REFERENCE
Religion, Cognition and Author-Function:
Dyer, Southwell, Lodge and As You Like It.

Abstract.

The thesis incorporates the view that allegory as a mode of communication is impossible. Accordingly, religious meanings of Elizabethan literary texts usually read as “secular” works are registered herein without recourse to positing an allegorical level of meaning in those texts. In order to arrive at relatively secure readings, texts have been selected which have explicit interrelationships (for example, texts which are parodies or adaptations of earlier texts). Registering the tenor of the later texts’ departures allows contemporary production of meaning from the earlier works to be traced. The aim, however, is not merely to show that Elizabethan “secular” texts are far more religious than tends to be supposed; the thesis seeks to demonstrate the extent to which theories of cognition were inseparable in the period from doctrinal issues. Early moderns not only thought and read religiously, religious concepts informed their cognitive theories (and vice versa).

The thesis culminates in a reading of As You Like It, arguing that the play employs facultative rhetoric (as derived from scholastic faculty psychology) in order to present human appetence as co-efficient in salvation. In doing so, the play downgrades the role of the intellectual faculty. The notion of author/dramatist as governing intellect is thereby brought into question. Accordingly, the thesis also traces the development of attitudes towards author-function in its study-texts, demonstrating the extent to which a given text’s cognitive model and its rhetorical stance towards crucial doctrinal issues (relating to human participation in salvation) affect its deployment of, and attitude towards, author-function.
Religion, Cognition and Author-Function:
Dyer, Southwell, Lodge and *As You Like It.*

Chris Butler

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Abbreviations.

AYLI: As You Like It.
CHR: Catholic Historical Review.
CRS: Catholic Record Society.
JEGP: Journal of English and Germanic Philology.
MLN: Modern Language Notes.
MP: Modern Philology.
N&Q: Notes and Queries.
OED: The Oxford English Dictionary.
P&P: Past and Present.
PQ: Philological Quarterly.
SEL: Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900.
SP: Studies in Philology.
SQ: Shakespeare Quarterly.
SS: Shakespeare Survey.
SSt: Shakespeare Studies.
TLS: Times Literary Supplement.
TSLL: Texas Studies in Literature and Language.
Note Regarding Sources.

Quotations from pre-modern primary sources retain original spellings with the following exceptions: where such sources use “i” for “j”, I have used “j” for the reader’s convenience due to the high number of quotations including names such as “Iohn” and “Iaques” (this does not apply to Latin texts and the poems in the appendix); where “w” is used for “w” I have used “w”, and where long “f’ is used for “s”, I have used “s”. Spellings and punctuation in modern sources have been adapted to British conventions.

References to classical texts and, where appropriate, medieval texts are normatized.

All titles have been normalized: initial letters of all words in titles, except prepositions, intra-clausal connectors and articles, are capitalized.
Introduction.

Religion, maintains Frederic Jameson, is “the master-code of pre-capitalist society”.¹ One must be careful, however, not to infer from Jameson’s use of the word “code” that “pre-capitalist” discourse should be decoded into modern capitalist discourse in order to find out what pre-capitalist subjects were “really” saying.² As Debora Shuger remarks, religion is “not simply politics in disguise”. Rather, in the Renaissance, “[r]eligion supplies the primary language of analysis. It is the cultural matrix for explorations of virtually every topic”.³ In a manner consistent with Shuger’s assessment, this thesis will argue that Shakespeare’s *As You Like It* addresses religious issues which were of major importance both at its moment of probable composition (1598-9) and first production (1599), and in the *longue durée* of late-medieval/early modern Christianity.⁴

Some modern readers might consider Elizabethan religious topics to be of little relevance to present-day concerns. However, since the historicist study of texts such as *As You Like It* is regarded as a legitimate means of developing greater understanding of present cultural formations, it follows that those texts are to be read in relation to their cultural moment (regardless of one’s incapacity to fully recreate that moment). Therefore, while the religious dimension of such

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"secular" texts as Shakespeare’s plays remains inadequately historicized (and apprehended), modern analyses of those texts will suffer from unnecessary transhistorical distortion.

This circumstance is not the only argument I would make for the modern relevance of my thesis. I will also maintain that *As You Like It* engages with issues relating to theories of cognition. As Jameson and Shuger’s comments indicate, that engagement cannot be separated from the text’s religious discourse. Nor, on the other hand, can it be regarded as either the ground or a side-effect of that discourse. Rather, registration of the interfusedness of early modern concern with doctrinal and cognitive issues offers a means of diagnosing the cultural relativity of modern cognitive habits which, of all habits, are the most likely to be considered “natural”. By assessing the relations between doctrinal positions and cognitive theories in the early modern period, that is, one gains a vantage point from which to observe the belief-positions informing modern cognitive habitus.

The present thesis, however, is a literary study. The foregoing remarks are offered to indicate the potential contemporary relevance of my findings. The thesis itself aims to demonstrate that *As You Like It* is informed by intellectual/theological problems which came to prominence following the nominalist challenge to (and within) scholasticism in the 14th century. Charles Trinkaus has recorded aspects of that challenge, noting, for example, how Ockhamists insisted that “only a freely elected, spontaneous act that was not guided by natural necessity could be considered moral”. The performance of even such a motiveless moral act, however, could have no actual bearing on the human agent’s salvific destiny. Thus, regardless of whether one had access to the sacraments, or received them in an appropriate spiritual state, and regardless of any ecclesiastical advisor’s opinion or operative efficacy, the human agent could not wilfully obtain grace. In other words, one could do *nothing* to affect the predestined outcome. This doctrine of divine election— which, of course, was

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taken up by later church reformers—arguably informs Orlando’s complaint in the opening scene of *As You Like It*. The rest of the play, moreover, can be read as interrogative of the Ockhamist position and its Lutheran/Elizabethan reception. For instance, Orlando’s eventual loving sacrifice—his “decision” to rescue his former enemy (his brother Oliver) from a predatory lioness—is not only (quite pointedly) “not guided by natural necessity”, but also (I argue) the ostensibly co-efficient means by which the hero converts passion to grace.

The religious interpretation of Shakespeare’s works is a valid historicist endeavour in and of itself. Nevertheless, it is my view that to segregate the religious from a larger philosophical framework is to participate in modern binary formulations which segregate the sacred from the “secular” and (if often unconsciously) the religious from the intellectual. The latter binary formulations are consistent with modern hegemonic secularism. The present thesis, therefore, has not only to contend with the historical complexities of its matter, but also needs to work hard to demonstrate its relevance in a resistant contemporary milieu. The resistance I have in mind is by no means confined to the “world outside the academy”. Fellow academics, on being told that the focus of my thesis is *As You Like It*, have expressed (polite) surprise that one play could provide enough matter for such a project—or, rather, it promptly turns out, that a comedy should do so. “If it were *Hamlet* or *King Lear*...” the conversation proceeds, “I could understand it.” One can expect to find serious intellectual issues explored in tragedies, it seems, because their mood is more “like ours” in their darkness, their apparent cynicism and scepticism. Comedies, however, are apt to be regarded as commercial fluff (as though *Hamlet* was not written for money!), offering escapism, diversion from political troubles, and facile endorsement of conservative social institutions such as marriage.

The link between a bias against comedy as vehicle for “serious” thought and binary thinking may seem obscure to the reader. However, it has a long pedigree. As Shuger records, there was widespread recognition, during the Renaissance, of the specifically rhetorical power of the Bible, not excluding those portions of it written in “plain style”. Indeed, a link was held to obtain
between the solemn/sublime and the plain. Nonetheless, in theoretical works of the period which discuss rhetoric in isolation from theology, “the plain style ... remains associated with ... the low, conversational idiom of comedy.”

Furthermore, as Shuger notes, the incongruity of recommending a “low” style for teaching, including religious instruction, goes unaddressed by early modern rhetorical scholars. The Bible was thus a particularly large elephant in the room whenever Renaissance neoclassicists insisted on stylistic decorum (inconsistency in this regard can be registered, for example, in Sidney’s *Apology for Poetry*). The plain style, or “low” comedy, therefore, was (and is) appropriate for instructing a socially-diverse audience about religious issues. Moreover, once the Bible—the example of mixed style *par excellence*—is adopted as a rhetorical role model, nothing prevents a comedy from alternating between “low”, “medium” and “high” styles to suit the matter at hand. Thus, alongside Touchstone’s recollections of Jane Smile and her cow’s dugs (2.4.43-50), one finds in *As You Like It* Rosalind and Celia exchanging philosophical sallies in prose about fortune and nature (1.2.31-55), Orlando’s Neoplatonic poems (3.2.85-92, 122-51) and Oliver recounting Orlando’s epic struggle with a lioness in blank Spenserian verse (4.3.97-119, 126-31, 139-55). In other words, *As You Like It* can be placed in the same genre as the Bible, being a defiantly non-classical, hybrid poetic work offering doctrinal/moral instruction to audiences with a diverse range of appetites.

The modern resistance to registering religious meaning in comedy is a function of an insistence on segregating the sacred and the secular. This

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7 Shuger, *Sacred Rhetoric*, p. 144.
8 *A historical text must show Socrates dying a criminal’s death whereas true poetry would not, Sidney argues there. Yet this is precisely how Scripture represents Christ’s death, and Sidney maintains that Scripture belongs to the highest type of poesy:* Geoffrey Shepherd, ed. *An Apology for Poetry*, by Sir Philip Sidney (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1973), pp. 111-2.
insistence is itself informed by a “sceptical” Cartesian (per)version of empiricism. “Whatever I have up to now accepted as most true,” says Descartes in the first of his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), “I have acquired either from the senses or through the senses. But from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once”. Descartes goes on to register the absurdity of this stance from a “common sense” position, only, however, as a prelude to bringing that common-sensical position itself into question en route to his famous conclusion. Jacques Derrida, in “Cogito and the History of Madness”, occupies—in customary deconstructionist fashion—Descartes’ position from within, in order to arrive at a new understanding of its meaning. Consequently, a central tenet of poststructuralism holds that, as one’s subjective experience of phenomena has no secure basis, empiricism can function only as a registration of diverse sets of conventions, not as an epistemology. A particular presupposition of the Derridean-poststructuralist position often goes unremarked: it takes for granted that the human subject is the (only) potential basis for (human) cognition (this basis failing, no other is presumed to exist). Derridean post-structuralism thus remains allied (albeit negatively) to a dualist mind-body split which has long since been exploded by advances in neurobiology and other related disciplines.

It is interesting, therefore, to note that many late-medieval and early modern (pre-Cartesian) scholars would not have accepted Derrida’s subjectivist premise. Granted that one never knows when one’s apprehension of reality is in accord with that reality, one does not know either (in that same subjectivist sense) when accurate apprehension may in fact have occurred/be occurring. Thus, the modern position is “sceptical” (not sceptical) because it assumes, in a naively positivist vein, that all of its apprehensions are as good as false. Influential late-medieval theorists of cognition, such as the 14th-century

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Franciscan theologian Peter Aureol, maintained on the contrary that the presence of error provided the epistemological basis for the cognition of reality (apprehensions err therefore something is).\(^{14}\)

Christianity is thoroughly bound up with theories of cognition because individual agency (and *a fortiori* human agency in regard to acts of cognition) is the very question it raises. As Robert E. Stillman has observed, “arguments about the freedom or bondage of the will provoked many of the most divisive theological debates of the [16th] century”.\(^{15}\) Jesuit theologians, like other Catholic—and Protestant—theorists (and like scholastics in previous centuries), developed elaborate positions on this issue. Furthermore, as missionaries to Protestant states, the Jesuits made use of popular art-forms in order to communicate their complex position on free will. Accordingly, it will be argued (in Chapter 4) that Thomas Lodge’s prose and poetry pastoral romance *Rosalynde* (first published 1590)—Shakespeare’s immediate source for *As You Like It*—functioned as a popularization of Jesuit theology. *As You Like It*, it will be suggested in turn, performs an Anglican borrowing of *Rosalynde*’s Jesuit feathers.\(^{16}\) Shakespeare’s play, moreover, does not replicate the humanism of Lodge’s romance; that is, the play (I suggest) interrogates the humanist tendency to equate selfhood with the intellect. In a manner that may strike the reader as incongruously medieval (but note the 11th-century provenance of the names Shakespeare gives to his fraternal agonists: Orlando and Oliver)\(^{17}\)—and also thus recalling Spenser’s antiquarian practice in *The Faerie Queene*—*As You Like It* presents human agency as facultative process.\(^{18}\)

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\(^{16}\) The anachronistic term “Anglican” is used for rhetorical convenience.


\(^{18}\) For analysis of the Neoplatonic provenance of Spenser’s facultative rhetoric, see: Alastair Fowler, “Emanations of Glory: Neoplatonic Order in Spenser’s *Faerie Queen*,” in Judith M. Kennedy & James A. Reither, eds. *A Theatre for Spenserians* (Toronto & Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1973), pp. 53-82. Fowler suggests that an alternative influence on Spenser’s facultative rhetoric may have been “the medieval tradition, going back to SS Augustine and Bonaventura, that traced a trinitarian pattern in operations of the human mind”: p. 67. On Spenser
Why would Shakespeare (or Spenser) draw upon such musty scholastic/Aristotelian concepts? Had the Reformation (if not Augustine) not swept all that away? "Augustinian humanism," William J. Bouwsma remarks, "saw man not as a system of objectively distinguishable, discrete faculties reflecting ontological distinctions ... but as an ... organic unity".\(^{19}\) It is worth pausing over Bouwsma’s formulation. It implies, of course, that, before Augustine, scholars did see "man ... as a system of objectively distinguishable, discrete faculties reflecting ontological distinctions". That is, those benighted scholars did not understand that words were only words, philosophical models only heuristic devices; they really did—en masse—conceive of the psychological faculties they described as occupying physical spaces in the head. This could be argued (with difficulty in the case of Aristotle, I would suggest),\(^{20}\) but it renders one a hostage to historical fortune. That is, one will be obliged at every turn to insist that whenever a later champion of rationalism uses an abstract (or a metaphorical) term, s/he is only doing so "rhetorically". Bouwsma’s humanists (poststructuralists avant la lettre) know better than to assume that there is any necessary correspondence between the language one uses and actual reality.

Thus, one here encounters the opposing nominalist extreme: there are "real" ideas in one’s head which, unfortunately, one simply cannot put into words, and so one has to make do with the clumsy labels left by one’s predecessors. Bouwsma strides confidently into this swampland: "Despite their underlying belief in the integral unity of the personality," he writes, "the Augustinian humanists accepted and argued in terms of the old vocabulary of the faculties".\(^{21}\)

In other words, Bouwsma knows what the nominalists are really saying even if

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\(^{20}\) See, for example: Joel Kaye, *Economy and Nature in the 14th Century: Money, Market Exchange and the Emergence of Scientific Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998), p. 49 ("Aristotle’s conceptual world was shifting and fully relational, with ... determinations changing as the point of reference changed").

\(^{21}\) Bouwsma, “Two Faces,” p. 37 (emphases added).
they did not know back then how to say it. However, the scholars whom Bouwsma states had an “underlying belief in the integral unity of the personality” did not actually possess a word for the modern concept of “personality”. It is difficult to see how a person can have an “underlying belief” in something of which they have no concept. Bouwsma’s transhistoricism thus reminds one to avoid reading back an idea of the self as “organic unity” onto early modern texts. Hence, instead of saying “Why would Shakespeare trade in faculty psychology when, being clever, he knew he was an unified organic individual, like us?”, I prefer to say (in anticipation of my reading of As You Like It): “Shakespeare appears to have made use of a facultative model of cognition in order to address religious issues before a diversified audience; this implies that the notion of the self as a unified whole was by no means universally accepted, and that a facultative model obtained as a social, rhetorically-produced, contingent reality”.

Certainly, Augustine is an important figure for the present discussion in that he placed his personal experience, as described in the Confessions, at the core of his theology. On the other hand, Augustine famously complained (following Romans 7:15) that what he willed to do and what he found himself actually doing were often two different things—can a “unity” be so radically divided? Colin Morris has noted that “intention” was given little attention by Christian theologians and philosophers prior to the 12th century (despite the importance accorded to intention by the New Law: “But I say unto you, that whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery

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23 For another reading of AYLI as concerned with the reliability of cognition, see: Maurice A. Hunt, Shakespeare’s AYLI: Late Elizabethan Culture and Literary Representation (New York & Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 54ff. Hunt sees the play as “a hinge in a grand cultural shift of responsibility from humankind to language for lapses in communication and meaning”: p. 55. Evidently certain that such “lapses” always do and must occur, Hunt does not engage with the notion of cognition as productive (as opposed to representational) process.
with her in his heart” [Matthew 5:28]) and that Augustine himself neglected the question of motive. Faced with this lacuna, Bouwsma moves forward in time to the Protestant appropriation of Augustine. Melanchthon’s respect for Augustine (in contrast to his contempt for other Church Fathers), says Bouwsma, explains the German reformer’s “indifference to the value of distinguishing the various faculties of the human personality”. There appears to be, moreover, a link between Melanchthon’s rejection of faculty psychology and his (admittedly ambivalent) anti-intellectualism. This is an important point as it relates directly to education (a major concern of the reformers, given the Lutheran-Tyndalian emphasis upon individual reading of Scripture). In the *Loci Communes* (1521), Melanchthon states: “in describenda homini natura non habemus opus multiplicibus philosophorum partitimibus”. Psychological faculties, in being so heuristically expendable, thus have much in common with their externalized collegiate namesakes, the latter being evidence of academic over-specialization. The early Melanchthon thus implies that only one discipline (Christian theology, presumably) is required for—indeed, worthy of—Christian education (not a Christian’s *religious* education, but the education of a Christian political subject). Not just the Aristotelian cognitive faculties, it appears, but fancy theory *per se* is out. Christians do not need abstruse disciplines and schools of thought because they prefer to read the plain and simple meaning of the only text worth reading: Scripture. Admittedly, Melanchthon modified his position in subsequent editions of the *Loci Communes* (though Bouwsma’s account itself does not observe this complicating circumstance). Nonetheless, one may infer that a “common sense” resistance to faculty psychology is consistent with an Ockham’s Razor approach

25 All Biblical quotations are from the Rheims-Douay *Holy Bible; Translated from the Latin Vulgate.*
27 Bouwsma, “Two Faces,” p. 36.
to theorization and education.

Melanchthon continues: "sed paucis in duo partimur hominem" (indicating some strain in Bouwsma’s “organic unity”). “Est enim in eo vis cognoscendi, est et vis qua vel persequitur, vel refugit, quae cognovit.” The body, presumably, participates in the “faculty by which [man] either follows or flees … things”. The exposition continues: “Vis cognoscendi est, qua sentimus, aut intelligimus, ratiocinamur, alia cum alis comparamus, aliud ex alio colligimus”. If the senses are connected in some way to the cognitive faculty, then one might expect sensation to belong to it also. Are the senses and sensation distinct from the body? Melanchthon does not want to go into this: “Non puto magnopere referre, hoc loco separare sensus ab intellectu, quern vocant, et adpetitum sensuum, ab adpetitu superiore”. Interestingly, Melanchthon here retraces the limits of Thomistic speculation. For example, regarding Aquinas’ statement that “[a]ll love of incorporeal or spiritual objects is an act of will rather than affectus”, Shuger notes that “Thomas … does not make it very clear whether this intellective appetite is subjectively experienced as emotion”. A major problem for Aquinas, one suspects, is that the ultimate source of his facultative theory is Aristotle who, in a manner unacceptable to Christian orthodoxy in its (Neo)Platonic reception, made “the heart the basis of sensation and motion, as well as the source of life”. One also begins to suspect that Melanchthon’s project consists, to a notable extent, of a retention of (and reliance upon) scholastic terms as rhetorical devices, simultaneous with a rejection of their

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31 Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” p. 86. “[A] cognitive faculty, and … a faculty by which he either follows or flees the things he has come to know”: Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” p. 23.
33 Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” p. 87. “I do not think it greatly matters at this point to separate the feelings from what is called the intellect, and the appetite of the feelings from the higher appetite”: Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” p. 23.
ontological validity. In other words, Melanchthon does not abolish facultative rhetoric, he restores (and insists upon) awareness of its metaphoricity. What Aquinas gained by (ostensibly?) assuming his terms corresponded to reality was an ability to use them as building blocks, leading to new insights. The disadvantage of this approach is that terms become mistaken for realities (by the philosopher’s followers). Melanchthon, on the other hand, employs terms as metaphors, useful for the communication of ideas. The danger here is that, in denying that language has any actual correspondence to reality, one is committed to wielding terms within a finite rhetorical system. In this sense, rhetoric is inherently conservative: statements work rhetorically because they appeal to people’s pre-established tastes (appreciation of this fact is perhaps signalled by the title “As You Like It”). Consequently, precisely where Aquinas left matters obscure, Melanchthon appears unable or unwilling to venture new insights. He can, however, turn back to Scripture, in order to escape what he regards as a maze of scholastic blind alleys.

Melanchthon continues: “Vis e qua affectus oriuntur, est qua aut aversamur, aut persequirum cognita, hanc vim alias voluntatem, alias affectum, alias appetitum nominant.” As the repetition of “alias” indicates, Melanchthon is impatient with the variety of opinions—with the confusion of the will and the appetite. “Interni affectus,” Melanchthon insists, “non sunt in potestate nostra ... non posse voluntatem sua sponte ponere amorem, odium, aut similes affectus, sed affectus affectu vincitur”. The latter clause should be noted, as again it seems descriptive of a closed system; it also anticipates the Elizabethan project to

38 Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” p. 87. “The faculty from which the affections arise is that by which we either turn away from or pursue the things known, and this faculty is sometimes called ‘will’ (voluntas), sometimes ‘affection’, and sometimes ‘appetite’”: Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” p. 23.
39 Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” p. 90. “Internal affections are not in our power ... the will ... cannot in itself control love, hate, or similar affections, but affection is overcome with affection”: Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” p. 27.
attach subjects’ affections to the queen in lieu of the Virgin Mary. In any case, here one reaches the anti-humanist core of the Protestant message, the parting of the ways for Erasmus and Luther: the will is not free.40 “Quid enim est voluntas,” asks Melanchthon, “si non adfectum fons est? Et cur non pro voluntatis vocabularo cordis nomen usurpamus? Siquidem scriptura potissimam hominis partem cor vocat.”41 As stated, this is not faculty psychology per se; it is facultative rhetoric. Nor is it anti-hierarchical, as Shuger suggests (with reference to Augustine, not Melanchthon, but the point applies to both).42 Rather, Melanchthon rejects the Thomistic hierarchy which follows the Stoics in placing intellect in alliance with will at the top of the facultative ladder. Melanchthon installs a new hierarchy, or, rather, claims to restore the Apostolic one, according to which the heart is “the most powerful part of man”. If there is any doubt on this matter, he adds: “Nam cum corda deus judicet, necesse est cor cum suis adfectibus summam ac potissimam hominis partem esse.”43

As Bouwsma notes, if Melanchthon’s Lutheran position freed the will from reason’s rule, it bound it to the heart. The conclusion was that, since he cannot control his affections, “man can only be saved by grace not by knowledge; for knowledge can at best reach only the mind, but grace alone can change the heart”.44 However, there is an oft-noted problem here. Why preach to people if nothing avails? Why observe the commandments? Why write plays to sway audiences? Why do anything? Bouwsma’s summary contains a crucial lacuna. Not “grace alone can change the heart”—rhetoric also can alter one’s affections, can persuade one to attach oneself to a new object, or detach oneself from an

41 Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” p. 90. “For what is will, if it is not the fount of affections? And why do we not use the word ‘heart’ instead of ‘will’...? For the Scriptures call the most powerful part of man the ‘heart’”: Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” p. 27.
43 Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” p. 92. “For since God judges hearts, the heart and its affections must be the highest and most powerful part of man”: Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” p. 29.
44 Bouwsma, “Two Faces,” p. 42.
object to which one had been previously attached. Rhetoric and grace, therefore, are the media of conversion. This might be stated more radically: grace equals rhetoric. This position is not in Melanchthon, nor any of the Lutherans—because it restores freedom to human cognition (if not to the willing and/or feeling “subject”).\(^{45}\) Such an understanding of grace, I will argue, is consistent with the theological position presented by As You Like It; hence, it will be claimed that the play employs facultative rhetoric. Understood non-facultatively, human agency cannot be presented as free. In other words, if the self is regarded as the “I” marking a unified totality, it cannot be free, for that “I” identifies itself with the will, which cannot control the affections, the highest and most powerful part of “man”. If, on the other hand, the “I” is destructured metaphorically, then the rhetorical means by which human agency operates, not (only) in collaboration with grace but as grace (as rhetorical effect), may be presented (and staged).

Regardless of the extent of the influence of Melanchthon’s Loci Communes within Elizabethan England,\(^{46}\) prominent use of facultative rhetoric in discussion of doctrinal issues occurred much closer in time and space to the moment in which As You Like It was written and staged—for example, in the writings of Richard Hooker.\(^{47}\) In his principal works, Hooker, of course, was not specifically answering (or defending) Luther or Melanchthon, but rather combatting the radical reformers who wished to see all forms of ecclesiastical hierarchy abolished in Elizabethan England, following the model Calvin imposed in Geneva. Like Melanchthon, Hooker “assigns emotion a central role in the act of faith”.\(^{48}\) Accordingly, Hooker did not regard faith as something a Christian acquires merely by reading Scripture. This was a controversial position in Elizabethan England. Hooker’s own curate, the radical reformer Walter Travers,
wrote in complaint to the Privy Council circa 1585: “Upon ... occasion of this doctrine of [Hooker’s], that the assurance of that we believe by the word is not so certain as of that we perceive by the sense”. In response, Hooker argued that Travers’s view exhibited over-confidence in human intellectual powers (the radicals had become the new scholastics!). In an adroit rhetorical move, Hooker insisted that the “saving truth” of Christian doctrine “is far above the reach of human reason”. This did not mean, however, that human cognition was incapable of degrees of certainty. “I conclude,” asserted Hooker, “that we have less certainty of evidence concerning things believed, than concerning sensible or naturally perceived [sic].” Comparison of the reliability of different modes of cognition thus occupied centre-stage during this high-profile Elizabethan doctrinal debate. Admittedly, Hooker’s facultative rhetoric is more implicit here than Melanchthon’s. The latter reformer, after all, had had to clear the way by explicitly rejecting scholasticism’s criteria of truth (if not its terms). With that battle long-won by the 1580s, Hooker has no need to explain why he will not be using scholastic terms in a systematic fashion. Nevertheless, as his response to the radical reformers shows, along with Melanchthon he rejected the notion of an isolated rational selfhood capable of accessing truth by volitional means. After all, if securing grace was as straight-forward as that, reading Scripture could be described as a “work” by which one became justified.

Where, though—in line with the doctrine of election—Melanchthon attributes all belief to grace, Hooker skirts the issue of predestination. Hence,

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52 Shuger, *Habits of Thought*, p. 75.
one seeks in vain, when reading Hooker, for the overwhelming apprehension of human nullity one experiences in reading Luther. This relative tepidity has been ascribed to the fact that Hooker was an apologist for an established regime, rather than the champion of a new movement, like Foxe.\textsuperscript{53} That circumstance also suggests why Hooker made greater allowances for the role one's historical moment plays in determining \textit{praxis}. Under the tyranny of the papacy, radical "unorthodox" insights based on individual close reading and the use of extravagant polemic were, presumably, necessary. With Elizabeth long-established on the throne, less non-conformist and less abrasive discursive activities are called for. Reasoned but nonetheless sensually appealing rhetoric is appropriate in a well-regulated Christian state, not Pauline lightning bolts and vituperation. Moreover, if, as Hooker says, one \textit{approaches} certainty regarding "things believed" by means of the senses, rather than immediately grasping "truth" with the intellect, then well-tuned rhetoric has an especially important role to play in leading people to accept the "saving truth".

Hooker's call for individual defiance to be supplanted by a cementing of communal bonds is a crucial difference between the early Lutheran and the late Elizabethan situations. In some ways, their firm approval of rhetoric can make Hooker and Melanchthon's positions seem extremely close. Both Lutherans and Anglicans, J. S. Pendergast has suggested, sought to use images to lead people away or "up" from the sensual world.\textsuperscript{54} But (setting aside the varieties of "Lutheran") is that true for all Anglicans? Is not Hooker, as spokesman for a rather dazzling regime, committed to the view that people could do much worse than \textit{attach} themselves to the visual spectacles of the court and its attendant power? How far should the average political subject go in his/her mystical career? "The proper use of images," says Pendergast, "is to deliver people out of that ignorance, which possesses people in the Roman captivity".\textsuperscript{55} Are Elizabethans still "in the Roman captivity"? Obviously, as defender of the


\textsuperscript{55} Pendergast, \textit{Religion}, p. 105.
Church of England, Hooker will not answer yes.

Moreover, as Pendergast himself observes, the distinction between an acceptable use of images as means of ascent to the spiritual and an unacceptable speculation on images as objects “does not clarify how images manifest Truth, or why speculation is such a dangerous thing”.\(^5\)\(^6\) It is not that the answer to the latter point is far to seek; rather, it was rarely in the interests of reformers seeking to win potentates to their cause to spell it out. Summarizing and interpreting arguments presented in an English religious treatise published in 1612,\(^5\)\(^7\) Pendergast observes that “speculation” (dwelling intensely on images) was regarded by some Protestants as apt to lead “to reliance upon academics and the Pope”\(^5\)\(^8\)—or, in England, subjection to the monarchy and/or its appointed doctrinal experts. Evidently, a hierarchical ecclesiastical structure is always necessary in a large-scale Christian political community.\(^5\)\(^9\) Otherwise, where all members are encouraged to engage in “speculation” (upon Scripture as well as upon “images”), there is nothing to prevent individual mystics from forgetting (or rejecting) their civic duties and floating off into the spiritual stratosphere (and/or wandering down into the radical underground).

Does this mean that there is no room for public debate of religious issues in a stable Christian political state? Does one end up subject once more to the tyranny of papal infallibility, only now disguised as monarchical absolutism? To answer this, I will return to that other point which, according to Pendergast, was left obscure by the Protestant distinction between acceptable and unacceptable uses of images: how do images manifest truth? If reason cannot access truth directly, \textit{what happens} when people cognize images? How does doing that lead them towards truth? Here Hooker diverges from the Melanchthonian position. Instead of everyone being their own authority when it comes to matters of faith,

\(^{57}\) Edward Skipworth, \textit{An Apology for the Holy Supper of the Lord against the Corporall Presence, Transubstantiacion, Masses without Communicants, the Communion vnder One Kinde, together with Certaine Analiticall and Orthodoxe Propositions vpon the Lords Supper} (London: Nathaniell Butter, 1612); this text is an English translation of a treatise by the French Protestant, Pierre du Moulin.
members of a Christian community must submit to the majoritarian view on all important issues. “Variety of judgement and opinions,” Hooker observes, “argueth obscurity in those things whereabout they differ. But that which all parts receive for truth, that which every one having sifted is by no one denied or doubted of, must needs be matter of infallible certainty.” As Pendergast remarks, “Hooker is suggesting that theologically ... ‘infallible’ opinion can be found in popular opinion”. The “pope” is the people. In other words, as As You Like It has it, when Touchstone and Rosalind reach a discursive impasse: “let the Forrest judge” (3.2.119). Insofar as Luther was understood to be asserting “I am right because I know I’m right” (as Sir Thomas More complained, with regard to the Lutherans), Lutheranism had to be rejected by a sane community.

Thus, in Hooker’s texts there are two types of facultative rhetoric—one relating to a notional topology of the human soul, the other descriptive of cognitive process. Regarding the first type: “Man doth seek a triple perfection[,]” Hooker writes, quoting (without attribution) the Nicomachean Ethics, “first a sensual”, aimed at necessities and “beauties”, “then an intellectual”, aimed at exercising reason, and “lastly a spiritual and divine”. Thus, Hooker divides “individuals” into three faculties (eschewing Melanchthon’s dualism), each with their own claims to perfection. I stress the latter phrase because it challenges the hierarchic model posited by Melanchthon, whereby, since God judges the heart, the heart should be regarded as paramount. By replacing the Stoic/scholastic identification of the “self” with the individual “mind” with an identification of the “self” with the “heart”, Melanchthon retains a subjectivist model of cognition. Cognition for Hooker, however, is always being communally performed. Discrete acts of judgement/discernment occurring during that on-going process (such as, say, the establishment of the Elizabethan religious settlement) are to be accepted or rejected (regardless of any individual’s subjective opinion) according to the extent to which they are consistent with the

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60 Quoted in Pendergast, Religion, p. 107.
63 Morris, ed. Ecclesiastical Polity, 1.205.
registrations of the communal assembly. Moreover, once those judgements have been ratified by an established legal system (itself a product of a contingent communal/historical process), it is not the place of individuals to question them outside of legitimate venues.

To put the matter another way: if Christ is the self and Christ is the community, then it follows that the Christian self is the community. No one faculty—not even the heart—is to be identified with the “self”. Thus, Hooker sees individual members of the state, each comprised of three faculties, as capable of acts of apprehension which contribute to cognition. However, reliable discernment occurs only after those members pool their data in a facultative assembly. *As You Like It*, it will be argued in Chapters 7-8, presents this facultative system in action. In any case, as may now be seen, discussion of early modern doctrinal positions cannot be usefully separated from discussion of early modern theories of cognition.

In his affirmative texts, Hooker employs abstract terms as metaphors in a logical register. In a poetic work (in print or on stage) fictional *persona* are signs and, therefore, metaphors. By means of these metaphors, Shakespeare’s *As You Like It* (I contend) dramatizes doctrinal conceptions consistent with 1590s Anglican theology—as formulated in Hooker’s works. As stated above, to stage human agency in cognition, one must abandon the notion of a unified selfhood directing a will by means of sovereign reason. Accordingly, in a play using facultative rhetoric, both the play’s characters and their sundry interactions may figure facultative processes.

*As You Like It* is an especially appropriate guide to navigation of the issues raised by Hooker’s departures from Lutheran-Melanchthonian thinking, in that Shakespeare’s comedy “answers” *Rosalynde*, a text written circa 1587 by the Catholic Thomas Lodge. As Keir Elam points out, *As You Like It* is notable in that it “is the comedy in which Shakespeare is most consistently and substantially

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64 I follow Sidney’s observation in *An Apology for Poetry* that poetic texts are distinct in that they “nothing affirm”: Shepherd, ed. *Apology*, p. 123.
indebted to a narrative source". That the source in question is an English "literary" work—one only a decade older than the Shakespearean text—further justifies selection of *As You Like It* as lodestar for the present thesis. Interpretation of the play is thus rendered relatively secure via triangulation (a hermeneutic process equivalent to the facultative empiricism recommended by Hooker).

However, *As You Like It* has been selected as the chief study-text for the present thesis for a further reason, relating to the third term in the thesis' title. I will argue that *As You Like It* engages extensively with the question of author-function. Specifically, it will be maintained that the melancholy Jaques figures the author-function in the body of the text.

It will be useful to consider here a recent account of late-medieval attitudes to the location of authority in literary works. The French medieval literary scholar Michel Zink has pointed to the shift in vernacular French fiction in the 13th century away from relying upon fidelity to a previous, authoritative source as vouching for the truth of a newly-written text. Once an ironic stance is adopted towards the evident absurdities of earlier fictions, the claims of a new fiction's authority reside in the author's subjectivity as represented in the text, Zink argues. Notwithstanding the importance of the shift Zink describes, it may be doubted whether this alteration can perform the "invention of literary subjectivity". After all, if earlier sources are, by the 13th century, being derided as

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66 In using the term "author-function" I am obviously influenced by Michel Foucault’s essay "What Is an Author?" (in Paul Rabinow, ed. *The Foucault Reader* [London: Penguin, 1991], pp. 101-20). Certainly, I would concur with Foucault’s statement that “in a civilization like our own there are a certain number of discourses that are endowed with the ‘author function’” (p. 107). However, in that essay Foucault neglects to account for the agency and/or process involved in the "endowing" of author-function. The present thesis offers a means of exploring that question by examining the relationship between the poetic faculty (as referred to by Robert Southwell in a passage discussed in Chapter 3) and the reification of same in the person of an author. Since Foucault pays no heed to facultative rhetoric, this is a point of distinction between the two approaches. For similar reasons, I have chosen to engage with Michel Zink’s more historicized approach to "literary subjectivity" (see below) in lieu of direct colloquy with Foucault’s essay.  
patently fallacious, then that charge will include the imputation that the earlier texts, whether read as spurious inventions or distorted accounts, are likewise the products of their authors' subjective viewpoints. More importantly, any text purporting to represent subjectivity implicitly relies upon the notion of a unified subject, identifiable with the mental processes of that isolated subject. Models predicated on such a notion will tend to regard artworks of all types as "mimetic" in the sense of being representational—that is, derivative—of an objective "reality" (the relationship to Platonism is evident). Indeed, according to Platonism, the human subject itself is a derivative assembly, a distorted reflector and reflection of ideal forms—hence, human subjectivity cannot even perform itself let alone iterate that performance in literary works. The following axiom thus holds: texts operating under the aegis of a rationalistic model of cognition cannot perform subjectivity because subjectivity in itself is not capable of performance. Thus, all texts actually communicate facultatively, whatever their philosophical (or doctrinal) allegiances. (Texts, however, may differ insofar as they acknowledge, suppress or challenge this circumstance.) The notion of the subjective is not interrogated by the alteration Zink describes. However, the nature of the author-function is being interrogated in French 13th-century fictions. The author-figure in these fictions is no longer presented as a scribe but as an ostensible locus of participation in the production of meaning.

The purpose of statements made by the 13th-century (and later) authors discussed by Zink, is, according to that scholar, to provide a link between the present moment of the text's reception and the historical narrative it recounts. Thus, by means of this link, what is being told as happening in the past is performatively enacted in the present when the text is read. However, whether or not the narrative was held to be capable of doing such work would depend on the reader's attitude to the work and, more generally, to the act of reading. The presence and statements of the authorial "I", therefore, are intended to indicate to

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69 Zink appropriately cites Lacan's "mirror stage" to illustrate his point—"appropriately" as Lacan's theory relies on a non-productive notion of identity as a former unity now characterized by lack: Literary Subjectivity, p. 33.

70 Zink, Literary Subjectivity, pp. 30-1.
the reader how the text is to be read. The authorial “I” itself does not determine how the text (how all texts) is (are) read. To re-state for emphasis: the fictional authorial persona stands as a sign indicating that the text as a whole is to be read as happening in the present: the moment of reception. Zink’s 13th-century texts, therefore, perform a fold of author-function onto the narratives which that function ostensibly creates, while itself featuring as a textual element in the texts of those narratives. The author-function thus folds on to the text as a whole and cannot be considered as present only in statements containing first person pronouns. Such statements are rather (and only) conspicuous markers of what the text as a whole does. The purpose of the fold, therefore, is not to enable the performance of fictional “narrative” in the present but, by framing that narrative as potential happening, not inert history, to show that all narrative happens when it is read, despite the (strategic) claims of earlier scribes to be narrating historical occurrences.

It is worth stressing here, therefore, that one should not confuse author-function with the representation of subjectivity in a text, regardless of whether that author-function appears as a narrating “I” or as a distinct heterobiographical personage—a character in the fiction with a name different to that of the author but who evidently bears some notional relation to the author.71

The relation of these issues to As You Like It may most readily be shown by considering relevant aspects of The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia (the “old” Arcadia). This version of Sidney’s romance is prefaced with a letter “TO MY DEAR LADY AND SISTER THE COUNTESS OF PEMBROKE” signed “Your loving brother, Philip Sidney” (3).72 The letter is followed immediately by the commencement of the narrative, which, to start with, may seem, to the modern reader, to be delivered by an impersonal omniscient narrator. For example, introducing Gynecia, but also anticipating her actions in the narrative to follow, the narrator says that the “wound” her virtue suffered “fell more to her own

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71 Zink, Literary Subjectivity, p. 109.
72 All quotations from The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia are from Katherine Duncan-Jones, ed. The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia (The Old Arcadia), by Sir Philip Sidney (Oxford & New York: Oxford UP, 1985).
conscience than to the knowledge of the world” (4). Here the narrator occupies a
place analogous to God’s in having knowledge of the condition of fictional
beings’ consciences. Before long, however, the narrator uses the first person
pronoun (“Basilius, I say” [5]) and also employs the modesty topos, saying that
to describe the former heroic deeds of Pyrocles and Musidorus “is a work for a
higher style than mine” (10). If the narrator is (a) God, his capacities are radically
circumscribed. The narrator, moreover, occasionally addresses his presumed
readers directly, using such terms as “fair ladies” (211)—as Katherine Duncan-
Jones observes: “we can almost picture the young Sidney sitting as entertainer
among a cluster of lively young ladies” (his sister’s “coterie”). What relation,
however, does this version of “Philip Sidney” have to his near-namesake, the
mournful shepherd Philisides, who is included in the narrative itself? Something
more baroque than the 13th-century practice described by Zink is happening.
The narrating “I” of Sidney’s Arcadia folds onto the romance’s narrative but, in
addition, within that narrative, Philisides narrates further woes, implying further
conceptual folds. The fact that Philisides is embedded in the narrative (is himself
an object of the universal narration), however, would indicate that he is in some
sense disqualified from complete identification with the host-text’s author-
function. Since he is “available” for narration by a further-seeing author-
function, Philisides may be regarded as representing the role of fallen sinner (the
role of lacking-subject lacking its object), with a view, perhaps, to the reader’s
mortification.

When a text’s nominal author splits into two in such a fashion, the
enframing author-figure can be regarded, somewhat paradoxically, as both the
father and son of the heterobiographical personage framed in the narrative—the
“father” in that, being “older”, he is able to look back upon errors committed by

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73 Duncan-Jones, Old Arcadia, p. xiii.
74 E. I. Watkin traces the early appearance of baroque sensibility in Italian poetry to Sannazaro’s
Arcadia, one of Sidney’s principal pastoral romance models: Catholic Art and Culture
the younger character and, in doing so, implicitly reprove them; the "son" in that he is, in some sense, the empirical product of that younger personage. Moreover, in narrating the text from a position of authority (claiming to perform the cognition of fictional beings' consciences), the begetting-begotten author-function implies that he has (modesty topos notwithstanding) overcome the cognitive uncertainties of the human condition and become a worthy conduit for the text itself.

This very practice, though, leads one to wonder if the current author-function has indeed reached full maturity. Might not further experience lead to recognition that the "Philip Sidney" narrating this version of the Arcadia is also a fallen being prone, at some point, to adopt a new fixed position from which to judge his earlier version(s)? The presence of the modesty topos indicates an awareness of this quandary on the part of Sidney (and "Sidney"). After all, the subsequent composition of a "New" Arcadia shows that further experience did lead to the formation of an updated "Philip Sidney".

Sidney’s pastoral Arcadias are not the objects of study here—their proximate sources are diverse and multilingual, which renders them less manageable as study-texts for this exploratory thesis. As stated, Shakespeare’s As You Like It, by contrast, has a non-controversially identifiable immediate English source in Lodge’s Rosalynde. Nonetheless, there is a point of resemblance between Shakespeare’s comedy and Sidney’s romance to which I wish to pay particular attention. Shakespeare adds the melancholy Jaques to the scenario of Lodge’s text. Jaques marks the site of author-function in the play, being, like Sidney’s melancholy Philisides, the conventional pastoral author-figure.

It might seem more feasible to describe the narrator as an older brother of the younger character; however, from a subjectivist perspective, in writing the narrative, "Philip Sidney" makes Philisides.


Jaques, of course, is more usually thought of, primarily, as the figure of a melancholic. An early passage in Robert Burton’s *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1st edition: 1621) indicates that melancholy came to be regarded as a characteristic property of the post-Reformation author, whose productions were found in “every close-stool and jakes”. Such melancholy authors claimed the satirist’s (and Lutheran’s) right to pronounce upon the “public good”:

> Out of an itching humour that every man hath to show himself, desirous of fame and honour … ‘though it be to the downfall and ruin of many others’ … they that are scarce auditors, *vix auditores*, must be masters and teachers, before they be capable and fit hearers … They commonly pretend public good, but … ’tis pride and vanity that eggs them on … By which it comes to pass, ‘that not only libraries and shops are full of our putrid papers, but every close-stools and jakes,’ … ‘With us in France,’ saith Scaliger, ‘every man hath liberty to write, but few ability … now noble sciences are vilified by base and illiterate scribblers,’ that either write from vainglory, need, to get money, or as parasites to flatter and colloque with some great men, they put out *burras* … ‘you shall scarce find one, by reading of whom you shall be any whit better, but rather much worse … by which he [the reader] is rather infected than any way perfected.”

Complaints about individuals’ presumptuous willingness to speak had, of course, been made before, but the arrival of printing upped the ante, as Burton’s language indicates. With the greater availability of printed books, students no longer had to “sit at the feet of a … master”. Hence, “they that are scarce auditors”, in Burton’s phrase, could soon appear in print themselves as “masters and teachers”. The number of the “many others” who would experience “ruin” as a consequence of being influenced by the heretical productions of these self-proclaimed teachers was likely to be far greater than the number of those influenced by their medieval equivalents. Burton specifically refers to the commercial aspect of the matter: “not only libraries” but also “shops” are “full of

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our putrid papers”. (Burton urbanely uses the pronoun “our”: as an author appearing in print he is part of the problem.) Checks applied by academic and scholarly process, one infers, were likely to be obviated by printers whose motives included not only the advancement of learning but also the making of a financial profit.81 (Likewise, the “base and illiterate scribblers” described by Scaliger in Burton’s account write not only “from vainglory” but also to “get money”.) The melancholy Jaques’ request for a license to “blow on” whom he pleases in his satire (2.7.49) may, therefore, allude to the Lutheran assertion of a right to pronounce in public on moral matters. The role of print in distributing Luther’s message is well-known; that distribution soon ceased to be under Luther’s control: he did not only “blow on” whom he pleased. His statements began to blow indiscriminately wherever they were printed, and making money was one reason that Lutheran texts were printed.82

Play-texts usually do not have narrators as such, though they often have, as their equivalent, choruses and/or chorus-figures.83 The fold performed by Arcadia, therefore, cannot be exactly duplicated by a play-text, assuming such a duplication was to be sought. However, the baroque performance of fold upon fold can be replicated in other ways. That is, Jaques, as author-function, is (if the pun may be forgiven) Jaques-père, the metaphorical father (creator) of his namesake Jaques de Boys,84 or Jaques-fils, who spends almost the entire notional duration of the play “at schoole” (1.1.5.), that is, at university.85 (Ted Hughes

81 Eisenstein, Printing Revolution, p. 169.
82 Eisenstein, Printing Revolution, pp. 150-2.
84 For names of characters from AYLI, I adopt the spellings most frequently used in the First Folio text.
85 Dusinberre, ed. AYLI, p. 149.n. The location of Jaques de Boys’ “schoole” is a question of interest, albeit Bradleyan. Jaques de Boys’ equivalent in Rosalynde, Fernandyne, “lyues a Scholler in Paris”, is “one that knewe as manie manners as he could points of sophistrie” (137)
observes that “the plain meaning of [Jaques] ... to Shakespeare and his contemporaries was not only Jakes = privy ... but the fact that it was the first syllable of [the dramatist’s] own name”). Jaques de Boys is named in the play’s opening speech (1.1.5) and then utterly forgotten until his arrival in the play’s final scene (5.4.148.sd). Thus, he performs an enframing function comparable to the narrator of the Arcadia. However, as noted, Jaques de Boys is a scholar, or reader, not an author. In other words, what is learned (by fictional persons, readers and audience-members) by experiencing the play is equivalent to what Jaques de Boys learns during the period he spends “at schoole”.

On the other hand, Jaques de Boys is the fictional creation of the play’s author (notionally figured by Jaques-père). Although himself embedded in the “narrative” of the play, the mournful Jaques-père (inverting the relationship of Philisides to “Philip Sidney” in Arcadia) marks the folding of the begetting-begotten “older” version of the author-function onto the text as a whole—but the fold occurs from the middle outwards. Thus, As You Like It literally explodes the subjectivist cognitive model performed by the folding techniques of the Neoapltonist Arcadia. Similarly, John Powell Ward sees Shakespeare “finally getting clear” in As You Like It of the “serene but elongated movement to the right” of Sidney’s Arcadia. By “movement to the right”, Ward denotes the logical cognitive registration of mechanical causation in a narrative, “within which variation of human character, or even spoken presences, could not grow.” As You Like It’s “exploding” of the linear model of identity-formation implies that experience (the result of cognition according to a subjectivist model) is in fact not the property of a “subject” accruing wisdom and moral authority as a result of growing older. As Maurice A. Hunt has suggested, “time in As You

and, according to Saladyne “hath no minde but on ARISTOTLE” (17). All quotations from Lodge’s texts are from Edmund W. Gosse, ed. The Complete Works of Thomas Lodge, 4 volumes (London & New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1966, reprinting Hunterian Club, 1883); each work of Lodge’s therein is individually paginated. Rosalynde is in Volume 1.

Hughes, Goddess, p. 101.
Focussing on gender issues and the character of Rosalind, Barbara J. Bono has also discussed AYLI’s critique of subjectivity: “Mixed Gender, Mixed Genre in Shakespeare’s AYLI,” in Bloom, ed. AYLI, pp. 131-48. See also: Catherine Belsey, “Disrupting Sexual Difference: Meaning and
Like It in a sense never calculated or controlled by the lovers [nor, a fortiori, by any of the other persona] appears to run backward from the present age so as to recover spiritually key moments”. Under such circumstances, cognition cannot be regarded as the volitional attitude a subject adopts towards experience. Rather, experience is the narrative mode of cognition and mood its lyrical mode (hence the humoral emphasis in the treatment of Jaques and other characters in As You Like It). From this it follows that the relative “ages” of human faculties are functions of mood not time. As You Like It’s presentation of facultative, non-linear cognition, therefore, indicates that a sequential notion of time as the essential ground of experience is itself a product of idealist presuppositions.

In any case, it has gone unremarked by scholars that Lodge omits the conventional authorial figure from his pastoral romance Rosalynde. (The status of “Montanus”, who might be taken for such a figure, will be discussed below.) Thus, Shakespeare’s addition of Jaques as author-function invites close attention as part of the play’s response to Lodge’s text. Indeed, this addition is a site of contest between the facultative rhetoric employed by Shakespeare’s text and the dualistic tendencies of Lodge’s romance.

Previous scholars have indeed examined in detail the character of Jaques. Most critics, however, have been content to consider Jaques mainly as a type of the melancholic (though some have quibbled over whether his melancholy is humorally determined or volitional). Such analyses are, of course, relevant to

89 Hunt, AYLI, p. 42.
the present study, not only because of the relation of mood to cognition just outlined, but also because—as has been shown—by the late 16th century, the intellectual faculty’s reliability and relative status had become a matter of dispute. Consequently, melancholy will be treated in the present thesis as a characteristic mannerism of the intellectual faculty reified as the exclusive site of selfhood, not as an emotion.\textsuperscript{92}

Operating within a post-Cartesian paradigm, scholars have tended to examine Jaques in isolation from the other characters of the play, in line with the modern tendency to approach fictional characters as isolated units analogous to “real individuals”.\textsuperscript{93} According to my argument, however, Jaques as melancholic intellectual is a term in the play’s facultative rhetoric. Though Jaques, like one of the radical reformers who opposed Hooker, may believe that his salvation depends upon his \textit{intellectual} capacity to accept Christ as saviour, the play’s rhetoric suggests that the strength of faith in salvation of all members of a given Christian community depends upon the cognitive production of that community as a whole. Previous studies have frequently and usefully considered the treatment of religious themes in \textit{As You Like It} (and will be drawn on accordingly at appropriate moments). However, the notion that discernment of the availability
of salvation is performed by communal means has not been canvassed in

Furthermore, by adding Jaques, \textit{As You Like It} inserts an antinomian marker into Lodge’s scenario in order to demonstrate that the implicit “Catholicism” of Lodge’s romance is isomorphic with \textit{post}-Lutheran schismatic positions. As may be inferred from this, it will not be argued that Jaques represents the play’s author, Shakespeare. It will be recalled that Zink identified in 13th-century French fiction a movement from the citation of one’s source as locus of authority to the assumption of ironic distance from that source. It will also be recalled that this activity became more baroque in the course of the 16th century. \textit{As You Like It}, therefore, I argue, uses Jaques to counter the attempt by Lodge to locate authority in his \textit{text} as a whole.\footnote{Dusinberre has also read Jaques as a figure for Lodge, observing that “Shakespeare often allows into his dramas a figure who speaks with the voice of a writer whose work he has plundered”: Dusinberre, ed. \textit{AYLI}, pp. 81-2. R. Warwick Bond considered Jaques to be “simply Euphues Redivivus”: Bond, ed. \textit{The Complete Works of John Lyly}, Volume 1 (London: Clarendon, 1902), p. 167. Since Lodge presented \textit{Rosalynde} as having been written by Euphues, Bond’s reading supports the current argument that Jaques figures the author-function as Lodge.}  

Richard Hooker, of course, was authorized to speak on behalf of the Elizabethan polity. He had been licensed not to “blow on” whom he pleased but to caution those reformers who, insisting upon their right to debate religious matters in public as individual Christians—self-authorized believers—refused to
observe facultative and civic decorum. Thus, given that *As You Like It* presents a doctrinal and political position comparable to Hooker's, Shakespeare's own right to speak "as author" is brought into question by the play's rhetoric. Hence, I contend that the play adopts an ironic stance with regard to author-function via the character of Jaques.

In sum, doctrinal issues have not only a necessary relation to cognitive theory in the early modern period, but also to the concept of the Christian self as authority. Accordingly, the thesis is concerned with *religion, cognition* and *author-function* not as distinct concepts but insofar as the three terms are interrelated.

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From the foregoing discussion, a reader might suppose that the present thesis intends to read the fictional *persona* of *As You Like It* as allegories of various faculties and/or facultative processes. However, such an assumption would itself be grounded upon the reification of a single faculty (whether the Stoics'/scholastics' intellect or the Melanchthonian "heart") as equivalent to the isolated agent. According to this view, all art is (merely) imitative of a real (objective) world of individuals, objects and concepts that is "out there". Likewise, Melanchthon employs facultative rhetoric, but denies that scholastic terms are necessary for the apprehension of Christian truth. As noted, Hooker's facultative rhetoric differs from Melanchthon's: Hooker's rhetoric is not *merely* rhetoric. For Melanchthon, there is a transcendental reality which rhetoric can be used to bring Christians in this world closer to apprehending, but that rhetoric bears no material relationship to that reality. The question of how any given human producer of rhetoric, according to this model, ever came into contact with that "reality" in order to either apprehend it themselves or become able to lead others towards it is one which expounders of the model tend not to broach (as Pendergast noted with reference to images). Why does anyone in Plato's cave ever turn? Protestants, by way of answer, are obliged to call upon the miraculous
intervention of divinely infused grace. In the Hookerian model, no such dilemma obtains—no miracles are required—because rhetoric *produces* social reality. Human rhetoric *is* grace. Reliable discernment occurs by communal facultative process. Since, for Hooker, “social” is an equivalent term to “human”, the point may be re-stated more radically: rhetoric produces *human* reality. In short, according to this understanding of cognitive agency, the majoritarian discernment of meaning in any text produces that text’s (then-current) meaning. The text as written material object has a human/social meaning when facultatively ratified. Thus, no text can have two meanings at any one time for a given audience, or community—not even for an individual reader, once the latter is apprehended as a facultative assembly. From the perspective of an ontologically valid facultative rhetoric, therefore, allegory as a mode of communication is impossible.

Since this denial of the possibility of allegory as mode of communication has obvious bearings on the manner in which the interpretations of the thesis’ study-texts are presented, Chapter 1 ("The Allegorical Fallacy") briefly examines medieval and early modern formulations of the term “allegory”, suggesting how and why the term came to be applied in place of metaphor and figure. Readers will no doubt be reassured to hear that I do not expect the entire world to stop using the term “allegory” as a result of my argument. Rather, my aim in Chapter 1 is to demonstrate that the concept of “allegory” as a mode of communication relies upon a transcendental notion of a unified, subjective “selfhood” (actually a mask for a reified faculty). Failure to register this circumstance has, in my view, resulted in hermeneutic distortion with regard to the reading of early modern texts.

