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DECISION-MAKING IN
RESIDENTIAL RENEWAL

A THESIS PRESENTED FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

September 1978

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PREFACE

This thesis explores a mixed and varied area of urban studies and political science which has been largely ignored. It provides the basis for greater research, on both a wider scale involving a large sample group of district authorities, and in the use of intensive case study analysis.

I am indebted to numerous persons for their aid during this project, especially to the two supervisors of the work, Mr. B.J.A. Goodchild and Dr. W. Hampton. This work could never have been completed without the co-operation of many local authorities - notably the anonymous Northtown and Southfield districts - or without the academic and moral support of many members of the Department of Urban and Regional Studies at Sheffield City Polytechnic. I am very grateful to Joan Bell and Christine Marshall for deciphering and typing early drafts of the work, and to Janice Nunn for typing the final script. The first and last acknowledgement, however, must go to my wife, Tricia, for her constant patience and encouragement during this endeavour.
ABSTRACT

Housing is a key element in welfare policy and in environmental planning in modern Britain and as a finite commodity it has only a limited life. To maximise this life potential the improvement and renewal of dwelling units is necessary, and is an important aspect of both national and local housing policies.

Differences in attitude between these two tiers of government form a background to discussions on residential renewal; in particular disputes occur about the control of local aspects of policy which are also part of a wider national policy. This study examines the differences between local and central government approaches to renewal, and hypothesises that the structures, processes and policies utilised by the local district authorities do not conform to the directives, circulars and attitudes of the central government. Advice is given by the central authority as if it is applicable to all local district authorities. Instead the larger authorities with the greatest resources in capital and manpower capabilities often tend to ignore or adopt advice at a local level. Alternatively because of their limited capabilities the smaller authorities do follow the central government advice. However, the central advice, based on evidence from this study, is often inappropriate to their needs.

This study examines three key areas of interaction between local and central government involved in their decision-making processes of residential renewal; administrative structures, policy choice and development, and public participation. These three concepts are drawn from central government legislation and policy, and provides a conceptual framework in which to study the data obtained from two intensive case studies of district authorities - one large and one small - and from the larger questionnaire survey.
From the evidence collected three main conclusions are apparent. First, that the assumption that lower tier subordinate administrative units of government conform to instructions from above cannot be taken for granted. All the local district authorities do not interpret central government advice in the same manner. Secondly, two distinct groups of districts can be recognised by their size. This is developed into a dual model typology of size based on characteristics of administrative structures, policy and participation. The third conclusion is that the advice given by the central authority is inappropriate to the problems of small local authorities.
Introduction

Housing is a key commodity and resource in physical, social and economic terms. It is also a finite resource having a limited life in both the physical sense of the structure of the dwelling, and in a social sense based on the standards demanded by society. A roof over one's head is assumed in our society to be a basic necessity of life, but this minimum condition is not really satisfactory. Modern society demands minimum standards in design, facilities and densities well above this basic criterion. Standards demanded change: dwelling units become obsolete or undesirable, or other land uses take over the dominant role in previously residential areas. This contributes to what is conceived by the mass media as part of the 'housing problem'. As housing stock declines it becomes in need of renewal - by redevelopment or modernisation. The problem is further complicated by the large numbers of homes involved, their locations and the decisions on the best policies needed to create the best results.

Which agency has the responsibility for taking these decisions is also a basic and important aspect of residential renewal. Both central government at a national policy level and the local district authority involved directly on the ground see themselves as playing the major role, but the central authority has the ultimate control. Central government is responsible for overall national policy and expects the districts to co-operate with it to achieve these policies.
objectives within the local district areas. Residential renewal policy in both national and local terms is not solely involved in the physical renewal of poor quality housing and/or clearance and redevelopment. More recently it has been seen as a tool for achieving parallel social objectives of government. These social objectives are stressed throughout recent legislation, and must be seen as part of both central and local government policy on residential renewal.

Under the 1969 Housing Act, Circular 65/69 Appendix B, paragraph 1, it is stated:

"Local authorities are not undertaking area improvement simply for economic reasons but also for social ones - to benefit the conditions in which people are living who have not been able to secure these benefits for themselves".

With the development of the 1969 Housing Act into the 1974 Housing Act the social objectives of renewal policies were reaffirmed:

"The Secretary of State will look to Local Authorities to consider, particularly in the context of priority neighbourhoods, housing action areas and general improvement areas, how they can extend their operations beyond the improvement and control of the housing situation towards the achievement of wider social objectives."

(Department of Environment Circular 13/75 para 28)

So the overall policy of residential renewal, at a general level, may be seen as a policy involving physical, economic and social objectives, but also restrained in its development by those same objectives. It is currently a priority programme for government action, under a series of collective umbrellas such as Inner Area Studies or Urban Aid programmes, as well as Local Authority plans. For this reason the research project is bound up with many similar and dissimilar projects which are examining a complex and potentially controversial subject area.
Central government issues advice and instructions to the district authorities on how to organise and operate various aspects of their local renewal policy to suit national policy and procedural objectives. This study examines a single area of England and how the district authorities use, interpret or disregard this central government advice and directives with regard to residential renewal. The hypothesis that this project examines is, that the decision making processes and structures of local district authorities do not always lead to the implementation and processing of the policy of residential renewal as it appears to be outlined in central government directives. The volume of government directives makes it impossible to examine them all, therefore stress is made of particular objectives based around social considerations. It appears from such directives that there are three core elements to any discussion of residential renewal. Both the 1969 Housing Act Circular 65/69 paragraph 18 and the 1974 Housing Act Circular 14/75, Memorandum C paragraph 20 outline these key elements.

The Circular 14/75 states:

"The successful planning and execution of schemes of area improvement depends on three main factors: the organisation set up by a local authority to promote and administer the project; the formulation of realistic and economic proposals to form the basis for discussions; and the involvement of owners, residents and other interested parties in the scheme".

For this project these three elements may be translated into three categories: organisational and administrative structures; policy choice, development and implementation; and public participation, politics and democracy. It is around these three areas that the hypothesis is examined, and it is from these three key areas of study that the selected central government directives and circulars originate.
Historical Development of Residential Renewal Policies

The successful examination of current policy, administrative structures and democratic participation necessitates some basic understanding of the historical background to current residential renewal policy and organisation. The housing activity of many local district authorities was, for many years into the mid 60's, dominated by the need to clear and redevelop areas of old housing for which no other satisfactory solution was available, despite the existence of voluntary improvement grants of various types. Not unnaturally, run-down areas not already in clearance programmes were often assumed to be suitable only for demolition and redevelopment in due course. Adverse blighting effects of clearance and the dispersal of communities were seen as being more than out-weighed by the benefits conferred by the improvement of housing conditions and standards. In the mid to late 1960's, except in a few major cities, the programmes of large-scale slum clearance drew to a close. It was found difficult to justify clearance and redevelopment policies where some dwellings were fit or owner-occupied, and general resistance to such policies increased from many quarters. Why did this change in policy occur?

First, there was a change in the emphasis on the types of housing stock being cleared. The most delapidated dwellings with little scope for building improvements due to their size, design and external layout had been cleared and redeveloped so that clearance policy was suggested for better quality late Victorian and Edwardian properties. These latter dwellings had a far higher potential for improvement and were of a far greater quality in size, design and external layout than the previous types of artisan property cleared.

Secondly, after Bevan and MacMillan in the late 40's and early 50's, public sector housing tended to receive low political priority,
suffering from both government capital economies, and greenfield
development restrictions. Whereas internally the standard of
dwellings did not vary widely, the external space designs declined
from the early 1950's resulting in what might be regarded as
inferior street layouts to those of some Victorian and Edwardian
developments.

A further decline in public sector housing occurred in the late 1960's
with the use of non-traditional building methods and high-rise flats.
Although high-rise flats in particular were not popular with the
residents, they appeared to many planners, housing administrators and
politicians as yet another "final solution" to the urban housing
problem. The necessary units of housing were built in quantitative
terms, but the external environment and the social implications of
housing were largely ignored.

Present policy may be seen as a reaction against comprehensive
redevelopments and the 1960's era of high-rise developments. Since
1969 and the advent of General Improvement Areas (GIAs) under the
Housing Act, many areas of older housing has been given the promise
of a new lease of life. This particular policy is not discussed
here in much detail but it involved the declaration of specific areas
for the allocation of improvement grants for both physical dwellings
and the environment. The movement towards area rather than individual
dwellings being improved was chosen because:

"The effort and resources devoted to improvement provide
a much better return when directed to the upgrading of
whole areas - the houses and the environment. People
are more likely to find it worth their while to co-operate
and to maintain their houses after improvement; and the
remaining useful life of whole residential areas is extended by many years". (1)
Various problems with this policy, which are discussed in chapter five led in 1974 to the Housing Act developing concepts of housing action areas (HAA's) and priority neighbourhoods (PN's). These policies strengthened the hand of authorities needing to tackle, more effectively than hitherto, those areas of stress where progress depended on a concentration of effort. HAA's are similar to GIA's, but have wider powers in financial and social objectives. As a broad guide to physical factors, the condition of housing stock in HAA's is usually poorer than that in GIA's, but not so bad as to require early clearance. It was foreseen by central government directives that Priority Neighbourhoods would co-exist in policy with HAA and GIA action. As a mixed policy these mechanisms of renewal policy attempt to maximise the use of the available resources of the renewal areas. Residents and owners are much more likely to participate in and to contribute to, the improvement of their homes if they are assured that their whole neighbourhood has a secure future. In fact the role of residents and owners has changed in response to developments of residential renewal policies. Since the early 1960's demands for 'participation' have developed in industry, housing, planning and government in general. This is well illustrated in Circulars on area improvement policy issued by central government in the late 1960's and early 1970's (2). Damer and Hague suggest that in the field of residential renewal it has developed for two major reasons (3).

First, the cumbersome and inefficient nature of planning machinery in the early 1960's, and secondly as a political movement from a representative democracy towards a more participatory political system, although other commentators suggest this movement is almost imperceptible.
The Skeffington Report (4) concentrated on the first point to the exclusion of the second but, say Damer and Hague, educated the public into the planners perspective on environmental matters. The report reflects the ambiguity as to whether participation is a means to an end, or an end in itself. The change in political emphasis was based upon a moral/social recognition that poverty still existed despite claims of a planning 'solution'. As attitudes in society and the local community altered, so the actions of the central state were seen to be rigid and impersonal. The community felt threatened by the large scale bureaucracy of the state and thus demands for greater community participation in politics evolved in an attempt to replace the elitist group of political representatives who were often seen as alienated from the community.

Bearing this development of participation and community action in mind, the need to respond to the democratic demands of the public became imperative and consequently was incorporated into the 1969 and 1974 Housing Acts. With the need for flexibility as a result of public participation local authorities were encouraged to develop policies of co-ordinated and continuous renewal that were flexible enough to avoid disruption to, and indeed to enhance, the local established communities.

One physical restraint on improvement as a housing policy is that the house as a man-made dwelling unit has a limited life. This 'life' is determined not only by physical standards, but by social and economic conventions. These conventions and rules, although rather abstract, limit the suitability and quality of dwellings acceptable for human habitation. The majority of Victorian working class
dwellings which failed to reach these quality standards have been demolished. On the other hand, current renewal policy mostly deals with dwellings built in the late 19th and early 20th centuries which are seen to satisfy basic quality demands and have the potential to be modernised. For improved dwellings, the timescales of life create further problems with the quality of the local environment. Whereas dwellings improved in action areas should be fit and acceptable for thirty years, standards change over time. This may mean that the standard of dwellings which have been improved may be either too low or too high for future individual and national standards developing in the next three decades. This question has been highlighted in studies like Norman Dennis's work on slum clearance in Sunderland (5). He contends that standards imposed by "planners" were far higher than those desired by local residents. Similar conclusions are reached in J. Davies's study of Newcastle (6), and Alison Ravetz's overview of the housing poor (7). Both suggest that the imposition of middle-class values and standards - Parker Morris Report (8), recommendations - leads to a contradiction between the objectives of social policy and practical constraints, eg:

"how to provide ideal housing at the cost levels we were willing to afford, and how to enable ordinary families to pay for it". (9).

Central government directives on goals and objectives in national housing policy take a long-term and macro-level, nationally orientated outlook on housing problems. Alternatively, the local residents within an improvement area, take a more local short-term view of policy, based on what directly affects them now. Local authority officials serving both parties are thus caught in a difficult position, and ultimately as far as the residents are concerned may appear to ignore
current local objectives in favour of long-term national policy. This appearance may occur because of the timescales involved in the bureaucratic mechanisms and control practices of government: a problem which is fundamental to decision-making where many tiers of organisations are involved and which affects residential renewal in particular. It is very hard for the layman in an improvement area to understand all the complexities and constraints of government, state intervention and general bureaucracy that underlies all improvement policy, legislation and action; a fact that is perhaps recognised by central government in their development of public participation. Timescales developed in local or central government may seem fair and appropriate but to the layman who is waiting for action they seem infinite. Despite its bureaucracy, local and central government planning was traditionally seen as the solution to urban problems. However, now it is seen only as a part of the problem (10). The changes in local and central government relationships and the role of government intervention, all contribute to the problem. But is change, resultant from intervention perceived in the same manner by government and community?

As Hampton says:

"Many of the same forces which are leading to a growth in scale in local authority provision, education and rising expectations for example, are leading also to people being less willing to accept decisions made by a remote bureaucracy". (11).

A comment, it would seem, which points towards governmental intervention for change as being a part of the urban problem. This is especially apparent in relations to the public regarding timescales and standards of dwellings.
Institutional Constraints and Governmental Relationships

Neither central nor local government actions, procedures and processes can be discussed in an isolated manner as the two tiers of government are essentially inter-related. In residential renewal at its broadest, central government is usually represented by the Department of the Environment (D of E) through its regional offices. In both residential renewal processes and in government in general, we find that the two levels 'live off' each other, each dominant in specific areas with the power balance fluctuating over time. Neither could legitimately claim to be able to function well independently of the other, flexibility and adaptiveness being the key elements of the relationship.

As Sharp states:

"While the Ministry ordinarily leaves the initiative to the individual authorities, it frequently exhorts authorities at large to particular policies by manual or circular; and sometimes urges individual authorities to particular action e.g. to push up their home building project" (12).

The Ministry maintains the dominant role, the vital key to which is the central government control of capital expenditure. The real power of the central government departments is reflected in directives where the Secretary of State has the power to veto local authority proposals. However, this power is not implemented unless it is really deemed as necessary by central government. The reasons for this lack of local autonomy according to Circular 14/75 are:

"powers under section 37 of the Act (1974 Housing Act) are intended as a safeguard, necessitated by the implications of HAA declarations for the residents and owners of property in the areas concerned and for the deployment of public resources, against the possibility of excessive, premature, or inappropriate declarations" (13).

These same powers, or safeguards apply to action undertaken in Priority Neighbourhoods and General Improvement Areas.
One area where the relationship between local and central government has changed is at times of political disagreement on policies. The Ministry is becoming increasingly interventionist, perhaps as a reflection of an overall trend in the 'nationalisation' of local politics, although in many cases prior intervention is based upon promoting the national interest and national policy objectives. The Minister directs the local authority on a particular course of administration or policy and seeks a mandate to approve all courses of action which it deems to be of importance. This thus creates disequilibrium in the power relationship between the two tiers, and may often cause resentment, fear, and further complexity in an already complicated relationship. Bearing all these problems in mind, head-on clashes between local and central government are minimal. The existence of a good working relationship is in the interests of officials at all levels of government. The most powerful weapon in serious clashes is the Ministry's control of the Loan Sanction, which means that no local authority can borrow money, without the sanction of the Minister, except by an Act of Parliament. The latest tool of financial control by the central authority involves Housing Investment Programmes (HIP's). Other control mechanisms used by central government in their relations to local districts include three formal mechanisms: the use of Circulars; Consultation powers; and Adjudicatory functions. These mechanisms and HIP's are discussed in more detail in Appendix D.

As Circulars are a key element of this study, it must be pointed out that together with advice notes and other specialist publications, they are used to impose approved patterns of behaviour on local authorities. This study hypothesises, however, that although the
advice given is normative, it is not implemented in all the district authorities in either the same manner, or to the same degree as the central authority intended. Cullingworth (14) says that in the power balance, various constraints on the local authority exist. They are 'creatures of statute' restricted to specific areas of authority by Acts of Parliament, they must act 'intra vires', this thus affects the scope and methodology of policies. The justification of this constraint is simply that the personal and property rights of individuals are involved, and that individuals may need protection against the arbitrary action of public authorities as they do against private companies. As Cullingworth suggests:

"The fact that the local authorities are charged with acting in the public interest (morally if not statutorily) does not mean that they are immune from the dangers of an over-zelous interpretation of their role or an inadequate consideration of the rights of individuals" (15).

Ultimately, however, central government has the final weapon of control: the withdrawal or restriction of finance capital to implement policy. The powers of the Minister to reduce or discontinue subsidies where local authorities have failed to discharge the duties imposed on them is the major constraint on the local government 'initiative' role. This is fundamental to policy when it is remembered that the local authority requires approval from central government for borrowing.

The latest financial tool of government - HIP's - look progressive. On the one hand the local authorities appear to get more autonomy, whereas on the other the public sector borrowing requirements can be centrally controlled. But, the idea is being put forward by central government at a time when public expenditure on housing is being cut back from a peak of £2,721m in 1974/75 to £1,849m in 1976/77 and £1,433m and £1,409m in 1977/78 and 1978/79 respectively (16).

Basically, the new system imposes cash limits upon local authorities
capital expenditure on housing, but these help to develop greater, not less central government financial control.

Before 1974 local authorities had greater freedom to spend money as they wanted, apart from the housing yardsticks on new building projects. So the greater freedom is only relative to the tightening control of the last three years! Local authorities still need to argue for as much flexibility as possible within the new system if the aim of more local autonomy is to be achieved. Whereas the expenditure groups are cut down to three for 1978/79, the local authorities really seek a single block allocation to spend as they wish, with an even greater 'tolerance' to carry over capital from year to year. (See Appendix D for further details).

At present applications for housing cost yardsticks will still be necessary, although they could be included under negotiations for housing investment programme capital. But are financial yardsticks necessary? In principle it could be maintained that detailed controls could and should be abolished. However, there is an alternative argument that the yardsticks involve useful financial limitations, and that local authorities adhere to their own local cost guidelines anyway. The use of loan sanctions as a policy for 1978/79 depends upon what decisions are taken on scheme control - yardsticks and cost limits - but no simplification is expected. So the HIP's seem rather muddled and also look as if they are giving autonomy with one hand of central government and taking it back, possibly with greater central restrictions, on the other. Thus they must be seen as a restrictive control mechanism of central government. For the future, many suggestions have been made regarding housing finance.
Notably the idea of Housing Policies and Programmes (HPP's). The concept of the HPP document was put forward by Cullingworth when he said:

"The duties of local authorities would be redefined to require them to produce comprehensive housing strategies. They would submit to central government annually a review of their housing situations, the steps they propose to take to meet identified problems, and the resources necessary to enable them to do so" (17).

HPP's as a policy framework for any type of housing investment programmes have not been sanctioned by central government, but many authorities, notably the Greater London Council have prepared or are preparing one. The scope of the HPP is seen as extending to all of the main housing policies of the local authority, not just residential renewal, and also involves housing associations and the major problems of the private sector development (18). The question is as with that for central government advice, would HPP's be suitable for all district authorities, or are the models based too greatly on the evidence of London's problems? This is outside the scope of this study, but HPP's do imply greater localised policy autonomy for the districts if applicable throughout their varying sizes.

Conclusion

The basic hypothesis of this study is that the decision-making processes and structures of local district authorities do not always lead to the implementation and processing of the policy of residential renewal as it appears to be outlined in central government directives. This chapter has briefly examined the historical, administrative and general background to renewal policy, but the key to this study in many senses is the relationship between the two tiers of government; the demands for local autonomy on the one hand and planned control and direction on the other. The term 'partnership' between the two
tiers does not appear to be appropriate. As Cullingworth says:

"This may imply rather more harmony than in reality exists, or can be hoped to exist, but it does highlight the fact that it is impossible to say who has 'the last word' and that it is not always the centre which leads while the locality 'follows.' (Indeed much of the political pressure for housing reforms have come from local rather than central government)". (19).

Throughout the historical evolution of residential renewal policy, from voluntary improvement grants and clearance policies, to area policies and suggestions of gradual renewal, the balance of power between local and central government fluctuates. The present trend is towards greater central control based on economic policies and restrictions, but even these must fit the parallel social aspects of national renewal policy. As this relationship changes, if central government intervention increases its scope, as is suggested by some commentators, then the bureaucratic and administrative links and processes impinging upon local government will automatically become more complex as the amount of information input demanded increases. For this reason demands to lessen this input occur, and are attempted by decentralisation and delegation, whilst still retaining control in the central state structure. The control, instead of being based upon day-to-day examination of processes and procedures of decision-making, involves a wider strategy of overall strategic control at both local and national levels. This is the pattern that emerges in modern Britain as far as residential renewal policy is concerned.

The imposition of new legal, financial and administrative sanctions directs local authorities towards specific strategies which still allow a central assessment of performance from the higher authority, the national state. This assumes, however, that all the local district authorities react in the same way to central government directives and that they all have both the will, and the capacity in local resources,
to fulfill the demands of the central authority's policy of residential renewal; both in its 'agency' and 'initiative' elements. This study hypothesises that all the district authorities do not develop decision-making structures, procedures and processes of residential renewal in this way, but that size is the key factor in their interpretation. This contention is examined through the three key areas outlined earlier, and which form the basis of the central governments schemes for area improvement; administrative structures; policy choices and developments; and public participation and democracy.
Chapter One: References

1. MHLG - Housing Act 1969: Area Improvement Circular 65/69, paragraph 3, HMSO 1969

2. See: MHLG DOE - Op Cit, paragraph 18
   Housing Act 1974: Parts IV, V and VI, Memorandum C para 20 (circular 14/75), HMSO, 1975
   Public participation is a fundamental key to residential renewal and is legally incorporated into various policies.


5. N. Dennis - People and Planning, Faber & Faber, 1970.


9. A. Ravetz - Op Cit, p11


11. Ibid - p.169


13. DOE - Op Cit, memorandum A, paragraph 28


15. Ibid - p.60

16. Cmd 6721-1

17. J.B. Cullingworth - "Housing priorities and inflation" in Housing Review January/February, 1976.
18. The functions of the HFP include:

(a) The provision of the reasoned basis for the HIP bid, and the application of systematic and comprehensive approaches to the formulation of policies and goals, all within what might be seen as a 'rational' planning framework.

(b) It provides a comprehensive statement of council policies for both members and officials and can act as a basis for public participation and discussion.

(c) Internally, it allows a framework for considering resource allocations and any virement alternatives.

(d) It is structured for efficient management, allowing a review of 'effectiveness' of policies and thus a structure for continued policy.

This latter point of effectiveness is problematic. Can the real effectiveness of policies be measured by the achievement of any type of goals, in either an organisational or socio-economic sense? Despite this question HFP's do provide a normative model based on rational principles. However, it assumes that these are desirable and efficient for all local authorities whereas perhaps the models are based too greatly on the evidence of London's problems. For this reason they may not be applicable to smaller provincial authorities, although they do imply great localised autonomy for policy.

CHAPTER TWO
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction
The problems of research methodology in all social scientific research are wide and varied, based as it is on the claims that society and its complex workings can be rationalised into limited theories or models. Within a dynamic society that is continually changing both in socio-moralistic characteristics, and in its relationship to its physical environment, the application of pure scientific analysis is both too simplistic and too rigid to be anything but limited in its usefulness.

Traditionally the social sciences have been too limited in their approaches to problems of society, often using singular and thus limited methods of investigation, and falling into the trap of ethnocentricity, comparing all societal traits with either their own personal examples, or those of their own society.

Attempts are often made to develop universal models and theories of various aspects of society (e.g. Urban spatial and social structures), but too often the ideas are based on limited examples taken at specific locations in time and space. This is an acceptable and useful method of analysis, but when extended in scope and applied as a 'universal norm', it is often found to be limited outside the environment in which it was designed. It must be stressed for all social scientific research that the limitations of models and theories are great, and that although they are useful as comparative case studies of differences in time and space, they can rarely be used as universally applicable in the same dimensions.
Research Methodology

With these general points borne in mind the research methodology of this project has attempted an alternative approach to social scientific research. By first defining general aims, objectives and potential subject areas to be studied this project develops a continuous and broad analysis of the subject areas of housing, planning, local and central government. It examines the most interesting characteristics of each inter-related field of study with regard to the specific, yet general and fluctuating, subject area of decision-making in residential renewal. This is the basic methodology employed by Glaser and Strauss (1), called grounded theory.

In this methodological approach, a wide variety of data input is collected from around the broadest part of the subject area, and then inferences and key aspects, as seen by the researcher, are drawn from the data. This approach when used in this project reflected the immense subject area involved in residential renewal and local government decision-making processes, varying from inner city ghettos to complex network library systems of information flows. The acceptance of pre-conceived ideas of the nature of the subject area was therefore accepted, and the use of grounded theory helped to develop and inter-relate these key concepts in particular directions of study.

Finally, a mixed approach was adopted involving questionnaire probing, interviews and comparative case study analysis, although the feasibility of developing general overviews or theories of decision-making in residential renewal was discounted. Initially, case studies were undertaken in a pilot group of local district authorities to develop a broad background to the specific problem area. These involved
formal interviews, informal discussions and non-participant observation to build up a general picture of local authority workings from which to design a questionnaire. In two of the authorities, chosen because of their differences in what might be termed organisational or management techniques, case studies continued throughout the period of the research and regular contacts were maintained so as to observe changes over time both in the physical and socio-economic environments.

Thus, three key stages within the mixed research methodology emerged: first, initial background interview case studies; secondly, questionnaire data investigations; and thirdly, comparative case study analysis. All three stages were closely inter-related and the knowledge gained in one was accumulated to develop a changing picture over time and space.

Problems and reservations associated with any methodology still occur. Were the initial interviews producing accurate data or was a public relations exercise being undertaken? Observation was important in this problem, although the informal discussion, answers, and comments were compared with the formal answers obtained in the questionnaires. The initial pilot interviews together with the comparative case studies provided an essential guide to the content and framework of the questionnaire. This was essential because without careful preparatory work and alternative validation measures (e.g. interviews and case studies) questionnaires may yield superficial and/or misleading results.

The other potential problem was response rates: 80% of those circulated with questionnaires replied however; 77% providing usable data.

As well as the questionnaire data, the mixed approach allowed the case study authorities to be continually assessed from the initial interview.
stage. The main problem being, were they representative of the wider questionnaire survey group? This could be tested by including them in the same procedures as the questionnaire group and analysing the results in relation to it. This was done and both the case studies of Northtown and Southfield (3) were found to illustrate key characteristics of various differences within the questionnaire sample. The validity of this combination of case studies, examined within a comparative analysis framework, rests upon its use in similar social science studies of urban sociology and organisation studies (4).

This leads to an alternative approach to a traditional field of study. Throughout this mixed methodological approach, various levels of study are also undertaken. Basically macro level structures of general or national policies and characteristics are outlined through questionnaire structures and initial secondary data investigation, whilst a micro, local or personal level of analysis is found in both initial interview discussions and in the case studies. This creates a vertical dimension of study to add to the horizontal dimensions of time and space usually examined, although throughout this general methodology a continuous assessment, feedback and reassessment of data and methodological approach is attempted.

Research Outline

Bearing in mind the overall, but general, research methodology outlined previously, this specific project's research outline is based on a similar structure. In the same way that government action on renewal schemes is said to be dependent upon three key factors:

"... the organisation set up by a local authority to promote and administer the project; the formulation of realistic and economic proposals to form the basis for discussion; and the involvement of owners, residents and other interested parties" (5).
So the project has three key elements of administrative structures, policies and participation/democracy.

Having introduced the broad subject area of residential renewal in chapter one and briefly explained the relationship between local and central tiers of government, it is necessary to relate the methodology and background approaches to the empirical data collected. This empirical data has been obtained from two major sources, first, through the initial informal interviews which were developed into the two case studies; and secondly, through the questionnaire. The questionnaire was based on the reactions of the initially interviewed authorities and before its final design form (See Appendix A) was tested in a pilot scheme on these local authorities.

From the empirical data collected the three key elements of administrative structure, policies and participation/democracy were defined and paralleled with central government directives. It is from these key elements that the structure of the project originates. A further brief introduction to the sample area is made later in this chapter to provide a regional and local focus for discussion of the project findings with regard to national trends for the whole of England.

When discussing the administrative structure and processes of local government it has been necessary to examine briefly the radical changes in the reorganisation of functions and roles of local authorities under the 1972 Local Government Act. This is particularly necessary when examining the Bains Report with regard to Corporate Management, because central government directives on residential renewal continually stress the necessity of such management techniques.

Chapter three therefore examines how the sample local authorities organise in relation to such management structures and examines their
general administrative structures for decision-making. Chapter four examines how the local district authorities relate to other tiers of government - County and regional DOE - and how this pattern is changing in the sample survey area.

