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*Tourists' Responses to Government Intentions for Red Tourism In China*

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**Tourists' Responses to Government Intentions  
for Red Tourism In China**

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## **Abstract**

This study analyses the Chinese government's involvement in Red Tourism, with a special focus on the government's political intentions in conveying messages at Red Tourism sites, and, critically, how tourists respond to the messages presented there. There are two separate identifiable phases in the development of Red Tourism since 2004. The first phase is from 2004 to 2010 and the second one is from 2011 to 2015.

Shaoshan, the birthplace of Mao Zedong, and Zhijiang, which is dedicated to commemorating the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army, are selected to examine the government's political intentions behind the messages presented at these two Red Tourism sites. The former is the best example from the first phase, while the latter is one of the most important in the second phase.

The messages produced by the Chinese government are communicated to tourists in Red Tourism sites, encouraging tourists to embrace certain political ideals. However, the messages presented at Red Tourism sites do not necessarily lead to tourists accepting unreservedly the government point of view. Tourists are free to reject this discourse and construct their own reading of the sites, and this they frequently do. Therefore, the sender of the messages, the government, and the receiver of the messages, the tourists, may not be in agreement.

It is to be hoped that this study contributes to a better understanding of Red Tourism in contemporary China, while the responses of visitors may will provide valuable insights into the state of Chinese society today.

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## **List of Abbreviations**

PRC	the People's Republic of China
CCP	the Chinese Communist Party
JIA	the Japanese Imperial Army
GDP	the Gross Domestic Product
NRTCET	the National Red Tourism Coordination Executive Team
CNY	Chinese Yuan or RMB for Ren Min Bi
KMT	Kuomintang
PLA	the People's Liberation
NBT	National Bureau of Tourism
U.S.A.F	U.S. Air Force

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## **Chapter 1: Introduction**

## 1.1 Introduction

The starting point of this thesis is to consider Red Tourism in the context of China as a form of heritage tourism and, by token, to explore its relevance to a local, domestic population and its employment as a nation-building tool within the context of an evolving economic and political society. The research, thus, builds on previous academic debates, including those that question the relationships between place heritage characteristics and tourists' perceptions of and values of their own heritage (Ali *et al*, 2015; Poria *et al*, 2001). In this thesis, specific consideration is given to understanding the potential congruence and dissonance that surround government intentions and Chinese tourism responses to Red Tourism provision.

Red Tourism, as a distinct form of heritage tourism, plays an important role in the rapid political and economic development of China during the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Chinese Red Tourism, since its official commencement in 2004, has propagated communist ideology and encouraged national pride at its designated visitor sites. There is an increasing involvement by the Chinese government in the development of Red Tourism.

This study explores the involvement of the Chinese government in Red Tourism, with a special focus on the declared intentions behind the official messages presented at Chinese Red Tourism sites vis-à-vis domestic tourist responses to those messages. The researcher is interested in how those two actor positions co-exist and the extent to which the views align (or not). This is important because it enables us to gain insights into the potential of Red Tourism to act as a tool for nation-building and maintaining national values and state loyalty in line with the idea that Red Tourism is surrounded by issues of selective representation, power and control (outlined in Chapter 2).

The research is contextualised through its focus on two specific Chinese Red Tourism sites, Shaoshan and Zhijiang. Shaoshan is heritage memorial tourism site in Hunan province in the south east of China, well known in China due to it being the hometown of Mao Zedong, the founding father of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Zhijiang, also in Hunan province, is the site of the monument commemorating the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army during



World War II. The two Chinese Red Tourism sites are used to enable a more rounded or holistic examination of the topic under research.

To date, Red Tourism has been used by the Chinese government to propagate, in the first instance, communist ideology and, later, nationalism. One reason for that shift is because China has experienced contradictions and tensions that have started to encourage ideological debates in both society and government (Wang, 2008). Overall, it has been claimed that Red Tourism and its promotion play an important role *“in an effort to exercise control and demonstrate authority and legitimacy”* (Henderson, 2002:73). These sentiments are shared by authors including, Handler, 1988; Leong, 2006; Light, 2007; Tunbridge and Ashworth, 1996; Wood 1984.

A research question arises: **to what extent are the messages produced by government or officials visibly on display at Red Tourism sites in an attempt to encourage tourists to embrace certain political ideals?** Red Tourism sites are often official government-sponsored constructions with clear aims (Pretes, 2003). As for the tourists visiting these sites, it should be recognised that their, *“ideologies may be consciously held or ‘unconscious’”* (Weber, 2005:5). The issue of agency arises. Tourists hold different views, just as nations project different values and beliefs (Macridis, 1986). Another research question surfaces: **to what extent do the messages presented at Red Tourism sites lead to tourists accepting unquestioningly the government or official point of view?**

It has been argued that tourists are not simply passive consumers or 'cultural dupes' (Meethan, 2001). Pretes (2003:134) suggests:

*“though tourists are presented with a hegemonic discourse of national ideologies...they are free to reject this discourse and construct their own reading of this site”.*

This implies that the sender of messages (in this context, the government) and the receiver of those messages (in this context, the tourists) may not be in agreement. However, the extent to which free will or agency in interpretation exists in the context of a prolonged period of heavily-controlled, state governance may be questioned. In China, Red Tourism, as a specific and relatively new type of heritage tourism, is being used as a strategy to improve living standards in under-developed revolutionary locations with the support of

the Chinese communist government and to promote the heritage of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) history.

This study of Red Tourism directly considers issues pertaining to Red Tourism policy planning and its implementation. In particular, there has been a relative lack of research on how tourists respond to the messages displayed at Red Tourism sites. This aspect seldom appears in tourism literature in spite of a growing body of research on Red Tourism. Given the importance attached to Red Tourism as a tool for transmitting messages, it is appropriate to try to gain insights into how those intended messages are received. As Chapter 2 of this thesis argues, Red Tourism may be positioned as a specific type of heritage tourism with a definite political character and, to date, research is "*only starting to scratch the surface*" of this key area (Timothy & Boyd, 2006:13). Moreover, because of the value-laden and selective nature of heritage policy in the one-party state that is the People's Republic of China (PRC), Chinese Red Tourism is of significance not only economically but also politically.

## **1.2 Significance of the development of heritage tourism**

This study positions Red Tourism as part of heritage tourism (discussed further in Chapter 2). Red Tourism in China has become an important subject in tourism studies over the past few decades. Heritage tourism itself is, of course, not a recent invention but a significant component of global tourism with a long history arguably measured in centuries (Swarbrooke, 1994; Towner, 1996). Importantly, heritage is not a static outcome of the past, particularly when it is presented and interpreted in the context of tourism in an attempt to reflect the political and economic changes of the contemporary world (Park, 2014). Notably, heritage tourism contributes to the "*ideological framing of history and identity*" (Johnson, 1999:187), economic incentives and political principles (Chhabra *et al*, 2003; Salazar, 2010) and security and stability (Halewood and Hannam, 2001).

Through heritage tourism visitors are afforded the opportunity to dwell on the past (glorious or otherwise); it provides visitors with the possibility of drawing their own conclusions about historical events; and displays factual information

which may not have been known to tourists prior to their visit (Prentice, 1993; Yale, 2004).

Since the 1970's, heritage tourism has expanded rapidly on a global scale, and is now being recognised as a special and distinct form of tourism (Hall & Weiler, 1992; Nuryanti, 1996; Urry, 1990). Not surprisingly, and in parallel with its growth, it has become one of the most studied topics in tourism research largely because it has been recognised as being a major contributor to the phenomenal world-wide growth of the tourism industry (Timothy & Boyd, 2006). Many disciplines have been drawn upon in an attempt to analyse its growth including: geography (Graham, Ashworth & Tunbridge, 2000); sociology (Lowenthal, 1998; Urry, 1990); and political economy (Hewison, 1987; Walsh, 1992), with every aspect of the industry being open to scrutiny.

Much research has been carried out on multiple aspects of heritage tourism, but there remains much more to do, especially in those areas which have not been thoroughly examined to date (Timothy & Boyd, 2006). It has been argued to be extremely valuable economically, especially so in poorer, rural areas, but is also of great ideological importance to ruling elites (Graham *et al.* 2000; Timothy & Boyd, 2003). Academic research and the heritage tourist industry are recognised to possess a mutually beneficial relationship. Knowledge generated by academic researchers may play a part in the long-term sustainability of heritage tourism with important consequences politically and economically (Swarbrooke, 1994), while academics recognise something that warrants serious consideration at the sites. As Salazar (2010:130) points out:

*“On the domestic level, cultural heritage is commonly used to stimulate pride in the (imagined) national history or to highlight the virtues of particular ideologies. In the supranational sphere, heritage sites are marketed and sold as iconic markers of a local area, country, region or even continent, and the journey abroad as an opportunity to learn about the ‘Other’- some go as far as promising a contribution to worldwide peace and understanding”.*

### **1.3 Significance of the development of Red Tourism**

Red Tourism has been exploited and marketed in the tourism industry along with the rapid development of heritage tourism. It plays an important role in a rapidly-developing China and has experienced noteworthy development since its commencement in China in 2004.

As acknowledged, heritage tourism underwent almost exponential growth since the 1970's. Red Tourism commenced in China in 2004, and, with state backing, it experienced a similar growth pattern. The Chinese state considers Red Tourist sites to be a kind of theme park dedicated to the memory of key moments, decisive battles and struggles, significant leaders, heroic acts and, above all, Mao Zedong. The period referred to is 1921-1949, when the Chinese people under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), fought against western and Japanese imperialism as well as a compliant Nationalist Party government. The anti-imperialist struggle was imbued with what is now referred to as 'red spirit', which combines Marxism-Leninism, traditional Chinese morality and national pride (Li & Hu, 2008).

Under the guidance of the Chinese government, Chinese Red Tourism sites portray the history of the Chinese revolution (with prominence given to monuments, relics, the homes of former communist leaders, revolutionary bases, surrender sites, etc.) in order to influence Chinese tourists from within China (Li & Hu, 2008). This is significant. Overall, Red Tourism and its promotion play an important role "*in the effort to exercise control and demonstrate authority and legitimacy*" (Henderson, 2002:73). This has been acknowledged by authors such as Handler (1988); Leong *et al.* (2006); Light (2007); Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996).

Red Tourism is an example of a specific type of heritage tourism with a definite political character. The economic benefits of Red Tourism are clear and uncontroversial. On the other hand, there is, as yet, no clarity on the success or otherwise of the political intentions of the CCP with regard to Red Tourism sites. This PhD thesis aims to make a contribution in this area by seeking domestic Red Tourist responses to the messages displayed at Chinese Red Tourism sites.

To visit a Red Tourism site is a long-standing tradition for Chinese citizens. Ever since the founding of modern China in 1949, trips have been organised by work places (almost all state-owned at the outset), educational institutions, and CCP branches with the intention of honouring the memory of the communist heroes, martyrs, leaders and their trials and tribulations. However, it is only recently that the Chinese government has openly acknowledged that its purpose in

promoting Red Tourism was to provide assistance (politically and economically) for the management of problems (including regional imbalances) which have arisen as a result of China's astonishing economic development.

It is clear that there is a rather complicated relationship between politics and economics within the sensitive context of Red Tourism (Lew, 2001; Sofield & Li, 1998; Zhang, 1995; Zhang *et al*, 1999). Given the importance of this relationship in the one-party state of the People's Republic of China, Xiao and Smith (2006) have made the point that the use of Red Tourism sites in China for political purposes merits some serious research.

#### **1.4 Significance of the government's involvement in Red Tourism**

Heritage tourism, especially in the one-party state which has existed in China since 1949, cannot be examined without acknowledging the enormous importance of how China's recent past is viewed by the ruling elite, and how that view can be successfully communicated to visitors. In the struggle for China's right to independence from foreign imperialist interference or indeed outright domination, the CCP led by Mao Zedong took the view that only the CCP could lead the people to success in that struggle. This key role adopted by the CCP was retained after 1949 and to this day the Chinese Communist Party is the only political party permitted in the People's Republic of China.

This has happened despite the enormous changes experienced during the last 40 years. Even though there is a marked and growing disparity between the rich and the poor in China, and a succession of financial scandals have been witnessed in recent years, (usually involving corrupt Communist Party officials together with an almost non-existent welfare system), the CCP has been helped in its struggle for survival by the extraordinary economic strides made in the last few decades. These include a widespread high speed railway system, high tech metro systems in many large towns, and massive house-building projects as old slums are cleared to provide good quality homes for those abandoning rural villages to live in the big cities. This tangible and substantial improvement in everyday living has been a major contribution to stability in China and, observedly, has contributed to popular acceptance of one-party rule.

Nevertheless, it may be recognised that the enormous gulf in wealth between rich and poor may inevitably lead to unrest if an economic downturn occurs. It would seem likely that the CCP's involvement in Red Tourism has a clear remit, namely to protect the CCP in the event of a major crisis. Given the secretive nature of the CCP, and the wariness of visitors being asked their opinion of messages displayed at Red Tourism sites, it would seem reasonable to conclude that only independent academic researchers would be able to determine what domestic Red Tourists really feel.

### **1.5 Significance of messages on ideologies at Red Tourism sites**

The focus of Red Tourism sites in the initial phase of Chinese Red Tourism development was communist ideology and the cult of Mao, as explicitly visible at the Red Tourism site of Shaoshan. This policy served a useful purpose in that the emphasis was on the sacrifices not just of those Chinese citizens who lost their lives in the anti-Japanese Imperialist Army struggle and the ensuing civil war, but also on the abstemious life-style of Mao Zedong. This appears to have been a strategy with the purpose of keeping the country together through hard times by promoting a sense of solidarity, demonstrating that national leaders were also suffering hardship.

The second phase of Chinese Red Tourism shifted focus and took a more overly nationalistic stance, explicitly visible at the Red tourism site of Zhijiang. This could be viewed as a response to the growing gap between rich and poor. It is important to acknowledge that inherent in Mao's ideology was the principle of equality. The enormous gulf between the 'super-rich' and the toiling masses could lead to populist movements for reform citing Mao in support of a change from what could be seen as an unfair capitalist system, precisely the sort of society that Mao sought to overthrow in the first place.

Better perhaps, and safer, to promote patriotism and nationalism which has none of the moral baggage inherent to communism. By doing so, it may be argued, China would be portrayed as the 'victim of western imperialism', including that of Japan which was, at the time of its invasion of China, an industrialised and militarized nation. It is true that the Chinese Red Tourism sites which previously promoted communist ideology still exist. But, at least there is a unifying, classless ideology to complement it. The nationalist focus

also has the merit of reaching out to Taiwan where the Kuomintang made their home after 1949. China is a major investor in Taiwan and an important market for its exports. The praise in the second phase Chinese Red Tourism sites for the Kuomintang's anti-Japanese Imperial Army struggle could be an important factor in China's long-term strategy of unifying China with Taiwan.

Homage is paid to communist ideology and the colossal role played in the struggle for an independent, communist China by Mao Zedong while simultaneously there is now a clear attempt to promote a patriotic and nationalist spirit. The latter has not replaced the former. They co-exist side-by-side. It may be observed that various interpretations have been made of what could be a difficult marriage of two somewhat contradictory ideologies. It would seem prudent to accept that it is impossible for the CCP to openly abandon communist ideology at such a historically early stage in China's development, but useful for the state to promote a nationalistic line alongside it, leaving Chinese Red Tourists to select the messages they prefer and depart satisfied.

### **1.6 Significance of heritage interpretation at Red Tourism sites and the tourists' responses**

Heritage interpretation depends to some extent on how exhibits are presented, but perhaps more importantly on how visitors view or make sense of them. The CCP is by its very nature an opaque body. It is highly unlikely that CCP officials will openly reveal to researchers what the intentions are behind individual exhibits or, indeed, Red Tourism as a whole. However, for the most part, it can be safely assumed that the guiding principle is bound to be the provision of support for the CCP, as explicitly reported by the Chinese government in the first phase of Red Tourism, with a focus on communist ideology and the cult of Mao, while in the second phase a nationalist stance has been adopted in response to problems concerning the gap between the ultra-rich and the ordinary masses. This is an issue on which political and social commentators have remarked, for example, Al Jazeera, (2013), Forbes, (2014), BBC news, (2015).

The acid test for the CCP is surely this: do the visitors generally agree with the line put forward in the messages? To answer this crucial question it was necessary to design a research study that would enable the views of both

Chinese Red Tourists and CCP to be captured. The research process in relation to this is presented as this thesis progresses.

At the outset it was recognised that there has been a great deal of academic research on Red Tourism in China already. However, notably, policy planning and its implementation have largely escaped scrutiny. It is not difficult to appreciate why this may be the case. Given the sensitive nature of the topic area, it would seem impossible to imagine any researcher being given full access to official documents explicitly and frankly stating the intended purpose of messages at Red Tourism sites.

Given that China is viewed in the West as a highly indoctrinated, monolithic nation-state, it may be challenged that it would be expected that Chinese Red Tourists would overwhelmingly accept the government's line as portrayed in Red Tourism messages. However, some researchers urge caution in this regard. Pretes (2003), Macridis (1986) and Meethan (2001) are all of the opinion that visitors come from different backgrounds and are likely to have their own views on the messages. They believe that visitors may choose to reject the line represented, or, of course, accept it. Visitors are recognised to possess agency. Thus, it is possible for a government to fail to have its view accepted, a fact that may surprise some western observers of China.

### **1.7 Aim and objectives of the research**

This study is interested in how Red Tourism, as a specific and relatively new type of heritage tourism, is being used as a strategy to improve living standards in under-developed revolutionary locations with the support of the Chinese communist government as well as promote the heritage of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) history and nationalism. The overall aim of the thesis is to reveal the political messages at the specific Red Tourism sites of Shaoshan and Zhijiang, having first established the intentions of the Chinese government, and thereafter the corresponding tourists' responses toward these Red Tourism messages. At a broader theoretical level, it is hoped that the thesis will offer a deeper understanding of the extent to which Red Tourism is influential as a political and ideological tool of the state.



The study's research objectives are:

**1). To examine the development of Chinese Red Tourism and its two phases with their markedly different foci.** This objective reflects and highlights the emergence of Red Tourism in its two distinct phases in the context of China's economic and political development. How or in what ways does the government use Red Tourism within its overall economic and political development objectives? The separate characteristics of the two phases of Red Tourism in China will be examined through Chinese government involvement in the process of Red Tourism policy-making and implementation.

**2). To establish the intentions of the Chinese government for Red Tourism.** For Chinese Red Tourism, the government plays an important role in deciding which part of, and what version of, history will be presented. Why is the Chinese government involved in Red Tourism development? What is the purpose of the Chinese government in the shift of focus from promoting only CCP history and the cult of Mao in the first phase of Red Tourism to supplementing this by encouraging nationalism in the second phase of Red Tourism? What is the advantage to the CCP in both economic and political senses from the implementation of Red Tourism?

**3). To analyse the messages that the Chinese government conveys at the Red Tourism sites of Shaoshan and Zhijiang.** What messages are on display at the Red Tourism sites of Shaoshan and Zhijiang? What strategies does the Chinese government adopt in order to convey the messages at Shaoshan and Zhijiang? How do the messages reflect political and economic development in contemporary China? The focus will be on the content of the messages, especially on those associated with communist ideology (as presented at Shaoshan) and those related to nationalism (as displayed at Zhijiang).

**4). To investigate the interpretation of messages, establish and examine tourists' responses to the messages conveyed by the Chinese government at the Red Tourism sites of Shaoshan and Zhijiang.** This will consider how the elements of communist ideology, patriotism and nationalism are interpreted by Chinese domestic visitors at the Red Tourism sites of Shaoshan and Zhijiang. The responses of Chinese domestic tourists visiting Shaoshan and Zhijiang will be scrutinised. Do the messages enable tourists to

share a political pilgrimage and nostalgia for patriotism, communism and nationalism or deprive them of a critical learning experience of history? How do tourists evaluate the authenticity of the messages presented at Shaoshan and Zhijiang? Do the tourists respond in the way intended by the promoted themes and messages?

## **1.8 The context of the research**

An understanding of the context in which the Chinese tourism industry functions is essential to this study to “*ensure that any historical study of the particular tourism element takes into account the changing political and socio-economic forces at work over time*” (Sofield and Li, 1998: 273). It is important to explore the Chinese government’s involvement in Red Tourism and the political role of Red Tourism in China through the context of its relationship with China's economic and political development.

### *1.8.1 Tourism in Mao’s regime from 1949 to 1978*

Tourism was not accepted by the CCP as an appropriate form of economic activity between 1949 and 1979 (Sofield and Li, 1998). For a long time, tourism in China was a ‘diplomatic activity’, serving political rather than economic goals. Domestic tourism hardly existed, and international travel in China was limited almost exclusively to diplomats and government officials (Zhang, 2003). The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) forced the nascent travel industry to be put on hold.

In the early 1970s, Mao Zedong, the founder of the PRC and Chairman of the CCP, gave permission for only a limited number of ‘rightists’ to visit China. It should be explained that the term ‘rightists’ refers to citizens of states opposed to the Chinese political system, especially the United States of America (Zhang, 2003). As a result of this policy, there were hardly any foreign visitors to China prior to 1978 (Chow, 1988; Hudman and Hawkins, 1989). The total number of international visitors for the period 1954-1978 was a mere 125,000. These were all approved by the China International Travel Service whose remit was to organise tours for ‘foreign friends’ (Richter, 1989).

The main reason for these restrictions was the ongoing tension between the western capitalist powers and the communist states of the Soviet Union (USSR) and the PRC. Visitors from the western sphere of influence required a special permit to enter China, usually granted, officially at any rate, for diplomatic reasons (Uysal *et al.*, 1986). The limited numbers of foreign visitors were sanctioned on the grounds that they would be shown the successes of communism (Sofield and Li, 1998). Tour guides were present throughout these visits and they were trained to “*quickly and proficiently report the great strides society and the economy had made under socialism*” (Hudman and Hawkins, 1989:178). Most guides were educated at the Beijing Foreign Languages Institute which provided a similar service for China’s future diplomats. Thus, the guides were considered to be an important part of the official diplomatic service in its quest to influence foreign powers (China National Tourism Administration Bureau, 1992).

Tourism was viewed by the Chinese leadership as one of very few options available to the economically weak Chinese state to meet influential foreigners who may be ‘won over’ to China’s cause. It has been observed that international visitors were treated royally, enjoying lavish banquets, conferences with high ranking officials, and the very best hotels. At the tourist sites, visitors were made aware of the successes of the Chinese government and its ‘moral compass’. It is significant that visiting groups had no choice as to where they would go and what they would see. All the arrangements were made by Chinese administrators. There were some extreme examples of regulation and control in place: tourists were only allowed to speak to locals if granted permission (Chow, 1988); and all foreign visitors were segregated from each other according to which category they fell into. Even overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macau Chinese were kept apart from each other as well as locals. This policy was strictly adhered to (Chow, 1988).

It could be argued that in China, prior to 1978, the “*destination selected the tourists rather than the other way around*” (Zhang, 2003:24). Travel services were set up but only provided services for Chinese visitors living abroad and other foreigners who had obtained official consent to visit China (Zhang, 2003). Tourism was viewed as a propaganda tool (Qiao, 1995) rather than a ‘proper’ form of development; communist dogma was, therefore, a major impediment to

the growth of tourism for the thirty years following Mao's seizure of power in 1949 (Sofield and Li, 1998).

### *1.8.2 The development of tourism in China after 1978*

Mao Zedong died in 1976. The new leader, Deng Xiaoping, introduced his 'open door' policies in 1978, embarking on a programme of economic reform in order to achieve modernization by using all available resources. In 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Congress took place. A ground-breaking motion was passed in which the re-building of the economy would take precedence over political struggle. Later that year, the first national conference on tourism took place. This conference was charged with the responsibility for drawing up principles and a framework for its development (Gao and Zhang, 1982). In three separate speeches in 1979, Deng made clear that it was of vital importance to China that its economy experienced a much faster rate of growth. The tourism industry would have an important part to play in this objective (He, 1992). Deng argued that tourism had, after all, a valuable role to play in a socialist society. It would not only provide a boost to local economies; it would also be a key element in the plan to open up the nation to the outside world. Deng considered that tourism could encourage friendship and a respect for different political systems between the 'toiling masses' in China and the citizens of other nations throughout the world. In short, it would be an agent for global peace (Sofield and Li, 1998).

Instead of restricting the development of the tourism industry, which was the policy in the period 1949-1977, the Chinese government removed some of the constraints on the free movement of people in China. Since 1978 and the opening up of China to foreign travel, social intercourse between travellers and Chinese nations is no longer forbidden (Wen and Tisdell, 2001). Under Mao, in contrast, less than 12 Chinese cities were open to 'foreign friends'. One year after Deng 'opened the door', 60 Chinese destinations were opened up to international visitors; by 1984 this had risen to 200; and by 1987, 469 destinations were 'approved' for foreign visitation (Richter, 1989). That figure had almost doubled by 1992 to 888 (Wei, 1993). Domestic tourism has also grown exponentially, largely due to people wishing to go and witness for themselves the celebrated heritage sites depicting their 'common ancestry'.

Prior to 1978, even Chinese domestic tourism was strictly controlled. Aspiring tourists had to obtain permission from the authorities to buy tickets for transportation and to book hotel places. When the controls were relaxed following Deng's change of policy, domestic tourism was observed to have experienced a substantial period of rapid growth (Sofield and Li, 1998).

From 1980 onwards, the Chinese government was clear in its belief in the importance of tourism as a major service industry requiring less capital, producing faster success, being less wasteful, employing many people, and improving living standards much more than other tertiary service sectors (CCP, 1993). By 1987, the CCP upgraded the status of tourism to that of a crucially important industry in its developing economy (Zhao, 1987). For the first time in the history of the PRC, the economic benefits of a successful tourism industry were considered to be greater than any political advantage which might accrue from the operation of tourism sites. International tourists were viewed as being a valuable source of foreign currency, so much so that this was factored into the National Plan for Socio-economic Development, the first time that this had ever occurred (Zhang, 1995). Soon, every part of China became aware of the tourism industry's capacity to amass steps to improve and add to their tourist attractions (Tisdell and Wen, 1991). In 1992, the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council went further when a decision was taken to enlarge the hitherto minimal role of the service industry in China, a notable shift from a focus on traditional commodity production. This was bound to impact on the tourist industry.

It did indeed have a positive effect on international tourism. However, as China's economy slowly recovered, its citizens, especially in the large towns, found themselves with more money in their pockets than they required for mere subsistence. More people chose to spend money on visiting the growing number of tourist sites, so much so that in December 1998 the CCP Central Committee announced that tourism was a significant part of the growing national economy. Since then tourism has indeed been included as a central pillar in the majority of local economic development strategies (Zhang, 2003).

By 1998, China was ranked the sixth nation in the world in terms of tourist arrivals and seventh in its tourist receipts by the World Tourism Organization

(NTA, 1999:1). In 2013, the Chinese tourism industry reported revenues from tourism had amounted to almost three trillion yuan, directly employing about 27 million people. In 2013, China was the world's largest travel and tourism economy with a global market share of 11 percent, surpassing the United States (Statista, 2016). China is poised to become the world's second largest travel and tourism economy after the United States by 2015, according to a new report from the World Travel & Tourism Council (WTTC) (Worldwatch institute, 2016). In the last decade, domestic tourism increased at around 10% per annum, adding more than 4% to China's GDP in that period, with a positive impact on jobs, consumer goods and the wider Chinese economy (<http://www.travelchinaguide.com/tourism/>, 25<sup>th</sup> May 2014). Clearly, tourism had established itself as a leading growth industry (Wen and Tisdell, 2001) and contributed to economic development in many Chinese cities and regions.

From the outset, China's tourism strategy was dedicated to providing support for the authority of the CCP's one-party rule. Following Deng's opening-up reform, the tourism industry was transformed into a central component of the growing service sector. Since 2000, tourism has undergone further development and is viewed as having a significant impact in the Chinese economy, society at large and the environment. Throughout this development, given the political circumstances of China, it is perhaps unsurprising that tourism retains its ongoing political purpose (Huang, 2010).

### *1.8.3 China's economic and political development and the emergence of Red Tourism*

Deng Xiaoping's 1978 'Open Door' policies sought to 'modernize' the country through a more market-oriented economy, from which have emerged tensions between the prevailing communist ideology and the increasing 'marketization' of the economy. The tensions and conflicts have generated a crisis of belief in China, with Deng's 'Open Door' reforms still being considered to be within ideological frameworks and a socialist system led by the CCP (Yan and Bramwell, 2008). Moreover, after over two decades of market-orientated reform which has eroded state control of the economy, it has been reported that communist ideology no longer dominates political life (Hutton, 2007). Despite this, it may be contended that observed changes have not substantially

undermined the dominant position of the CCP and state; on the contrary, it is claimed that the gradual evolution of policy has given the government valuable time to devise new ways of maintaining power (Kang and Han, 2008).

The overtly political foundation of the PRC is communist dogma. A switch to a market-based economic system, demanded considerable alterations to long-held communist beliefs (Sofield & Li, 2011). Deng succeeded in his aim by first asserting that socialism retained its dominant role in China and that, accordingly, the CCP was the only party capable of taking a socialist China forward, while the market reforms were themselves portrayed as a prerequisite for the advancement of socialism (Sofield and Li, 1998). The Heritage Conservation Act 1982 embodied these tenets. The preamble to the Act states that the Act is designed “*to strengthen the conservation of China’s heritage*” and “*to promote nationalism, and revolutionary traditions, and to build up socialism and modernization*” (Sofield and Li, 1998: 370).

By the turn of the millennium, China had undergone a shift towards a free market economy and this was accompanied by a significant degree of personal freedom. There has also been a trend towards government decentralization with the deepening of reform. Traditionally there has been great stability in the conception of authority as “*deriving ultimately from a single, exceedingly centralized source on high*” (Shue, 2008: 141).

However, with the rapid development of the economy, the resultant enormous disparity in personal wealth has led to widespread discontent in China. The income gap between urban and rural areas has also been growing. For example, the growth elasticity of income of the lowest quintile of the Chinese population for 1980-1995 was only 0.308. This suggests that the poor did not benefit even half as much from growth as the richer segments of the society did (Lubker, 2000). Despite the fact that China has lifted some 200 million people out of absolute poverty since 1978, the number of poor is still estimated to amount to between 65 million and 350 million (Cook and White, 1998). Most of the poor live in the interior provinces of China. Lacking basic infrastructure, these impoverished rural regions are typically disconnected from the outside world (and modernity), while natural resource constraints set considerable limits to employment opportunities from agriculture.

As long ago as 1986, the Chinese government launched an initiative with the aim improving the lives of the impoverished peasantry by directing resources to the poorest areas with the intention of boosting the local economy. More support was required and, in 1994, the 'Eighty-Seven Reduction Plan' was published. Its purpose was to take 80 million peasants out of poverty within seven years, i.e. by 2000 (Wang, 2005). The plan is often referred to within China as the '8-7 Plan'. The leadership of most of the poorer Chinese counties identified in the plan have made public their intention to use tourism as a driver to lift the poorest people out of poverty (Xu and Kruse, 2003). However, it is believed that both China's mass poverty and growing income gaps could undermine China's social and political stability which, in turn, may pose a threat not only to the country's further growth and development but also to the legitimacy of the Chinese government. (Xu and Kruse, 2003).

As President Jiang Zemin stated in his address to the 'Fifth Session of the 14th Central Plenum of the CCP' held in September 1995, "*Stability is the premise for development and reform, and development and reform require a stable political and social environment*" (Xinhua News Agency, 9<sup>th</sup> October 1995). In 2004 the Central Committee of the CCP acknowledged that reform had reached a critical stage and that the party's "*ruling status will not last forever if the party does nothing to safeguard it...We must develop a stronger sense of crisis...and strengthen our ruling capacity in a more earnest and conscientious manner*" (Baum, 2010: 262). Meanwhile, Hu Jintao (Chinese President prior to Xi Jinping) demanded that the party "*takes a dominant role and coordinates all sectors. Party members and party organisations in government departments should be brought into full play - so as to reassert the party's leadership over state affairs.*" (Hutton, 2007:140).

Henderson (2007:244) has remarked that:

*"While the ruling Communist elites allocate the highest priority to retaining their authority, they do confront potentially destabilising questions of political legitimacy and social and economic uncertainties".*

In this context, the 'National Red Tourism Development Plan 2004-2010' was published jointly by the State Council and the Central Committee of the CCP. The Red Tourism policy could be interpreted as an attempt to provide support for the constructs of 'socialism' and 'communism' and to assist in the task of



restoring national unity. An official with the National Coordination Group on Red Tourism, made up of people from ministries of the central government, commented, "*This is a major project that benefits the Party, the nation and the people, in an economic, cultural and political sense.*" (Xinhua News Agency, 22<sup>nd</sup> February, 2005).


