related organisations, as well as between the public and private sectors and NGOs, in the context of tourism management. These relations were examined in relation to the formulation and implementation of a tourism development plan. A conceptual framework was developed specifically in order to fulfil this research objective. The framework was devised to analyse the nature and extent of the relationships between the public and private sectors and NGOs, their implications for the formulation and implementation of the Belek development plan, and to provide a better understanding of the elements of the tourism environment and of the relations among the parties involved in the plan. In the following discussion of the conceptual framework, the terms depicted in the summary in Figure 9.1 are shown in italics.

The conceptual framework put emphasis on the roles of the public and private sectors as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in tourism planning and development, on the nature and extent of the interdependencies and interactions
among the various parties, and on the social, economic, technological and political environment within which they operate (Hall 1994; Burkart and Medlik 1981; Lickorish et al 1991; Sharpe 1970) (Figure 9.1). Attention was given to the relationships between public and private sector organisations and NGOs, and also to the links between organisations at different scales, notably, the national, provincial and local scales (Pearce 1992). The framework recognised that central government, particularly in developing countries, has critical functions to fulfil in terms of coordination, planning, legislation, entrepreneur regulation, and the stimulation of tourism development (Jenkins and Henry 1982; Mill and Morrison 1985). “Problems arise and costs are increased when the different sectors do not develop harmoniously or when the motives and capabilities of different development agents conflict... uncontrolled growth of tourism can destroy the very source base on which it was built” (Pearce 1992: 12).

This framework reproduced again in Figure 9.1 drew on and integrated existing research literature on public administration, decentralisation, systems, inter-organisational relations and network theories, and on the concepts of resource exchange and power-resource dependency (see chapters 2 to 5 for more details). Within the literature, four main types of influence can be identified which affect centre-local relations in tourism planning and management, including the formulation and implementation of local tourism development plans. These are: the environmental context, the administrative structures, the geographical scale of the administrative structures, and the nature of the inter-organisational interactions. In the framework each of these influences was broken down into related elements which can affect central-local relations in tourism planning and management (Figure 9.1).

This model takes into consideration the role of the external environment and existing networks between organisations, and it adopts a domain level focus, which includes, "the set of actors (individuals, groups, and/or organisations) that become joined by a common problem or interest" (Gray 1989: 912). It proposes that tourism organisations at the same or different spatial scales operate in a dynamic environment, composed of micro, task and macro environment sets. It should be noted that each environment set has its own elements and there are reciprocal relations between the elements within each environment set, as well as between environment sets. Hence,
these sets are not necessarily separate entities and they will exert more or less force on one another.

The arrows in Figure 9.1 emphasise this dynamic and cyclical nature of relations between the three sets of environments. As discussed in chapter 3 section 3.3, different forms of inter-organisational relations, such as co-operation, co-ordination, competition or conflict, begin in the context of broader social, economic, political or technological forces that cause a relationship to be initiated (Selin and Chavez, 1995). The nature of these relationships is also determined and shaped by the absence or existence of microenvironment elements. The arrows in Figure 9.1 indicate that an organisation's proclivity to enter into a co-operative relation with another organisation will be heightened when the resources necessary to meet its organisational objectives are scarce. Similarly, high levels of competitive uncertainty will force organisations to enter into collective arrangements (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976). When there is no respect of one another's identities (inter-organisational evaluation), or there is insufficient information and consultation (communication network), the organisations are unlikely to form co-operative relations. Drawing on propositions reviewed in chapter 3 section 3.5, the model noted that organisations may know one another through working together on other projects in the past (existing network) or they might not have worked together previously (new network). Hence, the organisation's experiences with the same, similar or other organisations in the past may play an important role in inter-organisational relations.

The framework was based on the premise that relationships between organisations should not be conceptualised along one dimension alone. Interorganisational relationships in tourism planning and implementation involve relations between central and local government, NGOs, the community and the private sector. As the arrows in Figure 9.1 illustrate, the linkages are multiple, and arise in particular from the possession by each organisation of certain resources and powers.
Figure 9.1 Influences and processes involved in inter-organisational relations in tourism planning and management

Macro environment
- Social trends
  - Constitutional arrangements
    - Institutional arrangements
      - Economic trends
        - Power and resource arrangements
          - Technological trends

Task environment
- Political trends
  - Economic trends
    - Constitutional arrangements
      - Institutional arrangements

Private sector organisations
- NGOs
  - Local people
    - Central government
      - Provincial government

Microenvironment
- Interests and objectives
  - Communication networks
    - Power and resource exchange and dependency
      - Rights, duties, values, and perceptions

Nature of interorganisational relations
- Co-operative
  - Domain consensus
    - Work co-ordination
      - Ideological consensus
        - Interorganisational evaluation
These resources and powers may be, for instance, constitutional, legal, financial, professional, informational and administrative (Jones 1980; Rhodes 1981). In other words, each organisation is interdependent and operates under the condition of partial autonomy (Gamm 1981). In other words, no organisation alone can perform its functions or tasks without at some time requiring resources controlled by other organisations or actions taken by them. Consequently, organisations within the system are likely to attempt to gain the necessary resources, and to do so they will employ various strategies.

The framework provides a means to evaluate how tourism management and tourism plan development and implementation depend on the nature of the interactions (e.g., conflictual, competitive, and co-operative) between organisations at national, provincial and local levels. The framework recognises that inter-organisational relationships take place in contexts where some organisations will be co-operating with each other for mutual benefit, while others are competing for the same political, financial and informational resources or locus of power. As discussed in chapter 3 section 3.5, integral to the framework is the contention that peaceful and harmonious interactions based on mutual agreement are only viable where each organisation respects the rights of all the others, and where viable institutions exist which embody and enforce the rules which allow them to exchange scarce resources on a secure and equitable basis.

The framework helps to evaluate how these organisations relate to their surrounding environment. As reviewed in chapter 3 section 3.3, it assumes that the nature of these inter-organisational interactions is likely to be influenced by the structural dimensions of the environment, including the degree of resource concentration or dispersal, the concentration or diffusion of power, and extent of autonomy or mutual dependence (Benson 1975). In this environment the external regulations may take the form of either enacted laws, rules, or procedures or of the attitudes and values of the organisations, and these then shape the nature of the inter-organisational relationships (Dawson 1986). The political culture of the country, the general economic conditions, as well as broader government policies are also likely to influence the plan outcomes by laying the foundation for inter-organisational
relations, including the communication networks, between the different levels of
government agencies. They also affect the organisational interdependencies, their
strategic perspectives, and their problem solving capacities (Klijn 1997; Pearce 1992).
This framework sees institutions as integrated within sets of rules that structure social
interactions in particular ways, based on the knowledge shared by the members of the
relevant community or society (Brett 2000). In other words, institutions both are
affected by and affect the norms, rules, habits, customs and routines, both formal and
informal, which govern the society at large. They influence the function, structure
and behaviour of organisations and groups of individuals bound by some common
purpose and who come together to achieve joint objectives (Brett 2000).

The framework helps to assess the character of centralist approaches to
government where a few central actors develop and apply policy proposals on their
own, and of localist approaches where local capacities and suggestions are much more
prominent. The framework recognises that collective action by actors at all
geographical scales can play a central part in tourism policy-making and
implementation. Certain rules and procedures tend to regulate the processes of
exchange between organisations (Laughlin 1996; O’Toole, 1997). For example, the
legal and institutional framework strongly influences the allocation of financial
resources, determines the duty to provide access to information, and is an important
determinant of the hierarchical character of relationships in the organisational
network. An analysis of inter-organisational relations needs to be placed in the
context of this institutional framework in order to understand its effects on system
outcomes.

The model is intended to provide a framework for researchers and
practitioners to critically interpret inter-organisational relations, and notably central-
local relations, for tourism planning. Thus, the research potentially has great value for
tourism researchers and practitioners examining such relations in tourism and related
disciplines. The model might have particular relevance in tourist destinations within
other developing countries.

In essence, the conceptual framework developed for this study identified the
influences and processes affecting inter-organisational relations, notably central-local
government relations relevant to tourism. Drawing on the concepts identified in the Literature Review chapters, this framework suggests that, in a tourism administrative context, consideration needs to be given to the character of the interactions between various actors in the system (patterns of interaction), the distribution of roles and duties between and within sub-systems, the extent of communication and co-ordination between the actors, the characteristics of the environmental context of the system and the related constraints, and the delegation or devolution of power (power distribution). Moreover, there needs to be an understanding of the interdependency between the different actors in the system in which tourism operates. The model integrates inter-organisational relations around tourism planning in a multi-scale tourism development network, including those related to central-local interactions. The concepts in the conceptual framework and conceptual themes and the relations among the several levels have been examined in detail in this study.

A wide range of literature on tourism planning, inter-organisational relations, network management, co-ordination, co-operation, collaboration, public administration, and decentralisation was reviewed. The researcher established a question bank through the analysis of the preliminary interviews and the literature review (e.g., Benson et al 1972; Schmidt and Kochan 1977; Taner 1978; Costa 1996; Selin and Beason 1991; Selin and Chavez 1995; Selin and Myers 1994; Williams et al 1998). The construction of the conceptual framework helped the researcher to identify a small number of related conceptual themes that were then pursued in the related interview questions. As a result of this extensive search and theoretical development, the conceptual themes may be of value for other researchers and practitioners who want to do similar research within the tourism field (see Table 9.1).

Seven conceptual themes were determined and used to organize the questions in the interviews, these being: the planning issues in Belek, inter-organisational communication, stakeholder involvement and consensus building, resource sufficiency and exchange, inter-organisational co-ordination, the roles and activities of the organisations, and the delegation of power (Table 9.1).
Table 9.1 The conceptual themes derived from the conceptual framework and used to organise the questions in the interview schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning issues in Belek</th>
<th>Result section 8.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-organisational communication</td>
<td>Result section 8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder involvement and consensus building</td>
<td>Result section 8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource sufficiency and exchange</td>
<td>Result section 8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-organisational co-ordination</td>
<td>Result section 8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The roles and activities of the organisations</td>
<td>Result section 8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation of power</td>
<td>Result section 8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The conceptual themes provided many insights concerning inter-organisational relation in a multi-scale tourism development network, and notably those between central and local scales. The themes simplified the concepts in the more complex conceptual framework of elements related to inter-organisational relationships, and between different management tiers involved in tourism administration. In conclusion, the conceptual framework, the conceptual themes and the study findings may well have direct relevance for other researchers and practitioners interested in other tourist destinations in Turkey or in other developing countries. The next section considers in more detail the potential value of the study for other researchers and for practitioners.

