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Alternative Realities: Counterfactual Historical Fiction and Possible Worlds Theory

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Abstract

The primary aim of my thesis is to offer a cognitive-narratological methodology with which to analyse counterfactual historical fiction. Counterfactual historical fiction is a genre that creates fictional worlds whose histories run contrary to the history of the actual world. I argue that Possible Worlds Theory is a suitable methodology with which to analyse this type of fiction because it is an ontologically centred theory that can be used to divide the worlds of a text into its various ontological domains and also explain their relation to the actual world.

Ryan (1991) offers the most appropriate Possible Worlds framework with which to analyse any fiction. However, in its current form the theory does not sufficiently address the role of readers in its analysis of fiction. Given the close relationship between the actual world and the counterfactual world created by counterfactual historical fiction, I argue that a model to analyse such texts must go beyond categorising the worlds of texts by also theorising what readers do when they read this type of fiction. For this purpose, in my thesis I refine Ryan's Possible Worlds framework so that it can be used to more effectively analyse counterfactual historical fiction. In particular, I introduce an ontological domain which I am calling RK-worlds or reader knowledge worlds to label the domain that readers use to apprehend the counterfactual world presented by the text. I also offer two cognitive concepts – ontolological superimposition and reciprocal feedback – that support a Possible Worlds analysis of counterfactual historical fiction and model how readers process such fiction. In addition, I redefine counterpart theory, transworld identity, and essential properties to appropriately theorise the way readers make the epistemological link between a character and their corresponding actual world individual. The result is a fully fleshed out Possible Worlds model that addresses the reader's role by focusing on how they cognitively interact with the worlds built by counterfactual historical fiction. Finally, to demonstrate my model's dexterity, I apply it to three texts – Robert Harris' *Fatherland* (1992), Sarban's *The Sound of his Horn* (1952), and Stephen Fry's *Making History* (1996). I conclude that the Possible Worlds model that I have developed is rigorous and can be replicated to analyse all fiction in general and counterfactual historical fiction in particular.

"History, despite its wrenching pain, cannot be unlived, but if faced with courage, need not be lived again"

Maya Angelou, *On the Pulse of Morning*

For Mumma and Raghuacha,

For everything.

For Shrav,

For never telling me my odds.

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Candidate's Statement

This is to state that parts of Chapter Four of my thesis has been previously published in the *Fantastika Journal*, titled 'Alternate History: Defining Counterparts and Individuals with Transworld Identity'.

In Chapter Five of my thesis, I have used some copyrighted images from Robert Harris' *Fatherland* (1992). As per the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988, I have explicit permission to use these materials as data. Under section 29(1) of the act, Fair Dealing is an exception to the copyright law that allows for the use of images and extracts from published novels for the purpose of research and private study.

Riyukta Raghunath
September, 2017

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Harris, R. (1992). *Fatherland.* London: Hutchinson.

Raghunath, R. (2017). Alternate History: Defining Counterparts and Individuals with Transworld Identity. *Fantastika Journal*, 1(1), 91–108.

Chapter 1: Introduction - Counterfactual Historical Fiction, Existing Scholarship, and Thesis Outline

1.1 Introduction

The aim of my thesis is to develop a cognitive-narratological methodology with which to analyse counterfactual historical fiction texts. Counterfactual historical fiction is a literary genre that comprises narratives that are set in worlds whose histories run contrary to the history of our actual world. From the genre of counterfactual historical fiction, for my research, I have chosen to analyse counterfactual World War II narratives that construct fictional worlds in which the Axis Powers – Germany and Japan – have won the Second World War.

This chapter explores the literary genre of counterfactual historical fiction in detail. In critically examining the existing research on counterfactual historical fiction, I argue that research in this area mainly deals with developing a typology of counterfactual historical fiction texts. In terms of research on counterfactual World War II texts in particular, the focus is on why people ask what-ifs with reference to an altered Nazi past. As I will discuss below, while there is some research that engages with how readers process such fiction, this is an area that is largely underdeveloped. In Chapter Two, my thesis addresses this issue by proposing Possible Worlds Theory as a suitable method of analysis. However, I also argue that a methodology to analyse counterfactual historical fiction texts effectively must go beyond dividing the text into its constituent

domains by also addressing what readers do when they read such fiction. For this purpose, in Chapter Three, my thesis develops Possible Worlds Theory and complements it with cognitive concepts that accurately model what happens when readers read counterfactual historical fiction texts. In Chapter Four, my thesis redefines integral concepts from within Possible Worlds Theory such as transworld identity, counterparthood and essential properties to reflect how readers process historical characters that appear in counterfactual historical fiction. The result is a revised and rigorous Possible Worlds model that can be used to categorise the worlds generated by such texts and theorise the different cognitive processes that readers go through when they read counterfactual historical fiction. Furthermore, the model that I offer can be replicated and used to analyse all narratives across the genre of counterfactual historical fiction.

In the first section of this chapter, I introduce counterfactuals and the concept of counterfactual thinking and in the second part I explain counterfactual historical fiction as a literary genre.

1.2 An Overview of Counterfactuals and the Concept of Counterfactual Thinking

Cleopatra's nose: had it been shorter, the whole aspect of the world would have been altered (Pascal, 2003 [1670]: 48).
The above quotation from Pascal expresses the concept of counterfactuals rather remarkably – it conveys the idea that a slight alteration could lead to highly changed outcomes. *The Oxford English Dictionary* (2017) defines the

word counterfactual as "[p]ertaining to, or expressing, what has not in fact happened, but might, could, or would, in different conditions". In social psychology, and in what is a more appropriate definition, Neal Roese and James Olson define the term counterfactual as something that "literally, runs contrary to the facts" (1995: 1 – 2). Therefore, a counterfactual expresses what has not happened, but as Roese and Olson point out, it is done by creating alternatives to facts. According to narratologist Hillary Dannenberg, a counterfactual is "generated by creating a nonfactual or false *antecedent*. This is done by *mentally mutating* or undoing a real-world event in the past to produce an *outcome* or *consequent* contrary to reality" (2008: 111, italics original). Dannenberg here explains how a counterfactual scenario is created when a particular event in our actual world is changed, thereby producing a new version of the actual world. My own example of a counterfactual statement is: *if I had watched Game of Thrones last night, my friends couldn't have spoiled the cliffhanger for me*, where 'I watched Game of Thrones last night' is the false antecedent that produces the outcome – 'couldn't have spoiled the cliffhanger'.

In social psychology, according to Epstude and Roese (2008), "counterfactual thoughts are often evaluative, specifying alternatives that are in some tangible way better or worse than actuality" (168). As a result, they are classified into two major types, upward and downward counterfactuals, based on their direction of comparison. According to the research (for example, Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, and McMullen, 1993; Roese, 1994; and McMullen, Markaman, and Gavinski, 1995), an individual creates an upward counterfactual when they imagine alternate situations that are subjectively better than actuality and they create downward counterfactuals when they posit alternate situations that are

subjectively worse than actuality. My example of an upward counterfactual is: *If Stevie hadn't slipped, he would've scored the winning goal* because it posits a scenario where Stevie scores a goal instead of falling and missing his chance, thus making it better than actuality. My example of a downward counterfactual would be when someone imagines a counterfactual scenario that is worse than actuality as a way of viewing the positives of their situation. For example: if X was supposed to be at a game which they missed because they overslept, but it so happened that a brawl broke out between the supporters leading to a stampede as a result of which many people were injured. In that case, a downward counterfactual imagined by X would be: *if I had gone to the game, I would have been injured,* which is imagining a scenario that is worse than actuality.

Roese states that "counterfactual thinking is a common feature of mental life that is often intermeshed with potent emotional states" (Roese, 1997: 143). This is because people imagine counterfactual alternatives often when they are either pondering over bad choices that they have previously made, wondering how things could have been different or when they are hoping for things to turn out a certain way. Dannenberg (2008) concurs with Roese in reference to counterfactual thinking being a common cognitive activity and further points out that "[s]uch alternate life scenarios are an everyday manifestation of the human urge for *narrative liberation* from the real world" (110, italics original). Dannenberg here refers to people's tendency to engage in counterfactual thoughts as a means of escaping reality. She maintains that it is not uncommon for people to create alternate worlds to the ones that they live in on an everyday basis.

To examine the concept of counterfactuals further, in this section I will explore the academic treatment of counterfactual thought in different disciplines. In Birke, Dorothee, Butter, Michael, and Köppe, Tilmann (Eds.) publication of *Counterfactual Thinking – Counterfactual Writing* (2011), an overview of the concept of counterfactuality is provided by studying its definition and use across a number of disciplines. More specifically, this volume investigates the history of the concept of counterfactual thinking, its meaning and treatment in philosophy, psychology, historiography, political science, and literary studies. For example, according to them, psychologists and historians believe, in Roese and Olson's (1995) words that "[a]ll counterfactual conditionals are causal assertions" (11). The term 'causal assertion' needs some clarification. According to Boje (2001), casual assertion is defined as "the principle that a prior event can be necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of a subsequent event, or that, a set of events is thought to be chained together" (95). Using Boje's definition, it can be inferred that what Birke *et al.* mean is that psychologists and historians alike believe that a counterfactual is produced by means of causal reasoning, where a chain of events unfolds logically, based on the previous event.

While scholars in both fields agree on a definition, Birke *et al.*, (2011) declare that psychologists in their study of counterfactual thinking "investigate the thought experiments undertaken by others" (4), while in historiography "they engage in thought experiments themselves" (4). This suggests that historians construct counterfactuals themselves to study the importance of the event or

person they are discussing, whereas psychologists examine the counterfactuals created by others to understand and study the rationale of it.

Moving on to the treatment of counterfactuals within psychology in some more detail, Byrne (1997) states that counterfactual thinking gained interest among psychologists only in the 1980s. According to him, in works such as Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and Kahneman and Miller (1986), psychologists began examining the cognitive processes that underlie the creation of counterfactuals. Epstude and Roese (2008) further point out that early research in the 1980s saw counterfactual thinking as dysfunctional in nature. To elucidate, they draw on a scenario:

> when a car accident victim focuses relentlessly on how she might have avoided the accident, even though to an outside observer the accident was attributable entirely to the other driver, who was drunk at the time [...]. Such self-blame-engendering counterfactuals may exacerbate negative affect, become a risk factor for depression, and yet bring no benefit in terms of behavior regulation (178).

This example shows how upward counterfactuals have the potential to result in personal blame and much of the research in the 1980s (for example, Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Landman, 1987; Macrae, 1992; Miller *et al.*, 1990) focused on the negative effects of counterfactuals. However, Epstude and Roese (2008) claim that a new wave of research in the 1990s took a functional perspective when psychologists began to look at counterfactual thinking as serving a beneficial function towards behaviour regulation. For example, Epstude and Roese point towards research that shows how counterfactual thinking can be

used to learn from unsuccessful behaviour (see Roese and Sherman, 2007) or in the context of achievements, upward counterfactual scenarios can be used as a motivator to achieve a goal (see Oettingen *et al.*, 2001) (184).

As this section has evidenced, the concept of counterfactuals and counterfactual thought has been treated differently within and between disciplines and therefore as Birke *et al.* (2001) point out "it is obviously impossible to synthesise the various definitions and deployments in a fashion that all disciplines can agree on" (4). As the genre of counterfactual historical fiction is central to my thesis, the next section will explore the notion of counterfactuality and its use within fiction before critically examining relevant research within the area.

1.3 Counterfactual Writing – The Genre of Counterfactual Historical Fiction

As was stated, the genre of counterfactual historical fiction consists of stories that are set in a world in which the history unfolds differently than it did in our actual world. More specifically, such fictions single out a crucial event in our actual world history and contradict it to create a counterfactual fictional world. Jeff Prucher in his *Brave New Words: The Oxford Dictionary of Science Fiction* (2007) notes the preferred usage of the term 'Alternate History' by literature scholars to refer to these texts. Other terminology can also be used to refer to this particular form of fiction. As Hellekson (2001) points out:

> Alternate histories are also known as alternative histories, alternate universes, allohistories, or uchronias. One scholar, Joerg Helbig, prefers

the term 'parahistory.' Historians use the term 'counterfactual.' Though 'alternative history' seems to be the preferred term among scholars (and it has the benefit of grammatical correctness), writers and editors like 'alternate history,' as evidenced by book titles such as Mike Resnick and Martin H. Greenberg's string of 'Alternate' anthologies, including *Alternate Outlaws* (1994), *Alternate Presidents* (1992), and *Alternate Warriors* (1993) (3).

In addition to these terms, Charles Renouvier (1876) uses the term 'Uchronie' from French which denotes a fictionalised historical time period to refer to this genre and Gallagher (2007) proposes to call these texts 'alternate world novels'. Gallagher explains, "[a]lternate-history novels attempt to create a complete alternative reality, presenting in detail the social, cultural, technological, psychological and emotional totalities that result from the alteration, which is why they are often called 'alternate *world* novels'" (58, italics original).

In my thesis, I have used the term 'counterfactual historical fiction' over the more popular 'alternate history' because using the premodifier 'counterfactual' instead of 'alternate', emphasises the typical nature of this type of fiction to present a world that is contrary to the history of our actual world. The term "alternate" only conveys that such fiction present a history that is different to or a substitute to the actual world history. However, my argument is that the historical descriptions presented in this type of fiction are not merely alternate to, but they are also historical deviations that are counter to actual world historical facts. The implicit distinction here is that the term 'counter to' expresses more clearly that the historical deviations in such fiction challenge

accepted accounts of history in the actual world. Moreover, the suffix 'fiction' clearly indicates that it is fiction. Therefore, calling this genre 'counterfactual historical fiction' emphasises that it presents *fictional* worlds that include *historical descriptions* that are *counterfactual* to the actual world history.

What is interesting about the genre of counterfactual historical fiction is that it is a kind of thought experiment where the author takes as their starting point an existing historical situation and changes it to explore the world of what-if scenarios. This starting point where the fictional history diverges from actual history is known as the 'point of divergence'. Singles (2013) defines the point of divergence as "the moment in the narrative of the real past from which alternative narrative of history runs a different course" (7). She also asserts that the point of divergence is a chief characteristic of counterfactual historical fiction because it is the "common denominator or trait that distinguishes [such fiction] from other related genres" (7). Like the varied terms that exist for counterfactual historical fiction, different terminologies are also used to refer to the point of divergence. For example, Hellekson (2001) uses the term 'nexus' event to describe the event in fictional history that replaces the actual one. She also notes Collins' (1990) use of the term 'Jonbar hinge' from Williamson's *The Legions of Time* (1952) to refer to the specific point when history changes. However, as Hellekson (2001) maintains, the term is "confusing and unwieldy; it certainly is not immediately understood" (6). Gallagher (2011) like Hellekson chooses to use the term 'nexus', and Dannenberg (2008) uses the term 'antecedent' from philosophy, to refer to the past event from actual world history that is negated or falsified in order to create an alternative historical timeline. Following Singles (2013), throughout my thesis, I will use the term

'point of divergence' to describe the point when fictionalised history branches off from actual world history because the term divergence more appropriately expresses that there is a deviation as opposed to the term 'nexus' which refers to the link between two historical events, and the antecedent which signifies prior event(s).

Moving on to a definition of the genre, Duncan (2003) describes counterfactual historical fiction as "not [...] history at all, but a work of fiction in which history as we know it is changed for dramatic and often ironic effect" (209). Counterfactual historical fiction can thus be considered a genre of fiction that is rich in possibilities. Inevitably, all fictional narratives are rich in possibilities because they present a what-if scenario in the sense that they imagine a world where such and such event or series of events take place, but they differ crucially from counterfactual historical fiction where the worlds created posit what-if scenarios based on rewriting the history of our actual world. In the words of Ryan (2006), "[a]lternate [...] history fiction creates a world whose evolution, following a certain event, diverges from what we regard as actual history" (657).

Spedo (2009) defines the genre by differentiating it from historical fiction stating that "AH [alternate history] is written as if it were historical fiction, containing characters and events partly or totally invented, set against a real historical background, but it is read as absolutely fictional, as it describes events that never happened. In contrast, historical fiction [HF] is written and read as essentially realistic, if not necessarily real in all its parts" (7). According to Spedo, the key difference between counterfactual historical fiction and historical fiction

lies in the way each of these genres is written and perceived by readers. He suggests that although counterfactual historical fiction is written as if it were real in that such fiction include historical characters and events presented within a historical context, readers tend to think of such fiction as made-up because they are aware that they are being presented with a historical timeline that never happened. Historical fiction, on the other hand, Spedo maintains is also written as though it is real, but unlike counterfactual historical fiction, readers consider historical fiction as being a representation of actual history.

The genre of counterfactual historical fiction is often seen as part of a larger category that also includes some types of science fiction and fantasy. Hellekson (2001) reminds us:

> Science fiction asks, 'What if the world were somehow different?' This question is at the centre of both science fiction and the alternate history. Answering this question in fictive texts creates science fiction or other fantastic texts, including fantasy and magic realism. One important point I wish to stress is that the alternate history is a sub-genre of the genre of science fiction, which is itself a sub-genre of fantastic (that is, not realistic) literature (3).

Here, Hellekson addresses the long-standing question of whether or not counterfactual historical fiction is a sub-category of science fiction and firmly concludes that it is. I do not agree with the argument that merely having a world that is different from our actual world makes it science fiction. Counterfactual historical fiction is not always science fiction and fantasy. Though some texts have science fictional elements (for example, *Bring the Jubilee* [1953]

by Ward Moore involves the protagonist travelling back in time using a time machine) and some have fantastical elements (for example, *Temeraire* [series] by Naomi Novik that imagines a world during the Napoleonic War fought using dragons), there are also others that contain neither (for example, *SS-GB* [1978] by Len Deighton is set in a world where England is occupied by Germany after Nazi Germany won the Second World war and *The Yiddish Policeman's Union* [2007] by Michael Chabon presents an alternate world where during the Second World War, the Jews were relocated to a city named Sitka which in the present day is a large Yiddish metropolis). While some counterfactual historical fictional texts are set against science fictional contexts, there also exists a broad body of work in counterfactual historical fiction that is not science fiction, and at this point counterfactual historical fiction needs to be considered a genre on its own.

To further understand the genre of counterfactual historical fiction this section explores the genre's historical development. Rosenfeld (2005) views the genre as a long-standing phenomenon when he writes:

> [...] it traces its roots back to the origins of Western historiography itself. No less a figure than the Greek historian Herodotus speculated about the possible consequences of the Persians defeating the Greeks at Marathon in the year 490 B.C.E., while the Roman historian Livy wondered how the Roman Empire would have fared against the armies of Alexander the Great (Rosenfeld, 2005: 5).

While Rosenfeld traces the genre's history back to Greek and Roman history, according to Hellekson (2009), the first novel-length counterfactual historical

fiction which was published in large quantities can be dated back to 1836 when French writer Louis Geoffroy penned his *Histoire de la Monarchie Universelle – Napoléon et la conquête du monde 1812–1832* [History of the Universal Monarchy: Napoleon and the Conquest of the World] (13). The text envisions the Napoleonic Empire victorious in the French invasion of Russia in 1812 followed by the invasion of England in 1814 and later unifying the world under Bonaparte's rule. However, in the actual world the French army were defeated in 1812 by the Russians and consequently Napoleon's dream of conquering Europe was shattered. Hellekson also states that the first known counterfactual historical fiction text in the English language is Nathaniel Hawthorne's *P's Correspondence* published in 1845 (454). This text recounts the tale of a mad man who lives in an altered version of 1845 where famous people such as Lord Byron, P. B. Shelly, John Keats, and Napoleon Bonaparte, to name a few, are still living. While Hellekson dates the first counterfactual historical fiction to the early nineteenth century, Rosenfeld (2005) holds the view that the first counterfactual historical novels began appearing in the mid-nineteenth century. Amongst all, he asserts that Charles Renouvier's *Uchronie* (1876) was distinguished "for giving the genre one of its defining terms" (5). The term 'uchronie' (a French word which translates to 'uchronia' in English) was invented by Charles Renouvier in his novel to refer to counterfactual historical fiction and is now identified as another term for such fiction (see Prucher, 2006).

As is already evident from the examples above, counterfactual historical fiction addresses a range of different historical events and scenarios, but Rosenfeld (2002) notes that "the most popular scenarios in alternate history have been those that portray events that have left their mark on the world of today and

that continue to resonate in the present" (94). Accordingly, the popular themes explored by counterfactual historical fiction writers are often political reversal stories in which the outcomes of crucial political events in history like the World Wars are changed. As Hellekson (2009) states, "[a] great number of alternate histories focus on warcraft and battles, often centering on pivotal battles during major wars, such as the Second World War or the US Civil War" (455). Examples of scenarios in counterfactual historical fiction texts that satisfy this pattern include: what if Roosevelt was defeated in 1940 while appealing for his third term as President? (for example, *The Plot against America* [2004] by Philip Roth); what if the British had never left India? (for example, *The Warlord of the Air by Michael Moorcock* [1971]); what would have happened if the Soviet Union won the Cold War? *(*for example, *The Gladiator* [2007] by Harry Turtledove); what if the Southern Confederacy had won the American Civil War? (for example, The Southern Victory series by Harry Turtledove that contains eleven counterfactual historical fiction novels beginning in 1997 and published over a decade); and more commonly what if Hitler had won the Second World War? (for example, *The Man in the High Castle* [1962] by Philip. K. Dick, *Fatherland* [1992] by Robert Harris, *SS-GB* by Len Deighton [1978]*, In the Presence of mine Enemies* [2003] by Harry Turtledove).

Other themes that do not engage with military or war outcomes include: what would the world have been if it had entered the computer age much earlier (for example, *The Difference Engine* [1990] by William Gibson and Bruce Sterling), what if in the absence of Christianity, other religions such as Islam, Buddhism, and Daoism were the dominant religions (for example, *The Years of Rice and Salt* [2002] by Kim Stanley Robinson), what would a world where the reformation did

not take place be like (for example, *The Alteration* [1976] by Kingsley Amis), or even what if the old world of Europe and parts of Asia and Africa disappear overnight and are replaced by land with different flora and fauna (for example, *Darwinia* [1998] by Robert Charles Wilson).

Within the scope of my thesis, I will be analysing political reversal stories: those that imagine a world where the Axis Powers – Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan – have won the Second World War. In the actual world, the Axis Powers were defeated in the Second World War by the Allies, Britain, France, The Soviet Union, The United States of America and China. Germany's defeat in the Second World War also led to Adolf Hitler's suicide in 1945, a historical fact that is often contradicted in counterfactual World War II fictions. The concept of the Axis victory in the Second World War has been explored often in counterfactual historical fiction texts, thus making it one of the most popular themes within this genre. I have chosen fictions that explore an alternative World War II outcome specifically because they are so dominant within the canon, thereby allowing me to draw on a variety of examples that will help me illustrate my argument.

These texts that explore the concept of the Axis victory in the Second World War posit scenarios that Rosenfeld observes have four recurring themes in them. He notes:

> These include tales in which: 1) the Nazis win World War II; 2) Hitler escapes death in 1945 and survives in hiding well into the postwar era; 3)

Hitler is removed from the world historical stage either before or sometime after becoming the F[ü]hrer; 4) the Holocaust is completed, avenged, or undone altogether (Rosenfeld, 2005: 13).

In my thesis, I define novels that engage with an altered Second World War timeline as 'counterfactual World War II' fictions. The next section explores this type of fiction in more detail.

1.3.1 Counterfactual World War II Fictions

Counterfactual World War II fictions have appeared in various forms of media. Rosenfeld in his *The World Hitler Never Made* (2005) surveys a range of novels, comics, television, movies, and videogames in order to study why counterfactual questions around the Nazi past have been so prolific in the post-war era. According to Rosenfeld, within the genre of counterfactual historical fiction, "the Third Reich has been explored more often than any other historical theme" (11). He studies the various themes included in these works such as Hitler wins the Second World War, Hitler is defeated much earlier in the War, Hitler lives beyond the Second World War, and Hitler is never born, in order to investigate:

> What set of motivations or concerns had led people over the years to wonder "what if?" with respect to the Nazi era? How had they imagined that the world might have been different? What explained the growth of such accounts in recent years? Finally, and most importantly, what did alternate histories reveal about the evolving place of the Nazi past in Western memory? (Rosenfeld, 2005: 3).

Rosenfeld believes the proliferation of what-ifs around an altered Nazi past and their development through time may be due to the fact that the defeat of Germany has become one of the most important moments in Western history. He further links it to collective memory, highlighting the event's historical significance and asserts that "by examining accounts of what never happened, we can better understand the memory of what did" (90). Here, Rosenfeld suggests that such narratives have the potential to refine people's understanding of what really happened in our world by underpinning the importance of a Nazi defeat in the Second World War. In a similar study that focusses mainly on the fictional treatment of a counterfactual Nazi past, Geoffery Winthrop-Young (2006) also concludes that "there is unanimous agreement that no scenario is treated more often than an altered outcome of the Second World War" (878) and, for the same reason as Rosenfeld, he seeks answers to the reason behind the "increasingly inevitable recycling of the Third Reich" (878). He asks:

> [...] not only why alternate history keeps returning to the Third Reich, but also why it tends to focus on particular aspects when engaged with Nazi culture. Why do certain themes keep reappearing? (Winthrop-Young, 2006: 880).

In his essay, he sets out to provide an explanation to the above questions by exploring whether or not a "genre-specific dynamics" (880) determines the recurring depictions of Nazis. From his analysis of texts such as Dick's *The Man in the High Castle* (1962)*,* Eric Norden's *The Ultimate Solution* (1973)*,* and Harry Turtledove's *The Presence of Mine Enemies* (2003), he infers that counterfactual historical fiction texts go through different phases of development that coincide with the unveiling of new information with reference to Nazi Germany.

According to Winthrop-Young, "it appears that the evolution of the Third Reich in official history and in alternate history have followed fairly similar paths" (892). This suggests that there is a correlation between the development of research on Nazi Germany within historiography and the development of counterfactual historical fiction on altered Nazi pasts.

According to Duncan (2003), "most alternate histories [...] tend to depict dystopias, bad societies that might have been" (212) and this trend can be seen in most counterfactual World War II novels. For instance, some novels portray a Nazified Britain where a number of British citizens are seen collaborating with the Germans, aiding the Nazi Holocaust (for example, *The Ultimate Solution* [1973] by Eric Nordern and *SS-GB* [1978] by Len Deighton). Other narrative motifs in counterfactual World War II texts is advanced Nazi technology – in particular, advanced nuclear technology, jet aircrafts and sophisticated space technology (for example, *The Man in the High Castle* [1960] by Philip. K. Dick) or some form of genetic engineering (for example, *Sound of his Horn* [1952] by Sarban). Given the dominant views on National Socialism, it is not surprising that the trend in these novels is the portrayal of the Nazis and their regime solely as malevolent. Rosenfeld (2005) assesses the situation and writes:

> The Third Reich is one historical era that has long resisted normalization. For many years, the Nazi period has been viewed as different from other periods of history. [...] The most obvious reason for Nazi period's disproportionately prominent status in current consciousness is its notorious degree of criminality. In unleashing World War II and perpetrating the Holocaust, among many other misdeeds, the Nazis

committed crimes that were so extreme as to be epochal in nature. [...]
For these reasons, historians and others have insisted for many years on
seeing and assessing the Nazi era from a manifestly moral perspective.
Non-fictional as well as fictional accounts of the Nazi period since 1945
have long been defined by a shared belief in Nazism's absolute evil (18).

Here, Rosenfeld points out that counterfactual World War II novels mostly
portray worlds that depict the Nazis as being sinister. He believes that the
primary reason for this is to always remind people about the Nazi carnage. He
clarifies by drawing on the words of George Santayana – "those who do not
remember the past are condemned to repeat it" (Santayana [no date] in
Rosenfeld, 2005: 18) suggesting that people learn from mistakes and therefore it
is important to remember them so as to ensure that it is never repeated.
Furthermore, I would suggest that readers are likely to expect a dystopian world
from a counterfactual historical fiction of the Nazi past. As Eyerman (2001)
explains, when there is "a dramatic loss of identity and meaning, a tear in the
social fabric, affecting a group of people that has achieved some degree of
cohesion" (2), it becomes a "cultural trauma" (2). The crimes committed by the
Nazis against the Jewish race have become a part of our cultural memory and as
such it is impossible to fathom a Nazi rule devoid of cruelty.

Having defined and described the genre of counterfactual historical fiction and
in particular counterfactual World War II fictions in this section, the next section
will review the existing scholarship on this genre to show how it has been
previously examined.

1.4 Existing Research on Counterfactual Historical Fiction: from Formal Typologies to the Importance of Readers

Since the aim of my thesis is to devise a methodology with which to analyse counterfactual historical fiction, it is important to discuss Hellekson's *The Alternate History – Refiguring Historical Time* (2001) in which she provides "a framework from which researchers may analyse the genre" (108). As Hellekson asserts, her framework is based on examining "alternate history in terms of history" (111). What she offers therefore, is an examination of the relationship between the genre of counterfactual historical fiction and history. For this purpose, she begins by offering a classification of counterfactual historical fiction based on the point of divergence, or as Hellekson terms it "the moment of the break" (5).

In her typology, Hellekson distinguishes between the 'nexus story', the 'true alternate history', and 'parallel world stories'. According to her, the nexus story is one that "occurs at the moment of the break" (5), the true alternate history "occurs after the break, sometimes a long time after" (5), and the parallel worlds story "implies that there was no break at all" (5). She explains that the nexus story is one that alters "a crucial point in history, such as a battle or an assassination" consequently rendering a changed outcome. She cites Poul Anderson's *Time Patrol* stories as an example of a nexus story on the basis that they centre on the nexus event by foregrounding "the primacy of events – even little-known events – in the shaping of history" (6). A true alternate history, according to Hellekson, "posit[s] different physical laws" (5) focussing on a "radically changed world" (5). This is represented by texts such as *The Man in the High Castle* (1962) by Philip. K. Dick and Edward Moore's *Bring the Jubilee* (1955)

because they present a fictional world that is set long after the point of divergence. For this reason, they also present worlds that are scientifically and technologically advanced as a result of the changed nexus event. As Hellekson states, these texts show how "a historical event turning out differently will in turn result in a number of other changes that cascade, culminating in worlds dramatically discontinuous with reality" (8). Her final category which is the parallel world stories, according to her, posit multiple alternate worlds that exist simultaneously and "[g]enerally, protagonists can move (or at least communicate) between these worlds" (8). Texts such as Piper's *Paratime* (1981) and *The Coming of the Quantum Cats* (1986) by Frederik Pohl are her examples of parallel world stories because these texts present multiple alternative historical worlds, where travelling between them is possible.

After categorising these texts, Hellekson further identifies each of these counterfactual historical fiction texts using four models of history – 'eschatological', 'genetic', 'teleological', and 'entropic'. According to Hellekson, "the eschatological model of history is concerned with the final events or ultimate destiny [...] of humankind or history" (2). These texts often include worlds that are destroyed completely. She states that Poul Anderson's *Time Patrol* series are "fundamentally eschatological in nature" (97) because these texts "point us forward to an ultimate destiny, to a glorious end, an eschatological promise" (107). Hellekson here refers to the protagonist Manse Everard's choice to preserve his future by destroying all alternate histories. The genetic model on the other hand, according to her is "concerned with origin, development, or cause" (2), that is, texts that use this model revert to the incident that has caused the counterfactual world. Texts such as Dick's *The Man*

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in the High Castle and Piper's *Paratime* follow the genetic model of history because they discuss the origins of their changed worlds. The entropic model "assumes that the process of history is of disorder or randomness" (2) and Hellekson states that Brian Adiss's *The Malacia Tapestry* (1961) is a good example of this model. In the text, the counterfactual world is a result of dominant intelligent dinosaurs in the distant past. Malacia in the present is a city where change is forbidden and as a result of this the city is decaying. Hellekson states that "nothing happens in the novel in terms of the story arc – the characters remain unchanged, just as Malacia does" (110) and for this reason she identifies this text as entropic. In contrast, the teleological model maintains that history has "a design or purpose" (2). Hellekson offers Bruce Sterling's and William Gibson's *The Difference Engine* as an example because in this text an intelligent computer called a 'narratron' narrates the story. According to Hellekson, "the iterations of the text exhibit a design that leads to a final cause: machine intelligence" (110) making it a good example of the teleological model.

Most of the texts that Hellekson discusses are genetic models, even if they are identified as also being one of the other models. This is because, as she states, "the genetic model lies at the heart of every alternate history because the alternate history relies on cause and effect" (2). What Hellekson means here is that essentially all counterfactual historical fiction texts follow the genetic model because the alternative historical timelines featured in these texts are a result of a specific event in the past being altered thereby also causing all the following events to be altered, ergo cause leading to effect.

As the preceding overview shows, Hellekson (2001) offers a typology of counterfactual historical fiction that is based on the point of divergence. However, she does so by mainly focusing on the formal features of the text and as such does not take into account the reader's role when reading such texts. Like Hellekson, Alkon (1994) also offers a typology of counterfactual historical fiction that is based on the point of divergence and the historical context of the text, but he approaches this from the perspective of a reader. Unlike Hellekson who examines counterfactual historical fiction texts in terms of how the point of divergence is treated within the fictional world, Alkon considers these texts based on how the points of divergence are revealed to the reader.

Alkon (1994) differentiates between what he calls 'classical' alternate history and 'postmodern' alternate history and argues that the former "may serve to provide enhanced awareness of what the past was like and of our relationships to it as well as our present historical moment [while the latter] may serve the more postmodern purpose of blunting awareness of actual historicity and of chronological distinctions" (48). Therefore, according to Alkon, classical alternate histories pay more attention to the development of the historical timeline within the text compared to postmodern alternate histories. To show how classical alternate histories achieve this, Alkon draws on texts such as Ward Moor's *Bring the Jubilee*, Philip. K. Dick's *The Man in the High Castle* and Harris' *Fatherland* and states that texts such as these include "historical information or references to orient the reader with respect to points of divergence and congruity between the fictional and real worlds" (81). As an example, Alkon shows how *Fatherland* includes an 'Author's Note' at the end explaining to the readers "where real and imaginary history intersect in [the novel]" (77). Similarly, he shows that Dick in

The Man in the High Castle includes a page of "'Acknowledgements' listing history books and other sources [that] becomes in effect an invitation to compare Dick's fiction with documents invoking the real past" (74). Alkon maintains that classical alternate histories focus on the historical context by ensuring that the point of divergence is causally connected to the following altered events. In contrast, Alkon classifies texts such as *Peter Nevsky and the True Story of the Russian Moon Landing* and Gibson and Sterling's *The Difference Engine* as postmodern alternate history. He places these texts under a larger category of the postmodern because unlike classical alternate histories, these texts do not adhere to the notion of a plausible causal relationship. Rather they conflate the past, present, and future "by importing features of our present into the past" thereby creating causal confusions (80). As an example, Alkon draws on *The Difference Engine* that is set in 1855 and in which "readers encounter [...] twentieth-century concepts very thinly disguised: a racing car is 'line-streamed for maximum speed; a ship has an anti-rolling mechanism actuated by sensors providing 'back-feed'" (80) to show how anachronisms are used in the text without sufficient causal explanation as to how the world changed so drastically.

Alkon acknowledges that "alternate history requires more knowledge of real history on the part of its readers" (69) compared to any other type of fiction. He therefore includes the role of readers in his distinction between classical and postmodern alternate histories when he explains that classical counterfactual historical fiction tends to avoid historical chaos by making the points of divergence explicit while postmodern counterfactual historical fiction relies on the reader's ability to infer the differences between the actual world and the counterfactual world. Notably, Alkon recognises the importance of a reader's

awareness of actual world history when reading counterfactual historical fiction. He thus implicitly shows that the role of readers within the context of understanding counterfactual historical fiction is an important one. However, Alkon does not interrogate this concept of readers any further. For instance, he does not look into how different readers with their different levels of knowledge cognitively process such fiction. As evidenced, he only uses the concept of readers to develop his typology of counterfactual historical fiction.

Like Alkon (1994), Singles (2013) in her analysis of counterfactual historical fiction texts, emphasises the importance of readers within the context of explaining the genre of counterfactual historical fiction. In her study, she compares the genre's poetics with other similar genres of fiction such as historiographic metafiction, science fiction, and fantasy that seem to overlap or crossover with counterfactual historical fiction. Her aim here is to situate counterfactual historical fiction within the wider context of fictional narratives, especially against the backdrop of narratives that bear resemblances to counterfactual historical fiction. As a result of examining the textual strategies such as point of divergence and other alternative historical descriptions that makes these texts counterfactual, Singles foregrounds "the context of reception" (8). She states that counterfactual historical fiction "as texts which rely on text-external knowledge, make specific demands on the reader" (84) in that such texts depend on the reader's ability "to contrast his or her knowledge of the narrative of history with the one presented in the text" (8). Singles recognises that counterfactual historical fiction requires a specific type of reader, "one with a horizon of knowledge about history as well as the ability to 'read' textual clues" (119). Singles' analysis here on counterfactual historical fiction readers

specifically is significant because she acknowledges the function of readers within the context of counterfactual historical fiction and asserts that "the realisation that the role of the reader, or the particular challenge posed to the reader of distinguishing between history and its alternate version is a genre-defining aspect of alternate history" (280). Although Singles, like Alkon (1994) accounts for the reader and maintains that their knowledge of the actual world history is crucial to the reading process, she does not develop this by theorising what readers do with this knowledge while reading counterfactual historical fiction texts.

Supporting this idea of how knowledge of actual world history is key in terms of understanding counterfactual historical fiction, Yoke's (2003) essay offers a close reading of Sarban's *The Sound of his Horn* (1952). More specifically, Yoke offers an interpretation of the text by showing how Hitler's Reich during the Second World War in Nazi Germany can be used to understand the fabricated world of *The Sound of his Horn*. What Yoke essentially demonstrates here is the cognitive operation of using the actual world to make sense of the counterfactual fictional world. In a similar kind of study, Spedo's (2009) dissertation 'The Plot Against the Past: An Exploration of Alternate History in British and American Fiction' offers an interpretive analysis of individual works of counterfactual historical fiction. Spedo maintains that one of the defining features of the genre of counterfactual historical fiction is its relationship to the actual world history. To show the link between the text and the actual world history, Spedo carries out a close reading of three counterfactual historical fiction texts – Philip K. Dick's *The Man in the High Castle*, Robert Harris' *Fatherland* and Philip Roth's *The Plot Against Ameri*ca – to interpret the historical references included in these texts.

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Spedo focuses on how history is treated within these texts and because of this, throughout his analysis he implicitly acknowledges the centrality of the reader to show how these texts make references to our actual world history. For example, in his analysis of *Fatherland* he maintains that "[m]anifold are the analogies between the actual Communist and the counterfactual Nazi regime" (11). More specifically, he demonstrates that "[t]he unearthing of the embarrassing secrets of an aging [Nazi] regime [in *Fatherland* is] eerily similar to the actual USSR" (11). Consequently, he shows how this link between the Nazi regime and U.S.S.R can be used to interpret the world presented in *Fatherland*. Both Yoke's (2003) and Spedo's (2009) approach that demonstrates how using that actual world history can help interpret counterfactual history in these specific texts is central to my thesis because it supports the model that I am devising to theorise the different cognitive processes that readers go through when they read counterfactual historical fiction.

What is of absolute significance to my thesis is Dannenberg's (2008) analysis of counterfactual historical fiction texts because she not only addresses the role of readers and the importance of using the actual world knowledge of history, but she also offers a cognitive model that captures the step-by-step process of what readers do when they read such fiction. Before she presents her model, the various functions of counterfactual events in novels are studied analytically in order to provide an effective categorisation of counterfactual historical fiction based on their ontological hierarchy. More specifically, she divides them into: 'single-world alternate history', 'dual-world alternate history', 'time-war story', 'time-travel story with historical alteration', 'time-travel story with historical

multiplication', 'multiple-worlds alternate history', and 'multiple-world future history'.

According to Dannenberg (2008), a single-world alternate history is one in which "only events in a single historically counterfactual world are narrated" (128) and a dual-world alternate history describes the "counterfactual historical world of the text" (128) as well as "acknowledges the existence of the real world of the reader" (128). In the former, the events are narrated by a covert heterodiegetic narrator and, in the latter by an overt heterodiegetic narrator. The time-war story contains "representatives of different versions of history that wage war against each other and, by means of history manipulation, attempt to establish their own version of history as actual" (128). A time travel story can be of two types: one with historical alteration where "a time traveler either intentionally (i.e., causal-manipulatively) or accidentally (i.e., causal progeneratively) creates an antecedent that leads to a new version of history" (129) and the other one with history multiplication where "a new branch of history is created, but the old branch is still explicitly featured in the text as a parallel world" (128). The multiple-worlds alternate history presents multiple worlds and there usually is "some form of commerce or communication between them" (128). The multiple-world future history presents "a world that is set in the future and consists of an a priori multiplicity of alternate worlds [...] or creates different versions of history through successive historical alteration" (129).

Although Dannenberg does not analyse particular counterfactual historical fiction texts extensively, she does provide a model with which to analyse these texts that is based on Fauconnier and Turner's concept of conceptual blending (cf. Dannenberg 2004, 2012). Therefore, the model that Dannenberg develops is a cognitive one capable of theorising the process that readers go through when they read counterfactual historical fiction texts. The cognitive model builds on Fauconnier and Turner's study of the mental processes of 'conceptual integration' or 'world blending' to comprehend counterfactual statements (also see Turner, 1996; Fauconnier and Turner, 1998, 2003) as I explain below.

According to Fauconnier and Turner (1998), a counterfactual claim such as: *If Churchill had been the prime minister in 1938 instead of Neville Chamberlain, Hitler would have been deposed and World War II averted* (286), asks us to blend two input spaces to create a "separate, counterfactual mental space" (286). From the example above, the first input space consists of the information that "Churchill in 1938 [was an] outspoken opponent of Germany" (286); and the second input space includes the information that "Neville Chamberlain in 1938 [was] prime minister [and] facing threat from Germany" (286). They continue, "to construct the blend, we project parts of each of these spaces to it, and develop emergent structure there" (286). The cognitive operation of 'blending' thus creates a unique blend of two input spaces – Churchill from input space 1 and the role of the prime minister form input space 2, resulting in a blended space in which Churchill in 1938 is prime minister. Thus, the blended space now consists of both the antecedent – Churchill as prime minister – and the consequent – World War II averted. My diagram as shown in Figure 1.1 illustrates Fauconnier and Turner's (1998) concept of blending using their example:

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1938
Churchill
Not Prime Minister,
opposition to
Germany.
Etc.

*Blended
Space*

1938
Churchill
Prime Minister
Opposes Hitler
No WWII
Etc.

1938
Chamberlain
Prime Minister
Appeasement
Etc.

Figure 1.1: Visual representation of Fauconnier and Turner's (1998) concept of blending

Dannenberg (2008) uses Fauconnier and Turner's (1998, cf. 2003) theory of blending outlined above and visually represented in Figure 1.1 to analyse counterfactual statements in her study of counterfactual historical fiction. In particular, she applies the blending model to a passage she cites from John Wyndham's *Random Quest* (1961) in which the protagonist finds himself transplanted into a counterfactual version of the mid-twentieth century where, in 1954, Nehru who was the Prime Minister of India in the actual world, is in prison and Rab Butler is the Prime Minister of Britain instead of Winston Churchill. She suggests that:

> the real world reader recognizes that she comes from a world in which
> Nehru became prime minister of India as a result of that country's

independence in 1947 and in which Rab Butler never became the leader of the British Conservative Party or prime minister in post war Britain. [...] The Nehru of this text, however, is a blend of two "mental spaces" from real-world Indian history: the first input space is Nehru's act of civil unrest against the British prior to Indian independence, which are here extended into the counterfactual space of 1954. The second real-world input space is Nehru's becoming prime minister of India as from 1947: while this fact is contradicted in the emergent counterfactual space (in which the imprisoned Nehru is patently not enjoying the privileges of prime minister), it is precisely because of the ironic contrast with the counterfactual scenario that it is a key input feature in the counterfactual construct that the reader is invited to entertain in her mind (Dannenberg, 2008: 59).

Dannenberg uses this example to show the success of the blending model which posits that when a reader is presented with a counterfactual description in the text such as the one above, they will first recognise names such as Nehru by "accessing [their] real-world encyclopaedic knowledge" (59). Presuming that the reader possesses all prior knowledge of twentieth century history, she suggests that the next step is for the reader to recognise that Nehru in the text is a counterfactual version of Nehru in the actual world. This leads to the understanding that the Nehru of the text is a blend of worlds that include inputs from the actual world history. Therefore, unlike the previous research outlined above, Dannenberg develops a model that surpasses simply recognising that readers must have and use their actual world history knowledge in order to understand a counterfactual historical fiction text by also explaining the underlying cognitive processes that readers are likely to engage in. As she

reveals in reference to the example that she analyses, "the cognitive dynamics here go beyond the automatic activation of previously stored knowledge" (59) because a "counterfactual construct does not simply involve recognition but the creation of a unique blend" of actual world input spaces (59). As such, what she provides is a cognitive model that theorises the reader's mental processing of the counterfactual history presented in these texts.

Furthermore, she also uses this example to argue that "the world-separatist possible-worlds framework is incapable of penetrating the cognitive dynamics of counterfactuals" (60). Thus, her analysis in this case is used to dispute the effectiveness of frameworks that separate fictional texts into ontological domains and in particular Possible Worlds Theory. The basis for Dannenberg's criticism of Possible Worlds Theory lies in the fact that it is essentially a tool that is used to *separate* the worlds of a text and it is therefore not capable of mapping the cognitive operation that requires the blending of input spaces. The criticism thus suggests that Possible Worlds Theory is not capable of analysing counterfactual historical fiction and a different cognitive model is essential for this purpose.

While I agree that a cognitive model must be used to understand counterfactual historical fiction, as I will argue in Chapter Two and demonstrate in Chapters Three, Four and Five of my thesis, it is also vitally important to separate the counterfactual historical fiction into its constituent worlds. Furthermore, as I will also show throughout in this thesis, Possible Worlds Theory is a suitable method of analysis for this type of fiction because, in addition to categorising the worlds

of the text, it also provides other tools that are needed to effectively analyse different aspects of counterfactual historical fiction texts.

As the preceding overview has shown, previous studies of counterfactual historical fiction have focused on various aspects of counterfactual histories. While some research focuses on developing a formal typology for the genre (for example, Hellekson, 2001; Alkon 1994; Dannenberg, 2008), others examine the genre's poetics (for example, Singles, 2013) or offer interpretive literary analyses of particular counterfactual historical fiction (for example, Yoke, 2003; Spedo, 2009; Singles, 2013). Nonetheless, what they have in common is that they address the concept of readers and acknowledge the importance of having prior knowledge of the actual world history; however, this is an area that they do not develop fully. As such, this is the gap that my thesis aims to fill because, in the words of Singles (2013) "any literary work is 'completed' by the reading process" (9). For this reason, I argue that a model with which to analyse counterfactual historical fiction texts must address the reader's role and more specifically, focus on how they interact cognitively with the worlds built by these texts.

Dannenberg (2008) offers a comprehensive and systematic treatment of the reader by developing a cognitive model based on blending that details the reader's mental processing of counterfactual historical fiction texts. However, as I will argue in Chapter Two, while the blending model is effective for the analysis of some counterfactual historical fiction texts, it cannot be applied across all narratives in the genre. As a solution to this issue, Chapter Three and Four offers a systematic approach, based on Possible Worlds Theory that is capable of

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modelling the different processes that readers go through when they read counterfactual historical fiction and one that can be replicated and applied across all narratives within the genre.

What my thesis offers is therefore a cognitive-narratological methodology that can be used to formally describe the different worlds created by such texts as well as theorise what readers do when they read such fiction. Possible Worlds Theory has been productively employed for this purpose by a number of theorists (see Pavel, 1986; Eco, 1984; Ryan, 1991; Bell, 2010). For that reason, rather than replacing Possible Worlds Theory with an entirely cognitive account such as Schema Theory (Rumelhart, 1980; Cook, 1994; Semino, 1997; Jeffries, 2001) or Contextual Frame Theory (Emmott, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998), I incrementally build Possible Worlds Theory by supplementing it with new cognitive concepts in Chapter Three and cognitively inflected accounts of existing concepts such as transworld identity and counterparthood in Chapter Four. The result is an elaborate Possible Worlds model that is capable of accounting for both the cognitive and the narratological aspects of counterfactual historical fiction.

Furthermore, as I will discuss in Chapter Six, collecting real reader responses to counterfactual historical fiction to accurately reflect how readers interact with such fiction is advantageous and a valuable area of study in itself, but falls beyond the remit of my thesis, where focus is directed towards revising Possible Worlds Theory to offer a thoroughly developed and replicable model.

1.5 Outline of This Thesis

This chapter of my thesis has examined the scholarship on counterfactual historical fiction. I have provided an overview of the study of counterfactuals between disciplines and explored the genre of counterfactual historical fiction in detail. I have also carried out a review of the literature around the genre of counterfactual historical fiction before concluding that the genre lacks a suitable systematic methodology that theorises the different cognitive processes that readers go through when they read such fiction. In this chapter, I have also defined the principle aim of this thesis.