The use of Red Tourism as a strategy to achieve a certain political purpose can be traced back to the control exercised by the CCP over its definition of 'legitimate knowledge'. In October 1950, the PRC Ministry of Education issued a manifesto for categorizing academic disciplines as either 'revolutionary' or 'counter-revolutionary' (Sofield and Li, 1998). For the discipline to be worth keeping it had to be seen to be serving Marxist doctrine: "*a discipline's role was to provide direction for policy to advance society through its various stages to the ultimate perfection of communism*" (Sofield and Li, 1998:368). The linkage between communist ideologies and education was therefore comprehensive and complete. The elements of the social sciences such as research, technology and training which were considered to be capable of providing support for Deng's claim that, contrary to earlier doctrines, market reforms should actually help the cause of socialism, were slowly rehabilitated though only where they were deemed to be appropriate.

## **1.9 Thesis Structure**

This thesis is organised into eight chapters based on the research process as shown in Figure 1-1.

Chapter 1 provides an overall introduction to the research topic including, identification of the significance of this research, the study's research aim and objectives, and the geographical context of the research. It provides a basis for an evaluation of research pertaining to the development of Red Tourism. It analyses the importance of the government's involvement in Red Tourism, political messages on display at Red Tourism sites, heritage interpretation at Red Tourism sites and tourists' responses. It also clarifies knowledge of the context in which the Chinese tourism industry functions.

**Figure 1-1: The thesis structure**



Chapter 2 presents a thematic review of the literature. It identifies key concepts in relation to the study's focus including, 'patriotism', 'communism', and 'nationalism'. The chapter considers previous research relating to: the political role of heritage tourism and government's involvement in tourism; political ideology in heritage tourism; heritage interpretation in tourism; tourists' motivations and experiences; and communist heritage tourism and Red Tourism in China.

Chapter 3 presents the researcher's conceptual thinking and develops a conceptual framework for the study that is subsequently applied and evaluated in the results chapters (Chapters 6 and 7) and also the final chapter (Chapter 8). It is designed to identify the key elements that guide the research and to denote the boundaries in terms of research focus.

Chapter 4 explains the research strategies and methodology employed in this study in order to operationalise the research aim and objectives. It examines the approaches used in the fieldwork, and the strengths and limitations of the

research design and data collection methods. It explains the historical elements in Red Tourism from a factual point of view.

Chapter 5 describes the policies of the two phases of Chinese Red Tourism and examines the achievements of the first phase of Chinese Red Tourism. The establishment of two phases of Chinese Red Tourism is based on an analysis of relevant official documents.

Chapter 6 is concerned with the Chinese government's political intentions regarding the patriotic education portrayed in Red Tourism sites. Shaoshan is taken to be the most important site from the first phase of Red Tourism and it would seem to be appropriate, therefore, to present and interpret the Chinese government's original political intentions behind the first phase of Red Tourism, including the promotion of the history of CCP, communist ideology and the cult of Mao. Unintended consequences arising from the cult of worship of Mao are analysed. Zhijiang, is arguably the most significant second phase of Red Tourism site and this study uses it to present and interpret the Chinese government's additional political intentions behind the second phase of Red Tourism. This site publicises the progress made by the CCP since 1949, as well as promoting national unity. It also considers the reasons for the re-development of the Mao Memorial Museum in Shaoshan as well as the Zhijiang site commemorating the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army.

Chapter 7 analyses tourists' responses to the Chinese government's political intentions for Red Tourism at Shaoshan and Zhijiang. The focus is on patriotic education, the history of the CCP and the cult of Mao at the Shaoshan site, while at the Zhijiang site the emphasis is on the progress made by the CCP since 1949, the more friendly view on Kuomintang and the promotion of national unity.

Chapter 8 reviews the study's overall objectives, key findings from the conceptual framework's application and their wider implications. This chapter examines the contributions of this research to the study of heritage tourism and government ideology, presentation, reception and negotiation. This chapter also discusses recommendations for future research development.

## **Chapter 2: Literature Review**

## **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter reviews the academic literature relevant to the study: of the political role of heritage tourism, government's involvement in tourism, political ideology in heritage tourism, heritage interpretation in tourism, tourists' motivations and experiences, communist heritage tourism and Red Tourism in China. In essence, it presents a thematic analysis of the literature.

The review begins with a discussion of the political nature of heritage in terms of value attachment and selectivity for heritage resources. It is noted that heritage tourism plays an active role in politics. During the rapid development of heritage tourism, it is recognised that the government is a key player in this area, highly involved in tourism policies and planning, as well as the interpretation and conveyance of political ideology in tourism sites.

The literature reviews and then explores political ideology in heritage tourism, namely, patriotism, communism and nationalism. Different approaches to the concepts by other researchers are covered. These provide a theoretical foundation before proceeding to examine the specific context of Red Tourism in China.

The study further examines heritage interpretation in tourism and the motivation and experience of visitors. The review of literature considers theories relevant to the interpretation of political messages. The literature concerning heritage tourists' motivations and experiences is reviewed, with an emphasis on the issue of authenticity.

The review of literature ends with the establishment of communist heritage tourism and Red Tourism in China, and the relationship between them.

Overall, this thematic literature review provides both theoretical knowledge on, and insights into, heritage tourism and Red Tourism which are necessary for this study. It also supplies the theoretical basis for the development of the conceptual framework for this research.

## **2.2 The political role of heritage tourism and government's involvement in tourism**

### *2.2.1 Heritage tourism as political tool*

In order to review heritage tourism from a political viewpoint, it is essential to clarify the concept of 'heritage' and its very nature. Scholars describe the term 'heritage' in many ways. Probably the most commonly accepted one is that heritage is 'the present-day use of the past' (Ashworth, 2003; Graham *et al*, 2000). However, scholars are aware of the fact that the past is not necessarily an objective, unchanging truth; rather, it depends on the changing circumstances in which we live and, crucially who is presenting materials and what their intention is. Thus, it can be seen that heritage is not just the past but a representation or a re-interpretation of the past (Lowenthal, 1997; Munasinghe, 2005; Henderson, 2007). Lowenthal (1997) argues that even recent history is open to interpretation. Many facts are only revealed some time after events have occurred. Memories fade with time and the view can become distorted; many historical events occurred before the birth of people living today. Heritage interprets the past with a purpose for today. With respect to heritage being used as a means of ascribing social meaning to historical events, it is often the case that heritage reflects the governing assumptions, beliefs and values of its time and context (Hall, 2005).

Heritage is regarded as one of the more important and faster-growing components of tourism (Alzue *et al*, 1998; Herbert, 2001). It is clear that "*heritage is a complex and highly politicised phenomenon. As a major global social and economic activity, tourism per se is also considered by many to be intensely political*" (Harrop & McMillan, 2002: 245). The political nature and significance of tourism has long been recognised (Richter, 1983) although, according to some, this has not, until recently, been reflected in the academic literature (Hall, 1994). Given the increasing importance of tourism as a strategy for tackling the consequences of widespread social and economic development, the state will inevitably be involved in the practical planning and management of tourism (Elliott, 1997; Hall, 2000). The nature of that involvement varies enormously, from a passive, enabling role (Jeffries, 2001) to a more active, entrepreneurial role, the latter more frequently required, though not always in

evidence, in less developed economies (Tosun & Jenkins, 1998). The degree and nature of the involvement will also, of course, be determined by the prevailing political ideology of the state. Park (2014) has specifically considered how tourism is often employed as a strategic political tool to reinforce a nation's ideological agendas and political stances. Tourism can be used as an effective instrument to assert the legitimacy of past events as represented and interpreted by the state. Indeed, one of the key challenges noted for tourism development is its close relationship with politics.

Heritage tourism is often used to highlight the less controversial aspects of specific political ideologies. For example, in communist countries, monuments and shrines are always well-publicised. Tourists are also introduced to schools, factories and community centres which are replete with images of an idealised communist lifestyle. This has been cited as a widespread practice in China prior to 1978 and also in the former Soviet satellite countries of Eastern Europe (Timothy & Boyd, 2006). Political heritage also features great military battles and critiques of imperialism (Henderson, 2007). It is generally accepted that heritage tourism is often used to encourage patriotism and nationalism among domestic tourists (McLean, 1998; Morales & Mysyk, 2004). Significant and highly visible sites are very important settings for the promotion of national pride; these comprise battlefields, collective graveyards and statues of national heroes (Chang, 1999; Chronis, 2005; Leong, 1989). It has been argued that heritage tourism promotes certain political messages on the past in specific heritage sites (Park, 2011). As Poria and Ashworth (2009) comment, heritage tourism aims at legitimizing a certain social-political order and ideological framework.

It is apparent that heritage tourism often promotes the past by way of selecting what should, or should not, be commemorated (Park, 2014). It is also critical to recognise that the use of the past for the creation and maintenance of national unity within tourism contexts is often connected to encouraging acts of intentional social amnesia in some cases and collective memory in others (Tunbridge and Ashworth, 1996; Walsh, 2001; Buzinde and Santos, 2008). Heritage tourism is regarded as an effective way to achieve specific political and educational aims (Ashworth & Turnbridge, 1990; Dean, Morgan, & Tan, 2002; Light, 2000a; Lowenthal, 1998a; Tunbridge, 1994). It helps government to promote a positive national image (Richter, 1980), influence public opinion,

obtain support for national ideological objectives (Gordon, 1969), develop national pride (Cohen, 2004), and enhance national identity (Hall, 1995; O'Connor, 1993; Pretes, 2003; Urry, 1990). The extent to which the political exploitation of heritage tourism is successful (that is, how well the state is able to meet its political objectives through heritage tourism) is itself dependent on the wider political-economic context. Economic factors may require the state to subordinate ideology to the more practical and pressing need for income, a factor which, for example, has strongly influenced the development of heritage tourism in Cuba since the late 1980s (Jayawardena, 2003; Sharpley & Knight, 2009).

Heritage tourism has, in fact, become one of the most remarkable and popular forms of tourism (Timothy & Boyd, 2006). In particular, it is acknowledged that heritage tourism can make a substantial contribution to social cohesion and patriotism (Mclean, 1998; Timothy & Boyd, 2006), a most desirable political outcome for most states.

### *2.2.2 The involvement of governments in tourism*

Generally, government is involved in tourism for three main reasons; political, economic, and environmental (Mill & Morrison, 1998). However, in academic and policy-based research, the economic reason for the involvement of governments in tourism has for a long time been the overwhelming focus, especially in less-developed countries where tourism produces a substantial percentage of the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) or has been considered as a panacea for the economic development of the country (Lew, 2000).

The economic case for government-sponsored tourism development is virtually universally accepted by academic researchers, with the proviso that some analysts consider it to be, on occasion, overstated. What is not disputed is that governments use tourist sites to increase their popularity and to validate their right to govern (Hall & Page, 2000; Richter, 1994). This is, to some extent, a direct result of substantial and tangible local economic progress. But undoubtedly governments enhance their public standing by conveying values, beliefs, norms and political ideologies at the tourism sites (Richter, 1983; Mclean, 1998; Palmer, 1999; Stock, 2001; Cano & Mysyk, 2004). Typically, governments often commence new projects with a view to influencing tourists in



a desired political direction (Richter, 1989; Bowman, 1992; Hall, 1994; Zhao & Timothy, 2015). They may also be involved in nation-building, value-formation, promoting national pride and achieving other socio-cultural objectives with the help of tourist interpretations (Carter, 1996). In any case, the purpose of the involvement of government is to structure an ideological framework in order to establish an intelligible public relationship with citizens (Pombeni, 2006).

Government may seek to develop specific forms of tourism, adopting a strategy in which places with their interpreted messages are promoted as tourist attractions, as a means of affirming its own cultural and political identity (Light, 2007). Moreover, the focus of such 'cultural mediation' may be on the internal promotion of domestic tourism to places deemed to be of national significance as a means of constructing and maintaining nationalism (Palmer, 1999). The political nature of government involvement in tourism development is usually embedded within tourism policies and planning. Tourism public policy can be defined in a simplistic way as '*whatever governments choose to do or not to do with tourism*' (Dye, 1992: 2). Hall (1994:51) observes:

*"When selecting certain tourism policies, decision makers are also choosing between different sets of values. Therefore, government bodies delegated with the task of regulating and determining the nature of tourism development are involved in the process of value choice".*

Moreover, powerful groups can form coalitions to dominate the planning process (Bramwell, 2004). It should be recognised that a number of government strategies may have considerable influence over tourism policy. These strategies include, for example, the statutory control of paid holidays, free entry ticket for selected tourist sites, and the projection of coherent site images (Wanhill, 1987).

However, government may on occasion be powerless to guide the development of tourism in a desired direction resulting in an outcome contrary to its political stance. For example, in the early 1990s the communist heritage continued to be a powerful attraction for international visitors to countries of the former Eastern Bloc, yet, as observed by Light (2000b), this site may actually be presenting a socialist past which the fledgling democratic states have decisively rejected.

Clearly, "*tourism development is an essentially political concept*" (Hall 1994:110). It is important to consider the role of government in the development

of tourism. There would seem to be a consensus among researchers that government involvement is essential to realise the full potential of the tourism industry.

### **2.3 Political ideology in heritage tourism**

Ideology has been identified as “*the field of discursivity being not a static ensemble of ideas but rather a set of complex effects internal to discourse*” (Alvesson & Kärreman 2000, cited in Zhang & Yan, 2009: 163). However, there is no single interpretation of the meaning of ideology. There has been a great deal of continuing intellectual debate in the West on the meaning and scope of this key concept, and it is now no longer adequate simply to state that one subscribes to the common-sense view. The politically correct way of thinking can often be unstated or understated but nevertheless will infuse the thought processes and deeds of those living in a highly controlled social system. Ideology is not confined to the common-sense view. Ideology can also refer to certain related belief systems, typically ‘-isms’ or quasi-religions (Tribe, 2006).

Ideology cannot be viewed as unchanging. Rather, it can be considered to be a sequence of related narratives in which the meanings of key terms or phrases can change over time (Eagleton, 1991; Said, 1991). In this way the prevailing ideology can be superseded by a later version. The ruling political class is inevitably in control of these narratives and their evolution. This is partly because all decisions taken by the ruling elite will have a similar effect on all other state institutions, but also because in a monolithic political system, the party is the only body through which any variation in ideology can be enacted.

There can be no doubt that ideology is a significant feature of political life. Ruling elites create the predominant ideology which in turn supports them in their desire to remain in power. In its attempt to control the collective thought processes of the masses, ideology creates an incrementally inaccurate view of facts and events which has been described by Marxists as a kind of ‘false consciousness’ (Tribe, 2006). Gramsci (1971) considered this process as essentially hegemonic in that ruling elites decide which opinions, belief systems and ideologies are acceptable, and which are not. Ideology can be thought of as a set of coherent belief systems, and so communism, patriotism and nationalism belong in this category.

Nowadays, tourism plays a vital role and acts as a positive force in economic development. It has been of considerable importance to nearly all political ideologies (Hall, 2000). Desmond (1999: xiv) argues that:

*“tourism is not just an aggregate of commercial activities; it is also an ideological framing of history, nature and tradition; a framing that has the power to reshape culture and nature to its own needs”.*

Heritage tourism has been identified by scholars as especially useful in influencing popular political attitudes (Richter, 1980, 1996). Heritage tourism is viewed as being not simply directed by market forces but also governed by the *“ideologically embellished capricious notions of society’s dominating party”* (Kreck, 1998:63).

A major task of heritage tourism is the provision of information, of varying degrees of accuracy, to visitors to tourism sites. In a communist country, state-sponsored tourism will undoubtedly direct its efforts to ensure that at least some of the information provided will be selected with the purpose of influencing tourists to accept the legitimacy of the state and its ideology (Richter, 1983). Thus, the state uses heritage tourism as an effective channel for disseminating propaganda.

A communist state is a one-party system. The lack of democracy creates a fundamental insecurity among its leadership. A great opportunity arises to showcase the superiority of communism, with the benefits of this system vis-à-vis capitalist ‘democracies’ embedded among the accepted historical facts portrayed at the sites (Henderson, 2007). There are very few communist states still in existence today. Laos, North Korea and China are examples of contemporary socialist countries each of which utilises heritage tourism to promulgate patriotism, communist ideology and their many successes (Henderson, 2007; Kim *et al*, 2007; Li & Hu, 2008).

It is inevitable, therefore, that political ideology will be promoted through the medium of tourism. In communist countries, messages on patriotism, communism and nationalism are ubiquitous in heritage tourism sites.

### 2.3.1 Patriotism

Patriotism is often accepted as “*an individual or collective loyalty to, and loves for, the motherland*” (Wen & Guo, 2012:123). It implies an emotional attachment to one’s country (Wen and Guo, 2012). In heritage tourism, homage is paid to a shared patriotic past, with the intention of enhancing national unity and a harmonious society while contrary views are discouraged (Shackel, 2005).

The connotation of patriotism is largely similar to that of nationalism. It is difficult to precisely differentiate these concepts. Both are connected with a desire for unity in a particular population and are concerned with the shared history and cultural characteristics of a group. However, patriotism does not concentrate on the ethnicity of its citizens. Thus, Rothi *et al.* (2005) termed patriotism as ‘relational orientation’ and nationalism as ‘identity content’. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the realization of republican ideals permitted a concept of patriotism to emerge in France which promoted loyalty to what it called the nation-state as opposed to the state- that is, to an entity defined politically but not ethnically (Caballero, 1999). According to Caballero (1999), both nationalism and patriotism invoke ‘collective experience’ and ‘collective memory’. In 1921 the conservative critic Pierre Lasserre (1922:iv) drew a clear distinction between the two concepts when he called patriotism “*the foundation of our lives*” and nationalism “*a reaction, a crisis...when the idea and feeling of fatherland are in peril*”.

In China, the meaning of patriotism has evolved in different historical phases. In the feudal stage, patriotism represented resistance to foreign invaders’ aggression, fighting against national schism and protecting national unity. After the Opium Wars (1839—1842; 1856—1860), China was plunged into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal existence. At that time patriotism adopted two distinct stances. Internally, patriotism took the lead in confronting the anti-democratic governing elite, which was collaborating with the European colonialists whose aim was the total control of China’s assets. Patriotism was at the forefront of the struggle to overcome the authoritarian feudal system which was incapable of defending the country against the predations of advanced western societies which could reach the Chinese coast with their steam-powered warships. Patriotism played an important part in the struggle for independence and the

need to create a modern industrialised state. Externally, patriotism was opposed to the imperialist powers' aggression and sought to defend the nation's independence and territorial integrity. During the period of democratic revolution (1919—1949), patriotism was exploited to urge the people to overthrow feudalism, imperialism and bureaucratic capitalism's reactionary rule and to fight for a democratic and independent nation (Wen & Guo, 2012).

During the early years following the establishment of the PRC (1949) patriotism played an important role in the creation and protection of a socialist China, bringing the fragmented nation together again ensuring the country's independence and traditional borders, and relentlessly proclaiming its dedication to socialism. In modern China, patriotism features prominently in the establishment of a harmonious society, providing vital support for the maintenance of a stable and prosperous nation state (Wen & Guo, 2012). It is notable that the CCP has recently invoked its non-communist past in an attempt to define patriotism in terms of Chinese history and culture with no mention of Marxism (Zhao, 1998).

Today in China, patriotism considers the CCP to be synonymous with the people's will, and accordingly believes that the people acknowledge its legitimacy as the creator of the new and communist China, a nation state shared by many ethnic groups. This principle was stated by the Chinese newspaper People's Daily editorial on National Day 1996, "*Patriotism is specific... Patriotism requires us to love the socialist system and road chosen by all nationalities in China under the leadership of the Communist Party.*" The policy of loyalty to the state of all ethnic groups in the PRC can be compared to Chinese nationalism in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century when the Manchu rulers were effectively seen as foreigners in what was a land inhabited by mostly Han Chinese (Zhao, 1998).

### 2.3.2 Communism

Visiting communist heritage sites has become an increasingly popular activity in China. The ideology itself, its governance and its best-known leaders have, as a result, become a notable asset for the tourist industry (Henderson, 2007). The exhibits are proof positive of the capacity of tourism to support and help sustain

the one-party Chinese state. Heritage, including communism, is therefore of immense value to the economy, society and the political class.

Clearly when heritage and heritage tourism are used for political purposes there is the real possibility of abuse, particularly in totalitarian states. This is well-documented in the former Stalinist countries of Eastern Europe (Hall, 1990). When the Soviet Empire imploded in 1989, the new regimes had to think hard about the communist heritage sites which they had inherited (Hall, 2001). Should they portray their communist past or erase all trace of it in their sites? There was, for example, a public outcry over a new museum in Russia dedicated to Stalinism, which was undoubtedly a very important part of Russia's heritage but anathema to many of its citizens recently freed from the Stalinist yoke (Andrew, 2016).

In contrast, a few Asian countries still claim to be communist states (Henderson, 2007). China, for instance, is a one-party state with the CCP at its helm. Although China has moved a long way from its communist ideals and has many of the features of a market economy, it can hardly disavow its communist roots. The CCP has a need to emphasise at all times its legitimacy to rule the nation, a direct result of the party's leading role in the 1949 revolution. Tourism is an important resource in this regard.

Tourism sites serve many purposes but one looms larger in a communist state than any other namely, to provide a setting visited by many of its citizens who can be presented with a 'rose-coloured' view of the state of their nation. This is extremely important to the one-party state which exists in a mind-set of insecurity, always fearful of being rejected by the people and so losing power. A feature of the tourism sites in communist states is the portrayal of the advantages of living in a socialist country. This, it is claimed, is a result of the superiority of communism over all other ideologies. Naturally, attention is drawn to the heroic struggle of the people led by the CCP which has made it all possible.

China is the best example of a nation in which communist structures, processes, personalities and their heritage are utilised as tourism resources in defence of the state and its underpinning doctrine (Sofield and Li, 1998). Communism was the ideology adopted by Mao Zedong with the aim of gaining the support of the

overwhelming majority of China's peasants allied to a substantial number of industrial workers. To maintain CCP leadership of the country requires many strategies. Coercion has undoubtedly been prevalent but by itself would be of limited use in the long term. The two main strategies implemented in support of Chinese communism are communist education and the mobilisation of the people (Macridis, 1986). A feature of the educational strategy would be the relentless trumpeting of the economic benefits accruing from communism.

Conversely, Macridis (1986) believes that prosperity was the main cause of the leadership's change in focus from communism to nationalism. Perhaps it concerned them that communism could have the potential to come back to haunt the party in the event of an economic down turn.

However, for the great majority of Chinese people, the advantages of being led by the CCP are there for all to see in their daily lives; the enormous and rapid growth of the Chinese economy with greatly enhanced living standards and opportunities for the vast majority of its citizens, a wide-spread and inexpensive high speed railway network, metro systems in many large cities, vastly improved housing, and a population often with more disposal income than their counterparts in the west (Macridis, 1986).

In the short term it would seem unthinkable that a totalitarian regime would surrender power voluntarily. The more likely scenario is that the regime will use all the levers at its disposal, be they political, economic or social, to maintain its hold on power. Tourism has an important part to play in the process. It may have the power to facilitate desired change, or alternatively help to maintain the *status quo*. For this reason, communist leaders are somewhat ambivalent in their attitude towards the tourism industry (Henderson, 2007). Without question, politics, heritage and tourism enjoy a complicated relationship worthy of further study.

### 2.3.3 Nationalism

Nationalism is a complex concept. According to Suisheng Zhao (2000:3), "*nationalism combines the political notion of territorial self-determination, the cultural notion of national identity, and the moral notion of national self-defense in an anarchical world*". Honderich (1995:605) expressed a similar view that

nationalism is a “*doctrine which holds that national identity ought to be accorded political recognition, that nations have rights (to autonomy, self-determination, and/or sovereignty), and the members of the nation ought to band together in defence of those rights*”.

Nationalism is defined as “*an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation*” (Smith, 1991: 73). Typical of almost all nations is the adoption of an official language, a national flag and an anthem (Brubaker, 1996). This is also the case in China, using the official language Mandarin, the five-star red flag and the anthem of ‘March of the Volunteers’. Along with other emblems, these help to define the nation globally and can be thought of as being part of a socio-political process whose purpose is to consolidate its people’s feeling of belonging to a free, unified and powerful nation (Griffiths and Sharpley, 2012). This process derives its impetus and direction from ideology (Smith, 1995).

A feature of nationalism is “*the attempt to assimilate or incorporate culturally distinctive territories in a given state*” (Hechter 2000:15). This is clearly of the utmost importance to states with many ethnic groups who are often different culturally, linguistically and religiously (Gary, 2012). This is precisely the position China found itself in 1949. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that China has a very large population inhabiting a great land mass with difficult communications to remote regions. “*Nationalism seeks to persuade its citizens to identify with other ethnic groups as a single people loyal to the unitary state*” (Greenfeld, 1992:3).

This PhD study is interested in the close relationship that nationalism has with heritage tourism due to a shared focus on past events that shape society. This can be seen from one particular definition of heritage tourism, that is, of “*tourism centred on what we have inherited, which can mean anything from historic buildings, to art works, to beautiful scenery*” (Yale 2004:21). Heritage tourism has specifically been identified as “*a powerful force in the construction and maintenance of nationalism*” (Palmer, 1999:313).

Smith (1999) is clear that how the past is remembered is crucial to an increase in nationalism. Of course, historical facts and events are subject to re-



interpretation by modern ideologues to serve their own purposes. Zerubavel (1995) cites the commonplace efforts of nationalist movements to devise a version of history that suits their own ends, namely to unify their nation on the basis of a shared past.

Nye (1993:61) makes a very important point: “*nationalism proved to be stronger than socialism when it came to bonding the working classes together and stronger than the capitalism that bound bankers together*”. This is particularly relevant in recent Chinese history. Red Tourism, a special form of heritage tourism developed in China, bears witness to the fact that the promotion of nationalism is indeed more effective now than that of communism. Red Tourism sites specialise in the dissemination of a sense of nationalism, patriotism, in addition to communism.

Nationalism plays an important role in most, if not all, modern nations. It provides the feeling of togetherness and security that comes from being part of something bigger and greater than being on one’s own, and so engendering a sense of self-worth in its constituent members (Vickers, 2007). It is generally accepted that nationalism may be of assistance in the promotion of social stability by deflecting any hostility against the regime towards external enemies, real or imagined (Wang, 2008).

Following the victory of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) over the Nationalist Kuomintang Army in 1949, the PRC found itself in control of most of the old imperial territories, which were inhabited by 55 minority ethnic groups in addition to the vast majority of supposedly Han Chinese. Although only comprising 8% of the population, the ethnic groups occupied 64% of Chinese territory (Heberer, 1989; Ma, 1989). Clearly, there was a real possibility of ethnic conflict, and so the CCP determined that the best route for a peaceful outcome was to adopt a state-led nationalism designed to create a unitary Chinese nation (Zhao, 1998).

## **2.4 Heritage interpretation in tourism**

Heritage interpretation by the state involves the construction and enhancement of visitor experiences (Moscardo, 2011), while simultaneously ensuring the long term viability of tourism (Moscardo, 1996). However heritage interpretation is

not the sole preserve of the state, as the visitors bring to the sites their own ideas, needs and interests. The visitor may have his own viewpoint which may be in contradiction to that intended by the state (Tilden, 1967).

The state's role in heritage interpretation is concerned with the creation of messages and stories about culture and the natural environment (Beck and Cable, 2002). This can be seen as the construction of narratives whose purpose is to allow tourists to make their own minds up about what is presented instead of being confronted by received wisdom, which is not thought to be an effective method of educating today's citizenry (Tilden, 1977).

Interpretation by the organisers of exhibitions can be taken to be part of a strategy designed to stimulate visitors into thinking about the significance of their interaction (West, 2010). Surprisingly, in most multi-party western systems of governance, ideology often plays a significant role in heritage tourism resulting in a value-laden presentation. Such attempts to guide the thought processes of tourists in the direction of the official line has led to acrimonious disputes over the depiction of these heritage experiences and called into question their worthiness (McKercher & du Cros, 2002).

Heritage interpretation by the state can be an impediment to understanding the relationship between heritage and tourism due to the process of 'reconstructing the past in the present' (Nuryanti, 1996). In heritage tourism, the visitor is exposed not just to an exhibit but rather to its interpretation. The interpretation takes precedence over the exhibit (Ashworth & Larkham, 1994; Ashworth & Graham, 2005). There is a political dimension to this process in which exhibits are associated with an official line. Facts become blurred and may elicit the desired, sometimes emotional, response (Nuryanti, 1996). The clearest example of such manipulation occurred in Israel, where Israel and Palestinian tour guides had completely contradictory approaches in their descriptions of the sites. The Israeli guides had the authority of the Jewish state behind them while the Arab guides were considered illegal and were eventually banned (Bowman, 1992). In the formerly Soviet satellite countries of Eastern Europe, communist heritage is often deliberately portrayed without context; nostalgia for that period is thought to be an impediment to their aim of re-establishing themselves as truly European (Light, 2000a). The clearest example of this can be seen in

Bucharest in the National History Museum of Romania where not a trace of communist history can be found (Light, 2001).

It is generally accepted that interpretation of historical events is at least partly dependent on the present situation (Merriman, 1991). This was eloquently described as “*every age has the Stonehenge it deserves or desires*” (Hawkes 1967:174). We have to realize that heritagisation is a “*social process whose final outcome is the presentation and interpretation (rather than archiving or sustaining) of heritage*” (Poria and Ashworth, 2009: 523). Today’s ruling classes consider history to belong to them to be interpreted and utilised for their own purposes (Poria and Ashworth, 2009).

Heritage interpretation is politically invaluable in the creation of a national identity, enhancing the doctrines and authority of hegemonies (Harrison and Hitchcock, 2005; Hems and Blockley, 2006; Rivera, 2008). Heritage interpretation needs to be considered from a social and cultural viewpoint as well as the logistical requirements of presentation.

Reisinger and Steiner (2006) emphasize that the on-site information presented and the accompanying interpretation is often neither truthful nor accurate. It is claimed that there are two main factors that affect the differences between the ‘real thing’ and its presentation. First, the display of heritage gives credence to the historical views of the ruling elites. This issue is closely associated with the political nature of heritage in that it relates to the distribution of power and influence. The second factor is the managerial direction of heritage sites. As a major source of income, heritage sites strive to attract tourists and the growing significance of tourism development in heritage sites clearly recognizes ways in which the commercial orientations of contemporary heritage sites influence their presentational and interpretational methods (Park, 2014). Marketing activities in sensitive sites need to prioritize opportunities for learning as the primary and dominant motivation for visiting (Austin, 2002). In these cases, there may be a conflict between the commercial requirements of the sites and an interpretation presented therein which is no longer acceptable to tourists whose views have changed over time (Sharpley and Stone, 2009).

Heritage interpretation is often heavily politicized. Historic events are carefully screened with a view to their being adapted for a political purpose relevant to

today's needs. This is acknowledged to be a global phenomenon (Garrod and Fyall, 2000). It is often used to help maintain the authority of powerful groups in a community (Tunbridge and Ashworth, 1996; Graham *et al*, 2000).

Hall (1994) contends that heritage sites often portray only one interpretation of events, that which favours a particular ideology. It seems that heritage is employed as a symbolic indicator of power and hegemony, with a particular emphasis on state-centred and official interpretations of heritage. However, there is a developing tendency to include multiple interpretations and diversified experiences of heritage, especially the subjective nature of heritage interpretations and experiences (Bruner, 1996; Austin, 2002; Park, 2010a). Some believe that research into heritage tourism should concentrate on the consumers rather than the uses of heritage. (Tunbridge and Ashworth, 1996; Voase, 2002; McCain and Ray, 2003). The shift from the monolithic and rigid to multiple and varied interpretations of heritage is clearly encapsulated in the way heritage is presented for contemporary tourism consumption. This change in emphasis in heritage interpretation has arisen as a direct result of consumer demand (Wight and Lennon, 2007). Heritage interpretation should aim to contribute to the "*various means of communicating heritage to people*" (Howard, 2003:244). Here, greater emphasis is put on the role of visitors as active agents in heritage interpretation by way of bringing their own ideas, preconceptions and images to heritage sites. It is also emphasized that visitors are increasingly enthusiastic about having the opportunity to make their own interpretation of events, a process that is likely to strengthen their emotional attachment to the site (Poria *et al.*, 2009).

Visitors are unlikely to accept messages at face value, unless they feel engaged in the learning process (Dumbraveanu *et al*, 2016). The materials provided should, therefore, add to what they already know from their own experience of life. Speaking down to tourists is unacceptable to the recipients. The visitors prefer to be part of a conversation at the end of which they make up their own mind (Tilden, 1967).

Technological advances have provided instant access to an enormous store of information (Hein, 1998). Visitors can check assertions dressed up as facts on the spot using their smart phones, for example. Visitors may resent being fed

untruths or even half-truths. The state will be wary of being found out misleading its citizens. A mutual break down of trust could have serious implications for the state. This is why it has become fashionable for tourism sites to provide an alternative and reasonable vision leaving visitors to choose between them (Dumbraveanu *et al*, 2016).