9.2.1 The value of the conceptual framework and conceptual themes

This section highlights the contribution of this study to the development of an improved theoretical understanding of inter-organisational relations, and notably of central-local relations in tourism planning. There have been only limited attempts to examine inter-organisational relations in the tourism context - a gap in current academic knowledge that has been commented on by a number of tourism researchers (Costa, 1996; Hall and Jenkins, 1995; Pearce, 1992). The existing literature is largely descriptive and does not adequately problematise the character of relations between organisations and especially between organisations at different geographical scales. In addition, there has been only very limited critical consideration of the strengths and
This research relates to the pressing practical issues faced by governments throughout the world, but notably in developing countries with a long history of centralised public administration. This is the issue of how best to combine central with local policy-making. The findings of the study provided a detailed evaluation of relations between central and local government in Belek, and the approach and findings have clear implications for other countries, that have similar tourism administrative structures to those in Turkey. The research can lead to a greater understanding of centralised, decentralised and network-based tourism management, their merits, limitations and applicability in a developing country context.

While developed to examine the specific case of the Belek Management Plan, the conceptual framework and themes used in this study may have relevance to researchers examining similar tourism destinations. They integrate tourism planning and implementation with other organisational elements, including with the local, provincial and national contexts, and with the broader socio-economic, political and legislative situations. The framework and themes give provenance to issues of geographical scale and to the different functions of tourist organisations in the pursuit of their goals. The emphasis is on an improved understanding of the ways in which tourism planning and development processes are carried out (Costa 1996). They indicate that there is the need to pay more attention to the organisational framework in which planning is undertaken (the administrative component), since this strongly affects planning efficiency and effectiveness. There is also a need for governments to pay more attention to local level administration, since the success of planning activity and the profitability of the tourism industry will increasingly depend on the efficiency
and effectiveness of planning and co-ordinating attitudes delivered locally (the local component). Account also needs to be taken of the potential role of networks in the improvement of tourism planning and in the co-ordination of the tourism sector (the network component). Greater flexibility and responsiveness in the way tourism planning is applied may be encouraged through recognition of the areas of interdependency, the exchange of resources among agencies involved in decision-making processes, and of the elements that either facilitate or inhibit the building of effective inter-organisational relationships. These assessments can help both researchers and planners to read local circumstances accurately and to identify relevant stakeholder organisations and individuals, and their values, interests and relative power.

Although it is argued that the research is worthwhile for other researchers and practitioners in the tourism field, the wider applicability of the empirical side of the research to other destinations of Turkey or other countries may be slightly limited due to the specific role and status of the private and voluntary sector organisations in the Belek case study which may not be commonly found elsewhere. Notably, delegation of authority to a private sector organisation, that is to Betuyab, as a counterpart of central government is not a widespread approach to tourism development in other destinations in Turkey and perhaps also in other developing countries. Similarly, the strong role of a voluntary sector organisation, NPS, in the formulation of the BMP is also unusual for tourism development in the country. This is largely because the BMP was intended to be a demonstration project providing a new paradigm for other tourism destinations of Turkey and for other Mediterranean countries. However, it is important to remember that the circumstances in every case and in each country are unique. More typically, the Belek case study still reflects the issues found in a highly centralised system for tourism administration, with central government organisations having a key role in tourism development. Hence, the case study provides important potential lessons for tourism planners in Turkey and other developing countries, especially in relation to how they can more proactively manage stakeholder relationships to better promote cooperative planning and plan implementation.

9.3 Conceptual themes applied to Belek
The research applied the concepts developed from a conceptual framework to the study of inter-organisational relationships in tourism planning, and notably those between national and local levels, to the specific context of Belek, a rapidly expanding tourism resort in Antalya, Turkey. This was based on the case study approach, and it drew on both secondary and primary data (Yin 1993, Williams et al 1998). The primary data collection involved purposeful semi-structured interviews with relevant people, focusing on seven conceptual themes identified from the theoretical framework. A software programme (Nud.ist) was used to analyse the interviews that had been carried out with selected representatives from relevant organisations and other groups. By this means important insights were gained into the nature of central-local relations in a developing country context. However, the empirical findings from this case study are not necessarily transferable to other tourism or land use planning contexts. Rather, they should be taken as a foundation for more empirical testing elsewhere.

The seven conceptual themes used in the study were developed from the study's conceptual framework. These themes were planning issues in Belek, inter-organisational communication, stakeholder involvement and consensus building, resource sufficiency and exchange, inter-organisational co-ordination, the roles and activities of the organisations, and the delegation of power (Table 9.1). The discussion that follows reviews the major findings of the study in relation to these seven conceptual themes.

9.3.1 Planning issues in Belek (tourism planning and development)

The elements influencing the effective use of the Management Plan for tourism development in the Belek region included difficulties arising from the legislative, institutional, political and economic environment, and from a lack of civic consciousness and commitment, a lack of local resources, the rapid growth of second homes, and the inadequate local infrastructure. Based on the scope and scale of their influence, these variables were categorised into two major groups. The variables belonging to the immediate local environment constitute the "micro environment", and the variables associated with the larger environment are labelled the "macro environment". The macro environment is the level of the tourism system's external environment made up of variables that are broad in scope and often influence tourism
development through affecting its operating environment (Liu 1994). Local forces, on the other hand, consist of those elements or characteristics of an area that influence the process of development or determine the capability and capacity of the region to respond to development requirements. The existence of two different but interlocked environments suggests that a change in one of the environmental variables is likely to create reverberations affecting the functioning of others (Liu 1994; Elliot 1997). Planners thus have to be concerned with not only technical aspects of planning but also have to understand the content of, and envision changes in, elements of the broader environment, which may have direct or indirect effects on planning and development. The following paragraphs now present some of these major forces in more detail.

9.3.1.1 Constitutional and legislative framework (Macro environment)

The variables in Belek’s macro environment most frequently mentioned by respondents were the general characteristics of the legislative environment (e.g., appropriateness and adequacy of legislation, and the distribution of responsibility, resources, and power in relation to legislation). This corresponds with the findings of Selin (1998), who argues that implementation is fostered when the enabling laws and management systems assist in the formation and continuance of partnership agreements. Respondents in this study complained that at present the legislation was in quite a shambles, leading to too many conflictual relations among central and local organisations. Under Turkey’s present legislative framework, it was almost impossible to put plans into practice effectively, and it was in need of significant revision. In contrast, some stated that the current legislation was not to blame. In their view, the tourism legislation was appropriate and adequate, but the enforcers were not applying the laws appropriately. The custom of “getting round” the legislation was stated to be rife in the region. It was noted that legislation could not achieve much on its own, as the mentality of the individuals involved greatly influenced the enforcement of any law. Respondents complained that there were countless ways to get around the legislation in order to exploit the environment to the advantage of individuals.

9.3.1.2 Institutional framework (Macro environment)
Another frequently mentioned influential macro variable was the nature of the institutional environment (e.g., a multiplicity of institutions, institutional rivalry and intolerance, incompatible goals and organisational ideologies, conflicting interests and expectations, a low level of institutional commitment, and staff discontinuity).

Tourism programmes involve interactions between government agencies and quasi-government and private organisations. Information, goals and resources are exchanged in these interactions. Tourism programmes have little chance of success unless this institutional context is considered and arranged carefully. The findings for Belek indicate that the institutional arrangements had inhibited the plan implementation process. In the Belek case there were problems of competition for prestige among a number of central organisations. Many of these organisations had incompatible goals and institutional ideologies, conflicting expectations and varying degrees of commitment to tourism-related issues. A collective mentality in terms of sharing the responsibilities and resources among the central institutions was almost absent.

9.3.1.3 Political environment (Macro environment)

The other factor in the macro environment repeatedly mentioned as adversely influencing Belek’s tourism planning was the unstable political environment and the discontinuity of political support. The most frequently mentioned features of the political environment were the recurring shifts in the political arena and the uncertainty and instability that it created, the tutelage imposed by central government, and partisanship and favouritism. This is not a surprising finding. As decisions about tourism are taken in the context of a political system, then political cultures, structures and situations are likely to affect the ways in which tourism is organised and its development is controlled (deKadt 1979; Elliot 1997). This finding indicates that a shifting political climate may severely hamper implementation efforts by limiting the power of the parties to take the actions they desire. Thus one may argue that successful implementation requires political skills, both within the domain and with respect to the wider environment, to ensure that sufficient political support for the agreements can be sustained (Gray 1989). Political instability can be seen as a hygiene factor in that it may not necessarily promote tourism development but its absence would certainly considerably damage or hamper plan implementation. The frequent changes taking place in the political environment, characterised by short-
lived political parties coming to power, were among the variables destabilising political support, a necessary ingredient for the success of any tourism development. These changes both in central and local government would give birth to something of a political hiatus and re-ordering of priorities, and changes in personnel and policies in the region. Ministers and even officers have a habit of replacing personnel in their department when they are appointed to a new post. It was claimed that high personnel turnover rates decreased efficiency, continuity, and thus the effectiveness of the collective arrangement for tourism development in Belek.

**9.3.1.4 Micro environment**

Frequently mentioned local factors influencing effective application of the BMP were the level of local commitment, the availability of human capital and other local resources, and the extent to which there was a sense of ownership of the Plan. The level of local engagement in a community is often stated to have a strong effect on the success of such efforts: “Communities with strong civic engagement have residents that participate actively in the life and politics of the community and state-joining associations and publicly advocating for quality of life improvements. Conversely the residents of communities lacking a strong tradition of civic engagement tend to develop dependencies on the state or corporations to provide for them” (Selin 1998: 12). A so-called indifferent attitude among local people towards local decision-making had undermined the Plan's effectiveness in the region. Here the administrative tutelage practised by central government on local government in Turkey may have fostered a tradition or expectation of non-participation or pseudo-participation by local people in their own affairs (Tosun 2001).

**9.3.2 Inter-organisational communication**

Communication and information sharing are important issues in tourism planning and implementation. Communication provides a number of benefits to management (Davidson 1976; Francis 1987). Without the sharing of information, ambiguities can remain in the differences and similarities between organisations, and the aspects of their agendas and approaches which can be used as the starting point for co-ordination. If organisations have communicated very little or have not communicated, it is highly likely that they will have had very few grounds on which to build co-ordination (Gardner and Snipe 1970; Hooyman 1976; Torrens 1969). The
performance of organisations in any given setting can be severely hampered when the agencies know nothing about one another (Njoh 1993). Such ignorance may lead to the unnecessary duplication of functions as well as compound the problem of organisational uncertainty. It is therefore reasonable to expect that agencies that interact are in a better position to know one another, and hence to respond better to the needs of their clients and adapt to the larger environment within which they operate than those that do not (Njoh 1993). Several factors, however, may work against achieving effective communication between stakeholders involved in tourism plans.