In Chapter Two, I will argue that Possible Worlds Theory provides a suitable methodology with which to analyse counterfactual historical fiction texts. I will explain the theory in detail, starting from its roots in philosophy before critically reviewing it, showing how it has been used so far in narratology. For this purpose, I trace the development of Possible Worlds Theory from its foundation in philosophical logic to its application in narratology. The first section includes a discussion of the term possible worlds to show its philosophical foundations. I also explore how analytical philosophers have developed Leibniz's [1710] concept of possible worlds and theological reasoning in the context of modal logic. Following an overview of Possible Worlds Theory in philosophic logic, I critically examine narratological applications of Possible Worlds Theory and conclude that Ryan (1991) presents the most comprehensive and most appropriate model because she establishes a modal universe with which the worlds created by texts can be labelled and analysed. However, I also identify

gaps in Ryan's model that I will address in Chapters Three and Four before it can be applied to counterfactual historical fiction texts. Adopting Ryan's framework, I provide an overview of the modal universe that I use throughout my thesis to analyse the worlds created by counterfactual historical fiction texts. In the final section of this chapter, I critically examine criticisms of Possible Worlds Theory to show the analytical potential of the theory.

In Chapter Three, I offer the first modification to Ryan's Possible Worlds model by arguing that an effective model to analyse counterfactual historical fiction texts must also reflect the way in which readers process these texts cognitively. More specifically, the model must account for the way that readers use their knowledge of the actual world to understand the counterfactual world and also to understand the significance of the relationship between both these worlds. To address the gap in current research, I introduce Reader K-worlds (RK-worlds) to Possible Worlds Theory to label specific knowledge worlds that include a reader's subjective representation of the actual world. I argue that while reading a counterfactual historical fiction, a reader uses their RK-world to interpret and understand the significance of the text. While readers of all kinds of fictional texts use their RK-worlds to interpret texts, this process is especially important for counterfactual historical fiction texts because such texts explicitly use and contradict moments from our actual world history in order to present a counterfactual world. As I have discussed in this chapter, owing to the nature of counterfactual historical fiction, the point of texts within this genre is thus to invoke in the mind of the reader the actual world history that it alters. My concept of RK-worlds is able to account for the activation of actual world knowledge in the mind of the reader more explicitly than current Possible

Worlds models. To further differentiate between different kinds of RK-worlds, I introduce complete RK-worlds, partial RK-worlds, and zero RK-worlds, each reflecting different levels of knowledge in readers. The modal universe that I establish to analyse counterfactual historical fiction now includes RK-worlds within the actual universe.

Having established my new concept of RK-world in Chapter Three, I then introduce two additional new cognitive concepts that are crucial to theorising and analysing the processes that readers go through when they read counterfactual historical fiction. First, I introduce my new concept of 'ontological superimposition' and show how it is able to model the two-layered structure that readers conceive in their mind when they read counterfactual historical fiction. More specifically I show that the counterfactual world is superimposed on the actual world background. When readers read such fiction, their RK-worlds are invoked, thereby provoking the reader to move between the world of the text and their RK-world to identify the historical deviations and to make sense of the counterfactual world. I then argue that this further induces a process that I am calling 'reciprocal feedback'. Reciprocal feedback proposes that readers use their RK-world to interpret the counterfactual world of text, but they also use that understanding of the counterfactual world to understand the importance of the point of divergence within the context of the actual world. The composite model that I propose thus suggests that a counterfactual has a superimposed structure that includes the actual world and the textual actual world which the reader then moves between in a reciprocal feedback process.

In Chapter Four, I develop my methodology further and offer the second modification to Possible Worlds Theory by critically examining two concepts that are especially important for analysing counterfactual historical fiction: counterparthood and transworld identity. These concepts are integral to my argument because they are concerned with how readers process actual world historical character that appear in fiction. I show that as a direct consequence of the conceptual disagreement between two opposing theoretical positions within Possible Worlds Theory, there is also a theoretical and conceptual disparity on whether individuals who appear in more than one possible world are the self-same individuals or not. I demonstrate that while some narratologists choose one term over the other, others employ both terms: 'counterparts' to define individuals who appear in more than one world, and 'transworld identity' to describe the process through which they cross ontological boundaries and appear in more than one world.

In this chapter, I revisit these concepts as they stand in philosophy and narratology to demonstrate how they each describe a separate concept. I then use these redefined terms to appropriately label the two different types of actual world historical figures that are presented in fictional world. I also show how they should not be perceived as concepts that are substitutes for one another. Instead, I argue that they each have a specific use within the context of counterfactual historical fiction.

Within the parameters of my thesis I will argue for the use of the term 'transworld identity' to describe actual world individuals who appear in textual

actual worlds, but share all properties with their original in the actual world thereby making them self-same individuals. In contrast, I will argue for the use of the term 'counterpart' to label actual world individuals in the textual actual world who share some crucial properties but still possess their own unique properties in the textual actual worlds. Having accounted for the different kinds of actual world individuals that appear in texts, throughout this chapter I also theorise the way that readers establish an epistemological link between the character and their actual world original. More specifically, using concepts such as Ryan's (1991) principle of minimal departure and Pavel's (1975) theory of proper names as a rigid designator, I show how readers are able to cross-reference counterparts and individuals with transworld identity to their corresponding actual world individuals. Furthermore, in order to work within the context of counterfactual historical fiction, I also redefine the concept of essential properties to show how readers link a specific kind of historical character in the fictional domain to the actual world individual. In doing so, this chapter highlights how readers process the inclusion of different kinds of actual world historical figures that appear in a fictional context.

In Chapter Five, I apply the revised Possible Worlds Theory model that I have developed to three texts – *Fatherland* (1992) by Robert Harris*, The Sound of his Horn* (1952) by John William Wall written under the pseudonym Sarban, and *Making History* (1996) by Stephen Fry – to demonstrate the dexterity of my methodology. I will be using these texts to illustrate the theoretical framework that I offer rather than to illuminate or to provide a new interpretation of the texts.

I have chosen these three texts in particular because they each portray a different kind of counterfactual world/worlds. To adopt Dannenberg's (2008) typology, *Fatherland* is a single-world counterfactual historical fiction because events from only a single counterfactual world are narrated. *The Sound of his Horn* is a time-travel story with historical multiplication in which the protagonist travels in time to visit a counterfactual world. Thus, two worlds – the counterfactual world and the protagonist's actual world – exist in the text. *Making History* on the other hand is a time-travel story with historical alteration where the protagonist creates different versions of history intentionally using a time machine. Apart from the stylistic differences between them, these texts each deal with varied themes and can be categorised under different genres – while *Fatherland* is a crime thriller, *The Sound of his Horn* is dystopian and *Making History* is postmodern. Thus, the rationale behind choosing the three texts is also to show that my methodology can be used across all types of narratives that create various kinds of counterfactual historical worlds.

Within this analytical chapter, I analyse *Fatherland* by applying the revised Possible Worlds Theory model to actual world images and quotations that are used within the text to show how readers with their different RK-worlds may interpret the inclusion of these. In doing so, I demonstrate the analytical potential of Possible Worlds Theory on counterfactual historical fiction texts that present complex ontologies by presenting actual world materials in their fictional world. Furthermore, it also showcases the model's dexterity in terms of analysing visual counterfactual worlds. In *Sound of his Horn*, I use the model to show how it can effectively analyse counterfactual historical texts that do not focus on the alternate historical events, but only on the world after the alternate

event has taken place. In doing so, I demonstrate the theory's adeptness in analysing texts that rely heavily on reader's RK-worlds to make sense of the fictional world. Since this text further exploits reader comprehension by presenting an unreliable narrator, I also explore how Possible Worlds Theory deals with unreliable narrators to demonstrate the manner in which readers process multiple worlds created within a text through unreliable narration. In *Making History*, I focus on historical characters within the text and use Possible Worlds Theory to analyse two contradictory chapters that include a historical character in one and their counterpart in another. In particular, I argue that while RK-worlds are used by readers to make an epistemological link between an actual world individual and their counterpart, when multiple counterfactual worlds are included within a text, I show how information supplied in the text within one world can also be used to establish an epistemological relationship between historical individuals that appear across these worlds. In doing so, this chapter demonstrates how a nuanced understanding of actual world characters as counterparts can be achieved using Possible Worlds Theory.

The sixth chapter presents the central conclusions of my thesis and proposes areas for further research that will benefit both Possible Worlds Theory and wider scholarship of counterfactual historical fiction.

Chapter 2: Methodology: Possible Worlds Theory – From Philosophical Logic to Literary Studies

2. Introduction

In Chapter One, I carried out a detailed exploration of the genre of counterfactual historical fiction. I critically reviewed the existing research on the genre and showed that the concept of readers and their function within the context of analysing counterfactual historical fiction is an area that is largely underdeveloped. In Chapter One, I also stated that this is the research gap that my thesis primarily aims to fill by proposing Possible Worlds Theory as a suitable method of analysis for counterfactual historical fiction.

Possible Worlds Theory is an interdisciplinary theoretical framework that has its roots in philosophical logic. In this chapter, I will show why Possible Worlds Theory is the most suitable methodology with which to analyse counterfactual historical fiction. I will provide an overview of Possible Worlds Theory, and trace the development from its philosophical origins to its application in literary studies. As I will show in this chapter, within narratology, the application of Possible Worlds Theory to fiction broadly falls under two categories – to study the fictionality of texts and to study the narrativity of texts. By critically reviewing the theory as a method of analysis for counterfactual historical fiction texts, I will demonstrate its suitability as a framework for the analysis of this genre. In reviewing the theory as a suitable methodology, what I will also highlight are

areas that that need to be further developed so the theory can be used effectively to account for how readers process such fiction.

In the first section of this chapter I will explain in detail the philosophical foundations of Possible Worlds Theory and then proceed to discuss its use within literary studies. In the subsequent section, I will interrogate how narratologists have used Possible Worlds Theory to develop a modal universe with which to divide the text into its various ontological domains. Following this, I will establish the modal universe and its associated terminology that I will use within the parameters of this thesis to describe counterfactual historical fiction texts in the subsequent chapters.

2.1 The 'World' Terminology

Before offering an overview of Possible Worlds Theory, it is necessary to define the concept of 'world' more generally in order to be clear about how it is used within Possible Worlds Theory. 'World' is a term that is frequently used in narratology, but there is no single definition of the term and hence it has been used variously between disciplines. In *Possible Worlds Literary in Theory*, Ronen (1994) defines the term 'world' in the following way:

> A world of any ontological status contains a set of entities (objects, persons) organized and interrelated in specific ways (through situations, events and space-time). A world as a system of entities and relations, is an autonomous domain in the sense that it can be distinguished from other domains identified with other sets of entities and relations (8).

Ronen defines 'world' in its broadest sense as a collection of objects and individuals connected through situations. She also stresses that a world as a domain can be distinguished from other domains in that it is autonomous. Although a fairly common term, the use of the term 'world' varies within the disciplines within which it is used. As Ronen points out, philosophers such as Kripke use the term world "within the context of a general semantic model" (102) to solve logical problems posed by propositions that express modality as opposed to the literary uses of the term, where world is used "in order to systematize the structure of the work of art from within" (103). Ronen here shows the distinct uses of the term world as used within philosophical logic and literary studies – while within the former it is used to describe modality, within the latter it is used to describe the structure of texts.

Ryan (1991) points out that the concept of using the metaphor 'world' to discuss fictional texts is no new phenomenon. She writes:

> The metaphor of worlds is of course nothing new to literary critics. An expression such as "the world of Virginia Woolf" is a neutral cliché so traditional in literary parlance that it does not commit its user to any particular approach or assumption (3).

Ryan here states that it is common to refer to fictional texts using world as a metaphor. She brings into account an example of an expression such as 'the world of Virginia Woolf' to show how world as a metaphor is frequently used while discussing literary texts and as such implying that it has many meanings. Similarly, Ronen (1994) reflects on the typical uses of the term 'world' in literary studies to show how their meaning can be varied. Ronen (1994) writes:

talking about "the world of Milton", "the world of Romance", "the world of *War and Peace*" and "the impossible world of Marques," is commonly accepted in discourse on literature, although presumably in each case we mean something different. The currency of the concept of *world* in literary studies and the way it is used illustrate a typical situation whereby a concept of a broad enough meaning, such as a *model* or *structure,* serves as a convenient metaphor in diverse concepts and for diverse purposes (97).

Ronen here points out that the term 'world' is used often because its meaning is so general that it can be used to express a number of things. According to Ronen, there are two main interpretations for the term 'world'- one being the "structural definition of the term world" (97) and the other "proceeding from an ontological definition of world" (97). The structural definition presupposes that when a reader reads a text (fiction or nonfiction) they construct in their imagination a world – a systematic structure that consists of objects, individuals, and situations. The ontological definition, which is "imposed by a philosophical framework on our understanding of the worlds of literary texts" (97), is used to theorise how readers think about the world of literary texts relative to other domains. For example, the ontological meaning attached to the term 'world' as posited by Ronen can be used to explain how readers understand that it is not possible to meet Lady Macbeth in our world and it is also not possible for Lady Macbeth to stop Desdemona's inevitable death. The ontological definition of 'world' is also used by theorists to study the fictionality of texts. Thus, one definition of 'world' takes into account the structural features attributed to a world, and the other definition includes the ontological characterisation and nature of a world. When discussing fiction, theorists and analysts tend to mostly

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use the term 'fictional world' (or 'storyworld' [Herman, 2002]) to describe the world created by a fictional text. For a detailed account of the uses of the term 'world' in literary studies and in philosophy, see Ronen (1994: 96–107).

Possible Worlds Theory is the most appropriate methodology with which to analyse counterfactual historical fiction because the primary focus of the theory is on the worlds built by fictional texts. In Chapter One, I showed how counterfactual historical fiction texts are intrinsically linked to the actual world in that they build fictional worlds that are based on contradicting historical facts from the actual world. For this purpose, as I will demonstrate in this chapter, Possible Worlds Theory is an effective methodology for this type of fiction because it offers the vocabulary that is needed to define the worlds created by counterfactual historical fiction and also to describe their relationship to the actual world. Furthermore, the worlds of counterfactual historical fiction include historical characters and, as I will show in this chapter, integral concepts from within Possible Worlds Theory, namely transworld identity and counterpart theory, can be used to theorise and analyse this phenomenon.

In addition to Possible Worlds Theory, which will be outlined in this chapter, there are also other stylistic approaches that deploy the 'world' terminology such as Text World Theory (for example, Werth, 1994, 1999; Gavins, 2007) which is a cognitive model that is used to describe how readers mentally represent fictional and non-fictional worlds using language as well as the context in which it is produced, and Deictic Shift Theory (for example, Duchan, Bruder, and Hewitt, 1995; Segal, 1995; McIntyre, 2006) which is a framework used by

theorists to understand the ways in which readers experience shifting viewpoints in texts. Both Text World Theory and Deictic Shift Theory are significant as methodologies to study fiction because they can each be used to understand how readers conceptualise language. While Text World Theory can be used to explain how readers make sense of discourse by creating mental representations or 'text worlds' (see Gavins, 2007), Deictic Shift Theory can be used to theorise how readers understand deictic centres and different points of view that are realised in texts (see McIntyre 2006). However, unlike Possible Worlds Theory, what neither of these theories offer is the necessary vocabulary with which to divide and describe the domains of a counterfactual historical fiction text. My thesis deals with readers and delves into how they process counterfactual historical fiction texts, but the focus is on how readers use the different ontological domains created and invoked by the text to make meaning. For this purpose, it is crucial that I use Possible Worlds Theory to establish a modal universe with which to describe the different worlds that are created by the text; to explain their relationship to the actual world; and also to analyse the ontological mechanics that exist between the different worlds created.

2.2 The Philosophical Origins of Possible Worlds Theory

Philosopher Raymond Bradley (2009) points out that the term 'possible worlds' entered the philosophical lexicon through the writings of German philosopher, Gottfried Leibniz [1646 – 1716]. Leibniz's (1952 [1710]) philosophical tract, first published in the early eighteenth century, proposes that our actual world is the best of all possible worlds. According to Leibniz, God conceives many possible worlds and chooses the best one among them and makes it the actual world

(that is, the world that we inhabit). In Leibniz's *Theodicy,* he states that "for this existing world being contingent and an infinity of other worlds being equally possible, and holding, so to say, equal claim to existence with it, the cause of the world must needs have regard or reference to all these possible worlds in order to fix upon one of them" (1898 [1710]: 201). Here, using the concept of possible worlds Leibniz implies that God must have chosen our world to be the actual one over all other possible worlds based on it having less evil compared to all other possible worlds. This also suggests that God did not create just one world but instead "an infinitude of possible worlds among which God must needs have chosen the best, since he does nothing without acting in accordance with supreme reason" (128). The key point here is Leibniz's implication that the actual world we live in is a part of the universe that contains along with the actual world, also a multitude of possible worlds. Furthermore, he states: "for since, there is an infinity of possible worlds, there is also an infinity of possible laws, some proper to one world, other proper to another" (2015 [1686]: 71). Therefore, for Leibniz, all worlds are complete entities and therefore possible worlds differ from the actual one not only in terms of content but also in terms of the rules that govern them.

While it has been established that the actual world is the world that we inhabit, the question that still remains is what is a possible world? As an answer to this, Loux (1979) writes:

> It is uncontroversially true that things might be otherwise than they are. I believe, and so do you, that things could have been different in countless ways. I therefore believe in the existence of entities that might be called

'ways things could have been'. I prefer to call them 'possible worlds' (182).

What Loux means here is that a possible world is one that contains an unrealised possibility of reality. He suggests that it is common to think about worlds that are different from the actual world and Bradley (2009) agrees when he points out that although the concept of possible worlds is considered the brainchild of Leibniz, "the fact is that we all think about them every day, though not usually under that description" (1441). He writes:

One wonders what the world would have been like if one had done something different from what one in fact did: if one had chosen a different partner or profession, for instance. One wonders what history would have been like if Hitler had won the war. Equally one ponders whether one should do this or that, or something else, where each of the possibilities would make a difference to how the world, or your little part of it, would then turn out. And one makes plans for the future hoping things will turn out one way though conscious of the fact that it may not (1441).

Bradley acknowledges that people often engage in thoughts about how things could have been or how they might be in the future – wishing they had done some things differently or hoping some things turn out a certain way in the future. He considers the notion of possible worlds as being implicit in all these thoughts.

Leibniz's philosophical tracts and theological reasoning were redefined by analytical philosophers, such as Saul Kripke and Jaakko Hintikka, to form Possible Worlds logic. In the late twentieth century, analytical philosophers became aware of the importance of Leibniz's concept of possible worlds to explain modal notions such as possibility, necessity, and probability. Philosophers such as Kripke (1963, 1972), Hintikka (1967, 1989), Lewis (1973, 1983, 1986), Plantinga (1974, 1979, 2003) and Rescher (1975, 1979) have each used Possible Worlds logic to interrogate reference and modality. Within Possible Worlds logic, the modal universe consists of the actual world and their respective possible worlds. For example, Kripke's (1963) modal universe is hierarchically-structured with the actual world at the centre surrounded by a number of possible worlds. In Kripke's application of the concept of possible worlds to modal logic he devises a model structure that consists of G, K, R in which K is a set of objects and G is a member of that set with R being the relation between the members of K. In the context of Possible Worlds logic, K would be a set of possible worlds and G is the actual world, with R being the accessibility or possibility relation between G and other members of K (see Kripke (1974 [1963]: 804). Following this he assigns a set of members to each of these domains with some members existing in more than one domain. Kripke's formulation as seen here also proposes that a quantifier such as 'some' means being true in at least one possible world and 'all' means being true in all possible worlds.

Possible Worlds logic is a form of propositional logic that can be used to determine the truth value of modal claims that express either what could be or what must be. Consider the statement: It is possible for Rags to become a

lecturer. On what basis can the truth value of this statement be determined if it has not been actualised in the actual world yet? According to Possible Worlds logic, the truth value of non-actualised possibilities or necessities can be determined by considering modal propositions in relation to possible worlds. Within the logic of possible worlds, propositions are assigned the status of true, necessary, or possible – a proposition that is true in the actual world is a true proposition; a proposition that is true in all possible worlds is a necessary proposition; and a proposition that is true in at least one possible world is a possible proposition. Hence, the statement 'It is possible for Rags to become a lecturer' is a possible proposition if there is at least one possible world in which it is true. This means that all propositions must be assigned to a particular world and they may be assessed only in terms of the world they belong to, and not outside of it.

Possible Worlds Theory, which was initially developed by philosophers to understand modal claims such as the one discussed above, is also used to interpret the truth conditionals of counterfactual statements. In the opening lines of *Counterfactuals*, Lewis (1973) clearly explains the basic framework with which counterfactual conditionals can be analysed:

> 'If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over' seems to me to mean something like this: in any possible state of affairs in which kangaroos have no tails, and which resembles our actual state of affairs as much as kangaroos having no tails permits it to, the kangaroos topple over (i).

Thus, according to this framework, a counterfactual condition is evaluated based on the relation of similarity between the actual state of affairs and possible state

of affairs. According to Lewis, a statement such as, if P, then Q denoted by (P →
Q) is true if the closest possible world in which the antecedent P is true, is a
world in which the consequent Q, is also true. This means that a counterfactual
is true only in a possible world that resembles the actual world in every way
except that where P is true in the actual world, Q is true in the possible world.
For example, consider the counterfactual statement: if Hitler had won the war
then he would have gone on to rule the world. This proposition, according to
Lewis's framework, would be a true counterfactual condition because in a world
as concrete as and similar to ours, a person like Hitler winning the war could
mean that he might not stop with Europe; he may go on until he rules the
world.

It is important to note that a world is considered a possible world in Possible
Worlds logic as long as it includes no contradictions. Conversely, a world with
contradictions is considered an 'impossible world'. In Leibniz's (1898 [1710])
account on the nature of possible worlds, he explains that no two contradictory
statements can be simultaneously true, in the following words:

> our reasonings are grounded upon two great principles, that of
> contradiction, in virtue of which we judge false that which involves a
> contradiction, and true that which is opposed or contradictory to the
> false (section 31, 235).

Leibniz maintains that a proposition and its contradiction cannot both be true
and this notion is adopted in logic to form the two laws of logic: The Law of
Non-Contradiction and The Law of the Excluded Middle. Bell (2010) states that
according to the Law of Non-Contradiction a proposition "p AND ~p is false"

(47) this means that for a world to be possible, a proposition and its negation cannot be true simultaneously. The Law of the Excluded Middle states that "p OR ~p is true" (46) suggesting that a statement is either true or false, an in-between state is not possible (46). Thus, according to Leibniz, there can be multiple possible worlds as long as these worlds do not contain any contradictions. To use the example of Schrödinger's famous cat, the Law of Non-Contradiction dictates that Schrödinger's cat cannot be both dead and alive at the same time and according to The Law of the Excluded Middle, Schrödinger's cat has to either be dead or alive; an in-between state of the cat being alive and dead is not possible. The two laws are important within logic and if either of these laws is broken, the world is considered impossible. However, as I will show in the latter part of this chapter, narratologists have suggested modifying Possible Worlds Theory to accommodate contradictory states of affairs that may sometimes appear in fiction.

2.3 The Ontological Debate on Possible Worlds

Within Possible Worlds philosophical logic, although there is consensus on the assertion that the modal universe consists of the actual world and other possible worlds, the ontological status of these worlds is a highly-debated topic among philosophers. There are three very specific versions of the Possible Worlds model and each of these versions differs from the other based on the degree of realism ascribed to the modal status of possible worlds. The two views that are in direct opposition to each other are "modal realism" and "moderate realism" (Ronen, 1994: 21–22). A third view exists – an "anti-realist view" (Ronen, 1994: 23) – which goes completely against both modal realism and moderate realism.

According to modal realism and moderate realism, the actual world is perceived as physically existing and the distinction exists between those who regard possible worlds as physically existing (modal realism) and those who do not (moderate realism). Nolan (2002) distinguishes the two views based on how they are treated conceptually – those who consider possible worlds to be "concrete" (19) and those who think of them as being "abstract" (19; cf. Bell, 2010). The anti-realist view is Goodman's constructionist perspective that discards the idea of a physically existing world all together and considers all worlds, whether actual or possible, as products of mental constructions. Although Ronen (1994) acknowledges the anti-realist position, she rejects it because it disregards the actual world as a physically existing entity. She argues against this position on the basis that "a belief in possible worlds assumes the existence [...] of an actual world" (23). It is probably for this reason that most Possible Worlds theorists discount this position in their work but it is important that it is included in my thesis because I will be drawing on this position in later chapters. In the sections below I provide an overview of the three schools of thought as discussed above. While Ronen (1994) chooses to use the terms modal, moderate, and anti-realism, and theorists such as Nolan (2002) and Bell (2010) use the terms Abstractionist, Concretist, and Constructionist to refer to the different perspectives, for consistency in this thesis, following Ronen, I will be referring to the three views as: modal realism, moderate realism, and anti-realism.

2.3.1 Possible Worlds as Concrete Entities – Modal Realism

The modal realist theory proposed by Lewis (1973, 1983, 1986) considers the many possible worlds as having the same ontological status as the actual world, in that they materially exist in the same way that the actual world does. Lewis discards the idea that possible worlds are merely conceptual and instead believes that akin to the actual world they too are concrete entities. This is because, according to Lewis (1986, cf. 1973), every world is a possible world and our world is one of the many possible worlds. The basis for Lewis's assertion is his indexical theory of actuality which states that:

> Our actual world is only one world among others. We call it alone actual not because it differs in kind from all the rest but because it is the world we inhabit. The inhabitants of other worlds may truly call their own worlds actual, if they mean by 'actual' what we do; for the meaning we give to "actual" is such that it refers at any world i to that world i itself. "Actual" is indexical, like "I" or "here", or "now": it depends for its reference on the circumstances of utterance, to wit the world where the utterance is located (Lewis, 1973: 85–86).

Lewis objects to the view that the world that we live in is the only concrete actual world. According to him, the ontological status of all domains, actual or possible, is relative. This means that what accounts for being the actual world depends on the point of view of its inhabitants. So for instance, from the point of view of a possible world, that world is considered actual and our world is considered possible.

Lewis (1973) further clarifies that his theory of actuality is identical to the theory of time. He explains:

> My indexical theory of actuality actually mirrors a less controversial doctrine about time. Our present time is only time among others. We call it alone present not because it differs in kind from among the rest, but because it is the time we inhabit. The inhabitants of other times may truly call their own times 'present' (86).

Lewis here draws a comparison to our conceptualisation of time in order to explain his indexical theory of actuality. According to him, when we use the term 'present' to describe time, we say so because it differs from other periods of time in only one way – that is, it refers to that period in time that is occurring now. Similarly, a possible world differs from the actual world in only one way – that is, it is not our actual world, but someone else's actual world.

When Lewis claims that possible worlds exist in the same way that the actual world exists, he also means possible worlds are as real as the actual world, that is, they are physical entities that actually exist. Lewis (1973) states:

> When I profess realism about possible worlds, I mean to be taken literally. Possible worlds are what they are, and not some other thing. If asked what sort of thing they are, I cannot give the kind of reply my questioner probably expects: that is, a proposal to reduce possible worlds to something else. I can only ask him to admit that he knows what sort of thing our actual world is, and then explain that possible worlds are more

things of that sort, differing not in kind but only in what goes on at them (85).

Here, Lewis underlines the idea that possible worlds differ from the actual world, not in terms of their ontological status but only in its content. According to him, possible worlds cannot be reduced to anything else; they are as real as the actual world.

Ronen (1994) suggests that Lewis's interpretation of the ontological status of possible worlds "assist[s] us in grasping the ontological extravagance implied in his position" (22) because "for Lewis possible worlds are parallel worlds, autonomous 'foreign countries' with their own laws and an actuality of their own" (22). Ryan (1991) concurs with Ronen when she states that Lewis's indexical theory presupposes that "every possibility is realized in some world" (18). She also suggests that despite the fact that Lewis's indexical theory is "a convenient way of distinguishing between the actual and the possible, [...] for many philosophers the loss of the privileged ontological status of the actual world is too high a price to pay" (18). Ryan maintains that even though Lewis's indexical view of actuality expounds the difference between the actual and possible worlds clearly, many philosophers reject this position because adopting Lewis's view would necessitate that all worlds have the same ontological status and as such they all physically exist somewhere in our universe for us to access.

2.3.2 Possible Worlds as Abstract Entities – Moderate Realism

In contrast to Lewis's view, moderate realist philosophers such as Rescher (1973, 1975, 1979), Kripke (1963, 1972), Hintikka (1967, 1989), and Plantinga (1974,

1979, 2003) maintain that our actual world is the only domain that physically exists. All other worlds are possible worlds that come into being through mental processes such as imagining, storytelling, dreaming and so on. Therefore, according to this view, possible worlds are not like the actual world because they do not actually materially exist in our universe. Instead, they are ways that the world might have been or would be, if certain events had gone or go otherwise.

In direct opposition to Lewis (1986) whose modal realism subscribes to the notion that possible worlds are "something like remote planets" (2), Kripke (1972) states that:

> a possible world isn't a distant country that we are coming across, or viewing through a telescope [...] *A possible world is given by the descriptive conditions we associate with it* [...] Possible worlds are *stipulated*, not *discovered* (44, italics original).

Kripke here stresses that possible worlds are only conceptual; they are not worlds that exist out there for us to physically access. Instead, he argues that possible worlds according to moderate realists are abstract entities constructed in the form of hopes, wishes, and dreams and rely upon the actual world for their existence.

According to Kripke, possible worlds can also be viewed as counterfactual conditionals that are based on the actual world. For example: statements such

as 'what if I were a mathematician' or 'what if the Allies lost the Second World War?' Kripke (1972) states:

> What do we mean when we say 'In some other possible world I would not have given this lecture today?' We just imagine the situation where I didn't decide to give this lecture or decided to give it on some other day. Of course, we don't imagine everything that is true or false, but only those things relevant to my giving the lecture; but, in theory, everything needs to be decided to make a total description of the world. We can't really imagine that except in part; that, then, is a 'possible world' (44).

Kripke explains why possible worlds do not actually and physically exist. He draws on a counterfactual conditional to say that when we imagine such a counterfactual situation we situate it within a world but we do not imagine everything about that world. Instead, we imagine only those things that are relevant to that counterfactual conditional. In that case, such a world is surely a possible world because it is not complete; it only contains specific and relevant descriptions.

Rescher (1973) concurs with this view when he asserts that all possible worlds are not to be considered as physically existing entities but merely as constructs of the mind. He maintains that a possible world "exists in a relativised manner, as the objects of certain intellectual processes" (168) but the actual world can "unqualifiedly be said to exist" (168) which means that the actual world differs from the various possible worlds solely because it physically exists. Thus, this school of thought regards possible worlds as alternate states of affairs that are

conceived and/or proposed by the mind and so are not physically and/or
materially accessible.

Ronen (1994) believes that this ontological position is advantageous because
moderate realists are able to distinguish between actual and possible states of
affairs without having to submit to the "'extravagant' assumption that these
possibilities are literally 'out there'" (23). Unlike Lewis's position, this ontological
position explains how possible worlds differ from the actual world and adopting
this position does not commit us to the extreme notion that all worlds, whether
actual or possible are physically accessible.

2.3.3 A Third School of Thought – Anti-Realism

Another school of thought, one that is expressed by Goodman (1978, 1983,
1984), regards all worlds whether actual or possible as products of mental
constructions. According to Goodman, there is no objective actual world but
only subjective versions of the actual world. Goodman (1983) poses this view in
the following way:

> What we often mistake for the actual world is one particular description
> of it. And what we mistake for possible worlds are just equally true
> descriptions in other terms. We have come to think of the actual as one
> among many possible worlds. We need to repaint that picture. All
> possible worlds lie within the actual one (57).

Goodman implies that our perception of the actual world is limited and that for
all practical purposes an actual world is what each individual inhabitant

perceives the world in which they live to be. This implies that all perceptions of the world are in fact actual worlds. As Bell (2010) points out, Goodman "sees our system of reality as a collection of multiple Actual Worlds each constructed subjectively" (58). Furthermore, Goodman also holds the view that possible worlds are not independent entities and that they exist within the actual world. According to him, possible worlds are individual descriptions of the actual world in terms of what could have been. Goodman asserts that descriptions of possible worlds must be viewed as descriptions of the actual. Thus, both actual and possible worlds are individual descriptions of the actual world and the distinction lies in the content. While the actual world represents the description of the way the world in which we live is, a possible world represents the description of the way the actual world could be and/or could have been. Therefore, since Goodman considers both actual world(s) and possible worlds as conceptual constructions of the same ontological domain, he seemingly fuses them by placing them within the actual world. Goodman's constructionist perspective is crucial to the model that I am developing with which to analyse counterfactual historical fiction and for this purpose I will be revisiting this position in further detail in Chapter Three.

To sum up the three positions: the modal realist perspective proposes that the actual world and all other possible worlds are physically existing entities with the same ontological status; according to the moderate realists, the actual world exists objectively and all possible worlds are constructed by the mind, hence they exist only conceptually; the anti-realist position proposes that there is no single objective actual world but only many subjective actual worlds and therefore all worlds whether actual or possible are only constructs of the mind.

While each of these schools of thought has its distinct position, some of them partially agree on other ontological positions. For example, the modal and moderate realists agree that the actual world is a concrete entity; the moderate realists and the anti-realists believe that possible worlds are only conceptual and that they depend on the actual world for their existence.

The debate still remains unresolved but Bell (2010) notes that, in spite of all the different interpretations by theorists, "there is an intrinsic conceptual consistency amongst them" (51) in that "the modal system is comprised of the Actual World and other possible worlds" (51). The contrasting views on the ontological status of worlds show a need to be explicit about the ontological position any analysis will be based on. The need to be clear about which system I subscribe to is also important because the primary aim of this thesis is to use Possible Worlds Theory and its accompanying terminology to divide the text into domains of actual and possible. Before I account for my ontological position, however, it is important to survey the different literary applications of Possible Worlds Theory.

2.4 An Overview of the Literary Applications of Possible Worlds Theory

Ronen (1994) points out that within philosophical logic, the model of a possible world is significantly different from that exemplified in literary studies. She explains:

> For literary theorists, and other art-theorists who employ possible worlds to account for fictional universes, possible worlds are not presented as a

set of theoretical entities used to describe a hybrid of logical and linguistic phenomena. [...] Possible worlds [for literary theorists] are not theoretical terms but rather descriptive concepts that work with a descriptive poetics (74).

Ronen here explains the difference between possible worlds in philosophical logic and possible worlds in literary studies. She suggests that while logicians use possible worlds as a semantic device for analysing modal statements concerning what is possible and what is necessary, literary theorists use possible worlds to describe different states of affairs in fiction and the relationship between them. "In literary theories", writes Ronen (1994), "possible worlds are pregnant worlds that carry concrete ontological content and denote an ontological density epitomized in the idea of a 'world'" (74) underlining the notion that possible worlds created by fictional texts are furnished with individuals, objects, and situations.

Philosophers who adopted the concept of possible worlds to interpret modal logic also recognised its relevance to studying fiction. For example, Leibniz in his publication *On Freedom* states:

Nor can we really deny that many stories, especially those called novels, are thought to be possible, though they might find no place in this universal series God selected—unless one imagined that in such an expanse of space and time there are certain poetical regions, where you can see King Arthur of Great Britain, Amadis of Gaul, and the illustrious Dietrich von Bern of the German stories, all wandering through the world (2015 [1686]: 94).

Here, Leibniz refers to the worlds created by stories in novels and suggests that they may be categorised as possible worlds. Although Leibniz is quick to note that the worlds created by fictional texts may not be one among the possible worlds created by God, he does not deny that we could imagine such worlds as being a part of the universe. Lewis (1973) also uses his own previously discussed Possible Worlds framework, initially developed to analyse counterfactual conditions, to study fiction, by stating that the same criterion can be used to discern the truth value of statements in fiction as in reality. Adapting his framework to fit fiction, Lewis (1978) proposes his criterion for evaluating the truth value of fictional claims:

> A sentence of the form 'in the fiction f, p' is non vacuously true iff some world where f is told as known fact and p is true differs less from our actual world, on balance, than does any world where f is told as known fact and p is not true (42).

Lewis states that a statement about the fictional world that is not mentioned in the text can be deemed as true or false depending on how close or distant it is from the actual world. While Lewis offers a method of analysis, he does not show what a practical application of his criterion to study fiction would include. Ryan (2006) does use an example from *Madame Bovary* to demonstrate how Lewis's criterion can be applied to fiction in order to determine the truth value of statements about fiction that are not specified in the text: she states that an assertion such as "Emma Bovary was a devoted mother" is false in the world of *Madame Bovary* because "a society where her attitude toward her daughter is regarded as devotion would be further removed in its values from our cultural pocket of the actual world than a society in which she is considered a neglecting mother" (647). Lewis's approach described here, however, has not yet been

sufficiently applied and as such it has not been developed into a comprehensive analytical method within the context of literary analysis.

Ryan (1992), in her article titled 'Possible Worlds in Recent Literary Theory' surveys the application of Possible Worlds Theory in literary studies and classifies the research into four categories based on the areas in literary theory that it has been used in: 1. 'theory and semantics of fictionality'; 2. 'genre theory/typology of fictional worlds'; 3. 'narrative semantics, including theory of character'; and 4. 'poetics of postmodern' (528). Under the first category, Ryan includes applications of Possible Worlds Theory concerned with "the truth value of literary discourse" (531) and analysing fictional texts by constructing a modal universe within which to situate them. She cites Pavel (1975), (1986); Doležel, (1976), (1980); and Ryan (1991) as examples of work in this area, but Bell (2010) can also be added to this list. Ryan shows that the second area of application includes theorists such as Maitre (1983), and Traill (1991), who each construct a typology of texts based on "the distance from the AW [actual world] to [the] FW [fictional world]" (537). The distance between the two worlds depends on the extent to which fictional worlds can be seen as possible or probable in the actual world. Thus, a fictional world that is "governed by the same physical laws as [the] AW [actual world]" (538) is closer to the actual world in representation compared to fictional worlds that "encompass fairy tales [and] children's stories with talking animals" (538).

Ryan's third category comprises studies that focus on possible worlds created by the characters in a fictional text (for example, Vania, 1977) and those created

by the readers (for example, Eco, 1979). She states that Possible Worlds Theory applications in this area also include the study of different aspects of fictional characters such as their ontological status or their thematic function within a narrative (for example, Margolin, 1990). Ryan's final category focuses chiefly on postmodern fiction. According to Ryan, a postmodern fiction has the following six properties:

> 1. Commitment to a plural reality [...] 2. Thematization of the origins of possible worlds in mental processes and search for the elusive base of reality [...] 3. Entangling of diegetic levels and plays with boundaries [...] 4. Migration of characters through intertextual borrowing [...] 5. Systematic investigation of the realm of the possible and refusal to choose among conflicting alternatives [...] 6. Questioning of the relations between AW [Actual World] and FWs [fictional worlds] (Ryan, 1992: 549).

Here, Ryan refers to texts that predominantly foreground ontological boundaries. She cites McHale (1987) as an example, but other theorists such as Ashline (1995), Koskimaa (2000), and Bell (2010) have worked in this area since Ryan's (1992) article.

Ryan's categorisation of the different areas in which Possible Worlds Theory has been used is slightly problematic. This is because under her fourth category she includes a genre of fiction regardless of what type of application it may be used for whereas her first three categories are based on the type of application – whether Possible Worlds Theory is used to construct a modal universe or if it is used to analyse possible worlds constructed by readers in particular and so on. She thus sets out each type of Possible Worlds application to fiction as a distinct

category when each of them can be equally applied to her final category that includes only postmodern fiction. Indeed, Bell (2006) points out that presenting postmodern fiction as a separate category, "sets up an inaccurate binary between Possible Words Theory as applied to postmodern narrative and Possible Worlds Theory as applied to non-postmodern narrative" (81). Bell here explains how a Possible Worlds analysis of reader-constructed possible worlds in a non-postmodern fiction will fall under Ryan's 'narrative semantics, including theory of character' category and a Possible Worlds approach that may be used to analyse reader-constructed possible worlds in a postmodern text will be categorised under Ryan's 'Poetics of Postmodern'.

My thesis is mostly concerned with constructing a modal universe in order to semantically describe the different worlds created by a text and the method of analysis adopted within this thesis thus falls under Ryan's first category of 'theory and semantics of fictionality' in which a modal structure for the analysis of counterfactual historical fiction texts will be constructed. The following sections will critically examine the application of Possible Worlds Theory in literary studies and later narratology with regards to establishing a modal system to study fiction.

2.5 A Special Possible World – The Autonomous Status of Fictional Worlds

Doležel (1990) shows how one of the earliest attempts to study the fictionality of texts using Possible Worlds Theory can be seen in Breitinger's application of the theory to poems. However, Pavel (1975, cf. 1986) is the first theorist to

recognise the importance of Possible Worlds Theory to study narrative fiction and consequently develop the theory for this purpose in any detail. In his 1975 article 'Possible Worlds in Literary Semantics', he shows how previous research (for example, Lewis [1978] discussed in the previous section) is inadequate and restrictive for analysing fiction because it validates propositions from the text by comparing them to the actual world. Pavel (1975) identifies the need for a theory such as Possible Worlds Theory that judges propositions and determines the truth value of them only in terms of the world to which it belongs. Elaborating on this he introduces the concept of 'ontological perspective', which he describes as the set of new rules that a reader adopts in order to understand propositions in text that are impossible in the actual world. Pavel (1975) explains the concept using the example of Marlowe's *Doctor Faustus* and writes:

> the reader takes the work as a whole and [...] when evaluating Faustus's actions and chances of success, he does not consider the situation according to his usual ontological perspective, but reacts as if he has adopted a set of new rules under which some of the previously impossible [...] propositions have become entirely acceptable (175).

Pavel describes how readers understand propositions in the text by adopting a new ontological perspective thereby allowing them to evaluate those propositions in terms of the fictional world that they belong to. According to Pavel (1975), "each literary work contains its own ontological perspective [and] [i]n this precise sense one can say that literary worlds are autonomous" (175). This concept of ontological perspective is important because it highlights a feature that is specific to fictional worlds, that is the autonomous structure of fictional worlds. By viewing fictional worlds as separate from the actual world, Pavel not only places them outside the actual world but also grants them the

status of being independent entities and having their own physical and logical laws. Ryan (1992) additionally points out that "by placing fictional worlds at the centre of a modal system, where they remain in relation with other worlds, the literary semantics envisioned by Pavel avoids [...] reducing fictional worlds to the status of a mere satellite of the actual world" (531–532). Thus, rather than regarding fictional worlds as possible worlds that surround the actual world, Pavel grants them their own autonomy. The idea that fictional worlds have an autonomous structure needs to be elucidated further because this idea is central to the research within Possible Worlds Theory that is focussed on developing a modal system for the analysis of fictional texts and from which this thesis will draw. For this purpose, in the following section I will draw on Doležel's (1998) proposal that a fictional world is a specific type of possible world.

According to Doležel (1998), fictional worlds differ from possible worlds because:

> Fictional worlds of literature [...] are a special kind of possible world; they
> are aesthetic artefacts constructed, preserved, and circulating in the
> medium of fictional texts (16).

Doležel maintains that a fictional world is a possible word but emphasises that it is a *special* kind of possible world in that it is rich and complex compared to the possible worlds of logic. According to him, possible worlds in the form of hopes, wishes, and fears differ crucially from possible worlds created by fictional texts, because they are stored and preserved in the form of a text unlike the former that is created through the process of some temporary mental activity. Doležel

also identifies that unlike possible worlds of logic that are complete sets, fictional worlds may be incomplete and heterogeneous.

Ronen (1994) concurs with Doležel's idea that fictional worlds are a special kind of possible world when she acknowledges that fictional worlds can be differentiated from merely possible worlds based on "the logic of parallelism that guarantees their autonomy in relation to the actual world" (8). She explains that "a world of any ontological status contains a set of entities (objects and persons) organised and interrelated in specific ways (through situations, events, and space-time)" (8) and these worlds "whether possible, fictional, or actual, are hence distinguishable from one another" (8). According to her, "a fictional world is constructed as a world having its own distinct ontological position, and as a world presenting a self-sufficient system of structures and relations" (8). She adds that fictional worlds are also distinguishable from possible worlds because possible worlds, "despite being distinguishable worlds, do not share this ontological autonomy" (8). Crucially, Ronen points out that the reason behind the autonomous status given to fictional worlds is "the way fiction constitutes an independent *modal structure*" (8, italics original). She explains:

> Constructed as a parallel world, every fictional world includes a core of facts around which orbit sets of states of affairs of diminishing fictional actuality. The fictional modal structure manifests the parallelism of fictional ontologies indicating that fictional facts do not relate *what could have or could not have occurred in actuality, but rather what did occur and what could have occurred in fiction* (Ronen, 1994: 8–9; italics original).

Ronen here underlines the significance of fictional worlds as autonomous structures having the potential to project a modal universe that is similar to that of our actual world. She suggests that fictional worlds are in a way 'parallel' to the actual world when she states that "fictional worlds, unlike possible worlds, manifest a world model based on the notion of parallelism rather than ramification" (8). This is because just like our system of reality that has an actual world and its set of possible worlds, a fictional world too has an actual world and its many alternate possible worlds.

Narratologists have embraced and adopted this concept of autonomous fictional worlds to establish a modal structure of the fictional universe. Since the primary aim of my thesis is to split the worlds of a counterfactual historical fiction text into categories of actual and possible, in the following section I will explore specific research in which a modal system that can be applied to literary texts is developed.

2.6 Ontological Configurations of the Actual and Fictional Universe

In what is one of the first attempts to create a modal universe for fiction, Pavel in *Fictional Worlds* (1986 cf. 1975, 1979) focuses on the worlds created by a literary text. He applies the concept of Possible Worlds Theory to *Don Quixote* and states that:

> the events of the novel take place in two parallel sets of worlds. One set has as its actual world the characters and events given as real in the novel: the infatuation of a certain Alonso Quixana with chivalric stories,

his first escape, his adventures. A number of possible worlds are linked to the actual-in-the-novel world by usual relation of alternativeness. Such is, for instance the world in which the priest, the barber, the other of Quixana's friends manage to prevent him from escaping a second time. The second set of worlds is existentially creative [...] it blends the world actual in the novel and the worlds given as actual in the romances devoutly believed by Quixote (Pavel, 1986: 61).

Here, Pavel explains the structure of *Don Quixote* that has two sets of worlds, where one world as Pavel terms it, is the 'actual-in-the-novel' because this is the world that the characters in the text inhabit and consider actual. The second world Pavel recognises is one that is a mix of the actual world in *Don Quixote's* novel and the actual worlds of other romance novels read by Don Quixote de la Mancha. What Pavel refers to here are the sections included in the novel when Don Quixote imagines that he is living in a fantasy world. In addition, Pavel uses the term 'possible worlds' to describe the worlds that are alternative to the actual in the novel world and imagined by the characters in the text. The terminology invoked by Pavel (1986) shows potential but as Pavel identifies:

the notion of *world of the work of art* refers to a complex entity that needs careful logical and aesthetic disentangling: the worlds that mix together in texts may resemble the actual world, but they may be impossible or erratic worlds as well (62).

Here, Pavel writes in reference to the fantasy world created by *Don Quixote* and admits that such worlds may be presented in the text as being its actual world, but they are also usually inconsistent and/or impossible worlds. To illustrate using my own example from the same text, in the world of *Don Quixote*, when

Don Quixote visits an inn, he imagines it to be a castle and believes that the girl servant in the inn is a beautiful princess. In this case, while the castle and the princess are presented as being part of the novel's actual world, they are only Don Quixote's delusions. In addition to this, Pavel here recognises a novel's potential "to combine world-structures, play with the novel's impossibility, and incessantly speak about the unspeakable" (62). In doing so, Pavel also shows that his Possible Worlds modal universe is limited when applied across all types of fictions.

Building on Pavel's approach, Doležel (1979) provides a means of dividing a fictional text into its constituent ontological domains. According to Doležel, "every narrative text constructs its own narrative world" (196). He begins by broadly categorising the world of a text into 'extensional narrative world' and 'intensional narrative world'. According to him, the extensional narrative world consists of a primary narrative world that "can be defined as a set of compossible narrative agents" (196) (i.e., the characters that exist in the text) and a secondary narrative world that consists of the actants or interpretations associated with the fictional characters of the text (196). Thus, the extensional narrative world includes the characters that are described by the text and the actions and properties that are associated with these characters. Doležel uses the following example to elucidate his definition of extensional primary and secondary narrative worlds: "the actant 'villain' is embodied in the primary narrative worlds by such agents *as Baby Yaga, the sorcerer, the step-mother*, etc" (199; italics original). The intensional narrative world, according to Doležel, is characterised by fictional characters that are assigned "proper names" or "definite expression" (201) and thus when reading fiction, readers move from

the intensional, that is, from a character's proper name to the extensional world, where the proper name is given its properties.

To summarise, while on the one hand, the extensional narrative worlds consist of fictional characters and their actants created by the text, the intensional narrative worlds, on the other hand, consist of the descriptions or the proper names that are given to these characters. Thus, according to Doležel, the reader moves from the extensional narrative world where no action has taken place to the intensional narrative world where a more specific meaning is expressed by the text. Although Doležel's (1979) methodology helps us conceptualise the internal structure of the text, it does not offer a modal universe that includes our actual world. As discussed in Chapter One, the focus of my thesis is on the cognitive processes that readers go through when they read such fiction and one of these processes includes using the actual world to make sense of the counterfactual fictional world. For this purpose, it is crucial that a modal universe which accommodates our actual world and also one that reduces the text into categories of actual and possible is used to label the different ontological domains created and invoked by counterfactual historical fiction texts.