## **2.5 Tourists' motivations and experiences of heritage tourism**

Travel motivation is a much studied subject of academics in the field of tourism research (Crompton, 1979; Dann, 1981; Galloway, 1998; Veal, 1997). Wahab (1975) takes the view that travel motivation is of crucial importance to tourism studies and development. Crompton (1979) considers that determining exactly why tourists travel to a particular site may not be so straightforward. Political parties are responsible for the interpretation and displaying of heritage exhibits, ensuring that any messages embedded in them are in line with the ideology of the ruling class. Some tourists, on the other hand, may only be interested in the entertainment value offered at the site, an experience they may enjoy and remember (Schouten, 1995; Moscardo, 2000; Halewood & Hannam, 2001). A common theme among researchers is that motivation is the most important driver of much activity, including tourism (Crompton, 1979; Fodness, 1994; IsoAhola, 1982). Motivation is undoubtedly a key factor in the response of tourists at heritage sites. It is essential therefore to look closely at its effect on the tourist experience (Gunn, 1988; Mill & Morrison, 1985).

Many diverse motives have been ascribed to people visiting heritage sites; these include entertainment and education. Heritage tourists may often have multiple reasons for going to a heritage site (Prentice, 1994). A love of the past, genuine portrayals of historical events, as well as learning and enjoying oneself are regularly cited by heritage tourists (Confer & Kerstetter, 2000; Light & Prentice, 1994; Prentice, 1993). Motivation research findings are of considerable value to business consultants because commercial possibilities can be scrutinised through them (c.f. Tribe, 2004). It is commonly accepted that the decision to go to a particular site owes a lot to the visitor's motives (Lue *et al*, 1993; Um & Crompton, 1990). Moscardo (1996) contended that a preference for the availability of certain activities may direct visitors to a particular site. It is common for tourists to opt for a visit to a site with universally accepted and,

therefore, unchanging depictions of historical events where the visitors may buy mementos (Gross, 2005). The exhibits will have been carefully selected and skilfully displayed with political messages, some bold, some understated, embedded strategically at the site (Brin, 2006). Schwartz (1991:599) terms this process as “*politicisation of the role of the traveller*”.

As far as tourist experience in heritage tourism is concerned, authenticity is an important concept for researchers. There are many schools of thought which have addressed the importance of authenticity. (i) Objectivists take the view that the authenticity and origin of the exhibits has been determined by professionals in the field of antiquities (Boorstin, 1964; MacCannell, 1976). (ii) Post-modernists reject this stance arguing that the tourist industry does not have the capacity or the will to obtain “authentic” objects (Baudrillard, 1983; Eco, 1986). Authenticity is never an issue for today’s tourists who seem content to see replicas (Cohen, 1995; Ritzer & Liska, 1997). Post-modernists believe that the provenance of the objects has no effect on the tourist experience. (iii) Constructivists believe that whether a tourist believes in the authenticity of the objects is dependent on their social class and may also be affected by the way other tourists react to the artefacts on display and also the heritage interpretation of the site managers (Li and Hu, 2008). (iv) Existentialists, in contrast, prefer to concentrate on the subjective experience of visitors (Kim & Jamal, 2007; Wang, 1999). Subjectivity is looked at from two points of view: the intrapersonal and the interpersonal. Intrapersonal authenticity is decided by the individual visitor (Wang, 1999). Interpersonal authenticity occurs by mutual agreement between tour group members (Kim & Jamal, 2007; Wang, 1999).

Using materials gleaned from environmental psychology and human geography, Poria *et al* (2001, 2003) took the view that if visitors thought of the site as part of their own personal heritage, they were more likely to visit and the duration of their stay would be longer. Their enjoyment would be enhanced, return visits were common and there was a demand for interpretation (Poria *et al*, 2004).

Interpretation is generally regarded as part of the learning process (Tilden, 1977; Beck and Cable, 1998). Where interpretation activities are offered, education becomes the main aspect of the dialogue between tourists and heritage sites (Staiff, 2014). It has been established that tourists consider interpretation as a

good way to add to their emotional experiences in addition to increasing their knowledge (Poria *et al*, 2009).

Some studies show that tourists may be exposed to indoctrination at tourism sites. The activities undertaken may modify their thinking, mores, and beliefs. Tourists can be affected emotionally by their visits (Palmer, 1999). Tourists may change their world outlook following visits to such sites.

Ideological narratives can be turned into a heritage product, but visitors may not accept them in the way intended. Indeed, political messages placed with collections of exhibits are often reinterpreted by the tourists depending on their own circumstances (Burnett, 2001; Timothy & Prideaux, 2004; Wall & Xie, 2005). It is highly unlikely that all the visitors to nationally important heritage sites will unquestioningly take the messages at face value. Tourists have a mind of their own (Meethan, 2001). Pretes (2003:134) is clear that "*though tourists are presented with a hegemonic discourse of nationalism ...they are free to reject this discourse and construct their own reading of this site*".

## **2.6 Communist heritage tourism and Red Tourism in China**

Communist heritage tourism is a new form of heritage tourism in the formerly socialist countries of Europe and more recently in the still surviving socialist regimes of Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba (Henderson, 2007; Light, 2000a; Sanchez & Adams, 2008). It exploits the physical legacies of socialism, such as statues, museums, monuments and historical buildings in tourist sites.

Communist heritage tourism in post-socialist countries in Europe developed in the aftermath of a momentous and sudden transition from what were totalitarian centrally planned regimes to representative democracies with a market economy. There are three key features shared by the tourism industry in each of the formerly communist states of Eastern Europe. First, as these countries traditionally have felt an affinity with Europe and the values of Western European civilization, they were determined to return to Europe once freed from communism and their much resented Soviet colonial construction of collective identity (Dingsdale, 1999). Second, with the economic decline of these countries, the tourism industry is confronted with problems such as poor infrastructure, insufficient investment and the collapse of a regional tourism

market network, and hence needs a new stimulus to kick-start the industry. Third, as soon as constraints on international communication are removed, Western tourists travel to these countries in order to experience an authentic socialist history. They constitute a major component of the communist heritage tourism market based on the socialist legacies of those countries.

Against this backdrop, communist heritage tourism is presented with a dilemma of 'economy versus identity' in post-socialist countries (Tunbridge, 1994). On the one hand, it capitalises on its socialist past as an intrinsic advantage in the development of new tourist attractions, the expansion of the international tourism market and helping transform the whole tourism industry (Coles, 2003a, 2003b). On the other hand, representing the physical legacies of socialism is at odds with post-socialist aspirations of erasing the image of socialism and reaffirming national identity as 'Europeanness' (Light, 2000b, 2001).

As a result, a decontextualization approach is adopted to interpret socialist heritage for tourist consumption in three particular ways (Light, 2000a). The first is to completely erase the history of socialism from the national chronicle, as happened in the National Museum of Romania (Light, 2000b). The second is to spatially relocate or contextually displace socialism heritage. By so doing socialist heritages are disconnected from their geographical and historical roots, and it may be argued that the symbolic meanings of socialist heritages are deprived of socialism, with only the commercial value of tourism remaining. The third is physical transformation or 'commemorative maintenance' (Forest & Johnson, 2002). Physical entities of socialist heritage are preserved but the functions of socialism like civil ideological education are removed (Forest & Johnson, 2002).

Communist heritage tourism in the few surviving socialist countries presents a different picture. According to some (Henderson, 2000, 2007; Kim *et al*, 2007), socialism maintains a powerful presence in these countries, even though the ruling elites confront substantial challenges to their political legitimacy amid the accompanying social uncertainty. The major driving force of communist heritage tourism in these countries is not external tourism demand, but the state itself which shows great enthusiasm for the exploitation of relics of the struggle for



independence from colonial powers. It is believed that such an approach will attract a substantial number of tourists from home and abroad.

Enthusiasm is stimulated in many ways in which the economic pursuit of foreign exchange and capital for industrial restructuring are the most acknowledged. Other than that, communist heritage tourism is deliberately used to improve international understanding and rally domestic support. In particular, it is designed to convince domestic tourists of the merits of their government, the wisdom of its political stance and the acumen of their leaders (Li & Hu, 2011). In this regard, communist heritage tourism in the currently existing socialist countries tends to reinforce rather than to erase a socialist national image through the public consumption of socialist heritage. A political indoctrination approach is thus dominant in socialist heritage interpretation. The most extreme case can be seen in North Korea where its leader gives the highest priority to promulgating the superiority of socialism and the benefits of life in a socialist Utopia. Within the relentless political indoctrination, martyrs, veterans and especially the leaders are apotheosized, and the party ideology, sanctified in order to sustain the legitimacy of Kim's governance (Henderson, 2007; Kim *et al*, 2007).

According to Lasswell (as cited in Hall, 1994), politics is ultimately about power. The needs of the party take precedence over all other interests (Ashworth & Larkham, 1994; Tunbridge, 1998). The party leaders assume authorship of the country's heritage (Peckham, 2003; Smith, 2003). It is, therefore, generally accepted that the debate on what is recorded and celebrated about significant historical events is always dominated by the ruling class (Corner & Harvey, 1991). In the special case of Red Tourism in China, such decisions are the exclusive preserve of the communist leadership. As claimed by the Director of the Chinese National Tourism Association, Shao, all presentations and interpretations of historical events have to comply absolutely to the letter with the official CCP version of the communist revolution (Shao, 2007). The government is, therefore, at all times profoundly involved in Red Tourism in terms of all the organisational minutiae of running the sites including finance, publicity, staff training programmes, and entry charges for visitors.

According to the National Red Tourism Development Planning 2004-2010, which was jointly issued in 2004 by the General Office of the State Council and the Central Committee of the CCP, Red Tourism is defined as an activity typified by learning, sightseeing and nostalgia in socialist heritage sites replete with monuments, memorials, museums, previous residences of CCP leaders and other relevant places (He, 2005). These sites relate to the period from 1921 when the CCP was founded until 1949 when the People's Republic of China was established. Since 2004, a series of policies was implemented with the purpose of stimulating the development of Red Tourism sites throughout the country (Li & Hu, 2008; Li *et al.*, 2010).

He's (2005) definition of Red Tourism, if taken at face value, makes it appear to be virtually identical to other communist heritage sites in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. What is missing from the definition is the crucial political purpose of Red Tourism in China.

There are, of course, many features common to communist heritage and Red Tourism. The two most important shared characteristics are: first, heritage resources in the two variants are similar, being based on the same physical legacies created during the struggle to establish a socialist regime (He, 2005; Light, 2000a); second, the symbolic meaning of such heritage forms is acknowledged as the source of attraction to tourists in both types of site. As a contemporary historical representation, these monuments, museums, sculptures and martyr tombs offer opportunities to learn about or celebrate communism in its role as a liberating ideology. Some commentators are somewhat sceptical about this portrayal of an 'objective' account of history in heritage sites (Lowenthal, 1996, Olsen and Timothy, 2002). So, what meanings these physical heritage forms communicate primarily depends on the wider context in which heritage tourism develops.

Compared with communist heritage tourism, Red Tourism developed in a different political and economic environment. Politically, the CCP uses all the means at its disposal to reassert the political legitimacy of its single-party governance and entrench its socialist polity against various challenges (Guo, 2004; Liew & Wang, 2004). In the view of the CCP, by recalling its heroic part in the revolution including the sacrifices and triumphs of the PLA, Red Tourism

can be an effective vehicle for the preservation of the loyalty of the people to the governance of the CCP, and their continuing confidence in the cause of socialist construction (He, 2005). As a result, the attitude of the Chinese government toward socialist heritage is understandably unlike that of the post-socialist governments. While the latter tend to consign socialism to the past, the former is determined to bring their view of the history of the Chinese revolution to domestic and international audiences (He, 2005).

Economic modernization in China has progressed at an unprecedented rate as a result of the 'Reform & Opening' policy. Heritage tourism, particularly Red Tourism has inevitably been affected by the marketisation of the economy prevalent in contemporary China. China's progress to a market economy has had significant consequences for Red Tourism, whereas the state-controlled economy of North Korea adheres to a more traditional approach.

Another point of distinction between communist heritage tourism and Red Tourism is the target market. Communist heritage tourism was initially externally-driven by often sympathetic tourists from the West such as France, U.K. and the USA, who wanted to experience what life was really like behind the Iron Curtain (Baker, 1993; Light, 2001). Meanwhile, the domestic market also prospered. Coles (2003a) reminds us that the first generation of East Germans born in the recently united Germany were seen to be highly motivated to visit the East in considerable numbers and thus provide a welcome impetus to the industry for some time to come. Moreover, a sense of nostalgia motivates many domestic visitors, mostly the elderly, who are often disoriented and dissatisfied with the resultant upheaval and economic decline at the early stage of the transition, to return and visit socialist monuments (Light, 2001).

Nowadays, as indicated in the National Red Tourism Development Planning 2004-2010, Red Tourism is mostly promoted to Chinese citizens, at least at the present stage of its development. Such a market choice has been encouraged by the CCP and the Chinese government. Red Tourism is not only an economic exercise but a political and cultural learning process for Chinese citizens. Red Tourism can make a significant contribution to a mature tourism industry, provide a timely boost to the local economy, improve the infrastructure, and provide more employment and business opportunities, as suggested by Mr. Li

Shenglin (2005), Vice-Director of the National Development and Reform Committee. Mr. Li Changchun (2004), a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of CCP's Central Committee, argued in a keynote speech about Red Tourism, that it helps people to learn how a suitable pathway to national independence, and the resulting prosperity was a direct result of the leadership of the CCP. The extraordinary growth of the Chinese economy has allowed the CCP to state that it was only with its leadership that such success could be achieved.

Red Tourism has received much attention from Chinese scholars and, they present their studies of Red Tourism from a business perspective, in terms of development strategy (Sheng, 2006), sustainable development (Dong & Mei, 2005), product marketing and branding (Zhou, 2006), and destination planning and construction (Shao & Wang, 2006). However, an examination of Red Tourism from a national cultural and ideological perspective has been lacking in their studies (He, 2005). Therefore, one could argue that the perspectives in previous studies regarding nationalism construction in heritage tourism may help us understand Red Tourism as an economic, cultural and political phenomenon in China.

## **2.7 Conclusion**

The literature considered in this chapter has outlined the key areas of literature that further an understanding of the issues examined in this study. In the study they are applied to the establishment of the political role of heritage tourism, government's involvement in tourism, political ideology in heritage tourism, heritage interpretation, tourists' motivations and experiences, and communist heritage tourism and Red Tourism in China. The special form of heritage tourism, Red Tourism, has experienced a noteworthy development in China. Thus research is needed to understand how government interprets political messages and how tourists respond to them.

The study's conceptual framework is developed next in Chapter 3, and this draws on some of the ideas relating to government involvement, ideology, interpretation, tourists' responses, Red Tourism that have been outlined in this Chapter.

## **Chapter 3: Conceptual framework**

### 3.1 Introduction

Paying due attention to the research questions, aim and objectives, as well as Chinese Red Tourism planning and practices, this chapter presents a conceptual framework for the purpose of systematically establishing the Chinese government's political intentions behind the development of Red Tourism which started in 2004, and the responses of tourists to them. The layout of the framework makes clear the main themes and associated elements which guide the direction and focus of the research. Developing a conceptual framework helps to make a connection between the theoretical approaches and the study objectives, and it provides a clear focus for the study by building "*the system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs and theories that supports and informs research*" (Maxwell, 1996:25).

The framework is devised to display the research aims and objectives and it is based on the key literature reviewed in Chapter Two and includes the political role of heritage tourism, government involvement in tourism, political ideology in heritage tourism, heritage interpretation in tourism, tourists' motivations and responses, communist heritage tourism and its Chinese variant, Red Tourism. There is an identifiable lack of research literature in the area of Red Tourism in China, especially on the political or ideological motivations behind Red Tourism and how tourists respond to them. The study's conceptual framework was developed following an examination of the theories and concepts discussed in the literature review. The framework draws on western theories and previous research on Chinese Red Tourism. The review of the relevant literature helped to identify key concepts and parameters for the conceptual framework. Fundamentally, this study aims to establish the government's political intentions behind Red Tourism in China, then obtain tourists responses to the messages on display, and finally collectively examine these responses.

This chapter comprises three sections. The first section deals with the evolution of the conceptual framework which was influenced by the research aims and objectives, as well as by Chinese Red Tourism planning and practices. This is followed by an explanation of the specific thinking in the development of the conceptual framework and provides the logistical basis of this study. Finally, the application of the conceptual framework is described.

## 3.2 Evolution of the conceptual framework

The conceptual framework draws on literature related to the study's research aims and objectives. It serves as an overall guide for the research and it directs the critical examination of the tourists' responses to the government's political intentions behind Red Tourism in China. Miles and Huberman (1984:33) define a conceptual framework as "*the current version of the researcher's map of the territory being investigated*". Maxwell (1996:25) refers to a conceptual framework, noting that "*a conceptual map, like the theory it represents, is a picture of the territory you want to study, not of the study itself*". Maxwell (1996:37) also states that "*it is a visual display of your current working theory- a picture of what you think is going on with the phenomenon you are studying*". It is possible that the word 'current' used in these definitions means that the conceptual framework is expected to evolve as the research develops (Leshem and Trafford, 2007). The conceptual framework for this research, unexceptionally, experienced a substantial evolution as the study developed, for example, a new theme titled 'unintended consequences arising from the cult of worship of Mao' emerged as the field work was being carried out on the cult of worship of Mao during the collection of data on the Chinese government's political intentions behind Red Tourism. The researcher had to adapt the conceptual framework to reflect the research objectives according to the practical findings. The final version of the conceptual framework shows the development of the author's thinking and how this study became a logical and coherent whole.


Three main versions of the conceptual framework were developed to more clearly describe the theoretical base for this study with respect to the research objectives and to assist demonstration of a clearer and explicit connection between the theory and the findings.

### 3.2.1 *The first version of the conceptual framework*

The first version of the conceptual framework is useful when comparing the Chinese government's political intentions behind Red Tourism messages with tourists' responses to those intentions in China's rapidly changing economic, socio-cultural and political context. This initial conceptual framework (Figure 3-1) was designed after a preliminary literature review. It was the author's initial idea

to structure the study on the basis of relevant theoretical and Red Tourism practical documents, and the findings from the author's MSc dissertation on 'Politics, Red Tourism and tourism governance in Mao's birthplace, China'.

**Figure 3-1 The first version of the conceptual framework**



As the study proceeded, the limitations of the first version of the conceptual framework demanded an improvement. Firstly, the middle box on 'Red Tourism messages' was too descriptive and lacked critical thinking about the Red Tourism messages used by Chinese government. Secondly, even though the Chinese government's intentions and tourists' responses are related to Red Tourism messages, the conceptual framework did not clearly demonstrate the comparison between the Chinese government's intentions and the tourists' responses. Thirdly, tourist responses to government's intentions were much more varied than anticipated. However, in the right side box, 'individual characteristics' and 'balance to the education and entertainment' should not be sub-themes. 'Individual characteristics' is not tourists' responses and 'balance to the education and entertainment' is not tourists' responses to the Red Tourism messages either. Therefore, it was felt that the first version of conceptual framework failed to express the research aim and objectives appropriately.


### *3.2.2 The second version of the conceptual framework*

This study is concerned with 'tourists' responses to government intentions for Red Tourism in China'. Thus, the second version of the conceptual framework (Figure 3-2) put 'tourists' responses' as a key theme, used 'Chinese government



intentions', 'two phases of the development of Red Tourism' and 'the management of Red Tourism' to support the key theme. The researcher also deleted the outside box about China's changing economic, socio-cultural and political context which will be considered later during the examination of the two phases of the development of Red Tourism.

**Figure 3-2 The second version of the conceptual framework**



The second version of the conceptual framework was based on the idea of drawing up a short list of the interview questions aimed at tourists, government officials and academic researchers. The four vertical boxes directed the main themes for interview questions.

Compared to the first version of the conceptual framework, the second version provided more clarity with regard to the sub-themes in each box and a greater focus on tourists' responses. However, the second version had many overlapping sub-themes; for example, research in boxes 2 and 3 overlaps with that in boxes 5 and 8; research in boxes 6 and 9 overlaps with that in box 12. Also, some boxes in this figure were still overly descriptive, such as boxes 1, 4, 7, 10 and 11. In all, it was decided that the second version could not

demonstrate the relationships between Chinese government intentions behind Red Tourism messages and tourists' responses successfully. Thus, the second version of the conceptual framework was revised yet again.

### *3.2.3 The third version of the conceptual framework*

The third version of the conceptual framework (see Figure 3.3) helps one to compare the Chinese government's political intentions behind Red Tourism messages with tourists' responses while acknowledging that the intentions will have changed somewhat in the second phase. According to the study's aim and objectives, the conceptual framework consists of three main components featured in the macro boxes and it indicates the critical linkages between each one. It examines the practicalities of Red Tourism strategy, and this leads to further analysis helping to provide a rationale for the research objectives. More specifically, the conceptual framework compares the government's intentions behind Red Tourism with tourists' responses to the Red Tourism messages. Thus, the third version of the conceptual framework demonstrates the analysis of the two phases of the development of Red Tourism and how the government conveys political messages at Red Tourism sites, together with tourists' responses to them. It examines Red Tourism messages from both the point of view of the sender (government) and that of the receiver (tourist). The framework examines the Chinese government's political intentions behind Red Tourism as they emerged chronologically. Tourists' responses will undoubtedly be affected by the economic and political changes that are ongoing in contemporary China. It is envisaged that the political messages conveyed at the Red Tourism sites affect what the tourists feel and how they respond. Tourists' responses help to show the extent to which government has achieved its purpose in displaying political messages at Red Tourism sites. Chapter 4 explains the operation of the framework in terms of research methodology. Two Red Tourism sites were selected as typical examples of the two phases: Mao's birthplace in Shaoshan; and the Zhijiang site, dedicated to the commemoration of the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army.

**Figure 3-3 The third version of the conceptual framework**




Figure 3-3 includes many horizontal and vertical arrows between the boxes. These indicate envisaged connections between the Chinese government's political intentions behind Red Tourism, and tourists' responses to the government's political intentions for Red Tourism at Shaoshan and Zhijiang.

In practice, the framework not only reflects the researcher's thinking based on the literature review and her personal experience of China as a Chinese citizen, in addition, it facilitated the design and execution of the research methodology (Chapter 4). Furthermore, it proved invaluable for the analysis and transcription of the empirical data, as well as the establishment of research conclusions and implications in Chapter 8. At the end of the research process, the framework was evaluated through its application to the case studies in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. It is revisited in Chapter 8 enabling the researcher to reflect on the

emergence of new ideas from the interviews. In this sense, the development of the conceptual model and analysis were interdependent.

### **3.3 Specific elements in the development of the conceptual framework**

Three connected sets of themes are developed in the third framework (Figure 3-3). These three themes are: the two phases of Red Tourism; the Chinese government's political intentions behind Red Tourism; and tourists' responses to the government's political intentions for Red Tourism at Shaoshan and Zhijiang. Each theme contains elements that highlight the key issues which exist in contemporary China's society. The framework illustrates each theme using arrows to show the relationships between them.

#### *3.3.1 The two phases of Red Tourism*

The top macro box is concerned with the two phases of Red Tourism which reflect China's changing socio-economic and political situation. This box forms the basis of Chapter 5. It is especially important to obtain a clear understanding of the two phases of Chinese Red Tourism, the first one spanning from 2004 to 2010 and the second one from 2011 to 2015.

The uppermost macro box introduced Objective 1 'to examine the development of Red Tourism and its two phases with different foci'. From this, reflecting the researcher's conceptual thinking post-literature review, the following three sub-objectives were developed:

Objective 1.1 To critically examine: (i) the first phase of Red Tourism in China from 2004 to 2010 which focused on the history of the CCP from 1921 to 1949; (ii) the role of Mao and his influence on China's governance and society; (iii) the first phase of Red Tourism Planning 2004-2010;

Objective 1.2 To consider the achievements of the first phase of Red Tourism;

Objective 1.3 To look at the strategy of the second phase of Red Tourism Planning 2011-2015 in China with regard to the history of China's struggle against feudalism and Japanese and western foreign imperialism aggression from 1840 to 1921.

In order to better understand Red Tourism in China, Objective 1 which occupies the top macro box in Figure 3.3 required an examination of the two phases of

Red Tourism with their significantly different foci which arose during the development of Red Tourism.

Objective 1.1 thus, highlights a need to analyse the strategy underpinning the first phase of Red Tourism Planning 2004-2010, which reflects the history of the CCP during 1921-1949 and the role of Mao and his influence on China's governance and society. Objective 1.2 explores the reported achievements of the first phase of Red Tourism. Objective 1.3 was designed to gain a better understanding of the second phase of Red Tourism from 2011-2015 in China. It introduces the purpose of the second phase of Red Tourism Planning 2011 – 2015, which concentrates on the history of China's struggle against feudalism, foreign capitalist aggression from 1840 to 1921, and Japanese imperialism, the relationship between the CCP under Mao's leadership and the Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai-shek, and progress made by the CCP from 1949 to now. This study investigates the Chinese government's political intentions behind Red Tourism sites and tourists' responses to the government's messages on display at the Red Tourism sites in Shaoshan and Zhijiang. Therefore, it analyses the two phases of Red Tourism Planning (2004-2010 and 2011-2015); thus far, this approach has attracted very little interest from tourism researchers.

### *3.3.2 The Chinese government's intentions behind Red Tourism*

Sofield and Li (2008) argue that the complexities of tourism development in contemporary China cover one era after another and may only be understood by delving back into the past. Therefore, the second step of this study is to gain an understanding of these complexities by investigating the role of the Chinese government in the development of tourism in general and that of Red Tourism in particular.

The literature review on the political role of heritage tourism and government's involvement in tourism indicates that governments generally play an important role in the development of tourism. At the same time, "*heritage tourism is, or can be, a tool used not only for economic but also for political means*" (Edgell, 1990: 37). As Kusters (1984: 612) observes, "*if a multi-disciplinary tourism science develops without the necessary ingredient of political analysis, it will remain imperfect and incomplete*".

On the left of the macro box in Figure 3.3, the focus is on 'Government' and its involvement in Red Tourism including its Red Tourism policies and through its intention of conveying political messages at Red Tourism sites. The economic and political reasons behind Red Tourism planning will be examined. The state is of "*crucial importance in understanding the contours of tourism policy...because the state translates values, interests and resources into objectives and policies*" (Davis *et al.* 1993:19). The Chinese government's political intentions regarding patriotism, nationalism and communism indicate how they were used to address Objective 2 'to establish the intentions of the Chinese government for Red Tourism'.

Shaoshan and Zhijiang are used as case studies to illustrate the nature of government involvement in Red Tourism development. They provide a specific context in which to explore the communication of Red Tourism messages and received responses. The character of political messages, and attitudes to patriotism, communism and nationalism, are bound to be influenced by the political process in a one party state. This is linked to Objective 1 and Objective 2 which seek to 'establish the relationship between government and Red Tourism in China' and also 'the intentions of government behind the political messages displayed at Shaoshan and Zhijiang'.

Red Tourism plays a significant political role in conveying political messages. In this research, the assessment of the political messages focuses specifically on their connections with three concepts, 'communism', 'patriotism' and 'nationalism', and how these values are featured at the Red Tourism sites of Shaoshan and Zhijiang. Communism, patriotism and nationalism are three main ideologies contained in the National Red Tourism Development Plans for 2004-2010 and also for 2011-2015.

This study seeks to establish the intentions and relevant government's policies associated with the first National Red Tourism Development Plan 2004-2010 and the second National Red Tourism Development Plan 2011-2015. Chinese Red Tourism underwent a relatively successful development in most respects during the first phase of the National Red Tourism Development Plans for 2004-2010. However, the messages presented at the Red Tourism sites have

undergone a change in emphasis from exclusively communist propaganda in the first planning phase to nationalism in the second planning phase.

In studying the Chinese government's intentions behind Red Tourism in the case study areas, Objective 2 is divided into more detailed sub-objectives in chronological order:

Objective 2.1 To investigate Chinese government political intentions regarding patriotic education throughout Red Tourism sites;

Objective 2.2 To examine the Chinese government's original political intentions behind the first phase of Red Tourism with regard to the promotion of the history of the CCP and consolidation of the CCP's leadership;

Objective 2.3 To explore the Chinese government's additional political intentions behind the second phase of Red Tourism regarding the promotion of the progress made by China since 1949, the re-development of the Mao Memorial Museum, the promotion of national unity and the re-development of the Zhijiang site commemorating the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army.

The government's intentions will be established from the Red Tourism messages on display at the two Red Tourism sites Shaoshan and Zhijiang from the perspective of government officials. Objective 2.1 is concerned with the importance of patriotic education in China and how the Chinese government promotes patriotism throughout Red Tourism. Objective 2.2 explores the history of the CCP and the crucial and heroic contribution of Mao Zedong which together constituted the Chinese government's original political focus during the first phase of Red Tourism. The Chinese government promoted the history of the CCP and the veneration of Mao in order to achieve its intention of consolidating the CCP's leadership. Objective 2.3 explores in depth the change of focus in the second phase of Red Tourism (2011-2015), identifies the progress made by the CCP since 1949 and considers the reasons for the re-development of the Mao Memorial Museum. It also establishes the Chinese government's additional political intentions behind the second phase of Red Tourism a key purpose of which is to promote national unity.

Like most governments anywhere in the world, the Chinese government reconstructs the past through these Red Tourism sites to suit its own purposes.

It gives meaning to the past so that the reconstructed past can be suitable for the present (Wang, 2008). Older narratives are adapted and, in the process, help to define a new relationship with the past. Therefore, the study will also consider how the Chinese government aims to achieve its objectives through Red Tourism messages on display and what the political myths are in its promotion. How can this be reduced to some idea of authenticity and provenance? Rather than focusing on the artefact, intentional display can be the art that makes Chinese revolutionary history real. This is linked to Objective 3, the purpose of which is to explore what messages the Chinese government conveys at the Red Tourism sites Shaoshan and Zhijiang, and how the nature of the Red Tourism messages promoted at Shaoshan and Zhijiang reflect the economic and political situation in contemporary China. These were also used to select more specific government officials and academic researchers for interview and to direct aspects of the fieldwork. The list of interviewees including government officials, academic researchers, and tourists is presented in Chapter 4.

### *3.3.3 Tourists' responses to the government's political intentions for Red Tourism at Shaoshan and Zhijiang*

The right macro box in Figure 3.3 concentrates on tourists who have visited Red Tourism sites. In order to understand the relationship between domestic Chinese tourists and Red Tourism, it is necessary to have an outline of the current tourism situation in China and the motivations of tourists. The Red Tourism sites exist primarily for Chinese domestic tourists who, among other things, will be presented with messages among the exhibits. The box addresses Objective 4 'to investigate the interpretation of messages by tourists, establish and examine tourists' responses to the messages conveyed by the Chinese government at the Red Tourism sites of Shaoshan and Zhijiang'. The following sub-objectives are:

Objective 4.1 To investigate tourists' responses to the Chinese government's intentions behind Red Tourism, especially in respect of patriotic education at the Red Tourism sites of Shaoshan and Zhijiang;

Objective 4.2 To explore tourists' responses towards the Chinese government's original political intentions behind the first phase of Red Tourism, mainly on the



history of the CCP as portrayed at Shaoshan and the promotion of Mao at Shaoshan;

Objective 4.3 To examine tourists' responses to the Chinese government's additional political intentions behind the second phase of Red Tourism focusing on the progress made by the CCP since 1949, the historical facts on the Kuomintang, and the promotion of national unity at the Zhijiang site.

Objective 4 was developed based on the framework of Objective 2 'to establish the intentions of the Chinese government for Red Tourism' and Objective 3 'to analyse the messages that the Chinese government conveys at the Red Tourism sites of Shaoshan and Zhijiang'. The case studies of Shaoshan and Zhijiang were used here to examine the reasons why the tourists chose to visit Shaoshan and Zhijiang, and most importantly, their feelings about the Red Tourism messages conveyed at Shaoshan and Zhijiang. Some of the Red Tourism messages may already be known or imagined prior to their visit to Shaoshan and Zhijiang. What are the tourists' views on the value of Shaoshan and Zhijiang? What are the tourists' feelings about the Red Tourism messages following their visit? Do visitors sometimes change their views after their visit? Do visitors' feelings about the Red Tourism messages differ from the government's perceived purpose in displaying them at the Red Tourism sites of Shaoshan and Zhijiang?

These feelings and experiences are linked to Objective 4, namely the establishment of tourists' responses to the Red Tourism messages by the Chinese government. This research pays special attention to government intentions behind the Red Tourism sites of Shaoshan and Zhijiang, and domestic tourists' responses to the political messages.