In Chapters 4 and 6-8, detailed religious readings of *Rosalynde* and *As You Like It* will be presented. Prior to that, however, it will be necessary to demonstrate that religious meanings in seemingly “secular” Elizabethan texts were readily apprehended by their contemporary readers. To do this as effectively as possible I have chosen to analyse, in Chapters 2-3, two short, related texts in their entirety: Sir Edward Dyer’s lyric poem “Hee That His Mirth
Hath Loste" (c.1571-3?) and the Jesuit Robert Southwell’s parody of that piece. Dyer’s poem was not selected for analysis simply because it was of manageable length. Rather, it was chosen as a highly relevant “ancestor” of the Southwell, Lodge and Shakespeare texts. “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste” was one of several Elizabethan “courtly” poems of which Southwell wrote line-for-line parodies during his time spent in England as a missionary priest ministering to English Catholics. Southwell’s parody of Dyer’s poem is usually read as converting a secular poem into a sacred one. However, analysis of the departures of Southwell’s parody from its source will seek to show, in Chapter 3 ("Robert Southwell’s ‘Phancification’ of Dyer’s ‘Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste’"), that Southwell read Dyer’s poem as a religious work in need of doctrinal correction. Prior to that, in Chapter 2 ("Sir Edward Dyer’s ‘Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste’: Author as Minister"), it will be suggested that contemporary lay copyists of Dyer’s poem (members, presumably, of Dyer’s social circle who copied the poem into their personal manuscript miscellanies, adapting it in the process) also read the lyric as a religious work, as shown by the nature of the changes they made in “copying” the text.

As Chapter 2’s title indicates, the poem is relevant to my general thesis in other ways. What tends to go unrecalled with regard to Dyer’s lyric is the massive impact it had upon Elizabethan culture. Dyer was, within the circle of the literate, a well-known writer. For example, Dyer’s lyric is the only English poem quoted in Sidney’s Arcadia, where Dyer is identified as “the loveliest shepherd” (66). Sir John Harington speaks of the poem reverentially in the notes to Book 8 of his translation of Orlando Furioso. Anne of Denmark asked her husband James VI to write her “a Dyer”: a version of—or a poem equivalent to—“Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste”. A version of Dyer’s poem by Fulke

Greville appeared in print as Sonnet 83 in *Caelica* (1633), where the punning authorial reference “*Die er*”\(^9\) is transmuted to “*Greiv Ill*”.\(^{100}\) Ferdinando Stanley, Lord Strange, plays the same game in his version of the poem, “Of His Unhappie State of Life”:


\[
\ldots\) this rivall of my such dispise,  
\text{With much desire shall seeke my name to know;}  
\text{Tell him my lines *Strange* things may well suffice,}  
\text{For him to beare, for me to seeke them so. (ll. 19-22)}^{101}
\]

To pun on one’s own name in this fashion in a lyric was, thus, to avow that one was self-consciously or ironically assuming authority upon the model of Dyer’s poem. The popularity of “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste”, therefore, contributed to an increasing emphasis upon the relationship of the writer’s identity to a text’s ostensible meaning. Hence, when Southwell targeted Dyer’s poem for parody, he set his sights upon a cultural monument in order both to achieve maximum symbolic impact and to interrogate the claims of Elizabethan poets to speak with religious/moral authority.

In the closing stanzas of its longest variants, Dyer’s poem foregrounds its concern with author-function. Having made his long complaint about his neglected and hopeless condition, the poem’s speaker utters an envoy, addressed to his song itself (whereby the status of written text as locus for facultative assembly is invoked):

\[
\text{My songe, if anie aske whose greivous Case is such,}  
\text{*Dy er* thou letst his name be knowne: his folly knowes to much,}
\]


\(^{101}\) May, *Courtier Poets*, p. 371.
But best were thee to hide, and neuer come to light.\(^{102}\)

The association of a presumption to speak on religious matters and too-cognizant “folly” anticipates the author-figure Jaques’ encounter with a manifest (but also absconded) fool in Arden (2.7.12ff), as discussed in Chapter 8.

Dyer’s poem may also bear a particular relationship to Lodge’s *Rosalynde*. In the latter pastoral fiction, the lovelorn shepherd-poet Montanus seems to occupy the conventional role of author-surrogate (Paul Alpers, for example, considers Montanus to be the romance’s “most poetical lover”);\(^{103}\) however, unlike “Jaques” or “Philisides”, the name “Montanus” lacks any evident resemblance to that of the romance’s author. There is precedent for the name in terms of pastoral convention: “Montanus” participates in Boccaccio’s 4\(^{th}\) eclogue,\(^{104}\) while the legalistic priest in Guarini’s pastoral play *Il Pastor Fido* is called Montano.\(^{105}\) In medieval and Renaissance pastoral works, such names tended to be chosen with care.\(^{106}\) Pastoral texts, moreover, had long been held to involve the figural discussion of theological and moral issues.\(^{107}\) Hence, one

\(^{102}\) Lines 77-9 of the version of Dyer’s poem preserved in the Bodleian MS. Ashmole, 781, pp. 140-2. For the full text of this version, see Appendix 1.2.


might also seek precedent for the name “Montanus” in Church history, especially as the historical Montanus was frequently cited in the period as an early Christian heretic.\textsuperscript{108} Montanus’s principal heresy consisted in claiming to speak on behalf of God himself, as though inspired by the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{109} “Montanus” is, thus, a suitable name for a presumptuous authorial figure. As Chapter 4 will show, Montanus’s verse in \textit{Rosalynde} differs in crucial ways from the poetry Lodge offered \textit{in propria persona}. Accordingly, it will be maintained that Montanus figures not Lodge but a Dyeresque poet as \textit{unauthorized} would-be author-function. Complaints voiced in Montanus’s poems closely resemble those expressed in Dyer’s. Indeed, several of Montanus’s poems from \textit{Rosalynde} were attributed to Dyer when reprinted in \textit{Englands Helicon} in 1600.\textsuperscript{110} In \textit{Rosalynde}, religious and moral authority is being lodged (the heavy-treading pun appears to have been current in the 1590s)\textsuperscript{111} in the printed text itself (and not in the authorial “voice”) as a place-holder for (Catholic) ecclesiastical mediation of Scripture. Hence, the text of \textit{Rosalynde} can be regarded as the equivalent of Dyer’s “songe”, to which Dyer’s narrator had attributed authority in a seemingly ironic manner. Dyer/Montanus is thus (I argue) characterized in \textit{Rosalynde} as unqualified to speak with spiritual authority in his poems precisely because he claims to speak on behalf of his \textit{own} authority as mystic wool-gatherer, not on behalf of any religious institution.

As mentioned, Chapter 3 focuses on Southwell’s rewriting of Dyer’s lyric.


There, it will be argued that, in responding to Dyer’s heretical poem in parodic form, Southwell entered the ideological market-place of fictions, and thus risked placing his authority as ordained priest on a level with Dyer’s self-ordained authority as poet. Southwell appears to have soon abandoned the parodic method; this suggests that the Jesuit quickly became aware of that method’s perils. In Chapter 4 (“Thomas Lodge, Robert Southwell and Rosalynde”), therefore, I consider the possibility that the Jesuit missionary sought alternative venues for the out-reach aspect of his literary project (his attempt to sway potential waverers attracted by Lutheranism and its later variants). By guiding and coaching a well-placed lay Catholic writer such as Lodge, Southwell could have arranged for the implicit doctrinal messages of poetic works by lay Protestant authors to be parodied and debunked without compromising his own priestly authority. In addition, works by such as Lodge, wearing the disguise of romance and pastoral conventions, could be commercially printed and reach a far wider audience than Southwell could minister to in person.\textsuperscript{112}

However, I also argue more cautiously that Rosalynde itself provides evidence of the influence of Southwell upon Lodge from circa 1588. Thus, I maintain that Southwell influenced Lodge from a considerably earlier date than other scholars (with the notable exception of Eliane Cuvelier)\textsuperscript{113} have tended to suggest. Such scholars have taken the Lodge of 1596 at his word when he renounced in print the writing of profane literature and committed himself to religious topics.\textsuperscript{114} This scholarly consensus has arisen, I surmise, as a result of the modern tendency to regard texts as neatly divisible into secular and sacred categories.\textsuperscript{115} Nevertheless, the commitment of Lodge’s Rosalynde to Platonism

\textsuperscript{112} For Southwell’s concern about reaching larger numbers of English Catholics, see: F. W. Brownlow, Robert Southwell (New York: Twayne, 1996), p. 11.
has been profitably explored, in particular by Walter R. Davis.\(^\text{116}\) Building on this work, but also extending its conclusions to religious matters, I seek to demonstrate that the Platonism of an Elizabethan text is most usefully discussed in conjunction with attendance to its religious affiliations.

A commitment to Platonism in the early modern period indicates a commitment to a transcendentalist conception of truth. Lodge’s Platonism thus speaks to his commitment to the Catholic ecclesiastical hierarchy as source of spiritual authority. Accordingly, Lodge’s text is presented as not actually having been written by Lodge at all. Rather, it is the “golden” production of Lyly’s Euphues, written “in his Cell at Silexedra” (1)—a tablet from the mystic’s mountain (Lodge’s version is, therefore, a reflection of the ideal world as refracted via Euphues’ reflection in his Platonic cave). The text and not its ostensible author (Lodge) is the locus of authority, as place-holder for the Catholic priests currently in short supply in Elizabethan England. Rosalynde nonetheless invites reader participation through narrative. The reason for this simultaneous insistence upon and relaxation of priestly authority, I argue, is that freedom from passive subjectivity is being offered to English Catholics as a strategic interim measure.\(^\text{117}\) This adroit manoeuvre on the part of Lodge is in turn contested by As You Like It’s retrospective interrogation of the author-function in Rosalynde through the addition of Jaques (the hitherto absent Lodge-surrogate) to the scenario.

By way of preparation for the thesis’ discussion of As You Like It, Chapter 5 (“Southwell, Shakespeare and Lodge”) examines documents relating to possible connections between Lodge, Southwell and Shakespeare. First of all, I consider the epistle poem of Southwell’s Saint Peters Complaynt (1st printed


1595), which is usually read as the Jesuit poet's reproof of the irreligious worldliness of writers such as Shakespeare (who is one candidate for being the "W.S." addressed in the epistle's dedication). However, I argue, Southwell is actually objecting to certain writers' exploitation of religious matters (not the neglect thereof). In addition, I suggest that this reproof may have had some bearing upon Shakespeare's decision to abandon the writing of narrative verse after 1593.

Subsequently, I propose that in Wits Miserie (1596) Lodge repositions himself following the trial and execution of Southwell. Southwell's attempt to reconcile the Roman Church and Elizabethan state had resulted in the Jesuit's prolonged torture and brutal public execution.118 Not only that, but the very techniques for self-exploration which Southwell had arguably introduced to English poetry and prose, as part of the Jesuit's attempt to equip English Catholics for a lack of access to Catholic priests and sacraments,119 had not been scorned but borrowed by writers with different priorities (as Lodge perceived matters)—writers such as Shakespeare. No longer committed to Southwellian appeasement, Lodge, I maintain, attacks Shakespeare in Wits Miserie, referring to the Stratfordian as a heretical "PLAIER Deuil". With these points established, As You Like It emerges as not only Shakespeare's borrowing and adaptation of the Jesuit-influenced religious position outlined in Lodge's Rosalynde, but also the dramatist's answer to Wits Miserie.

Scholarly inattention to the way in which the religious dimension of Rosalynde is bound up with its philosophical tenor has in turn obscured As You Like It's religious valence. Among the plentiful work done on the play's departures from its source, the religious implications of those departures have occasionally been noted.120 However, the contest of rival theories of cognition which informs the texts' differences has not been examined. Accordingly,

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119 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 146.
Chapter 6 ("As You Like It's Religious Revision of Rosalynde") explores alterations the play makes to its main source in order to show how As You Like It engages directly with the religious position—and concomitant cognitive model thereof—of Lodge's romance.

Chapter 7 ("Jaques the Lutheran") argues that the relations between the author-function Jaques and the banished Duke Senior in Act 2 of the play figure and assess the Lutheran critique of papalist Catholicism. As You Like It thus indicates by way of contrast (again, via the pointed addition of the character of Jaques) that the play's source, Rosalynde, adopts a cognitively impotent ("subject") position with regard to temporal authority (whether papal or royal). In addition, the chapter examines the repeated presentation in As You Like It of staggered cognition—that is, the play's tendency to have a character (x) report at length his/her prior observations of character y to characters zz. Analysis of the First Lord's report of his observation of Jaques in Act 2 Scene 1—this being an example of staggered cognition—shows the relationship between the Lutheran hermeneutic "revolution" and prior scholastic/academic developments in cognitive theory.

By figuring author-function as the ineffectual and melancholy Jaques, Shakespeare (I argue in Chapter 8: "As You Like It: a Purge for Neo-classicists") challenges humanist assumptions. Taking into account Luther's privileging of oral delivery of Christian doctrine over printed communication of same, the chapter reads As You Like It as addressing a widespread humanist misappropriation of Luther's teachings. The chapter's first section concludes by suggesting that Shakespeare, like Sir Thomas More, conceived of selfhood as performance involving the discarding of alienated personæ (of which Jaques is an example). Hence, Jaques is not "Shakespeare" (or Lodge or Luther or anyone else) in any biographical sense but a figure for the inauthentic subjective conception of selfhood which underpins the very notion of the "author" and, thus, of author-function.

The chapter's second section offers a close reading of the encounter between the banished Duke and Jaques in Act 2 Scene 7 of As You Like It,
arguing that Shakespeare therein deconstructs Lutheran anti-papal rhetoric. That is, the scene inhabits Lutheran "allegorical" practice in order simultaneously to dismantle and make use of it. Via its presentation of Jaques as Lutheran mis-reader of Scripture, *As You Like It* demonstrates the inadequacy of a subjectivist model of cognition, showing that Christian "truth" is written and read (cognized/produced) on the stage of the world—in other words, in the realm of social experience (as figured by Shakespeare's comedy-in-performance)—not on the printed page.

The reading of *As You Like It* offered in Chapters 6-8 focuses intensely on aspects of the play which relate directly to the thesis' central concerns (religion, cognition and author-function). In the Conclusion, therefore, I consider further aspects of the play which would benefit from being examined in the light of the thesis' findings. In particular, I note that space has not been found for sustained analysis of the characters of Rosalind and Celia. To have explored the figural valence of Rosalind and Celia adequately (that is, in a manner comparable to the Dyer-Southwell-Lodge-Shakespeare sequence pursued here in relation to author-function) would have required detailed tracking of alternative streams of influence, beginning with analysis of the treatment of the character "Rosalind(e)" in *The Shepheardes Calender*. This topic is pondered in the conclusion as an available means of compensating for its omission in the main body of the study.

In addition, while the thesis reads *As You Like It* as staged play as being very much in step with the establishment position presented by Hooker in the *Ecclesiastical Polity*, when the comedy is considered as *reading-text*, the situation might be expected to alter. Again, sustained examination of this aspect of the text was beyond the remit of the present thesis. Thus, the Conclusion also briefly considers some of the implications of the contrast between *As You Like It* on stage and on page.

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Chapter 1.

The Allegorical Fallacy.

This chapter seeks to uphold the claim made in the Introduction that, according to a facultative model of cognition, allegory as a mode of communication is impossible given that facultative assemblies (and not individual subjects, nor the rational intellects thereof) produce meaning.¹ St. Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana is a key reference point in this endeavour. In that work, Augustine equates a properly Christian hermeneutic with charitable reading. Thus, by implicit contrast, Augustine exposes the allegorizing nature of uncharitable “readings”. Hence, it will be observed that, while it is impossible (facultatively speaking) to produce a functioning “allegory”, allegorization nonetheless frequently (indeed, almost always) occurs. To allegorize, in other words, is to “not-read”: to erase/obliterate through writing-over under the aegis of a subjectivist model of cognition, to colonize de facto a text in the name of one’s subjective values and imperialising cultural moment.

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One is often told that allegory “presents one thing in words and another in

meaning". However, to accept this definition would be to inscribe the intentionalist fallacy into every act of communication. To paraphrase Wimsatt and Beardsley: neither readers nor theatre-audiences possess assured access to authorially-intended meaning. Meaning is produced by facultative assemblies, whether those assemblies consist of the members of a theatre-audience or a community of readers, or include the facultative components of a text’s single recipient. Levels of meaning, therefore, are to be regarded as neither inherent in a text nor located in some transcendental realm of ideas. Consequently, the term “allegory” names neither a trope nor a mode of communication (since “it” cannot facilitate communication).


Scriptural exegesis is obviously central to any consideration of the history of the term “allegory” in Western culture.5 Auerbach points out that, for authorities such as Tertullian, typological figures were not allegories.6 Where an “allegory” is held to say one thing but mean another, 

\textit{figura} is something real and historical which announces something else that is also real and historical. The relation between the two events is revealed by an accord or similarity … Often vague similarities in the structure of events or in their attendant circumstances suffice to make the \textit{figura} recognizable; to find it, one had to be determined to interpret in a certain way.7

There are two points to stress here: firstly, Auerbach does not insist upon this process being a matter for the intellect; secondly, the term “determined” indicates that a receiver’s disposition, not the author’s intention, is crucial in the production of figural meaning. Whether receiving disposition is volitional or not is, therefore, a pertinent question. If one believes in free will, rhetoric may co-

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7 Auerbach, “\textit{Figura},” p. 29.
produce gracious consequences in a charitably disposed receiver; if one does not believe in free will, only supernatural grace can effect an equivalent result. (In the Introduction, it may be recalled, I suggested the latter distinction could be made between the positions of Melanchthon and Hooker.)

Auerbach acknowledges that the terms “figura” and “allegory” became interchangeable (with regard to usage) from the 4th century CE onwards. D. W. Robertson, Jr., however, does not uphold the Tertullian distinction between typology and allegory. Discussing Paul’s use of the term “allegory” at Galatians 4:22ff., Robertson, Jr., comments:

The word *allegory* here means, as it does among the grammarians, ‘saying one thing to mean another,’ but the thing said in the first place is also true. The principle involves neither the analysis of figurative language nor the interpretation of a superficially false fable. The things and events described in the Old Testament remain things and events, but they are nevertheless significant *by an allegory*.

Robertson, Jr. here cites the “grammarians” only then to cancel their definition with a “but”. According to Robertson, Jr., the grammarians claim that “allegory” occurs when a person says one thing to mean another; yes, says Robertson, Jr., allegory does mean that but it also occurs when a statement means what it says and means another thing, though the latter meaning may not yet be apparent. Allegory becomes manifest as such with (and as) Christian revelation. Hence, Robertson, Jr.’s account is arguably of a piece with the Christian assimilation of the Hebrew Scriptures. Implicit here is the notion that the events of the “Old Testament” are only “significant *by an allegory*”. This may be true according to Christian orthodoxy, but one is not obliged to accept it from a historicizing point of view. Robertson, Jr.’s dismissal of the relevance of “the analysis of figurative language” is also telling. He thus implies that a clear distinction may

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8 Auerbach, “Figura,” p. 34.
9 Robertson, Jr., *Chaucer*, pp. 57, 190.
10 Robertson, Jr., *Chaucer*, p. 291.
be maintained between literal and figurative language. Such a distinction cannot be upheld in practice; as Saussure demonstrated, all signs are conventional and, therefore, figurative to an extent.\textsuperscript{13}

Furthermore, Robertson, Jr., claims that, in a typological “allegory”, “[t]he relationship between the two elements, old and new, is implied rather than stated, but the spiritual meaning for the individual which arises from their combination is something which can result only from the intellectual effort of the observer”.\textsuperscript{14} As noted in the Introduction, Melanchthonian theology is founded upon Christianity being a matter for the heart not the intellect. Matthew 11:25, moreover, records Christ as praising God because “thou hast hid these things [proofs of salvation] from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them to little ones”. Robertson, Jr.'s disinclination to distinguish between typology and allegory, however, results in a Paul who bases his preaching upon an intellectual process.\textsuperscript{15} Nonetheless, Robertson, Jr. usefully records that “[t]he term allegory is said to have first been used by a grammarian around 60 B.C.”\textsuperscript{16} Paul (or his scribe, or some pseudo-Paul) could be borrowing a grammarian’s Greek term to describe a typological (and figurative) operation.\textsuperscript{17}

Setting aside the philological problem of Paul’s usage as beyond the remit of the present thesis, the burden of my own position is that the Tertullian view is applicable to all figuration (leaving no scope for allegory as mode of communication). However, it is not a case of “imposing” post-Sausserean or

\textsuperscript{14} Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, p. 190 (emphases added).
\textsuperscript{15} For a categorical statement by a theological scholar that Paul employs typology not allegory here, see: Anthony Tyrrell Hanson, Studies in Paul’s Technique and Theology (London: SPCK, 1974), pp. 94-5. Robertson, Jr., moreover, neglects to register the frequent elision of the terms “spiritalis” and “intelligibilis” in early Christian Latin texts; see: de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, p. 140. There is, of course, an important difference between stating that the intellect is necessary for a particular meaning to be apprehended, and stating that a given meaning, once apprehended “intuitively” or spiritually (or, in the present thesis’ terminology, facultatively), can be understood and confirmed by the intellect.
\textsuperscript{16} Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, p. 290.n.13.
post-structuralist theory upon medieval and early modern texts. It is my contention that these issues were theorized by medieval and early modern scholars in a manner consistent with my own position. Augustine, for example, recognised that the Scriptures contain obscurities and apparent internal contradictions. In *De Doctrina Christiana*, the Church Father outlined a practice for handling instances of these:

> Demostrandus est igitur prius modus inueniendae locutionis, propriane an figurate sit. Et iste morum honestate neque ad fidei veritatem proprie referri potest, figuratum esse cognoscas.\(^{18}\)

We must first explain the way to discover whether an expression is literal or figurative. Generally speaking it is this: anything in the divine discourse that cannot be related either to good morals or to the true faith should be taken as figurative.\(^{19}\)

Furthermore, an important distinction may be made between post-structuralist theory and medieval sign-theory such as Augustine’s. Where (for instance) Derrida concedes only the possibility of *différance*, Augustine (on the basis of Matthew 22:40 and 1.Timothy 1:5) identifies “charity” as the defining value of his hermeneutic.\(^{20}\) In reading a text, one’s disposition should be charitable: one thus aims to overcome love of the self by dispositioning the self and attaching one’s love to God. The aim, therefore, is neither to regard the text as a shimmering phantasm whose meaning is forever deferred nor to transform the other (any given text) into a replica or mirror of one’s self. Rather, the aim is to escape the self/other binary in producing a text’s meaning. Thus, Erasmus: “Scripturam divinum non esse detorquendum ad nostros affectus, sed nostrum

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\(^{20}\) Green, ed. *Christian Teaching*, III.XIV.22; Chadwick, ed. *Confessions*, X.3-4; XII.27 and p. 259.n.21; XII.32.
sententiam ad Scripturae regulam emendandam”.

Augustine’s hermeneutic of charity can be (and inevitably was) applied to any type of text. Reading a text charitably, however, is not to “Christianize” it, in the sense of making it consistent with Christian dogma. Rather, to read a text charitably is to be co-translated by it. To produce meaning from a text by, say, Marx, a reader should approach that text charitably. In doing so, there can be no attempt to make Marx’s text conform to Christian teachings. Similarly, adverse (but nonetheless charitable) criticism of Marx’s text would take the form of observing where (if anywhere) it sought to impose its own values upon (in other words, allegorize) a designated other.

Augustine is held to have contributed to the practice of interpreting the Scriptures allegorically. He will have done so where he imposed his own values on texts. Such activity, however, does not (and could not) convert the Scriptures to an allegory. On those occasions when Augustine allegorizes Scripture, moreover, he does what modern allegorists do to (for example) Shakespeare’s texts. That is, when a passage in Shakespeare does not fit with what is currently held to be “realistic” in subjectivist/rationalist terms, it is often emended (allegorized).

In “Interpreting the Variorum,” Stanley Fish characterizes Augustine’s hermeneutic as belonging to the naïve time when Christianity was widely believed in. Fish thus conflates Augustine’s hermeneutic with the Church

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22 Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, p. 296.


Father's belief-position, regarding Augustine's hermeneutic as being aimed towards "forever making the same text". As Robertson, Jr. observes, however, "in spiritual exegesis, there is no such thing as a single definitive interpretation". Moreover, "St. Augustine welcomes the resulting diversity of interpretations". Switching targets, Fish observes that "for at least three hundred years, the most successful interpretive program has gone under the name 'ordinary language'". An editorial note in the 2001 Norton anthology of critical theory, which includes Fish's essay, states that "*[s]trictly speaking, [the 'ordinary language movement'] is a 20th-century movement started by ... Wittgenstein ... though it is rooted in the work of ... Locke". From Locke to Wittgenstein is a long way. It seems rhetorically crude of Fish to state matters in such broad terms, especially as the descriptive and ostensibly pluralist model he eventually offers in place of all previous ones (all of which are to be regarded as prescriptive in contrast to Fish's) turns out to be a determinist one, according to which meanings are produced as a result of one's institutional formation.

It is worth noting here, therefore, that Wittgenstein's theory of meaning actually dissolves Augustine's res/verba binary (a residue of Augustine's Platonic/Stoic formation at odds with his hermeneutic theory). Indeed, for Wittgenstein, logic belongs to exegesis and is not a "thing" (or set of facts) which can be "represented" by language. Wittgenstein's position thus offers a refinement of (post-)Augustinian sign theory arguably more consistent with Christianity than Augustine's overall stance (Christ, the logos, himself figuring the dissolution of the sign/substance binary). Moreover, Wittgenstein's contestation of logic-as-substantive (as opposed to logic-as-exegetical process

25 Stanley Fish, "Interpreting the Variorum," p. 170, in Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard UP, 1990), pp. 147-73.
26 Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, p. 298; see: Chadwick, ed. Confessions, XII.17-43.
27 Leitch et al, eds. Theory, p. 2087.n.
28 Fish, "Variorum," pp. 171-3.
vis-à-vis “reality”) anticipates the present thesis’ insistence that allegory (as opposed to allegorization) is impossible.

The position which Fish suggests is currently dominant would be better described, therefore, not as Wittgensteinian, but as a relatively unreflective “common sense” position, tacitly subscribed to by the intellectual mainstream of modern Western society, according to which signs refer to things—a position which received its classic formulation in Augustine! After all, given Saussure’s demonstration that all signs are fluid, it is difficult to see how a binaristic sign theory can be regarded as dominant in practice at any time. Given the fluidity recorded by Saussure, for communication to occur, any user of a sign-system must place trust in (in other words, must charitably dispose him/herself towards) other users of that sign-system. Wittgenstein’s logical process relies for its social (and scientific) efficacy upon this circumstance. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, Michael Potter notes, “truth and falsity are not internal to a proposition but are different relationships that may hold between a proposition and the relevant feature of the world”.

My point is: deciding which “feature of the world” is “relevant” is the crux of the matter. Communication, according to this model, relies on production of a text’s meaning by its recipient. If “successful communication” is understood to occur when a recipient’s production of meaning is held to bear a satisfactory resemblance to the sender’s notional intended meaning, then successful communication relies on charitable production of meaning (“I knew that was what you meant; I trusted your words and my own comprehension of them”). One can only “know” this has occurred, of course, if the sender declares his/her intention. If data regarding intention is available in the initial text then how can that text be described as an allegory since the text says what it means? If, however, ratification requires that data be supplied in a second text (whether

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33 Bally et al, eds. Linguistics, pp. 67ff.
34 See also: Chadwick, ed. Confessions, VI.7.
spoken or written) regarding intention expressed in a previous text, then how can the first text be said to have successfully communicated its meaning? Even if a communication of “allegory” were intended it would not be possible of achievement.36

Arguments apparently similar to aspects of the present chapter’s position have been made in the past without gaining widespread acceptance. Robertson, Jr., for instance, argued that all medieval texts expressed one meaning (“the concept that the love of God is all-important”) and should be read accordingly.37 My position differs from Robertson Jr.’s, however, in stressing that charity is performed by facultative assemblies, not locatable as an object of subjective cognition within a text. Furthermore, Robertson, Jr. asserted that medieval texts contain a literal meaning and an allegorical meaning, with the charitable message more or less concealed in the latter.

Wishing to persuade on Platonic grounds, therefore, Robertson insisted upon the presence of “deeper meaning” (or “allegory”) in medieval texts. Chaucer’s texts, after all, seem to support such an insistence. The Nun’s Priest, for example, refers to the fruit and the chaff of his text as (apparently) two levels of discourse:

But ye that holden this tale a folye ...
Take the moralitie, good men.
For Seint Paul seith that al that written is,
To oure doctrine it is ywrite, ywis;
Take the fruyt, and lat the chaf be stille.38

Setting aside the priest’s subtle extension of Paul’s meaning to “al that written is”, it is my contention that the “fruyt” of true meaning does not (and cannot)

inhere in a text; rather, such “fruyt” is produced by a facultative assembly (whether understood as located within a single reader or as formed by a community of readers). Likewise, “chaf” is not “objectively” “there” in the text. “Chaf”, too, is produced (in abundance) by facultative assemblies.

The French medieval literary scholar Michel Zink has pointed out that the term allegory was “never used in the Middle Ages [in France] in reference to the Roman de la Rose or works of similar inspiration”; rather, “all its uses in French texts of that period ... refer to the field of exegesis, not that of rhetoric”. That is, the term “allegory” was not used by medieval French theorists to denote a rhetorical figure or a mode of communication; allegoria referred to hermeneutic practice. However, as Zink’s observation implies, confusion regarding the term “allegory” arose from interdisciplinary contests. In Dante’s view, “the theologians take this sense [that is, the ‘hidden’ meaning conveyed by ‘allegory’] otherwise than do the poets”. “What Dante means by this distinction between the allegory of the poets and the allegory of the theologians is not entirely clear[,]” remark the editors of the 2001 Norton anthology of literary theory.

Bernard F. Huppe and Robertson, Jr. are more assertive: “By this distinction [Dante] means merely that the theologians use allegorical in a technical sense to refer to one of the levels of exegetical sentence, whereas poets use it to refer to a rhetorical trope.”

In other words, the theological use of “allegorical” is held to apply to exegesis, not the writing of poetry. One assumes that Dante’s usage derives from the Latin-classical tradition given definitive form by Quintilian and taught throughout Europe in the medieval and early modern periods. Quintilian redundantly included allegory among the tropes. I say “redundantly” because, as Todorov has shown, no adequate distinction can be adduced between the

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39 Zink, Literary Subjectivity, p. 255.n.
41 Leitch et al, eds. Theory, p. 249.n.2.
42 Huppe & Robertson, Jr., Fruyt and Chaf, p. 16.
43 Borris, Allegory and Epic, p. 56; see also: Quilligan, Language of Allegory, p. 29. MacQueen states that Dante was the first to apply allegorical theory explicitly to vernacular literature: Allegory, p. 54.
examples Quintilian supplies for allegory and metaphor. One assumes, therefore, that the term “allegory” had lost its earlier non-rhetorical meaning in its transmission from Greek to Latin culture and had been assimilated to metaphor by the rhetorician Quintilian (or his source[s]) in the interests, perhaps, of inclusiveness. In line with this supposition, Kenneth Borris has noted that “literary theorists” of the Renaissance repeat Quintilian’s definition of allegory but also “often seem in search of formulations much beyond the limits of rhetorical definition”.45

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In the centuries after Augustine, any rigid distinction between sacred and other texts, in terms of truth-value, ceased to obtain. Alanus de Insulis, “recognized as one of Chaucer’s authorities ... considered that his poetry has an aim similar to that of Scripture”.46 In Alanus’s De Planctu Naturae (1160-5?), for instance, Nature observes that “poets present falsehood”.47 However, she also states:

the poetic lyre gives a false note on the outer bark of the composition but within tells the listeners a secret of deeper significance so that when the outer shell of falsehood has been discarded the reader finds the sweeter kernel of truth hidden within.48

The trouble with poets, Nature continues, is that they write as though they do not know that “the dreams of Epicurus are now put to sleep, the insanity of Manichaean healed, the subtleties of Aristotle made clear, the lies of Arrhius [sic] belied”.49 Pagan errors and Christian heresies are here intermixed, one notes, and not presented in historical or hierarchical order. Should poets (in a manner akin

44 Tzvetan Todorov, Symbolism and Interpretation (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1982), pp. 46-7; see also: Fletcher, “Allegory without Ideas,” p. 33.n.16.  
45 Borris, Allegory and Epic, p. 58.  
46 Huppé & Robertson, Jr., Fruyt and Chaf, p. 5; Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, p. 350.  
48 Sheridan, ed. Plaint, p. 140.  
49 Sheridan, ed. Plaint, pp. 140-1.
to Cassius in Shakespeare’s *Julius Caesar* [5.1.76-8]) reject the teachings of the likes of Epicurus and Manichaeus, one surmises, there is nothing preventing their productions from being regarded as legitimate expressions of rational truth and Christian orthodoxy.

In the 14th book of his *Genealogicae Deorum Gentilium* (1360-62), meanwhile, Giovanni Boccaccio claims that true poets work in the same way as the Holy Spirit in composing their works, expressing coherent meaning in a complex integuem for the benefit of well-attuned readers:

Nec sit qui existimet a poetis ueritates fictionibus inuidia conditas, au tut uelint omnino absconditorum sensum negare lectoribus, au tut artificiosiores appareant, set ut, que apposite uiluissent, labore ingeniiorum quesita et diuersimode intellect comperta tandem faciant cariora. Quod longe magi stamen Sanctum fecisse Spiritum unusquisque, cui sana mens est, debet pro certissimo arbitrari.51

In the *Didascalion* (a treatise composed in Paris in the late 1120s which “became the standard elaboration of Augustinian literary theory”), Hugh of St. Victor identifies three orders of meaning, potentially discernible in any kind of text (spoken or written): the letter, the sense and the sentence. He proceeds to state:

that discourse in which the hearer can conceive nothing from the mere telling unless an exposition is added thereto contains only the letter and a deeper meaning [the sentence] ... something else is left which must be supplied for its understanding and which is made clear by exposition.54
In this statement, one may observe that the difficulty of a discourse is not inherent but determined by the hearer’s capacities and/or inclinations. As I understand the case, any “hearer”, regardless of their educational background and “intelligence”, could understand a given text—one which another hearer might find hopelessly obscure—by interpreting it charitably (in other words, via facultative attachment).\(^{55}\)

This observation enables me to differentiate my position from that of Huppé and Robertson, Jr., who consider Hugh’s statement to mean that the reader must make an “intellectual effort” in order to understand medieval poetry.\(^{56}\) This privileging of the intellect is an expression of the subjectivist cognitive model (which identifies the rational intellect with the isolated human subject). From the facultative point of view, meaning is produced by an assembly whose members include sensory receptors and perceptual processors. The disposition of the intellect towards assembled material data is not pertinent to cognition \textit{per se}. However, a fuller exposition of how facultative reception was understood to work may be reserved until Chapter 7, which examines As You Like It’s presentation of that process in action.

Having presented the grounds for my view that the term “allegory” is used fallaciously to denote a mode of communication, the following chapter will seek to register religious meaning in Sir Edward Dyer’s poem “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste”. Since that poem is usually read as a “secular” love lyric, arguing for a religious interpretation might be thought tantamount to reading the poem as a religious “allegory”. The present chapter should have made clear that this is not the case. More importantly for the thesis as a whole, the registration of \textit{non-allegorical} religious meaning in Dyer’s text will be shown to be consistent with the view that the imposition of a sacred/secular binary on early modern texts is

\(^{55}\) John Donne provides a 17th-century witness to this hermeneutic model: “when we speake to godly men, we are sure to be believed, for God sayes it; if we were to speake to naturall men onely, we might be believed”: \textit{Fifty Sermons, Preached by That Learned and Reverend Divine, John Donne, D’ in Divinity, Late Deane of the Cathedrall Church of S. Pauls London} (London: M. F. J. Marriot & R. Royston, 1649), pp. 271-2.

\(^{56}\) Huppé & Robertson, Jr., \textit{Fruyt and Chaf}, p. 20.
invidious. It remains standard procedure for scholars to observe such a binary as though the “religious” and the “secular” are descriptive categories. However, the present thesis holds that the insistence upon the sacred/secular binary is always effectively prescriptive.

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Chapter 2.

Sir Edward Dyer's "Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste": Author as Minister.

Though scholars customarily regard Sir Edward Dyer's poem "Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste" (written circa 1571-3) as a "secular" love lament, the work (I will contend) communicated religious meaning in the period. The extent to which Dyer's poem was praised by contemporary readers has, moreover, puzzled modern commentators. The suggested misreading and the puzzlement go hand in hand, in my view: Elizabethan readers may have valued Dyer's poem for its religious-political discourse and the freedom it gave readers of diverse religious and political allegiances to insert themselves as "speaking subject".

Following a brief biographical profile of Dyer, textual variants of the lyric will here be analysed in order to register potential religious and political meanings of the poem. In addition, the strategic placing of Dyer's text within a sequence of poems in the Arundel-Harington manuscript will be considered as further evidence of contemporary reception.

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1 Ralph M. Sargent suggests the poem was written between 1572 and 1575: the Life and Lyrics of Sir Edward Dyer (London: Oxford UP, 1935), p. 207. Textual evidence and topical arguments (presented below) indicate a date between 1571 and 1573.
3 May, Courtier Poets, p. 64.
Leaving Oxford University around 1561, without a degree, Dyer travelled abroad, pursuing an unrecorded itinerary. Following his return to England, Dyer found employment as a secretary for Robert Dudley, the earl of Leicester. Dyer’s relationship with Queen Elizabeth was, like his patron’s, unsettled; he was himself occasionally “banished from court, most notably around the time of the proposed [Alençon] marriage”. In a letter dated May 11 1573, Gilbert Talbot observed (in Steven May’s paraphrase) that “Dyer had been in disgrace with the queen for the past two years, but was now restored to favour”. The precise reason for Elizabeth’s anger on that occasion is not known. Dyer’s “loyalty was not called in question; rather, some flaw appeared in his judgement or his behaviour”.

Notwithstanding his subsequent reinstatement in Elizabeth’s favour, and despite having been previously dispatched to Holland to negotiate with the Duke of Orange, Dyer stayed at court in 1585 during Leicester’s Netherlands campaign. Dyer, moreover, distanced himself from Leicester following the death of Sir Philip Sidney, having confessed to feeling “some anxiety about his responsibilities” during that earlier Dutch embassy.

In June 1588, Dyer interviewed the alchemists Dee and Kelley in Prague—a rather quixotic occupation to be engaged in while the Spanish Armada was threatening England. May suggests that Dyer “probably bore an informal mandate from the crown” to undertake this journey. The trip’s timing leads one to speculate that Elizabeth may have arranged for Dyer to be absent. Possibly accompanied by Robert Southwell’s brother Thomas, Dyer is said to have spent

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5 Pilarz, Southwell, p. 87.
6 Steven W. May, “Dyer, Sir Edward (1543-1607),” ODNB.
7 Sargent, Dyer, p. 23.
8 May, “Dyer”.
9 Sargent, Dyer, p. 23.
10 May, “Dyer”; see also: Sargent, Dyer, pp. 95-6.
11 Many prominent English Catholics were interned at this time: Christopher Devlin, Hamlet’s Divinity and Other Essays (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1963), p. 51; the Catholic Montague was excused from leading his troops at Tilbury: Richard Wilson, Secret Shakespeare: Studies in Theatre, Religion and Resistance (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2004), p. 21.
time in Prague with the Catholic Elizabeth Jane Weston. Nonetheless, whatever his religious affiliations, Dyer's aura of unworldliness might explain why, despite being awarded numerous decorous positions, such as Chancellor of the Order of the Garter in 1596, Dyer attained no "position of genuine trust" in the Elizabethan administration. He was, however, sent to Denmark in 1589 to monitor negotiations preceding the marriage of James VI to Anne of Denmark.

Writing prior to the development of "revisionist" history, Dyer's biographer Ralph M. Sargent regarded the likes of Dyer, Sidney and Leicester as patriotic Protestants. However, E. G. R. Taylor places Dyer among Leicester and Hatton as possible Catholic-sympathizers. It is worth noting here that Sidney's own religious position has been reevaluated by Stillman, with Sidney emerging as not Calvinist but Phillipist, under the influence of Languet (a disciple of Melanchthon). Other scholars, however, have objected that the modern urge to affix religious labels to early modern individuals results in unnecessary distortion. The present thesis' commitment to the validity of a facultative model of cognition is in accordance with such a view. Identity, according to that model, is co-extensive with facultatively-produced environment.

Concluding his argument for the presence of a "Catholic poetic" in Songes and Sonettes (1557; commonly known as Tottel's Miscellany), Stephen Hamrick states: "We cannot read such figurations of Catholicism [as Hamrick discerns in certain poems in Songes and Sonettes] as a simple index of confessional allegiances, but neither can we reject the possibility that such poems could

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14 Sargent, Dyer, pp. 72, 128, 131
15 Sargent, Dyer, p. 124.
17 Stillman, Sidney, pp. 14ff, 64, 104, 143ff.
express Catholic sympathies”. Given that no authoritative version of Dyer’s poem is extant, and given that I will be arguing that the Elizabethan copyists of Dyer’s poem made alterations in line with their own doctrinal and political views, to speculate upon Dyer’s religious position at the outset might prove prejudicial to the proposed hermeneutic operation. To suppose that Dyer’s position, as individual, must be first outlined so that one can proceed to “understand” the variants of his poem would be to assume an idealist position which tends to treat textual variation as evidence of “corruption”. Nonetheless, Dyer’s own religious position will become relevant insofar as analysis of the variants’ pluralistic witness will describe a situational stimulus to which Dyer, as the nominal “author” of the poem, may be regarded as having had temporal and affective proximity.

That said, it will be helpful to make some general remarks about the religious and cultural situation in which Dyer’s poem and its variants came into existence. In the years following 1558, many Elizabethan subjects, it seems, were prepared to accept the Elizabethan Settlement as an institutional environment in which a Christian Catholic faith could be professed. As the 1560s progressed,

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however, some of those subjects may have become perplexed to find their Church changing around them.\textsuperscript{21} A loyal church-member who deplored such change might seek to withdraw from institutional influence as much as possible. Such an intention is possibly announced by the speakers in some of the non-Southwellian variants of Dyer’s poem discussed below. However, these


\textsuperscript{21} For discussion of the Elizabethan Settlement’s relative capacity to accommodate crypto-Catholics prior to the 1570s, see: Walsham, \textit{Church Papists}, pp. 18-20.
declarations might be regarded as ironic in some or all of these cases. After all, inconsistency in the religious environment in which one ineluctably participates would result (according to a facultative model of cognition) in a tendency to speak not only mournfully but also ironically.

Amidst these ambiguities, the historical record allows one to observe that Dyer, notwithstanding his diplomatic appointments and missions, was inclined to investment in get-rich-quick schemes (such as the Frobisher and Davis expeditions)\(^2\) and speculation in alchemy.\(^3\) This characterization conflicts with the profile of the typical “Calvinist” (drawn by Keith Thomas)\(^4\) as a member of the middling classes who regards material success as the reward for hard work. Herself seemingly uncomfortable with predestinarian doctrines, Elizabeth seems to have been fond of Dyer, perhaps as a fellow Nicodemite.\(^5\)

Regardless of his religious affiliations, Dyer acquired considerable contemporary fame as a poet. Indeed, such was Dyer’s renown as poet during Elizabeth’s reign that his name came to denote the author-function in English post-Reformation culture. James VI’s bride Anne asked her husband to write her not a poem but “a Dyer”.\(^6\) Thomas Nashe referred to Dyer as “our patron, our first Orpheus or quintessence of invention”, as though the court-satellite embodied the very concept of the Poet in a Neoplatonic and Hermetic sense.\(^7\)

(The Florentine Neoplatonist Ficino had been the first to translate the Hermetic

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\(^2\) Sargent, *Dyer*, pp. 40-6, 77.
\(^4\) Thomas, *Decline*, p. 131.
\(^7\) May, *Courtier Poets*, p. 67.
Justin Martyr [110-165 CE] had included Orpheus among the 
prisci theologi—a chain of divinely inspired poets descending from either Moses 
or Hermes Trismegisthus.) As noted in the introduction, Dyer’s “Hee That His 
Mirth Hath Loste” is the only English poem quoted in The Countess of 
Pembroke’s Arcadia, where the poem’s author is identified as “the lovely 
shepherd” (66)—anticipating another “author-function moment”: Shakespeare’s 
nod to Marlowe as “Dead Shepheard” in As You Like It (3.5.82-3). Thus, in a 
culture where the right of poetry to speak on religious matters was contested by 
radical reformers (who, though they insisted on their right to discuss religious 
matters in public venues, also insisted that religious discourse speak plainly and 
not wear courtly dress), Dyer’s implicit assertion of authority in writing poetry 
that addressed religious topics was comparable to his claiming the role of self­ 
ordained minister. Accordingly, the question of author-function as religious 
figure will prove central to the ensuing analysis.

As stated, no authoritative version of Dyer’s much-imitated poem, “Hee That His 
Mirth Hath Loste”, is extant. Dyer appears to have composed the poem at some 
time between 1571 and 1573. The earliest-surviving version of the poem might 
be the one preserved in the section of the Arundel-Harington manuscript entitled 
“Certayne Verses Made by Vncertayne Autors Written out of Charleton His 
Booke” (this version of Dyer’s poem is hereafter referred to as AH)—a section 
which Ruth Hughey says must have been transcribed after 1572. “The 
unidentified Charleton,” May remarks, “was favoured with a text of [Dyer’s]
poem closer than any other to Dyer's original except for its omission, with [the
text of the version in Marsh's Library, MS 183], of lines 53-56.\footnote{May, Courtier Poets, p. 292.} I concur with Hughey's view, however, that the evidence does not allow one to conclude that \textit{AH} more closely resembles Dyer's composition than do the other extant versions.\footnote{Hughey, ed. Arundel-Harington, II.206.} After all, Dyer might never have written down \textit{any} version of the poem. Sargent maintains that Dyer sang his poems at social gatherings.\footnote{Sargent, \textit{Dyer}, p. 9.} It is possible that Dyer altered the lyric at each performance to suit the tastes/inclinations of a given audience.

Despite acknowledging \textit{AH}'s temporal proximity to Dyer's composition, May uses Cambridge University Library MS. Dd. 5.75, ff. 25-5v (CUL) as his copy-text, dating that manuscript's transcription to c.1582.\footnote{May & Ringler, Jr., \textit{Index}, p. 669.} "As copy text, the Cambridge Manuscript requires six more emendations than would \textit{AH} but supplies the four lines missing from \textit{AH} and Ma." May declares: "These three texts [CUL, \textit{AH} and Ma] are far superior to the others."\footnote{May, Courtier Poets, p. 293.} However, analysis below will indicate that May's preference for \textit{AH} and CUL as textual witnesses can be challenged. Certainly, May betrays an idealist bias when he criticizes Sargent's previous selection of Bodleian MS. Ashmole, 781 (ASH) as copy-text on the grounds that the latter is a late transcription and contains "corruptions". May objects that the concluding couplet unique to ASH is in "regular iambic heptameters as opposed to the consistent poulter's measure of the preceding eighty lines. These metrically anomalous lines at the end of one of the most corrupt texts of the poem must be rejected as spurious." I agree that the concluding couplet of ASH is "anomalous", but May makes no clear case for his assertion that the rest of ASH represents "one of the most corrupt texts of the poem". May does observe that ASH and "the [Bodleian] Tanner Manuscript share conjunctive errors at lines 40, 43 and 64"; however, he does not quote these "errors" or explain their erroneous nature. Nonetheless, May plausibly concludes
that ASH and Tanner “are thus derived from a lost intermediary”. Against May’s low opinion of ASH it might be noted that it was Elias Ashmole who bequeathed the collection housing ASH to the Bodleian, Ashmole having acquired portions of John Dee’s “monumental library”. Taylor describes Dyer as Dee’s “closest personal friend”. Indeed, Dyer became the godfather of Dee’s oldest son, Arthur, on 13 July 1579, and, as noted, spent considerable time with Dee in Prague. The 1583 catalogue of Dee’s library shows that “it housed between three and four thousand printed books and manuscripts ... universally encompassing every aspect of classical, medieval and Renaissance culture”. It is at least possible, then, that Dee possessed a copy of Dyer’s popular poem, recorded in ASH. Regarding (with Sargent), therefore, ASH’s claims as comparable to those of May and Hughey’s copy-texts, CUL and AH, in the interpretation offered below I synthesize the witness of these three variants.

As stated above, instead of supposing an ideal authorial version of Dyer’s poem, I prefer to posit a situational stimulus. Rhetorical consistency might then indicate a variant’s relative proximity to that stimulus, whereas local content which seems at odds with a text’s rhetorical tenor might be viewed not as evidence of “corruption” but as the result of interventions by agents who presuppose less need to maintain rhetorical consistency than the scribes of the source(s) they adapt.

38 May, *Courtier Poets*, p. 293. There are two further branches in the stemma: the versions in British Library, Harleian MS 6910, Huntingdon Library, MS HM 198, volume 2, folios 43-5 and *Poems of Pembroke and Rudyard* (1660; the first printed version) “descend from a common original”: May, *Courtier Poets*, p. 292; Bodleian, Rawlinson poet. MS 85 and British Library, Harleian MS 7392(2) also share “errors in common”: May, *Courtier Poets*, p. 293.


43 In a private email, October 16 2011, Steven W. May states that ASH was transcribed c.1620-31 and points out that ASH is currently inaccessible due to the condition of the manuscript.

Before discussing the three variants, it is necessary to offer a brief summary of the poem’s narrative (as neutrally as I can manage) in order to orientate the reader. The speakers in the variants discussed below alike insist that they remain faithful to the woman who has betrayed their trust in some undisclosed manner (AH 47-8, 55-6; ASH 47-8, 53; CUL 47-8, 59-60).\(^4\) The speakers announce that they will henceforth live in seclusion (AH 59-60; ASH 63-4; CUL 63-4); worms will be their only food (AH 61; ASH 65; CUL 65); they regard their after-life prospect as involving damnation (AH 67; ASH 71; CUL 71).

With regard to the question of the poem’s overall tone, a useful point of agreement with May lies in our both finding the “worms” detail hyperbolic.\(^4\) Quilligan has suggested that “the absurdity of the surface of a text is the necessary signal for the existence of allegory”.\(^4\) I would prefer to say, following Augustine, that apparent absurdity indicates figuration. This does not mean that the “worms” necessarily figure some other diet; after all, irony is a figure. The hyperbolic detail might, for instance, be a clue that the entire poem is ironic: the speaker is overdoing it; the “woman” addressed might be imagined as rolling her eyes.

Of course, my would-be neutral summary of the poem might seem intended to suggest that the poem has a “religious” message, given the final emphasis on damnation. Conversely, the poem’s ironic tenor might indicate a worldly ambivalence vis-à-vis religion or, at least, scepticism towards the possibility of religious faith being capable of sincere public expression. In any case, I resist applying a secular/sacred binary to the poem; that is, in line with Hamrick’s approach, I do not suppose that the poem is either a secular love poem or a figurative religious poem.\(^4\) Regardless of Dyer’s own religious affiliations (or those of his copyists), the poem is post-Lutheran. An important aspect of the Lutheran challenge to the Roman Church was the protest against the Church’s

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\(^4\) For the full texts of AH, ASH and CUL, see: Appendix 1.1-3.
\(^4\) May, Courtier Poets, p. 55.
\(^4\) Quilligan, Language of Allegory, p. 28.
\(^4\) Hamrick, “Tottel’s Miscellany.”
ostensible commitment to dividing human society into clerical and lay sectors.\textsuperscript{49} It became a reformist position that no such external division actually obtained in Christian society. The Roman Church could argue in return that the clerical/lay divide had (and could have) only ever been a formal scheme (as pre-Lutheran reform-minded Catholic texts had more than hinted).\textsuperscript{50} Accordingly, it seems anachronistic of textual scholars such as May and Ringler, Jr. to categorize Elizabethan poems as \textit{either} secular or sacred (as they do in their \textit{Index}), when precisely that binary had ceased to be touted as legitimate by post-Reformation Europe (notwithstanding continued commitment to that binary by conservative elements). Of course, texts continued to be referred to as more or less devotional, moral, immoral and so on. Conservative post-Reformation commentators might insist on referring to texts as either sacred or worldly; this does not justify modern scholars' unquestioning retention of those default settings. A point I wish to stress, therefore, is that all texts can be read as participating in a flesh-spirit dialectic, without transhistorical imposition. (Indeed, as noted in the Introduction, it might be suggested that to read post-Lutheran texts otherwise does involve transhistorical imposition.) The poles of that dialectic are \textit{not} isoconceptual with the externalized (institutional) categories of sacred and secular.\textsuperscript{51} Accordingly, I propose reading the variants of Dyer's poem as participants in the flesh-spirit dialectic.

In any case, it is known that at least one contemporary reader regarded Dyer's lyric as being concerned with matters beside the erotic. Sir John Harington refers directly to Dyer's poem in the notes to his translation of \textit{Orlando Furioso} Book 8. Speaking of "the Allegorie" of Ariosto's text, Harington focuses on "these impediments that disturbe men in their good


Harington’s remark speaks to a central issue of Dyer’s poem: the extent to which one’s fortunes in the world function as reliable signs of one’s spiritual condition. Harington figures worldly impediments to one’s “good course” as “owls”. An owl appears in Dyer’s poem: “the shreekinge owle” is to be the dejected one’s “clocke” (AH 64). Harington observes that such owls may be “driven away with the sunne shine” and refers to Dyer’s poem in the following comment:

for the light of understanding and the shining of true worthiness, or (as M. Dyer in an excellent verse termeth it) the light that shines in worthines, dissolveth and disperseth these ... impediments, that let [that is, obstruct] a man in his journey to Logestillas Court, that is to the court of vertue, of temperance, of pietie, where all good lessons are taught.

As Hughey remarks, Harington’s comments “reveal the philosophic significance which the poem might have for an Elizabethan reader”. Philosophical, yes, but, given the explicit reference to “pietie”, religious also. Moreover, since Dyer acted as Harington’s guardian in the early 1580s, the latter man may be regarded as a well-informed reader of the poem.

A final point: Dyer’s lyric was arguably produced/altered in the copying to suit the religious and political positions or semi-public “fronts” of its copyists. Given this state of affairs, it might be wondered why one should continue to refer to Dyer in particular as the author of “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste”. The principal answer is that the poem’s contemporary readers (Southwell—or his

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52 Hughey, ed. Arundel-Harington, II.207.
53 Hughey, ed. Arundel-Harington, II.207.
54 Screeching owls feature prominently in the well-known Tudor ballad “A Lament for Our Lady’s Shrine at Walsingham”. The poem is usually read as expressing Catholic nostalgia. Philip Schwizer, however, has argued that the poem was written by a newly-converted Catholic with a Protestant formation: Archaeologies of English Renaissance Literature (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), pp. 84-92. For the “Lament,” see Robert S. Miola, ed. Early Modern Catholicism: an Anthology of Primary Sources (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), pp. 172-3.
55 Hughey, ed. Arundel-Harington, II.207.
56 Hughey, ed. Arundel-Harington, II.207.
57 Hughey, ed. Arundel-Harington, II.207.
58 Sargent, Dyer, pp. 74-5.
copyist—included) invariably ascribed the work to Dyer. Thus, whether Dyer (first) wrote the poem or not, the lyric participates as “a Dyer” in the development of the author-function in Elizabethan culture.

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At the outset, the reader of Dyer’s poem learns that its protagonist is unhappy because his “faith is scornd” (ASH 2). Furthermore, the speaker’s existence is not outwardly unhappy: he is obliged to wear a mask, being “one that lives in shew, but inwardly doth dye” (AH 13). However, the protagonist insists that he is not dismayed by the prospect of the body’s death for that “mak[es] free the better part” (CUL 10). This statement is consistent with Florentine Neoplatonism, which tended to treat the body as inferior to the spirit, notwithstanding the value it awarded to the physical as a means of access to the spiritual. In any case, Dyer’s speaker then specifies that the type of death he dreads is “of the mind” (ASH 11)—that is (from a Neoplatonic perspective), it relates to the soul. The influence of the late-medieval recovery of Aristotle is evident. Late-medieval Christian scholars seized upon Aristotle’s apparent identification of the active intellect as the only human faculty capable of surviving separation from the body. This understanding appears to inform the selection of the word “mind” here in Dyer’s poem where, according to more modern conceptions of Christian dualism, one might expect to read “soul” or “spirit”. It is important to stress, therefore, that the equation of “mind” with “soul” represents a Neoplatonic-Christian (or Averroistic) distortion of Aristotle, who, on the contrary, held the soul to be the form of the body. Thus, the anguish expressed by Dyer’s lover may be at least partly attributable to category error (“fancy” in the parlance of the period) resulting from philosophical-religious misalliance.