Like Pavel and Doležel, Eco (1984) also offers an approach that can be used to describe a text's internal configurations, but in his model he also includes a category of possible subworlds that a reader imagines. Eco disregards the idea that the semantic domain of a narrative is a single possible world. Instead he believes that it is "*a machine for producing possible worlds* (of the *fabula*, of the

character's *fabula*, and of the reader outside the *fabula*)" (246; italics original). According to Eco, the three different types of possible worlds created by texts are "the possible world W_N" (235) imagined by authors to create texts, "the possible subworlds W_{NC}" (235) imagined or wished for by the characters, and finally "the possible worlds W_R" (235) imagined or wished upon by readers.

In line with other Possible Worlds theorists, I agree with Eco's idea of the fictional world being more than a single possible world. However, like Doležel the modal universe that Eco offers to categorise the text does not include the actual world. Instead, he offers an approach that divides the text into different possible worlds. Moreover, his approach is unclear because the possible worlds imagined by the author and the possible worlds imagined by the reader belong to the same modal universe – i.e. the actual universe – whereas the worlds imagined by the characters belong to the universe described by the text. As such, he fuses two distinct ontological universes. Although Eco includes the role of readers which is an integral part of my thesis, he is interested in the possible worlds created by readers. My thesis, however, is concerned with the ways in which readers use the actual world to make sense of the worlds created by counterfactual historical fiction texts.

2.7 Ryan's (1991) Possible Worlds Model

In what is the most comprehensive and, as I will show, most appropriate Possible Worlds model, Ryan (1991) offers a thorough modal universe that not only divides the fictional text into its constituent domains, but also establishes its relationship with the actual world. As a basis for Ryan's (1991) modal system,

she develops Pavel's (1975) concept of ontological perspective as outlined above that suggests, according to Ryan (1992), "that a text establishes a 'new actual world'" (535). She asserts that fictional texts project universes much like our modal system because they have the ability to present a universe that has an actual world at the centre surrounded by multiple alternate possible worlds that are imagined by the characters of that world.

Based on this idea that the universe projected by fictional texts resemble the actual universe, Ryan (1991) proposes a modal universe that comprises "three modal systems [the actual universe, the textual universe, and the referential universe], centred around three distinct actual worlds" (24). According to Ryan, the first modal system is our system and "its central world is the actually actual world (or more simply, the actual world)" (24). The actual world, according to Ryan, is the world that she inhabits; "the sender (author) of a text is always located in AW [actual world]" (24). Alternate possible worlds according to Ryan belong to the same ontological universe as the actual world and these worlds are possible worlds that are created in imagination by inhabitants of the actual world, that is, you and I. The second system – 'the textual universe', explains Ryan, is "the sum of worlds projected by a text" and "at the centre of this system is the textual actual world" (24). The textual actual world then is the actual world of the text. In the same way, Ryan uses the term 'textual alternate possible world' to categorise the different possible worlds imagined, wished upon, or hoped for by the characters of a fictional text. The prefix 'textual' that she attaches to the possible worlds originating in the text makes it easy to situate them as separate from the possible worlds that might be imagined by readers.

She introduces a third system, which she calls the 'referential universe', and this is the system that the textual universe represents. As stated in Ryan (1991), "just as the textual universe is offered as an image of the referential universe, the textual actual world is proposed as an accurate representation of an entity external to itself, the textual reference world" (24). Thus, according to Ryan, there are three modal systems, each having at its centre an actual world: the actual world is at the centre of our actual universe, the textual actual world is at the centre of the textual universe, and the textual reference world is at the centre of the referential universe.

Explicitly labelling the different worlds with the terms, 'actual', 'textual actual', and 'textual reference' is appealing because it does not cause any kind of confusion in terms of identifying the modal system to which they belong. Ryan's (1991) terminology is also thorough because, as Bell (2010) points out, "the textual universe that Ryan presents, though ontologically distinct from our system of reality, has a very similar configuration" (24) and in doing so, her terminology reflects "the similarity and differences between the two systems" (24).

In this section, I will further explain the third model system that Ryan (1991) offers – the referential universe – as this system is not as straightforward or self-explanatory as the other two systems. According to the definition provided by Ryan, the textual reference world is "the world for which the text claims facts;

the world in which propositions asserted by the text are to be valued" (vii), implying that this is the world from which the text gathers facts and somehow precedes the textual actual world. Ryan asserts that a textual reference world "does not exist independently of its representation" (26) therefore making "TAW [textual actual world] and TRW [textual reference world] largely interchangeable when discussing fiction" (26). Bell (2010) uses this assertion as a basis to show why a textual reference world is irrelevant within the context of most fiction. She explains that in most fiction "the textual reference world is rendered redundant" (24) because we have no access to the textual reference world, as a consequence of which "in the textual universe we can never know whether the descriptions of a textual reference world verify or contradict its actual status because it does not actually exist" (24).

Consequently, Bell's modal universe, although based on Ryan's modal universe, only consists of two modal systems – the actual universe and the textual universe. She uses the term 'actual world' to refer to the domain that is at the centre of our universe. "In the context of literary analysis", writes Bell "it is the domain to which the reader belongs" (25). Taking influence from the abstractionist perspective, she refers to the alternative worlds created by dreams, wishes, fears, and so on using the term 'possible worlds'. Like Ryan (1991), Bell (2010) uses the prefix 'textual' to define worlds originating in the text. According to Bell the 'textual actual world' is "a particular type of possible world which is described and thereby created by the text" (25). The characters of a text belong to this domain and like the actual world, the textual actual world is at the centre of the textual universe. On the other hand, she states that 'textual possible worlds' are "generated by characters' mental processes such as wishes,

dreams or imaginings and therefore constitute possible alternates to the actual course of events" (25). The textual actual world and the many textual possible worlds belong to a modal system known as the textual universe.

Although Bell (2010) acknowledges that "for the purpose of methodological completeness, the textual universe can be notionally conceptualised as comprising a textual reference world, a textual actual world and alternate textual possible worlds" (24), she does not include Ryan's third system – the referential universe – in her analysis of hypertext fiction because "in the context of analysing fictional narratives, the first two categories are conflated and a textual universe of fiction comprises a textual actual world and alternate textual possible worlds only" (Bell, 2010: 24–25). Thus, according to Bell, within the context of most fiction, excluding those that present multiple narrators and unreliable narrators, a textual reference world and a textual actual world do not exist separately and hence, a textual reference world is unnecessary.

Differing from views that a textual reference world is not relevant within fictional texts, Charles (1995) and Cover (2010) show how Ryan's (1991) category of textual reference world can be used to analyse all types of fiction. In the following section, I will provide an overview of how a textual reference world is interpreted within the context of fiction in order to make clear how it will be used within the parameters of this thesis.

Charles (1995) uses Ryan's (1991) model to study Gilbert Sorrentino's *Mulligan Stew* and describes the textual reference world as being "postulated by the reader to preexist textual stipulation" (235). Charles explains:

> The reference world is what we have in mind when we speak of traditional fictional characters as if they were ontologically complete persons with selfhood and destiny. In this world we routinely fill in gaps in description and consider psychological motivation for characters' actions [...] The reference world includes all truths activated textually, including not only those directly asserted and those logically inferred but also those not in any sense told: that is, the vast number of untold facts that contribute to the imagining of an ontologically complete world (1995: 236).

Charles' explanation here relates to what we know about a reader's interaction and engagement with fictional texts. While reading a text, readers are forced to routinely fill in the gaps in knowledge because the text does not supply all the information (for a detailed discussion of the process of gap-filling see Iser, 1974, 1978; Sternberg, 1985: 186; Hochman, 1985: 36). Thus, according to Charles (1995), the information that readers bring to the textual actual world, which is not stated in the text, actually belongs to the textual reference world. Charles' interpretation is true, in the sense that readers often fill in the gaps in knowledge by, in the words of Sanford and Emmott (2012), "relating what is being read to a situation that the reader knows something about already" (5–6). However, Charles' concept is vague and problematic because we do not know what information exists in the textual reference world. Besides, all readings are never the same because every reader comprehends a narrative differently implying that there can be multiple textual reference worlds depending on the

reading. Therefore, it does not wholly fit Ryan's (1991) definition of a textual reference world because according to Ryan, the textual reference world is a single domain. Ryan states that the "TRW [textual reference world] is the centre of a system of reality comprising APWs [alternate possible worlds]" (Ryan, 1991: vii) implying that it is a singular domain.

In a more successful interpretation, Jennifer Grouling Cover, in her book *The Creation of Narrative in Table-top Role Playing Games* (2010), uses Possible Worlds Theory, especially Ryan's (1991) typology, to label the different worlds created during the course of playing a table-top role playing game. Cover explains:

> The TRW [textual reference world] and the TAW [textual actual world] come into being with the creation of the text. The author refers to the TRW but controls our view of that world by presenting only pieces of it in the TAW. Thus, a narrative structure involves only a selection of a possible world rather than the entire thing – a view into a world that the author allows us to see (2010: 91–92).

Cover, here, presents a distinction between the textual reference world and the textual actual world. According to her, the author regulates our view of the textual reference world by presenting to us in the textual actual world only information that is relevant. This suggests that the textual reference world is somehow an entity bigger than the textual actual world. Unlike Charles (1995) who conceives the textual reference world "as a reader construct, created through shared, interpersonal, and recognizable reading operations" (236), Cover points out that it is the text that creates the textual actual world and the

textual reference world. This also means that the textual reference world is postulated to be inferred by the reader only via the textual actual world because as such we do not have direct access to the referential universe.

The preceding discussion demonstrates that the term 'textual reference world' has been interpreted somewhat differently by researchers. Yet, what is consistent in each definition is that the textual reference world is presumed to exist autonomously somewhere for the narrator to present events from. In my thesis, I argue that the textual actual world and the textual reference world are not always interchangeable in fiction. Furthermore, in line with Ryan's definition I maintain that the textual reference world exists outside the textual universe in its own system – the referential system. In the fifth chapter, I will explain how a textual reference world is useful in describing the narrative structure of texts that include more than one textual actual world, specifically through unreliable narration.

Returning to Ryan's (1991) textual universe and her modal system of the textual universe, in her discussion specifically of the textual actual world, Ryan focuses on the problem of authentication in the case of a personal narration. She states, "a personal narrator is a mind interposed between the facts and the reader, and the discourse reflects the contents of his or her mind" (113). She contrasts this with impersonal narration where the "speaker has absolute authority" (113) and their discourse is what makes up the textual actual world (113). What Ryan highlights here is the problem that readers face in terms of judging from a narrator's assertions of what is true and what is not. This is because a reader

only observes the textual actual world through the subjective lens of the narrator. Drawing on an example from *One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest* (1962), she describes how readers are faced with the task of discerning what among the unreliable narrator's assertions are facts and what are solely his hallucinations. Ryan (1991) declares:

> the existence of unreliable narrators in fiction demonstrates a possible gap between the world projected by the narrator's declarations (what could be called narratorial actual world, or NAW) and the facts of the TAW [textual actual world] (113).

Ryan introduces a new category within the textual universe, which she calls the narratorial actual world. According to Ryan, a narratorial actual world is "what the narrator presents as fact of TRW [the textual reference world]" (vii). She also affirms that "in fiction told by an unreliable narrator" the narratorial actual world is not equivalent to the textual actual world (viii). Therefore, a narratorial actual world is the narrator's personal and somewhat inaccurate view of the textual actual world that is presented to the reader. As hitherto mentioned, I will be examining how multiple textual actual worlds are constructed by texts through unreliable narration in a later chapter. More specifically in Chapter Five, I will revisit Ryan's narratorial actual world to show how this concept raises issues when applied to certain counterfactual historical fiction texts that complicate a reader's construction of a textual actual world by presenting an unreliable narrator.

Furthermore, in her modal system of the textual universe, in addition to the textual actual world, narratorial actual world, and alternate possible worlds, Ryan

further distinguishes between three worlds: authentic worlds, pretended worlds, and F-universes. Under her first category of authentic worlds, Ryan includes K-worlds or belief/knowledge worlds, O-worlds or obligation worlds, and W-worlds or wish worlds. She categorises them as authentic worlds because according to Ryan the propositions in the text that create these worlds are sincere. Ryan (1991) asserts that the meaning of the operator of knowledge is straightforward – "a character 'knows' a proposition p, when he or she holds it for true in the reference worlds and p is objectively true in this world" (115). Thus, propositions about the textual actual world that the character knows and holds to be true belong to the character's knowledge world or K-world. K-worlds are significant to my thesis and in particular to the first part of the model that I develop to map how readers process texts. For this reason, I will return to Ryan's concept of K-worlds in more detail in Chapter Three, building on it to show its relevance within the context of counterfactual historical fiction texts specifically.

An obligation world or O-World, according to Ryan, is defined as "a system of commitments and prohibitions defined by social rules and moral principles" (116). These rules can then be used to classify propositions in the text as allowed (possible), obligatory (necessary), or prohibited (impossible). An O-world of a character in the textual actual world is satisfied "if all the obligations have been fulfilled and none of the interdictions transgressed" (116). That is, if a character is able to carry out all their obligations, whilst also ensuring that none of their transgressions are realised in the text, then the character's O-World is considered satisfied. Finally, a wish world as Ryan suggests is one that includes a character's desire. She claims that with this world, it is possible to establish a

character's desire using axiological premises such as being good or bad. A character's W-world is satisfied in the textual actual world, if all their W-worlds that are labelled as good are true in the textual actual world. Conversely, the non-satisfaction of W-worlds may lead to conflicts within the textual actual world.

In contrast to authentic worlds, Ryan's second category of 'pretended worlds' is those private worlds of characters that are not sincere. Instead, they are forged by a character with the intention of deceiving others. Ryan states that in this way, "the complete semantic description of a character's domain thus includes authentic and inauthentic constructs – beliefs and mock beliefs, desires and mock desires, true and faked obligations, as well as genuine and pretended intents" (118). Ryan here explains how a character's world within a text comprises honest beliefs, obligations, and wishes along with their insincere variants.

Lastly, the F-universe or fantasy universe includes a character's mental constructions such as dreams, hallucinations, or fictional stories. Unlike her first and second category above, she uses the suffix 'universe' for this category. This is because Ryan does not consider these mental constructions as textual possible worlds that are satellites to the textual actual world. Instead, for her, these are complete universes that have their own actual world – the actual F-world that is inhabited by characters and situations – created by a character in the textual actual world. The rationale here is that when characters in a text construct a fantasy universe in the form of a dream, they populate the dream

with its own inhabitants and events. The world of the dream then becomes the actual world for its inhabitants. These inhabitants then also have their set of beliefs, obligations, and desires. In this sense, Ryan suggests that a dream has the potential to project a whole universe much like a textual universe.

Having established her modal universe in full, Ryan engages with the debate on the ontological status of possible worlds, and instead of choosing between the conflicting ontological positions, she puts forth a different perspective:

> Of Rescher's [moderate realist] and Lewis's [modal realist] contrasting views of the nature of possible worlds, which one is the most promising for a theory of fiction? Rescher's position invites us to regard the universe of a fictional text as a possible world created by a mental act. Like all types of merely possible worlds, fictional worlds lack autonomy, reality, and actuality [...] Rescher's position may account for what we know objectively about fictional worlds, but the indexical theory of David Lewis offers a much more accurate explanation of the way we relate to these worlds. Once we become immersed in a fiction, the characters become real for us, and the world they live in momentarily takes the place of the actual world (Ryan, 1991: 21).

Acknowledging the divide between the modal realism and the moderate realism, Ryan here tries to explain the significance of choosing either position for literary analysis. Ryan points out that the moderate realist perspective justifies what we as readers know about the nature of fictional worlds, i.e., we

cannot physically access fictional worlds but Lewis's modal realist perspective elucidates the manner in which we make sense of and identify with these worlds. Moreover, Ryan notes that as readers of fiction, we often get absorbed in the new world presented in the text, that is, for the duration of reading, readers are drawn into these worlds cognitively.

According to Ryan, an ontological position that acknowledges the moderate realist perspective whilst incorporating Lewis's indexical theory of actuality for narratological applications of Possible Worlds Theory helps us to accept that an actual world lies at the centre of a fictional universe. This is because Lewis's indexical theory shows us that while fictional worlds may be non-actualised states of affairs from the point of view of our actual world, from the point of view of a fictional world, to their inhabitants, that world is the actual world.

In order to support her ontological position as outlined above, Ryan develops the concept of "fictional recentering" (21–23). She combines Lewis's view that all worlds exist in the same way that the actual world does and Reschers' position, which asserts that the actual world is the only physically existing world, to offer her theory of recentering. In addition, she also develops "a law of primary importance for the phenomenology of reading" (51) which she calls the principle of minimal departure. These two cognitive concepts that Ryan develops are significant to my thesis because they explain how readers experience fictional worlds. In the next section, I will discuss the two concepts to show how they support Possible Worlds Theory in its application to fiction.

2.7.1 Fictional Recentering

As we have seen above, according to Ryan (1991), "once we become immersed in fiction, the characters become real for us, and the world they live in momentarily takes the place of the actual world" (21). In order to account for the manner in which readers engage with fiction and relate to the worlds created by them, Ryan offers the concept of fictional recentering. Fictional recentering, according to Ryan, is a cognitive activity that readers experience while reading a fictional text that allows them to relocate mentally to the ontological domains created by the text. "As a traveler to this system", explains Ryan, "the reader discovers not only a new Actual World, but a variety of APWs (alternate possible worlds) revolving around it" (22). Ryan uses the metaphor of a traveler to suggest that a reader moves from the actual world to a textual actual world and, for that moment, accepts the textual actual world as though it were the reader's actual world. Ryan claims that fictional characters also go through this process of recentering. In same way that we recenter from our actual world to the textual actual world, fictional characters too, recenter from their actual world (the textual actual world) to their possible world(s) (the associated textual possible world(s)). This recentering takes place when fictional characters construct alternate possible worlds in the form of hopes, wishes, dreams, and fears. When fictional characters "recenter their universe into what is for them a second-order" (22) that is, their alternate possible world, we as readers move from our second system – the textual actual world – to our third system of reality – the textual alternate possible world. Fictional recentering is thus the process of cognitively entering the fictional world, in the words of Ryan, whilst behaving as though "the actual world of the textual universe were *the* actual world" (23, italics original).

Although Ryan here suggests that readers recenter when they are immersed in fiction, according to her 2010 article 'Fiction, Cognition, and Non-Verbal Media', she asserts that "while recentering is a logical operation which we deliberately perform whenever we read (or watch) a work of fiction, immersion is an experience created by artistic devices" (5). Fictional recentering, for Ryan, is thus a conscious cognitive process and consequently can be achieved even when immersion does not take place.

To summarise, the notion of recentering proposes that while reading fiction, readers relocate into the textual actual world. This is a temporary shift and thus Ryan is able to maintain Rescher's view that there is only one actual world whilst also accommodating Lewis's view that every possible world is real by allowing readers to have temporary actual worlds for the duration of reading fiction. Therefore, in the words of Bell (2010), Ryan's theory of recentering is effective because it is "able to accurately model fictional communication, maintain loyalty to the ontological status of the participants and ensure that the ontological tenets of Possible Worlds Theory are maintained" (32).

2.7.2 Principle of Minimal Departure

As previously discussed, Possible Worlds narratologists maintain that fictional texts have the ability to project universes that are much like our actual universe. Every text has its actual world, its inhabitants, and situations. As Ryan asserts with her concept of fictional recentering, for the duration of reading a fictional text, readers cognitively relocate into the textual actual world. From this, Ryan

proposes the principle of minimal departure which suggests that while reading a fictional text, readers makes sense of the textual actual world based on what they know about the actual world. She states that:

> we reconstrue the central world of a textual universe in the same way we reconstrue the alternate possible worlds of nonfactual statements: as conforming as far as possible to our representation of AW [actual world]. We will project upon these worlds everything we know about reality, and we will make only the adjustments dictated by the text (51).

Therefore, according to Ryan, when we read fiction, we use our knowledge and experience of the actual world in order to construct the textual actual world. That is, we imagine the textual actual world as similar as possible to the actual world and only make changes when specified by the text. To use Ryan's example: when a text presents a horse that has wings and can fly, we imagine a horse as we know it in the actual world and the only change we make to this image is that of the horse having wings and being able to fly.

Recall that in Possible Worlds logic as discussed previously, propositions about a possible world are judged in terms of the world that it belongs to, while Ryan's principle of minimal departure suggests that "our knowledge of reality is put to [...] use in the valuation of statements of fact about fiction" (51). Ryan clarifies that this is because a possible world in philosophy "is a complete state of affairs in which every conceivable proposition is either true or false" (532). However, according to Ryan, this poses a problem when applied to fiction because "a fictional text is notoriously incomplete in its specification of details" (532). As readers of any fictional text, we know that we do not receive all the information

about the textual actual world. Assuming that the textual actual world is constructed as having the same properties of the actual world, readers are able to fill in the gaps in knowledge by making inferences based on their understanding of the actual world. As Bell (2006) highlights, fictional texts can be given the liberty to avoid revealing every single detail as the principle of minimal departure explains the process that readers go through when they try to interpret a textual actual world that is lacking in detail. Moreover, she also states that according to the principle of minimal departure, "propositions that are necessarily true or possibly true in the Actual World are, unless otherwise stated, necessarily true or possibly true in the Textual Actual World" (71). This means that, for example, statements such as 'All elephants have trunks' are assumed to be true in the textual actual world unless the text specifies otherwise.

Ryan's principle of minimal departure is crucial to the methodology that I am developing because it theorises the cognitive processes that readers go through when they read fiction. This is because the principle of minimal departure explains how readers use their knowledge of the actual world in order to imagine the textual actual world. While Ryan's concept is valid and integral to my model, it needs to be developed further before it can be applied to counterfactual historical fiction to show how readers process these texts. The reason for this is that while the principle of minimal departure is useful for explaining how readers project on to textual actual worlds whatever they know about the actual world, it does not further theorise how different readers with their different levels of knowledge differ in terms of what they project. For example, consider the description 'A Flying Joker'; how readers imagine this

would depend on what sets of knowledge and expectation they draw on from the actual world. The following images show some possible outcomes:

Reader A   Reader B   Reader C   Reader D

Shaw, 2014; Superhero Time, 2016; Superhero Kids Rhymes, 2016

Figure 2.1 Varied mental images of 'A Flying Joker' based on varying reader knowledge and expectation

Figure 2.1 is a visual representation of some of the possible mental images that may be invoked in the mind of the reader depending on the kind of knowledge and expectations that they bring to the phrase 'A Flying Joker'. This figure illustrates four Readers, A, B, C and D as having imagined a distinct visualisation. As shown, while Reader A and Reader B imagine the Joker from Nolan's *Dark Knight* series, the former imagines him in the form of a drone that can be flown using a remote controller and the latter as a superhero with Superman's power to fly. Reader C imagines a different version of the Joker from Batman with wings to accommodate his ability to fly. Reader D on the other hand, imagines the Joker on a set of playing cards flying across the room as a result of someone throwing the cards. Here, different sets of knowledge lead to different ways of making sense of statements. In Chapters Three and Four of my thesis, I will demonstrate how the concept of readers having different levels of knowledge is relevant and important within the context of analysing counterfactual historical

fiction. Consequently, in these chapters I will develop a model that builds on Ryan's concept of the principle of minimal departure in order to more accurately theorise how readers use their knowledge of the actual world to process counterfactual historical fiction texts.

2.8 Counterpart Theory and Transworld Identity

Within Possible Worlds Theory, two integral concepts namely counterpart theory and transworld identity are used to define and describe the process through which individuals exist in the actual world as well as appear across other possible worlds. According to counterpart theory and transworld identity, all actual world inhabitants are considered actual, that is, you and I are actual and the distinction lies in the ontological status of possible individuals. As a result, there are two distinct sets associated terminology to label actual world historical figures that appear in texts.

These concepts are crucial within the context of analysing counterfactual historical fiction because a typical feature of such texts is to populate their textual actual worlds with actual world historical figures. For example, a counterfactual historical fiction such as *Fatherland* (1992) that explores the premise 'what if Adolf Hitler had won the war?' includes prominent actual world historical individuals from the Second World War such as Adolf Hitler, Reinhard Heydrich, and Heinrich Himmler. Counterpart theory and transworld identity are therefore fundamental to my argument. However, within Possible Worlds Theory a discursive and conceptual disparity exist between these concepts and for this

purpose I will critically examine both concepts in detail before offering a new approach in Chapter Four when I develop my model further.

2.9 Logical Contradictions in Fiction

In order to successfully apply Possible Worlds Theory to fiction, it is necessary to address the restrictions imposed on possible worlds within logic. Leibniz (2012 [1699]) argues that "possible things are those which do not imply a contradiction" (513) suggesting that worlds that include contradictions cannot be classified as possible worlds. In the beginning of this chapter, I stated that within philosophical logic a world was considered possible if and only if there are no contradictions, that is, if it adhered to both laws of logic (see section 2.2). In contrast, a world that has contradictions is considered an impossible world. This tenet poses a problem when the theory is applied to fiction primarily because, in the words of Ashline (1995), "in fiction, anything is possible" (215).

Within logic there is no place for contradictory states to exist within a given world. However, narratologists have dealt with this somewhat differently in order to accommodate the notion that, in the words of Ashline (1995), "the logically impossible is a salient feature in the fictional universe of many works in recent literature" (216). For example, Pavel (1986) suggests modifying Possible Worlds Theory in order to accommodate contradictory states of affairs that are often found in textual actual worlds. He writes:

> If, on the one hand, technically impeccable possible worlds are too
> narrowly defined to provide for a model in the theory of fiction, on the

other hand the notion of the world as an ontological metaphor for fiction remains too appealing to be dismissed. An attempt should be made at relaxing and qualifying this crucial notion (Pavel, 1986: 50).

Pavel claims that although current Possible Worlds logic does not accommodate logical contradictions in fiction, the metaphorical language that it offers is too useful to be rejected altogether. Consequently, he recommends revising the model. Eco (1989) proposes a possible solution that accounts for logical inconsistencies in fictional texts. He suggests that when fictional worlds present impossible properties, they should be considered as "properties [that] are simply mentioned, as it happens with the magic operators in fairy tales" (353). He adds, "an impossible PW [possible world] does not mention something unconceivable, it builds up the very conditions of its own unconceivabilities" (353). Eco here suggests that we negate the laws of logic, a tenet that is the fundamental principle of the concept of possible worlds, by discarding it entirely.

Similarly, Doležel (1989) acknowledges Possible Worlds Theory's incompatibility with logical contradictions or impossible worlds in fiction but for Doležel the problem is with these fictions rather than with the theory. He states that:

> The set of fictional worlds is unlimited and maximally varied. If fictional worlds are interpreted as possible worlds, literature is not restricted to the imitations of the actual world [...] To be sure, possible-worlds semantics does not exclude from its scope fictional worlds similar or analogous to the actual world; at the same time, it includes without difficulty the most fantastic worlds, far removed from, or contradictory to,

"reality" [...] It is well-known that Leibnitz imposed a restriction on possible worlds, but this restriction is purely logical: Possible worlds have to be free of contradictions [...] Do we have to accept this restriction into fictional semantics? (Doležel, 1989: 231).

Here, Doležel explains that Possible Worlds Theory is capable of interpreting fictional worlds that are identical to the actual world as well as ones that are alien or counterfactual to the actual world. Yet, it is incapable of interpreting logically impossible worlds. Furthermore, he suggests that impossible worlds or contradictions occur in self-voiding narratives because while such narratives construct impossible worlds, they do not authenticate them. This means that worlds are impossible only because, "it is impossible to decide what exists and what does not exist" (238). Doležel offers a means of comprehending contradictions within fiction, but he insists that impossible worlds are "semantically, a step backward in fiction making; it voids the transformation of nonexistent possibles into fictional entities and thus cancels the entire world-making project" (165). Here, Doležel declares that impossible fictions invalidate the process of world building by presenting contradictory states of affairs.

Ronen (1994) opposes Doležel's argument and states that "the coherence of fictional worlds does not collapse when a world of the fictional type contains inconsistencies or impossibilities" (91). To support her view, she highlights the manner in which readers are able to comprehend fictional worlds in spite of their internal inconsistencies. Like Ronen, Bell (2010) too asserts that "texts do produce unusual ontological structures and logically impossible scenarios, which

although impossible in the Actual World, can be processed by the reader" (48).

Alber (2016) concurs with this view that impossible narratives or what he calls

'unnatural narratives' are not violations and instead asserts that they have

interpretative potential. In order to substantiate his position, in addition to

concepts such as Ryan's (1991) principle of minimal departure and Pavel's (1975)

ontological perspective, as discussed previously in this chapter, Alber devises

eight other reading strategies that can be used by readers to make sense of

impossible worlds specifically, thereby reinforcing Ronen's and Bell's view that

impossible fictions are not necessarily difficult to process (For a full list of these

reading strategies, see Alber, 2016).

In an attempt at revising Possible Worlds Theory to accommodate logical

impossibilities within fiction, Ronen (1994) provides a means of dividing the

worlds of texts that posit logically inconsistent events. She writes:

> Since possible worlds represent states of affairs as ontic spheres,
>
> impossibilities can be neutralised relative to different spheres (one
>
> proposition does not contradict another – each is valid in another
>
> subworld); and indeterminacies (p and ~p) can be made valid when each
>
> interpretation of an indeterminate proposition obtains a different ontic
>
> sphere (55).

What Ronen suggests here seems useful because instead of dismissing

impossibilities, they can now be assigned to a separate sub-world thus

validating all inconsistencies posited by a text. Thus, the textual universe

contains a logically consistent textual actual world and many sub-worlds rather

than comprising an illogical textual actual world. However, Bell (2010) argues

that "while Ronen's approach stretches the potential constraints of Possible Worlds Theory by rectifying logical inconsistencies [...] it misrepresents the text as well as the reader's experience" (49). This is because by isolating every contradiction in the text to a different world implies that a reader treats every logical inconsistency within the text as a separate narrative thereby "forgetting the one when others are found" (49–50). As an alternative, Bell suggests amending Possible Worlds such that contradictions be allowed to exist within the same textual actual world thereby necessitating that one of the laws of logic be violated. She explains that violating the Law of Non-Contradiction suggests that an event occurs and does not occur simultaneously, but this poses "a challenge to our own logic because this is something that is impossible in the Actual World" (50). On the other hand, "a violation of the Law of the Excluded Middle means it is impossible to establish whether something has happened or not" (50). This according to Bell, is beneficial "because it represents the inability to choose between the alternatives that are offered" (51) making it "congruous with our experience in the Actual World" (51). As she reasons, "if Possible Worlds Theory is to become a comprehensive theoretical approach which can encompass all types of text, some of its logical axioms may have to be relaxed" (51). Bell's solution is advantageous because by viewing all contradictory statements within the text as existing with the same textual actual world, she accurately represents the text that present these inconsistencies as part of the same world. Furthermore, it also accurately reflects a reader's experience of such texts. That is, when a reader is faced with two contradictory propositions in a text, for example, Schrödinger's cat is alive and Schrödinger's cat is dead, the reader is less likely to assume that both statements are true simultaneously and more likely to be faced with the challenge of deciphering which of these statements is true.

The preceding discussion has shown how narratologists have developed Possible Worlds Theory for its application to fiction. In particular, I have shown how they have developed a modal structure of fictional universes. I have concluded that Ryan (1991) offers the most comprehensive model by establishing a modal universe with appropriate terminology and by also providing other cognitive concepts that are useful to explain how readers engage with texts. However, I have also shown how some aspects of Ryan's model are not fully developed yet and this is the issue that my thesis aims to rectify. The next section outlines the Possible Worlds terminology that I will be using throughout of my thesis for the purpose of literary analysis.

2.10 Possible World Terminology

This thesis applies Possible Worlds Theory to three counterfactual historical fiction texts for the purpose of dividing the text into its constituent domains and mapping the processes that readers go through when they read such fiction. In order to do this, it is important to first establish a modal universe with consistent terminology that can be used to label and describe the different worlds created by the text.

Following Ryan (1991) and Bell (2010), throughout this thesis, the following terms will be used:

Actual World – This is the system that exists physically. It is the world from which a counterfactual historical fiction text chooses events to alter. It is the world to which I belong and I consider this as a concrete domain.

Possible Worlds – These are the alternate worlds imagined by inhabitants of the actual world in the form of hopes, wishes, dreams, fears, and so on. Possible worlds, in my view, are as the moderate and anti-realists advocate, products of mental constructions rather than materially existing worlds.

Actual Universe – This comprises the actual world and the associated possible worlds.

Textual Actual World – This is the actual world created by any fictional text. It is the world to which the characters of the text belong.

Textual Possible Worlds – These are possible worlds imagined by the characters of an associated textual actual world in the form of hopes, wishes, dreams, and fears.

The Textual Universe – This comprises the textual actual world(s) and its associated textual possible worlds.

Textual Reference World – This is the autonomously existing world that contains all the information about the textual actual world, and upon which the textual actual world is based. This system is inferred by the reader and precedes the textual actual world and exists within the referential universe.

Referential Universe – This is the system that contains the textual reference world(s). Every textual actual world has its own textual reference world.

Although a modal universe with accompanying terminology has been established, as I will show in Chapter Three, it is still lacking in terms of defining all the ontological domains that come into play when a reader reads a

counterfactual historical fiction text. In the following chapters, I will address this by developing a comprehensive modal system that can be used to effectively describe and analyse all the ontological domains that are invoked and created by counterfactual historical fiction texts.

2.11 Possible Worlds Theory and Counterfactual Historical Fiction: Applicability and the Principle Aim of this Thesis

As the overview of Possible Worlds Theory within narratology has shown, one of the key tenets of Possible Worlds Theory is that a fictional world can be perceived as a specific type of possible world because of its autonomy that is much like the actual universe. As discussed in Chapter One, counterfactual historical fiction texts evidently use our actual world as their epistemological template but alter a few crucial events from our history to make it counterfactual. By doing so, the text essentially creates a possible world where certain events might have turned out differently. In this way, a counterfactual historical fiction text is epistemologically linked to the world that we inhabit and it is for this reason that I argue that it can be best understood with an ontologically centered theory, that is, Possible Worlds Theory.

Possible Worlds Theory is effective as a methodology because it can be used to divide the ontological universe of the text into constituent worlds; characterise the worlds of the text into different actual, reference, and possible worlds; and determine their position in relation to the actual world. It also offers theories such as counterpart theory and transworld identity to define and describe the appearance of actual world historical figures within a textual actual world, a

salient feature of counterfactual historical fiction texts. In addition, Possible Worlds Theory also offers cognitive approaches to fiction that dictates how readers engage with fiction. For example, Ryan's (1991) concepts of the principle of minimal departure and fictional recentering as discussed above are cognitive tools that are offered to support a Possible Worlds analysis of fiction. Therefore, the theory offers tools and terminological vocabulary that is needed to effectively describe a counterfactual historical fiction text and as such it provides an approach that is useful to understand the ontological mechanics of even the most complex of texts. As Gallagher (2011) points out "possible-worlds theory handily explicates the thinking that underlies historical counterfactualism" (331) because while reading a counterfactual historical fiction text, readers have to construct a possible world as two contradictory historical events or individuals cannot exist within the same world. For example, when we read fiction that posits a victorious Adolf Hitler in the Second World War, we cannot think of the victorious Hitler within our actual world as it conflicts with the Hitler of our world who loses in the Second World War.

However, as I will demonstrate in the following chapters, while Possible Worlds Theory is a useful analytical tool, in its current state it is not fully applicable to counterfactual historical fiction texts yet. The principle aim of this thesis is therefore to address these issues in Chapters Three and Four by developing Ryan's (1991) Possible Worlds framework to offer a rigorous model with which to effectively analyse all aspects of counterfactual historical fiction texts.

2.12 Limited applications of Possible Worlds Theory to Counterfactual Historical Fiction and Criticisms

In Chapter One, after surveying the research on counterfactual historical fiction, I concluded that theorists have often alluded to Possible Worlds Theory when discussing the genre of counterfactual historical fiction (Hills, 2009; Gallagher, 2011; Sladek 2006). Hills (2009) states that Possible Worlds Theory can be used to study counterfactual historical fiction texts but in his short article titled 'Time, possible worlds, and counterfactuals' he does not apply the theory to any particular fiction. Instead, he only provides an overview. Like Hills, Gallagher (2011), as noted above asserts that it can be used to study historical and counterfactual historical fiction in particular. However, she too does not show us what such an approach would involve.

Sladek (2006), in his article 'Between History and Fiction: On the Possibilities of Alternate History', uses Possible Worlds Theory terminology to provide an analysis of the characteristics of worlds created by fictional, historical, counterfactual, and counterfactual historical narratives. He analyses the worlds created by these narratives in terms of how physically feasible they are, whether or not they have counterparts, and the nature of gaps: epistemological and/or ontological. Although he uses the term 'possible world' to describe the type of world that is created, he does not focus on the specifics of Possible Worlds Theory or its analytical potential when applied to counterfactual historical fiction texts. Rather he focuses solely on the nature of the alternate worlds that are created. An exception is Spedo's (2009) dissertation titled 'The Plot Against the Past: An Exploration of Alternate History in British and American Fiction' in which he applies Possible Worlds Theory to address what he believes is the

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foremost issue in counterfactual historical fiction, that is, the issue of reference. Spedo claims that the fictionality of counterfactual historical fiction "can be fruitfully analysed in terms of Possible Worlds Theory" (7). According to him, the reason for this is because a "fictional story is *not* about the real world in the first place, although its interpretation will take our knowledge of the real world as the starting point" (40). Therefore, for Spedo (2009), a framework such as Possible Worlds Theory with which "alternative states of affairs [are] analysed in terms of their modal relation to the actual world" (7) is suitable for the analysis of counterfactual historical fiction because:

> the worlds created by AH [Alternate History] are not as autonomous from reality as are other fictional worlds, as the historical alternative they posit is inevitably compared to the actual timeline so that its plausibility may be tested (7).

Spedo, here, argues for the use of Possible Worlds Theory to analyse counterfactual historical fiction texts solely based on the theory's capability to analyse fiction in terms of its relation to the actual world. Although Spedo offers Possible Worlds theory as a suitable method of analysis for counterfactual historical fiction, his agenda here is different to mine. His agenda is to evaluate the possibility of the counterfactual world in its relation to the actual world. For this purpose, he focuses on referentiality and in particular to mentions of anachronisms which he calls 'presentism' in counterfactual historical fiction. Since Spedo's focus is on fictional reference and the concept of 'history' within the text, his approach involves simply applying the logic and vocabulary of Possible Worlds Theory in order to compare the fictional world to the actual world "so that its plausibility may be tested" (41). My thesis on the other hand, develops Possible Worlds Theory so as to offer a systematic and replicable

model that can be used to divide counterfactual historical fiction texts into its various ontological domains and to explain the different cognitive processes that readers go through when they read such fiction. Therefore, the focus of my thesis is not so much on the genre as much as it is on the analytical potential for Possible Worlds Theory on a specific genre of fiction.

As seen above, while some theorists agree that Possible Worlds Theory is a suitable methodology for the analysis of counterfactual historical fiction, Dannenberg (2008) argues that the theory is incapable of analysing such texts. In Chapter One, I have shown how she points out that counterfactual historical fiction texts are best understood by an approach that involves "the *blending* and not the *separation* of worlds or 'input spaces'" (60, italics original). She therefore rejects a Possible Worlds analysis of counterfactual historical fiction texts because such an approach involves separating the fictional text into different worlds. However, in her explanation of the model she initially separates the actual world history and the contradiction into two input spaces. In doing so, the starting point of Dannenberg's blending model is the separation of worlds (or input spaces).

Furthermore, she borrows concepts and terms from within Possible Worlds Theory such as counterpart and transworld identity to describe the process through which actual world historical figures appear in fictional worlds. Consequently, she introduces the concept of transworld identification and transworld differentiation to show how readers interpret counterfactual historical fiction texts. According to Dannenberg (2008), the process of

transworld identification involves the "perception that fictional [historical characters] [...] have real-world counterparts" (60) and transworld differentiation is the process through which readers "perceive the strategic differences between the input spaces [worlds] in order to appreciate the emergent structure of the counterfactual world" (60). While Dannenberg rejects Possible Worlds Theory for a comprehensive analysis of counterfactual historical fiction texts on the basis that such an approach includes the separation of input spaces, what Dannenberg essentially proposes in her model at least as the first step is in fact the separation of worlds, or in the words of Dannenberg (2008) "differentiation of input spaces" (60), which she asserts is vital to comprehending the counterfactual that is presented. Therefore, Dannenberg (2008) criticises Possible Worlds Theory for something that she ultimately does in her own analysis.

Challenging Dannenberg's accusations against Possible World Theory, my thesis will show how the theory is in fact the most appropriate model with which to analyse counterfactual historical fiction texts. Moreover, while Dannenberg claims that world blending is essential to understanding how readers process counterfactual worlds in a text, in my thesis I develop concepts based on the separation of worlds to accurately map the cognitive processes that readers go through when they read such fiction. Furthermore, within my thesis, I also challenge criticisms about Possible Worlds Theory such as Klauk's (2011) assertions: "a well-known, and by now a bit rusty, theory" (38) and "the current unpopularity of the 'fiction-in-terms-of-possible-worlds theory'" (38).

2.13 Summary

In this chapter, I have traced the development of Possible Worlds Theory from its foundations in philosophical logic to its application in literary studies. Since the focus of the thesis is on establishing a modal universe within which to situate fictional entities, I have critically reviewed literary theorists who have developed a modal universe before concluding that Ryan (1991) and Bell (2010) are most successful in developing a modal universe to analyse fiction.

Following Ryan (1991) and Bell (2010), I have established a modal universe with its accompanying terminology to be used within the parameters of this thesis to label the different types of worlds that are created by counterfactual historical fiction texts. Furthermore, in this chapter I have also identified certain inadequacies within Possible Worlds Theory in terms of analysing counterfactual historical fiction texts. I will address these inadequacies and suggest revisions in the subsequent two chapters. Analysing counterfactual historical fiction texts using Possible Worlds Theory is rewarding in two ways: a) it develops the theory so as to make it effective to analyse all types of counterfactual historical fiction texts, and b) it gives the genre of counterfactual historical fiction a systematic methodology with which it can be analysed. However, it currently lacks cognitive approaches that accurately theorise the cognitive processes through which readers make sense of counterfactual historical fiction texts. In Chapter Three I will account for readers' varied levels of knowledge and theorise how they use their knowledge before offering a new approach to account for the different types of actual world historical individuals in Chapter Four.

Chapter 3: A Revised Possible Worlds Model Part One: RK-worlds, Ontological Superimposition, and Reciprocal Feedback

3. Introduction

The primary aim of this chapter is to develop the first part of the systematic two-part model that I am offering to analyse counterfactual historical fiction texts. Previously, I have shown that existing research on counterfactual historical fiction is lacking in terms of analysing how readers engage with these texts cognitively. I proposed Possible Worlds Theory as a suitable method of analysis and as I have concluded in Chapter Two, Ryan (1991) offers the most comprehensive and most appropriate Possible Worlds model to analyse fiction. However, as I have also shown in Chapter Two, the theory is still lacking in its current state in terms of cognitive approaches that systematically theorise what happens when readers read fiction. I argue that a model to analyse counterfactual historical fiction texts must reflect the way in which readers not only use their knowledge of the actual world to understand the counterfactual textual actual world and but also use their knowledge to understand the significance of the relationship between both these worlds. Consequently, a key aspect of this chapter will consider the relationship between the actual world and the textual actual world created by counterfactual historical fiction texts.

By applying Ryan's Possible Worlds model to Harris's *Fatherland* (1992), the first section of my chapter will show how Possible Worlds Theory in its current form

does not have all the necessary tools to successfully carry out an analysis of this type of fiction. More specifically, I will show that the theory currently does not fully account for readers and the different levels of knowledge that they bring to the text. As a solution to this issue, I will build on Ryan's (1991) category of K-world (or knowledge world) to show its importance in the context of analysing counterfactual historical fiction. In the subsequent section, I propose my new concept of 'ontological superimposition' and its associated process of 'reciprocal feedback', that I argue, support a Possible Worlds analysis of counterfactual historical fiction texts. In doing so, my thesis offers a systematic approach that theorises the processes that readers go through when reading a counterfactual historical fiction text. In this chapter, by way of illustration, specific examples from *Fatherland* (1992) will be analysed to show the effectiveness of the model that I have developed.

3.1 Importance of Actual World Knowledge within the Context of Counterfactual Historical Fiction Texts

As the review of the genre of counterfactual historical fiction in Chapter One has shown, a typical feature of counterfactual historical fiction texts is that they use the actual world as an epistemological template. Texts of all genres arguably use our actual world as a background, but its use is emphasised in a counterfactual historical fiction text because such texts single out a pivotal moment in our actual world history and build textual actual worlds that contradict or are counterfactual to this moment. For example, in a broader sense, a counterfactual World War II fiction presents a textual actual world that is counterfactual by contradicting a crucial moment in our actual world history such as Adolf Hitler's defeat in the Second World War.

In Harris' *Fatherland* (1992), along with altering the outcome of the Second World War in order to present a textual actual world that explores the premise 'What if Adolf Hitler had won the Second War?', the text also alters other major and minor details of the Second World War as it happened in our actual world. To draw on an illustrative example, when the protagonist Xavier March is locked away in a cell, he stares at Reinhard Heydrich's photograph on the wall and begins to think of everything he knows about Heydrich:

> The press portrayed him as Nietzsche's Superman sprung to life. Heydrich in his pilot's uniform (he had flown combat missions on the Eastern front). Heydrich in his fencing gear (he had fenced for Germany in the Olympics). Heydrich with his violin (he could reduce audiences to tears by the pathos of his playing). When the aircraft carrying Heinrich Himmler had blown up in mid-air two years ago, Heydrich had taken over as Reichsführer-SS. Now he was said to be in line to succeed the Führer (Harris, 1992: 135).

The above extract from *Fatherland* opens with a reference to an actual world historical figure – Reinhard Heydrich. Here, a textual actual world is established in which the reader learns about Heydrich and also learns a bit about the history of the textual actual world. The history presented above deviates from the history of the actual world in multiple ways. The table below lists some of these differences with its corresponding history in the actual world that it diverges from:

Textual Actual World	Actual World
Heydrich in his fencing gear (he had fenced for Germany in the Olympics)	Heydrich was good at fencing but he never participated in the Olympics. Instead, he protected the Polish fencing team when they competed in the 1936 Olympics.
The aircraft carrying Heinrich Himmler had blown up in mid-air two years ago [that is, 1962 because the text is set in 1964].	Heinrich Himmler committed suicide on May 23, 1945 while he was in British custody.
Heydrich had taken over as Reichsführer-SS. Now he was said to be in line to succeed the Führer.	Operation Anthropoid – the assassination attack on Heydrich was carried out on May 27, 1942 in Prague. He suffered injuries from the attack and eventually succumbed to these on June 4, 1942. Heydrich was never the head of the SS. He held the head of Reich Main Security Office post when he died.

Table 3.1: Actual world history and textual actual world history in *Fatherland*

As Table 3.1 shows, *Fatherland* explicitly uses and contradicts several moments from our actual world history in order to present a counterfactual textual actual

world. For a reader to appreciate the deviations, they must be able to use their knowledge of the actual world in order to cross-reference these counterfactual descriptions included in the textual actual world to its corresponding fact in the actual world. I argue that this type of cross-referencing is especially important while reading a counterfactual historical fiction text because the point of such texts is to invite the reader to compare the textual actual world history to the actual world history. Ryan identifies this process of comparison as fundamental to the experience of reading counterfactual fiction when she states that "the purpose of such thought experiments is to invite reflection on the mechanisms of history, and the real world always serves as an implicit background" (Ryan, 2006: 657).

Within Possible World Theory, this idea of using the knowledge of the actual world to make sense of the textual actual world is not a new concept. As I have shown in Chapter Two, Ryan's (1991) principle of minimal departure primarily deals with how readers use the actual world to construct textual actual worlds. The principle of minimal departure states that when reading any kind of fiction, readers construct the textual actual world as being similar to the actual world and only make those adjustments as dictated by the text. The principle of minimal departure is useful within the context of analysing counterfactual historical fiction texts because in the words of Ryan (1991) "if it weren't for the principle, a novel about a character named Napoleon could not convey the feeling that its hero is *the* Napoleon" (52, italics original). While reading counterfactual historical fiction about an alternate Adolf Hitler, readers use their knowledge of the actual world Hitler in the context of the textual actual world Hitler. However, as I have also shown in Chapter Two, while the principle of

minimal departure is useful for theorising how readers use their knowledge of the actual world, it cannot distinguish between different readers and their different levels of knowledge.