### **3.4 Application of the conceptual framework**

Influenced by the discussions in earlier sections, the conceptual framework is applied to this study in various ways. Firstly, it directs the study in relation to the research aim and objectives, and it influences the type of data to be collected and analysed. Secondly, it assists in the selection of methodological approaches in terms of collecting appropriate information concerning the Chinese government's intentions behind Red Tourism and tourists' responses

to the political messages at the Red Tourism sites at Shaoshan and Zhijiang. Valuable information obtained from qualitative methods helps in the creation of a comprehensive picture of the evolution of Red Tourism in the booming economy and concomitant political change in contemporary China. The reasons for the choice of methodology are explained in Chapter 4. Thirdly, following this structured, yet interactive and flexible framework, the interview questions were constructed and will be examined in the next chapter. The interview questions reflect the detailed elements of each theme, and each question is also cross-checked, referenced and compared to avoid unnecessary duplication. Fourthly, it provides guidance for data analysis. The details of this will be explained in Chapter 4. With the use of this conceptual framework, broad ideas are developed on which to anchor categorisation of the data which will be interpreted, analysed and subsequently reported in the results chapters. Fifthly, the title of each results chapter (Chapter 5, 6 and 7) is also drawn from the three macro boxes of the theoretical framework. As a result, the three results chapters are developed to elucidate critical analysis. These include the context of the development of Red Tourism (Chapter 5), the Chinese government's political intentions behind Red Tourism (Chapter 6), and tourists' responses to the government's political intentions for Red Tourism at Shaoshan and Zhijiang (Chapter 7). Finally, in the conclusion chapter (Chapter Eight), the framework helps with understanding the development of Red Tourism in the economic and political context of contemporary Chinese society through a comparison of the government's political intentions behind Red Tourism with tourists' responses towards them.

### **3.5 Conclusion**

Reflecting on her conceptual thinking throughout the research enabled the researcher to ensure that sight of the research objectives was not lost. Focus was maintained through definition and articulation of research boundaries, using the frameworks as a visual representation of thinking.

The third conceptual framework indicates the relationships between the government's intentions and tourists' responses to them in addressing the study objectives. Thus, the conceptual framework introduced "*explicitness with research processes*" (Leshem and Trafford, 2007: 2011). The conceptual

framework reflects the complexity of studying Red Tourism in the context of the rapid economic and political development of contemporary China. It indicates the limitations of the study topic, and addresses the study objectives in relation to the evolution of the two phases of Red Tourism in chronological order. It helps to build a bridge between the researcher's thinking about government and tourists in the context of the development of Red Tourism and it binds the study together as a more unified whole. The conceptual framework was effectively employed as a tool. The next chapter on 'Methodology' discusses the research design processes, including the research philosophy, research methodology and data collection, and also the analytical methods adopted in this study. It considers how the research objectives were operationalised.

## **Chapter 4: Methodology**

## 4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the research philosophy, methodology, data collection and methods of analysis employed during the study. It also reports on the practical limitations of the research. Based on an interpretivist paradigm, this research can be broadly categorised as a qualitative social science study, with a focus on politics, language and people, in particular. The study applies a case study methodology and this chapter explains the multiple data sources that were used: semi-structured interviews; non-participant observation; and documentary analysis. These sources were used to explore the particular political messages at the Red Tourism sites of Shaoshan and Zhijiang on the basis of the establishment of the intention of Chinese government and Chinese tourists' responses to these Red Tourism messages.

The chapter begins with a discussion of the philosophical approach - interpretivism, in line with the research goal of deepening understanding. It then explains the research design and the case study methodology adopted in this study. A qualitative approach is suitable for this study as it can help to provide abundant information in a flexible way about the Chinese government's intentions behind Red Tourism and then elicit sufficient tourists' responses to the political messages at the two Red Tourism sites. In addition, an analysis is included of semi-structured interviews, participant observation and document information. Research limitations encountered during the fieldwork are also explained.

## 4.2 Research approach

The purpose of identifying the research approach is "*to frame the study within the philosophical and theoretical perspectives*" (Creswell, 1998:73). The research approach is often based upon the researcher's own views of the social world and how it is interpreted. Gill and Johnson (2002:168) argue that "*the research approach must be determined in order to explain the nature of human action as viewed by the researcher, which "has direct methodological implications"*". Firstly, this section details the philosophical approach of the research and, secondly, it explains the theoretical approach adopted in this study.

#### 4.2.1 Philosophical approach

There is a need “to explore how knowers’ values and politics impact upon the ways in which they undertake research and create knowledge” (Phillimore & Goodson, 2004: 35). Therefore, the ontology, epistemology and methodology guide this study in order to establish a basis of ‘thinking’ for the research. These three components make up the research inquiry paradigm, and the methodological choices are a product of the researcher’s own views of reality.

This study adopts an interpretivist approach (often aligned to the epistemological stance of constructivism - Guba & Lincoln, 1999), which is “distinguished by an interest in understanding the world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live it” (Locke, 2001:8). This paradigm sits with the study's intention of developing an understanding of the political messages interpreted at Red Tourism sites. The study highlights what the Chinese government does in practice and how the tourists’ respond, the way in which tourists view the government political intentions, and how they interpret Red Tourism messages behind Chinese government political intentions. The government’s political intentions are examined through the experiences and perspectives of tourists visiting the Red Tourism sites. Research within the social sciences can often benefit from an interpretivist standpoint (Bryman, 2001). It has been recognised that interpretivism can be of use particularly when analysing experiences and perspectives. Ontologically, interpretivism casts a critical eye on 'factual' information obtained from surveys on a particular societal issue. Arguably, such information cannot be viewed in isolation from the prevailing culture. It would be wrong to think of social science as totally objective. Any conclusions drawn from such a process are bound to be coloured by material or moral issues (Schaffer, 2016). As such a subjective ontology is acknowledged.

It is important to stress that interpretivists do not aspire to absolute research objectivity. Their aim is to “illuminate how communally-held views and their relationship with ruling elites affect society and its study” (Hawkesworth, 2014: 29–41; Marcus and Fischer, 1999:17–44). The findings of this study were intended to arise from the discourse between the researcher and research

issues; the researcher's interpretation of Red Tourism messages; and an understanding of the views of other people.

Methodologically, the study is intended to provide an insight into a shared social reality (Schutz, 1954). As Taylor explains, "*The realities here are practices; and these cannot be identified in abstraction from the language we use to describe them, or invoke them, or carry them out*" (1971:24). In other words, the goal of the findings of this research and the analytical realities from the findings is elucidation through an understanding or interpretation of the Red Tourism messages, not reconstruction by the researcher. As Myers (2008:38) remarks:

*"interpretive researchers assume that access to reality (given or socially constructed) is only through social constructions such as language, consciousness, shared meanings, and instruments".*

It is recognised that the flexibility of the interpretivist paradigm facilitates the use of multiple methods and techniques for data collection and analysis. The research employs a case study approach based on the Red Tourism sites at Shaoshan and Zhijiang. It critically examines Red Tourism messages at the two sites through detailed, in-depth data collection involving observations, semi-structured interviews, documents and audiovisual materials. It also explores the political intentions behind them and the corresponding tourists' responses to the messages. Potential insights can be gained about political messages from the responses to questions presented to the government officials and tourists at the chosen Red Tourism sites and also from exploring the complex interactions related to the case study among government, Red Tourism site and tourists, and their wider context. It is important to adopt a range of research methods due to the dual focus of the study which analyses different themes during the two phases of Red Tourism, whilst comparing two case studies. Trow (1957:33) justified the use of this approach, arguing that "*different kinds of information about man and society are gathered most fully and economically in different ways, and the problem under investigation properly dictates the methods of investigation*".

Documentary analysis and non-participant observation were also used to support or challenge some of the interpretations, contributing to a deeper understanding of the issue under research. The research approach assumed

allowed the researcher to supplement empirical data with personal interpretations and knowledge-based views of the situation.

#### *4.2.2 Theoretical approach*

The importance of political ideology is crucial to an understanding of Red Tourism in China. It would seem appropriate, therefore, that the research assumed a critical approach. It must be emphasised that this is quite distinct from 'critical theory'. Indeed, whilst critical theory often aims to effect social change, a critical approach is simply implied here to refer to the researcher's consideration of the data presented as subjective, reflective of individual opinions and not without question in terms of the broader, social situation under study, Chinese Red Tourism. The researcher, in line with interpretivism, acknowledges the subjectivity involved in respondent views but seeks to assume an objective position in relation to the collection and analysis of the data.

The researcher's conceptual thinking was outlined in Chapter 3, her subjective thoughts may be reconciled with interpretivism if the role of the researcher in this study is conceived of as being distinct from the researched, i.e. the government and tourists. Her role is to set the boundaries of the study and to interpret or 'make sense of' the data collected, through the identification of patterns or themes (adopting a thematic analysis technique).

### **4.3 Research design**

The design of the research is based on the research approach, and on what the researcher considers to be the most appropriate way of operationalising the aims and objectives of the study (Bell, 2005). In order to achieve this, and in line with methodological pluralism, several strategies were employed. The research design is divided into the following sections: inductive approach; qualitative research; critical ethnography and case study approach.

#### *4.3.1 Inductive approach*

This study adopts an inductive approach. Generally, inductive research is directed by what the researcher finds in the field, so that final theoretical claims are based firmly on the data the researcher actually collects. The inductive



approach involves starting with a specific example and generating a theory. Firstly, it commences with considering the Red Tourism theory about the topic of interest (Chapter 2). Then it narrows that down into more specific thinking or tentative propositions about Red Tourism messages presented at Red Tourism sites alongside Chinese government intentions and Chinese tourist responses toward them. Finally, specific data including observations, interviews and documents are collected to explore the research topic under investigation.

It should be highlighted that the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 3 (Figure 3-3) was developed after a review of thematic literature. That framework was intended to present the researcher's thinking visually, to articulate the boundaries of the research and to provide a loose guide to assist data collection and analysis. It was not intended to be employed as a prescriptive tool; it allowed for the exploration of experiences in the own words, and even the own reality, of government and tourists.

#### 4.3.2 Qualitative research

The differences between qualitative and quantitative research are not only in the methods used, but raised questions of an ontological and epistemological nature (Table 4-1).

**Table 4-1 Features of Qualitative and Quantitative Research**

<b>Qualitative Research</b>	<b>Quantitative Research</b>
The aim of qualitative research is a complete, detailed description	In quantitative research we classify features, count them, and construct statistical models in an attempt to explain what is observed
Recommended during earlier phases of research projects.	Recommended during the latter phases of research projects.
Researcher may only know roughly in advance what he/she is looking for.	Researcher knows clearly in advance what he/she is looking for.
The design emerges as the study unfolds.	All areas of the study are carefully designed before data is collected.
Research is the data gathering	Researcher uses tools, such as

instrument.	questionnaires or equipment, to collect numerical data.
Data is the form of words, pictures or objects.	Data is in the form of numbers and statistics.
Qualitative data is more 'rich', time consuming, and less capable of generalisation.	Quantitative data is more efficient, able to be used to test hypotheses, but may miss contextual detail.
Researcher tends to become subjectively immersed in the subject matter.	Researcher tends to remain objectively separate from the subjective matter.

*“Quantitative methods are generally concerned with counting and measuring parameters of societal factors, while qualitative methods are more concerned with producing discursive descriptions and exploring social actors’ meanings and interpretations”* (Blaikie, 2000:232). Quantitative methods can be construed as a research strategy that depends on an ongoing numerical evaluation of data gathered. Deduction is then used to derive a theory from the data followed by a series of tests on the evolving theory using established techniques of natural science. Positivism plays an important role in this type of process; it is taken for granted that social reality is an objective fact independent of the observer (Bryman, 2004). Quantitative methods usually involve experiments, written “objective” testing, sampling and statistics (Cook and Reichardt, 1979).

In contrast to this approach, Creswell (2003) notes that qualitative methods are intrinsically interpretative. Qualitative research usually involves words when gathering and processing data. Interpretation is an iterative process in which the processed data leads to a revised hypothesis which suggests further worthwhile research and so on and so forth (Creswell, 2003). As Belsky (2004:273) observes:

*“Qualitative research has been instrumental in uncovering and elucidating the political dimensions of tourism. Among the many tools in the qualitative research toolbox,...in-depth interviewing can help to develop a holistic perspective on the context and political dynamics of politics.”*

Qualitative methodology and its well-established practical measures are particularly suitable for tourism research as it often avoids a value-free epistemology. It is notable that qualitative methods are recognized to be well-suited for conducting research in specific contexts, especially those with a political dimension (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). Indeed, Denzin and Lincoln (2005:3) define the key, enduring features of qualitative research as contextuality, interpretation and subjectivity:

*“It [qualitative research] consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them”.*

Qualitative research strategies are based on an interpretivist approach to the social world. Qualitative methods seem to be ideal for this study because it focuses on issues of politics, beliefs, values and power, and these are too complex and multi-dimensional to be tackled quantitatively by questionnaires and closed-ended response options.

This research employs a qualitative methodology. This is recognized to be particularly appropriate to the research study, offering a number of advantages.

Firstly, qualitative research is considered to be ideal for the purpose of gaining valuable insights into the behaviour of actors in a specific cultural context (McQueen and Knussen, 2002). This study describes the context of Red Tourism and the socio-economic and political development of contemporary China partly to gain an understanding of how and why the Chinese government promotes Red Tourism (see research objectives given in Chapter 1 and developed further in Chapter 3).

Secondly, qualitative research allows one to gather emerging data, a significant advantage when the main purpose is to construct hypotheses from the data rather than to validate a previously determined idea against the data (Creswell, 2003). Thirdly, qualitative approaches are extremely well-suited to the study of new topics, or existing topics not previously studied in a particular sample, or where the researcher has not yet established the relevant variables (Creswell,

2003; Morse, 1991). This fits well with a topic like Chinese Red Tourism where intentions and responses have been under-explored.

Mason (2002) considers that qualitative research is generally “interpretivist” in nature since it is interested in how society is interpreted, comprehended and created and how it affects its members. Its foundation is the generation of data, a process which is capable of adapting to the social context in which data is created. It aims to produce fuller understanding on the basis of rich, contextual, and detailed data.

This methodology accommodates variance in respondents' answers as a result of their own personal outlooks and their position(s) in society (Flick, 1998). It was recognized that the present study mainly deals with the Chinese government's intentions which are sometimes obtuse and tourists' responses toward the government's intentions behind Red Tourism, which vary considerably. The topic of Red Tourism is not new, but the government's political intentions behind Red Tourism and tourists' responses to them have never been addressed within a selected sample. Nor are there existing theories relating to the particular sample or group under study - Chinese Red Tourists.

So, a qualitative research approach is more appropriate for this study. In this study, the researcher wanted to obtain a profound and authentic understanding of the tourists' thoughts and feelings on the messages displayed at the actual sites. A more numerical approach would not have facilitated this. In this study, the key data collected through semi-structured interviews was supplemented by data gathered through non-participant observation and documentary analysis. These methods of data collection sat within a case study approach.

#### *4.3.3 Case study approach*

Two case studies are used in this research. One is Red Tourism at Shaoshan which was Mao Zedong's birthplace. The second is Red Tourism at Zhijiang which was the original choice of Chiang Kai-shek for the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army.

Shaoshan plays a significant role as one of the three top educational sites promoting Chinese ideology in communism and belief in the Communist Party which considered itself to be the only power that can safeguard China, lead the

Chinese people and develop China. It is a unique case in the history of Red Tourism in China because it was Chairman Mao's birthplace and an important base during the Chinese Communist Revolution. In fact, it is considered the most important site in China for Red Tourism. Shaoshan was designated in 2004 by central government as one of '100 Classic Red Tourism Destinations', and it was nominated in 2006 by the central government as one of the 10 best red tourism sites. On 6<sup>th</sup> September 2011, Shaoshan was listed by the state as a top Tourism Site (personal communication with government official, 2014).

The second case study Zhijiang became an authorized 'patriotic education site' in 2005 and afterwards it was officially designated in 2011 by central government as a second phase Red Tourism site because of the monument commemorating the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army. It is also a cultural exchange site with Taiwan (personal communication with government official, 2014).

Shaoshan and Zhijiang are employed specifically as two case studies in this research, reflecting the two phases of Red Tourism under examination. Shaoshan is one of the first phase Red Tourism sites. Messages on communism and the Communist Party are mainly presented in Shaoshan. Zhijiang is one of the second phase Red Tourism sites and as such messages are mainly presented on nationalism and patriotism.

Apart from the political importance of these two sites they are in the home province of researcher and Shaoshan was also the case study used in researcher's master's dissertation from which her thesis was developed. The familiarity and accessibility of the sites to the researcher mean that a high level of access was enjoyed providing the opportunity for multiple visits for fieldwork.

A case study approach was adopted based on the two Red Tourism sites at Shaoshan and Zhijiang in Hunan province, China. The researcher visited the two sites in person and interviewed tourists shortly after their exposure to the messages portrayed in the exhibits. 66 visitors were interviewed and also government officials, while newspapers and official documents provided additional valuable material. This was in accord with the case study requirements outlined by Yin (1989), Robson (2002) and Hartley (1994). A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon

within its real context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 1989). It is a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence (Robson, 2002). A detailed investigation is conducted involving one or more organizations, groups within organizations, or individuals – with a view to providing analysis of the context & processes involved in the phenomenon of interest (Hartley, 1994).

Stake (2005) contends that case study research is simply a matter of what the researcher decides to study rather than an actual methodology. However, others consider it to be a methodology, a type of qualitative research design, or comprehensive research strategy (Creswell, 2007; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Yin, 2003). There may be some truth in both views. The case study approach was selected as the most appropriate for this research. This is because of the potential insights that can be gained about political messages when questioning government officials and tourists at the chosen Red Tourism site and also from exploring the complex interactions related to the case study between government, and Red Tourism site visitors, and their wider context. More particularly, the study will consider in some detail the contextual reasons why the Chinese government has sought to use Red Tourism in order to convey political messages to tourists, how the government at different levels seeks to do this, and how the tourists interpret and respond to the messages. The case study approach also allows the researcher to utilise many sources and approaches for the specific case study context. This is of considerable value in coming to terms with Red Tourism planning, with regard to the strategic and logistical components of government involvement. The case study attempts to analyse the formulation of political messages. It is important for the case study to be appropriate for the research objectives and to have a wider relevance (Denscombe, 2003). The research considers the broader contexts affecting Red Tourism messages at Shaoshan and Zhijiang and explores the wider research themes concerned with political messages presented at Shaoshan and Zhijiang, including the relevant involvement of government, and tourists' responses.

Cresswell(2007) highlights five points which researchers should consider when they conduct a case study. Each of these points is explained in turn in relation

to this study. Firstly, researchers should determine if a case approach is appropriate to the research question (Creswell, 2007). According to Yin (2003:9), a case study has a distinct advantage in situations when *“a ‘how’ or ‘why’ question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no control”*. Case studies are used *“where no single perspective can provide a full account or explanation of the research issues, and where understanding needs to be holistic, comprehensive and contextualised”* (Lewis, 2003:52).

Secondly, researchers need to identify their case or cases (Creswell, 2007). They should consider what types of case study are most promising and likely to be productive. When they choose which case or cases to study, a range of possibilities is available for purposeful sampling. Researchers also need to clearly identify the type of sampling strategy for each case study and a rationale for it. This includes decisions about *“who or what should be sampled, what form the sampling will take, and how many people or sites need to be sampled”* (Creswell, 2007:125). Purposeful sampling should also be applied to the sampling of information used within the case (Creswell, 2007).

In this study, Red Tourism was analysed during the development of its two phases. Therefore, a collective case study approach was chosen to examine two Red Tourism sites. Shaoshan and Zhijiang were chosen as they are exemplars of Phase 1 and Phase 2 Chinese Red Tourism respectively. Shaoshan was Mao Zedong’s birthplace and the government’s intentions behind Red Tourism there are concerned with the promotion of the history of the CCP and Mao. Zhijiang was the original choice of Chiang Kai-shek for the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army and the government’s intention behind Red Tourism there is the promotion of national unity. The two case study areas provide the material required to analyse the Chinese government’s intentions in conveying political messages at the two sites and to establish tourists’ responses to the messages at Shaoshan and Zhijiang.

Thirdly, data gathering for case study research utilises as many sources of information as possible (Creswell, 2007). According to Yin (2003), this is a significant advantage of this type of study. He highlights the potential strengths and weaknesses of six types of information that can be collected: documents,

archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observations, and physical artefact, as shown in Table 4-2. In this study, the six aforementioned information types were collected. This is discussed in more detail in the following section on data collection.

**Table 4-2 Six sources of evidence: potential strengths and weaknesses**

<b>Sources of Evidence</b>	<b>Strengths</b>	<b>Weaknesses</b>
Documentation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stable—can be reviewed repeatedly</li> <li>• Unobtrusive—not created as a result of the case study</li> <li>• Exact — contains exact names, references, and details of an event</li> <li>• Broad coverage — long time-span, many events, and many settings</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Retrievability— can be low</li> <li>• Biases selectivity, if collection is incomplete</li> <li>• Reporting bias — reflects (unknown) bias of author</li> <li>• Access— may be deliberately blocked</li> </ul>
Archival records	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• [same as above for documentation]</li> <li>• Precise and quantitative</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• [same as above for documentation]</li> <li>• Accessibility due to privacy reasons</li> </ul>
Interviews	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Targeted- focuses directly on case study topic</li> <li>• Insightful — provides perceived causal inferences</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bias due to poorly constructed questions</li> <li>• Response bias</li> <li>• Inaccuracies due to poor recall</li> <li>• Reflexivity—interviewee gives what interviewer wants to hear</li> </ul>
Direct observations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reality— covers events in real time</li> <li>• Contextual — covers context of event</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Time- consuming</li> <li>• Selectivity — unless broad coverage</li> <li>• Reflexivity — event may proceed differently because it is being observed</li> <li>• Cost — hours needed by human observers</li> </ul>
Participant observation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• [same as above for observations]</li> <li>• Insightful into interpersonal behaviour and motives</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• [same as above for observations]</li> <li>• Bias due to investigator’s manipulation of events</li> </ul>
Physical artifacts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Insightful into cultural features</li> <li>• Insightful into technical operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Selectivity</li> <li>• Availability</li> </ul>

(Source: adapted from Yin, 2003: 86)



Fourthly, it is viable to employ holistic analysis throughout a case study or to examine one particular set of data (Yin, 2003). Researchers may opt to classify issues that have arisen and then seek out common themes which overarch them (Yin, 2003). In a multi-case study, it is typical to provide a within-case analysis, which describes the minutiae and themes within individual cases. The researcher would probably continue with a comparison of the themes in the different cases, including assertions or interpretations of the meaning of the cases (Creswell, 2007). The researcher generally establishes the meaning of the case and how it was arrived at (Creswell, 2007).

This study provides both within-case and cross-case analyses in relation to the two case study areas. However, the purpose of selecting two case study areas was not to compare and contrast them, but to examine the different foci in the two sites of the government's intentions behind Red Tourism messages and tourists' responses to them in China's socio-economic and political context. By doing so, the study triangulates the findings in the two areas. The three results chapters report the findings and the significance of the case study.

A case study approach is also beneficial for the process of data collection in this study. A large and wide-ranging mass of data is essential for case studies, using as many sources of information as possible (Yin, 2003).

#### **4.4 Research methods of data collection**

Bell (2005) stresses that there are no right or wrong methods for collecting data; the aim is to select methods which are most appropriate to the study. The methods were selected as the most appropriate tools for achieving the study aim and objectives. Bell (2005) also emphasises the importance of financial and time constraints, and highlights the importance of using data collection methods which are feasible and viable for the researcher. Thus, the methods selected were those which were feasible and could be viably applied within the timeframe and financial constraints of the researcher. Previous sections of the chapter have discussed the adoption of a methodological pluralist approach, which is also applicable to selecting methods of data collection. The following sections explain and justify the selected research methods, including: semi-structured interviews, observation techniques and document collection.

#### 4.4.1 *Semi-structured interviews*

In this research, semi-structured interviews were used to collect primary data. This type of interview was considered suitable as the information likely to be obtained from each subject is expected to vary considerably (Veal, 1997). Semi-structured and unstructured interviews are on a continuum and aim at 'discovery' about complex issues rather than 'checking' (Denscombe, 2003:167). Semi-structured interview is also distinguished from structured interviews, which strongly influence how the subjects respond (Denscombe, 2003). Semi-structured interview has more advantages than structured and unstructured interviews because it is relatively informal, open to the input and direction of both the researcher and the research subject, and are partially structured through the use of an interview checklist or schedule. It enables a shift of focus as the conversation unfolds to enable follow-up questions to be asked or to accommodate unexpected material (Hannam, 2010). Semi-structured questions are especially appropriate when the interviewer wishes to obtain not just an account of a set of opinions but also the reasons when they are held (Saunders *et al*, 1997).

- *Design of the interview questions*

After the construction of the conceptual framework, the researcher worked out an interview guide in advance based on her own personal experience and her previous work in China (see appendix 1). This comprises a list of questions on specific topics to be covered, but the interviewees have the freedom to answer as they see fit (Bryman, 2008). A complex, detailed understanding of the issue requires the drawing up of a considerable number of interview questions which can address the research objectives. The researcher created the interview schedule based on her previous understanding of the subject area due to her MSc dissertation on 'Politics, Red Tourism and tourism governance in Mao's birthplace, China'. This study tests the respondents on whether they agreed with what the researcher thought and what the literature review said. An exploratory study is a valuable means of finding out "*what is happening; to seek new insights; to ask questions and to assess phenomena in a new light*" (Robson, 2002:59). It is particularly useful if the understanding of a response needs to be clarified. Therefore, the interview questions were designed for

government officials and tourists with a reasonably good knowledge of the issues. The questions were also based on the third version of the conceptual framework and interview schedules for officials and tourists were developed in consultation with the researcher's supervisors.

In advance of the interview, a list of theme and related questions were designed about the relationships between government and Red Tourism, government intentions, messages presented at Red Tourism sites with tourists' responses, and an assessment of experiences. There are four main themes designed for the study:

Theme 1. Background questions for officials and tourists;

Theme 2. Relationships between government and Red Tourism, and government intentions;

Theme 3. Messages presented at Red Tourism sites and tourists' responses toward (i) communism and the CCP, and (ii) national pride and patriotism;

Theme 4. Assessment of experiences.

These themes enabled were in line with the researcher's conceptual thinking and the version of the conceptual framework presented in Figure 3.3. (Chapter 3). In total, 62 questions were devised covering numerous elements of the broad issues in the conceptual framework and specific ones related to the explicit case study sites. The interview questions were designed for the different groups of respondents (representatives of government, academics (aligned to the state), and domestic Red Tourists). Using semi-structured interviews meant that flexibility was possible in the interview situations. For example, some questions were amalgamated or 'secondary' questions (often linked to background, for example) were avoided if interviewees were short of time. The questions were initially developed in English and translated into the native language of the researcher and interviewees, Chinese.

Some interview questions were targeted at officials and tourists in line with the sample of respondents (see Appendix 2). There were 39 questions for officials and 44 questions for tourists. Among 62 interview questions, the questions on patriotism were used at both sites. 39 questions were for the Shaoshan site and 36 questions for the Zhijiang site. The roughly balanced number of questions between officials and tourists, for Shaoshan site and Zhijiang site was intended

to at least partly guarantee that sufficient information would be collected from all interviewees, irrespective of the site.

Some questions related to both sites but during the interview process it became clear that some tourist interviewees only attended one site, so those questions were deemed inappropriate and there was a need for the researcher to adopt a flexible approach.

- *Sample of interview respondents*

Whatever the research question, an understanding of techniques for selecting samples is likely to be very important (Saunders *et al*, 2009). In this research, a wide range of tourism-related government officials, academic tourism experts and tourists were chosen for the interviews. The interviewee samples were carefully selected in order to ensure a reasonably representative cohort of each category. “A sample is said to be representative of a population if studying it leads to conclusions that are approximately the same as those that one would reach by studying the entire population” (Krippendorff, 2004:111). Sampling theory, if effective, should allow the researcher to extrapolate his/her findings from the small selected group to the general population. In qualitative research it is unlikely that the population size can be known by the researcher with precision or certainty, and the sample size will generally be relatively small (Denscombe, 1998:26-27). However, qualitative research offers the possibility of comprehending issues in relation to the full complexity of a given situation.

In this research, 66 interviews were conducted, including 11 interviews with tourism-related government officials, 5 academic tourism experts and 50 interviews with domestic Red Tourists. Of the domestic tourists, 28 interviewed on site at Shaoshan and 22 were interviewed on site at Zhijiang. Since this is a qualitative research study, purposeful sampling of key officials was selected to obtain rich information on the topic being studied.

In terms of the institutional arrangements for Red Tourism, in April 2005 the National Red Tourism Coordination Executive Team (NRTCET) was formed and its members included senior officials from 11 central government departments and three CCP central departments (Li and Hu, 2008). The

members were meant to be accountable for supporting Red Tourism developments using the specific resources related to their government institutions. For instance, the member representing the Ministry of Finance was responsible for the provision of a special budget to be allocated to support Red Tourism. Members representing the Ministry of Railways and National Administration of Civil Aviation were charged with ensuring that extra transportation would be provided for visitors to Red Tourism sites. The NRTCET also had a representative from the CCP Propaganda Department to ensure that Red Tourism would be developed on the right political track under the nation-state's ideological guidance (Li and Hu, 2008).

The tourism-related government interviewees and tourists for this research were:

- \* Officials of the Hunan Provincial Administrations, including Hunan Provincial Tourism Administration, the Propaganda Department of Hunan CCP's Provincial Committee and the Office of the History of the Communist Party of Hunan CCP's Provincial Committee;
- \* Officials of the Shaoshan Local Administrations, including Shaoshan Tourism Administration, Shaoshan Management Administration and Mao's Memorial Museum;
- \* Officials of the Zhijiang Local Administrations, including Zhijiang Tourism Administration, the site of the monument commemorating the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army, Zhijiang Government official and Zhijiang Peace culture research centre;
- \* Academic researchers of the Red Tourism Research Centre of Xiangtan University, Tourism Centre of Central South University of Forestry and Technology and Zhijiang research centre on peace culture;
- \* Domestic Tourists. This was a heterogeneous group in terms of age, gender, education level, social status, first-time visitors and repeat visitors.

Purposive sampling is "*based on the assumption that one wants to discover, understand, gain insight and therefore select a sample from which the most can be learned*" (Merriam, 1998:61). Patton (1990) is adamant that purposeful sampling relies heavily on the researcher choosing cases which can provide

much detail relevant to his principal objective in conducting the research. In this study, purposeful sampling was adopted in order to see whether the tourists agreed with the messages on display as interpreted by the government officials.

Using publicly available online information, I obtained the telephone numbers of eleven government officials responsible for Red Tourism development in Hunan Province. I was granted an interview by all of them and conducted the interviews in their office at their convenience. The interviews with the officials lasted two hours on average.

Permissions were requested to interview visitors at both Shaoshan and Zhijiang red tourist sites, following on from the interviews with government officials at each site. Visitors were approached and the purpose of the research and the interview was introduced, including the aims of the research. The tourists were reassured that their responses would be anonymised and they were explicitly asked if they were agreeable to be interviewed in line with research ethics codes. Interviews were conducted on-site and lasted approximately 30 minutes each. Tourists were identified for interview based on opportunities to speak with them, for example when they were queuing or resting. The researcher adopted a purposive approach to sampling, mindful of a desire to interview a mixture of age ranges and gender.

- *Practical issues in undertaking the interviews*

Conducting qualitative research is taxing, especially for researchers engaged in studies that require extensive interviewing. The challenges in qualitative interviewing often focus on the mechanics of conducting the interview. During the interview process for this study, the researcher adopted flexibility when needed (for example, in rephrasing questions where interviewee comprehension was limited). It should be emphasised that the interviews were conducted using the native language of the interviewees and the researcher.

Some difficulties relating to interactions with interviewees were overcome by using existing and developing new contacts, and paying due attention to minimize the power relationships that often exist between a researcher and participants in a study of this nature; for example, providing a clear account of purpose and type of access required, collaborating directly with participants by giving them sight of the interviewee questions. In addition, this detail can only be established by talking directly with people, going to their home or places of work, and allowing them to tell their narratives unencumbered by what may be expected of them from previous literature on the subject.

In this study, face-to-face interview and remote interview methods were adopted to acquire information on Red Tourism and government intentions in Shaoshan and Zhijiang. Most of the interviews were conducted by recording with respondents' permission. However, on occasions some officials refused to be interviewed using a recorder in this way. Therefore, note-taking was used in order to carry out the interviews. As the interviews developed, the interview questions were sometimes adjusted in order to obtain information with most relevance to the study aim and objectives and to keep the interviews focused.

As part of the fieldwork for this study, semi-structured interviews helped the researcher to obtain insights into interviewees' experiences, opinions, aspirations and feelings. This was a flexible and adaptable way of finding things out in relation to the present research. It also gave the researcher opportunities to seek clarification and elaboration on the answers given (May, 2001). Literature on research methods proved to be a useful tool to guide the practice of the researcher. In particular, the researcher found solace in advice that the interviewer may be flexible and modify the original question order, and allow interviewees to develop ideas, elaborate on points of interest and, speak more broadly on the topics brought up by the researcher (Denscombe, 2003). Thus, the interviewees in this study were encouraged to use their own words, to develop their own thoughts and to speak their mind.

Potential key interviewees were approached and many of the interviews were arranged before the field-work began. However, the data collection process was open to new possibilities as the interviews were being conducted; this allowed for new key actors to be identified through a snowballing process, for example.