Policy choices and developments with regard to residential renewal will be discussed in chapter five, and this will include a more detailed examination of the central government directives on area residential renewal action under the 1969 and 1974 Housing Acts. It will specifically examine what happens in local authorities with regard to policy choice, and how quickly they adapt, if they do so, to changes in central government policy initiatives. The process of implementation of policies and the question of who is involved in such decision-making processes, will be discussed in chapter six, as will the possibility of any classification of implementation structures. Specific questions will be examined about the use of central government area improvement note 11 on Networks for Local Authority decision-making.

The third key area of public participation and democracy will be examined directly through looking at the mechanisms used by local authorities. Stress will be placed on community groups and their origins and roles with regard to both central and local government. The formal mechanisms of democratic participation, i.e. Councillors, are also examined both in their individual personal role as constituency members of the council and in their collective committee roles.

The concluding chapter will attempt to justify or refute the hypothesis, and will see if any major distinctions occur between authorities based on size. It is further hypothesised that such a distinction will occur with regard to central government directives and circulars being of
least use to the smaller authorities with smaller uniquely localised problems of residential renewal. Possibilities as to the future potential for similar research projects will also be suggested as well as the constraints of such future action.

Sample Area for Questionnaire Survey

The sample area for the questionnaire survey involved all the local district authorities in the D of E Regions of the East Midlands and Yorkshire/Humberside and in the county of Cleveland. This includes local district authorities in the counties of: Humberside, South Yorkshire, North Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Cleveland, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Lincolnshire, Leicestershire and Northamptonshire, an area of approximately 12,750 square miles with an approximate total population of 9.5 million.

In formal administration terms the sample area is divided into:-

- 47% District Councils
- 33% Borough Councils
- 7% City Councils
- 7% Metropolitan Borough Councils
- 6% Metropolitan City Councils

But this is really only a two-fold division into metropolitan and non-metropolitan districts based on functions and responsibilities (See Appendix 3). The size of authorities varies from 748,000 population to 30,000 population. For the handling of the data and because size is considered to be a fundamental criteria in analysing different problems for the local authorities, the population sizes were ranked and divided into three major categories or classes.

CLASS 1 Local authorities with populations over 100,000 inhabitants.
(Average size 233,800) (34% of sample)

CLASS 2 Local authorities with populations between 70,000 and 99,999 inhabitants
(Average size 84,000) (32% of sample)
CLASS 3 Local authorities with populations of less than 70,000 inhabitants (Average size 54,600) (34% of sample)

(Figures from Municipal Year Book 1977, i.e. May 1976).

As seen from the above statistics, over 60% of the local authorities contain populations of less than 100,000, thus implying small housing stocks and mixed rural-urban environments, and unequal distributions of population in spatial terms. As not all the authorities chose to answer all the questions the sample size may differ between questions. For this reason the use of percentage figures occurs allowing direct comparisons to be more easily made. The political control of the area is shown in Figure 2.1, which has been classified according to the classes of size defined above.

**Figure 2.1. Political control of local authorities in sample area**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CLASS ONE ( n = 15 )</th>
<th>CLASS TWO ( n = 14 )</th>
<th>CLASS THREE ( n = 15 )</th>
<th>OVERALL SAMPLE ( n = 44 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Control</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Control</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Control</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Overall Controlling Party</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977)

The overall picture of political control reflects the fact that a Labour Government was in control nationally, although central government directives on residential renewal do not appear to fluctuate greatly with changes of either central or local government control. With the Labour Party in control in Westminster a swing to the Tory Party in
the lower tiers of government was expected and was especially notable in the largest, Class One authorities. 40% of these authorities had changed control in the previous five years, mostly from Labour to Tory control. None of these authorities however said that this had any major policy implications for local decision-making in residential renewal. In this largest class by size, all the local authorities are controlled by one of the two major parties, both of whom are committed to policies of residential renewal through rehabilitations of dwellings and environmental improvement. Class Two, has an interesting pattern of control, with by far the largest number of authorities with no overall controlling party (57%). This perhaps is a result of the changes in control over the last five years that have involved 29% of these authorities, most of whom have changed from single party control—mostly Labour, but some previously Tory—to a mixed pattern of no majority controlling party. Surprisingly, only one Local authority (No. 30) specifically stated that this led to policy and procedural difficulties in governing. This authority was traditionally Labour controlled and had been involved in an unexpected change of control. No other authorities saw any serious implications in local political changes. Whereas the class one authorities were either large cities or largely urban dominated areas, the local authorities in this class varied. The majority are small market towns with rural hinterlands, or are small concentrated industrial centres surrounded by rural constituencies with a widely distributed population, and consequently widely distributed problems of residential renewal.

In the class three areas, the Tories traditionally have been strong and this is reflected in present patterns of control. Only 13% of the authorities have had any major changes in political power over the last
five years, with no major policy or structural implications for decision making in residential renewal.

Overall the sample area must be seen as diverse, ranging from Metropolitan urban authorities to small rural town authorities. Hence the question arises of the applicability of central government's general directives on residential renewal being applicable to all varied and often contradictory types of local authority.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined briefly the general problems of social science research methodology, and has attempted to develop a more mixed approach to the data so as to lessen these limitations.

The methodology employed has three key elements: initial background pilot case studies and interviews; the questionnaire sample survey; and comparative case study analysis. All these three elements of the methodological approach are linked and involve continuous adaptation and flexibility in response to changing legislation, social norms and values and the physical environment. They form the basis of the empirical analysis that involves three key elements similar to those suggested by central government directives: administrative structures, policy choices and public participation/democracy. Throughout the examination of these factors data will be obtained both from the questionnaires and from the case studies to provide two levels of analysis: the macro/regional level, and the micro/local level.

The sample area for the survey has been outlined with stress placed on the population sizes involved and the diversity in both this aspect and in the wider physical environment, both urban and rural. The contextual background is thus established on which to build the empirical and theoretical core of the project.
Chapter Two: References

1. B. Glaser and A. Strauss - The Discovery of Grounded Theory
   Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968

2. See: A.V. Cicourel
   - Method and Measurement in Sociology,
     N.Y. Free Press, 1964
   A.N. Oppenheim
   - Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement, Heinemann, 1966

3. For reasons of confidentiality no names of local authorities are given throughout this project. The two case studies are given the pseudonyms Northtown and Southfield and all the other authorities are identified by numbers.

4. See: P.M. Blau and M.W. Meyer, A. Strauss
   - Bureaucracy in Modern Society,

5. DOE
   - Housing Act 1974: Parts IV, V, VI,
     Circular 14/75, Memorandum C, paragraph 20, HMSO, 1975
CHAPTER THREE

ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Introduction
As explained in earlier chapters the main structure of this research project is built around the three key factors of administrative organisation, policy development and implementation, and participation/democracy. This chapter examines the first concept as it provides an opening into the working environment in which the problems of decision-making in residential renewal are set. The general administrative structures of local government were reorganised in 1972 under the Local Government Act. This Act reorganised the structure and procedures of local authorities in an attempt to develop coherent and more equal powers for various authorities. Whether this development was necessary or not is outside the scope of this project, but the fact that changes did occur is important. The 1972 Act was an attempt to keep up with the demands of an everchanging dynamic society. It established a two-tier vertical structure of local government below the central government structures - namely County and District authorities. Across these vertical tiers is a horizontal functional division based on the responsibilities of local government. This introduces metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas, corresponding spatially to areas of continuous large-scale urbanisation, and alternatively areas where town and country merge into what is perceived as a 'natural' unit of administration. Within the counties are new districts; these may include former county boroughs reduced in both status and power, as well as borough councils, urban and rural district authorities. The reduction of these authorities creates further conflict about management techniques, as their retained resources may be
different from those of the other district authorities designated before
the 1972 Act, which are now also part of the same new district authority.
This difference is important with regard to the patterns of decision-
making in residential renewal, as experience, aspirations and values
of districts may differ as widely as does their spatial area and
residential infra-structure.

Reorganisation should have led to the development of similar local
district authorities both in general terms and specifically in their
administrative structures of residential renewal. This chapter
examines this latter point, and asks the question: do all the local
authorities develop the same structures of administration on which to
build their residential renewal policies? If not, does any particular
pattern emerge? It also examines the notion that; if corporate manage-
ment is the key structure outlined in central government advice, do all
the local authorities interpret and utilise such concepts in the same
way?

To answer these questions it is necessary to examine briefly the roles
and functions of the new local district authorities (1), as well as
the circulars and advice notes circulated by the central government.
This will provide a background against which to examine the use of
corporate management techniques and the general administrative structures
of the districts in the sample survey. This thesis hypothesises that
the processes and procedures in district authorities differ from those
perceived by the central authority, and thus questions whether local
government functions independently of, or is merely the local represen-
tative of, the central authority. Tony Eddision (2) sees the role of
local government as being determined by the legislation published through
its structure. He describes this role as the 'agency' role of local
government that allows central government to impose certain obligations
upon it. In other words, local authorities are seen as convenient
instruments for implementing the will of national government. This
is an idea that must be considered with regard to all policy, and
impinges upon all decision-making, especially our example of residen-
tial renewal. Backing for this attitude is given by the Maud Report
in 1967. This stated:

"Local Authorities occupy a wide range of subsidiary or
dependent positions in relation to Parliament and the
Central Government. Even where a local authority has legal
independence of action, it owes it to statute, and in any
case is likely to be dependent on the central government
for finance. It would be wrong to say that local authorities
have no life other than that which Parliament breathes into
them; but they have no purpose other than that which
Parliament allows". (3)

Thus the debate between the dominance of local or central government
continues, and as Cullingworth says, it is often impossible to say
who has 'the last word'. (4) The relationship is dynamic, and the
role of local government fluctuates along a continuum from 'agency' to
'initiative' roles, often dependent upon the wider socio-economic and
political environment. As mentioned in the introduction, the control
of finance capital by the central state provides a useful tool of
control and flexibility for the national government over the local
district authorities. Differences may also occur between district
authorities in their attitude to the central authority. For example,
in the two case study authorities, Northtown displays a rather aggressive
'initiative' attitude to its local DOE office as the representative of
central government involved in residential renewal. Southfield on the
other hand is far more conciliatory, and sees itself more as an
'agency' for implementing central government action.
Although it is not stated in the 1972 Local Government Act, both functions and the relationships to central government appear to be related to size, capacity and the former status of local authorities before reorganisation. Great rivalry is exhibited between the larger authorities and the local county tier and this can create additional problems in processes of decision-making of residential renewal where responsibilities overlap. The need for co-operation and co-ordination with the county tier of government is confirmed under the 1974 Housing Act (Circular 13/75):

"The location and scale of renewal is likely to be an issue of key importance for structure planning ... District Councils should, therefore, ensure that County Councils are kept informed of the broad features of their renewal strategies." (5)

The importance of this relationship and of general aspects of co-ordination both between levels of government, and within them between departments, cannot be ignored. Thus the need for corporate approaches to be examined. The relationship between the tiers of government is discussed in chapter four.

The Corporate Approach

Residential renewal is a complex and mixed policy of government with both national and local goals and diverse problems. The solutions to such complex problems, if such solutions exist, will not be accomplished through a single department of government, but by a more complex policy involving varying specialist components. These components within the largest local district authorities will need to be drawn from various departments, but must act in a related policy approach. Thus to achieve maximum utilisation of such specialist resources a co-ordinated process of resource allocation is necessary. This need was recognised by the central government in the 1969 Housing
Act Circular 65/69. For improvement area policy it states:

"Area improvement schemes cannot be planned and undertaken in isolation from much of the other work of a local authority - for example, housing, town planning, public health, highways, legal matters and finance; this means that area improvement cannot be done without reference to those dealing with such matters. Ministers are sure that in these circumstances every authority will wish to make arrangements at both committee and officer level for activities in a GIA to be co-ordinated and controlled. The advantages of centralising the direction of the work are that the committee (or perhaps, a sub-committee) and officers concerned:

i. can at all time take the initiative and supply a momentum to the job of improvement; and

ii. can become known locally as the point to which the people concerned can turn with questions or problems. The local authority is required by section 28(2) to give owners and residents the name and address of someone to whom enquiries and representations may be addressed." (6)

This statement illustrates both the suggestion and the need for local authorities to develop a co-ordinated approach to management. It also reflects the need for greater participation by the public in the overall processes of residential renewal and co-ordinated action from such participants in renewal schemes. In planning and housing terms we see both departments as essential elements in renewal areas. Co-ordination of their resources is desirable and to fulfill potential commitments it will be necessary, according to the DOE, to develop a comprehensive plan covering a local authority's district and including within its scope both privately-owned and community-owned housing.

A need for co-ordination and a corporate approach is thus stressed in general terms under the specific Housing Acts responsible for residential renewal. But, does co-ordination take place between various traditionally independent and often rival departments? Where more than a simple division exists, for example between the planning, housing and environmental health departments, corporate management in a formal sense is
more desirable than in the smaller authorities where informal contact between perhaps only two elements of the same larger department occurs. For example, Housing and Planning responsibilities may be held under the auspices of the Technical Services Department in the latter authorities, thus allowing greater internal department co-operation, or equally conflict, but at a more informal level. Traditional rivalries will exist in both situations, but corporatism may differ in its formal or informal application.

Sample Survey: Corporatism

The sample survey discovered great differences in the numbers of departments involved both in their general organisation and consequently in residential renewal. This difference may well be reflected in their attitudes to, use of, or dismissal of central government directives on corporate management.

Fig: 3.1: Separate Departments within Local District Authorities
(Classified in Classes by size)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total n = 44</th>
<th>Average number of departments</th>
<th>Range of differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CLASS ONE:</td>
<td>10 departments</td>
<td>5 to 26 depts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASS TWO:</td>
<td>6.5 departments</td>
<td>4 to 9 depts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASS THREE:</td>
<td>6 departments</td>
<td>5 to 8 depts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVERALL SAMPLE:</td>
<td>8 departments</td>
<td>4 to 26 depts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977)

In figure 3.1 an important division is apparent, not just between the three classes, but between Class One (Over 100,000 pop) and the rest of the sample. The local authority (No. 10) with 26 departments interestingly enough had been a model for experiments in corporate management, and was also one of the largest authorities. Considering
the number of departments within the various local authorities very few claimed to operate a specific residential renewal department. Of those that did, most in fact were independent Renewal or Improvement teams, or co-ordination units responsible for various housing or planning functions, either within or outside their indigenous departments.

In 1972, as a result of the Local Government Act mentioned earlier, the Bains Report (7) on the management and structure of the new local authorities was published. This report was the key to corporate management in local authorities and for many their possessing a copy seems to be the nearest they have been to enacting a corporate approach! In general terms corporate management means organised co-ordination, discussion and planning in an attempt to develop coherent and practical policies to local (micro) and regional or national (macro) problems. Any attempt at the development of such an approach and structure must be seen as an attempt to develop a decision-making structure and process that is rational, logical and diverse, encompassing all aspects of its specific problem, e.g. residential renewal. Corporatism as a central government directive is a normative approach and its success can be seen in figure 3.2 which shows the number of local authorities in the sample survey claiming to adopt a "corporate approach" to management.
The question is do all these local authorities really understand what corporate management is? It was continually advocated in the Housing Acts, but it was the Bains Report that provided the means to achieve its structures. Thus, central government, having suggested the need and provided the means, might well have expected Policy and Resources Committees, programme review sub-committees, Chief Officers Management Teams and general inter-disciplinary or inter-departmental liaison at all levels throughout the organisation of local government. Thus the question arises; do all the local authorities develop such administrative structures as the basis of their residential renewal policies? This and the problem of authorities understanding the meaning of corporate management can only be assessed by evidence from the district authorities.

Based on the evidence of the sample survey, full corporate management techniques and structures have not been developed, although many authorities are in the process of developing such frameworks. This is illustrated in figure 3.3. When considering this data it must be remembered that for the overall sample, 94% of the local authorities...
claimed to use a corporate approach!

**Fig. 3.3: Percentages of Authorities using various mechanisms of Corporate Management**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>CLASS ONE (n = 15)</th>
<th>CLASS TWO (n = 12)</th>
<th>CLASS THREE (n = 10)</th>
<th>OVERALL SAMPLE (n = 37)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy and Resources Committee</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme Review/Resources Sub-Committee</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Officers Management Team</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter departmental/disciplinary working parties of lower tier officers (including members)</td>
<td>80% (13%)</td>
<td>25% ( - )</td>
<td>20% (10%)</td>
<td>46% (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local projects or specific policy groups of officers</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amended Bains Structure of Corporate Management used</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Corporate Management/Planning Unit involved or started</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Co-ordination Unit in Operation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(NB. 94% of Sample claimed to use a Corporate Approach)


Analysing the data by size class, it might be expected that the largest authorities - Class One - would have the greatest need for some kind of corporate management structure owing to the number of departments involved in policy development. The statistical evidence for these authorities suggests more lower-tier co-operation and corporatism and,
together with the number of authorities operating Chief Officers Management Teams, reflects quite a varied approach to Corporate Management. As all these authorities claimed to operate a corporate approach to administration in general, including residential renewal commitments, it might be expected that the majority operate some minimum level of co-operation. This level will depend upon local circumstances. Some authorities traditionally operate their own developments of corporatism, and continue with what they find satisfactory despite the suggestions made by Bains. This type of independent 'initiative' attitude might well be expected in these largest authorities who traditionally have high demands for autonomy and local variation. They can provide the necessary resources in manpower, capital and administration to follow their local inclinations, and yet remain flexible towards central government suggestions and controls, thus having their independence and yet remaining on the right side of the central authority.

The stress on lower tier inter-departmental/disciplinary working parties, may be based on traditional informal, or formal ties now formally institutionalised within the management framework.

It is difficult to examine the attitudes, structures and local anomalies of the overall sample due to the limited nature of postal questionnaire surveys, however this size class of the sample is represented in further detail by the case study authority Norhtown. Norhtown's structure with regard to housing renewal area management is an example of an authority with no Chief Officers Management Team. The decision not to adopt such a system was made by the members of the council who despite this decided on a 'Bains type' structure of second layer management officers reporting to the Chief Executive. This was backed up by developing member-officer working parties for greater horizontal liaison,
and a corporate work system which allows all officers above the third tier of management to be kept in the picture. On the members side a Policy and Resources Committee operates and is kept informed through sub-committees and member/officer working parties. In addition, a GIA Working Party meets on a monthly basis and formally discusses what has taken place, problems and future actions. This involves middle to senior tier officials of various departments under the chairmanship of the project co-ordinator, who although basically independent of departmental ties works in a sub-section of the Legal and Administration Department. Informal ties also occur, notably between the key departments of Planning, Engineering and Project Co-ordination. The officials representing the various departments on the GIA working party 'team' report back to their senior officers and junior personnel involved in the various schemes. A computer network charts the progress of various sub-networks in the scheme and these progress reports are available to all senior officers and members.

Northtown is also in the process of developing a full corporate plan of its roles and functions. Great emphasis is placed upon the use of computer systems in this scheme, although many officials doubt its ability to effectively influence local goals, policies or their end results. Like most authorities Northtown has accepted the normative nature of corporate management, and unlike many smaller authorities has taken positive steps towards achieving its full implementation throughout its general activities. The medium size class authorities also claimed 100% use of corporate management systems. By this they may have meant a minimum level of officer co-operation - formally or informally. This trend is displayed by the high proportion (83%) whose key corporate management mechanism appears to be the Chief Officers
Management team. This higher tier co-operation does not appear to permeate to the lower tiers of management as is the case in the larger authorities, nor is there much mention of member participation. 25% of this size class sample claimed to have used, examined or amended the Bains Report - mentioned by name - but do not really appear to have acted upon it. As 100% of these authorities claimed to have adopted corporate management techniques it must reflect their normative stance, and perhaps reflects the fact that changes take longer to be acted upon in the smaller authorities. This point is important as the failure to implement fully corporate co-operation may lead to a breakdown in residential renewal techniques which the central government circulars imply are based upon corporate, or at least co-operative, management structures for their maximum efficiency.

In the case studies this group plus the size class three, i.e. all those authorities with populations under 100,000, are represented by Southfield. Corporate planning is restricted in this authority mainly to Chief Officer level which forms a management group. However, due to the insularity of the authority and traditional rivalry between departments, problems occur as a result of 'personality' clashes. For this reason it is not surprising that co-operation in formal terms is minimal and based on piecemeal technical advice where approaches to other departments are essential. At lower tier levels informal contact and co-operation is greater, possibly due to the small number of professional and administrative staff at work in the authority. Thus an ad hoc informal co-operative management structure might be identified, although the authority maintains the normative stance of claiming a corporate management framework.
In the smallest authorities - size class three - only 82% claimed to have adopted a corporate approach, but this might be explained by differing interpretations of terminology. As with the medium size class authorities the basis of any formal corporate approach was at the higher tiers of management, 80% operating Chief Officer Management teams.

At both member level and in lower management tiers minimum corporatism is observed, or at least seen as important in answering the postal questionnaire. The high claims for a basic use of a corporate approach may however reflect its normative role and emphasise the fact that the central government circulars on residential renewal assume certain levels of co-operation and co-ordination for maximising policy effect.

Overall for the sample survey area, the key elements in corporate management claims appear to be at higher officer level and to a lesser degree among middle tiers of officials. These figures, however, only illustrate formal corporate relationships, whereas informal co-operation and co-ordination is more likely in the smaller authorities with closer knit staff resources. This was true, despite the personality problems, in Southfield, but poor resources and other priorities made management reorganisation to any degree a lower priority than action policies involving the community.

For residential renewal as an example of a policy needing close inter-departmental co-operation, various authorities suggested the use of specific local project management teams or working parties which varied in membership for the distinctive individual problems within their areas, thus flexibility outside a corporate framework occurs, and indeed is essential when manpower resources are limited.
Other Administrative Problems

A major problem, both in administrative and organisational terms, in many new district authorities has been the amalgamation of various smaller authorities under a new or adapted name. This was as a result of the reorganisation of local government in 1974 and has resulted in the combination of different policies and procedures of government coming together and creating bureaucratic complexities. For example, the situation may exist where a previously autonomous county borough with full planning powers loses its overall dominance in this field and only retains control of local planning. This may lead to over-manning in personnel terms and duplication of physical resources in equipment terms. Alternatively, if a new district authority is created from a number of smaller units none of which had any local planning responsibilities, no physical or personnel resources will exist if the new authority is given any such new responsibilities. Similar problems of under or over-utilisation of resources - physical and personnel - may also occur when an 'adopted' authority is involved with independent consultants or 'county' 'agency' planners. In this case a single residential renewal strategy to cover all areas of the new authority is impossible to achieve until the new authority can either take over or co-opt the outside bodies into the new district's strategy. Other problems arise if standards of dwellings and their acceptability as fit or unfit units differ. This can lead to areas having been prepared for declaration as action areas in a pre-reorganisation authority, but when directly compared with other property in the new authority they are found to be a low priority, thus necessitating changes in policy to allocate resources to more suitable and urgent cases that the DOE would deem more acceptable for action.
These diverse problems complicate the notion of a 'standard' local authority, and reflect how 'out of touch' the central authority is. The hypothesis of this study is that all the local authorities do not interpret and use central government advice in the same way, and that the central government's perception of the districts is invalid. The notion of their being 'out of touch' backs up this suggestion as the central authority fails to acknowledge the differences in resources, personnel, capital and general structures between districts. The case study authorities reflect this pattern. Northtown is an example of the standards conflict in residential renewal as well as the more general procedural and administration differences. At its inception it was an amalgamation of seven local authorities, all with varying local problems, procedures of decision-making and policies. For residential renewal they had between thirty and forty residential areas proposed for action, whereas the capacity of the new authority was six or seven declarations per annum. Problems of under capacity thus occurred. Eventually the current priority policy was reached by reassessing the designated areas from all seven authorities and ranking them in order of necessary action, with consequent accusations of spatial prejudice, but a workable policy.

Southfield, the smaller of the two examples, was an amalgamation of three authorities, although only the present enlarged authority had any plans for area renewal action, having declared three general improvement areas. This created less specific policy problems in residential renewal operations, but procedures of decision-making and administrative differences still created difficulties. The new Southfield authority had another advantage. Before reorganisation, the County authority in its role as an 'agency' planning unit had surveyed
all pre-1914 housing and pre-1945 National Coal Board dwellings in all three districts. This allowed greater organisation of priorities under the new authority and less accusations of bias in spatial preferences for policy action. Southfield has suffered, however, from traditional rivalries between various departments within the new authority as previous 'dominant' departments in the old authorities had less power under the new management. These problems will, however, be eradicated over time, as the new authority gains its personal characteristics in local terms.

Conclusion

In examining the general administrative structures of local government with regard to corporate management it becomes increasingly obvious that the interpretation of various official management techniques varies; and that no 'standard' local authority exists based on the administrative structures outlined by central government.

At the beginning of this chapter two key questions were asked. Do all the authorities develop the same structures of administration for residential renewal?; and, is corporate management defined by all authorities in the same manner? Within the sample survey local authorities, central government both assumes a corporate framework as the basis of management processes, and provides the basic means to achieve it. Yet among the sample even the term corporate management has different meanings! These may vary from full complex and bureaucratic inter-related levels of government organisation, to minimal informal co-operation at a specific level of administration, i.e. - single one-off policy problems. In the differing interpretations the size of the local authority is a major factor. The larger authorities having a greater knowledge and
perception of the central government's idea of corporatism based on Bains. If the authorities differ in their understanding of these management techniques it is not really surprising that differences occur between authorities in their use of corporate techniques and structures. It appears from the sample survey local authorities that only a basic minimum of corporate management has been instigated, and then to a large degree only in the largest authorities. A division between size class one authorities who adopt more formal, varied and possibly 'initiative' corporate approaches, and the smaller authorities occurs. The latter are less formal in all their workings of government. Their corporatism, or perhaps co-ordination is a better description, is based around informal ties which might be seen from a central government point of view as being outside the corporate management techniques formally developed by Bains. In addition to these corporate problems, central government seems to have created further problems in reorganisation with various formerly independent authorities joining together to form single new authorities. Problems of differing policy interpretation, procedures of decision-making, priorities for resources and attitudes to government all lead to conflict occurring, which perhaps supports Toffler's idea of no real solutions in bureaucratic reorganisation (9).

The evidence in this chapter illustrates that although corporate management is a normative management technique of central government, it is not either interpreted, or used, in the way in which the central government foresaw. The local districts interpret it, and develop their management structures in different ways depending upon local resources, capabilities and problems. Size is the key factor in the overall pattern: the large authorities, such as Northtown, are based upon formal
management structures that will ultimately lead to full corporate structures throughout the districts, co-ordinating all their resources. The smaller authorities, whilst acknowledging the normative nature of corporatism, develop ad hoc informal structures based on co-operation, e.g. Southfield.
References: Chapter Three

1. The roles and functions of the new local district authorities are outlined in DOE Circular No. 121/72, tabulated in Appendix B.

2. A. Eddison

3. Maud
   Maud Committee on Management in Local Government, Report Volume 1, HMSO, 1967 p68

4. See: J.B. Cullingworth
   Housing and Local Government in England and Wales, Allen & Unwin, 1966, p64

5. D of E
   Housing Act 1974: Renewal Strategies Circular 13/75, HMSO, 1975, para 8

6. MHLG
   Housing Act 1969 - Area Improvement Circular 65/69, HMSO, 1969, para 19

7. K.A. Bains (et al)
   The New Local Authorities - Management and Structure, HMSO, 1972

8. Bains suggests four basic agents that can contribute to the development of a corporate management framework:

   (a) Each authority should establish a Policy and Resources Committee to provide co-ordinated advice to the Council in the settling of its plans, objectives and priorities (para 4.14)

   (b) Resources sub-committees of the Policy and Resources Committee should exercise day to day control over staff, finance and land (para 4.16)

   (c) Each authority should establish a Management Team of Principal Chief Officers whose corporate identity should be recognised formally within the management structure (paras 5.38 and 5.42)

       The Management Team should be responsible, under the Chief Executive's leadership, for the preparation of plans and programmes in connection with the long term objectives of the Council and for the general co-ordination and implementation of those plans (para 5.42)

   (d) Multi-disciplinary working groups of officers should be set up to service the programme committees (para 5.75)

9. A. Toffler
   Future Shock
   Pan, 1971, pp 122-126
CHAPTER FOUR

RELATIONSHIPS OF GOVERNMENT: COUNTY AND DOE

Introduction

After examining the differences between local authorities administrative structures, it is necessary to assess their roles and relationship with regard to other levels of administrative government concerned with residential renewal. Consultation is the key element in this relationship, and the district is expected to be in regular contact with both its local county tier of government, and the regional representatives of the central state. In organisational, financial and technical terms both these elements of government contribute to, and in many ways guide and control, the workings of residential renewal at a local district level. The regional tier of government as far as improvement policy is concerned is based under the auspices of the regional DOE Offices, whereas the Counties were redefined under the 1972 Local Government Act (See Appendix D).