In order to effectively analyse counterfactual historical fiction texts, it is important to take into account different readers and the extent of their knowledge of the actual world because it facilitates the process of cross-referencing counterfactual descriptions within the text, one that is fundamental to the reading experience. As Doležel (2002) states a "counterfactual history is a thought experiment: we are testing the importance of a particular factor in actual history by its modification or elimination" (361). Although Doležel makes this remark in the context of counterfactual histories written by historians, I argue that it can be applied to counterfactual historical fiction as well. I propose that counterfactual historical fiction texts can also be seen as thought experiments because in such fiction, the significance of an actual world event(s) is tested when the text creates a textual actual world in which a particular event did not happen or it happened differently and as such reinforces my argument about the importance of cross-referencing textual actual world historical counterfactuals to its corresponding actual world historical facts.

This process of cross-referencing or recognising historical descriptions in the text as counterfactual directly depends on how much prior knowledge a reader has about the actual world. This is because the textual historical deviations from the actual world history are not always explicitly stated within the textual actual

world. For this purpose, as Kurtz and Schober (2001) states "readers all fill in the unwritten portions of a text in their own ways, meaning is produced by the reader's activity and is not the sole property of the text" (141). This means that different readers will make different inferences from the text depending on the extent of knowledge that they each have of the actual world.

Using the knowledge of the actual world to construct the textual actual world is a process that readers go through while reading any type of fiction, but it is particularly important in counterfactual historical fiction because readers do not always possess all the prior knowledge on history that is needed to recognise all the ways in which the history presented in a counterfactual historical fiction text is contradictory to the actual world history.

Returning to the example introduced above from *Fatherland*, it can be argued that not all readers will recognise that the history of the textual actual world deviates from the actual world history in three ways (Heydrich's participation in the Olympics, Himmler's air crash death, and Heydrich as Reichsführer-SS). Depending on the reader's knowledge of the Second World War, they may recognise one or more of these differences in history. For example, there may be a Reader X who may recognise all counterfactual descriptions as contradicting the history of the actual world. At the same time, there may be a Reader Y who has no knowledge of Reinhard Heydrich's assassination in Prague and as a result of which, this reader will fail to detect the statement, 'Heydrich had taken over as Reichsführer-SS. Now he was said to be in line to succeed the

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Führer' as counterfactual to the actual world history. Owing to the counterfactual nature of the text, it may also be that Reader Y will assume that all historical details included in the textual actual world are counterfactual descriptions. However, they will fail to cross-reference the counterfactual description in the text to its corresponding historical fact in the actual world and I have already established above, this type of cross-referencing is especially important while reading a counterfactual historical fiction text.

This essentially establishes two types of readers: readers who possess all of the background knowledge that is needed to recognise the counterfactual descriptions presented in the text and another type of reader who might not have all the background knowledge and as a result of which they fail to identify the counterfactual descriptions in the text. Of course, there are also many other readers in-between who have varying degrees of knowledge, and which I will explore in the latter part of this chapter. However, at this point, the key aspect of the argument that I wish to highlight is that these readers differ from each other not because Reader Y exists in different actual world, one where Reinhard Heydrich was not assassinated, but only because their knowledge or representation of the actual world, that is, what they know lies within the actual world differs. Therefore, while all readers alike exist within the actual world, it is not enough to say that readers use the *actual world* to deduce counterfactuals in the text; instead it needs to be underlined that they use their *knowledge of the actual world* while trying to deduce historical deviations. Therefore, while a reading a counterfactual historical fiction text, there exists a clear distinction between the actual world that is an objective ontological domain and the

reader's knowledge of the actual world, or what we might conceptualise as their subjective actual world.

Within Possible Worlds Theory, this notion of there being multiple subjective actual worlds, that is, individual representations of the actual world is not a new concept. It has been explored and used by philosopher Nelson Goodman (1983) to describe the ontological status of possible worlds. Goodman's (1978, 1983, and 1984) so called "anti-realist" view proposes that all worlds, whether actual or possible, are products of mental constructions. While modal and moderate realists consider the actual world to be an objective domain, anti-realists like Goodman believe that there is no objective actual world because what we think of as the actual world is not the actual world but only our conception of it. He claims that "what we often mistake for the actual world is one particular description of it" (57). Goodman here proposes that we have multiple actual worlds because all individual descriptions of the actual world are in fact actual worlds. Bell (2010) explains that Goodman "sees our system of reality as a collection of multiple actual worlds each constructed subjectively" (58).

Goodman (1978) uses the term 'version' to describe these individual descriptions or perceptions of the actual world and claims that these versions – "some conflicting with each other, some so disparate that conflict or compatibility among them is indeterminate – are equally right" (39) because these versions cannot be "tested by correspondence with a world independent of all our versions" (39). By saying that all versions of the actual world are equally right, Goodman stresses that it is impossible to determine which of

these versions map over the objective actual world wholly. What his multiple actual worlds model underlines is the idea that the actual world can only be experienced subjectively, as a result of which, there is no single actual world but many subjective representations of the actual worlds. Ryan (1998) describes Goodman's actual world model as a "decentered model that rejects the idea of hierarchy and ascribes equal status to all worlds" (147) as opposed to a centred model, advocated by the other factions of Possible Worlds Theory in which "one world, the actual world, is opposed to all others" (147). Therefore, according to Ryan, Goodman's model discards the view that there is an objective actual world that precedes all other worlds and instead proposes that there are many actual worlds that are equally valid.

Ronen (1994) argues against Goodman's position because, for her, the position that Goodman puts forth "contradicts a sense of division throughout the culture between fiction and reality" (24). She continues, "treating all worlds as versions of an equal status defies the very idea that a culture differentiates among its various ontological domains" (24). Ronen points out that Goodman's anti-realist view blurs the line between fiction and reality. She contends, "a belief in possible worlds assumes the existence, or at least the accessibility, of an actual world" (23). Ronen, here, argues that Goodman's position is incompatible with the tenets of Possible Worlds Theory because it rejects the existence of a concrete actual world. She considers that this is problematic because it makes it impossible to distinguish between what is possible and what is actual. Although Ronen maintains that Goodman's anti-realist view denies the existence of an absolute objective actual world, Ryan's (1998) analysis of Goodman's position,

shows us that this position does not necessarily deny the existence of an objective actual world; it simply does not account for one.

Referring to Goodman's actual world(s) model, Ryan (1998) rightly points out that "Goodman never takes a clear stand on what it means for a version to be a description or depiction of a world" (150). Goodman's lack of distinction between the two poses a problem because it means that his model fails to differentiate between alternatives to a world and individual versions of a world. As a resolution, Ryan begins by explaining clearly what Goodman (1983) means by versions. Ryan (1998) states:

> The model presents an attractive account of the world-creating power of versions. This power can take two forms [...] a version can create "our worlds" by offering something to contemplate to the imagination; or it can create "our world" by shaping our personal representation of what lies at the centre. The model suggests that our private realities are not unified and coherent wholes, but composite aggregates of beliefs and ideas gathered from various sources and conflicting versions (150).

Here, Ryan explains that a version could either be possible worlds created in imagination, of ways *the actual world could have been* – so a possible world in modal realist and moderate realist terms – or it could be individual representations of what one believes *is* the actual world – the actual world experienced subjectively. In any case, Goodman's position is ontologically and conceptually unusual in Possible Worlds Theory because it is difficult to determine how Goodman's 'versions' differ from possible worlds.

However, the most important part of Ryan's analysis of Goodman's model is her own interpretation of the term 'version'. Although Goodman's position seems to rest on the premise that there is no objective actual world that exists beyond our individual representations of the actual world, Ryan highlights how Goodman's modal universe hinges on a logical fallacy because "a version, by definition is a version of something" (148) thereby showing the existence of an original. This clarification that Ryan offers to Goodman's model is important because it explains how Goodman does not actually deny the existence of an objective actual world, only that we have no access to it other than through a subjective lens. Bell (2010) points out that although Goodman's view rejects the notion of an actually existing actual world he "does not deny that there is a world behind versions but only that it is not possible to reach it or test the different versions against it" (59).

Ryan's and Bell's analyses of Goodman's position therefore show that although Goodman seems to differ from all other Possible Worlds theorists in his belief that there are multiple actual worlds thus each constructed subjectively, by calling them versions, he implies that an original and singular actual world exists. This clarification of Goodman's school of thought is important within the parameters of this thesis because fusing Ryan's argument about the existence of an original and Goodman's concept of subjective representations of the actual worlds brings forth a specific ontological position that is important for analysing counterfactual historical fiction texts.

To reiterate Goodman's revised position as outlined above, there is not one actual world, but only many subjective representations of the actual world. However, as I have established above, subjective representations of the actual world owe their existence to the objective actual one. Therefore, a modal universe based on Goodman's ontological position would comprise subjective representations of the actual worlds which are individual perceptions of the actual world. Possible worlds in Goodman's model are also versions of the actual world but they are alternatives to the actual world in terms of what it might have or should have been. Finally, the original or the objective actual world is a domain that we cannot access other than through a subjective lens. It is the domain which subjective representations of the actual worlds are based on and the domain which possible worlds exist as alternatives to. This ontological position can be represented diagrammatically as follows:

Figure 3.1: A visual interpretation of Goodman's modal universe

In Figure 3.1, I have diagrammatically represented Goodman's ontological position by labelling the objective domain as 'actual world' and the subjective representations of the actual world as 'versions'. This visual representation of the actual universe appears to be similar to the diagram Ryan proposes in her 1998 article titled 'The Text as a Game versus The Text as a World', which she refines in her 2001 book *Narrative as Virtual Reality:*

Figure 3.2: Ryan's (2001: 102) recenterable possible worlds model

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Here, as seen in Figure 3.2, Ryan (1998, cf. 2001) proposes a visually similar modal system to the one depicted in Figure 3.1, but the terms she uses to label the different worlds vary. For example: she labels the centre as 'objective reality' (in the Goodman model represented in Figure 3.1, this domain is the actual world) and she labels the different subjective representations of the actual worlds as 'actual worlds (individual representations of reality)' (in the Goodman model represented in Figure 3.1, these are called versions of the actual world).

Ryan proposes her modal system in response to the centered model – that is, a model that acknowledges a single actual world – proposed by moderate realists or abstractionists. Ryan argues that a single actual world model poses the difficulty of distinguishing between "the realm of actually existing objects and the domain of merely thinkable existence" (Ryan, 2001: 100). In order to highlight how each of our representations of what lies within the actual world is different she states that some of us believe in UFOs and not angels, while others believe in angels and not UFOs. Using these examples, Ryan argues for a model that acknowledges different versions of the world such as the one proposed by Goodman (1986) in order to account for individual representations of the actual world. However, for Ryan "an egalitarian model such as Goodman's cannot account for all-important semantic concepts" (101) and so she adopts Lewis's definition of 'indexical' and argues that an indexical actual world "can easily tolerate historical, cultural, and even personal variations" (101). What Ryan means here is if the term indexical can be used to distinguish between our actual world and the actual world of a possible world inhabitant, then the term

can also be used to differentiate one person's subjective representation of the actual world from another person's subjective representation of the actual world.

Ryan (2001) argues that Goodman's model gives equal status to all worlds whether possible or actual because his model places both the actual and possible worlds within the same ontological domain. Consequently, Goodman's model according to Ryan, fails to reflect "our intuition that there is a difference between fact and mere possibility" (101). Therefore, the modal system that Ryan proposes (see Figure 3.2) uses Lewis's indexical definition of actual to differentiate one person's subjective representation of the actual world from another's.

However, Ryan's engagement with this notion of individual representations of the actual world that is based on an indexical actual world model is very brief and as such underdeveloped. This is mainly because Ryan's proposed model does not subscribe to any particular ontological position. Although she adopts Lewis's definition of the term 'indexical', her model is not based on his ontological position because according to Lewis's modal realism, from a given point of view there can only be one actual world. Similarly, Ryan's model is not based on Kripke's moderate realist view because this view too proposes that there is only one actual world. Therefore, both Lewis's and Kripke's positions do not accommodate this notion of an individual's subjective representation of the objective actual world. By not explicitly revealing the ontological position that Ryan's modal universe is based on, it is difficult to comprehend how

accompanying terminology is being used. For example, as seen in Figure 3.2, Ryan uses the term 'actual worlds' to label individual representations of the actual world, but the term 'actual' within Possible Worlds Theory refers to a concrete entity. Therefore, using the term actual world to refer to individual representations of the actual world would imply that all these representations are concrete and they actually exist out there. Furthermore, she does not provide an explanation in terms of why she engages with this idea and therefore the purpose of her revised Possible Worlds model remains unclear.

To summarise, Ryan (2001) offers a modal universe that comprises: (i) an objective reality, (ii) actual worlds or individual representations of reality and (iii) nonactual worlds. As shown above, Ryan states that her model is not based on Goodman's ontological position because her proposed modal system does not ascribe the same status to all worlds. However, as I have shown, Ryan's modal system is not in line with Kripke's moderate realism or Lewis's modal realism because it seems to propose a multiple actual world view.

While Ryan denies it, it can be reasoned that Ryan's model is in fact based on Goodman's ontological position because as Ryan (1998) has previously clarified, a distinction can be made between Goodman's possible worlds and actual worlds. To reiterate the difference: Goodman's possible worlds are individual versions of the ways the actual world could have been that exist conceptually, as opposed to being concrete alternative worlds within the actual universe. Goodman's actual worlds are subjective representations of what the actual world currently is. Goodman's modal universe is therefore relative with each

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individual having a subjective representation of the actual world and many possible worlds, but they both only exist conceptually.

The idea that Goodman and Ryan above put forth about individuals possessing subjective knowledge of the actual world is indeed important for my new approach with which to analyse counterfactual historical fiction texts. However, the fault in their Possible Worlds models lies in the terminology that they employ. They use an already established term 'actual world' to refer to an individual's subjective construction of the actual world. It therefore goes against the very basic premise of Possible Worlds Theory that dictates there is only one actual world which is a concrete domain that exists objectively.

The solution to this issue lies in establishing terminology that demarcates an individual's subjective knowledge of the actual world more clearly from the concrete actual world. For this purpose, in the following sections I will set out a new concept and new terminology that is in line with Possible Worlds Theory so that it can be used in the analysis of fiction and in particular, counterfactual historical fiction. Since the purpose here is to establish terminology that captures the idea of an individual's knowledge of the actual world, in the next section, I will first critically examine Ryan's category of K-world (or knowledge worlds) which Ryan develops within the context of characters and their knowledge of the textual actual world. I will then show how this concept is relevant to my agenda, but underdeveloped for my purposes. Consequently, I will build on this concept so it can be used effectively within the context of counterfactual historical fiction.

3.2 K-world or Knowledge World

In order to capture the modal complexity of narratives, which Ryan (1991) asserts has the ability "to project a complete universe, not just an isolated planet" (32), she establishes that a textual universe of a narrative comprises the textual actual world and other alternate textual possible worlds. These alternate textual possible worlds are worlds that the characters of a text imagine, wish upon, or dream of.

As discussed in Chapter Two, Ryan differentiates between these worlds by classifying them according to the type of mental activity that characters indulge in. For example, K-worlds or knowledge worlds comprise "exclusively known propositions" (114), the O-world is "a system of commitments and prohibitions defined by social rules and moral principles" (116), and the W-world consist of "propositions involving axiological predicates good, bad, and neutral" (117) that typically put forward a desire. According to Ryan, these worlds K-worlds, O-worlds, and W-worlds, make up the "private world view of characters" (114). To use Ryan's (2006) example, imagine a situation where Dorothy and John are married but Amanda likes John. In this case, at the moment Amanda's W-world is unfulfilled, but she continually strives to fulfil her wishes. John has so far been faithful to Dorothy as a result of which his O-world is satisfied. Dorothy's K-world does not match reality as she is unaware of Amanda's interest in her husband (650) (A full discussion of K-worlds, O-worlds, and W-worlds is carried out in Chapter Two). In this chapter, for the purposes of establishing new

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terminology to define and describe an individual's representation of the actual world, I focus primarily on Ryan's category of K-worlds.

Ryan (1991) states that a K-world comprises "known and believed propositions" (114). For Ryan, "the meaning of the operator of knowledge is fairly straightforward – a character 'knows' a p, when she or he holds it for true in the reference world and p is objectively true in this world" (115). This means a K-world includes those facts that are true in the given world.

A K-world, according to Ryan, can vary in kind depending on the type of propositions it includes. She states that "a K-world may be not only correct or incorrect, and complete or incomplete with respect to its reference-world but also total or partial" (115). According to Ryan, a correct K-world contains propositions about the reference world that are accurate and in contrast an incorrect K-world comprises propositions that are inaccurate. A complete K-world is one that consists of all the propositions about the reference world. On the other hand, she explains that an incomplete K-world "means that some propositions 'in the book' on the reference world are indeterminate" (115); that is, these propositions are vague: "did the butler kill Lady Higginbotham, or did he not do it, wonders inspector Snively" (115). According to Ryan, "a partial K-world leaves out some of the propositions in the book" (115); that is, to have a partial K-world means to be unaware of certain propositions about the reference world: "returning from a weekend with his mistress, Lord Higginbotham is unaware that Lady Higginbotham has been murdered" (115).

Whilst both partial and incomplete K-worlds are void of some propositions about the reference world, Ryan clarifies that the difference between an incomplete K-world and a partial K-world: "an incomplete K-world fits on its reference world like a cover with some holes in the middle [...] [and] a partial K-world is like a cover that is too small, the regions beyond the cover remaining unsurveyed" (115). That is, while an incomplete K-world includes unanswered propositions, a partial K-world involves not knowing some propositions.

Ryan states that a K-world can be used to speak about both systems of reality – "whether projected by the text or intuitively experienced as our 'native system'" (115), and thus K-worlds are ontological domains that are generated by both characters in the text and by readers when they read fiction. However, in her discussion she focuses only on the K-world of characters within a fictional text and throughout she uses the term K-world only to refer to a character's knowledge world with reference to propositions within the text. Therefore, within Possible Worlds Theory, this term has been developed only in the context of a textual actual world to express a character's knowledge world and as such there is no terminology to describe a reader's knowledge world.

Similarly, in a Possible Worlds analysis of *Victory Garden* (1991), a novel that is set against the background of the Gulf War, Bell (2010) briefly engages with a reader's use of their knowledge of the actual world in her analysis. She explains that the reference to 'Saddam' in the novel "requires that readers access particular historical knowledge from the actual world" (78). Although Bell

acknowledges that readers access their subjective knowledge of the actual world, she does not develop this idea fully because her focus is on the way in which *Victory Garden* foregrounds and blurs the ontological boundary between the actual world and the textual actual world.

Although Ryan (1991) and Bell (2010), in their analyses, acknowledge that readers use their knowledge of the actual world in order to construct the textual actual world, this is a concept that they do not explore in detail and as such current Possible Worlds Theory does not account for the different individual's representations of the actual worlds that belong to different readers and which are so relevant to the analysis of counterfactual historical fiction. Therefore, in literary studies, Possible Worlds theorists either do not engage with this idea of different readers and their individual knowledge of the actual world or they do but they do not develop it thoroughly. Nevertheless, I argue that Ryan's (1991) category of a K-world can be fully developed and used as a solution to this problem. The result is a fully fleshed out Possible Worlds model of readers' subjective representations of the actual world – what I define as Reader K-worlds, which can then be applied in the analysis of counterfactual historical fiction.

3.3 New Terminology: Reader Knowledge Worlds or RK-worlds

While Ryan does not make the connection herself, I argue that Ryan's concept of a K-world can be correlated with Goodman's idea of a subjective representation of the actual world and Ryan's (1998) own concept of individual representations of the actual world. Where Goodman asserts that there are

versions of the actual world according to an individual's knowledge of the actual world and Ryan (1998) maintains that there are individual variations of the actual world – what they confusingly call 'actual worlds' – Ryan (1991) identifies K-worlds of individuals that comprise propositions that individuals know about the reference world. In talking about our system of reality – that is the actual world – Ryan states that "K-worlds may be either complete or incomplete with reference to their reference world, but never mistaken, since we have no access to the reference world" (Ryan 1991: 115). This thereby reiterates Goodman's theory that the actual world can only be accessed subjectively.

Combining Ryan's concept of a K-world with Goodman's Possible Worlds model is significant for literary analysis because it puts forth a specific ontological position that an analysis of counterfactual historical fiction texts can be based on. I have established in section 3.2 that in spite of Goodman's claims that there is no single objective actual world, Ryan reminds us that a version cannot exist without its original, implying that an objective actual world exists. To make my terminology consistent with Possible Worlds Theory, I propose that the actual world is objective and what Goodman means by versions or individual's representation of the actual world corresponds to Ryan's (1991) classification of K-worlds or knowledge world. However, in order to make clear and avoid any kind of terminological confusion, I suggest splitting Ryan's category of a K-world into CK-worlds that describe a character's K-world and RK-worlds that describe a reader's K-world. The modal structure of the actual universe that I propose, now includes RK-worlds along with the actual world and possible worlds. RK-worlds are individual reader's knowledge worlds that consist of

propositions that they know about the actual world. I consider RK-worlds an individual's subjective construction of the objectively existing actual world. The concept of RK-worlds thus preserves the ontological privilege of the actual world, whilst also accommodating individual representations of the actual world.

Like Ryan's K-worlds that may be correct, incorrect, complete, incomplete or partial, I suggest that not all RK-worlds are identical. To further differentiate between different kinds of RK-worlds, below, I introduce complete RK-worlds, partial RK-worlds, and zero RK-worlds, to accurately reflect different levels of knowledge in readers. In the context of a counterfactual historical fiction text, an RK-world is considered complete when the reader has sufficient background knowledge to identify all the historical deviations presented in the textual actual world. For example: like complete CK-worlds that consist of all the propositions about the textual actual world, a reader of an alternate World War II narrative can be said to have a complete RK-world if they have all the background knowledge that is needed to recognise a counterfactual at a particular point, in a particular text. While reading *Fatherland* for example, a reader with a complete RK-world will have all the prior knowledge that is required to cross-reference all historical deviations in the text to its corresponding fact in the actual world.

Similarly, like partial CK-worlds that consist of only some propositions about the textual actual world, readers with a partial RK-world will have some prior knowledge, as a result of which they may recognise only some of the historical deviations presented in the textual actual world. There also exists another type

of reader who may not recognise any of the historical deviations presented in the textual actual world because they have no prior knowledge. This type of reader, I am proposing, has a zero RK-world. It is important to point out that readers of alternate World War II texts are likely to have some knowledge of the Second World War and as such a zero RK-world is likely to be rare and purely theoretical. However, in order to ensure that the methodology that I offer is theoretically sound and complete, I have included this category within my model. The modal universe based on the modified ontological position established above is represented using the diagrams in Figure3.3 and 3.4:

Figure 3.3: The modal structure of the actual universe

As shown in Figure 3.3, at the centre lies the actual world – the only objective domain that exists independently of an individual's representation of it. Within

the realm of the actual world is every individual's knowledge of what the actual world is. They may overlap when one or more individuals share knowledge about the actual world. Surrounded by the actual world are the different possible worlds. Although they are individual descriptions of what the actual world may have been like if things had happened differently, I place them outside the actual world to emphasise that, as counterfactuals, they are ontologically different to the actual world.

Figure 3.4: Different types of RK-worlds

In Figure 3.4, my modal universe shows a textual actual world that readers recenter to when they read a fictional text. Here, the different RK-worlds have also been depicted because they represent the knowledge that readers bring with them. As shown in Figure 3.4, the complete RK-world wholly maps over the textual actual world to show that a reader with this type of RK-world has all prior knowledge needed to understand the text. In contrast, the partial RK-world covers only a part of the textual actual world to show that a reader with this type of world has some background knowledge and therefore may identify some historical deviations included within the text. Finally, a zero RK-world is placed outside the textual actual world to show that a reader with this type of RK-world has no knowledge that is required to identify historical deviations in the textual actual world. Similar to the actual world, the textual actual world is surrounded by textual possible worlds which are alternate worlds created by characters of the textual actual world in the form of hopes, wishes, or fears as already established in Ryan's (1991) modal universe.

To return to my original example from *Fatherland* (which I repeat here for ease of reference):

> March had never met Heydrich, or seen him; had only heard the stories. The press portrayed him as Nietzsche's Superman sprung to life. Heydrich in his pilot's uniform (he had flown combat missions on the Eastern front). Heydrich in his fencing gear (he had fenced for Germany in the Olympics). Heydrich with his violin (he could reduce audiences to tears by the pathos of his playing). When the aircraft carrying Heinrich Himmler had blown up in mid-air two years ago, Heydrich had taken over

as Reichsführer-SS. Now he was said to be in line to succeed the Führer (Harris, 1992: 135).

On reading the above extract, depending on the type of RK-world that readers have, they may recognise one or more instances when the history of the textual actual world deviates from the history of the actual world. Using new terminology as established above, a reader of the extract above can be said to have a complete RK-world if they have all of the background knowledge that is needed to recognise the three different counterfactuals expressed. Alternatively, they may have a partial RK-world if they notice only some of the historical alterations in the text. For example: a reader with a partial RK-world will know everything about Reinhard Heydrich and so they will recognise the two historical deviations in the text around him, but will fail to recognise the other deviation about Himmler. A reader with a zero RK-world will likely fail to identify any of these historical descriptions as deviations from the actual world history.

Making use of the term RK-worlds enables a clear distinction between the actual world that is used as an epistemological template for counterfactual historical fiction and RK-worlds that readers use to interpret and understand the significance of these texts. The revised Possible Worlds Theory model that I offer accounts for all forms of fictional texts and their reading because when readers read any kind of text, they use their RK-world to make sense of it. However, it is important to account for RK-worlds and establish a divide between the actual world and RK-worlds in my analysis of counterfactual historical fiction texts. This is because, unlike other genres of fiction, in counterfactual historical fiction it is important to reflect on the actual world history by comparing it to the

counterfactual history and this kind of reflection is solely dependent on the type of RK-world that a reader possesses. Having established a revised Possible Worlds model that includes RK-worlds, in the next section I will develop additional cognitive concepts that can be used to theorise how readers use their RK-worlds while engaging with the text.

3.4 Ontological Superimposition and Reciprocal Feedback: Cognitive Concepts to Support a Possible Worlds Analysis of Counterfactual Historical Fiction

As I have iterated, the primary aim of my thesis is to offer a methodology with which to analyse the genre of counterfactual historical fiction. In the previous chapter I argued that Possible Worlds Theory is a suitable methodology to analyse this type of fiction. However, while analysing a counterfactual historical fiction text, it is not enough to only dissect the text into its various ontological domains; a different approach is required, one that focuses on how readers interact with the worlds built by these texts cognitively. Given the close relationship between the textual actual world of a counterfactual historical fiction text and the actual world, a model that includes the manner in which readers consult their RK-world to identify and subsequently interpret the historical textual deviations presented to them is required. For example, as I have shown in Table 3.1, *Fatherland* relies heavily on the details around the Second World War as it happened in our actual world. In order to recognise the historical deviations as shown in Table 3.1, the reader must consult their RK-world. If the reader has a complete or partial RK-world, they will be able to accurately pick out the counterfactual historical descriptions, in that way being able to also detect what is counterfactual and what is purely fictional.

Alternatively, if the reader has a zero RK-world, then they will fail to do either correctly because they might assume that all references to history in the text is counterfactual to the actual world history.

Having established in the previous section the importance of RK-worlds while reading counterfactual historical fiction, in the following sections I am going to develop my model further by addressing the way in which readers move between the textual actual world and their RK-worlds when they read counterfactual historical fiction texts. For this purpose, I offer the concept of 'ontological superimposition', which as I will show below, accurately models a reader's engagement with a counterfactual historical fiction text. In addition to the concept of ontological superimposition, in the following sections I also discuss an associated process of what I call 'reciprocal feedback' that readers go through while reading counterfactual historical fiction. However, before I introduce these concepts it necessary to revisit Dannenberg's (2008) cognitive model that is based on the concept of blending (previously discussed in Chapters One and Two). This is because Dannenberg offers her blending model as an approach with which to analyse counterfactual historical fiction but, as I will show below, her model raises some issues when applied to certain texts within the genre of counterfactual historical fiction in turn emphasising the need for a different model, one that can be replicated and applied across all narratives in the genre of counterfactual historical fiction.

3.4.1 Arguing Against the Blending Model

In the Chapter One, I briefly introduced the model that Dannenberg (2008) uses to analyse counterfactuality in fictional texts. I showed that Dannenberg's (2008) model builds on Fauconnier and Turner's (1998, cf. 2003) blending model that is useful for analysing counterfactual statements. As noted in Chapter One, Fauconnier and Turner's model suggests that the counterfactual space is result of a blend of two actual world input spaces.

According to Fauconnier and Turner (1998, cf. 2003), when a reader encounters a counterfactual element in a narrative text they first identify the characters using their knowledge of the actual world or what I call RK-worlds. Next, Fauconnier and Turner (1998) argue that identifying characters alone is not enough and so the reader creates a unique blend of the two worlds – the world of the text and the actual world of the reader. This unique blend now creates a "separate, counterfactual mental space" that can be used to understand the counterfactual world that is constructed (286). They use the following example: *If Churchill had been the prime minister in 1938 instead of Neville Chamberlain, Hitler would have been deposed and World War II averted.* The concept of world blending proposed by Fauconnier and Turner, when applied to the above counterfactual statement, creates a blend of three things: *Churchill* from the text, *prime minister in 1918* from the actual world, and the *consequent* (World War II would not have happened). Thus, the blended space that contains the input that Churchill is prime minister and World War II is averted, can now be used to understand the counterfactual world.

Dannenberg (2008) advocates using this model to analyse counterfactuals in counterfactual historical fiction texts because she believes that a "counterfactual construct does not simply involve recognition but the creation of a unique blend of worlds in which input is taken from a number of realworld 'mental spaces'" (59). Dannenberg, here, argues that it is not enough for the reader to recognise that something is a counterfactual by using their knowledge of the actual world – or RK-world. She argues that the reader must also "identify the [counterfactual construct's] emergent structure" (59; cf. Fauconnier and Turner, 1998: 286) which means that along with recognising that the text is counterfactual, the reader must also be able to discern the emergent structure which is the product of creating the blend using the actual world input spaces. She applies this model to a passage she cites from *Random Quest* (1965) where the protagonist Colin Trafford finds himself in a counterfactual version of 1954:

> I turned to the middle page, and read: 'Disorders in Delhi. One of the greatest exhibitions of civil disobedience so far staged in India took place here today demanding the immediate release of Nehru from prison....' (Dannenberg, 2008: 144–145).

The above extract explains how protagonist Colin Trafford reads in the newspaper about the counterfactual historical timeline of the textual actual world. Dannenberg does not produce a visual representation of this blend, but for the purposes of clarification and my associated argument, it is necessary for me to do so. Therefore, the Figure 3.5 visually represents the blending model as applied by Dannenberg to the above passage from *Random Quest*:

Actual world input space 1

Actual world input space 2

Nehru's act of civil unrest before India's independence

Nehru as Prime Minister of India in 1947

CONTRADICTED

The Blend

Nehru's acts of civil unrest leads to him being in prison (year: 1954)

Figure 3.5: A visual representation of Dannenberg's model applied to a passage from Random Quest (1965)

Figure 3.5 gives a visual representation of how Dannenberg suggests a counterfactual works as a blend in counterfactual historical fiction texts. She proposes that the "Nehru of this text [*Random Quest*] [...] is a blend of two 'mental spaces' from the real world Indian history" (59). While one space comprises Nehru's acts of civil unrest against the British before India's independence, the other space comprises Nehru's role as Prime Minister after India's independence. While the information from the first input space is

extended directly into the counterfactual space, a contradiction of the information in the second space (Nehru is not the Prime Minister, instead he is in jail) exists in the counterfactual space. Thus, according to Dannenberg's analysis above, the blended space is the counterfactual that is presented in the text. Following Fauconnier and Turner, Dannenberg suggests that the blended space can now be used to understand the counterfactual world that is presented to us. To conclude, the concept of world blending that is used by Dannenberg suggests that mixing the textual actual world and the actual world together allows readers to interpret the counterfactual textual actual world that is constructed by the text.

I argue that Dannenberg's (2008) blending model, as illustrated above, is ineffective for three reasons. First, as explained above, the model suggests that the first space contains an actual world input that is extended into the blended space directly, while the actual world input from the second space is contradicted in the blended space. This model is effective in terms of the example that Dannenberg uses from *Random Quest* because input space one is the antecedent, which is the event (a false one, at times) that leads to the hypothetical proposition or the counterfactual – in this case Nehru's act of civil unrest in India. Input space two is the consequent, that is, the counterfactual description – in this case Nehru's imprisonment. In this example, both the antecedent and the consequent are explicit in the text: Nehru's act of civil unrest leads to Nehru's imprisonment. As a result, it is easy to fill in the input spaces with this information. However, not all counterfactual narratives reveal the historical antecedent in the text so explicitly; they only present the altered outcomes in the textual actual world. Thus, her model cannot be used to study

all narratives across the genre of counterfactual historical fiction because a large number of these narratives only present the altered historical timeline; they do not give any details of the events that directly lead to the alternative history in textual actual world and as such a more rigorous and replicable model is needed.

To make the above criticism of Dannenberg's model less abstract let me draw from a short example from *Fatherland*:

> In Prague, Reinhard Heydrich is recovering from an assassination attempt (Harris, 1992: 230).

In this example, the antecedent to the counterfactual history that is presented in the text is not clear; the text only presents the consequent, that is, the alternative history of the actual world that is constructed in the textual actual world. More specifically, the text only tells us the alternate version (Reinhard Heydrich survives the assassination attempt). According to Dannenberg's blending model, the text contains the information from the second actual world input space – Reinhard Heydrich is assassinated in 1942 – that is then contradicted in the emergent blend – Reinhard Heydrich is recovering from an assassination attempt. However, in *Fatherland,* the textual actual world does not give us any information on how Heydrich survives the assassination attempt and events that lead to Reinhard Heydrich surviving the assassination attempt is also not revealed to the reader. This means that the contents of input space one are not explicitly mentioned in the text. As a result, it becomes difficult to complete the blending process with there being an unspecified input space. This is primarily because Dannenberg only applies this model to an example that

specifies both the antecedent and consequent within the text and as such we do not know what an application of her model to a text that requires the reader to fill in input space one would look like.

Actual world input space 1

Actual world input space 2

Not specified in the text

Heydrich is assassinated in 1942

The Blend

CONTRADICTED

? + Heydrich survives the assassination attempt in 1942

Figure 3.6: Unspecified input space one

Figure 3.6 gives a visual representation of Dannenberg's blending model when applied to the example from *Fatherland* introduced above. While input space two contains the information of Heydrich's assassination attempt that is contradicted and exists in the blended space, as seen in Figure 3.6, the first

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input space is unspecified and therefore it is not clear what information is directly extended into the blend from this space.

Secondly, she uses her analysis of the extract from *Random Quest* to assert that "the world-separatist possible-worlds framework is incapable of penetrating the cognitive dynamics of counterfactuals" (60). What she fails to recognise here is that before blending the two actual world inputs, she essentially separates them and thus her model relies on a *world-separatist* approach during its first step at least.

Thirdly and most importantly, I argue against the blending model proposed by Dannenberg to analyse counterfactual historical fiction texts because it does not sufficiently explain how readers process a counterfactual historical fiction text. The concept of blending, within the context of a counterfactual historical fiction text, proposes that the blended space or the blend that includes the counterfactual description is a new domain that is a product of running the blend. As Fauconnier and Turner (2002) state, "the blend develops emergent structure that is not in the inputs [...] composition of elements from the inputs makes relations available in the blend that do not exist in the separate inputs" (42). This suggests that it is more than just the sum of the two initial input spaces. As such, using the word 'blend' to describe the counterfactual space raises an issue in that the term 'blend' of input spaces suggests that they are combined inseparably. That is, once the blend is complete they cannot be taken apart. As Fauconnier and Turner explain, "completion [of the blending process] brings additional structure to the blend" and "at this point, the blend is

integrated" (43). As such, defining the counterfactual space as a blend terminologically implies that the two input spaces that create the blend do not exist as separate spaces anymore because they are combined.

The blended space in the context of a counterfactual historical fiction text is the textual actual world. Therefore, to say that the textual actual world is a result of a blend of two input spaces, or to use my terminology, two worlds – the actual world and the textual actual world – would imply that these worlds are inseparably mixed. Thus, although counterfactual historical fiction texts use events from the actual world, thereby presenting a textual actual world that combines the actual world and the textual actual world, I argue against the use of the term 'blend' to describe the manner in which the two worlds are combined. More specifically, I argue that using the process of blending to describe how readers use the two worlds to make sense of the counterfactual textual actual world does not accurately reflect the manner in which readers use their knowledge of the actual world (i.e. their RK-worlds) to understand the significance of such texts. The reason I argue that the process of blending is inaccurate is because, as I will show below, readers use their RK-world separately before using it in combination with the counterfactual textual actual world. Dannenberg does not account for this process in her model but in her analysis of *Random Quest*, she rightly points out that:

> The real world reader recognizes that she comes from a world in which
> Nehru became prime minister of India as a result of that country's
> independence in 1947 [...] only if the reader possesses this knowledge is
> she able to perceive the above events as counterfactual deviations from
> actual history and enjoy the text's full counterfactual-creative scope (59).

Dannenberg acknowledges that these texts invoke the actual world; that is readers use their RK-world to recognise the counterfactual deviations in the textual actual world, and that the significance of such texts is understood only when readers compare their RK-world to the textual actual world. She also suggests that counterfactual historical fiction texts must be seen cognitively as a "multiple-world text because in order to understand it the reader must access real-world history to grasp its counterfactual frame. Ontologically, however, it is a single-world text in the realist tradition, since the counterfactual world is the text's only actual world" (62). Again, what Dannenberg highlights here is how the text presents only the textual actual world but when readers read such texts they conceptualise both, the actual world and the textual actual world. Furthermore, Dannenberg uses the terms 'transworld identification' and 'transworld differentiation' to describe the process that readers go through – a reader first identifies that the world they come from is not the same as the textual actual world and then they differentiate between the factual and the counterfactual (60). However, while she seems to acknowledge the importance of moving between worlds, the model that she offers does not reflect this unique 'multiple-world' structure of such fiction as identified by her and neither does it reflect the different readerly processes that she claims readers entertain in their mind.

Singles (2013) makes a similar point about the relationship between the actual world and the textual actual world of counterfactual historical fiction texts when she states that "alternate histories [...] create a dialogic relation between history and its alternate version, superimpose them, rather than merging or cancelling them out" (72). Singles here uses the term 'superimpose' to describe the relation

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between the actual world and the counterfactual textual actual world. She draws on a Bakhtinian term – dialogic – to describe the continual dialogue that the textual actual world history has with the actual world history. According to Shepherd (2009), Bakhtin's dialogism "is most commonly used to denote the quality of an instance of discourse that explicitly acknowledges that it is defined by its relationship to other instances" (123). Therefore, within counterfactual historical fiction texts, the term 'dialogic' may be applied to mean that the significance of the textual actual world history is only understood using the actual world history that it contradicts. This notion of there being a dialogue between the two histories needs to be reflected in the model that is used in the analysis of counterfactual historical fiction texts. For this purpose, in the next section I will develop my Possible Worlds model further by introducing the concept of 'ontological superimposition' to model the two-layered structure that readers conceive in their mind when they read counterfactual historical fiction texts.

3.4.2 Ontological Superimposition

I propose that according to the concept of ontological superimposition, in a counterfactual historical fiction text, the textual actual world is superimposed on the actual world. Before I begin explaining my model in any detail, it is important to clarify what I mean by the term superimposition. According to *The Oxford English Dictionary* (2017), to superimpose means "to impose, place, or lay (something, now esp[ecially] an image) on, over, or on top of something else, typically so that both are still evident". Therefore, conceptualising a counterfactual historical fiction text as having a superimposed structure implies that the actual world and the textual actual world are separate and hence are

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both evident. This idea that counterfactual historical fiction texts have a superimposed structure needs to be illustrated clearly. For this purpose, I am going to use visual aids (as shown in Figures 3.7 and 3.8) to represent what a superimposed structure of a counterfactual historical text looks like.

Figure 3.7: A map of Europe and Russia after the Second World War

Figure 3.7 shows a map of Europe that is divided into countries such as Germany, Poland, Belarus and so on. This is the actual world background on to which the textual actual world of *Fatherland* is superimposed. In the textual actual world, the Greater German Reich, as seen in Figure 3.8, stretches all the way to the   east of Poland.

Figure 3.8: The Greater German Reich, 1964 in textual actual world of *Fatherland*

According to my concept of ontological superimposition, when readers read counterfactual historical fiction texts, they superimpose the textual actual world (as shown in Figure 3.8) on the actual world (as shown in Figure 3.7) to be able to identify and appreciate the historical deviations introduced in such texts.

Figure 3.9: Two layers of the superimposed structure invoked by *Fatherland*

Figure 3.9 shows the manner in which readers process the structure of counterfactual historical fiction texts. It shows the two layers of the superimposed structure – it conveys how the actual world and the textual actual world can be seen together (as seen in Figure 3.8) to reveal the textual actual

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world and be seen separately and alongside one another so as to allow the reader to compare the textual actual world with the actual world. In Figure 3.9, a visual representation of the map of the Greater German Reich, 1964 as described in *Fatherland* is placed over or superimposed on a map of Europe and Russia as it is in the actual world. Figure 3.9 is an example that essentially conveys how readers process all counterfactual historical fiction texts, and in particular how they process *Fatherland* – the textual actual world with its alternative-to-the-actual-world historical timeline is superimposed on the actual world background for them to be able to appreciate the historical deviations in the text.

The text creates the textual actual world, and as such readers primarily only see the textual actual world – this is the first layer of the superimposed structure. However, when readers with a complete or partial RK-world encounter a counterfactual description in the text, their RK-worlds are invoked in their minds to be consulted with. This makes up what I define as the secondary layer of the superimposed structure, that is, the actual world. The reason I claim that it is the textual actual world that is superimposed on the actual world and not the other way around is because when the reader reads such texts, they initially only see the textual actual world. However, when the text presents a counterfactual scenario, a reader with a complete RK-world or partial RK-world immediately recognises the secondary layer of the text, that is, the actual world that the textual actual world directly contradicts.

I argue that this dual structure – i.e. the creation of a textual actual world and the invocation of the actual world – of a counterfactual historical fiction text needs to be acknowledged in analyses because it more accurately reflects the reading experience. The concept of ontological superimposition is effective because by asserting that the counterfactual historical fiction invokes a superimposed structure in readers' minds, it implies that both worlds are intermittently separate. Therefore, it accounts for the way in which the reader moves between the two worlds – the counterfactual textual actual world and the actual world that is invoked by the text in the reader's mind to be consulted with. This movement between the two worlds is important because a reader has to access information from their RK-world and contrast it with the information provided in the textual actual world with the purpose of deducing the counterfactual. Therefore, as a model that acknowledges that the two worlds – the actual world and the textual actual world – are separate at times helps us to explain how a reader uses their RK-world to identify the historical deviations in the textual actual world.

To summarise, I have clarified what I mean by the term 'superimposition' and demonstrated how conceptualising a counterfactual historical fiction text as invoking a superimposed structure in the mind of the reader reflects the manner in which the actual world is invoked when reading such texts. In the next section, I will demonstrate how accounting for the invocation of the actual world acknowledges the precise manner in which the textual actual world and the actual world are closely related. For this purpose, I draw on another example from *Fatherland* that focuses chiefly on the alternate historical timeline of the textual actual world – Xavier March, while waiting for a radio broadcast that

would announce a government statement, recalls similar broadcasts he has
heard in the past, especially during the Second World War:

> How many of these events could March remember? They stretched away
> behind him, islands in time [...]. Victory over Russia in the spring of'43 – a
> triumph for the Führer's strategic genius! The Wehrmacht summer
> offensive of the year before had cut Moscow off from the Caucasus,
> separating the Red armies from the Baku oilfields. Stalin's war machine
> had simply ground to a halt for want of fuel. Peace with the British in '44
> – a triumph for the Führer's counter-intelligence genius! March
> remembered how all U-boats had been recalled to their bases on the
> Atlantic coast to be equipped with a new cipher system: the treacherous
> British, they were told, had been reading the *Fatherland*'s codes. Picking
> off merchant shipping had been easy after that. England was starved into
> submission. Churchill and his gang of war-mongers had fled to Canada.

> Peace with the Americans in '46 – a triumph for the Führer's scientific
> genius! When America defeated Japan by detonating an atomic bomb,
> the Führer had sent a V-3 rocket to explode in the skies over New York to
> prove he could retaliate in kind if struck. After that, the war had dwindled
> to a series of bloody guerrilla conflicts at the fringes of the new German
> Empire. A nuclear stalemate which the diplomats called the Cold War. But
> still the broadcasts had gone on. When G[ö]ring had died in '51, there
> had been a whole day of solemn music before the announcement was
> made. Himmler had received similar treatment when he was killed in an
> aircraft explosion in '62 (Harris, 1992: 85 – 86).

It is through the above extract that the alternate historical timeline is revealed to the reader. Through this extract, we learn about the different historical developments that ultimately allowed Germany her victory in the Second World War in the textual actual world. According to this alternative Second World War timeline, in the summer of 1942 Germany had succeeded in cutting Moscow off from the Caucasus thereby cutting the Russian army from its fuel reserves in the Baku oil fields. Consequently, Russia was defeated by Germany in the spring of 1943. Germany discovered that the British were reading Germany's naval codes; the U-boats had been recalled, installed with a new cipher system, and Germany carried out a massive U-boat attack of Britain that forced them to surrender in 1943, following which Churchill and his entourage fled to Canada. After America defeated Japan in 1945 by using the atomic bomb, Germany had sent V-3 rocket to skies over New York to warn America that they were equipped to strike back if they were struck. A Cold War broke out between the two nations after this. Hermann Göring had died in 1951 and Henrich Himmler was killed in an air crash in 1962. Table 3.2 below shows the historical events in the actual world on the right with the historical deviations in textual actual world on the left:

Textual actual world	Actual world
Victory over Russia in the spring of'43	Germany was defeated by Russia in 1943 in the Battle of Stalingrad
The Wehrmacht summer offensive of the year before had cut Moscow off from the Caucasus, separating the Red	Although this was Germany's plan, the Case Blue operation – the name given to this plan – failed miserably. The

armies from the Baku oilfields. Stalin's war machine had simply ground to a halt for want of fuel.	Germans were defeated at Stalingrad and were forced to retreat from the Caucasus.
Peace with the British in '44	Germany did not make peace with the British in 1944
March remembered how all U-boats had been recalled to their bases on the Atlantic coast to be equipped with a new cipher system: the treacherous British, they were told, had been reading the *Fatherland*'s codes.	Germany never discovered that the English were reading their codes. England successfully broke the German naval enigma codes as they were being introduced and this ultimately led to the destruction of the German U-boats.
Churchill and his gang of war-mongers had fled to Canada	Churchill led Britain to victory against Nazi Germany in the Second World War.
When America defeated Japan by detonating an atomic bomb, the Führer had sent a V-3 rocket to explode in the skies over New York to prove he could retaliate in kind if struck. After that, the war had dwindled to a series of bloody guerilla conflicts at the fringes of the new German Empire.	It is true that America defeated Japan in 1945 after it dropped atomic bombs in the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, this was the last of the war; Hitler never sent a V-3 rocket. Instead, Japan surrendered and so did Germany after Hitler committed suicide on April 30, 1945.

Cold War ensues between Germany and America	In 1947, the Cold War started between U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
Göring died in 1951	After the Second World War, Göring was convicted of war crimes and sentenced to death by hanging. He committed suicide in 1945 – a night before his sentence was to be carried out.
Himmler died in an aircraft explosion in 1962	Himmler was captured by the British and committed suicide in 1945.

Table 3.2: Counterfactual history in the textual actual world of *Fatherland* with its corresponding fact in the actual world

As evidenced by Table 3.2, there is a very close relationship between the two worlds and in some cases the textual actual world history almost directly negates the actual world history. For example, in the textual actual world Germany is successful in cutting the Russian army off their petroleum reserves. However, in the actual world Germany failed to carry out this operation successfully. As seen in the above example and table, the text does not include any antecedents, that is, it does not explicitly reveal the incident that lead to the counterfactual consequent. However, because my model accounts for the actual world that is invoked in the mind of the reader, it thereby also accounts for how readers bring their knowledge of the actual world – what I call RK-worlds – while reading such fiction.

The concept of ontological superimposition suggests that in a counterfactual historical fiction text, the actual world history is *overwritten* as opposed to being *rewritten* with a textual actual world history. Consequently, the actual world still remains in the background, so the counterfactual textual actual world can be compared with it. The reason I argue that the two worlds are superimposed is also because a distinct feature of counterfactual historical fiction texts is the idea that the actual world is overwritten with the textual actual world as opposed to non-counterfactual historical fiction texts in which the actual world is rewritten by a textual actual world. In order to explain this distinction, I would like to draw on Singles' (2013) assertion that "alternate histories are not paraodies" but they are similar to them in that "they paradoxically preserve the text(s) that they change; in marking difference rather than similarity between two texts" (72). What Singles emphasises here is the manner in which counterfactual historical fiction texts retain the actual world that they alter in the textual actual world. Unlike other types of fiction such as historical fiction and other realist fiction, where readers assume that the textual actual world is an extension of the actual world and so we only see the similarities between the two worlds, in counterfactual historical fiction texts the emphasis is on the differences between the actual world and the textual actual world. The same can be said about genres such as fantasy and science fiction because as readers of such genres we focus on the differences between the textual actual world and the actual world, and construct the textual actual world as an alternative to the actual world.