Moreover, the field-work was conducted on two separate occasions; the first time in the summer of 2013; and once more in the summer of 2014, with the aim of supplementing the information already gathered. The importance of having two periods of data collection emerged during the writing-up process.

The main technical considerations which rose involved the devices used for recording and transcribing which had to be procured and set up prior to interview.

There were also some difficulties experienced during data collection due to the politically sensitive nature of the topic in China. Ritchie (1984) notes that there are substantial methodological problems when conducting political and administrative studies because of difficulties in obtaining appropriate data. Problems have arisen because of the multiplicity of potential frameworks for analysis and the implicitly political characteristics of the results of the research process (Hall, 1994). Difficulties may arise through the unwillingness of government and significant individuals within the policy-making process to be scrutinised and therefore to be held responsible for the decisions that they have made. Sometimes government and important persons conceal the nature of politics in tourism development and management on purpose and avoid talking about it due to political sensitivity. Therefore, the lack of a clearly articulated or agreed upon methodological or philosophical approach to politics *per se*, let alone the politics of tourism, may present an intellectual and perceptual minefield for the researcher. This is notable; particularly as, in the study of politics, the value position of the researcher will have an enormous bearing on the results of any research (Hall, 1994). Indeed, problems of "*lack of intellectual co-ordination and insufficient cross-fertilization of ideas among researchers; an inadequacy of research methodologies and techniques; and a lack of any generally agreed concepts and codes in the field*" (Burton, 1982: 323-324) have made tourism policy research relatively poor.

During the fieldwork Shaoshan, birth-place of Mao Zhedong, the founding father of the PRC, appeared to be a more politically sensitive site in comparison to a general tourism site. This was also true to a lesser extent of Zhijiang, the original choice of Chiang Kai-shek for the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army, because of the politically charged and changing relationship between the



CCP and Kuomintang. In Shaoshan, for instance, formal interviews and reports are not allowed unless permission is granted by the central state organisation. It is also worth noting that some government documents relevant to Shaoshan are not available to the general public. The difficult situation of gaining access resonates with the comments of Buchanan *et al.* (1988: 53-4):

*“Fieldwork is permeated with the conflict between what is theoretically desirable on the one hand and what is practically possible on the other. It is desirable to ensure representativeness in the sample, uniformity of interview procedures, adequate data collection across the range of topics to be explored, and so on. But the members of organisations block access to information, constrain the time allowed for interviews, ... go on holiday, and join other organisations in the middle of your unfinished study. In the conflict between the desirable and the possible, the possible always win”.*

The approach for determining ethicality was based on the principle of doing no harm and of considering ‘just tourism’ (Hultsman, 1995).

#### *4.4.2 Non-participant observation*

In this study, the researcher went to the Red Tourism sites at Shaoshan and Zhijiang on a number of occasions as a non-participant observer. She simply observed the activities of Red Tourists without actively taking part in them and her presence on site at both Shaoshan and Zhijiang was overt - she had sought and been granted permission to be on site as a researcher. Adler and Adler (1994:378) remark that, *“observation...consists of gathering impressions of the surrounding world through all relevant human faculties”.*

It proved useful to visit the case study sites in person in order to have a better understanding of tourists’ responses. It was also useful in that it enabled the researcher to take photographs of some of the exhibits at both sites to record the interpretation that existed on site. Permission was sought and obtained in relation to this activity, due to the research purposes of the photography. Taking photographs on the spot for subsequent further consideration can help enrich the data obtained during fieldwork. In addition, it can enhance the quality of data interpretation no matter how the data was gathered (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2011). The data from the non-participant observation is complemented with data from the individual interviews, and this helps the researcher to critically analyse the government’s political intentions behind the Red Tourism messages at Shaoshan and Zhijiang and tourists’ responses toward them in practice.

#### *4.4.3 Documentary data collection*

Besides in-depth interviewing, data was also collected from government documents, newspapers, official websites and academic research papers. Most organisations collect and store a variety of data to support their operations or record their achievements: for example, the leader's speech record, annual scheme of work, annual work report, official document, minutes of meetings and tourism planning. The local newspaper 'Xiaoxiang Morning Daily' contains a wealth of data, including reports on tourism development. Government tourism organisations undertake surveys and publish official statistics. Some data can be found in pamphlets such as Hunan Tourism Planning and Hunan Tourism Report and are only available on request from the Hunan Provincial Tourism Administration. Others, including government surveys such as 'Hunan Tourism', 'Research on Tourism' are widely available print as well as via the Internet or in university libraries. In addition, Hunan Provincial Tourism Administration and Shaoshan Tourism Administration have their own Internet sites from which data may be obtained. This secondary data provided supplementary but vital information for the researcher in terms of understanding the contexts of the Red Tourism sites and also of declared government intentions. In addition, the secondary data helped the researcher to examine the same issue using another type of data, for example, documents as well as interviews. Therefore, the findings of the research can be compared increasing confidence that the findings are soundly based. The study questions are answered using a combination of secondary and primary data to meet the objectives.

Using multiple sources of data, such as documentation and archival records, provides several benefits for a case study strategy (Yin, 2003). The wide range of data collected in this study contains much detailed information. They cover various events in different settings over a long period of time. It is easier to compare with the policies or tourism planning in the same place and examine the development of Red Tourism at different stages. However, some government documents are confidential and they are difficult to access.

Important and useful information came from government documents, including policies, planning, reports and sometimes the leader's speech. Examples of key documents used in the study are listed in Table 4-3.

**Table 4-3 Examples of key documents used in this study**

<b>Title</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Author/Organisation</b>
National Red Tourism Development Planning 2004-2010	Jan 2004	General Office of the CPC Central Committee
National Red Tourism Development Planning 2011-2015	July 2010	General Office of the CPC Central Committee
A special tourism plan for the leader's residence of the Red Triangle Region (2008-2020)	Jan 2008	Hunan Tourism Bureau
A special tourism plan for the leader's residence of the Red Triangle Region (2010-2020)	Jan 2010	Hunan Tourism Bureau
The development of Hunan Red Tourism Planning (2011-2015)	July 2010	Hunan Tourism Bureau
Hunan Red Tourism Development Report	23rd Feb. 2011	Director of Hunan Tourism Bureau
Shaoshan Red Tourism Development Planning	March.2006	Shaoshan Tourism Bureau
Report on Shaoshan Red Tourism Development Planning	Dec. 2006	Shaoshan Tourism Bureau
Speech at the meeting on No.1 project for constructing Shaoshan	30th Nov. 2009	Li Changchun (a senior leader of the Communist Party of China)

During the fieldwork, the National Red Tourism Development Planning 2004-2010 and 2011-2015, a special tourism plan for the leader's residence of the Red Triangle Region (2008-2020) was studied prior to the interviews so that the researcher had a good understanding of the context of Red Tourism in advance of visits and the related political messages in the case study areas. The researcher was, therefore, well-prepared with valid and relevant questions for the interviews. Many official documents were collected when the researcher worked previously on Red Tourism policy and planning in Hunan province for her MSc degree. The latest official documents were accessed through personal networking with officials in China. Other public materials were accessed from newspapers, official websites and archives.

## 4.5 Data analysis

The analytic approach employed in this research was implemented by examining both the primary and secondary data, including data from the interviews, observation and official documents. The secondary data arising from the documents and the archival information were used to complement the primary data from the individual interviews with respondents and the observation records, and this helped to increase the trustworthiness of the qualitative evidence. The Thematic Framework Analysis method for data analysis (Ritchie *et al*, 2003) in line with general analytic induction was used to classify and organise data according to the key themes, concepts, and emergent categories.

Thematic Framework Analysis is founded on a matrix-based analytic method and one key advantage is that it facilitates the coding of data at different levels of abstraction in situations where relatively large amounts of raw data are collected, as was the case in this study. Thus, it was considered to be a useful and appropriate data management and data analysis technique. When the Thematic Framework Analysis method is applied, establishment of higher-level concepts is followed by the identification of 'themes' and 'sub themes' (see Figure 4.1). In this PhD study an initial list of concepts that shaped the initial focus of the interview questions was presented in the conceptual model (Figure 3.3 in Chapter 3). However, this did not preclude the emergence of themes and sub themes through data analysis.

Figure 4-1 Example of data analysis concepts-themes-sub-themes



In this PhD study the analysis of data, followed the processes of Thematic Framework Analysis using a manual method of coding (reading and highlighting themes in the transcripts by hand) (Hootman, 1992) rather than using software such as NVivo. This facilitated confirmability of data analysis in relation to the trustworthiness of data as discussed in Section 4.6. Based on the literature review and the two phases of Red Tourism in China, the main themes were outlined. Following the interviews transcriptions were made and multiple close readings were made with notes being made in the margins. These notes picked out the themes that had been identified in the literature review relating primarily to the two main phases in red tourism. Following further readings of the text other sub-themes began to emerge such as those relating to the cult of Mao that had not initially been identified. As Saunders *et al* (2009:481) note, the conceptual framework reflects the researcher's thinking at a certain point in time or represents "*the current version of the researcher's map of the territory being investigated*" (Miles and Huberman, 1984:33). In this PhD study, the researcher's conceptual thinking evolved as the study progressed, particularly pre-collection of primary data, reflecting how conceptual thinking post-literature review (Figure 3.3) built on the thinking of the researcher that had previously developed through masters level study and the researcher's position as a Chinese citizen (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). The final version of the conceptual framework (Figure 8.1) reflects the researcher's evolved thinking post-data collection, data analysis and evaluation (Figure 8.1).

Firstly, when different secondary data were considered, they highlighted how documentary data was available in written form, including organisational documents, reports, newspapers, and also non-written form such as audio- and video-recordings. Secondly, the interviews were digitally recorded and note-taken, and subsequently transcribed in Mandarin (and translated into English), that is, reproduced as a written account using the actual words. The interactive nature of data collection and analysis was helpful in identifying important themes, patterns and relationships as the data were collected. As Saunders *et al* (2009) have noted it is possible to group data into three main types of processes: summarising of meanings; categorisation of meanings; and structuring of meanings using narrative.

During the analysis process, any non-standardised and intrinsically complex data that had been collected was condensed and grouped in a narrative to support meaningful analysis. As Kvale (1996) states, the process of analysing qualitative data is likely to begin at the same time as you collect the data as well as continue afterwards.

The main themes (titles) and sub-themes (subtitles) were identified and listed. These were partially based on the interview themes (reflecting the final version of the conceptual framework). However, some new themes also emerged from the analysis of the interview data. For example, the sub-theme 'the cult of worship of Mao Zedong and its unintended consequences' emerged after transcribing the data in relation to the 'promotion of Mao Zedong' and sharing the data with the research supervisors. The research findings thus, were partly imposed but also able to emerge from the summarised data which was collated, reviewed and analysed for the research purpose.

#### **4.6 Data Trustworthiness**

Issues surrounding data trustworthiness were addressed in a number of ways. Firstly, the range of data sources enabled the researcher to gain confidence in the credibility transferability, dependability and confirmability of interview data. Her personal experiences as a Chinese researcher, native to Hunan Province (the area in which both case study sites were located) also enabled her to consider the validity of the qualitative data. Sharing the English translations of transcripts with her research supervisors also enabled confirmability (Lincoln and Guba, 1984; Cresswell, 1997; Sinkovics et al, 2008).

The researcher was keen to retain interview languages (albeit translated into English) in the presentation of the interview data within the results chapters. This was part of an attempt to ensure authenticity in the reported results and to enable induction to take place alongside deduction in this research. Given the nature of the sample, it was problematic to verify the researcher's interpretation of the responses with the interviewees, for reasons, pertaining to practical access.

The secondary data was corroborated using case study data and the personal knowledge of the researcher as a Chinese citizen.

#### **4.7 Research limitations**

The researcher faced some challenges and practical difficulties due to the sensitivity of the topic to the Chinese state, especially in the case of Shaoshan. In all, there are five main limitations caused by the difficulties met during the fieldwork.

The first limitation is that the government officials interviewed were mainly from the provincial and local levels. Since Red Tourism is a policy delivered from the top down, i.e. from central to local government, it would have been better to interview directly the relevant central government officials about the government's intentions behind Red Tourism. A problem here was that in most cases requests for interview were refused or simply ignored.

The second limitation of this research is that the site of Shaoshan is so politically sensitive that potential interviewees were reluctant to speak either at all, and on the rare occasions in which they did agree to speak, their answers displayed a lack of frankness. Nearly all the government officials pointed out that they are not allowed to be interviewed without the permission of the central government. However, some did agree to meet the researcher once a higher official reassured them that he was satisfied with the interviewer and the proposed interview questions. Even though some local government officials accepted the interview request, they were very cautious at the beginning and answered the questions very carefully. After the researcher explained that the interview would only be used for academic purposes, and a few warm-up questions were introduced, they were relaxed and gradually spoke freely with the researcher, often in considerable depth. However, there was one instance when one of the important officials did not allow the interview to be recorded, only permitting manual note-taking. This was not a problem as it was managed as part of the participant consent process. Some of the prospective interviewees were CCP members or government officials (usually both). When they realised that the questions may have political implications (in that politics were embedded in the topic under investigation), they often declined the interview. Because some potential interviewees were reluctant to be involved, the views collected reflect those of people who were willing to share their

responses. Non-respondents might have held different, perhaps more extreme views given their reticence to participate in research relating to Chinese politics.

A third limitation of this research is that there was a time limitation to impromptu interviews. Interviews could only be carried out when tourists were having a break or waiting for a bus or train back home. The time available was short. Therefore, the information gathered from the tourist interviewee was not always completed to the researcher's satisfaction.

Time may also be recognised as a factor affecting the breadth of the research focus. The researcher relied on only two specific Red Tourism sites with interviews taking place during two specific data collection periods in 2014 and 2015, well after the end of the first phase of Red Tourism ended in 2010.

A fifth limitation may be acknowledged relating to the position and role of the researcher as a Chinese person who has been raised in and lived in the same geographical area (Hunan province) as the case studies. The ideological commitments of Red Heritage Tourism in the Chinese context raise the issue of the researcher herself having been influenced by the ideology in place. Potential subjectivity here was recognised and, to an extent, mitigated by the additional influence of two English supervisors at the design and analysis stages of the research.

However, this study gathered a lot of useful information from the responses of local officials and tourists. This study was largely successful in meeting its study objectives.

#### **4.8 Introduction to the Case Study**

Prior to the results chapters, it is useful to provide some context to the case study area. Shaoshan is a county-level city in Xiangtan, Hunan Province which is located in the south-central part of China. It is 100 kilometres (62 miles) from Changsha, the capital of Hunan. According to the 2012 Chinese statistic yearbook, Shaoshan has 120,000 residents and its total land area is 247.3 square kilometres.



The standard of living in Shaoshan has markedly improved because of the development of Red Tourism in Shaoshan. Before 2004, which was the year when the first phase National Red Tourism Plan was implemented, agriculture was the main economic activity, and tax on peasantry was the main source of Shaoshan's income. In 2003, the total Shaoshan's income was 40.68 million yuan while the tourist spending amounted to 262 million yuan. The total number of tourists coming to Shaoshan in 2003 was 1.85 million. In 2005, Shaoshan's income was 70.69 million yuan and the tourist spending has risen to 396.12 million yuan. (The total number of tourists coming to Shaoshan in 2005 reached 3.05 million). As Red Tourism boomed in China, in 2012, Shaoshan hosted 8.45 million tourists and the tourism spending 2100 million yuan, and the total Shaoshan's income reached 350 million yuan (Hunan Statistic Bureau, 21 March, 2013). As of now, the tax collected from the tourist industry is the biggest part of Shaoshan's income, having overtaken the tax received from peasantry.

In Shaoshan there are numerous Mao landmarks, including Mao's house, the Museum of Mao, the Dripping Water cave and the Shaoshan Mountain. Shaoshan is significant not only for being the birthplace of Mao Zedong, but also for its natural landscapes. Moreover, the legends of Mao contribute to the dignified mystique of Shaoshan. For example, in the morning of 20<sup>th</sup> December 1993, which was the hundredth anniversary of Mao's birthday, the previous Chairman, Jiang Zeming, unveiled Mao's bronze statue at a ceremony in Shaoshan, on that day, both the sun and the moon were clearly seen at the same time in the sky as an auspicious sign by many people (Zhao, 2015). When Jiang Zeming attempted to unveil Mao's statue, the red silk, more than 20 meters long, stuck to the manuscript held by Mao's hand. An attendant came to Jiang and whispered. Jiang stepped back three paces and made three respectful bows facing Mao's statue. Surprisingly, when Jiang pulled the red silk again, it now fell down easily to the bottom of Mao's statue. On that day, azaleas, which should bloom in April, flowered in a single night unexpectedly all over Shaoshan. It flowered three months ahead of time (Peng, 2015). These, and similar stories add to the mystique surrounding Chairman Mao. Since then, more and more people come to Shaoshan to worship Mao for good luck, health and wealth.

The second case study Zhijiang is a Dong Autonomous county in Huaihua, Hunan Province. It is 438 kilometres (272 miles) from Changsha, the capital of Hunan. According to the 2012 statistic yearbook, Zhijiang has 379,400 residents and its total land area is 2096 square kilometres.

On 15<sup>th</sup> August 1945, the Japanese Imperialism Army officially surrendered. Two days later, on 17<sup>th</sup> August, Chiang Kai-shek held a military conference with American and Chinese military representatives in Chongqing and designated Zhijiang as the site of the Japanese surrender (Nanjing government, 2010: 14). On 18<sup>th</sup> August, 1945 an office was set up for the preparation required for Japanese surrender. The director of the office was the army commander Liao Yaoxiang of Kuomintang New Sixth Army. Chiang Kai-shek discussed with the Commander of Kuomintang army General Ho Ying-chin the arrangements for the Japanese surrender in Zhijiang. At that moment, Nanjing was still a war zone. On 21<sup>st</sup> August 1945, Nanjing was returned to China while eight Japanese representatives were dealing with the surrender issues in Zhijiang. On the evening of 22<sup>nd</sup> August General Ho Ying-chin contacted Chiang Kai-shek through a telex message to confirm the surrender site. However, Chiang Kai-shek changed his mind about the surrender site (Nanjing government, 2010). After the return of Nanjing to China and considering the significance of Nanjing as the capital of the Republic of China at the time of the massacre of more than 300,000 Chinese people by the Japanese Imperial Army, Chiang Kai-shek decided to move the surrender ceremony to Nanjing instead of Zhijiang. On 26<sup>th</sup> August, General Ho Ying-chin flew to Nanjing from Zhijiang. The surrender ceremony in Nanjing lasted less than twenty minutes. The preparation had already been done during two days hard work in Zhijiang (Ming Newspaper, 2015;).

Like Shaoshan, Zhijiang is also a county with agriculture as the main economic activity and the tax on peasantry is the main source of Zhijiang's income. In 2010, Zhijiang's income was 270 million yuan and the tourist spending was 636 million yuan of which the tourist spending of the Japanese Imperialism Army (JIA) surrender site was 21.77 million yuan. The total number of tourists coming to Zhijiang in 2010 was 2.12 million and the tourists visiting the JIA surrender site was 1.66 million. After Red Tourism strategy started in 2011, Zhijiang's income was raised up to 505 million yuan and the tourist spending was 932

million yuan in 2012. The tourist spending at JIA surrender site 20 million yuan which was covered 2.1 percent of the whole Zhijiang tourist spending. The total number of tourists coming to Zhijiang in 2012 reached 2.76 million. Among it, 1.18 million tourists to the Japanese Imperial Army surrender site (Wan, 2011).

Zhijiang is well-known not only for being the commemoration site for Japanese Imperial Army surrender, but also for Zhijiang airport which is 31 kilometres from the city centre. The airport was built in 1942 and was the second largest military airfield in the Far East for the Allies during World War II. During World War II, the airport was known as Chiang Kai-shek Airfield and was used by the United States Army Fourteenth Air Force as part of the China Defensive Campaign (1942-1945). Right near the airfield, Japan officially surrendered to China on 21 August 1945. Zhijiang airport was re-opened for civilian use in September 2004, and now provides a much more convenient transportation hub for the tourism development in Zhijiang.

#### **4.9 Conclusion**

This chapter explains and justifies the research methodology and the specific methods selected in this study in line with the researcher's philosophical stance. A wide range of methodologies fit within the interpretivist paradigm. Qualitative methods including case study, semi-structured interviews, non-participant observation and documentary analysis were used in this study. A 'Thematic Framework Analysis' technique was employed as an approach to data analysis. The chapter also highlighted some key, practical limitations of data collection namely, in relation to the interviewees.

The next chapter is one of three results chapters. It investigates the two phases of Red Tourism from 2004 to 2010 and from 2011 to 2015 in China by focusing on the documents collated. These include the examples provided in Table 4.3 as well as newspaper and secondary archived materials. A key focus is on exploring the achievements of the first phase of Chinese Red Tourism.

## **Chapter 5: The two phases of Red Tourism in China**

## 5.1 Introduction

The emergence of Chinese Red Tourism can only be understood by examining tourism policy evolution in the context of contemporary China. From 1949, when the PRC was founded by Mao Zedong, tourism was forbidden except for a small number of special cases (as outlined in Chapter 3). In 1978, Deng Xiaoping's 'open door' policies reversed this stance. Tourism became acceptable because of its capacity to make a contribution to modernization (Sofield and Li, 1998) and produce an economic benefit.

In this context, Red Tourism is regarded as part of a national strategy to overcome the political and economic problems which emerged during China's economic reform and opening-up to the world. It has been suggested that contemporary Red Tourism development in China, mainly aimed at the domestic market, can be an effective vehicle for reconciling, to some extent, the contradictions inherent in a 'free' market economy functioning in a one-party state.

Red Tourism owes its origins to the 'First National Red Tourism Development Plan 2004-2010'. The first Red Tourism sites cover Chinese history from the year the CCP was founded in 1921 to the year of the creation of the PRC in 1949. This led to the designation of 12 major Red Tourism regions in China, 30 recommended Red Tourism routes and 100 key Red Tourism scenic sites. The CCP takes the view that the Xinhai Revolution led by Sun Yat-sen which overthrew China's last imperial dynasty, the Qing Dynasty, leading to the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911 was essentially a bourgeois nationalist revolution and, thus, incomplete in terms of Marxist ideology. A further revolution was therefore required. The defeat of the Japanese Imperial Army in 1945 provided the opportunity for Mao Zedong to complete the revolution which followed the rout of Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang Army in the civil war of 1949. A key part of the plan was to provide support for the CCP.

Subsequently, perhaps in response to the difficulties encountered in winning over public opinion to the CCP view, a further Red Tourism Development Plan 2011-2015 was drawn up. The Red Tourism sites added in the second phase

cover Chinese history from 1840 until the present day. Thus, they focus on the Sino-British Opium Wars, the humiliation of the Japanese invasion of 1894, and the western nations' control of the coastal area including Shanghai, Qingdao, Macao, Hong Kong as well as Taiwan (occupied by the Japanese for half a century). It was clear that the Qing Dynasty was incapable of protecting China from foreign depredation. The Great Wall of China, built to prevent a land invasion from the west, was incapable of preventing an attack by steel warships from the Pacific Ocean (2004-2010 Red Tourism Planning No.35 [2004] of the CCP Central Committee issued by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council). The contrast with, for instance, China's permanent membership of the UN Security Council after the revolution is dramatic. It is discernible that the second phase rather than just concentrated on communism, attempted to gain support for a unified nation through the portrayal of patriotic events.

In order to fulfil the study's aim and objectives, two different foci were selected. It was considered feasible to research two Red Tourism case study sites in the time-scale available. These sites were selected in relation to their respective alignment with the first and second phases of Chinese Red Tourism planning - Shaoshan with the first phase, and Zhijiang with the second phase. Thus, the information presented and analysed in this Chapter relates to the context of the case study sites. This is in line with the top box in the researcher's conceptual framework (Figure 3-3) outlined in Chapter 3.

This chapter looks at the history of the CCP and Mao during 1921-1949 and the plan of the first phase of Red Tourism from 2004 to 2010. It then examines the achievements of the first phase of Chinese Red Tourism. This is repeated with the plan and achievements relating to the second phase of Red Tourism from 2011 to 2015.

## **5.2 The first phase of Red Tourism Planning 2004 - 2010 in China**

The focus of the first phase of Red Tourism covers Chinese history from 1921 to 1949, that is, from the year the CCP was founded to the year that Mao Zedong proclaimed the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) from the top of Tiananmen Gate Tower 2004-2010 (2004-2010 Red Tourism Planning No.35 [2004] of the CCP Central Committee issued by the CPC Central

Committee and the State Council. In Chinese revolutionary history, Mao was a towering figure and became the first chairman of the PRC. In fostering patriotism today, and also to better understand Red Tourism and its related impacts, it is therefore necessary to search from the riches of Chinese revolutionary history, the role of Mao and his influence on China's governance and society.

### *5.2.1 The history of the CCP during 1921-1949 and the role of Mao and his influence on China's governance and society*

After the 1919 May Fourth Movement, Marxist ideas reached every part of China. The May Fourth Movement, whose aims were cultural renewal and revolution, grew out of student demonstrations in Beijing on May 4, 1919. The students were protesting at the decision of the Paris Peace Conference to transfer Germany's rights in Shantung province to Japan (Bianco, 1967). Soon after, the May Fourth Movement spread throughout the country. Among the new generation of leaders, the young Mao Zedong, in his native Changsha in Hunan Province, gained his first experience of political activism (Keay, 2008).

The CCP's origins can be traced to the French-controlled city of Shanghai. The party was founded there early in 1921 by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao. The Headquarters were established in Shanghai and the very first Congress took place there in July 1921 with 53 delegates in attendance for its inauguration. Later the Headquarters were relocated to Jiaxing. Mao Zedong was one of two representatives from Hunan who were present. The Party's founding was broadcast from a boat in South Lake (Keay, 2008). By popular acclaim, South Lake is among the most celebrated revolutionary sites in China.

As of 1922, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the CCP agreed on a joint programme to reunite the country and attain full independence, even though there were unresolved tensions between the two parties. However, Chiang Kai-shek grew increasingly hostile to the CCP and launched a military campaign against it. Since the betrayal by the KMT in 1928, the CCP had gone back to the countryside and created a number of 'Soviet Areas' with Comintern (Soviet dominated) guidance and support. The most important Soviet had Zhu De and Mao Zedong as its leaders. The two of them had jointly created the Soviet

Republic of China in less accessible places following communist-led peasant uprisings (Wang, 2004).

The CCP had no choice but to abandon their bases and commenced what became known as the 'Long March' (1934-1935) which ended in the establishment of a safe haven in Yan'an. In the course of the Long March the leadership revisited its strategy and pointed the finger of blame at Otto Braun, a German military leader sent to 'guide' the Chinese revolution. He was, of course, totally under the control of Comintern whose interests were not necessarily the same as of the Chinese communists. On the road to Yan'an the native Chinese communists, among them Mao Zedong and Zhu De, seized control of the party. The Comintern and Stalin's Soviet Union had lost control of the CCP (Keay, 2008).

During the Sino-Japanese war (1937–1945), the CCP and KMT united for a time against the JIA (Payne, 1950). However, the CCP army maintained its independence from that of the KMT.

Throughout the eight-year war, the Communists became strong enough numerically and militarily to challenge for the leadership of the Chinese nation. The CCP membership rose in the period from 40,000 to 1,200,000 and its regular army - from 30,000 to nearly one million, with an additional network of more than a million militia units (Yang, 1993). After the end of WWII, the civil war resumed between the KMT and the communists. The open warfare between them did not break out until 1946 (Bianco, 1967). Although the KMT had the upper hand at first, the advantage gradually passed to the CCP. The KMT was eventually defeated and forced to flee to the off-shore island of Taiwan. With the KMT's defeat, Mao Zedong established the People's Republic of China in Beijing on October 1st, 1949 (Bianco, 1967).

The CCP won the civil war against the much larger KMT army which was better funded, had superior weaponry and ready access to essential provisions. The CCP army also fought valiantly against the ruthless JIA occupation. The CCP army won the war despite receiving minimal international assistance (Breslin, 1998).

The Chinese communists had come back from the brink of disaster which the remnants of the Long March faced in Yan'an to gain a heroic victory against all



the odds. One of the greatest victories of the twentieth century was successful largely due to the inspirational revolutionary zeal and organisational ability of Mao Zedong (Breslin, 1998).

The history of contemporary China is inseparable from the rise of Mao (1893-1976) (Chevrier, 2004). In July 1927, Mao led the Autumn Harvest Uprising and took his army to the safety of the Jinggang Mountains which became a home for a key revolutionary base, controlled by armed workers and peasants—to all intents and purposes a Bolshevik Soviet in China. Mao devised his Chinese path to socialism here; the encirclement of the cities by his peasant army. The victory of the Chinese Revolution owed its success to Mao Zedong's rural and peasant-based revolution. The position of leader and commander of the CCP, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) naturally and irrefutably belongs to Mao Zedong (Jiuang & Macfarquhar, 2010).

Without the leadership of Mao Zedong it is inconceivable that the Chinese revolution would have succeeded. Mao was an extraordinary individual who enthused the masses in their struggle against the Japanese Imperialist Army, confronting Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang, and ridding China once and for all of the last remnants of western colonialism in China. Under Mao's tutelage, China became a global player protected from future invasion by a nuclear arsenal and an exemplar to the many third world countries still fighting to throw off the colonial yoke (Lynch, 2004). By any measure, these were monumental achievements.

Mao was portrayed by the CCP as the 'Great Helmsman' guiding China's mighty ship of state through hostile waters to the promised land of prosperity and security (Breslin, 1998). He is rightly celebrated for his contribution to the concept of Marxism-Leninism with a Chinese characteristic (Cheek, 2010).

Mao progressed from being a minor communist cadre in the early 1920's to being appointed to the position of rural organiser in the late 1920's and early 1930's. Mao led the Long March to Yan'an (1934-35) and the communist resistance to the Japanese occupation (1937-45). As a result, in the mid-1940's Mao became the unchallenged leader of the CCP. Under his leadership the KMT were defeated in the civil war. In 1949 Mao became the leader of what we know as the People's Republic of China (Chevrier, 2004, Breslin, 1998).

Mao led his country on a unique path to revolution, intimately linked to China's recent history. Mao refused to slavishly follow Marxist dogma. Rather he adapted it to China's needs (Lynch, 2004). This was considered to be a sinification of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, often referred to as Maoism. Maoism had a global impact as Asian, Latin American and African third-world countries adapted Marxism-Leninism to suit the needs of their own anti-imperial requirements (Cheek, 2010). Mao remains to this day a colossal figure throughout the under-developed world.

He has been presented by his faithful followers in the CCP as the embodiment of the socialist revolution that reunited China and restored national dignity after decades of war, division, and semi-colonial subjugation (Cheek, 2010). To his loyal supporters in the CCP, Mao was the heart and soul of a popular uprising which resulted after a long struggle in a united nation, proud of its victory over imperialist interference. Mao's lifelong sacrifice for the socialist revolution in China represented a major success for Marxist ideology as practised in twentieth-century China and inspired anti-colonial forces throughout the third world (Cheek, 2010).

It has to be said, however, that Mao's legacy was tarnished somewhat in later years (Breslin, 1998). The forced collectivisation of 1955, the Great Leap Forward in 1958-59 and perhaps above all the Cultural Revolution a decade later are now considered to have been serious and costly mistakes which caused great hardship and loss of life. Mao gradually lost popular support in the ensuing turmoil (Chevrier, 2004).

Chevrier (2004) gives Mao a score of 7/10 for his overall record. However, the CCP cannot jettison Mao despite the negative aspects of his legacy. Quite simply, the party, the military and all government institutions need Mao more than ever to give credibility to their right to rule (Jiuang & Macfarquhar, 2010). Mao's image is omnipresent, an iconic reminder of his crucial importance to China. Mao adorns China's banknotes and a likeness of Mao is mounted at the entrance to the Forbidden City in Beijing. So important was Mao's image as the father of the People's Republic of China, that, when in 2010 a biopic of Mao Zedong was televised with Zhang Tielin playing Mao, a furore ensued due to the fact that the actor had given up his Chinese citizenship to become a UK

national. The bloggers had a field day and their views were echoed by the state-owned newspaper China Daily which commented that such a person was not fit to play the part of Mao (Schulz, 2013).

Red Tourism gives a reasonably accurate outline of Mao's role in China's revolutions (Cheek, 2010). However, it has to be said that the later damaging failures of Mao, are not mentioned.

In the second phase from 2011 to 2015, there was a noticeable shift in purpose. Instead of concentrating on the Communist Party, the new policy for Red Tourism adopted a national unity and patriotic approach. This looks back to the war against the invading Japanese Imperial Army, and also forward to the progress made by the CCP from 1949 to the present day.

#### *5.2.2 The first phase of Red Tourism Planning 2004 - 2010 in China*

The development of Red Tourism in China started officially with the National Red Tourism Development Plan 2004–2010 (Li and Hu, 2008). An additional organisation, the National Red Tourism Coordination Executive Team (NRTCET), was set up specifically for the development of Red Tourism. It was constituted in April 2005; the members are senior officials from 11 national government departments including the National Development and Reform Committee, China National Tourism Administration, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance, and also three CCP departments: viz, the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee; the Literature Research Centre and History Research Centre of the CCP Central Committee (Wan, 2011). NRTCET is responsible for coordinating policy formulation among various departments according to their respective roles in the national administration system (Li, 2005). The office of NRTCET is a part of the National Tourism Administration. Similar teams have been set up in every province of China.