The importance of both tiers of authority are continually stressed throughout central government legislation, and the corporate values developed, internally within the district, also apply to relationships with the county and the regional offices of the DOE. Under the heading "Action to improve the area - organisation," Circular 14/75 states quite categorically, when discussing renewal:

"Careful liaison with the county council and statutory undertakers over matters affecting their interests will also be essential." (1)

With regard to the DOE regional offices, stress is placed on the need for consultation, and a warning of the powers available if such aspects of discussion are ignored reinforces the need to make sure it is included:
"Close liaison between local authorities and the Department's Regional Officer will ensure that the limited total of available resources is devoted to the greatest need, which is one of the purposes of the Secretary of State's power to cancel or reduce in size a declared HAA and FN. The Secretary of State is anxious that he should not be faced with situations where by reason of excessive, premature or inappropriate declarations he is compelled to use it frequently." (2)

This statement not only indicates the idea that the central authority sees liaison as useful, but also illustrates the general power of central government in all aspects of residential renewal. The power to veto the declarations made by local authorities really means that it is advisable for the districts to consult the regional DOE offices both before and during preparations for such submissions. Thus it might be predicted that such consultation would be an important behavioural characteristic of all local authorities; but is it?

The county authority does not have quite the same power to veto the actions of districts, but the smaller authorities especially are tied to it by both technical and financial links, often based on historical traditions. The larger authorities on the other hand often resent the role of the county tier of government, although for the wider long-term planning commitments of both the town and county, co-operation is necessary. But the question is; does such consultation and co-operation occur, and if so, do all the districts behave in the same manner?

Consultation in both directions is especially necessary in such areas as structure planning and traffic management, both of which are the responsibility of the County, but are important considerations in any improvement schemes at a district level.

**Relationship to County tier of Government**

After the reorganisation of local government as a result of the 1972 Local Government Act, various responsibilities were allocated to the
district and county tiers of government (See Appendix B). Counties are responsible for highways, and district councils for local plans including renewal. However, it has been stated:

"The improvement of roads – for example, re-surfacing, the tidying-up of pavements and, sometimes, street closures – is often the key to the successful rehabilitation of a general improvement area". (3)

Thus the need for liaison between the local district authority and the county is essential. The district authority is expected by the central government to arrange any of the county's functions within its overall residential renewal plan – again this assumes a corporate and organised structure – and may, if the changes are serious, contribute towards the cost of alterations from the renewal fund allocated.

Alternatively, if the rehabilitation work is merely repair and maintenance, under Section 187/2 of the Local Government Act 1972 the district can work on the repairs, subject only to the county approval of their estimates.

The need for early liaison and consultation between the district and county authorities is necessary throughout the various stages involved in developing and implementing improvement area policy. Central government stresses the necessity to allow sufficient time within the planned stages of work for the resolution of any problems that arise. This is particularly important where improvement proposals include such processes as Pedestrianisation orders which, because of statutory requirements, may prove to be time consuming tasks.

Bearing such comments in mind it would appear highly desirable to maintain close, efficient and friendly relations between the district and county authorities. We have already seen that counties are involved in some district functions, and that many smaller authorities
have traditionally relied on the county as 'agency' planners. Thus it is interesting to see how regular such contact is regarding residential renewal. It is hard to assess, in purely empirical terms, how central government might see the need for liaison, but some basis of regularity might be seen as desirable, for example, inclusion on a particular monthly working party? Alternatively, dependent upon the level of involvement of the county, liaison may be based on informal ad hoc arrangements for the district to call in the county when needed, although this obviously does not provide a very strong foundation for an important and useful relationship.

Figure 4.1 indicates the frequency of contacts between the two tiers of government within the sample survey area. Again the Class one

![Fig. 4.1: Frequency of Contact between District and County Authorities on Residential Renewal](image_url)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CLASS ONE n = 14</th>
<th>CLASS TWO n = 10</th>
<th>CLASS THREE n = 8</th>
<th>OVERALL SAMPLE n = 32</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i Daily</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii Weekly</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii Monthly</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv Quarterly</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v Annually</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6%*</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi As Required/Occasionally</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>45%*</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii Never/&quot;As infrequently as possible.&quot;</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977

*See p 205

authorities appear the most formally organised, with more than one in three maintaining regular meetings with the county. But regularity may not necessarily be the most efficient method of liaison. The county will only be involved at specific times in the process, so it is not
surprising to note that the majority of districts liaise on an "occasional" basis, as required by either authority. More unusual are the high numbers, one in five, of the districts who either never liaise or endeavour to have as "little contact as possible" with the counties. This attitude is summed up in such comments as "The County Council merely complicates matters leading to frustration, delay and extra cost" (Authority No. 26).

Despite the apparent friction between authorities, the districts cannot really do without the aid and advice of the county in various aspects of renewal, as indicated in figure 4.2. As can be seen, and

Fig. 4.2: Percentages of Local Authorities Receiving Either Financial Aid and/or Technical Advice from the County Authority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One</td>
<td>Two</td>
<td>Three</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 14</td>
<td>n = 11</td>
<td>n = 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i Engineering:</td>
<td>Advice</td>
<td>Financial Aid</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial Aid</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>5%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii Environ. Works:</td>
<td>Advice</td>
<td>Financial Aid</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial Aid</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii Finance:</td>
<td>Advice</td>
<td>Financial Aid</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial Aid</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv Housing:</td>
<td>Advice</td>
<td>Financial Aid</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial Aid</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v Planning:</td>
<td>Advice</td>
<td>Financial Aid</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial Aid</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi Struct. Plans:</td>
<td>Advice</td>
<td>Financial Aid</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial Aid</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii Traffic Manag:</td>
<td>Advice</td>
<td>Financial Aid</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial Aid</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>5%*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977 *See p 205

might have been expected, the dominant role of the county is the provision
of advice on traffic management and engineering work, and to a lesser degree financial aid for the latter. Surprisingly, the level of both aid and advice in all sectors throughout all the size classes is very low. Traffic management advice in all three classes is high, although aid in finance capital terms is low. In fact the only area where financial aid is available to any degree is in engineering works, and then only moderately so. It is interesting to note the high level of planning advice utilised among the smallest authorities, perhaps illustrating both the continuing 'agency' role which the county still provides to these districts lacking such resource capabilities, and the division of planning functions under the 1972 Local Government Act (See Appendix B).

The number of local district authorities who receive financial aid specifically for residential renewal schemes is equally low. (See figure 4.3). But this pattern is changing, and among the smaller class two and class three authorities a major disparity occurs. Two county authorities, up until 1977, allocated either 25% or 50% grants towards environmental works and other action within GIAs operated in districts within the counties. This capital has now been stopped for all future action areas, although it is continued in those areas at present involved until their completion. This development is important with regard to the relationship between the levels of government: in the future greater direct capital loans will be needed from central government, thus increasing their control over the districts, and consequently lessening the role and control operated by the county. This change may reflect the aims of central government to develop a similar pattern of procedures in all districts in an attempt to develop the possibilities of universal application of their policy initiatives
or directives. However, as we continue to see in this study, local differences in processes, structures, resources and attitudes are a fact and cannot be ignored.

Fig 4.3: Percentage of district authorities receiving direct financial aid for residential renewal schemes from the county authorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CLASS ONE n = 14</th>
<th>CLASS T70 n = 11</th>
<th>CLASS THREE n = 8</th>
<th>OVERALL SAMPLE n = 33</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>YES</strong></td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6% *</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NO</strong></td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>94% *</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977

All the finance received by the largest authorities, who appear to find capital more readily available from the counties, involves Traffic and Highways work. For improvement areas this is normally visible in private streetworks, new roads, street closures and general maintenance, often executed by district authority staff under the scrutiny of county officials. However, great criticisms of the county-district financial arrangements were particularly forthcoming from the sample group. These include:

"Serious problems regarding the matching of County and District capital programmes in renewal areas"
(Authority No. 26)

"Problems:
1) Co-ordination of work priorities
2) Co-ordination of budgeting provisions
3) County hierarchy."
(Authority No. 38)

All these criticisms and comments and those of other authorities are summed up, both in their cause and effect, by the comments of Authority No. 36, a large metropolitan authority, which concludes:
"Probably the main cause of the stagnation of our GIA programme up to now is the county. Problems include:

1. Financing of PSW in GIAs
2. Decisions on responsibility for land acquisition and road closure
3. Time taken for the county to respond to technical matters
4. Lack of staff at county, yet reluctance to let the District Engineers take an additional design on highways."

This sums up the frustrations of a metropolitan authority which has basically lost a lot of its responsibilities under the 1972 Local Government Act, and perhaps may be seen as resenting such a change.

This leads to rivalry between the two tiers of government, which lessens co-operation whereas to the central authority such co-operation is essential for improvement policy to work.

This co-operation and co-ordination is especially stressed with regard to the wider elements of planning - structure planning - and both the location and scale of renewal are likely to be key issues within future county structure plans. This co-operation is spelt out quite clearly by central government in circular 13/75:

"District Councils should, therefore, ensure that County Council are kept informed of the broad features of their renewal strategies, particularly while structure plans are being prepared." (4)

Figure 4.4 illustrates the number of local district authorities who actually do consult the County with regard to the Structure Plans.
Fig. 4.4: Percentage of local authorities that consult the County authority concerning local residential renewal procedures and the County Structure Plan (only includes those authorities whose Counties have Structure Plans)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CLASS ONE n = 14</th>
<th>CLASS TWO n = 8</th>
<th>CLASS THREE n = 7</th>
<th>OVERALL SAMPLE n = 29</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977

Surprisingly in view of the stress placed on the need for the local district authority to consult the county fewer than half of the sample did so. Two interesting and important points must be made about this figure. First, that all the largest metropolitan authorities said that they did not consult the counties, and secondly, four out of five of the smallest class size of authorities did so. This reflects two major trends: first, the tremendous rivalry between the largest districts and the county authorities, and secondly, the independent nature of these large authorities both from central and county authority. The smallest authorities on the other hand see the counties as an aid to assisting their local policy problems, and see the county as part of the 'government from above' to which they act in an 'agency' manner in fulfilling national policy on renewal and improvement.

One of the large authorities that does consult the county structure plan with regard to renewal indicates that this itself creates further problems because "There is a serious breakdown in that we (the district) consider the County Council to be unprepared to back the wording of their structure plan with additional finance for road improvements in GIAs (as requested by residents)" (Authority No. 45). So a 'stalemate' exists.
As far as the case-study authorities are concerned, Northtown as a large authority has had difficulties with the county, especially with regard to engineering responsibilities. At present the district engineers are involved in the action area processes, but the possibilities of involving county engineers is being considered. The pertinent question is at what level or stage of the process should they be involved? At present they are only incorporated as and when needed, but provide both advice and financial aid in matters of engineering and environmental works, as well as advise on structure plans and traffic management. Formal meetings between those involved in residential renewal at a district and county level are minimal, but occasional, although the district does not consult the county to see if their renewal plans conform to the structure plan. Overall Northtown exhibits very similar trends and attitudes to the other class one authorities, and tends to resent the county tier of government's existence.

Southfield, on the other hand, has minimal occasional dealings with the county and does not take much notice of it as a tier of government. It is much more likely to be involved with the regional DOE office. The county is, however, consulted for advice on traffic management, and some rivalry based around existing engineering responsibilities occurs. But really the district tries to have as little to do with county as possible, an ideal that is possibly made easier by the step-by-step decision-making processes of Southfield and the aim of minimal controversy in any actions undertaken.

Regional Department of the Environment Influences

The Department of the Environment is the key central government representative in matters of residential renewal, and at a regional level it
operates offices to administer its function for particular spatial areas. As shown in earlier quotations the central government sees it as both necessary and desirable that the local districts consult the regional DOE on all its actions. The DOE can thus keep an eye on the districts, and provide a national framework of administration, as well as providing advice for the districts. It must also be remembered that the DOE maintains the power of veto of any districts' declarations and will use this power if an authority steps out of line. For this reason it is to the advantage of the district authority to keep in touch with the regional office of DOE during all stages of the improvement process, from its earliest formulation to its final implementation. This is backed by the statutory requirements of submission. Circular 14/75 (c) states:

"Notwithstanding the requirement placed upon a local authority to submit to the Secretary of State a copy of the report at the preliminary declaration stage, delays could be avoided if the authority were - as is customary - to consult, as early as is practicable, the appropriate Regional Office of the Department about proposals for the selection of areas." (5)

Bearing this in mind, as far as the sample survey authorities are concerned it might be expected that some basic and regular level of consultation between themselves and the regional DOE would occur. This might be undertaken in a number of ways to varying degrees. Meetings where policy and processes could be debated would appear to be the most formal, and possibly the most effective method of democratic government, but also the most time consuming and inconvenient.

Alternatively, consultation can be by letter, circular or advice notes, exchanged either way in the relationship. Or at an informal level, telephone contact for minor clarification, advice, comment or consultation might be expected to be the most regular method of communication.
But, overall, as central government suggest, some communication between the regional DOE and the local authority is both desirable and advisable, thus some regularity of contact might be foreseen.

Within the sample area three different DOE regional offices operate, and this may affect the overall pattern of consultation. It is therefore necessary to indicate the distribution of the sample local authorities by DOE region, and point out that for the case study authorities, Northtown is in DOE region B and Southfield in DOE region A. Figure 4.5 indicates this distribution, and reflects the pattern that Region A contains half of the sample group, but is similar to Region B, whilst only 9% of the authorities are related to area C.

Fig 4.5: Distribution of Local Authorities in Sample Survey by DOE Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Class One n = 15</th>
<th>Class Two n = 14</th>
<th>Class Three n = 15</th>
<th>Overall Classes n = 44</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
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The levels of regularity of contact between the authorities and the various regional offices of the DOE are illustrated in figure 4.6. The table is divided into three levels of contact as these different elements provide different functions as far as both the local authority and the county are concerned.

There is a difference in regularity of contact between the class one authorities and the rest of the sample. 65% of this class size being involved in regular meetings on either a monthly or a quarterly basis,
whereas less than one in three of the other authorities have such
arrangements. The smaller authorities keep to their more 'normal'
ad hoc arrangements, with over 50% of the authorities throughout only
meeting and contacting the DOE "as and when needed" or "occasionally".
These differences back up other evidence of a basic difference in
attitudes, processes and structures between the large authorities and
the general sample. The increased level of communication may also
reflect that there is greater discussion between the DOE and the larger
authorities about future policies, how experiments are working or any
suggestions for future legislation. This two-way pattern of relation­
ships is dominant throughout the sample survey authorities, although
the necessity for this regional layer of government is often questioned.

Often informality is important in communications between the regional
DOE and the local authorities. This is reflected in the regularity of
telephone contact. As can be seen in figure 4.6, the largest
authorities are far more likely to be involved in such contact on a
regular basis than the other size classes. Although size class two is
equally more likely to be involved than are the extremely small class
three districts. Why is this? Does the attitude to the DOE in general
have anything to do with these differences?

To answer this question it is necessary to examine the local authorities'
attitudes to DOE technical and financial advice, and to see just how
flexible both the advice and the local district authorities can be.
Figure 4.7 gives alternative responses to this question and indicates the
responses of the sample survey authorities.
Fig. 4.6: Regularity of Contact between the Local District Authority and the Regional DOE with regard to Residential Renewal

### Meetings

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<td>Weekly</td>
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<td>31%</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<td>16%</td>
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<td>Annually</td>
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<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As required/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>50%</td>
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### DOE Areas

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<tr>
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### Publications, Letters or Circulars

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### Telephone Contact

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<tr>
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<td>39%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annually</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</table>

Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977

*See p205*
Fig 4.7: Emphasis placed on the use of DOE Technical and Financial advice by Local District Authorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>n = 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>i 100% Order to be FINANCIAL 16%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>followed at all TECHNICAL 20%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>costs</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii Advice-disregarded FINANCIAL 3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>if not seen as TECHNICAL 19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relevant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii Advice-Adapted FINANCIAL 78%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>but retained in TECHNICAL 58%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>outline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv Advice-Adapted in FINANCIAL 3%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>new local outline TECHNICAL 3%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v Other emphasis  FINANCIAL -</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TECHNICAL -</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>

*n = 9 for Technical advice

Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey November 1977

Over half the overall sample regard the DOE as providing advice to be adapted but retained in outline. This might be expected, and when calculated with the local authorities who adapt advice in a more independent outline this attitude is prevalent in two out of three local districts. Nearly 60% of the largest authorities consider this limited flexibility in finance essential and pay more attention to this than to technical advice, thus retaining a larger physical element of local autonomy. On the other hand the authorities with under 100,000 population lay more stress on technical advice, where they are limited in their local resource capabilities. The stress on finance may also lead one to speculate that because the large authorities financial transactions are large and complex, they cannot be put at 'risk' by independent action not desirable to DOE national policy. However, in
technical advice they are far more likely to disregard it if it is found to be irrelevant to local conditions, again stressing local independence. Among the class three authorities, over one in three consider DOE financial advice to be a 100% order to be followed at all costs. Similarly 25% of them see DOE technical advice in the same manner. But overall, the pattern is fairly uniform, although this obviously does not reflect just how effective any adaptations are, or how they differ from the DOE advice. The rigidity of DOE financial advice under the present period of capital restraint may in fact be greater than the authorities would like to admit. Central government control over this aspect of renewal policy is an important aspect of national policy and for the smaller authorities especially adherence to such directives is essential if they are to fulfill 'agency' roles in the process of renewal policy. But for these authorities, technical advice although perhaps not so tightly controlled by central government, is important owing to the limitations of the districts, whereas the larger authorities pay regard to it, but have greater ability to adapt and reassess its local relevance.

The importance of both technical and financial advice is reiterated in figure 4.8 which reflects how useful local authorities subjectively adjudge DOE advice to be. The responses are to the question: Is the DOE advice usually (over 50%) useful? As can be seen by the statistics, in general terms it is seen as "useful", although as already mentioned it is often adapted, and its usefulness does not really reflect its actual use for specific local projects of residential renewal.
As far as regional DOE offices are concerned the attitude to different offices appears similar in statistical terms at least, and often depends on the individual local authority officials and their informal relationships to DOE personnel. This relationship between the DOE and the local authority did however create numerous additional comments from the local authorities, about equally for and against the DOE.

Some authorities were very antagonistic towards the DOE, making such comments as:

"The DOE is a generally unnecessary layer of bureaucracy, the staff of which it would appear have little knowledge or interest in local conditions, and whose sole purpose, apart from generally impeding progress, is to distribute the region's share of the national financial cake."

(Authority No. 58 - Regional Office B).

Alternatively, Authority No. 15 talking about the same DOE office says:

"Great value is placed upon contacts not only with the particular department of the DOE, but with particular named officers of that department".

Other authorities (Nos. 20 and 26) regard the DOE as "very helpful", whilst No. 53 claims:

"There is too much control over detailed matters. The limited notice of financial allocations makes forward planning difficult".
Perhaps two final comments made by the authorities help to indicate the general role of the DOE with regard to the local district authorities. Authority No. 24 points out that:

"providing statutory guidelines are followed, the DOE seems prepared to accept the judgement of the local authority."

This is agreed by authority no. 36, which does, however, question its future relationship. It states:

"We consult the DOE to try to ensure that our proposals are also in line with their thinking. Hence we have regular consultations. As yet no real confrontations have occurred and I am not certain what our policy would be in such circumstances."

Both these comments illustrate that flexibility and communication are the key to a good relationship to the DOE, but that it is equally possible to act independently of it to a large extent within various constraints.

To assess the relationship between the central government's regional representative and the local districts the case studies provide a greater insight. The two authorities differ remarkably in their relationships to their local DOE regional offices, although it is their attitudes rather than the fact that they are involved with different offices which is important. Both are similar in their communication with the DOE in formal terms: they are in contact with the regional office on a monthly basis. Both also adapt financial advice, whilst Northtown will disregard technical advice it does not see as relevant. This is the basis of their differences. Northtown is "aggressive" towards the DOE seeing it as an unnecessary aspect of government, and admits to having "many problems" with regard to the regional office. As an authority it complains of excessive control of local detail, especially the power to veto or hold-back the authority's
GIA declarations which has been used. Northtown implies that the DOE 'changed the rules' without due notice or consultation. It admits consultation occurred between the national DOE and the national local authorities' association, but politics overlaps in this additional relationship and Northtown believes that individual local authorities should have been consulted. The financial restraints are considered to be a not too subtle control mechanism imposed by the central government on the local authorities, suggesting that late changes in finance regulations restrict policy planning and development. Overall the authority feels aggrieved at their treatment by the DOE, and so becomes more 'aggressive'. Northtown informs the DOE of their actions after the event, in an attempt to present a "fait accompli", and thus limit central government influence. Alternatively, Southfield is "passive" in its outlook. It seeks advice, often informally, at all levels and stages in the decision-making process of residential renewal, and planning in general. It claims to have a very good relationship to the DOE, based upon regular contact before action, in the early stages and after implementation work. It assumes a 'quasi-agency' role, acting out the DOE's suggestions. Its only complaint about the DOE is in terms of the financial restraints; but Southfield even blames the central treasury rather than the DOE for this. Thus, the differences between the authorities are wide and perhaps again reflect alternative interpretations of central government legislation and attitudes by different local authorities. This might further suggest that every district reacts in a different way to central government legislation, thus perhaps greater flexibility is necessary in its implementation, or alternatively still greater central government control over local action.
Conclusion

Overall in the relationship to the county and the regional DOE, the more corporate nature of the largest authorities is apparent. In consultation with both aspects of government they are more regular in their contact; but based on traditional freedom and autonomy, they are involved in the greatest conflict.

This regularity of contact is not really evident among the smaller authorities who are more likely to adopt 'ad hoc' relations with the county and DOE on an informal basis. The smaller local authorities see themselves as "agencies" of higher government. They rely upon the county for personnel aid, and the DOE for greater technical choices. Such aid or advice is then rigidly applied.

Some liaison between the districts of all sizes and the county is essential. This is true for the wider areas of planning such as traffic management, engineering works and structure plans, all of which may impinge on the workings of improvement areas. Thus the county do have some influence in residential renewal work, although the larger authorities maintain that they are able to fulfill the major aspects of the county's responsibilities at a local level.

A major recent change that is important in reflecting greater control from central government, and its consequent loss at a county level, is in GIA finance. As mentioned previously many of the smaller districts received aid from their counties for up to 50% of GIA environmental expenditure. As this has been stopped, capital will need to be obtained locally or from the central authority, and in the latter case this results in even greater control of local policy as capital is the key to much of the districts actions and policies. Such financial
responsibilities might then be taken over by the regional DOE which may change the districts relationship to these offices.

Throughout its circulars central government has stressed the need for continuous consultation during decision-making in residential renewal. But as far as the sample survey is concerned, this is not always occurring. The large authorities are more regular in their contact, but this may be because of their continuing conflict. Alternatively, the smaller districts are more irregular and informal in consultation, but take more notice of DOE advice, especially on the technical side. All the districts are limited by the central government financial "advice", and this is a major complaint from the districts. However, the reactions to the authority differ widely as shown by Northtown's "aggressive" attitude, as opposed to Southfield's "passive" "agency" response.
Chapter Four: References

1. DOE - Housing Act 1974: Parts IV, V and VI, Memorandum C, Circular 14/75, paragraph 21, HMSO 1975

2. DOE - Housing Act 1974: Renewal Strategies, Circular 13/75, paragraph 14, HMSO 1975

   NB The same powers to prevent confirmation of GIAs exists under paragraph 19 of the same document.

3. DOE - Housing Act 1974: HAA, PNs and GIAs, Circular 14/76, paragraph 22, HMSO 1976

4. DOE - Op Cit (Circular 13/75) paragraph 8

5. DOE - Op Cit (Circular 14/75) Memorandum C, paragraph 16
CHAPTER FIVE

POLICY: CHOICES AND DEVELOPMENTS

Introduction

Residential renewal, housing and environment improvement policies must fit both the needs of national and local objectives. This chapter examines the recent national policies developed by central government - GIAs, HAAs, PNs - and assesses how they are interpreted locally by district officials. It asks the question: do all local districts interpret and adopt the policies to their full potential; and if not, does any pattern in interpretation and use arise? This assessment will be based on an examination of central government advice notes and circulars, and how the sample survey authorities react to them. The speed at which the local districts adopt the new policies will also be examined, and the relationship between this take-up and the suitability of the policy for all districts will be assessed.

Before the 1969 Housing Act and the development of GIAs as mechanisms of renewal, various experiments in area improvement took place. In the mid 1960's two key studies were in Rochdale and the Barnsbury district of Islington. (1) Both of these experiments provided evidence for the development of area improvement policies. The professional members of the housing and planning professions also advocated this change in approach, but it was the decision-making aspects of government that were the decisive factor. Many local authorities found that the 1964 Housing Act was both cumbersome and time-consuming, thus they decided to postpone policy decisions until new 'easier' legislation was enacted. The 1969 Act was seen by central government as this 'easier' legislation.
The White Paper of 1968 (2) confessed the failings of Part II of the 1964 Housing Act: thus it was proposed that local authorities should have the power to declare 'General Improvement Areas' (GIAs). The 1968 White Paper should have been a political bombshell, as its first paragraph suggested that a greater share of public investment in housing should be used for improvement rather than new building. This implied a cut in the half million new completions promised in 1964 by the Labour Government to a level below that of the 1967 devaluation reappraisal. But, despite this, the 1969 Housing Act had the backing of all the major parties in Parliament.

General Improvement Areas (GIAs)

Under the 1969 Housing Act the concept of housing improvement in area terms was adopted as a major policy of central government action to be implemented by local authorities through the mechanism of general improvement areas. As a general policy it was stated:

"The effort and resources devoted to improvement provide a much better return when directed to the upgrading of whole areas - the houses and the environment. People are more likely to find it worth their while to co-operate, and to maintain their houses after improvement; and the remaining useful life of the whole residential areas is extended by many years" (3)

Thus general improvement areas involve both physical housing units and the general environment and must be planned to improve the housing environment for thirty years before further action is required. It must be emphasised on this timescale that a GIA should not be an area destined for early redevelopment or major structural change (e.g. major roadworks). Continuity of the areas in a particular landuse is indeed an essential characteristic of general improvement areas, except in the case of non-conforming industrial units among housing.
In terms of size, the Act sets no upper or lower limits, but with the emphasis on environmental improvement it would be necessary to declare areas of more than twenty houses, which for smaller local authorities with limited problems in spatial, if not physical, terms creates problems. The Act suggests that GIAs should contain between 300 and 500 housing units, although flexibility with regard to local characteristics was foreseen. As the circular 65/69 states:

"There may be a small island of houses in any urban area lending itself to such treatment, while in rural areas it might often be convenient to deal with small groups of old housing in this way". (4)

So the central authority recognises the problems of small urban or rural areas of poor quality housing as an exception to the 300-500 size directive; yet all the policies and objectives of residential renewal continue to aim above these smaller areas towards large urban areas of housing which it admits are not likely in smaller towns and more semi-rural areas! Thus central government acknowledged the problems of 'size' in renewal, but owing to national policies ignored this more local problem. Further problems in the development of GIA policy arose: first, Public Health Officers involved in GIA's had, because of their traditional role involving inspecting and commenting on individual dwelling units, found the transition to the wider field of mixed policy enactment very difficult. There was a misinterpretation of their roles regarding the new area approach involving large numbers of dwelling units, and their use of compulsory improvement powers. Secondly, the conceptual frameworks and procedures imported from statutory structures of the town-planning profession were unfamiliar and often misunderstood by some local government officials. Unresolved contradictions between improvement and clearance also dulled the decision-making potential of local policy-makers and implementors. Also, in physical terms, the
original improvement grant structure was aimed at 'good poor quality housing' of the 1950's era, not the poor quality type units of the 1960's improvement period.

In the relationship between central and local government, the central authority's attitude to GIA programming was initially flexible allowing the local authorities to be quite autonomous, especially with regard to assessing local values, criteria and priorities. The local authorities were allowed to re-interpret the legislation to meet their individual ends which thus affected, on a national policy scale, the scope, direction and ultimately the 'success' or otherwise of the 'macro' national policy. The only major central government control was the vetting of local authority environmental proposals for eligibility for loan sanctions or subsidies, i.e. limited finance controls. Central government thus took a risk in giving wider discretionary powers, hoping that responsible local authorities, together with central government advice, could relate local practices to the national policy of improvement areas; allowing both levels of government to experiment in policy procedures and solutions. This is a traditional central government approach, in which they use circulars initially to advise local authorities on policy choices. Then if these are found to be completely ineffective, adaptations based on suggestions made by the local authorities can be implemented. The only major problem with this type of approach is that the smaller authorities often follow the advice of central government despite its limitations. This is because owing to a lack of resources they are unable to develop alternative constructive suggestions. This leads to the larger authorities working with the DOE, as the central authority, often by-passing the problems of the smallest local district authorities. This approach may be the
origin of many of the problems later faced by the small authorities who find central government 'solutions' inappropriate for their local situations.