However, the key difference between genres such as fantasy and science fiction, and counterfactual historical fiction texts lies in the emphasis on the opposition between the counterfactual textual actual world and the actual world. To explain: the textual actual worlds of fantasy and science fiction embellish worlds, that is, they create textual actual worlds where they introduce fantastic and science fictional elements, but in a counterfactual historical fiction text, historical events from the actual world are directly negated in the textual actual world. The focus of counterfactual historical fiction texts is on the history of the actual world and more specifically on the divergence from it. Therefore, we can say that a counterfactual textual actual world is a special kind of textual actual world, in that it directly contradicts the actual world. Conceptualising the structure invoked in the mind of a reader as a superimposition of two worlds avoids rendering them both as undecipherable, which, as I have argued above is a consequence of blending.

3.4.3 Reciprocal Feedback

In his discussion of historical fiction, McHale (2003) shows that when readers encounter two versions of history, an ontological flicker is induced in their minds. He states that apocryphal or alternate history contradicts the original history either by supplementing the original with more details or displacing the original completely. He writes:

> In both cases, the effect is to juxtapose the officially-accepted version of what happened and the way things were, with another, often radically dissimilar version of the world. The tension between these two versions induces a form of ontological flicker between the two worlds: one

moment, the official version seems to be eclipsed by the apocryphal version; the next moment, it is the apocryphal version that seems mirage-like, the official version appearing solid, irrefutable (90).

McHale here suggests that when readers encounter two versions of history, they juxtapose them in their minds and this juxtaposition prompts an ontological flicker between the two. Through an ontological flicker, what we think of as accurate frequently changes from the original version to the apocryphal version. Although McHale is right in pointing out that while reading counterfactual historical fiction texts we juxtapose the actual world and the textual actual world, I argue against the use of the term 'ontological flicker' to describe the movement between the two ontological domains. The term 'flicker' suggests that it is a fleeting movement, almost like a disturbance, an idea that is reinforced by McHale when he acknowledges that the span of the flicker is between 'one moment' and 'the next moment'. However, while reading a counterfactual historical fiction text, the pace of reference between the worlds is a considered and measured engagement with the text as opposed to being a sudden movement as the term flicker reflects. Furthermore, when a reader with a complete RK-world or partial RK-world encounters a counterfactual scenario, they are aware that the textual actual world is counterfactual to the actual world. A reader with a complete or partial RK-world does not question the accuracy of the textual actual world over the actual world; they are aware that the actual world history is authentic. Therefore, as an alternative I propose that a counterfactual historical fiction text induces an 'ontological *movement*' between the two worlds – when a reader with a complete or partial RK-world reads a counterfactual historical fiction text, the actual world is invoked and the reader

moves from the textual actual world to the actual world. The term 'ontological flicker', as argued above, does not fully capture this process.

In addition, I propose that readers further engage in a process which I define as 'reciprocal feedback' when they move between the two worlds. The process of reciprocal feedback proposes that this movement between worlds allows the reader to contextualise and evaluate the textual actual world within the domain of the actual world and also contextualise and evaluate the actual world within the domain of the textual actual world.

In order to explain the process of reciprocal feedback clearly, let me draw on and expand on the short example that I introduced earlier: During the investigation, March pulls out blank pieces of paper and begins to write a date one each of them followed by an incident. On the paper dated 'July 1942' he writes:

> On the Eastern Front, the Wehrmacht has launched Operation 'Blue': the offensive which will eventually win Germany the war. America is taking a hammering from the Japanese. The British are bombing the Ruhr, fighting in North Africa. In Prague, Reinhard Heydrich is recovering from an assassination attempt (Harris, 1992: 230).

Here, the reader learns that in the textual actual world in 1942, 'Operation Blue' was launched, which ultimately led to Germany's victory in the Second World

War. The Japanese were attacking America and the British were busy fighting in North Africa. Reinhard Heydrich had survived the assassination attempt and was recovering in Prague.

A reader with a complete RK-world, among other deviations, will also identify that in the actual world Operation Blue, which was intended to defeat the Soviets and remove them from the war, had failed when the Soviets defeated the Axis in the Battle of Stalingrad. Here, just as the reader uses the RK-world to interpret the textual actual world, while reading a counterfactual historical fiction text it is equally important for the reader to understand the point the counterfactual textual actual world is making about our actual world. As Ryan states, "the pragmatic purpose of counterfactuals is not to create alternate possible worlds for their own sake, but to make a point about AW" [Actual World] (Ryan 1991: 48). What Ryan underlines here is the importance of understanding what a counterfactual textual actual world is saying about the actual world. Since a counterfactual is created as an alternative to the actual world that we inhabit, it enables us to see what might have happened.

A reciprocal feedback in this case is the process of using the actual world we inhabit to understand the counterfactual textual actual world and similarly, using the textual actual world that presents a 'what could have happened' to understand the importance of what happened in the actual world. In the example above, through a reciprocal feedback the reader would learn that if Operation Blue had been a success then the German army would have been successful in knocking the Soviets out of the war and this would have

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culminated in an Axis victory in the Second World War. To illustrate, Figure 3.10 provides a visual representation of the concept of reciprocal feedback:

Figure 3.10: Reciprocal feedback

Figure 3.10 shows how a reader engages with the actual world and the textual actual world cognitively. That is, a reader uses their RK-world to understand the significance of the textual actual world, which in turn helps them understand the point that the textual actual world is making about the actual world. Consequently, the importance of the actual world event that the textual actual world alters can also be evaluated.

To conclude, when a text presents a counterfactual event within its textual actual world, it invokes the reader's RK-world in the background because the information supplied in the text directly contradicts what the reader knows about the history of the actual world. As such, readers move between their RK-world and the textual actual world in a reciprocal feedback process, by using each of these worlds to appreciate and understand the significance of the other.

3.5 Summary

In this chapter, I have critically examined the notion of individual representations of the actual world or knowledge worlds within Possible Worlds Theory. I concluded that although the concept of using the knowledge of the actual world to interpret textual actual worlds is not new within Possible Worlds Theory, it is a concept that is underdeveloped and lacking in concretisation. I have shown how both Goodman (1986) in philosophy and Ryan (1991) in narratology have proposed modal systems that include individual representations of the actual world. However, the terminology that they adopt raises an issue in that they use a well-established term in Possible Worlds Theory – the 'actual world' – to define a completely different concept, that of, subjective representation of the actual world. As a solution to this problem, I have recommended building on and using Ryan's (1991) category of K-worlds. In order to avoid terminological confusions, I have spilt Ryan's K-worlds into CK-world which is a character's knowledge world and RK-world to describe a reader's knowledge world. I have further differentiated between RK-worlds by categorising them into complete RK-world, partial RK-world, and zero RK-world. Depending on the reader's RK-world, they will recognise one or more deviations

from the actual world history that is presented in the textual actual world of counterfactual historical fiction texts.

After introducing the category of RK-worlds and using Possible Worlds Theory to effectively separate the worlds of the text as a starting point for analysis of counterfactual historical fiction, I have introduced the concept of ontological superimposition and its associated process of reciprocal feedback. My new concept of 'ontological superimposition' is able to model the two-layered structure that readers conceive in their mind when they read counterfactual historical fiction; that is, the counterfactual textual actual world is superimposed on the actual world background. When readers read such fiction, their RK-worlds are invoked. Consequently, readers use their RK-worlds to identify the historical deviations in the textual actual world. Following this, readers go through a process of reciprocal feedback, in which after they use their RK-world to interpret the counterfactual world of text, they also use that understanding of the counterfactual textual actual world to evaluate and/or appreciate the actual world.

Having offered the first set of modifications to Possible Worlds theory in this chapter by offering the concept of RK-worlds, ontological superimposition, and reciprocal feedback, in the next chapter I will develop my model further. More specifically, I will critically examine concepts within Possible Worlds Theory such as transworld identity and counterparthood to show how they can be used alongside my concepts of RK-world and reciprocal feedback to theorise how readers process the inclusion of actual world historical characters in fiction.

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Chapter 4: A Revised Model Part Two – Redefining Counterpart Theory and Transworld Identity

4. Introduction

As seen in the previous chapters, in counterfactual historical fiction texts it is very common for actual world individuals, objects, and events to appear in the textual actual world. Within Possible Worlds Theory, there are two sets of conflicting concepts – counterpart theory and transworld identity – to define and describe the process through which individuals exist in more than one world. This is because Possible Worlds theorists in philosophy remain divided not only in their view on the ontological status of possible worlds, but as a direct consequence of this, both sides also disagree on whether individuals who exist in more than one world are the same individuals with transworld identity or if they are counterparts of each other.

In this chapter, I will critically examine counterpart theory and transworld identity, to demonstrate the manner in which both concepts deal with individuals that appear in more than one possible world. This is because, within the context of effectively analysing counterfactual historical fiction, before beginning any kind of analysis, it is first important to establish appropriate terminology with which to label individuals who appear across worlds. As I will show in this chapter, although a discursive and conceptual disparity exists between logicians about the status of individuals in and across worlds, within

literary studies, critics have dealt with such terminological inconsistencies by either choosing one concept over the other or employing both sets of concepts and associated terminologies. Narratologists who employ both terms use 'counterpart' to label all actual world individuals who appear in textual actual worlds and appropriate the term 'transworld identity' to describe the process through which they cross ontological boundaries and appear in more than one world. However, as I will argue in this chapter, within counterfactual historical fiction, it would be misleading to label all actual world individuals that appear in textual actual worlds as 'counterparts'. Using examples from Stephen Fry's *Making History* (1996) and Sarban's *The Sound of his Horn*, I will illustrate the inconsistencies of this nomenclature as both texts are indicative of the different types of actual world individuals that may typically exist in counterfactual textual actual worlds but in divergent ways. The aim of this chapter is therefore to develop my model further by establishing an appropriate approach with which to characterise the different kinds of actual world individuals based on how they are presented in texts. In doing so, I will be modifying Possible Worlds Theory so it can be used more accurately to analyse historical individuals that appear in counterfactual textual actual worlds.

4.1 Counterpart Theory and Transworld Identity

Philosophers who subscribe to Possible Worlds Theory disagree not only on the ontological status of possible worlds but also on the ontological status of individuals who inhabit these possible worlds. As I have discussed earlier in Chapter Two, modal realists such as Lewis (1986) maintain that both the actual world and all other possible worlds are concrete entities; thus the individuals

who inhabit these worlds are also concrete entities. The basic tenets of modal realism propose that:

(1) absolutely every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world is, and,

(2) absolutely every way that a part of a world could possibly be is a way that some part of some world is (Lewis, 1986: 86).

Therefore, according to Lewis, there are multiple worlds in the universe and any world that you could possibly imagine is an account of a world that already exists. This idea implies that there is no space in the universe for a *what-might-have-been* world that exists only conceptually. This is because modal realism asserts that such worlds are in fact true accounts of some world that physically exists as a part of our universe. Consequently, modal realists argue that although individuals can exist in more than one world, they are not the same individuals because it is logically not possible for any individual to exist in more than one world simultaneously. As Lewis (1983) explains, "worlds do not overlap: unlike Siamese twins, they have no shared parts [...] No possible individual is part of two worlds" (36). Since he proposes that the term actual is indexical and that all possible worlds exist concretely and simultaneously with the actual world, he argues that entities that exist across possible worlds cannot be the same entities. In line with his ontological position, Lewis (1968, cf. 1971, 1983) thus proposes a formal theory known as 'counterpart theory'. According to this theory, inhabitants of the actual world who exist in other possible worlds are not the same individuals, but instead they are counterparts of each other.

Lewis proposes his counterpart theory because he believes that "everything is identical to itself; nothing is ever identical to anything else except itself" (1986: 192). For Lewis, the concept of identity is unproblematic because it is a relation that one has with oneself and no one else. As an alternative, he proposes a counterpart relation to describe the identity between an actual world individual who exists in a possible world. He suggests that each of these individuals that exist across multiple worlds is a different counterpart. He clarifies:

> The counterpart relation is our substitute for identity between things in different worlds. Where some would say that you are in several worlds, in which you have somewhat different properties and somewhat different things happen to you, I prefer to say that you are in the actual world and no other, but you have counterparts in several other worlds. Your counterparts resemble you closely in content and context in important respects. They resemble you more closely than do the other things in their worlds. But they are not really you. For each of them is in his own world, and only you are here in the actual world (Lewis, 1968: 114).

Lewis's point here is that you exist only in the actual world but counterparts who resemble you in crucial ways exist in other worlds. He maintains that counterparts of you are more similar to you than other individuals who exist in their world. Therefore, while it may be possible that an individual X has multiple counterparts in other worlds, X exists only in the actual world. Here, Lewis uses phrases such as 'somewhat different properties' and 'resemble you closely in content and context' without specifying what these entail. Lewis (1973) in his later work elaborates that counterparts of X are "those things existing [in

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possible worlds] which resemble [X] closely in important respects of intrinsic quality and extrinsic relations" (39). However, Lewis's proposition here is still unclear because it does not adequately explain the extent of properties that an individual must possess to qualify as a counterpart of someone.

To summarise, according to Lewis's counterpart theory, a conditional statement in the form of 'If I were a Mathematician...' presupposes, not that in some spatio-temporally distant possible world, *I* am a Mathematician, but that in some possible world, there is a *counterpart* of me who is a Mathematician. Based on the above example, a counterpart of me bears a resemblance to me in certain aspects but also has other distinct properties (for example, I am a linguist but a counterpart of me is a mathematician). There is something very convincing about Lewis's reasoning here because it makes sense that the possible world me is not the actual world me. We are not the same individuals because the actual world me is a linguist, whereas the possible world me is a mathematician. This raises the question of how the same individual can be a linguist in one world and a mathematician in another. A possible answer here is that they are two separate individuals and thus counterparts of each other. However, it is important to note that Lewis's counterpart theory is also problematic because it is an ambiguous concept. To elucidate, consider that there is a possible world in which X resembles two people in the actual world, then which actual world individual would X be considered a counterpart of? As Margolin (1990) notes, "questions immediately arise about whether there is a minimum degree of similarity required for counterparthood and what it may be" (866). However, Lewis offers no concrete method of discerning how someone in a possible world qualifies as a counterpart and even more so over other

individuals in their world that may also resemble the same actual world individual.

In direct opposition to Lewis's counterpart theory is Kripke's (1972) transworld identity or transworld identification. Transworld identity advocates the notion that the same individual can exist in multiple possible worlds, including the actual world. The basis for this argument is the ontological position held by moderate realists. As discussed in Chapter Two, for moderate realists, our actual world is the only concrete domain while all other possible worlds exist only conceptually. Accordingly, possible worlds along with their inhabitants are abstract entities and any talk about possible worlds is concerned with how things might have been rather than how things really are in another ontological domain. Therefore, when we talk about actual world individuals within a possible world, we imagine the same individual in a different context. Kripke (1972) uses the example of President Richard Nixon to argue that while "talking about what would have happened to Nixon in a certain counterfactual situation, we are talking about what would have happened to *him*" (44, original emphasis) as opposed to what would have happened to a counterpart of him.

Arguing against Lewis's counterpart theory, Kripke (1980) asserts that the concept is misrepresentative because according to counterpart theory:

> If we say 'Humphrey might have won the election (if only he had done such-and-such)', we are not talking about something that might have happened to *Humphrey* but to someone else [...].[H]owever, Humphrey

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could not care less whether someone *else*, no matter how much resembling him, would have been victorious in another possible world (Kripke, 1980: 45).

Kripke here explains why counterpart theory fails as a concept within Possible Worlds logic because analysing a counterfactual statement about Humphrey of the *actual world* in terms of counterpart theory only allows us to analyse what would have happened to a *counterpart* of Humphrey, who would be a different person, and *not* the actual world Humphrey as it would be intended. Kripke, therefore, rejects the notion of counterparts and asserts that a counterfactual statement about Humphrey is talking about what would have happened to *him*, and not to any of his counterparts.

Lewis (1986) explicitly argues against the Humphrey objection by pointing out again that it is not logically possible for an individual to exist in more than one world at the same time. He states: "what I do find problematic – inconsistent, not to mince words – is the way the common part of the two worlds is supposed to have different properties in the one world and in the other" (199). He continues:

> Hubert Humphrey has a certain size and shape, and is composed of parts arranged in a certain way. His size and shape and composition are intrinsic to him. [...] they differ from his extrinsic properties, such as being popular, being Vice President of the United States, wearing a fur hat, inhabiting a planet with a moon, or inhabiting a world where nothing goes faster than light. Also, his size and shape and composition are accidental, not essential, to him. He could have been taller, he could have

been slimmer, he could have had more or fewer fingers on his hands.

Consider the last. He could have had six fingers on his left hand. There is some other world that so represents him. [...] He himself one and the same and altogether self-identical-has five fingers on the left hand, and he has not five but six. How can this be? (Lewis, 1986: 199).

Lewis, here, points out that size and shape constitute an individual's intrinsic properties, that is, they are internal or inherent properties as opposed to extrinsic properties such as an individual's popularity or occupation which is dependent on context or external relations. Lewis also introduces the idea of essential and accidental properties here. An essential property is defined by Teller (1975) as "a property a thing has necessarily" (233). That is, "the difference between having [essential property] P and not having [essential property] P makes a difference to what a thing is, in the strong sense of making a difference as to the very identity of a thing" (236). Based on this definition, it can be interpreted that the essential property of an eraser is its ability to erase pencil marks because if an eraser loses this property it ceases to be an eraser. An accidental property, on the other hand, is a property that is not essential. For instance, the eraser's colour would be its accidental property.

Lewis (1986) above states that Humphrey's shape and size are his intrinsic properties, but they are not essential to him. This means that changing the number of fingers in Humphrey's hands does not stop him from being Humphrey. In that case, he affirms that it is possible that Humphrey in a possible world has six fingers on his left hand. If we are to side with transworld identity, according to which individuals across possible worlds are identical,

Lewis questions how we can claim that the same individual has different properties in different worlds. Lewis stresses that both the Humphreys cannot be the same individual solely because in the actual world he has five fingers and in a possible world he has six fingers. Instead, Lewis suggests that the six-fingered Humphrey in a possible world is the counterpart of the five-fingered actual world Humphrey. Although not explicitly stated, it can be inferred through Lewis's conjectures that a counterpart of X is someone that shares some essential properties with X, while also having other distinct properties of their own. However, it is still unclear as to what qualifies as an essential property of an individual such that it makes them a counterpart and as such Lewis's approach remains indeterminate.

4.1.1 Essential Properties and Rigid Designation

As discussed above, essential properties are those defining properties that are crucial for an object to be what it is. Accordingly, an essential property of an individual can be understood as properties that are necessary for an individual to be who they are. Ronen (1994) explains that traditionally "the meaning of a term is formed by a conjunction (or disjunction) of [essential] properties associated with the term" (42). This means that terms have certain fixed properties. To use Ronen's example: "the meaning of the name Socrates is fixed by the property 'a Greek philosopher'" (42). Ronen states that within Possible Worlds Theory, this initially raised concern over the nature and extent of essential properties that individuals must have across multiple ontological domains for a proper name to serve as a rigid designator that designates the same individual across multiple possible worlds. For instance, to build on Ronen's example, it is possible to refer to Socrates, even if one is unaware of any

of his essential properties. Suppose, one asked 'is Socrates the Roman mathematician?' they *are* referring to Socrates even if they do not know of Socrates' essential properties. The concept of essential properties is therefore somewhat restrictive to serve as a successful form of reference.

Opposing such traditional theories of reference, philosophers such as Kripke (1972) have argued that proper names refer to an individual regardless of whether or not their essential properties pertain. To support his notion of transworld identity, Kripke develops a criterion for identifying the same individual across possible worlds. That is, to use Kripke's Humphrey example from above, a means of establishing how Humphrey in a possible world who has won the election is the same individual as the actual world Humphrey who loses the election. Kripke proposes the concept of a rigid designator and states that, "let's call something a rigid designator if in every possible world it designates the same object" (48). He further suggests that "proper names are rigid designators" (49) as opposed to definite descriptions that are non-rigid designators. He explains that a description such as "the President of U.S. in 1970 designates a certain man, Nixon [in the actual world]; but someone else (e.g. Humphrey) might have been president [in a possible world] in 1970" (49). Kripke reasons that while Nixon might not have been the president in 1970, "it is not the case that he might not have been Nixon" (49). Therefore, if Humphrey was president in 1970, then the description 'President of the US in 1970' would refer to Humphrey instead of Nixon. It also means that a world where Nixon is not the president is being imagined as opposed to imagining a world where Nixon is Humphrey.

As Kripke shows, a definite description does not rigidly designate, that is, it does not identify the same individual in every world. As an alternative, he proposes that proper names on their own are rigid designators. For instance, using the proper name Nixon refers to Nixon, even if he was not the president of the US in 1970. By formulating a basis by which different occurrences of a name across possible worlds can be identified as the same individual, Kripke avoids any uncertainty that a criterion such as Lewis's, that is based on essential properties, might bring with it. However, the concept of essential properties is important within the context of counterfactual historical fiction and as I will show later in this chapter, the concept is problematic only because it is insufficiently explained. Furthermore, the concept of proper names as rigid designators is also integral to my argument. For this purpose, I will be drawing on both of these concepts later when I explicate my approach to characterising actual world individuals that appear in counterfactual historical fiction texts.

To summarise both concepts clearly: while Lewis's counterpart theory argues that only counterparts can exist in more than one world at the same time, transworld identity commits us to the view that it is possible for the same individual to exist in multiple worlds simultaneously. To clarify using my previous example: counterpart theory posits that a statement such as 'I could have been a Mathematician' assumes that there is a possible world in which a counterpart of me is a mathematician. In contrast, according to transworld identity, the same statement presupposes that there is a possible world in which *I* exist and I am a mathematician. Therefore, to say that an individual has

transworld identity means that the same individual exists in more than one world and to say that you have a counterpart means that you exist in the actual world but someone who resembles you closely exists in a possible world. However, as critiqued above, while Lewis presents his counterpart theory he fails to clarify the grounds on which an individual in a possible world can be deemed a counterpart of an actual world individual. On the other hand, Kripke (1972) bases transworld identity on the concept of rigid designation in the form of proper names and as such he offers a possible solution to the issue around identity between actual and possible individuals.

4.2 Counterpart Theory and Transworld Identity within the Context of Fiction

As the preceding discussion has shown, within philosophical logic, modal realists and moderate realists remain divided in their view and as such the debate surrounding transworld identity and counterpart theory remains unresolved. Bell (2010) notes that as a consequence "the field of literary studies has inherited [from possible worlds logic in philosophy] – if only implicitly – a number of unresolved conflicts along with disparate conceptualisations, varied terminology and potentially incompatible approaches" (75). Before I explain the approach that I wish to adopt to analyse counterfactual historical fiction, it is necessary to first explore how narratologists have dealt with the conceptual and terminological disparities that exist between both these concepts in their analysis.

In Ronen's discussion of the concept of transworld identification, although she appropriates the term 'transworld identity' to link an actual world individual to their corresponding character in a textual actual world, she recognises the problem that the term transworld identity poses in literary studies. She links the problem to the "difference between the way possibility functions in philosophical logic and in literary theory of fictionality" (60). According to Ronen, possible worlds in philosophy are conceptual worlds and the only restrictions imposed on them are the two laws of logic – The Law of the Excluded Middle and the Law of Non-Contradiction. As an example, she points out how possible worlds may consist of only one or two entities and sometimes even no entity at all. That is, it is logically possible for a possible world to be empty. Fictional worlds on the other hand, in the words of Ronen, are "pregnant worlds, concrete constellations of objects, and not abstract constructs" (60) and therefore possibility within this discipline "depends on the presence of concrete fictional entities" (60). Ronen highlights how possible worlds are perceived differently between the two disciplines – possible worlds are perceived by philosophers as conceptual constructs but she claims that fictional worlds are perceived by literary theorists and readers as concrete constructs. As a result, Ronen explains that "transworld identity does not raise a problem when we treat all worlds relevant for cross-identification as if they were of the same logical order" (59).

To show how the notion transworld identity in narratology is not problematic, Ronen gives the example of when individuals travel between worlds that belong to the same ontological universe (i.e., the actual world and possible worlds or the textual actual world and textual possible worlds). However, she

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acknowledges that it is problematic when individuals move from one ontological universe to another. Ronen explains:

> Trans-world identity does raise a problem in the context of worlds of different orders, worlds which do not belong to the same logical domain. Such is the case when we have a fictional construct on the one hand and the given world of our experience, on the other hand (Ronen, 1994: 59).

Ronen here highlights why transworld identity is an issue when inhabitants of the actual world appear in the textual actual world because these worlds belong to different ontological domains – while one originates in the actual universe, the other exists in the textual universe. Bell (2010) concurs with Ronen when she states that "the movement of an individual between the Actual World and possible world or a Textual Actual World and a Textual Possible World can be easily theoretically accommodated because they belong to the same system of reality [...]. [However] issues of counterparthood and transworld identity represent a potential ontological challenge when an Actual World individual appears in a Textual Actual World because they belong to different systems of reality" (76).

Like Ronen (1994), Doležel (1998) also acknowledges the illogicality of actual world individuals that appear in the textual actual world. Bell (2010: 76) notes that unlike Ronen (1994), Doležel (1998) offers a solution when he uses both terms – counterpart and transworld identity – in his analyses. Doležel justifies his choice of using both terms to talk about actual world individuals that exist within the realm of fiction in the following words:

Tolstoy's fictional Napoleon or Dickens's fictional London are not identical with the historical Napoleon or the geographical London [...] [yet] an ineradicable relationship exists between the historical Napoleon and all fictional Napoleons, between the actual London and all the fictional settings called London. [...] This relationship extends across world boundaries; fictional entities and their actual prototypes are linked by transworld identity. [...] Lewis, emphasizing that 'things in different worlds are never identical,' links the various incarnations of one thing in different worlds by the 'counterpart relation.' It is 'a relation of similarity' and thus seems to presuppose that the counterparts share some essential properties. But it is also flexible enough to link the Hitler of history and a Hitler who led 'a blameless life' (Doležel, 1998b: 788–789).

Doležel's reasons for using the term 'counterpart' are as follows: 1) he recognises that actual world individuals and their fictional counterparts are not identical, and, 2) although a counterpart and their corresponding actual world individual are not identical, they still share certain essential properties that are sufficient to link the textual actual counterpart to the actual world individual. At the same time, Doležel also uses the term 'transworld identity' in order to show that although actual 'prototypes', that is, the individual that originates in the actual world and their counterparts are not the same individuals, they are still epistemologically related. Therefore, in order to be able to use Possible Worlds Theory to theorise the process through which actual world individuals appear in textual actual worlds, Doležel also proposes using the term transworld identity.

Ryan (1991) also recognises the importance of using both terms for the analysis of fictional texts. Using the example of Napoleon Bonaparte appearing in fictional texts, she asserts that "the Napoleon of TAW [textual actual world] is regarded as a counterpart of the Napoleon of AW [actual world] linked to him through [...] a line of transworld identity" (52). Like Doležel (1998) and Ryan (1991), Bell (2010) too sees merit in using both terms and states that:

> The use of the Concretist term, 'counterpart', to describe an actual world figure in fiction acknowledges that a fictional incarnation is not the *same* individual as the actual world inhabitant. However, by describing the process through which they move through and across the different modal systems of reality as 'transworld identity' – a term allied with Abstractionism – their essential epistemic relation is maintained (77).

Bell, here, explains that using the term 'counterpart' maintains that the actual world original and its counterpart in the textual actual world are not the same individual. However, using the term 'transworld identity' to describe their movement from one modal system to another, readers can still make the epistemological connection between the actual world individual and their counterpart.

As the discussion has shown, using the term transworld identity alone to describe actual world historical figures in textual actual worlds maintains the epistemological link between them, but it also commits us to the notion that they are the *same* individuals. This is misrepresentative because it fails to capture the differences that exist between these individuals. On the other hand, using both terms is advantageous because it not only highlights that an actual

world individual and their counterpart are not the self-same individual, but it also ensures that the epistemological relation between the two is maintained. In any case, for these concepts and associated terminology to work within the context of fiction, a means of theorising how readers recognise that a character within a text is a counterpart of an actual world historical figure is required.

As Bell (2010) notes, "while terminology and conceptual boundaries are important to establish, the evidence on which associations are made are equally if not more pressing for a literary critical agenda" (123). This is because, as a prerequisite to appropriately using the concepts of counterparts and transworld identity within fiction, one needs to discern how texts signal the use of actual world historical figures in their textual actual worlds. For this purpose, Pavel (1979) draws on Kripke's (1972) concept of proper names as rigid designators and proposes a theory of rigid designators to work within the context of fiction. Pavel (1979) suggests that proper names "are linguistic labels pegged to individuals, independently of the properties these individuals display" (181). Pavel's theory of rigid designators states that actual world individuals can be invoked by their proper names. Using the example of Shakespeare and authorship, Pavel shows that if it were to be proved that *Othello* or *Hamlet* was written by Bacon and not Shakespeare, "this discovery would not entail that Bacon is Shakespeare, nor that Shakespeare ceases to be Shakespeare" (181). He argues that "a being is given a name which refers to him, even if his set (cluster) of properties is unknown, variable or different from what one believes it is" (181).

Pavel's proposition that proper names are rigid designators is useful because when this method is used to analyse counterfactual historical fiction texts, it allows, for example, the actual world Adolf Hitler to be invoked by a text simply by using the proper name, even if the textual actual world counterpart has different properties. Therefore, to use another one of Ronen's (1994) examples this would mean that by using the theory of proper names as a rigid designator, "we can refer to Nixon, for instance, if we assume that none or almost none of his properties obtain ('imagine Nixon was not elected president')" (42). As Bell (2010) notes, "using a proper name as a form of rigid designator is attractive because it allows a particular individual to be invoked while allowing changes to be made to that individuals properties" (123). However, Bell also points out that when applied to certain fiction, Pavel's approach can be insufficient. She shows this using an example from Stuart Moulthrop's Victory Garden (1992) that includes the name 'Saddam' against the backdrop of the Gulf War. She states:

> Using [Pavel's] method, individuals are invoked by their proper names and their attributes are susceptible to change or mutation. Yet in instances, such as 'Saddam' in {Cyclops} where the full designation is missing, this is not completely sufficient (Bell 2010: 72).

Here, Bell points out how proper names as rigid designators can be problematic when a text fails to use the full designation. She argues that Pavel's theory of rigid designators is limited because cross-referencing between individuals across domains is not always straightforward. She links this issue to instances when the text uses only the first or last name to refer to the character. This is because more than one individual may share that proper name in the actual world. In such a case, the text could be referring to any of those individuals in the actual world. To circumvent this issue, Bell uses Ryan's (1991) principle of

minimal departure alongside Pavel's (1979) theory of rigid designation because she recognises that it is possible to cross-reference individuals based on the context as well. This is because the principle of minimal departure posits that readers use their actual world knowledge to make sense of textual actual worlds. In that case it can also be used to explain how readers can interpret names as well as descriptions and events that surround these names as a reference to an actual world historical figure.

While using Pavel's rigid designation together with Ryan's principle of minimal departure is favourable, as I will argue in the subsequent section, this approach is not always effective when analysing counterfactual historical fiction. More specifically, in the absence of a proper name to serve as a form of rigid designation, as I will argue below, a different approach, one that is based on using the concept of essential properties is needed.

To summarise, while some Possible Worlds literary theorists choose one term over the other (e.g. Ronen, 1994), others see the merit in using both terms (e.g. Doležel, 1998b; Ryan, 1991; Bell, 2010) to label and describe the process through which actual world individuals appear in textual actual worlds. As such, within Possible Worlds Theory, narratologists have appropriated the terminology and accompanying conceptual disparity to suit their analysis. However, this also means that from one to another they differ on which approach to adopt. In addition, while Possible Worlds theorists utilise proper names as a form of rigid designation to explain how texts signal their use of actual world inhabitants, the concept of essential properties is one that is largely

overlooked. In the next section, I will argue for its relevance within the context of counterfactual historical fiction. In doing so, I will clearly define what counts as an individual's essential properties so it can be used to effectively characterise the different actual world individuals in counterfactual historical fiction texts. While the approach advocated by narratologists such as Doležel (1998), Ryan (1991), and Bell (2010) of using the concepts of counterparthood and transworld identity from modal and moderate realism respectively proves useful in most kinds of analysis, in the next section I will show why their approach is not appropriate in the context of counterfactual historical fiction. More specifically, I will show how the concepts of counterpart theory and transworld identity refer to different phenomena in counterfactual historical fiction.

4.3 Counterparts and Transworld Identity within the Context of Counterfactual Historical Fiction

In this section, I will draw on two examples from Stephen Fry's *Making History* (1996) to show how the textual actual world of this novel includes actual world historical figures, but they vary in terms of how they are presented in the text. As a result, as I will argue below, using the term 'counterpart' to characterise all actual world historical figures in the text alike would be misleading.

In the textual actual world of *Making History*, Michael, a history graduate student and his friend Leo devise a time machine and decide to prevent the birth of Hitler by sending a contraceptive pill back in time. They use the machine and drop the pill in Braunau's water supply. Braunau is the town in which Hitler

was born. This pill contaminates all of the water forever; Hitler's mother never gets pregnant ergo Hitler is never born. Consequently, the world changes – Michael wakes up in a world where Hitler does not exist. Nevertheless, in Hitler's absence another leader rises to power and a different form of the "Final Solution" of the Jews or the Holocaust is still implemented.

The first illustrative example that I present takes place at a point in the narrative before the time machine has been used:

> Kremer kept a diary, you know. It was his downfall. He was at Auschwitz for three months only, but it was enough. The diary was confiscated by the British who allowed him to be extradited to Poland. Extracts are included in this book which was published in Germany in 1988. I read to you. "10th October 1942. Extracted and fixed fresh live material from liver, spleen, and pancreas. Got prisoners to make me a signature stamp. For first time heated the room. More cases of typhus fever and Typhus abdominalis. Camp quarantine continues. [...] Attended trial and eleven executions. Extracted fresh live material from liver, spleen and pancreas after injection of pilocarpin. [...] Sunday. Horrible scenes with three naked women who begged us for their lives." And so on and so on and so on. This was Kremer's three months. His entire contribution to the Final Solution of the Jewish Problem in Europe (Fry, 1996: 132–133).

This example describes a character who goes by the name Kremer, who in the textual actual world, according to Leo, kept a diary when he was assigned to work at the Auschwitz concentration camp. He worked in the camp for three months, among other things he mainly contributed towards live organ removal

experiments, one of the different strategies employed to ensure the Final Solution. While the extract above only includes a second name, following this Kremer is introduced using his full name: Johannes Paul Kremer (Fry, 1996: 134). Pavel's (1979) theory of rigid designation states that an occurrence of a proper name in fiction rigidly designates the actual world individual who shares that proper name. In this instance, readers will use their RK-worlds to recognise that the text is invoking the actual world Johannes Paul Kremer. 'For ease of reference I am going to call this Kremer, 'Kremer 1'.

In another example from this text, this one from after the time machine is used and the world has changed, Kremer is presented somewhat differently in the new textual actual world:

> He [the Führer] wanted Kremer and [Leo's father] to synthesise this water of Braunau on a large scale. He wanted us to set up a small manufacturing plant, somewhere discreet. We chose a little out of the way town in Poland called Auschwitz. The Braunau Water was to be produced in the greatest secrecy of course and with superhuman care. Each flask to be numbered, sealed in wax and accounted for. They were to be used in a great task, the greatest task then facing us, now that Russia had been defeated and absorbed into the Reich, and Europe was stable and free of Bolshevism. The water of Braunau was to be used, in the Führer's words, "to cleanse the Reich, as Hercules had cleansed the Augean stables. All the filth of Europe will be washed away (304).

These descriptions associated with Kremer appear in the second textual actual world which is a counterfactual version of the first textual actual world. This

extract is one among other counterfactual descriptions in text. The extract in essence explains how a different form of the Final Solution was implemented in the second textual actual world. After Michael and Leo send the contraceptive pill back in time, the resultant world is a drastically changed one.

In the new world, Braunau's water supply is contaminated forever because of the pill. The Führer of the second textual actual world, Rudy Gloder, orders Kremer to manufacture the contaminated water in large quantities, thus ensuring that the Jewish race is wiped out entirely in one generation. In this world, concentration camps do not exist and as such there is no mention of any kind of human experimentation. Instead, the Braunau water synthesis plan is perfected and used to execute the Jews. Here again, the text invokes the actual world historical figure using the name 'Kremer'. Similar to the previous example, this extract also gives the reader some contextual information associated with Kremer. Readers with partial or complete RK-worlds will recognise that the proper name 'Kremer' is a reference to the actual world Kremer even though Kremer here possesses different characteristics. As Pavel's (1979) theory of rigid designation proposes, a proper name rigidly designates regardless of what properties the individual displays. In addition, readers will also recognise the place Braunau, which in the actual world is Hitler's birthplace and where in the textual actual world Michael and Leo sent the pill before the world changed. As evidenced through the extract, Kremer has still contributed to the Final Solution, expressed here through the phrases "to cleanse the Reich" (304) and "all the filth of Europe will be washed away". However, unlike Kremer 1, he is not conducting live experiments on humans; instead he is perfecting the Braunau water synthesis. For ease of reference I am going to call this Kremer, 'Kremer 2'.

While reading both these extracts, Ryan's (1991) principle of minimal departure can be used to explain how readers utilise their RK-worlds to make sense of the text. Ryan's principle of minimal departure proposes that a textual actual world can be understood "as conforming as far as possible to our representation of the AW [actual world]" (51). This means that when readers read any kind of fiction, they use the actual world as an epistemological template. According to this principle and in the case of example one, readers with a complete or partial RK-world will notice that the text uses much of the information from the actual world. More specifically, they will recognise that the text makes references to the Auschwitz concentration camp which existed in the actual world during World War II. They will also become aware that the text makes a reference to Kremer's diary, excerpts from which were published in the actual world. According to Kremer's diary, in Auschwitz, Kremer conducted experiments on humans by removing live organs or extracting samples from organs such as the kidney and liver and studying starvation in adults (see Höss, Broad and Kremer, 1994: 169). Similar to the entries in the example above, Kremer often mixed the day to day mundane with murder and executions in his diary entries (see Höss, Broad and Kremer, 1994).

Similarly, while reading the second example, a proper name – Kremer – which rigidly designates is still available. As Bell (2010) points out the principle of minimal departure explains "how casual forms of reference, such as proper names, are interpreted by readers as referring to an Actual World individual unless they are given details which challenge this assumption" (72). Here, Bell

affirms that the principle expresses the manner in which readers understand actual word proper names as references to the actual world individuals but also highlights that this is true of texts that do not specify otherwise. In the second example, an actual world individual's proper name is used, but the contextual information surrounding the proper name challenges what readers know about this individual in the context of the actual world. As previously discussed, Kremer in the actual world served in the Auschwitz concentration camp where he carried out organ removal experiments. Evidently, Kremer 2's description in the textual actual world conflicts with what readers may know about the actual world Kremer.

Pavel (1979) claims that "names in fiction work like usual proper names, that is as rigid designators attached to individuated objects, independent of the objects' properties" (185). Here, Pavel explains that regardless of the descriptions associated with an individual in a textual actual world, a proper name alone is sufficient to link the textual actual world figure to their corresponding actual world historical figure. Therefore, based on this, despite Kremer 2's dissimilarities to the actual world Kremer, the use of his proper name within the text establishes an epistemological link between the two. Furthermore, while the descriptions in the textual actual world associated with Kremer 2 challenge a reader's complete or partial RK-world, Kremer 2 should not be perceived as epistemologically removed from the actual world Kremer. This is because, given that these examples are from a counterfactual historical fiction text, readers may well expect to encounter counterfactual versions of actual world historical figures. For a reader to enjoy the full reading experience, it is necessary for them to make an integral epistemological link between actual

world historical figures and their counterfactual textual actual world namesakes. Therefore, with Kremer 1 and Kremer 2, it is important that readers understand that they are references to the same actual world historical figure – Johannes Paul Kremer, but that his properties are different in each case.

Juxtaposing the two examples introduced above demonstrates a key difference in the manner in which actual world historical figures are presented in textual actual worlds. The following table elucidates my key argument:

Kremer during the Second World War in the first textual actual world – Kremer 1	Kremer during the Second World War in the second textual actual world – Kremer 2	Kremer in the actual world during the Second World War
Conducting medical experiments on humans in Auschwitz involving removal of live organs.	Producing large quantities of the contaminated Braunau water.	Conducting medical experiments on humans in Auschwitz involving removal of live organs.
Contributes to the Final Solution that is a result of concentration camps and gas chambers.	Contributes to the Final Solution that is a result of the Braunau water synthesis.	Contributes to the Final Solution that is a result of concentration camps and gas chambers.

Table 4.1: Table showing the similarities and differences between the two Kremers presented in the text and the actual world Kremer

As evidenced by Table 4.1, Kremer 1 is presented as being identical to the actual world Kremer. In the textual actual world and in our actual world, Kremer was Professor of Anatomy and Human Genetics at Münster University in Germany. He served in the SS in the Auschwitz concentration camp as a physician during World War II. During his time, he was involved in Nazi human experimentation on the prisoners of Auschwitz. However, once the world changes, Kremer 2 is not conducting experiments on humans, instead he is perfecting the Braunau water synthesis. This leads me to my key argument which is that using the term 'counterpart' to name both fictional incarnations of Kremer would be misleading as it would not capture the difference between the manner in which they are presented. Likewise, using only the concept of transworld identity and its associated terminology also fails to capture the nuances. As a counterfactual historical fiction text, while most times actual world historical figures that appear in textual actual worlds possess altered attributes, occasionally they are also presented as being identical with the actual world individual. Consequently, I argue that a new approach is needed to capture the two different kinds of actual world figures. More specifically, I propose that terminology be used to demarcate actual world historical figures that are presented in a fictional context as being the self-same individual from those that are not. For this purpose, in the next section, I develop my model further by offering a new approach with which to define and describe all types of actual world historical individuals that appear in textual actual worlds.

4.4 The New Approach

In the previous section, I have demonstrated how existing approaches within Possible Worlds Theory to label and characterise actual world historical figures

in fiction is inappropriate for my purposes. However, instead of unnecessarily introducing new terminology, I propose rethinking already existing concepts and terms. Recall that within philosophical logic, the term counterpart proposes that they "resemble you in content and context in important ways [...] but they are not really you [...] your counterparts are men you would have been, had the world been otherwise" (Lewis, 1968: 27–28). In contrast, transworld identity proposes that the self-same person exists across possible worlds. That is, as Rescher (1975) asserts "distinct versions of the same individual" (79) exists across possible worlds. Here, the key difference between these concepts is that while the term counterpart implies that a different person who resembles the actual world individual exists in possible worlds, transworld identity insists that the same actual world individual exists. It is this crucial difference that I intend to reflect with my new approach. However, before any of these terms can be appropriated, it is important to clarify some existing issues especially with reference to the concept of properties. As I previously critiqued in my discussion of counterpart theory within philosophical logic, Lewis's concept is ambiguous because he does not specify how closely a counterpart must resemble the actual world individual or what kind of properties a counterpart must share with their corresponding actual world individual. This brings me to an insufficiently explained concept within Possible Worlds Theory, namely essential properties.

Within philosophical logic, Teller (1975) maintains that "an essential property is a property such that, if a thing loses it, that thing ceases to exist (236). To draw on the example of an eraser that I introduced earlier, it can be said that an eraser's essential property is its ability to erase. Therefore, using this definition to make sense of Lewis's counterpart theory would propose that a counterpart

of X shares some if not all essential properties with X, whilst also having other distinct essential properties of their own. However, it is important to first clearly define what is meant by essential properties within the context of counterfactual historical fiction so as to be able to appropriately label the different actual world individuals in these texts. Within the context of counterfactual historical fiction, I propose tailoring what counts as essential properties. For this purpose, I draw on Margolin's (1996) work:

> we encounter in major or minor role actuality variants, that is named [individuals] whose originals, bearing the same proper name, are actual [individuals] whose existence is certified by public intersubjective discourse [...] what's more, the story does not contradict any intersubjectively acknowledged singular facts about the original (127).

Here, Margolin explains a type of actual world individual that is found in texts. He calls them actuality variants because these individuals share a proper name with an actual world individual and the descriptions associated with these individuals do not contradict anything recorded about them in the actual world. Within the context of counterfactual historical fiction, I propose utilising Margolin's concept of "intersubjectively acknowledged singular facts" (127) as essential properties. Intersubjectively acknowledged singular facts about a historical figure can be defined as information about the individual that has been documented and authenticated by certified discourses such as historical books and newspapers. As Margolin (1996) explains, "the author's knowledge and image of the historical original underlying his work is based on verbal records contained in various certifying discourses of his culture, that is, discourses with institutionalized truth or fact claim, such as newspapers and history books" (128). I propose treating such agreed-upon information or

intersubjectively acknowledged singular facts about an individual as their essential properties especially within the context of counterfactual historical fiction.

Bearing this in mind, if we return to the analysis, I propose using the term 'counterpart' to label individuals like Kremer 2 who share some essential properties but also have other distinct-to-the-textual-actual-world properties. That is, they share some intersubjectively acknowledged facts with their corresponding actual world individual such as being the Nazi doctor, being ordered by the Führer to contribute towards the Final Solution and so on, but also have other distinct priorities like the Braunau water synthesis plan and execution.

In contrast, I propose that individuals like Kremer 1 who share all essential properties, that is they do not contradict any 'intersubjectively known facts' about the actual world historical figure should be labelled as individuals with transworld identity. Although Margolin (1996) uses the term 'actuality variant' to label these individuals, I propose using the concept of transworld identity that is in line with Possible Worlds theory to define and describe these actual world individuals in texts. Moreover, the suffix 'variant', if applied to describe Kremer 1, suggests that he is an alternative to the actual world Kremer, when what I want the new terminology to reflect is that they are both epistemologically the same individuals but just existing in different domains. Barring the fact that Kremer exists in the actual world and Kremer 1 appears in the textual actual world, there are no other differences between them, that is, they share all essential

properties. Ryan's principle of minimal departure can be used to explain how readers will assume that he is the same individual as the actual world Kremer because the text does not signal any changes to character Kremer in the textual actual world.

Furthermore, while the term 'actuality variant' may seem appropriate because it captures the idea that the character in question originates in another domain, I argue that it does not reflect whether the character is being presented as being identical or as being a different version to their corresponding actual world individual. While reading counterfactual historical fiction, readers are aware that actual world historical individuals presented in the text originate in the actual world and by no means do they assume that classifying them as being identical to their textual representatives presupposes that they have physically crossed ontological boundaries. Consequently, I argue that while it is important to focus on the ontological domains that these characters originate in, it is equally if not more important to focus on how they are being used within the domain. To this end, describing actual world individuals in the text who do not differ in essential properties derived from intersubjectively acknowledged facts as individuals with transworld identity accurately reflects that they are the same individuals existing in a fictional context.

To reiterate, as Lewis (1968) affirms, counterpart theory is a "relation of similarity" and transworld identity is an "equivalent relation" (115). Building on this, I propose using the term 'counterpart' to describe individuals across possible worlds who are linked to their corresponding actual world individual by

a similarity relation, that is, they resemble the actual world individual by sharing some essential properties, but also having other properties of their own. On the other hand, I propose that when we say that a certain individual has transworld identity, it means that they share a relation of equivalency with their actual world namesake, that is, they are identical to the actual world individual. Furthermore, Ryan's principle of minimal departure can also be used to differentiate between counterparts and transworld individuals. That is, when a character in the text is a counterpart, the text dictates some changes to the individual (as seen with the Kremer 2 example), but when the character possesses transworld identity the text does not dictate any changes in terms of the character (as seen with the Kremer 1 example).

In current Possible Worlds Theory, literary theorists (e.g. Doležel 1998; Ryan 1991; Bell 2010) have adopted the term 'transworld identity' to describe the process through which actual world figures appear in textual actual worlds. However, within the parameters of this thesis and within the context of counterfactual historical fiction, for reasons that I have argued above, I propose using the concept to describe a specific type of actual world individual that appears in texts. As an alternative, as seen through my analysis of the extracts from *Making History* above, Pavel's theory of rigid designation and Ryan's principle of minimal departure can be used to explain how readers use their RK-worlds in the context of the textual actual world to identify that Kremer 1 and Kremer 2 are epistemologically related to the actual world Kremer. In particular, I showed how Kremer 2, despite having contextual information that conflicts with readers' complete and partial RK-world, can and should be perceived as a

reference to the actual world Kremer thereby interpreting him within the context of the actual world Kremer.

In my discussion so far of actual world individuals in textual actual worlds, I have focused on two types: one where counterparts of actual world individuals appear in textual actual worlds and the other where actual world individuals with transworld identity are presented in textual actual worlds. However, a third type of actual world historical figure may also appear in counterfactual historical textual actual worlds, that is, historical figures that appear in textual actual worlds with a different proper name. To explain this further, in the next section I will draw on an example from *The Sound of his Horn*.