59 Sargent, Dyer, pp. 205, 208.
60 Fowler rightly says that “the single orthodox Neoplatonic system ... has never had a real existence: differences, even between the systems of Pico and Ficino, obstinately divide the parts of the chimera”: “Neoplatonic order,” p. 78.n. Nevertheless, the “system” is called Neoplatonism for a reason.
61 Augustine’s view, by contrast, while also influenced by Neoplatonism evinces its priority to the Averroistic distortion of Aristotle: Chadwick, ed. Confessions, IV.25; X.40.
Be that as it may, superlative pain is experienced by the speaker of ASH. A large part of that speaker’s anguish appears to be due to an obligation to hide most of this pain behind a mask of apparent well-being:

my death is of the mind,
Which always yeelds extreamest paines, yet keepes the most behind:
As one that lives in shewe

AH’s reading is softer:

my greefe ys of the mynde,
Which allw ays yeeldes extreamest payns, but leaves the worst behind.
As one which lyves in showe [...] (11-13)

If, as I have suggested, the “mind/mynde” here is equivalent to the soul, there might be much difference between “death” and “greefe”—as though AH’s protagonist is incapable of having true (spiritual) insight into what is in store for him. Moreover, where May perceives “corruptions” in ASH, I would draw attention to AH’s arguably nonsensical “leaves” as compared with ASH’s “keepes”, which is cogent in combination with the notion of living “in shewe”.

The full stop after AH’s “behind” (found also in CUL) results in syntactical breakdown, as the following “sentence” lacks a subject (13-16). CUL reads:

my death is of the mynd,
Which always yeldes extremest pangues but keepes the worst behind.
As one which lyves in show […] (11-13)

Here, the full stop after “behind” renders less precise the meaning of “keepes”. This conclusion might seem to rely too much on the secure registration of a
scribal colon and two full stops (or haphazardly to apply modern punctuation conventions to early modern manuscripts). The reader is invited to consult lines 1-16 of Appendix 1.3, noting the relative syntactic regularity of lines 1-12. In marked contrast, the “sentence” in lines 13-16 is incomplete. ASH, on the other hand, maintains syntactic regularity at least until line 40.

An early modern colon could either mark a pause or suggest that a balancing phrase is to follow of equal importance to the phrase which went before. Thus, I would suggest that when the material presence of the colon in its 12th line is acknowledged, ASH implicitly attributes free will to its speaker: he chooses to keep the majority of his pain hidden behind a mask of well-being (but just for safety’s sake, employs a simile-construction). In CUL it is the speaker’s “death”—his spiritual condition—which “keepes the worst behind”. This version not only refrains from ascribing free will to the speaker but also implies that no matter how great his current suffering may be, the lover’s situation in the afterlife will be far worse. According to this interpretation, AH and CUL adopt an ironic (and judgemental) attitude towards their own protagonists. Conversely, ASH appears to sympathize and, therefore, identify with the speaker’s predicament. Given that AH and CUL’s intervention has resulted in syntactic breakdown, moreover, it might be suggested that ASH is a better witness to the situational stimulus of Dyer’s composition.

In line 15, the speaker employs religious imagery, speaking of himself as one “Whose hart the alter is, whose spirit a sacrifice” (CUL). This is reminiscent of the “Catholic poetic” Hamrick has detected in many poems from Songs and Sonettes. Catholic ritual is reassigned a location in the body of the lover. On the other hand, such language is also characteristic of, say, Calvin’s Institutes. Thus, Hamrick’s reluctance to regard such acts of figuration as reliable indices of

62 As transcribed by Hughey, AH is less consistent, with lines 5-6 and 7-8 being incomplete “sentences”.
64 Hamrick, “Tottel’s Miscellany.”
65 Beveridge, ed. Institutes, III.3.16.
a speaker’s confessional allegiance is to be commended. As Hamrick argues, by such figuration, the speakers in these poems seem to be exploring religious questions in a perilous religio-political climate in the relative safety of ostensibly “secular” love poetry.66

CUL’s protagonist reveals that the “sacrifice” in question is being made “Unto the powers whom to appease no sorrow may suffice” (16). This might seem to be the standard indictment of the Petrarchan beloved as cruel mistress—one whom no amount of suffering can induce to relent. But the cruel “one” in Dyer’s poem is pluralised—and capitalised in ASH—as “the Powers”: the lover thus indsicts a corporate assembly. Possibly, these “Powers” are the holders of political power.67 No amount of “sorow” can appease such beings.

Identifying “the Powers” becomes somewhat easier when Dyer’s speaker begins to apportion blame for his current predicament. The protagonist’s “thoughtes” are compared to Troy: “the town that Sinon bought and sold” (ASH 20). Comparable references to Troy occur in Songs and Sonettes.68 However, Sinon—a classical figure of non-erotic treachery—appears out of place in a lover’s complaint; a reference to Helen’s career might be thought more fitting. Both “Troy” and “Sinon” also feature prominently in Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucrece, wherein Sinon again takes priority over Helen. After a two-stanza reprimand of Helen,69 the character of Sinon is discussed at much greater length as part of Lucrece’s musings on the Fall of Troy (1501-68). Like Dyer’s suffering speaker, Lucrece associates herself with the doomed city (“my Troy did perish” [1547]). John Klause suggests that Lucrece identifies the “Sinons” of the

66 Hamrick, “Tottel’s Miscellany.”
67 For the implications for Protestant resistance theory of Luther’s awareness of Paul’s usage of the plural term “powers”, see: Bainton, Luther, pp. 381-2.
68 See, for example: Henry Howard’s “The Louer Comforteth Himself with the Worthinesse of His Loue,” ll. 7-24 (p. 20) and “Complaint of a Diying Louer Refused vpon His Ladies Injust Mistaking of His Writynge,” ll. 52 (p. 23): Nicolas Grimald, ed. Songs and Sonettes: Written by the Ryght Honorabale Lorde Henry Howard Late Earle of Surry, and Other (London: Richard Tottel, 1557). Page numbers refer to a facsimile edition (Exeter: Shearsman Books, 2010).
world as “smiling villains in high places” (99). Similarly, Dyer’s “Sinon” could figure those who have “bought and sold” the poem’s protagonist with unfulfilled offers of career advancement.

Around the time of the composition and reception of Dyer’s poem, “Sinon” functioned as a by-word for internal enemies of the Elizabethan regime’s true religious and political interests. After a more aggressively Protestant policy became “obtrusive” in Elizabethan England, what has been termed the first Catholic political pamphlet A Treatise of Treasons (1572) appeared, arguing that “the real traitors in England were ... the two ‘Synons’: William Cecil and Nicholas Bacon”. Thus, just as the crafty Sinon had persuaded the Trojans to lower their guard and allow in a foreign religious device, so had Cecil and Bacon encouraged Elizabeth to distance herself from the conservative nobility and orthodox Christianity. Given the poem’s probable date of composition, it is scarcely credible that Dyer’s Sinon would not have been taken as an allusion to Cecil (and Bacon). On the other hand, like his patron Leicester, Dyer seems generally to have harmonized his actions with Cecil’s policies. Indeed, Sargent notes that while Dyer was acting as Leicester’s secretary, he was working as an agent for Burghley. Stephen Alford has persuasively argued that previous scholarly apprehensions of Elizabethan political factionalism, with, for instance, a Leicester faction competing against a Cecilian faction, have been too schematic. Arguing from such a schematic factionalist viewpoint, one could maintain that Dyer, in this poem, is implicitly praising Leicester’s upfront, old-fashioned loyalty, as against Cecil’s self-interested and more devious approach to politics and religion. Such an argument would assume that Dyer’s poem is either a sincere expression of its author’s personal views and/or a (dangerously) partisan production. Given the rhetorical sophistication of the Elizabethan period,

neither interpretation seems especially plausible. The question then remains: why would Dyer include a punning signature in a poem which appears to perpetuate the association of Cecil with Sinon?

It has been suggested that Dyer is the “Volcatius” Lodge describes in “Satyre, 5” of A Fig for Momus (1595) as having been “laught in court” in the 1570s, having “subborn’d, devis’d and wrought / To worke out Themis [Sir Christopher Hatton], from the place he sought” (50). The “Themis” identification remains under-substantiated; however, reading “Volcatius” as Dyer seems reasonable, given the poem’s statement that Volcatius “wept his follies to a woodel skreene” (50). Setting aside the line’s intriguing suggestion of a confessional box, Dyer is thought to have sung his own “The Songe in the Oke” to Queen Elizabeth from within an oak tree at Woodstock in 1575. On the other hand, Lodge operated at some remove from the court, and thus was obliged and possibly willing to tailor gossip in compressed poetic format. After all, it would appear that Hatton became a friend of Dyer’s. Nevertheless, around May 1573, Leicester and Burghley—working together—are said to have sought to replace Hatton with Dyer in Elizabeth’s favour. Hatton received a copy of A Treatise of Treasons while recovering from illness in Antwerp in 1573. The letter accompanying the book, signed “T.G.”, asked Hatton “to deliver this warning book to Elizabeth and assumed that he was of the Catholic faith, mentioning that he had been baptised in that religion.” Prudently, Hatton passed the letter on to Burghley. Synthesizing these details, one could construct a scenario whereby Leicester commissioned Dyer to ventriloquize Hatton’s compromised religious position in a poem. Read thus, “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste” is a dramatic

74 Sidney H. Atkins, “Dyer at Woodstock,” TLS, February 3 1945, p. 55; Cuvelier, Lodge, p. 356. A Fig for Momus is in Volume 3 of Lodge’s Works. For Atkins’s arguments that portions of A Fig for Momus were written in the late-1570s, see: “George Stoddard,” TLS, January 18 1934, p. 44; “Lodge’s A Fig for Momus,” TLS, August 16 1934, p. 565; “A Fig for Momus,” TLS, February 7 1935, p. 76.
75 Sargent, Dyer, pp. 29-34.
76 Vines, Hatton, pp. 25-6.
77 Vines, Hatton, p. 27.
78 Vines, Hatton, p. 29.
monologue, as spoken by a repining English Catholic. Dyer seems to indict himself by including his own name in the poem’s envoy, but also thereby protects himself from accusations of malice (while actually writing under Leicester’s protection). Since Cecil was working with Leicester in the supposed effort to replace Hatton with Dyer, he would be privy to the undertaking. Though extremely speculative, this hypothesis does, at least, offer an explanation for Dyer’s otherwise perplexing decision to attach his name to a poem attacking a “Sinon” around the time of the publication of A Treatise of Treasons.

Such a sinister interpretation of events would not disqualify Dyer from himself having Catholic sympathies or leanings. It was precisely such sympathizers who were recruited by Cecil et al to perform tasks involving adroit communication with Catholics. For example, the Catholic Montague (whose 1559 speech to parliament anticipated basic arguments of A Treatise of Treasons) undertook diplomatic missions to Catholic states on behalf of Elizabeth’s regime, and moderates such as Thomas Sackville were employed by Cecil for dealings with English Catholics. With or without its author’s complicity, Dyer’s poem could even have functioned as a window into the souls of readers who appeared to identify with the poem’s stance. Indeed, the poem, with its emphasis on suffering and pain, could be regarded as a virtual torture device. Copying it, quoting it or expressing admiration for it, one confesses religious secrets. Again, this scenario may sound implausibly Machiavellian, but an anonymous English court memorandum of 1586 recommends the following behaviour to spies being sent to Spain:

He [the spy] is to yeilde himself, as it were, under shyfte to have advice and goastlie counsel, alleging a malcontentednesse in hym with repyninge at his present fate: being desirous, if it might please sweet Jesu, for his deare mother’s sake, to gain some friends

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80 Questier, Catholicism and Community, p. 123.
81 Questier, Catholicism and Community, pp. 140ff.
82 Pollen, English Catholics, p. 81. See also: Pritchard, Catholic Loyalism, pp. 58-9.
for his better access into foreign parts and Catholike countries, there to pass the tyme with the quiet and comfort of his conscience and in the causes of his poor distressed countrymen.  

The spy, in other words, is to behave like the speaker in the “Dyer”. The memorandum postdates the composition of Dyer’s poem, of course, and it is possible the poem’s career suggested the strategy, rather than vice versa. In any case, the subsequent history of Dyer’s poem suggests that such a procedure could easily be thwarted by readers and copyists treating the poem in an ironical fashion—that is, in a manner which turned the poem’s latent confession of guilt back upon the author and the regime for which he might have been perceived to speak.

Leaving these speculative matters, I return to the material witness of the variants of Dyer’s poem. Line 21 of both AH and CUL refers to their respective protagonist’s “mortall fall”, where ASH reads “mortall foe”. Again, I would suggest that AH and CUL appear syntactically problematic here. In both versions, the “Whom” of line 22 (“Whom love and fortune once advanced but now have cast away” [CUL]) lacks an antecedent. (Hughey notes that line 22 in AH is “written over an erasure”.) ASH’s reading, meanwhile, leads one to suppose that the “mortall foe” is the one “Whome love and fortune once advaunced and now hath cast away”. In other words, the lover himself is his own “mortall foe”. Doctrinal matters may have influenced these readings. Alexandra Walsham has observed that, regardless of the greater complexity of Calvin’s own position, Reformist understanding of Providence in Elizabethan England often regarded worldly success as a sign of spiritual election. If he were to accept such a framework, the poem’s speaker could regard his fall from fortune’s favour as a sign of his being predestined to damnation. Thus, a Catholic (or gnesio-Lutheran)

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85 Walsham, Providence, pp. 10-32, 69-87, 332-3; see also: Thomas, Decline, p. 130; Beveridge, ed. Institutes, I.16.2; Weber, Protestant Ethic, p. 114.
becomes his/her own foe when interpellated by supralapsarianism. According to Article 17 of the Church of England’s Thirty-Nine Articles (“Of Predestination and Election”), it was always going to happen that way. Article 17’s description of the condition of those conscious of their damnation is similar to the predicament of Dyer’s narrator: “for curious and carnal persons, lacking the Spirit of Christ, to have continually before their eyes the sentence of God’s Predestination, is a most dangerous downfall, whereby the devil doth thrust them ... into desperation”. The phrase “to have [one’s sentence] continually before their eyes” finds an equivalent in Dyer’s poem: “still [that is, continually] before my face my mortall foe [or ‘fall’] doth lay” (ASH 21). The “foe” or “fall” is here read as “mortall”, being a sign of the “carnal” one’s predestined damnation.

Though this reading makes grammatical and polemical sense, it seems strained. If this is the poem’s message, it is expressed with a lack of clarity which is uncharacteristic of the poem as a whole (especially ASH). It is possible that the lost version May detects behind ASH bore plainer witness to the poem’s situational stimulus. That said, it may also be observed that none of the three versions makes better sense in this respect when read as “secular” love poem. The obscurity of lines 21-22, in other words, arguably results from a doctrinally dangerous statement having been removed or altered.

In a more defiant vein, Dyer’s protagonist suggests that his predicament is more the result of human injustice than divinely ordained destiny: “Forsaken first was I, then utterly foregotten, / And he that came not to my faith, lo, my reward hath gotten” (ASH 39-40). These lines could be taken to imply that it is not God’s inscrutability that decides who is to number among the elect (in this life) but rather the ability to conform to worldly values. The speaker thus presents professors of the politically expedient faith (pragmatic Protestantism) as

86 Lindberg, European Reformations, pp. 38-9; see also: Cummings, Grammar and Grace, p. 291. For the Elizabethan reception of supralapsarianism and predestinarianism, see: Alison Shell, Shakespeare and Religion (London: Methuen Drama, 2010), pp. 180-1.
ambitious dissemblers who will espouse whatever doctrines circumstances
require.

A hostile attitude to predestinarian doctrine could also explain the pointed
reference by Dyer’s speaker to “grace reserved” (AH, ASH & CUL 44), which,
combined with a reference to “secret thankfulness” (CUL 43), might be read as
targeting the God of predestinarian doctrine as an ingrate: such a God accepts his
worshippers’ prayers but offers nothing in return. According to this possibly
hostile witness, the more abject Protestantism inclines the believer to become, the
more aggressive he or she is forced to be in trying to obtain signs of election
from a taciturn deity.

This note of accusation notwithstanding, the speaker appears willing to
come to terms with predestinarian doctrine. A sophisticated understanding of the
political need to mask one’s religious faith is demonstrated. Against this reading
of the poem as a public demonstration of political cunning, though, it might be
objected that the text was not intended for publication; rather its intended
audience was a presumably sympathetic coterie. However, the poem is
conspicuously coy about its entry into the public domain. Its speaker-as-author,
for example, feigns a desire for anonymity:

My songe, if anie aske whose greivous Case is such,
Dyer thou letst his name be knowne: his folly knowes to
much,

But best were thee to hide, and noever come to light.

(ASH 77-9)

In AH, the speaker’s folly “shews to muche” (74; CUL’s line 78 is similar).
Whatever the wording, the fact that the poem is extant shows the
disingenuousness of the injunction. The obvious inclusion of the poet’s name
(“Dyer”) indicates that the desire for anonymity is incomplete. Regarding such
instances, Jonathan Crewe remarks:
conflicting wishes for privileged insidedness and for extended family influence attained through publicity would necessarily result in an attempt to have it both ways: to hide and reveal the secret at the same time; to let the right outsiders become insiders.\(^8\)

The common identification of Dyer as the author of “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste” would seem to corroborate this assessment.

With that point established, it would be as well to consider how “conciliatory” Dyer’s poem appears to be. Of particular note in this regard is the observation: “O fraile vnconstant kynd, and safe in trust too noe man! / Noe women angels are, and loe, my mystris is a woeman” (ASH 47-8; CUL and AH offer similar readings).\(^9\) If the poem is read as an Elizabethan courtier’s (secular) complaint concerning lack of promotion, the implication that the speaker’s beloved—whether or not she is Elizabeth herself—is not only “fraile” but “vnconstant” because she is female would do little to improve that courtier’s career prospects. Furthermore, the poem possibly thus indicates that a particular woman had previously been adopted as a female intercessory figure, comparable to an “angel”.\(^9\) If that female figure is Elizabeth, then the patent injustice of her administration has revealed the queen to be thoroughly mortal. Nevertheless, if the queen were to restore Dyer’s protagonist to favour, she would not only perform tacit agreement with his criticism of doctrines which tend to refuse efficacy to intercessors, but also perform efficacious intercession in thus rewarding his constancy and virtue. The survival of the poem and Dyer’s eventual readmission to the Court might indicate that something like this indeed occurred. As Gilbert Talbot wrote, in the May 11 1573 letter previously-quoted, the banished Dyer informed the queen that he was mortally sick and “unless she


\(^9\) A version of the latter clause of the latter line is the phrase quoted in Sidney’s Arcadia (66).

\(^9\) Elizabeth’s function as intercessor is more explicitly advertised in: Thomas Bentley, The Monument of Matrones Containing Seven Severall Lamps of Virginitie, or Distinct Treatises; Whereof the First Five Concerne Praier and Meditation: the Other Two Last, Precepts and Examples, as the Woorthie Works Partlie of Men, Partlie of Women; Compiled for the Necessarie Vse of Both Sexes out of the Sacred Scriptures, and Other Approoved Authors (London: H. Denham, 1582); Bentley “confers upon Elizabeth the ‘gratious’ capacity to ‘pardon and forgive’ him”: Hamrick, Catholic Imaginary, p. 169.
would forgive him he was not like to recover, and hereupon her majesty hath forgiven him, and sent unto him a very comfortable message. However, this may be reading the poem too autobiographically. When the variants are similar, the lack of scope for triangulation hinders registration of rhetorical stimulus.

An important variation can be analysed by considering the first of a set of 4 lines in ASH and CUL which are entirely omitted from AH. The speaker in ASH refuses to portray himself as inconstant; he asserts: “Hers still remaine must I, by wronge, by death, by shame” (53; emphasis added). The speaker in CUL, however, declares: “Here styl remayn must I, by death, by wrong, by shame” (53; emphasis added). Rather threateningly, in CUL “death” tops the list of possible outcomes. More importantly for the present discussion, CUL’s speaker subsequently contradicts himself by announcing: “The solitarie wood my citie shall becom” (63; emphasis added). AH’s protagonist likewise states that “The solitaries woodes my cyte shall becom” (58), but without contradiction due to the omission of ASH and CUL’s lines 53-6. Presumably, a “secular” reading could explain this act of omission by AH’s copyist as being accidental. (Looking at CUL, one wonders why a rejected lover would insist on remaining “here”—or even be capable of so remaining—unless, that is, he is either an impotent political subject or a member of an erring church which is figured as female.) To read AH as “secular” love poem, therefore, one might import the “Her” reading: though the woman has treated the lover badly he will remain constant. However, restoring the “her” reading would thus tend to confirm that CUL’s version of line 53 presents a political-religious alteration of its source, an alteration which involved CUL’s copyist in a subsequent contradiction. One might then observe that AH’s speaker is already in exile: “The solitarie woodes my Cittie shall remaine” (63; emphasis added). Here, I submit, is an important clue to the poem’s situational stimulus: it is as though the speaker has never moved but his mistress (the Elizabethan Settlement figured as female) has moved doctrinally, leaving him alone in exile on native conceptual turf. If Dyer was writing (at least partly) to implicate such as Hatton, it may be suggested that he did his job too

91 Quoted in A. H. Bullen, “Dyer, Sir Edward (d. 1607), Poet and Courtier,” ODNB.
well. Elizabeth, whose motto was *Semper eadem* ("always the same"),\(^9^2\) might not approve of the poem’s charge, however ironic or fictional its presentation.

In the following lines, the speaker insists upon his constancy: "I cannot sett at naught which I have held so dear" (CUL 55). He has no intention of changing his fundamental allegiance: "Nor that I meane hencfoorthe this straunge will to professe / As one that could betray suche trothe to buyld on ficklenesse" (AH 53-4). The word "will" invites attention: the "will" here is something foreign which the speaker can *choose* not to "professe*. (The assertion of free will here—in the rather curious matter of refusing to concur with a "straunge will"—is possibly further evidence of CUL and AH’s rhetorical inconsistency, given that I have previously read those variants as opting not to allot free will to their respective protagonists.) The lines can be read as an assertion of unswerving loyalty to Elizabeth (possibly in response to the 1570 papal bull of excommunication).\(^9^3\) Conversely, the adjective "straunge" might denote the importation of doctrinal innovations from, say, Geneva or Zurich, which now form part of Elizabethan England’s doctrinal assembly.\(^9^4\)

All three variants of the poem appear keen to stress a non-seditious future for their protagonists. ASH’s speaker asserts: "I yeelde me Captive to my curse, my harde fate to fulfil" (62). Again, there is ambivalence regarding the question of volition: certainly one can “yeelde” to a state of captivity but can one properly be said to “yeelde” to “fate”? The selection of the verb “fulfil”, moreover, seems more appropriate to a religious discourse than a “secular” one. Might not a rejected Petrarchan lover simply accept his fate rather than yielding to it *in order to “fulfil”* it? CUL 62 and AH 58 use the same words but do not capitalize "captive*. ASH’s capitalization could encourage the reader to identify the speaker as Christ—from a Christian viewpoint, Christ is the only historical personage who could accurately be described as yielding to fate by becoming

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\(^9^2\) Patrick Collinson, "Elizabeth I (1533-1603), Queen of England and Ireland," *ODNB*.

\(^9^3\) English Catholics were divided into "hostile camps of reconcilables and irreconcilables" by the papal bull: Meyer, *Catholic Church*, pp. 79-80.

“Captive” in “harde” matter in order to fulfil a predestined role. The copyist of ASH may have introduced the capitalization but the selection of verbs is consistent across all variants. This would counter the argument that ASH offers a (late) religious adaptation of Dyer’s “secular” love poem.

The speakers of AH and CUL both announce that their “wyne [shall be] of Niobe” (AH 59, 63). The obvious reading is that the lover’s “wine” will henceforth be tears, but why refer to tears metonymically by citing the pathetic Niobe? In Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Niobe’s children are slaughtered as a consequence of her impious boast that she has had more children than the outcast goddess Latona.95 If the protagonist in AH and CUL is speaking (or being made to speak) from within a (penitent) Catholic paradigm, the reference to Niobe could function as a confession of prior Catholic hubris. The current post-Reformation circumstances in England would then be the “harde fate” which must be fulfilled by English Catholics. The following passage from Book 2 of Plato’s Republic may also be relevant:

but if any poets compose a ‘Sorrows of Niobe’ or a tale of the Pelipodae or Troy, or anything else of the kind, we must either forbid them to say that these woes are the work of God, or else, they must devise some such interpretation as we now require, and must declare that what God did was righteous and good, and they were benefitted by their chastisement. But that they were miserable who paid the penalty, and that the doer of this was God is a thing that the poet must not be suffered to say, for neither would the saying of such things, if they are said, be holy, nor would they be profitable to us or concordant with themselves.96

Given the cultural prominence of Plato’s Republic, Dyer, or a subsequent copyist, might, therefore, discreetly be attacking predestinarian theology by referring to tears in a hyperbolic manner as “wyne of Niobe”.

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Nonetheless, since Dyer's poem was probably composed in the early 1570s, its early readers were perhaps more likely to interpret “Niobe” as a topical political allusion. The Duke of Norfolk was executed in 1572 following the exposure of another “conspiracy” to marry the duke to Mary Stuart. Scholars have noted that Mary Stuart may be figured as Niobe in Ben Jonson’s *Cynthia’s Revels* (1.11.85-7; 5.9.16-17). The association could have had its beginnings in the fact that Niobe boasted of having more children than a goddess; Elizabeth, being “of barren stock”, was “infuriated” by the birth of Mary’s son. Alluding to this circumstance, Dyer’s much-copied poem, in variants such as *AH* and *CUL*, may have popularized the association. Indeed, the poem appears in the Charleton sequence in the Arundel-Harington manuscript after two poems which are directly concerned with the Mary Stuart-Norfolk “conspiracy”.

Sir Henry Goodyer (1534-1595), the author of Arundel-Harington Poem 147, had “conveyed some letters” (I. 31) for the imprisoned Mary Stuart. The poem was written circa 1572 when Goodyer was a prisoner in the Tower. The poem’s style is comparable to that of Dyer’s text, but Goodyer’s protagonist does not bemoan his lack of advancement. Rather, he confesses his “one yll” action (8), begs Elizabeth’s forgiveness (13-14) and justifies his action as not inconsistent with persuading Mary to rely on Elizabeth’s sympathy (19-21).

Goodyer’s poem is followed in the manuscript by a parodic answer written by Thomas Norton, co-author of *Gorboduc* and English translator of Calvin’s *Institutes*. Norton’s parody adopts Goodyer’s stanza form, metre and phrase-structure. As with the Dyer-Southwell pairing (to be discussed in the following chapter), the later poem offers a conflicting viewpoint to its model: “Yow did a

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100 Hughey, ed. *Arundel-Harington*, II.194.

101 Hughey, ed. *Arundel-Harington*, I.181. Line references to this edition of the poem are in the text.
perilous queene ... / more then advyse agaynst yowr princes heere / by
cypheringe sleyghte to daunger the estate" (19-21)—Norton here apparently
refers to Goodyer's use of cipher in letters carried for Mary. This may in turn
imply that Goodyer's poem itself has hidden meanings, with which Norton's
answer engages.

This pair of poems is followed by "He That His Myrthe Hath Lost". One
notable aspect of Dyer's poem, in all its variants, is that the nature of the
speaker's "sin" is never specified (in contrast here to Goodyer's abject
confession of a particular deed). It might be possible, therefore, for readers of the
CUL and AH variants of Dyer's poem to infer that the "sin" of their respective
protagonists was (and is) loyalty to Mary Stuart as rightful (and Catholic) heir to
the English throne. Such a reading could explain the anguish of the poem's lover
at his mistress's inconstancy: many English Catholics had been appalled by Mary
Stuart’s hasty marriage to Bothwell, following the murder of her second husband,
Lord Darnley.102 According to this view, the "Sinon" attacked in Dyer’s poem
again emerges as a composite allusion to Cecil and Nicholas Bacon; authorship
of the Catholic pamphlet A Treatise of Treasons attacking these two counsellors
as "Synons" has been attributed to either the secretariat of Mary’s ardent
supporter John Leslie, the Bishop of Ross, or the bishop himself.103

As noted, at the time he wrote "Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste", Dyer was
working as the secretary of the earl of Leicester. Leicester himself had become
embroiled in the Mary Stuart controversy prior to the Northern Rising of 1569.104
Sargent remarks that "Dyer, as an agent of the earl, must have been privy to his
movements throughout the affair (the intrigue involving Mary Queen of Scots in
the late 1560s/early 1570s)".105 In April 1567, Sir Nicholas Throckmorton wrote
to inform the earl that he had "entrusted Dyer at Court with an oral message for
Leicester".106 This is the only recorded association of Dyer’s name with the Mary
Stuart plots and counterplots. Read against this background, the variants of Dyer’s poem function as salvos in ongoing religious/political debates, with the arc of their flight determined by the conditions of production and reception. Depending on alterations made in the copying, or on inflections produced by placement in a compilation-sequence,\textsuperscript{107} the poem could be read as advertising the principled loyalty of such as Leicester (the relevant principle[s] and object of loyalty depending on the aforementioned conditions) and/or as denigrating the self-serving pragmatism and duplicity of such as Cecil. That the poem may have arisen from Leicester (and Burghley) commissioning Dyer to write a lament which Hatton himself might conceivably utter would not prevent the poem, in suitably altered form, from subsequently being used in related but different ways.

Taking all of this into account, it is worth noting that ASH makes no reference to Niobe or to any kind of wine that is to be drunk. Instead ASH’s speaker offers the relatively uninteresting information that “My pillow [shall be] the mould” (67). Indeed, this detail is rather redundant as the speaker also specifies (as does his equivalents in \textit{AH} and \textit{CUL}) that his bed will be “the cragie rocke” (67). The redundancy suggests that ASH’s copyist has replaced the Niobe reference with some acceptable filler. In any case, the copyist of ASH retains other classical allusions present in \textit{AH} and \textit{CUL} (to Carthage, Troy, Sinon [20] and “Sisiphus” [72]). Thus, it is not a question of ASH being, say, anti-humanist. One might suppose that the ASH-copyist has reasons for wishing to consign the Mary Stuart affair to history, but why in that case not exploit the opportunity to state overtly that the lover’s “wine” will be tears? Possibly, the lost variant May detects behind ASH itself lacked the “wine” clause. Alternatively, ASH may be voicing a \textit{conservative} Catholic position of the late 1580s, or of the 1590s, by which time Jesuits such as Southwell had (re)imported to England the “literature

of tears”\(^{108}\) (and expressed conspicuous criticism of the treatment of Mary Stuart).\(^{109}\) That is, a conservative Catholic copyist of the 1580s/90s, resistant to Jesuit influence, might regard references to not only Niobe but also tears as no longer *comme il faut*.

I do not wish to close this analysis on a narrowly topical note, however. After all, according to the Augustinian hermeneutic outlined in Chapter 1, a Christian reader produces textual meaning by reading charitably. Satire, insofar as it is uncharitable in its operations, could be (and was) regarded as unchristian.\(^{110}\) An Augustinian reader of Dyer’s poem, therefore, would not dig for satirical or polemical intent but, rather, work to construct a charitable meaning. Once polemical/topical paradigms are qualified as being more relevant to particular copyists’ concerns, the poem’s speaker’s is (also) available to be identified as, to an extent, Christ himself, bemoaning the exiling of his Real Presence from the Elizabethan world.

This conclusion may seem to contradict earlier claims that the poem’s speaker is a perplexed Elizabethan mortal subject, struggling to come to terms with the encroachments of Calvinism. However, the continued possibility of efficacious imitation of (and participation in) Christ is a crucial point at issue.\(^{111}\) Consequently, Dyer’s poem could be said to have pleased so many contemporary readers not because it was the early expression of an individual poetic voice but because, in a Christ-like fashion (but also, after all, in the manner of a sophist), the “author” had abstracted himself from the text. In a ministerial (but self-ordained) manner, Dyer simultaneously declines subjective identity and acquires authority as a participant in Christ. Moreover, this authorial persona attains existence *in the act of reception*. Thus, Dyer’s poem operates within the conventions of its genre, as described by Alison Shell: “[I]amentations are exhortatory; they purport to be the voice of objective woe interrogating the


reader, subjectivity beginning with that reader’s response”. However, Shell’s terms observe a subjectivist model of cognition. “[O]bjective woe” can only be located in some ideal realm. How then can a “subject” effectively identify with same? Dyer’s lamentation may appear (from a subjectivist perspective) to be uttered by a human subject but its performance of identity relies upon facultative reception—that is, it is neither uttered by nor read by (a) subject(s). Its accent is sounded “aright” when its meaning is co-performed-in-the-reading.

In the Introduction, I left available the possibility that Dyer’s speaker mocked the notion of text as facultative assembly, asserting instead his authority-to-speak on his own behalf. But the protagonist’s “folie” (CUL 78) is (I suggest) not attributable to the fact that he, as individual, presumes to speak. Rather, the folly arguably belongs to Christ: the notion that the “I” which one equates with the self is a cultural construct is folly in the eyes of the world. Interpreted thus, Dyer’s speaker does not mock facultative identity but adopts an ironic stance towards it, knowing that the world will regard such a notion as folly. Only those who read the poem in a Christian accent will avoid mistaking “Dyer” for Christ the actual (only) author. Dyer must “dy” to himself “er[e]” he can resurrect in Christ via a poem whose meaning is embodied by faithful witness; the poem’s faithful readers likewise participate in Christ by this witness. Hence, Dyer’s lover does not necessarily restrict his song to an individualistic audience of one in saying that “in the world can none but thee these accents sound aright” (ASH 80): “thee” may refer to a facultative assembly, the Christian community.

The possibility that Dyer could write a poem spoken by a neglected Christ has already been canvassed. Katherine Duncan-Jones notes that “Dyer’s ‘Song’ at Woodstock [1575] … ends with a somewhat blasphemous echo of a Biblical text often applied to Christ on the Cross: ‘O ye that here behold infortune’s fare: / There is no grief that may with mine compare’”. Turning to the Scriptural source, Lamentations 1:11-12, one notes the applicability of this text to a

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112 Alison Shell, Catholicism, Controversy and the English Literary Imagination, 1558-1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), p. 177.
113 2 Corinthians 5:14-15.
dramatization of Christ lamenting the denial of Real Presence in the Eucharist:

All her [Jerusalem's] people sigh, they seek bread: they have given all their precious things for food to relieve the soul ... O all ye that pass by the way, attend, and see if there be any sorrow like to my sorrow.

Punished anew by banishment from the hearts of English believers, Dyer's Christ may be asking all those who had previously united with him by participating in the Eucharist to join him now in internalised ceremonies only, as necessitated by temporal conditions.
Chapter 3.

Robert Southwell’s “Phancification” of Dyer’s “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste”.

The changes which the Jesuit poet Robert Southwell made to Sir Edward Dyer’s “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste”, in writing a parody of the latter work (titled “Dyers Phancy Turned to a Sinners Complainte”),\(^1\) indicate that Southwell did not consider himself to be converting a secular text into a sacred one. Rather, Southwell, it will be argued, sought to diagnose and rectify the earlier work’s religious errors.

The earliest extant reference to “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste” as “Dyers Phancy” occurs in the c.1592(?) “Waldegrave” manuscript of Southwell’s poetry.\(^2\) In the epistle prefacing the “Waldegrave” sequence, Southwell complains that “the Devill as hee affecteth Deitye and seeketh to have all the Complements of Divine honor applied to his service, so hath he amonge the rest possessed also most Poets with his idle phancies”.\(^3\) Southwell himself, therefore, appears to have branded Dyer’s poem a “phanncy”. The last-quoted statement, moreover, appears to indicate that Southwell regards such poems as Dyer’s as the work of Catholic/Christian poets led astray by “the Devill”. Furthermore, Southwell’s “phancification” of Dyer’s poem shows the relevance of facultative rhetoric to the Jesuit’s poetic interventions. Different writers observe different topographies, but it may generally be said that “fancy” (phantasia)—the

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\(^1\) Peter Davidson & Anne Sweeney, eds. Collected Poems, by Robert Southwell (Manchester: Carcanet, 2007), pp. 32-5.


\(^3\) Davidson & Sweeney, eds. Collected Poems, p. 1.
imaginative faculty—was regarded as the holding zone for mental conceptions assembled from received sensory data.\textsuperscript{4} When decisions need making, appropriate \textit{phantasia} are examined in the “action of\textit{ cogitatio}”.\textsuperscript{5} Accordingly, the reports of the fancy \textit{per se} are not to be taken as reliable witnesses of phenomena, given the distortions of sensory perceptions (the constituents of fancy). Labelling Dyer’s poem a “phancy”, therefore, indicates the spurious nature of the text’s claim to speak with authority. The author-function assumed in Dyer’s text is thus made to resemble a “false” prophet who—perhaps claiming to have been inspired by the Holy Spirit—offers to the Christian community an \textit{addition} to established orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{6}

However, in answering Dyer’s work in an equivalent poetic form, Southwell entered a perilous field. Unlike the statement of a priest \textit{qua} priest, a poetic statement does not perform propositionally. As Dyer’s friend Sidney insisted, in \textit{An Apology for Poetry}, “the poet … nothing affirms, and therefore never lieth”. Unlike (presumably) a Roman Catholic priest, “[t]he poet never maketh any circles about your imagination, to conjure you to believe for true what he writes”.\textsuperscript{7} Therefore, in offering an orthodox view in the form of a corrective parody of an earlier (unorthodox) poem, Southwell aligns orthodoxy with the non-affirming. Consequently, both poems are available to be regarded as poets’ “phancies”. It is likely that Southwell was aware of this danger. Hence, it will be maintained that this circumstance led the Jesuit subsequently to adopt more sophisticated literary strategies in combatting and preventing English Catholic apostasy.

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\textsuperscript{4} Ruth Leila Anderson, \textit{Elizabethan Psychology and Shakespeare’s Plays} (Iowa City: University of Iowa, 1927), pp. 7-28; Harvey, \textit{Inward Wits}.

\textsuperscript{5} Harvey, \textit{Inward Wits}, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{6} In \textit{An Apology for Poetry}, Sidney implies that poets receive divine inspiration: “with the force of a divine breath he [the poet] bringeth things forth far surpassing her doings”: Shepherd, ed. \textit{Apology}, p. 101 (“her” relates to the “second nature” which God “set him [man] beyond and over”).

\textsuperscript{7} Shepherd, ed. \textit{Apology}, pp. 123-4.
The intentions of a Jesuit priest sent on a mission to Elizabethan England may be surmised with more than usual confidence. The first missionary priests were given clear instructions by their Superior General: "Finis hujus missionis propositus est primum, conservandi, Christo propitio, et primovendi in fide et religion nostra Catholica omnes, qui in Anglia Catholica inveniuntur, deinde, ad eam reducendi quicunque ab ea, vel inscitia vel aliorum impulse aberrasent."8

There is no record of Southwell being told to spread his Tridentine message by poetic means. Indeed, there are suggestions that aspects of Southwell's poetic production were a cause of concern to his superior on the mission, Henry Garnet.9 Garnet did approve, though, of using printed media to spread the message, and had trained with the printer Richard Tottel before becoming a priest.10 On reaching London in 1586, Garnet organized a secret press and began producing "holy texts and catechisms to support faith, and other scholarly works".11 Doctrinal flexibility was reserved for private conference with believers.

Given attempts by the Elizabethan authorities to characterize Jesuit priests as seditious agents, "complete abstention from political activity was ... explicitly imposed on all Jesuits ... going to England".12 Similarly, the Jesuit emissaries were advised not to engage in overt controversy with heretics, either orally or in writing. It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that in writing poetry for circulation in manuscript form, and in issuing prose from secret presses during his mission in England, Southwell pursued (or assumed that he could reasonably claim to be pursuing) the above two legitimate functions (encouraging committed Catholics and recovering strayed ones), and eschewed the cited forbidden activities (political action and overt polemical debate).

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8 "Instructiones Datae P. Roberto Personio et P. Edmundo Campiano Fundatoribus 1580," in Leo Hicks, ed. Letters and Memorials of Father Robert Persons, S. J. Volume 1 (to 1588) (London: CRS, 1942), pp. 316ff. ("The object aimed at by this mission is, firstly, to preserve, if God is propitious, and to advance in the faith and in our Catholic religion all who are found to be Catholics in England; and, secondly, to bring back to it whoever may have strayed from it either through ignorance or at the instigation of others": p. 319.)
9 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, pp. 98-9.
11 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 97.
12 Devlin, Southwell, p. 57.
As Pilarz notes, “the Jesuits concentrated their efforts on the social elite”, or on Catholic members of that group. Pilarz suggests two main reasons for this strategy: firstly, it was based on “Loyola’s conviction that powerful people … most effectively serve faith and promote the common good”; secondly, the upper classes could offer protection to the fugitive priests. In addition, Catholics in England tended to concentrate around landed gentry. In the Elizabethan period, “every attempt to count Catholics reveals them as coagulated in local groups at the centre of which a gentleman’s household will usually be found”. Targeting the “social elite”, therefore, was the most effective means of holding intercourse with England’s Catholic community. This strategic motivation, however, is not inconsistent with a broader socio-religious consideration. A respect for social (microcosmic) hierarchy reflects and reciprocally influences divine (macrocosmic) hierarchy. Thus, the Jesuits, in recognizing the claims of the Elizabethan nobility and gentry, relied, for pragmatic reasons, upon pre-existing social forms as a reliable means of conveying their message, but their message was not necessarily inconsistent with the larger interests of the existing hierarchy.

In acknowledging the tastes and circumstances of his target audience, Southwell adopted a “class-conscious rhetorical strategy”. Addressing an elite audience, accustomed to creature comforts, Southwell emphasised, but also clarified, “anti-ascetic strands within Loyola’s teachings”. In “Principle and Foundation” (placed at the beginning of the Spiritual Exercises), Loyola explains that all earthly things are created for human beings in order to help them pursue the end for which they are created [praise and service of God]. It follows from this that one must use other created
things in so far as they help towards one’s end, and free oneself from them in order in so far as they are obstacles to one’s end.\textsuperscript{19}

Classical culture, according to this view, as a source of pleasure, has value in so far as it promotes Christian aims. Indeed, as the Jesuits developed their educational methods, classical works came to be regarded as \textit{necessary} tools, given their evident appeal to and proven emotional impact upon pupils—particularly aristocratic ones, the extent of whose social influence, as noted, was an important factor. In Pierre Janelle’s assessment of the Jesuit position, human beings

must be enticed to righteousness by literary beauty, by the literary beauty which their present-day tastes lead them to prefer. Their partiality for Renaissance standards should be gratified. Antiquity will remain the model to be imitated ... but in its outward form only ... Thus a classical garb will be made to clothe religious truth.\textsuperscript{20}

The distinction Janelle makes between form and content—“garb” and “truth”—is symptomatic of a Platonic mode of thought. This attitude operates according to a humanist reception of a transcendentalist cognitive model, whereby “truth” is an ideal object available for apprehension by a volitional subject—\textit{if only the latter entity is adequately trained} (the humanist confidence that such a capacity can be taught was a distinctive characteristic of the Jesuit educational project). Janelle’s distinction, therefore, is consistent with the implicit Platonism of Jesuit thought and policy. Such ideas informed the milieu where Southwell received his early education under William Allen at the Douai English College. The curriculum there was “grounded in the humanists’ conviction that literature, especially classical secular literature, was congenial with and conducive to the Catholic faith”.\textsuperscript{21} However, Southwell encountered even more positive assessments of classical culture after moving to the Jesuit

\textsuperscript{21} Pilarz, \textit{Southwell}, p. 80.
college at Rome. One of his teachers there, the literary theorist Franciscus Bencius, maintained that poetry "being truly divine can be no other than Christian; it was Christian in classical antiquity, despite all appearances to the contrary". According to such a view, no distinction can be made between sacred and secular verse. Poetry, by definition, is always Christian and always religious; conversely, works which do not observe Christian values, notwithstanding any use they make of ostensibly poetic forms, are heretical, fanciful. The term "pagan", on this view, is synonymous with "heretical", not with, say, "worldly", "secular" or "sensual". This position dismantles Janelle's "garb"/"truth" binary: poetic form is always Christian; pagan poetic form is a contradiction in terms. Thus, elements of Jesuit artistic theory, as taught within the order, reject the form/content binary. The importance of this point with relation to the registration of meaning in Southwell's works cannot be stressed enough.

John R. Roberts and Lorraine Roberts have argued that the moralistic ideas of the German Jesuit theorist Jacobus Pontanus had considerable influence upon Southwell. Pontanus's major work, Poeticae Institutions, was not printed until 1594, but the German's teaching was influential from as early as 1573. Pontanus condemned poetic works which were filled "with amatory lewdness"; the nature of poetry for Pontanus is not 'artistry' but moral wisdom. He also complained that "secular poets aim 'to gratify the vulgar'". Roberts and Roberts refer the reader to the relevant pages of Janelle's study of Southwell. However, Janelle states that Bencius's position is "far more akin to Southwell's

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23 Janelle, Southwell, p. 118.n.5.  
24 My source for this utterance by Pontanus is Roberts & Roberts, "New Webbe," p. 67, who, in turn, cite Janelle, Catholic Reformation, p. 137. Unfortunately, Janelle does not provide a textual reference. As my aim here is to counter Roberts and Roberts' position (which has had some influence), I have not felt obliged to compensate for the scholarly omissions of Janelle and Roberts and Roberts by tracing Pontanus's actual words.  
26 Roberts & Roberts, "New Webbe," p. 67 ("vulgo gratificans": Poeticae Institutiones [1594], quoted in Janelle, Southwell, p. 120.n.12).
real spirit than Pontanus’ distrust of human nature, of its love of beauty, of its ardent emotions”\textsuperscript{27}. Indeed, Southwell’s poetic practice, in my view, does not bear out Roberts and Roberts’s assessment. The courtly poems parodied by the young Jesuit missionary—including works by Dyer and Oxford—were not “wholly filled ‘with amatory lewdness’”. Even read as “secular” productions, these poems are patently moralistic, promoting Stoic dissatisfaction with, and withdrawal from, the court and the world. Secondly, it is inconsistent to argue that Southwell introduced exciting new poetic techniques to Elizabethan English verse (as Sweeney and other scholars persuasively do) \textit{and} to argue that he was influenced by Pontanus’s prescription for poetry to eschew “artistry” and promulgate principally “moral wisdom”. After all, such a didactic conception of poetry remained characteristic of the very courtly works Southwell’s parodic interventions overhauled (according to Martz, Sweeney \textit{et al}). Thirdly, Pontanus attacks “secular poets” for seeking to please the vulgar; again, the aristocratic and gentrified Elizabethan poets whose works Southwell parodied can hardly be said to have aimed their works at the “vulgar”. Though Dyer was considered by contemporaries to be Sidney’s rival as a literary innovator, the majority of Dyer’s works are presumed lost because they were only circulated in manuscript among members of the social elite. Pontanus’s views thus have no evident bearing on Southwell’s selection of targets for parody.

Pontanus’s views did, however, prove congenial to a cultural moment which post-dates Southwell’s activity as poet, a moment when confessional positions had hardened and it became more important to represent Catholicism as morally more rigorous than Protestantism in all of its manifestations. In \textit{Shakespeare and Religion}, Alison Shell suggests that Southwell, in his poetic activity in England, was “repudiating certain aspects of the literary education which he would have undergone”\textsuperscript{28}. Certainly, Shell is right to say that “humanistic literary ideals” came under threat as religious polarization intensified\textsuperscript{29}. However, Southwell’s English texts show the Jesuit becoming more

\textsuperscript{27} Janelle, \textit{Southwell}, p. 125.
\textsuperscript{28} Shell, \textit{Religion}, pp. 79, 253.n.
\textsuperscript{29} Shell, \textit{Religion}, p. 80.
flexible in his commitment to promoting orthodoxy, not less. Sweeney observes how, after arriving in England and becoming familiar with the actual conditions under which Elizabethan Catholics lived, Southwell’s initially judgemental attitude matured and mellowed.\(^{30}\) The young priest did not, that is, move towards a position consistent with Pontanus’s; he drew upon the flexibility promoted by such as Bencius’s formulations.

On arrival in England, Southwell would have been fully aware that “pagan” motifs could communicate Christian matter. Given, however, that Southwell had been specifically enjoined \textit{not} to engage in overt doctrinal debates, to correct what he perceived as unorthodox works in public he would need to speak in a non-confessional register. One strategy he chose was to employ facultative rhetoric. Hence, in the opening sentence of the “Waldegrave” epistle—arguably his first “public” statement to English readers (and poets)—Southwell complains that “Poetes by abusing their talent and making the follies and feyninges of love the customary subject of theire base endeavors, have so discredited this facultye that a Poett a lover and a Iyer, are by many reckoned but three words of one significacon”.\(^{31}\) The “facultye” referred to is evidently that of poetry itself. Hence, poetry-as-faculty belongs to a larger facultative ensemble: the Christian community. Christian poets, that is, do not speak as inspired subjects, offering authoritative doctrinal “news” to their fellow subjects. Rather, they process and present data to a facultative assembly (an equivalent of the apostles) for ratification and ramification. However, because “the Devill” has possessed English poets with Platonist transcendentalist fancies, those poets have reified their function and now consider themselves autonomous individuals possessed of spiritual authority.\(^{32}\) Seeking to redeem the poetic faculty, Southwell does not adopt a similarly Platonist position and reprimand the English poets from a position of presumed moral superiority. Instead, he offers a facultative remedy:

\(^{30}\) Sweeney, \textit{Snow in Arcadia}, pp. 6, 136; see also: Brownlow, \textit{Southwell}, p. 72.
\(^{32}\) Chadwick, ed. \textit{Confessions}, III.16.
And because the best course to lett them see the error of their works is to weave a newe Webb in their owne loome; I have here laied a few course thridds together to invite some skillfuller Wittes to goe forward in the same.33

In standard Counter-Reformation fashion, Southwell here announces that he will play the role of Lutheran poet within a facultative assembly, so that facultative process (the collective genius of “skillfuller Wittes”, not his own intellect) can register and counter the individualistic/egoistic tendencies of Lutheranism. In other words, the Jesuit offers a toolkit for better facultative practice, not (pace Sweeney) simply better “natural” poetry in place of Neoplatonic or allegorical discourse.34

Such explicit statements by the Jesuit poet-priest have led scholars to conclude that Southwell’s principal aim in writing poetry was the “reformation” of English verse. Roberts and Roberts claim that “Southwell hoped that, through example, he would be redeeming poetry from paganism, old and new, and would show how it could be, in fact, the handmaiden of religion”.35 As stated, this is inconsistent with the Ignatian values which guided Southwell’s education. “Pagan” poetry could be “the handmaiden of religion” or active virtue, just as, in Dyer’s hands, it could be the “handmaiden” of (from a Jesuit point of view) conformism, Lutheran individualism and defeatist resignation. Instead of preaching Stoic resignation, and implying that it is consistent with Christ’s message—Southwell may be understood as saying—poets and their readers should remember that, though Christ’s values are not the world’s, one participates in Christ in the world.36 Consequently, in taking Southwell at (what seems to the modern secular eye to be) his word—in supposing that he registered

34 Where Sweeney’s Southwell rejects allegory (pp. 10, 25)—especially Spenserian (pp. 166-7)—in favour of a “natural, honest, non-allegorical focus upon imagery” (p. 49), the Southwell of the present thesis exposes the allegorical machinery of, say, Spenser’s Faerie Queene as a strategic ploy (Southwell’s poetry being no more or less “natural” than Spenser’s). See also: Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 291 n.31 and Shell, Catholicism, pp. 72-7.
35 Roberts & Roberts, “New Webbe,” p. 64; see also Pilarz, Southwell, p. 84.
36 Psalms 145:2; Chadwick, ed. Confessions, X.70; 2 Corinthians 5:15.
no religious meaning in the courtly poems he revised—the religious discourse of those poems is effectively censored by a hegemonic secular materialism.

There is another reason why the argument that one of Southwell’s aims as a Jesuit author in England was to Christianize English poetry (and not reform it, in the sense of restoring its facultative process) should be regarded with care. As mentioned, Jesuit teachers were committed to using classical forms because they were popular and versatile. Classical texts were popular because they were aesthetically pleasing and emotionally affecting. Such qualities led the Jesuits to regard classical forms as effective tools for achieving Christian ends. As stated, certain Jesuit theorists even asserted that classical poetic forms were equivalent to Christian forms. Accordingly, if one decided to replace “classical forms” entirely, one could not be regarded as “reforming” poetry unless one simultaneously provided a non-classical poetic form, or forms, to serve Christian ends in the place of the rejected classical forms. Scholars such as Pilarz and Roberts and Roberts, in suggesting Southwell aimed principally to “reform” English verse by replacing its pagan “secular” forms with “sacred” ones, neglect to take this consequence of their argument(s) into account. Louis L. Martz, on the other hand, an early proponent of the same view, emphasises the point:

Southwell [in his version of Dyer’s poem] ... smoothes out a breach of rhythm here, adds a bright verb for a pale one there, tightens up the use of balanced phrasing, gives emphasis and unity at certain points through careful alliteration, deepens the thought by use of religious paradoxes, and, above all, creates a fairly tight unity.37

Martz’s assessment of the relative merits of the two poems is open to question (certainly, the classical idealism evident in his privileging of “unity” may be noted). For the moment, however, it only needs to be said that in the discussion of Southwell’s revision of Dyer offered below, the extent to which Southwell’s aim seems to be to “improve” Dyer’s poem as an aesthetic product will be considered. If it emerges that Southwell’s changes are constantly geared towards such an aim, then the argument that the stylistic reformation of English poetry

37 Martz, Meditation, p. 190.
was his principal goal will be substantiated. If, however, this does not emerge, then a contrary view may be advanced, namely that Southwell was not engaged in writing (to use Martz’s phrase) “sacred parodies” of secular works but, rather, was diagnosing and correcting the religious meanings of Elizabethan poems.\footnote{Martz, Meditation, p. 186 (emphasis added).}

Indeed, before proceeding to an analysis of Southwell’s rewriting of Dyer’s poem, it is necessary to address an important terminological point. Rosemond Tuve observes that the habit of using the term “sacred parody” to describe the conversion of “secular” poems to “religious” ones began among leading George Herbert scholars, such as Herbert Grier and F. E. Hutchinson, and was taken up by such as Martz.\footnote{Rosemond Tuve, “Sacred ‘Parody’ of Love Poetry and Herbert,” p. 212, in Thomas P. Roche, Jr., ed., Essays by Rosemond Tuve: Spenser, Herbert, Milton (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1970), pp. 207-51. Hutchinson reads back from Dryden’s definition of parody: F. E. Hutchinson, ed. The Works of George Herbert (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1941), pp. 540-1.} However, Tuve points out that Herbert’s use of the term “parody” was at odds with contemporary definitions of the term (which resemble modern ones) as “burlesque”. Accordingly, Tuve argues that Herbert’s understanding of the term “parody” derived from the longstanding musical tradition of parodia missa. Productions in this tradition did not cancel out “secular” texts by overwriting them with “religious” ones but rather, in using familiar music, placed a new sacred text alongside a previous sacred text with a view to polysemous elaboration.\footnote{Tuve, “Parody,” pp. 208-12.} “Par-ody” can thus be taken to mean “beside-song”.\footnote{Linda Hutcheon, A Theory of Parody: the Teachings of 20th-Century Art-forms (New York & London: Methuen, 1985), p. 32; Margaret A. Rose, Parody/Meta-fiction: an Analysis of Parody as a Critical Mirror to the Writing and Reception of Fiction (London: Croom Helm, 1979), p. 18.} (It may be noted here that the singer of Dyer’s “song” calls for any listener in comparable circumstances to “take his place by me” [AH ll. 1-4, 73], as so many copyists/parodists—including Southwell—proceeded to do.) Hence, when scholars refer to Southwell’s rewriting of Dyer’s poem as a “sacred parody”, as virtually all modern commentators do in discussing the Jesuit’s rewrite, the term (according to Tuve’s assessment) requires that Dyer’s poem be a sacred work also.\footnote{Presumably aware of this circumstance, Martz, following Grier and Hutchinson, refers to Herbert’s “neutral” use of the term. Tuve points out that though Herbert’s activity is not aggressive, it is obviously not “neutral” either: “Parody”, pp. 214-6.} Obviously, such scholars—who evidently regard Dyer’s

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\footnote{Martz, Meditation, p. 186 (emphasis added).}
\footnote{Tuve, “Parody,” pp. 208-12.}
\footnote{Presumably aware of this circumstance, Martz, following Grier and Hutchinson, refers to Herbert’s “neutral” use of the term. Tuve points out that though Herbert’s activity is not aggressive, it is obviously not “neutral” either: “Parody”, pp. 214-6.}
poem as a “secular” text—do not mean to employ the term in this way. Indeed, the term is misleading, being expressive of the modern commitment to a sacred/secular binary. Thus, I will refer to Southwell’s version as simply a parody of Dyer’s poem.