**9.3.2.1 Barriers to effective communication**

Interorganisational communication during the formulation and implementation of the Belek Plan was hampered substantially by several structural and personal factors, shifting political interests, and by unfavourable perceptions that parties held about each other. Dissimilarity in values and attitudes between organisations (i.e., while one supports environmental protection, the other supports its utilisation); and prejudice toward the capability and credibility of particularly voluntary sector organisations, appeared to be among the main obstacles in the way of effective communication. An absence of common and complementary goals was stated to be an important barrier to interorganisational communication (Gray 1989; Schermerhorn 1975; Selin and Chavez 1994; Tjosvold 1988). In this study, individual relations, current legislation, and geographical distance were other significant variables determining the frequency of contact between organisations. This finding parallels observations made by Gray (1989). Physical proximity facilitates frequency of contact, and enhances the likelihood that there is some interdependence among stakeholders with respect to information resources. Geographic dispersion increases the cost of face-to-face communication, and introduces the possibility of cultural differences (institutional norms) that will make structuring more difficult (Gray 1989).

A number of external and internal factors, such as an adequate representation of interests, good working relationships and open communication may determine the success of inter-organisational relations (Selin and Myers 1998). The recognition by stakeholder groups that their actions are inextricably linked to the actions of other
stakeholders could be a critical basis for successful communication and co-operation (Gray 1989). Moreover, a perceived right and capacity to participate (legitimacy) in the formulation and implementation process might be among the factors determining the frequency of inter-organisational communication (Gray 1989). Historical relationships among stakeholders undoubtedly colour their perceptions of legitimacy. For example “government officials may not perceive citizens as having a 'legitimate voice' in a technical issue even though the citizens will have to live with whatever solution is adopted” (Gray 1989: 322). The legitimacy of organisations involved in the Belek planning process was an issue. In line with the theoretical arguments outlined, the respondents complained that no national and local institution was keen to be at the beck and call of another institution. Despite the fact that the fear of losing organisational prestige and strategic position may have very little to do with the competency and legitimacy of the other agency, some organisations remained reluctant to contact parties with a perceived lower status. The negative stereotypes about a number of organisations in the administrative system not only curtailed cooperation, but also increased the difficulty of correcting those stereotypes because information flows were severely restricted. This applied, for example, in the case of the Nature Preservation Society. Certain repercussions may flow from this. For instance, distrust may prevail when one party has had little contact with another organisation, and images have not had time to be modified. Central government officials relevant to the Belek area were critical of local officials. They held a stereotype that local government was inefficient, extravagant, and oppressive over their local inhabitants, while they felt that the centre, as the guardian of wider public interests, was more committed to stimulating efficiency, to eradicating waste and to protecting local inhabitants from local mal-administration. Central government treated local government as its extension and considered itself superior to local government, which meant that the local government officials were alienated and did not share information with the centre. These specific problems are also evident in the literature. For instance, Gray (1989) cites the study of Gricar (1981) in which local officials were found to be sceptical about the ability of some stakeholders, and hence they questioned the need to include citizens at all.

Lack of a common language might have given rise to communication problems. The involvement of junior staff representing key institutions but who
lacked the required power in decision-making emerged as another factor that considerably slowed inter-organisational communication. Gray (1989) noted a similar problem. Individuals participating in a collaborative initiative because of their technical expertise or local knowledge may not have decision-making authority for their organisations. Hence, if an organisation is not represented at senior staff level, it is possible that policies subsequently will be forgotten or disavowed (Bramwell and Sharmann 1999). Additionally, some irresolvable differences and incompatible interests between national and local organisations blocked the flow of information upward and downward between these two levels. The effects of red tape on effective communication were also observed. Red tape or "tortuous and wasteful" communication, as Francis (1987) puts it, might have consumed too much time, generated frustration and made decision-making sluggish and inefficient. Many of the communication problems could be due to the absence of a communication and Public Relations strategy.

9.3.2.2 Improving communication

Empirical research elsewhere suggests that proper communication contributes to the effectiveness of partnerships (Selin and Myers 1998); however, when communication is viewed narrowly (i.e., communication is not a good thing to be doing) then a spate of issues is likely to constrain effectiveness. In their research Selin and Chavez (1994) found that active listening, honesty and directness were important success indicators. Similarly, respondents in this study of Belek suggested a number of ways to promote this, ranging from building trust to having permanent staff. However, they indicated that effective communication could not be achieved through laws and regulations. Instead, the importance of information sharing should be actively cultivated between individuals.

9.3.3 Stakeholder involvement and consensus building

Despite the many difficulties that it may involve, decisions are more likely to be implemented if they are taken through interactive or "communicative" planning in which a participatory process is employed to gather experiences, opinions and constructive recommendations from diverse constituencies (Gunn 1994; Inskeep 1991; Lang 1988; Pearce 1981). Stakeholder involvement in the decision-making process is also recognised as one of the prerequisites of sustainable tourism planning.
(Harssel 1994). Much has been written illustrating the significance of stakeholder involvement in planning (Brandon 1993). Direct and meaningful participation in decision-making is likely to induce a sense of ownership (Brandon 1993), and this sense may be imperative in implementation and in achieving results. The involvement of relevant stakeholders in the planning process is also often depicted as vital, as failure to involve relevant stakeholders in the decision-making process can be a major obstacle to realising the goal of sustainable development (Ioannides 1992). The literature is replete with examples of how an absence or lack of stakeholder involvement may lead to incurable negative social and economic impacts (Inskeep 1991). In this Belek study, respondents criticised the form of participation. They also questioned the way in which their concerns had been listened to but had not been adequately incorporated in plan objectives.

9.3.3.1 Forms and levels of participation

There was an apparent divergence among stakeholders in relation to the extent and nature of participation in the decision-making processes. In particular, the NPS and Betuyab respondents considered that participation should not be judged according to the number of people present at a meeting. Instead, they argued that it should be evaluated on the basis of commitment and cooperativeness. It seems that the reaching of full consensus was almost impossible during the BMP meetings, partly because many of the participants who regularly attended them did not have sufficient power to make decisions on behalf of their own organisations. Based on local respondents’ comments, it could be said that there was token participation, and residents were the only group disadvantaged by their limited status and power in the making of decisions. These respondents stated that the centralist administration that was dominant in the country meant they were unable to have their concerns addressed adequately about the kind of development they wanted. Several of the barriers to reaching consensus that were mentioned share similarities with those identified in previous studies (Bramwell and Sharman 1999).

9.3.3.2 Barriers to reaching consensus

According to the literature, individual access to power and decision-making is usually unequal, and this tends to inhibit consensus-building (Hall 2000; Hall and Jenkins 1995; Tosun and Jenkins 1996). From the perspective of local Belek
stakeholders, there was a difficulty in accessing the responsible central agencies. However, these agencies were thought to be more accessible to the local elite and entrepreneurs with more political and financial power. Additionally, the existence of a low level of trust in the administrative system and the tradition that bureaucrats made decisions on behalf of the local people, led to a feeling of isolation among the local population. The legal system had not encouraged local people to participate, rather it put a distance between them and the authorities. Local respondents complained specifically that because of geographical distance they were unable to participate in meetings, particularly those held in Ankara. Political distance or fractures constituted another barrier that hindered broader participation in the initial and subsequent meetings related to the Belek Plan. Political opposition between municipalities and the history of past conflicts also meant that some mayors avoided being present in some meetings in order to avoid public confrontation with another mayor.

Reaching a consensus involves a discursive process where participants learn about and respect each other and their different points of view, come to reflect on their own point of view, work together with this combined local knowledge to establish a new discourse about the issues and the policy direction, and come to value and respond to the new policy direction (Healey 1997 in Bramwell and Sharman 1999). It should recognise the potential fractions among stakeholders, should help the stakeholders to understand each other’s concerns, and should reach out across their differences (Bramwell and Sharman 1999). In Belek the inequalities in power and resource allocations between stakeholders, and their differences in interests and values meant that a consensus and a shared ownership of the resulting policies had not emerged between all stakeholders. As Ritchie (1993) observes, there were fundamental differences in values systems that the wide-ranging stakeholders had brought to the process. Thus reaching a consensus and obtaining endorsement was a challenging and delicate task. Local people in general noted that their concerns were just listened to but not incorporated adequately in the objectives. In Belek concerns raised in meetings might not have been taken account of as a result of hidden agendas, changing personal or institutional values, or beliefs and attitudes. Local respondents in general in Belek complained that many central government officials in the meetings were short of patience and were not keen to change decisions that they had already made. In contrast, the public officials were of the view that community participation
takes up a lot of time and resources. More effective public participation in decision-making in Belek, however, could have prevented many of the costs resulting from continued conflicts and from the need to change decisions that prove subsequently to be inadequately informed. Several disputes had ensued in part because of the failure to reach an adequate consensus among stakeholders.

9.3.3.3 Disputes and their causes

There were conflicts between organisations in the case study area. Many of these conflicts had gone unmanaged in the region because of the lack of a conflict management procedure other than litigation. Given the limited communication between parties identified in this study, it is not difficult to understand why conflicts had not been settled successfully. Issues giving rise to conflicts between organisations had not been dealt with at a deeper level. Some conflicts had continued and become quite destructive. The ongoing conflictual relations between Kumkoy villagers and the Ministry of Forestry exemplified such a case. These parties used litigation for the resolution of their problem. However, adjudication defines winners and losers, and thereby it decreases support for the implementation of agreed decisions (Hall 2000; Williams et al., 1998). Consensus building, on the other hand, produces win-win solutions, which reduce or eliminate power imbalances between parties because each effectively has a say over decisions and hence they are free from the autocracy of the majority (Cormick 1989). However, this approach has not been exercised to any fundamental degree in the case study area.