As an approach to area management, the GIA is a selective device and yet, paradoxically, it lacked selectively available teeth in the critical field of improvement grants. This deficiency has been belatedly and marginally rectified under the 1974 Housing Act, but the same legislation has given any incisive powers to Housing Action Areas (HAA's - discussed later). These are an equally selective agency and consequently are of little benefit to the mass of poor housing where the inhabitants do not exhibit prescribed stress characteristics. Selectivity is further developed under the 1974 Act; GIA declarations warrant approval or veto from central government, thus increasing central control over local policy. J.T. Roberts suggests that a less selective approach aimed at different types of housing is necessary (6). The problem is not spatially uniform, as the arbitrary grants imply, thus policies must be more far reaching and adaptable. A policy with greater flexibility might also help to develop stronger links between housing and planning officials and to determine the roles played by each within the administrative structure of local government, thus increasing co-operation and corporate management possibilities. GIA policy also raises problems of local and national objectives and their relative priority. If stress at the local level is based on social and/or environmental factors this may not conform to the national policy based on physical factors. (7) This is a continuing problem of policy being too rigidly applied and failing to allow local priorities to be developed to fit the different problems of all district authorities.
GIA policy on its own has not really been very successful. Perhaps this fact was recognised by central government before even implementing the 1969 Housing Act: with regard to the worst areas of housing in physical and stress terms it was suggested:

"... there are a limited number of areas, mainly in large cities, where the problems of physical decay are combined with problems of overcrowding and multiple occupation and other severe and intractable problems. They have been called twilight areas and coincide in some cases with what have been called in another context areas of multiple deprivation. The social reasons for taking action in such areas may be imperative even if the economic prospects are doubtful." "As problems of these areas are very various so the treatment would be far from uniform and no such overall result might be possible as is to be expected in "normal" GIA. (8)

Additional GIA action still failed to change successfully these areas, so the need for greater flexibility and wider policy alternatives again became apparent. The evidence of the work undertaken by local authorities, together with central government's own acknowledgement of the various problems of residential renewal is reflected in the 1974 Housing Act. The White Paper for this Act (9), promised that a new policy would be enacted in 1973. However, the external political environment led to legislation being suspended by two general elections. Eventually, although having all-party backing, the relevant sectors of the Housing Act 1974 did not come into operation until December 1974, eighteen months after the White Paper's publication. This time-lapse must be seen as very important as it held up action by the local authorities which sought to enact the policy, thereby creating further management problems and allowing the physical standards of dwellings to worsen. The attitude of all the major political parties must be criticised, as must the priorities of government at both levels of organisation.
Housing Action Areas (HAAs)

The 1974 Housing Act attempts to bridge the gap between initial policies of clearance and those areas which although economically capable of improvement may, because of the acute nature of their problems, defy the persuasive powers of the GIA treatment. However, the introduction of HAAs does not mean the dissolution of GIA policy either in central government strategy terms or on the ground within local authority renewal areas. HAA policy is an adaptation and development of the 1969 policy aimed at improving standards and performances, particularly in the worst areas ignored by GIA policy. The GIAs developed by the 1969 Act are retained but operationally the two policies are mutually exclusive. Section 38 of the 1974 Act however allows for the upgrading of a GIA for HAA treatment, or after a five year period if the HAA is not completed it may be designated as a GIA. The only real differences in the role of GIAs as policies for residential renewal are first, the Secretary of State has the power to prevent final declarations of GIAs thus imposing greater central government control; and secondly, the worst areas of housing stress now have an alternative mechanism, HAA treatment, to develop them to their greatest potential. As a broad guide in physical terms the condition of housing stock in HAAs will usually be worse than that in GIAs, but not as bad as to require early clearance. The official central government criteria for declaring an area for HAA treatment demands stress in both physical and social aspects of the dwelling and its environmental conditions. A period of five years is stipulated for the successful implementation of the policy, so as to secure three major aims:

"a) the improvement of the housing accommodation in the area as a whole;
b) the well-being of the persons for the time being residing in the area, and;
c) the proper and effective management and use of that accommodation." (10)
The wide ranging nature of this policy is further emphasised when it is reiterated:

"To be effective, a programme will have to take account of more than the physical state of the housing in the area and its improvement potential; the social factors that have contributed to the HAA declaration will have to be considered. A programme will have to be sensitive to the characteristics of the area, to the role that it plays in the wider neighbourhood, and to the needs, expectations and resources of its residents. An action programme should therefore be flexible, and the authority will need to be ready to modify it if public consultation or experience shows this to be desirable". (11)

Thus in a potential HAA, physical and social factors combine to create housing stress. The area should therefore not be declared an HAA unless the means are available not only to improve the housing within a reasonably short time, but also to do so without prejudicing the interests of the local residents. Central government proposed that the size of HAAs should be 200-300 dwellings. This size of area is drawn from the experiences of GIA legislation: the 1969 Act suggested areas of 300-500 dwellings but eventually found 200-300 to be the optimum size. Even then the question arises, is this too large for the small areas? This question is especially important considering the economic aspects of policy. Limited resources may restrict the size of improvement areas, however central government does not expect such problems to interfere with national policy objectives:

"In issuing guidance on the implementation of these provisions the government is conscious of the problems facing local authorities as a result of the need to economise in the provision of many important services in consequence of decisions on public expenditure ... But it is the government's wish that, at whatever level of constraints on resources, action to help people living in sub-standard houses, especially in difficult areas, should be given priority, even at the expense of other areas and services." (12)

The 'new' policy was stressed as a major national policy with local inputs that central government decided it was necessary to control centrally. This led to greater central government control over the
local authorities action to maximise effectiveness. The 1974 Act further stressed the need for corporate management structures and the importance of the policy in 'real' terms:

"The Secretary of State expects authorities to use the new housing action area and priority neighbourhood powers as the basis of practical programmes drawn up on corporate principles to optimise the use of scarce resources, to relieve housing stress. Declaration of these special areas should not be simply gestures of concern or good intention, but should lead to a prompt and appreciable improvement in living conditions." (13)

The intention of the policy, although important, is not part of this study. However, the effectiveness of resources and methods for maximising efficiency is, and must be stressed. The question is, do such strong intentions lead to fulfilment of the policy objectives in all the sample survey authorities and if so do they display the same concern?

Before the questions are examined a brief assessment of two other tools of renewal policy available to the district authorities must be made.

**Priority Neighbourhoods (PNs)**

Under the 1974 Housing Act that introduced HAAs and adapted GIAs the concept of Priority Neighbourhoods as a third mechanism of residential renewal occurred. The official government definition of the role of PNs is clear and concise:

"PNs are designed to prevent the housing position in or around stress areas from deteriorating further and to stop stress from rippling out from areas which are the subject of concentrated action, normally by use of HAA powers; and may also serve to pave the way for later, more intensive, action by HAA treatment if still needed, or by GIA action of a kind which cannot be undertaken immediately." (14)

PNs must always adjoin or surround a declared HAA or GIA, and the declaration allows the local authorities similar powers to those in HAAs. The use of PNs is unusual and no authorities within the sample area have implemented them. (15)
Housing Associations

The potential for the successful utilisation of registered housing associations for renewal work is considerable, but stress must be placed on their legitimacy as legal enterprises. In buying houses that come on to the market in renewal areas and improving, converting and managing them, as may be appropriate under arrangements with the local authority, efficient and financially sound housing associations can make a very useful contribution. The 1974 Housing Act Circular states:

"... registered housing associations can and should play an important role in supporting authorities, particularly in tackling areas of housing stress and meeting the housing needs of special groups of people. The use in HAAs of housing associations in whom authorities have confidence will augment the resources available for tackling such areas ...

... Authorities who have not hitherto made a practice of working with housing associations, or in whose districts there has been little housing association activity, should not hesitate to consult the Housing Corporation who have experience of the problems of setting up and operating housing associations and who will be ready to assist in developing effective support for authorities' action programmes." (16)

Among the smaller towns and cities little experience and knowledge of the workings of Housing Associations is available and they are viewed with suspicion. This is a great pity because as a contributor to small scale projects of renewal - common in smaller districts - the potential of the Housing Associations is high.

General Policy

Overall in policy choice two major approaches to area improvement are available: GIAs designated in 1969 and HAAs designated in 1974. The use of Housing Association might be expected in many local authorities, especially as central government sees them as a major future tool of
renewal. The question is: do all the authorities react to central government circulars in such a simple and widespread manner, and use the available tools of renewal in the manner for which they were designed?

Sample Survey: Residential Renewal Policies

Bearing in mind the restraints placed upon local authorities due to reorganisation, limited resources and capital, it might be expected that their patterns of take-up of central government directives on residential renewal would be high in the hope that solutions to such problems would be forth-coming. The stress placed on such policies by the central authority, together with the comprehensive nature of the policy directives, should lead to the development of forward plans of action involving various policies dependent upon local constraints and characteristics. But does this pattern occur in all authorities?

The questionnaire sample survey examines the take-up of policies at three specific points in time. (See Appendix A for questionnaire). It examines policies 5 years ago (1972/3) pre-reorganisation and before the development of HAAs; present policies (1977/8) which involve all the present policies; and, Future Plans in 5 years time (1982/3) assuming no new legislation. The statistics drawn from the questionnaire are divided into classes based on the size of the population within the local authority.

If we examine the three classes in historical terms we can compare the size classes in direct relation to one another and to the central policy initiatives available at the time. At the first historical period classified in 1972/3, the most widely expected policies of residential renewal would be clearance and redevelopment with the
additional use of the then new mechanism of GIA treatment. As this was introduced in 1969 it might be expected, either by central government officials or independent observers, that within three years most local authorities would have enacted aspects of this policy. The minimum level reached should have been basic declarations and the majority should have moved further along the decision-making management path towards implementation processes.

Fig. 5.1: Residential Renewal - Percentages of Authorities using various Policy Tools (1972/3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RR policy in use in % of areas</th>
<th>Class One n = 15</th>
<th>Class Two n = 14</th>
<th>Class Three n = 15</th>
<th>Overall Sample n = 44</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 yrs ago</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearance Areas</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIAs</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Assoc.</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified Improvement Grant Areas (Pre-GIAs)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charity Trusts</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiv. Dwellings</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEGB</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977)

With these expectations the statistical data (see Fig. 5.1) is much as might have been expected for the largest classes of authorities, nearly 70% of them using either clearance or GIA treatment as a major policy tool of residential renewal. Interestingly, another 7% of local authorities in this size range had previously adapted individual dwelling improvement grants so as to attempt an area approach before GIA
legislation, and as this process continued working despite the 1969 Housing Act it is included in the data independently from GIAs. The use of Housing Associations that was also encouraged in the 1969 Act was low, but as far as renewal work is concerned, their use outside London was still in its infancy and despite initiatives from the central authority many local districts are suspicious and unco-operative in their use of such organisations. In this 1972/3 period, for our sample survey area, only 13% of the large authorities adopted policies involving such associations whereas none of the smaller authorities did so. The two smaller size classes are similar in their take-up of GIA treatment techniques and their use of clearance/redevelopment policies. As might be expected 50% of the medium size authorities and 40% of the small authorities continued with clearance/redevelopment policies, but the take-up of the newer GIA policies was low. Only 29% of the class two authorities and one in five of the class three authorities had any minimal involvement. The reasons for this failure to adopt the new policies might indicate that the smaller authorities take longer to absorb and understand new policies, or they may be seen as just over-cautious. Another explanation for the low take-up of the new policies might be that they are unsuitable when applied to local district authorities under a particular size, e.g. 100,000 population. Management techniques will also be important. As central government called for co-ordination and corporate management within the districts, it might be expected that such a structure was a basic prerequisite of implementing the new policy. Hence if districts could not fulfil the normative demands on corporate structures, they might conclude that the implementation of policy could not be accomplished.
After re-organisation as the smaller local authorities were amalgamated or enlarged it might be expected that resources and capabilities would develop, thus a greater take-up of new policy initiatives might be expected. But, in many of the small local authorities, residential renewal was still based on individual dwelling units and area policy was completely ignored, whereas in other authorities institutional housing groups, eg. RAF, were the main exponents of area renewal on services estates. This was a system of co-operation where the local authorities responsibilities were lessened but flexible enough to allow such outside involvement. Empirically these comments can only be developed at a micro-level through the case studies and an examination of Northtown and Southfield may be useful in developing various themes.

Northtown, as the representative of those authorities with a post reorganisation population of over 100,000, in the 1972/3 period was at the end of its proposed clearance policy programme. It only had one clearance area, but it must be remembered that this is before reorganisation and in Northtown's case specifically before reappraisal of policies, objectives and their new local environmental conditions. As might be expected and backing up the general data for this size class, Northtown had ten GIAs declared or actually being implemented at this time. It was not however one of the 13% of the large local authorities which had used Housing Associations for renewal purposes, a factor that may reflect the authorities current rather aggressive and antagonistic attitude towards them in present and future policies. Thus its take-up of general policy follows the sample survey trend for a district of its size, but still reflects the relatively slow nature of all local authority flexibility in policy i.e. legislation was instigated in 1969 and the patterns illustrated are still quite low 3/4 years later.

Southfield representing those authorities with under 100,000 inhabitants also reflects its peer groups' trends. Its actions before
the present post-1974 policies were minimal as far as residential renewal was concerned. It had terminated its Clearance Programme on an area basis, although it was still involved with individual dwellings or terraces of four to six houses which was not enough for its overall policy to be considered as involving area clearance programmes. The take-up of GIAs for these smaller authorities was about one in four, and Southfield was again in the majority having no declarations of GIAs, nor any real proposals to develop such programmes. Basically this was through lack of motivation and over-caution among members and officials of the pre-reorganisation authorities who were all too small to function at any successful level that involved the corporate or management based techniques suggested for GIAs.

So overall at this time (1972/73) it may be seen that two size groups emerge with regard to the take-up of GIA policy initiatives. The largest authorities appear to have had either greater flexibility in policy terms, or greater needs necessitating the new policies, as well as the staff capabilities, in both numbers and abilities, to adopt the new techniques. The small authorities appear to have been inadequate in all these respects, and were involved more with individual dwellings on a piecemeal basis, than with a long term structured programme into which to mould the new GIA policy.

As far as present policies (1977/78) are concerned it might be expected that the use of area policies of clearance should be declining, the policy of GIAs should be in full swing, and the take-up of HAA policies developing. The continual and reinforced encouragement of Housing Associations, as in the 1974 Housing Act, should also mean that more authorities were involved in this alternative policy choice. However, in the sample survey area in both the largest two size classes and
overall the use of area clearance policies has increased. The reason for this may be that the reassessment of all the housing stocks of the new authorities led to a reappraisal of policy and it was found necessary initially to clear areas of housing. This programme should now be drawing to a close with final tidying up and redevelopment taking place, however, policies may be prolonged due to financial cutbacks extending time periods set for policy completion.

As can be seen in Fig 5.2 the take up and use of GIA policies throughout the sample area has developed and overall is the dominant policy rather than clearance or HAA implementation.

Fig. 5.2 Residential Renewal - Percentage of Authorities using various Policy Tools (1977/8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exist at Present *</th>
<th>Class One n = 15</th>
<th>Class Two n = 14</th>
<th>Class Three n = 15</th>
<th>Overall Sample n = 44</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearance Areas</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIAs</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAA</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Assoc.</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impr. Grant Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pre-GIAs)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charity Trt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind. Dw'g</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEGB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Army</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCB</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Review</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In principle if not fully implemented in 1977/8
(Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977)
As with GIA policy the take up pattern for HAAs is varied across the size classes. Four years after the initial introduction of the concept of these stress areas only 40% of the largest authorities have declared or implemented them as components of their overall residential renewal structure. Surprisingly considering some of the extremes of housing stress in some of the small towns within the sample area only 77% of the medium size towns have declared HAAs, although less surprisingly none of the smallest authorities have done so. This pattern might be expected when it is considered that HAAs are aimed at areas of severe concentrated housing stress, and yet overall the sample contains a large element of heavy industrial, traditional fishing and coal mining areas which would perhaps have areas suitable for this type of treatment considering their economic and industrial structures. The use of Housing Associations which was again encouraged in the 1974 Housing Act has been highest among the largest authorities where two-thirds of the authorities have adopted them. Within the smaller authorities one in five of the medium size districts see them as useful mechanisms for implementing renewal policies, although as yet none of the smallest authorities have adopted them into their residential renewal procedures. This seems a pity as the role of such associations would appear suitable for small scale renewal policies such as those found in these smaller districts. Perhaps further government directives are necessary specifically to encourage such a policy?

In the case of the two case study authorities, Northtown's present residential renewal programme is expanding rapidly. It involves 25 GIAs, 9 Clearance areas, 1 Housing Action Area and the use of a single Housing Association on a trial basis to establish how efficient it is in management techniques, physical standards and within its
economic constraints. This authority is typical of the size class one authorities and although noting their availability has no Priority Neighbourhoods at present. In fact none of the authorities within the sample area is involved at present with PN policy. In the smaller Southfield authority the diversity of policy is minimal, although six GIAs have been declared or are being implemented at present. No HAAs, PNs, Clearance Areas or Housing Associations are being used and this authority seems to reflect a general traditional step-by-step approach to both the implementation of policies of residential renewal and to overall changes in the actual policies chosen. It will never be an 'initiative' authority, but more of a 'plodder' reacting slowly and it might say carefully to central government directives, never wishing to 'wake-up' to any startling developments. In this way the local government attitudes, abilities and personnel reflect the town: traditional and sleepy. Northtown on the other hand is more radical and perhaps brash. It is ambitious, being rather over-shadowed by the very large cities and seeking to adopt policies that involve experimentation and learning. It is continually reviewing its processes and is willing to adapt.

Overall present policies throughout the sample are divided into two major categories as represented by the case study local authorities. The larger authorities with perhaps the greatest problems adopt new policies far more quickly than the medium and small districts. The small districts do not appear to have much in common with the central government's conception of residential renewal problems. Central government assumes urban intensive problems of a medium to large scale whereas the problems of these areas, although arguably as bad as many purely urban areas in comparison with their local environment, are
intensive localised concentration which are too small for major area policy action.

For the next five years the programmes of the authorities are vague, (See Fig. 5.3). Either depending on future central government legislation, or based on the present legislative tools available, many local authorities are at present reviewing their future policies. 27% of the class one and 29% of the class two authorities are undertaking this process whereas many of the class three authorities appear to have very little idea of their future trends, whether or not new policy solutions are available.

Fig 5.3: Residential Renewal - Percentages of Authorities using various Policy Tools - Projected 1982/3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Five Year Plan</th>
<th>Class One n = 15</th>
<th>Class Two n = 14</th>
<th>Class Three n = 15</th>
<th>Overall Sample n = 44</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearance Areas</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIAs</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAAs</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Assoc</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNs</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charity Trt</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind. Dw'l'g</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCB</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Review</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977)

Despite changes in government initiatives, 60% of the largest authorities will still be involved in some element of area clearance and redevelopment into the early 1980's. Clearance will, of course, always be
necessary due to the finite lives and general nature of the dwelling stocks available. In all three size class groups GIA policies are dominant and rising in use notably in the smallest authorities who reflect a very slow pattern of take-up of central government's ideas. With such high percentages of the largest authorities policies under review, it might be expected that eventually the number of authorities using EAAs as tools of renewal will increase rapidly, as authorities begin to examine the worst areas for which GIA policy was not suitable.

The rate of use of Housing Associations appears to decline, but this method of renewal is one of the most experimental for many local authorities. It will only be expanded or continued if the present association working in the local districts are successful in their actions, or if central government financial incentives are given to the local authorities. Despite the many problems involved with PNs, 14% of the largest authorities are planning to use them, although it is possible that upon further examination they will be dropped.

The case study authorities are both expansionist in their future plans although Southfield appears rather limited in resources to achieve its goals. New staff in this authority have added additional life but perhaps have led to idealism overtaking reality in their plans. In the next five years they expect to expand from 6 to 12 GIAs, introduce three new HAAs and experiment with a single Housing Association! However, their actual capacity to achieve such targets is debatable, although on the whole they reflect the ambitions, attitudes and plans of most of the small local authorities. Like so many of these smaller authorities they are slow to react to central government's stimuli, and yet wish to fulfill an 'agency' role in implementing central government's national policy. For this reason they run the risk of
falling between the two stools and achieving very little except frustration for officials, members and the residents to whom promises have been made. Northtown's policy is at present under review, although it will continue its clearance programme in 9 areas. It expects to develop its GIA and HAA programmes but new declarations are still being assessed, as is the use of Housing Associations. The patterns of behaviour of the present Association working in the authority will be the key to any final decisions. The role of the members is also important as the future use of the general policy of improvement and rehabilitation is opposed by some senior councillors who are in favour of full-scale clearance and redevelopment. Although this is against national policy goals and against the wishes of many of the local officials who maintain that the social and community role of improvement is more effective. A similar political aspect occurs with regard to the future of Housing Associations. The council members are divided on their future use but at least one senior official is very much against their future use in Northtown, thus the future policy picture is unclear, but is being examined locally in great detail.

Overall, for all three periods in all three size classes change is visible, but trends exhibited illustrate that the larger authorities are far more ready to try the new policies suggested by central government. This may be because they have been previously consulted about such policies and have engaged in a two-way exchange of ideas, thus developing central government policy directives towards their local problems. The smaller authorities on the other hand are more diverse and have little additional 'political' power to wield. They may give less advice and information to the central authority due to
lack of expertise and other resources. In fact they may see the DOE as an 'agency' feeder to them rather than as a two-way information flow system involving local 'initiative' in policy development. For the smallest authorities or even those under 100,000 population, the slowness to take-up central government policy directives may be because no or few problems exist, but it is more likely to be because the directives are inappropriate for their local problems. This may then lead to them asking the regional DOE representatives for advice and adaptation of directives to apply to their local problems, thus indicating reasons for the time delays between new policies being circularised and their take-up.

Similarly, if no formal council policy on renewal exists in the local authority, then perhaps the management structure within which the policy directives can be enacted will not function. It has been continually stressed in central government circulars that corporate approaches to residential renewal are essential if the complex policies are to function properly. It might be natural to assume that the local authorities, all of whom were involved in residential renewal processes, were bound to a formal council resolution. This need for a formal resolution is emphasised in the comment:

"The Secretary of State is sure that ... every authority will wish to make arrangements at both committee and officer level for activities in a general improvement area to be co-ordinated and controlled". (17)

This applies equally well to all residential renewal processes and at committee level co-ordination and control might be through council resolution. The majority of local authorities do have their residential renewal schemes controlled by the numbers through a council resolution (Fig. 5.4). However, in size class terms only the class one - authorities over 100,000 population - has a majority with council resolutions. The 13% without such resolutions are among the smallest of this size class
and authority No. 13 comments further that their "Policy is determined as patterns and government policies emerge", thus perhaps adopting an 'agency' role with regard to implementing such policies. With the low numbers of authorities in class sizes two and three who have formal council resolutions, it is perhaps worth noting that many of their policies will be incorporated into overall Housing or Planning Policies passed by the council. Overall it is surprising that a formal declaration - which assumes the necessary control and co-ordination of policy - does not occur in more local authorities, especially since it appears to be another normative notion of the central state authority.

Fig 5.4 Use of the Council Resolution to Approve Residential Renewal Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Class One n = 15</th>
<th>Class Two n = 12</th>
<th>Class Three n = 7</th>
<th>Overall Sample n = 34</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is Residential</td>
<td>YES 87%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewal approved by Council Resolution?</td>
<td>NO 13%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977)

It is also important to see how residential renewal policies fit in with the wider local planning or local housing policy structures. Are individual residential renewal projects incorporated into District Plans? Central Government suggests:

"A comprehensive plan covering a local authority's district and including within its scope both privately owned and community owned housing should be a pre-condition of an effective renewal programme." (18)

So central government sees such an incorporation as desirable. Figure 5.5 illustrates the results from the sample survey:
Fig. 5.5: The relationship of Individual Residential Renewal Schemes to the Local Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Class One n = 15</th>
<th>Class Two n = 14</th>
<th>Class Three n = 9</th>
<th>Overall Sample n = 38</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q: Are individual residential renewal schemes incorporated into local plans?</td>
<td>YES 60%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO 40%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977)

Statistically the conclusion is that residential renewal schemes are incorporated into local plans, but no major differences occur throughout the sample survey analysis. Thus although such a policy is desirable it is not essential for implementing renewal policy. One class one authority (No. 38), however comments:

"local plans and housing renewal priorities are often difficult to reconcile"

thus illustrating the need for incorporation. This authority also admits that it only incorporates local plans and housing renewal informally, but it is flexible and go-ahead enough to be experimental. On policies of residential renewal in general the comment is made;

"Renewal is largely policy related and not so much area related - currently a one-off study is investigating the concept of more 'cellular renewal'." (Authority No. 38) (19)

Thus the relationship between local plans and renewal strategies is far from clear and perhaps future policy will reflect the complexity of policies and need for further co-ordination. This type of large authority with its experimentation plays an additional role as an advisor to the DOE. Its experiences will be related to central government and later small authorities may gain from its experience,
although obviously in size terms - population, expertise, resources, capital - it may only lead to the development of policies of minimal applicability to small scale improvement. More importantly, experience can be gained where authorities do incorporate their renewal strategies in local plans as on the whole within these plans they act as key model elements of the local plans in spatial and priority terms and help to clarify the role of residential renewal in planning, if not housing, philosophies.

Conclusion
The choices and development of policies of residential renewal reflects three major characteristics of the decision-making processes of renewal. First, the changes in the level of control and autonomy between local and central government; secondly, the differences in interpretation and use of the central government advice by all the local districts; and thirdly, the differences between the districts in their speed of adoption of new policies. After the early freedom of the late 1960's and early 1970's the role of central government under the 1974 Act became more restrictive as far as allowing local authorities any real initiative on policy choices. For example the Minister now has the power of approval or veto of all GIAs suggested for declaration by local authorities. This is an important control mechanism, as is approval of capital finance expenditure and the control of future Housing Investment Programmes. Alternatively, where central government sought the introduction and use of Housing Associations - often against the wishes of the local authorities - it had little direct power except through advice notes and the publicising of the Housing Corporation. Similarly, PNs are largely ignored by the districts, but unlike the HAAs and GIAs developed under the 1974 Housing Act, central government
itself has not used its full powers to initiate their use.

As policy became area based under the 1969 and 1974 Housing Acts, the size of improvement areas proved a barrier to many small authorities. Although declining from the 1969 optimum size of 300 to 500 dwellings to the 1974 optimum of 200-300 dwellings, these 'ideal' limitations were still rather large concentrations for small district authorities with areas in need of treatment. Among the sample survey in 1972/3, only the largest authorities were flexible and adaptable enough to adopt GIA legislation in a rather 'initiative' manner, to use Eddison's term. These larger authorities - over 100,000 pop. - were willing to interpret central government legislation, and then experiment at a local level to develop policies aimed at achieving national goals. The smaller authorities were, however, rather more 'agency' orientated, less willing to interpret legislation for themselves, instead waiting for firm directions and adaptations of policy by the regional DOE to suit their individual needs.

This latter pattern is continual in their behaviour, at present with regard to HAAs, as they slowly implement adapted GIA policy. It might be predicted that in five years time HAA policy will have been more readily accepted and any more new policies held under suspicion. The larger authorities have been more flexible in their interpretation, adapting more readily. By their greater contributions to the formulation of central government policy they will probably continue to do so for area management, whilst the smaller authorities find the policy less appropriate for their local problems.

Alternatively, Housing Associations were only taken up to any important degree in the present policies and their future for the majority of the
authorities, across the size classes, is very dependent upon their localised behaviour, efficiency and ability. Because of the varying standards between associations it is difficult to see, under their present management, how else local district authorities can assess their future roles and performances. Only time and experience will alter this attitude.

The speed of policy adoption illustrated in the sample survey both in the interpretation of policy and in the 'agency' characteristics displayed by the local districts, appears to be a direct result of the size of the authorities involved. This reflects both the limitations in resources within the smaller districts, and the localised nature of their areas suitable for treatment.

Overall, the differences in policy interpretation, development and local use reflect the size of the authorities; this hypothesis is continued in chapter six that examines implementation structures and processes involved in the policy choices.
1. The Deeplish Study in Rochdale - "Improvement possibilities in a district of Rochdale," HMSO, 1966 - examined the physical structure and feasibility of improvement of both the dwellings and their environment, and led to a pilot experimental improvement scheme. Similarly, the "Barnsbury Experimental Study Report" HMSO, 1968, examined an inner city 'twilight' area and the social problems emerging if and when improvement took place.


4. Ibid paragraph 15

5. This arbitrary nature is especially visible on the periphery of a declared area where similar houses may be in the area declared or just outside, making serious financial differences for the two groups due to the value of improvement grants.

6. J.T. Roberts General Improvement Areas Saxon House, 1976, page 38

7. Ibid pp 51-52

8. MHLG Op Cit (1969) paragraphs 37 and 38


10. D of E Circular 14/75, Housing Act 1974 Parts IV, V, VI, Memorandum A paragraph 9, HMSO, 1975

11. Ibid paragraph 37


13. Ibid paragraph 12


15. PNs are rarely used at present for two major reasons:

(i) Because declaration of a PN commits an area to later development as a GIA or HAA, which means that local residents will often not improve their property, instead waiting for the higher grants of the GIA or HAA policies. Thus a self-destructive process exists as blight sets in.
(ii) Because declaring PNs may lead to management responsibilities for the local authorities. But PN declaration does not provide the necessary financial incentives to private sector improvement. Thus overall the policies appear rather limited in their possibilities.