Southwell’s version of Dyer’s poem begins:

Hee that his myrth hath lost
Whose comfort is to rue
Whose hope is falne whose faith is cras’d
Whose trust is founde untrue

Where Dyer’s speaker invites the company of any whose “comfort is dismaid” (ASH 1), the Jesuit’s version suggests instead that his protagonist’s “comfort” is “to rue”. This alteration implies that Dyer’s speaker takes comfort from self-pity and here invites others to join him in that attitude. Furthermore, where Dyer’s lover declares that his “faith is scornd” (ASH 2), Southwell’s speaker confesses instead that his “faith is cras’d”. Dyer’s protagonist, the alteration implies, is spiritually confused and in need of guidance (and is certainly not to be regarded as a sound spiritual adviser). Dyer’s lover complains that his “trust is all betraid” (ASH 2), but Southwell’s speaker admits instead that his “trust is founde untrue”. Thus, Southwell refuses to allow his protagonist to blame external agents for his current predicament.

Subsequently, where Dyer’s speaker refers to himself as one “Whose feare is fallen, whose succor voyde, whose hurt his death must be” (ASH 8),

43 Roberts and Roberts, for example, state that the term “sacred parody” has been “given its fullest definition ... by Rosemond Tuve”. Their overall argument and subsequent discussion, however, indicate that they have misunderstood Tuve’s position: “New Webbe,” p. 70 and passim. Clark is aware that Tuve’s position represents a “caveat vis-à-vis the scholarly consensus: Christ Revealed, p. 191.n.32.
44 Quotations from Southwell’s poem are from Sweeney & Davidson, eds. Collected Poems, pp. 32-5. See Appendix 1.4 for the full text.
45 CUL has the more doctrinally aggressive “whose helpe his death must be” (8; emphasis added).
Southwell has “Whose tyme in teares whose race in ruth / Whose life a death must be” (15-16). Thus, the Jesuit agrees that the situation of the poem’s protagonist is a cause for sadness, but prescribes active expression of penitence (“teares”) and removes the suggestions that the lover’s “feare” (“fere” as beloved/spouse:46 the church?) is “fallen” and that sacramental “succor” is “voyde”.

Southwell follows Dyer’s text closely hereafter until Dyer’s speaker asserts that (mental) death “keepes the worst behinde” (CUL 12). Southwell declines to allow that a believer can speak with such (pessimistic) assurance about his post-life destiny, saying instead that an anguished mental death “threttens worse behinde” (24; emphasis added).

The following change is even slighter but also telling: Southwell replaces “but” with “And” in his line 26. Dyer’s speaker complains that he is “one that lives in shewe but inwardly doth dye” (ASH 13); Southwell’s protagonist is “one that lives in shewe / And inwardly doth dye”. While this alteration holds obvious significance as a doctrinal correction, it appears baffling when read as part of an attempt at stylistic improvement. Dyer’s speaker evidently believes that on the surface he appears happy and that this offers a poignant contrast to his inner condition. Southwell’s “And”, however, suggests that living “in shewe” entails spiritual death. Therefore, reaching accommodation with a heretical environment involves dire spiritual consequences, not merely cause for self-pity.

Lines 29-32 of Southwell’s text describe one

Whose hart the Alter is
And hoast a god to move
From whome my evell doth feare revenge
His good doth promise love

Dyer’s threatening “Powers” whom “noe sorrowes can suffize” to appease (ASH 16) are not admitted to Southwell’s text. It is not obvious that Southwell’s lines

46 “[F]ere, n.1” (2): OED.
are "artistically" superior (or that they are offered as such). Dyer's largely Latinate alliteration ("spirit", "sacrifice", "sorrows", "suffice" [ASH 15-16]) has been replaced by the paired "English" combinations "hart", "hoast" and "god", "good". Southwell's poetic "reform" is thus arguably Spenserian in its apparent commitment to the promotion of plain English lexis, in contrast to the "Areopagite" tendency of Dyer's Latinate vocabulary. Moreover, a case could be made that Southwell's set of alliterative pairs alludes to a reciprocal and collaborative relationship between God and the worshipper, as opposed to the closed, self-regarding system implied by Dyer's fourfold repetition; that is to say, aesthetic effect works in tandem with doctrinal correction. Most importantly, Southwell is keen to remind his readers that God's "good doth promise love"; that, therefore, the self-pity arising from the fatalism of Dyer's speaker is more to be eschewed. In the Jesuit's view, remarks Sweeney, "injustice was a bad teacher: the only proper end of penance was ... a genuine change of heart ... [This] could only come from ... realistic self-interrogation." By this means, the human heart for Southwell can be transformed by repentance into a "hoast" capable of moving God.

An argument that Southwell was concerned with stylistic reform could be made, however, on the basis of the next notable alteration. Where Dyer's speaker compares his thoughts to the ruins of Carthage or Troy (ASH 19-20), Southwell dispenses with classical allusion, offering the more concrete lines: "My thoughts [are] like ruyns old / Which shew how faire the building was / While grace did it upholde" (38-40). Recalling Southwell's humanist education, one wonders what

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47 For a similar observation, see: McDonald & Brown, eds. Southwell, p. 138.
48 "[S]pirit", "sacrifice" and "suffice" have Latin roots ("spirit, n.", "sacrifice, n.", "suffice, v.": OED); "sorrows" is the old English exception in this group ("sorrow, n. & adj.": OED). However, it may be noted that "spirit" and "sacrifice" retain positive, or neutral, valence in Dyer's lines, whereas old English "sorrows" are described as insufficient. For Dyer's membership of the "Areopagites", see: Edmund Spenser & Gabriel Harvey, Two Other Very Commendable Letters, of the Same Mens Writing: Both Touching the Foresaid Artificiall Versifying, and Certain Other Particulars (London: H. Bynneman, 1580).
49 Elsewhere, the Jesuit author expresses this notion in even stronger terms: "Southwell's marriage in 'At Home in Heaven' of Christ and the human soul is interesting [in that] ... it is the soul that seems to do the attracting: indeed, its 'ghostly beautie offred force to God', chaining him, albeit in 'the lynckes of tender love'": Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, pp. 26-7; note again the alliterative pairs: "ghostly ... God", "lynckes ... love".
50 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 52.
the Jesuit could find to object to, on purely poetic grounds, in Dyer’s allusion. To modern tastes, Southwell’s lines may appear shorn of hackneyed imagery, but to a Renaissance reader, Dyer’s sudden evocation of the classical past in what might, until that point, have passed for a poem of private complaint could have offered a powerful associative impetus. However, on reading Southwell’s poem, it becomes apparent in retrospect that Dyer’s protagonist, in associating his personal religious disaster with the collapse of once mighty empires, may be implying that the Roman Catholic church (figured as Troy) has also definitively fallen. Alternatively, he might be implying that the human condition itself is irretrievably fallen. Southwell’s speaker, however, records “how faire the building was / While grace did it uphold” (39-40). That is, if the beautiful edifice no longer appears “faire”, that change has been occasioned by the beholder’s fall from grace into a despairing state.

A subsequent grammatical change makes for an emphatic point of distinction between the two poems. Dyer’s speaker states that “In was stood my delighte, in is and shall my woe” (ASH 33). Newly-acquired knowledge appears to have disclosed to the lover that his former happiness was due to ignorance. Southwell agrees with Dyer’s protagonist that his current situation is “woeful”, but says “In was stands my delight” (65; emphasis added). The past belief has not been proved wrong; if the poem’s speaker reverts to its profession, he may regain delight.

Similarly, where Dyer’s lover is utterly fatalistic as regards his situation: “I looke for noe delight, releefe will come too late” (ASH 35), Southwell’s version suggests instead that the speaker is “Unworthy of reliefe” having “craved it too late” (69-70).

Most crucially of all, Southwell’s protagonist—unlike Dyer’s speaker—locates inconstancy in his own “fleshe” (93). This note of self-accusation makes for a suggestive contrast with the self-exonerating misogyny of Dyer’s lines:

O fraile vnconstant kind, and safe in trust to noe man!
Noe women angels are, and loe, my mystris is a woeman
If Southwell’s principal aim had been to rescue English poetry from its erotic errors, one might expect him to stay close to his source when it declares its female love-object to be a ground of inconstancy.

Southwell subsequently makes an even more assertive change to his source. In Dyer’s poem, the speaker is a man of his word, who swears that the pledge shall never “faile that my faithe bore in hand” (CUL 59); conversely, Southwell’s sinner confesses: “I brake my plighted troth” (115). Arguably, only doctrinal aims could justify what would, rendered on any other terms, constitute an act of gross misrepresentation.

As mentioned, Dyer’s lover accepts a fatalistic creed: “Syth then it must be thus … / I yeelde me Captive to my curse, my harde fate to fulfill” (ASH 61-2). Southwell retains the latter line but replaces line 61 with “But since that I have synnd / And scourge none is to ill” (121-2). Evidently, the Jesuit refuses as heretical the notion that “it must be thus”, for it denies free will.51

Southwell also makes minor but significant alterations to the reclusive itinerary of Dyer’s exile. For example, where Dyer’s speaker, in CUL, intends to drink “wyne of Niobie” (67), Southwell’s sinner discards the classical figure, announcing his intention, instead, to drink penitential “teares” (133). The attempt to connect (possibly sacramental) “wine” with Niobe’s futile grief is thus rejected. The Jesuit removes classical references found in ASH also: where ASH’s speaker views his “prospect into Hell”, containing “Sisiphus and all his pheres” (71-2), Southwell’s sinner sees “Judas and his cursed crew” (143).

The foregoing analysis has suggested the extent to which the Jesuit Southwell registered religious meaning in Dyer’s poem. However, it might be equally instructive to assess Southwell according to the values of Dyer’s poem. Dyer might have agreed with everything Southwell could tell him about

Tridentine doctrine and still defend his poem as a devout product of its circumstances. By the same token, instead of criticising Dyer, Southwell might be read as updating the court-satellite’s religious position (perhaps under cover of criticising him). Nonetheless, whatever allowances one makes for rhetorical games Dyer might have been playing, the fact that the poem could be taken non-ironically—or, at least, could ostensibly be taken so—by contemporary readers (as indicated in the previous chapter) is evidence of its capacity to communicate a particular pragmatic strategy (at the same time that it appears to criticize cynical pragmatism).

Where Dyer might have defended his poem as a well-intended salvo in a courtly game, Southwell’s act of parody implicitly accuses Dyer of an indiscretion: he has parodied the Mass in appearing to provide its textual substitute. According to the present interpretation, Southwell’s parody reads Dyer’s text as performatively saying: “He that has lost access to the Real Presence, his previous source of comfort, do as I do: lament, for that is all one can do in a fallen world; do not, however, bemoan the absence of priests for, since all human beings are fallen, priests could never do you any good anyway.” However, Dyer’s text cannot erase from its cultural assembly the role which the priestly function previously performed. The slack has to be taken up somewhere. Indeed, it is presumed to be performed by Dyer’s poetic text itself, which offers (hollow) consolation. The poet-as-minister replaces the priest in the ostensibly egoless form of the author-function (actually, from the Southwellian point-of-view, a site for the reification of ego). Thus, though Southwell may not be attacking Dyer personally, his parody of Dyer’s poem is an attack on the burgeoning ego-cult of the author-function. The Jesuit’s Lutheran impersonation exposes the author-function as a parodic distortion of priesthood and, therefore, of Christianity (from a Catholic perspective).

In criticising the author-function, Southwell also implies that Dyer, as the ostensible author of such a poem, performs the role of (self)interpellated subject. This is an especially adroit manoeuvre. After all, as a modern student of

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52 “One of the readerships [Southwell] courted was in effect that of men like Dyer and Wriothesley”: Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 169.
"literature", one has learnt not to confuse the “I” of a literary text—for example, a lyric poem—with the author. The attempt of Dyer’s protagonist to abstract his ego from the text in order to qualify as a performer of Christian imitation, and liberate the co-cognizing reader, seems to anticipate and corroborate the theses of structuralists such as Roland Barthes and Foucault. However, Southwell’s parody shows that this move is precisely the means by which the reading of Christ’s passion as a self-pity valve for the abject individual enters literary texts. As noted, Dyer’s poem became known to its Elizabethan admirers as not a “phanery” but “a Dyer”. Sympathetic early modern readers—Catholic, Lutheran or confused floaters—granted authority to the poem insofar as they read it as an expression of the author’s situation. This magnified subject-position is then made available to the poem’s readers in turn as something with which they can identify as likewise under-valued subjects.

Hence, it could be argued that the intentional and biographical fallacies begin with acquiescence in ultra-nominalism by post-Reformation subjects. According to Southwell’s parody, Dyer’s speaker is not Christ but a subject—an author manqué—who has fabricated, and continues to fabricate, the very prison he complains of being held inside against his will.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the speaker-as-author-function in Dyer’s poem appears aware that his text will take on other accents when read:

My songe yf any aske whose greevous case ys suche
Die er thowe let his name be known his folly shews to muche.
But best yt is to hide and never come to lighte
 ff or one the earthe may none but I the accente sound aright. (AH 73-6)

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54 For Luther’s complex relationship to nominalism, see: Oberman, Luther, pp. 119-23; Bayer, “Interpreter,” p. 76.
55 Chadwick, ed. Confessions, III.16.
The poem’s ideal meaning, it appears, is incapable of being accessed by anyone “one the earthe”. Whichever version of Dyer’s poem one ponders, this statement (and its equivalents in CUL and ASH) works as a challenge. The reader is called upon to respond: “No, I do identify with the plight the song describes. I will act accordingly and, thus, sound the song’s accents right”. ASH, though, is adamant: no-one, including the protagonist himself, can “sound aright” the song’s ideal accent (77-80). In which case, the song (as a manner of speaking) is distinct from the impotent lover’s “case” (as a social and political matter). Considered thus, the lover—in contrast to the song itself—lacks agency: the author/speaker is a function who allows the song to speak through or rather as him; he provides an inadequate, durational vehicle for the ideal, like one of Plato’s reflecting cave-dwellers. From an idealist perspective, it emerges, discursive utterance is the representation of inevitable failure in the attempt to sound an ideal “aright”.

The envoy of Dyer’s poem occupies the three final stanzas of its longest variants, forming an appendix with an ambiguous relationship to the text’s main body. Hence, the envoy functions as a terminal: a site of conspicuous conventionality, or artifice, which implies (by way of contrast) that the preceding stanzas are, figuratively speaking, “real” (“figuratively” in that they inevitably fall short of the ideal). Consequently, it is important to note that the final three stanzas are omitted in most versions. Placed between other poems in compilations Dyer’s lyric acquires new terminals, new accents; idealism is obscured, material contingency asserts itself.

Southwell, too, omits the final three stanzas. His parody interrogates the claims of “Dyers Phancy” to be a truth statement which none is qualified to sing beside. Southwell’s text does not engage with Dyer’s poem as an artful construction whose truth is contingent on formal emplacement. However, Southwell has it both ways. The parody is placed near the centre of the “Waldegrave” manuscript: 18th of 40 poems (if one counts the opening sequence of poems on the Virgin Mary as one poem). It follows poems on “Davids Peccavi”, “Saint Peters Remorse” and “Mary Magdalens Blushe”, and it precedes poems entitled “A Vale of Teares”, “The Prodigall Chylds Soule Wracke” and
"Marie Magdalens Complaint at Christs Death". The imputations of self-pity, worldliness and lack of faith are clear.

This apparent gamesmanship serves to remind the reader that, if Dyer-as-author has encroached on the priest’s territory, the priest has strayed into the swamplands of communicative failure (like Plato, imitating the imitators).\footnote{Jacques Derrida, "Plato’s Pharmacy," p. 1860, in Leitch et al, eds. Theory, pp. 1830-76.} Orthodoxy itself engages in dialectical process, of course, \textit{but in designated venues}. By writing a parody of Dyer’s poem, Southwell steps outside of the exclusive “circle” which bestows his authority as priest. Dyer’s Christ is Dyer’s fancy: defeatist, self-pitying. However, Southwell’s Christ, conscious of (his own) human faults, seeking to amend them, is in danger of becoming Southwell’s fancy in the marketplace of fictions.

Such a danger may have occurred to Southwell. Sweeney notes occasional expressions of concern by the young Jesuit at a lack of guidance from his mission superior Garnet.\footnote{Sweeney, \textit{Snow in Arcadia}, p. 104.} Consequently, his line-for-line parodies of Elizabethan poems appear to be early works in Southwell’s career as English-language poet.\footnote{Sweeney, \textit{Snow in Arcadia}, p. 136.}
Chapter 4.

Thomas Lodge, Robert Southwell and Rosalynde.

This chapter is concerned with the influence upon the Elizabethan Catholic writer Thomas Lodge of not only Jesuit meditational practice but also, and especially, Jesuit doctrinal theories of justification, as distinguished from the doctrinal positions authorized by the Council of Trent. Analysis of aspects of Lodge’s romance Rosalynde will supply the main evidence for this influence. However, corroborative biographical and other historical evidence will be discussed first, by way of preparation for that analysis.

Developing the previous chapter’s argument that Southwell became wary of engaging parodically with doctrinal matters in his prose and poetry, I will consider the possibility that, by preparing and instructing Lodge to participate in comparable activity in his texts, Southwell solved the problem of venue. That is, a lay figure such as Lodge could engage with other Elizabethan writers in print about doctrinal matters without bringing religious orthodoxy and authority formally into question. A principal benefit of such an arrangement, from Southwell’s point of view, is that it would have enabled Jesuit theological breakthroughs to be communicated to a wider audience.

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The will of Lodge’s father, Sir Thomas Lodge, appears “staunchly Protestant”,¹ and there is scholarly uncertainty about when exactly his son Thomas became a Catholic. The younger Thomas Lodge’s most overtly Catholic text, Prosopopeia

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Containing the Teares of the Holy, Blessed, and Sanctified Marie, the Mother of God (1596) is dedicated to Lady Margaret Stanley, the Countess of Derby (5). Thus, I am inclined to agree with Charles Whitworth’s view that Lodge’s Catholic sympathies date from the time Lodge spent “in mine infancie” (A Fig for Momus [4]) in the house of Lord Henry Stanley. Born c.1558, Lodge was page to the Stanleys from c.1564 to c.1571. The earliest (apparent) documentary evidence of Lodge’s Catholicism, however, dates from 1581, in which year Lodge’s supplication for the MA at Oxford was initially accepted and then, later that year, denied. In the interim a Thomas Lodge, gentleman, was called before the privy council to answer ‘certain matters’ and a Thomas Lodge was imprisoned at the king’s bench, according to the confession of an anti-Catholic informant.

Lodge attended Trinity College, Oxford, from c.1573 to 1577. Jesuit scouts were known to have made the rounds of Oxford University in the period, looking for young men with “extraordinary pregnancy of wit”. In any case, as Tenney observes, “[i]f Thomas Lodge had no leanings toward Catholicism before [1573], he had ample opportunity to acquire them ... for Trinity nurtured many of the Roman persuasion”.

Around 1579, Lodge wrote an answer to Stephen Gosson’s The Schoole of Abuse. This work, usually referred to as A Defence of Poetry, may have been entitled Honest Excuses. Its humanist defence of poetry—and the fact that

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2 In Works, Volume 3.
3 In Works, Volume 3.
6 Tenney, Lodge, p. 80; Shell, Catholicism, p. 179.
7 Alexandra Halasz, “Thomas Lodge (1558-1625), Author and Physician,” ODNB.
9 Paradise, Lodge, p. 18; for the Jesuit Jasper Heywood’s “work at the universities” in the early 1580s, see: Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, pp. 54, 86.
Lodge’s next publication, *An Alarum against Vsurers* (1584), was dedicated to Sir Philip Sidney—suggest that Lodge was associated to an extent with Sidney at the time.\(^\text{12}\) The Catholic Lodge’s association with the Protestant Sidney might seem counter-intuitive. However, there is evidence that Sidney sympathized with particular Catholics if not with Catholicism as a papally-governed institution.\(^\text{13}\) Indeed, Sidney met Campion in Prague and apparently confessed his religious doubts to the Jesuit. (Campion then wrote to the Jesuit Father General Acquaviva saying Sidney was ripe for conversion.)\(^\text{14}\) There is, therefore, room for common political and religious ground between Lodge and Sidney at this point.

*Honest Excuses* was “suppressed before publication, probably in consequence of the usual licence being refused”.\(^\text{15}\) The text is unusually explicit about the use of pagan figures for discussion of religious topics: “you know not” Lodge teases Gosson, “that the creation is signified in the Image of Prometheus; the fall of Pryde in the person of Narcissus”.\(^\text{16}\) In short, no real distinction obtains between sacred and secular texts. Lodge thus implies that Gosson merely chooses not to acknowledge the religious content of the “secular” works to which he objects.\(^\text{17}\)

Lodge’s *Rosalynde* appeared in print for the first time in 1590 but may have been written as early as 1587.\(^\text{18}\) The title-page specifies that the romance has been “Fetcht from the Canaries” (1).\(^\text{19}\) This detail is usually taken to indicate


\(^{13}\) Buxton, *Sidney*, pp. 53-4.


\(^{15}\) “Some Account of Thomas Lodge and His Writings,” p. xx, in David Laing, ed. *A Defence of Poetry, Music and Stage-Plays To Which Are Added, by the Same Author, An Alarum against Usurers; and The Delectable History of Forbonius and Prisceria*, by Thomas Lodge (n.p.: Shakespeare Society, 1853), pp. xi-lxv. Lodge himself says the book was “forbad” by the “godly & reuerent yt had to deale in the cause”: “An Alarum against Vsurers,” p. 6, in *Works*, Volume 1.


\(^{17}\) Hamilton, *Munday*, p. 18.


\(^{19}\) *Rosalynde* appears in Lodge, *Works*, Volume 1.
that Lodge wrote the book while voyaging to the Azores, as the author seems to declare in the dedicatory letter to the Lord Chancellor, Henry Carey, Lord Hunsdon (1585 or 1586 are held to be the most likely dates for such a journey).

The book is “rough, as hatcht in the stormes of the Ocean, and feathered in the surges of many perillous seas” (4). It is worth noting, however, that the three books of Lodge’s which scholars tend to regard as being most strikingly explicit in their Catholicism—“Trvth’s Complaint ouer England” (1584), “the astonishingly Catholic Catharos” (1591) and Prosopopeia—each appeared immediately prior to one of Lodge’s three conspicuous departures from England: 1585, putatively with Captain Clarke; August 1591, with Captain Cavendish; and 1597, when Lodge headed to Avignon to swear allegiance to the Pope. Thus, these three texts can be read as Lodge defiantly burning his bridges prior to leaving England on three occasions. However, on at least one of those occasions he returned evincing a desire to repair those bridges by re-establishing his credentials as a loyal Elizabethan. That is, in the dedicatory letter to Carey, in Rosalynde, Lodge addresses the patriotic Carey heartily as a sailor and a scholar.

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21 For “Trvth’s Complaint” as evidently Catholic work, see: Edmund W. Gosse, “Memoir of Thomas Lodge,” p. 12, in Lodge’s Works, Volume 1, pp. 1-46; Shell, Catholicism, p. 179; Janelle, Southwell, p. 55; Cuvelier, Lodge, p. 503.


23 It remains unclear whether Lodge actually sailed with Clarke or not; see: Tomás Monterrey, “Thomas Lodge’s Rosalynde and the Canary Islands,” SEDERI 17 (2007), pp. 131-40. Lodge’s claim to have found the source for A Margarite of America during his sea travels, again in a preface, has likewise been regarded as fallacious: Claudette Pollack, “Lodge’s A Margarite of America,” p. 1, Renaissance and Reformation 12 (1976), pp. 1-11; Davis, Idea, pp. 198-9.

—as though he had never been a (Catholic) writer. After all, one might wonder what relevance the author’s recent sea-travels could have to *Rosalynde*, a noticeably landlocked romance.

It could be argued that, in speaking of his recent maritime experiences, Lodge is metaphorically confessing that he had previously been blown about on the seas of religious error, and the present romance is an account of his delivery from that perilous condition.25 (The metaphor of wildly errant voyage to the far side of the world is analogous to Orlando’s journey—subsequent to losing his wits—to the moon in Ariosto’s romance.)26 A prefatory letter “To the Courteous Reader Whatsoever” in Lodge’s subsequent publication, *The Famous, True and Historicall Life of Robert Second Duke of Normandy* (1591), again uses the sea-voyage trope, referring to “The Loadstarres that directed me in my course” (4).27 The latter statement may indicate that Lodge’s recent course of spiritual recovery had been supervised by a specific group of guides (here, Lodge neglects to mention any geographical itinerary). In the second dedicatory letter of 1590’s *Rosalynde*, Lodge offers “the Gentlemen Readers” “the fruits of his labors that he wrought in the Ocean, when euerie line was wet with a surge, & euerie humorous passion countercheckt with a storme” (7). The metaphorical nature of the sea-crossing seems undeniable here (unless one wishes to suppose that Lodge considers describing oneself as writing while waves literally crash across one’s desk as pertinent in some way). Lodge can be read as stating that he wept tears as he produced his manuscript. Indeed, instead of a meteorological storm, there are two rival forces: Lodge’s passions and the storm that “countercheckt” them. Lodge, having suffered tribulations, may have apprehended that his own passionate nature was the cause of them, not fortune (or the weather). Furthermore, I would argue that, writing circa 1587 of storms of tears, of


humoral “fate” being overcome by volitional means, of passions being subdued by passion (not by reason), Lodge is revealing the effects of Jesuit influence. Janelle has identified the Jesuit Southwell as the primary agent responsible for introducing the “literature of tears” to England in 1587. However, if one accepts that Lodge had been influenced by Southwell or some other Jesuit by 1587-8, one might also observe that Lodge has not fully assimilated Ignatian principles. “If you like it, so”, he informs the gentlemen readers of Rosalynde (7). Such peremptory notes recur in Lodge’s paratexts and are not especially Southwellian in tone. On the other hand, it may also be noted that Lodge’s prefatory statements are often at odds with the main body of the works they precede, as though the author deemed it necessary to adopt an aggressive stance towards the world in these frames, regardless of the accompanying work’s content.

Nonetheless, in the letter to Hunsdon, Lodge is advertising the fact that he has been abroad. Aside from any relevance his travels may have had to Hunsdon, Lodge can be read as advertising his wares to London book-stall browsers, announcing that he has “news” from overseas. In early modern England, romances and broadside ballads were the only ready means of distributing news outside of the direct auspices of the government and the ecclesiastical authorities. Donna Hamilton has pointed out that “packaging news important to the Catholic community by enveloping it, front and back, within statements of government policy provided Catholic writers with one way of getting that news

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28 Janelle, Southwell, p. 190; see also: Peter Milward, Shakespeare’s Religious Background (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1973), p. 54; Helen C. White, “Southwell: Metaphysical and Baroque,” pp. 159-60, MP 61 (1964), pp. 159-68. The earliness of Southwell’s contribution in this respect must be stressed. For example, Thomas Wright, a potential rival candidate for being an early transmitter of such notions, was not active in London until 1595: Pritchard, Catholic Loyalism, p. 61; Klause, Jesuit, p. 89.
30 Thus, for example, Lodge “adopts a fractious, ‘satyrical’ tone” in the preface to A Fig for Momus: Whitworth, “Lodge,” p. 145. A further example—a prefatory epistle from Prosopopeia—is discussed below.
31 Lennard J. Davis, Factual Fictions: the Origins of the English Novel (New York: Columbia UP, 1983), pp. 45-8. Davis sees broadsheet ballads, not romances, as the forerunners of modern newspapers, partly on the grounds that ballads were more popular; however, different newspapers address different “classes” of reader; romances, therefore, may have been aimed at particular classes of reader.
out.”32 Inhabitants of a culture fed by 24-hour news channels should recall that news can be ten or twenty years old and still be news in a place where communication lines are broken.33 The Tridentine doctrinal formulations continued to be news for Elizabethan Catholics in the late 1580s and beyond.34 However, Lodge’s 2nd epistle in Rosalynde addresses not Catholics but “Gentlemen”—that is, any fair-minded readers who wish to learn what they need to know, if they are to behave as Christian gentlemen according to the latest fashion.35

It might be wondered why, though, if Lodge’s Rosalynde can be read as a “Catholic” text, the authorities allowed it to be printed. A letter from Burghley to Walsingham, dated June 12 1588, suggests a possible answer:

I could wish some expert lerned man wold fayne an answer as from a nombre of Catholiques that notwithstanding ther evill Contentment for Religion, shuld profess ther obedience and promise with ther lyves and power ageynst [sic] all strang forces offryng to land in this realm.36

Such a statement indicates that the publication of certain types of Catholic text was consistent with the regime’s interests.37 The reading of Lodge’s Rosalynde offered below will describe such a text: the position I infer from its content, for example, is consistent with (measured) support for a Stuart succession. Read figuratively, it does not advocate recusancy, and, doctrinally, it contains nothing which conservative Elizabethan Protestants could not accept (indeed it anticipates the English church’s subsequent movement away from High

32 Hamilton, Munday, p. 37.
33 Davis, Fictions, p. 50.
35 Wooding notes that early Elizabethan Catholic works often “contained two prefaces, one which replied to the Protestant controversialists and the other which addressed the reader”: Rethinking, p. 193.
37 See also: Pritchyard, Catholic Loyalism, p. 68.
Calvinism). These circumstances inform my decision to argue specifically for Southwell's—as opposed to a generalized Jesuit—influence upon Lodge. As Pilarz has observed, Southwell delivered a reconciliatory message to Elizabethan England.\textsuperscript{38} Suitably edited and arranged, Southwell's texts were published with the authorities' collusion (as will be shown in Chapter 5) and were immensely popular with Protestant readers.\textsuperscript{39}

It might be objected that the first publication of \textit{Rosalynde} (if not its composition) postdates the Armada scare. However, "it remained useful for Elizabeth and her government to keep tight control over the succession question after the failure of the Armada".\textsuperscript{40} Moreover, to encourage opposition to radical Protestant elements in England, it suited the Elizabethan government to maintain that a threat of Spanish invention continued to exist at various times during the 1590s.\textsuperscript{41} For instance, the government claimed that the Jesuits had arrived in England in advance of invasion by Spanish forces landed at Normandy in late 1591.\textsuperscript{42}

If \textit{Rosalynde} was written in 1587-8, though, one might wonder why it was not printed at that time. Courtly poets such as Sidney and Dyer saw printed publication as a dangerous venue for fictional texts. They apparently preferred to circulate their poetic productions via a select network of influential readers in manuscript.\textsuperscript{43} Conversely, Lodge had sought to print his works from as early as 1579-80, though he had presumably learnt (from his experience with Gosson's book) to observe a printing schedule attuned to what the state would tolerate.\textsuperscript{44} Thus, with \textit{Rosalynde}, Lodge may have pursued a two-stage strategy (manuscript first, print-version second), possibly aimed at different audiences (comparable to the modern two-stage process: hardback, paperback).

A conventional time-lag seems to have been observed. Norton and

\textsuperscript{38} Pilarz, \textit{Southwell}.
\textsuperscript{39} Herbert Thurston, "Catholic Writers and Elizabethan Readers: II. Father Southwell the Euphuist," pp. 232-3, \textit{The Month} 83 (1895), pp. 231-45.
\textsuperscript{40} Andrew Zurcher, \textit{Shakespeare and Law} (London: Methuen Drama, 2010), p. 68.
\textsuperscript{41} Paola Pugliatti, \textit{Shakespeare and the Just War Tradition} (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 55-62.
\textsuperscript{42} Brownlow, \textit{Southwell}, p. 64. See also: Parmelee, \textit{Good Newes}, pp. 17-18.
\textsuperscript{43} Duncan-Jones, ed., \textit{Old Arcadia}, p. iii.
\textsuperscript{44} Hamilton, \textit{Munday}, p. 20.
Sackville’s *Gorboduc*, for example—a prominent example of a literary text with evident topical relevance—“was performed before Elizabeth in January 1562 and was published … apparently without the authors’ permission, in September 1565”. However, if this 2-3 year gap represents a conventional time-lag, the failure to obtain “the authors’ permission” might appear strange. On the other hand, authors in such cases may have conventionally adopted a pose of resisting publication.

Accepting the latter observation could explain Lodge’s addition of a more conspicuously Counter-Reformation-influenced “Scedule” to the 1592 edition of *Rosalynde*. In the “Scedule”, Lodge’s mouthpiece “Euphues” (John Lyly’s creation) insists his book is an anatomy of—not “wit” but—*love* “with as lively colours as in *Apelles* table: roses to whip him [Love] when he is wanton, reasons to with stand him when he is willie”.

The promise of “lively colours” and extreme naturalism of presentation are characteristics of reformist art (Catholic and northern European). The whips associated with orthodox asceticism have become roses; figures of creaturely beauty as a means of regulating desire are here preferred to flagellation. Reason retains a role, but comes second to roses. Lodge’s Euphues of 1592, in other words—after the waters had been tested by the 1590 edition—more boldly embraces the Jesuit prioritisation of the emotions over the intellect.

Lodge-biographer N. Burton Paradise has noted apparent alterations in Lodge’s temperament around 1590. Paradise finds Lodge’s dedicatory letter in *Scillaes Metamorphosis* (1589) to be “marked by a note of querulousness”; Lodge “is full of what he calls ‘divine discontent’”. By 1590 (in the *Rosalynde* dedications), “something seems to have happened which made Lodge exchange

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48 Robertson, Jr., pp. 95-6.
his mood of rather petulant unhappiness for one of confidence and high spirits”. As noted earlier, Lodge’s “humourous passions” had been “countercheckt”. Consequently, Paradise finds Rosalynde to be uniquely “sunny” among Lodge’s fictions.

Material traces possibly exist of a desire on the part of Elizabethan lay-writers to associate their productions with Southwell’s religious authority. Lodge contributed verses to the printed poetry collection The Phoenix Nest (1593). In the Induction to Lodge’s almost simultaneous publication Phillis, Gosse notes, “Lodge seems to claim for himself the responsibility of The Phoenix Nest”. Lodge refers to himself in the Induction as “I that haue liu’d a Phanix in loues flame / And felt that death I neuer would declare”. Gosse perhaps over-states the case; Lodge’s statement sounds more like a description of a recent conversion experience. However, according to its title-page, The Phoenix Nest was “set foorth” by one “R. S. of the Inner Temple, Gentleman”. Given that Robert Southwell was arrested in 1592, it is, of course, unlikely that the Jesuit played an editorial role as “R. S.”. Nonetheless, it is possible that persons associated with the volume sought to advertise that the project had been planned (“set foorth”) under Southwell’s auspices. Hyder E. Rollins, a modern editor of The Phoenix Nest, considers the suggestion that Southwell had any connection with the volume “ridiculous” on the grounds that it is full of “love-poems”. (What possible interest in love could the author of Marie Magdalens Funereal Teares have!) A rather perplexing reluctance to apprehend a connection between

51 Paradise, Lodge, pp. 37-8; see also: Gosse, “Lodge,” p. 13 (Scillaes Metamorphosis “seems to me to be a product of the poet’s early London life [dating from 1585-6] ... the tone of the preface, no less than the style of the contents bears out this supposition”).
52 Paradise, Lodge, p. 96; Tenney uses the same adjective: Lodge, p. 104.
53 Gosse, “Lodge,” pp. 32-3; see also: J. Payne Collier, A Bibliographical and Critical Account of the Rarest Books in the English Language, 2 volumes (London: Joseph Lilly, 1865), II.162-3 (“we cannot help thinking that Lodge himself may have had some hand in introducing corrections into the poems copied from [Phillis into The Phoenix Nest]”).
55 [Robert Southwell], ed. [?] The Phoenix Nest. Built Up with the Most Rare and Refined Woorkes of Noble Men, Worthy Knights, Gallant Gentlemen, Masters of Arts and Brave Schollers, Full of Varietie, Excellent Invention and Singular Delight. Never Before This Time Published. Set Foorth by R. S. of the Inner Temple, Gentleman (London: John Jackson, 1593).
Christianity and love informs the secular-sacred binary imposed by Rollins. In Janelle’s view, on the other hand, Southwell’s “condensed, rhetorical style is strikingly akin to that of the *Phoenix Nest*”. Janelle also notes that “several publishers made free with [Southwell’s] initials in order to take advantage of his wide fame”. Collier records that “the opinion of bibliographers seems to have settled most on the belief, that R. S. ... means Robert Southwell”. Hugh MacDonald, another modern editor of *The Phoenix Nest*, dismisses Southwell’s candidacy for identification as “R. S.” on the grounds that the Jesuit was not a member of the Inner Temple. Yet an association with Lincoln’s Inn “was proudly announced from 1584 to 1595 on the title pages of at least five of Lodge’s publications [though] he never entered the legal profession.” (MacDonald, Rollins and Collier, incidentally, all prove unable to offer a plausible alternative candidate for “R. S.”.)

In any case, it may be noted that, when commissioning visual artworks in Renaissance Italy, “the Jesuits worked directly with the artists to formulate new styles appropriate for their [the Jesuits’] goals”. Similarly, a Jesuit such as Southwell may have encouraged Lodge to issue *Rosalynde* in print in 1590 as a way of communicating updated Catholic doctrinal values to English Catholics. In the prefatory letter to *Marie Magdalens Funeral Teares*, Southwell exhibits full awareness of the need for masks in offering printed works, “without which moral truths ‘would not find so free a passage’”. Southwell at this time was

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60 Collier, *Rarest Books*, II.163 (Collier neglects to support this assertion with references).
61 MacDonald, “Introduction,” p. 3.
63 Bailey, *Renaissance and Baroque*, p. 16.
himself engaged in writing and printing works with a view to disseminating Jesuit doctrinal innovations which went further than the Tridentine decrees in allowing scope for free will.\textsuperscript{66} Being fugitive from the law, Southwell was free to handle religious content overtly in his writings—free even from Rome’s control.\textsuperscript{67} Southwell, though, desired to reach a larger audience,\textsuperscript{68} and, as previously suggested, may have found that certain textual strategies were not fully in keeping with his role as priest. In other words, if the religious errors of courtly Elizabethan works were to be diagnosed and rectified in public by parodic means, it might better be done by a lay author.

A number of scholars have considered it probable that Southwell and Lodge were acquainted in London.\textsuperscript{69} (Herbert Thurston even suggests that it was Lodge who taught Southwell how to write euphuistically.)\textsuperscript{70} Lodge married Jane Aldred some time prior to 1596. Aldred had belonged to the household of the Countess of Arundel at the time when Southwell is thought to have conducted his mission from the Countess’s residence, Arundel House in the Strand.\textsuperscript{71} This circumstance led Devlin to imply that Southwell may even have arranged the marriage of Lodge and Aldred.\textsuperscript{72} However, as Cuvelier points out, Aldred was not a widow until 1592, by which time Southwell was in prison.\textsuperscript{73} Nonetheless, Cuvelier too supposes that Lodge and Southwell were acquainted, judging from the evidence of the Jesuit’s influence upon Lodge’s works of the late 1580s and early 1590s.\textsuperscript{74}

Somewhat incongruously, Thurston concludes that Lodge numbered among the “finest wits” committed to “stilling Venus rose” whom Southwell reproved in

\textsuperscript{67} Sweeney, \textit{Snow in Arcadia}, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{68} Brownlow, \textit{Southwell}, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{69} Thurston, “Southwell the Euphuist,” p. 242; Pilarz, \textit{Southwell}, p. xviii.
\textsuperscript{70} Thurston, “Southwell the Euphuist,” pp. 241-3.
\textsuperscript{72} Devlin, \textit{Southwell}, p. 267.
\textsuperscript{74} Cuvelier, \textit{Lodge}, pp. 118, 152-3, 477-8.
the epistolary poem prefacing *Saint Peters Complaynt* (as discussed in more
detail in Chapter 5).\textsuperscript{75} It seems inconsistent to describe Lodge and Southwell as
sharing a desk in the Strand, so that Lodge could coach Southwell in his early
attempts at euphuism, while also suggesting that Southwell issued a
condemnation of Lodge’s poetic vanity *in public*! Thurston’s habit of imposing a
sacred/profane binary upon early modern texts may have led him to entertain
such a hypothesis.

There is evidence, moreover, that precisely such covert strategies as I am
posing Southwell adopted with Lodge were employed by the Jesuits with new
converts. For example, after the Elizabethan courtier Thomas Pounde expressed a
wish to join the Jesuits, the Father General of the order wrote to him on
December 1 1578, saying:

This one thing … I greatly desire of you, that you publish to no one this your
determination regarding our Society, neither by habit or dress, nor by discourse, but that
you keep your secret to yourself until better times come forth, when this your desire …
may be openly followed out.\textsuperscript{76}

Pounde was much more useful to the Society as a covert operative in Elizabethan
England.

As already noted, in *Robert Duke of Normandy* (a work published soon
after *Rosalynde*), Lodge refers to “[t]he Loadstarres that *directed* me in my
course [that is, in his writing of that text]” (4; emphasis added). Whether or not
these “Loadstarres” are Lodge’s doctrinal advisers and spiritual *directors*,
Lodge’s prefatory matter retains its querulous stance. Lodge instructs “the
Curteous Reader”: “if they [his “Loadstarres”] haue colours and no counterfeit,
[then] doo me right to say they set down colours without counterfeit” (4). This
statement could be read as Lodge commenting on the nature of his medieval (or
other) literary sources. However, read thus, there is no evident reason for offering

\textsuperscript{75} Thurston, “Southwell the Euphuist,” p. 242.
\textsuperscript{76} Henry Foley, *Jesuits in Conflict: or Historic Facts Illustrative of the Labours and Sufferings of
see also: pp. 94, 148-54 for the comparable and related case of George Gilbert.
a justification for his current endeavour. Certainly, “colours” is an ambiguous
term. At this period, it could mean (especially in a legal context) “specious
argument”;77 less pejoratively, it could refer to an explicit sign of allegiance”.78
The second alternative seems relevant here, as it would be self-incriminating of
Lodge to claim that he was compensating for the deficiencies of a specious
argument by augmenting it with “counterfeit”. Thus, Lodge could be read as
saying: “if my (Jesuit) guiding lights are able to declare their allegiance in their
productions and require no recourse to poetic disguises, in fairness to me observe
that their productions, consequently, preach to the converted whereas mine may
appeal to general readers”. Lodge’s narrative, that is, combines a broadly
attractive form with sound doctrine; therefore, his book should not be condemned
(or read) as profane in intent, despite its worldly guise.

With the exception of Cuvelier, critics tend to date the influence of the
Jesuit poet Southwell upon Lodge from 1596. This is understandable, given
public statements made by Lodge that year. For example, in the epistle “To the
Readers” prefacing Prosopopeia, Lodge states that previously he had “begot the
foule forepassed progenie of my thoughts, in the night of my error” (10). Many
scholars read such statements as repudiations of Lodge’s previous profane works,
despite the fact that Lodge’s A Margarite of America appeared in the same
year.79 Indeed, some scholars even date Lodge’s Catholicism from 1596,
indicating the extent to which a secular/sacred binary informs historicist
readings.80 After all, the reproaches uttered by “Truth” in Lodge’s “Trvth’s
Complaint ouer England” (appended to An Alarum against Usurers in 1584) are
difficult to understand, as Edmund Gosse observed, without “supposing the satire
to be a prudently concealed protest against the anti-Romanist action of
Parliament, and the new stringent laws against the Jesuits”.81 Lodge’s 1581
imprisonment and his arguable presentation of Tridentine and subsequent Jesuit

77 Zurcher, Law, pp. 179, 306.n.32.
78 “[C]olour|color, n.1,” (d): OED.
79 Janelle, Southwell, p. 56; Brownlow, Southwell, p. 44; Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 150;
Martz, Meditation, pp. 259-60; Shell, Religion, pp. 259-60.n.69.
80 Raspa, Emotive Image, p. 51. See also: Hamilton, Munday, p. 18.
doctrinal innovations in *Rosalynde* also combine to suggest that Lodge was a (Counter-Reformation-influenced) Catholic much earlier than 1596.

In company with other scholars, Paradise dates Southwell’s influence upon Lodge from 1596. He observes how the epistle “To the Readers” in Lodge’s *Prosopopeia* recalls Southwell’s *Marie Magdalens Funeral Teares* and *Saint Peters Complaynt*.82 There, Lodge compares his case to “other that haue wept (as Peter his apostasie, Marie her loss and misse of Christ,) their teares wrought from them either for repent or loue” (10).83 By 1596, St. Peter and Mary Magdalen were closely associated with Southwell, being the speakers in the Jesuit’s longest compositions. Thus, Lodge’s most explicit allusion to Southwell occurs in a prefatory letter. As noted earlier, Lodge tends to adopt a worldly pose in such paratexts. In the supposedly “Southwellian” *Prosopopeia*, therefore, Southwell is arguably relegated to the work’s worldly frame. Possibly, the Lodge of 1596 is implying (with Romans 12:2 in mind) that the young Jesuit had accommodated himself rather too well to the Elizabethan political world.

Scholars often register the epistle’s Southwellian allusions but fail to note the strikingly non-Southwellian nature of the main body of the text.84 As Cuvelier points out, in *Prosopopeia*, “Lodge y abandonne toutefois un instant le style éploré et ardent de la devotion pour l’invective”.85 What devotional piety is expressed in the work has been traced to the more orthodox influence of Luis de Granada.86 Moreover, the psychology of Lodge’s speaker in *Prosopopeia*—the Virgin Mary—is *not* explored in a manner comparable to the way in which Southwell had explored the mental and emotional states and processes of St. Peter and Mary Magdalene. Instead, Lodge’s Mary offers conventional pieties at exhaustive length in a manner the modern reader is apt to regard as “uninspired

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83 Comma before parenthesis in the original.
84 Molly Murray, for example, mistakenly assumes that the “Marie” speaking in *Prosopopeia* is the more prominently Southwellian Mary Magdalen: The Poetics of Conversion in Early Modern English Literature: Verse and Change from Donne to Dryden (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009), p. 56.
and tedious". In any case, as argued above, not only the prefatory matter but also the main narrative in *Rosalynde* appears already to reflect the emotional emphasis Southwell introduced to English writing in 1587. It is possible, therefore, that Southwell’s direct influence upon Lodge dates from around that year, and that, just as the Jesuit Father General sought to make the best use of Pounde in the run-up to the 1579 Ireland-campaign, Southwell encouraged Lodge to operate covertly, so as not to compromise a parodic (that is to say, a reconciliatory, non-aggressive, but hardly neutral) strategy—singing alongside the authorities’ song.

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Scholars frequently comment on the fact that Lodge pioneered a given form or *topos* in English literature. For example, *An Alarum Against Vsurers* has been regarded as a forerunner of the modern realistic novel. *Scyllaes Metamorphosis*, as epyllion and in its use of a 6-line stanza, anticipates Shakespeare’s *Venus and Adonis*. Arguing for a 1586-7 date of composition, Joseph W. Houppert considers Lodge’s *The Wounds of Civil War* to be “the oldest extant English

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87 Walker, “Reading,” p. 280.
89 In *Robert Second Duke of Normandy*, a 7-year silence is imposed upon the penitent hero by his papally-appointed confessor, “in acknowledgement of his accustomed leawndnesse”, during which time Robert “should walke in a fooles habite” (p. 46). Read biographically, this detail is consistent with the present argument, suggesting Lodge came under Southwell’s direct influence in 1589 and was sworn to conceal same until 1596.
drama based on classical history.”\textsuperscript{93} Lodge, moreover, was the first Elizabethan poet to publish satires in notable quantities.\textsuperscript{94} Two questions, therefore, arise: 1) How did Lodge manage to break new ground so often? 2) Why did he receive so little credit for this?\textsuperscript{95}

That Lodge repeatedly broke new literary ground suggests that he had access to the latest continental theories (doctrinal and literary—the distinction between these categories not being rigid at the period).\textsuperscript{96} Presumably, however, Lodge aimed his innovative works at a mixed but broadly conservative audience. Ironically, therefore, other English writers could then copy the forms Lodge introduced and produce “Counter-Reformation” works that could appeal to less-conservative “Anglicans” and more radical reformers.

The famous complaint about Shakespeare in \textit{Greenes Groats-Worth of Witte} (1592) is consistent with this assessment.\textsuperscript{97} Whether written by Robert Greene or not,\textsuperscript{98} the attack voices the angry response of a university-trained author to a non-university-trained agent’s “borrowing” of new forms in order to use them for populist purposes. (Greene, of course, pioneered the romance novel in Elizabethan culture along with Lodge and Sidney.)\textsuperscript{99}

Another important innovation may be attributed (belatedly) to Lodge. Sweeney has argued that Southwell’s experience of the Ignatian Exercises facilitated his innovative presentations of the mental processes of fictional characters. Accordingly, Southwell’s Magdalen, Sweeney maintains, imported to English poetry “a ‘real’ self-exposing psychology, depicted in disordered mid-


\textsuperscript{96} Martz, \textit{Meditation}, p. 7.


\textsuperscript{98} Mentz, “Forming Greene,” p. 117.

thought, mid-crisis, the sort that later appeared as ... realistic ‘personations’ in Shakespeare”. This suggestion is a welcome corrective to the usual reliance upon Shakespeare’s unique genius as the crucial factor in the Elizabethan revolution in fictional characterization. What also needs to be stressed, however, is the ready home Elizabethan culture provided for the Ignatian guide to interiority. As Ronald J. Corthell has argued, Catholics were “uniquely situated to experience the problem of the subject in Elizabethan England”. For Corthell, moreover, English recusant documents “pro- and anti- Catholic, represent an estranged or divided subject, a representation potentially productive of a discourse of interiority”. It would appear, therefore, that Southwell and other Jesuit missionaries found fertile cognitive terrain for their Ignatian seed. Hence, Lodge’s innovative representation of Rosalynd’s thought processes (discussed below) may indicate that the lay author had learned from Southwell how to employ Ignatian techniques in literary performance. Lodge would thus have pioneered (in print) Southwell’s Ignatian-inspired poetic breakthrough.

Read as a Jesuit-inspired exploration of interiority for the purposes of teaching Elizabethan readers how to simulate the prohibited priest function, “Rosalynd’s Passion” (as the monologue uttered by Lodge’s heroine upon her

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100 Sweeney, *Snow in Arcadia*, p. 146.
102 The title-page of the 1590 edition of Lodge’s romance has the spelling “Rosalynde”. (The only title Lodge uses to refer to the 1590 text in the prefatory epistles is “Euphues Legacie” [8].) In the body of the narrative, the heroine’s name—prior to her assumption of her Ganimede-disguise—is generally spelled “ROSALYND” (and the first page of the narrative is headed “Rosalynd”). With reference to books printed in England in the last quarter of the 16th century, Ronald B. McKerrow suggests that one should “regard the title-page not as part of the work to which it is prefixed, or as the production of its author”: *An Introduction to Bibliography for Literary Students* (New Castle: Oak Knoll, 1994 [reprint of 1928 edition]), p. 91. Accordingly, I retain the title-page’s spelling for the book’s title but refer to Lodge’s heroine as Rosalynd before she assumes her Ganimede-disguise and as Rosalynde after that point (the change will be signalled in a footnote). After the heroine removes her male disguise, the text abandons localized consistency and flickers between the two spellings as though registering alternative realities. From p. 133 to the narrative’s conclusion, “ROSALYND” appears 6 times and “ROSALYNDE” 4.
104 Sweeney, *Snow in Arcadia*, pp. 130-1.
beloved Rosader’s attractions is titled [27]) is a spiritual meditation in which the speaker evaluates her worthiness to be loved by Christ (as figured by Rosader). Love has “presented [Rosalynd] with the IDEA of ROSADERS perfection, and taking her at discouert, strooke her so deepe, as she felt her selfe grow passing passionate” (27). A mystical atmosphere is detectable in this description of an experience comparable in its sensual violence to that of St. Teresa of Avila. The meditation then proceeds in proper Ignatian fashion with an intense visualisation:105

she began to call to minde the comelinesse of his person ... and the vertues that ... made him so gracious in the eies of euerie one. Sucking in thus the hony of loue, by impring in her thoughtes his rare qualities, she began to surfit with the contemplation of his vertuous conditions. (27)

By way of dramatic contrast, having mentally conjured this image of perfection, Rosalynd then pictures herself: “but when she cald to remembrance her present estate ... desire began to shrink” (27). Rosalynd’s anguish upon apprehending infinite-seeming distance between herself and a divine object recalls Luther wrestling with the meaning of Paul’s letters. However, where Luther employed his self-bound intellect and humanist technique to cut through what he regarded as scholastic obfuscation in order to obtain “true” readings of Scripture, Lodge’s Rosalynd examines her own mind: “betweene a Chaos of confused thoughtes, she began to debate with her selfe in this manner” (27). This is not the unified Lutheran subject capable of auto-cognition by rational means. Rosalynd’s meditation employs facultative means to bring a “Chaos of confused thoughtes” to order (as a priest would endeavour to do were one to hand) with a view to rediscovering one’s likeness to (participation in) a triune (or facultative) God.

An orthodox meditation on the topic of the believer’s relationship to Christ would be expected to lament the believer’s condition as a sinner, one condemned

to moral failure by Adam and Eve’s fall. Rosalynd does indeed focus on family history. The consequences of past political events prevent her from obtaining her desires: “Thy father is by TORISMOND banisht from the crowne” (28). The “banisht” ex-ruler thus resembles Adam (erstwhile lord of nature) exiled from Eden and deprived of his “crowne” of glory. Accordingly, Rosalynd describes herself as “the unhappie daughter of a King detained captive, liuing as disquieted in thy thoughts as thy father discontented in his exile” (28). By means of euphuistic parallelism, Gerismond’s current discontentment is connected to the “disquieted” condition of Rosalynd’s mind. If Rosalynd cannot bring her thoughts to order, this circumstance suggests, it is not because she is ontologically fallen but because she has allowed an adverse political “fate” to disorder her cognitive process.

Rosalynd proceeds: “Oh ROSALYND, hadst thou been borne lowe, thou hadst not fallen so high” (28). Here, Rosalynd seems to brag of her pedigree in a manner unbecoming to a romance heroine. However, if she is read as speaking on behalf of humanity, then her words offer a refutation of an ontological understanding of Original Sin. Such a refutation, moreover, contradicts the Council of Trent, which stated: “Si quis Adae praevationem sibi soli et non ejus propagini asserit nocuisse ... anathema sit”. Denying this postulate allowed one to consider the human will as not fallen in an ontological sense; therefore, human beings could cooperate in the performance of salvation. Trent denied such a conclusion:

Si quis hoc Adae peccatum, quod origine unum est, et propagation non imitation transfusum omnibus inest unicuique proprium, vel per humanae naturae vires, vel per aliud remedium asserit tolli, quam per meritum unius mediatoris Domini nostril Jesu

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106 Fraser makes the same observation with reference to the banished Duke in AYL: “Genesis,” p. 125.
As Sweeney observes:

Jesuit thinkers had ... developed a modified attitude to the effects of Original Sin: our will was weakened but not annihilated by it, allowing for grace-fuelled effort; indeed, 'grace, always the primary factor, allowed the will to “cooperate” with it, so that in some mysterious way human responsibility played its part in the process of salvation.' This is a constant underlying thesis in Southwell's poetry, and it gave comfort, as well as dignity to human enterprise that was, for the moment, denied in Protestantism.¹⁰⁰

Southwell's influence (the present reading infers) has propelled Rosalynd—and Lodge—beyond the bounds of Catholic orthodoxy.