9.3.4 Resource sufficiency and exchange

Problems related to resources are the mainstay of explanations for the policy-implementation gap, especially in the developing world, where resources are generally scarcer (Morah 1996). The findings for Belek indicated that only a few national and local organisations had certain resources. Most of the national and local organisations, however, lacked the financial, legal, political and informational resources to make a success of the BMP. The Belek environment corresponds to the "resource scarcity" type of environment suggested by Benson (1975). This had a considerable effect on the supply of money and other resources and on the distribution of power within the network. In Belek some parties in the environment dominated others as a consequence of their resource abundance (money, authority, etc.).
was a clear-cut pattern of dominance in which some parties controlled others (e.g., the relations between Betuyab and the Belek municipality). The authoritative control mechanisms used by central government over local government appears to have important implications for the nature of relations within the network. An overall lack of organisational resources also adversely affected the results of the Belek Management Plan.

### 9.3.4.1 Resource exchange

The tourism environment is made up of a variety of organisations, with each controlling these resources to a differing extent, including capital, technology, personnel and knowledge. As no organisation can possess or generate independently all the necessary resources, each organisation is likely to interact with others in order to acquire the resources necessary for goal achievement (Klijn 1997). The interactions with other organisations may consist of the exchange of funds, sharing of information, and collaboration and sharing of personnel. The interactions may also include expressions of criticism or opposition, competition for funds, and even purposeful disregard between agencies. The literature supports the view that resource scarcity leads organisations to exchange relations. This study, however, showed that resource scarcity is likely to produce conflicting strategies between organisations. This would inhibit effective interactions between organisations.

### 9.3.4.2 Barriers to resource exchange

Resource exchange between organisations tends to emerge in periods of resource scarcity or declining resources. Interestingly, however, while the resources of many organisations were scarce in the Belek study, there was little or no exchange of resources between organisations at the same or different spatial levels. For exchange relations to occur the interactions between organisations must be based on a high degree of cooperation and shared problem-solving. However, interactions among organisations involved in the Belek Management Plan could be characterised by a high level of conflict and bargaining. This might have greatly hampered resource exchange relations.

Several issues are discussed as correlates of resource exchange between organisations (Levine and White 1961). For example, exchange would be very
unlikely without some level of agreement. Factors mentioned in Belek as impeding resource exchange between organisations were the unequal distribution of existing resources, managerial incompetence in their utilisation, institutional jealousy, the limited level of perceived interdependency, politically partisan organisations, and differences in ideology and organisational values. Respondents were critical about there being a culture of individualism. This appears to have been a key impediment undermining co-operative actions, particularly among the municipalities of the region. The history of political fractions and rampant partisanship might have blocked the exchange of resources. Because several national organisations, and to some extent local government organisations, had highly similar domains, they were likely to need the same kind of resources, and this reduced the potential benefits of making exchanges. The power and money possessed by a party influenced whether they followed competitive strategies (as in the case of national organisations), or whether they preferred co-operative strategies to help reduce uncertainty (such as the mutual agreement between the Nature Preservation Society and Betuyab after the closure of the former’s office in Belek as a result of the budget problems at Nature Preservation Society headquarters). The national organisations involved in implementing the BMP were in competitive relations, or asymmetric relations, as Logsdon (1991) puts it. Each organisation attempted to achieve its own interests at the expense of others. Resources were centrally concentrated and scarce, which eventually led to conflicts between local government organisations competing for these same resources, including for funding and authority. Moreover, the environment within which organisations made contact was not at all stable. Furthermore, the balance in the distribution of resources and their quantity changed as a result of new actors entering or leaving the system. The Nature Preservation Society was an example of the latter, while the municipalities illustrate the former.

9.3.5 Inter-organisational co-ordination

The notions of co-ordination, collaboration and partnership in tourism have received growing research attention in recent years as a means of finding solutions to resource management and destination development problems (Hall 2000; Selin 2000). However, despite the potential value of such attention, these concepts have remained relatively poorly critically evaluated from a public policy perspective (Bramwell and Lane 2000; Hall 2000). This study showed that discussing co-ordination on paper
might be easier than doing it in practice. Several obstacles were identified in the way of co-ordination.

### 9.3.5.1 Barriers to co-ordination

Organisations tend to seek out or be more receptive to interorganisational co-operation and co-ordination when they face resource scarcity. The underpinning reason is that resource scarcity forces organisations to enter into co-operative activities in order to make resources stretch to meet increasing needs. Interestingly, despite the resource scarcity of many parties involved in the BMP, co-ordination and co-operation were exercised infrequently. Some parties wanted to benefit without contributing. Importantly, because the commitment of organisational resources was modest, the relationships between organisations were less formal and consequently more difficult to maintain. Co-ordination between organisations was also vulnerable to the turnover of organisational staff. The co-ordination between some parties was a "mutual adjustment" form of co-ordination (Whetten 1981), whereby co-ordination focused on specific cases rather than on the development of a comprehensive delivery system.

Co-ordination and co-operation between the parties in Belek failed substantially because of the diversity of public organisations involved, each with its own political agenda to increase its power. The institutional set up was described as too fragmented, complex and ambiguous in the delegation of responsibilities. The low level of co-ordination between national and local organisations was also attributed to the administrative culture in Turkey which discourages a cross-sectoral approach to problem solving. This is despite the potential value of direct relationships between groups, organisations and individuals operating in close proximity (Robinson 2000). This would enable informal interactions between key decision-makers and communication between the staff of organisations. Such interaction would facilitate a recognition of (1) similarities in orientation, (2) similarities in the training of staff, (3) possible cross.matches between goals and resources, and (4) an inter-dependency for scarce resources. Organisational performance was severely hampered as the agencies knew very little about each other (Njoh 1993). Such ignorance led to an unnecessary duplication of functions. The national organisations hardly communicated amongst themselves much less with local organisations, whose confidence they had lost as a
result. When an agency has had very little contact with another organisation, then
distrust may arise and prevail. Ideological differences between private and public
organisations, and among public organisations generated conflict rather than
collaboration. As central government ignored the opportunity to work through the
local authorities, the chances of achieving widespread participation in the
development effort became weakened and mistrust developed.

The cultivation of co-ordination and co-operation between parties in Belek
would be difficult because of strong opposition to the policies of some national and
local parties. The respondents suggested that each party should commit itself to an
agreed course of action, and communicate this commitment to other parties in the
relationship. The reluctance to promote co-ordination was partly because for some
national (Ministry of Culture) and local organisations (Betuyab) this entailed
relinquishing some control over important elements of their viability, power and
privileges. It is clear that these organisations were unlikely to relinquish control
without receiving in return some compensatory concessions (Davidson 1976). The
study findings support ideas discussed by Whetten (1981) that managers must have a
positive attitude toward interorganisational co-ordination, they must recognise partial
interdependence and an organisational need, and they must have the capacity to
manage the on-going co-ordination process. However, given the differences between
organisations, it was difficult to secure the co-ordination of all organisations within
the network relevant to the BMP. For example, the mayors’ comments revealed that
they were in fear of losing their prestige in the eyes of their political supporters, and
thus of their strategic position, if they engaged in co-ordinated relations with another
mayor of an opposing party. Similarly, some national organisations were reluctant to
co-ordinate with agencies perceived to have lesser importance.

9.3.6 Roles and activities of the organisations

Peaceful and harmonious interaction based on mutual agreement is only viable
where each organisation respects the rights of all the others, and where viable
institutions exist which embody and enforce the rules, thus allowing them to exchange
scarce resources on a secure and equitable basis. This study found that the nature of
relations was likely to be determined by the level of agreement between organisations
regarding the appropriate role and scope of an agency (domain consensus), the nature
of the tasks confronted by the organisation and the appropriate approaches to those
tasks (ideological consensus), the judgement in one organisation of the value of the
work of another organisation (positive evaluation), and the patterns of co-ordination
(work co-ordination).

9.3.6.1 Domain and ideological conflict

Respondents were unhappy about the way in which authority and
responsibility was divided in relation to tourism planning in Belek. Similar planning
authority was given to different public organisations. Because of the domain
similarities of many national organisations, the potential for territorial disputes and
competition was high. Undertaking organised and integrated activities between
organisations was a challenge with this current distribution of responsibilities and
authority. The situation was characterised by ambiguity. This had induced
management incapacity and also undermined accountability because each unit tended
to put the blame on each other when things went wrong. There was authority
(domain) conflict between central units, between central and local units, and between
local units. The power was not distributed equally among the organisations and there
existed a power monopoly. Central government was accused of being interventionist
and acting merely on political and economic concerns. While local government was
empowered to carry out certain tasks, the legislation in this respect was violated
because of the monopoly of power through the personal contacts of Betuyab staff. The
central government had transferred some of its responsibilities to Betuyab (a non-
government unit) in the name of decentralisation. However, this transference was
widely assumed to be illegal, as it was not based on a legal framework. Local
government was powerless and helpless in the face of this informal arrangement.

There were differences in opinion about what tasks should be undertaken by
organisations at different spatial levels. Many respondents felt that central
government interest in promotion and development should be matched by concerns
for the environmental impacts of tourism development and environment protection. It
was also often argued that the municipalities should pay more attention to the
realisation of environment protection measures through observing careful resource
management, undertaking co-operative relations between central and local units, and
by improving public consciousness and public participation in decision-making.
According to Betuyab, the municipalities in the area must be more attentive and sensitive to the development and application of sanctions to stop the conversion of fertile agricultural land into development land. In turn, Betuyab’s role was severely criticised by the majority of local government representatives and some other public and private sector organisations. These signal serious domain and ideological dissension among organisations.

9.3.6.2 Negative evaluation of other parties and work co-ordination

The majority of national organisations involved in the Belek plan disparaged the performance of the other national organisations in general and local government in particular. The same was true of opinions of local people about national and local organisations. This negative evaluation appears to have been closely related to the domain and ideological conflicts. The litigation process and its outcome between the villagers and the Ministry of Forestry, and the continuing opposition of villagers to their lands being designated as a specially protected zone, were clearly difficult barriers to the development of positive evaluations of one another. The central units were accused of illusionist presentations, such as by trumpeting visitor numbers as an indication of success and by overlooking of the real costs of tourism for the area. Many respondents were critical about the effectiveness and efficiency of provincial government, local government and central government, and also felt that a union involving local and central units might be a better solution. The administrative incapacity of provincial and local government might have been clearly affected by political pressures, limited professionalism, a high staff turnover (such as of the governor), and a lack of appropriate skills. The administrative incapacity of local and central units might not largely stem from inefficient legislation, being affected more by factors such as by nepotism, favouritism, and clientelism. According to several respondents, the effectiveness of municipal services was impeded by financial and human resources constraints, by administrative tutelage and by the central monopoly of power. Respondents did not believe that relations would be improved if the legislation was changed. As they commented, the legislation was satisfactory but its implementation was poor. These results indicate that attempts at domain expansion and domain defence by both national and local organisations were severely hampering effective interorganisational relations in Belek. Similarly, work co-ordination between parties largely failed because of the diverse range of public organisations involved,
each with their own political agendas, and each seeking to increase their power. Based on the interviews, it would be naive to think that it would be easy to build effective inter-organisational relations under circumstances where each organisation viewed itself as more important than the others, and also disparaged the work undertaken by the others.