16. DOE On Cit (14/75) Memorandum A, paragraph 25
17. Ibid Memorandum C, paragraph 21
18. DOE On Cit (Circular 13/75) paragraph 6

19. The process of cellular or gradual renewal is continuous, involving minor rebuilding and renovation, together with localised clearance policies within the same area. The aim of the policy is to sustain and reinforce the vitality of the neighbourhood in both social and physical needs by reducing wholesale decasting of the population. The management of such a policy is complicated, and calls for great flexibility in local government management so as to allow the rate at which desirable standards can be achieved to be both fast and continuous. It must be accepted that some houses of a low quality fulfill a real need for cheap accommodation and thus perform a useful social function. For example, sub-standard dwellings occupied by elderly people could, if the residents wished, remain largely undisturbed except for basic repairs and improvements, thus retaining a flexible policy and allowing the residents a greater say in policies involving their lives.
Introduction

After assessing policy choices and developments since the late 1960's, and the differences in their interpretation and adoption, it is necessary to assess how they are implemented. Do the corporate management structures of the administrative aspects of local government impinge on implementation structures and processes of renewal? If so, do the local district authorities all follow the advice of central government in developing their local structures? After assessing the background to these questions, this chapter will examine them in more detail based on the evidence found in the implementation structures and processes of the sample survey. How the local authorities implement policies advocated by the central authority, if they do, will also be assessed, as will the contribution of corporate management techniques and the use of management networks. These factors will all affect the choices made by the district authorities for implementation, and thus impinge upon the local policy objectives of residential renewal.

It is not really within the scope of this project to examine the practical processes of individual authorities step-by-step, but to undertake a general viewpoint of decision-making processes and procedures within the internal structures of local district authorities. This is desirable when it is considered that, as a policy, residential renewal cannot be encompassed within the limited resources capabilities of a single traditional department like housing or planning. The DCE recognises these complications, and emphasises the need for corporate management and co-operation.
"The resources of several local authority departments - notably housing, finance, environmental health, and social services, but also planning, roads, education and others - will be needed if an action programme is to be carried through successfully. Some authorities have already found it useful to set up area teams to co-ordinate and carry through action. Such teams, involving officers of the various departments of the housing authority and, where necessary, of the county council or of other agencies should ideally be based within the HAA". (1)

However, while the idea of area based teams of officers with various skills working together on the same objective is excellent in theory, it is more limited in practice. Except for very large metropolitan authorities the capital and manpower costs involved in such a programme would appear to be too high to justify such action, although many authorities see such a team as basic to any real long-term action leading to any final solution. Perhaps this indicates how 'out of touch' the central D of E, and even its regional offices, are about 'on site' problems of capital and manpower shortages. Despite this, the role of a team is perhaps the key to the central authority's ideas on the implementation of residential renewal policy. But who is involved in such a 'team'? Is it based on one department, or is it an independent unit outside the general post-Bains local government administrative structure?

Sample Survey: departmental and administrative structures

After the 1972 Local Government Act, greater uniformity of departmental structures of district authorities might have been expected. With this in mind, and the earlier stress on the key departments involved in renewal - Housing, Finance, Environmental Health and Social Services - a limited pattern of key departments involved in renewal might be expected in all the districts. But, as one of the class three small authorities points out:
"None but metropolitan authorities will have social services departments",
(No 8), thus the use of the latter department within our sample survey area might be expected to be small. Most districts will have to rely on greater co-operation with the county tier of government for its facilities.

As can be seen in Figure 6.1 the other three departments are well to the fore in being key contributors to residential renewal policy. Examining these statistics, the existence of two major groups of departments is found in all three sizes of authority. For clarity, in figure 6.1, these have been divided into a major inputs section that is ranked on its overall sample classification, and a minor division of departmental inputs that are included in any team or other approaches as and when needed. The Housing, Environmental Health, Planning and Legal/Administrative departments are by far the most often mentioned, and these would appear to be the departments most likely to exhibit a co-ordinating or lead department role in any 'team' approach. The only real exception to this pattern, is among the smallest authorities where the Technical Services department is highly ranked. Even this disparity is eliminated, however, as many of the departments classified as 'technical services' may incorporate the services of traditional Housing, Planning, Environmental Health and Engineering Departments, which due to the size of the local authority do not warrant independent departmental status.

With stress being placed on corporate management as the normative image of local government given by the central authority, it is not surprising to find that project co-ordination units exist in the more complex authorities, i.e. the largest authorities. The use of such units is
Figure 6.1 Administrative Structure of Residential Renewal Strategy Organisation (2)

'Points adjustment score' rankings (A) and percentage figures of full-time involvement of departments in the local authorities (B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Authority Department</th>
<th>CLASS ONE</th>
<th>CLASS TWO</th>
<th>CLASS THREE</th>
<th>OVERALL SAMPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAS(A)</td>
<td>% Involve(B)</td>
<td>PAS(A)</td>
<td>% Involve(B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 15</td>
<td>n = 13</td>
<td>n = 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Inputs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANNING DEPARTMENT</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENVIRON. HEALTH DEPARTMENT</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSING DEPARTMENT</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGAL/ADMIN. DEPARTMENT</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECHNICAL SERVICES DEPT.*</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINANCE DEPARTMENT</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENGINEERS DEPARTMENT</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT CO-ORDIN. DEPT.</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTATES DEPARTMENT</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMENITIES/RECREATION DEPT.</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Departments/Inputs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCHITECTS DEPARTMENT</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIEF EXEC/SECRETARY DEPT.</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSULTANTS (Outside Body)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTY - Engineers</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTY - Highways</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESIGN DEPARTMENT</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRANTS/MORTGAGES DEPT.</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTS DEPT.</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL SERVICES DEPT.</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURVEYORS DEPT.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Technical Services may include:— Engineers, Housing, Planning and Environmental Health Functions.

Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November, 1977
lower in the smaller size classes where the overall structure of inter-departmental management is less complex. This allows greater informal co-ordination between various groups based on a step-by-step attitude to decision-making processes. Co-ordination in these smallest authorities might appear to be based on a single individual or department which acts as a nodal focus. Since reorganisation the most likely candidate for this role is the Chief Executive who oversees the various aspects of local authority work. The larger authorities may, alternatively develop an independent co-ordination unit or department. This is less likely to be formed on an area basis as perceived by the central authority, than as a 'policy team'. It may involve various specialists, co-opted from their indigenous professional departments, who act quite independently, exercising their skills to solve the specific local policy problem. Usually if they are not needed as full-time team members they retain basic ties to their traditional departments and previous work areas. The use of departments from within the County tier of government is rare and in the sample survey it is only the class one authorities who mention their use. Overall, a predictable traditional pattern of departments is involved in residential renewal processes at a macro level. This pattern may follow historical patterns of responsibility within the specific authority, or may be a result of direct influence from the central government. This latter impetus may be created by the distribution of directives or circulars that need specialist interpretation, analysis, comment or adaption. The departmental specialist then assumes a dominant 'lead' role in further involvement in that particular aspect of policy. This 'lead' will then be defended within the local authority to benefit the interests of that department in controlling any such power base for future action.

Bearing in mind the notion of a 'lead' department which might tradition-
ally occur, and central government's idea of a team approach to the administration and management of residential renewal, a model involving three alternative types of local authority management structure was developed. This tripartite typology was based on discussions with various local authority officials interviewed in earlier pilot study authorities, together with the views of various academics. It has led to the formulation of three simple and descriptive models of local authority organisation against which districts can evaluate their local structures (See Figure 6.2). It must be noted that a similar study by the National Building Agency independently developed a similar set of models late in 1977 after the circulation of the questionnaire survey (3). The three descriptive models, used in the questionnaire (Appendix A), and against which the local authorities were asked to assess their own structures were:

(a) Traditional Model - The residential renewal policy is centred around one dominant department which co-ordinates the specialist services of other departments, within the framework of its own procedures.

(b) Co-ordinator Model - The use of an independent area improvement co-ordinator is the central role within the residential renewal process. His role is to programme and co-ordinate the work of all the specialist departments.

(c) Team Model - A team approach is the dominant procedure of residential renewal policy. A full team of specialists drawn from various departments handles one or more schemes of renewal within a defined area.

From these three models it might be expected that the basic frameworks of decision-making in residential renewal will be developed. It might be that the central authority stresses the role of both the Co-ordinator and Team Models, whilst the traditional model is based on previous experiences of the limited vertical and horizontal aspects of local government hierarchies.
Figure 6.2: Typology of basic decision-making structures of residential renewal (Percentages using basic model frameworks)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CLASS ONE n = 15</th>
<th>CLASS TWO* n = 13</th>
<th>CLASS THREE n = 8</th>
<th>OVERALL SAMPLE n = 36</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) TRADITIONAL MODEL</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) CO-ORDINATOR MODEL</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) TEAM MODEL</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*8% of the local authorities in this class did not agree that any of the models applied to their structures. These appear to exhibit unco-ordinated patterns of policy and organisation based upon independent departments leading to policy problems.

(This figure is excluded from the overall sample statistics)

Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977.

Although only asking those authorities with traditional lead department structures to name the "dominant" departments within their residential renewal processes, many of the authorities involved in "team" model structures also indicated that even within the "team" particular departmental staff dominated. Although the "team" members are outside the direct control of their traditional departmental structure, the traditions of pre-reorganisation and departmental hierarchies continue.

The pattern of dominant departments is shown in Figure 6.3.

Figure 6.3: Dominant departments in Local Authority residential renewal structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPARTMENTS</th>
<th>CLASS ONE n = 10</th>
<th>CLASS TWO n = 10</th>
<th>CLASS THREE n = 4</th>
<th>OVERALL SAMPLE n = 24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENGINERS</td>
<td>15%*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSING</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGAL/ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANNING</td>
<td>15%*</td>
<td>15%*</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURVEYORS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECH. SERVICES</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977 * See p.205
When considering the dominant departments involved in residential renewal, the Housing Department perhaps rather surprisingly plays a minor role. This is especially true when it is just a single element in an overall "team", where it is often only involved in specific housing responsibilities e.g. Rent Collection. The "team" approach which is advocated to a certain extent by central government is seen in Figure 6.2 as the dominant trend in the overall sample and particularly so at the extremes in size of the authorities. However, these models only represent a very crude basic structure as most authorities adapt to their local environments. Despite this limitation a difference between the 'team' approaches of the large class size one and small class size three authorities may be identified. The reasons for structuring their administration on such frameworks must also be examined. For the small authorities sheer lack of size calls for a mixed team approach using the skills of all the departments for the different policies of government to be successfully enacted. In these cases the team members will vary as and when needed and will have no full-time commitment to the residential renewal process team as opposed to any other policy teams of local government. Alternatively, among the largest authorities an independent renewal team may be developed and full-time officials specialising in particular aspects of the renewal strategy may be seconded to work solely on these projects. Owing to problems of obtaining any empirical data on staff resources from most authorities, who suggested such figures were hard to obtain, this aspect of the questionnaire is not statistically tabulated.

After the questionnaire collection, a study by the National Building Agency was made into the organisation and staff resources of various local authorities. This gave details of staff inputs by department
in five case study authorities and calculated their costs. It called for greater co-ordination between staff in a wide range of disciplines and departments as a major step towards a successful policy of area management. It also stressed that it is essential:

"that staff resources are fully taken into account before any areas are declared" (4)

Thus emphasising the importance of full and adequate resources before any improvement policy can be successful. Within our sample survey the staff resources used can be illustrated in two varied examples of local authorities. Authority No. 13, is a large class one authority with a growing pattern of residential renewal changing from Clearance to HAAs and GIAs. Typical of its size class its administrative and decision-making structure is based on a team model with eight full-time staff in addition to various numbers of part-time staff allocated for specific projects. The dominant department is the Environmental Health Department which allocated three full-time staff to the residential renewal team. Others involved are two full-time planning department staff, two full-time legal/administration department staff, a single full-time project co-ordinator, and various part-time staff inputs from the Engineers, Finance, Housing departments. The Amenities/Recreation and Estates departments supply staff when particularly needed. This authority would to a large extent fit the central government concept of a co-ordinated and corporately managed renewal team, but based on policy rather than area functions.

An example of a small class size three authority (No. 55), presents a very different picture of a residential renewal "team". The dominant department within a "loosely knit team" is the Planning department with three staff contributing on a limited part-time basis.
This caucus is assisted by a single part-time official from the Environmental Health, Housing and Technical Services departments, whilst a single part-time representative of the finance department is involved as and when needed. This type of informal co-ordination between departments typifies the structures of the smaller authorities, and helps to explain the problems created by the central state authority when it imposes national policies and directives aimed at large authorities as the limited structures and resources of small districts.

Whereas these are examples of team approaches, traditional dominant lead departments exist. Different internal processes may be controlled by different dominant departments within the same authority's overall process of residential renewal. For example Authority No. 24 states that the Environmental Health Department is dominant for Clearance; Housing and Planning departments are dominant for residential renewal plan preparation; and Technical Services is dominant for implementing policy plans. Authority No. 46 also claims that the dominance of departments is defined by the area of work. The Planning department dominates in plan preparation, public participation and similar development work, whilst the Engineers are the key factor in detail and implementation processes. Many differences occur, therefore, between various authorities, although flexibility in approach is found even where traditional limitations on departmental responsibilities - thus power bases - continue to exist.

To give an insight into specific structures of decision-making in residential renewal, the case studies of Northtown and Southfield are useful. The smaller authority of Southfield, whilst claiming to adopt a team approach to residential renewal, is at present (July 1978) still considering the formation of a GIA team to smooth relations between
the major responsibilities of planners and engineers. However, the development of this team is held up by problems of staff shortages throughout the authority. The informal technical co-operation taking place could only really be regarded as an informal team approach although, as with a number of aspects of this authority, whereas the ideas and attitudes of the officials are good the resources and facilities are not. This problem itself contradicts central government assumptions and dictates which indicate the background necessary for devising a renewal strategy:

"Apart from over-riding considerations of finance ... main resources demanded by a renewal programme are ... the local authority's own capacity for planning, executing and monitoring the programme. Some schemes will be very demanding in management terms". (5)

This central government comment really is based on assumptions that strong and flexible management systems occur, and that staff resources can be re-allocated. However, Southfield has only one and a half staff allocated full-time to a present renewal policy of six GIA's that is optimistically planned to expand to 12 GIA's, 3 HAA's and one Housing Association in the next five years! These staff are allocated as one official in the planning department and a half in the Engineer's department, although part-time contributions are essential from other staff resources. Perhaps for these reasons the dominant department within Southfield's "team" is the Planning department, which is especially responsible in the earliest stages of plan preparation and public participation, whereas the physical implementation is a protected 'interest' of the Engineer's department.

In comparison with Southfield, Northtown is far better off in resources allocated for renewal both in capital and staff terms, although staff will continually stress their hands are tied by central government
controls operated by public sector spending cuts and lately by HIP policy. Northtown claimed that it did not fit one of the typologies of administrative structures to any degree more than another which was probably quite fair. It operates a GIA team and ultimately a similar HAA team, but this team is chaired and perhaps controlled as a personal interest by the project co-ordinator. Despite this hybrid type structure, as with Southfield the dominant departments vary with the process in operation. The Planning department is responsible for originating much of the work in plan preparation and is the key element in public participation, although the project co-ordinator has a 'finger in every pie'. When implementation starts the Engineers take over dominant roles and are also responsible for final clearing up in conjunction with the Amenities and Recreation department - again under the watchful eye of the Co-ordinator's department.

In resources terms the planning department allocates 5 full-time staff to residential renewal, whilst the Engineers claim the equivalent of 7 staff and the Project co-ordination unit the equivalent of 2 staff. The planning department is the only department with full-time staff allocated to GIA's. Other departments which serve on the GIA team working party monthly meetings are representatives from the Estates, Environmental Health, Housing and Legal/Administration departments. The services of the Amenities/Recreation, Finance and Social Services departments being incorporated as and when needed. The differences between the two case studies are varied and do not need to be repeated, but they illustrate the problems facing the central authority when making its overall macro-level plans. Differences on site are wide in resources, capabilities, flexibility and scope for development. This may reinforce the role of regional offices or indicate the necessity
for greater local or regional control of administrative structures used in decision-making in residential renewal.

Sample Survey: Policy implementation processes

The structures involved in the administrative and decision-making framework of residential renewal strategy provide a background for an examination of the associated processes of policy implementation. For this to be achieved it is necessary to examine the decision-making processes using the sample in the questionnaire and, at a micro level, the case studies. In the questionnaire - Appendix A - the local authorities were asked to assess their processes of decision-making with regard to three suggested alternative sequences. Considering the emphasis placed on residential renewal as a key physical and social policy of central government, it would appear natural for authorities to develop a flexible and open ended policy. This need for flexibility is even more apparent owing to continual changes in policy directives, whether by specific types of action area being developed, or by finance capital restraints being implemented, e.g. HIPs. It might thus be assumed that all local authorities would have a flexible and open ended policy process. This ability to adapt both to changes in policy directive from above, or to local problems, is fundamental to a successful programme of change, whether it is assessed in political, physical or social terms. But do all the local authorities across the size sample exhibit such uniform sequences? Three sequences were outlined for the local authorities choice in the questionnaire:

a) "A formal sequence of decision making and implementation always to be followed"

b) "A flexible sequence of decision making and implementation to be adapted to differing situations"

c) "An ad hoc procedure determined by individual problems"
The patterns reflected in Figure 6.4 show that 64% of the overall sample claim to operate quite rational, flexible or adaptive decision-making processes, and also that 36% of the authorities do not.

**Figure 6.4: Decision-making sequences in residential renewal.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CLASS ONE</th>
<th>CLASS TWO</th>
<th>CLASS THREE</th>
<th>OVERALL SAMPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 15</td>
<td>n = 12</td>
<td>n = 8</td>
<td>n = 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a)</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b)</td>
<td>Flexible</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c)</td>
<td>Ad hoc</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977

This might lead to serious communications and implementation problems, both at local and central government levels as well as between the two hierarchial authorities. If one concentrates on this 36% group it is found that 53% of it (19% of the overall sample), operate an independent 'one-off' step-by-step approach to policy. This is an alternative process of decision-making, where plans for action and resources are both linear and limited. But areas with such procedures may perhaps be seen as undesirable in the face of the efficient corporate long term management procedures outlined by central government in the various circulars on residential renewal. In size class terms this step-by-step policy increases among the smaller authorities where the general informality of co-ordination leads either to informal ad hoc procedures, or to very rigid processes. As many of these smaller authorities point out, the rigidity of their decision-making sequences is often based on the individual power and control of the Chief Executive who may or may not be willing to share his influence and allow wider informality in sequences. Thus, although the majority of the local authorities in the sample survey area follow an adaptive flexible
sequence of decision-making processes, a quite high proportion (36%) act in a far more inflexible, and hence limited, manner in implementing policy and government directives. A somewhat sobering thought for those implementing a national policy scheme. Against this basic background, it is desirable to examine another dimension to the problem. Previously stress has been laid on the time involved in various processes and how time delays in renewal areas can lead to blighting of properties. So as to avoid such adverse affects it might be expected that a strict timing of procedural functions would be necessary in policy implementation. This timing would obviously need the flexibility to adjust to localised environmental or housing problems, but would indicate an efficient and structured decision-making policy process. This might be expected in an authority applying the central authority's dictates on corporate management. Linked to a basic requirement on timing of various decisions within the overall process is the question of using other management techniques such as library networks, decision paths or 'key decision' routes for particular problems. Figure 6.5 reflects the balance of authorities using time restraints in decision-making processes. As a management tool, or indicator of management capacity, this reflects a similar pattern to that of local authorities using network techniques to further residential renewal developments (see Fig. 6.6). This also helps to indicate those authorities who are involved in strict and organised processes of corporate organisation.
Table 6.5: Use of strict timing in decision-making processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS ONE</th>
<th>CLASS TWO</th>
<th>CLASS THREE</th>
<th>OVERALL SAMPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n = 14</td>
<td>n = 11</td>
<td>n = 7</td>
<td>n = 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sample Survey Questionnaire Survey, November 1977

A clear disparity between those authorities with populations of over 100,000 and the rest of the sample is illustrated. The majority of the larger authorities use, or at least aim at, a strict timing background to the residential renewal decision-making processes. However, as authority No. 36 points out "this aim is not always achieved", and No. 23 answers "Yes hopefully!", thus indicating that the flexibility of their processes allows the timings not to be too rigid. On the other hand, authority No. 45, which does not use such timings, explains its reasoning that "Networks are loose because GIA's differ and are difficult to monitor", thus both local problems and wider economic or political restraints impinge on such limitations as time mechanisms. But with the development of HAA's rather than GIA's as a more important policy, the question of timescales will again become important as HAA work has to be completed with a short term five year period, thus restraints may be re-emphasised. Both the class two and class three smaller authorities in the large majority admit that strict timing mechanisms are not adopted. Whereas the larger authorities can slow down processes and be quite flexible in their policy processes, the smaller districts work on a step-by-step basis in their long term plans. Thus, any slowing down may often mean a complete halt to the forward progress.
of the work. This is illustrated in the two case studies with regard to the cutbacks in public spending. Northtown has slowed down its policy and re-assessed its short term objectives, whereas Southfield slowed down in an equally predictable manner but has really temporarily halted its work in residential renewal, and is just 'ticking over'. So the major explanation for the use or non-use of timing limitations might be seen to be bound up in the overall structure and size of the authority. The large, complex and more corporate management system can slow down, but continue working in the event of environmental change. Whilst the small authorities operate towards short term goals, in a step-by-step approach, and so they do not utilise such a strict timing mechanism: they only proceed to the next step in the process when the previous one is achieved. Thus in the event of cutbacks - changes in the outside environment - the stages take longer and a complete halt in renewal action may occur.

As a follow up to the timing problem, the use of management networks in decision-making in residential renewal arises. The larger authorities might be expected to adopt an organised network of procedures whilst the smaller authorities would not. This hypothesis and its links to central government directives and how local authorities react to them may be assessed by examining the problem with regard to the central government's area improvement note 11 'Networks for home and area improvement' (6). This management document shows local authorities the type of model structures and processes that they should be attempting to achieve. This directive on networks was not published as an area improvement note (AIM) until 1977, but since the 1969 Housing Act and the emergence of GIA's some similar activity networks were available at the regional offices of the DOE,
if requested by the local authorities. The new AIN has incorporated the provisions of the 1974 Act as well as the experience gained using such systems since the 1969 Act. As these Housing Acts both stressed the importance of a corporate approach to the management of residential renewal, so too does the AIN. However, it assumes such management techniques rather than encourages them.

The introduction to the document states:

"Many local authorities will have developed their own programming techniques for improvement and it may be of interest to them to compare these with what is offered here. Other authorities are developing or are about to develop such techniques and it is hoped that this AIN will help them in doing so". (7)

This emphasis on the assumptions of a corporate approach having been adopted perhaps helps to explain why so many of the local authorities claimed, at an earlier stage in this study, to have such structures. The normative nature of the government circulars is again emphasised and pressure for adhering to these types of management structure is continued and assumed by central government to be the best system for all district authorities. The AIN continues:

"The procedures associated with area and house improvement consist of many separate but inter-related activities. In order to carry out schemes economically and to avoid unnecessary delays it is helpful to identify each activity and its relationship with other activities and to develop a project programme which is based on a realistic assessment of the time and resources required for each component activity. The activity networks in this note set out the activities involved and show their logical relationship to other activities". (8)

These 'logical relationships' assume that an ideal situation exists without such complications as public spending cuts, limited resources and restraints from the outside political environment. These false assumptions underline the way in which the central government officials are out of touch with reality. It also reflects the overlying philosophy
of the central authority, based upon long term national goals and
efficient corporate management as the single method of achieving it.
Alternatively, perhaps the local experiences of the smaller authorities
are overlooked. Their informal co-operation on policy and technical
details using the step-by-step minimum risk approach may be the most
suitable to their situation. Central government makes basic assump­
tions in both housing circulars and in AIN 11 which must be assessed
and possibly challenged. For the small authorities to make "a
realistic assessment of the time and resources required for each com­
ponent activity", additional resources would be necessary. Thus even
to assess, let alone implement the needs of the AIN's process, exist­
ing resources would have to be expanded, or stretched, probably to the
detriment of the continuation of any residential renewal policy.
Figure 6.6 illustrates the reaction of the small authorities to AIN 11,
regardless of its normative nature or misplaced assumptions. The
difference between the largest authorities - size class one, over
100,000 population and the rest of the sample is wide, and similar
to the statistics on the use of strict timescales in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.6: The use of 'Network analysis' within decision-making processes of residential renewal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are 'Networks' used?</th>
<th>CLASS ONE n = 15</th>
<th>CLASS TWO n = 12</th>
<th>CLASS THREE n = 8</th>
<th>OVERALL SAMPLE n = 35</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If YES:

i. Exactly based on AIN 11?
ii. Based on AIN 11, but adapted for local use?
iii. An adapted system - Independent and AIN 11 incorporated
iv. Based on Independent work but AIN 11 used as adaptive aid
v. Completely independent of AIN 11

If NO:

Does the authority use an ad hoc arrangement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CLASS ONE n = 15</th>
<th>CLASS TWO n = 12</th>
<th>CLASS THREE n = 8</th>
<th>OVERALL SAMPLE n = 35</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. 66% of the overall sample have populations of under 100,000.

Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977.

As might have been predicted it is the larger authorities who make most use of organisational networks in general, although nearly half of them only compared their own previous networks with the central government AIN 11, and adopted any of its locally advantageous points. In addition to this 18% of the Class one authorities using networks worked completely independently of note 11. The difference between the 'agency' or 'initiative' roles of the different sizes of local authorities is reflected in the fact that of those small authorities (class three) who attempted to develop
networks they all followed the AIN and only adopted it for local use, i.e. an 'agency' role whereas at the other extreme only 27% of the class one authorities did so. None of the authorities entirely based their local network systems on AIN 11, but this is not surprising owing to its being based on an 'ideal' structure developed from the central authority's perception of the average local authority. But none of the authorities is that 'ideal'. An important comment made by one of the largest authorities (No. 36) was that although they developed their network system before AIN 11 was published they were able to include parts of it. But their network "has yet to be used all the way through since so far we have been dealing with inherited CIA's (declared before reorganisation) none of which have followed the times procedure that we are now proposing to use". This further illustrates the problems of applying new concepts to established patterns of decision-making. Once a traditional process has started, however flexible it is in policy terms, in management structures and decision-making/administrative processes it is rather inflexible and bound by local constraints and historical traditions. This lack of flexibility results from the fact that structural frameworks of government are bound by long term restraints, and any attempt to alter them is a major step in central and local government activity as it may involve both high capital expenditure on resources, and problems of loss of skilled personnel. This problem is well illustrated by the problems created by major administrative changes in the reorganisation of local government. Although at a lower level of complexity, costs and numbers, the same problems are apparent in residential renewal organisation structures and processes which cannot be greatly altered during set procedures. In this way perhaps the ad hoc step-by-step processes of the smaller authorities allow greater flexibility in major changes of structures and processes.
Despite the central government ANU's claim for universal applicability of their networks with statements such as:

"These planning and control functions, by identifying potential problems of delays at an early stage when corrective measures may effectively be taken, play an essential part in the efficient execution of a scheme of whatever size". (9)

It appears from the sample survey that few small authorities use any type of networks. Instead they rely on ad hoc arrangements often based on separate steps of decision-making, many of which although informal, may be parallel and 'co-ordinated' on a small scale without relying upon complex master networks supported by numerous sub-networks all calculated to minute detail. The smaller local authorities by retaining their traditional frameworks possibly rely more on localised D of E advice. If the comparison is possible, now that the D of E have indicated how to design, operate and manipulate networks, they may be used more frequently as occurred slowly with the use of the new policies of GIA's and HAA's. Additionally, with the informal local decision-making structures emphasis can be placed on local participation, based on ideals of informal democracy and consensus. By implementing networks democratic participation will not necessarily be eroded, but it will be more limited, and structured in a rather formal and inflexible, thus less democratic manner.

Having made these general points on decision-making processes with regard to implementing policies of residential renewal in the sample area we can compare the case study areas of Northtown and Southfield. Each represents one of the two 'model' authorities which are being moulded through the evidence of the sample survey group, and they serve as useful tools to illustrate further any such difference, especially with regard to the way in which central government seems to adopt overall ideas applicable to all local district authorities.
Southfield, the smaller of the two authorities, reflects the same sequence for decision-making processes as the majority of the sample survey, including Northtown, in that the process is flexible and adaptable to varying situations. This claim can be verified to a certain extent as Southfield tends to be flexible in its policy to such an extent that it does not use any system of networks, but evaluates particular individual residential renewal projects in their local situations based on a simple step-by-step approach with no set timescales for activity. Originally in 1974 they developed a GIA project 'work path' but this has never been implemented as a model sequence of decisions to follow. Nor has any use been made of AIN 11 which is rather too complex for many smaller local authorities without the personnel trained in such management techniques. Thus Southfield appears a macro-level to exhibit most of the major characteristics of its peer group local authorities - those under 100,000 population - in its less complex and perhaps more locally efficient decision-making processes.