Furthermore, where one might expect Rosalynd's clause “hadst thou been borne lowe” to be followed by the conclusion “thou hadst not fallen so far”, the speaker substitutes “high” for “far”. Losing status in the world’s eyes, such a substitution implies, is a means of rising in God’s regard. A further implication, I would suggest, is that the cause of Rosalynd’s current misery is not divine decree but a human or demonic misappropriation of power, resulting in the promulgation of a false teaching which inculcates despair. Bleak as this analysis sounds, it also reveals (in line with Jesuit thinking) that the situation can be rectified by human endeavour: human beings are not condemned to moral failure; indeed, they must collaborate with God to achieve salvation. It may be noted here that such formulations were more than Claudio Acquaviva—Jesuit Father General from 1581, and throughout Southwell's mission—was prepared to endorse.¹¹¹

“[B]eing great of bloud,” Rosalynd next tells herself, “thine honour is

¹⁰⁰ “Peccato Originali,” p. 301. “If anyone asserts that this sin of Adam, which in its origin is one, and by propagation, not by imitation, transfused into all, which is in each one as something that is his own, is taken away either by the forces of human nature or by remedy other than the merit of the one mediator, our Lord Jesus Christ ... let him be anathema”: Schroeder, ed. Trent, p. 22.
more, if thou brookest misfortune with patience” (28). Lodge’s princess here confronts the Stoic formula which tended to hold Elizabethan conservatives in check, only to reject it thus: “Suppose I contrary fortune with content, yet Fates vnwilling to haue me any way happie haue forced loue to set my thoughts on fire with fancie” (28). The “loue” Rosalind feels is (it might be argued) no less “predestined” than any other aspect of her earthly career; that this “loue” appears incapable of fulfillment would then indicate that the universe is ruled by unkind “Fates”—a heretical thought. Reading back, however, Rosalind’s “Suppose” cancels the notion in advance. Moreover, unless her “loue” is of a religious (albeit troubling) nature, her statements here might disqualify Rosalynd as virtuous heroine. Read doctrinally, though, Rosalynd’s musings engage in the contemporary debate about whether one had to willingly solicit/accept grace or whether, on the contrary, grace is irresistible. The same debate arguably informs aspects of The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia. Sidney’s narrator there describes love as “that wonderful passion which to be defined is impossible, by reason no words reach near to the strange nature of it. They only know it which inwardly feel it.” (Likewise, in Mary Magdalen’s Funeral Tears, Southwell’s narrator states: “Love is not controled by reason. It neither regardeth what can be, nor what shall be done, but only what itself desireth to do”.)

Sidney’s treatment is more tentative than Lodge’s. No-one is on hand to gainsay Rosalynd’s arguments, as Musidorus does Pyrocles’s with the Platonic assertion: “Remember ... if we will be men, the reasonable part of the soul is to have absolute commandment”. Nonetheless, Musidorus himself soon proceeds to fall in love. Cross-dressing and pastoral disguise notwithstanding, the two friends remain the principal heroes of the earlier version of the romance, albeit ambivalently so; their careers, therefore, are not being presented to the would-be virtuous reader as necessarily courses to shun. A more complex salvific contest is being exhibited than that envisioned by the moral certainties of early

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112 Schroeder, ed. Trent, pp. 29-46.
113 Duncan-Jones, ed. Old Arcadia, p. 11.
114 Walter, ed. Prose Works, p. 65.
115 Duncan-Jones, ed. Old Arcadia, pp. 17, 370.n
Renaissance humanism. Sidney, moreover, is known to have studied the
Tridentine decrees in Italy during his continental travels.\textsuperscript{117} Hence, Counter-
Reformation influence could have reached Lodge via Sidney. Further discussion,
below, however, will argue that Southwell led Lodge into doctrinal territory
uncharted in \textit{Arcadia}.

In any case, Rosalynd subsequently descends from these spiritual heights to
material considerations: “consider ROSALIND [sic] his [Rosader’s] fortunes,
and thy present estate, thou art poore and without patrimonie, and yet the
daughter of a Prince, he a younger brother” (28). Rosalynd is more concerned
about a lack of material means than her lover’s pedigree (she does not consider
Rosader’s parentage); Rosader is “voide of such possessions as eyther might
maintayne thy dignities, or reuenge thy fathers injuries” (28). (The imprisoned
Mary Stuart likewise hesitated to attach herself to any suitor without the means to
promote her cause successfully.) “Tush ROSALYND,” Lodge’s heroine
continues, “be not ouer rash; leape not before thou looke; eyther loue such a one
as may with his landes purchase thy liberty, or els loue not at all” (29). The
phrase “purchase thy liberty” reminds the reader that Rosalynd is currently an
imprisoned princess. It is scarcely conceivable that such a character in a text
written in 1587 could have been read as \textit{not} alluding to Mary Stuart. (One of
Southwell’s poems [“Decease release”] treated of Mary’s execution;\textsuperscript{118}
Southwell’s \textit{Humble Supplication} [1592] details the conspiracy behind her
execution.)\textsuperscript{119}

Finally, though, Rosalynd rejects material considerations: “Why
ROSALYND, can such base thoughtes harbour in such high beauties?” (29). In
the “Madrigal” she sings at the close of her meditation, she allows “Loue” to
make “His bed amidst my tender breast” (29). She threatens the “wanton”, telling
him she “will whip you hence ... with roses euerie day” (30), which (anticipating
and endorsing the “Scedule” Lodge “annexed” to the 1592 edition)\textsuperscript{120} may

\begin{footnotes}
\item[117] Buxton, \textit{Sidney}, p. 72.
\item[119] Bald, ed. \textit{Humble Supplication}.
\item[120] Lodge, “Miscellaneous Pieces,” pp. 5-6, in \textit{Works}, Volume 4.
\end{footnotes}
describe an Ignatian penitential practice (involving a rosary, as promoted vigorously—in and around 1592—by Southwell’s fellow missionary Garnet). Nonetheless, Rosalynd concedes that, in such a case, penitential activity is futile. This is not a bad thing, though, because the love she feels has a divine source: “He will repay me with annoy, / because a God” (30). Like the Virgin Mary in response to the angel Gabriel, Rosalynd submits to this divine decree: “Then sit thou safely on my knee, / And let thy bowre my bosome be” (30). Love of this version of the Virgin Mary will allow the lover to mature, as Christ matured in her womb.

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During a picnic on the outskirts of the Forest of Ardennes, Rosalynd—disguised-as-Ganimede points out to Aliena (her fellow princess Alinda in disguise) some verses carved on a tree, calling them “figures of men”. The verses are “Montanus Passion”; their contents reveal that “the flower of beautie” adored by the shepherd Montanus is “attir’d in scorne” (like the conventional Petrarchan beloved). These devotional verses have been left by a fountain (awarded a capital “F”) in the “groue of some Goddesse” (36). Montanus’s plight signals that grace is not won by devotion, at least not in this wild territory.

That the shepherd’s poem is a religious complaint is arguably indicated when “Montanus” moans: “Had I the power to weepe sweet Mirrhas teares ... I then could beare the burden of my griefe” (37). Suitors seeking sensual gratification would presumably not consider ongoing rejection to be adequately compensated by the ability to shed copious tears. As Nellist and Batin’s gloss observes, the classical figure Myrrha “was metamorphosed into [a] weeping, oozing myrrh tree (denoting tears of penitence)”. Naming Mirrha, the mother

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122 Spenser’s “faithless Rosalind”, on the other hand, is “voide of grace”: Smith & Selincourt, eds. *Spenser*, p. 442.
123 I retain the spelling “Rosalynd” until the longer version is adopted by the text.
of Adonis, is an acceptable way of referring to a penitential female figure, reminiscent of, say, Mary Magdalen. (As noted above, Lodge had prescribed precisely such a coded use of classical figures in his *Defence of Poetry*.) According to "Montanus Passion", Mirrha’s tears were/are efficacious; however, Montanus (as, it would seem, irretrievably fallen being) lacks "the power" to weep them.

Cognizably sincere disclosure alone can improve matters between Montanus and his beloved: "not my teares, but truth with thee preuailes" (37)—but, of course, between human *subjects* such disclosure is impossible. The case, therefore, is hopeless, as long as Montanus remains committed to subjectivism. Montanus does not criticise his mistress’s position, but appears to retain an attachment to the former value of tears. Thus, he figures exactly the type of Luther-influenced person the Jesuits had come to admonish and reclaim.

Subsequently, Aliena and Ganimede spy "an old shepheard" and "a yong swaine" conversing in a place designed for secrecy, where trees "with the thicenesse of their boughes so shadowed the place, that PHCEBUS could not prie into the secret of that Arbour". Here spurs "a Fount so Christalline and cleere, that it seemed DIANA with her DRIADES and HEMADRIADES had that spring, as the secrete of all their bathings" (39). It sounds like a dissolved, dilapidated monastery, gradually returning to a state of nature. The scene also potentially recreates the first image which Jesuit novices encountered upon entering the gallery at the Novitiate of S. Andrea al Quirinale in Rome, "[t]he principal training centre for the entire Jesuit order". That image showed "The Good Old Man and the Young Novice", a figuration of "the spiritual journey the novices would undertake ... under the guidance of their superior". Describing this crucial moment, Lodge’s narrator switches (for the only time in the romance) from third person plural ("they might perceiue" [39]) to first person plural: "drawing more nigh wee might descrie..."and "wee (to heare what these [woes] were) stole priuilie behind the thicke" (39-40; emphases added). Lodge selects

Montanus, the young swain, is reminiscent of Dyer’s lover: his “countenance ... full of sorowe, his face ... the verie pourtraiture of discontent, and his eyes full of woes, that liuing he seemed to dye” (40). “A Pleasant Eglog betweene Montanus and Coridon” ensues. In this exchange, Coridon begs Montanus to “sing for joy” in response to the beauty of their surroundings. However, Montanus knows no joy, on account of his mistress “Phœbes bitter scorne” (40). “Phœbe” may function here as a conventional name for Queen Elizabeth I. Spenser, in the letter to Sir Walter Ralegh included in the first edition of *The Faerie Queene*, recalls that Ralegh figured Elizabeth as the goddess Cynthia and iterates the latter deity’s cognate names: Phœbe and Diana.127 Scholars have argued that the concept of Elizabeth-as-goddess could have functioned as a Virgin Mary-surrogate for English subjects.128 In which case, from the Catholic Lodge’s perspective, “Phœbe” might figure an intercessor to whom one prays to no effect.

Montanus’s situation is not simply one of erotic deprivation:

In errours maske I blindfolde judgements eye ...
I seeme secure, yet know not how to trust:
I liue by that, which makes me liuing die ...
Plague to my selfe, consumed by my thought (41)

Montanus’s lament restates the plight of the speaker in Dyer’s poem, but in a more explicit vein. That is, Lodge renders overt the mournful speaker’s *knowing* acquiescence in an erroneous belief-system. Such a person wears the “maske” of “errour”: he feigns to profess assurance of salvation, all the time knowing that he


has no sound basis for that “trust”. In this way, one becomes one’s own enemy (as intimated in Dyer’s poem).

Seeking to enlighten his companion, Coridon offers moralistic platitudes, according to which, for example, love is

A painted shrine ful-fild with rotten treasure,
   A heauen in shew, a hell to them that proue ...
A broken staffe which follie doth vpholde (41)

The heavy-handed religious imagery recalls Southwell’s re-write of Dyer’s poem. There is something futile about such a method of reproof. It defeats itself, retaining the sententiousness of the style it seeks to correct, but lacking the courtier’s wit and irony; it converts what ought to be a joyous message to earnest dreariness.

Unsurprisingly, Coridon’s argument has no effect on Montanus, principally because of the latter shepherd’s experience of an intense pleasure attendant upon his misery: “Thinke I of loue, ô how my lines aspire? ... the Muses ... fill my braines with chast and holy fire” (42-3). Sent to convert wavering poets and their readers, Southwell had to confront the fact that Lutheranism had created infinite conceptual space for poets to explore; it also granted them the freedom to explore it. “Amaz’d I read the stile when I haue done”, crows Montanus.

Indeed, there is a mystical tenor to the shepherd’s raptures:

My sheepe are turned to thoughts, whom froward will. [sic]
Guides in the restlesse Laborynth of loue,
   Feare lends them pasture wheresoere they moue,
   And by their death their life renueeth still. (43)

Note that it is Montanus’s will—which he cannot control—which makes his sheep-thoughts stray restlessly in a “Laborynth of loue”. Having wandered from their former, restful feeding place, the sheep-thoughts feed now on anxiety alone; dying, these anguished, aimless thoughts continually revive as new thoughts.
Montanus thus seeks to justify his creed on the grounds that, according to this new arrangement, sheep are not parishioners in the care of a priest, but thoughts in the care of the individual. In this system, sheep feed themselves; there is no role for an external priest. In short, Montanus prizes his spiritual anguish: “although I blythe me not ... since sorrow is my sweete ... Montanus liketh well his lot” (43).

As Coridon recognises, there is no curing such a lover by reason alone. The text endorses Coridon’s verdict by concluding the “Eglog” with a quotation from Terence’s Eunuchus, which includes the observation: “incerta hac si tu pustules, ratione certa fieri nihilo plus agas, quam si des operam, vt cum ratione insanias” (45). In a pamphlet published in 1587, William Allen, the head of the Douai College, quotes the same tag in relation to the futility of arguing with Protestants: “to deale with such, either by humane, or Divine laws, were, Cum ratione insanire. [Margin: “To be madde with reason.] As the Poete said.”

Coridon informs Aliena and Ganimede—the two travellers having approached the shepherds—that he cannot help Montanus: “Exhort him I may, but perswade him I cannot; for Loue admits neither of counsaile, nor reason” (46). If such as Montanus are to be “cured”, some new approach is required. Southwell had brought such an approach to England. This will be discussed in due course, with reference to the hero Rosader. For now, though, it is necessary to observe what further methods are applied to Montanus.

At a later point in the narrative, Rosalynd-disguised-as-Ganimede uses his receipt of a love-letter from Phœbe as an occasion to try and educate Montanus:

enter with a deepe insight into the despaire o f thy fancies, and thou shalt see the depth of thine owne follies ... Thou seekest with PHŒBUS to winne DAPHNE, and shee flies faster than thou canst followe ... in courting PHŒBE thou barkest with the Wolues of Syria against the Moone (119)

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Montanus’s rationalistic faith is irrational. The intellect alone cannot grasp “truth”. Montanus (in his “Passion” verse) has acknowledged the futility of his prayers. Hence, he implicitly confesses to idolatry—the worship of a hollow image; his prayers are as idle as the barking of wolves, seeking to influence the moon’s course.

Lodge’s reference to “Syria” may glance at English Catholic conformists (“Church Papists”). The English Catholic priest Alban Langdale had defended attendance of Elizabethan church services, using the Biblical example of Naaman. Though Jewish, Naaman participated in pagan rites in order to “exhibit his service to the king”. However, the prophet Elisha pardoned Naaman’s expedient action. Naaman performed this act of conformity in “Syria where all were idolaters”. As “[r]esident priest to the Montague household”, Langdale typified the kind of priest the Jesuits had been sent to bring back into line.

As may be seen, Ganimede has strayed into polemics, after the manner of Coridon. This admonitory method achieves nothing. To effect a change in Montanus’s cognitive habitus, facultative rhetoric must be employed—indeed, facultative interaction must be performed (as in an Ignatian exercise). For this to occur, an emotional relationship needs to be established between both participants. Rosalynd-Ganimede cannot establish such a link with Montanus, for he is committed to subjective isolation, his unique selfhood. Hence, as seen, his anguish is insincere (he claims to enjoy being unhappy). He is not prepared to dismantle his self-ideal and reform it radically by facultative means.

Unable to stop loving Phoebe (the projection of his self-ideal), Montanus appears incurable, immobilised: “the Shepheard stooode as though hee had neither wonne nor lost” (120). Does, then, Montanus’s plight recall more that of a Dyer or a Sidney? After all, Sidney represented himself in the Old Arcadia as, like Montanus, a lovelorn shepherd (Philisides). Perhaps Lodge here represents the

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131 Walsham, Church Papists.
133 Miola, ed. Early Modern Catholicism, p. 72.
134 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 27; O’Malley, First Jesuits, p. 41.
situation of English Protestant subjects such as Sidney who remained supposedly loyal to Elizabeth despite the fact that they were generally refused key positions within her administration, and no matter what engagements she appeared to countenance with Catholic princes. Exposure of that last form of betrayal is possibly figured when Montanus discovers that the letter Phœbe bade him carry treacherously declares her love for the new arrival Ganimede—after she had declared herself incapable of loving anyone.

However, Montanus says:

so hath Loue taught mee to honour PHCEBE, that I would prejudice my life to pleasure her, and die in despaire rather than she should perish for want ... If she marrie though it be my Martyrdome: yet if shee bee pleased I will brooke it with patience (121)

Recalling that such as Leicester and Sidney did not “brooke” the proposed Alençon (French) match “with patience”, it appears that Lodge awards credit to Montanus as loyalist crypto-Catholic.

After all, if Ganimede is employing Jesuit techniques to recover erring Catholics, it would make little sense for him to seek to win Phoebe for Montanus if the latter were to be read as Protestant. Moreover, that the fictional shepherd’s case was read by contemporaries as resembling Dyer’s is confirmed by the fact that two poems “by” Lodge’s Montanus reprinted in Englands Helicon (1600) were there ascribed to Dyer.

The clearest indication that Jesuit doctrinal theories influenced the writing of

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136 Kennedy, “Sidney’s Astrophil,” p. 72; Wooding, Rethinking, p. 240; Southwell makes a comparable case for the principled loyalty of Catholics in Bald, ed. Humble Supplication. See also, with reference to the presentation of Montague (whose name might be alluded to in Lodge’s “Montanus”) as loyal Elizabethan Catholic in A Treatise of Treasons: Questier, Catholicism and Community, p. 145.

137 MacDonald, ed. Englands Helicon, pp. 142-3, 167.
Rosalynde is provided by the presentation of Rosader's forgiveness of his brother Saladyne. At one point in the story, the fugitives Adam and Rosader find themselves starving in "the thicke of the forrest" (54). As the faithful servant of Sir John of Bourdeaux, Adam respects traditional values. Thus, he responds to current misfortune with Stoic resolve, telling himself to "thwart her [misfortune] with brooking all mishappes with patience". However, the limits of a Stoic response to circumstances attendant on persecution are plainly observed. Seeing no means of preventing young Rosader's death from starvation, Adam cries: "What shall I do? preuent the sight of his [Rosader's] further misfortune, with a present dispatch of mine owne life" (55). This action, of course, would not help Rosader and might result in Adam's damnation for self-murder. Hence, Stoicism is unable to suggest an adequate response in certain circumstances. In this mystical forest, Rosader's starvation can be read as spiritual: deprived of the Eucharist in a Protestant land, his approach to death signifies his worsening state of sin. Hence, Southwell, on arrival in England, stressed to Catholic waverers the limits of a quietist (Stoic) response to their circumstances. One was not obliged to resist temporal evils (Stoicism is adequate to temporal trials), but one should seek access to the Eucharist, even if doing so is against the law.

Adam concludes that "despaire is a mercilesse sinne" (55) and adopts a new resolution, telling Rosader: "I will presently cut my veynes, & master, with the warme bloud relieue your fainting spirits: sucke on that till I ende, and you be comforted" (56). This baroque-sounding offer yields unmistakeable traces of the influence of Southwell. In a text printed as an epistle to his brother, the Jesuit author had written that if Christ's "blood move you not ... I would I might send you the sacrifice of my dearest veines, to try whether nature could awake remorse, and prepare a way for grace's entrance". Thus, in the character of a servant with the appropriate name "Adam", Lodge represents the limits of the natural man's ability to access grace unaided.

At this very moment in Rosader's history Providence intervenes: "It

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chaunced that day” that the banished king was holding a great feast in the forest. The role of “chance” is emphasised by repetition: “To that place by chance Fortune conducted ROSADER” (56; emphases added). This reliance on an almost miraculous intervention, in the context of the necessity of obtaining the spiritual food of the Eucharist at all costs, reflects the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina’s insistence (published in *Concordia Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis* [1588]) on the bestowing-reception of grace as a human collaboration with God. The Stoic endures Fortune; the Jesuit-taught Catholic perceives “Fortune” to be a worldly illusion and restores Providence to its rightful place. However, though Providence supplies the occasion, the believer must perform the efficacious deed. That is, Rosader must not only forgive his wicked brother, but also risk his life to save him—for “chance” also leads Rosader to Saladyne’s sleeping body in the forest. A hungry lion watches the sleeping man, waiting to devour him when he wakes (83).

Earlier, the text has demonstrated that Rosader has been raised to observe the values of “Cheualrie” within a Stoic framework (20). Therefore, he has been taught to withstand rather than love his enemy. As a result, he was likely to fail to perform the efficacious deed required by the new Jesuit theology. However, Rosalynd-disguised-as-Ganimede has intervened with a uniquely Jesuit technique. In the poems Rosader writes in honour of the absent Rosalynde, the lovesick youth expresses his sorrowful condition: “Full wofull ... my heart” (25); “I bemoane / The absence of faire Rosalynde” (“Rosalyndes Description” [65]); “In sorrowes cell I laid me downe to sleepe” (“Rosaders Sonnet” [71]); “Search I the shade to flie my paine” (“Rosaders Second Sonetto”[75]). From these poems one learns that Rosader is in love and he is unhappy. There is no ethical element. After meeting Ganimede and Aliena in the forest and reading them his second sonnet, Rosader asks, “How like you this Sonnet[?]” Ganimede answers: “for the penne well, for the passion ill” (75). That Rosader loves Rosalynde is, it seems, all well and good, but it has had no improving effect on his tendency to bemoan

139 The relevant passage is discussed in Chapter 6.
140 From this point on the name of Lodge’s heroine will be spelled “Rosalynde” in accordance with the text’s general practice.
his fate. Ganimede, however, seeks “to driue him out of this amorous melancholie” and the method he adopts is Jesuit-inspired (76). Just as the Jesuit colleges used drama as an educational tool (and as a means “to foster authentic commitment”), Lodge’s Ganimede offers to “represent ROSALYNDE” in a role-play session (77).

Dramatic representation offers a means of having the self-obsessed Rosader participate in a spiritual meditation without him knowing that he is doing so. Ganimede composes the essential features of the “place”: “see in some amorous Eglogue, how if ROSALYNDE were present, how thou couldst court her” (77; emphasis added). The emphasis on vision is important. In “The Wooing Eglogue” that follows, Rosader not only prays for pity but (unprompted) strikes a new note: “Looke on mine eyes made red with rufull teares, / From whence the raine of true remorse descendeth” (77; emphases added). “[R]emorse” for what? This is the utterance (at last) of one who is aware that he has committed sin; previously, Rosader had been preoccupied with his own misfortune. Ganimede-as-Rosalynde now adopts a Counter-Reformation poetic manner to woo/instruct Rosader:

Loues wantons arme their traitrous sutes with teares,
With vowes, with oathes, with lookes, with showers of golde:
But when the fruite of their affects appeares,
The simple heart by subtill sleights is solde. (78)

No less moralising than Coridon’s remonstrations (also in verse-form) with Montanus, this “Eglogue” nonetheless differs in that both participants are acting. (Of course, Montanus and Coridon might also be said to be enacting conventional roles, but that perspective is not ascribed to them within the narrative.) Thus, the resistance one puts up when one speaks in propria persona

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is dissolved. The “authentic-self-as-subject” becomes vulnerable to exposure as a role one’s culture has led one to adopt. Consequently, the isolated, suffering Christian subject threatens to appear as a misconceived parody of Christ. Where Montanus’s own pride in the pleasure he claimed to gain from his suffering deafens him to Coridon’s arguments, Rosader-performing—“Rosader” can surrender ground without loss of (egoistic) dignity. There are also differences in style and content: Ganimede-as-Rosalyndye’s chain of repeated mini-phrases (“With vowes, with oathes, with lookes, with showers of golde”) convey a Southwellian urgency, whereas Coridon’s alliteration is euphuistic in its transpositions and, thus, requires more space (“As manie starres as glorious heauen containes, / As manie stormes as wayward winter weepes...” [44]).

Intimacy and intensity replace orotundity. Moreover, Ganimede does not condemn love as Coridon did, but insists only that “beautie leane ... to wit and soothfastnesse” before acceding to a lover’s suit (78). Most importantly, Ganimede’s Rosalyndye agrees to “grace thee [Rosader] with her loue”, which dissolves Rosader’s melancholy at once:

Since Rosalynde will Rosader respect
Then let my face exile his sorrie cheere,
And frolick in the comfort of affect (80)

However, when the “Eglogue” ends, Rosader observes, reasonably enough:

ROSADER hath his ROSALYNDE: but as IXION had IUNO, who thinking to possesse a goddesse, onely imbraced a clowde: in these imaginarie fruitions of fancie, I resemble the birds that fed themselues with ZEUXIS painted grapes ... so fareth it with me, who ... onely in conceipt reape a wished for content (80)

143 A Southwellian “chain” occurs in the second of the following lines: “Fatt soyle, full springe, sweete olive, grape of blisse / That yeldes, that streames, that powres, that does distil...”, “Christs Bloody Sweate,” in Sweeney & Davidson, eds. Collected Poems, p. 17.
Imitations of the blood of Christ are not the thing itself. English Catholics cannot live by reading romances alone. Nonetheless, from the spiritual guide’s point of view, gains have been made: Rosader has expressed an understanding of the need for penance. Some change may already be presumed to be taking place within him. Indeed, Rosader says: “Yet doo I take these follies for high fortunes, and hope these fained affections doo deuine some unfained ende of ensuing fancies” (80-1). Likewise, reading Lodge’s Rosalynde, an Elizabethan Catholic might be reminded of values which had been neglected, and in that act of recollection apprehend a greater alteration soon to come.

As Lodge’s narrator puts it (allowing himself a rare interjection): “all was well, hope is a sweete string to harpe on: and therefore let the Forrester a while shape himselfe to his shadow, and tarrie Fortunes leasure, till she may make a Metamorphosis fit for his purpose” (81). Such an optimistic understanding of how “Fortune” functions suggests it is Providence in disguise.

Thus, in re-educating Rosader, Ganimede employs the very strategies which the Jesuits imported to England. This observation accounts for the intriguing moment after Rosader has departed, when Aliena remarks to Ganimede: “I haue heard them say, that what the Fates forepoint, that Fortune pricketh downe with a period”. The princess seems to hint here that Ganimede’s Jesuit-style methods do not leave everything to Providence, for she adds: “it cannot bee but such a shaddowe portends the issue of a substaunce, for to that ende did the Gods force the concept of this Eglogue [between you and Rosader], that they might discouer the ensuing consent of your affections” (82; emphasis added). That is, Aliena commends Ganimede on having found such a clever way to have Rosader participate in an imaginary rite of confession, in order to divine (and perhaps “force”) his religious allegiance.

In response, Ganimede points out that such enactments are no proof of

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144 O’Malley, First Jesuits, p. 39.
145 Velma Bourgeois Richmond notes that while Lodge subtracts the anti-clerical details of his source Gamelyn, he retains its faith in a Providential pattern: Shakespeare, Catholicism, and Romance (New York: Continuum, 2000), p. 134.
146 Jesuits were sometimes accused of making “use of the confessional to attract novices”: Meyer, Catholic Church, p. 111.
anything in themselves: “the match is not yet so surely made but he [Rosader] may misse of his market; but if Fortune be his friend, I will not be his foe” (82). It sounds like Ganimede is being crassly materialistic: if Rosader gets rich, Rosalynde will marry him. On the other hand, Ganimede can be read as countering Aliena’s imputation that he was forcing the issue by setting up the “eglogue” with Rosader on partisan terms. That is, Ganimede insists that the youth’s spiritual success will be decided by Providence (“Fortune”), not his (Ganimede’s) devices, however subtle. That the question of interpreting “Fortune” as either Providence or chance is at stake is confirmed by the following scene.

Saladyne, lost in the forest, “hungrie with long fasting”, falls asleep, and is watched by “a hungrie lion” which declines to attack him till he wakes. Lodge’s narrator observes that “Lions hate to pray on dead carkasses”. One might accept this with regard to actual sated lions, but not hungry ones. The improbability justifies the supposition that this beast is the Devil in disguise, who has no appetite for the already lost, but who nonetheless waits and watches for signs of vestigial virtue in the dormant Saladyne. However, “fortune that was careful ouer her champion, began to smile” (83). The narrator’s choice of terms suggests that “fortune” may be read as Providence, for while the non-Christian deity Fortune might smile upon or show favour to an individual, she was not therefore held to take “care” of anyone, nor perceived as needing “champion[s]” as such. After all, it would be a callous touch if the reader was supposed to read Fortune as smiling on the hero of a romance by giving him the opportunity to witness his brother being eaten by a lion.

However, notwithstanding his re-education by Ganimede, Rosader is not yet fully qualified to be the hero of this romance. In his ensuing meditation, he does interpret Fortune as mere chance, congratulating himself on his good luck: with his brother dead, he will regain his properties and “make her [Rosalynde] loue thee more willingly: for womens eyes are made of Chriscoll, that is euer vnperfect vnlesse tempred with golde” (84). Rosader is the vehicle for a doctrinal

147 Wright, “Psalter Lion”; Chadwick, ed. Confessions, VII.27; Psalms 90:13
thesis here. From a “realistic” point of view, he is speaking out of character: this is the first time Rosader has echoed his father’s misogynous morality.\textsuperscript{148} Note also how this selfish meditation follows directly on Ganimede’s similar seeming-expression of crass materialism (“if Fortune be his friend, I will not be his foe” [82]). These two utterances appear to confirm loyalist Catholic prejudices regarding the material greed of Jesuit priests and the self-seeking nature of their young adherents. However, the generic thrust of the romance renders that verdict untenable. If the hero and heroine are so selfish, who cares if they get together? Hence, for the romance to function, it must be concluded that Rosalynde had Rosader’s spiritual “fortunes” in mind; that is, she hopes/foresees that the Providential outcome will be Rosader’s maturation as a Christian “champion”.

(Of course, one might cynically read the entire romance as ironic, in which case Lodge may be understood as adopting a “let’s wait and see” attitude towards the Jesuit participation in a long-term project to restore Catholicism to England.)

Suddenly, “a new motion stroke him [Rosader] to the very hart”, whereupon “hee fell into this passionate humour. Ah Rosader, wert thou the sonne of Sir JOHN of Bourdeaux ...” (85). There are, it now appears, two ways of imitating old chivalrous Sir John: one, by allowing hackneyed truisms to justify one’s behaviour as in accord with custom, alias the way of the world; two, by putting others first. Ganimede’s role-play sessions had taught the latter message: repent of one’s own faults instead of seeking to blame or punish the faults of others—stop all this self-indulgent Petrarchan moaning. That Rosader had been in danger of resembling the wrong version of his father, and becoming morally indistinguishable from Saladyne, is made clear when Rosader reflects: “\textit{Non sapit, qui non sibi sapit} is fondly spoken in such bitter extreames” (85). The iteration of the Latin tag which Saladyne had earlier misapplied (to justify pilfering Rosader’s inheritance) (16) secures the parallel. But here Rosader observes the self-deceiving folly of relying on such truisms when real decisions have to be made: if one is wicked, the self-serving logic of Saladyne’s application runs, and one knows oneself to be wicked, then one is justified in

\textsuperscript{148} “[W]omen are wantons,” says Sir John, “and yet men cannot want one” and so forth (12-13).
behaving wickedly.

In due course, Saladyne wakes “as a man in a traunce” to find himself saved from the lion by a stranger (not recognising his brother in his new spiritual condition). Nor does Rosader quite know him: “ROSADER ... wondred to heare such courteous words come from his [brother’s] crabbed nature”. Moreover, Rosader now seems to have a new understanding of how things come to pass, for by “following my Deere to the fall,” he reports, he has been “conducted hether by some assenting Fate” (86). As usual in Lodge’s text, the capitalisation is significant; the “Deere”, I would suggest, is the fleeting, attractive image of Christ one pursues, consciously or not, in the midst of the world’s snares. Attracted to it without recognising its divine nature, one is Providentially led to one’s “Fate”. There is something pre-ordained about these events, Rosader now suspects, though he carefully avoids endorsing predestination by qualifying “Fate” as “assenting”; there appears to be some collaboration between his own willed action of pursuing the “Deere” and the workings of “Fate”. Sweeney has noted that precisely such a collaborative understanding of the operations of grace—the “scientia media”, as developed by Jesuit theologians such as Luis de Molina and Francisco Suárez (the latter being one of Southwell’s tutors at the Roman College)—was “pure gold to Southwell on mission in ‘heretic’ England”. It enabled the Jesuit to convince and reclaim Catholic waverers, many of whom had succumbed to Lutheranism.

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This chapter has argued that Lodge’s Rosalynde expounds a Jesuit doctrine of justification in presenting the conversion of Rosader. In addition, the romance appears to address the scope of the Jesuit mission in its handling of the case of

149 Given the meaningful distribution of the spellings “Rosalynd” and “Rosalynde” in the romance, I assume the text’s capitalization to be authorial.


the Dyeresque Montanus. Moreover, Rosalynd’s meditation upon her relationship to Rosader has been identified as an Ignatian-style spiritual exercise. In carrying out missionary work on behalf of—and in possible collaboration with—the Jesuit Southwell, Lodge’s text implicitly claims to speak on behalf of a spiritual authority located outside of that text. The omission of the conventional heterobiographical pastoral author-figure, therefore (the equivalent of the Arcadias’ Philisides), becomes conspicuous.
Chapter 5.

Southwell, Shakespeare and Lodge.

By way of preparation for the following chapters on Shakespeare’s *As You Like It*, the present chapter examines documents relating to possible connections between Lodge, Southwell and Shakespeare. First of all, I consider the epistle poem (“The Author to the Reader”) which prefaces Southwell’s *Saint Peters Complaynt* (printed 1595). The epistle poem is usually read as the Jesuit poet’s reproof of the irreligious worldliness of writers such as Lodge and Shakespeare (the latter writer is a candidate for being the “W.S.” addressed in the epistle’s dedication). However, I contend that Southwell is actually objecting to writers who distill pagan toys from spiritual material for private purposes. In addition, I suggest a link between this reproof and Shakespeare’s decision to abandon the publication of narrative verse after 1593.

Furthermore, I argue that in *Wits Miserie* (1596), Lodge indicates that, following Southwell’s arrest and execution, seeking reconciliation with English Protestantism has less to recommend it.1 By this point, Shakespeare’s facultative rhetoric had arguably borrowed feathers from the Jesuit poetic project. Perhaps coming to suspect that Southwell’s reconciliatory strategies had, to some extent, furthered the encroachments of worldliness upon poetic terrain, Lodge (I suggest) includes an attack on Shakespeare in *Wits Miserie*, referring to the Stratfordian as a “PLAIER Deuil”.

With these arguments in place, *As You Like It* can be read as not only Shakespeare’s borrowing and adaptation of the Jesuit-influenced religious position outlined in Lodge’s *Rosalynde*, but also the dramatist’s reply to *Wits Miserie*.

1 According to Pilarz, Jesuits such as Robert Persons responded in a similar way: *Southwell*, p. 238. See also: Pritchyard, *Catholic Loyalism*, p. 201.
Prefaced to the 1595 edition of Southwell’s *Saint Peters Complaynt* is the epistle poem “The Author to the Reader”. The poem is dedicated to Southwell’s cousin, who had asked the Jesuit to send him some religious verse. In a 1616 St. Omer edition of Southwell’s verse, the cousin is identified by the initials “W.S.” Certainly, as Shell observes, “one cannot hang too much on a set of initials”. On the other hand, Shakespeare was Southwell’s cousin. There may be other candidates for “W.S”, but Shakespeare is one whom it became more acceptable to identify by his initials in 1616 (the year of Shakespeare’s death). Moreover, the poem which the epistle prefaces employs the same stanza form as *Venus and Adonis*. In any case, as Shell notes, “one contemporary commentator suggests very strongly that Shakespeare was thought at the time to be the addressee of Southwell’s reproof”. Shell refers here to “a long religious poem” with a Southwellian title: “*Saint Marie Magdalens Conversion* ... published by a Catholic secret press in England, with a preface dated 1603.” The author, “I. C.”, refers to

Helens rape, and Troyes besieged Towne.
Troylus faith, and Cressids falsitie.
... Richards strategems for the English crowne.
... Tarquins lust, and lucrece chastity...

As Shell observes, “the characters make an eclectic group”. However, “given that all their stories were written up by Shakespeare, an overarching reference to Shakespeare’s work is surely intended”.

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3 Shell, *Religion*, p. 89.
4 Shell, *Religion*, p. 89.
5 I concur with Thurston’s surmise that “I. C.” was the Jesuit Joseph Cresswell: “Southwell the Euphuist,” p. 241. Cresswell supplied the materials for—or (it has been suggested) wrote—the first biography of Southwell: Loomie, *Elizabethans*, p. 207.
Turning to Southwell’s epistolary “reproof”, one reads:

Still finest wits are stilling Venus Rose.
In paynim toyes the sweetest vaines are spent:
To Christian works, few have their tallents lent. (16-18)

Line 16 sounds to modern ears like Southwell the stereotypically religious author condemning erotic verse. However, as recorded in Chapter 3, the Jesuit-trained Southwell would have valued erotic verse as a means of wedding readers to the love of God. Furthermore, because modern scholars tend to impose a radical spiritual/sensual split, it is usually assumed that Southwell condemns celebration of “Venus Rose” (sensual love); however, that is not what he “condemns” in the epistolary poem. Southwell does not complain of worldly poets who are “praising” or “singing” “Venus Rose”; he regrets that “finest wits” are stilling that “Rose” (which makes it sound as though the persons in question are “stealing” from the “Rose”). It might be argued that Southwell chooses the verb “still” merely for purposes of alliteration, but if one neglects to provide a rhetorical justification for that decision, one anachronistically credits the Jesuit with a romantic (and self-indulgent) preference for sound over sense. Instead of singing the praises of natural beauty, and thus acknowledging the sublime truth which “Venus Rose” contains, as a means of bringing spiritual profit, “finest wits”, suggests Southwell, distill the essence of “Venus Rose” to make “paynim toyes” for private purposes.7 The “Rose”, after all, was a common figure for the Virgin Mary.8 In Lodge’s Prosopopeia, Mary is “the rose without prickles, the flower of the rose in the prime” (51). Distilling (“stilling”), moreover, is the

7 See: Chadwick, ed. Confessions, XII.34-5.
opposite of "sublimation". The essence of roses could be preserved for winter via distillation, but (from such as Lodge and Southwell's point of view) a more enduring result could be obtained via the sublimation of natural beauty. Thus, Lodge: "Before the virgin ... conceiued Christ, it was winter, but after she had conceiued the word of God, it became Summer. Finally, thorough the vapour of the holye Ghost the flower sprung" (51; emphasis added). Mary did not "still" the "crimson rose Jesus"; Lodge states that she "fixed not her happiness in vncertaine substaunce, but fastned her hope to her son Christ, intentiue in her works ... whose purpose was not to satisfie man, but to seeke after God" (52).

It is sometimes supposed that if Southwell's "reproof" was aimed at Shakespeare, the latter author ignored it (or answered it with the more "serious" Lucrece) and carried on writing "secular" works. This account neglects to offer any explanation for Shakespeare's decision, post-1593/4, to abandon the publication of narrative poetry. It might be argued, though, that Southwell's reproof influenced Shakespeare's decision to discontinue publication of his narrative poetry. Since the present thesis concerns itself with As You Like It, I must restrict myself to observing that Shakespeare's comedy can be read as not "stilling Venus Rose". The play arguably employs facultative rhetoric in order to attach audiences' sensory faculties to "Venus Rose" (Rosalind) so that their wills may be wedded to heaven (Celia).

The existence of common ground, vis-à-vis the religious import of cognitive processes (and the role of facultative rhetoric in same), between the Jesuit Southwell and Shakespeare the Elizabethan conformist is not as implausible as, at first glance, it may appear. Southwell not only pursued a
flexible literary strategy but also showed signs of acknowledging the rights of the English monarch to determine the country's religion. This circumstance may inform the popularity of Southwell's writings in orthodox Protestant circles. Alison Shell has seen "the semi-anonymity and continued popularity of Southwell's poems" in 1590s England (and after) as evidence of "a collusion between officialdom, publisher and public". The poet contributed to this collusion to an extent, devoting his longer works to penitent sinners such as St. Peter and Mary Magdalene, "acceptable to Protestants as well as Catholics".


13 Bald, ed. Humble Supplication, p. xxii; Corthell, "Recusant Discourse," p. 280; Brownlow, Southwell, pp. 71-2. For Southwell's conciliatory attitude towards the Cecils, see: Corthell, pp. 281-6.

14 Shell, Catholicism, p. 63; see also: Parmelee, Good Newes, p. 154.

15 Shell, Catholicism, pp. 80-1. The 1599 Scottish edition of Saint Peters Complaynte "bears the insignia Cum Privilegio Regio" and was printed by Robert Waldegrave, printer to James VI: Cummings, Grammar and Grace, p. 332. Earlier, Waldegrave had been the illegal printer of the
When Southwell’s poems appeared in Catholic editions outside of England and Scotland, their “sensualist aspects were omitted”, which again suggests that in adapting his poetic output to the tastes of his intended English audience, Southwell had departed from Catholic orthodoxy.16 (Southwell did, however, write shorter poems celebrating the Virgin Mary; these tended to be omitted from the early English and Scottish editions.)17

Be that as it may, with Southwell gone, Lodge’s willingness to pursue reconciliatory strategies seems to have decreased. In his 1596 romance _Margarita_, Lodge declares Jesuit influence, informing his “Gentlemen Readers” that he found his romance’s source “in the librarie of the Jesuits” (4).18 However, the effects of that influence differ from those which the present thesis has hitherto inferred: Margarita as a lead female character lacks any vestiges of the “individuality” ascribable to Rosalynd; the agency of “women” in the world is no longer Lodge’s concern. All political agents in the tale are debauched, utterly corrupt.19 Male characters claim to love beloveds but really love only to pursue wicked pleasures. Thus, by 1596, Lodge appears to have abandoned flexible strategies _vis-à-vis_ dealing with a corrupt political world. (His attitude to the French poet Desportes provides a corroborative example of the English author’s post-1595 conservatism. After admiring—or at least imitating/borrowing from—Desportes in the late-1580s/early-1590s, Lodge, in _Wits Miserie_, refers to the French poet by name, and accuses him of “plying the same trade as a devil”.)20 Consequently, embittered and unsettled by the failure of Southwell’s mission, Lodge, I suggest, attacks Shakespeare in _Wits Miserie, and the Worlds_...
In the section of *Wits Miserie* entitled “Of the Great Deuill Belzebub, and What Monstrous and Strange Deuils He Hath Bred in Our Age”, Lodge speaks of “BELZEBUB ... Archduke of Grecian fantasies” (61; latter emphasis added). “Grecian fantasies” is perhaps an echo—but also an adjustment—of “paynim toyes”. Where, according to my reading, Southwell had accused Elizabethan wits of making private profit from spiritual materials, Lodge appears to attack an individual or individuals (“BELZEBUB”) for promulgating heresies (“fantasies”) out of step with Latin orthodoxy, being “Grecian”.

The Greek provenance, moreover, may allude to the repackaging of Southwell’s language by another Grecian “duke”, Shakespeare’s Duke Theseus in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*. As noted in Chapter 3, Southwell had complained that a poet, a lover and a liar were in danger of being mistaken for aspects of the same entity. Shakespeare’s Theseus, seeming to echo Southwell, complains of “fairy toys” (5.1.3). The Duke describes systematically the cognitive disorder that produces these “toys”:

> Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,  
> Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend  
> More than cool reason ever comprehends. (4-6)

Theseus sees scholastic fancies out of control, dreaming up facultative species and other arcane terminology for unreal phenomena. A paraphrase of Southwell follows: “The lunatic, the lover, and the poet / Are of imagination all compact” (7-8). Evidently, Theseus considers poets, lunatics and lovers to be reified faculties; not reified intellects like himself, but reified fancies (“of imagination all compact”). In denying actual productive agency to the fancy (“How easy is a bush supposed a bear!” [22]), Theseus asserts that poems and plays can have no effect on rational readers/audience-members such as himself. Note, though, that Theseus exchanges Southwell’s “liar” for “[t]he lunatic”. As a successful

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21 For the relationship between Southwell’s writings and Shakespeare’s, see: Klause, *Jesuit*.  

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politician, Theseus is aware that rhetoric (lying) has its rational uses. Also, being in conversation with his captured wife, the Amazon Hippolyta, he presumably has little desire to equate lovers and liars as ineffectual homunculi.

Hippolyta’s answer is a compact lesson in facultative process: “But,” she protests,

all their minds transfigured so together,
More witnesseth than fancy’s images,
And grows to something of great constancy (23-6)

Faculties working in assembly are less likely than an individual’s reason, working in isolation, to be mistaken.

In the same section of Wits Miserie, Lodge goes on to observe that “al the heresies in the church were enough to condemn your [Belzebub’s] horns to be sawed off of your head” (61). The horns often associated in the period with cuckoldry are here linked to a different form of infidelity: heresy. Elsewhere in Wits Miserie, horns are attached to an actor. In the section entitled “Of Strange and Miraculous Deuils Ingendred by Mammon”, Lodge comments:

They say likewise there is a PLAIER Deuil, a handsome sonne of Mammons, but yet I haue not seene him, because he skulks in the countrie, if I chance to meet him ... Ile pleasantly conjure him, and though hee hath a high hat to hide his huge horns, Ile haue a wind of Wit to blow it off. (46)

Identifying the above statement as a reference to Shakespeare might seem at best arguable. The placing of the former attack in a sequence of theatre-related statements, however, is worth considering. After the attack on the “PLAIER Deuil”, Lodge turns his attention to actors in general:

For all of that sect I say this much, If they vse no other mirth but Eutrapelian vrbaneitie ... it is to be borne withal; but filthie speaking, Scurrilitie, vnfit for chast eares ... should

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22 See: Chadwick, ed. Confessions, III.16.
Thus, Lodge separates one “PLAIER Deuil” from the “sect” without supplying any reason other than the fact that the former individual currently “skulks in the countrie”.

In the third statement in this anti-theatrical sequence, Lodge denounces plays which contravene a Tridentine ruling. He writes: “in stage plaies to make vse of Hystoricall Scripture, I hold it with the legists odious, and as the Councill of Trent did, Sess. § 4. Fin. I condemne it” (46). As far as I am aware, the only other use of the term “Hystoricall Scripture” in printed works of the period occurs in another text published in 1596: *Vlysses vpon Ajax. Written by Misodiaboles to His Friend Philaretes*. This work, of unknown authorship, is an attack upon Misacemos (Sir John Harington, as author of *The Metamorphoses of Ajax*), written by “Misodiaboles” (a hater of devils). Misodiaboles cites the same Tridentine clause as Lodge in *Wits Miserie*, and uses the term “Hystoricall Scripture” to designate the whole of Scripture. Moreover, Misodiaboles’s recourse to the Tridentine ruling informs disapproval of the “allegorical” wrenching of scriptural matter to suit one’s doctrinal purposes, not the adaptation of specific Biblical narratives.

Though I evidently wish to imply that Shakespeare is Lodge’s lone player-dramatist, working on play-scripts in the “countrie”, it must be acknowledged that making “vse of Hystoricall Scripture” is something Lodge attributes to the sect of actors no less than the “PLAIER Deuil”. Plays, that is, are not here treated as fixed and finished scripts produced by a dramatist in isolation. Indeed, not the rural loner, but the town-based players are, for Lodge, a potential source of “Eutrapelian urbanitie”. Lodge’s call for “Eutrapelian” wit, moreover, may be particularly addressed to Will Kemp, the leading clown of Shakespeare’s company. “The leading player/character was in charge of overseeing and

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directing the play,” Robert Weimann and Douglas Bruster have observed, “such direction involved providing explanations whenever necessary.”25 Thus, Lodge appears to urge accomplished (“Eutrapelian”) improvisers such as Kemp to exert more influence upon the scripted plays in which they perform.26 After all, Bottom’s notorious mangling of a sublime passage from Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians towards the close of *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* (4.2.204-7) may read like the consequence of a clown’s memorial reconstruction but is evidently scripted in.27 Such scripted “Scurrilitie”, in Lodge’s view, has a rural (Warwickshire?) source, like the Marprelate pamphlets—another sophisticated set of productions using folly as a stalking-horse.28

Thus, bearing in mind that elsewhere in *Wits Miserie* Lodge describes an early performance of *Hamlet* (62) and (I have argued) alludes to *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*, the treatment of the “PLAIER Deuil” can be read as an update upon the attack on “Shake-scene” in *Groats-worth*.29 The actor-plagiarist of the latter text has, by 1596, withdrawn to concentrate on scripting activity, with scurrility now his chief offence in place of plagiarism. Admittedly, these comments are based on speculative readings. However, even if the reference to the “PLAIER Deuil” is not accepted as an allusion to Shakespeare, the relevant passage presents Lodge’s particular relationship to the stage (as of 1596) as conservative Catholic. There is nothing wrong with the stage (Lodge implies) when it confines itself to the performance of works of humanist provenance (texts by properly educated wits—gentlemen who have studied both Scripture and the classics). These performances may be enlivened by witty (non-scurrilous)

26 Weimann and Bruster oppose the tendency to regard Kemp as a coarse performer replaced by the more “sophisticated” Robert Armin: *Power of Performance*, p. 87.
27 For Shakespeare as “the controlling intelligence” behind the plays he wrote by himself, see: Weimann & Bruster, *Power of Performance*, p. 189.
28 For the Warwickshire provenance of the Marprelate texts, see: Dusinberre, ed. *AYLI*, p. 58; see also: Shell, *Religion*, pp. 57-8, 64-5.
improvisations to meet topical and other needs of the moment.\textsuperscript{30}

Such a state of affairs indeed appears to have obtained in the early years of Elizabethan commercial drama—from the first performances at the Red Lion in 1567 to circa 1584 (for which period extant play-scripts of non-humanist provenance are lacking).\textsuperscript{31} It is noteworthy, therefore, that when the relevant passages in \textit{Groats-worth} and \textit{Wits Miserie} are considered together, Shakespeare appears guilty of two related “crimes”: encroaching upon humanist territory as dramatist \textit{and} fusing the spiritual and the material by mingling scurrility with scriptural matter.

Lodge, of course, had himself recently been a dramatist. Michael O’Connell regards \textit{A Looking-Glasse for London}, the play Lodge wrote in collaboration with Greene circa 1589-90, as evidence of “a ‘revival’ in the use of biblical sources … in the early 1590s”.\textsuperscript{32} Whether or not one considers the number of extant biblically-sourced 1590s plays to offer sufficient evidence of such a “revival”, one thing is apparent: Lodge (with Greene) was again the literary pioneer. Thus, in \textit{Wits Miserie} he appears to condemn his own innovation. Moreover, he sides not with the Jesuits before quoting Trent but with “the legists”.\textsuperscript{33} That is, he is announcing his return to legalistic Catholic orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{34} The zealous phrase “I condemn it” (on what basis does Lodge claim the authority to condemn such things?) shows a lack of humility foreign to the

\textsuperscript{30} For evidence of productions departing from play-scripts to make religious and political points, see: Aveling, \textit{Northern Catholics}, pp. 288-9.


\textsuperscript{33} Compare Robert Persons’s attitude to Trent and Catholic conservatism: Persons considered Trent to have “been subject to political influences” and thought English Catholics should “build up from the very foundation … our Catholic Church”: Carrafiello, \textit{Robert Parsons}, p. 58. For the purposes of the argument’s relation to Lodge specifically, I restrict the historical terms of reference to the Jesuits, but it is likely that the Counter-Reformation tendency towards an expedient reliance upon princely (as opposed to papal and/or parliamentarian) power is the larger force at work here; see Carrafiello, \textit{Robert Parsons}, pp. 14, 27; Benjamin, \textit{German Tragic Drama}, pp. 65, 81; Corthell, “Recusant Discourse,” p. 276.

\textsuperscript{34} Lodge’s post-1595 antitheatricalism recalls the antitheatricalism of the prominent Catholic reformer, Carlo Borromeo, not coincidentally famous as the inventor of the private confessional box: O’Connell, \textit{Idolatrous Eye}, pp. 30-2; Hamilton, \textit{Monday}, p. 20.
Ignatian penitent. Lodge, therefore, both expresses and manifests a need for dogmatic rigidity. In announcing his Tridentine credentials at the same time as he misrepresents the Tridentine position (Trent having made no specific reference to stage-plays), Lodge displays a commitment to confessionalization.

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Chapter 6.

As You Like It’s Religious Revision of Rosalynde.

This chapter analyses departures of Shakespeare’s As You Like It from its main source, Lodge’s Rosalynde. These departures, it will be argued, interrogate the religious position—and the concomitant cognitive model thereof—of Lodge’s pastoral romance.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section focuses on the contrast between As You Like It’s presentation of its hero, Orlando, in its first act, and the presentation of Rosader in Lodge’s romance. I argue that, in its characterization of the brothers Orlando and Oliver, the play complicates Rosalynde’s interrogation of a Stoic conception of chivalric ethics. In addition, the play’s presentation of the wrestling bout at the usurper’s court aligns a perceived restriction of avenues for self-expression with constrictions engendered by the Catholic sacramental system in its late-medieval (post-Crusades) form. At the same time, the play implicitly explores the doctrine of predestination (via the character of Oliver).

In the second section, Shakespeare’s decision to make Lodge’s rival dukes brothers is examined. It will be pointed out that, pace modern editorial orthodoxy, Shakespeare gives the name “Frederick” to both dukes. Accordingly, I argue that the dukes figure two human apprehensions of the divine.

The chapter’s third section considers differences between the conclusions of the comedy and the romance. For example, where the end of Lodge’s Rosalynde indicates that war is required to make a peace, the usurping duke in
As You Like It becomes a hermit and abandons his military campaign. This can be taken to imply that the appearance of tyranny is produced by cognitive distortion. The section also considers the play’s addition of the god Hymen to Lodge’s scenario. Where, Lodge’s Rosalynde offers no cognitive bridge between the reception of its textual performance and spiritual authority, As You Like It provides such a bridge via the conspicuous addition of a divine character who performs fusion in a socially necessary but nonetheless strictly formal manner. Thus, where Rosalynde offers itself as text as a temporary substitute for the priest-function, As You Like It performs the priest-function, celebrating the facultative participation of members of a Christian assembly in the divine.

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In Shakespeare’s comedy, Lodge’s hero Rosader is renamed Orlando. The name “Rosader” resembles “Rosalynd” and so might have been changed to prevent confusion for theatre audiences. However, As You Like It elsewhere courts such confusion by, for instance, including two characters called “Jaques”. In any case, the choice of the name “Orlando” is significant, belonging as it does to one of the most famous fictional characters in Renaissance literature. Ariosto’s Orlando was known, of course, for becoming “furioso” as a result of his passion. The name “Orlando” thus associates the play’s hero not only with feudal chivalric values, as promoted during the Crusades, but also with intemperate behaviour consequent upon unregulated passion (and the rectifying thereof).

In line with his feudal chivalric name, Orlando expresses considerable pride in his lineage: “call you that keeping for a gentleman of my birth,” he protests in the play’s opening speech, “that differs not from the stalling of an Oxe?” (8-10; emphases added). Orlando has evidently forgotten that “the stalling of an Oxe” was good enough for Christ, whose lineage was impeccable. Sir Philip Sidney makes a similar “error” in his Apology for Poetry. A historical

text must show Socrates dying a criminal’s death whereas true poetry would not, Sidney argues there. Yet this is precisely how Scripture represents Christ’s death, and Sidney maintains that Scripture belongs to the highest type of poesy. The similarity to Orlando’s misprision is suggestive. The conservative position of Sidney and Lodge, informed by a Stoic conception of chivalric tradition, is arguably being exposed as inconsistent with Christianity.