The conceptual framework developed for this study is premised on the assumption that the formulation and implementation of tourism plans is affected by interactions between organisations at national, provincial and local levels. It is usual for inter-organisational relationships to involve some organisations co-operating with each other for mutual benefit, and for others to compete for the same political, financial, informational resources or power. The literature reviewed in chapter three suggests that peaceful and harmonious interaction based on mutual agreement and the exchange of scarce resources will only be viable where each organisation respects the rights of others and where there are viable institutions which embody and enforce the rules. Inter-organisational interactions can be in equilibrium when the relationships between two or more organisations are harmonious, non-conflicting, and collaborative. In this study, inter-organisational relations were not in equilibrium as there was domain and ideological conflict together with negative evaluation of other parties and a limited degree of work co-ordination.

9.3.7 Delegation of power

It was argued in chapter two that the long-term success of tourism increasingly relies on the effectiveness and efficiency of the administrative framework within which it operates. Two alternative administrative models were identified in the literature and were studied in depth in chapter five. The first model, Centralised Tourism Administration (CTA), assumes that a central steering agency has at its disposal the necessary information about existing public problems and preferences and about the available resources and solutions (Kickert et al. 1997). The CTA is generally adopted by developing countries where there is no system allowing decisions to be taken by the people most immediately affected by them, with tourism usually considered to be an industry of national concern which should be centrally planned and controlled (Wahap 1997). This administrative form of tourism management has certain advantages but also limitations, and there are numerous cases
of tourism plans formulated at the top and implemented by people at the bottom that have not achieved the desired outcomes. One explanation for this is that centrally formulated plans may be out of touch with local people's needs and may lack a detailed knowledge of the local environment.

Centralisation means that the authority, responsibility and ability to perform the basic functions of the state are concentrated in central governing organisations (Ocampo 1991: 193). These elements can be concentrated in the central government of a country so that it can command and control the behaviour of more localised organisations, and notably local government. It can do this by setting limits on or dictating their goals, by directing or otherwise guiding their decisions and actions, by substituting their judgement with their own through prior or post-hoc approval or by their own direct action, by monitoring and evaluating their performance, by instituting corrective measures, and by imposing sanctions for local deviations from central guidelines (Ocampo 1991). Centralisation may be justified as necessary to define a comprehensive and coherent framework of goals and norms for the government and nation as a whole and to ensure there is consistency and compatibility of local activities within that framework. It may be needed not only to co-ordinate local decisions and actions, but also to aggregate and distribute resources and capacities and to focus them according to national standards and priorities that transcend those of local units. Foreign relations, environmental standards, human rights and social justice in particular are often considered beyond the competence of local units to undertake without central guidance and assistance (Ocampo 1991: 194).

However, this form of tourism management has certain limitations. When goals, targets and priorities are promulgated by central government in a top-down fashion, there is usually little opportunity for local contributions to their formulation. Central government tends to put a premium on a strict instead of a liberal interpretation of local powers, to require prior clearance of local decisions, to closely supervise local performance, and to penalise departures from norms. In order to ensure goal-achievement, central government may even pre-empt implementation, such as by directly taking on policy making and planning roles and by allocating the resources necessary to perform them. There is very limited local autonomy under a centralist regime. Central control tends to stifle any initiative, discretion, or self-reliance that
local units may want to exercise. Local units may not be self-aware to begin with, their identity having been suppressed by the primacy of central government. Most of the powers and resources as well as responsibilities may be concentrated at the centre and top. While there may be local government and local representatives of national agencies, they may be under-endowed in many respects and look to central government for resources and support. However, these conditions are argued to work against the whole system. For example, it is argued that centralism is likely to overload central government with unessential tasks, hierarchical overgrowth, and unnecessary resources. Staff and line units are likely to proliferate near the top. The ability of central authorities to make sound decisions and to command and control local actions will be impaired because of the sheer volume and complexity of functions that they have to perform or direct. The information that local units get might be fragmented and distorted by crowded and convoluted communication channels, their decisions delayed or derailed by confused lines of command, and implementing actions may lag far behind and become incongruent with changing environmental conditions.

There are numerous cases where tourism plans formulated at the top and implemented by people at the bottom have not achieved the desired outcomes. One reason for this consequence is that the formulation and application of plans by central government might be out of touch with the needs of local people and is not based on detailed knowledge of the local environment (Baud Bovy 1982). CTA results in local tourism development decisions being taken by central rather than by local authorities, and decisions are inevitably made at a distance from the location of local administrative units. The existence of this physical distance can impact on the willingness of local stakeholders to participate in the decision-making process. Barry (1965: 56 in Stoker 1996) points out that "if bureaucracies are too large or too distant from the people affected by decisions then people become alienated". When individuals do not have access to decision-making, this brings about a substantive breakdown in the flow of communication. This alienation from participation, whether as a result of distance or bureaucracy, may impair the legitimacy of the resulting policy decisions (Almond and Powel 1966; Barry 1965). Building on a study conducted in Turkey, Tosun and Jenkins (1996) point out that "the Ministry of Tourism and bodies responsible for the authorisation of tourism investment and
incentives are accessible to a rich and educated elite and not to the majority of indigenous people in tourist regions. In this sense, there is a big communication gap between communities and decision-makers. In short centralisation has intensified formidable bureaucracies. Even the physical distance from Ankara is a barrier for people who may not be able to afford to go to the capital city” (p. 527).

CTA seems likely to reduce the legitimacy of decisions. It can also hinder plan or policy implementation in local areas distant from the centre. Tourism plans developed by a mono-actor form of centralised administration generally overlook the knowledge, skills and goals of local public and private sector tourism organisations, in their design phase. Subsequently, there may be resistance from the implementing bodies, such as from local government. The centralist model appears to neglect the values and interests of implementing bodies, fails to utilise the resources and capacities of local actors, and promotes the bureaucratisation of the public sector, which therefore diminishes management effectiveness and efficiency (Kickert et al 1997). Key characteristics of the CTA can clearly thwart the effectiveness of tourism administration, such as through coercive decision-making, ambiguous balances between responsibility and authority, a distant bureaucracy, limited local participation, and uneven power relations.

An alternative form of administration, decentralisation, has been suggested in order to overcome the potential problems that may ensue from CTA. The second model, Decentralised Tourism Administration (DTA), involves the transfer of power from central agencies to local government and it takes the interests of local actors as its point of departure. Smith (1985: 1) describes this concept as “the delegation of power to lower levels in territorial hierarchy, whether the hierarchy is one of governments within a state or offices within a large-scale organisation. Thus decentralisation refers to territorially-based delegation not to purely functionally based delegation” (in Turner and Hulme, 1997).

It is argued that “when implemented properly”, decentralisation could offer greater efficiency and effectiveness in various areas (Turner and Hulme 1997). Through decentralisation, plans can be tailor-made for local areas using detailed, up-to-date information which is only available locally, and inter-organisational co-
ordination can be achieved more effectively at the local level. Experimentation and innovation can also be fostered, which can increase the chances of establishing more effective development strategies (see chapter five). Decentralisation may also help enhance the motivation of field level personnel, as they will have greater responsibility for the programmes they manage. It is argued in the literature that a reduction in the workload of central government will relieve them from routine decision-making and give them more time to consider strategic issues so that the quality of policy should improve.

It is important to note that decentralisation does not imply that all authority should be delegated. The central government may retain a core of functions over essential national matters and ultimately has the authority to redesign the system of government and to discipline or suspend decentralisation units that are not performing effectively. However, “how extensive this core of central government functions remains is a major ideological and intellectual debate of the late twentieth century” (Turner and Hulme 1997: 154). According to some, DTA needs to be adopted in order to “emphasise an equitable distribution of the benefits of development which have required programmes that need the support and involvement of local level administrators and the citizens. It has been necessary to develop the administrative capacity of local organisations to provide services in the remote areas as well as to improve the effectiveness of central government” (Rondinelli 1978: 45 in Huque 1986). The reasons for decentralised administration are varied. The process may be resorted to in order to overcome difficulties and constraints that are faced in centralised planning. Administrators may prefer decentralisation to emphasise an equitable distribution of benefits of development which have required programmes that need the support and involvement of local level administrators and citizens. Decentralisation may help to accelerate the pace and spread the benefits of growth, integrate diverse regions in internally heterogeneous countries, and use scarce resources more efficiently to promote development in economically lagging or relatively poor areas (Rondinelli 1981).

Some argue that it may be more suitable to incorporate a combination of principles adapted from both centralised and decentralised management approaches (Turner and Hulme 1997). However, while it might appear easy to achieve this in
theory, implementing a combination of central control and local autonomy that responds to administrative needs and popular participation is still a puzzle for governments. The excessive concentration of decision-making and authority within central government continues to represent an obstacle to the effective performance of public administration in most developing countries (ibid.).

9.3.7.1 Decentralisation

An alternative form of management, *decentralisation*, has been suggested in the literature in order to overcome the potential problems of centralised tourism management. The concept of decentralisation basically implies the transference of power from central government to local government. It has received growing support from researchers as a means for achieving better implementation. However, the application of this administrative system particularly in developing countries seems to be problematic too, which raises questions about the suitability of this approach. While tourism authorities are advised to switch to relatively decentralised forms of tourism administration, there is no information readily available for authorities to guide this transition. The question of whether this form of administration can be applied to a developing country with different institutional and constitutional contexts remains unexplored. There is also limited understanding of whether top-down (centralist) or bottom-up (decentralist) perspectives on management are likely to be more or less effective in handling complex interactions between various parties with different perceptions, preferences and strategies.

The concept of decentralised management has attracted growing support from researchers as it is thought to offset the problems of centralised tourism management. While tourism authorities are advised to switch to relatively decentralised forms of administration, no research has attempted to ascertain in depth whether this form of administration is likely to be more viable and applicable given the prevailing constitutional and institutional contexts of centralist countries. Although the decentralisation concept supports the retreat of central government from the public domain, at the same time central government is urged to give more attention to the problems of local organisations and to provide them with more resources, and to the co-ordination of the system as a whole. Thus, the extent to which decentralisation represents a realistic alternative to the centralist model, may be disputed. It seems
that whatever approach is adopted, a greater understanding is needed of the relations between multiple actors involved in plan formulation and implementation, their interdependencies and the way in which these patterns and interdependencies influence management processes (Kickert and Koppenjan 1997).