The original 'Red Tourism' programme encouraged people to visit and learn from national sacred sites. These included birthplaces of heroic revolutionaries on places of special significance to the CCP, such as battle grounds, martyrs' graveyards and triumphal arches. The messages displayed helped to enhance the national prestige of China (Yoko, 2009, Caraba, 2011). Included in the Red Tourism programme are the revolutionary bases which are situated in the

remote highland regions which provided shelter and sustenance to CCP cadres and soldiers throughout a nearly three decade struggle; first for survival, thereafter to seize power (People's Daily online, 14<sup>th</sup> May 2011).

The CCP embarked on the initiative towards the end of 2004, it was designed to be implemented in two stages. During the first stage, from 2004 to 2007, the focus was mainly on establishing an elementary network of 100 Red Tourism sites comprising 30 tourist routes and 12 major zones. The second stage, from 2008 to 2010, would involve major improvements to infrastructure including airports, railway, roads, hotels in order to attract as many visitors as possible (Xinhua News Agency, 2005).

Every aspect of the plan was designed to serve the interests of the CCP. Its main function was to portray in the best possible light the history of the CCP from 1921 to 1949 that is from the birth of the Chinese Communist Party until the founding of the PRC which took place on 1<sup>st</sup> October, 1949 (Caraba, 2011). The most important Red Tourism zones (Figure 5-1) with their chosen themes are listed in Table 5-1.

**Figure 5-1: Major zones of Chinese Red Tourism**



(Source: Yoko, 2009:116)

**Table 5-1: 12 Key Red Tourism Zones and themes**

<b>Major Zone</b>	<b>Theme</b>
1. Shanghai	Beginning of the History, Foundation of the Party
2. Jinggangshan, Ruijin, Shaoshan, and Nanchang	Cradle of the Revolution, Homeland of Leaders
3. Baise District	Baise Storm, Two River Red Tourism
4. Zunyi	Historical Change, Victory by surprise attack
5. Northern Yunnan and Western Sichuan	Unspeakable Hardship, Miracle of the Revolution
6. Yan'an	Yan'an Spirit, Revolutionary Sacred Place
7. Northern East	Anti-Japanese Heroes, Endless Snowfield
8. Shanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia	Overture to the Eastern March, Decisive Battle in Huaihai
9. Dabieshan	Great Strides, Homeland of General Revolutionary Bases
10. Taihang	Taihang Gunpowder Smoke, Hope for Victory
11. Chongqing	Chuanshan Soviet District, Red Tourism Spirit
12. Beijing and Tianjin	People's Victory, Waving Flag

(Source: Yoko, 2009:116)

Each major zone represents a theme related to Chinese revolutionary history in its associated region.

Zone 1 represents 'Theme 1'. In 1921, Shanghai hosted the CCP's inaugural National Congress. The conference hall was re-constructed in 1999 and has been converted to a commemorative museum which is focal point of the Red Tourism district (Yoko, 2009).

Zone 2 represents 'Theme 2'. On 1<sup>st</sup> August, 1927, the CCP led an assault on the Wuhan Nationalist Government building in Nanchang, capital of Jiangxi Province. However, the communist leadership was unsuccessful on this occasion, and had no alternative but to retreat to the countryside where they could rally their troops (Yoko, 2009). The Nanchang uprising was noteworthy in that it was the first time the CCP had fought against the KMT. August 1<sup>st</sup> has gone down in history as the date when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was founded. The leaders of the Nanchang uprising regrouped at Jinggangshan, where Mao devised the strategy of rebuilding his military strength in the countryside in preparation for the encirclement of the urban centres as a

prelude to the PLA seizing power through armed struggle (Chinapictorial, 2011). Subsequently, under Mao Zedong's leadership, the Chinese Soviet Republic was established in Ruijin in south-eastern Jiangxi in 1931 (Yoko, 2009).

Zone 3 represents 'Theme 3'. Baise Uprising Memorial is located in Guangxi province, and was the site of the Chinese Worker and Farmer 7<sup>th</sup> Red Army Military Headquarters. The 7<sup>th</sup> Red Army Military Headquarters Site has been restored. The Youjiang Revolution Cultural Relic Showroom was built for the purpose of commemorating the Baise Revolution led by Deng Xiaoping; the 7<sup>th</sup> Red Army Fighting Corps and the history of the Youjiang Revolution (Crienglish, 2005).

Themes 4, 5, and 6 are concerned with the Long March. Threatened with disaster by the KMT army, Mao Zedong was forced to abandon his stronghold of Ruijin in Jiangxi Province. During the retreat, Mao Zedong secured the leadership of the CCP at the Zunyi Conference which took place in 1935. The site of the conference was later incorporated into the Most Important Patriotic Education Base in Guizhou Province. The PLA suffered heavy losses during the retreat. Finally, that same year, the depleted Red Army arrived at Yan'an in western Shanxi Province. It was here that the CCP located its new operational command centre. While in Yan'an, Mao Zedong worked on a comprehensive strategy for revolution in China. His thoughts were later published in what became known as *The Little Red Book* (Yoko, 2009).

Themes 7 and 10 relate to the Sino-Japanese War which broke out in 1937. Theme 7 refers specifically to the Endless Snowfield and describes the battles in which the CCP mopped up the rest of the KMT in the endless snowfield in northeast China. Prominently featured in this discourse are two anti-Japanese Imperial Army heroes, Yang Jingyu (1905-1940) and Zhao Yiman (1905-1936). Yang and Zhao died while in the custody of the JIA and henceforth they were depicted as revolutionary martyrs in bill boards and theatrical productions. Zhao Yiman was subjected to torture in the Manchurian Police headquarters in Harbin. The building is an impressive example of the typically European classical architecture of the north-eastern town. On 19<sup>th</sup> October, 1948, it was converted into an early revolutionary memorial hall. A statue and tower were erected in a park close to where Yang Jingyu perished in honour of his dying for the

revolutionary cause. The park is situated in Jilin Province and was re-named Jingyu.

Themes 8 and 9 deal with the Chinese civil war which followed the JIA surrender in 1945. Since 1938, the CCP had premises in Hongyan Cun (Red Rock Village) which had been set up in a KMT-controlled area to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek and provide assistance for the anti-Japanese Imperial Army National United Front. The KMT were forced to abandon Chongqing, but before they left, they liquidated two hundred communists in the Baigongguan (the White Residence) in Geleshan, a prison for communist prisoners, originally a training centre for the KMT's secret police built with US aid in 1942. This episode was the centre-piece of the celebrated revolutionary novel Hongyan (Red Rock). In 1964 Baigongguan was given a new name, the Exhibition Hall of Chiang Kai-shek's Crime of Collaboration between the KMT and the USA. Shortly afterwards, the Geleshan Revolutionary Martyr Cemetery was constructed there (Yoko, 2009).

Theme 10 tells the story of Taihang, a place in Shanxi Province where a battle occurred in 1942. The Eighth Route Army, one of the precursors of the People's Liberation Army, commanded by Generals Pang Dehuai and Zuo Qian, succeeded in breaching the encircling Japanese lines. The Japanese responded with a massive attack from the air in which Zuo Qian lost his life. The town's name was changed to Zuo in an act of respect (Yoko, 2009).

From September 1948 to January 1949, in Hebei's Xibaipo Village, the communists emerged victorious following the Three Major Campaigns waged against the KMT army led by Chiang Kai-shek. This was the beginning of the end for the KMT. The Liberation War ended in a resounding victory for the CCP and on March 1949 their Central Committee departed for Beijing. On 1<sup>st</sup> October, from the top of the Tian'anmen Gate Tower, a triumphant Mao Zedong announced to the whole world "The Chinese people have risen up!" From then on, China's future would rest on the shoulders of the CCP (Chinapictorial, 2011).

The themes come to a glorious finale with Mao's proclamation of the creation of the People's Republic of China by Mao Zedong. The most illustrious sites in this

regard are National Flag Square, the Monument to the People's Heroes and, of course, the Chairman Mao Mausoleum in Tiananmen Square. Visitors encounter descriptions of martyr's deaths and the battles in which they perished. As a result of such stories the Chinese people have a common view of their recent history often referred to as 'Red Spirit' (Yoko, 2009).

Based on the goal of solidarity and unity of the Chinese nation, the CCP led the Chinese people in waging a long, arduous and courageous struggle to achieve the independence of the nation and liberation of its people, establish a new China, bring an end to the fragmentation of the country, humiliation of the nation, and the miserable lot of the people. Since then, the Chinese people have become the real masters of their own country, China has marched onto the path of independence, democracy, and unity, and the Chinese nation has started a new era in history. This most extensive and most profound social transformation in the history of China has struck up a great symphonic movement that is also powerful and stirring. Without the CCP, there could have been no new China; there could have been no prosperity of the country or rejuvenation of the nation (Xinhua News Agency, 2009).

Nowadays, revolutionary-era edifices and places in town or country where the CCP was formed, grew and prospered, are regularly visited by those in awe of the Party's successes. There they can experience once again the glory of that period in their history. These places are referred to as Red Tourism Sites (Chinapictorial, 2011).

Red Tourism ensures that the masses do not forget the emergence of the CCP and the part it played in the birth of the nation. There are countless references in these sites to the fact that communism was the historical choice of the Chinese people (Xinhua News Agency, 2005).

### *5.2.3 The achievements of the first phase of Red Tourism*

From 2004 to 2010, Red Tourism flourished in China. Red attractions and Red tourist routes were proliferating throughout China. The rapid expansion of Red Tourism has resulted in an enormous boost to commerce in each area. The capital generated has been utilised to good effect in upgrading transport



systems, hotels, restaurants, and domestic housing. This represents a major socio-economic development.

People are visiting Red Tourism sites today in greater numbers than ever before. Originally, only group tours were permitted, but now visitors are allowed to visit on their own (People's Daily online, 17<sup>th</sup> June 2011). In 2004, there were 20 million visitors to these sites (Xinhua News Agency, 2005). By 2010, this had increased to 430 million which amounted to 1/5<sup>th</sup> of all domestic visitors that year. The Chinese National Tourism Administration claims that the number of visitors to the top 10 Red Tourism sites has underwent a 50 percent annual increase in recent years (CNN Travel, 2011).

Following the inauguration of the first-stage project in 2004, Red Tourism sites have welcomed 1.4 billion visitors in the years up to 2010 (People's Daily online, 2011), while income has amounted to 700 billion RMB (Lu, 2011). Entry to many sites is free of charge. Nevertheless, the total income accruing from Red Tourism sites in 2010 came to 130.2 billion RMB, a truly staggering figure (People's Daily online, 2011).

The increase in Red Tourism has been a catalyst for the building of 127 access routes totalling 3,418 kilometres in all parts of China. Airports have been constructed or refurbished in Baise, Jinggangshan, Huai'an and other Red Tourism sites; direct flights have been introduced connecting Yan'an, Jinggangshan and Nanchang to major urban centres. 106 of the 123 Red Tourism sites can be reached by rail including, in some cases, high-speed trains. Services to the stations serving the sites are much more frequent than in the past (Lu, 2011).

In 2004, the Chinese state provided RMB 2.15 billion on Red Tourism infrastructure, including Mao's birth-place at Shaoshan. Two million workers were employed in the construction stage (CNN Travel, 2011). The China National Tourism Administration produced figures which indicate that, since 2004, almost 1 million people are directly employed in the industry while another 4 million people have posts in companies serving its needs (Lu, 2011).

There is a cultural aspect to Red Tourism which is to the public's liking. Cultural themes are featured in the sites, with 'Red' products with a socialist theme on

sale at most sites. Publicity was given to the sites when 2005 was declared to be 'the year of Red Tourism' (China Daily, 2005). Several important sites including Shaoshan, Xibaipo, Jinggangshan, Yan'an, Longyan, Linyi and Zunyi, built stages where 'Red' performances could be held for tourists to enjoy. Prominently featured productions are the celebrated 'Mao Zedong', 'Jinggangshan' and 'Dreaming Yan'an Defense Battle' which are extremely popular and usually involve audience participation (People's Daily online, 17<sup>th</sup> June 2011).

Red Tourism sites are held in high regard and are an important factor in promoting a sense of national identity. Red Tourism plays a significant role in China's growing tourism industry, contributing much to local prosperity and social cohesion, and at the same time enhancing support for the CCP and its achievements which are portrayed at all the sites.

### **5.3 The second phase of Red Tourism Planning 2011 - 2015 in China**

The focus of the second phase of Red Tourism covers Chinese history from 1840 to 1949, that is, from the year of the Sino-British Opium Wars, the humiliation of the Japanese invasion of 1894, and the western nations' control of the coastal area including Shanghai, Qingdao, Macao, Hong Kong and Taiwan (occupied by the Japanese for half a century) to the year that Mao Zedong proclaimed the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) from the top of Tiananmen Gate Tower (2011-2015 Red Tourism Planning No.10 [2011] of the CCP Central Committee issued by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council).

#### *5.3.1 The history of China's struggle against feudalism, Japanese imperialism, and foreign capitalist aggression from 1840 to 1921*

From 1840, the occupying western nations compelled the Qing dynasty to impose a semi-colonial and semi-feudal existence on an already impoverished population whose living conditions became unbearable. Discontent grew to a crisis level. The period was accordingly typified by almost continual popular revolt as exemplified in the Opium Wars, the Movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the 1898 Reform Movement, and the Yihetuan Movement. Guerilla-

style attacks were launched by desperate people while politically-minded theoreticians attempted to devise a road map to national salvation.

None of the assaults was successful, but they were helpful in pointing the aspiring revolutionaries in the most productive direction. The Qing dynasty, last in the line of emperors of China over many millennia, was identified as being a major impediment to progress. In 1911, the expatriate leader Dr Sun Yat-sen organized the overthrow of the autocracy which was viewed as being a satrapy of the western imperial powers. This monumental act cleared the way for further progress. The 1911 revolution led to the creation of the Kuomintang (KMT) under the auspices of Song Jiaoren and Sun Yat-sen. However, the KMT proved incapable of ridding China of its semi-feudal and semi-colonial status. It failed to ameliorate the hardship of the Chinese masses. The 1911 Revolution represented a very small step on the road to a more democratic system. It utterly failed to tackle the iniquities of feudalism or China's colonial status. It has been described with some justice as a bourgeois revolution. Activists and scholars embarked on a quest for a political theory which could act as a guide for future action to save the Chinese nation (Chan, 2009).

In 1917, Imperial Russia was mired in the chaos of the Great War in Europe. The Bolsheviks seized power in what was effectively a revolution; Marxism precluded such an occurrence on the basis that it was necessary for an initial bourgeois revolution to take place which would be followed by extensive industrialisation and the creation of a working class. It would then be the responsibility of the enlightened Marxist leaders to lead the proletariat to victory in a socialist revolution. The Bolsheviks led by Lenin adapted Marx's theory to justify their coup. This was referred to as Marxism-Leninism (Renmin Ribao & Hongqi, 1964).

Influenced by these momentous events in Russia, a group was formed on 4<sup>th</sup> May, 1919 with the aim of establishing the working class as the leading progressive force in China. Simultaneously, several prominent academics upheld the importance of democracy and scientific principles in the modern world, inevitably ushering in the study of scientific socialism as an engine of change. In 1921, the Communist Party of China was formed with the purpose of

fulfilling its historical role in the application of Marxism-Leninism to China's situation (Xinhua news, 2011).

From then on, the CCP prospered during the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle of the people of all ethnic groups in China and in the momentous rise of the international proletariat. In Marxist terms, this was the unavoidable outcome emerging from the contradictions of a bourgeois society and the popular struggle for a fair society in the Republic of China (Slaughter, 1975).

### *5.3.2 The anti-Japanese Imperial Army war in China during World War*

The anti-Japanese Imperialism Army war in China during World War II started on 7<sup>th</sup> July 1937 and ended on 9<sup>th</sup> September 1945. It is also called the Second Sino-Japanese War.

The conflict went badly for China largely due to the Qing dynasty's failure to bring its army up to the standards required of a modern state to defend its sovereignty. The contrast with Japan became more pronounced following the post-Meiji Restoration. China's defeat by the superior Japanese forces provoked a number of uprisings masterminded by Sun Yat-sen and Kang Youwei which in turn led to the 1911 Revolution (Paine, 2003).

On 18th September, 1931 the Japanese military destroyed part of the railway line in the vicinity of Shenyang which they had previously annexed. The Japanese government blamed Chinese soldiers for the incident, and used this as an excuse to wage war against China. A massive pre-planned assault followed, resulting in the occupation of Manchuria (Gustafsson, 2011). This is referred to as the Mukden Incident.

On 7<sup>th</sup> July, 1937, another conflagration erupted, this time in Lugouqiao. Circumstances had changed since 1931, and a nationwide resistance against the Japanese invasion ensued. The KMT army lost many soldiers when facing the Japanese in pitched battle. The guerrilla tactics of the CCP within the Japanese controlled areas were much more successful allowing their forces to retake territory (Fitzgerald, 1978).

There was clearly a need for unity in the face of the enormous fire-power of the JIA. Zhang Xueliang, a KMT general, believed that it was more important for the KMT to attack the JIA rather than wage a self-destructive campaign against the CCP. In one of the most extraordinary events of the war, Zhang Xueliang was convinced by the CCP of the need to take Chiang into custody until he consented to a joint CCP-KMT campaign against the JIA. This happened in Xi'an in 1937 and is remembered as the Xi'an Incident. Chiang agreed to the demand, but it meant very little in practice. There was some collaboration for a short time but conflict between the two parties continued throughout the war with well-authenticated assaults by both of the Chinese armies on each other (Wesley, 1992).

In the early part of 1942, the American government drew up plans to create a China War Zone and offered the post of commander-in-chief to Chiang Kai-shek. Although it was called the China War Zone, it also included Vietnam, Thailand, Burma (now Myanmar) and other south-east Asian states. China was clearly viewed by the United States as the key player in the anti-JIA war. Shortly after, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China came together and issued a United Nations Declaration proclaiming China as one of the four major anti-Fascist powers. In December 1943, in Cairo, a further proclamation was issued by China, Great Britain and the United States. This was the Cairo Declaration (Paine, 2003).

It listed the general terms of engagement for resistance to Japanese imperialism in a global fight against Fascism. The Chinese, American and British Governments were signatories to the Potsdam Proclamation which received widespread international backing when announced in July 1945. The Soviet Union joined up in August 1945 (Office of the historian online, 2<sup>nd</sup> October, 2015). On 2<sup>nd</sup> September, 1945, matters were brought to a head with the atomic bombs dropped by the United States Air Force (USAF) on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan surrendered soon after and this was followed by the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. Apart from Manchuria, the JIA military signed the surrender documents to their Chinese counterparts on 9<sup>th</sup> September, 1945 (Mitter, 2014).

The War of Resistance against Japanese Imperialism closed one inglorious chapter of Chinese history and paved the way for the creation of the modern state. There emerged a unity of purpose which had scarcely existed since the Opium War of 1840. The Chinese masses were roused into action, fuelled by a common hatred of a cruel invading army (Paine, 2003). A re-invigorated national spirit was unleashed in defence of the nation's honour was spectacularly vindicated.

### *5.3.3 The relationship between the CCP under Mao's leadership and the Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai-shek*

The relationship between the CCP under Mao's leadership and the Kuomintang (KMT) led by Chiang Kai-shek can be summarized as a 'struggle to coexist'.

After Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, the real power of the political leadership of KMT fell to Chiang Kai-shek, who, in his capacity as Head of the Whampoa Military Academy, had virtually total control of the army. Chiang became leader of the KMT on 6<sup>th</sup> July 1926 (Mitter, 2014).

During the second Sino-Japanese War, CCP cadres had been busy clandestinely signing up new members from within the KMT administration and its armed forces. This growing influence of the communists was a matter of great concern to Chiang. It was Chiang's firm view that the struggle against the Japanese aggressors could only be waged successfully once the CCP had been eliminated. In 1934, he embarked on his second attempt to destroy the CCP. Under the guidance of the German high command, the KMT succeeded in drawing the communists from their strongholds in southern and central China. The CCP was forced to retreat in greatly depleted numbers to the remoteness of Shanxi province. This was the Long March much celebrated in revolutionary history. With the assistance of the Soviet Union, the CCP speedily re-built their military base (Fitzgerald, 1978).

The KMT was notorious for its use of a clandestine police force which was officially charged with the responsibility of keeping an eye on communist sympathisers and anyone else opposing its regime but often used the black arts of the terrorist against its enemies including assassination and torture. In C.P. Fitzgerald's book *The Birth of Communist China*, the author portrays life under

the KMT thus: "*the Chinese people groaned under a regime fascist in every quality except efficiency.*" (Fitzgerald, 1964:106).

The surrender of the JIA in 1945 heralded the reintegration of Taiwan into the KMT's Republic of China. This took place on 25<sup>th</sup> October 1945. A dark shadow was cast over this happy event as the impending civil war between the KMT and the CCP loomed ever closer. All-out hostilities broke out in 1946. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) had grown from humble beginnings into a formidable force. The CCP enjoyed the support of the vast majority of China's population and this precluded the possibility of Chiang Kai-shek's KMT army engaging successfully against the PLA (Wesley, 1992)

By the end of 1949, the CCP was in command of almost the entire Chinese mainland. The KMT sailed to Taiwan taking with it much of China's gold reserves and two million people including soldiers. A number of KMT members opted to remain on the mainland and severed all relations with the Taiwan-based KMT. A new party was formed by them, the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang. This is still extant today, one of the eight small official recognised parties in the PRC (Wesley, 1992).

#### *5.3.4 Progress made by the CCP from 1949 to now*

From the Opium War (1840-1842) to the founding of New China (1949), China experienced great hardship. In the period from 1840 to the founding of the Communist Party of China (1921), China's ruling elites ceded control of their nation to western imperial powers and accepted a punitive settlement. Wars and turmoil became the norm. The vast majority of the population lived in abject poverty. Following the founding of the CCP in 1921, the masses came together to form a well-organised force which overcame great adversity to secure a series of victories in their quest for a better society.

In the aftermath of the foundation of the PRC in 1949, China's economy has enjoyed enormous growth resulting in the population becoming wealthier and healthier. Housing is greatly improved and the people better educated than ever. It is generally accepted by the Chinese populace that the extraordinary and historic change to life in China since 1949 could not have been achieved without the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (Meisner, 1999).

There are three main reasons for China's success.

Firstly, the CCP created a comprehensive economic system designed to suit China's needs. Those industries necessary for the creation for a modern economy were identified and provided with capital. China's GDP has expanded dramatically. Its growth has averaged nearly 10 percent a year and has lifted more than 800 million people out of poverty. Progress has also been made in defence, science and technological advance (the World Bank online, 2016).

Secondly, the CCP has remained true to its Marxist origins, teaching people the virtues of patriotism, collectivism and socialism. Advances have been made in all areas of Chinese society. The CCP has paid particular attention to the uniqueness of the many diverse ethnic communities in China. No part of China has been left behind in the drive to modernisation (Xinhua News, 2002).

Thirdly, the CCP has gone to great lengths to unify the nation from the fragmentation endemic in the Old China, including, of course, the ethnic groups. Imperialism and feudalism have been abolished. The feeling of unity has been extended to include Hong Kong, and Macao which have been returned to the motherland. Taiwan is being assiduously courted. The eagerly anticipated reunification with the PRC would complete the process.

The progress made by the CCP from the founding of the PRC (1949) to the present day is illustrated at Red Tourism sites and experienced in everyday life. The disparity between the 'super rich' and the poor has not yet become a major issue.

#### *5.3.5 The second phase of Red Tourism Planning 2011-2015*

Even though the outline of the second phase of Red Tourism Planning 2011-2015 was partly developed on the foundations of the first phase of Red Tourism Planning 2004-2010 to satisfy the Chinese people's growing needs in Red Tourism, there were additional motives included in the second phase of Red Tourism Planning 2011-2015 to promote the further development of Red Tourism.

Firstly, it made clear that Red Tourism has been developed as a political and economic project, and that Red Tourism should educate people and guide them



to fully realize that it was the Chinese people who chose the CCP, the socialist system and the road leading to opening-up. It is a historical trend. Through Red Tourism, with a firm reliance on the CCP, socialism with a Chinese characteristic. and opening-up reforms, the Chinese people should strengthen their common purpose in constructing unity in the country. These were clearly stated in the second phase of Red Tourism Planning 2011-2015 but not mentioned in the first phase of Red Tourism Planning 2004-2010.

Secondly, a key objective in the second phase of Red Tourism Planning 2011-2015 was to exceed 800 million visitors to Red Tourism sites by 2015, a year-on-year increase of 15 percent throughout the period, encompassing 15 percent of China's domestic tourists. Income from Red Tourism is projected to reach 200 billion yuan per annum, a mean growth rate of 10 percent per year. The sector should provide 500,000 new employment opportunities and indirectly a further 2 million posts (People's Daily online, 2011).

Thirdly, the second phase of Red Tourism Planning 2010-2015 covers Chinese history from 1840 until the present day. It widens the range to complement the promulgation of the historical events from 1921 to 1949 which were covered in the first phase of Red Tourism Planning 2004-2010. It focuses not just on the history of the CCP with the aim of improving its standing among the population at large, but also concentrates on Chinese history from 1840 until the present day. It includes the Sino-British Opium Wars, the humiliation of the Japanese invasion of 1894, and the western nations' control of the coastal area including Shanghai, Qingdao, Macao, Hong Kong and Taiwan (occupied by the Japanese for half a century) (2011-2015 Red Tourism Planning No.10 [2011] of the CCP Central Committee issued by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council). It also called for the featuring of China's Industrial and Technological Development in modern times, including China's space programme, for example, Xichang Satellite Launching Centre.

Fourthly, following the establishment of those Red Tourism sites designated in the first phase of Red Tourism Planning 2004-2010, 130 new Red Tourism sites were planned for development in the second phase of Red Tourism Planning 2011-2015. These new Red Tourism sites highlight patriotism as well as traditional revolutionary spirit.

Fifthly, it promotes the further development of Red Tourism. It encourages Red Tourism to combine with cultural tourism, village tourism, leisure tourism and other types of tourism to extend its reach. It also brings innovation to the management of Red Tourism in order to increase its vigour and efficiency. Moreover, it strengthens the role of tour guides in Red Tourism sites. Tour guides will get specialist professional training to improve their overall quality.

### *5.3.6 The achievements of the second phase of Red Tourism*

From 2011 to 2015, Red Tourism was further developed in its second phase. Red Tourism sites became more popular and the first choice of Chinese domestic tourists for holiday visits. Based on the experience gained in the development of first phase of Red Tourism, China's Red Tourism industry began to look for more opportunities to co-operate with foreign investors and attract more international tourists.

According to the report on Red Tourism achievement in 2015 (China's Travel and Tourism Newspaper, 15<sup>th</sup> February, 2016), up to 2015, there are 249 classic Red Tourism sites, 18 important Red Tourism sites and 180 Red Tourism routes. In 2015, the Red Tourism sites received 188 million tourists, in which 2 million were international tourists and 186 million domestic tourists. The tourists increased by 11.24% compared to that in 2014. The total tourism income from Red Tourism in 2015 reached 2.4 billion Yuan, an increase of 194% compared to that in 2014 (China's Travel and Tourism Newspaper, 15<sup>th</sup> February, 2016).

There are five identifiable achievements that may be identified during the second phase of Red Tourism in China. These are:

(i). Activities featuring Red Tourism spread throughout the country. Red Tourism is booming in China, especially so in 2015, which is the anniversary of the 70<sup>th</sup> for the victory over the Japanese Imperial Army. For example, the Red Tourism torch relay hosted by the National Red Tourism Coordination Executive Team (NRTCET) travelled all over China. This activity lasted 3 months, passed through 15 provinces, 26 towns and covered 10,000 km, with the aim of developing the spirit of the Long March which is dedicated to revolutionary

heroism. Shaoshan, Gansu, Shijiazhuang, Shenyang and other Red Tourism sites held special exhibitions on patriotic education;

(ii). Red Tourism combined with other types of tourism. According to the official state sample survey at Red Tourism sites in 2015, 74.4% tourists visited other types of tourism places on their way to visit Red Tourism site. 51.7% tourists selected the Red Tourism site combined with other places of historical interest, 45.3% tourists selected the Red Tourism site in combination with areas famous for their beautiful scenery (China's Travel and Tourism Newspaper, 15<sup>th</sup> February, 2016). In Shaoshan, a new exhibition garden for aerospace, science and technology, and agriculture was constructed. Substantial finance was provided to a Runze Eastern cultural industry town;

(iii) Investment for improvements to services in Red Tourism sites. In 2015, 42.37 billion Yuan was invested in important Red Tourism sites. The investment in Red Tourism sites in Hubei province reached 75.25 million Yuan RMB. It increased by 43.23 million Yuan compared to that in 2014. The investment was mainly provided for road construction to Red Tourism sites, parking lots, the establishment of tourist service centres, toilet facilities at Red Tourism sites, fire safety and improvement of the environment, etc. In Zhijiang, the investment was utilised for the enlargement of the anti-Japanese Imperial Army exhibition hall. The new hall covers 15890 m<sup>2</sup> and cost 140 million Yuan for the infrastructure. 35.03 million Yuan was set aside for the displays (China's Travel and Tourism Newspaper, 15<sup>th</sup> February 2016);

(iv). Red Tourism attracted much more international visitors than ever before. In 2015, the classic Red Tourism sites received 2.08 million international tourists and 18 important Red Tourism sites welcomed 1.49 million tourists. In September 2015, the Association for the Second World War Museum was established in Beijing. 35 museums from 11 countries including China, America, Russia and Korea, joined this project. This association provides a platform for the internationalization of Red Tourism. In addition, the anti-Japanese Imperial Army hall in Zhijiang jointly held exhibitions with Russia, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and Macao. In Zhijiang, international academic conferences were held to promote the Zhijiang Red Tourism site (Ran, 2015);

(v). The development of modern IT technology in Red Tourism, in particular the use of the internet. Zhijiang anti-Japanese Imperial Army museum operated an online site, which achieved 95 million click rates, of which 2 million were from outside China. There is a lot of information online, including 30 specific topics commemorating the resistance war (Interviewee 41, 2014).

#### **5.4 Conclusion**

This chapter explains the two separate phases of Red Tourism in China. The first phase focuses on promulgating the part played by the CCP from 1921 to 1949. 1921 was the year in which the Chinese Communist Party was founded while 1949 was the year when the People's Republic of China was born. The second phase covers Chinese history from 1840 until the present day and highlights national unity and patriotism. Both phases are referred to as Red Tourism, even though there has been a change of emphasis..

The first phase of the Red Tourism plan was implemented from 2004 to 2010. It began with 100 key Red Tourism scenic sites, 30 tourist routes and 12 major zones, and involved major improvements to infrastructure. By the end of 2010, Red Tourism enjoyed increased popularity throughout China. Visitors to Red Tourism sites have increased in number and more Red Tourism sites have been developed. The completion of the second phase of Red Tourism plan from 2011 to 2015 has produced even more growth in the Red Tourism industry.

This chapter on the two phases of Red Tourism in China is based on secondary data analysis. The secondary data includes government official documents on Red Tourism Planning, official newspapers, websites and academic papers. An awareness of the two distinct phases in Red Tourism planning is of crucial importance. It is a precondition for the analysis of the government political intentions behind Red Tourism and tourists' responses to them at Shaoshan and Zhijiang.

## **Chapter 6: The Chinese government's political intentions behind Red Tourism**

## 6.1 Introduction

Throughout the development of Red Tourism, political education has been at the forefront of policy-making. Two separate phases in the development of Red Tourism have been identified: the first phase from 2004 to 2010, and the second phase from 2011 to 2015. Two main intentions lie behind the promotion of Red Tourism in both phases: firstly, the economic intention whose purpose is to improve the local economy of the areas surrounding the Red Tourism sites; and secondly, and arguably importantly, the political intention. In the first phase, the political intention was to improve the standing of the CCP in the public mind. In the second phase from 2011 to 2015, there was a noticeable shift in purpose. Instead of concentrating on the history of the Communist Party and the life of Mao Zedong, the new policy adopted a more nationalistic approach. This looks back to the war against the invading Japanese Imperial Army and, at the same time, forward to the enormous industrial and technological achievements of modern China.

This chapter examines the Shaoshan site, the birthplace of Mao Zedong, as the supreme example of the first phase of the National Red Tourism Development Plan 2004-2010 and the Zhijiang site, a very important example of the second phase of Red Tourism development due to its role in the commemoration of the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army.