4.4.1 Actual World Individuals in Textual Actual Worlds with a Different Proper Name

As seen throughout the discussion in the section above, when a proper name is used within a textual actual world, it is relatively easy to make the epistemological connection to the corresponding actual world individual, provided readers possess complete or partial RK-worlds. I have also demonstrated how the principle of minimal departure can be used to explain how readers make inferences about counterparts and transworld individuals using contextual information available in the actual world. However, this type of interpretation that involves using RK-worlds to cross-reference counterparts and transworld individuals with their corresponding actual world individual is challenged when an actual world proper name is unavailable to readers. As Bell (2010) points out, "some texts are not necessarily explicit about characters that

they utilise" (124). An example of one such text is Sarban's *The Sound of his Horn* (1952). In this textual actual world, the protagonist Alan discovers a character named Count Hans von Hackelnberg, whose estate Alan is being treated in. At this point, it is necessary to point out that Alan escapes a prisoner of war camp during the Second World War and during his escape he passes through a mysterious ray of fences which transports him to a world where it is 102 years after the Second World War. Here, Adolf Hitler won the Second World War. Curious about the Count, Alan questions the nurse who tells him that the Count is the Reich Master Forester:

> "The Count?' I asked. "Who is the Count?'
> She came and looked down at me, so that I could just make out her features in the grey light from the window.
>
> She murmured something in German, then explained in English
> 'Count Johann von Hackelnberg.
> "And who is he?' I persisted, being determined to make the most of this opportunity when she seemed to have been startled into treating me as a sane person. But she paused and considered me before replying, as if my ignorance had reminded her that I was not normal after all: still, she did answer
> "Well, he is the Reich Master Forester.'
> Is he?' I said. "I thought Marshal G[ö]ring was that."
> I might have mentioned the name of our ship's cat for all the recognition she showed.
>
> It was news to me that Hermann G[ö]ring had divested himself of one of his functions, but it was more than likely that we should never

have heard of that event in Oflag XXIX Z. What was settled was that I was

the guest of the Reich Master Forester, and that seemed to me to explain

more than it left unexplained. But what a queer character the Graf von

Hackelnberg must be to go a-hunting in the forest by moonlight.

(Sarban, [1952] 2011: location 539–555).

This conversation between Alan and the nurse takes place at night after Alan

hears noises, which the nurse confirms is the Count returning home after

hunting. Here, when the nurse tells Alan that the Reich Master Forester is Count

Johann von Hackelnberg, Alan does not recognise the name. Moreover, he is

surprised because where Alan comes from Marshall Göring is the Reich Master

Forester. Readers with complete and partial RK-worlds will be aware that Alan

refers to an actual world historical figure, Hermann Göring. At first, Alan

addresses him using a title and a second name, that is, Marshall Göring, but in

the second instance he uses his full proper name. Furthermore, the reference to

the prestigious title of Reich Master Forester together with the awareness that

the text is an alternate World War II narrative, aids the cross-referencing

process.

A reader with a complete or partial RK-world will be able to comprehend Alan's

cause for surprise because they will know that in the actual world and the world

that Alan originally comes from, Hermann Göring, member of the Nazi party,

was appointed as the Reich Master of the Hunt in 1933 and the Master of

Forests in 1934 and as a result of which he was known as the Reich Master

Forester in the Third Reich (Speer, 1971: 244–245). Alan reasons that if the

Count had been made the Reich Forester, news as important as this was sure to

have made its way to Oflag XXIX Z, his prisoner of war camp. In any case, Alan tries to piece all the information together, and through him readers also learn more about the count Johann von Hackelnberg and the estate he lives on. For example, we know that the Count is the Reich Master Forester who lives on an estate and goes hunting, even at night. Later in the novel, Alan uses the phrase 'night-hunting Count' as naming strategy to highlight the Count's passion for hunting (Sarban [1952] 2011: location 704).

At very beginning of Alan's time in the new textual actual world, he learns that in this world Adolf Hitler won the Second World War 102 years before he arrived. In an encounter with the doctor on the estate, Alan suggests that he be handed over to the police because he was a prisoner of war who had escaped the camp, but the doctor appears confused: "'The police?' he repeated thoughtfully. 'It is not necessary. The Master Forester has jurisdiction in the Reich forest'" (Sarban, [1952] 2011: location 598). This suggests that some sort of feudal system is still in place in this world. From the examples included above, readers can gather a few details about the Count and this world that Alan is transported into. That is, Count Johann von Hackelnberg is the Reich Master Forester, who is a feudal lord. He owns a very large estate and he is passionate about hunting.

Previously, I have shown how Kripke's (1972) theory of proper names as rigid designators is an effective way of explaining how readers cross-reference individuals across ontological domains. However, when a proper name as a rigid designator is unavailable, a different approach is needed to explain how readers

make an epistemological connection between a counterpart and their corresponding actual world individual. Doležel (1998) points out how some texts "do not always obey the semantics of rigid designation" (226). In such a case, Doležel suggests that an alternative method of cross referencing in the form of "strong textual and structural evidence" (226) such as "the title, quotations, the intertextual allusions, the similarity of the fictional world's structures" (226) to support the epistemological connection between actual world individuals and their counterparts in different worlds is required.

Doležel's suggestion is useful because it offers a method of making associations using textual evidence, when a proper name as a rigid designator is unavailable. While Doležel offers his approach to analyse postmodern narratives, I propose adopting Doležel's approach to analyse any counterfactual historical fiction text that uses an unnamed counterpart or transworld individual. I further suggest that what I defined as essential properties, that is, 'intersubjectively known facts' about individuals in the actual world, can be used to make these associations. For a reader, these essential properties may be inferred through the contextual information available in the text and/or through the use of their RK-worlds. The essential properties that readers may gather from the text can be theorised as being a form of textual evidence that is used to support the connection between the actual world individual and their textual actual world counterpart.

Returning to the analysis of the Count in *The Sound of his Horn,* the name Count Johann von Hackelnberg is available, but this name does not designate any historical individual in the actual world. However, in this text, invoked rather

subtly is the connection between Count Johann von Hackelnberg and the actual world figure Hermann Göring. That is, as I will show below, the Count in the text is presented as a counterpart of Hermann Göring in the actual world.

A reader with a complete or partial RK-world may see the association because, as already established in the section above, they may recognise that Hermann Göring was Reich Master forester in the actual world. Furthermore, they may also be aware that G[ö]ring had a passion for hunting and consequently owned more than one hunting lodge on an estate similar to the one described in the text. As historians Manvell *et al.* (2011) point out, "the G[ö]ring s' first home was a hunting lodge at Hochkreuth in the Bavarian Alps, near Bayrischzell" (43). Further, they point out that:

> during 1933 [Hermann G[ö]ring] began to plan his great country house of Carinhall. As the second man to Hitler in Nazi Germany, as Premier of Prussia, as Reich Master of the Hunt and as Master of the German Forests, he felt himself entitled to the finest territory that could be found within reasonable distance from Berlin. He chose an area in the Schorfheide where there was a German imperial hunting lodge built of wood, near a lake called the Wackersee. Here he had a hundred thousand acres set aside as a state park reserved as far as possible for himself, to be the center for the house he planned to build and the game reserve he had decided to establish for his shooting parties (119).

Here, Manvell *et al.*, shed light on Hermann Göring's hunting lodges, especially Carinhall which they describe in great detail. According to them, Carinhall was a built on a large estate that Göring had reserved for himself, and on which he

planned to organise hunting as game for his shooting parties. They add that Carinhall was one of Göring's hunting lodges where he spent a substantial amount of time hunting. This description of Carinhall and Göring's fascination for hunting is similar to what readers learn about the Count's estate and his fondness for hunting through Alan in the text.

As shown through the analysis, on reading *The Sound of his Horn,* the following description about Count von Hackelnberg's properties can be gathered: Count von Hackelnberg is the German Reichforester. He has a passion for hunting and pursues this passion as a sport on the large estate that he owns. This description serves as a form of reference to the actual world Hermann Göring. Recognising that the Count in *The Sound of his Horn* is a counterpart of Hermann Göring in the actual world depends on the reader's RK-world with reference to Hermann Göring. Therefore, in spite of the absence of a proper name, there is some textual evidence to substantiate the link between the Count in the textual actual world and Hermann Göring in the actual world. This link is established in the text by invoking political and personal details about Hermann Göring thereby make the references implicit.

The cross-referencing here between the Count and the actual world Hermann Göring is not straightforward because unlike other instances where counterparts appear in textual actual worlds with a proper name to function as a rigid designator, here no proper name is available. However, Göring's counterpart in this case does share some essential properties with the actual world Göring, that is, the Count shares with Göring some intersubjectively acknowledged facts

about him in the actual world. This further highlights how it is necessary for readers to have access to specific knowledge in order to make these associations. As a result, only readers with a complete or partial RK-world will be able to cross-reference the Count to Hermann Göring in the actual world. Alan makes an explicit reference to Göring being the Reich Forester in his conversation with the nurse, a textual strategy to tacitly indicate the link between him and the Count. However, in order to make the epistemological connection wholly, a reader must be familiar with Hermann Göring and his essential properties in the actual world. Once the epistemological connection is made, the reader can then use their RK-world to map everything they know about Hermann Göring in the actual world to make the epistemological connection between the Count in the textual actual world and Göring in the actual world. In contrast, readers with a zero RK-world will not pick up on the textual evidence that is needed to make the connection and as such they will not recognise that the Count in the textual actual world is a counterpart of the actual world Hermann Göring. Ontologically, the Count will still exist within the textual actual world, but establishing the epistemological connection between the Count and his actual world counterpart Hermann Göring depends on the kind of RK-world that the reader possesses. Consequently, this type of reader has no access to any extra-textual information from the actual world that they can use to explore the character of the Count further.

To summarise, when an actual world historical figure is introduced in the textual actual world of a counterfactual historical fiction text, they are done so either by invoking the historical figure's proper name or by simply describing them as having similar essential properties as their actual world representatives. An

example of the latter is seen with the example from *The Sound of his Horn* above. Conversely, when they are introduced using an actual world proper name, as seen with the examples from *Making History*, they may be presented either as a counterpart (e.g. Kremer 2) or as a transworld individual (e.g. Kremer 1). The inclusion of actual world historical figures in textual actual worlds are very typical of the genre of counterfactual historical fiction and these examples illustrate the different ways in which actual world historical figures may be used in a counterfactual textual actual world.

4.6 Summary

Building on the first part of my model that I developed in Chapter Three, this chapter has offered the second part of my model and thus completes the cognitive-narratological methodology with which to analyse all narratives across the genre of counterfactual historical fiction. I have critically evaluated existing concepts within Possible Worlds Theory that are used to define and describe actual world individuals in fiction and redefined them to offer an alternative approach with which to effectively analyse all types of historical individuals in counterfactual historical fiction texts. Using concepts such as RK-worlds, Ryan's (1991) principle of minimal departure, Pavel's (1979) proper names as a form of rigid designation, and the concept of essential properties, I have also theorised how readers make the epistemological connection between counterparts and individuals with transworld identity, and their corresponding actual world individuals.

In order to demonstrate the need for a new approach, I have shown how existing approaches within Possible Worlds theory are lacking when applied to counterfactual historical fiction. More specifically, using examples from *Making History*, I have shown how textual actual worlds of such fiction can have two types of actual world historical figures presented as characters within the text. Consequently, two sets of terminology are needed to appropriately label the two types of actual world individuals in texts. In revisiting existing concepts within Possible Worlds Theory, I have shown that the terms 'counterpart' and 'transworld identity' are not substitutes for one another, but rather that they are two conceptually different concepts that refer to two different phenomena especially within the context of counterfactual historical fiction. I have concluded that within the context of counterfactual historical fiction, counterparts are those individuals that appear across possible worlds, share some essential properties with their actual world namesakes, but also differ from them in other respects. On the other hand, the term transworld identity should be used when the same actual world individual is presented in the textual actual world. That is, a transworld individual shares all essential properties with their corresponding individual in the actual world. In redefining these concepts, it was also crucial to address the concept of essential properties, which within Possible Worlds Theory is an area that is largely overlooked.

To work within the context of counterfactual historical fiction, I have clearly defined what counts as a historical individual's essential property. Borrowing Margolin's (1990) vocabulary, I have proposed that essential properties of an actual world historical figure are those "intersubjectively acknowledged singular

facts" (127), that is well-known facts about a historical figure that are recorded in certifying discourses such as history books and newspapers.

In differentiating between two crucial types of actual world individuals that may appear within the counterfactual historical fiction genre, the Possible Worlds model that I have developed offers appropriate vocabulary that may be used to define and describe all individuals who appear across possible worlds and also theorise the manner in which readers process them. Having now developed the whole model, in the next chapter I will utilise it to analyse three texts – *Fatherland, The Sound of his Horn,* and *Making History* – to demonstrate the model's dexterity.

Chapter 5: Applying the Whole Model to Harris' *Fatherland*, Sarban's *The Sound of his Horn*, and Fry's *Making History*

5. Introduction

In the preceding chapters, I have modified specific aspects of Ryan's (1991) Possible Worlds model in order to be able to successfully analyse counterfactual historical fiction texts. Having presented the concept of readers' knowledge worlds (RK-worlds) to account for readers and the different levels of knowledge they bring to the text, I introduced the concept of ontological superimposition and its associated concept of reciprocal feedback. These concepts show the processes that readers go through while reading a counterfactual historical fiction text. In addition, I have used the conceptual disparity that exists between the terms counterparts and transworld identity to show how they can be each used to describe historical characters that appear in counterfactual historical fiction texts. Furthermore, I have demonstrated how Pavel's (1979) theory of rigid designation and Ryan's (1991) principle of minimal departure can be used to explain how readers process the inclusion of these historical characters. I have also redefined the concept of essential properties so it can be used effectively to analyse counterfactual historical fiction.

Having presented my model in full, in this chapter I will use it to analyse three texts – Robert Harris' *Fatherland* (1992), Sarban's *The Sound of his Horn* (1952), and Stephen Fry's *Making History* (1996). Each of these texts create a different

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kind of textual universe. For instance, in *Fatherland* only events from a single counterfactual world are narrated while in *The Sound of his Horn*, two worlds are presented with one being counterfactual to the other as well as being counterfactual to the actual world. In *Making History,* multiple successive textual actual worlds are created with the second and the third textual actual world being counterfactual not only to the first textual actual world but also to the actual world.

As was discussed in Chapter One, apart from the stylistic differences between them, these texts each deal with varied themes and can be categorised under different genres – while *Fatherland* is a crime thriller, *The Sound of his Horn* is dystopian and *Making History* is postmodern. Furthermore, they also explore different textual and narratorial features. For example, *Fatherland* creates a complex ontology by using actual world images, documents, and quotations within the text. The text includes an Author's Note at the end to explain to the reader the epistemological significance of specific entities included in the text to the actual world and as such has an influence on RK-worlds. For example, Harris (1992) states that "the following documents quoted in the text are authentic: Heydrich's invitation to the Wannsee Conference; G[ö]ring's order to Heydrich of 31 July 1941" (386).

In contrast, in *The Sound of his Horn*, not much importance is given to the counterfactual historical timeline. By creating a dystopian counterfactual textual actual world, the text relies heavily on RK-worlds for readers to be able to identify the extent to which the counterfactual world is epistemologically related

to the actual world. Furthermore, the text complicates this relationship further by presenting an unreliable narrator. In *Making History,* although an Author's Note is not included, the text does supply the reader with enough historical knowledge pertaining to worlds created in the text within its respective textual actual worlds. By including a combination of explicit and implicit references, the text signals to the reader the epistemological relationship between each of these worlds as well as their relationship to the actual world. Thus, the rationale behind choosing the three texts is also to show that my methodology can be used across all types of narratives that create various kinds of counterfactual historical worlds.

5.1 *Fatherland* (1992) By Robert Harris

Fatherland presents a world in which the Axis Powers have won the Second World War. The textual universe of *Fatherland* consists of a single textual actual world that is narrated by an extradiegetic narrator. In Chapter Three, where I introduced my model, I did so by drawing on examples from *Fatherland* that focused mainly on events; I will now apply my model to the images, documents, and quotations that are included in the text to show how my model accounts for the different ways in which readers process their inclusion.

5.1.1 Plot Summary

Fatherland opens to an unfamiliar version of history – a 1964 in which the SS, Gestapo, and Ordnungpolizei (or, Orpo) are still in operation, and a 1964 in which Hitler is still alive with Berlin preparing for his seventy-fifth birthday celebrations. The text therefore uses the actual world as its epistemological

template but alters a few crucial events from our history to make it counterfactual. The textual actual world of *Fatherland* is populated with a mix of actual and fictional, events and characters. For example, the protagonist Xavier March and his friend Charlie Maguire are purely fictional characters within the textual actual world and historical figures such as Reinhard Heydrich, Josef Bühler, Odilo Globocnik and Wilhelm Stuckhart are introduced as characters in the textual actual world. Furthermore, other historical figures such as Adolf Hitler and Heinrich Himmler are mentioned by some of the characters in the textual actual world, but they never appear in the text.

The text is divided into six sections – each dedicated to a day in the week leading up to Hitler's seventy-fifth birthday. The first section is dated 'Tuesday 14 April, 1964'– this is the day protagonist Xavier March, an officer with the Kriminalpolizei (The German Criminal Police handling political crimes) is called in to investigate the death of Josef Bühler, a high-ranking Nazi official. Bühler 's body was found afloat in the river Havel. Mid-investigation, March is told that the Gestapo have taken over the case, and that he has been ordered to cease all investigation immediately. Despite these orders, March continues covertly. During his investigation, he recovers Bühler's diary with a cryptic message that leads him to a staged suicide scene, that of Wilhelm Stuckhart, another high-ranking Nazi official, and his mistress. Charlie Maguire, an American journalist, currently residing in Nazi Germany, is roped into the investigation after a call was made to her by Wilhelm Stuckhart a couple of days before his murder.

At first, March and Charlie's investigation leads to what they think is a theft racket of priceless art wherein they believe that some high-ranking Nazi officials had stolen paintings during the Second World War and sold them in foreign countries. However, March soon discovers that the theft racket was only a ruse used by the Gestapo to throw him off-track. March and Charlie learn that the recent deaths were in fact staged murders carried out by Odilo L. Globocnik, a Gestapo Obergruppenführer (a paramilitary rank) who is essentially the antagonist of the text, under the orders of Reinhard Heydrich. The victims were Nazi officials involved in the Wannsee Conference that was held in 1942 to discuss the future of the Jews in Nazi Germany. In the text, it is speculated the murders were being carried out to ensure that the truth behind the Final Solution in Nazi Germany is protected, especially now as the Cold War is expected to come to an end. In the text, we are told that the current President of the Unites States of America, Joseph P. Kennedy is coming to meet Hitler. It is hoped that the Cold War between Germany and The United States of America that ensued after the Second World War would end after this meeting.

Eventually, March and Charlie find official but hidden documents which prove that the Holocaust actually did take place under Adolf Hitler's orders. They decide that the truth about the Nazi atrocities should be made known to the world. Together, they devise an escape plan; Charlie drives South to Switzerland with all the documents. March lets her go, promising to follow her and meet her there. However, March is captured by the Gestapo, taken into custody and tortured. The officials want to know about Charlie's whereabouts and the suitcase with all the documents that she has in hand. March hoping to buy Charlie enough time so she can successfully cross the borders, lures the Gestapo

into following him while he drives off to what was once the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp. The end of the text suggests that Charlie would have crossed borders and escaped to Switzerland, where she will disclose all the evidence that she has in hand against Nazi Germany. Meanwhile, March loads his gun and walks off towards the trees.

At the end of the novel, Harris (1992) includes a section called 'Author's Notes' in which he explains that all historical figures who appear in the textual actual world and share a proper name with historical individuals from the actual world during the Second World War are the same individuals. He states that their biographic details until 1942 are correct, after which they have been altered for the sake of the narrative. Similarly, Harris also explains that all historical documents introduced in the text, barring the minutes from the Wannsee conference, are authentic documents from the actual world.

5.1.2. The Use of Images within *Fatherland*

Fatherland incorporates several visual images and artefacts within the text in order to help the reader visualise the textual actual world. These visual images include maps of geographic locations, hand-drawn sketches of places, photographs of train timetables, and documents such as letters and diary entries. The images included supplement certain events described in the text. As such, the inclusion of these images can be regarded as a way of helping the reader make sense of the text. As I will show in the subsequent sections, Possible Worlds Theory can be used to explain how readers process the inclusion of images within texts. Furthermore, while some images are

representations of objects that also exist in the actual world, others are fictional and represent objects that exist only in the textual actual world. Through my analysis, I will also demonstrate how Possible Worlds Theory can be used to explain and analyse the ontological mix that occurs in the text.

At the very beginning of the novel before describing the textual actual world of *Fatherland*, Harris (1992) presents two images (as shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2) that serve as visual aids to give readers a clear picture of what the counterfactual world looks like.

Figure 5.1: Greater German Reich, 1964 in Harris (1992: 1)

Figure 5.2: Hitler's Berlin, 1964 in Harris (1992: 2-3)

Figure 5.1 is a map of the Greater German Reich in 1964 in which Nazi Germany stretches all the way to the east of Poland. Figure 5.2 is a map of Hitler's Berlin in 1964 which is depicted as comprising among others, the Great Hall measuring "exactly seven hundred metres, exceeding by one hundred metres the facade of Louis XIV's palace at Versailles" (Harris, 1992: 29) and the Arch of Triumph, which is the brainchild of Hitler, "constructed of granite and has a capacity of two million, three hundred and sixty-five thousand, six hundred and eighty-five cubic metres [...]'The Arc de Triomphe in Paris will fit into it forty-nine times" (24).

Piatti and Hurni (2009), in reference to the images above, state that "the maps render a service to the reader, for instead of being forced to undertake some research of their own, the two maps offer the most important bits and pieces of

spatial and political information in a dense and comprehensive form" (336). Here, Piatti and Hurni explain the purpose of these maps within the text, which is, to orient the reader and help the reader readily visualise the textual actual world of *Fatherland*. These maps are accurate representations of the textual actual world and as such, their inclusion within the text is significant because they help the reader interpret the new world being presented to them before any of the narrative has begun.

A third image in the form of a map is also included in the text, almost at the end of the novel. This is a hand-drawn sketch of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp by Martin Luther, a Nazi official as shown in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3: Authentic sketch of the installation in Auschwitz-Birkenau in Harris (1992: 314)

During their investigation, March and Charlie uncover the sketch shown in Figure 5.3. In the textual actual world, this sketch has not been made public knowledge. However, this sketch is a sign that concentration camps and death camps existed in the textual actual world. A reader with a complete or partial RK-world will recognise that this map originates in the actual world because it is a diagrammatic representation of the concentration camp that exists in Auschwitz in the actual world. To this type of reader, as Piatti and Hurni (2009) point out, "this map is an icon, a gateway to the collective knowledge of the darkest side of the Third Reich" (336), that is, the death camps. Readers with complete or partial RK-worlds may recognise the actual world origins of Figure 5.3 as soon as they see the image in the text. Equally, to help other readers such as readers with zero RK-worlds become aware that Figure 5.3 is authentic, Harris (1992) includes an 'Author's Note' at the end of the novel. In this section, Harris states that "[Martin Luther's] biographical details are correct up to 1942" (386) confirming that Luther produced the sketch of Auschwitz in the actual world.

In the textual actual world, there is some written description that supplements this sketch and as such they can be regarded alongside each other. For instance, Martin Luther makes detailed notes on his visit to the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp. These notes as shown in Figure 5.4 are presented as documents within the textual actual world.

NOTES ON A VISIT TO AUSCHWITZ-BIRKENAU BY MARTIN LUTHER, UNDER STATE SECRETARY, REICHS MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

[Handwritten; 11 pages]

14 July 1943

At last, after almost a year of repeated requests, I am given permission to undertake a full tour of inspection of the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp, on behalf of the Foreign Ministry.
I land at Krakau airfield from Berlin shortly before sunset and spend the night with Governor-General Hans Frank, State Secretary Josef Buhler and their staff at Wawel Castle. Tomorrow morning at dawn I am to be picked up from the castle and driven to the camp (journey time: approximately one hour) where I am to be received by the Commandant, Rudolf Hoess.

15 July 1943

The camp. My first impression is of the sheer scale of the installation, which measures, according to Hoess, almost 2 km. X 4 km. The earth is of yellowish clay, similar to that of Eastern Silesia - a desert-like landscape broken occasionally by green thickets of trees. Inside the camp, stretching far beyond the limits of my vision, are hundreds of wooden barracks, their roofs covered with green tar-paper. In the distance, moving between them, I see small groups of prisoners in blue-and-white striped clothing -some carrying planks, others shovels and picks; a few are loading large crates on to the backs of trucks. A smell hangs over the place.

I thank Hoess for receiving me. He explains the administrative set-up. This camp is under the jurisdiction of the SS Economic Administration Main Office. The others, in the Lublin district, fall under the control of SS-Obergruppenführer Odilo Globocnik. Unfortunately, the pressure of his work prevents Hoess from conducting me around the camp personally, and he therefore entrusts me into the care of a young Untersturmführer, Weidemann. He orders Weidemann to ensure I am shown everything, and that all my questions are answered fully. We begin with breakfast in the SS barracks.
After breakfast: we drive into the southern sector of the camp. Here: a railway siding, approx 1.5 km. in length. On either side: wire fencing supported from concrete pylons, and also wooden observation towers with machine-gun nests. It is already hot. The smell is bad here, a million flies buzz. To the west, rising above trees: a square, red-brick factory chimney, belching smoke.
7.40 am: the area around the railway track begins to fill with SS troops, some with dogs, and also with special prisoners delegated to assist them. In the distance we hear the whistle of a train. A few minutes later: the locomotive pulls slowly through the entrance, its exhalations of steam throw up clouds of yellow dust. It draws to a halt in front of us. The gates close behind it. Weidemann: 'This is a transport of Jews from France.'
I reckon the length of the train to be some 60 freight cars, with high wooden sides. The troops and special prisoners crowd round. The doors are unbolted and slid open. All along the train the same words are shouted: 'Everyone get out! Bring your hand-baggage with you! Leave all heavy baggage in the cars!' The men come out first, dazed by the light, and jump to the ground -1.5 metres - then turn to help their women and children and the elderly, and to receive their luggage.

Figure 5.4: Notes on Luther's trip to Auschwitz-Birkenau in Harris (1992: 322–323)

Figure 5.4 illustrates the manner in which Luther makes detailed notes about the concentration camp: "The camp. My first impression is of the sheer scale of the installation, which measures, according to Hoess, almost 2 km X 4 km" (Harris, 1992: 322). This description can be viewed alongside the sketch because it explains the scale of the camp that it represents. From describing the extent of the camp, Luther moves on to explaining what goes on in these camps:

The guards shout: 'Everyone undress! You have ten minutes!' [...] Naked, the crowd shuffles through large oak doors flanked by troops into a second room [...] The chamber fills, the doors swing shut. [...] Only sound

is a muffled drumming coming from the far end of the room, from beyond the suitcases & the piles of still-warm clothes. A small glass panel is set into the oak doors. I put my eye to it. A man's palm beats against the aperture & I jerk my head away. Says one guard: "The water in the shower rooms must be very hot today, since they shout so loudly.' Outside, Weidemann says: now we must wait twenty minutes. Return underground installation. Loud electric humming fills the air – the patented 'Exhator' system, for evacuation of gas. Doors open. The bodies are piled up at one end [Illegible] legs smeared excrement, menstrual blood; bite & claw marks [...] four such gas chamber/crematorium installations in camps. Total capacity of each: 2,000 bodies per day = 8,000 overall. Operated by Jewish labour, changed every 2-3 months. The operation thus self-supporting; the secret self-sealing. Biggest security headache — stink from chimneys & flames at night, visible over many kilometres, especially to troop trains heading east on main line (Harris, 1992: 324–325).

The above extract is a reproduced section from Luther's eleven pages of notes as seen in Figure 5.4. Here, we learn in some detail about the Holocaust death camps that were set up in order to exterminate the Jews. More specifically, Luther explains the casual manner in which the Jews were ordered to undress before being corralled into the gas chambers. The fatal gases were then released into these chambers, and all that could be heard after that were the voices and scattering of people trying to escape the chambers, in vain. Again, viewing this in conjunction with the sketch will help the reader learn more about the different aspects of the camp. For example, readers may now identify that what the sketch depicts on its far left are gas chambers with their chimneys

and/or that the rectangles depict rooms that the Jews were being held captive in. The images used within the text may therefore be thought of as visual counterfactual worlds, that is, they are accurate representations of objects that exist in or have existed in the textual actual world. Furthermore, as seen above, these documents originate in the actual world and as such they are epistemologically relevant to the actual world as well as to the textual actual world.

According to Piatti and Hurni (2009), the images in *Fatherland*, that is, Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 serve as a "combination of space types in a counterfactual world: an ontologically unreal Berlin is combined with the historic reality of the death camps" (336). Here, Piatti and Hurni recognise the way in which the text fuses visuals from two ontologically distinct worlds. That is, while Figures 5.1 and 5.2 are referents of fictional geographical locations, Figure 5.3 represents an actual world concentration camp.

5.1.3 Possible Worlds Theory and the Ontological Status of Images in Fiction

Within Possible Worlds Theory, Ryan (1991) discusses the ontological status of images within a literary context. According to her, "there is an element of make-believe inherent to all pictures: the sender (artist, photographer, etc) presents spectators with a surface covered with lines and colors, and asks them to regard these marks as an object – to pretend that they see this object" (97). Ryan's emphasis here is on the issue of representation because an image is only a representation of the original object and this, for Ryan, makes it problematic to

classify them as either purely real or purely fictional. As a means of resolving this issue, Ryan explains that:

> even if one admits that all pictures conjure up make-believe presence [...] the existence of the referent is not necessarily established by the act of make-believe. When we look at a portrait of Napoleon, we may face him in make-believe, but it takes no act of pretense to believe in his historical existence (Ryan, 1991: 98).

Here, Ryan discusses how images are perceived as either being representational of actual objects or fictional objects. She explains that while an image of Napoleon may be fictional, it denotes an actual world individual, thereby making images that have actual world origins less fictional than others. Ryan further proposes three conditions on which the fictionality of an image is dependant. She suggests that images are fictional when "it is offered as an illustration of a fictional text" (99), and/or when "it represents a nonexistent [actual world] object located in an APW [alternate possible world]" (99), and/or finally "when pretense and role-playing are involved on the level of the scene depicted by the artist" (99). Each of these conditions posits a scenario where the referent of the image is located in a domain that is not the actual world and hence the image is considered fictional. To explain, in the first scenario, the image depicts a fictional text or a textual actual world. For example, the map of Westeros included with the series *A Song of Ice and Fire* (1996–2011) depicts a purely fictional ontological space. In the second scenario, the image depicts an object that does not exist in the actual world, but one that is located in a possible world. For example, an image of a UFO which depicts a non-existent entity. The third scenario is an example of when individuals in the actual world create images of fictional entities. For example, if an artist creates a drawing of

R2D2 from the film series *Star Wars*. Therefore, what Ryan essentially proposes here is that images should be classified as fictional if their referents originate in a fictional domain.

Returning to the analysis of images in *Fatherland*, according to Ryan's suggestion above, the images in Figure 5.1 and 5.2 should be classified as ontologically fictional because they are created "partly or wholly from imagination" (100). In contrast Figure 5.3 can be classified as ontologically actual or non-fictional because it accurately depicts an actual world concentration camp. However, as I will argue below, the distinction between these figures is more nuanced than this.

As established, Figure 5.1 and 5.2 represent purely fictional locations. Here, the term fictional is used to denote that these areas and locations, that is, the Greater German Reich and Hitler's Berlin did not exist in the actual world. However, a reader with a complete or partial RK-world may recognise that the Greater German Reich and the Hitler's Berlin depicted in the text are a visual representation of models that Hitler hoped to achieve within the actual world. Herwig (2006) affirms that Hitler intended to, "control [...] the Eurasian land mass stretching from the Rhine River to the Ural mountains" (326). As evidenced in Figure 5.1, it is this that has been recreated with the image. Figure 5.1 meets Ryan's second condition which states that an image is fictional if it represents an object that is located in a possible world. Since the Greater German Reich is conceptual, it can be understood as a non-existent entity that is located in a possible world constructed by Hitler in the form of a hope.

Piatti and Hurni (2009) also point out, "[t]he expansion to the East [as depicted in *Fatherland*] is directly linked to the plans of building a new Berlin: in Hitler's opinion, the Greater German Reich called for a suitable 'world' capital, and while planning it, Hitler and [Albert] Speer were thinking along the lines of vastness of scale and gigantomania" (336). Here, Piatti and Hurni confirm that the textual actual world of *Fatherland* with all its enormous buildings is something that Hitler and Hitler's architect, Albert Speer, wished for Germany's future. In the text, the narrator describes settings and the maps act as a reference for the reader. For example, the narrator's description of the Führer's Great Hall with "its dome half hidden in the low cloud" (Harris, 1992: 25) matches the dome that is included in Figure 5.2. This can be further correlated with Albert Speer's vision of the Great Hall produced in the actual world in the form of a sketch as shown in Figure 5.5:


Figure 5.5: Original sketch of Hitler's Great Hall by Albert Speer in Piatti and Hurni (2009).

Figure 5.5 shows the original sketch of the Great Hall that Hitler and Speer hoped to build in Berlin. As can be seen, this image matches the depiction of

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the Great Hall included in the map of Hitler's Berlin in *Fatherland*. Furthermore, descriptions of the Great Hall in the text can futher be associated to the descriptions of the Great Hall documented in the actual world. To draw on an illustrative example, in the textual actual world, the narrator asserts that the dome "is one hundred and forty metres in diameter and St Peter's in Rome will fit into it sixteen times" (Harris, 1992: 28). This description of the dome within the textual actual world is also similar to Speer's (1971) description of the dome of the Great Hall he hoped to build in the actual world which "was [...] to contain a round opening for light, but this opening alone would be one hundred and fifty-two feet in diameter, larger than the entire dome of the Pantheon (142 feet) and of St. Peter's (145 feet). The interior would contain sixteen times the volume of St. Peter's" (198). As evidenced, there is an epistemological link between Hitler's Berlin in the textual actual world and the one Albert Speer and Hitler wished to build in the actual world. Following Ryan's assertions would mean that the ontological status of Figure 5.2 is purely fictional because it depicts a Berlin that never existed in the actual world. However, although Hitler's Berlin as presented in the textual actual world did not materially exist in the actual world, it was one that was imagined in the actual world.

Harris (1992) also explicitly asserts in his Author's Note that appears at the end of the text that "[t]he Berlin of this book is the Berlin Albert Speer planned to build" (Harris, 1992: 386). It is important to note at this point that since the Author's Note appears at the end of the novel, it is more likely that readers will read them only after reading the novel. In that case, while readers with a complete or partial RK-world may already be aware of the epistemological link between Speer's and Hitler's plans for Berlin in the actual world and the Berlin

realised in the textual actual world as they are reading the novel, readers with zero RK-worlds will be able to make this connection only after reading the novel. Consequently, to readers with complete or partial RK-worlds, the non-fictional status of images included in *Fatherland* will be more apparent as they are reading the text. In contrast, the ontological status of these images can be perceived as shifting from being fictional to being non-fictional for readers with zero RK-worlds when they read the Author's Note after they have read the narrative.

Comparing Figure 5.3 (sketch of the concentration camp) with Figure 5.2 (Hitler's Berlin) illustrates that the former represents not only the corresponding actual world image that it is a reproduction of, but also the actual world object that it depicts. By contrast Figure 5.2 only represents the actual world image that it reproduces. The difference between both the images can also be seen in terms of the manner in which readers may process these. While Figure 5.2 is more likely to pose an ambiguity to readers with reference to its existence within the actual world, the same is not true of Figure 5.3. More specifically, while readers may be aware that Hitler's Berlin in the text is the one imagined by Speer and Hitler in the actual world, if not initially at least after reading the Author's Note at the end, they may be less likely to know that an original sketch of the Great Hall exists in the actual world. As a result, readers are most likely to only contextualise Figure 5.2 within the context of its accompanying descriptions within the textual actual world.

Conversely, with Figure 5.3 readers are most likely to be aware of the existence of concentration camps and Holocaust within the actual world. As Piatti and Hurni (2009) point out with reference to the sketch of the concentration camp (Figure 5.3):

> Suddenly, the reader knows much more about the horrifying reality than March and Charlie do. Whereas in the book, a small, straightforward, innocent looking sketch map is included, in order to depict rudimentary knowledge about the camps; in the average reader's reality, almost no subject is better covered with visual materials such as documentaries, photographs and maps, than the concentration and death camps. There is an overwhelmingly rich store of collective images, which will be recalled at the sight of the small map (336).

Here, Piatti and Hurni emphasise reader knowledge on the subject of the Holocaust and compare it to March and Charlie's knowledge of the Holocaust within the textual actual world. As shown in the plot summary, in the textual actual world, people are unaware of the Nazi atrocities committed against the Jews. As such March and Charlie have very little knowledge and it is through documents such as the ones shown in Figures 5.3 (sketch of concentration camp) and 5.4 (Luther's notes from his visit to Auschwitz) that they uncover details about their harsh reality. In contrast, Piatti and Hurni state that readers will be able to recall more about the Holocaust than March and Charlie. From within Possible Worlds Theory, Ryan's (1991) principle of minimal departure can be used to explain how readers use their RK-worlds to access information on the Nazi atrocities against the Jews in concentration camps to make sense of the depiction of the Holocaust within the text. Therefore, with reference to Figure

5.3 and 5.4 specifically, readers are more likely to have complete RK-worlds compared to Charlie and March who have partial CK-worlds.

The disparity that exists here between readers and characters (specifically March and Charlie) in terms of their knowledge worlds can be further juxtaposed with the knowledge that is likely possessed by both groups with reference to Figures 5.1 and 5.2. That is, while comparing CK-worlds to RK-worlds with reference to Figure 5.1 and 5.2, readers know much less about the Greater German Reich and Hitler's Berlin compared to how much March and Charlie know. Here, March and Charlie are likely to have complete CK-worlds because these images are representations of the world that they inhabit while readers are more likely to have partial RK-worlds. In contrast, with reference to Figures 5.3 and 5.4, March and Charlie may have partial CK-worlds compared to readers who are more likely to have complete RK-worlds.

To further explain the difference between RK-worlds and CK-worlds that is established by the text, I draw on an illustrative example below. As the novel progresses, March and Charlie uncover more details that confirm that the Holocaust took place in their textual actual world. For instance, they find old train timetables that show the frequency of trains that transported Jews to different concentration camps as shown in figure 5.6 and a telegraph from the Railways Services in Reich to officials with some added instructions with references to sterilising the trains after use is shown in Figure 5.7.

11.2 Pj 131	Bialystok	9.00	Treblinka	12.10
Lp 132	Treblinka	21.18	Bialystok	1.30
12.2 Pj 133	Bialystok	9.00	Treblinka	12.10
Lp 134	Treblinka	21.18	Grodno	12.10
13.2 Pj 135	Bialystok	9.00	Treblinka	
Lp 136	Treblinka	21.18	Bialystok	1.30
14.2 Pj 163	Grodno	5.40	Treblinka	12.10
Lp 164	Treblinka		Scharfenweise	

Figure 5.6: Train timetable in Harris (1992: 316)

A rusty paper clip had mottled the edge of the timetable. Attached to it was a telegraphic letter from the General Management, Directorate East, of the German Reich Railways, dated Berlin, 13 January 1943. First, a list of recipients:

Reich Railway Directorates
Berlin, Breslau, Dresden, Erfurt, Frankfurt, Halle (S), Karlsruhe, Konigsberg (Pr), Linz, Mainz, Oppeln, East in Frankfurt (O), Posen, Vienna
General Directorate of East Railway in Krakau
Reichsprotektor, Group Railways in Prague
General Traffic Directorate Warsaw
Reich Traffic Directorate Minsk

Then, the main text:

Subject: Special trains for resettlers during the period from 20 January to 28 February 1943.
We enclose a compilation of the special trains (Vd, Rm, Po, Pj and Da) agreed upon in Berlin on 15 January 1943 for the period from 20 January 1943 to 28 February 1943 and a circulatory plan for cars to be used in these trains.
Train formation is noted for each recirculation and attention is to be paid to these instructions. After each full trip cars are to be well cleaned, if necessary fumigated, and upon completion of the programme prepared for further use. Number and kinds of cars are to be determined upon dispatch of the last train and are to be reported to me by telephone with confirmation on service cards.

[Signed] Dr Jacobi
33 Bfp 5 Bfsv   Minsk 9 Feb. 1943

Figure 5.7: Telegraph from the Management of the German Reich Railways in Harris (1992: 316).

The documents shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7 along with those in Figures 5.4 and 5.3 are what help March and Charlie learn the truth about the relocation of the Jews. More specifically, through the notes written by Martin Luther from his trip to Auschwitz, March and Charlie learn about what happened to the Jewish prisoners in concentration camps. This knowledge, coupled with the railway timetable and the telegraph that explains the manner in which the Jews were transported in freight cars allows March and Charlie to piece together the complete information:

> So: a train would be loaded in the Polish town of Bialystok at breakfast time. By lunchtime, it would be at this hell, Treblinka. (Not all the journeys were so brief- he shuddered at the thought of the seventeen hours from Berlin to Auschwitz). In the afternoon, the cars would be unloaded at Treblinka and fumigated. At nine o'clock that evening they would return to Bialystok, arriving in the early hours, ready to be loaded up again at breakfast (Harris, 1992: 317).

Here, March deduces the manner and pattern in which the Jews were being transported from their homes to the Auschwitz concentration camp. Furthermore, through the sketch of the concentration camp shown in Figure 5.3 alongside the notes Luther makes about what he witnessed in these death camps (shown in Figure 5.4), March and Charlie learn about concentration camps and the brutal murder of millions of Jews in gas chambers. Therefore, in reviewing all the documents that they have found (as shown in Figures 5.3, 5.4, 5.6, and 5.7) March and Charlie gain a cohesive understanding of the systematic process through which the Nazi government carried out the Jewish genocide. However, in comparison to readers with complete RK-worlds, March and Charlie may be inferred as having partial CK-worlds. This is mainly because while March

and Charlie are only able to make sense of the Holocaust using the information that is available to them within the textual actual world, readers can contextualise the documents available in the text within the actual world in which they originate as well as within the textual actual world in which they are presented. In contrast, March and Charlie have complete CK-worlds with reference to the textual actual world, while readers only have partial RK-worlds. As I will argue below, the reason for the difference between the nature of CK-worlds and RK-worlds as seen above can be linked to the ontological status of the images.

5.1.4 RK-worlds and the Indexical Nature of Images in *Fatherland*

As shown in the preceding section, Ryan's (1991) conjectures for classifying images as fictional essentially proposes that the ontological status of an image is fictional, if the object that it represents originates within a fictional domain. However, as I have shown above, evaluating the fictionality of images found within *Fatherland* is not so straightforward. Consequently, I argue that applying Ryan's suggestions to these images does not accurately reflect the nature of their ontological status. Consider the image in Figure 5.1 that shows a map of the Greater German Reich in 1964. As shown through the analysis above, the map is an accurate representation of the textual actual world. Additionally, it also accurately represents Hitler's intended plans of expansion, that is, if Hitler had won the war, like he did in the textual actual world, the Greater German Reich of the textual actual world would have existed in the actual world. Therefore, while Figure 5.1 does not exist within the actual world, it can be inferred as existing within a possible world in the actual universe owing to it being a part of Hitler's conception. Applying Ryan's (1991) conjectures would

mean that the ontological status of the image in Figure 5.1 is fictional because it represents a geographic location that did not exist in the actual world and as such only originates within the domain of the text. However, I argue that labelling this figure as fictional fails to capture how closely it is epistemologically related to the actual world. That is, while it represents a fictional location, it also represents a location that could have been in the actual world.

Furthermore, Hitler's agendas, such as the expansion of the German empire, are ones that are recorded in books and historical documents that exist in the actual world (for example, Herwig, 2006; Hildebrand, 1973). Therefore, if the reader has a complete or partial RK-world they will recognise the epistemological relevance of the images in the text within the actual universe, and as such realise that the image is simultaneously relevant to both ontological universes. Consequently, the ontological status of the image becomes indexical because it depends which universe the image is being evaluated in.

The second image, that is, Figure 5.2 shows Hitler's Berlin. As shown in the analysis, similar to Figure 5.1, this image is also an accurate representation of the textual actual world. Again, in addition to being an accurate representation of Berlin in the textual actual world, the image is also an accurate representation of Hitler's and Speer's plans for Berlin's architecture during the Second World War. This image is less fictional than Figure 5.1 because while Figure 5.1 represents one of Hitler's aims, one that is purely conceptual, Figure 5.2 represents an abstract idea as well as an actual world object – the original sketch of the Great Hall in Hitler's Berlin as planned by Hitler and Speer. Figure

5.2 is therefore an accurate representation of one of Albert Speer's architectural plans as drawn in the actual world. The Great Hall does not exist physically and structurally for us to access in the actual world, but it has been preserved in the form of a sketch that is accessible. If the reader's RK-world includes this information, then the reader will be able to identify the indexical nature of this image. A reader with a zero RK-world may perceive the image as fictional at first, but after reading the Author's Note at the end where Harris explains the authenticity of Hitler's Berlin, even this type of reader will be able to conceive the image's indexicality.

Figure 5.3, in contrast to both Figures 5.1 and 5.2, is an accurate representation of an object that appears in the textual actual world as well one that exists in the actual world. According to Ryan's classification, this image should be categorised as non-fictional because it represents an object in the actual world. As Ryan (1991) states, an image is non-fictional when it represents an "authentic visual source" (100). As I have already established, the sketch of the concentration camp used in the text is authentic because it represents an object that originates in the actual world – the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp in Poland. However, I argue that labelling the image as non-fictional would be misleading because it does not acknowledge that the image is also fictional owing to its existence within a fictional domain in which it represents an object that exists in the textual actual world. Furthermore, as evidenced through the discussion above, this image is crucial within the textual actual world because it is used by March and Charlie to uncover and piece together the truth about the Holocaust in the textual actual world. Consequently, I propose that classifying the ontological status of this image as indexical and therefore relative to the

context in which it is being judged in, accurately captures the nature of such images that can be both fictional and non-fictional.

Similarly, the historical documents presented as images within the text as shown in Figures 5.4, 5.6, and 5.7 also originate in the actual world. According to Ryan's conjectures, the authentic status of these documents is enough to classify them as non-fictional. However, as I have discussed above, repositioning these documents within a text adds an element of fictionality to it, especially because the fictional context influences the manner in which readers interpret these documents. Therefore, owing to their epistemological relevance to the actual and textual domain, readers are able to interpret them within both contexts. As such, the ontological status of these documents becomes indexical and therefore must be evaluated according to its context.

To conclude, the images used within *Fatherland* are epistemologically relevant to the textual domain and the actual domain. As such, the fictionality of images within *Fatherland* is indexical. They are neither purely fictional nor purely non-fictional. Instead, their fictionality is relative and depends on the type of RK-world that a reader possesses and consequently also on which domain it is being evaluated in. Furthermore, this also accurately reflects how readers and characters perceive these images. More specifically, initially Figures 5.1 and 5.2 may appear as fictional to some readers, but the information included in the Author's Note in the end and some research on their part will show how the fictionality of these images becomes indexical. In contrast, when March and Charlie first discover some of the documents as shown in Figures 5.4, 5.6, and

5.7, they may appear as fictional, but when they uncover more details surrounding these documents, the ontological status of the images changes. The fictionality of the images can be further linked to the kind of knowledge worlds that readers and characters possess. That is, readers are likely to have complete RK-worlds with characters having partial CK-worlds regarding the image of the concentration camp (Figure 5.3), an image that originates in the actual world. Conversely, readers will have partial RK-worlds and characters complete CK-worlds regarding the image of the Greater German Reich (Figure 5.1) and Hitler's Berlin in 1964 (Figure 5.2), images that originate in a possible world.

5.1.5 Quotations Used in *Fatherland*

In my analysis so far, I have focussed on the fictionality of images and historical documents used within the text. In this section, I will extend the analysis to examine the use of quotations within *Fatherland*. In particular, I will show how Possible Worlds Theory can be used to analyse an ontological mix that occurs when actual world quotations are used within a fictional context.

As mentioned in the plot summary, the text is divided into six parts and each part begins with a date followed by a quotation or an excerpt from a speech with a citation alongside. These direct quotations and excerpts used in the text appear in the form of epigraphs at the beginning of every part and as such they are isolated from the rest of the text. For example: The first part of the text opens with a date 'Tuesday 14 April, 1964' followed by an SS oath:

Tuesday 14 April, 1964

I swear to Thee, Adolf Hitler,

As Führer and Chancellor of the German Reich,

Loyalty and Bravery.

I vow to Thee and to the superiors

Whom Thou shalt appoint

Obedience unto Death,

So help me God.