Rondinelli (1979; 1981), Rondinelli and Nellis (1986), Rondinelli, McCullough and Johnson (1989) identify a number of potential advantages arising from transferring more responsibilities for development planning and management from central government to lower administrative levels. Some of the potential benefits of decentralisation are presented in Table 9.2.

### Table 9.2 Potential benefits of decentralisation

- Decentralisation is a means of overcoming the severe limitations of centrally controlled planning by delegating greater authority for development planning and management to officials who are working in the field, closer to the problems.
- Decentralisation to local levels allows officials to tailor development plans and programmes to the needs of different areas and people within a country.
- Decentralisation is useful in cutting through red tape and highly structured procedures, common characteristics of central planning in developing nations, and which can result from an over-concentration of power, authority and resources at the centre.
- Central officials can be reassigned to local levels, thus increasing their knowledge of and sensitivity to local level problems and needs.
- Decentralisation offers closer contact between government officials and the local population, thus allowing them to obtain better information with which to formulate more realistic and effective plans for government programmes.
- Decentralisation can pave the way for greater political and administrative penetration of national government policies into areas remote from the national capital, where central government plans are often unknown or ignored by the populace or hampered by local elites.
- Decentralisation might allow greater representation for various political and other groups in development decision-making, and this could lead to greater equity in the allocation of government resources and investments.
- It might lead to an enhanced administrative capability of local government and private sector institutions in the regions or provinces. It may help to expand their capacities to take over functions that are not usually performed well by central ministries, such as the maintenance of roads and infrastructure investments in areas remote from the national capital.
- The efficiency of central government could be increased by decentralisation. The time released from routine administration can free political and administrative leaders to plan more carefully and supervise more effectively the implementation of development polices.
Decentralisation may provide a structure through which the activities of various central government agencies involved in development can be co-ordinated more effectively both with each other and with local leaders and non-governmental organisations.

A decentralised government structure can facilitate the exchange of information about local needs and channel political demands from the local community to national ministries.

By proving alternative means of decision-making, decentralisation can offset the influence or control over development activities by entrenched local elites who are often unsympathetic to national development policies and insensitive to the needs of the poorer groups in rural communities.

Decentralisation can lead to more flexible, innovative and creative administration. Local government can have greater potential to experiment with new policies in selected areas. If experiments fail, their impacts will only be on small jurisdictions.

Decentralisation can allow local leaders to deliver services more effectively within communities, to integrate isolated or lagging areas into regional economies, and to monitor and evaluate the implementation of development projects more effectively than central government.

Decentralisation can increase political stability and national unity by giving groups in different parts of the country the ability to participate more directly in development decision-making, thereby increasing their stake in maintaining the political system.

It is important to note that the assertions underlying the potential advantages shown in Table 9.2 have not all been empirically verified. Rondinelli (1981) admits that in reality, the results of decentralisation policies in many developing countries are often disappointing. Huque (1986: 91-92), for instance, insists strongly that "judging from the existing conditions, it might be wise to abandon efforts directed at complete decentralisation in Bangladesh and concentrate on limited decentralisation". However, there are also cases where some of the potential benefits of decentralisation listed in Table 9.2 have been observed. Crook and Manor (1994) argue that some countries, such as India, have benefited from the practice of decentralisation. They suggest that in India decentralisation has resulted in a clear division of responsibilities between central and local government. Through India's decentralisation policies, community needs have been taken into account better and benefits have sometimes been channelled more effectively to vulnerable groups. Other achievements have included an improved effectiveness in project delivery, a better mobilisation of local resources, and improved horizontal co-ordination. In addition, political awareness has been created among local residents, and better information gathering networks have been established in local constituencies. Similarly, they argue that through decentralisation,
the completion rate of local projects has increased and the distribution of resources in localities has sometimes become fairer. Decentralisation has also prompted improvements in the institutional response to the problems identified.

Stakeholders interviewed in this study in the context of Belek in Turkey, a country with a highly centralised tourism administrative system, had varying preferences and they provided several explanations in support of these preferences. Table 9.3 shows the respondents' preferences in relation to different types of decentralisation of planning authority in relation to Belek.

Table 9.3 Preferences for different types decentralisation of planning authority in relation to Belek

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The type of decentralisation models</th>
<th>Number of people who preferred the model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partnership model</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devolution</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deconcentration</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quite a significant number of respondents - twelve - supported a partnership model that could be established through the involvement of representatives either from national and local government or else cross-sectorally from among the public and private sectors and NGOs. As many as ten of the 30 respondents favoured devolution - passing the planning authority to local government - whereas a moderate number of respondents - five - considered that a central government unit in the region should lead the planning process, which entails deconcentration. Only three of the 30 respondents agreed that delegation - leaving the entire planning authority to a private sector organisation - would be more beneficial. At present, there is inadequate understanding of whether decentralist forms are likely to be more or less effective in handling the complex interactions between parties with differing perceptions, preferences and strategies.

9.3.7.2 Barriers to decentralisation

The current administrative customs (corruption, bureaucracy, clientelism, etc.)
appeared to be seen as a big obstacle to the success of decentralisation in the country. The comments indicated that each of these alternative administrative approaches suffered from major limitations. Those against central administration stated that if authority was retained by central government, then policies would generally be idealistic and plans conceived by the central units would tend not match the local realities and priorities. This corresponds with Barry’s (1965: 56) observation that: "if bureaucracies are too large or too distant from the people affected by decisions then people become alienated". When individuals do not have access to decision-making, this brings about a substantive breakdown in the flow of communication. This alienation from participation, whether as a result of distance or bureaucracy, might have impaired the legitimacy of the resulting policy decisions (Almond and Powel 1966; Blau1964).

According to the respondents, any model supporting the delegation of power to a single organisation might suffer from major limitations and serious repercussions. The concentration of control under one organisation might lead to an expansion of favouritism, which allegedly was rampant in the region. Local respondents stated that local officials were more informed about local problems. This is a conventional contention raised in the decentralisation literature. They were also perceived to have a greater capacity to mobilise local resources. The central units, however, might not be aware of local priorities. By contrast, central government officials stated that handing over power to local units might have adverse consequences. It might lead to regional inequality as local authorities may not respond to the needs of other regions in a balanced way. Another concern of the central officials was about the continuity of projects. They stated that because partisanship was rife, subsequent mayors might not resume projects commenced by their predecessors, particularly if they were from an opposing party. Additionally, respondents stated that while decentralisation was generally favoured, it came with a real risk of arbitrariness. They felt that the human infrastructure of the country was not yet ready for decentralisation.

When the various stakeholders with an interest in the BMP were asked whether local or national organisations should be in charge of decision-making on their own, they largely favour neither level of governance having such power. Rather than leaving decision-making authority to a single organisation, it was suggested that
these institutions should be linked together in such a way that their individual strengths are utilised and their weaknesses are counterbalanced. A process is badly needed to identify which organisation is good or bad at what and to fuse their strengths together, since both local and national organisations have the resources and capabilities required to make a success of Belek’s tourism development.

9.4 Implications of the study

Until now the chapter has focused on reporting the conceptual framework and conceptual themes together with the findings of the study. The goal of this section is to draw attention to the contribution of the study to the development of enhanced theoretical understandings of inter-organisational relations, and notably of central-local interactions in tourism planning. Therefore, the following section presents several implications or recommendations that planners could take into account in order to facilitate interorganisational relations and subsequently to enhance the success of tourism plans.

9.4.1 A learning approach to planning is likely to be a key success factor.

An examination of the Belek case suggests that the tourism planning process should be adaptive and strategic, flexible to overcome unexpected constraints, and ready to propose alternative solutions to unforeseen situations. It also shows that a realistic period of time is needed to achieve the expected results of tourism plans. Adopting a rigid “blueprint” in the making of tourism plans should be avoided. The blueprint model of planning is where planning is thought of as a one-shot activity, with set deadlines, and specified activities, and which is schedule-driven, and assumes no deviation. It is like a job description where one’s duties and responsibilities are itemised (Korten, 1980). The case study shows that planning is in fact best conceived as a learning process. The learning process approach to planning suggests the idea of an open system, which is so permeated by influences that it is difficult to estimate precisely the diversity of attitudes, activities and responses. The approach recognises that the project must be in balance with its environment, in terms of the social, economic and political contexts in which it takes place (Korten, 1980). Once goals are established, it may be better to design activities for the first year, and define subsequent activities on the basis of project learning. The study also indicates that change could be a source of programme failure or success. A change in any of the broader and sub-systems, whether environmental, organisational or personal, is likely
to have ripple effects on projects. For example, a change in project personnel might mean an increase, or conversely a decrease, in project performance, dependent on, for instances, the disposition of the individual toward the project. People do also change their minds and attitudes, and they may become unexpectedly conciliatory on a topic, which enraged them earlier. And a solution argued to be acceptable initially, may become controversial. As changes may occur in the goals and functions of tourism organisations during planning, additional research will be needed to develop empirically-based intervention strategies for facilitating and maintaining coordinative and co-operative relations in unstable environments.

9.4.2 Adequate resources are needed not only to start but also to maintain tourism plans.

The case study analysis further suggests that goodwill and good intentions are necessary but they may not be sufficient for successful planning. A threshold of policy resources is necessary for there to be any possibility of realising policy objectives (Morah 1996). Resource scarcities in a developing nation context may frustrate planning intentions from being put into concrete action. Resources should be allocated at the outset, and they must be sufficient for an ongoing programme and renewed as necessary. An equally important issue which planners should pay attention to is the equality of access to resources. This study shows that control over access to resources can be restricted to powerful elite organisations and that this can give rise to adversarial relations.

9.4.3 The degree to which consensus emerges among stakeholders may dictate the success of a tourism plan.

It is true that tourism planning would benefit from participative approaches. However, the study shows that participation is not sufficient on its own to reach consensus. Planning is complicated by the existence of diverse organisations with different viewpoints and vested interests. The study shows that reaching a consensus is a delicate task. Even if it seems to have been reached, it may only represent the interests of, and opinions of, elite and powerful organisations. It must be noted that not all participants would enthusiastically accept or embrace all the initial proposals and resulting policies. More interpretative case studies will be necessary to fully
capture the essence of the concept of partial consensus (Bramwell and Sharmann 1999).