Northtown as an alternative is very conscious of new management techniques and modern technological developments. Its entire residential renewal programme is operated using a computer, and all the various stages of the process are based around this tool of technology. At the present time no timescales can be applied strictly in this authority, although at the policy conception and the crucial development of the computer backed 'library network' system, timing restraints did apply. These restraints were found to be impractical as finance and personnel resources were cut, but they still provide a basic 'scale' framework in which residential renewal decision-making processes can be developed. The library network is based upon independent work within the local
authority who viewed the publication of ADH 11 with interest although
admitting it does not really develop their present system. Changes in
the present network may however be needed as the Northtown authority
prepares to implement policy towards HAA's rather than GIA's. Detailed
adjustments in their organisation will be necessary, although the same
basic pre-declaration procedures will occur. Hence when the full
programme of renewal work in Northtown comes into operation it will
use different basic networks for different policies, but allow them to
be flexible enough to deal with local area level differences. However,
their present problem is to 'slow down' the processes involved in the
networks as the GIA programme in general is restrained due to financial
cutbacks, however some forward movement in policy is essential.

Conclusion

The structures and processes involved in the implementation of policies
of residential renewal appear to be different from those outlined by
central government. The degree of this difference varies and, as far
as the sample survey authorities are concerned, might be seen as a
function of size. The central government authority called for the
development of a structure of area based teams for implementing policy,
based within a local authority organised on corporate management terms.
Similarly for the processes involved in implementing policy a 'Network'
system was suggested. This was based on a complex corporate management
system involving numerous networks and sub-networks for individual goals
which contribute to the overall residential renewal policy. Both these
concepts were seen as key elements of renewal policy for the district
authorities. The local authorities examined appear to adopt these ideas
to suit their local situations, and may broadly be divided into two
key groups. These two groups are suitably represented by the case
study authorities of Northtown and Southfield, whose major characteristics are typical. Size is the key factor in defining these two entities, and a crude measure of 100,000 population is used as the determining factor. As we have seen both groups follow basic ideas of 'teams' for residential renewal, and both are based on policy rather than on area characteristics; but they differ in their organisation and formality. The large authorities are more autocratic and organised, but not inflexible; whilst the small districts are based upon informality, personal contacts, and more limited horizons. In the majority of both 'size' groups similar departments still dominate despite the 'team' approaches; usually these are those departments involved in traditional individual dwelling improvements - Environmental Health, Planning, and Legal/Admin. The only exception are the smallest authorities where the policy is often dominated by the Technical Services Unit which has the traditional responsibilities under one roof. Overall the large authorities are the more complex and flexibly based on team and/or co-ordinator structures, whilst the smaller districts are limited more by their resources, and are based on informal relationships - they 'muddle through'.

Both groups claim flexible sequences for implementing policies, a flexibility possibly necessary because of the continuing actions of the central government which 'changes the rules' during processes, e.g. HIP's. But most authorities continue, even if, among the small authorities especially, halts in progress occur until enough resources are available to take the next step towards the policy goal. Timing is not really important except to illustrate the scale of implementation processes between various stages. But networks are useful to develop even comparative timescales of any type to their maximum efficiency. Not surprisingly AHN II, published so long after policy processes had started,
is largely overlooked. The large complex and corporate authorities
had already developed their own systems, whilst the smaller authorities
are too limited and informal to utilise the concept. The only
possibilities for large scale use of the ABi advice are that traditionally
the smaller authorities see central government advice as normative, and
may, once they understand the networks, implement them however
potentially unsuitable they are for their needs. Alternatively as
HIAs emphasise time considerations, networks might prove useful in
helping to alleviate social and physical stress problems. So from this
limited sample it appears neither the processes nor structures of
renewal policy are developed as the single common 'ideal' perceived by
central government. Instead local factors - the size of the district -
thus its resource capabilities - mean that a varied pattern occurs.
Chapter Six: References

1. D of E
   Housing Act 1974: Parts IV, V and VI, Memorandum A para 39 (circular 14/75), HMSO, 1975

2. Notes on figure 6.1

   *Technical Services may include: Engineers, Housing, Planning and Environmental Health functions.

   If this is stated then both departments are allocated points.

   (A) The 'points adjustment score' is used to assess the level of involvement of various local authority departments in their residential renewal processes, procedures and strategies.

   From the questionnaire (See Appendix A), it is possible to award points for the various levels of declared involvement in the residential renewal process by the departments, e.g.

   'At all stages' 8 points
   'In over 75% of Stages' 6 points
   'In over 50% of Stages' 4 points
   'When specifically needed' 2 points
   'Rarely Involved' (but mentioned) 1 point

   This allocation is then calculated for each department and then divided by the number of authorities in that class to give a class 'points adjustment score'. The overall figure is then gained from calculating the total number of 'points adjustment scores'. This overall PAS then allows the departments to be ranked according to their importance in the process of decision-making in residential renewal.

   (B) The percentage figure illustrates the number of local authorities in each class that state that various departments are involved in the residential renewal process 'at all stages'. For example, the Housing Department is involved at all stages in 47% of the largest (Class One) Local Authorities. This allows the development of a further ranking of departments, reflecting the number of authorities that involve them 'at all stages' of the residential renewal process.

3. NBA
   Organisation and staff resources for area improvement Part 1: General approach pp 11-15, NBA, November 1977

4. Ibid
   p.24
   See also: Organisation and staff resources for area improvement Part 2 Case Studies, NBA, February 1978

6. D of E: *Networks for house and area improvement* Area improvement note 11, HMSO, 1977

7. Ibid p.l

8. Ibid p.l

9. Ibid p.l
Introduction
Both this study and central government directives have based their approaches to decision-making in residential renewal on three key elements: the organisation and administrative functions of government; the formulation, development and implementation of policies; and, the involvement of owners, residents and other interested parties through public participation. Having discussed the first two elements it is now necessary to examine the role, procedures and attitudes of the interested parties involved in public participation in residential renewal processes. All government, at both local and central level, in Britain is there to serve as a tool to implement the will of the majority as expressed through Parliament. This is the democratic system by which all the processes involved in decision-making must abide if they are deemed to be legitimate.

Central Government places emphasis on the need for local authorities to consider the individual in any actions involving this personal environment. For example, circular 13/75 states:

"Careful regard should be paid to the views of residents and owners. To achieve success, authorities must involve local residents and secure their commitment to the proposals for a specific area." (1)

The Minister in Parliament has called upon local authorities to be receptive to the ideas and feelings of the residents and owners. The improvement proposals for any area must contain key points of positive ideas, but these must be flexible enough to respond and alter to include any majority viewpoint expressed by the public. The only fixed points
must be the aim of bettering the area as a whole, and a readiness to encourage those ideas that appear worthwhile. Stress is placed on the need to communicate ideas across the spectrum of opinion and the key to this may be publicity in varying forms. Such publicity for a proposed action area should begin with an invitation from the local authority to the residents to discuss its proposals for the area. The need for giving accurate and truthful information is fundamental if only to avoid unnecessary complications caused by uninformed rumour and opinion. However, it must be stressed that the public meeting is not simply an occasion for the local authority to mount a public relations exercise, but should be the catalyst for future action based on an exchange of opinion between interested parties. Although the central authority sees public participation by owners and residents as a key aspect of renewal policy, the districts must reaffirm this contention locally. Thus the question arises; do the local district authorities develop the processes and structures necessary to sustain this aspect of democracy? From other chapters a dual typology of district authorities based on size has been developed; thus it would appear unlikely that all the districts would, or indeed could, deal with public participation in the same manner. The small authorities being less formal in processes might have good informal links with the public, whilst the large authorities might be found to be socially distant from the public. These questions and concepts are examined with regard to the sample survey authorities. First the advice notes and circulars on participation must be assessed and then compared with the workings of the districts as given in the questionnaire responses.

Central Government Advice

Before the 1974 Housing Act the key document for the district authorities
to learn about public participation was Area Improvement Note (AIN) number eight (2). This describes the possibilities for public meetings, surveys and how general techniques of democratic discussion can be organised and developed. However, the advent of HAAs under the 1974 Act was the key to formal participation. Under the title 'public participation and information,' the Circular stated:

"A basic - and novel - feature of HAAs is the statutory provision which makes the well-being of the people living in them one of the requirements for, and objects of, declarations. This means involving people, and groups, in the scale, nature, and timing of proposed action programmes. The Act provides for public information both on declaration (section 36(4) and throughout the period of the HAA (section 41). The Secretary of State attaches great importance to the giving of adequate publicity to HAA declarations and proposed action programmes. Experience with other area policies shows that unless the support of people in the area is secured, it is unlikely that an HAA programme could be carried out effectively. He therefore wishes authorities on declaration and in formulating action programmes, to consider carefully how best to bring their plans to the attention of residents and owners of property and to take into account representations they receive. A successful HAA programme will call for regular exchanges between the authority and residents"(3).

The Act leaves the amount and method of publicity to the discretion of the local authority, only indicating that all publicity material should stipulate a specific person and address to contact for further details. This person would normally be the Improvements Officer who can give both technical and financial details of improvement grants available, and may ultimately be involved in visiting individuals in order to increase the involvement of the community. Local authorities are also encouraged to use established groups to disseminate information, especially where language barriers occur and if translation is necessary. This may involve the local ethnic religious groups or an established community or residents committee/group that operates within or near the proposed renewal area. Participation is not a one-off exercise, the
initial public meeting must be followed by regular exchanges between
the local authority officials and the democratically elected representa-
tives of the community. This representative group may be a committee
elected throughout the area, or to be more spatially equal, based on
street representatives or terrace nominees. Such meetings develop
communication channels and educate both the local officials into the
special characteristics of an area, and give residents an insight into
the problems and constraints of government involved in decision-making
in residential renewal. But, as the central government directives say,
the potential for such community representatives is wide;
"Almost invariably, a residents' committee can play more
than a merely consultative role; they can indeed provide
a very useful addition to the authority's resources for
carrying through the project. Participation should ideally
lead to the identification and use of resources which will
continue to make a contribution to the welfare of the
neighbourhood long after the initial process of area
improvement has been completed." (4)

So it may be seen that in central government thinking both area improve-
ment and participation as processes do not stop on completion of the
project. They can provide an impetus for the development of community
spirit (5), as the improvement project provides a focus for local
attention. Past problems may be forgotten, and an old declining area
is potentially given new life in social, community and physical terms.
The attitudes of the local community - both residents and owners - to
renewal is important, as voluntary action is the key to the renewal in
areas designated as GIAs, thus co-operation between the community and
local authority must be maintained both formally through the organised
community groups, and informally on a day-to-day basis.

In an early report published by central government (in co-operation with
the London Borough of Haringey), the suggestions and directives made in
The Circulars were reinforced. Haringey was depicted as a potential 'model' authority involved in HAA legislation, against which others were to assess and adapt their local structures and processes of renewal. It reaffirmed that:

"The concept of public participation is based partly on the need to ensure that Council decisions properly reflect the needs and aspirations of those affected by them, and partly upon the desire of many people to have a say in matters which affect their everyday lives." (6)

The demand for participation both from the population and government officials, contributed to its becoming a legal requirement for area renewal policies. This legal requirement was meant to act as a 'whip' to local authorities to develop some minimum level of participation. The 'carrot' was the development of good local community relations and stability in the local physical, social and economic environment.

Although such a 'whip' was developed, no set rules for developing satisfactory processes and procedures of participation were given. AIN 8 was an advisory note for the use of all local authorities, but admits:

"Each GIA represents a unique combination of physical, social and political characteristics and the best approach is one which takes account of local circumstances." (7)

This statement does not really direct the local authorities to any positive action. In particular, it leaves the smaller ones in a void, awaiting their usual instructions as to how to fulfill their 'agency' roles of government. The picture is further complicated by the DOE/Haringey report. This stresses that participation in HAAs as opposed to GIAs may differ, based on their differing policy objectives. It suggests that council resources should be directed towards meeting individual needs and wishes of residents rather than those of the community. Differences in house-to-house, family-to-family circumstances
occur so that the individual circumstances must override those of the community:

"... participation should be on the basis of individual contact and small group discussions - small enough for the views and needs of individuals to be identified." (8)

This implies that two separate processes and structures are necessary for participation in overall residential renewal: those based on community in GIAs, and on the individual in the stressful HAAs. This is perhaps a proper analysis, but one which is liable to stretch the limited resources of the smaller authorities. Pressure on these resources may lead to the authority restricting its policy choices based on a single approach. This might entail the use of either GIAs or HAAs to the exclusion of alternative policies; a choice based not on need, but on the districts resources for administration. The district would therefore not be maximising its potential for residential renewal policy locally.

Sample Survey: Participation Structures

The mechanisms of public participation used in the district authorities result from both minimal legal requirements dictated by central government, and the social pressures of the community. Mechanisms will vary between the districts although, based on the overall pattern of government advice on renewal, the use of formal and corporate organised approaches might be expected. The response of the sample survey to such a concept is shown in figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1: Use of formal mechanisms of public participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Class One n = 13</th>
<th>Class Two n = 12</th>
<th>Class Three n = 7</th>
<th>Overall Sample n = 31</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977)
The larger authorities, not surprisingly, display a far higher level of formal organisation, a characteristic that might be expected when we consider previous comments on their independent, corporate and 'initiative' role as local authorities. The smaller authorities however, reflect a mixed, almost equal, balance, which indicates some attempt to be organised in a corporate and formalised manner on the one hand, as well as the more usual ad hoc, step-by-step, informal processes and structures outlined in earlier chapters. The reason for the real lack of formal mechanisms may be the limited capacity of the authority to initiate its own new ideas. The 1974 Housing Act fails to remedy the problem and indicate what mechanisms or procedures should be used. It left both the manner and the amount of publicity, and thus participation, at the discretion of the local authority. It does, however, suggest:

"The possibilities include local newspapers, advertisements in places to which the public have access, pamphlets, public meetings, local offices, advice centres, demonstration houses, or local radio." (9)

Most of the Circulars and advice notes, in a publicity and notification sense, are merely advisory, dependent upon the local situation. But, under section 36(4) of the 1974 Housing Act, various actions that a local authority must take as soon as practicable after declaration are prescribed. This includes placing advertisements in two or more newspapers and endeavouring to bring to the attention of all owners of property and residents the intention of declaration. A copy of the declaration resolution should also be made available at all reasonable times as should a copy of the declaration report and map. For the authorities AIN 8 gives an insight into operating these GIA procedures of notification and publicity, but only at a general level.

The greatest asset to any local authority in participation terms and probably the most effective tool of this democratic process is the use of local teams or offices. By developing a 'presence' within the
potential improvement area, regular and easy access is obtainable by local residents who otherwise might not make the often tiresome and protracted journey to the council offices. The local authorities can achieve such a local presence in two major ways. They can open demonstration or showhouses exhibiting the potential changes that can be achieved through improvement; or/and they can accommodate an 'area management team' that is responsible for the running of the improvement scheme. In addition, liaison or steering committees might be set up to develop a two-way local issues communication link. All these policies for achieving a local presence are expensive though, in capital and personnel terms, and, although it can be argued that they are excellent policy aids, in most authorities cost limitations often override other considerations as a result of cutbacks. For the smallest authorities the size of the areas of improvement may not warrant such 'onsite' teams, although in the largest authorities they appear to be the best solution for aiding improvement work.

Having outlined a few of the central government suggestions for methods of publicity and notification, the actual procedures used must be examined. Figure 7.2 illustrates the responses to questions on the use of various methods i to xi, and includes any additional tools mentioned by authorities.
Fig. 7.2 Procedures used by the local authorities to allow public participation in and notification of policies of residential renewal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Class One n = 15</th>
<th>Class Two n = 11</th>
<th>Class Three N = 8</th>
<th>Overall Sample n = 34</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i Speaking rights at Council Meetings</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii Access to Councillors</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii 'Open Door' access to departments</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv Appointment access to departments</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v Formal Resid. Meets</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi Informal Resid. Meets</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii Door-to-Door Notification</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viii Information Paper</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ix Notification via:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) local press</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) local radio</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) area TV</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x Exhibitions used</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xi Show houses</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questionnaire Survey</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of local plan leaflets and books</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad hoc procedure</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977)

Many authorities pointed out that methods of participation varied within their own districts between different improvement areas, but that the approaches mentioned were the ones most commonly used.

The role of councillors within the participation process is discussed later in this chapter, but appears to be a basic component of the majority of the local authorities' plans for participation. But more important in the overall sample than councillors is the informal 'open door' access to departments. It is questionable just how "open" this system is, and no doubt it will vary from one authority to the next,
and even between departments within the same district. Such differences might not be a result of deliberate policy, but maybe based on the personalities involved, although the fact that so many of the authorities claim such a procedure implies that they see it both as a key element and as a 'good' characteristic of public participation. Just because access to officials is available it does not mean that major policy changes will occur. Discussions are often of an individual nature rather than involved with the area improvement scheme as a spatial entity. As authority No. 54 states, "Public participation tends to concentrate on matters outside the scope of proposals", whether they are social services responsibilities which can be directed to the correct department, or individual dwelling repair problems that need individual work. This process illustrates that the 'on-site' teams would serve a greater community need than that of solely residential renewal work. They would act as social, economic, legal and political advisors to the local community. However, cost restraints forbid this local presence in many cases, so the advisory role stays with the 'contact' at the council offices who is approached with the local problems in an informal way, or with the local councillor.

In the sample survey this informality of public participation is reflected in the use of residents' committees. Groups based on an informal organisation and flexible to the changing demands of the participants, are found throughout the sample, but are most common in the largest authorities. On the other hand the smallest class three authorities are equally likely to organise residents meetings formally or informally. The problem may be that if no formality in organising such groups occurs, then only the most vociferous and articulate will be heard to the detriment of democratic participation. The community group is considered in more
detail later in this chapter, but from the data showing the number of local authorities involved with such groups its role appears to be important.

The notification aspect of public participation is also emphasised and appears quite well catered for. An average of 68% of all the authorities in the sample were involved in door-to-door notification of policy, but the smaller the authority the less likely this was to happen. The use of local information papers for disseminating details of policy was more equal throughout the sample, with around 60% of the local districts involved. Notification via the local press - a legal requirement - was found in over 70% of the sample, declining in use over size. However, this perhaps illustrates the failings of the questionnaire: all the authorities would be obliged to publicise the declaration intent. As might be expected the use of local radio and TV was small although potentially useful for disseminating information. Showhouses or exhibitions were both widely used, although they are expensive in both personnel and in capital. The latter is usually cheaper because a mobile caravan is moved into an improvement area and can then be used again in the next area. It was mainly the largest authorities who use showhouses, but exhibitions were more evenly distributed, possibly as a result of cost considerations.

Overall, one major point must be made. Two types of publicity and notification occur, what might be called "aggressive" - where the local authority goes out and perhaps "forces" involvement, e.g. Door-to-Door notification - and "passive" - where the local authority waits for questions to be asked and doesn't create "friction" where none occurs, e.g. "open door" access to local authority officials. Most local authorities exhibit
elements of both of these trends, although perhaps the larger authorities are more "aggressive" and more able to deal with anything they create in the way of problems! The smaller authorities, on the other hand, tend to do the minimum to actually attract attention - a "let sleeping dogs lie" philosophy of participation.

Neither notification nor basic discussion are really effective in changing or adapting policy. The timing within the linear decision-making process is the key to such change. Notification often only means telling the residents and owners what is going to happen rather than advising them of various alternatives. Ultimately however, for the public or their representatives to be effective in changing any policy, involvement is necessary throughout the processes of decision-making and implementation.

The timing of various methods of participation is important and involves two major decisions. First, when to hold the first public meeting; and second, when to arrange an exhibition - possibly including one or more show-houses - which will demonstrate improvement possibilities. The first meeting must necessarily take place early in the improvement programme since its purpose is to publicise the council's ideas for the area, and to obtain public support for them. The timing of the exhibition can be more flexible, but a greater publicity impact is made where both events take place within the same two-to-three week period. In advice given by the DOE in AIN 8, no clear directive is given as to which of the alternative timings is the most useful for successful participation to occur. It just gives the alternatives, leaving it to the local authority involved to adapt to their local circumstances. It states:
"Some authorities consider that there are advantages in holding the first public meeting before the exhibition is opened. This order of events means that residents can discuss in more detail with the council officers manning the exhibition the issues already raised at the public meeting. Department of the Environment staff from experience gained in manning mobile exhibition units demonstrating improvement ideas also consider that residents look more carefully at environmental proposals if these have already been explained at a public meeting. On the other hand, where the show-house or exhibition has been opened before the public meeting, authorities have found that it gave officers an opportunity to discuss with residents a number of controversial points which might otherwise have aroused opposition at the meeting. Exhibitions held at this stage also helped to educate residents in the possibilities of area improvement, thus enabling them to make a more positive contribution at the meeting." (10)

Differences in timing are often a result of local practical considerations, such as the availability of suitable vacant properties to convert, or alternatively two separate events are seen as prolonging interest to achieve wider publicity, or as the quote suggests, to lessen opposition at the meeting.

For the benefit of the questionnaire sample nine stages within the residential renewal process were identified based upon general information on possible processes or routes. The occurrence of public participation at these specific points was assessed, and figure 7.3 illustrates these stages and the responses given by the local authorities. Throughout the sample it is found that the most common time for public participation is just after an area has been declared, when design details are being initiated. This is on the whole true of all the size classes, although the class two authorities most common process of participation is 'passive': based upon the community group seeking a meeting. The community group's demands for a meeting with the local authority are also common among the class one districts, as is the likelihood of the local authority calling additional meetings. Among this latter group
Fig. 7.3: Stages in the process of decision-making in residential renewal at which public participation occurs (% of l.a. using each stage per class)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage Description</th>
<th>Class One n = 14</th>
<th>Class Two n = 11</th>
<th>Class Three n = 8</th>
<th>Overall Sample n = 33</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i At all stages (included in % of) iii to x</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii At original examination of possible areas</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii At pre-declaration, initial briefing stage</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv At pre-declaration, survey stage</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v At declaration stage</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi At post-declaration, design detail stage</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii At post-declaration, final design stage</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viii During Implementation</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ix When community groups requests meeting</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x When l.a. requests a meeting</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xi Other processes 'detailed follow up' 'regular committees' 'varies depends upon scheme, i.e. Ad Hoc'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977)
one in three of the authorities claim to involve the public at all stages of decision-making. For the large authorities the figures are high at every stage, perhaps demonstrating the idea of "aggressive" marketing of the participation idea. This is further illustrated in Figure 7.4 where it is seen that a large number of authorities are involved in participation in at least six stages within the decision-making process. This attitude to participation may illustrate a real concern for public democracy, although the authority may see it as "an action seen to be done" to publicise just how democratic the authority is! Neither of these attitudes however, necessarily means that the procedure of public participation will actually affect policy choices or development. It might really be just a public relations exercise in information dispersal to all concerned in the renewal areas.

The patterns of participation found among the sample are unexpected. The small authorities are usually considered to be more in touch with the local population. But, in the sample survey the larger districts have the more effective machinery for participation in area improvement schemes. This does not however mean that their participation processes are more successful. The smaller class three authorities have only minimal formal mechanisms for participation, but informal contact may be more useful. These authorities, owing to their limited capital and manpower resources cannot afford to indulge in protracted and regular participation, instead they just fulfill their minimum requirements and try to cope with the local situation. In both the smaller two classes by size, the number of stages of the decision-making process that involve public participation is low and the most common number of stages is one, usually just after the declaration, the minimum possible.

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Figure 7.4: Number of stages where public participation occurs, based upon the model structure in figure 7.3 (maximum nine)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All (9)</th>
<th>Class One n = 14</th>
<th>Class Two n = 11</th>
<th>Class Three n = 8</th>
<th>Overall Sample n = 33</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad Hoc</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977)

Sample Survey:— Attitudes to public participation

The attitudes of participants are the key to whether any system of public participation is either possible, or useful, in benefitting local and national housing policies; or in promoting the well-being of the residents and owners of property within an improvement area. In the questionnaire study (see Appendix A) the attitudes of the local authority officials were tested on seven potential effects of participation, as shown in figure 7.5. The importance of public participation cannot be denied in a democratic society, but does participation lead to greater democracy? Over 70% of the class one and class two sample authorities thought so, but a mere 14% of the smallest authorities agreed. This basic difference in philosophy is interesting and reflects the problem of any overview of all authorities being considered when developing either national or local policy. The attitude of many of the smaller authorities may be based on the premise that local councillors provide suitable and adequate mechanisms of public opinion. They may see public participation as a potential tool for the more 'extreme' political groups,
and due to their lack of experience with them, as with Housing
Associations, await more detailed directives from the regional DOE offices.
Yet 86% of these smaller authorities suggest that a freeflow of ideas,
values and attitudes occurs between the local authority and the public.
The idea of a freeflow of ideas is also high among the larger authorities,
and overall this must be seen as an important aspect of public participa­
tion as it broadens the horizons and experiences of both officials
and residents. A high proportion of the top two class size groups also
claimed that participation slowed down the implementation of strategies.
Fewer smaller authorities agreed, but as mentioned previously more of
the smaller authorities operate in a step-by-step manner anyway so they
would not necessarily be so concerned.

Based on the central government conception of corporate management
systems it might be expected that strict timescales - as the basis of
achieving specific objectives - would be important in administrative
structures of renewal policy. In a local sense any 'time-wasting' can
lead to blight and the general physical and economic deterioration of
both dwellings and the environment of improvement areas. Thus the question
of public participation using up valuable time within the decision­
making processes of residential renewal is important. Such 'time' prob­
lems affect the more complex large authorities most, as the small
authorities work in a more limited time sequence. Their step-by-step
processes do slow down and may in fact lose all momentum but this
merely leads to the rebuilding of resources before the next step in
their process is taken.

If participation slows down processes it also increases the costs,
although in the sample it is difficult to ascertain if the authorities
can isolate the costs of public participation from the overall budget.
Fig. 7.5: Contribution of public participation to the strategies and decision-making processes of residential renewal - Attitudes of local authorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Class One n = 14</th>
<th>Class Two n = 10</th>
<th>Class Three n = 7</th>
<th>Overall Sample n = 31</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i Greater democracy in producing public demands (POSITIVE)</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii Free flow of ideas, values and attitudes between l.a. and client (POSITIVE)</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii Slowed down speed of implementation of strategies (NEGATIVE)</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv Raised the cost of strategies in financial terms (NEGATIVE)</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v Eased complexities of decision-making process (POSITIVE)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi Increased complexities of decision-making process (NEGATIVE)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii Caused greater flexibility in earlier stages in process (POSITIVE)</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November, 1977)
But as "time costs money" any time spent specifically in participation will be an additional cost. As processes are slowed, the question of easing or increasing the complexities of processes remains unclear among the sample survey authorities. On the whole the two largest size groups thought that it increased the complexities, whilst the smallest districts did not really seem to know. But remembering figures 7.3 and 7.4 these smaller authorities only had minimal involvement in such processes, thus it might be expected that minimal repercussions would be exhibited. As to whether greater flexibility occurred in the earliest stages of decision-making the response was equal low across the size classes with one in four saying flexibility did increase. But this does not really contribute much to the picture, as flexibility does not necessarily mean that the processes or policies will change. Overall the positive and negative elements of participation are well balanced, many on the one hand agreeing that it is a correct and useful tool to allow greater public involvement in decisions that affect them, but alternatively finding that it perhaps complicates matters and that the response could be low and unrepresentative. Thus participation was perhaps seen as a 'necessary evil' that is politically important as it often creates greater comment, criticism and reassessment before policy is irreversibly enacted.

The central government in AIN 8 see a key problem in sustaining public interest in policies, especially whilst committees are approving proposals and conforming to statutory requirements. But alternatively, if participation builds up public confidence in the future of its area, then any other problems created must be seen as worthwhile. Local authorities further commented that; "public participation exists as part of a planning as well as a renewal process," (Authority No. 26),
thus illustrating its wider role, as does the comment by Authority No. 15, that "public participation gives a proprietary attitude towards completed schemes, and has cut down vandalism". Other authorities are not so enthusiastic. No. 45 said that participation merely "highlights public ignorance of local authorities" whilst No. 54 suggests "consensus is impossible to achieve". Thus throughout discussions of participation great differences in attitudes occur. These may be based both on local situations and on the individual attitudes of the personalities involved, both in the authority and among the residents.

But do individual residents only exhibit individual problems and attitudes? How does the role of community groups fit into this theory? At most initial public meetings too many individuals are looking after their own interests and thus the meetings are not a good forum in which to discuss detailed matters of renewal. Thus to move forward in any discussions with residents or owners of property within an area, it is necessary to limit discussions to a smaller number of officials and representatives of the residents: a recurrent practice of representative democracy.