By rechristening Rosader “Orlando”, As You Like It associates its hero with the crusading ideal. The Crusades marked a moment when institutionalized (western) Christianity showed itself at odds with its essential message, embarking on expeditions of murder and plunder in Christ’s name (as endorsed by successive Popes). This was apparent to contemporary monks if not to more worldly “Christian” agents. As R. W. Southern records: “The monastic ideals of the 11th century were in the main hostile to the idea of the Crusade. To a Saint Anselm, for instance … the Crusade made no appeal.” At the same historical moment, the large-scale sale of papal indulgences became established. It is relevant to note, therefore, that, in Rosalynde the hero’s wicked brother is named Saladyne, bearing in mind that Christian-occupied Jerusalem had fallen in 1187 to Saladin. As You Like It, on the other hand, opts to internalize “heathendom” within the hero, with the name “Orlando” associating its bearer with the worldly values of the Crusades and the mechanical winning of grace by individual merit. However, the play does not let the older brother entirely off the hook: “Saladyne” is renamed Oliver after the medieval Roland’s crusading comrade. Both brothers have been formed by chivalric ideals.

A further difference between the two texts corroborates the view that the play is concerned to attribute chivalric values to both Orlando and Oliver.

Having suborned the Norman wrestler near the beginning of *Rosalynde*, Lodge’s Saladyne “went to young ROSADER, (who *in all his thoughts reacht at honour*, and gazed no lower than vertue commaunded him)” (20; emphases added). Saladyne plays the reputation-guilt card: “now brother (quoth he) for the honor of Sir JOHN of Bourdeaux our renowned father, to famous [sic] that house that neuer hath been found without men approued in Cheualrie...” and so forth (20). Thus, Lodge presents Saladyne’s malicious abuse of the chivalric code, not the wrongness of that code *per se*. Shakespeare’s treatment, by contrast, suggests that, as a result of cultural influences, champions are apt to mislead themselves: Orlando decides to take part in the wrestling without any persuasion from Oliver, his motive being (to judge from the concerns expressed in his opening speech) a desire to have his social status confirmed by public witness.

Furthermore, the innate superiority of the (predestinated) Christian implied by the name “Rosader” (“fashioned by/after the rose”?) is interrogated by the play’s rebranding. “Rosader” has the form of a past participle—something always already accomplished;8 “Orlando”, on the other hand, has the form of a present participle, which suggests the name’s bearer is always in a state of becoming: a “goldening”. (Similarly, Shakespeare’s Rosalind presents Orlando with a chain [1.2.234.sd.] while Lodge’s Rosalynd awards Rosader a jewel [25]: Orlando’s salvation is diachronic and relational; Rosader’s synchronic and idealist.)9

If Orlando is becoming a worthy Christian hero, he has made scant progress at the play’s outset. His snobbery is indicated in the opening speech, where he harps upon his neglected social status and his lack of appropriate education: Oliver’s “horses are bred better” (10), he moans, and “are taught their mannage ... but I (his brother) gaine nothing vnder him but growth” (11-13). Thus, Orlando complains, Oliver “mines my gentility with my education”

(19-20). Upon recalling his threatened “gentility”, Orlando belatedly remembers his father—the disgruntled hero had forgotten to refer to Sir Roland even by a pronoun while discussing his unsatisfactory bequest in the play’s opening lines (1-2). He now declares:

This is it Adam that grieues me, and the spirit of my Father, which I thinke is within mee, begins to mutinie against this seruitude. I will no longer endure it, though yet I know no wise remedy how to auoid it. (20-23)

Seeking justification for self-assertion, Orlando invokes his dead father—Sir Roland’s own ethical code, potentially, could lend support to a mutinous action. However, in contrast to Rosalynde, where Sir Roland’s equivalent Sir John of Bourdeaux expounds his Stoic moral code at tedious length, As You Like It does not disclose by direct means the values of Sir Roland.

Evidently, Sir Roland’s code does differ from Sir John’s because the youngest son in As You Like It receives not the largest bequest from his father, like his equivalent in Lodge, but the smallest. This circumstance possibly speaks to medieval and early modern debates concerning the value of the “religious” life (a life lived in seclusion from the “world”). As is well-known, prior to the Reformation, younger sons of the nobility and gentry were often disposed of by being sent to monasteries (the newer gentry tending to prefer the more affordable option of Augustinian endowments). Of course, this circumstance bears no obvious relation to late-Elizabethan concerns. Orlando complains that he is not being allowed “such exercises as may become a gentleman” (1.1.67-8). Dusinberre infers from Orlando’s earlier complaint that Oliver’s horses are “taught their manage” (12) while he (Orlando) is taught nothing, that the younger brother thinks he should be taught how to ride, fence and tilt, etc. Orlando, however, expresses no concern for the social utility of such exercises. From a chivalric point of view, Orlando’s “proper” training

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10 John W. Draper, “Orlando, the Younger Brother,” p. 72, PQ 13 (1934), pp. 72-7.
11 Southern, Western Society, pp. 245-6. The apparent stinginess of Sir Roland’s bequest to Orlando in AYLI may reflect the de Boys’ social status.
12 Dusinberre, ed. AYLI, pp. 154.n, 150.n.
would prepare him to be an elite soldier. Following the invention of gunpowder, though, times had changed (as recorded in Ariosto’s *Orlando Furioso*). In other words, the causes of Orlando’s social deprivation go deeper than Oliver’s enmity. On the other hand, Oliver has evidently not sought alternative outlets for Orlando’s abundant physical energy. Thus, the play’s opening scene implicitly broaches the topic of educational reform, offering an equivalent of Francis Bacon’s complaints in *The Advancement of Learning* (1605), albeit uttered by a less articulate product of the current system. Orlando does not express any desire to be sent to school like his brother Jaques, despite the fact that “report speakes goldenly of his [Jaques’] profit” (5-6). In fact, Orlando does not seem to know what he wants; following the demise of the chivalric and crusading ideals, society has neglected to provide worthwhile occupations for the younger sons of the gentry and nobility.

The use of monasteries for the disposal of superfluous children of those social groups “naturally imposed on families an obligation to make suitable provision for their upkeep. Parents commonly gave large gifts to the monasteries to which they offered a child.” Thus, in *Rosalynde*, the evident adequacy of Sir John’s bequest may figure the provision of (already noble) younger sons (such as Rosader) with a ready-made path to heaven via a monastery. That pathway is obstructed—fortunately as it turns out—by Saladyne pilfering the youngest brother’s inheritance. This reading, incidentally, provides an explanation—lacking in other interpretations—as to why the wicked brother in both texts exploits only the youngest brother; both texts appear to engage hereby with the validity of “religious” vocations (crusading or contemplative), not with abstract wickedness.

Recognizing the play’s concern with educational reform, and the imbrication of that topic with the question of religious ideals, facilitates greater understanding of the figural work performed by the wrestling bout in Act 1 Scene 2. In that scene, the usurping Duke regards Orlando as a misguided

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13 McNulty, ed. *Orlando Furioso*, IX.24.5-25.8.
contender when the latter prepares to tackle the powerful wrestling champion Charles. The Duke places emphasis on the perversity of Orlando’s will and the danger it entails: “since the youth will not be intreated His owne perill on his forwardnesse” (142-3). Though, in terms of romantic convention, the Duke occupies the role of wicked usurper, he expresses a desire to have his daughter Celia and her cousin Rosalind “disswade” Orlando from the contest (152). This indicates that any “wickedness” apprehended in the Duke is a consequence of cognition.16

Celia responds to her father’s request by warning Orlando (in a cognitive vein): “if you saw your selfe with your eies, or knew your selfe with your judgment, the feare of your adventure would counsel you to a more equall enterprise” (167-70). Orlando’s evident lack of self-knowledge is thus foregrounded. In response, Orlando begs the ladies, “I beseech you, punish mee not with your harde thoughts” (175-6; emphasis added). The use of the word “harde” (instead of “soft” or “pitying”) indicates the youth’s perception that the two women are judging him ethically.17 As noted, Orlando’s avowed concerns are self-centred and worldly (at the same time they are idealistic rather than pragmatic): in this wrestling match he hopes to demonstrate his courage and strength and win honour. In actively seeking to win recognition (as unsolicited “challenger” [162]), Orlando displays an egoistic desire for glory (a will to power, in modern parlance). However, despite his earlier preoccupation with questions of social status, Orlando now declares that there is something existential at stake in his current action. He implies that the present contest is a means by which his individuality may be registered: “If I bee foil’d,” he says,

there is but one sham’d that was neuer gracious: if kil’d, but one dead that is willing to be so: I shall do my friends no wrong, for I haue none to lament me: the world no injurie, for in it I haue nothing: onely in the world I fil vp a place, which may bee better supplied, when I haue made it emptie. (178-84)

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16 Ward, AYLI, pp. 22-3.
17 For wrestling as externalization of a “moral situation”, see: Roland Barthes, Mythologies (St Albans: Granada, 1973), p. 18.
For Hunt, this speech of Orlando's is self-pitying and melancholy.\textsuperscript{18} Certainly, there is a "no-one thinks I'm special" tone to it. Moreover, Orlando declares that he has \textit{never} been "gracious", a controversial assertion for a baptised Christian to make. (A hint of Anabaptism may be detected.) Nevertheless, the statement marks a turning point: Orlando has made a crucial admission, one that qualifies (in both senses of the term) his earlier exhibition of pride.

Consideration of another departure from Lodge's text will help to elaborate this point.

In Lodge, Rosader's private (honour-seeking) motive for wrestling is converted to a public one, following his promise to avenge the deaths of the wrestlers who fought before him (22-3). In contrast to this, the audience of \textit{As You Like It} is not shown Orlando's response to the tears of the non-Stoic father of the wrestler Charles's earlier victims.\textsuperscript{19} In the play, Orlando \textit{remains} self-absorbed. Rosader's replacement of his egotistical motive with a heroic one invites the reader's sympathy. Since the equivalent alteration is absent in \textit{As You Like It}, how comes it that the play's audience-members and readers hope Orlando will win the fight? The alteration indicates that the rejection of egoism by Lodge's Rosader-as-wrestler is only apparent: wrestling out of pity for others is not a heroic sublimation of egoism but a projection of egoism onto the spiritual plane. Audience-members/readers, however, continue to "identify" with Shakespeare's Orlando despite the latter's failure to reject egoism at this stage because the truth of his appeal (that he has no other means of registering his social existence) is acknowledged. Luther insisted that justification cannot be won by wilful means—by heroic actions stimulated by pity for others which is, in fact, egoism in disguise. On the other hand, not only may one legitimately seek to demonstrate the extent of one's potential civic usefulness, one has a \textit{duty} to realize that usefulness.\textsuperscript{20}

It is also necessary here to consider the figural function of Charles the

\textsuperscript{18} Hunt, \textit{AYLI}, p. 121.
\textsuperscript{19} Dusinberre, ed. \textit{AYLI}, p. 168.n.
wrestler. In Act 1 Scene 1, Charles declares himself absolutely assured of victory in the forthcoming bout with Orlando (120-4). Thus, like Orlando himself, Charles exhibits pride. Indeed, in Scene 2, Charles emerges as a boaster, given to crude taunts: “Come,” he calls, “where is this yong gallant, that is so desirous to lie with his mother earth?” (191-2); this allows the previously proud Orlando to appear modest in comparison: “Readie Sir,” he answers, “but his will hath in it a more modest working” (193-4). The Duke announces: “You shall trie but one fall” (195). Now Charles not only exhibits assurance of victory, but also sarcastically mocks the impotence of presiding authority: “No, I warrant your Grace you shall not entreat him to a second, that haue so mightily perswaded him from a first” (196-8). Orlando then says: “You meane to mocke me after: you should not haue mockt me before” (199-200). In other words, pride comes before a fall.

The surprising rudeness of Charles’s remark to a tyrant known to be given to violent mood-swings (255) offers a clue to the larger theological concerns regarding the necessity for Christ’s Incarnation which appear to inform this scene. According to a view which came to be consistently held among theologians by the 11th century, the Incarnation was necessary in order for man to be emancipated from his willed enslavement to the Devil, consequent upon Adam’s act of disobedience. As man had committed his error of free will, man had to make good the error. But man could not do this, being enslaved to the Devil. The only way out of this fatalistic impasse was for God to become man. By this means, the Devil could be tricked into breaking his side of the bargain by overstepping his bounds and arranging for his henchman Death to claim Christ as just another man. Death could not, however, legitimately claim the part of Christ that was God. According to this view, the Incarnation was a trick played on the Devil and his henchman Death. Man was thus freed from the Devil’s service.21 All of this is arguably figured in the first two scenes of As You Like It: Oliver (Lucifer)22 assures his henchman Charles (Death) that he may

21 Southern, Making, pp. 223-4; see also: Chadwick, ed. Confessions, VII.27; Romans 7:24; John 14:30; Colossians 2:14.
22 Aspects of Oliver’s resemblance to Lucifer are discussed below.
indeed kill Orlando (Man). Charles taunts the presiding Duke (God) for his failure to prevent the death of Orlando. Orlando, who suspects that “the spirit of my Father ... is within mee” (1.1.20-1), informs Charles that he should not boast until he knows the final outcome. (I am not suggesting As You Like It thus endorses the medieval understanding of the Incarnation; the latter’s lack of consistency with divine dignity had been patent for centuries—at least since Anselm. Rather, the play draws upon this model in order to analyse the mismatch of Orlando’s values with the usurping Duke’s.)

Further details of the wrestling scene may now be considered. The wrestling champion Charles easily and violently slays the three young men he encounters first (1.2.119-25). Unlike Lodge, Shakespeare does not specify the social status of the earlier challengers. Their father is described as “poore” only after their death and so the adjective may have an emotional meaning. Le Beau, meanwhile, describes the victims as “proper yong men, of excellent growth” (115). In a play which uses the word “gentle” so frequently, it is noticeable that these victims are not styled gentlemen. The play is not being snobbish: the omission of any reference to gentility indicates that the first two challengers retained too much pride—too much churlishness, too much of “Charles”—in their own nature to defeat him; hence, they were of comparable physical stature (no-one objected to their bouts on the grounds of mismatched size). Orlando, on the other hand, appears horribly mismatched because, in fact, his arrogance is not as great as his social presumption would indicate.

Orlando proceeds to win the bout. The defeated Charles “cannot speake”: death’s erstwhile vaunting pride is silenced (209). The presiding Duke now should dispense justice and reward Orlando’s victory. However, when Orlando declares himself to be the son of “Sir Roland de Boys” (211-2), the Duke regretfully observes that “The world esteem’d thy father honourable, / But I did find him still my enemie” (214-5). This is another departure from Lodge’s text. In Rosalynde, the usurper declares his love for Rosader’s father, the Stoic Sir John. In As You Like It, the Duke is displeased by Orlando’s proud

announcement of his human parentage.

Of course, salvation is not to be won by solely human means. Orlando as yet remains unaware of his participation in Christ. Orlando’s victory is not cosmically valid because he speaks only of human parentage. One could, therefore, construct a case that the usurping Duke’s position is legitimate. However, the Duke (usurper or not) is patently not God. For example, he has to wait to be told Orlando’s name (1.2.210-1). In addition, an emphasis upon the need to descend from the right house brings to mind the well-known practice of nepotism in the papal institution.²⁴

On the other hand, the presiding Duke’s regret at Orlando’s declaration of his human lineage is sincere: “I would thou hadst beene son to some man else” he begins by saying (213). What use is this observation/wish to Orlando? How could he have “beene son to some man else”? The Duke’s statement is, therefore, otiose unless one reads it as: “if you had been the Son of God, not a son of Adam, I could acknowledge your victory”. The Duke goes on to say: “But fare thee well, thou art a gallant youth” (218). Now softening after bristling at Orlando’s declaration of his human parentage, the Duke offers a significant variation upon his earlier statement: “I would thou had’st told me of another Father” (219). Now it is not a question of somehow being son to a different father but of telling of (professing) a different father. In other words, if Orlando had told the Duke (as he had previously told the princesses) that he was a nothing, here to allow his Father, God, to work through him, then matters would be different. But Orlando’s human pride reasserted itself at a crucial moment: he took personal credit for the victory in the name of “Sir Roland”.

Following the Duke’s exit, Celia says: “Were I my Father (Coze) would I do this?” (220). Not: “Were I in my father’s place...” but “Were I my Father...?” Heaven (Celia) denies any participation in this all too human version of God. The Duke is not possessed of divine infallibility: he claims spiritual authority but can err.

From the medieval perspective of the via antiqua, God could not, by his

very nature, act otherwise than justly, in accordance with human concepts of goodness and justice. Thus, the sacraments—including non-scriptural ones such as baptism and confession—could be relied upon as channels of grace. (How could a just God allow those sacraments to be implemented and trusted in for so many centuries, if they were not efficacious?) According to this view, all that would (and should) be required to rectify the communications breakdown between feudal values and sacramental values (themselves a consequence of feudal influence!) figured in Act 1 of As You Like It is the replacement of a tyrannical pope (or equivalent ruler laying absolute claim to spiritual authority) with a just one; that is, the reformation of the papacy/sacral monarchy not its abolition.

Luther, however, was influenced by the via moderna: God is inevitably just but his justice may not accord with human understanding.25 The play thus might seem to align itself with Lutheran anti-papalism but for that pointed remark of Celia’s. Put another way: Celia is obviously not really the voice of heaven, but (I am suggesting) Shakespeare’s ventriloquism of same. For institutional religious reform to be achieved, one does not do nothing and leave all up to God (as the via moderna might dictate); one reforms human conceptions of divinity so that they may coincide (more) with Celia’s/heaven’s notional ontic state. The play, I submit, employs facultative rhetoric as the agency of such reformation (as Chapters 7 and 8 will aim to show).

In another important departure from its proximate source, the play removes the motivation for the older brother’s hatred. In Rosalynde, Saladyne resents the larger legacy awarded to Rosader. In As You Like It, Oliver receives the larger legacy but confesses:

my soule (yet I know not why) hates nothing more then [Orlando]: yet hee’s gentle, neuer school’d, and yet learned, full of noble devise, of all sorts enchantingly beloued, and indeed so much in the heart of the world ... that I am altogether misprised. (154-60)

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25 Bagchi, Opponents, pp. 24-5.
Oliver’s motiveless jealousy has a primal quality, reminiscent of the envy Lucifer expresses upon hearing of God’s intention to create Man, as related in the Miracle plays. In the play’s only monologue, Oliver insists that he is incapable of doing otherwise than hating Orlando. There thus seems to be a predetermined quality to that hatred, as though Oliver embodies some evil principle at work in the cosmos. In *The City of God*, Saint Augustine writes: “tamen lege iustitiae boni homines malis angelis praeferantur”. This may explain why, despite not having evinced any admirable qualities, a Luciferan Oliver declares himself “misprised”. A subsequent passage in Augustine’s text anticipates, moreover, Shakespeare’s portrayal of Oliver. Augustine describes Lucifer’s strategy in exile: “malesuada versutia in hominis sensum serpere affectans, cui utique stanti, quoniam ipse ceciderat, invidebat”. A comparable strategy is employed in *As You Like It*, when Oliver tells the wrestler Charles that Orlando is “full of ambition, an envious emulator of every man’s good parts ... he will practise against thee by poison, entrap thee by some treacherous devise ... I speak but brotherly of him” (134-46). The Luciferan Oliver here attributes his own nature to Orlando. Like Lucifer—also a first-born—he resents his “younger brother”, who seems to possess more of his father’s (God’s) spirit.

Consequent upon this deterministic rationale for Oliver’s envy would be

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27 McCracken, ed. *City of God*, Xl.xvi (“yet by the law of righteousness good men are rated above bad angels”).

28 McCracken, ed. *City of God*, XIV.xi (“After his fall, he sought by corrupting guile to work his way into the heart of man, whose unfallen state surely he envied since he himself had fallen”).

the notion that the reforms ostensibly achieved by Protestantism are not to be understood as means by which God tests humanity’s (and [a fortiori?] the Catholic church’s) virtue through suffering. Rather, they are to be understood as playing a crucial role in the build-up to the imminent end-times. The former (non-eschatological) conclusion was an enabling aspect of the Counter-Reformation platform and is represented in Lodge’s Rosalynde by the non-cosmic rationale for Saladyne’s resentment (Catholics had been prodigal and therefore the Reformation, with all its consequences, was merited). Hence, Lodge’s text cannily restricted the need for violent resistance to the temporal plane.

In As You Like It, though, some form of violent resistance to the religious-political status quo might be justified (from Orlando’s point of view), since a principle of primal evil appears responsible for the current state of affairs. Recalling, however, that Orlando shares Oliver’s chivalric values, a useful counterweight is provided by Lodowick Brysket’s A Discourse of Civill Life (1606). Brysket there disapproves of the notion that “a man for cause of honour may arme himselfe against his country”. Rather, Bryskett insists, says Paul N. Siegel, that “reputation should be gained in war against a national enemy”. Shakespeare’s adoption of the names “Orlando” and “Oliver”, champions of the medieval resistance to Islam, has obvious relevance here. Instead of Christian fighting Christian in internecine squabbles over doctrine, Christian “heroes” should unite in virtuous missions into infidel lands. On the other hand, commitment to the crusading ideal does not sit well with the analytical tenor of As You Like It. As mentioned, Shakespeare internalizes infidelity: true Christians should make war against the infidelity in their own nature, not project their lack of faith onto their brother-Christians.

However, the play does suggest a cause for Oliver’s malice (though he is

31 Lodowyck Brysket, A Discourse of Civil Life Containing the Ethike Part of Morall Philosophie (London: Edward Blount, 1606), p. 74.
unaware of it). Celia and Rosalind’s love for each other, unique in human history (according to Charles) for its lack of ego-based individuality (1.1.102-7), is said to result from the circumstance that they have been bred together from the cradle, neither one given precedence over the other, until, presumably, political events disturbed that equity. Rosalind, whose name translates as “beautiful rose”, can be taken to figure physical beauty, or the natural world (the field which the Baconian scientific project seeks to master). When the heavenly order (figured by “Celia”) is not regarded as being of greater intrinsic worth than the earthly order, but is instead apprehended as interfused with it, then the rationale for contemptus mundi is removed. Doctrines based on contempt for the natural world are then revealed to be erroneous. Conversely, if a hierarchical relationship is insisted upon as an ontological given, one that determines the intrinsic worth of all given elements within the system, then the notionally “higher” member will insist on always being valued above the lower. A member, therefore, who fails to perceive that only through virtuous actions do they (performatively) justify their nominal position, may be led to vent his/her resentment on apparent climbers. In short, if Oliver has been educated to believe that being born first automatically makes him superior, then his hatred of Orlando does have a human (but non-subjective) cause. Intriguingly, one consequence of this error arising from indoctrination is that it appears to make evil actions seem unmotivated (as Oliver’s malice seems to Oliver himself), and therefore speciously validates a deterministic creed.

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36 “In the picture of the ‘malecontent’ [in Wits Miserie] it is interesting to see how Lodge accepts motiveless malignity as a familiar fact calling for no explanation. The ‘right malecontent Deuill ... hating his countrie of meer innated and corrupt villanie’”: Lewis, English Literature, p. 410.
Unlike Lodge, Shakespeare makes his rival dukes brothers. Similarly, the playwright doubles the three sons of Sir Roland: each has name-sakes in the play (as discussed below). This concern with doubleness suggests that considerable significance attaches to the relationship between the “old” and “new” dukes.

In fact, not only does Shakespeare make the rival dukes brothers, he gives them the same name. In Act 1 Scene 2, Celia asks which “knight” the fool is referring to in his banter about oaths. Answers the clown: “One that old Fredericke your father loues” (80-1). At this point, members of a theatre audience register to whom the Clown addresses this remark. This is important because “Fredericke” is said by the clown to love a knight who “neuer had anie [honour]” and who, moreover, practises equivocation (76). That is a serious charge to level at a Renaissance duke. As the clown is answering Celia, the reader may suppose that he speaks of her father. On the other hand, the text identifies “Fredericke” as old; Rosalind’s father is the older brother, and indeed it is she who answers the clown: “My Fathers loue is enough to honour him enough [sic]” (82-3).

The confusion is deliberate: “Fredericke” is the name of both women’s fathers. Modern editors (after Theobald) assume an error, however, and ascribe the line to Celia because the usurping Duke is identified as Frederick in the final act. Thus, for example, Horace Howard Furness objected, in the 1890 variorum edition of the play: “it is impossible that the two brothers should both have the same name”. (Perhaps Furness had not read The Comedy of Errors recently.) Likewise, de Somoygi insists that the line requires emendation as Rosalind answers the Clown and “her father’s name cannot be Frederick”. However, in a play which doubles the names Orlando/Roland, Jaques and Oliver, how can one be so certain that both brothers are not meant to be taken as rival

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38 De Somoygi, ed. AYLJ, p. 177 (emphasis added).
apprehensions of one entity—for example, as rightful and wrongful avatars of (divine) authority respectively? After all, although uttering a defining relative clause, the clown does not use the adjective “old” to qualify the noun “Duke” but the name “Fredericke”, which implies there is an old Fredericke and a young one. In short, there is no justification for emending the text here.39

When, later in the same scene, the tyrant duke expresses regret over Orlando’s naming of his father, the offended youth responds: “I am more proud to be Sir Rolands sonne ... and would not change that calling / To be adopted heire to Fredricke” (221-2). Again, Rosalind (not Celia) answers this remark: “My Father lou’d Sir Roland as his soule, / And all the world was of my Fathers minde” (224-5). It appears that the relative merits of opposed Frederickian attitudes to Sir Roland is the topic under discussion.

When the banished duke is introduced in Act 2 Scene 1, the stage directions identify him as “Duke Senior”. This title clarifies that he is the older of the two versions of Frederick, as the clown’s earlier phrasing also stated. (The title “Duke Senior” is never spoken onstage.) The use of the term “senior” was loaded in the period, for it was the word William Tyndale initially used in place of “priest” in translating the Bible.40 Tyndale insisted that presbyters/seniors were only ministers of the Word: their function was to teach and nothing else. A priest, on the other hand, was understood as synonymous with “sacer”; that is, a priest was one who sacrificed Christ on the altar in the form of the Eucharist. The First Folio, therefore, arguably introduces the banished Duke as “Duke Priest”.

The ambiguity as to whose father is called “Fredericke” draws attention to Shakespeare’s rejection of the names of Lodge’s rival rulers, Torismonde and

39 Charles Gildon, summarising the plot of AYL in “Remarks on the Plays of Shakespear,”—first published in Rowe’s 1710 edition of Shakespeare—wrote: “Frederick the Duke of some part of France is Depos’d, and Banish’d by his younger Brother”; he does not name the usurper: p. 79, in Tomarken, ed. AYL, pp. 79-80. The “Dramatis Personae” of Samuel Johnson’s 1765 Shakespeare edition lists both Rosalind and Celia as “daughter to Frederick”, but lists the rival-dukes as “DUKE” and “Frederick, brother to the Duke, and usurper”, p. 133. In his commentary, Johnson objects to Theobald’s supposition that the Dukes cannot be “Namesakes” on the grounds that “the Dramatis Personæ were first enumerated by Rowe”, p. 141; in Tomarken, ed. AYL, pp. 133-224.

Gerismonde. Reading “Geri” as “gyre”, both names appear to mean “the world turns”. Implicit in Lodge’s choice of names for rulers past and present, therefore, is the notion that obedience to authority is all that matters, whoever is actually ruling is a matter of indifference to the religious mind.

Shakespeare’s choice of the name “Frederick” for his dukes brings to mind Castiglione’s The Book of the Courtier. At the start of Book 1, Castiglione asserts (in contrast to the Stoic indifference of Lodge to worldly affairs) that the greatest felicity a man can hath is to be “governed with very good Princes”, and praises “the famous memorye of Duke Fridericke, who in his dayes was the light of Italy”. Siegel notes that “Duke Fridericke” is the name given to the “idealized court-ruler” in this central text of courtly culture, he being “wise and benevolent” (a valid placeholder, that is, for God). Though Castiglione took Cicero’s De Oratore as his chief model in writing The Courtier, he adapted that model to “the exigencies of a courtly establishment and its autocratic ruler”; thus, The Book of the Courtier “marks historically ... the transformation of the late feudal warrior aristocrat into the polite courtier ... that occurred as first princely courts and then the absolutist state forced the nobility to give up its ... feudal entitlements”. The relevance of this transformation to the situation of Orlando (and Oliver) in As You Like It is patent, especially in the light of what has been said about the two brothers’ commitment to chivalric values.

An implicit question is asked by this particular revision of Lodge: as the world turns, and modes of production change, what are the characteristics and functions of a good ruler (God’s lieutenant) under, say, post-feudal conditions? Jettisoning “Torismond” and “Gerismond”, Shakespeare calls his duke(s) “Frederick” (“rich in faith”). Thus, by way of contrast with Lodge’s nomenclature, Shakespeare’s choice of name for his ducal brothers suggests that not only temporal powers but also spiritual authorities change as a consequence

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41 Kinney considers the two names to be interchangeable: Humanist Poetics, p. 378.
43 Siegel, Shakespeare, p. 179.
of changes in modes of production (including cognitive production).

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At the end of *Rosalynde*, Rosader, Saladyne and Phoebe, having undergone their personal reformations, marry Rosalynd, Alinda and Montanus respectively. This epidemic of marriage suggests that a loving reconciliation is being projected by Lodge’s romance rather than an enforced restitution of Catholic power. Accordingly, the programme Lodge appears to endorse would involve a peaceful Stuart succession to the English throne, permitting the establishment of a national (Catholic) church along the lines of the Gallican ecclesiastical body, as perhaps hinted by the romance’s French setting. Lodge’s choice of primary dedicatee for *Rosalynde* is, therefore, significant. Henry Carey, Lord Hunsdon, was a conservative loyalist entrusted with responsibility for controlling the English/Scottish border during the Armada threat. He was also a frequent ambassador to Edinburgh, his trustworthiness appreciated by Elizabeth I and James VI. Hence, Lodge could not, in good faith, dedicate to such a man a metaphorical representation of the restoration of full papal authority in England. Nonetheless, the romance does indicate that violent action of some kind will be necessary to establish the Stuart succession on the correct institutional footing.

Towards the close of *Rosalynde*, Fernandyne, “a Scholler in Paris” (137) and the brother of Rosader and Saladyne, arrives in the forest with news that “hard by at the edge of this forrest the twelue Peeres of France are vp in Armes to recouer thy [Gerismond’s] right; and TORISMOND troupt with a crue of desperate runnagates is ready to bid them battaile” (137-8). Such an intervention by French peers on behalf of a usurped power had been prophesied by a poet favoured by Mary Stuart (and much translated by Lodge): Pierre

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Ronsard, in “Sonnet”, a poem dedicating his 1578 collected works to that sovereign. The French poet, writes James Emerson Phillips, “threatened that, unless Elizabeth mitigated her wrath, the heroes of France would take up the cause of the beauteous Scottish Queen”.  

With Torismond slain, the restored Gerismond calls a parliament within 30 days and “by the consent of his Nobles he created ROSADER heire apparant to the kingdom” (139). This outcome was in line with Catholic thought. “It was generally accepted as orthodox Catholic theology,” writes Peter Holmes, “that ultimate political authority lay not in the hands of the prince, but in those of the commonwealth”.  

An obvious aspect of Shakespeare’s alteration of Lodge’s conclusion, therefore, is that the restoration of Duke Frederick Senior is achieved by peaceful means. As in Lodge, the “Second Brother” appears (in deus ex machina fashion) and reports:

Duke Frederick hearing how that euerie day
Men of great worth resorted to this forrest,
Addrest a mightie power ...
... purposely to take
His brother here, and put him to the sword (5.4.152-6)

However, Second Brother then adds that the tyrant duke met “an old Religious man” at “the skirts of this wilde Wood” (157-8). Scholars and editors sometimes associate this “old Religious man” with the “old religious uncle” referred to earlier by Rosalind-disguised-as-Ganimed (3.2.332).  

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50 Holmes, Resistance and Compromise, p. 63.
51 Dusinberre, ed. AYLI, p. 324.n.
misogynous personage belonged to Rosalind’s account of her upbringing. The location of the current “old Religious man” (“the skirts” of the wood) tallies with one recently supplied by Oliver for Corin’s cottage (“the Purlews of this Forrest” [4.3.75]). Hence, Corin is a textually available candidate for the “old Religious man” encountered by the tyrant-duke. Second Brother says that the tyrant, “[a]fter some question with him [the old religious man], was converted” (5.4.159). What news could the plain-speaking Corin give Frederick, Jr. to effect this Pauline conversion of one who previously persecuted friends of Sir Roland? The name “Corin” partakes of “Corinthians”, recipients of the convertite Paul’s correspondence. Celia and Rosalind’s “very faithfull Feeder” (2.4.98), I suggest, has communicated the miracle of Orlando’s Christ-like act in forgiving and saving his brother Oliver. Orlando’s bloody and loving sacrifice atones for the sins of others (and for the pre-Reformation abuse of papal authority).

In short, the play’s departure from Lodge here rejects the necessity for papal-sponsored military intervention to secure the restoration of sound religious authority in England. Rather, the play suggests, once passionate and resentful young Englishmen facultatively cognize Christ by reforming themselves and forgiving former injuries, apparent “tyranny” will convert to legitimate authority. That is, the apprehension of tyranny will turn out to have been the product of distorted cognition.

One final major departure from Lodge remains to be discussed: Shakespeare’s addition of the god Hymen to Lodge’s scenario. As mentioned in the Introduction, Lodge not only omits the conventional heterobiographical author-figure from his pastoral romance (an equivalent of the Arcadias’ Philisides), he also presents his narrative as having been written by someone

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other than himself (namely, Lyly's Euphues). Thus, the narrator of Rosalynde is not "Thomas Lodge". By this means Lodge locates the source of authority—the fount of narrative "truth"—outside of his text. Consequently, the cognitive union facilitated by the centrally-accented structure of Rosalynde offers no means of union with that external authority.

In Chapter 8, it will be argued that As You Like It reinserts the missing heterobiographical figure from Lodge's text in the form of Jaques. Here, however, the addition of Hymen is the focus of attention. Like Rosalynde, As You Like It performs central accent: as far as audience-members are concerned, Rosalind and Orlando unite at the centre of the play (4.1.127ff); in addition, Orlando performs an efficacious imitation of Christ prior to the final act. Rosalind-disguised-as-Ganied then claims to have magical powers, telling Orlando that she will deliver Rosalind to him in person (5.2.57-66). Of course, Rosalind does not need magical powers to deliver herself to Orlando. Nonetheless, delivery of her presence is the occasion of a divine manifestation before a public assembly (5.4.110-1). Spiritual authority is not external to the play; it manifests in the final scene.

The following two chapters will argue that the melancholy Jaques is a figure for author-function in the play. Perhaps, then, Jaques should be the one to summon Hymen (in line with the suggestion in Chapter 2 that the author-function present in Dyer's poem performs a ministerial role). According to a subjectivist model of cognition, such a figure would be best qualified to apprehend the divine: the intellect apprehends Christ, by meditation upon the Scriptures, and makes religious truth manifest in the world via preaching. Earlier in the play, Jaques shows himself to be a stickler for sacramental procedure, advising Touchstone and Audrey to consult a priest who will tell them what marriage means (3.3.1-11). In this intervention, however (as with every other he attempts in the play), Jaques—being a figure for the author-function as intellect—achieves nothing. The intellect by itself is incapable of affecting reality. It can only render judgement, after the fact. Thus, Jaques plays no part in the facultative elicitation of Hymen's manifestation.
It is precisely the function of the appetitive faculty, however, to interact directly with the world. This faculty is figured (I maintain) in the play by Orlando, lover of Rosalind (natural beauty). The appetitive faculty is not superior to the intellect, but its functions are always prior to intellection. Orlando’s performative union with Rosalind at 4.1.127ff. necessarily precedes the union of the will (Oliver) with heaven (Celia) (described at 5.2.31-40). Sober discernment had not been invited to the unofficial “wedding” of Rosalind and Orlando; hence, Orlando expresses frustration and impatience at 5.2.42-6 and 49, being unaware that he is already united with Rosalind. The sacramental rite in Act 5 Scene 4, performed by Hymen (123-144) with an impromptu assist from Jaques (184-90), is the ratification of the entire process.

Jaques administers blessings to the four married couples, though it might be expected that this task would be performed by Duke Senior, the play’s nominal authority figure. However, since cognitive processes are facultative, not exclusively rational, the intellect (here figured by Jaques)—in addition to institutional power—must approve them. After all, if the intellect (however inflated or misled) does not accept the spiritual truth of what has been performed, how long can the institution based on that performance endure? At last, Jaques actively intervenes: he speaks the blessings (184-90). Jaques does not challenge but rather acknowledges and comments upon what has been performed. With that, his task is done. This version of the intellect opts not to enchain itself to the institution—it is not for “dancing meazures” (191). Jaques departs in order to converse with the latest occupant of the hermit’s cave (178-82, 193-4).

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In conclusion, it may be observed that As You Like It does not target for correction those aspects of Rosalynde which present a Jesuit-influenced doctrine of justification. It does, however, correct other, more conservative aspects of its source. For example, the sacramental system of penance as it was traditionally
understood in its late-medieval reception, is (I have argued) shown to be unworkable—not because Christians are saved by "faith alone" but because popes, priests and sacral monarchs are strictly formal representatives of divine authority: they cannot see into human hearts. This does not render the spiritual condition of believers opaque, however, as a subjectivist model of cognition would assume (that model only regarding objects of the rational faculty, as assembled by the senses, as to any extent knowable). Christians—As You Like It indicates—perform justification by facultative means: the soul’s appetitive faculty is attracted to the good, recognizing it as the beautiful.53 Acted upon by the rhetorical power of natural beauty,54 the appetitive faculty endeavours to unite with its "object". This endeavour will fail as long as natural beauty is regarded as a quality belonging to an isolated object capable of possession by an isolated subject. Orlando does not win Rosalind as prize-object through heroism but rather performatively demonstrates his cognitive union with beauty—he performs a graceful action—when he rescues his brother. As a result (or simultaneously), the soul’s volitional faculty—Oliver—turns to the good (in the form of the heavenly Celia). With this achieved, the “fallen” creature becomes capable of meritorious action, as a consequence of its having conformed itself to God’s likeness.

Unlike Rosalynde, As You Like It does not offer a message to its audience as an interim substitute for “the real thing” (access to Catholic priests and the Eucharist). As Oliver says (with regard to Rosalind’s swoon): “This was not counterfeit: there is too great testimony in your complexion that it was a passion of earnest” (4.3.168-70). The conversion of passion to grace is the Christian operation, though it clothes itself according to current fashion.

53 In anti-materialistic facultative models, the appetitive faculty is “replaced” by the faculty of memory. The appetite, though, properly understood, is memory: one must have previously tasted/experienced something to now have an appetite for it. Thus, recognition of natural beauty is precisely that—re-cognition of heavenly beauty experienced prior to birth as natural beauty. Accordingly, the first words spoken by Orlando, in the play’s opening line, are “As I remember Adam” (with no comma before “Adam” in the Folio text).
54 Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, p. 66.
Chapter 7.

Jaques the Lutheran.

As You Like It’s second act will here be read as an assessment of the Lutheran critique of papal Catholicism, conducted via the character of Jaques and his combative relationship with the banished Duke Senior. This reading supplements the previous chapter’s contention that the play’s departures from its source, Lodge’s Rosalynde, enact a conversation with anti-papalism.

In addition, I will examine the repeated presentation in As You Like It of staggered cognition—the play’s tendency to have a character (x) report at length his/her prior observations of character y to characters zz. Analysis of the First Lord’s report of his observation of Jaques in Act 2 Scene 1—this being an example of staggered cognition—will seek to demonstrate the relationship between the Lutheran hermeneutic “revolution” and cognitive theory.

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Having given the theme of the auto-cognitive benefits of suffering his best rhetorical shot (2.1.1-17), the banished Duke Frederick Senior is confronted by his follower Amiens’ pagan-materialist understanding of “fortune” (“happy is your Grace / That can translate the stubbornnesse of fortune / Into so quiet and so sweet a stile” [18-20]). Amiens’ doxy-deaf praise is a non sequitur for the humanist educator. Having encountered this fresh evidence of the limitations of reason and Ciceronian rhetoric, the Duke does not abandon his didactic enterprise, but turns to alternative media. The Duke, it should be noted, has just declared a commitment to what many might consider to be over-determination:
“this,” he says,

our life exempt from publike haunt,
Findes tongues in trees, bookes in the running brookes,
Sermons in stones, and good in euery thing. (15-17)

The Duke thus applies the Augustinian hermeneutic (as outlined in Chapter 1) to all nature as text. Not only is the spiritual meaning of natural phenomena apparent when “publike” noise is subtracted from the cognitive process, but that meaning has charity (“good”) as universal referent. Accordingly, the “venison” which the Duke now proceeds to recommend that he and Amiens hunt figures, I suggest, not meat for the carnal man but passions of the flesh to be “hunted” (expelled) by means of penitential exercises (here specifically flagellation). Hunting as a figure for spiritual exercise was a medieval commonplace, appearing in texts both clerical and lay.¹ The opening of Psalm 41 was influential in this tradition:

As the hart panteth after the fountains of waters: so my soul panteth after thee, O God (1.2)²

Here, the soul, figured as a hart, is not hunted, but quests for God, figured as “fountains of waters”. However, in The Prophecy of Jeremias, hunters are figures for “true Christian prelates”:³

Behold, I will send many fishers, saith the Lord, and they shall fish them [that is, the children of Israel]: and after this I will send them many hunters, and they shall hunt them

² The Rheims-Douay gloss/title to Psalm 41 bears some relation to the themes of AYLI: “Quemadmodum desiderat. The fervent desire of the just after God: hope in afflictions”.
³ Robertson, Jr., Chancer, p. 255.
Having gained a degree of self-insight, the exiled Duke is careful to include not only Amiens but also (via the ethical dative) himself in the penitential “hunt”: “shall we goe and kil vs venison?” (21).

Surely, though, figural precedents notwithstanding, deer are actually hunted in this play? It may be recalled that the wrestling bout in Act 1 Scene 2 turns out to be just a wrestling bout: Orlando is refused a prize on the grounds of his worldly affiliations. That is, the presiding Duke (I argued) treated the contest as a form of sacramental rite whereby Orlando’s works could merit a reward (if he belonged to the right family). Read thus, the bout figures the apprehension of physical actions as (potentially) spiritually efficacious procedures. It is my contention that an equivalent (complex) situation obtains here: the banished Duke speaks, figuratively, of flagellation as a spiritually efficacious activity. According to the text’s cognitive play with the “real” and the “misprized”, however, the Duke and his followers may be doing no more than whip flesh to no gainful end. The futility and misguided nature of the action are in turn presented figuratively as the unnecessary/untimely hunting of venison. (The Duke’s description of the weather suggests it is winter in the forest, but Owens notes that “[a]ccording to contemporary sources, it [deer] was hunted in summer”). Killing for sport or to secure a luxurious diet when simpler food is available is a superfluous, and, therefore, sinful action, as Sidney’s Philisides insists. At first, says the mournful shepherd, man pretended to share dominion of the world with the beasts, but

At length for glutton taste he did them kill;
At last for sport their silly lives did spill.

But yet, O man, rage not beyond thy need;
Deem it no gloire to swell in tyranny.
Thou art of blood; joy not to make things bleed.5

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5 Duncan-Jones, ed. Old Arcadia, pp. 224-5.
In isolation, the quotation from Sidney might seem obviously concerned with actual hunting. However, Philisides is delivering a beast *fable*; thus, he adds:

And you, poor beasts, in patience bide your hell,  
Or know your strengths, and then you shall do well.6

Sidney scholars such as Blair Worden have explored the political significance (and ambiguities) of this couplet.7 For my present purpose, it only needs to be observed that when hunting is mentioned in Elizabethan pastoral, it is done so in a figural manner. Berry notes, incidentally, that hunting is never mentioned in the narrative of the *Old Arcadia* and receives only two mentions in the eclogues (“both times in relation to Philisides”).8 Intriguingly, “Shakespeare’s exploitation of [hunt] imagery is unique among dramatists of the period”.9

What justification do I have, though, besides precedent, for importing these complications into *As You Like It*? With regard to restraining subjective interpretative excess, I rely here—as throughout the thesis—upon the Augustinian (if not the Lutheran) hermeneutic, taking into account the post-Augustinian scholastic expansion of the applicability of that hermeneutic to *all* texts including natural phenomena. Luther asserted that no figural meaning should be attributed to a scriptural text unless to do otherwise would result in absurdity. Thus, where Augustine’s concern was for charity always to emerge as scriptural referent (even at the cost, presumably, of apparently wrenching a text to secure that outcome), Luther let charity fall by the wayside being more concerned to protect Holy Writ from absurdity.10 Without wishing to denigrate or

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10 There might seem to be some conflict here with the supposed influence upon Luther of the *via moderna*. According to the *via moderna* model, apparent scriptural absurdities would be a consequence of human fallibility, not an incentive to interpret figuratively. However, Luther
caricature Luther, I would suggest that the Wittenberg-based scholar was either hermeneutically naïve or disingenuous in the early stages of his contest with Rome as regards the “plain meaning” of Scripture. In any case, in the wake of, say, Luther’s contest with Erasmus regarding the scriptural basis for the freedom or bondage of the human will, it readily became apparent that scriptural statements rarely admit of a single universally acceptable interpretation. Thus, regardless of Luther and other reformers’ explicit preference for “literal” readings, figural interpretations are the norm whenever Scripture is read. As noted, moreover, the banished Duke extends the application of the Augustinian hermeneutic to all of nature as text. Luther, for his part, opposed the division of human society into religious and lay sectors. If the Augustinian and Lutheran hermeneutics apply to Scripture, therefore, they apply to all of the creation, in its “natural” and human cultural forms, with God as (sole) author.

Applying the Lutheran hermeneutic to the present case, one might say “What need to read the Duke’s hunting of venison as flagellation? He’s in a forest, he needs food and deer abound…” Certainly, if one reads the relevant speeches in Act 1 Scene 2 in isolation, that argument cannot easily be gainsaid. From the Augustinian perspective, however, one struggles to find a meaning consistent with charity in the banished Duke’s simultaneous perception of “good in euery thing” and eagerness to slaughter deer. Luther’s follower Tyndale, moreover, observed that individual phrases of texts should not be interpreted in isolation to suit one’s polemical intention. That is, read in a Lutheran way, the Duke’s moral inconsistency is (locally) patent. Reading in an Augustinian (and Tyndalian) way, one reserves judgement until the text as a whole may be assessed.

“The melancholy Jaques”, the reader/audience is told in Act 2 Scene 1,

relies on Scripture as the efficacious vehicle of human cognition of God; Scripture does not necessarily partake of divine attributes.

12 William Tyndale, “A Prologue upon the Epistle of St Paul to the Romans,” p. 505, in Henry Walter, ed. Doctrinal Treatises and Introductions to Different Portions of the Holy Scriptures, by William Tyndale (Cambridge: Parker Society, 1848), pp. 483-509; the relevant passage is discussed in Greenblatt, Self-fashioning, pp. 102-4. The need to attend to the meaning of texts in their entirety was also emphasized by leading humanists, such as Erasmus and Melanchthon: Stillman, Sidney, p. 64.
“grieues” at the Duke’s recurrent slaughter of deer (26). Reading “realistically”,
modern readers sometimes interpret Jaques’ protest as animal rights activism (for
example, the character is a zealous vegetarian in Kenneth Brannagh’s 2006 film
adaptation of the play). However, in Act 4 Scene 2, a jubilant Jaques is eager to
“present” the one “that killed the Deare … to the Duke like a Romane
Conquerour” (1, 3-4). Applying Luther’s hermeneutic, the vegetarian Jaques of
the “realistic” reading may be discarded. Jaques objects to the Duke’s (manner
of) slaying deer, not the slaying of deer per se. Indeed, observation of the correct
manner of deer-slaughter is a cause for communal celebration; it also prompts a
wish (on Jaques’ part alone) to taunt the erring Duke with signs that the reformed
rite has been performed (“it would do well,” Jaques continues, preparing for the
presentation of the anonymous deerslayer to the Duke, “to set the deer’s horns
upon his head for a branch of victory” [4-5]). Now it is Jaques, not the Duke,
who appears morally inconsistent from a “realistic” point of view. To rescue
Shakespeare, the Duke and Jaques from absurdity, therefore, the hunting of deer
needs to be read figuratively. I suggest that the killing of the deer figures the
conversion of death to victory, in the face of Roman tyranny, as performed by
Christ on the cross and by his subsequent (sacramental) imitators. Of course, the
sacrament in question cannot be that of penance in the Lutheran scheme of Act 4
Scene 2; rather it is the reformed rite of the Eucharist (in pagan costume). One
might infer, though, that having Jaques wish to present the celebrant “like a
Romane Conquerour” indicates the reformed rite is no more than a burlesque
version of the Roman one.

Since Jaques’ appearance of inconsistency is removed once Act 4 Scene 2
is read figuratively, the same service may be performed for the banished Duke of
Act 2 Scene 1. James Black has pointed out that the Duke’s speech does not
accurately describing actual hunting practices: “deer are not conveniently taken
by being shot in their backsides”. Likewise, Edward Berry notes that “haunches

13 Berry, Hunt, p. 182.
were never a target in hunting”, being “among the most desirable cuts”. That the Duke specifies that “round hanches” are the targets of the “forked heads” he envisions, therefore, suggests that those “forked heads” figure the bifurcated ends of whips, as applied to human buttocks.

However, the Duke has recently insisted there is “good in every thing” (2.1.17). What need for flagellation? He acknowledges the seeming contradiction:

And yet it irks me the poore dapple fools
Being natiiue Burgers of this desert City,
Should intheir [sic] owne confines with forked heads
Haue their round hanches goard. (22-5)

This is a complex statement. First of all, it is difficult to understand how a “desert [that is, empty] City” can have “natiiue[s]”. The “obvious” answer is that the Duke is saying that his animal quarry live in an unpeopled forest. (The “realist” reading thus relies on figuration.) But the term “Burger” in the early modern period appears to have meant “citizen”; hence, the Duke could be paraphrased as saying “these citizens live in a city without citizens”. The “obvious” answer makes no sense. Moreover, does one suppose that the Duke chooses his similes at random? Why does he call the deer “Burgers”?

The earliest examples of “burgher” given in the OED date from the 16th century. However, the word derives from Old Saxon “burg”, meaning “fort”. Thus, the word “burger” may denote a protected inhabitant belonging to a feudal structure. The medieval French chronicler Guibert of Nogent, for instance, refers to “burgensibus” in relation to the “abbatiae Sancti Joannis”:

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16 For a similar usage of “desert”, see: Duncan-Jones, ed. *Old Arcadia*, pp. 11 and 369.n.
17 “[B]urgher, n.,” *OED*.
18 “[B]urgher, n.,” *OED*.
19 “[B]orough, n.,” *OED*.
the abbey of Saint-Jean". Guibert's modern English editor, John F. Benton, observes that these burghers "may be thought of as serfs of the abbey who had burgess rights in Laon in return for the dues they paid the church". Thus, to read the Duke's term "Burger" as exactly synonymous with "citizen" flattens the former term's registration of changes consequent upon the decay of feudal culture. Restoring that awareness could dissolve the apparent self-contradiction in the Duke's comment. The "deer" may be regarded as Christians who have deserted the City of God; perhaps they have exchanged native serfdom (as servants of God) for apparent worldly "liberty". Accordingly, they are subject to great suffering for their sins (to the Duke's impotent regret). There is "good in every thing", but people fail to apprehend this and, in pursuit of individualistic liberty, enslave themselves to sin. Arguably, the Duke equates his own current acts of penance with the suffering of the "native burgers"—he too had deserted the City of God in his former enjoyment of "painted pompe" (2.1.2).

At this moment, another of the Duke's followers—the First Lord—introduces the character of Jaques. Jaques plays no dramatically necessary role in the unfolding of the play's plot (slender as that is) and yet is provided with a lengthy description prior to his arrival onstage. Hence, one is led to assume that he is of particular conceptual importance. Jaques, moreover, is presented (made present) for the Duke and his company's—and the audience's/reader's—cognition by the First Lord, who has observed and eavesdropped upon Jaques. This is but one of many instances of the play's performance of staged or (if the theatrical pun obtrudes) staggered cognition. For example, in Act 1 Le Beau describes defeated wrestlers ("Three proper yong men, of excellent growth and presence" [2.115-6]) for the cognitive benefit of Rosalind and Celia (and the theatre audience/reader). Often in the play, a character is first apprehended by sensory means by one character and the results of that apprehension are then

22 Benton, ed. Guibert, p. 160.n.8; see also: Bourgin, ed. Histoire, p. 149.n.1.
23 See: Chadwick, ed. Confessions, V.2 ("they have fled ... for you [God] do not desert anything you have made ... you have not abandoned your creation as they have deserted their Creator").
relayed to further characters. The prior apprehensions are almost never presented on stage (exceptions include Orlando’s mention of the starving Adam to Duke Senior and his company [2.7.129-134] and Orlando’s description of his first meeting with Ganimed, again to Duke Senior et al [5.4.28-9]).

It might be said that such “staggering” is often merely the dramatist’s attempt to heighten audience anticipation. Nonetheless, the play’s repetition of the device is striking. It is, for instance, applied three times to descriptions of Orlando (by Le Beau, who refers to him as “the best” [1.2.109-11], Celia [3.2.174-241] and the transformed Oliver [4.3.97-155]). In the latter case, the appeal to dramaturgical criteria is countered by the observation that the presentation of Orlando’s combat with the lion holds greater obvious dramatic potential than Oliver’s Spenserian (and/or Copleyan) account of same. Regardless of its capacity to generate audience anticipation, the device’s frequent appearance in the play indicates a preoccupation with cognitive process.

Such staggering could have no bearing on cognition per se, according to a subjectivist cognitive model. That is, once a subject perceives an object, discrete cognitive act x is concluded. Reporting finite cognitive act x to another person would lead to the performance of finite cognitive act y by that recipient; it would not contribute to an always incomplete cognitive process. According to the subjectivist model, the receiving subject could ask questions leading the initial observer to alter their opinion. The witnesses in As You Like It, however, never alter their “opinions” (vis-à-vis their prior respective apprehensions) as a consequence of any response to their reportage. This is because they do not have opinions. In making these reports, they are not representations of individuals but

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24 Further examples include: First Lord as reporter (reporting on “ladies” [themselves reporting on Celia to the First Lord]) > Duke Frederick, Jr. et al, as recipients (2.2.4-7); Second Lord (Hisperia [Rosalind and Celia] > Second Lord) > Duke Frederick, Jr. et al (2.2.10-16); Adam (Oliver) > Orlando (2.3.17-26); Orlando (Adam) > Duke Senior et al (2.7.129-134); Orlando (Sir Roland) > Duke Senior (2.7.195-8); Oliver (Orlando) > Duke Frederick, Jr. et al (3.1.1); Celia (Orlando) > Rosalind (3.2.174-241); Oliver (Orlando [Ganimed and Celia] > Oliver) > Rosalind/Celia (4.3.82-7); Oliver (Orlando) > Rosalind/Celia (4.3.97-155).

25 For the Catholic Copley’s imitation of the Spenserian poetic in A Fig for Fortune (1596), see: Susannah Brietz Monta, Martyrdom and Literature in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), pp. 100-4. Oliver’s statement (from an omniscient viewpoint) that Orlando “threw his eye aside” (4.3.101) bears some relation to the portentous style of Copley’s narrator, who at one point describes himself as “Casting my eye aside”: Fortune, p. 73.
facultative presentations.

Before continuing it will be helpful to outline some relevant details of facultative cognition. First of all, one should distinguish (as did Hooker)\(^{26}\) between a facultative taxonomy of the soul and facultative cognition *per se*. In the facultative taxonomy, as derived from Plato via Aristotle, the latter’s Arabic commentators and the scholastics, the soul is conceived as comprising three faculties (in the Anselmian and Piconian models, these are itemized as the appetitive, volitional and intellectual faculties).\(^ {27}\) Facultative cognition *per se* involves sensory data being gathered by different sensory organs and presented to the “common sense” (*koine aesthesis*) for synthesis.\(^ {28}\) For instance, visual data presented to two eyes is combined there to form a single mental “image”. Multisensory experiences (such as touching and tasting an apple) are likewise assembled in by the *koine aesthesis*.