9.4.4. **Preparation of a plan on its own will not guarantee that the recommendations will be implemented.**

The study suggests that preparation of a plan will not guarantee that the recommendations will be implemented. All agencies should be integrated into the process of project implementation at all stages under terms and conditions expressed and agreed by all sides. Much focus needs to be placed on the realistic means to achieve implementation (Inskeep 1991). The initial consensus reached during preliminary stages of tourism plans might be deceptive. As Bardach (1977) notes, each group may have its own set of goals, and it may attempt to play one of the many games that would enable it to pull the implementation process in its duration, either furthering the policy but steering it in the direction desired by the group, or delaying the policy and dissipating its energies. Effective implementation mechanisms are likely to entail the logical staging of development, the effective organisation of public and private sectors in tourism, close co-ordination between the public and private sectors and with NGOs, and the adaptation and application of appropriate legislation and regulations for tourism development. Tourism development plans would not be capable of being implemented unless the relationship elements are envisaged and managed accordingly. Thus, not only technical aspects of planning but also the relationship elements should not be understated, such as commitment, and willingness to collaborate, share information and co-operate on the outcomes.

9.4.5 **The broader environment must be enabling for plans to succeed.**

The activities, goals, and ideologies of tourism organisations of various types, and of different spatial scales, influence virtually all aspects of tourism planning and implementation. The BMP shows that tourism policies and programme implementation result from decision-making within the organisation, interactions between other organisations, and from the legislative, economic, institutional and political environment. The study suggests that tourist organisations are organic and they act like other organisations. They interact with the broader environment in order to acquire resources while also being influenced by the political culture of the country, its general economic conditions, as well as the broader government policies.
It is helpful to analyse organisations as part of an open system and to understand the conditions external to the organisation and how they directly or indirectly influence its activity, efficiency and behaviour. For example, in the case study area the planning environment within which decisions were made was characterised by turbulence. There were competing national organisations, all acting independently in many diverse directions, producing unanticipated events in their shared environment. Thus, different structural dimensions of the environment, such as the concentration and dispersal of resources, and power and autonomy may need to be studied carefully to better understand organisations and their behaviour. Additional research will be needed to develop empirically-based strategies for facilitating co-operative relations within different environment types.

9.4.6 There may be forces other than resource scarcity that encourage organisations to exchange resources.

Two main approaches, exchange and the power-dependency, have been proposed to explain interactions among organisations. Exchange theory (Levine and White 1961) assumes that organisational exchange is a voluntary activity between two organisations, which has consequences, actual or anticipated, for the realisation of their respective goals or objectives. The power dependency model argues that organisations form relations to gain or improve their own control over scarce resources in the environment. According to the exchange model, tourism organisations view the chances of realising their goals in some domains to be greater by performing jointly rather than by acting independently (Pearce 1992). The emphasis is on voluntary, goal-oriented behaviour, not just on the transfer of material goods (Pearce 1992). The results of the study, however, indicate that resource exchange may not be a straightforward strategy, as one might assume particularly in a developing nation context. There are a number of structural and behavioural constraints, which need to be addressed before there can be an effective exchange of resources. The limited resource exchange found in this study indicates that organisations by and large may be in competitive and conflictual relations, and this reduced the effectiveness of the plan in this case. The study further shows that organisations are not likely to engage solely in exchange relationships or solely in power-dependency relationships, but are likely to be involved in a mixture of each type.
9.4.7 Clarity about who does what, and for whom, needs to be established.

The institutional arrangements may either facilitate or inhibit the plan implementation process. Researchers examining tourism planning and development thus have to be concerned with the range of public, private and voluntary institutions involved in tourism management and in tourism plan formulation and implementation. They should also be concerned with the aims and objectives of organisations and the extent to which different public, private and voluntary organisations influence tourism planning decisions at the local level (including the legal power to do so). The study shows that the formal and informal rules and procedures that regulate interactions between these institutions (notably the legislative framework and “rules of the game”), and their effects on the power of these organisations, have important implications for tourism planning and implementation. The implications of dependency between these institutions, notably between state and local level organisations, and of the forms of instruments (e.g., regulatory, financial, communicative, etc.,) used in managing relations between organisations for tourism planning could not be understated. Additionally, the autonomy of the institutions involved in tourism management should be considered. This study suggests that the extent of interorganisational communication and the ways in which the organisations communicate with one another may underpin the success of tourism plans. The study further shows that adversarial conflicts between interest groups could be wasteful. Thus, the extent of conflict between organisations, the sources of this conflict, the ways in which conflicts are resolved, and the effects on power relations between organisations should receive adequate consideration in planning. The question as to which functions are most appropriately undertaken at which scale by which organisations to achieve which goals needs further attention.

9.4.8 Strategies need to be developed to facilitate co-ordination when disequilibrium exists between organisations.

The case study analysis suggests that the degree of equilibrium between organisations and its causes must be studied extensively before planning starts. More specifically: (1) the appropriate role and scope of an agency (domain consensus); (2) the nature of the tasks confronted by the organisations and appropriate approaches to those tasks (ideological consensus); (3) the judgement by workers in one organisation
of the value of the work of another organisation (positive-negative evaluation); and
(4) patterns of collaboration and co-operation (work co-ordination) must be examined
(Benson 1975). Effective planning depends on building, maintaining and managing
positive interorganisational relations, which rests heavily on the degree of equilibrium
present among tourism organisations. Consistent with Selin and Beason’s (1991)
finding, in this study many of the respondents did not see how the work of other
organisations was important to their organisation. This independent view might have
contributed to a lack of co-operative relations among the organisations. The study
shows that interorganisational relationships take place in contexts where some
organisations will be co-operating with each other for mutual benefit, while others are
competing for the same political, financial, informational resources or locus of power.
Peaceful and harmonious interaction based on mutual agreement is only viable where
each organisation respects the rights of all the others, and where viable institutions
exist which embody and enforce the rules, which allow them all to exchange scarce
resources on a secure and equitable basis. However, this statement may be easier to
say than to achieve.

9.4.9 The balance of power between central and local organisations is a
central issue, that has a significant effect on the implementation
of tourism plans.

The study suggests that planning efforts in tourism are likely to be hindered
when significant power differences exist among stakeholders or when certain
stakeholders are seen as illegitimate. In this study, the Nature Preservation Society for
instance was perceived to be illegitimate by some public and private organisations.
This has greatly reduced the extent of their influence. The study results further show
that the extent to which powerful stakeholders perceive little or no interdependence
with other stakeholders will determine whether or not they resist efforts to balance the
power differences among stakeholders. In this case study, some public and private
sector organisations were observed to have concerns about preserving their own
institutional power, which posed a real obstacle to effective co-ordination and co-
operation. Two forms of power relations might be stated: vertical and horizontal. The
control authority of national organisations over strategic resources required by the
peripheral organisations dictates the nature of vertical power relations between
national and local public organisations. The bureaucratic structure of vertical power
relations may need to be made more flexible for organisations engaged in vertical power relations to achieve better outcomes. It is clear that the network among multiple organisations (e.g., municipalities, Betuyab and NPS) is often blocked and non-co-operative because these agencies suffer from resource shortages and cannot muster power sufficient to dictate terms to others (Benson 1975).

Lack of power, however, does not necessarily make one organisation subservient to another. Manipulative strategies might be favoured by organisations that lack certain forms of power but are rich in others. For example, due to its limited authority, Betuyab attempted to divert resource flows and establish dependency relations with some mayors and the MOT. By providing some local services that should be rendered by the municipalities, Betuyab attempted to ensure that relations were established in a way that protected its own dominance. Power inequalities may also push some organisations to co-operate. The refusal of some weaker organisations (e.g. municipalities, the NPS) to accommodate the demands of stronger agencies (e.g., the MoT, Betuyab) appears to have had serious consequences for the weaker organisations. The case study further suggests that in this Turkish context the planning mediator might best be an external body with very little to gain from the planning outcomes. In this case, Betuyab acted as an informal mediator between the national and local organisations, but the problems seem to have been interpreted according to their own organisational ideologies and the solutions reflected their own goals.

9.4.10 Trust is central to the building and continuation of mutually satisfying inter-organisational relations and trust grows by its use.

Trust is the basic element that fosters co-operation and co-ordination among stakeholders involved in the tourism planning process. Understanding the elements contributing to the restricted level of trust among stakeholders clearly needs more attention. To understand it better, one needs to focus on historical relations among organisations. The case study suggests that the more diverse the group, the less likely it is to secure trust, and thus the more difficult it is to sustain interorganisational arrangements. Trust requires a common set of values to operate between stakeholders. Conflicts over controversial issues may deplete trust. Much attention in conflict resolution and mediation needs to be given to the social and political contexts.
within which tourism development occurs and conflicts arise. The study shows that taking legal action against one another in order to resolve problems may even lead to greater conflicts between parties. Therefore, different forms of conflict resolution must be sought through which trust can develop. It is also shown that information sharing is critical to the building of trust in planning. Tourism planning often gives rise to new organisational structures and/or responsibilities (Hall 2000). Some stakeholders, because of their power and position may have more access to information than others and unless this information is shared with others mistrust may prevail.

9.4.11 Several explicit structural and behavioural disincentives to co-ordination may exist.

The literature suggests that when faced with complex problems that are beyond the capabilities of any one organisation to resolve, the organisation may engage in joint arrangements to cope with this complexity. This study suggests that this may not be so. In addition to structural obstacles, the study shows that in the Belek context the low commitment of organisations to co-ordination and co-operation constituted a behavioural obstacle. There may be several reasons underlying such a low level of commitment. Partisanship clearly provides disincentives to co-ordination. The perceived costs involved in co-ordination may also deter municipalities from establishing co-ordination. Since in Belek they appeared to communicate little with one another, it is likely that they may have few grounds on which to build any type of co-ordination. Some mayors may see co-ordination as too costly due to their own weak organisational resources. Resource inadequacy may be perceived to form an inferior position in exchange relations. The fear of losing autonomy may be another deterrent. Getting municipalities to see co-ordination and co-operation with other municipalities of opposing political parties as a feasible and desirable alternative certainly requires education about the advantages. Co-ordination is also low between different governmental tiers. The administrative tutelage imposed by Turkey’s central government on local government and the attitude of central officials have inhibited the formation of voluntary co-ordination between local and central organisations. The locus of decision-making and structural differences between private and public organisations are other significant factors hindering co-ordination. In essence, many of the factors necessary for successful co-ordination were not in place. This augurs
badly for the future effectiveness of the BMP. However, it should be noted that co-
ordination is only one form of interorganisational linkage, involving a partial pooling
of assets. Betuyab uses a somewhat less involving strategy of placing one of its
representatives on the municipal committee of Belek town. Although this arrangement
does not involve the same degree of commitment of resources as co-ordination, it
nevertheless has facilitated more stable interactions between Betuyab and the
Municipality over time. This practice has provided the opportunity to establish
friendships, the exchange of information, and identification with the focal
organisation (with the Belek Municipality).