The government's AIN 8 makes some interesting comments on the role of community groups based on evidence in 1972-73, but it is interesting to see that many of the characteristics they define are still found in the sample survey area in 1977. The number of authorities who are involved with residents' committees or community groups is varied. As seen in figure 7.6, practically all the class one authorities have residents' groups within their districts, and even those that don't, propose to do so in the future. A similar, but not so intensive pattern, is found among the middle-size authorities where 82% have some involvement. On the other hand the majority of the smallest authorities do not use such mechanisms. This may be because the size of improvement areas

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in these districts is so small that direct contact through public meetings is possible, or alternatively this may merely display the organisational limitations of these districts. This latter point may be emphasised when the origins of the community groups or residents committees is examined. From AIN 8 it seems that the capabilities of the local authority are key elements in participation:

"Most residents' committees it seems do not emerge spontaneously in GIAs but are formed on council initiative: they are usually set up following the first public meeting and in some cases the council has given considerable thought to arranging the election procedure in order to make them representative of the different streets and tenure groups in the area." (11)

This point is backed up in Figure 7.6b: two-thirds of all the residents' groups operating in renewal areas have originated from the local authority. As the area improvement note says, they are often organised by streets or by terrace blocks of houses electing representatives, depending on the size of the area. The only real problem with this relationship is that the community group may be controlled by the local authority and used just to indicate participation on the surface. The problem of "co-optation" occurs when, if difficulties arise, the residents' group just becomes an element of the local government structure, and is no longer able to act independently and criticise the authority. Where residents' groups occur in small authorities they have usually been established by the local authority. Independent groups resulting from other social problems or in direct reaction to renewal are found in the large and middle size authorities, and this type are the least likely to be co-opted or absorbed into the government machinery. In the question of individuals versus community playing the dominant role in participation, the evidence is split evenly. It may even vary within the same authority, based on local situations and personalities.
### Nig. 7.6: The use of Community Groups/Residents Committees in public participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One n = 15</td>
<td>Two n = 11</td>
<td>Three n = 8</td>
<td>Sample n = 34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### A. Q: Do residents committees exist in the l.a. residential renewal areas?

- **Yes:**
  - In all areas: 40% (Class One), 9% (Class Two), 25% (Class Three), 27% (Overall)
  - In over 50% areas: 20% (Class One), 93% (Class Two), 18% (Class Three), 82% (Overall) 12.5% (Class One), 82% (Class Two), 37.5% (Class Three), 18% (Overall) 18% (Overall)
  - In some areas: 33% (Class One), 55% (Class Two), 53% (Class Three), 33% (Overall)
- **No:**
  - Other comments: "residents’ committees proposed in future GIAs"

#### B. Origin

- L.A. origin for residential renewal work:
  - 71% (Class One), 50% (Class Two), 100% (Class Three), 68% (Overall)
- Response to resid. renewal work:
  - 15% (Class One), 25% (Class Two), 40% (Class Three), 16% (Overall)
- Reaction to other social problems:
  - 14% (Class One), 25% (Class Two), 40% (Class Three), 16% (Overall)

#### C. Q: Are community groups rather than individuals involved in the public participation process?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class One</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Two</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Three</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### D. Q: Are the community groups democratic and representative of the local community?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class One</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Two</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Three</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class One</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Two</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Three</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### E. Q: Does the community group appear to follow the same procedural stages in doing HR as the l.a.?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class One</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Two</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Three</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cont'd...
Most local authorities, not surprisingly since they established them, see community groups as democratic, but many have reservations. The attitude is similar to that of authorities to Housing Associations, based on suspicion and fearing the worst until evidence shows otherwise.

Because the community groups are based upon local authority structures, the processes involved should be similar. But again the sample reflects an equal division, both between and within the local district authorities. Lack of parallel procedures does not however really prove any obstacle to progress on participation.

**Sample Survey: Councillors in public participation**

The experiences of GIA pilot studies reflected in AIN 8, illustrate the central government's belief that community groups are the most suitable localised method of communication between the authority and the residents. Their activities involved collecting the social data required, canvassing local reactions, and explaining various schemes to their neighbours. This dominance is reflected in the sample survey throughout all the classes, although both individuals and elected councillors were also mentioned in this process. In fact the role of
the latter with regard to community groups is very vague, and according to authority No. 38 has led to "problems of the relationship of community groups to councillors" occurring over conflicting interests and responsibilities. However, the role councillors play may, in individual areas, be the key to a successful improvement area. After the DOE's pilot studies, before the reorganisation of local government, it was found that the interest and enthusiasm of council officers was backed up by the support given to schemes by the elected members. In many areas the councillors as the representatives of the people provide the liaison between the local authority officials and the public. The DOE suggest that this might be increased through the use of local 'surgeries' on residential renewal where both the local councillors and officials involved can be questioned by the public.

As seen in figure 7.2, access to councillors is regarded as a key general characteristic of public participation with 82% of the overall sample mentioning it. The sometimes controversial role of the member can be divided into two distinct areas of responsibility: as an individual constituency number, and as the member of a particular collective committee. Figure 7.7 illustrates which areas of the member's responsibilities are most influential with regard to the local problems of residential renewal.

**Fig. 7.7: Local councillors involvement in residential renewal**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>Two</td>
<td>Three</td>
<td>Sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 15</td>
<td>n = 11</td>
<td>n = 8</td>
<td>n = 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i Only local ward members</td>
<td>7% 6%</td>
<td>12% 5%</td>
<td>6% 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii Only members of committees concerned with RR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii Local ward and C'tee members</td>
<td>73% 91%</td>
<td>50% 37%</td>
<td>73% 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv All local councillors</td>
<td>20% 9%</td>
<td>37% 5%</td>
<td>23% 37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v No councillors</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(SOURCE: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977)
The dominant classification throughout illustrates that those members who either serve on an appropriate committee - usually planning or housing - and/or are local ward members for affected areas are most concerned with renewal. In the smaller authorities this group may often be the whole council, thus explaining the proportion of class three authorities illustrating that all councillors are involved. The only problem is that the actual 'active' level of interest of councillors, as opposed to general 'political' or 'decision-making' interest, is hard to ascertain without the co-operation of the intensive case study authorities. In an attempt to see the stages at which involvement occurred in general, the stages of the residential renewal process developed in figure 7.3 were used, and authorities were asked to define the stages when either individual members or committees - housing or planning - were involved in decision-making (see fig. 7.8). Individual councillors rather than committees are most important for individual areas, but committees - most commonly the Housing Committee - are responsible for the wider general implications of residential renewal policy. Individual councillors, especially in the smaller - under 100,000 pop. - authorities, appear to be involved, or at least have access to, decision-making at all stages of the renewal process.

Through their positions on various committees the councillors are in quite a strong position to influence fellow members in making the final policy decisions, but it appears unusual for councillors to get involved with pressure groups concerned in renewal action. Even the representative community or residents' group may be opposed by the local councillor, and councillors rarely sit as members of the group. They may liaise between the residents and the authority, or merely feel threatened in their own roles by the community groups. The continual question arises of who
**Fig. 7.8 Stages of involvement of members - individuals and committees - in the decision-making process of residential renewal**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS</th>
<th>Class One n = 14</th>
<th>Class Two n = 10</th>
<th>Class Three n = 8</th>
<th>Overall Sample n = 32</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i At ALL stages/open access</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii At orig'l exam of possible areas</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii Pre-declar'n initial briefing</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv Pre-declar'n survey stage</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v At declar'n stage</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi Post-declar'n design detail</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii Post-declar'n final design stage</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viii During implmt' work</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ix When Councillors request a meeting</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x When l.a. officials request a meeting</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i At all stages</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii At original exam of poss. areas</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii Pre-decl'rn initial briefing</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv Pre-decl'rn survey stage</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v At declar'n stage</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi Post-decl'rn design detail</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii Post-decl'rn final design stage</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viii During implemn'rn work</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ix When council'r request a meeting</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x When l.a. officials request a meeting</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO COMMITTEE*</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Renewal Policy is the responsibility of the "Environmental Health" or "Amenities" Committees in other authorities.

(Source: Sample Questionnaire Survey, November 1977)
is the most representative of the area? The problem may often be that
the improvement area involved in any discussion is within his local
ward, but is only a small part of it. Thus, cynically, it has little
'political' benefit to become too involved. Also the populations
of areas before declaration for improvement are often very mobile and
short staying, thus further complications occur for the councillor
who may have been elected by one group of residents who have now left
the area. Instead he is faced with a new and often closely knit
community within an improvement area who have been involved with the
'area' improvement scheme and have thus developed a collective response
to various 'outside' pressures. Overall it is impossible to say that
councillors operate in one particular way or another. It differs
too greatly between authorities, often based on individual personalities
and philosophies. Some local authorities regard councillors "as an
alternative avenue of influence to the residents committee" (No. 11),
whilst another included them in participation: "local councillors and
committee chairman are involved in residents' liaison committee
meetings held on a regular basis" (No. 46). Councillors may even replace
community groups: "Councillors Role - feedback of general information
and public opinion" (No. 61). Thus the differences are wide and
classification is difficult, especially with a small sample base.

Although ultimately councillors control residential renewal policy,
personality clashes, both with and between members and officials still
occur. Authority No. 51 claims: "councillors have a tendency to resent
the more prominent role played by officers, particularly at residents'
meetings." The position of councillors as local constituency representa-
tives is vague. They liaise between both officials and residents'
committees and yet perhaps feel they have little effect on negotiations, although they may see themselves as representing both the community and the officials in other areas of discussion. It has been said that the community group will take-over the role of the councillor, being spatially and politically more representative, but it is a changing position and can only really be assessed in individual micro level examples. This is true of many aspects of participation in renewal, thus Northtown and Southfield and their role in public participation must be discussed.

Both of the case study authorities display the characteristics of the majority of the sample survey claiming to use formal mechanisms of public participation. Similarly the actual procedures used were based on a mixture of formal and informal relationships, both claiming to adopt 'open door' access to local authority officials and councillors. With regard to residents' meetings Northtown admitted they were formalised and the residents' representatives complained that this created problems. The use of archiac and traditional council chambers for these meetings was rather overbearing, if not intimidatory, for the residents who were not particularly articulate when 'safe' in their own environment and thus were even less at ease in such surroundings. In fact the problems this caused in Northtown for one community group led to a more informal basis for meetings being developed and this has proved more satisfactory. Southtown has also found that informality is more effective, although at present it is only dealing with experimental residents' groups and trying to gain experience for future participation processes.

Surprisingly, of the two authorities it is the smaller Southfield that
makes the greater use of showhouses, although public apathy led to low attendances even for this positive and "aggressive" marketing of residential renewal alternatives. This has been a continual problem in this particular local authority: even the councillors are very parochial and only interested in their own patches, a point that is reflected in their low attendance records at public meetings.

In Northtown, mobile exhibitions of improvement possibilities are used but the key to their participation process is a questionnaire sent out before the public meeting. To get an acceptable response rate a follow-up procedure of visits also occurs, and this has led to an average response rate of 55% throughout the district, and up to 90% if questionnaires were circulated through a previously originated residents' group.

Both authorities are reasonably flexible in the involvement of public participation at various stages in the renewal project, and both place emphasis on the fact that either the residents group or the local authority can ask for special meetings to clarify any problems. The key stages for more formal participation in both authorities are before declaration to discuss alternatives, at the stage of declaration to explain exactly what is foreseen, and in the earliest post declaration designs. But basically both authorities try to operate their normal decision-making processes with the minimum of participation as this may make the processes more complex, which both claim the participatory input does. They also claim that it slows processes down, and even with Northtown and Southfields processes differing very widely - i.e. based on networks versus step-by-step processes - this is a continual problem. Alternatively, both authorities see advantages in public participation.
The public demands can more easily be assessed or implemented, and a free flow of ideas, values and attitudes can take place between client and official. Public participation has also led to other advantages outside the direct process of residential renewal. Eg. the community groups help to liaise with the local authority on other problems especially social services. The 'contact' in the local authority thus has a wider social role. This creates a better social relationship between the community and the authority, although the influence of individual personalities is very important in the making or breaking of good community relations, and changes in officers on either side can change the relationship.

Reiterating a pattern from the overall sample survey, one difference between the authorities is the wish to provoke or develop involvement. Whereas the larger Northtown aims at creating its own community groups and developing longer term relations, thus seeing wider problems, Southfield is satisfied to utilise the minimum procedures of more distant contact with the community. By central government standards this is satisfactory and the attitude of "let sleeping dogs lie" is prevalent. This is not necessarily a criticism: owing to the various limitations on resources any greater involvement might create further problems. Northtown on the other hand is a more "aggressive" authority - perhaps this reflects the general attitude of the town - and insists on greater involvement of the public. The question is though, is one approach better than the other? Northtown may raise public awareness and also demands, but can the local authority produce the goods? Meanwhile Southfield attempts to chip slowly away at the problems of renewal. No really useful detailed directives have been developed by central government, but local differences are so great that problems can only be
assessed and solved on a local basis! Participation fundamentally is local, and is dependent upon various individual characteristics and personalities both in the authority - officials and councillors — and in the community — community leaders and/or the apathetic residents.

Conclusion
Throughout earlier chapters the organisational structures, attitudes, processes and policies of residential renewal have differed in a dual pattern within the sample survey authorities. This division continues to a certain extent with regard to public participation and democracy, but the fundamental key to the differences rests locally. For this reason perhaps central government only gives general directives through the Housing Acts and area improvement notes, and allows for the local development of participation. However, after maintaining a position whereby smaller authorities act as a local 'agency', further help is necessary if these authorities are to develop successful processes and structures. The voluntary nature of improvement means an emphasis on co-operation is implied, but this equally applies to relations between central and local government, as it does to local authority and community relations.

Because of the social and economic aspects of renewal a number of other advantages occur through public participation. First there is the response of the public overall to participation, attendances at public meetings once suspicions have been dispersed are high - 90% in some Northtown areas - and a willingness to help themselves and develop a 'community' is often exhibited. Again however, individual personalities often help or hinder this procedure, thus differences will occur within individual districts as well as between various authorities on a national scale.
Secondly, participation is a two-way learning process. The local authority gains an insight into the thoughts and feelings of residents, and they gain an insight into the workings of government. A clear national indication of residents' attitudes is reflected to a degree in the resistance to clearance, even when involving only a few dwellings. This two-way learning process has also lessened the widest elements of apathy and perhaps has also lessened the 'them and us' attitude of both residents and officials. Both these advantages of participation help to lessen the 'social distance' between the local community and the district authority. General criticisms of the structures and processes of participation can still be made despite their individual localised nature. Participation increases capital costs in expenditure budgeting, and slows down the decision-making processes of the policy. Increased costs will occur in all the districts, but the affects of participation on the rate of decision-making differ according to the size of the authority, based on their 'agency' and 'initiative' roles.

This survey has established the basis of two different types of decision-making in residential renewal. The larger authorities can slow down their corporate management networks for participation to be extended, as they have to do with finance cuts, but this creates bad feeling rather than physical problems. Various sub-networks not involved directly in the process continue to function and implement various elements of the overall system unaffected by direct public involvement. The flexibility of their decision-making processes copes with participation, and perhaps overrides it so that it does not actually alter policy. The smaller authorities on the other hand work in a step-by-step decision-making based process, thus if slowed down all the steps slow and no real action is seen in the wider renewal sense. In fact the whole process may grind
to a halt and this creates further tension for the residents and
the officials.

Overall, public participation is uniquely local in physical, social,
political and personality terms. But the larger authorities have
developed far more complex mechanisms of participation than the small
authorities. Whereas the latter are willing to operate at a minimum
"passive" level of participation, the more corporate authorities are
"aggressive" in their marketing of democracy, although the real affect
in changing policies in either size authority cannot be easily
determined. Both processes have advantages for their local environments
considering their administrative structures and policy developments.
An important consideration is that whereas previously central government
has assumed uniformity in the districts structures and policies, for
participation it acknowledges local differences. In this their per­
ception is correct, as the local attitudes and resources of both the
district and the local community are key factors in developing public
participation.
Chapter Seven: References

1. DOE

   Housing Act 1974; Renewal Strategies
   Circular 13/75, paragraph 10(b)
   HMSO 1974

2. DOE

   Public Participation in General Improvement
   Areas AIN 8, HMSO 1973

3. DOE

   Housing Act 1974: Parts IV, V, VI
   Circular 14/75 Memorandum A
   paragraph 31, HMSO 1974

4. IBID

   Memorandum C paragraph 33

5. See; G.D. SUTTLES

   The Social Construction of Communities,
   University of Chicago, 1972

6. DOE/LONDON BOROUGH OF
   HARINGEY

   First Steps towards a HAA
   HMSO 1975 p.18

7. DOE

   Op Cit (1973) paragraph 5

8. DOE/HARINGEY

   Op Cit p.18

9. DOE

   Op Cit (14/75) Memorandum A
   paragraph 31

10. DOE

    Op Cit (1973)
    paragraph 20

11. IBID

    Paragraph 37

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CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

This study examines the relationship between the two tiers of government involved in residential renewal. It asks the question: do the decision-making processes and structures of the local authority reflect the advice given by the central government in circulars and advice notes? It also examines the workings of the district authorities to see if the policies suggested and outlined by the central authority are used or implemented in the manner in which the central government intended. At the outset it was hypothesised that the districts' structure, processes and policies did not conform to these directives or to the aspirations of the central government.

These problems and the general relationship between the tiers of government have been examined throughout this study, based on the empirical evidence collected from the questionnaire survey and two case-studies. The data collected has been structured around three key elements within the process of decision-making in residential renewal: organisational and administrative structures; policy choice and implementation; and political democracy and public participation. These three areas are drawn from central government circulars on renewal, based on the 1969 and 1974 Housing Acts (1). Although the questionnaire sample survey group is statistically small and this can create problems, various conclusions can be drawn from the study which would provide the basis for a wider and more detailed project based on a larger sample area. In the development of a typology of district authorities based on their responses to central government advice and directives, size in
relation to structure, policy and participation is a key factor. From the evidence obtained in the sample survey two key 'model' classes are identified. This concluding chapter will examine this dual model, structured around the three main elements of renewal: administrative structures; policies; and participation. The relationship between the two tiers of government will be continually examined, and the hypothesis challenged.

The final question will be: is it possible to apply central government advice in a universal manner for all local district authorities? Or is greater liaison necessary to make such advice more applicable to the large numbers of smaller and diverse authorities in England?

**Typology of District Authorities**

Throughout the study of decision-making in residential renewal, and based on the research hypothesis, a specific pattern of behaviour, structures and attitudes has emerged among the district authorities within the sample survey area. This is based upon size. As a crude measure the figure of 100,000 population within a district was used to create two main groups of authorities, although with a larger sample greater division might be possible. Based on the three key areas of administrative structures, policy and participation a model depicting two levels of authority can be developed, as shown in figure 8.1. This is based on the local authorities responses to central government advice notes and directives issued to develop the policy of residential renewal at both a local and national level.

This model is not rigid, but is based on the evidence collected in the case studies and sample survey. Classified by size, the district authorities will generally exhibit the model patterns, limited only
by their resources and capabilities in finance and personnel terms. The model can only be assessed by more detailed surveys involving a larger sample of authorities, although it forms a good framework for assessing the hypothesis and final conclusions of this study.

**Fig. 8.1: Dual Typology of District Authorities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Administrative Structure</th>
<th>Policy choice, development and implementation</th>
<th>Participation/Political Democracy</th>
<th>Size of district authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CORPORATE &amp; FORMAL</td>
<td>INITIATIVE</td>
<td>AGGRESSIVE</td>
<td>Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD HOC &amp; INFORMAL</td>
<td>AGENCY</td>
<td>PASSIVE</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Organisational and Administrative Structures**

There are two key questions in any examination of the organisational and administrative structures of local authorities from a central government point of view. First, do all the districts develop the same or similar structures for processes of residential renewal? Secondly, is corporate management, as a normative element of central government policy, defined and interpreted by all the districts in the same manner? As corporate management structures are the most desirable framework for developing residential renewal projects in the manner outlined by the central government, the two questions are closely related. If the semantic term 'corporate management' is not interpreted in the same way by all the districts, it is unlikely that any new structures developed - based on 'corporate' structures - will be similar.

Among the sample survey authorities, the notion of 'corporate management' is interpreted in many different ways. These range from full corporate
management systems, operating at all levels of the authority across all departments and co-ordinated by a specific corporate management unit, to minimal levels of informal discussion between various individuals based around single 'one-off' local problems. The basic difference between such interpretations, their implementation and use, is linked to the size of the district authority. This will have an important affect on all the other aspects of the districts' policies of residential renewal.

The larger authorities - over 100,000 population - are the most formal in their corporate management techniques; they meet to discuss problems of policy and general management at all levels within their structures. Individually they differ, and no 'ideal type' structure is apparent as each authority adapts advice to suit its local environment. The small district authorities - under 100,000 population - are structured on an informal ad hoc basis through their management structures. Their conception of corporate management is really informal co-ordination and co-operation, based on irregular meetings, which bears little resemblance to the structures outlined in the Bains Report (2).

Based on the evidence from the sample survey we must conclude that all the districts do not develop the same or similar structures of administration, nor do they interpret and use the central governments normative notion of corporate management in the same way. The key general characteristics defined are based on size: the large authorities have developed formal corporate management systems, whilst the smaller districts rely on informal ad hoc systems of co-operation. Both of these general characteristics react to local conditions, and are not strict models or 'ideal types'. However, the notion of a dual typology
of local authorities based on their administrative structures is reinforced.

Relationship to other tiers of Administrative Government

The corporate nature of the large district authorities is reflected in their relationship to both the County tier of government and to the regional offices of the DOE. The consultation that the central government says is necessary should be both regular and continuous within the overall process of residential renewal of all district authorities. Instead, among the sample survey authorities, the large districts' consultation is regular, but is not based on the co-operative formulation of a means of implementing national policy at a local level. Instead it reflects a pattern of conflict over the roles and responsibilities of the various tiers of government. The formally organised and independent 'initiative' nature of the larger districts conflicts with the role of the district demanded by the central authority. Central government seeks to control and monitor the actions of the districts which it sees as fulfilling national policy at a local level. The larger authorities seek to control their local policy choices, and consider their local autonomy and freedom to initiate localised projects as key aspects of their role. For this reason the consultation aspect of residential renewal although appearing regular and continuous, instead is based on conflict over the control of local policies and resources.

Alternatively, based on the dual typology of size, the smaller district authorities display an 'agency' role of government. Their relationship to other tiers of government is subordinate, and they demand minimal local autonomy. Although their contact with the higher tiers of
government is both irregular and more informal than the larger districts, they rely on the County for personnel aid and the DOE for technical advice. In this way they act as 'agencies' of central government, seeking directions to develop local solutions to local problems, but attempting to utilise central government tools.

In these ways the differences between all district authorities is emphasised, as is the need for flexible central government advice if it is going to be applied to any major degree. Differences based on the size of the authorities are also reflected in the attitudes of the case study authorities to outside bodies: the larger Norhtown is 'aggressive' seeking independence based on corporately organised internal resources. Whilst Southfield adopts a 'passive' attitude, acting as an 'agency' for national policies at a local level.

Policy: Choices and Implementation
The hypothesis that the local district authorities do not interpret or use the policy initiatives of central government as the latter would wish is reflected in policy action. The central authority has in the last few years come to dominate the relationship between the two tiers of government. Its basis for this power has been the control of finance capital, and the power of veto for GIA's provisionally declared by the district authorities. This control has led all the district authorities to develop policy choices, plans and implementation processes that can conform to this central government control, but still retain some local autonomy. The level of this autonomy will vary and will be based on the size of the districts and the 'initiative' and 'agency' roles and aspirations of the authorities. This 'initiative' or 'agency' role, drawn from the dual typology, will be reflected in the interpretation of
central government advice by the districts.

Central government appears to consider that its advice notes and circulars are applicable to all the district authorities; this is not the case. This is the key element in this study, and is reflected in the sample survey authorities. But, is the basic policy of residential renewal based on areas of 300 to 500 dwellings suitable for all the districts? The policy appears to have been designed to suit the problems of London and the major cities of England. Thus for the smaller local authorities with smaller concentrations of housing suitable for treatment, it may not be applicable. This difference is important when it considered that within the sample survey area 60% of the districts might be considered small - using 100,000 population as a crude division - thus the applicability of policies in smaller districts can be assessed.

The larger - over 100,000 population - districts interpret advice or directives from central government, and adapt it to fit their local conditions in an independent 'initiative' manner. The smaller districts are more cautious, and await further directions from their regional DOE offices as to how to adapt policy to suit their individually local problems. The sample survey respondents were unlikely to interpret policy directives independently, instead they displayed an 'agency' role of fulfilling national policy at a local level once it had been suitably adapted. This pattern was illustrated for both the take-up of GIA's in 1972/3 and HAAs in 1977/8. The speed of their adoption was not uniform and reflects this key difference between the district authorities, based on size and consequently resources and personnel capabilities.

The same differences in behaviour exhibited in the choice of policies of residential renewal are reflected in their implementation structures.
Central government calls for the development of an implementation structure based on the use of area 'teams', within a corporate management framework. The steps involved in implementation are dealt with in a corporate manner, based on a 'network' system of complex decision-making stages. These 'networks' and the area 'teams' form the basis of the normative implementation structure of the central government. But do the district authorities behave in this manner and follow the dictates of the central authority?

If the authorities are classified into two class groups by size, it is found that both follow the basic idea of a 'team' involved in implementation. Although instead of an area 'team' the districts tend to adopt policy 'teams'. The idea of a specific renewal 'team' including various officials from different departments all located in a particular action area is unusual in our sample. Instead a 'team' of specialists from various departments is drawn together to work on all GIA's or HAA's within the district. This tends to lessen the spatial aspect of the teams' role and to re-emphasise its policy role within local government as opposed to within the community. Policy 'teams' tend to differ in formality and organisation between the district authorities. The large authorities' 'teams' are based on autocratic, organised, but not inflexible processes of policy implementation; whilst the small districts are more informal, based on personal contact and limited horizons. Among both groups of authorities the general 'teams' still reflect dominant departments; Environmental Health, Planning or Legal/Administration among the larger authorities; and these, or the Technical Services Department, among the smaller districts.

The use of corporate networks is similarly affected by size. Owing to the publication of the central government advice on networks after the
policy advice, many of the more corporate larger authorities acted on their own initiative in developing network systems for management decision-making. They then only adapted their local networks toward the central government system if and when it appeared to be a more suitable tool for decision-making. In this way the larger districts reflect the independent 'initiative' aspect of the dual typology.

Alternatively, the decision-making processes of the small district authorities are too informal and ad hoc to utilise the network's concept. Their cautious approach to new policy means that they wait for greater advice from the DOE regional offices. In this way they reiterate their 'agency' role of implementing national policy at a local level.

The hypothesis is therefore sustained among the sample survey authorities for policy choice and implementation: the local and central government's conceptions differ across the sample. Size is again relevant, and the district's size - thus resources in personnel and capital terms - reflect their behaviour. Both groups of authorities adopt 'team' approaches, but based on policy not area criteria, although their formality varies between the large - formal - districts and the small - informal - districts. The key characteristic developed from this examination of the districts role regarding policy, is that the large authorities tend to be independently 'initiative' in their attitudes, whilst the smaller authorities exhibit more of an 'agency' role in their relationship to the central authority.

Public Participation and Democracy

The third major element of decision-making in residential renewal involves the clients - the community - and their relationship to local and
central government. The dual model of authorities based on size is apparent in administrative structures and policy, but public participation and democracy is more individual and localised in its effects within the sample survey authorities. Central government appears to have realised that participation is a local district level function of government. In its advice to districts it only provides general directives to be adopted at the local level by the districts. This creates problems for the small authorities, because in their role as 'agencies' of central government they need further direction from above to implement any procedures or policy!

As central government fails to provide this aid, and as a result of the structures, attitudes and policies of these smaller districts, they differ from the larger authorities in the sample survey area in their approach to public participation. The large authorities based on complex corporate structures and networks of processes appear to be socially distant from the community. To remedy this, they develop a complex and varied system of mechanisms of participation based on 'aggressive' marketing techniques. They encourage participation at all levels, and although creating both management and community politics problems, they usually have the capability to control the situation. Management problems like the extending of timescales of renewal can be dealt with by developing flexible decision-making processes, and as far as physical planning is concerned participation may make policy choices both more democratic and technically more simple. On the other hand, encouraging participation may lead to an increase in the expectations of the community. The question then becomes who controls decision-making in residential renewal, rather than the choices involved in policies of residential renewal.
As long as the district authority retains the dominant role in this
debate backed by the greater variety of expertise, it will be seen
to be 'democratic' and accessible to the community for participation.
Thus in most cases the management decision-making networks, processes
and timescales will not be greatly affected by participation. With
corporate networks operating, processes in one sub-network will be
slowed down, while other sub-networks will continue. This reflects
the flexibility of the large districts corporate management structures.

The small authorities, which appear close to the community in a 'small
is beautiful' sense, have no strict mechanisms of participation. Their
processes are based on their informal ad hoc administrative structures,
and develop only a legal minimum of public involvement. Their marketing
techniques are 'passive', expecting any problems to be brought to them,
and taking an attitude of 'let sleeping dogs lie'. This attitude is a
reflection of their decision-making processes. Being based on ad hoc
foundations and operating in a step-by-step process. Thus whereas
'passive' techniques of participation may involve a single step in the
linear process of decision-making and implementation, a more 'aggressive'
approach may lead to three or four 'steps' being involved. This will
slow down the process, and may if complications occur bring it to a halt,
thus creating further management problems.