SS Oath

(Harris, 1992: 5)

As the example shows, the quotation used is accompanied by a reference that signals that it is an SS oath. Here, the principle of minimal departure can be used to explain how the text uses the actual world as an epistemological template and as such readers will use their RK-worlds to make sense of the quotation. A reader with a complete or partial RK-world may be aware that in the actual world, in the words of Ziegler (1989), the oath was the one "demanded of the men who from 1925 were collectively known as the Schutzstaffel of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP)" and whose only purpose was to "guard Adolf Hitler's life with their own" (3). While this quotation originates in the actual world, its inclusion within the text causes the reader to assume that it is also epistemologically relevant in the textual actual world. As the quotation appears at the beginning of Part One, it can be seen as a way of setting the scene. A reader with a complete or partial RK-world may recognise that the SS or the Schutzstaffel did not exist in the actual world after the end of the Second World War in 1945. However, in the textual actual world the SS oath is also accompanied by a date – 14 April 1964 which can be

seen as a consequence of the counterfactual nature of the text. At this point, readers may pick up on these hints and infer that in the textual actual world of *Fatherland*, Adolf Hitler was in power and the SS were in place still protecting him. Furthermore, since the rest of the text deals with the SS and Gestapo and how they handle the murders, for a reader with a zero RK-world the inclusion of this quotation can be seen as a textual strategy employed to let this kind of reader know what the role of the SS is in Nazi Germany.

While the above example only indicates that the quotation is an SS oath, there are other examples within the text where quotations are accompanied by the name of the author and some contextual information such as publication details in the form of a date or stating whether it was verbal or in print, as shown in Figures 5.8 and 5.9:

PART THREE

THURSDAY 16 APRIL

When National Socialism has ruled long enough, it will no longer be possible to conceive of a form of life different from ours.

ADOLF HITLER, 11 July 1941

Figure 5.8: Adolf Hitler's quotation in Harris (1992: 127)

PART FIVE

SATURDAY 18 APRIL

Most of you know what it means when one hundred corpses are lying side by side. Or five hundred. Or one thousand. To have stuck it out and at the same time - apart from some exceptions caused by human weakness - to have remained decent fellows, that is what has made us hard. This is a page of glory in our history which has never to be written and is never to be written.

HEINRICH HIMMLER

secret speech to senior SS officers,

Poznan, 4 October 1943

Figure 5.9: Heinrich Himmler's quotation in Harris (1992: 263)

Figure 5.8 shows Part Three which is dated Thursday 16 April with a quote by Adolf Hitler accompanied by a date – 11 July, 1941 – that indicates when it was spoken. Figure 5.9 shows Part Five dated Saturday 18 April followed by an excerpt from Heinrich Himmler's speech accompanied by details such as "secret speech to senior SS officers" (Harris, 1992: 263) and a date/place "Poznan, 4 October 1943" (263). The example of the SS oath above differs crucially from the other samples (as shown in Figures 5.8 and 5.9) because although it includes a date within that page, as the plot summary has shown, this date represents each day that leads up to Hitler's 75th birthday in the textual actual world. However, the other examples (see Figures 5.10 and 5.11) also use an additional date that points out when the quotation was spoken. As shown in the analysis of the SS oath, the use of the date 14 April, 1964 foregrounds the counterfactual nature of the text. Although the quote originates in the actual world, it does not challenge a reader's understanding of it within the textual actual world.

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However, with figures 5.8 and 5.9, by also including the name of the author and the original publication date of the quotation, the text problematises the ontological status of the quotations because the text makes it explicit that these quotations have been borrowed from another ontological domain.

It is important to note that it is unlikely that readers are going to be familiar with all, if any, of these quotations. In this sense the quotations pose an ontological challenge to all readers. By including formal citations, the text indicates that the quotations belong to a domain that is outside of the text. Furthermore, although readers may be unaware of the quotations themselves, they are likely to be aware that the cited figures such as Adolf Hitler and Heinrich Himmler were inhabitants of the actual world – Hitler was Chancellor and Führer of Nazi Germany and Himmler was the Reichsführer of the SS – thereby foregrounding their apparent actual world origin. Likewise, authentic dates (year 1941 and year 1943) which exist within the confines of the Second World (1939 – 1945) in the actual world further suggest that these quotations belong to the actual world. However, as a result of their use within the textual actual world, determining the ontological status of these quotations is relative and as such challenging. This is because these quotations belong to the actual world and the textual actual world simultaneously. As Bell (2010) in her analysis of quotations that appear in historical fiction *Victory Garden* notes, "while, ontologically the quotations originate in the Actual World, because they are epistemologically relevant to both Actual World and Textual Actual World, readers can use the quotations in both the domains" (103). Here Bell explains that quotations such as the ones analysed in the section above, do not belong to one domain exclusively. Consequently, she states that readers are able to

interpret them within the domain that they originate in, that is, the actual world and also within the new domain that they are being used in, that is, the textual actual world. Therefore, similar to the images used within the textual actual world that are indexical, these quotations exist within both domains and as such their ontological status is also indexical.

Out of the six parts that begin with quotations, one part particularly stands out due to the kind of ontological ambiguity that is introduced. At the beginning of Part Six, a section from Primo Levi's book '*The Drowned and the Saved*' (1986) is included. In the actual world, Primo Levi is a Holocaust survivor (see Levi, 1991) and this book is a compilation of essays written on life within Nazi death camps:

> However this war may end, we have won the war against you; none of you will be left to bear witness, but even if someone were to survive, the world would not believe him. There will perhaps be suspicions, discussions, research by historians, but there will be no certainties, because we will destroy the evidence together with you. And even if some proof should remain and some of you survive, people will say that the events you describe are too monstrous to be believed: they will say that they are the exaggerations of Allied propaganda and will believe us, who will deny everything, and not you. We will be the ones to dictate the history of the Lagers.
>
> SS officer, quoted in *The Drowned and the Saved* by Primo Levi (Harris, 1992: 329).

Here, an SS officer is quoted as speaking these words. They are speaking about an unnamed event stating that no one would survive the event and warning the addressee that even if someone manages to survive it, no one would believe that such an event took place. According to the officer, the event will be brushed off as an 'Allied propaganda'.

Akin to the other quotations analysed above, with the use of a citation that informs the reader whose quote it is and where it appears, the text explicitly indicates that the quotation belongs to a domain external to the text. A reader with a complete or partial RK-world may recognise that the ontological landscape established is complex for a number of reasons. First, the above extract includes an explicit reference to another text that exists in the actual world. Therefore, like *Fatherland*, The *Drowned and the Saved* (1986) is also a text that exists in the actual world. The two textual actual worlds (created by *The Drowned and the Saved* and *Fatherland*) are epistemologically related but at the same time they are ontologically distinct. Second, although included in the text, the extract above is a written representation of a verbal warning given by an SS officer to the inhabitants of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp in the actual world. Therefore, within *The Drowned and the Saved,* the verbal warning is represented in the form of a quote. This quote is then further quoted in *Fatherland* in the form of an epigraph. In this case, the epigraph creates an embedded structure that represents a quote of a quote.

Third, while *The Drowned and the Saved* originates in the actual world, it was only published in the actual world in 1986, but here it is being used in a textual

actual world that is set in 1964. This particular anachronistic element creates a chronological inconsistency within the text. However, as *Fatherland* is a counterfactual historical fiction text, readers may interpret the inclusion of this as one of the many other alterations that the text makes in order to present a counterfactual textual actual world.

Unlike the previous quotations that may be interpreted as belonging to the textual actual world, interpreting this particular quotation as belonging to the textual actual world poses a particular challenge. The extract does not make a direct reference to any particular event, but as I have established, the formal citation accompanying the extract indicates that it belongs to another book in the actual world. As such, readers are required to access information from a different textual actual world in order to understand the extract used in *Fatherland*. As Bell (2010) explains "when readers are alerted to the significance of another text, they gather information from another Textual Actual World as well as using the Actual World as a source of information" (157).

Within Possible Worlds Theory, Doležel (1998) explains how readers use intertextual references. Doležel introduces the concept of "encyclopaedic knowledge" (177) or previously stored knowledge which readers possess that includes their "actual-world encyclopaedia" (177) as well as their "fictional encyclopaedia" (177). What Doležel calls the 'actual-world encyclopaedia' comprises a reader's knowledge of the actual world. Similar to Ryan's (1991) principle of minimal departure, Doležel also proposes that readers use their experience of the actual world to understand fiction. However alongside, this

type of knowledge that comes from knowing about the actual world, Doležel further proposes the concept of a 'fictional encyclopaedia' that includes all the knowledge that a reader gains from reading fictional texts. His rationale for proposing this specific type of knowledge that comes from reading fictional texts is because according to him, "the actual-world encyclopaedia might be useful, but it by no means is universally sufficient" (177) in order to interpret fictional texts. Instead, Doležel proposes that "knowledge of the fictional encyclopaedia is absolutely necessary for a reader to comprehend a fictional world" (181) because sometimes "readers have to be ready to modify, supplement, or even discard the actual-world encyclopaedia" (181). Here, while Doležel maintains that it is important for readers to use their knowledge of the actual world, he insists that it is also equally important for them to use their knowledge of other possible worlds, in particular of fictional worlds in order to comprehend fictional texts. Although Doležel's 'fictional encyclopaedia' only refers to knowledge gained from fictional worlds in particular, the concept can be expanded to include non-fictional texts such as *The Drowned and the Saved* that exist in the actual world. Consequently, Doležel's (1998) suggestions can be used to explain how a reader of *Fatherland* can be said to have a complete RK-world if they have along with the knowledge of the actual world also other 'fictional encyclopaedia' that is required.

Returning to the analysis of *Fatherland*, a reader with a complete or partial RK-world will use their fictional encyclopaedia that comprises their knowledge of *The Drowned and the Saved* to process the extract. In doing so, this type of reader will be able to make some inferences about the topic and the context in which the topic is being discussed. In this case, the topic or the event being

addressed is the Holocaust. The SS officer is cautioning his Jewish prisoners that no one will survive the death camps and even if someone did survive, nobody will ever believe the truth about the gas chambers or the concentration camps. The reader will also understand the extract reflects the inaccuracy of the SS officer's suggestion that in the actual world people may have suspicions but they will not know for certain about the historical genocide that took place.

Although the SS officer is right in pointing out that the Final Solution is a monstrous act, it did not lead to the Holocaust being discounted as an exaggeration. In the actual world, the Holocaust will always be remembered as a tragic event where millions of Jews were persecuted and murdered under the Nazi regime. In the words of Bergen (2009), the Holocaust is "the largest and deadliest conflict in human history" (vii). Within the textual actual world, however, what was given as a warning by the SS officer did in fact become true. At the point in the text that this quotation is used, the reader is conscious that no one in Nazi Germany 1964 knows about the Holocaust death camps or where the Jews were relocated to. As speculated by the SS officer, in the textual actual world described by *Fatherland* the Nazi officials had succeeded in wiping out the entire Jewish population. There is no official record of anything related to the Jews and their whereabouts. Except for a few documents that March and Charlie uncover, all other documents and any evidence that pointed towards the concentration camps were destroyed.

Additionally, even the Nazi officials involved in the Wannsee conference were now being hunted down and murdered under the orders of Reynard Heydrich in

order to make sure that all evidence in the way of the Holocaust was destroyed entirely. As a result of this, the inhabitants of the textual actual world are unaware of the Nazi atrocities that were carried out against the Jews. As the extract states, in the textual actual world any speculation around the Holocaust is ignored as overstatements by the Allies. This is significant because, as evidenced above, it illustrates the difference between the inferences that can be made by interpreting the quotations within the actual world and within the textual actual world. For instance, within the context of the actual world, the extract can be seen as a warning that nearly happened, but within the context of the textual actual world, it is their reality. Nevertheless, while readers are able to perceive the impact of the quotation within the actual and the textual actual world, it poses a challenge when trying to conceive the extract as existing within the textual actual world. To explain, while the other quotations in the text can be conceived as belonging to the textual actual world because they represent events that have taken place in the textual actual world, it is difficult to think of the extract from *The Drowned and the Saved* as belonging to this domain. This is because readers are aware that in the textual actual world nobody knows about the Holocaust and barring the few historical documents, no other evidence for the concentration camps exists. Given this understanding, readers may consider it logically impossible for this text that is written by a survivor of the Holocaust to exist within the textual actual world.

In any case, as discussed above, there is a use for the quotation within the textual actual world. Furthermore, there is an irony in the placement of this extract within the text because it appears immediately after March and Charlie uncover all the evidence that confirm the Holocaust death camps. The reader is

able to see the irony here because they are aware of March and Charlie's plans to inform the world about the Nazi regime's crimes against the Jews. The SS officer's threat may not come true after all. At the same time, readers may also be concerned whether or not the extract is used as a premonition to suggest that all the evidence that March and Charlie have gathered may be destroyed and their truth may be regarded as, in the words of the SS officer, "exaggerations of Allied propaganda" (Harris, 1992: 326).

To conclude, as shown through my analysis, the textual actual world of *Fatherland* presents an indexical ontology because the ontological status of images and quotations used within the text is relative. The ontological status of the images and quotations used depends on the reader's RK-world as well as the domain relative to which the images and quotations are being judged in. With my analysis of images in particular, I have shown how their ontological status can change depending on their context. Similarly, with the analysis of quotations, I have shown how in most cases they may be perceived as belonging to the textual actual world and the actual world simultaneously depending on the type of quotation that is being used and the manner in which it is being presented within the textual actual world. More specifically, I have shown that quotations that originate in the actual world are epistemologically relevant to the actual world and the textual actual world, and as such they should be interpreted within the context of both domains. Furthermore, these quotations are presented as epigraphs and consequently the link between the quotations and the narrative that follows that section is not explicit. Through my analysis, I have shown how Possible Worlds Theory can be used to explain how readers tease out the implicit link that exists between them by using their RK-

worlds to access information from the actual world before applying it within the context of the textual actual world. Therefore, when a reader approaches the beginning of the section, they are not aware of why these specific quotations have been used, but as I have shown in my analysis, as readers progress through the parts that follow the quotation, they begin to understand the implication of its inclusion in the text.

5.2 *The Sound of his Horn* (1952) By Sarban

The second novel that I have chosen for analysis is *The Sound of his Horn* (1952) by John William Wall, written under the pseudonym Sarban. Unlike *Fatherland* that has a single textual actual world within the text, as I have shown in the previous chapter and as I will show below through a plot summary, in *The Sound of his Horn* more than one textual actual world is established. This text was particularly chosen because it does not explain to the reader how Hitler won the war or how the world changed so drastically. Instead readers are presented with a dystopian counterfactual world that they are expected to piece together. The text plays with the reader further by presenting the protagonist as a potentially unreliable narrator. In doing so, the text relies on the reader's ability to access specific information from their RK-worlds. More specifically, using the concept of RK-worlds, I will show how readers conceive the protagonist as reliable or unreliable and in turn make sense of the counterfactual world presented to them. For this purpose, I will carry out a discussion on unreliable narration and examine how Possible Worlds Theory deals with textual actual worlds established through unreliable narration. Through my analysis, I will also show how my model can be used to account for how readers make sense of and organise textual actuals worlds that are created through unreliable narration.

5.2.1 Plot Summary

The Sound of his Horn is a counterfactual historical fiction text that is based on the theme of 'if Adolf Hitler had the won the Second World War'. In what I call 'textual actual world one' (TAW1), in the year 1949, the protagonist Alan narrates his experience of being captured as a British prisoner of war in the Battle of Crete during the Second World War. He is imprisoned in a German camp – Oflag XXXI Z. Alan also tells his friend about his escape from the camp and the journey that ensued after. Alan tunnels his way out of the camp at night and runs for the coast. He sleeps during the days, and walks at night to avoid being captured. While travelling through a forest, a night when he was delirious from starvation, he sees a light. He heads towards the light but on his way, he passes a barrier of 'Bohlen rays', a mysterious fence of rays that create a temporal anomaly by transporting Alan into the future. An unconscious Alan wakes up in a hospital. At first, Alan assumes that he has been picked up by the Germans and is now in a military hospital in the present day. However, he notices small alterations in the world around him. For example, Alan wonders: "I did not even hear an aeroplane, and that, in Germany in 1943, struck me as peculiar" (Sarban, [1952] 2011: location 485). He is being tended to by two nurses who do not tell him much except that he is somewhere near Hackelnberg and that it is the Reich Master Forester who owns the estate that he is on.

 A few days later, the hospital doctor examines Alan and tells him that he has fully recovered. Alan learns that it is currently year 102 and that in this textual actual world everyone "subscribe[s] to the convention that we are living in the

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hundred and second year of the First German Millennium as fixed by our First Führer and Immortal Spirit of Germanism, Adolf Hitler" (Sarban, [1952] 2011: location 628). The doctor explains to Alan that his memory of 1943 (from TAW1) is a delusion that he is suffering from because of the Bohlen rays that he ran into. Instead, in this world they are on year 102 on the new calendar that was introduced after Adolf Hitler won the Second World War. This is what I am calling 'textual actual world two' (TAW2) – a counterfactual textual actual world that Alan has travelled to.

Through Alan, readers learn that in this textual actual world two, it has been more than a hundred years since the Nazis won the Second World War. Alan does not mention anything about the wider counterfactual world as the whole story takes place on the estate owned by a Reich Master Forester, Count Hans von Hackelnberg. However, through Alan we know that the Second World War has been renamed the war of the German rights and the world is being controlled by the Nazis. The TAW2 that is depicted is largely dystopian: non-Aryans are genetically mutilated and bred as slaves; hunting is sport where women dressed to look like hunting birds are the prey; feudalism and feudal lords rule the land. As was discussed in Chapter Four, during Alan's stay on the estate he learns a bit about the Count. He a was man who loved hunting games in which hunters preyed on bird-women. Alan recalls hearing strange sounds and cries at night. The doctor tells him that the sounds were that of the hunting horns and the cries were cats. After Alan is treated by the doctor, a curious Alan secretly follows the Count and his guests to learn more about these hunting games, sounds, and cries that Alan keeps hearing all the time. While following the Count and touring the estate, Alan sees the pits for the first time. Here he

notices some animals; cheetahs he thinks at first. However, he soon realises that these are actually women. He discovers that they genetically modified leopard-like women who are attacking and consuming deer. Alan is caught while following the Count and his entourage; as a result of which he is dehumanised like the others by being made to dress as a deer. Alan, therefore essentially becomes a deer for the hunters to prey on like the other bird-women and cat-women on the estate. During this time, Alan befriends one of the bird-women, a character called Kit North.

Alan tells us that Kit North was a former university student in England and was a part of the resistance movement against the Nazis. After being caught, she was sent to the Reich institution to serve her punishment. Together, they devise a plan to escape the estate. To do this, they need to cross the fence with the Bohlen rays. Alan having escaped from the prisoner of war camp previously suggests tunnelling a way out from one side of the fence to the other.

Alan manages an escape, but Kit dies, sacrificing herself when the hunters come after them. Past the fence, Alan reappears in September 1943 in TAW1. With the war still in progress, Alan is captured and thrown into another prisoner of war camp. When the War ends in 1945, Alan is released by the Russian army.

Alan's experience of the prisoner of war camp, his escape, and his experiences in TAW2 are narrated in the form of a flashback to his friend in TAW1. As the novel is a story within a story, at the end of the novel the text returns to the frame

story set in 1949 where Alan has finished narrating his story and is now preparing to turn in for the night.

5.2.2 The Textual Universe of *The Sound of his Horn*

Through the plot summary, I have established that the textual universe of *The Sound of his Horn* consists of two textual actual worlds, that is, TAW1 which is the world Alan originates in and TAW2 which is the counterfactual world that Alan travels to. The ontological landscape of *The Sound of his Horn* can be visualised as shown in Figure 5.10:


Figure 5.10: The ontological landscape of *The Sound of his Horn*

Figure 5.10 shows the textual universe of *The Sound of his Horn* with two textual actual worlds. TAW1 includes Alan and his friend that he narrates his experience

of TAW2 to. In this world, Adolf Hitler does not win the Second World War. TAW2, on the other hand, includes Alan, his bird-friend Kit, the doctor, and the Count. In TAW2, Adolf Hitler has won the Second World War and the Nazi regime is still in power 102 years later.

In this text, not much importance is given to the alternate historical timeline in that there are only two instances when the text makes a reference to its history. The first instance is when Alan learns that it is year 102. In the hospital, Alan describes what he sees around him–a clock that also has a thermometer and a barometer along with it. He notices some numbers which he believes is a date of some sort. The doctor that is treating Alan tells him that it is year 102. He explains that they adhere to a system where it is year hundred and two of the German Millennium. The first Führer, Adolf Hitler, after the end of the Second World War announced a new calendar to indicate the First German Millennium.

The only other mention of an alternative history is when Alan's friend Kit North (a bird-woman) mentions to him about Britain's German invasion in 1945 because of which there has been resistance in Britain since. In any case, a dystopian TAW2 is described in detail. To draw on an illustrative example:

> The grille was raised with a jerk and a clang, and there bounded into the pit some twenty large animals [...] In repose they would have been models for a sculptor of ideal feminine beauty, but as they bounded into that arena, circling it with a fluid speed of movement almost too quick for the eye to follow, they were utterly unhuman: women transformed by a

demonic skill in breeding and training into great, supple, swift and dangerous cats.

Their heads and necks were covered by a close-fitting helmet of spotted skin which bore the neat, rounded ears of a leopard, but the oval of the face was exposed, and each face as I saw it upturned to the lights was contorted in a grin, with red lips drawn back from strong white teeth, and in each pair of eyes a pale glitter of pure madness. [...] I remembered the Doctor's remark about the dumb slaves and guessed that the surgeons had operated on these women too (Sarban, [1952] 2011: location 1085).

The above extract is an example that depicts a form of feudal hunting that the Count von Hackelnberg indulges himself and his guests in. Here, you see a description of genetically altered women. In TAW2, women are bred as slaves. They are genetically mutilated by surgeons to resemble cats. These cat-women are then made to hunt on their prey, which the Count and his guests enjoy as a sport. As the principle of minimal departure states, readers assume that the textual actual world is similar to the actual world, unless the text explicitly challenges this assumption. As seen with this extract, the text presents a world that is continuously at odds with the reader's actual world because it presents a post-war master-slave progression. As such the reader is expected to make more departures from the actual world in order to construct the textual actual world.

As evidenced, a dystopian TAW2 is presented in the text, but throughout no

explanation as to how the world changed so drastically is specified in the text. As such, by presenting a world that is so far removed from a reader's experience of the actual word, the text challenges readers' conceptualisation of this world. The text further complicates and exploits this conceptualisation by presenting Alan as a seemingly unreliable narrator thereby making readers question the plausibility of TAW2 throughout. In the next section, I will discuss how the text reveals Alan's potential unreliability to the reader.

5.2.3 Alan Querdillon as an Unreliable Narrator

TAW1, which is essentially the frame story, is narrated by Alan's friend in the form of a first-person narration and all the nightmarish events pertinent to TAW2 are narrated by Alan and as such TAW2 is established only through a first-person narration. When Alan narrates his suffering to his friend, there are a number of instances in the text where Alan's credibility can be questioned and in which he alerts us to his potential unreliability explicitly. To pick out an illustrative example, before Alan begins narrating the story to his friend he warns him:

> "I've not told this to anybody," he began. "Not to my mother, or Elizabeth. And before I tell it to you, I want to make the point that it is a tale: just a tale, you understand, that I'm telling you because I think it'll entertain you; I'm not asking you to listen so that you can tell me what my trouble is. I know that perfectly well myself, and there's nothing anybody can do about it. It's just a question of waiting to see if it happens again. It hasn't recurred in three years; if I get through another

year without it happening I shall take it that it won't happen again"
(Sarban, 1952 [2011]: location 221).

This extract captures Alan's direct speech and appears in the frame story at the beginning of the novel. It is the first instance in the text where Alan gives the reader a reason not to believe what he proceeds to narrate. Here, Alan informs his friend that the story he was about to narrate is one that he has never told anyone about. He also cautions that it is "just a tale" (location 221) and specifies that he does not expect his friend to speculate the cause for his distress because he already knows what it is. At this point, it is not clear what Alan's trouble is, but based on his statements it is possible for readers to infer that there is something wrong with Alan. Following this, Alan begins to recount the experience of his escape. While on the run, he comes across a vast expanse on land. He explains:

> Had that narrow track led me to a farm, I think I would have leant with
> my head upon the door and begged for the peasants' pity; but it led to
> no human habitation [...] I have often wondered how much of that scene
> I really saw that night. I can say what I later knew to be there—or thought
> I knew. I know exactly how it looked to the eyes I had on the other side—
> if you understand me—but I'd give anything to be able to recollect
> precisely what I saw with my real vision—the vision I'm using now. The
> trouble is, I suppose, that I had been going gradually round the bend all
> that night. The fatigue and anxiety had found out my flaw and were
> extending it all the time, until, just about when I reached that open ridge
> the fissure in my mind was complete (Sarban, [1952] 2011: location 364).

This extract appears towards the beginning of the story (within a story) that Alan narrates. Here, Alan contrasts the phrase "eyes I had on the other side" (location 364) with the phrase "my real vision – the vision I'm using now" (location 364). This suggests that he has two types of eyes, the one he has now which he claims is his 'real' vision and the one he had while he was in TAW2. The juxtaposition of the two phrases may be inferred by readers to mean that there is some sort of discrepancy between his two types of eyes. Alan attributes this discrepancy to fatigue and anxiety that has resulted in him going crazy while he was on the run. Alan's admission that he is crazy may be interpreted by readers as compromising his credibility. It also further implies that TAW2 could be a figment of his imagination or some kind of hallucination that Alan was experiencing as a result of being delirious from exhaustion and dehydration. Alan further describes:

> There was one other thing I saw, and, again, I'd give so much to know which eyes I saw it with; for in my heart I'm still not convinced that the shock I received was real. But all I know is that I did notice something there, between me and those inviting woods, something at odds with experience; a phenomenon that would have been unremarkable enough in a dream and which might yet be not impossible in reality (Sarban, [1952] 2011: location 381).

In this extract, Alan is referring to the fence of 'Bohlen rays'. Here again, Alan draws on his concept of having two sets of vision to underline the illogicality of what he witnesses. He claims that what he saw is incompatible with his experience of TAW1, but states that it is within the realm of possibilities. By further stating that the fence of rays was too ordinary to be in a dream, Alan suggests that he may not have imagined TAW2. Instead he may have travelled

to another possible world. Therefore, as evidenced by these examples, there is some contradiction inherent in Alan's statements.

While on the one hand Alan's evaluation of TAW2 seems uncertain, he also admits that he has spent so much time questioning his reliability but has found nothing that would help him know for sure whether or not TAW2 actually existed out there. He confides in his friend:

> Ah well! You'd not believe the times I've been over the evidence for my sanity during these two years, and the care with which I've sifted it to find the little flaw, the sign of hidden weakness, and I never can find it. I ought to; I ought to be able to find out why I went out of my mind for a period, because, don't you see, that would be the best proof of sanity—not my own sanity alone, but the sanity of all this order that we believe in, the proper sequence of time, the laws of space and matter, the truth of all our physics; because you see, if I wasn't mad there must be a madness in the scheme of things too wide and wild for any man's courage to face (Sarban, [1952] 2011: location 265).

Alan here explains to his friend that for the two years that he has been back from TAW2 he has been trying to come to terms with everything he has seen and been through in the other world. He wishes that he would find proof so he would be assured that what he experienced out there had actually happened, thereby also proving that he was not insane. Alan refers to TAW2 when he talks about the time and space because as established in the previous sections, Alan is temporally displaced to TAW2 that is set 102 years in the future of a counterfactual world.

It is through instances such as these that Alan's unreliability is gradually revealed to the reader. This makes Alan an unreliable narrator. The term 'unreliable narrator' was coined by Booth in his 'Rhetoric of Fiction' (1983 [1961]). According to Booth, a narrator is "reliable when he speaks for or acts in accordance with the norms of the work (which is to say the implied author's norms), unreliable when he does not" ([1961] 1983: 158–159). Here, Booth proposes that a narrator be classified as unreliable if they are in disagreement with the implied author or the narrative in general. This definition of an unreliable narrator has been developed further by theorists who have reviewed the concept from a reader's point of view (see Chatman, 1978; Herman, 2009; Rimmon-Kenan, 2002). For example, Chatman (1978) proposes that:

> 'unreliable narration' the narrator's account is at odds with the [...] reader's surmises about the story's real intentions. The story undermines the discourse. We conclude, by 'reading out' between the lines, that the events and existents could not have been 'like that' and so we hold the narrator suspect (Chatman, 1978: 233).

Chatman here explains how readers of fiction make judgements about a story's plausibility based on any inconsistencies there may be in the textual universe. As the above discussion shows, Alan gives readers reasons to be suspicious of his sincerity throughout and as such they are not confident that Alan is saying the truth about TAW2. This makes Alan an unreliable narrator. However, a reader can never be completely sure if Alan is reliable or not. This is because just as much as there is evidence in the text for Alan's unreliability, as seen above, there is also some evidence that suggests that Alan has been speaking the truth all

along. Furthermore, Alan's honesty in telling us that he is unsure could also mean that we are more likely to believe him. In the following section, I will discuss how Possible Worlds Theory and in particular the concept of RK-worlds can be used to deal with unreliable narrators. Using Alan as an (un)reliable narrator, I will also explain how his (un)reliability relates to the overall ontological configuration of *The Sound of his Horn*.

5.2.4 Possible Worlds Theory and Unreliable Narrators

In Ryan's (1991) discussion of authenticity of textual actual worlds, she maintains that:

> in impersonal narration [...] the speaker has absolute authority , and his or her discourse yields directly to what is to be taken as the [textual] actual world. But a personal narrator is a mind interposed between facts and the reader, and the discourse reflects the contents of his or her mind (113).

Here, Ryan explains the difference between third-person narratives and first-person narratives. According to Ryan, the statements made by a third-person narrator represent the textual actual world because this type of narrator has "absolute authority" (113). In contrast, in first-person narration, the narrator's statements are their personal or subjective representation of the textual actual world. As such, readers do not perceive the textual actual world directly, but only through the mental world of a first-person narrator. According to Ryan, "the existence of unreliable narrators in fiction demonstrates a possible gap between the world projected by the narrator's declarations (what would be called the narratorial actual world, or NAW), and the facts of the TAW [textual

actual world]". What Ryan (1991) states here is that a textual actual world narrated by an unreliable narrator is essentially a narratorial actual world or a textual actual world according to a narrator. This is because, as Ryan points out, when the text presents an unreliable narrator the narratorial actual world does not match the textual actual world because the "[textual] actual facts potentially conflict with the narrator's declarations" (113). That is: NAW ≠ TAW when there is an unreliable narrator.

Given this scenario, Ryan proposes that readers "must sort out, among the narrator's assertions, those which yield objective facts and those which yield only the narrator's beliefs" (113). Applying this to an example from *One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest* that comprises a single textual actual world that is created by an unreliable narrator, Ryan explains how readers are able to regard Chief Bromden's belief that "the mental hospital where he is a patient have sensitive equipment to detect his fear" (113) as constituting his hallucination "[b]ut [readers] accept as fact the statement that orderlies are mopping the floor in the hallway" (113). Here Ryan's suggestions about decoding what is fact and what is not is similar to Chatman's (1978) suggestion as seen above, where he states that readers must "read out aloud" (233) and decide that the textual actual world "could not have been like that" (233).

Figure 5.11 shows my interpretation of the textual universe of *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest* that includes the narratorial actual world created by the schizophrenic narrator Chief embedded within the textual actual world:

Figure 5.11: Interpretation of the narrative structure of *One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest*

According to Ryan, these worlds – textual actual and narratorial actual as shown in Figure 5.11 – are conflicting worlds because readers are able to read between the lines and infer that they each describe a different version of the textual actual world. That is, while the narratorial actual world here comprises the sensitive equipment, the textual actual world does not. As evidenced in Figure 5.11, this concept is effective for analysing texts such as *One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest* because, according to the definition, a narratorial actual world is a *mental world* that is created by a homediegetic narrator. Consequently, in texts such as this where, as Ryan claims, there is enough textual evidence to confirm that the narrator is unreliable, it easy to infer what is the narratorial actual world (or the mental world) and what is the textual actual world.

By invoking Vogt's (2015) classification of the different types of unreliable narration, the narrative unreliability in texts such as *One Flew over the Cuckoo's*

Nest can be categorised under "ironic-unreliable narration or ironic-unreliable focalization" (132). This is because in such narratives "unreliabilty can be understood as a trait of a homodiegetic narrator" (131), as is in the case of Chief Bromden whose narration is unreliable because he suffers from schizophrenia. In ironic-unreliable narratives, as Vogt claims, "readers detect a discrepancy between the narrative world and the account or interpretation that the narrator or focalizer offers, and they naturalize these inconsistencies by resorting to the narrator's or focalizer's mind" (131–132). Here, Vogt explains the manner in which readers are able to distinguish between what Ryan (1991) calls the narratorial actual world and the textual actual world. As seen in Figure 5.13 the inconsistencies that are caused by Chief Bromden's assertions in the text can be evaluated and resolved. As Vogt (2015) explains, this resolution is a result of the reader detecting world conflicts and believing one world "to be more adequate in relation to the [textual universe] than the narrator's" (141). Vogt calls this process of choosing one world over another "hierarchization of worlds" (141) through which a reader reconstructs an alternative course of facts and events" (141) in the textual universe.

In contrast, deciding whether or not Alan is unreliable is not straightforward because as in the case of *The Sound of his Horn* "a homodiegetic narrator questions his account or evaluation of the facts and events" (139) and the process of arranging the conflicting worlds within the text is challenging because the reader is unable "to decide what is the case in TAW [textual actual world]" (141). Vogt (2015) building on Rimmon-Kenan's (1977) explanation of ambiguity in narration, terms this type of narrative unreliability as "ambiguous-unreliable narration" (133). As a solution to the process of deciding what

happens in the textual actual world, Herman (2009) echoes Chatman (1978) and Ryan (1991), as seen above, when he states that an unreliable narrator "cannot be taken by his or her word compelling the AUDIENCE to 'read between the lines' —in other words, to scan the text for clues about how the STORYWORLD really is, as opposed to how the NARRATOR says it is" (194). As Chatman, Ryan, and Herman suggest, while reading *The Sound of his Horn*, the reader is suspicious of Alan's experiences in TAW2. This is because Alan continuously reminds the reader that before he stumbled into the counterfactual TAW2, he was tired and delirious from having not eaten and asserts that he could have easily been out of his mind. Alan even confides in his friend that his memories of TAW2 are garbled. Furthermore, Alan's uncertainty coupled with the questionable nature of events in TAW2 makes it hard for the reader to believe him. This is because the events from TAW2 as narrated by Alan seem unlikely especially when readers compare it to TAW1 that is narrated by Alan's friend. This is because, as Chatman (1978) proposes above, most readers would assume that "it could not have been like that" (233) because while the Second World War was still in progress in TAW1, it could not have been that there was a world out there where it was hundred and two years after the Second World War. This seems physically impossible in relation to TAW1 and in relation to the actual world. However, as I will discuss below the concept of RK-worlds can be used as a way of determining Alan's (un)reliability and ultimately determining how the textual actual world really is. '

5.2.5 RK-worlds and Alan's Unreliability

As the preceding discussion has shown, in unreliable narration and in particular in first-person unreliable narration, as Ryan (1981) questions, "the text

constitutes the reader's sole source of information about the represented state of affairs. How then can [they] test the accuracy of the narrator's declarations?" (530). According to Ryan, in unreliable narration, there is no way of verifying the narrator's claims about the textual actual world because the narrator is the reader's only access to truth. As a possible solution to this problem, theorists such as Chatman (1990) and Herman (2009) have suggested that when a reader is suspicious about a narrator's reliability they can "read out aloud" (Chatman, 1990: 233) or "read between the lines [...] and scan the text for clues" (Herman, 2009: 194) in order to decide what the truth is in the textual actual world.

While constructing the textual universe of *The Sound of his Horn*, the principle of minimal departure can be used to explain how readers will begin by using their RK-worlds (their knowledge about physical laws, general truths, people, places and entities) until the text indicates a difference between the textual actual world and the actual world. While constructing TAW1, the reader will assume that TAW1 is an epistemological extension of the actual world. This is because, as the plot summary has shown, in the frame story which constitutes TAW1, readers learn that England was dive-bombed in 1943 after which Alan was captured and sent to a prisoner of war camp. When the war ended in 1945, Alan was released by the Russians. As such, the text does not dictate any changes and as the principle of minimal departure proposes, the reader will perceive a similarity between TAW1 and the actual world. In contrast, while constructing TAW2, readers will be able to detect a discrepancy between TAW1 and their actual world and also between TAW1 and TAW2. This is because, as Ryan (1991) claims, for a textual actual world to be similar to the actual world, certain

accessibility relations must apply between the two domains. Three accessibility relations can be identified as being relevant to TAW2 of *The Sound of his Horn*.

According to Ryan, a textual actual world is chronologically compatible with the actual world if "the TAW [textual actual world] is not older than the AW" (559). In this case, TAW2 is not accessible to the actual world or TAW1 because it is set in the future and as such, it is older than both the actual world and TAW1. She asserts that a textual actual world is analytically compatible if "it shares analytic truths" (559). In TAW2, Adolf Hitler wins the Second World War, feudal lords and the feudal system are in place, but in the actual world and in TAW1 Adolf Hitler is defeated in the Second World War and a feudal system similar to the one depicted in TAW2 does not exist. In addition, Ryan states that a textual actual world is taxonomically compatible if "it contains the same species, and the species are characterized by the same properties" (559). In TAW2, Non-Aryans are genetically mutilated to resemble animals and they are bred as slaves whereas in the actual world and in TAW1 no forms of genetically modified slaves exist (For a full discussion of accessibility relations, see Ryan, 1991b: 553–576). As such, readers will perceive these differences between TAW2 and the actual world as indicative that TAW2 is not an epistemological extension of the actual world.

Despite these anomalies, owing to the nature of counterfactual historical fiction, readers expect to be presented with a counterfactual world that diverges from the events of the actual world. Furthermore, a reader with a complete or partial RK-world may recognise that the dystopian TAW2 depicted in the text is an

exaggeration of Hitler's totalitarian government and racial ideologies in the actual world. As Yoke (2003) confirms, "to appreciate the impact of Sarban's fabricated world, we must examine the real world of Hitler's Reich" (54). Yoke draws on Waite's (1993) detailed psychohistorical study on Adolf Hitler that documents his behaviour, his likes, dislikes, fetishes and so on to show how the evil and dystopian textual actual world accurately reflects Hitler's psychopathic ideologies. According to Yoke, "at the heart of Sarban's world is the Nazi philosophy of leadership" (61). As an example, Yoke explains that Hitler wished to transform German society into one that was based on race and this can be seen in TAW2 where non-Aryan people are not only bred as slaves but they are also genetically transformed into and treated as animals. To clarify further, while reading *The Sound of his Horn*, the actual world in which Hitler correlated slaves to animals may be invoked in the mind of a reader with a complete or partial RK-world. For in the words of Adolf Hitler:

> Only after subjugated races were employed as slaves was a similar fate allotted to animals, and not vice versa, as some people would have us believe. At first it was the conquered enemy who had to draw the plough and only afterwards did the ox and horse take his place (Hitler, [1925] 2015: 218).

It is this thinking that is realised in TAW2. Similarly, another example which illustrates the inhuman manner in which the Count's slaves are treated is when Kit North describes the officers:

> These forester officers are monomaniacs, and the most inhuman thing about them is the way they fail completely to see that you are a human being: they'll fuss and fiddle about with you for hours to get you exactly

dressed for your part in one of their shows, and yet you feel that they understand nothing at all about girls, or human beings of any sort."

She had a fine steel chain bearing a numbered tag round her neck. I turned it over; there was no name-just a group of letters and a number (Sarban, [1952] 2011: location 1445).

The above extract exemplifies the manner in which subjected identities within TAW2 are dehumanised by the Count's officers. In addition to being dressed as animals and birds, they were also given number tags, entirely stripping them of any personal identity. A reader with a complete or partial RK-world may recognise that this alludes to how the Jewish prisoners were treated in the concentration camps. After they were captured and thrown into concentration camps, their heads were shaved, they were given uniforms, and they were branded with a number tattooed on their forearm (see Harran *et al.*, 2000: 461; Berenbaum, 2005). As evidenced, in order understand the epistemological significance of TAW2 to the actual world, the text draws on a specific set of knowledge that is gained from knowing about Hitler's personality and Hitler's Reich during the Second World War.

Most readers may not be familiar with all this information and unlike *Fatherland* which includes an Author's Note at the end explaining the epistemological relationship between the textual actual world and the actual world, *The Sound of his Horn* carries no such information to help the reader. In such a case, the text relies heavily on readers possessing complete or partial RK-worlds that include specific actual world knowledge about Hitler and his Nazi regime.

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In reviewing the accessibility relations between TAW2 and the actual world from the point of view of a reader with a complete or partial RK-world, some degree of accessibility relations can be established between the two domains. For instance, as the analysis has shown, TAW2 shares some analytic truths with the actual world at least to some extent. Moreover, as shown in Chapter Four, the Count introduced in TAW2 is a counterpart of Hermann Göring in the actual world. If readers are able to make the epistemological connection between the Count and Hermann Göring in the actual world, they may be able to further see how TAW2 is accessible for the actual world. Therefore, in *The Sound of his Horn,* while it is possible to interpret TAW2 as too horrific to be real and consequently consider there to be almost no accessibility relations between TAW2 and the actual world, as I have shown above, for a reader with a complete or partial RK-world there is some evidence to support its plausibility. In the next section, I will show how a revised understanding of the accessibility relations between TAW2 and the actual world as seen above, influences changes in terms of whether or not the narrator is reliable.

5.2.6 Determining Hierarchies using RK-worlds in Unreliable Narratives

As the preceding discussion has shown, one of the issues that readers face while reading unreliable narratives is the problem of hierarchising worlds, that is, deciding which is a textual actual world and which is the narratorial actual world. Vogt suggests that in ambiguous-unreliable narration readers construct two separate textual universes for the same text depending on whether they trust the narrator or not. He explains:

Even after having finished the narrative, the conflicting worlds remain
unresolved for the reader. For this reason, the reader can construct
separate fictional universes on the basis of the same text—one in which
the narrator is ironic-unreliable and another in which he is to be trusted
(141–142).

Here, Vogt explains the manner in which readers resolve conflicting worlds
within a text by isolating each possibility into a separate textual universe. In
applying Vogt's conjectures to *The Sound of his Horn*, two possible textual
universes can be imagined. As I have hitherto discussed, readers with complete
or partial RK-worlds are more likely to believe Alan and his description of TAW2.
For this type of reader, Alan is most likely a reliable narrator. Conversely, to a
reader whose RK-world does not include the specific set of knowledge that
enables them to see the accessibility relation between TAW2 and the actual
world, Alan may be perceived as an unreliable narrator. As such, for this type of
reader only one textual actual world exists within the textual universe. Figure
5.12 shows the first of the two universes. In this universe, Alan is reliable and
therefore two textual actual worlds exist within the textual universe:

Figure 5.12: The textual universe of *The Sound of his Horn* from the point of
view of readers for whom Alan is a reliable narrator

Figure 5.12 shows the textual universe of *The Sound of his Horn* with its two textual actual worlds. TAW1 where protagonist Alan is narrating the story in form of a flashback to his friend and TAW2, a counterfactual world that Alan is transplanted into after he passes the barrier of Bohlen rays.

From the point of view of a reader who considers Alan an unreliable narrator, the textual universe of *The Sound of his Horn* comprises one textual actual world with TAW2 being one of the potentially many textual possible worlds constructed by Alan. This is because the counterfactual world described by Alan is not actual, instead it is a textual possible world created by Alan through mental processes such as imagining, dreaming, and/or storytelling. More specifically, by invoking Ryan's (1991) terminology explicitly, the textual possible world created by Alan can be further identified as an F-universe or fantasy universe that is created through elaborate mental processes such as dreams and storytelling. According to Ryan, an F-universe is more than a textual possible world, because instead of merely acting like a satellite to a textual actual world, an F-universe is a complete universe. As seen in *The Sound of his Horn*, the F-universe created by Alan has its own actual world – I call this F-TAW or fantasy textual actual world in keeping with Ryan's conventions – and it also has its own inhabitants and events such as genetically mutilated slaves, the Count, Axis victory in World War II, and feudal system. Therefore, if the reader perceives Alan as an unreliable narrator, then the ontological configuration of the textual universe of *The Sound of his Horn* can be diagrammatically represented as shown in Figure 5.13:

Figure 5.13: Textual universe of *The Sound of his Horn* from the point of view of readers for whom Alan is an unreliable narrator

Figure 5.13 shows the internal ontological configuration of the textual universe which includes a textual actual world and a fantasy universe. In the textual actual world, Germany is defeated in the Second World War and Alan is at home having been released from the prisoner of war camp at the end of the war. In the textual actual world, Alan narrates a story to his friend. The textual actual world is surrounded by textual possible worlds and these are worlds created by

characters in the textual actual world through mental processes such as wishes and hopes. For example, there are instances in the text when Alan wishes he could escape from the prisoner of war camp or he imagines that he was never captured. Figure 5.13 also shows the F-universe within the textual universe, one that Alan creates through the story that he narrates to his friend. The F-universe includes an F-TAW (fantasy textual actual world) in which Nazi Germany wins the Second World War. In this world, Alan lives on the Count's estate where he meets genetically modified slaves and befriends Kit North. The F-TAW is surrounded by F-TPWs or fantasy textual possible worlds. These are worlds created by inhabitants of the F-TAW in the form of wishes and hopes. For example, Kit North and Alan hope to escape the estate someday.

While Ryan (1991) uses the term narratorial actual world to define and describe the world created by unreliable narrators, as evidenced above, I have used Ryan's F-universe to label and describe the domain that Alan as an unreliable narrator presents as TAW2. Although Alan is an unreliable narrator, the concept of a narratorial actual world is problematic when applied to *The Sound of his Horn* because while we are unsure whether or not TAW2 really exists within the textual universe, we are also unsure about the individual events that have taken place in TAW2. It may be that a counterfactual world truly exists within the textual universe but some of the events that Alan has narrated about that world may be fallacious. Therefore, readers have no way of distinguishing between Alan's description of mental worlds or narratorial actual world and his description of TAW2. In addition, Alan is not necessarily an unreliable narrator; he is only possibly an unreliable narrator. This is because while the text gives us enough reasons to question Alan's reliability, it does not give us enough to

confirm or validate it. Besides, given the nature of counterfactual historical fiction texts, readers expect to be presented with a counterfactual world. This is further complicated when the text creates two textual actual worlds with readers only questioning the reliability of TAW2 that is narrated by Alan, an unreliable first-person narrator. The text does not give us any reason to question the reliability of TAW1 which is narrated by Alan's friend, a reliable first-person narrator. In such a case, I suggest using a different approach that involves rethinking this issue in light of Ryan's concept of a textual reference world. This is because, as I will show below, the definition and concept of a textual reference world explains more appropriately how the different worlds created by *The Sound of his Horn* relate to each other.

As explored in Chapter Two, Ryan (1991) maintains that in fiction, the textual reference world is an accurate representation of the textual actual world, that is, it is equivalent to the textual actual world. According to her, only in non-fiction that is inaccurate with lies or errors does the textual reference world differ from the textual actual world. Bell (2010) agrees with Ryan when she states that a textual reference world can be used as a means of "distinguishing between what is presented as fact and what actually exists" (24) and therefore it is useful for studying non-fictional texts. Following on from Ryan, Bell (2010) explains:

> When someone makes an error, the textual actual world that they present conflicts with the Textual Reference World because they describe something which does not exist in the actual world. Conversely, when someone lies, the textual actual world that they present knowingly conflicts with the Textual Reference World because they describe

something that they know does not exist in the actual world. Ryan's distinction between textual reference world and a textual actual world can be used as a means of assessing the truth value of claims made in non-fictional texts (24).

Here, although Bell explicitly states that it is useful for analysing non-fictional texts, she mentions that it can also be used for studying texts in which someone lies. This assertion is important because as I will show below, it can be adapted to also analyse fictional texts that include narrators who describe textual actual worlds that they believe to be true, but whose ability to narrate or recount accurately is in question. In the next section, I will build on the concept of a textual reference world to show its relevance within the context of fiction. I argue that this can be used as a solution to the issue of labelling and splitting up the universe of the text into its various ontological domains.

5.2.7 Referential Universe and Unreliable Narratives

Ryan (1991) states that the textual actual world is "the image of the TRW [textual reference world] proposed by the text" (vii), that is, in fiction the textual actual world is always equivalent the textual reference world. While Ryan and Bell (2010) maintain that in fiction the textual reference world is redundant as they are easily interchangeable, other theorists (e.g. Charles, 1995 and Cover, 2010) have rejected this view and have used the concept of a textual reference world while analysing fictional texts (see Chapter Two discussion on textual reference world). Similarly, I propose using the concept of a textual reference world when a fictional text presents an unreliable narrator such as Alan.