9.4.12 Decentralisation: playing the same old song?
A major characteristic of centralised government, which causes management
inefficiency, is that public institutions are often geographically and socially remote
from local people. This study shows that the decisions taken in central government
may not reflect, or address local needs and problems. This may largely be because of
a lack of consultation with local people or with their representatives. Centralised
governance is slow as a result of lengthy bureaucratic procedures, prompted by laws
regulating interactions between government agencies at different levels and by
conflicting responsibilities and authorities. As a result, a more decentralised
management approach may be suggested in order to overcome these difficulties and
constraints. The forms of decentralisation are: (1) deconcentration, which refers to
transferring resources and decision-making from headquarters to other branches of
central government; (2) devolution, referring to devolution of resources and power to
autonomous units of government, such as municipalities and local governments; (3)
and delegation, meaning delegation of resources and power to organisations outside
the regular bureaucratic structures, such as public corporations and development
agencies. Table 9.4 shows the forms of Decentralised Administration in the literature.

Table 9.4 The forms of Decentralisation Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>De-concentration</th>
<th>Power transfer from headquarters to other branches of central government</th>
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<tr>
<td>Devolution</td>
<td>Power transfer to autonomous units of government, such as municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation</td>
<td>Power transfer to organisations outside the bureaucratic structures, such as development agencies</td>
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However, these alternative forms of governance did not find the level of support from the stakeholders interviewed that might be expected due to their inherent and more specific weaknesses in the Belek case. When carried out properly, these forms of devolution and delegation can make development programmes effective. However, decentralisation in a developing country context was perceived by the stakeholders to be problematic, as it may take the form of deconcentration, which implies that the potential benefits of decentralisation are likely to be enjoyed by dominant power groups, such as by the ruling political party, and not by the local people.

Both centralised and decentralised administrative forms fail to consider tourism management from a network perspective, which recognises that the multiple actors involved in plan formulation and implementation are essentially interdependent stakeholders. In other words, actors are dependent on each other because they need each other’s resources (of capital, technology, labour, expertise, and information) for goal achievement, as no organisation can generate independently all the necessary resources. Thus consideration needs to be given to a framework which endorses cooperation and co-ordination between interdependent parties with different and often conflicting rationality, interests and strategies. This may help to ensure that all decisions, policies, and activities are consistent and coherent and not at cross-purposes.

The success of tourism increasingly relies on the effectiveness and efficiency of the administrative framework. A framework which promotes participative decision-making, delineates clear balances between responsibility and authority, promotes cooperative relations and effectively co-ordinates the fragmented activities carried out by different public and private sector organisations undoubtedly enhances the chances of success. By contrast, a framework endorsing coercive decision-making, resulting in ambiguous balances between responsibility and autonomy, and inducing a distant bureaucracy and uneven power relations between public and private agencies can undermine the legitimacy of policy decisions and their implementation. Thus, successful tourism administration requires democratic and transparent participation in decision-making, and it promotes a greater accountability of institutions to the people.
they are instituted to serve, it increases the availability of information, and it optimises the use of resources by clarifying responsibilities, authority and standards.

The study suggests that decentralisation is not a relatively straightforward process of transfer of powers originally held by the centre to units of local government. The complex web of interorganisational relationship elements may still apply within a decentralised administration context. Transferring powers partially or completely to another organisation may not be a cure on its own. The question is not whose interests form the point of departure but how can mutual respect, understanding, trust and a shared vision be built. Decentralisation of administration can still create problems of co-ordination. A tourism project can fail, despite its apparent worth, simply because of the many levels of organisation through which it must pass to be implemented successfully. The problems of creating a tourism policy that can survive intergovernmental action may be overcome by including elements of both centralisation and decentralisation. Both administrative models have merits, and in some cases one would be more effective and economic than the other. Thus, the challenge for most governments is “to find a balance between centralised and decentralised arrangements and to link them in ways that promote development most effectively” Rondinelli and Nellis (1986: 11). What is the optimal mix is a challenging question.

9.5 Toward future research

Numerous planning paradigms, with slightly different considerations, have been proposed to guide stakeholders involved in the formulation of tourism plans. However, despite strictly following the guidelines and the often high level of goodwill that stakeholders have at the formulation phase, the majority of tourism plans either fall short of the ideal or are never initiated. The case investigated in this study did not escape from this legacy. Inadequate consideration seems to have been given to understanding the micro- and macro- organisational environment in which the planning was undertaken, and of the ways in which the planning and development process was carried out. A limited collective understanding of the pattern of relations, resources, and power interdependencies between the multiple agencies involved in the
decision-making process might have laid the foundation for most of the problems encountered.

This study has contributed to further research by bringing together, in a single study, the various issues creating problems associated with implementing a tourism policy in a developing nation context. The study results show that relationships between central and local organisations develop and operate within a broader socio-economic and political system. The environmental conditions are likely to determine the plan outcomes by laying the foundation for the relations and communication networks between different governmental levels. In this study, organisations at different scales had different values, ideologies, goals and interests. This has given rise to different interpretations of the problem at hand and therefore of the solutions. There are examples of local government and national organisations bargaining over the specific form and content of planning policies with regard to Belek and of local government simply not implementing central policies. This suggests that due attention needs to be given not only to the formal aspects of relationships, but also to their informal aspects, the strategies employed and the extent of bargaining (Rhodes 1980). Respondents interviewed did not see how the work of other organisations was important to their own. This independent stance, observed by Selin and Beason (1991), might have contributed to a lack of co-operative relations between national and local organisations. Neither local nor central government should be viewed as dependent or independent of the other levels, as linkages between levels of government are based on interdependence.

The study results showed how the structural dimensions of the environment influenced the nature of interorganisational relationships (Pearce 1992). The concentration, control and distribution of resources at the centre gave rise to conflicts among organisations competing for the same kind of resources. The power to formulate and implement policies between the national and local levels of public sector tourist organisations influenced the balance in central-local relations, which in turn affected the practice of local level tourism planning. Disequilibrium existed among the parties involved in the management plan. There was a low to non-existent domain consensus between central and local units, which has given rise to conflicts. For example, both central and local units assume that planning activity is in their
jurisdiction, and unless there is some agreement on this then either local or local government will be in a state of conflict with one another. Stakeholder organisations disagreed on the nature of the tasks of other organisations and on the appropriateness of the approaches to those tasks. There seemed to be little positive assessment of other parties’ competence and performance. The activities and programmes of stakeholder organisations involved in the plan have not been integrated with each other to secure effectiveness and efficiency. Because the commitment and contribution of organisational resources to shared work is low or modest, the relationships formed between organisations were difficult to maintain. Overall, the Belek area suffers from ambiguously defined authority. Further attempts should be made to realise new institutional arrangements that are needed for gathering and allocating necessary resources, renegotiating relationships, and co-ordinating and controlling implementation.

Planning is not simply about explicit planning but is probably an ongoing process in which a number of factors play a role: environmental, organisational, individual and so on. Successful interorganisational relationships are thus critical to the implementation of tourism plans. Consideration needs to be given to the character of the interactions between various actors in the system (patterns of interaction), and the distribution of roles and duties between and within sub-systems. Understanding organisations involved in planning is the important first step towards identifying and devising action points in order to build interorganisational relationships. In this analysis, the issues of relative power, and of control of, and access to, resources must receive attention. There is a tendency to overlook the political side and barriers in discussions of interorganisational relationships in tourism. However, the autonomy and power relations depend on political circumstances. The level of understanding about how an organisation retains its autonomy whilst working jointly with other organisations needs to be expanded. The implications of different kinds of institutional arrangements may be great. Much more needs to be understood about different levels and forms of interactions between stakeholders, about elements that determine the form of these relations, and about formal and informal negotiations which may permeate all aspects of interorganisational relationships. Additional insight into principles for creating win-win negotiations in tourism planning contexts is needed, and this may constitute a fruitful research avenue.
By pooling or exchanging resources, tourism organisations can forge cost-effective solutions to challenges (Selin and Beason 1991). Interestingly, despite the scarcity of resources, organisations were not greatly involved in exchange relations, and most were in conflictual relations. One must note that building interorganisational relationships (co-ordination or co-operation) is not merely a technical issue about resources. It is a very human activity where success depends on the individuals’ ability to work together. Interorganisational relationships are neither automatic nor costless, and they have to be nurtured and invested in (Robinson 2001). There may be no easy blueprints for building interorganisational relationships, as this process may differ as a result of structural and organisational variations. However, the components of the conceptual framework and the conceptual themes developed for this research may constitute starting points for those interested in exploring interorganisational relations in tourism. This study pointed to a number of problems involved in implementing tourism policy in Belek, including the need to work with and through a large number of separate organisations. The planning effort needs to be fully cognizant of the implementation process. Interactions between organisations have crucial effects on the processes of both policy-making and implementation and these warrant far more attention than they have received to date. It is to be expected that some organisations will attempt to control complexity and turbulence to their advantage by limiting the access of other organisations to the necessary resources. Thus, interpretative case studies and longitudinal research are needed to explore whether and how co-ordination, co-operation or partnership between central and local organisations can successfully reduce uncertainty and turbulence.
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Appendix 1

Covering Letter for Semi-structured Interviews
Dear......

I am conducting research on tourism planning for a PhD thesis at Sheffield Hallam University, England.

The research examines the participation of organisations and other interested parties from government, the private sector and NGOs in tourism planning for the Belek Coastal Management Plan. The research will assess inter-organisational relations, notably between central and local government, with an interest in the formulation and implementation of the Belek Coastal Management Plan.

I would be grateful if you would agree to be interviewed in relation to this research. The purpose of the interview would be to discuss your organisation's views about the planning process for the Belek Coastal Management Plan. Your views will be very useful for the PhD research project. I can assure you that opinions expressed in the interview will be used strictly only for the purpose of academic research and will not be used in any other way.

I will contact you in the near future to schedule an interview with you and, if you are in agreement, to fix an appointment at a time and place most convenient for you.

Yours sincerely,

Research Co-ordinator

Fisun Yuksel

Dr. Atila Yuksel