For both types of authority in the typology the real affects of partici­
pation on policy are difficult to determine. Whether policy changes
result from participation cannot even be determined by the case studies,
except in a superficial manner. In most cases the attitude of the
authority towards participation will reflect the flexibility, or otherwise,
of major changes in policy actions. Local differences between authorities
are more important for participation than in any other element of
residential renewal. The key general difference between authorities
is in their marketing attitudes to community involvement. The 'aggressive' and 'passive' elements in the dual typology reflect this difference between the large and small districts respectively.

**Hypothesis Assessment**

The basic hypothesis of this study was that although central government advice was issued to all local authorities, and was assumed to be appropriate for all districts in England, it was not so widely applicable. Using the policy of residential renewal and the evidence obtained in the sample survey area this hypothesis is sustained. The larger authorities find the advice far more suitable for their district problems of residential renewal, whereas as it is issued the advice is inappropriate for the majority of small district authorities. This may reflect the London bias of policy issued by the central government. Although the problems may not be so large in the smaller districts, in many of them concentrations of poor housing and environmental conditions do occur, as does social stress. Greater flexibility in policy, as issued by the central authority, is essential if a national policy of renewal based in all local districts is to be effective.

**Conclusions**

Three main conclusions are apparent from this study. First; that all the local authorities do not interpret central government advice in the same manner; secondly, that two distinct groups of local district authorities with different structures, processes of decision-making and attitudes to participation exist with regard to residential renewal; and thirdly, that the advice given by the central government when applied to small authorities with diverse areas and problems is inappropriate and bears little resemblance to the authority's local problems.
Chapter 8: References

1. See; IHLG
   DOE
   - *Housing Act 1974*, Parts IV, V, VI
     Circular 14/75 Memorandum C, paragraph 20, HMSO 1975

2. M.A. Bains (et al)
   - *The New Local Authorities - Management and Structure*
     HMSO 1972
APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY

SHEFFIELD CITY POLYTECHNIC

Department of Urban and Regional Studies

Research Project; Decision making in residential renewal

Questionnaire Survey; Please answer as many questions as you wish. If not all the questions are answered, please still return the questionnaire. All the information given is confidential and will only be published as part of an empirical analysis giving no local authority names.

Please add any comments relevant to the project at any point in the questionnaire.

1. Name of Local Authority; (To be kept strictly confidential)

2. Political Structure of the council;
   a) Controlling Party;
   b) Has control changed in the last FIVE years? *YES/NO
   c) Do any other significant political structures that play a role in the decision making process of residential renewal exist within the local authority? If so please comment.

3. Administrative Structure of the Local Authority;
   a) Total numbers of employees (approx);
   b) Total number of separate departments;
   c) Does the authority have a specific Residential Renewal Department? *YES/NO
   d) Does the authority attempt a corporate approach to the general administrative structure of policy making. *YES/NO
      If YES, How?

*Delete as necessary
3. d) If NO, is a corporate approach used in localised subject areas e.g. Renewal, Clearance? *YES/NO
If YES, How?

e) Any other comments regarding the administrative structure of the local authority.

4. Residential Renewal Policy;

a) Which of the following exist, existed Five years ago or are programmed for the next FIVE years? Please include actual numbers where possible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exist at Present</th>
<th>Did Exist Five Years Ago</th>
<th>Programmed In Next Five Years</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. Clearance Areas (C.As)</td>
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<td>ii. General Improved Areas (GIAs)</td>
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<td>iii. Housing Action Areas (H.A.As)</td>
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<td>iv. Housing Associations (H.As) used in re-habilitation work</td>
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<td>v. Priority Neighbourhoods (P.Ns)</td>
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<td>vi. Other relevant policies or organisations e.g. NCB, Charity Trusts</td>
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b) Does the local authority have a general policy relating to residential renewal that has been approved by Council Resolution? *YES/NO

If YES, i. Is residential renewal as a strategy incorporated into a Corporate Planning Framework? *YES/NO

ii. Are the individual residential renewal projects incorporated within a broader local plan framework? *YES/NO

If so, Please indicate how, by what mechanisms?
If NO, iii. Please comment on any policy and procedural implications that may occur.

c) Other comments regarding Residential Renewal Policy (if any)

5. Administrative structure of residential renewal policy.

a) Please indicate with a tick which of the following departments are involved in the Residential Renewal process. Also please indicate the numbers of staff who are involved in a full or part-time capacity on residential renewal. (Full-time is over 32 hours per week)

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<th>At all Stages</th>
<th>In Over 75% of Stages</th>
<th>In Over 50% of Stages</th>
<th>When Spec. needed</th>
<th>Rarely involved</th>
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6. Which of the following statements is most appropriate to the type of structure of administration used in your local authority?

a) "The residential renewal policy is centred around one dominant department which co-ordinates the specialist services of other departments, within the framework of its own procedures"

b) "The use of an independent area improvement co-ordinator is the central role within the residential renewal process. His role is to programme and co-ordinate the work of all the specialist departments"

c) "A team approach is the dominant procedure of residential renewal policy. A full-team of specialists drawn from various departments handles one or more schemes of renewal within a defined area"
i. Please indicate which of the three statements is most applicable;

a) [ ]  b) [ ]  c) [ ]

ii. If a), Please indicate the co-ordinating department,

iii. If MORE THAN ONE statement applicable, please mark and make further comments.

iv. If NONE applicable, please comment briefly on the structures within your local authority;

7. Is the local decision making structure used as:- (please tick box)

a) A formal sequence of decision making and implementation always to be followed? [ ]

b) A flexible sequence of decision making and implementation to be adapted to differing situations? [ ]

c) An adhoc procedure determined by individual problems? [ ]

d) Another procedure or sequence, Please specify.

8. a) Does a strict timing have to be adhered to in the decision making process? *YES/NO

b) Does the Local Authority use any system of 'Network Analysis', as in D.o.E Area Improvement Note 11? *YES/NO

c) If YES, is the local authority system (please tick box)

   i) Exactly based on Note 11 [ ]

   ii) Based on Note 11 but adapted for local use [ ]

   iii) An adapted system, with both independent and Notell advice incorporated. [ ]

   iv) Based on independent work, but Note 11 used as adaptive aid. [ ]

   v) Completely independent of Note 11 [ ]
d) If NO to 8b), Does the local authority operate an adhoc arrangement? *YES/NO

e) Any other comments on the use of 'Network Analysis' or similar arrangements, (if any)

9. Relationship to the local community;

a) Does the local authority have any formal mechanism for the involvement of local communities within the residential renewal process? *YES/NO

b) Which, if any, of the following procedures are used to allow public participation and notification of policies regarding residential renewal? (please tick box)

   i. Speaking rights at Council Meetings or relevant committee meetings

   ii. Access to councillors to speak on residents behalf

   iii. 'Open Door' access to departments involved in the residential renewal process

   NB. By 'Open Door' is meant non-appointment, personal access at any time.

   iv. Appointment access to departments involved in the residential renewal process

   v. Formal residents meetings

   vi. Informal residents meetings

   vii. Door to door notification of policy implications

   viii. Information paper to all residents in affected area

   ix. Notification notice and general information, through,
       a) Local press
       b) Local radio
       c) Area T.V.

   x. Use of exhibitions of possibilities for an area

   xi. Specific examples of renewal; show houses

   xii. No procedure at all

   xiii. An adhoc procedure

   xiv. Other procedures, please stipulate

*Delete as necessary
c) At what stages in the decision making process does public participation exist? (please tick box)
   i. At all stages
   ii. At original examination of possible areas
   iii. At pre-declaration, initial briefing stage
   iv. At pre-declaration, survey stage
   v. At declaration stage
   vi. At post declaration, design detail stage
   vii. At post declaration, final design stage
   viii. During implementation work
   ix. When community groups request a meeting
   x. When the local authority requests a meeting
   xi. At other times, please stipulate.

d) In which of the following ways has public participation contributed, positively or negatively to residential renewal strategies? (please tick boxes)
   i. Made them more democratic in producing what the public desires
   ii. Allowed a free flow of ideas, values and attitudes to exist between the local government official and his client
   iii. Slowed down the speed of implementation of the strategies
   iv. Raised the cost in financial terms of the strategies
   v. Eased the complexities of the decision making process
   vi. Increased the complexities of the decision making process
   vii. Caused more flexible strategies to be considered at an early stage in the procedure of decision making
   viii. Other effects, please stipulate.

e) Any further comments on public participation in residential renewal.
10. a) Do residents committees exist in the local authority's residential renewal areas? (please tick in boxes)
   i. Yes, in all areas
   ii. Only in ___ out of ___ areas Please give numbers
   iii. In none of the areas
   iv. Other comments

b) If residents committees do exist, What is their origin? (please tick in boxes)
   i. Local authority originated for use within the public participation stage of residential renewal policy
   ii. Evolved in response to residential renewal policy
   iii. Evolved as a reaction to other social problems or policies, but continued to become involved in residential renewal processes
   iv. Other - please specify

IF MORE THAN ONE AREA OF RESIDENTIAL RENEWAL WITHIN LOCAL AUTHORITY CONTROL, PLEASE GIVE THE NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES OF ORIGINS OF LOCAL COMMUNITY GROUPS/RESIDENTS COMMITTEES.

c) Are community groups, rather than individuals involved in the public participation process? *YES/NO

d) Do you consider the community groups as democratic and representative of the local residents of the renewal areas? *YES/NO

e) Does the community group appear to follow the same procedural stages involving residential renewal, as those of the local authority? *YES/NO

f) If NO to 10 e), Is this a major cause of conflict between the community group and the local authority? *YES/NO

g) Is the community group the dominant group involved in change and feed back of information within the renewal process? *YES/NO

IF NOT WHO IS?

h) Any other comments on Community Groups?
11. Relationship between the local authority and the County Authority regarding residential renewal.

   a) Which of the following activity relationships occur
   Financial Aid or Advice from County on:- (please tick box)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Advice</th>
<th>Financial Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. Engineering</td>
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<td>ii. Environmental Works</td>
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<td>iii. Finance</td>
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<td>iv. Housing</td>
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<td>v. Planning</td>
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<td>vi. Structure Plans</td>
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<td>vii. Traffic Management</td>
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<td>viii. Other advice (please stipulate)</td>
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   b) Does the local authority receive any financial support for renewal schemes from the county? *YES/NO
   If YES in what areas?

   c) How regularly do the Local Authority and County Authority representatives meet regarding residential renewal. (please tick box)

   Daily  | Weekly | Monthly | Quarterly | Annually | Never | Occasionally
   (Please stipulate regularity.)

   d) Does the local authority consult the County Authority to determine if the decisions concerning local residential renewal conform to the County Structure Plan? *YES/NO

*Delete as necessary
e) Please comment further if any serious problems occur in the local authority - county authority relationship.

12. Relationship to the D. Of E. regarding residential renewal. (N.B. Names of local authorities will NOT be published)

a) Which is your local D. of E. office?

b) How regularly are the local authority and D of E representatives in consultation or advice contact? Please indicate by a tick in the columns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Face-to-face meetings</th>
<th>Publications/Letters/Circulars</th>
<th>Telephone</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
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<td>Occasionally</td>
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(please stipulate regularity.)

c) How much emphasis is placed on the use of D of E Technical and Financial Advice?

Is it regarded as:- (please tick in Box)

- A 100% order, to be followed at all costs
- Advice, to be disregarded if not seen as relevant
- Advice, to be adapted to the local situation, but retained in its Outline Structure
- Advice, to be adapted to the local situation, within a new organised local structure.
- Other emphasis, please stipulate
d) Is the advice usually (over 50%) useful?
   TECHNICAL *YES/NO   FINANCIAL *YES/NO

e) Is the advice relationship with the D of E
   Please tick in box.
   i. A D of E to local authority flow of advice □
   ii. A local authority to D of E flow of information □
   iii. A two way D of E local authority flow of
        information and advice.

f) Any further comments regarding the D of E?

13. a) Which local council members become involved in the local
   problems of residential renewal?
   Please tick in box.
   i. Only local ward members □
   ii. Only members on the committees concerned
       with residential renewal □
   iii. Local ward and committee members □
   iv. All local councillors, as a general
       problem of the local authority □
   v. No councillors □
   vi. Others (please stipulate)
13. b) At what stages in the process do the local councillors individually, the housing committee and/or the planning committee (if they exist) become involved in residential renewal? Please tick in box.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Councillors</th>
<th>Planning Committee</th>
<th>Housing Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. At all stages - open access</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. At original examination of possible areas</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>iii. At pre-declaration - initial briefing stage</td>
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<td>iv. At pre-declaration - survey stage</td>
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<tr>
<td>v. At declaration stage</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi. At post-declaration, design detail stage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii. At post-declaration, final design stage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viii. During implementation work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ix. When councillors request a meeting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x. When the local authority officials request a meeting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xi. At other times, please stipulate.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) Any other comments regarding the role of local council members in the residential renewal decision making process?

14. a) Have the financial restraints of the last TWO years created any unplanned for changes in the residential renewal strategy of the local authority? *YES/NO

b) If YES, please comment further if you wish to.

*Delete as necessary*
15. Any further comments regarding:
   a) Your future, next FIVE years Policies on residential renewal?
   
   b) On decision making in residential renewal in general?

16. For statistical reasons, can you please give details of
   a) The grade of the person(s) replying to the questionnaire?
   
   b) Their Department
   
   c) Their personal role in the residential renewal process

   THIS INFORMATION IS, OF COURSE, CONFIDENTIAL

All information liable to identify individuals or local authorities
used in this study is CONFIDENTIAL and will not be published under
their titles.

My sincere thanks for answering the questions, however, if any
problems occur or further explanation is sought, do not hesitate to
telephone me (Sheffield 20911 Extn. 369) or write to the address
below. I am always willing to discuss the research project on
residential renewal processes with you.

N A GOFFIN

Please return all questionnaires, complete or incomplete to:-

N A Goffin
Department of Urban and Regional Studies
Sheffield City Polytechnic
Pond Street
Sheffield S1 1WB
South Yorkshire

Enc. Stamped Addressed Envelope
Covering Letter
Appendix B: 'Allocation of Functions in England' - Local Authority Functions

Local Government Act 1972, D of E Circular No 121/72, HMSO 1972

County Councils (Outside Metropolitan Areas) and Metropolitan District

Councils: EDUCATION
           LIBRARIES
           PERSONAL SOCIAL SERVICES
           YOUTH EMPLOYMENT

All County Councils

MUSEUMS & ART GALLERIES; (a)
HOUSING;
Certain reserve powers

All District Councils

MUSEUMS & ART GALLERIES; (a)
HOUSING; Provision
Management
Slum Clearance
House & Area Improvement

TOWN DEVELOPMENT; (a)
PLANNING; Structure Plan
  Development plan schemes(b)
  Development Control(d)
  Derelict Land (a)
National Parks
Country Parks (a)
Conservation areas (a)
Building preservation notices (a)

Tree preservation (a)
Acquisition & disposal of land for planning purposes, development or redevelopment (a)

FOOTPATHS & BRIDLEWAYS; Surveys
Creation, diversion & extinguishment
Orders (a)
Maintenance (a)
Protection (a)
Signposting

TRANSPORTATION; Transport
Highways (e)
Traffic
All parking
Public Transport (g)
Road Safety
Highway lighting
Footway lighting (a)

- 188 -
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH:
Animal Diseases
Consumer protection (eg weights and measures, trade descriptions, explosives, food and drugs)
Refuse disposal
Police
Fire

Swimming Baths
Physical training and recreation
Paths and open spaces (a)
Smallholdings
Airports (a)

PARISH COUNCILS: Parish Councils will, broadly speaking, retain their present functional responsibilities. In relation to the functions listed above they will have powers in connection with:

Footpaths & Bridleways - maintenance
- signposting
Transportation - off street parking (f)
- footpath lighting
Cemeteries & Crematoria
Swimming Baths
Physical training & recreation
Parks & Open Spaces
Allotments

The Act provides parish councils with a right to be consulted about planning applications affecting land in their areas.
(a) Concurrent powers exercisable by county & district councils.

(b) In consultation with district councils.

(c) Except in national parks where counties would be responsible. Responsibility for local plans subject to development plan schemes or structure plan.

(d) Primarily a district council function except in the case of a national park or of "county matters" as defined in schedule 16 of the Act.

(e) District councils may claim maintenance powers for footpaths, bridleways and urban roads which are neither trunk roads nor classified roads.

(f) In accordance with the county transportation plan.

(g) Metropolitan counties will be Passenger Transport Authorities, non-metropolitan counties have co-ordinated functions.

(h) Some non-metropolitan districts under local act powers.

(j) Fire precautions under the Office, Shops and Railways Premises Act will be a county council responsibility.

(k) Subject to water reorganisation.

(l) Subject to amalgamation schemes.
## General Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Local Authority</th>
<th>NORTHTOWN METROPOLITAN BOROUGH COUNCIL</th>
<th>SOUTHFIELD DISTRICT COUNCIL</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Sample Class One (Over 100,000)</td>
<td>Sample Class Two (70 to 100,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOE Region</td>
<td>Sample Region 'B'</td>
<td>Sample Region 'A'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Control</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre local government reorganisation</td>
<td>Combination of seven district authorities</td>
<td>Combination of three district authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwelling Stock</td>
<td>85,000 dwellings</td>
<td>36,000 dwellings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43% Council owned</td>
<td>30% Council owned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40% Owner occupied</td>
<td>45% Owner occupied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17% Private rental</td>
<td>20% Private rental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5% National Coal Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Structures:</td>
<td>14 departments</td>
<td>5 departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Based on a general corporate management system including: Policy and Resources Committee, Member and Officer Working Groups. No Chief Officers Management group exists, second tier officers report to the Chief Executive. The district is in the process of designing and implementing a full corporate plan for the authority.</td>
<td>Claims to be based on general corporate management system. This is based on the Chief Officers group, and below this informal co-ordination and co-operation dominate. The district has no plans for a full corporate plan for the authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departments involved in residential renewal policy.</td>
<td>Planning: 4 full-time staff members Project Co-ordination: 1 full-time staff member Estates: ½ full-time staff member. The Engineering, Environmental Health, Housing and Legal/Administration Dept all attend every renewal policy working party meeting. When needed representatives of the Amenities/Recreation, Finance and Social Services Departments are seconded to this working party.</td>
<td>Planning: 1 full-time staff member Engineering: ½ full-time staff member. The Environmental Health department also plays a major role in the policy, but allocates no full-time staff. When needed, representatives of the Estates, Finance, Legal/Administration departments are consulted.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Models of Administration

The authority operates in both a 'team' and 'co-ordinator' manner according to the questionnaire choice (see question 6, Appendix A). The planning department dominates the preparation, declaration and public participation stages of the process; whilst the Engineering department is dominant in implementing it. The Project Co-ordination Unit has an overview and generally co-ordinates action.

Relationship to other tiers of government: DOE

The district authority generally communicates with the regional office of the DOE on a monthly basis. Although over 50% of both the financial and technical advice is useful, the districts relationship to the DOE is not good. The authority's independent nature of acting then telling the DOE what it has done has led to conflict. The district tends to disregard technical advice if not seen as relevant; only retaining finance advice at a minimum level if it suits the local policy. It complains that there is "too much control over detailed matters. The limited notice of financial allocations also makes forward planning difficult".

County

Northtown receives advice on Engineering, Environmental Works, Structure Planning and Traffic Management, as well as capital aid for Engineering, Environmental Works, and general renewal work outside improvement areas. Meetings with the County to discuss area renewal are irregular and occasional, mainly involving Highways and Engineering work. The district

Southfield District Council has meetings with the regional DOE officials quarterly. Contact by telephone or letter is more likely; on average at monthly intervals depending on local problems and the need for advice. The district claims to have a very good relationship with the DOE, consulting them at an early stage in the policy development and throughout its implementation procedure. Both financial and technical advice issued by the DOE is regarded as over 50% useful and is adapted to the local situation as flexibly as is possible within the local structure.

Southfield only receives advice from the County on traffic management problems, but receives no financial aid.

Meetings with the County are irregular and occasional, and the County does not play a very important role in the
NORTHTOWN M.B.C.       SOUTHFIELD D.C.

County (Cont'd.)

claims that the County could provide greater financial aid for this latter work. Generally the relationship to the County is uneventful, although it must be noted that the authority does not contact the County to discuss the implications of renewal in the Structure Plan.

Policy: 5 years ago

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 Clearance Area</th>
<th>Nil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 G.I.As</td>
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</table>

Present policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9 Clearance Areas</th>
<th>6 GIAs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 GIAs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 HAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Housing Association</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Future/5 year plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9 Clearance Areas continue</th>
<th>Optimistically plan 12 GI:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rest of policy under review based on priority ranking list, government policy and/or restrictions, and local resources</td>
<td>3 HAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Housing Association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Policy Implementation

The implementation of policy is based on Corporate structures and processes of management, based around library networks. The district has no strict time limits, although a timescale as a part of the Network System operates. Northtown developed its Network System before AIN 11, and has only used it as an adaptive aid. The whole process is linked to the district's computer system.

Southfield's implementation is based on ad hoc procedures which will vary according to local problems and resource limits. It acts in a step-by-step process with no strict timing limits, merely achieving one step before the next one is taken. The authority makes no use of AIN 11 on Network Analysis.

Participation

Northtown has formal mechanisms for public participation and adopts an 'aggressive' attitude in selling renewal choice. It has 19 community groups operating in its 26 action areas, the majority originated by the local authority. At least one area originated from direct community action; a child was injured in a road accident and the local community barricaded the road to prevent further use of it as a short cut. This road has now been officially closed except for access.

Southfield has formal mechanisms for public participation, but adopts a 'passive' attitude in its marketing of renewal choice. It waits for reactions from the residents to any problems in the areas, an attitude that reflects the fact that only one community group exists in an improvement area, and that had been developed before the area was declared for renewal action.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributions of Public Participation to Renewal Policy</th>
<th>NORTHTOWN M.B.C.</th>
<th>SOUTHFIELD D.C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are Community Groups rather than individuals dominant in public participation</td>
<td>Yes, and the process is more democratic</td>
<td>No, but it is too early to say if this affects democracy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| The Role of Council Members | Local ward and specific committee members dominant in their interest among the overall Council, although the community groups complain that members are not very co-operative towards the residents groups. They all have access to officials throughout the renewal process, and the planning committee is the major interest group. | Local ward and committee members are dominant in their interest among the overall Council. Official comment that the members have little interest though, thus they have little power, except in full council or committee, i.e. to refuse capital expenditure. Members have access to officials at all times during the complete renewal process. |

| Other Comments | "Financial restraints have slowed down and limited the effectiveness of the strategy. There is a need for simpler procedures". This district continually complains of central government control and seeks greater autonomy and independence to choose its local policies and implement them in its own manner. | "Financial restraints have naturally slowed down the renewal programme". Lack of staff and general resources are apparent in this district. Although the ideas and plans are potentially acceptable local restraints and the need to obtain advice from central government restrict policies that need to be adapted for local use. |
APPENDIX D
MECHANISMS OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE OVER DISTRICT AUTHORITIES

1. Government Circulars

Circulars form a key element in this project and have four main functions:

i) To obtain information. In this the circulars and a form for the local authority to complete are sent out.

ii) Explanation - Circulars are sent out to explain the mechanisms of new Acts or Statutory Instruments with special regard to their affect on local authorities.

iii) Introduction - used to introduce departmental publications, handbooks, pamphlets.

iv) Guidance - give policy and technical guidance to the local authority. This may vary from being very vague to most precise, even within the same department, often dependent upon their ultimate aim in policy implementation or restriction.

Circulars can be very useful, especially to the fields of planning and housing through the D. of E. The problem is assessing their importance and impact within the hierarchical structure of government. Are they less than an Act or Regulation, but more than a speech in status and effect? In Housing and Planning, although Circulars have not been classified as 'delegated legislation', it appears that some could be classified as 'custom' and so may eventually 'ripen' into law, as suggested by Lord Wilberforce in a 1969 Court Action (1). Advice given in Circulars, as well as in other government papers may also be seen as a way of imposing approved patterns of behaviour on local authorities in a normative way. By suggesting certain procedure and processes for decision-making they direct the authority. An example of the general normative advice is found in the residential renewal area improvement note (AIN 8) on 'Networks for home and area improvement', (2). This suggests that certain 'model' procedures are followed. If an authority ignores these guidance notes, it may be because of its individual failings in this area, or its 'one-off' policy implementing attitude. Although alternatively, it may adopt them in an equally acceptable manner to fit their local situation, having first considered the local environment - political and physical.

2. Consultation

Consultation as a basic requisite of democracy is inherent in all local authority and central government work. In residential renewal action consultation occurs for two main reasons. First, due to statutory
requirements, the Minister must consult with local authorities and some planning bodies before exercising certain powers. Secondly, as H.J.R. Wade said:

"Consultation before rule making, though not usually required by law is one of the major industries of government". (3)

In this way Circulars may also be sent around for consultation before official publication, which may perhaps be seen as a basis of consultation between the two tiers.

In addition to consultations as a prelude to a specific set of regulations or specific Circular, consultation papers on proposed legislation reforms may be circulated. Hence, consultation is more than just an informal method of data discussion. McAuslan refers to it as being:

"... on legal and constitutional conventional grounds, a formal means of departmental influence, but unlike other formal means, and herein lies its importance, it generates a two way flow of influence from the department to the local authority and vice versa". (4)

This however assumes that all the local authorities will both understand and contribute to the document's formulation. Whereas this project contends that it is more likely that only those larger authorities with the interests and capacity to contribute will do so, thus creating further problems if the cumulative documents are recirculated as policy.

3. Adjudicatory Functions
The third major mechanism of institutional constraint or control is the central authority's adjudicatory function. Central Government acts as a referee in any disputes between local authorities e.g. County and District authorities on dispute over the allocation of local planning and engineering responsibilities, as is found among the sample survey authorities. This adjudicatory function may be used as informal and subtle leverage to keep particular local authorities in hand, thus it is a powerful weapon.

4. Financial Restraints
The latest in a series of fiscal measures that permeate the relationship between local and central government in residential renewal is the concept of Housing Investment Programmes (HIP's). These play a basic role in the formulation of future policy on residential renewal for all local authorities and may be seen as a restraint mechanism on local authority wastage of capital.
Central government claims the aims of the policy are:

"..... to enable local authorities to present co-ordinated analysis of housing conditions in their area and to formulate coherent policies and programmes of capital spending on public housing. Within the framework of national policies and resources available, this system will enable local authorities to produce solutions that accord most closely to their assessment of local needs". (5)

Essentially, local housing authorities will put forward a 'bid' for capital to cover each part of their housing programmes, other than locally determined expenditure. Once national figures for expenditure in each sector of housing are agreed, the allocations will be distributed regionally, and then locally, after negotiations between local authorities and D of E regional offices. These negotiations require the local authorities to submit a 'Housing Strategy and Investment Programme' to the regional office. This contains three parts:

i) Description of major aspects of the housing strategy.

ii) Numerical data - population, households and housing stock, and expected changes up until March 1987.

iii) Financial statement of past expenditure and proposals for the next four years.

For 1977/78, a transitional year is planned, the details of which are explained in D of E Circular 18/77 (6). Basically this entails four main expenditure blocks with seven main expenditure heads:

**BLOCK 1**

i) New house building, including Part V acquisitions and package deals

**BLOCK 2**

ii) Slum clearance, including Part III land acquisitions.

iii) Rehabilitation under Section 105.

iv) Municipalisation, including initial repairs.

**BLOCK 3**

v) Private sector improvement grants

vi) Home loans

**BLOCK 4**

vii) Loans to housing associations.

Cash limits are rather inflexible, so the idea of 25% virement - the power to transfer spending from one account to another - and tolerance (10%) - provision for carrying forward limited over - and under-spending into the next financial year - have been introduced. For the 1978/79 scheme Block heads will be reduced to three in number with Blocks 1 and 2 basically joined together.
### Appendix D: References

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Networks for House and Area Improvement AIN 11, HMSO, 1977</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<th>Author/Project</th>
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General Bibliography Cont'd.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
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<tbody>
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Statistical Addendum

a) For figures 4.1, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 6.3 and 6.4. Please note that where a local authority answers positively to more than one alternative questionnaire answer the following statistical procedure occurs:

If two answers are given $\frac{1}{2}$ of a mark is allocated to each category;
If three answers are given $\frac{1}{3}$ of a mark is allocated to each category;

This explains why these figures do not always appear to reflect the exact percentage figures to fit full local authority values.

b) For figures 4.2 and 4.3. Please note that where a change in local authority policy during the research period occurs, some local authorities answered both yes and no to questions. Therefore, the following statistical procedure occurs:

Where answer YES and NO $\frac{1}{2}$ of a mark is allocated to each category;

This explains why the figures do not always appear to reflect the exact percentage figures to fit full local authority values.