Within the parameters of my thesis, in Chapter Two, I have defined a textual reference world as one that contains all the information about the textual actual world. This world is inferred by the reader and it exists autonomously and within its own system called the referential universe. Therefore, in fiction that presents a reliable narrator, the textual actual world matches the textual reference world, and the textual universe matches the referential universe. In such a case, the referential universe is not visible because it is overlaid by the textual universe that maps wholly and accurately over it. For example, let us imagine that Alan is a reliable narrator. In that case the narrative structure of *The Sound of his Horn* is represented as shown in Figure 5.14:

Figure: 5.14: The modal structure of *The Sound of his Horn*: the textual universe from Alan's point of view and the referential universe with Alan as a reliable narrator

As can been seen in Figure 5.14, the textual universe here mirrors the referential universe and as such, it not visible because it perfectly sits behind the textual universe. The projected textual universe here is from the point of view of the narrator. When this narrator is reliable, the reader does not doubt the events of

the textual actual world(s). However, as I have argued above in relation to *The Sound of his Horn,* Alan is possibly an unreliable narrator and as a result of this, the reader suspects that Alan is presenting an inaccurate image of the textual reference world. The reader, recognising that Alan is an unreliable narrator infers that the textual reference world includes only one textual actual world. Diagrammatically this can be represented as shown in Figure 5.15:


Figure: 5.15: The modal structure of *The Sound of his Horn*: the textual universe from Alan's point of view and the referential universe with Alan as an unreliable narrator

Figure 5.15 shows the textual universe projected by Alan along with the textual reference world that is inferred by the reader. Here, as can be seen, the textual actual world does not match the textual reference world. This is because Alan, as an unreliable narrator, inaccurately presents a mental world, which in Possible Worlds Theory is a textual possible world, as a textual actual world within the

text. The key argument here is that in a fictional text such as *The Sound of his Horn* where there is an unreliable narrator, the textual universe that is projected by the unreliable narrator is not identical to the referential universe. Consequently, the referential universe becomes visible, unlike in fiction with reliable narrators where the textual universe is indistinguishable from the referential universe.

As evidenced by the above discussion, while a referential universe and its textual reference world may be unnecessary for some types of fiction, within the context of fiction that have ambiguous-unreliable narrators, a referential universe is a useful concept. This is because, as seen above, it can be used to explicate the relation between the referential universe and the textual universe as well as the differences between them.

In figures 5.14 and 5.15, I have shown the textual universe to include two textual actual worlds because both the textual universes are viewed from Alan's point of view. I have done this to show that the textual reference worlds conflicts with the textual actual world in unreliable narratives. However, from the point of view of a reader, the ontological configuration of the textual actual world depends on whether or not readers conceive Alan as unreliable which in turn depends on their RK-worlds.

To conclude, on reading *The Sound of his Horn*, readers can never truly decide if Alan is an unreliable or a reliable narrator because there is no evidence in the

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text to support one or the other. This is because Alan is what Vogt (2015) calls an 'ambiguous-unreliable narrator'. In spite of the challenges that ambiguous-unreliable narratives pose, I have shown how readers can use their RK-worlds to determine whether or not Alan is reliable. More specifically, I have shown how readers with complete or partial RK-worlds are more likely to consider TAW2 as true within the textual universe because they will be able to recognise its epistemological relevance to the actual world and in particular to Hitler's Reich in the actual world. Readers who do not possess this knowledge, that is, readers with zero RK-worlds are more likely to question Alan's account of TAW2. In addition, I have shown how RK-worlds have a bearing on how readers construct the textual universe and hierarchise the worlds presented within it. While Ryan (1991) offers the narratorial actual world to define the worlds created by unreliable narratives, I have shown why this is problematic when applied to fiction that have more than one textual actual world. As an alternative, I reviewed the text using Ryan's textual reference world to show how a textual reference world and a textual actual world are not interchangeable in unreliable fiction. Instead, as I have shown, it is a useful concept that can be used to theorise the relationship that exists between the domains in such fiction.

5.3 *Making History* (1996) by Stephen Fry

Stephen Fry's *Making History* (1996) explores the premise: 'what if Adolf Hitler was never born?' and in doing so presents multiple textual actual worlds, each created through historical alterations. In my analysis of this text, the focus is on historical characters and their counterparts presented within the text. More specifically, the text makes an association between Adolf Hitler and a character named Rudi Gloder in TAW2. However, the text also complicates this association

by presenting Rudi Gloder in a way that it challenges readers' knowledge about Adolf Hitler. In the subsequent sections, I will show how Possible Worlds Theory and in particular the concept of RK-worlds, counterparts and essential properties can be used to achieve a more nuanced analysis of actual world counterparts presented as characters in fiction.

5.3.1 Plot Summary

The text is divided into three sections titled 'Book 1', 'Book 2', and 'Epilogue' with each part constructing a different textual actual world. Michael, nicknamed 'puppy' in what I call TAW1, is a history graduate student in Cambridge working on a doctoral thesis that focuses on the life of Adolf Hitler's parents and his early childhood. After his geneticist girlfriend Jane leaves him, he meets Leo Zuckerman, a physician who also works at Cambridge. Akin to Michael who has a research interest in Adolf Hitler, Leo has a personal interest in Hitler and the Nazi atrocities during the Second World War. As a result of this, Leo has built a machine that enables him to view the past – a day at the Auschwitz concentration camp. At first, Michael assumes that this is because Leo is Jewish, but soon learns that Leo whose original name is Axel Bauer, is the guilt-ridden son of Dietrich Bauer, a Nazi doctor at Auschwitz. Together, Michael and Leo devise a plan to get the machine to do more than just view the past. They modify the machine so that now it can be used to send something back in time. They decide to send a permanent male contraceptive pill that Michael has stolen from Jane, back in time to a well in Braunau am Inn – Hitler's birthplace – to make sure that Hitler is never born. They succeed; history changes and Michael wakes up in an alternate world – a second textual actual world, that is, TAW2.

In TAW2, Michael is a student of philosophy. His nickname is no longer Puppy; in this world, his nickname is Mike. In TAW2, Michael discovers that his plan with Leo in TAW1 has worked. He is overjoyed when he hears that his new friend in TAW2, Steve, has never heard of Adolf Hitler. However, soon to Michael's dismay Steve tells him that while he may not know who Adolf Hitler is, he is very aware of the Nazi Party. Michael discovers that in the absence of Adolf Hitler, a more charismatic leader – Rudi Gloder – has led Nazi Germany to European domination. Moreover, another version of the Holocaust exists in TAW2. The contraceptive pill that Michael and Leo dropped into Braunau am Inn's water supply in TAW1, called 'Braunau Water' in TAW2, was used to sterilize the Jews, thus making sure that they were wiped out in one generation. Furthermore, in TAW2 set in 1996, America is fascist with rampant racism and homophobia. Michael's friend Steve is homosexual and much to their surprise, Michael begins to develop feelings for Steve. He tells Steve about TAW1, the time machine, and an England that is socially liberal with gay pride marches and gay communities.

Michael meets Axel Bauer (Leo in TAW1) and learns that similar to the events of TAW1, in TAW2 it was Axel's father who was responsible for perfecting the Braunau water synthesis. Yet again, a guilt-ridden Axel Bauer has built a machine that can view history. Repeating their actions in TAW1, the duo use the time machine, but this time they drop a dead rat into Braunau's water supply therefore contaminating the Braunau water. History changes once again and Michael finds himself in another textual actual world. This world, we learn is very similar to TAW1 except here, Michael's favourite band does not exist, making

this a different textual actual world, that is, TAW3. In this textual actual world, Michael is reunited with Steve, his love interest from the previous world, who like Michael seems to have travelled to TAW3.

5.3.2 Adolf Hitler and Rudi Gloder

As evidenced through the plot summary, the textual universe of *Making History* includes three textual actual worlds that the protagonist Michael travels between using a time machine. Crucially, the difference between TAW1 and TAW2 is that in the latter Adolf Hitler is never born. However, another Nazi party leader who goes by the named Rudi Gloder is presented. There are some implicit and explicit references in TAW2 that suggest that an association exists between Rudi Gloder and Adolf Hitler. More specifically, as I will show in the subsequent sections, through the use of explicit references in the text Rudi Gloder can be inferred as being offered as an alternative to Adolf Hitler. However, through the use of implicit references that involve establishing an epistemological link between Adolf Hitler and Rudi Gloder, Gloder may be seen not simply as a substitute to, but as a counterpart of, Adolf Hitler. As is the case here, the counterpart of Adolf Hitler is presented using a different proper name. As was discussed in Chapter Four, when a proper name is unavailable to cross-reference a character to their corresponding actual world individual, the concept of essential properties can be used to make the connection. However, in order to make this connection, as I will show below, the text requires that readers' RK-worlds possess specific knowledge about Adolf Hitler. Additionally, making the epistemological connection is further complicated because the text plays with how Rudi Gloder is presented in the text.

One of the most important aspects of the text is that although the first two textual actual worlds within the novel are separated into two sections (Book 1 and Book 2), each of these sections that include chapters set in 1996 are further interleaved with chapters that reveal the historical timeline around Hitler's parents, Hitler's early days and the First World War. For example: in Book 1, a chapter titled 'Making Conversation' where Michael and Leo Zuckerman talk about Michael's PhD thesis (in 1996), is followed by a chapter titled 'Making Threats' that presents a part of Michael's dissertation that narrates a day in the life of a young Adolf Hitler where he is being reprimanded by his father. A reader with a complete or partial RK-world may be able to piece together the information that this event might have taken place in or around 1895. Similarly, when readers move to TAW2, chapters that present the current events that include Michael waking up in a new world and getting accustomed to his surroundings is interleaved with chapters that reveal the alternate historical timeline of TAW2 by focusing on important wars such as the First and Second World Wars. The alternate historical timeline of TAW2 contradicts not only the history of the actual world but also that of TAW1. For example, as the plot summary shows, in TAW1, Adolf Hitler used concentration camps and gas chambers to achieve the Holocaust wheras in TAW2 a different approach was adopted.

As previously discussed, Ryan's (1991) principle of minimal departure can be used to explain how readers use their RK-worlds when constructing a textual actual world. According to this principle, readers assume that the textual actual

world is similar to the actual world unless the text specifies otherwise. In this case, while constructing TAW1, readers will assume that the history of TAW1 is similar to the history of the actual world because the text does not contradict a reader's RK-world. On the other hand, in TAW2, Adolf Hitler does not exist but a Nazi leader called Rudi Gloder does. In this world, there are no concentration camps or gas chambers but a different form of the Final Solution that includes synthesising the contaminated Braunau water in large quantities exists. In *Making History*, while it is important for readers to use their RK-worlds to identity the historical deviations included in TAW2, they must also retain their knowledge of TAW1 in order to see its epistemological relevance to TAW2. While a number of contradictory historical events are presented as part of the textual universe of *Making History*, in the following section, I am drawing on one specific example where the rewriting of history within TAW2 in relation to TAW1 is presented explicitly. This is done through two contradictory chapters that are included in the text — one in TAW1 titled 'Making Smoke – The Frenchman and the Colonel's Helmet: I' and the other in TAW2 titled 'Military History –The Frenchman and the Colonel's Helmet: II'. The reason for choosing this as an illustrative example is that it is through the two contradictory chapters in the text that readers are explicitly made aware that Rudi Gloder is a substitute for Adolf Hitler.

In TAW1, the chapter presents three characters: Adi (Adolf Hitler) and Hans Mend – men in the German army fighting during World War I – and Rudi Gloder who holds an officer's rank in the German army. Hitler tells Rudi Gloder about the Colonel's helmet that the French have conquered in their raid of the German dug-out the previous night. Hitler suggests that someone must go to retrieve

the helmet. The same night, Gloder sets out to recover the Colonel's helmet from the French army but he does not make it back to the German side:

> Gloder lay face up, his sightless eyes staring at the risen sun, his ivory throat open and scarlet pools of jellied blood spread down his tunic like frozen lakes of lava. A metre or so beyond his outflung fist, Colonel Maximilian Baligand's grand ceremonial lobster-tailed Pickelhaube stood, spike upwards, as if the Colonel himself, buried underground, were wearing it still. Over one shoulder, in casual Hussar style, hung the richly braided mess-jacket of a French brigadier (Fry, 1996: 180).

Here, the reader learns about Rudi Gloder's death. He succeeds in recovering the Colonel's helmet and also takes a French brigadier's mess jacket but not before being spotted by the French army who shoot him down with a sniper. Hans Mend sees Gloder's body from the German side through a field glass and also notices something in the foreground:

> A movement in the foreground caught Hans's attention. Slowly, centimetre by centimetre, from the direction of the German lines, a man was crawling on his stomach towards the body. My God,' whispered Hans. 'It's Adi!'
>
> 'Where?'
>
> Hans passed the field-glasses over to Ernst. 'Damn it, if we start up any covering fire, the French will spot him for sure. Get down, we'll use periscopes. It's safer.'
>
> [...]

'And where's Hitler now?'

Schmidt bellowed the answer from behind his field-glasses. 'He's at the wire sir! Sir, he's all right sir! He's found the doorway. He's got the body. And the helmet, sir! He's even got the helmet!'

[...]

Hans walked slowly out of the trench just as Rudi's corpse rolled into it. Adi followed, the Colonel's helmet raised aloft in his right hand, the gold eagle stamped upon it flashing in the sun (Fry, 1996: 180–184).

Here, readers are informed that Hitler goes over to the French side to retrieve Gloder's body. The German army uses smoke bombs to help Hitler make the escape – he does so with Gloder's corpse and the Colonel's helmet.

In contrast, in TAW2, a similar event but one that directly contradicts the above event takes place. Here, instead of Hitler it is Rudi Gloder who tells Hans Mend and Ernst that the French have captured the Colonel's helmet in their raid the previous night. Gloder suggests that someone must retrieve it and Ernst decides to carry it out. He goes to the French side and recovers the helmet along with a French officer's sabre but not before being spotted by the French army. Hans Mend in his tent on the German side witnesses the scene through a field glass:

Ernst lay face down, his back torn open and glistening like blackberries, his outflung fist clutched tightly around the strap of Colonel Maximilian Baligand's grand Imperial lobster-tailed Pickelhaube. Just out of his

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reach, as if his dying act had been to fling it towards his home lines, was

a French officer's sabre, sheathed in a silver scabbard (Fry, 1996: 255).

Here, as evidenced, in a setting similar to that in TAW1, a soldier goes to the French side to retrieve a German Colonel's helmet that the French have captured. In TAW1, this soldier was Rudi Gloder and in TAW2 the soldier is Ernst Schmidt. Similarly, another soldier goes to retrieve the body:

A movement in the foreground caught Hans's attention. Slowly, centimetre by centimetre, from the direction of the German lines, a man was crawling on his stomach towards the body.

'My God,' whispered Hans. 'It's Rudi!'

'Where?' Ignaz grabbed the field-glasses. 'Sweet Maria! He's insane. He'll be killed. What can we do?'

'Do? Do? Nothing, you fool. Any action on our part will only draw attention to him. Get your bloody head down, we'll use periscopes.'

[...]

And where's the Hauptmann now?'

Westenkirchner bellowed the answer from behind his field-glasses. 'He's at the wire sir! Sir, he's all right sir! He's found the doorway. He's got the body. And the helmet, sir! He's got the helmet and the sword!' (Fry, 1996: 255–258).

Akin to the events that take place in TAW1, in TAW2 too, a brave soldier goes to retrieve the body of the dead soldier. Here, the brave soldier is Rudi Gloder. In

this case, TAW2 utilises a specific set of knowledge that is gained from reading Book 1 in *Making History.* With knowledge of TAW1 that readers possess, the scene presented here can thus be interpreted as a representation of history that is rewritten based on events in TAW1. In explicitly contradicting TAW1, the text makes a clear distinction between TAW1 and TAW2.

An important aspect of both the extracts is the brave soldier that is presented at the end. In TAW1, the brave soldier is Adolf Hitler. As was discussed in Chapter Four, Pavel's (1979) theory of rigid designators claims that all occurrences of a proper name across possible worlds identify the same person in the actual world. Consequently, the name Adolf Hitler in the extract from TAW 1 can be inferred as representing Adolf Hitler, the leader of the Nazi party in the actual world. Conversely, the brave soldier presented in TAW2 is Rudy Gloder. This name does not designate an actual world historical figure. However, by juxtaposing the two histories as depicted in both extracts from TAW1 and TAW2, a link can be drawn between Adolf Hitler and Rudi Gloder. That is, in TAW2, Rudi Gloder is offered as a substitute for Adolf Hitler in TAW1.

5.3.3 Rudi Gloder as a Counterpart of Adolf Hitler

As the preceding discussion has shown, in TAW2 by offering Gloder in place of Hitler the text makes an explicit association between them. However, while readers with a zero RK-world may see this replacement as the only link between the two individuals, a reader with a complete or partial RK-world may understand that an inextricable epistemic relationship exists between them.

In Chapter Four of this thesis, I discussed how some counterfactual historical fiction texts present actual world historical figures with a different proper name within their textual actual world. In such a case, I proposed that essential properties in the form textual evidence and extra-textual knowledge can be used to support an epistemological link. Here, with reference to Rudi Gloder in TAW2, the following descriptions can be gathered from the text: 1. "Founder and leader of the Nazi Party, Reich Chancellor and guiding spirit of the Greater German Reich from 1928 until his overthrow in 1963. Head of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Führer of the German Peoples" (Fry, 1996, 247); 2. "All Jews forced to evacuate countries under the control of Greater German Reich and emigrate to new 'Jewish Free State' in area carved out between Montenegro and Herzegovina under control of Reichsminister Heydrich" (268); and 3. "Rumours of ill-treatment and mass-murder of citizens of Balkan Jewish free State bring America to the brink of nuclear war with Greater Germany" (269). From these extracts, readers become aware that in TAW2 Rudi Gloder was the leader of the Nazi Party. He advocated for the evacuation of the Jews from the German Reich. Readers also learn that the rumours about the genocide were true because in TAW2 the Holocaust was carried out using the contaminated Braunau water.

Invoked implicitly here is the counterpart relation between Adolf Hitler and Rudi Gloder. Gloder possesses some essential properties, which as was discussed in Chapter Four, can be gathered in the form of intersubjectively acknowledged singular facts typically identified with Adolf Hitler in the actual world, thereby

serving as evidence that the two are epistemologically related. Therefore, readers with a complete or partial RK-world will comprehend that Gloder is not merely offered as a replacement for Hitler, he's offered as his counterpart. That is, he shares with Hitler some of his essential properties.

Furthermore, of primary importance is the manner in which Hitler and Gloder are presented in TAW1 and TAW2 respectively. In TAW1, Hitler goes to retrieve Rudi's body, but along with the body he also procures the Colonel's helmet. In contrast, in TAW2 Gloder goes to retrieve Ernst's body, and on his way out he not only retrieves Ernst's body and obtains the Colonel's helmet, but he also manages to steal the sword. Gloder's return to his camp is met with cheers and congratulations, which he shames into silence through his visible grief of Ernst's death. This act can be interpreted as a more dramatised version of the event in TAW1 that depicts Gloder in a more charismatic light. The difference between the way Hitler and Gloder are presented is further strengthened by the contrasting manner in which Hans Mend receives Hitler and Gloder in their respective textual actual worlds. In TAW1: "As Hans moved away, the cheering of the men grew and swelled inside him until it burst from his eyes in a flood of hot, disgusted tears" (Fry, 1996: 184) is to be juxtaposed with TAW2, where:

> Suddenly Hans knew something with absolute clarity and conviction. It is impossible, he realised with a burst of pride, for Germany to lose the war. If the enemy could see what I have seen they would surrender tomorrow. It will soon be over. Peace and victory will be ours (260).

Contrasting Hans's reaction to Adi that is expressed through the phrase "disgusted tears" with his reaction to Gloder expressed through the phrase

"burst of pride" conveys to the readers that Gloder in TAW2 is presented not only a preferred leader but also as a far more efficient and charismatic leader as he evokes empathy and pride.

As evidenced by the analysis, Rudi Gloder's contextual information included in TAW2 challenges readers' RK-worlds about Adolf Hitler. That is, when readers conceive Adolf Hitler, they are less likely to associate Rudi's characteristics as described in TAW2 to Hitler. Therefore, by presenting a counterpart that is considerably different from their corresponding historical individual in the actual world, the text intensifies the characterisation of Adolf Hitler. More specifically, Gloder is anti-Semitic like Hitler, but unlike Hitler, Gloder manipulates everyone into believing that he is virtuous. For example, in TAW2 with the discovery of Gloder's diary, readers learn that he orchestrated himself to look like a hero during the Colonel's helmet incident discussed above. Furthermore, he successfully executes the Jewish genocide and wipes the entire race out in one generation. In the actual world, Hitler is mostly despised for his role in Holocaust. However, in TAW2 in spite of the Holocaust, Gloder convinces people that he is honourable and consequently he rises and stays in power till 1963. Although the text plays with the association between Gloder and Hitler, in order to comprehend the implications of the contrasting characterisation of Gloder, it is important for readers to establish a counterpart relation between the two.

Margolin (1991) identifies what he calls 'institutionalized truth' (128) to explain how texts establish associations between a counterpart and an actual world

individual. According to Margolin, the author of a work of fiction draws upon certain 'institutionalized truth' (128) or widely acknowledged facts about an actual world individual in order to present their counterpart in fiction. As such, for readers to be able to make the connection, their RK-worlds must include the same knowledge that the text draws upon. In *Making History*, the text draws upon both basic facts about Hitler such as his professional background as well some specific facts about Hitler's characteristics.

Margolin (1990) also suggests that "the cultural stereotype of generic images of the most prominent historical figures vary enormously according to the nation, period, race, or ideology that constructs historical images in certifying discourses" (128). Margolin's claim that perceptions about historical figures are constructed through written discourses and as such they are subject to variation depending on socio-cultural changes. Readers are very likely to be familiar with Adolf Hitler in the actual world. However, it may also be that from one reader to another they may vary in their perception or impressions of Adolf Hitler and his personality. Consequently, readers may also differ in terms of what textual clues they pick up on and how they construct Rudi Gloder in TAW2.

5.3.4 The Significance of Presenting Gloder as a Counterpart of Hitler

The analysis so far has shown that *Making History* plays with the reader in that the text exploits readers' knowledge of Hitler in the actual world by presenting a counterpart of him in TAW2 who is overtly incompatible with him. However, even if readers' RK-worlds do not include specific information to establish the

epistemological connection between Hitler and Gloder, as the preceding discussion has shown, the text noticeably draws parallels between Gloder's rise to power and Hitler's rise to power implying that Gloder is a counterpart of Hitler.

The epistemic relationship invoked between Gloder and Hitler is important to overall didactic purpose of the text because it propagates the inevitability of history. Although Michael and Leo Zuckerman succeed in making sure Adolf Hitler is never born in TAW2, they are unable to change anything else. More specifically, they were unable to avoid the rise of Nazism or stop the Holocaust. As Wallace (2012) points out, "Gloder's impact on the course of history is far from negligible, for he proves even more ruthless than Hitler [...] confirming the structuralist view that not any particular individual but deeper trends in German history are the real explanation for the rise of Nazism" (365). Here, Wallace explains that Michael, by believing that Hitler is the only cause of Nazism, he overlooks the background against which Nazism rose and consequently in trying to undo the Holocaust, he only creates another version of it. Therefore, the underlying didactic purpose of presenting Rudi Gloder as a counterpart of Adolf Hitler is also to highlight to the reader that some significant historical events are inevitable.

While Michael believed that he could make the world better by removing Hitler from it, he fails to take into account the consequences of his actions. In TAW 2, as Michael states in retrospect, "I suppose I should have known better. The circumstances were still the same in Europe. There was still a vacuum in

Germany waiting to be filled" (380). Michael here alludes to the situation in Germany after the First World War that proved favourable for Hitler's rise to power. The text also implies that when an event in the past is altered, time finds a way to replace it and in this case, as the text suggests, Hitler and his version of the Holocaust are somehow better than what it is replaced by in TAW2. Here, the concept of reciprocal feedback can be used to explain how TAW2 prompts the readers to evaluate the importance of the course of events in the actual world. More specifically, readers may see the importance of defeating Adolf Hitler in the Second World War. Furthermore, by presenting a pessimistic view of what the world would have been without Adolf Hitler, the text prompts the reader to think about the wider role that Germans played in the Holocaust. As Rosenfeld (2005) states, "Fry's aims in writing the novel were partly to shift attention towards the German people's role in perpetrating the Holocaust and thereby broaden the popular understanding of the crime as one caused not only by Hitler" (367). That is, by presenting a counterfactual world where the Germans even without Hitler cause the Holocaust, the text challenges the common notion that one man was responsible for the Holocaust.

Furthermore, Singles (2013) asserts that in offering "a worse alternative to Hitler" (218), the text also implies that "our world is the best of all worlds" (218). That is, in *Making History*, Michael's original actual world, that is, TAW1 is the best of all possible worlds, a realisation that Michael comes to when he travels to TAW2. Similarly, Singles also posits that when readers are presented with a counterfactual TAW2 which is worse than the actual world, the text invites the reader to infer that our actual world is the best of all possible worlds. This, however, is an ethically problematic position to assume because it promotes the

view that the world today is more fortunate with Adolf Hitler and the Nazi atrocities as it happened than otherwise. Therefore, as Rosenfeld (2005) assesses, *Making History* presents the "most pessimistic portrayal of the historical consequences of Hitler never becoming the Führer" (298).

To conclude, the analysis of *Making History* has shown how Possible Worlds Theory can be used to effectively tease out the link that the text presents between Adolf Hitler and his textual counterpart in TAW2. More specifically, I have shown how establishing the epistemological relationship between Hitler and Gloder can be achieved by two ways – readers can use the explicit references that the text supplies and/or they can use their RK-worlds. With reference to readers using their RK-worlds, the text relies heavily on readers possessing complete or partial RK-worlds about Hitler and the impressions readers have about him in the actual world. For instance, while the text presents Gloder as possessing certain shared essential properties with Hitler, it also exploits specific actual world views that readers may have about Hitler to present a counterpart that is noticeably different. Furthermore, I have explained the implications of presenting a counterfactual counterpart of Hitler, that is, by presenting Gloder as a far more damaging version of Hitler, the text highlights the inevitability of history.

5.4 Summary

In this chapter, I have applied the Possible Worlds Theory that I have developed in the preceding two chapters to three texts. In my application of Possible Worlds Theory to *Fatherland*, I have shown how my model can be effectively

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used to analyse actual world images and quotations that appear in texts. More specifically, I have shown how readers with a complete or partial RK-world will recognise the complex ontology that *Fatherland* creates by presenting images and quotations that are ontologically indexical. That is, they are difficult to conceive as belonging to the actual world or the textual actual world. As such, the images and quotations are theorised as having an indexical ontology that is relative to the context that it is being evaluated in.

By applying Possible Worlds Theory to *The Sound of his Horn*, I have shown how it can be used to analyse texts that heavily rely on RK-worlds to make sense of the textual actual world. More specifically, TAW2 presented in this text is one that is narrated by an unreliable narrator. In such a case, I have shown how the concept of RK-worlds can be used to posit how readers determine the plausibility of TAW2. In doing so, readers are also able to decide whether or not Alan is unreliable and as such explain the manner in which readers process the different worlds created by the text and determine their hierarchies. Furthermore, I have also shown how Possible Worlds Theory serves as a means of characterising the textual universe created by unreliable narratives.

In my application of Possible Worlds Theory to *Making History,* by focusing on historical characters, I have theorised the manner in which RK-worlds can be used to establish the epistemological link between an actual world individual and their textual actual world counterpart that does not share a proper name to serve as a rigid designator. More specifically, I have shown how the characterisation of Hitler and his counterpart in the text draws upon RK-worlds

specific to Hitler and how he is perceived in the actual world. Using Possible Worlds Theory, I have shown how the implicit link between the two can be teased out to provide a more nuanced analysis of actual world individuals and counterparts.

Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Research Recommendations

In this thesis, I have developed a cognitive-narratological methodology with which to systematically theorise the different processes that readers go through when they read counterfactual historical fiction texts. As such, this study argues for a reader-focussed analysis of the genre using Possible Worlds Theory. In this chapter, I present the central conclusions of my thesis in a systematic order. Having considered the strengths and limitations of this thesis, I also recommend areas for further research that will benefit both Possible Worlds Theory and the genre of counterfactual historical fiction.

6.1. RK-worlds

In my application of Possible Worlds Theory to counterfactual historical fiction texts, I have argued that while existing theory can successfully reduce the text into different ontological domains, it does not account for how readers process such fiction. As previously stated, Ryan (2006) helpfully points out that "whether alternate history fiction presents the fate of the world as determined by human decisions at certain strategic points or shows it to be the product of forces too numerous and too complex to be controlled, the purpose of such thought experiments is to invite reflection on the mechanisms of history, and the real world always serves as an implicit background" (657). As Ryan states, the purpose of such fiction is draw attention to the actual world and the significance of such texts is understood only when a reader uses their knowledge of the

actual world to interpret the text. For this purpose, I concluded that a model to analyse counterfactual historical fiction texts must include the manner in which readers use their actual world to interpret the textual actual world.

Using examples from *Fatherland*, in Chapter Three I have shown how not all readers of counterfactual historical fiction texts will be able to recognise and cross-reference the counterfactuals in the text to its corresponding fact in the actual world. I argued that this broadly creates two types of readers – readers who are able to cross-reference counterfactual descriptions in the text to its original fact in the actual world and those are not able to do this. I argued that this was not the result of each type of reader being situated in a different actual world. Instead, these readers differ from each other because their knowledge of what lies in the actual world is different. This led to the notion that every reader has an individual perception of what lies in the objective actual world and to them their subjective perception of the actual world is *the* actual world.

I have showed that Goodman (1986) puts forth a similar view when he argues through his anti-realist position that there is no objective actual world, but only versions of the actual world. Drawing on Ryan (1991) and Bell (2010) I've also argued that what Goodman proposes as versions of the actual world are an individual's representation of the actual world. I have subsequently suggested that a revised version of Goodman's anti-realist view can be said to accommodate both the objective actual world and different individuals' subjective versions of the actual world. I have also shown that Ryan (1998) proposes a Possible Worlds model that accounts for an individual's

representation of the objective actual world. Akin to Goodman (1986), Ryan too uses an established term – actual world – to label the different representations of it that differ from one individual to another. Both Goodman (1986) and Ryan (1998) propose a multiple actual world model, but as I have shown in Chapter Three, the problem lies in the terminology that they employ to label these individual representations as opposed to their theoretical stance that proposes the concept of an individual's version or representation of an actual world.

In Chapter Three, I have also shown how the notion of an individual's representation of the actual world corresponds to what an individual knows about the actual world. Ryan (1991), within the textual universe that she establishes to study fiction, introduces knowledge worlds or K-worlds. According to Ryan, K-worlds comprise what an individual knows about the reference world. She also states that the reference world could be either system of reality, that is, the textual actual world or the actual world. Although Ryan states that K-worlds can be used to describe the knowledge worlds of readers, I have shown that she only develops this category with regards to the textual actual world and as such within Possible Worlds Theory a K-world has only been used to refer to a character's knowledge world. As a result, I have argued that the actual universe that Ryan establishes does not accommodate readers' knowledge worlds and instead only includes the objective actual world and other alternate possible worlds. Therefore, as I have demonstrated in Chapter Three, within Possible Worlds Theory a reader's knowledge world is a theoretical concept that has not been developed in any detail.

To remedy this gap in scholarship, in my analysis of counterfactual historical fiction with a special focus on readers, I have shown that it is crucial to account for a reader's 'knowledge world' as opposed to using the term 'actual world' to label the domain that readers use to interpret such fiction. This is because it is important to demarcate an individual's subjective knowledge of the actual world more clearly from the concrete actual world. In order to analyse counterfactual historical fiction texts, and in particular to accurately theorise how readers interpret these texts, I argued that it was necessary to have a model that accounts for different readers and their different levels of knowledge.

In my thesis, I have termed individuals' representations or individuals' knowledge of the actual world as 'RK-worlds' or reader knowledge worlds. In order to avoid all terminological confusions with the well-established character's K-world within Possible Worlds Theory, I chose to demarcate readers' knowledge worlds by calling them RK-worlds. Furthermore, I have also suggested modifications to Ryan's (1991) terminology by proposing the term 'CK-worlds' to characterise a character's K-world. Therefore, I have divided Ryan's K-world category into CK-worlds and RK-worlds to explicitly distinguish between character and reader knowledge worlds.

By introducing RK-worlds within my modal universe, I have shown how it can be used to label specific knowledge worlds that readers bring to the text. Consequently, I have shown that while reading a counterfactual historical fiction text, a reader uses their RK-world to interpret and understand the significance of the text. In order to further differentiate between RK-worlds, I have introduced

complete RK-worlds, partial RK-worlds, and zero RK-worlds, each reflecting different levels of knowledge in readers. More specifically, I proposed that a reader can be said to have a complete RK-world if they possess all the background knowledge that is needed to identify how a text is epistemologically related to and counterfactual to the actual world. A reader with a partial RK-world will only identify some of the ways in which a text draws on and contradicts the actual world. Finally, a reader with a zero RK-world will fail to see how such texts explicitly invoke the actual world history.

To summarise, I have revised Possible Worlds Theory so it may be used to effectively analyse counterfactual historical fiction by accounting for different readers and their knowledge worlds. In doing so, I have also modified Goodman's ontological position so it is no more at odds with Possible Worlds Theory. Whilst the scope of this thesis covers counterfactual historical fiction, the modal universe that I have established can also be used to analyse other genres in fiction. This is because while reading any kind of fiction, readers use their knowledge of the actual world in order to interpret the textual actual world. As such the concept of RK-worlds can be used to explain how different readers use different interpretive strategies while constructing fictional worlds.

6.2 Ontological Superimposition and Reciprocal Feedback

After introducing an ontological domain to define and describe a reader's knowledge world, in Chapter Three, I developed two cognitive concepts – 'ontological superimposition' and 'reciprocal feedback' – which I showed can be

used to analyse the processes that readers go through when they use their RK-worlds to make sense of a textual actual world. Arguing against older models such as the blending model proposed by Dannenberg (2008) which suggests that the structure of a counterfactual historical text is a blend of actual world input spaces, in my thesis I have theorised a two-layered superimposed structure to model how readers process counterfactual historical fiction.

Crucially, I proposed that there is dialogic relationship between a textual actual world created by a counterfactual historical fiction text and the actual world. While all textual actual worlds can be conceived as epistemologically related to the actual world to a lesser or greater degree, I suggested that the epistemological link established between the two domains in a counterfactual historical fiction text is more prominent. I have suggested that the distinction between non-counterfactual historical fiction and counterfactual historical fiction can be seen metaphorically as a distinction between the process of rewriting and overwriting. More specifically, in non-counterfactual historical fiction, the actual world is rewritten as a textual actual world. However, in counterfactual historical fiction the actual world is overwritten with a textual actual world. The distinction therefore lies in the manner in which the actual world is somewhat preserved in the background in counterfactual historical fiction texts and as such a binary relationship is established between the textual actual world and the actual world that it contradicts.

Owing to the close relationship that exists between the actual world and the textual actual world in counterfactual historical fiction, I proposed that when

readers read such fiction they process the structure of counterfactual historical fiction texts as having a superimposed structure. That is, in order to model the manner in which readers use their RK-worlds to make sense of the textual actual world, I proposed that when they read such fiction they conceive the textual actual world as being superimposed on the actual world. This is because, while the text presents the textual actual world, it constantly invokes the RK-world in the mind of the reader. Consequently, in order to appreciate the historical deviations included in the text, readers must access their RK-worlds and apply that information within the context of the textual actual world. In order to move between these worlds and access information from their RK-world and bring it to the textual actual world, the two domains must be kept separate in the reader's mind. In my thesis, I have called this cognitive concept 'ontological superimposition'.

Furthermore, I also introduced an associated process called 'reciprocal feedback' that readers go through when they read such fiction. As was discussed in Chapter Three, readers move between their RK-worlds and the textual actual world to access information from their RK-world and use it to make sense of the textual actual world. I have shown that knowledge gained from understanding the textual actual world can also be used to appreciate and evaluate the significance of the actual world. Therefore, while reading counterfactual historical fiction, readers go through a circular process of constructing meaning. That is, they move between their RK-worlds and the textual actual world in a reciprocal feedback process, wherein they use their RK-world to make sense of the textual actual world, and then use the textual actual world to further evaluate and/or appreciate their actual world.

In offering RK-worlds and the associated cognitive concepts of ontological superimposition and reciprocal feedback, I offered the first set of modifications to Ryan's (1991) Possible Worlds model.

6.3 Transworld Identity and Counterpart Theory

In Chapter Four, I deal with two concepts from within Possible Worlds Theory namely transworld identity and counterpart theory, that are integral to how readers use their RK-worlds to process the inclusion of actual world historical characters in particular in fiction. Owing to the nature of counterfactual historical fiction, a salient feature is the use of historical figures from the actual world within their textual actual world.

As was discussed in Chapter Four, as a direct consequence of the conceptual disagreement between the modal realists and moderate realists on the ontological status of possible worlds, both schools of thought also disagree on whether or not individuals who appear in more than one possible world are the self-same individuals. Consequently, two sets of concepts and accompanying terminology are available to define and describe actual world individuals who appear in fiction. Modal realists who believe that all possible worlds, like the actual world, physically exist out there propose that individuals who appear in more than one possible world cannot be the same individual. This is because it is logically impossible for one individual to exist in two or more worlds simultaneously. Instead, they propose that counterparts of each other exist in

possible worlds. In direct contrast, moderate realists do not subscribe to the notion that possible worlds are concrete entities and thus according to this view it is logically possible for the same individual to appear across possible worlds. That is, they propose that the same actual world individual with transworld identity appear across multiple possible worlds.

Within philosophy, this debate remains unresolved, but narratologists in their application of Possible Worlds Theory to fiction have appropriated the associated terminology to benefit their analysis. As was demonstrated in Chapter Four, while some narratologists choose one term over the other (e.g. Ronen, 1994), others (e.g. Doležel, 1998; Ryan, 1991; Bell, 2010) employ both terms – counterparts to describe individuals who appear in more than one world and transworld identity to theorise the process through which they cross ontological boundaries and appear in more than one world. However, I have argued that existing narratological approaches within Possible Worlds Theory are lacking when applied to counterfactual historical fiction, thereby demonstrating the need for a new approach. More specifically, using examples from *Making History*, I have shown how textual actual worlds of such fiction can present actual world historical figures in divergent ways. Consequently, I argued that two sets of terminology are needed to appropriately label the two types of actual world individuals presented in texts.

For this purpose, I have revisited counterpart theory and transworld identity as they stand in philosophy, to show how they each describe a separate concept. More specifically, I have shown why they should not be perceived as concepts

that are substitutes for one another. Consequently, I have redefined the two concepts to offer an alternative approach with which to effectively analyse all types of historical individuals in counterfactual historical fiction texts.

I have proposed that the term transworld identity be used to describe actual world individuals who appear in textual actual worlds, but share all essential properties with their original in the actual world thereby making them the same individual. In contrast, I proposed that the term counterpart be used to label actual world individuals in the textual actual world who share some essential properties, but also possess other properties of their own in a textual actual world. However, before reconceptualising these concepts and applying them within counterfactual historical fiction, it was important to define what I meant by essential properties. In Chapter Four, I have shown how the idea of essential properties is an area that is largely underdeveloped within Possible Worlds Theory. For instance, theorists such as Lewis (1986), use the term but do not necessarily define what counts as an individual's essential property. For this purpose, I chose to clearly define what I meant by essential properties within the context of counterfactual historical fiction. Adopting Margolin's (1990) theory of individuals in narrative worlds, I defined an actual world individual's essential properties as amounting to those "intersubjectively acknowledged singular facts" (127) or well-known facts about that individual that are recorded in the actual world in institutionally recognised documents.

Furthermore, using concepts such as Ryan's (1991) principle of minimal departure and Pavel's (1979) narratological development of the theories of rigid

designation and essential properties, I have also theorised how readers make the epistemological connection between counterparts and individuals with transworld identity, and their corresponding actual world individuals. More specifically, I have shown how in order to be able to differentiate between which historical individual is presented as a counterpart and which one as possessing transworld identity, it is first important for readers to use their RK-worlds to recognise how they are presented in the text. I have shown how Pavel's theory of rigid designator used alongside Ryan's principle of minimal departure is a useful way of explaining how readers identify fictional incarnations of actual world individuals in texts. However, in the absence of a proper name to serve as a rigid designation, I have theorised an alternative method that can be used to establish epistemological links.

In Chapter Four, I suggested that when a proper name is not provided in the text for readers to cross-reference counterparts to their corresponding actual world individuals, or when a text purposely plays with the reader by altering the name of the counterpart, the redefined concept of essential properties can be used as a useful method of cross-referencing. That is, essential properties of an individual can be gathered in the form of textual evidence to support the epistemological link between an actual world individual and their counterpart. Using an example from *The Sound of his Horn*, I have shown how actual world individuals that appear in the text with a different proper name can be conceived as counterparts of each other.

In differentiating between the diverse ways in which actual world individuals are presented in texts, my thesis accounts for how readers process them differently and thus presents the second set of modifications to Ryan's (1991) Possible Worlds Theory model.

6.4 Textual Reference World and Narratorial Actual World

In Chapter Five, I have built on Bell's (2010) idea that a textual reference world is relevant when a text includes errors or lies to show how this ontological category is important when analysing textual actual worlds in fiction that are created through unreliable narration. I have argued that in most fiction, as Ryan (1991) and Bell (2010) show the textual actual world accurately imitates the textual reference world, and thus the two domains are indeed interchangeable. However, as I have shown, in fiction similar to *The Sound of his Horn* that includes two textual actual worlds within the textual universe, and in particular when a textual actual world is created through unreliable narration, the textual universe conflicts with the referential universe. This is because an unreliable narrator often narrates events that do not occur in the textual actual world. Consequently, the referential universe becomes visible, unlike in fiction with reliable narrators where the textual reference world sits behind the textual universe because they are identical. Therefore, opposing Ryan's argument that the textual actual world is always equivalent to the textual reference world in fiction, I have shown how the textual reference world is distinguishable from the textual universe in fiction with unreliable narrators, and therefore not always redundant in fiction.

Although Ryan (1991) offers the term 'narratorial actual world' to label a narrator's personal narration of the textual actual world, in Chapter Five I have shown how this can be used only when it is possible to differentiate between the narratorial actual world and the textual actual world. In texts such as *The Sound of his Horn*, where it is problematic to infer what a character's mental world is and what the textual actual world is, I have argued that the concept of a textual reference world is an appropriate alternative that can be used to explain the relation between the referential universe and the textual universe as well as the differences between them.

Furthermore, I have theorised that whole worlds created by unreliable narrators, such as TAW2 created by Alan in *The Sound of his Horn*, can be conceived as a specific type of textual possible world – an F-universe or fantasy universe. I concluded that readers who believe that the unreliable narrator's claims about a TAW2 are true, will perceive the textual universe as comprising two textual actual worlds. Alternatively, readers who disbelieve the narrator's claims about a TAW2 and consider it as part of their mental world instead, will perceive that domain as an F-universe. In order to successfully apply the concept of a F-universe to the worlds created by the narrator, following Ryan's (1991) conventions, I proposed labelling the central world of the F-universe as F-TAW, that is fantasy textual actual world, and the possible worlds created as part of this F-universe as F-TPW or fantasy textual possible world.

6.5 The New Modal Universe and Accompanying Terminology

Building on Ryan's (1991), the modal universe that I offer to analyse counterfactual historical fiction texts consists of three modal systems – the actual universe, the textual universe, and the referential universe.

The first modal system is the actual universe that comprises the actual world, RK-worlds, and possible worlds.

Actual world - In line with Ryan, the actual world is an objective domain that exists physically. It is the domain to which I belong.

RK-worlds - As a new contribution to Ryan's Possible Worlds modal universe, RK-worlds or reader knowledge worlds are worlds that include propositions that a reader knows about the actual world. Every reader has their own RK-world that is their subjective construction of the objectively existing actual world.

Possible worlds - Following Ryan, these are alternate worlds that are a product of mental constructions. They are created by actual world inhabitants and they exist in the form of hopes, wishes, and so on.

Mirroring the ontological structure of an actual universe is the textual universe. In agreement with Ryan, this domain comprises the textual actual world(s) and textual possible worlds associated with a text.

The textual actual world - Following Ryan, this is the world that the characters of a text inhabit. This domain is ontologically distinct from the actual world.

Textual possible worlds - These are worlds that are constructed conceptually by fictional characters who inhabit the textual actual world.

F-universe - As Ryan proposes, a specific type of textual possible world constructed by characters is called an F-universe or fantasy universe created in the form of dreams. Here the suffix universe as opposed to world is used to account for the manner in which this universe is elaborate and as such comprises its own textual actual world.

F-TAW - As a new contribution and in conforming to Ryan's conventions, this domain is the textual actual world of the fantasy universe.

F-TPW - In line with Ryan's conventions and in addition to the F-TAW, this domain is the textual possible world creating by characters in the F-TAW.

CK-worlds - Adapting Ryan's K-world, characters have knowledge worlds called CK-worlds which comprise propositions that they know about their textual actual world. I have used this convention to demarcate K-worlds of characters from RK-worlds.

Following Ryan, the third modal system is the referential universe that comprises the textual reference world.

The textual reference world - Developing Ryan's concept, this world exists autonomously within its own system. It is the world that the textual actual world is based on. The textual reference world includes all the information about the textual actual world, it is inferred by the reader and it precedes the textual actual world.

Throughout my thesis, I have shown how the modal universe and accompanying terminology that I offer can be used to label and analyse the different worlds created by a counterfactual historical fiction text effectively.

6.6 Future Recommendations

The scope of my thesis has been limited to counterfactual historical fiction. However, the model that I have developed can be replicated to effectively analyse genres of fiction that use the actual world as their epistemological template. Some examples of genres that display characteristics that are similar to counterfactual historical fiction to a lesser or greater degree are science fiction, fantasy, speculative fiction, and historical fiction. Apart from historical fiction, each of these genres comprises either supernatural and/or futuristic elements, thereby overlapping with some counterfactual historical fiction. Historical fiction is more closely related to counterfactual historical fiction in that it is set against the actual world background and includes actual world historical individuals in their textual actual worlds. The concept developed throughout this thesis such as RK-worlds, ontological superimposition, reciprocal feedback, counterparthood and transworld identity can be used to theorise how readers engage with such texts. More specifically, they can be used to explicate the epistemological relationship between their textual actual worlds and the actual world.

Likewise, within my thesis I have focussed on characters in textual actual worlds that have an actual world original. However, these concepts can also be extended to define and describe characters that possess transworld identity with, or are counterparts of, a character who originates in a fictional domain. For example, in texts such as *The Dark Tower* series by Stephen King, the protagonist Roland travels to other parallel earths and meets characters like Randall Flagg that are originally from a different textual actual world. The concepts of transworld identity and counterparts that I have redefined in this thesis can be used elucidate the differences between characters who possess transworld identity and characters as counterparts presented in such texts.

Finally, while my thesis only theorises how readers engage with counterfactual historical fiction, in terms of further research I propose testing and developing the theoretical contributions of the thesis by using empirical data. In order to do this, real-reader responses to reading counterfactual historical texts must be collected. Some of the key questions to examine will be the manner in which readers consult their RK-worlds to make the epistemological link between the textual actual world and actual world history and also to make sense of the counterfactual historical timeline in the text. Since readers use their knowledge of the actual world to interpret counterfactual historical fiction texts, a comparative analysis can also be undertaken to explore the difference between the kind of readings produced by readers with complete, partial, or zero RK-worlds.

In addition, with reference to actual world individuals in fiction, in Chapter Four, I proposed that three types of actual world historical figures appear in the textual actual world as characters: 1. Actual world individuals who share some essential properties but also have other altered (counterfactual-to-the-original) properties; 2. Individuals who share all essential properties with their original; 3. Individuals who share certain essential properties with their original, but have a different proper name. These three types of actual world individuals in fiction can be further interrogated by exploring the cognitive or emotional effects that each of them would have on the reader. For instance, an exploration of whether readers engage with one of these types of historical figures over others because of the way in which they are presented in the text can be carried out. Furthermore, by focussing on reader responses, the language that readers use to discuss counterfactual historical fiction can also be analysed. By paying attention to specific features of the text that readers find particularly engaging, the manner in which they describe their experience of these features and elements can be examined. For example, theorists such as Swann and Allington (2009); O'Halloran (2011); and Peplow *et al.* (2015) analyse reading group discussions as a way of examining how readers experience and interpret literary texts. This kind of research is important because it includes rich interdisciplinary analyses of the texts, and because it redresses a lack of scholarly research that focuses on analysing reader responses to counterfactual historical fiction texts.

6.8 The Key Contributions of this Thesis

Offering modifications to Possible Worlds Theory by rigorously applying the theory to specific texts throughout my thesis, I have revised the theory so it can

be used to effectively analyse all aspects of counterfactual historical fiction. In my analysis of counterfactual historical fiction, I have used Possible Worlds Theory not merely as a descriptive tool, but also as an analytical and cognitive tool through which the implications of the ontological configurations of the different worlds created can be understood. In doing so, my thesis serves as an example of the cognitive capacity of Possible Worlds Theory. Further applications of my modified Possible Worlds model to other genres of fiction will be able to reinforce the theory's analytical and cognitive capacity for literary analysis. Therefore, while Dannenberg (2008) accuses Possible Worlds Theory of being incapable of understanding the cognitive dynamics especially that of counterfactuals, the analysis carried out in this thesis however, has proved otherwise.

Furthermore, in modifying, supplementing, and applying Possible Worlds Theory to counterfactual historical fiction, my thesis has contributed to a new analytical and cognitive approach to counterfactual historical fiction with a specific focus on the role of readers. The central contributions of this thesis are therefore twofold.

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