The chapter commences with an analysis of patriotic education throughout Red Tourism. After the Tiananmen Square events in 1989, the CCP leaders realized that the very survival of the Party could depend on whether, and how soon, they could change the younger generation's attitudes towards Western values and the Party itself. Essentially, the patriotic education campaign's purpose was to present Chinese youth with detailed information about the sacrifices made by the leadership and membership of the CCP in the face of Western and Japanese incursions (Wang, 2008). The Chinese revolution under Mao's leadership changed China's fate, secured its independence and thus ended the country's national humiliation.

To begin with, the chapter establishes the Chinese government's original political intentions behind the first phase of Red Tourism. Red Tourism has a

significant role to play because of its capacity to bring the history of the CCP to the attention of the younger generation, in the hope of enhancing the status of the CCP in the one party state. Promotion of the life of Mao and his heroic image was of great importance in the first phase of Red Tourism.

The chapter then proceeds to examine the cult of worship of Mao Zedong and its unintended consequences. The boom in state-sponsored Red Tourism seems to have gone hand-in-hand with a rise in popularity of Mao worship. However, it is officially discouraged by the government today, in sharp contradiction to earlier times when the cult of worship of Mao was encouraged by government.

The discussion goes on to explore the Chinese government's additional political intentions behind the second phase of Red Tourism. Instead of concentrating on the Communist Party and Mao, the displays at designated Red Tourism sites began to focus on a more nationalistic approach, including the promotion of the exponential progress in the industrial technological fields in modern China. The intentions behind the re-development of the Mao Memorial Museum and the Zhijiang site are also examined. There is inevitably some controversy surrounding this change in emphasis, particularly with regard to the rehabilitation of the Kuomintang.

## **6.2 Chinese government political intentions regarding patriotic education throughout Red Tourism**

A number of themes emerged relating to the government and official interviewee responses to the Chinese government's political intentions regarding patriotic education throughout Red Tourism. These are discussed, in turn.

### *6.2.1 The importance of patriotic education in China*

Patriotic education (inculcation of feelings of pride in their native land), plays a very prominent role in the Chinese education system and permeates every part of daily life. There are many everyday examples of such all-pervading political education; for example, the dawn flag-raising ceremony performance on a daily basis at many institutes, Chinese history textbooks; and the words of the song of the Young Pioneers of China, as learned from an early age by every pupil in China and sung regularly at school:

*We are the Communist successors,  
Heirs of the glorious revolutionary tradition  
Love the motherland, love the people  
Our crimson scarves aflutter  
We fear no hardship, fear no enemy  
Intrepid in our studies and our deeds,  
We bravely march toward victory!*

*We are the Communist successors,  
Heirs of the glorious revolutionary tradition  
Love the motherland, love the people  
Young Pioneers, we proudly wear our name  
Always prepared, ready for the cause  
We will annihilate every last enemy  
Bravely marching toward our ideals!*

(Huangdong, 8<sup>th</sup> October 2007)

Therefore, it is not surprising that patriotism has been an important characteristic of Red Tourism since 2004. That is one of the defining differences between Red Tourism and general tourism. As a government official remarked, *“Red Tourism is different from general tourism. The latter mainly focuses on economic benefit, while Red Tourism pays more attention to political and educational purposes”* (Interviewee 32). Most of the Red Tourism sites are situated in poorly-developed areas. Red Tourism plays an important role in the improvement of the local economy and the amelioration of living conditions in traditional revolutionary base areas. Poverty alleviation is a driving motive behind the development of Red Tourism. One academic researcher noted that,

*“Red Tourism sites are nearly all situated in remote areas. Only in areas where the Kuomintang’s control was weak, could the CCP survive and develop. These areas are poor because of their remote location and inadequate transport infrastructure. The state promotes Red Tourism in order to attract tourists to these areas. The money tourists spend can stimulate capital flow and help develop the local economy”* (interviewee 38).

Another academic researcher expressed a similar opinion:

*“During that time, it was not easy for the CCP to win power. The people who followed the CCP and helped make the revolution came from remote and poor places. They couldn’t even feed themselves at that time. A person who has ample food and clothing wouldn’t risk his life for the revolution. Eventually, after several decades, the CCP seized power and ruled this country. One aim was to improve the living standards of the poorest people. Red Tourism sites, especially those in remote and impoverished places are, of course, situated mostly in more beautiful surroundings, but economic development is slow. The strategy of Red Tourism can protect the environment and exploit it sensitively so that it*



*can promote local economic development and create opportunities to enhance the living standard of local people” (interviewee 39).*

It is evidenced that the people of the revolutionary Red base areas made great sacrifices during the anti-Japanese Imperial Army campaign and the ensuing civil war. It was seen as the government’s duty to help them escape poverty through ‘Red Tourism’, rather than simply extend relief to them (Yu, 2005). With respect to this one of the government officials commented,

*“Red Tourism satisfies popular demand. They want to be better off. The people who live in the revolutionary areas made a great sacrifice for the New China; the government has the responsibility for improving their living standards. This is an important reason for Red Tourism” (interviewee 30).*

Local people have a part to play in the development of Red Tourism, and have been responsible, to some extent, for the provision of goods and services thereby increasing jobs and salaries, and so helping to create a fair society in the old impoverished revolutionary base areas (People’s Daily online, 14<sup>th</sup> May, 2011). The local people can take advantage of Red Tourism’s job opportunities through a variety of activities such as food, beverage, accommodation, transport, retailing, sightseeing, entertainment services, raw material supply and tourism souvenirs.

Overall, Red Tourism has proved to be a successful way of improving living standards in remote and underdeveloped areas with little natural resources available to them.

However, the political intentions of Red Tourism play the more important role. A government official used Shaoshan, the birthplace of Mao Zedong, as an example to illustrate this:

*“Shaoshan was established as one of the most important sites for patriotic education. Among the Red Tourism sites that commemorate the great men, Shaoshan is number 1. The state pays much attention at considerable expense to Shaoshan. From the point of view of the state, it focuses on the political and educational aspects rather than the economic gains” (Interviewee 17).*

The CCP officially launched the patriotic education campaign in August 1991 (not long after the Tiananmen Square protest) with two documents: the “Notice about Conducting Education of Patriotism and Revolutionary Tradition by Exploiting Extensively Cultural Relics”, and the “General Outline on Strengthening Education on Chinese Modern and Contemporary History and

National Conditions” (CCP Central Committee, 1991 and Ministry of Education, 1991). It would seem likely that the patriotic education campaign was, at least in part, a response to the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989. The Chinese leader at that time, Deng Xiaoping, took the view that the CCP had paid the price for not attaching sufficient importance to the dissemination of ideology to the masses. He stated that:

*“I have told foreign guests that during the last 10 years our biggest mistake was made in the field of education, primarily in ideological and political education— not just of students but of the people in general. We did not tell them enough about the need for hard struggle, about what China was like in the old days, and what kind of a country it was to become. That was a serious error on our part”* (Dor, 15<sup>th</sup> August 2015).

Therefore, the patriotic education campaign is in reality a history education campaign about what China was like in the old days.

The document ‘Notice about Conducting Education of Patriotism and Revolutionary Tradition by Exploiting Extensively Historical Relics’ issued by the CCP Central Propaganda Department in 1991 explains the rationale for using historical sites for patriotic education:

*“Using rich historic relic resources to educate the masses about loving our motherland, loving the party, and loving socialism has the characteristic of visualization; i.e., real and convincing. In some aspects, this approach is much more effective than that of normal oral lessons and written propaganda materials. It provides a very efficacious methodology for the younger generation to learn about their national history, to understand the state’s current situation and to learn from our tradition”* (CCP Central Committee, 1991).

Although the campaign was officially started in 1991, it was not fully implemented until August 1994 when the CCPs Central Committee issued the ‘Outline on Implementing Patriotic Education’. (<http://www.china.com.cn>, 23<sup>rd</sup> August 2009). The CCP explained why they launched this education campaign as follows:

*“The objectives of conducting the patriotic education campaign are to boost the nation’s spirit, enhance cohesion, foster national self esteem and pride, consolidate and develop a patriotic united front to the broadest extent possible, and direct and rally the masses’ patriotic passions to the great cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics”* (Wang, 2008:789).

The Outline stated that, in order to provide legitimacy for CCP rule, patriotic education must continually emphasise the historic and decisive part played by

the CCP in the fight for China's independence. Shortly after, the Ministry of Civil Affairs nominated 100 sites to be "demonstration bases" for patriotic education (<http://dangshi.people.com.cn>, 23<sup>rd</sup> June, 2009).

In October 2004, a number of government departments published a new paper—'Opinions on Strengthening and Improving the Work of Patriotic Education Bases' (<http://www.people.com.cn>, 3<sup>rd</sup> October 2004). State agencies, schools and colleges, were urged to "free up their thought processes" and adopt more effective pedagogy aimed primarily at the younger generation. A key part of this strategy was that teachers should use the everyday language of youth culture. The CCP proposed an updated policy, 'The Three One Hundreds for Patriotic Education' (<http://cpc.people.com.cn>, 2004). The 'Three One Hundreds' are 100 films, 100 songs, and 100 books, all sharing the common theme of patriotism. A number of PRC ministries and CCP departments, including the Ministry of Education and the Propaganda Department, jointly recommended 100 selected films, 100 selected songs, and 100 selected books to China's population (Wang, 2008).

Furthermore, in order to promote patriotic education and attract more people to visit patriotic education bases, many of the 100 Red Tourism Scenic Spots published in 2005 by China's National Bureau of Tourism (NBT) are also included among the list of patriotic education bases drawn up in 1994 (Xinhua News Agency online, 22<sup>nd</sup> February 2005). For example, the Red Tourism site, Shaoshan, birthplace of Mao Zedong, was one of the patriotic education bases designated in 1994. Another Red Tourism site, Zhijiang, "*was authorized as a patriotic education site on 21th November 2005 by the Central Propaganda Department*" (Interviewee 41). An academic researcher explained that,

*"Zhijiang was awarded the title 'Patriotic Education Site'. Why was it given this title? Because there is an authentic history about this nation disclosed in Zhijiang. The Chinese government definitely wants people to know the history of the struggle of the nation for survival, how people fight against invaders including the Japanese Imperial Army"* (Interviewee 36).

In 2014, the current President, Xi Jinping, declared that "*We need to seize these two concepts—red bases and patriotic education on the one hand and developing Red Tourism on the other*" (Bloomberg, 2014). In order to improve the aim of fostering patriotism today, the Chinese government combines

patriotic education with recreation at Red Tourism sites. It is regarded as an easy and relaxing way for tourists sightseeing in these revered places, (most of which are located in mountainous regions or adjacent to long rivers) to reflect positively on China's 'Red' history. The Chinese people do like to hear about the country's communist history, probably because from it they can glean something about the heart of China and renew their enthusiasm for China's continual quest for modernity. The juxtaposition of natural beauty with the trappings of modern life will probably lead to an even greater love for the motherland and augment popular support (Yu, 2005). In such ways, patriotic education in Red Tourism can help the Chinese people to strengthen their love of the nation.

Under these circumstances, patriotic education continues to fulfil its political role and it has encouraged the dissemination of political messages at Red Tourism sites since 2004. One government official noted that:

*“from the state’s point of view, the most important reason for the government developing and promoting Red Tourism in several places in China is its educational purpose. The educational purpose is in accordance with the political purpose in this matter. There is not much difference between the two. Education serves politics”* (Interviewee 32).

This is also mentioned by Sofield and Li who claim that the use of education as a strategy to achieve a certain political purpose can be traced back to the CCP's ownership of 'legitimate knowledge'. In October 1950, the Ministry of Education published a document categorizing educational subjects as being for the revolution or against it (Sofield and Li, 1998). It can be concluded that political purpose and education, especially patriotic education, are closely related.

### *6.2.2 Patriotic education in Red Tourism*

Patriotic education has undergone a major shift in emphasis in the second phase of Red Tourism as compared to the first phase. Whereas the first phase concentrated on the communist party's struggle to create an independent nation under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the second phase placed nationalism and national unity at centre stage. The context of China's rapid economic growth, massive income inequality and perceived corruption of CCP officials were surely important drivers in the decision to change focus. Mao's frugality,

sacrifice and adherence to the class struggle sit uneasily with the present regime's capitalistic leanings.

A key component of the patriotic education drive would seem to be the portrayal of China as a victim of western and Japanese colonialism. Wang (2008) sees this move from a nation imbued by Maoist class conflict to a nation freed from victimhood as being rather significant in terms of the CCP's survival. In the wake of the Tiananmen Square protest and the country's gross inequality, the CCP thinks it prudent to urge its citizens to work hard to strengthen the country and prevent it from ever being a victim again. Class conflict could jeopardise this objective and threaten the one-party-rule of the CCP.

A government official said "*Patriotic Education in Red Tourism asks people to love the Chinese nation*" (Interviewee 32). China's President Hu Jintao strongly encouraged alumni to convert their love for the country into concrete deeds during a visit to Beijing University. He said students should turn patriotism into the "*actions of studying hard and improving yourselves to meet the needs of the country and the people*" (Xinhua, 2008). Liu Yunshan, head of the Publicity Department of the CCP Central Committee, advocated that the authorities should incorporate patriotic education into the daily life of the Chinese people so as to "*turn their love for the country into concrete actions*" (Xinhua, 2009). Here 'concrete actions' in Hu's and Liu's speeches might potentially be understood to mean learning to trust the CCP, be a good Chinese citizen, and to work hard for the nation. These are also the desired criteria for the younger Chinese citizen.

One of the government officials interviewed noted that, "*visiting Red Tourism sites provides effective patriotic education for many people. By using historical displays, people in general, but especially younger people, are taught to cherish the present-day peaceful environment*" (Interviewee 41). It is helpful for younger people to have a better understanding of the original Chinese revolutionary hardships, and at the same time to cherish the peaceful nature of life in contemporary China.

It can be seen that the most important target group of the patriotic education offered in Red Tourism sites is the younger generation. However, an academic researcher also argued that:

*“Old and young tourists, especially students, were specifically targeted to visit Red Tourism sites in the past. But now civil servants, most of whom are middle-aged, also constitute a substantial number of visitors who go to Red Tourism sites. When students hold their ceremonies for being a member of the Youth League or the CCP, they would like to go to Red Tourism sites. Now, many companies organise their staff to go to in order to enhance their group solidarity. In addition, Red Tourism sites are a good place to travel at public expense. One reason for that is that the sites are free of charge, and another reason is the result of the directed movement provided by government. Now the government limits civil servants from going abroad at public expense, whereas visiting Red Tourism sites is encouraged” (Interviewee 37).*

Interestingly, a government official claimed that:

*“Our target is tourists from all over the world who love peace. But, as of now, more domestic tourists than international ones come here to visit and receive patriotic education. So far, international tourists have come from more than one hundred countries, but they are few in number” (Interviewee 41).*

Furthermore, another government official observed that:

*“To international tourists, we chose to recommend purposely. Many international friends come to China and also to Hunan. If they wish to go to visit Shaoshan, we will arrange their trip. Once in Shaoshan, we do not provide a special guide. They are free to do as they wish. Actually, we thought about international tourists when we planned the exhibits. The captions and sign posts were written in both Chinese and English” (Interviewee 17).*

This was confirmed by a different government official:

*“It is definitely intended at present to attract domestic tourists more than international tourists to Red Tourism sites. Most of the visitors to Red Tourism sites are, indeed, domestic tourists. As for international tourists, because they have a different ideology, their motivation may not be the same as ours. For example, for those people who believe in Maoism, many from Vietnam, Korea, Albania and some African countries, they go to Shaoshan because they have a feeling for Mao. You cannot expect an anti-communist person to go there. Another group of people is those with a special interest in Chinese history and the history of the CCP. Those international tourists are different from those going to visit general tourism sites, such as Zhang Jiajie and Hengshan in Hunan province. As for domestic tourists who went to Shaoshan, most of them went there because they have a deep feeling for Mao. They believe Mao changed backward China. They went there as a mark of respect” (Interviewee 34).*

Liu Yunshan, Head of the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China's Central Committee noted how *“Patriotic education should focus on China's youth in the development of Red Tourism which mainly consists of visiting sites related to the history of the CCP and its armed forces” (Xinhua,*

2009). An academic researcher concurred, *“Political purpose is the primary reason for developing Red Tourism, because it focuses on the education of young people. The government pays a great deal of attention to it”* (Interviewee 38).

It seems that the Chinese government wants to learn from the Tiananmen Square Protest and is determined that younger people should get to know ‘what China was like in the past’. Wen and Guo (2012) note that Red Tourism not only reviews the general history of the Party, but it also specifically lets students know more about the heroic sacrifices of the Chinese Communist party members, thus deepening the students’ appreciation of patriotism. Crothall (1994: 8) finds that:

*“today’s students are far less willing to criticize the party because to do so, would be seen as being somehow unpatriotic. Furthermore, the students have seen living standards rise while China’s position in the world has improved markedly over the past 20 years”.*

This helps to maintain the cohesion of Chinese society. Liu Yunshan, head of the Publicity Department of the CCP Central Committee, called for more patriotic education ahead of National Day in 2009. He argued that: *“Patriotic education should be included in the process of tackling the global financial crisis, and maintaining the country’s steady and relatively fast economic development, and should help stabilise China’s reforms”* (Xinhua, 2009).

Red Tourism sites were established in areas associated with key figures or major events in the years before the founding of the People’s Republic of China. The government has encouraged people from every social stratum to visit Red Tourism sites. According to a report in Business Week, 786 million tourists visited China’s various revolutionary sites in 2013, an increase of 17.3 percent compared with the previous year, earning the National Tourism Administration 198.6 billion yuan (\$32 billion) in revenues (FlorCruz, 11<sup>th</sup> July, 2014).

The earlier domestic tourists travelled to Red Tourism sites at public expense. This has changed somewhat in recent times, with many tourists visiting of their own accord and out of their own pocket. As one would expect, specific Red Tourism sites are busier at different times of the year, for example, at Shaoshan on the anniversary of Mao’s birthday, and at Zhijiang on the anniversary of the

day of surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army. A government official commented that:

*“On some important festivals, such as the 90<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the CPC, many people were organised by their Unit to go to Shaoshan to receive patriotic education and develop their party spirit. On 1<sup>st</sup> July many activities take place, like new party members taking an oath in Shaoshan. The most typical groups are army, party and government organisations, as well as schools, who organised their people to go too. Meanwhile, many ordinary citizens go to these festivals of their own accord” (Interviewee 17).*

The main strategies for developing Red Tourism are different from those adopted in general tourism sites. Red Tourism sites are always open to the public free of charge, and they attract much more financial support from the state for construction, renovation and enlargement. It has been reported that, *“China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs spent 2.8 billion yuan on constructing memorials that commemorate heroes and figures of the revolution. Additionally, the government bureau in charge of cultural relics allocated 487 million yuan to refurbishing ‘red’ sites” (FlorCruz, 11<sup>th</sup> July, 2014).* In relation to this, an academic researcher explained how:

*“The different strategies for developing Red Tourism at each site depend on local government. But there are two main strategies adopted by central and provincial governments. One is that the sites with educational content, including the memorial halls, museums and great men’s hometowns, are open to the public free of charge. This policy has made it easier for people to accept historical education presented in this way. This compulsory policy of making them free of charge is good for tourists. What we call Red Tourism, a political and cultural project, can enhance its effect in this way. Another strategy is that the central government allocates a large amount of administrative funding every year to guarantee the running costs of the sites, and so assure the morale of staff at these sites. Free entry at these sites requires financial support. A further strategy is to give priority to the designation of 12 major Red Tourism regions, 30 recommended Red Tourism routes, and 100 key Red Tourism scenic sites in a planned way in order to carry forward the development of Red Tourism” (Interviewee 38).*

Another academic researcher claimed that:

*“Actually, Red Tourism, as an industry, produces considerable economic benefit. But the government concentrates more on its political purpose, and it develops it as a public facility so that everybody can enjoy it. Red Tourism is a relatively recent phenomenon. If government wants it to continue to be popular, then it needs to add value to its attraction. If the attraction is insufficient, then the government may abolish charges. The reason why the attraction is not enough is because the history presented in Red Tourism sites covers only a period of a few decades. The present*



*generation have no special feeling about the history of those decades. How can you attract them if you want people to commemorate the old times? The people who have a deep feeling for these times are all people who lived through those times or whose parents did. But Red Tourism pays attention to the education of young people. This is the point” (Interviewee 37).*

A government official concurred:

*“There are differences between Red Tourism and general tourism. The difference mainly concerns the significance of politics. For those natural tourism sites, what you need to do is to preserve them well. But for Red Tourism sites, not only is it essential to manage it well, but we also need to make use of it. How can we exploit its Red spirit so it can play its role? For example, in Shaoshan, there was originally just an old house of Mao. In order to fulfil its political role, the Mao museum, the Mao exhibition hall, the Mao statue square and the martyrs’ cemetery have been built to complement and supplement Mao’s old house. This is not just preservation, but making use of the old house. These sites have been used to educate people. From this point of view, that is substantially different from general tourism. The government has invested relatively generously in the Red Tourism sites” (Interviewee 34).*

An academic researcher added:

*“The propaganda of Red Tourism is much more controlled than that of general tourism. You cannot just invent stories. Historical facts should be accurate. All documents in these sites should be approved in advance. The propaganda should meet the requirement of the higher level administrative organisations” (Interviewee 36).*

In addition, the management organisations at Red Tourism sites have a higher administrative level. This demonstrates the greater importance attached to those sites by the CCP.

It can be seen that through the rapid development of Red Tourism, the CCP has creatively used patriotic education as a tool to enhance the legitimacy of one-party rule by the CCP, and to consolidate the PRC’s national unity.

### **6.3 The Chinese government’s original political intentions behind the first phase of Red Tourism**

The original Red Tourism sites cover Chinese history from 1921, the year of the founding of the CCP, to 1949, the year of the creation of the PRC. They highlight the importance of great men and events in Chinese revolutionary history.

The CCP takes the view that the Xinhai revolution (led by Sun Yat-sen) which overthrew China's last imperial dynasty, the Qing Dynasty, and which led to the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911, was essentially a bourgeois revolution and that it was thus incomplete in terms of Marxist ideology (Jacques, 2012). A further revolution was required. The defeat of the Japanese Imperial Army in 1945 provided the opportunity for Mao Zedong to complete the revolution, which ensued after the rout of Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang in the civil war of 1949.

Since Mao's death, China has changed dramatically with the modern state having made great strides economically. At the same time, China has become a much less equal society, with widespread corruption. Red Tourism is part of a strategy enabling the CCP to inform visitors of the struggle to liberate China from foreign domination, allowing it to set course on a path of peace and prosperity. At the same time, the CCP portrays the present-day leadership as being true and legitimate heirs of Mao. The best example of such a site is that of Shaoshan, the birthplace of Mao Zedong. The Chinese government's original political intentions involved the promotion of the history of the CCP and Mao Zedong in the first phase of Red Tourism. The political scientist Peter Gries (1999:15) recognized that, "*It is utterly undeniable that in China the past lives in the present to a degree unmatched in most other countries*".

### *6.3.1 Promotion of the history of CCP and consolidation of the CCP's leadership*

Even though the CCP established the PRC in 1949 and generally earned the trust and support of the Chinese people after many years of fighting foreign invaders and the KMT army, it encountered a crisis of trust in the Party after 1978, when the Open-Door policy led to an enormous gap between the rich and the poor. The booming economy produced undreamt of wealth among successful businessmen, with some of that wealth making its way to corrupt party officials. This undermined the authority of the CCP, and it may have contributed to other incidents, including the Tiananmen Square protest in 1989. Rapid economic development and corruption of CCP officials caused many serious problems. The adulterated milk powder scandal in China exposed in September 2008 is an example of what may happen in a get-rich-quick culture

when a dairy company cut corners after buying the compliance of party officials (Xinhua News Agency. 23<sup>rd</sup> September 2008).

Similarly, there are many instances of people being forced to move from their homes to make way for re-development by property developers, with this being rubber-stamped by CCP officials. In response to such scandals, some officials were punished, while the Party urged members to help weed out corruption. This could perhaps be viewed as mere window-dressing rather than meaningfully tackling the less welcome effects of the Open-Door policy, especially the endemic corruption. When the masses no longer believe in the CCP, the one party state will no longer be able to count on them to maintain their support for a socialist future (Wang, 2008).

The Central Committee of the CCP recognised that the reform process was in crisis and under these circumstances, the Chinese government utilized Red Tourism to address the credibility gap which had arisen from an identity crisis among the people, and a general sense of emptiness and alienation. Schulz has posed questions like “*What exactly should people in China believe in these days?*” and “*Who is really still interested in ideology*” (Schulz, 28th March, 2013)? The CCP opted for a hands-on approach. Its part in the history of modern China would be displayed wherever possible, a reminder to the people throughout the land ensuring that China’s populace would be aware of who had restored their country to its rightful place (Schulz, 2013).

The Chinese government seeks to utilise Red Tourism to remind people of the CCP’s history. An academic researcher stated that:

*“Red Tourism is not just a simple form of tourism. It combines history with leisure. It contains education in leisure. The main reason to develop Red Tourism is to propagate the history of a nation’s fight for independence and the struggle of the new nation for survival. The Chinese government presents this history with intent. It makes use of the strategy of Red Tourism to portray the history vividly to the public”* (Interviewee 36).

A government official confirmed that, “*the political reason for the development and promotion of Red Tourism is to provide tourists with a narrative on the Chinese revolution*” (Interviewee 30). Chen Doushu, the head of an agency organizing package tours to Red Tourism sites, regards Red Tourism as a way to respect the people’s desire to remember their history, “*Chinese people must*

*not forget their history, and the best way to do that is to go and witness it—that's where Red Tourism comes from"* (CNN Travel online, 2011).

A government official remarked how, *"Red Tourism sites record the history of the CCP, the history of the country and the history of the development of modern China. They are good sites to educate people and help them to remember the history of China"* (Interviewee 33). An official who is a member of the national coordination group on Red Tourism, which is made up of people from ministries of the central government, said that, *"Red Tourism will help people to further review the rise of the CCP and national progress."* It is believed that there are abundant 'facts' in these sites showing that the Party and socialism have historically been the choice of the people (Xinhua News Agency, 22<sup>nd</sup> February, 2005). A tour guide in Shaoshan said, *"The reason for the government developing and promoting Red Tourism in Shaoshan is because the government wants to portray the period of history in a positive light including the CCP's model deeds"* (Interviewee 23). A government official stated that, *"All the exhibits in Shaoshan show people the historical truth with a factual and realistic style. Tourists experience it themselves through their visit. There is no single way to tell people how great the communist party is"* (Interviewee 29). It can be seen that the messages in Shaoshan are all related to the history of the CCP; and the government wants people to experience it and to remember the past.

Forging a country's collective memory is an integral part of nation-building (Podeh, 2000:65). This is especially important in Red Tourist sites, which recall the history of the communist revolution, reminding the Chinese people of the leading contribution of the CCP to the country's national independence, liberation and prosperity (Li *et al*, 2010).

Highlighting the history of the struggle for independence is important for young people as they did not live through it. A government official claimed that, *"Even though our country was established after the struggle of the senior pioneers of the revolutionary period over many decades, some Chinese people, especially the young, don't know much about the revolutionary tradition and its history. Red Tourism can be used to educate young people and the public"* (Interviewee 17). Furthermore, an academic researcher stated:

*“There is no doubt that the CCP advocates its ideology in Red Tourism. This ideology can be seen as a spirit of striving for independence and the liberation of our nation: for example, the Long March. Among Chinese youth today Chinese revolutionary history seems to belong to a distant past. The Chinese government presents it through the strategy of Red Tourism in order that young people today can experience it and feel the greatness of the sacrifice that the pioneers made for communist beliefs” (Interviewee 36).*

The Chinese people are often interested in the nation’s ‘Red’ past, and they want to get more knowledge of the CCP’s revolutionary history. A government official recognized that:

*“We cannot guarantee that the policy of Red Tourism will be implemented successfully unless this policy meets the demand of the market. There is a market for Red Tourism because the people want it. Even foreign tourists come to visit; they also have this desire. Red Tourism reveals a period of history. Tourists want to know about this period of history and to make sense of it” (Interviewee 29).*

It is seen as important for Chinese youth to recognise and respect the sacrifices made by communist leaders and people in the past and for them to see this as for their own benefit. An academic researcher stated that:

*“Many of the pioneers who lost their lives in the Long March were young people. It was arduous and heart-breaking. The Chinese government wants us never to forget their sacrifice, and it wants people to know that it took an heroic effort to gain victory over the JIA [Japanese Imperial Army]. Similarly, the modern China we know today was built on the heroic sacrifices of the revolutionary generation” (Interviewee 36).*

Similarly, for Shaoshan, an academic researcher claimed that, *“The government wants to use Mao’s image and principles displayed in Shaoshan in order to educate people and guide them, especially young people. The government wants them to know about the tremendous sacrifices of the pioneers” (Interviewee 36).*

Red Tourism not only portrays the history of the CCP, but it also explores a kind of Chinese national spirit. A government official reflected that:

*“Red Tourism primarily shows historical remains. The epithet ‘Red’ has a certain cultural connotation, a somewhat positive meaning, for example, plain living, hard work and indomitable spirit. They represent a kind of Chinese national spirit. So, I believe this is one of the reasons to develop and promote Red Tourism in China. I personally think the single most important reason is to remember the history and develop our historical culture” (Interviewee 29).*

The images of plain living, hard work and indomitable spirit as presented at Red Tourism sites might be perceived as answers to the questions posed by Schulz including “*What exactly should people in China believe in these days?*” and “*Who is really still interested in ideology?*”. It may be the case that these images can help Chinese younger people to solve their sense of emptiness and alienation.

The Chinese government wants to utilise Red Tourism to help people to be fortified in their conviction in supporting the party. An official from the national coordination group on Red Tourism quoted in the Xinhua News Agency (22<sup>nd</sup> February, 2005) claimed that, “*It will make people, especially younger people, further consolidate their faith in pursuing the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics and in realizing the great rejuvenation of the nation under the leadership of the CCP*”. In Hu’s report at the 18<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, he noted:

*“We must uphold the leadership of the Party. The Communist Party of China is the leadership core of the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics...Centralized leadership of the Party is the source of its strength and a fundamental guarantee for China’s economic and social development, ethnic unity, progress, enduring peace and stability”* (Hu, 2012).

It appears that Chinese Red Tourism is intended to have a didactic role, in its attempt to strengthen the relationship between the people and the Chinese Communist Party (Caraba, 2011). The same situation prevails at the Shaoshan Red Tourism sites: “*From the point of view of the central government, the reason for developing Red Tourism in Shaoshan is to deepen the impression that the CCP, as the ruling party, has legitimacy. It owes this, above all, to Mao, founder of the CCP and the man who is the father of the CCP’s state power*” (Interviewee 24). An academic researcher asserted that, “*the purpose behind developing Red Tourism in Shaoshan is to support the current ruling elite*” (Interviewee 39).

It can be concluded that Red Tourism became the vehicle for bolstering the authority of the CCP. According to one academic researcher, “*The Chinese government wants to do something for the stability of its political power. This is the political purpose of Red Tourism*” (Interviewee 39). A government official agreed that, “*the aim for the Chinese government in developing and promoting Red Tourism is to consolidate the CCP’s position in power*” (Interviewee 17).

Thus, Red Tourism aims to serve the purpose of the nation state in the promotion of the CCP's role in history for the purpose of consolidating the CCP's one-party rule. A government official asserted that, "*Through Red Tourism, the CCP wants to purify party members' beliefs and take a firm stand. Visitors to the site are influenced without their being aware of it*" (Interviewee 34). Just like an invisible war, the Chinese government intends to use Red Tourism to influence people in a more user-friendly way than formal school education. This can also be seen from a keynote speech by Mr Li Chang Chun, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, at a national 'Red Tourism' conference in 2004. C.C. It troubled him that a communist China could be toppled by the army of a more developed capitalist country if China itself had adopted a democratic system at the early stages of its development. It was his belief that internal enemies of the CCP would be able to advance the cause of liberal capitalism at a time when China would be too weak to resist a determined enemy. He considered it to be of the utmost importance that the CCP improve its standing in a population living in a fast-changing socio-economic condition with particular attention being paid to youth (Li *et al*, 2010). FlorCruz asserts that Red Tourism has the capacity to renew the population's devotion to the party by recalling the struggles of the Maoist-era rather than concentrating too much on the Marxist doctrines which were an inspiration to Mao Zedong (FlorCruz, 11<sup>th</sup> July, 2014).

### *6.3.2 Promotion of Mao Zedong*

Mao Zedong, the father of the People's Republic of China, is a pivotal figure in modern Chinese history. He led the Chinese Communist Party to victory over the KMT in 1949 and he established the People's Republic of China. Later that year the Chinese government decided to promote the history of the CCP at all Red Tourism sites including, of course, Mao's outstanding contribution. Shaoshan is one of the three top educational sites promoting patriotism in Red Tourism sites in China. Because it is Chairman Mao's birthplace, it is by far the most important site in China for Red Tourism. A government official confirmed the importance of Shaoshan: "*The significance of Shaoshan is about the commemoration of Mao*" (Interviewee 33).