Read facultatively, therefore, Le Beau, in relaying information to Rosalind, Celia and the clown, functions in a manner akin to a set of sense-organs reporting to the *koine aesthesis* (note that he provides visual and aural data [1.2.119-25]). However, characters who are information-bearers in one scene may be receivers in another scene. They do not consistently figure this or that component in a cognitive assembly. (After all, sometimes the ears “inform” the eyes, and vice versa, and so on with other sensory combinations.) Celia, while listening to Le Beau, is part of the receiving sensorium; elsewhere, *she* acts as a set of sense-organs in apprehending Orlando in the forest—prior to relaying that apprehension to an impatient Rosalind (3.2.174-241).

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\(^ {26}\) As discussed in the Introduction.


\(^ {28}\) Daniel Heller-Roazen, *The Inner Touch: Archaeology of a Sensation* (New York: Zone, 2007), p. 38. Aristotle’s *koine aesthesis* is usually Latinized as the *sensus communis*. Following Heller-Roazen, I retain the Greek term because it defamiliarizes the concept, foregrounding the matter at issue: that the act of cognition is usually taken for granted. The *koine aesthesis/sensus communis* is also sometimes referred to as the *fantasia*. This, however, can lead to confusion—firstly, because in Aristotle the *fantasia* is a function of the *koine aesthesis*; secondly, following Avicenna, Albertus Magnus and Roger Bacon divided the *sensus communis* from *imagination* “according to whether [the latter faculty] receives [sense-impressions] or retains them”: Harvey, *Inward Wits*, p. 71.n.138.
When components act in co-operation, “social” hierarchy does not affect reception. First-hand witnesses are allowed to have their say; the data they present is accepted on its own terms. Alternative views, however, are also allowed their input. No facultative reporter can over-rule another by fiat. Probable certainty is approximated by the combining of data. Evident contradictions, however, can lead to the questioning of data. For example, the eyes see a bent stick in the water and report this to the koine aesthesis. “Yes,” says the assembly, “you do see a bent stick.” The hand then reports: “the stick feels straight.” Evidentiary contradiction leads to judgement (discernment) being reserved. Available data may then be submitted to the intellect for ratification according to this or that theoretical model or further evidence may be sought. This is the psychic commonwealth in action. It is pertinent, therefore, that the tyrant Duke Frederick, Jr. does not adopt such an approach in declaring Rosalind a traitor (“Let it suffice thee that I trust thee not” [1.3.52]).

As You Like It thus presents cognition as a staggered process. Sensory data is gathered and then presented to a group of characters for corroborative processing. (The single exception is Celia’s reporting of her sighting of Orlando to Rosalind alone: Rosalind’s impatience leads to a violation of assembly protocol.) The repeated pattern—whereby sensory data tends only to be reported, while subsequent communal corroboration is actually performed—might be a function of the dramatic format. On the other hand, it could indicate an inclination to regard unmediated sensory experience, especially ocular, as commonly over-privileged; hence, communal synthesis of multi-sensory data is promoted instead. The latter point is consistent with Luther’s insistence that the preached word take precedence over images adored in isolation. Note though that this position is not anti-visual as such.29

In performing staggered cognition, however, As You Like It does not

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29 This is in line with Luther’s tolerance for icons and imagery in churches. Witness, for example, his clashes with Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt vis-à-vis the latter’s iconoclasm: Markus Wriedt, “Luther’s Theology,” pp. 104-6, in McKim, ed. Luther, pp. 86-119; Oberman, Luther, pp. 302-3. This aspect of Luther’s position is elided in Huston Diehl, Staging Reform, Reforming the Stage: Protestantism and Popular Theatre in Early Modern England (Ithaca & London: Cornell UP, 1997).
perform cognition of the initial phenomenon as existent being. Rather, cognition of appearance/s occurs (the koine aesthesis has no direct access to phenomena). As noted, moreover, judgement/discernment (the forming of a settled opinion vis-à-vis the initial phenomenon) is postponed until a later moment (cognition per se is in fact never complete). (That is, in each case except one: Oliver's report of Orlando's combat with the lioness.) These cases, in other words, do not perform the presentation of assembled sensory data to the intellect for ratification. Thus, though Jaques figures the intellectual faculty, the play presents its data to the faculties of the audience/reader—to be assessed as they/he/she like/s it. Hence, the framing function performed by Jaques de Boys (as passive intellect) is equivalent to the spectation-audition/reading experience of audience/reader.

The dramatic relevance of having Rosalind hear multiple descriptions of Orlando is evident. Where, though, does the dramatic significance lie in having the banished Duke Senior receive an extensive report concerning Jaques? In answer, it may be noted that the Duke's oblique treatment of the need for penance is the cue for Jaques' first "appearance". Here comes news of someone meditating upon related doctrinal (and cognitive) issues. While the Duke ponders the meaning of being blasted by "the winters winde", Jaques watches a wounded stag weep and expounds upon the meaning of the spectacle at length, while also commenting upon the banished Duke's moral failings. The views of Jaques the would-be reformer are delivered to the Duke by a spy: "Indeed", says the First Lord,

The melancholy Jaques grieues at that
[the hunted creatures' suffering in their native precincts],
And in that kinde sweares you doe more vsurpe
Than doth your brother that hath banish’d you (25-8)

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30 Discussion of this "exception" belongs to a sustained consideration of the character of Rosalind; space restrictions therefore allow only a diagnostic outline of the matter in the Conclusion.
31 For the distinction between the active and passive intellects, see: Lawson-Tancred, ed. De Anima, 417b.
According to the First Lord, Jaques is not sad but "melancholy", a pejorative term in the period denoting spiritual failure and/or political discontent. The use of the term as a defining epithet implies that Jaques does not so much compassionately "grieue" at the hunted creatures' suffering, as object to the malpractice of the hunting institution. At the same time, according to the First Lord, Jaques accuses the exiled Duke of an act of usurpation more serious ("in that kinde"—that is, in a manner of speaking, or speaking "allegorically") than his brother's political act of seizure. In Jaques' view, it seems, the Duke exceeds the authority given to him by law and custom more by promulgating the efficacy of works (here in the form of penance) than his harsher-seeming brother does by ruling tyrannically.

The fundamental question posed by the Lord's report, however, is: what phenomenon did Jaques experience by "the brooke that brawles along this wood" (32)? The obvious answer for previous commentators has been "a wounded stag". According to the reading offered earlier of the Duke's use of the term "venison", the phenomenon experienced by Jaques took the form of one of the Duke's "Coe-mates" (1) flagellating himself. Jaques speaks of the Duke's usurpation of the animals he hunts. How does the Duke usurp flagellants? To account for this, it needs to be observed that the First Lord is reporting the series of possible meanings Jaques attaches to the phenomenon he witnessed. Each appearance of the "stag"—each meaning Jaques reads onto the experienced phenomenon—is discrete, produced serially, and has no certifiable attachment to the existent phenomenon.

Jaques' charge of usurpation glances at more than just the papal endorsement of the efficacy of works. The usurpation of the claims of both secular clergy to parochial authority and of beggars to alms by the spread of mendicant friars is also potentially recalled here. Erasmus dedicates a section of


33 Martin Luther referred to the papacy as "Nimrod, the mighty hunter": "The Babylonian Captivity of the Church," (1520), p. 364, in Theodore G. Tappert, ed. Selected Writings of Martin Luther, 4 volumes (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007), 1.355-478; he also described the place where the Pope stored his profits from selling indulgences as the "skinning house": "To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation Concerning the Reform of the Christian Estate," (1520), p. 324, in Tappert, ed. Selected Writings, 1.251-353.
Encomium of Moria (1511) to an attack upon “those that are commonly called religious” or “Monks and Friars”.\textsuperscript{34} “Some of them,” Erasmus complained, “make a lot of money from wearing filthy clothes and begging; they go from door to door bellowing out demands for bread …doing ordinary beggars out of a lot of business”.\textsuperscript{35} The main objection to the mendicants expressed by secular clergy, meanwhile, was “the usurpation of the rights of the parish clergy”.\textsuperscript{36} Why, though, would Jaques associate the Duke and his followers with begging monks (friars)? First, it needs to be stressed that the tendency of putatively anti-“allegorical” Reformers to produce multiple meanings from a “text” is itself a target of satire here. In thus earnestly teasing out the possible applications of Jaques’ remarks, I also become the target. Be that as it may, a remark of John Wyclif’s provides a clue to the link between Church corruption (as figured by the banished Duke) and the friars. In Of Prelates, Wyclif complains that “men supposen that newe religious han leue of worldly prelatis to preche here fablis and lesyngis and to robbe the pore peple bi beggyng”.\textsuperscript{37} The two types of usurpation performed by the friars are here itemized, but “worldly prelates” bear the blame for tolerating this new movement. A link obtains between the Church (and papacy’s) corruption by worldly values and the spread of the reformist mendicant movement.

A usurper (political or “allegorical”) must replace (not merely kill) the previous occupant of the usurped seat. Hence, it becomes absurd to interpret the quarry here as actual animals (the banished Duke does not become a zoological deer by hunting them). According to the two readings offered above, the usurped former “rulers” of the forest are either the creatures (sins/passions) hunted by the Duke or “regular beggars” deprived of their livelihoods. To a Lutheran, a pope who legitimates the traffic in indulgences usurps the authority of all believers and betrays the Christian obligation to believe in salvation by faith alone. In a

\textsuperscript{34} Desiderius Erasmus, “An Encomium of Mòria or Praise of Folly,” p.77, in Roger Clarke, ed. Praise of Folly and Pope Julius Barred from Heaven, by Desiderius Erasmus (Richmond: Oneworld, 2008), pp. 1-115.

\textsuperscript{35} Erasmus, “Encomium,” p. 78.


Lutheran’s eyes, a minister of God (a “senior” not a “sacer”) should only teach (as the Duke has tried, and failed, to teach Amiens).38

Continuing his report, the First Lord tells the exiled Duke that he saw Jaques reclining “[v]nder an oake, whose antike roote peepes out / Vpon the brooke that brawles along this wood” (31-2). This is the first mention of this ancient oak tree, a Shakespearean addition to Lodge’s forest which lends itself to “mystical interpretations”.39 That is, the oak in this Edenic location appears to figure the Tree of Life.40 Interpreted thus, “the brooke” to which the oak tree is adjacent would be the fountain of grace supplied by Christ’s sacrifice.41

That versions of the three brothers are represented lying beneath the oak tree/Tree of Life at different stages of the play42 suggests that they may be figures for the (Aristotelian) stages of a man’s life: youth, maturity and seniority.43 However, the meaning of the category “age” is a question asked by the play. (Jaques’ famous discourse on the “Seven Ages of Man” signals the currency of rival models to the Aristotelian [2.7.140-67].) When Orlando defeats his older brother in a wrestling bout, he observes: “Come, come elder brother, you are too yong in this” (1.1.50-1). Age, it appears, can be understood metaphorically. (The severe Jaques is referred to as “the olde gentleman” by Audrey [5.1.3-4].)

Oliver complains of Orlando being more valued by the world than himself (1.1.156-60), while Orlando is dismissive of his brother Jaques de Boys’ intellectual achievements “at schoole” (5-6). This tetchy rivalry may be ascribed to the three (topographical) faculties of the human soul, competing for cognitive pre-eminence. Accordingly, the de Boys brothers could figure the Anselmian/Piconian triad: the appetitive (Orlando), the intellectual (Jaques) and the volitional (Oliver). In the Introduction I observed that Shakespeare’s facultative rhetoric had much in common with Hooker’s and by no means

40 Scoufos, “Paradiso Terrestre,” p. 221.
41 Martz, Meditation, pp. 71-2; Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, p. 93.
42 Jaques: 2.1.30-2; Orlando: 3.2.227-8; Oliver: 4.3.103-6.
required direct acquaintance—or (more pertinently) intellectual agreement—with the scholastic or Florentine traditions. That Shakespeare was at least indirectly acquainted with Neoplatonism is indisputable, given its prevalence in Elizabethan poetry (not least in *The Faerie Queene*) and, indeed, the scattered Neoplatonic passages in Shakespeare’s own works (including *As You Like It*). Whether or not Shakespeare had read any of the Florentine Neoplatonists, the (ontological) hierarchical bias of Neoplatonism is contested in *As You Like It* by the play’s commitment to viewing hierarchies as purely *formal* necessities. According to the play’s non-ontological conception of the category “age”, the relative status (seniority) of the faculties depends upon cultural norms.

Like many moderns, Jaques *qua* Lutheran would regard scholastic faculty psychology with scepticism and distaste. The melancholy Jaques, therefore, according to the present thesis, figures an intellectual faculty that mistakes itself for—and thus reifies itself as—an individual or isolated subject.

With these points established, I can return to the First Lord’s report, concerning Jaques by the brook:

To the which place a poore sequestred Stag
That from the Hunters aime had tane a hurt,
Did come to languish; and indeed my Lord
The wretched animall heau’d forth such groanes
That their discharge did stretch his leatheme coat
Almost to bursting, and the big round teares
Cours’d one another downe his innocent nose
In pitteous chase: and thus the hairie foole,
Much marked of the melancholie *Jaques*,

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45 Scoufos maintains that *AYLI* echoes Pico and Ficino’s overturning of “the old hierarchies”. However, such an overturning is not unambiguously present in either of the two major Florentine Neoplatonists. Scoufos writes: “Harmony between man and the outer powers was no longer a one-way relationship,” according to the Florentine Neoplatonists, “mankind’s volitional surge upward toward God—up the ladder of love—must surely be paralleled by God’s movement downward man”. There is evident strain in describing two coinciding trajectories as “parallel”—the need for a ladder presupposes a hierarchy: “*Paradiso Terrestre*,” p. 224.
As previous scholars have noted, this is a description of a scene commonly found in Renaissance emblem books.\textsuperscript{46} The moralistic and figurative nature of the speech, therefore, would have been evident to contemporary audiences/readers. The First Lord, in responding to the banished Duke’s suggestion that he, Amiens and others go “kill vs venison”, sustains the figuration of penitential acts as hunt. He reports that Jaques has witnessed one of the Duke’s followers vainly (in Jaques’ opinion) imitating Christ’s suffering on the cross by flagellating himself—hence, the “groanes” and “teares”.\textsuperscript{47} Moreover, as Edward Berry notes, in Jaques’ reported speech, “[t]he human responsible for the actual grief of the deer … is virtually [absent] … the stag has ‘ta’en a hurt’ from ‘the hunter’s aim’. The stag itself is therefore complicit in its own wounding.”\textsuperscript{48} The latter phrase has obvious application to the case of a flagellant. In any case, the “sobbing deer” image “had a long poetic and iconographic history. Almost always, the image is anthropomorphic, the actual experience of the deer serving as a mere vehicle for human grief”.\textsuperscript{49} Thus, reading/hearing of Jaques’ speech, it is “difficult to tell whose pain is really at issue … his language so confuses deer behaviour with human behaviour that one is tempted to say that the ‘real’ subjects of the passage are … human beings.”\textsuperscript{50} Jaques’ “confusing” language is consistent with medieval rhetoric, in which the image of the stricken stag was used as a figure for the crucified Christ.\textsuperscript{51} Furthermore, the adjective “hairie” could metonymically denote the hair-shirt worn by the penitent as imitator of Christ.

That this “Stag” has been “sequestered” (“removed from office”),\textsuperscript{52} may


\textsuperscript{47} For “stag” as weeping penitent, see: Bath, “Weeping Stags,” pp. 18-19; Thiébaux, \textit{Stag of Love}, pp. 45-6.

\textsuperscript{48} Berry, \textit{Hunt}, p. 175.

\textsuperscript{49} Berry, \textit{Hunt}, p. 171.

\textsuperscript{50} Berry, \textit{Hunt}, pp. 27-8.


\textsuperscript{52} Dusinberre, ed. \textit{AYLI}, p. 192.n; Berry, \textit{Hunt}, p. 175.
indicate that it is one of the Duke's "Coe-mates, and brothers in exile" (2.1.1)—a cleric prevented from performing his proper function/office. As mentioned above, Jaques seizes the opportunity to extract a series of meanings from a single phenomenon. That is, Jaques also "sees" the stag "as" a Christian (priest or not) who, in obedience to the Church's teachings, neglects his office of engaging in useful activity in the world and spends time instead performing futile penitent "works". The penitent's "nose" is "innocent" (or, in the modern idiom, clean) because of Christ's sacrifice, not as a consequence of any ritualized penitential observances.

Certainly, if the text were to be read as referring to the hunting of a zoological stag, the exiled Duke would seem a moral monster. For the same gentle Duke who regrets the goring of venison in their "owne confines" responds to this description of a stag weeping in agony not by saying "How terrible, I hope it was soon put out of its misery" but by asking,

what said Jaques?

Did he not moralize this spectacle? (3.43-4)

Thus, the amused Duke acknowledges that the First Lord is parodying Lutheran polemics. Though dedicated to reading Scripture "literally", and despite being avowedly opposed to "allegory", Protestant reformers, not excluding Luther, indulged in de facto "allegorical" moralizations as much as, if not more than, their Catholic opponents.53 The First Lord, therefore, has been engaged in counter-espionage: Jaques himself had been spying, under cover of the oak, on one of their company as he performed penitential acts. The Duke now anticipates a long, moralizing pamphlet from the Reformist press excoriating this practice and ranging over a multitude of (more or less) related topics. Sure enough, the

First Lord proceeds to report how Jaques transformed the image into a thousand similies.

First, for his weeping into the needlesse streame;
Poore Deere quoth he, thou mak'st a testament
As worldlings doe, giuing thy sum of more
To that which had too must [sic] (45-9)

That the stream is “needlesse” is customarily glossed “realistically” as meaning that a brook has water without anyone crying into it.54 This reflects badly on either Jaques, the First Lord or Shakespeare’s rhetorical abilities, for, used thus, “needlesse” is mere sentiment and the image is banal. Since neither Jaques nor the First Lord elsewhere conspicuously display the traits of a bad poet, either Shakespeare nods or the stream should be apprehended as other than an actual water feature. As suggested above, it figures the fountain of grace flowing from the crucified Christ’s side. From the Lutheran’s point of view, the flagellant’s self-punishment is superfluous, for Christ’s sacrifice has no need of further contribution. A redundant image is thus converted into an observation upon redundancy.

Moreover, the blood of Christ flowing in the stream, and present in the wine of the Eucharist, is associated here with “a testament”. Jaques does not say, however, that “some worldlings” behave in the manner described; rather, he implies that all “worldlings” do this. In what sense may all people be said to leave wealth to the excessively wealthy? His remarks, however, are apt when read as pointing out to the flagellant that, although he thinks he is engaging in a spiritual action, he is actually behaving just like worldly people; the implication being that, though material wealth is held to be an obstacle to salvation, yet people leave their goods to friends and family as though they are doing them a good turn; in the same way, the flagellant thinks he collaborates with Christ by punishing himself in this fashion, when, in fact, Christ has no need of anyone’s

The Second Folio altered the obviously erroneous “must” to “much”, but not until J. P. Collier’s edition of 1842-4 was “had” changed to “hath” on the assumption that a grammatical error was present. Indeed, if the phrase were applied to an actual stag weeping into the brook, the present tense would be correct. However, if Jaques addresses a flagellant thinking he is retroactively assisting Christ’s Passion, the past tense, as retained by the Second Folio and subsequent editions, is carefully chosen. Jaques, like Luther, stresses that the Atonement occurred once and for all in the past; hence, the current suffering is needless.

That said, it is not easy to make sense of the next phrase in the First Lord’s account: “then being there alone, / Left and abandoned of his veluet friend” (49-50). Modern editions struggle with this remark. Dusinberre makes “then” the start of a new sentence (as do other editors), reading it as a description of the stag being “Left and abandoned” by the rest of the herd. Why, though, in that case, use two terms (“Left and abandoned”)? According to George T. Wright, Shakespeare often employs such “adjectival hendiadys” to “blur ... logical lines”. In any case, the herd would require the plural “friends”. Dusinberre opts to argue that “friend” is possibly left singular to “glance at the queen’s [Elizabeth’s] relationship to Essex”. However, this reading of “friend” as Essex is entirely localised; even contemporary readers of the text would have been obliged to guess that (for one instance only) alluding to Essex is the reason for a grammatical “error”.

The speech as a whole needs to be considered. The First Lord itemises Jaques’ “thousand similies”, beginning: “First, for his weeping into the needlest streame” (emphasis added); this is the first topic Jaques uses to frame a simile (the deer is like a worldling). The First (and Second etc.) Folio’s punctuation, observing early modern conventions, perhaps obscures from modern eyes the

58 Dusinberre, ed. *AYLI*, p. 194.n.
signalling of the second item in the Lord’s list. The word “then” follows a colon, which could function as the equivalent of a modern semi-colon. That is, “then” introduces the second topic upon which Jaques moralizes, which is the deer’s “being there alone, / Left and abandoned of his veluet friend”. The adjective “veluet” has also exercised editors. Since “in Elizabethan London only aristocrats were allowed to wear velvet”, Dusinberre uses the detail to support her Essex-reading.59

Above, venison and the stag were apprehended as the flagellated body. Jaques, however, is producing “similes”: he is reading non-charitably, cynically, “allegorically”, “moraliz[ing] this spectacle”. Thus, he compares the isolated “Deere” to a helpless person “[l]eft and abandoned” by a sumptuously-dressed friend. Jaques, therefore, arguably interprets the stag as a Christ-figure previously protected by association with wealthy and worldly institutions.

Jaques (via the First Lord) proceeds in his interpretation: “‘Tis right quoth he, thus miserie doth part / The Flux of companie” (51-2). The selection of the unpleasant term “Flux” reflects Jaques’ distaste for affiliated groups (which in turn may recall Luther’s dislike of fraternities).60 When circumstances become adverse, in Jaques’ view, such solid-seeming companies break up into those in and those out of harm’s way. This detail speaks to the larger argument being made here, that Jaques is committed to a subjectivist model of cognition, which reifies the isolated individual as rational subject. “The Flux of companie” which Jaques regards as a phantasmic semblance of cohesion, is, however, according to a facultative model, the actual and necessary co-agent (or “Coe-mate”) of all cognition. Hence, it is incapable of actually being divided by “miserie” (as the expansion of Duke Senior’s company-in-exile confirms).

The subsequent section of the passage runs:

Anon a careless Heard
Full of the pasture, jumps along by him
And neuer staies to greet him: I quoth Jaques,

59 Dusinberre, ed. *AYLI*, p. 194.n.
Sweepe on you fat and greazie Citizens,
'Tis just the fashion (52-6)

This herd is “careless”: devoid of charity. They pass the weeping stag without greeting him. These are “fat and greazie Citizens”, who observe not the golden rule but “the fashion” (current false materialistic values).

The First Lord concludes:

Thus most inuectively he pierceth through
The body of Countrie, Citie, Court,
Yea, and of this our life, swearing that we
Are meere vsurpers, tyrants and whats worse
To fright the Annimals, and to kill them vp
In their assign’d and natie dwelling place. (58-63)

The Lord reports how Jaques (himself, ironically, now the hunter) “pierceth through”—he sharply criticises—the current forms of the three estates identified by Luther as the basic elements of human society: the Church, oeconomia (“household rule”) and politia (secular authority)—in literary pastoral terms, “Countrie, Citie, Court” respectively.61 The three stages of the critique are flagged in the preceding section of the First Lord’s speech by the linking words “First”, “then” and “anon”. “First” introduces the error of penitential practices, targetting, therefore, the religious estate; “then” prefaces the observation that “miserie” parts company, which would relate to the failure of social institutions (oeconomia) such as, say, fraternities under stress; and “anon” leads to complaint about selfish “Citizens”, themselves allowed to grow “fat” in order to be exploited in turn by their temporal masters (politia).

However, the First Lord seems to add a rogue “estate”, saying Jaques also “pierceth through … this our life”.62 Roving in some way across the categories is the exiled Duke’s company, which has usurped power in the other spheres.

61 Wannenwetsch, “Theology,” p. 130.
62 Bainton notes that Luther converted Augustine’s four estates into three, omitting the monk: Luther, p. 240.
Transordinal displacement was a particular bugbear of Luther’s: “Luther spoke out against the various forms of religiously motivated ‘desertion’ of [the] orders”. Papal corruption per se had, of course, for centuries invited criticism; nonetheless, the hierarchical stability which the institution of the Church provided was, evidently, deemed sufficient compensation for the social harm caused by clerical abuses. Church corruption thus secured tacit toleration. However, when the Church itself encouraged innovations which threatened that hierarchical organisation, the sequence of events leading to the Reformation was arguably set in motion. The Duke and his followers, therefore, are not only criticized by Jaques for an excessive emphasis on penitential practice—thus neglecting the cure of souls—but also for seeking to infiltrate social institutions and for laying claim to temporal power.

Luther attacked “the Friars who lived their life as ‘parasite’ existences at the cost of others who cared for those institutions which, in their zeal for a better justice … the religious presupposed but devalued”. The link between the fraternal orders and papal corruption may not be obvious. The Franciscan order in particular had begun as a reformist movement, seeking to promote the apostolic lifestyle. Over time, as is well-known, the order acquired property, forcing it to abandon its ideal of poverty. As a solution, the Church stepped in: it would be the nominal possessor of the Franciscans’ (extensive) property. Of course, this led to reciprocal fraternal influence—doctrinal and other—within the Church. Likewise, the Dominicans had gained considerable doctrinal influence by assisting the Church, for example, in the suppression of the Catharist heresy.

By such means, the fraternal orders secured papal approval for their mission to

64 Wannenwetsch, “Theology,” p. 132; see also: Luther, “Christian Nobility,” p. 308.
67 Logan, Middle Ages, p. 218; Duffy, Saints and Sinners, p. 156; Luther, “Christian Nobility,” pp. 308-9.
68 Duffy, Saints and Sinners, p. 149; Bossy, Christianity, p. 92.
export monastic ideals into the parish and the city—69—a procedure Jaques may be referring to here as “fright[ing] the Annimals”: terrifying the souls in parishes (“their assign’d and native dwelling place”).70

Connecting Luther’s criticism of the mendicant orders to Jaques’ moralizations may still seem fanciful. After all, there are no explicit references to friars in the scene and, in any case, what relevance could the topic have for late-1590s theatre-audiences/readers? True, the validity of the mendicant out-reach was not a burning issue circa 1599; however, the social consequences of a diminished regard for the practice of confession remained a cause of concern.71 The topics of the mendicant project(s) and the performance of confession are closely connected, as will be shown below. Above, the wrestling bout in Act 1 Scene 2 of the play was read as Orlando’s confessional failure (though Orlando does not regard it as such). How does one process one’s sinful acts, the play seems to ask, when sacramental confession is no longer available?

Though Luther did not regard confession as a sacrament, he did not consider it to be a harmful practice in itself, if practised with sensitivity and in accord with a belief in salvation by faith alone. However, in order to survive (and, it was argued, prosper), friars stressed the need for more regular and more rigorous confession, and were backed up in this by papal proclamations.72 Parishioners could enjoy a stable relationship with their resident priests.73 Thus, the validity of the confessional exchange was underwritten by the participation of an informed and familiar spiritual guide, sensitive to local conditions. However, from Luther’s perspective, with the advent of the friars, the confessional system became a papally-sponsored control system, geared towards the generation of fear and guilt, and the production of obedient subjects.

Confessants were encouraged to regard themselves as their confessors saw

70 Luther refers to “the insurmountable task which they [that is, the Roman Church] have imposed upon us, namely, that we are to frame a contrition for every sin”: “Babylonian Captivity,” p. 437; see also: Tyndale, Obedience, p. 82.
71 For useful discussion, see: Barroll, Artificial Persons, pp. 13-14.n.6.
73 Staley, Catholic Religion, p. 93.
them. The confessant performed a subject position as judge while discursively joined with the confessor. This “subject” then regarded the confessant’s recent career as object—a medium for sinful actions—thus rendering self-cognition performable. In seeing oneself as an object, however, one does not necessarily commit to an ontological understanding of the self as unified subject (hence cognizable as object). Medieval languages, it will be recalled, had no equivalent term for the modern word “personality”. “Persona” was understood to refer to the mask of an actor. Saying “yesterday I was jealous” is problematic, therefore, in that the jealous “person” is not participating in the act of confession. Hence, it may be said that, in order to facilitate confession, a facultative model of cognition made strategic use of a subject-object model, without ontological commitment to same. The confessant might say: “yesterday, a jealous deed was performed by this creature” (jealousy is not attributed to the personality of the confessant). By occupying the role of subject, guided by a priest, the confessant achieves distance from committed sinful actions, in a sense expelling them from the self as objects.

The friars, however, evidently held sinful actions to congest as a result of confession being too infrequent. Sins do not simply manifest as a series of discrete objects which one may expel at a convenient moment. This implies in turn that sins are not acts but properties. With more frequent confession, the objects apprehended in the confessional begin to take on a stubborn consistency. The same sinful objects keep appearing. One comes to suspect that one is a sinful subject: a producer of sinful objects. Subsequent to that “realization”, confession cannot be held to work because one’s sinful nature cannot be expelled—only itemized expressions of that nature may be recalled and regretted.

Luther today is still sometimes regarded as presiding over the birth of the modern subject, the individual. It might be said that, on the contrary, he opposed the Church’s production of guilt-ridden subjects, and wished to dispel the illusion

75 Thus, Margery Kempe, repeatedly refers to herself as “this creature” or “the creature”—seven times, for example, in Chapter 21 of her book: Barry Windeatt, ed. The Booke of Margery Kempe (London: Penguin, 1985), pp. 84-6.
that conceptual subjects and objects partake of ontological essence. A major problem for Luther, though, lay in contesting Church production of the guilty subject without encouraging the production of self-seeking guilt-free subjects ("libertines"). To do this, one does not "liberate" subjects from the Church; rather, one promotes a return to the understanding of subjectivity as strategic performance, or act.

Thus, in figuring author-function as Jaques qua Lutheran, As You Like It does not celebrate the author as individual genius, a free subject capable of supplanting the priest-function. As stated, Jaques also figures the intellectual faculty. However, he is melancholy; he is spiritually afflicted and incapable, therefore, of efficiently performing his function as intellectual faculty. Hence, Jaques should not be regarded as, say, a biographical portrait of Luther. Rather, Jaques figures the intellectual faculty reified as unified subject as a result of a miscomprehension (or inevitable consequence) of Lutheranism. One consequence of that miscomprehension is the supposition that all believers are their own spiritual authorities. According to such a view, authors can not only offer texts as substitutes for the rites previously performed by Catholic priests but also discuss doctrinal issues with subjective authority. Hence, As You Like It reinserts the conventional heterobiographical character omitted from Lodge’s Rosalynde, in order to indicate the surreptitious nature of the latter text’s usurpation of spiritual authority (at the very moment it insisted, or feigned to insist, that true authority lay outside of its text). Hence, also, the play includes another extended report of an experience Jaques has in the forest—his encounter with a fool—in order to articulate a cure for Jaques’ melancholy. This encounter will be discussed in the following chapter.
Chapter 8.

As You Like It: a Purge for Neo-classicists.

Building upon Chapter 7’s analysis of Jaques as Lutheran, the present chapter seeks to demonstrate that As You Like It addresses widespread misappropriation of Luther’s teachings. The chapter’s first section concludes by suggesting that Shakespeare, like Sir Thomas More, conceived of selfhood as performance involving the discarding of alienated personae (of which Jaques is an example). Hence, Jaques is not “Shakespeare” (nor, for that matter, is he Lodge or Luther) in any biographical sense but a figure for the inauthentic subjective conception of selfhood which underpins the very notion of the “author” and, thus, of author-function. Subjective authority, moreover, tends to be associated in the period (by Platonic defenders of poetry such as Sidney) with classical ideals. By presenting the author-function as a relatively impotent consequence of the cognitive processing of sensory experience—rather than as a masterful, authoritative judge of same—As You Like It offers a purge for neo-classicists.

1 Owens, “Melancholy,” p. 15.
2 This appears to have been recognized in the period. “William Kemp” in the second part of The Return from Parnassus (performed 1601-2) states that “our fellow Shakespeare hath given him [Ben Jonson] a purge that made him bewray his credit”; quoted in James P. Bednarz, Shakespeare and the Poets’ War (New York: Columbia UP, 2001), pp. 20-1. For discussion of the competing scholarly views regarding the nature of the “purge” administered to Jonson by Shakespeare, see: Bednarz, Poets’ War, pp. 20-2, 282-3 n.6. The present chapter’s argument indicates that AYLI in toto is that purge (for Bednarz’s analysis of AYLI in relation to Jonson, Jonsonian satire and the “purge”, see: Poets’ War, pp. 105-31). For AYLI as “populist critique of university-born literature”, see: Lesley Wade Soule, Actor as Anti-Character: Dionysus, the Devil and the Boy Rosalind (Westport & London: Greenwood, 2000), p. 171. With regards to the play’s multi-media approach, Soule notes the “music hall” variety of AYLI’s actions (songs, dance, wrestling, a procession, a masque and other visual spectacles) and observes that it has more songs than any other Shakespearean comedy: p. 141. See also: Lesley Anne [sic] Soule, “Subverting Ros: Cocky Ros in the Forest of Arden,” pp. 135-6, New Theatre Quarterly 7 (1991), pp. 126-36.
The chapter’s second section offers a close reading of the encounter between the banished Duke and Jaques in Act 2 Scene 7 of As You Like It, arguing that Shakespeare therein deconstructs Lutheran anti-papal rhetoric. That is, the scene inhabits Lutheran “allegorical” practice in order simultaneously to dismantle and make use of it. Accordingly, Jaques’ account (and allegorical usage) of his encounter with a fool in the forest is read as a presentation of the Lutheran encounter with Scripture. By insisting on faith alone as necessary for salvation, while appearing to rely on rationalist access to scriptural “truth” (in place of institutional process) as a basis for preaching that message, Luther paved the way for a subjectivist conception of Christian selfhood. Via its presentation of Jaques as Luther-influenced mis-reader of Scripture, As You Like It demonstrates the inadequacy of that subjectivist conception, showing that Christian “truth” is written and read (performed and cognized) on the stage of the world—in the realm of social experience (as figured by Shakespeare’s comedy-in-performance)—not on the printed page.

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Early modern pastoral literary works conventionally explore author-function via the inclusion of a heterobiographical character—a character featured within the narrative who bears a special relation to the work’s actual author. Especially influential in the Renaissance, Sannazaro’s Arcadia features the author’s namesake Sincero (note the playfully quasi-homophonic nature of the name), Spenser’s Shepheardes Calender and Faerie Queene host Colin Clout (a borrowing from Skelton), Sidney’s Arcadias contain Philisides (eliding the author’s Christian and surnames, linking father and son in a Christ-like manner),

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3 See: Cummings, Grammar and Grace, pp. 29-30. It is not being asserted that Luther consciously privileged reason, but that Luther’s emphasis on Scripture at the expense of the Church-as-visible-institution entailed a prioritization of individuals’ use of reason.
6 For Sidney’s response to Sannazaro, see: Rosenmeyer, Green Cabinet, pp. 226-7.
and (less famously) “Anthony Munday became ‘shepherd Tonie’ in *England’s Helicon* (1600).” An example from an influential pastoral drama may also be cited: the Tirsi of Tasso’s *Aminta*. The present thesis regards Jaques as *As You Like It*’s equivalent heterobiographical figure. Of course, over the years, Jaques has been said to contain elements of certain of Shakespeare’s contemporaries (in particular Marston and Jonson). However, the present reading has the benefit of formal justification, stressing the conventional function of Jaques’ role. Accordingly, the character will be read as bearing a formal relation to not only the play’s actual author but also to Thomas Lodge, the author of the play’s main source, *Rosalynde*.

The previous chapter noted an ironic detail in the First Lord’s report upon the melancholy Jaques. The banished Duke and his men as *hunters* of venison are the nearest objects of Jaques’ “inuictiue” (2.1.58); however, the First Lord says that Jaques himself “pierceth through the body” of all three estates along with “this our life” (58-9; emphasis added). Thus, if the banished Duke has usurped authority by hunting, Jaques the piercer (the parallel suggests) also makes a false claim to speak with authority in satirizing the Duke’s practice. This exposure of the hypocritical nature of Jaques’ activity as satirist informs my reading of Jaques as author-function. Insofar as writers use texts to express their own (political and personal) viewpoints, regardless of any lip-service paid to the pursuit of nobler aims, they become *mercenary* hunters of others’ faults when (from a Christian point of view) they should be paying more attention to their own.

I describe these “hunters” as “mercenary” because such writers, in Elizabethan culture, participate in commercial transactions in issuing their works. Given that non-commercial discourse circulates freely in the public and private

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7 Bednarz, *Poets’ War*, p. 117.
spheres—for example, in the form of conversation—such works, in order to persuade potential buyers of their use-value, advertise themselves as possessing qualities which justify the purchase-price. News-bearing might be one such quality; however, bearing news is never a neutral activity. Some moral inflection always obtains in the telling of news. When concrete news is in short supply, moreover, “news” can be produced by extrapolating moral content from available data. In order to produce such protracted moral discourse, one needs familiar targets. Jaques as satirist, therefore, figures the author as parasite who requires “corrupt” authority figures. By satirizing such figures, the author can win fame, exhibit his moral superiority and make money. He is thus a mercenary “hunter” of sins no less than the Pope of Reformist anti-clerical satire. (Lodge, one recalls, was a pioneer in the publication of satirical poetry in Elizabethan culture.)

However, is not Shakespeare a “hunter”—a wielder/shaker of a pen as spear with which to pierce others—in this way as well? In satirizing the satirist, surely Shakespeare participates in the same commercial hypocrisy. Regardless of Shakespeare’s personal commitment to publishing his dramatic works, this is true to an extent. Nonetheless, it is important to stress that Jaques as a figure for author-function does not mark the site of actual moral authority in As You Like It. Of course, the same could be said for, say, the Philisides of Sidney’s Arcadias. However, as discussed in the Introduction, the narrators of those romances are identifiable with Philip Sidney the nominated author, and those narrative voices do function as bearers of moral authority (demonstrating knowledge of the spiritual condition of the characters they describe, for instance). Jaques is allowed to perform a chorus-like function in As You Like It, but his moral qualifications are undermined by his various encounters with the banished Duke, Rosalind, Orlando and Touchstone. The play lacks a formal chorus and, of course, has no continuous “narrator”. Authority is thus dispersed throughout the

12 The author of Greenes Groats-worth of Wit (ventriloquizing Robert Greene) addresses Lodge as “yong Juvenall, that byting Satyryst, that lastly with mee together writ a Comedie ... thou hast a libertie to repropuse all”: Harrison, ed. “Groats-worth,” pp. 44-5. For the identification of “yong Juvenall” as Lodge, see: Drew, “Juvenal.”
text and *is not circumscribed by the text*. Rather, “critical” discernment is produced (not passively received, as with the *Arcadias*) when the play is audited/spectated/read.

Thus, where Sidney’s *Arcadia* folds inwards, with a framing narrator reflecting on a “younger”, melancholy version of himself (Philisides), *As You Like It* explodes that fold, placing the older of two Jaques (the melancholy Jaques-*père*) in the midst of the play. Jaques de Boys, referred to in the play’s opening scene and appearing (at last) in the final scene, marks the formal frame of the play-text. As scholar, Jaques de Boys also figures the activity of the reader as co-producer of the performed play-text. The play’s Epilogue, however, where the actor playing Rosalind speaks as both character and “actor”, indicates that the play’s formal boundaries do not (cannot) provide closure. Consequently, audience-members/readers are reminded that they co-produce Jaques the hypocritical satirist along with the other characters in the play, and that, therefore, any criticism performed is likewise co-accomplished by them.

An author such as Lodge, being committed to an idealist notion of immutable truth, may attempt to fix his meaning by recording it in print, but he cannot control distribution and reception. Reception, that author may be startled to learn, produces meaning, not the author’s mind (or the Holy Spirit via same). The Lodge of the 1590 *Rosalynde* seems relatively blithe. However, the “Scedule” Lodge added to the 1592 edition of *Rosalynde* betrays concern that people had been misreading his text:14 “Let them [Philautus’ sons, the notional readers of the romance] read it as Archelaus did Cassender, to profit by it: and in reading let them meditate: for I haue approued it the best method”.15 The use of the word “meditate” implies that the romance is not to be consumed rapidly for its story, but read as many times—and pondered for as long—as necessary for its meaning to be properly understood. A text, the author apprehends, does not

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14 As Kinney also infers: *Humanist Poetics*, p. 386.
15 Lodge, “Miscellaneous Pieces,” p. 6, in *Works* IV.
convey a fixed meaning merely by appearing in print. What can one do about this (besides nag frivolous readers)?

By way of answer, More advises Hythlodaeus in *Utopia*: “oblique ductu conandum est, atque adnitendum tibi, uti pro tua uirili omnia tractes commode”.16 This advice offends Hythlodaeus’s commitment to “truth”:

“Caeterum falsa loqui, sitne philosophi nescio, certe non est meum,” he objects.17 The position of More’s Hythlodaeus anticipates Lodge’s own Platonic viewpoint18—hence, I contend, the conventional heterobiographical figure is absent from *Rosalynde*. When one speaks “the truth”, what need for a marker of one’s ironic attitude to one’s own position?

*As You Like It*’s Jaques has much in common with More’s Hythlodaeus. Jaques is “the olde gentleman” (5.1.3-4); Hythlodaeus: “uergentis ad senium aetatis”.19 Like Jaques, Hythlodaeus is a seasoned traveller (“uultu adustu”).20 Jaques “sold [his] own lands to see other men’s” (4.1.20-1); of Hythlodaeus, it is said: “relictu fratibus patrimonio”;21 thus, Hythlodaeus, too, was able to travel. Jaques travelled to obtain “experience” (4.1.23); Hythlodaeus “totum se addixerat philosophiae”.22 Rosalind recognizes Jaques’ literary ancestry: “Farewell, Monsieur Traveller. Look you lisp and wear strange suits” (4.1.30-1; emphases added); More describes Hythlodaeus with “penula neglectim ab humero dependente”.23 Shakespeare, in other words, adds the Hythlodaeus-like Jaques to Lodge’s scenario in order to restore ironic detachment.

“In fleeing fascism,” suggests Gilles Deleuze, “we rediscover fascist

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17 Surtz & Hexter, eds. *Works*, p. 100 (“To speak falsehoods, for all I know, may be the part of a philosopher, but it is certainly not for me”: p. 101).
18 Hythlodaeus repeatedly cites Plato as authority for his position: Surtz & Hexter, eds. *Works*, pp. 100-5.
21 Surtz & Hexter, eds. *Works*, p. 50 (“He left his patrimony at home ... to his brothers”: p. 51).
22 Surtz & Hexter, eds. *Works*, p. 50 (“he had devoted himself unreservedly to philosophy”: p. 51).
coagulations on the line of flight ... reconstituting ... our formations of power".24 This describes in modern terms the process whereby Lodge, after managing his passional drives via Ignatian exercises (as I have suggested he did), succumbed to a Counter-Reformation moralistic certainty. The very process of enlightenment “carries off the writer”. The writer belongs to the formal beginning—and would like to retain control of the end—of the writing process: the will to possess the truth (the beginning), the conversion of others to one’s own truth (the rhetorical end). However, “[it is never the beginning or the end which are interesting,” cautions Deleuze, “the beginning and end are points. What is interesting is the middle.”25 The middle is traversed by writer after writer but belongs to no writer—belongs only to its own process. If a writer wishes to remain the occasion of the process over the course of a series of works he must, like Thomas More, (repeatedly) abstract himself from that process. Hythlodaeus, for example, as Greenblatt observes, “represents all that More deliberately excluded from the personality he created and played”. Greenblatt, in line with his thesis of “self-fashioning”, speaks of this process as “More’s self-creation” (as though “More”, as the notional remainder following the presumed-essential More’s projection of Hythlodaeus, bears a “more real” relation to a notional selfhood than “Hythlodaeus”).26 Greenblatt’s analysis actually describes the generation of not one viable “personality” but of disposable personae. “More” is generated via abstraction facilitated by the generation of Hythlodaeus—yet why should the process end there or be regarded as the willed act of an assumed essential selfhood? This is the fundamental contradiction in Greenblatt’s thesis: the self cannot fashion the self unless it already exists; the self is therefore not “self-fashioned”. If the self is to be regarded as a process at all (or, as Greenblatt implies, as the consequence of a process) then one must suppose that the “self” is what remains following acts of abstraction performed by an agency other than

25 Deleuze & Parnet, Dialogues II, p. 29. 
that self. Thus, it would be more accurate to describe More’s (and, I submit, Shakespeare’s) overall activity as writer (not as Hythlodean author) as a facultative, ongoing performance which produces a series of personæ as alienated by-products. In As You Like It, for example, Shakespeare alienates Lodge-aspects of his self-performance as Jaques, figure of author-function. The writer, moreover, necessarily betrays (discards) the institutional formats which occasion the line of flight. Catholicism, and not Protestantism, is (theoretically) committed to precisely such a notion of ongoing relational transformation (as opposed to approximation to a normative ideal). In this sense, it may be argued that Shakespeare was Catholic, if not a Catholic.

Hence, Jaques is not “Shakespeare” because he is not the author of the play (nor is Shakespeare, facultatively-speaking). The author-function is relegated to the role of virtual spectator of an action beyond the control of any script. Jaques’ “seven ages” sermon, for instance, requires the (from Jaques’ point of view) unscripted arrival of Orlando bearing Adam on his back. Meaning is performed by an assembly’s cognition of embodied data. Still, it might be objected that Shakespeare builds this awareness into the script itself (scripting the reliance of Jaques’ sermon upon Orlando’s performed action), so the play does, after all, prioritize authorial intellect, whether or not it critiques Jaques as one conception of author-function. Certainly, a page-bound work such as More’s Utopia cannot avoid appearing as a product of ingenuity ascribed to an individual author. However, a dramatic performance staged before an assembly produces a communal text. Attending a play is, in a sense, participating in a guided reading, an experience equivalent to consulting a priest (or attending to the opinions of, say, a prose romance’s narrator)—but the priest in this case is not the dramatist-as-author; the “priest” is cognition-by-assembly.

27 For a comparable position, see: Barroll, Artificial Persons, pp. 70-3. Barroll discusses The Imitation of Christ as an important source in this regard.
29 Shakespeare is here accepted as the formal cause of the play-script as a given set of words, but the text of AYLI is not isomorphic with that set. Authority is co-performed by the text-as-received not performed in the play-script.
In Act 2 Scene 7 of *As You Like It*, Jaques at last confronts the banished Duke, appearing not melancholy as the Duke has heard him described, but looking “merrily” (11). In answer to the Duke’s expression of surprise at his happy demeanour, Jaques cries:

A Foole, a foole: I met a foole i’th Forrest,
A motley Foole (a miserable world:)
As I do liue by foode, I met a foole,
Who laid him downe, and bask’d him in the Sun
And rail’d on Lady Fortune in good termes,
In good set termes, and yet a motley foole. (12-17)

Why was Jaques so very surprised by this encounter? A forest is a peculiar place to bump into a court jester (one assumes Jaques has met Touchstone), but other characters—Corin, Audrey, Martext, Orlando and William—meet Touchstone in Arden without evident astonishment. A person *would* be as surprised as Jaques, however, if, while meditating upon the folly of the world, a living breathing fool were to manifest before their eyes. That Jaques was meditating on precisely that is suggested by his interjected comment in the quoted speech: “a miserable world”.

Other explanations for this interjection have been offered. Dusinberre suggests that “Jaques remembers just in time [?], amidst laughing at the fool, his own role as melancholy satirist”. Hattaway follows Hilda M. Hulme in suspecting a textual error but also suggests “the subtext could be a belated reply to the Duke’s rhetorical question” (which would make the gist of the remark no more evident). Brissenden also cites Hulme but suggests that Jaques is so surprised to encounter a fool in the forest that he concludes “the world is full of

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them, according to the proverb, ‘The world is full of fools’”.\textsuperscript{32} This option \textit{seems} no less arguable than my present suggestion. However, it should be noted that (since surprise is being held responsible for the lack of logical connection) it is based on the unlikely supposition that Jaques had not reached such a conclusion long before the present encounter. (And anyway, Jaques had no doubt encountered as many fools—\textit{in his estimation}—\textit{in the forest as at court}.) As Brissenden reads it, Jaques is saying “I met a fool in the forest! \textit{Therefore}, the world must be full of fools.” Thus, Jaques’ pleasure is presumed to derive from his having found proof that the world is full of fools. This would be a mordant rather than an ecstatic operation and as such does not account for the semantic rupture. Indeed, it seems an uncharacteristically poor piece of psychological observation on the dramatist’s part to have Jaques deliver a detached \textit{satirical} remark in the middle of a burst of excitement. According to my interpretation, Jaques says: “I met a fool in the forest, a motley fool, the miserable world in human form”. The benefit of this reading is that it allows that Jaques had long since concluded the world was full of fools. The source of his surprise, therefore, remains elusive unless one supposes that it derives from this folly having suddenly manifested in bodily form before his eyes. Touchstone’s appearance is thus more surprising to Jaques than to any other resident of the forest because he is in the habit of meditating upon human folly. The fool has seemingly stepped out of the world of his own preoccupations.

Jaques as subjectivist (one preoccupied with “a melancholy of mine owne” [4.1.15]) regards phenomena as isolated objects of perception. These objects offer passive bases from which to produce abstract meanings by a process of intellection alone (as Jaques did copiously with regard to the flagellant-as-stag). However, the physical manifestation of an idea upon which he was meditating in the forest would offer a hint to Jaques that, on the contrary, cognitive processes \textit{produce} reality.\textsuperscript{33} It should be stressed, though, that any alteration in Jaques’

\textsuperscript{32} Brissenden, \textit{ed. AYLI}, p. 143.n.

\textsuperscript{33} “Jaques had chosen the spot by the brook for ... meditation”: Winfried Schleiner, “Jaques and the Melancholy Stag,” p. 178, \textit{English Language Notes} 17.3 (1980), pp. 175-9. For Hazlitt, Jaques is “the only purely contemplative character in Shakespeare”, in Tomarken, \textit{ed. AYLI}, p. 17; for contestation of Hazlitt’s assertion, see: Brissenden, \textit{ed. AYLI}, p. 31. Levi notes that “a
understanding of cognitive process is nascent—he remains a subjectivist for the
duration of the play.

It will be useful here to back-track a little and consider (in a Bradleyan
spirit) what specific meditations Jaques had been engaged in, before the fool
appeared. One gathers that Jaques has been spying on the Duke (just as the First
Lord has monitored Jaques’ behaviour). In describing this “Foole”, Jaques seems
to refer to the Duke himself—the man who claims to enjoy the weather in this
cold forest, as though winter wind were sunshine, and expatiates “In good set
termes” (classically-polished rhetorical speeches) on Lady Fortune’s incapacity
to harm him. After all, unless Jaques is being disingenuous—unless he is actually
satirising the Duke—it is odd that he cites the guise of fool as apt for his own
project of social reform, when the fool’s words, according to Jaques, show that
his knowledge is “mangled” (42).

Lutheran propaganda may inform Jaques’ description of a “Foole” in
“motley”. After his encounter with the Dominican papal emissary Cajetan, for
example, Luther declared that “the cardinal was no more fitted to handle the case
than an ass to play on a harp”. Cartoonists “took up the theme and pictured the
pope himself in this pose”. Hence, printed images of an ass dressed as the pope,
playing bag-pipes, began to proliferate along with portraits of “The Cardinal-
Fool”, showing two faces—one of a cardinal, one of a fool—joined together so
that the nose of one was the chin of the other, thus indicating that these two
characters were but one foolish creature in different costumes. The guise of a
fool was thus understood as being equivalent to papal and priestly robes.

Jaques also arguably caricatures aged popes as incarnations of Old Father
Time. Indeed, Jaques laughs “like Chanticleere” for an hour non-stop at the

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recurring image of meditation in 17th-century painting” shows the meditating figure “lying full
length resting on one elbow”, a posture attributed to Jaques by the First Lord (“he lay along /
34 Dickens, Counter-Reformation, p. 101. For Luther as satirist, see: Cummings, Grammar and
Grace, pp. 35-6.
35 Bainton, Luther, p. 96.
36 Bainton, Luther, pp. 96-7.
37 For the suggestion that Hymen identifies Rosalind as “Truth” and the point that “[n]o emblem
is more familiar than that of Time leading forth his daughter [Truth] from a cave or dungeon”,
see: Waddington, “Moralizing the Spectacle,” p. 162.
fool’s business with his clock (30-33). Chaucer’s “Nun’s Priest’s Tale” suggests a reason for Jaques’ amusement: “Well sikerer was his [Chanticleere’s] crowing,” says the Nun’s Priest, “Than is a clokke or an abbey orlogge”.\(^{38}\) Abbey clocks regulated the performance of salvation according to a schedule.\(^{39}\) Conversely, Jaques \textit{qua} Lutheran regards all true believers as priests guided by conscience, not a ritual timetable, and thus laughs like Chanticleere at the fool’s mockery of monastic observations.

The Duke possibly suspects that he is the target of Jaques’ satire, for he asks “What foole is this?”, as though to say: “Are you referring to me in this fashion?” (35). Jaques chooses not to answer directly, preferring to keep the Duke in suspense (the market for satire has to be prolonged). The satirist offers instead a teasing association of the “Foole” with Peter’s betrayal of Christ. That is, Jaques identifies the fool only as “One that hath bin a Courtier” (36). Attending Caiphas’ court is the cause of Peter’s lapse in Southwell’s \textit{Saint Peters Complaynt} (where the cock—a forerunner of Chanticleere—of course puts in an appearance, too).\(^{40}\) This anecdote, though extremely slight in the Gospel account, had come to be associated with the corruption of the Papal Court through its involvement in temporal possessions and power. Jaques thus intimates that, if the description of the fool seems to apply to the Duke, that may tell the Duke something about himself; Jaques, thereby, escapes the charge that he is directly (discourteously) calling the Duke a fool.

Over the course of this conversation between Jaques and the Duke, the audience will have had time to surmise that Jaques really has met a fool in the forest, in the form of Celia’s clown (though why the clown had been roaming about on his own is never explained). The tension caused by the pointed nature of the anti-papal satire will have been dissipated to some extent by this dawning apprehension. Jaques has a get-out clause; he is using an actual encounter with a


fool as a stalking-horse for his satire.\textsuperscript{41}

However, any “cheap” anti-papal satire here is simultaneous with exposure of Reformers/Lutherans as self-righteous and uncharitable. Just as the Cardinal-Fool’s head can be turned to show either “Cardinal” or “Fool”, so can this exchange be cognized in two ways: anti-Papalist or anti-Lutheran. Critics such as Keir Elam have argued that in designing such structures Shakespeare offers no “meaning”, only an image which reveals earnest people to be fools when they argue (as I am doing) for a particular interpretation.\textsuperscript{42} It is healthy to acknowledge the danger. Nonetheless, Elam’s argument rests upon a modern act of allegorization, reading modern doubts regarding the possibility of effective communication \textit{into} early modern texts. Elam’s scepticism, in other words, requires that human communication always \textit{fail} (without being able to account for how one \textit{knows} when a given attempt at communication has failed).

To recapitulate: Jaques’ speech has two “levels” of meaning from Jaques’ point of view, one “literal” (relating to the fool of his forest-encounter) and one “allegorical” (relating to satire of the papacy). The rhetorical aim of Jaques’ “allegory”, however, cannot be achieved unless the Duke infers that he is being referred to as the Fool. In which case the “literal” idea of the fool is exposed for what it always was—an act of bad faith, a smokescreen—and the \textit{actual} meaning is revealed to be an anti-papal tirade.\textsuperscript{43} Certainly, this conception of the process

\textsuperscript{41} For Luther’s similarly strategic presentation of himself as a fool in his writings, see: Wriedt, “Luther’s Theology,” p. 101.


\textsuperscript{43} This diagnosis of the erasure of material presence in the conscious manipulation of an “allegorical” sign implicit in Shakespeare’s text, and the association of same with Lutheran anti-papal satire, is consistent with the Jesuit theologian Robert Bellarmine’s rebuttal of Lutheranism in the first volume of his \textit{Controversies}, where Bellarmine insists on the inherent goodness of matter; see: M. L. Balam, “Bellarmine and the Sacramental Principle,” p. 312, \textit{The Month} 160 (1932), pp. 308-16. According to Bellarmine’s view, to engage consciously in allegory is to express sacrilegious contempt for the material referents of signs, this being related to the heresy of denying Christ’s taking on of human form: “He chose a human way, which the sense-bound creature could see and appreciate”: p. 314. Greenblatt’s assessment indicates the relationship between Lutheranism and the present study’s understanding of “allegory”: “Luther’s power over the unsuspecting, who long for a release from an uncertain, imperfect, and guilt-ridden existence, derives from his unscrupulous understanding that, in the absence of reality, the mere forms of reality will suffice”: \textit{Self-fashioning}, p. 59. The production of “mere forms”, of course, is as impossible as allegory. However, while Greenblatt’s account offers a fair summary of certain types of “Lutheranism”, it does not accurately register Luther’s own position. Luther, after all,
would work smoothly enough in an account of the earlier stag/trans-ordinal
usurpation meditation; however, here there is a complicating factor: Jaques did
meet a fool. In other words, where (according to my argument) the "stag" was
Jaques' intellectual translation of a flagellant, the "fool" of his meditation has a
physical manifestation. His current discourse, in reverting to its customary
satirical/"allegorical" mode, fails to acknowledge crucial implications of this
phenomenological difference.

It should by now be evident why Jaques remains incapable of responding
appropriately to his encounter with the fool. The only legitimate target of "satire"
from a Christian point of view is the satirical self—specifically, tendencies in
that self to doubt the participation of the human in the divine. Hence, the egoistic
notion of the "I" (the intellectual faculty misapprehended and reified as
individual totality) is a prime target. Consequently, satirical critique of
"selfhood" is not exclusively auto-directed. In As You Like It the intellectual
faculty reified as rational individual self has been named "Jaques", which,
pronounced "jakes", echoes the Elizabethan slang for toilet. Refuse from the
information gathered by the senses and processed by the koine aesthesis ends up
here. When the intellect isolates itself from the koine aesthesis—as Jaques has
done, in isolating himself from the society Arden affords—it can only speculate
on the meaning of appearances. The communal cognitive process described in
the previous chapter is omitted. Both that cognitive process and Jaques' 
operations are "empirical". The isolated intellect, however, receives all sensory
data as of equal validity (and, therefore, equal potential non-validity). There is,
thus, no reliable empirical means of discerning the relation of appearances to
existent phenomena. The intellect may believe everything the senses tell it; or
doubt everything the senses tell it.

Hence, Jaques is an appropriate name for the author-function as self-
righteous moral authority. Print is empirical refuse—the relic of experience(s),
suitable matter for a jakes (toilet). Printed works often claim to speak with
authority: such works as Lodge's Rosalynde expect to be meditated upon

was committed to the doctrine of Real Presence. (Greenblatt leaves unclear the extent to which he
is ventriloquizing More's position in this passage.)
(seeming to chafe at being merely *read* by fellow participants in a cognitive assembly). Lyly, in the letter “To the Gentlemen Readers” prefacing *Euphues*, declares himself (sincerely or not) “content this winter to have my doings read for a toye, that in sommer they may be ready for trash”. Lodge, on the other hand, despite claiming to offer a sequel to *Euphues*, insists, in 1592, that his romance be pored over until it is understood. *Rosalynde*, that is, presents itself as not a participant in today’s conversation but a tablet from the mountain.

Similarly, where Shakespeare’s play is called *As You Like It*, Lodge’s letter to the readers of *Rosalynde* states: “If you like it so” (7). Like the cognitive reporters discussed in the previous chapter, *its* opinion is not to be changed. Unlike those reporters, it does not present itself as contributing information to a larger assembly for consideration. It speaks as an isolated subject addressing other isolated subjects from a position of greater (borrowed) authority. Thus, it communicates and relies upon subjection/abjection, its progressive Jesuit “content” notwithstanding.

As stated in the Introduction, subjectivity is incapable of performance, even on its own (Platonic) terms. Meaning and self-performance occur *when* printed texts are read, not before. Printed texts which refuse this notion pose as isolated units—however, they cannot function as *texts* as such. An unread piece of print is not a text. This is perhaps why Orlando calls Jaques a cipher (3.2.282): in isolation a “human being” is nothing—an unread (non)text. The dangers of a subjectivist concept of Christianity are thereby indicated. The intellectual ego usurps the claims of other faculties when regarded as the *subject* of all experience. However, a *non-existent subject cannot be the agent of faith*. Hence, Jaques is melancholy: he has accepted the Lutheran precept *sola fide* but cannot believe.

This *de facto* scepticism expresses itself as anti-Christian satire—satire which “goes the wrong way”, from the intellect outwards: the intellectual self criticizes others. Thus (to anticipate interpretation offered below), Jaques puts his (subjective) reading of Scripture to uncharitable use as the basis for a critique of

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the banished Duke and his followers.

As already noted, Jaques does not apprehend crucial implications of the physical manifestation of the fool of his meditation(s). The fool’s bodily presence says: “How would you even be able to speculate about, and so condemn, the world’s sense-ridden folly without your senses? How then can you blame the senses for folly?” Jaques interprets the experience in precisely the opposite way: he becomes merry because his meditation has “come to life” in a seeming confirmation of the truth of his pessimistic speculations. Hence, he concludes, upon encountering the fool: “a miserable world”—the world is as objectively foolish as his subjective interpretation of Scripture has led him to suppose.

The fool, Jaques reports, then “laid him downe and bask’d in the Sun” (15). Jaques evidently means that the fool reposed in the sunlight. One problem with deciding that such a normal-seeming action is being “realistically represented” is that, according to the banished Duke and his lords, the forest is currently a cold environment where the winter wind blows (1.6-10; 5.6-7). Nonetheless, during his encounter with the fool, Jaques’ forest is a place of warmth and light. Then, the realist-interpreter must suppose, the sun came out for a brief spell and the clown made the most of it. Jaques’ emphatic wonder at this simple action, though, suggests that he interpreted the source of light as Christ himself (conveyed via Scripture). By means of a glorious inglorious death (analogous to the pyric fate of the phoenix) God revealed the world to be a hospitable environment where all humanity may bask (bathe, be baptised) in grace.

To recap and clarify: while meditating on Scripture and the folly of the world, Jaques has an encounter with a materially present fool, whom he interprets as in some way embodying the insight into universal folly he has gained by reading Scripture. He (mis)interprets this experience as confirmation of his ability to perceive “the truth” of Scripture. Likewise, Jaques regards this

45 Chadwick, ed. Confessions, V.4; X.18.
47 Luther and other Protestants considered Scripture to be “the same thing as Christ”: Cummings, Grammar and Grace, p. 44; Questier, Conversion, p. 69.n.135.
“objective” manifestation of folly as justification for his (Lutheran) critique of the banished Duke. Thus, he uses the experience with the fool as the basis for further “allegorical” satire on the Duke’s folly.

On the other hand, the “fool” (the audience is at liberty to suppose) is Celia’s clown, not objective truth. As heaven’s clown, the fool is a figure for the folly of supposing one can access divine truth merely by reading Scripture (mistaking the letter for the spirit). Scripture is motley: a patchwork textual assembly, isolated passages from which can always be understood in various ways.

With these points established, Jaques’ misinterpretation of his encounter with the fool can be further explored. According to Jaques, the fool observed how

from houre to houre, we ripe, and ripe,
And then from houre to houre, we rot, and rot,
And thereby hangs a tale. (26-8)

This paraphrases Southwell’s *Epistle of Comfort*: “Every day we die, and hourly lose some part of our life; and even while we grow, we decrease.” Both statements seem to partake of the pessimism of bleaker scriptural texts such as Ecclesiastes. It should be noted, though, that the fool does not draw a despairing conclusion from his “reading” but seems rather to suggest that interpretations are to be sought: “And thereby hangs a tale”. Southwell’s text might also be taken to inform Jaques’ “Seven Ages” speech (140-67), for it continues: “We have lost our infancy, our childhood, our youth and all, till this present day; and this very day death by minutes is secretly purloining from us”. However, there is a crucial difference: Southwell gives a central accent to “this present day” between the terminals of infancy and death. Thus, he does not recommend apathetic despair but stresses that Christian works are to be done now. Jaques’ speech, by contrast, describes only linear succession—there is no ripening, no noon in

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Jaques’ day.\textsuperscript{50} The solar stage which Jaques omits from the conventional “seven ages” sequence, moreover, is the one denoting Christ as man’s perfection.\textsuperscript{51} The Aristotelian conception of nature as teleological process is here ignored.\textsuperscript{52} By omitting the solar stage of human maturity, Jaques arguably omits salvific imitation of Christ (alias \textit{works}).

In short, I am suggesting that Jaques enacts the Luther-influenced failure to recognize that Scripture is a mirror, not a document where truth is recorded in printed form. One does not read therein a stable written message; rather, in reading, one co-produces Scripture’s meaning \textit{via one’s mode of perception} (as you like it). The fool, therefore, is Scripture: a mirror of Jaques’ own folly. Jaques’ misinterpretation of the fool as confirmation of his own wisdom figures all subjectivist Scriptural reading, in that such reading produces meanings determined by one’s own biases—hence the irony of Jaques’ sarcastic praise for the “deepe contemplatiue” fool (31).

As mentioned above, the banished Duke responds to Jaques’ account of the fool with a straight-forward question: “What foole is this?” This line commences a lengthy passage (35-87) cut from the Douai manuscript-version of \textit{As You Like It} (1694-5). The other cuts in this manuscript, used in the education of “children sent abroad by their Catholic families”, seem motivated by the desire to remove “risqué jokes and allusions”.\textsuperscript{53} However, the removal of lines 35-87 appears intended to subtract Jaques’ satire from the piece. Dusinberre implies that the motive for this would be to make a “faster-moving narrative”.\textsuperscript{54} The earlier exposition of Jaques’ anti-papal “allegory” suggests other reasons.

Impressed by the fool’s ability to voice criticism of the Church-as-court in such safely “mangled forms”, Jaques declares, “I am \textit{ambitious} for a motley

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{50} Kieman Ryan, \textit{Shakespeare’s Comedies} (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 219.
\item \textsuperscript{52} David Bostock, ed. \textit{Physics}, by Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996), II.1; see also: Chadwick, ed. \textit{Confessions}, IV.10; V.9; Ephesians 4:13.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Dusinberre, ed. \textit{AYLI}, pp. 384-5.
\end{itemize}
coat”. That is, having learned from the fool something of the lesson More (whose name, of course, was observed to resemble the Latin morus—"fool") tried to teach Hythlodaeus, Jaques has decided that he has no choice but to pose as a fool, since all human beings are fools/fallen. However, it is never made clear why Jaques seeks the Duke’s permission to adopt a motley suit. A professional fool needs a patron, but the fact that Jaques, who previously emphasised his wish to avoid the exiled Duke, now acknowledges his need for the latter’s patronage suggests that the Duke is uniquely authorised to grant Jaques’ suit. That is, Jaques requires a religious institutional mandate to preach his personal understanding of Scripture. Indeed, he states:

    I must haue liberty
    Withall, as large a Charter as the winde,
    To blow on whom I please (7.47-9)

Such a “Charter” would allow Jaques to criticise even the Pope himself. Only the Pope, therefore, could grant such a privilege. Jaques is not advertising his own wisdom: he (mockingly) acknowledges that the Duke and his companions possess “better judgements” and asks that they “weed” those faculties “Of all opinion … / That I am wise” (45-7). In other words, Jaques will function as the mouthpiece of the Holy Spirit (“the winde”), channelled via his reading of Scripture.

    Most pointedly, Jaques specifies:

    And they that are most gauled with my folly,
    They most must laugh: And why sir must they so?
    The why is plaine, as way to Parish Church (50-2)

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55 In *The Papacy in Rome, an Answer to the Celebrated Romanist in Leipzig* (1520), Luther wrote: “Because my Lord Christ and his holy Word … are held to be but mockery and fools’ wit, I must likewise drop all seriousness and see whether I, too, have learned how to play the fool and clown”: pp. 202-3, in Tappert, ed. *Selected Writings*, I.197-249.

56 Brissenden, ed. *AYLI*, p. 146.n.
The way to a parish church was so plain because the footpath to it was so well-trodden—everyone went there on a regular basis. Jaques' new message with regard the true and neglected meaning of Scripture is to be promulgated there from now on every week (if he receives his mandate). Hence, the targets of the resulting criticism who will be "most gauled" (because lambasted severely in every sermon in every parish) will be the corrupt head and members of the Church. However, they "most must laugh" and not seem unresponsive, for otherwise they will merely prove the truth of the criticism (that they refuse to respond to criticism). It is worth observing here that Jaques neglects to indicate that the fool he met ever used his motley license to criticise any particular person or institution. Yet the nature of the role Jaques now envisages for himself retroactively indicates that he considers such to have been the fool's business in the obscure remarks quoted previously.

Furthermore, Jaques promises that universal reform will be the result of his ministry:

Give me leaue
To speake my minde, and I will through and through
Cleanse the foule bodie of th'infected world,
If they will patiently receiue my medicine (58-61)

Note the passivity required in the world-as-audience: Jaques intends to deliver sermons from a subjective position of moral superiority, not engage in dialogues. In a strictly Lutheran vein, moreover, Jaques does not claim to be able to redeem the world's fallen condition, but he does desire the means of reforming the world's corporate "bodie"—the universal (Catholic) Church—head and members.

The Duke becomes angry with Jaques here, exhibiting perturbation for the only time in the play ("Fie on thee," he says [62]). This response recalls the severity with which King Thamus responds to Theuth's offer of his invention,

57 Dusinberre, ed. *AYLI*, p. 220.n.
58 Luther, "*Babylonian Captivity*," pp. 423-4.
writing, in Plato’s *Phaedrus*. Like Theuth, Jaques thinks (or pretends to think) that his “gift” will afford a neutral means of improving human society: “What,” he says, in response to the Duke’s angry words, “for a Counter, would I do, but good?” (63). The Duke angrily explains that Jaques-as-*pharmakon* would do

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Most mischeeouous foule sin, in chiding sin:
For thou thy selfe hast bene a Libertine,
As sensuall as the brutish sting it selfe,
And all th’imbossed sores, and headed euils,
That thou with license of free foot hast caught,
Would’st thou disgorge into the generall world. (64-9)
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Here is one of the play’s most explicit indications of the currency of the facultative model of cognition. Read “logically”, the Duke’s charge makes no sense: why, because Jaques has been a libertine, will his chiding the sins of others automatically pollute the world? However, when the venting/vending of satire is understood facultatively as the projection outward of violence occasioned by one’s own sins, and which properly, therefore, should be directed at the sinful tendencies in the self, then the Duke’s charge makes perfect sense. The more sinful Jaques has been himself, the more sins he will attribute to the targets of his satire. Thus, in uttering condemnation of the world, he will make the world conform (more and more) to his own, sinful inner state.

Jaques makes no attempt to answer the Duke’s charge. This indicates to the audience/reader that the Duke has scored a palpable hit. On the other hand, that the Duke’s anger uniquely manifests at *this* moment is the accusation’s own refutation. The “father” recognizes himself in the “son” and abandons his customary (condescending) pose of paternal indulgence. As Derrida shows, Plato’s banishment of poets from his ideal republic and Thamus’ rejection of the invention of writing are of a piece. Plato performs poetry in his dialogues; the laws of Thamus’ state are themselves exemplary (and, therefore, examples of

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60 “[C]ounter, n.,” (2.c): “a thing of no intrinsic value”: *OED.*
“writing” that aid the memory). What is being banished/rejected, therefore, is not writing or poetry per se but a venue for opposing voices. The Duke is not perfect in self-knowledge (no-one can be). Likewise, no pope, priest or Church Father can unilaterally transmit the truth of Scripture through edict, sermon and/or exposition. Jaques, however, cannot make this case without acknowledging the purely subjective basis of his own claims to speak.

Yet if any and all criticism of an institution by persons outside of that institution is to be dismissed as self-serving and socially polluting, how can corrupt institutions ever be reformed? Explication of the answer requires the presentation of simultaneity. The point is made thus: Orlando’s loving sacrifice (his rescue of Oliver from the lioness) reforms the corrupt institution figured by both Dukes (in their tyranny and indulgence). More specifically: apprehension of the Christian meaning of Orlando’s loving sacrifice achieves that. That is, Orlando reforms an erroneous conception of God (belonging to himself and his society, and figured by the tyrant version of Duke Frederick) by overcoming his own pride, anger and desire for revenge. God could not forgive him when he tried to confess (at the wrestling bout) because the God he believed in was an unforgiving tyrant God.

The play performs this work of reformation by multi-sensory means. When the “old Religious man” (5.4.158)—Corin, whose name recalls Paul’s epistles to the Corinthians—infirms the tyrant Duke of the meaning of Orlando’s sacrifice—that by combatting one’s own sins, one commutes the sins of others—reform is achieved; the tyrant Duke converts. Theological wrangling, no matter how motivated and no matter of what intellectual calibre, achieves nothing. The stage of the world, not the page of Scripture (nor the pages of neo-classical, humanist texts), is where Christianity is “written” and read.

Given that Jaques has here been read as figuring the intellectual faculty, the following passage from Colet’s commentary on the first letter to the Corinthians is pertinent:

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The Corinthians, accounted wise both in their own opinion and in that of others, supposed that there could be no topic of discourse, about which they could not dispute most subtly, and deliver a plausible decision. Presumptuously relying on their own abilities, and arrogating to themselves the title of wisdom, they imagined that they could, by their own resources, detect the true and the false in everything. An intellectual race, with leisure and literature, confiding at the same time in an elaborate kind of rhetoric, they had no scruple at pleading on either side ... In these subtleties of the versatile human intellect, the Greek nation was ever adroit ... but yet was woefully deluded by such vagaries of the mind. For, in fact, the very faculty by which the Greeks thought they could best see and discern the truth was the one by which they were most blinded.

Jaques announces his decision to converse with the convertite Frederick, Jr. Presumably from that Frederick, Jaques will soon also hear the Corinthian message and—as with another famous convertite, Augustine—the full conversion so desperately sought by intellectual means will be accomplished facultatively. Allowing space for free will, the play leaves Jaques’ final condition an open question.

By way of conclusion, it may be noted that Orlando’s arrival after Jaques’ defence of satire marks the end of the section cut from the Douai manuscript. The

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63 Translation from Hunt, *Colet*, pp. 93-4 (emphases added).
foregoing analysis indicates why the Douai college would omit that particular
exchange between the exiled Duke and Jaques in a text for Catholic children. For
political reasons, a facultative understanding of cognition was in the process of
being replaced by a subjectivist conception. Once it mattered more than anything
else which Church a political subject was loyal to, a facultative model of identity
only muddied the issue for both sides. There was no reason to explicate such a
passage to Catholic pupils of the 17th Century. (And, left unexplicated, it might
be mistaken for straight-forward anti-papal satire.) Hence, in a very short time,
under the aegis of confessionalization, the facultative model (as bearer of—and
as dependent upon—Christian universality) became obscure.

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Conclusion.

In this thesis, I have found it convenient to structure an implicit narrative of Elizabethan theology using prominent writers as reference points (Dyer, Southwell, Lodge and Shakespeare), paying particular attention to their respective cognitive models and positions vis-à-vis author-function. In Chapter 2, I suggested that the earliest of these writers, Sir Edward Dyer, in “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste”, presented a participant-in-Christ as a speaker ironically aware of his own “folly”. In producing this text, Dyer as ostensible “author” dies to himself (the argument holds) in order to participate in a communal Christ via reception of “his” poem as Eucharist-surrogate. Here, by way of summation, one might consider a question that it was not possible to explore in that chapter; namely, why offer a Eucharist-surrogate as poem? That is, accepting the chapter’s contention that Dyer’s protagonist presents an auto-ministerial viewpoint, should not that protagonist (and his author) be aware that, from a general Christian perspective, tribulations are to be welcomed as crosses to bear? Why, in that case, bemoan the encroachments of either Calvinism or some centralizing monarchical equivalent of papal tyranny instead of simply entering one’s religious retreat—as the poem’s speaker claims he intends to do—but silently, without complaining in public? If Dyer’s poem does not address doctrinal matters, why does it present a speaker so concerned about his spiritual condition? If the poem does address doctrinal matters, then Dyer claims authority to speak as a sound interpreter of Scripture.

In response to radical appropriations of his message, Luther came to distinguish (by no means always clearly) between the priesthood of all believers and the need for ordained ministers in a Christian community.¹ Unlike an ordained Lutheran minister, Dyer lacks any official mandate to speak on

doctrinal matters. Dyer’s protagonist, for his part, implies that his mistress has failed to reward his virtue, while promoting others of lesser “faith”. Thus, one might read the poem as a political intervention, written from an all-too-human perspective. In other words, the poem can be read as implicitly coercive. As stated, the poem is arguably offered as a Eucharist-surrogate: performatively, the speaker has assumed ministerial office and addresses a community of like-minded potential (internal) exiles. “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste” thus, I have suggested, presents itself as self-authorizing, or, rather, it locates authority in the Christian community as distinct from the community of Elizabethan subjects. (Writing as establishment-man, two decades later, Hooker laid great emphasis on the identity of precisely these two communities.)

One might suggest that Dyer articulates a conservative position on behalf of his patron of that period, the earl of Leicester. Available evidence does not allow one to conclude that this particular poem—specifically its popularity—was the cause of Dyer’s expulsion from court (which event approximately coincided with the poem’s probable date of composition). Interpretation offered in Chapter 2 suggests, after all, that the poem demonstrates that a political lesson has been assimilated. There is, in any case, no need to establish such a precise causational link. It is enough to say that Elizabeth was especially sensitive at that stage of her reign (the early 1570s) to public challenges to her role as supreme governor of the English church.

Chapter 3’s analysis indicates that the Jesuit Robert Southwell did not approve of Dyer’s strategy. Southwell is unlikely to have been unaware of the political dimension of Dyer’s poem just outlined. Thus, it is striking that, in rebutting Dyer’s text, Southwell occupies the *de facto* position of defender of Elizabeth’s ecclesiastical supremacy against a conservative post-papal ministry abiding in the wings. The time-lag between Dyer’s poem and Southwell’s parody, however, should be taken into consideration: Dyer’s poem spoke to the

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political and ecclesiastical conditions of the 1570s; Southwell, therefore, may not be criticizing Dyer’s political strategy in respect to its moment of publication but may be revising it according to the political needs of the late-1580s. Nonetheless, the point holds: Southwell assumes a de facto position as defender of royal supremacy. Hence, perhaps, Elizabeth’s expression of regret following Southwell’s execution, claiming that her advisers “had deceived her with calumnies” regarding the Jesuit’s political position.³

To counteract Elizabethan Lutheranism, Southwell, Chapter 3 argued, occupied it from within—for example, by writing parodies of Elizabethan courtly verse, including Dyer’s poem. One participates in Christ, Southwell’s revision of Dyer’s lyric implies, by dying to the self not in (egoistic) Stoic resignation but via communal Christian activity. The inherent danger of establishing parity between Elizabethan verse and orthodox Catholic poetry, however, perhaps led Southwell (the present thesis has suggested) to seek venues where the parodic project could be conducted by lay Catholic writers, including Thomas Lodge. Accordingly, Chapter 4 argued that Lodge’s Rosalynde expounds a Jesuit doctrine of justification. In carrying out this missionary work on behalf of—and in possible collaboration with—the Jesuit Southwell, Lodge’s text implicitly claims to speak on behalf of a spiritual authority located outside of that text. Therefore, Lodge’s omission of the conventional heterobiographical pastoral author-figure (the equivalent of the Arcadia’s Philisides) invited close examination.

In Chapter 5, it was suggested that Lodge lost confidence in reconciliatory strategies following Southwell’s arrest and execution. Accordingly, in Wits Miserie (1596), Lodge (I proposed) attacked Shakespeare as a skulking “PLAIER Deuil”, writing plays in a rural location, using scriptural material in unorthodox, “scurrilous” ways. Shakespeare answered Lodge by adapting Rosalynde as the comedy As You Like It (1599). The latter text corrects the more conservative aspects of its source, as Chapter 6-8 demonstrated. Christians qua Christians—As

³ Devlin, Southwell, p. 318.
You Like It indicates—perform justification by facultative means, not strategically under adverse temporal conditions, but at all times and in all places.

That, in outline, is the argument of the present thesis. The emphasis on author-function, it may be acknowledged, has resulted (in accordance with the conventions of the period) in a masculinist bias. Space has not been found for sustained consideration of, for example, the characters of Rosalind and Celia. To have explored the figural valence of Rosalind and Celia adequately would have required detailed tracking of alternative streams of influence, including analysis of the treatment of the character “Rosalind(e)” in The Shepheardes Calender. However, one aspect of the play’s treatment of Rosalind may be briefly considered here.

As noted in Chapter 7, judgement/discernment (the forming of a settled opinion vis-à-vis apprehended phenomena), according to the facultative cognitive model, is best postponed until a moment subsequent to the accumulation of an adequate range of sensory data. As You Like It observes this delay in each of its presentations of staggered cognition except one: Oliver’s report of Orlando’s combat with the lioness. For that very reason, it is striking that the scene itself prominently foregrounds an instance of staggered cognition: Rosalind faints not at the sight of blood (4.3.92) but upon learning that the blood she has already observed on the napkin held by Oliver has been shed by Orlando in his combat with the lioness (153-55 and s.d). As with the “deer” reported to have been witnessed by Jaques in Act 2 Scene 1, the lioness is not a zoological entity. As noted by Neil H. Wright, Oliver describes, in the manner of an omniscient narrator, Orlando’s moments of indecision following his discovery of the sleeping Oliver being observed by the hungry lioness. Not only does Oliver recount bodily gestures which he could not have witnessed from a “realistic” point of view (4.3.99ff), he also—like Sidney’s narrator in the Arcadia—records Orlando’s thoughts. He knows what occasioned his brother’s various hesitations and what finally enabled him to overcome them:

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4 Wright, “Psalter Lion".

242
Twice did he tume his backe and purposed so  
[to leave Oliver as ‘Food to the ... Lyonnes’)  
But kindnessse, nobler euer then reuenge,  
And Nature stronger then his just occasion,  
Made him giue battell to the Lyonnesse (124-9)

These circumstances indicate that the battle with the “lioness” occurs in a  
space to which Orlando and Oliver share common access. According to  
facultative topology, the soul comprises three principal faculties. In the  
Anselmian/Piconian model these are the will, the intellect and the appetite. I have  
argued that these are figured by the characters of Oliver (will), Jaques (intellect)  
and Orlando (appetite), with the melancholy Jaques and Jaques de Boys sharing  
duties as respectively the active and passive sub-faculties of the intellect. Thus, it  
follows that the interior space to which Orlando and Oliver both have access is  
the human soul. The intellectual faculty is absent from this encounter, due to the  
will’s dormancy and the appetite’s excessive strength, but is recalled (as Jaques  
de Boys) from “schoole” as a consequence of the outcome, when the appetite  
converts its strength/passion to charitable use and the will awakens (131).

Since the battle occurs in the human soul, and the hungry lioness is not  
biological, what is the nature of the blood on the napkin? As soon as Rosalind is  
informed by Oliver that the blood belongs to Orlando, she cognizes its meaning  
immediately, over-riding the facultative process exhibited in the play’s other  
presentations of staggered cognition. (It may be recalled that Rosalind’s  
impatience was a determining feature in another departure from facultative  
protocol.) Rosalind’s immediate cognition of the meaning of the blood, following  
Oliver’s account, occasions her swoon. (The swoon is not feigned according to  
Oliver’s witness [4.3.168-70].) This response has been read as a sexist  
sinuation that Rosalind-disguised-as-Ganimed thus reveals her gender.  
However, read facultatively, the response confirms Rosalind’s participation in

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Orlando’s spiritual condition. As observed in the course of the thesis, Rosalind figures earthly beauty, being the inseparable companion of Celia: heavenly beauty. (Rosalind is not, therefore, equated with the “physical” because she is female.) Rosalind, as a figure for the body *per se*, participates in the soul’s being. According to Aristotle, the soul is the form of the body. (Augustine’s interpretation of the term “flesh” in Paul’s letter to the Galatians is consistent with the Aristotelian view.) On this perspective, by participating in Christ’s sacrifice, Orlando redeems the body. Again, Augustine’s position is relevant:

Et adgravamur ergo corruptibili corpore, et ipsius adgravationis causam non naturam substantiamque corporis sed eius corruptionem scientes nolumus corpore spoliari, sed eius immortalitate vestiri. Et tune erim erit, sed quia corruptibile non erit, non gravabit.

Consequently, we are burdened by the corruptible body, and yet knowing that the cause of our burdening is not the true being and substance of the body but its decay, we do not want to be stripped of the body, but to be clothed with its immortality. For then too there will be a body, but because it will not be subject to decay, it will not be a burden.

The body will die in the natural course of things—as possibly figured by Rosalind’s swoon—but through participation in Christ it will revive, as Rosalind does (“Looke,” says Oliver, indicating the prone Ganimed, “he recouers” [4.3.159]).

Rosalind’s delayed but (when it comes) immediate response indicates that she cognizes the blood on the napkin as the miraculous sign of Orlando’s participation in Christ. That is, she apprehends his loving sacrifice—the selfless act of saving another without anticipation of reward, the preparedness to put the interests of the dormant will before those of the appetite (how easy, after all, for Orlando to have let the lioness consume his will and thus obtain the material means to satisfy his sensual desires).

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6 “[E]o locutionis modo quo totum significatur a parte ipsum hominem vult nomine carnis intelligi”: McCracken, ed. *City of God*, XIV.2 (“he means the word ‘flesh’ to be understood as meaning ‘man’ by that figure of speech which uses a part to indicate the whole”). See also: Chadwick, ed. *Confessions*, III.10.

7 McCracken, ed. *City of God*, XIV.2.
The dormant will observes the battle as interested spectator, being dependent on the appetitive faculty’s translation of passion to grace. Who or what, then, “wills” Orlando’s decision to wrestle with the lioness? With the will unable either to accede to or to resist the urges of the appetite, grace is the only available agency. Hooker’s use of facultative rhetoric, as discussed in the Introduction, indicated that grace is rhetoric. Orlando has recently been worked upon at length by Rosalind’s rhetorical powers (and the rhetorical effect of her presence). Her theatrical lessons, delivered in confessional role-play sessions, were not salvific in themselves but they prepared Orlando so that his passion could convert to grace when the crucial moment offered itself. His own action in turn becomes a rhetorical intervention, occasioning the conversion of his will (unlike Saladyne—his equivalent in Lodge—Oliver has not repented prior to his rescue by his estranged brother). How different a process this is, incidentally, to deciding to take part in a wrestling bout because one’s social status is not being adequately acknowledged, and then exhibiting pique when one’s high pedigree and “virtue” go unrewarded.

Unlike Spenser’s Rosalind, Lodge’s heroine speaks a great deal. Shakespeare’s Rosalind is no less loquacious but she faints, where Lodge’s princess does not, because of that miraculous blood, which (I suggest) announces that she and Orlando share a bond akin to that of the Virgin Mary and Christ. In other words, Rosalind has co-fashioned with Orlando a manifestation of Christ (as witnessed by the blood on the napkin). Rosalind thus cognizes her own participation in the mystical blood-loss via the napkin and faints from loss of

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8 Here comparative study of Spenser and Shakespeare’s Rosalind’s would prove especially useful, given that Spenser’s Rosalind is not allowed to speak directly in The Shepheardes Calender.
9 Saladyne announces his intention to perform “some penance” in a soliloquy prior to his own banishment by Torismond the usurper (60).
blood accordingly. Where Rosader is made—as the past participle form implies—by Lodge's Rosalind, Orlando co-fashions himself. Or rather, the present participle (-ando) suggests (since the self cannot fashion the self) that Orlando is fashioning itself (semantic ambiguity intended).

Rosalind faints, therefore, just as the Virgin Mary fainted at the crucifixion in many medieval presentations of that scene. The showing of the blood is equivalent to a presentation of the crucifixion in that it is a sign that Orlando died to himself (no matter if momentarily) and was reborn as non-self-bound process. He thus qualifies for marriage with Rosalind—the marriage of Rosalind and Orlando being a sacramental equivalent of the bodily union with God. Orthodox Renaissance theologians such as the Dominican Thomas de Vio (later Cardinal Cajetan) objected to the presentation of the fainting Mary because they feared it might be taken to indicate the Virgin's lack of conscious participation in Christ's divinity/resurrection. As You Like It's facultative analysis of the issue demonstrates that the matter is best regarded as concerning not the extent but the nature of the Virgin's participation in Christ's redemptive project. Nature does not know what outcome the sum of its rhetorical effects upon the human appetite will deliver until the moment of truth. A difference of (Catholic) opinion on the meaning of the Virgin Mary, therefore, is registered in As You Like It's departure from Rosalynde in having its heroine swoon: the future state of Shakespeare's Rosalind was in the balance until the moment of her cognition of Orlando's participation in Christ.

It is tempting to close on that rapturous note. However, I would like to acknowledge another area which I have not been able to explore in the space available but which has an obvious relevance to issues raised by the thesis. As observed in the Introduction, As You Like It as staged play is very much in step with the establishment position presented by Hooker in the Ecclesiastical Polity.

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13 Rubin, Mother of God, p. 362.
14 For discussion of the comparable swoon in Tasso's Aminta, see: Cody, Landscape, pp. 68-9.
However, when the comedy is considered as reading-text, it might be supposed that the situation alters. As with the figuration of Rosalind, one example will have to do duty here for the larger argument. When the comedy achieves social harmony, Jaques withdraws, being “not for dancing meazures” (5.4.191). This act of withdrawal can be read in the light of Hooker’s text. Hooker informed the discontented radical reformers of the 1580s and 1590s that, as dutiful members of a Christian commonwealth, they should accept the rulings of established authority if their doctrinal challenge to the Elizabethan Settlement was allowed a fair hearing. The only greater authority they could reasonably appeal to was not their subjective understanding of Scripture but a general council of Christendom or, failing that, a council of recognized delegates from the reformed churches.  

Given these circumstances, the best course the reformers could follow would be to hone their arguments in private in order to render them as plausible as possible when presented in a legitimate public forum. (Hooker’s advice would also apply to Dyer’s case: instead of complaining in circulated verse, frustrated courtiers should nurse their grievances in private.)

At the end of As You Like It, Jaques de Boys, whom I have argued is a figure for the passive intellect, arrives in the forest without being summoned. Thus, he appears to participate in the settlement reached by the play’s resolution. Tellingly, though, he lacks a bride, which suggests that Shakespeare does not conceive of the intellectual faculty as having any crucial role to play in the communal performance of salvation. As mentioned, Jaques de Boys (read facultatively) returns from “schoole” as a consequence of Orlando converting his passions to grace and rousing the dormant will. With the appetite under control, and the will (Oliver) wedded to heaven (Celia), the (passive) intellect may now settle down to useful endeavours within the commonwealth. The melancholy Jaques, on the other hand, refuses to participate in the celebration of the new

16 Hooker, “Preface,” pp. 120-1.
17 This point is informed by Elizabeth Hanson’s discussion of Francis Bacon’s method for securing the results of empiricism from “every manifestation of the subject’s desire, or will”: Discovering the Subject in Renaissance England (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998), p. 140.
settlement. My question is: does the play present Jaques’ withdrawal in a positive or negative light? Should the intellect submit to merely a passive role within a Christian commonwealth? Another way of putting the question: is the notion of an “active” intellect an accident of culture (or a consequence of the fall) or is the distinction between active and passive intellects an ontological one? The simplest answer is that the play leaves the question open. However, does the play-as-staged-performance—or the play-as-read, for that matter—leave the question less open? Watching a performance of the play, one might (to speak stereotypically for heuristic purposes) be caught up in the dancing and festive joy, the promises of sensual gratification, and be inclined to regard Jaques as a self-righteous and mistaken killjoy. Reading the play in the study, the reflective reader might be more inclined to agree with Jaques that human beings are fools for allowing themselves to be seduced by transient pleasures.

The melancholy Jaques appears to take Hooker’s advice, retiring to a cave for further contemplation instead of venturing to criticize the new settlement which everyone else seems happy with. Thus, the play, as read, is arguably no less consistent with the Hookerian establishment position. Moreover, one must beware here of applying subjectivist logic instead of considering the matter facultatively. The active intellect will always—by definition—be “unhappy” with the status quo—how else could it be active unless it questioned the way things currently appear? Nonetheless, its activity is not independent of either the body or the community. Only when both the body and the community are well-regulated can the active intellect function in a non-polluting manner. This conclusion is consistent with aspects of Luther’s teaching. Luther’s view of marriage, for example, though entirely positive, was unromantic: one has physical needs and instead of suppressing them one should satisfy them in a manner consistent with civic order. This achieved, the intellect/s—passive and active—may be trusted to go about its/their work. The active intellectual faculty may be allowed to theorize in its cave/laboratory with the appetite properly satisfied and the will wedded to heaven.

18 Chadwick, ed. Confessions, XII.27 and p. 288.n.22.
One might read *As You Like It*, therefore, and find support there, say, for one’s eschatological hobby-horse. However, one should not then take this as a cue for issuing a public challenge to the religious establishment. Instead, one ought to attend a performance of the play in order to discern how consistent one’s *reading* is with the communal reception of the play.
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Appendix.

1. *Arundel Harington Manuscript*, fol. 106v-107.\(^1\)

A complaint of one forsaken of his love.

1 He that his myrthe hath lost whose sorrow is dismayde, whose hope ys vayne, whose faythe ys scorne whose trust ys all betrayd,

2 Yf he have held them deere, & cannot cease to mone, Come let him take his place by me, hee shall not rue alone.

3 But yf the smallest sweet, be mixt wth all his sowre, Yf in the day the moneth the yeere he feelle one lightning howre.

4 then rest he wth him selfe he ys no mate for me, whose feare ys fallen whose succor voyd, whose hurt his death must be.

5 Yet not the wished deathe wth hathe noe playnt or lacke, which making free the better part, ys only natures wracke

6 Oh noe that weare to well, my greefe ys of the mynde, which allways yeeldes extreamest payns, but leaves the worst behind.

7 As one that lives in shew, but inwardly doth dye, whose knowledge ys a blody feeld whear all helpe slayne doth lye

8 Whose hart the awilter is his spyrit to sacrifice, vnto the powers whome to appease noe sorrows can suffise.

9 My fancies are lyke thornes on whiche I goe by nighte,

\(^1\) Text from Hughey, ed. *Arundel Harington*, I.182-4.
Myne arguments are like an host whose force ys put to flyghte.
10 My sence my passions spye, my thought lyke ruines olde,
of famous Carthage, or the towne w^th Synon bought and solde. [20]
11 Which still before myne eyes my mortall fall dothe laye,
Whome love and fortune once advaunct, & now have cast away.²
12 Oh thought, no thought but who woundes somtyme y^e seat of 

Joy,
somtyme the store of rest, but now, the nourse of all annoye.
13 I sowed the soyle of peace,my blisse was in the springe, [25]
and day by day I eat the fruite that my lives tre did bringe
14 To nettles now my corne my feelde ys turned to flynte
whear sitting in the Cipres shade I reade this hiacinthe
15 The peace, the rest, the lyfe, that I enioyd of yore tofore
Came to the[^y[^y] my lot that by the losse my smarte might be the
more. [30]³
16 So to vnhappy me enne the best frames for the worst
Oh tyme, oh place, oh woordes, oh looks then deere but now
accurst
17 In was stands my delight, in ys and shall my woe,
Myne horror fastned in the yea, my hope hangde in the noe.
18 I looke for noe releefe releefe would come to late, [35]
To late I fynde, I fynde to soone^well to well stood myne estate.
19 Behold suche is the end, what pleasure heere ys suer,
Ah nothinge ells but cares and playntes dothe to the world endure.
20 fforsaken first am I yea w[tt vv]terly forgotten,
and they that came not neere my faythe to my reward are gotten. [40]

Then love./
21 Then love wheare ys thie sawce that makes thie tormentes
sweet
whear ys the cause that some have thoughte theare deathe for
the but meete.
22 The stately chast disdaine, the secret thankfulnesse.

²"Line 22 is written over an erasure": Hughey, ed. Arundel Harington, II.202.
³Hughey notes that "'be' is inserted in another ink": Arundel Harington, II.202.
The grace reserved the common light that shynes in worthiness.
Oh that ye wear not soe or I yt coulde excuse, [45]
[Oh] that the wrahte of Ielowsye my iudgment might abvse.
[Torn page]
Oh frayle vnconstant vnconstant Kinde oh sure in th trothe to no
man
[No w]omen Angells be, but loe, my Mths ys a woman
Yet hate I but the fawtle and not the fawly one
[Nor c]anne I ridd frome me the bonds in whiche I lye alone. [50]
26 Alone I lye whose lyke, in love was never yet.
The prince, the poore, the yownge, the ould, the fond, or full of
wit.
27 Nor that I meane hence fourthe this straunge will to professe
As one that could betray suche trothe d'o buyld on ficklenessse
28 But yt shall never fayle that my faythe bbare in hande [55]
I have my word my word gave me bothe word and guift shall
stande.
29 Sithe then yt must be thus, and this ys all to yll,
I yeelde me captive to my curse my harde fate to fullfill.
30 The solitarye woodes my cyte shall becomme
The darkest den shalbe my lodge in wth I reste or rome. [60]
31 Of heben blacke my boord, the wormes my feast shalbe.
whearwth my carcase shalbe fed vntill they feed on me.
32 My bedwys of Niobe my bed of Craggie rocke,
the serpents hisse myne harmonye the shreekinge owle my clocke.
33 Myne exercise nought ellse but raging agonyes, [65]
My bookes of spytefull fortunes foyles or dreary tragedyes.
34 My walke the pathe of playnt my ppect into hell
Wheare wretched Sisiphe and his feeres in endless torment dwell.
35 And thoughe I seeme to vse the fayninge poetes style
To figure foorth my ruffull flight my fall or my exile [70]
36 yet are my greefs not fayned whearin I sterue or pine.
Who feelethe moste shall fynde yt leaste yf his compare wth myne.
37 My songe yf any aske whose greevous case ys suche
Die er thowe let his name be known his folly shews to muche.  
38 But best yt is to hide and never come to lighte  
for one the earthe may none but I the accente sound aright.  
finis.

Hee that his mirth hath loste, whose comfort is dismayd,
Whose hope is vaine, whose faith is scornd, whose trust is all betraid;

If hee have held them deare, and cannot cease to mourne,
Come, let him take his place by mee: he shall not rue alone.

But if the smallest sweete be mixt with all his sowre,
If in the day, the moneth, the yeare, he finde one lightsome howre,

Then rest hee by himself, he is noe mate for mee,
Whose feare is fallen, whose succor voyde, whose hurt his death must be;

Yet not the wished death, that hath noe plainte nor lacke,
Which making free the better parte, is onely natures lacke;  

Oh noe, that were too well: my death is of the mind,
Which always yeelds extreamest paines, yet keepes the most behind:

4 The monogram "E.D." appears in the left margin by this line: Hughey, ed. Arundel Harington, Ill.202.
5 Text from Sargent, Dyer, p. 184-7, 205-7. Sargent uses ASH as copy-text but draws upon other versions for emendations. The text here is reconstructed from Sargent's text and textual apparatus.
As one that lives in shewe, but inwardly doth dye,  
Whose knowledge is a bloody field, wheare all help slaine doth lie;  

Whose hart the Aulter is, whose spirit the sacrifize  
Vnto the Powers, whome to appease noe sorrowes can suffize:  

My fancies are like thornes, on which I goe by night,  
Mine arguments are like an hoste, that force hath put to flight:  

whose sense whose thoughts whose passions like ruins old  
Of famous Carthage or the town that Sinon bought and sold,  

Which still before my face my mortall foe doth lay,  
Whome love and fortune once advaunced and now hath cast away.  

O thoughtes, noe thoughts, but woundes, sometimes the seate of Joy,  
Sometymes the chaire of quiet rest, but now of all Annoy!  

I sewed the soyle of peace, my blisse was in the springe,  
And day by day I ate the fruits, that my Lives tree did bring.  

To nettles nowe my Corne, my feild is turnd to flint,  
Where, sitting in the Cipros shade, I reade the Hyacint.  

The ioy, the rest, the life, that I enjoyed of yore,  
Came to my lot, that by my losse, my smarte might smarte the more.  

Thus to vnhappie man, the best frames to the worste,  
O tyme, o place, o words, o looks deere then, but nowe accurst:
In was stood my delight, in is and shall my woe;
My horror hastned in the yea, my hope hangs in the noe.

I looke for noe delight, releefe will come too late,
Too late I finde, I finde too well, too well stoode my estate.

Behold, suche is the end, and nothing such is sure:
Oh, nothing ells but plaints and cares, doth to the world enduer.

Forsaken first was I, then vtterly foregotten,
And he that came not to my faith, lo, my reward hath gotten. [40]

nowe love, where is thy laws, that make thy torments sweete:
what is the cause, that some through thee have thought their
death but meete?

The stately chaste disdaine, the secret thanckfulness,
The grace reserved, the common light that shines in worthines?

O that it were not soe, or that I could excuse, [45]
O that the wrath of Ielousie my Judgment might abuse!

O fraile vnconstant kind, and safe in trust to noe man!
Noe women angels are, and loe, my mystris is a woeman;

Yet had I but the falte, and not the faultie one,
Nor can I rid me of the bands wherein I lye alone. [50]

Alone I lye, whose like by love was neuer yet,
Nor rich, nor poore, nor younge, nor old, nor fond, nor full of
witt.

Hers still remaine must I, by wronge, by death, by shame:
I cannot blot out of my minde that love wrought in her name:
I cannot set at nought that I have held soe deare: [55]
I cannot make it seeme soe farre, that is indeed soe neare.

Not that I meane henceforth this strange will to professe:
I neuer will betray such trust and fall fickelnesse;

Nor shall it ever faile that my word have in hand:
I gave my worde, my worde gave me; both worde and guift shall stand. [60]

Syth then it must be thus, and this is all to ill,
I yeelde me Captive to my curse, my harde fate to fulfill.

The sollitarie woodes my Cittie shall remaine:
The darkest den shalbe my lodge, whereto noe light shall come:

Of hebans blacke my boorde, the wormes my meate shalbe, [65]
Wherewith my Carcasse shalbe fed, till they doe feede on mee:

My pillow the moulde, my bed the cragie rocke,
The serpents hyssse my harmony, the scritchinge owle my clock:

Mine Exercise naught ells but raginge agonies,
My bookes of spightfull fortunes foiles and drerye tragedies: [70]

My walkes the pathes of plaint, my prospect into Hell,
With Sisiphus and all his pheres in endless paines to dwell.

And though I seeme to vse the Poets fained style,
To figure forth my wofull plight, my fall, and my Exile;

Yet is my greefe not faind, wherein I strive and pine: [75]
Whoe feeleth most, shall finde it least, comparing his with mine.
My song, if anie aske whose greivous Case is such,

Dy er thou letst his name be knowne: his folly knowes to much,

But best were thee to hide, and neuer come to light,
For in the world can none but thee these accents sound aright. [80]

And soe an end, my Tale is told: his life is but disdaind,
Whose sorrowes present painehim soe, his pleasures are full faind.

3. Cambridge University Library, MS Dd.5.75, folios 25-5v.6

Bewayling his exile he singeth thus

He that his mirthe hathe lost, whose comfort is dismayd,
Whose hope is vayne, whose faith is skornd, whose trust is all betrayed,
Yf he have held them dear and can not ceasse to moan,
Com let him take his place by me, he shall not rew alone.
But yf the smallest sweete be mixt with all his sower,
Yf in the day, the monethe, the year he feele one lightning hower,
Then rest he with himself, he is no mate for me,
Whose feare is fallen, whose succour voyd, whose helpe his death must be.
Yet not the wished deathe which hath no playnt nor lacke,
Which making free the better part is only nature's wracke; [10]
Oh noe! that were to well, my death is of the mynd,
Which alwayes yeldes extremest pangues but keepes the worst

Text from May, Courtier Poets, pp. 290-4. May uses CUL as copy-text but draws upon other versions for emendations. The text here is reconstructed from May's text and textual apparatus.
behind.

As one which lyves in show but inwardly doth die,
Whose knowlege is a bloudie field wheer all help slayn dothe lie;
Whose hart the alter is, whose spirit a sacrifice[15]
Unto the powers whom to appease no sorow may suffise.

My fancies are like thomes on which I goe by night,
Myn arguments are as an host whom force hath put to flight;
My sense my passions' spie, my thoughtes like ruins old
Of famous Carthage or the towne which Synon bought and sold,

[20]

Which still before myn eyes my mortall fall dothe lay,
Whom love and fortune once advanced but now have cast away.
Oh thoughtes, no thoughtes but woundes, somtyme the seates of joye,
Somtyme the store of quiet rest but now of all annoye.

I sowd the soile o f peace, my blisse was in the spring,[25]
And day by day I eat the fruict which my lyve’s tree doth bring.
To nettles now my Corne, my feild is turned to flint,
Wher sitting in the Cypresse shade I read the hyacinthe.
The peace, the rest, the life which I enjoyed o f yore,
Cam to my lotte that by my losse my smart might sting the more.[30]

So to unhappie men the best frames for the worst,
Oh tyme, ohe place, o wordes most dear, sweet then but now accurst!

In (was) standes my delight, in (is) and (shall) my woe,
My horrour fastened in the (yea), my hope hanges in the (noe).
I looke for no relief, reliefe would com to late,[35]
To late I fynd, I fynd to well, somtyme stood my estate.

Behold suche is the end, what pleasure here is sure?
Ohe nothing els but care and playnt dothe to the world endure.
Forsaken first am I, then utterlie forgotten,
And they that cam not to my faith to my reward have gotten. [40]
Then love wher is the sawce that makes thie tormentes sweete?
What is the cause that many thinke ther death throughge the but
The statly chast disdayn, the secret thankfulness,
The grace reserved, the common light that shines in worthiness;
Oh that yt wer not so, or I yt could excuse,
Or that the wrathe of Jelousie my judgement did abuse.
Oh frail, inconstaunt kynd, o safe in trust to no man,
No wemen aungels be and lo my maystres is a woman;
Yet hate I but the fault and not the faultie one,
Nor can I rid from me the bonds in which I lie alone.
Alone I lie whose like in love was never yet,
The prince, the poore, the yong, the old, the fond or full of witte.
Here styll remayn must I, by death, by wrong, by shame,
I cannot blott out o f my brest what love wrought in her name;
I cannot sett at naught which I have held so dear,
I cannot make yt seme so farre which is in deed so neere.
Not that I mean henceforth this straunge will to professe,
As one that could betray suche trothe to build on fickleness,
For yt shall never faile that my faithe bore in hand:
I gave my word, my word gave me, bothe word and gift shall stand.
Sithe then yt must be thus, and this is all to yll
I yeld me captive to my curse my hard fate to fulfill.
The solitarie wood my citie shall becom,
The darkest denne shalbe my lodge wherin I rest or runne;
Of eben blacke my boord, the wormes my feat shallbe
Wherwith my bodie shalbe fed till they doe feede on me.
My wyne o f Niobie, my bed a craggie rocke,
The serpent’s hisse my harmonie, the scriching owle my clocke.
My exercise nought els but raging agonies,
My bookes of spightfull fortune’s foiles and drery trajedies,
My walke the pathe of playntes, my prospect into hell
Wher Sisiphus, that wretched wight, in endlesse payn dothe dwell.
And though I seeme to use the fayninge poets’ stile
To figure forthe my ruthefull plight, my fall and my exile,
Yet is my greife not fained wherin I serve and pyne,
Who feeles his most shall fynd yt least yf his compare with myne.
My song, yf any aske whose greivous case is suche,
Die er thou lette his name be knowen, his folie shoes to muche;
But best is the to hide and never com to light,
For on the earthe may none but I this accent sound aright.

4. Stonyhurst MS A.v.27.7

Dyers phancy turned to a Sinners Complainyte

Hee that his myrth hath lost
Whose comfort is to rue
Whose hope is falne whose faith is cras’d
    Whose trust is founde untrue
If he have helde them deere
    And cannot cease to mone
Come lett him take his place by me
    He shall not rue alone
But if the smallest sweete
    Be mixt with all his sower
If in the day the moneth the yere
    He feele one lightninge houre
Then rest he with himself
    He is no mate for me
Whose tyme in teares whose race in ruth
    Whose life a death must be
Yett not the wished deathe
    That feeles no plaint or lacke
That makinge free the better parte

7 Text from Davidson & Sweeney, eds. Collected Poems, pp. 32-5.
Is onely natures wracke
O no that were to well
   My death is of the mynde
That allwaies yeldes extremest pangues
   Yet thretens worse behind
As one that lives in shewe
   And inwardly doth dye
Whose knowledge is a bloodye feilde
Where vertue slayne doth lye.
Whose hart the Alter is
   And hoast a god to move
From whome my evell doth feare revenge
   His good doth promise love
My phancies are like thornes
   In which I go by nighte
My frighted witts are like an hoaste
   That force hath put to flighte
My sence is passions spie
   My thoughtes like ruyns old
Which shew how faire the building was
While grace did it upholde.
And still before myne eyes
   My mortall fall doth laye
Whom grace and vertue once advaunced
   Nowe Synne hath cast away
O thoughtes no thoughtes but woundes
   Sometyme the seate of joy
Sometime the store of quiet rest
But now of all annoye.
I sow’d the soyle of peace
   My blisse was in the springe
And day by day the fruite I eate
   That Vertues tree did bringe
To nettles nowe my Corne
My feild is turnd to flynte
Where I a heavie harvest reape  [55]
Of cares that never stynt
The peace the rest the life
That I enjoyd of yore
Were happy lott but by their losse
My smarte doth stinge the more.
So to unhappye men
The best frames to the worste
O time o place where thus I fell
Deere then but now accurste
In was stands my delighte  [60]
In is and shall my woe
My horour fastned in the yea
My hope hangd in the no.
Unworthy of reliefe
That craved it to late
Too late I finde I finde too well
Too well stoode my estate
Behould such is the ende
That pleasure doth procure
Of nothing els but care and plaint  [70]
Can she the mynde assure
Forsaken firste by grace
By pleasure now forgotten
Her payne I feele but graces wage
Have others from me gotten.
Then grace where is the joye
That makes thy torments sweete
Where is the cause that many thought
Their Deathes through the but meeete
Where thy disdayne of synne  [80]
Thy secreet sweete delite
Thy sparkes of blisse thy heavenly rayes
That shined erst so brighte
O that they were not loste
Or I could it excuse
O that a dreame of fayned losse
My judgement did abuse
O frayle inconstant fleshe
Soone trapt in every gynn
Soone wrought thus to betray thy soule
And plunge thy selfe in synne
Yett hate I but the faulte
And not the faultye one
Ne can I rid from me the mate
That forceth me to mone
To moane a Synners Case
Then which was never worse
In prince or poore in yonge or old
In bliss’d or full of curse
Yett gods must I remayne
By death by wronge by shame
I cannot blott out of my harte
That grace wrote in his name
I cannot sett at nought
Whome I have held so deare
I cannot make him seeme afarre
That is in dede so neere.
Not that I looke henceforthe
For love that earst I founde
Sith that I brake my plighted truth
To build on fickle grounde
Yet that shall never fayle
Which my faith bare in hande
I gave my vow my vow gave me
Both vow and gift shall stande
But since that I have synnd

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And scourge none is to ill
I yeld me captive to my curse
My hard fate to fulfill.
The solitare Woode
My Citye shall become
The darkest Denns shall be my lodge
In which I rest or come.
A sandy plot my borde
The worms my feast shall be
Wherewith my carcas shall be fedd
Untill they feeede on mee
My teares shall be my Wyne
My bedd a craggy rokke
My harmonye the serpents hyssse
The screeching oule my clocke
My exercise remorse
And dolefull sinners layes
My booke remembrance of my crymes
And faltes of former dayes
My Walke the pathe of playnte
My prospect into hell
Where Judas and his cursed crewe
In endles paynes do dwell
And though I seemed to use
The feyning Poets stile
To figure forth my carefull plight
My fall and my exile
Yet is my greife not faynd
Wherein I sterve and pyne
Who feeleth most shall thinke it lest
If his Compare with myne.
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