The commemoration of Mao features Mao's life and his influence on China's government and society. The rapid economic growth in China has created a very wealthy entrepreneurial class who have been using their financial power to corruptly obtain favours from party officials to the disadvantage of many ordinary citizens. This was almost certainly a factor in the lead-up to the Tiananmen Square protest in June 1989. In response to this, the Chinese government deemed it prudent to promote Mao's simple life as a matter of urgency with a timely reminder to government officials of their responsibility to set a similar example to the people they serve. They should remember to live frugally and selflessly like Mao, instead of feathering their own nest at the state's expense. A tour guide disclosed that, "*the main reason for the government developing and promoting Red Tourism in Shaoshan is to publicise Mao's simple life style which was also recommended in his own lifetime by Mao, just like the promotion of anti-corruption policy nowadays*" (Interviewee 19).

The reality of Mao's simple life is generally accepted. An academic researcher claimed that, "*Mao was very strict with himself throughout his life*" (Interviewee 36). A government official elaborated on Mao's life style:

*"In the Mao Museum, you can see those possessions that Mao used - his slippers, and his pyjamas with so many patches (Figure 6-1). From these, you can feel how hard a life Mao had and how he lived in the same way as the general populace. You can understand why Chiang Kai-shek could not defeat him. Chiang Kai-shek's life, in contrast, was luxurious. As the leader of a great country, Mao wasted nothing. Comments are superfluous. You can draw your own conclusion through visiting those exhibits"* (Interviewee 34).

The researcher's observations of the site at Shaoshan capture Mao's implied frugality (Figure 6-1).



**Figure 6-1: Mao's dressing gown with 37 patches on show in the Mao Exhibition Hall.**



(Source: The researcher, 2014).

Mao's simple life style is regarded as representing his morality. It is not just the Chinese government that wants to promote this. It actually reflects the desire of the people for a moral compass in their everyday lives. A government official argued that, *"People respect Mao. Mao's morality, many of his possessions and his deeds are truly touching. As the leader of a great country his life, in contrast, was very simple"* (Interviewee 33). A government official voiced the opinion:

*"As society develops and changes, people need positive moral values. Today's market economy is competitive and it seeks to maximise rewards. At the same time, a positive spirit and moral values are also required. Only by obtaining spiritual and materialistic values can one be a complete human being. In contemporary Chinese society, we often see some people lacking morality. A lot of people naturally want to get their moral values back"* (Interviewee 29).

Another government official was in agreement, *"Along with material development, people need more spirituality in their lives"* (Interviewee 41).

Mao's life was greatly influenced by communist ideology. The people accept the greatness of Mao. The government hopes that popular respect for Mao can be

used to bolster support for communism and the CCP. One government official asserted that: *“The government uses Mao’s iconic image in order to promote a belief in communism”* (Interviewee 16). Another government official added that:

*“The ‘Thoughts of Chairman Mao’ have had a profound effect on China. The messages about communism and about the Communist Party cannot be presented at Shaoshan without linking them with Mao. When we promote Mao, we talk about how he founded the CCP following his decision to adopt Marxism as a young man, while later maintaining his belief in a communist path for China”* (Interviewee 33).

He argued that, *“I do not think that communism is a belief; it is a direction for development that we are undertaking”* (Interviewee 33).

There are conflicting views on the ideology presented at Shaoshan. A government official noted how, *“There are messages about communism and about the Communist Party presented at Shaoshan. The government promotes Mao in order to promote a belief, that is, communism. The government realised that it was important to focus on Mao because Mao represented the CCP and modern China”* (Interviewee 16). An academic researcher agreed: *“There are messages on communism and about the Communist Party presented throughout the Shaoshan site. Even though the Shaoshan site is mainly concerned with Mao’s life, it is also about the history of how he led the people to strive for communism”* (Interviewee 38). However, a government official took a different view that:

*“There are no special messages promoting how great communism and the Communist Party are. All the exhibits show people the historical truth in a factual and realistic style. Tourists experience these themselves through their visiting. There is no specific way to tell people how great the communist party is”* (Interviewee 29).

It seems that the messages on communist ideology, Marxism and Mao’s thoughts presented at Shaoshan mean different things to different people. One reason for this is that some people can view the displays about the CCP and Mao at Shaoshan without thinking too much about vague and abstract ideology. An academic researcher went further in his opinion: *“In present-day China, different ideologies are not important in Chinese politics”* (Interviewee 39).

A government official observed that:

*“At the Shaoshan site, you can see how the CCP worked at that time. You can see the good relationship between the CCP and the people. You can see the principles and path taken by the CCP. In the early*

*stages, Mao Zedong went to Shaoshan himself to develop a party branch. You can see from that how the leader at that time went down to the grass roots to work. So, you can understand why the CCP triumphed in the end, and why the Kuomintang could not defeat the CCP. That is because the CCP had the support of the peasantry, and it maintained a very close relationship with the people” (Interviewee 34).*

Since the current President Xi Jinping took over as Communist Party leader in 2012, he has demonstrated a liking for Maoist rhetoric. He has called, for example, for a ‘mass line’ campaign to re-establish the traditional mores of the party and a ‘rectification’ movement to rid the party of corrupt practices (<http://www.economist.com>, 7<sup>th</sup> December 2013). This ‘mass line’ campaign is on display at Shaoshan. A government official commented:

*“Mao was the founder of the CCP, so developing Red Tourism in Shaoshan can bring the populace and the CCP closer together in order that the people can better understand what the CCP has achieved. This is its true significance. It can influence public opinion and educate people through understanding the great achievements of Mao” (Interviewee 34).*

There are many messages about Mao’s monumental contribution to the CCP and the country portrayed at the Shaoshan site. Their presence was justified by a government official:

*“Mao is a towering figure of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. His achievements and influence on China cannot be under-estimated. After all, it was he who founded the PRC which created the framework for China’s modernisation, a process which has had a massive global impact. Most Chinese people view him in a positive light” (Interviewee 34).*

A government official noted that, *“Mao was the founder of the CCP. You cannot talk about the founding of the CCP without Mao. What Mao thought was not just about himself, but rather about the country and the people. He is a great example to us all, and worthy of our study” (Interviewee 33).* Another government official asserted that, *“The government focuses on the greatness of Mao as the man who founded the CCP and laid the foundation of the modernised China we know today” (interviewee 16).*

A government official elaborated:

*“The significance of Shaoshan is about the commemoration of Mao. He was the founding father of the new China, and he had the paramount relationship with party history, national history and the history of the Chinese Revolution; and, of course, the construction of the new China. We also focus more on how he led the Chinese people to construct a modern communist China starting from the feudal poverty of the past. He sacrificed a lot for the people throughout his life” (Interviewee 33).*

An academic researcher also remarked, *“Mao made a great contribution to the army, the party and the country. Mao has a very high reputation in the heart of the Chinese nation. His dedication to the country cannot be written out of human history or Chinese history”* (Interviewee 36).

In addition, the Chinese government wants people, especially Chinese youth, to know what a big sacrifice the pioneers made to create a better life for later generations who have greatly benefitted from Mao’s contribution to their country. A government official noted that, *“Public opinion can be affected through understanding the great achievements of Mao”* (Interviewee 34). An official, government employed tour guide said, *“The main reason for the government developing and promoting Red Tourism in Shaoshan is to promote Mao’s revolutionary spirit”* (Interviewee 19). Another government official claimed that, *“The main reason for the government developing and promoting Red Tourism in Shaoshan is to propagate tales of Mao’s heroism”* (Interviewee 16). An academic researcher drew the following conclusion, *“The government wants to use Mao’s image and the principles presented in Shaoshan to inspire the people and guide them, especially the younger generations, and to let them know about the difficulties overcome and the tremendous sacrifices of the pioneers”* (Interviewee 36).

Undoubtedly, Mao’s contribution to CCP history and the founding of the PRC was immense and crucial. Perhaps it is not surprising that controversial issues such as ‘The People’s Commune’, ‘The Great Leap Forward’ and ‘The Cultural Revolution’ have no place in the exhibitions. For example, the Mao Memorial Museum’s exhibits have downplayed these aberrations. A team member involved in planning the Mao Memorial Museum exhibits explained that:

*“The Mao Memorial Museum requires the presentation of Mao’s life systematically, entirely and correctly. However, the exhibits were designed to show Mao in the best possible light. Thus, for the Cultural Revolution there is only one photograph displayed of Mao meeting the Red Guards in Tiananmen Square. Mao did some good things during this period; for example, he protected the old cadres, specialists and scholars; he criticised Jiangqing [Mao’s wife] and the ‘Gang of Four’; and he proposed the theory of ‘Three Practices’ to enhance the national economy. These positive things are, of course, displayed prominently. Regarding the now discredited activities and struggles in the Cultural Revolution, they are not good, and won’t be on show”* (Interviewee 35).

Arguably, it is natural that the Chinese government promotes Mao in the best light possible in order to have a positive influence on visitors. Nothing will be allowed to impede the Chinese government's intentions behind Red Tourism, especially the consolidation of CCP rule. Of course, people do want to show their personal respect for Mao. A government official observed:

*"You can see tourists of all ages coming to Shaoshan. They come to Shaoshan of their own free will. It is a period of more freedom. People no longer just do what they are told to do. They have a demand, including a feeling of respect for Mao, which can give them a positive drive; so they visit Shaoshan irrespective of state propaganda"* (Interviewee 29).

It can be concluded that the Chinese government's original intentions behind Red Tourism are about the promotion of the history of the CCP and Mao. The history of the CCP and that of Mao are inseparable. The Chinese government wants to utilise the messages in its promotion of the history of the CCP and Mao to maintain its one-party rule.

#### **6.4 The cult of worship of Mao Zedong and its unintended consequences**

Many Chinese people show their respect for Mao; however, some of them worship Mao Zedong in a quasi-religious way. Moore claims that, *"In China, Chairman Mao is still bigger than Jesus"* (Moore, 25<sup>th</sup> December 2013). This cult of worship is similar to how Chinese people in the past worshipped Confucius (the Chinese philosopher and teacher who founded Confucianism). Confucianism is a philosophical and cultural set of beliefs which in dynastic times governed most aspects of Chinese life, and retains much influence to this day (Yan and Bramwell, 2008).

##### *6.4.1 The cult of worship of Mao Zedong*

Actually, the Mao cult emerged as far back as the 1940s when Mao appeared prominently on propaganda posters, despite his somewhat ambivalent admonitions on the cult of personality. However, the glorification of Mao in the latter part of the 1960's was unprecedented. (Chinese posters online, 14<sup>th</sup> December, 2015).

Under Lin Biao, the People's Liberation Army was used more and more to reinforce the cult of Mao, displaying posters which projected a deified image of Mao Zedong. This could not have been done without the agreement of Mao.

Mao was portrayed as a generous father, invoking in the process the Confucian ideals of filial duty and social order (Chineseposters online, 14<sup>th</sup> December, 2015).

Portrayals of Mao had to comply with CCP guidelines and contain an approved message. One of the most extraordinary examples of this genre is the work entitled 'Chairman Mao goes to Anyuan'. This painting and poster became a *cause célèbre* and "*perhaps the most important painting of the Cultural Revolution period*" (Chineseposters online, 14<sup>th</sup> December, 2015). The young Mao is shown in this painting en route to Anyuan to lead a strike by local mineworkers. This has not been reproduced in this thesis in view of image copyright restrictions.

Liu explains how the painting conformed to doctrinal guidelines replete with value-laden symbolism:

*"To put him in a focal position, we placed Chairman Mao in the forefront of the painting, advancing towards us like a rising sun bringing hope to the people. Every line of the Chairman's figure embodies the great thoughts of Mao Zedong and in portraying his journey we strove to give significance to every small detail. His head held high in the act of surveying the scene before him conveys his revolutionary spirit, undaunted before danger and violence and courageous in struggle and in 'daring to win'; his clenched fist depicts his revolutionary will, scorning all sacrifice, and his determination to surmount every difficulty to emancipate China and mankind demonstrating his confidence in victory. The old umbrella under his right arm demonstrates his hard-working style of travelling, in all weather over great distances, across the mountains and rivers, for the revolutionary cause.... The hair grown long in a very busy life is blown by the autumn wind. His long plain gown, fluttering in the wind, is a harbinger of the approaching revolutionary storm.... With the arrival of our great leader, blue skies appear over Anyuan. The hills, sky, trees and clouds are the means used artistically to evoke a grand image of the red sun in our hearts. Riotous clouds are drifting swiftly past. They indicate that Chairman Mao is arriving in Anyuan at a critical point of sharp class struggle and show, in contrast, how tranquil, confident and determined Chairman Mao is at that moment"* (Zheng, 2008:126).

The portrayal of Mao had to be in line with the guide-lines laid down by the party. Mao's image became more divine with the passage of time. Typically, he was presented in an almost other-worldly demeanour, floating high above the 'masses' (Chineseposters online, 14<sup>th</sup> December, 2015).

Amid the developing Cultural Revolution, Mao's image featured in every household, sometimes in portrait form, but also in busts or statues. For a home

not to have a Mao likeness on display meant a family could be viewed with suspicion. Were the occupants harbouring counter revolutionary tendencies or unwilling to accept Mao's key role in Chinese political life? For the bulk of the population, the chosen image of Mao would usually be placed, god like, in the most prominent part of the family altar, although it should be remembered that the altars were later destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, by the Red Guards (Chinese posters online, 14<sup>th</sup> December, 2015).

Following the Cultural Revolution, the beatification and idolatry of Mao and his wonderful achievements came to an abrupt end. The ushering in of economic reform and the Open Door policy of the eighties, meant that the images associated during Mao's lifetime were replaced with posters devoid of ideological content; now, the emphasis was on the need for the reconstruction of the economy alongside the commercial advertisements associated with a market economy. Nevertheless, the quasi-divine Mao did make a short comeback in the early nineties. The outbreak of 'Mao Fever' coincided with the centenary of Mao's birth. The issue of the new 100 yuan bank note on the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the PRC bears adequate testimony to the enduring power of Mao's image (Figure 6-2 and Figure 6-3). Mao features on the notes still in use to this day. Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin were portrayed in posters as the "three generations of leaders" to mark the anniversary, an acknowledgement of Mao's continuing value to the new leaders (Chinese posters online, 14<sup>th</sup> December, 2015).

**Figure 6-2: The first version of the 100 yuan bank note issued in 1987.**



**Figure 6-3: The new 100 yuan bank note issued in 1999.**



Before 1976, the year marking the end of the Cultural Revolution and also of Mao's death, the cult of Mao looked as if it was designed to signal to the party that Mao Zedong was in power. That is, of course, no longer the case. However, along with the boom in Red Tourism, more and more people go to Shaoshan in unorganised visits specifically to worship Mao. On the 120<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Mao's birth, many peasants and buses full of Maoists made their way to Shaoshan, often sporting branded clothing and green revolutionary caps; with their smart phones ready for the inevitable selfies. Those attending were in a heightened state of excitement intent on a joyous celebration of Mao's life. This perhaps sat uneasily with the CCP's policy of eschewing the over-spectacular occasion in an attempt to use simplicity in order to regain the confidence of the masses. *"Xi Jinping [the president] himself told the leaders here in Shaoshan that there should be no gala, no singing, no dancing and no big events,"* said one employee working for a tourist concession. (Moore, 25th December 2013). Yet people continue to use many traditional ways to pay their respects to Mao.

A team member involved in the planning of the Mao Memorial Museum exhibits claimed that, *"There are superstitious values present in the worship of Mao Zedong at Shaoshan. It is very natural when, during the Chinese Spring Festival, people place a pig before Mao's statue to pay homage to him"* (Interviewee 35). This resembles a traditional religious offering. An academic researcher added,

*"You can see many places where people put up Mao's photograph on the wall in their living room. They burn incense and pay homage to Mao just like they pay homage to Buddha. What they do is spontaneous, and*



*not because the government has asked them to do it. You will also notice that drivers hang a photograph of Mao in their cars in order to bring good luck and avoid disaster. Even when people build a house in the countryside, they paint Mao's image on the roof just like a homely household god. It is a common sight. This has emerged from our traditional ethnic culture" (Interviewee 39).*

Another academic researcher suggested a possible reason why some members of the general public still worship Mao:

*"The purpose for developing Red Tourism is related to our culture, such as Fengshui [For example, the location of a house or tomb is supposed to have an influence on the fortune of a family]. For example, many local people and tour guides in Shaoshan will talk about the dragon root [In ancient China, a dragon stands for the emperor and the 'dragon root' represents the elements required to be an emperor]. One of the reasons that Mao Zedong could win power was because he was a descendant of the dragon. These ideas may not be the same as communist ideology, but you cannot separate them when you talk about the popularity of Red Tourism. When people go to visit any successful historical figure's hometown, they want to see whether one can copy his conditions; whether one can build a house like his; whether one can have some dragon root so that one's offspring can enjoy the benefit from it. Not all the tourists to Shaoshan go at the expense of the state. A lot of visitors visit Shaoshan out of their own pocket. The reasons are for worshipping iconic figures and for traditional culture as well" (Interviewee 39).*

It was suggested by a different academic researcher that:

*"Businessmen go to Shaoshan to worship Mao in the hope of earning more money; students go to Shaoshan to worship Mao in order to help them get places in better universities; some restaurants display a Mao's statue replica in the hope of more customers. All of this shows that Mao is still an important figure in the people's eyes. Otherwise people will not pay homage to him" (Interviewee 38).*

While worshipping Mao as a saint or powerful icon is by no means universal, it is quite common for officials go to Shaoshan to pay homage to Mao. The officials sometimes pay homage to Mao for related but different reasons from the general populace. A team member involved in the planning of the Mao Memorial Museum exhibits noted that, "*nowadays, even some politicians think that they cannot have the good fortune of obtaining an illustrious post in officialdom without going to pay homage to Mao* (Interviewee 35). An academic researcher agreed, '*Officials go to Shaoshan to pay homage to Mao to advance their career in the bureaucracy*" (Interviewee 38).

Whatever the reasons for people worshipping Mao, it can be seen that the cult of worship of Mao was encouraged by the government in earlier times, most

noticeably during the Cultural Revolution. However, the cult of worship is officially discouraged by the government today.

#### 6.4.2 Unintended consequences arising from the cult of worship of Mao

The cult of Mao continues to resonate strongly in China. This can be seen from the large number of the visitors who came to Shaoshan spontaneously on the 120<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Mao's birth. Large groups of Maoists prostrated themselves in front of a solid likeness of Mao erected in his honour in the town of his birth (Moore, 26<sup>th</sup> December 2013) (Figure 6-4). However, in an address in Beijing China's President Xi called for a measure of perspective on the 120th anniversary of the former leader's birth:

*"Mao is a great figure who changed the face of the nation and led the Chinese people to a new destiny." But he added: "Revolutionary leaders are not gods, but human beings. We cannot worship them like gods or refuse to allow people to point out and correct their errors just because they are great. Neither can we totally repudiate them and erase their historical feats just because they made mistakes" (Moore, 26<sup>th</sup> December, 2013).*

An example of public worship to Mao is visually captured in Figure 6-4.

**Figure 6-4: Thousands of people celebrate the 120<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Mao's birth in Mao Square in Shaoshan on 25<sup>th</sup> December, 2013.**



(Source: [http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog\\_45deee280102eo2a.html](http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_45deee280102eo2a.html), 25<sup>th</sup> December, 2013)

President Xi Jinping's oration encapsulated the on-going quandary in which the CCP finds itself almost forty years after the death of Mao. In Beijing Xi, accompanied by six members of the Politburo went to Chairman Mao's mausoleum where they all lowered their heads before his statue. Meanwhile, in Shaoshan, the birthplace of Mao, several thousand people stayed up all night long, enjoying the firework display and dining for nothing on noodles provided by local restaurants (Moore, 2013).

The adoration of Mao by many ordinary people is viewed with suspicion by China's government. It seems that the continuing devotion to Mao has worried the authorities, as evidenced by the current government leader's statement. After Deng's Open-Door and reform policy, it seems that China has departed more and more from Mao's precepts; adopting the free market economy has resulted in an enormous disparity between the rich and poor. In those circumstances it is not surprising that many ordinary people yearn for the good old days of Mao's Communist China.

In line with the low-key stance adopted by the Party for the 120<sup>th</sup> anniversary, Mao's birthday anniversary failed to make the front page of the party's official newspaper, The People's Daily. He did make page seven where he was lauded as a brilliant "*proletarian revolutionary, strategist and theorist*". A full page article on Mao sat beside a leader writer telling readers that the "*best commemoration*" of Mao would be continue with the free market reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping (Moore, 2013).

The increasing enthusiasm for the worship of Mao creates a dilemma for the Chinese government. On the one hand, with much of its legitimacy resting on Mao's legacy, Mao's thirty years in power has rarely been subjected to an objective analysis precisely because the CCP needs to be associated with Mao in order to retain the support of the masses. In actual fact, the present CCP leadership feels it necessary to immerse itself even more in Maoist invective as a cover perhaps for its deepening commitment to a free market economy (Moore, 2013). On the other hand, the Chinese government does not want some people with ulterior motives to make use of the general respect for Mao to threaten its rule. The Bo Xilai scandal in 2012 is an example.

Bo Xilai was one of the former CCP regional leaders before being toppled during one of the worst scandals to emerge in China in recent years. As party leader in Chongqing in south-western China, he became well-known there for promoting China's communist past, alluding tirelessly to the morality of Mao's China, and encouraging public performances of 'red songs'. Bo Xilai had a substantial following in the less affluent parts of Chongqing but his populism alienated many party members and was also causing consternation among the CCP leadership in Beijing, a fact noted by political analysts (<http://www.bbc.co.uk>, 22<sup>nd</sup> September, 2013). Beech remarked how, "*Rifts between those who supported Bo's neo-Maoist leadership style and others pushing for further market-oriented reforms have been laid bare, betraying dissent within a party desperate to portray itself as united*" (Beech, 7<sup>th</sup> May, 2012).

The resulting political dilemma was also reflected in the responses of the government officials who were interviewed. When a government official was interviewed, he explained that, "*These ways of paying homage to Mao only take place on specific dates; for instance, the Chinese spring festival, or Mao's birthday. People will often use traditional ways like burning paper money and lighting incense. It is rarely seen on normal days*" (Interviewee 17).

Nearly all the views expressed by government officials interviewed on Mao worship were hostile to it. A team member involved in the planning of the Mao Memorial Museum exhibits claimed that, "*There are superstitious values present in the worship of Mao Zedong at Shaoshan. But we will not promulgate these*" (Interviewee 35). A government official noted that, "*These superstitious values do not have official approval. From our point of view, even though the ways of honouring Mao are accepted by Chinese tradition, idolatry is not something we would encourage*" (Interviewee 17). A government official responded in the same vein: "*Superstitious values are not advocated by the Chinese government*" (Interviewee 29). And a government official noted that, "*These superstitious values are held by many people. The Chinese government will not promote them and, on the contrary, is opposed to them*" (Interviewee 30).

Thus, the Chinese government actively discourages superstitious values in the worship of Mao. A government official said that, “*There is definitely government-sponsored education against superstitious values like this*” (Interviewee 30). Another government official stated that, “*We strongly oppose superstitious values. We require the tourism administrator to train the tour guides strictly. Fairy tales and superstitions are not allowed*” (Interviewee 32). Another government official said that:

*“You can talk about any facts no matter how ridiculous they appear to be. For example, on the day of the ceremony for unveiling Mao’s statue in Shaoshan Square, the sun and moon both appeared at the same time in the sky. There is, however, no need to describe this event in a superstitious manner. We asked the tour guides to follow this rule”* (Interviewee 29).

A government official concurred:

*“This kind of superstitious value comes from worship over a long period of time. People think Mao was great and gradually came to see Mao as a god. We asked the tour guides not to encourage tourists into being superstitious. Actually, many things happened in Shaoshan which were truly fantastic. But we do not allow the tour guides to publicize these things. For example, the truck that carried Mao’s bronze statue to Shaoshan stopped abruptly in Jing Gangshan which was the base of the Chinese Red Army. Next day, the truck started immediately without any attention from a mechanic. Unusual or supernatural?”* (Interviewee 32)

A similar statement was made by a team member involved in the planning of the Mao Memorial Museum exhibits: “*We have already instructed the guides in the Mao Memorial Museum not to mention these mystical events*” (Interviewee 35).

Besides the officials, the academic researchers in educational organisations (in China closely aligned to the government) also supported the Chinese government’s discouragement of superstitious values. It must be understood that education and politics in China are very much inter-connected and are meant to be ‘conflict-free’. One academic researcher claimed, for example, that, “*Our government will not advocate this; the state promulgates a normal education. But folk belief exists. What we can do is to guide them and help it to be seen in context*” (Interviewee 36). Another academic researcher noted that, “*Probably elderly people have more superstitious values. I do not share them myself*” (Interviewee 37).

The Chinese government discourages people from openly displaying their superstitious values in the worship of Mao and this seems to be in complete accord with the atheism of the CCP. Associating Mao with superstition is considered to be disrespectful to his legacy. A government official claimed that, *“Superstitious values are not scientific. I personally think that they do challenge our country’s belief system. As for Mao, we need to treat this historical figure rationally”* (Interviewee 17). Another government official confirmed how:

*“This is not right because, after all, even though Mao was a great man, he was not a god. Fairy tales and superstitions are harmful to the image of Mao. First of all, Mao was a real character, not a god. He was a leader of the CCP. He was the architect of the People’s Republic of China. Idolizing Mao will divorce Mao from the masses. As we are the legitimate administrative authority, we should promulgate the fact that Mao identified himself with the masses; he was not a deity and all-powerful. Superstitious values damage Mao’s image”* (Interviewee 32).

An academic researcher also noted that, *“I do not think it is good. It distorts Mao’s life history and can affect the education of young people. It is easy to produce conflicting values. But people do have superstitious values and also make use of them to earn money. This is why we should regulate it”* (Interviewee 36).

However, even though the Chinese government does not approve of the superstitious values present in the worship of Mao, government officials and academic researchers sometimes adopt a more ambivalent and tolerant stance. A government official claimed that, *“There are superstitious values present in the worship of Mao Zedong at Shaoshan. It can be understood as an emotional show of respect for Mao”* (Interviewee 16). Another government official further stated that, *“Of course, people have the freedom to hold them [superstitious beliefs]. Worshipping Mao is not necessarily superstitious”* (Interviewee 17). A further government official considered:

*“But we cannot stop the general public having some superstitious values. It is because of their feeling of love and respect for Mao. I personally think it is also related to Chinese traditional culture. For example, Chinese people will sweep the ancestral graves on Tomb-Sweeping Day. People worship ancestors during the Chinese Spring Festival and the Ancestors’ Festival. Many tourists coming to Shaoshan think of Mao as their ancestor. That is why there is a superstitious aspect to the worship of Mao”* (Interviewee 29).

Additionally, one government official also showed his lack of concern for apparent state fear:

*“Superstitious values have existed in Chinese tradition for a long time. That is why many people gradually came to accept Mao as a Buddha or a god. It is normal. The Chinese social system developed in a feudal society; so many people still worship a deity in their everyday life. In Chinese history, many deities were created from great men, for example, Guanyu. Guanyu was a Chinese warrior in ancient times. Because of his loyalty, he was regarded over time as a god by the people. Mao is also like that. They can become an idol, and eventually be deified. This is quite normal in China” (Interviewee 32).*

The reasons for the superstitious values present in the worship of Mao Zedong were explained by one of the government officials:

*“There are some reasons for the superstitious values present in the worship of Mao Zedong at Shaoshan. Firstly, it has some relationship with Chinese tradition. The Chinese people always respect the worship of character. The worship of Mao in Chinese Revolutionary Culture was like that. Chinese people always in their hearts expect a good idol, a good emperor. Mao was a perfect human being to many citizens, which is one of the reasons for the superstitious values present in the worship of Mao Zedong at Shaoshan. Secondly, the development of a stronger and stronger China has been achieved as a result of the establishment of the PRC which was founded by Mao. People do not want to forget him. People want to show their appreciation of Mao. Thirdly, along with the rapid development of China, more and more corruption and corrupt officials have emerged in the party. The Party is going further and further away from the masses. People dislike corrupt officials hoarding money for themselves. So they want to worship Mao to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the Party and society. In their mind, Mao was a person eschewing self-interest; indeed, he lost six of his close relatives in the struggle for the Party’s existence. Mao set an example for everyone. The fourth reason is that in contemporary China, no matter the ordinary citizen or the Party member, all have a crisis of identity. They have no belief and no aim. Nothing. One aim they lack is communism. They feel that it is unattainable, and an unrealistic goal. It seems that socialism is worse than capitalism. They feel that Marxism, Leninism and Maoism seem to be out of date. These values are vague. There is nobody to help them solve the crisis in belief. However, as a human being, people need something to believe in. I can say now that more and more people are becoming religious. Some believe in god, some believe in Jesus, Buddhism, or the Goddess of Mercy; others believe in Mao. So the fact cannot be denied that some people regard Mao as a god in their mind and worship him as a god” (Interviewee 34).*

Thus, it is apparent that some of the government officials take it for granted that superstitious values are part of a value system that people have the freedom to believe in. A team member involved in the planning of the Mao Memorial Museum exhibits said that, *“People can show their appreciation for Mao and at the same time can make themselves feel better. We will not forbid people from saying what they think and doing what they want” (Interviewee 35).* A

government official agreed, *“There is freedom for people to believe what they want to”* (Interviewee 30). Another government official even claimed that, *“Superstitious values are not in conflict with the ideology of communism”* (Interviewee 16).

One of the academic researchers suggested that:

*“We should analyse objectively the superstitious values present in the worship of Mao Zedong at Shaoshan. How did these emerge? It is obvious that Mao, as a great man, has an important status in the eyes of the people. That is normal. Later, some people sought advantage from this, and they treated Mao publicly as a god”* (Interviewee 38).

Another academic researcher confirmed, *“I think it is first and foremost a kind of respect. After all, Mao was a great man and no matter what, his achievements were significant”* (Interviewee 37). Another academic researcher believed that:

*“The superstitious values present in the worship of Mao Zedong at Shaoshan should be seen from a historical point of view. When an American journalist interviewed Mao in Yan’an, he asked Mao: ‘Can I take it that the communism you advocate is a religion?’ Mao answered, ‘Yes, it is. This is one of my main objectives. The communism believed by the Chinese Communism Party members is our final aim; embracing communism leads to paradise’. In fact, Chinese religious values are quite different from western ones like Christianity. Chinese people continually create new gods. For example, Guanyu who lived in the Three Kingdoms Period (220-180) came gradually to be seen as a god. He stood for loyalty, wealth and courage. People built temples to worship him. Actually, in Chinese culture, every human being has the opportunity to become a Buddha or a god, provided that he makes a major contribution and receives public approval. China’s religion and beliefs can be seen as a kind of pragmatism; that is, one believes in the people who can help one. The Chinese people have never had a monotheistic religion. From this point of view, it is understandable that some people say ‘communism is a religion and Mao is a god’”* (Interviewee 39).

The cult of Mao had its origins in the need to rally support for the Communist Party in its struggle for survival. However, it may provide a focus for opponents of the present regime and its cosying up to big business, as evidenced spectacularly in the case of Bo Xilai. This could be seen as an unintended consequence of the earlier promotion of the cult of worship. Fear of the possibility of unrest provoked by inequality and corruption in direct and stark contrast to Mao’s frugality and communist values, might possibly have been a major motive in shifting the focus of Red Tourism from promoting the CCP and Mao to promoting national unity in the second phase (2011-2015).



## **6.5 The Chinese government's additional political intentions behind the second phase of Red Tourism**

Instead of concentrating on the Communist Party and Mao, the new policy in the second phase of Red Tourism focused more on a nationalist approach. This approach looks back to the war against the invading Japanese Imperial Army, and also forward to the industrial and technological achievements of modern China. These are inevitably less controversial than the original political messages, such as those on display in Shaoshan. The industrial and technological achievements are there for all to see in everyday life, and Nationalism is a much easier way to unify a nation, a kind of lowest common denominator of political life everywhere. For instance, it is not associated with awkward questions regarding the ultra-rich and the poor. Zhijiang is an important site in the second phase of Red Tourism development in that it is dedicated to commemorating the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army. This site was Chiang Kai Shek's original choice for the Japanese surrender, although later it was changed for logistical reasons to Nanjing. The political messages at this site are directed much more towards the encouragement of national unity as opposed to be the communist revolution which is the main theme at Shaoshan.

### *6.5.1 Promotion of the progress made by the CCP since 1949, and the re-development of the Mao Memorial Museum*

The Chinese economy has developed extremely rapidly since the implementation of the Open-Door and reform policies put in place by Deng Xiaoping, but there have been identifiable downsides to the unprecedented growth, notably the resulting gross inequality. The Chinese government wants people to concentrate on the country's achievements and the great improvement in living standards of the masses as a consequence of the Open-Door and reform policies. Therefore, the second phase of Red Tourism (2011-2015) has been used as a vehicle for the promotion of the country's progress and improved standard of living for the vast bulk of the population.

A government official commented,

*“The progress and improvements that have been made in China since the reforms and opening-up to construct the socialist country have been*

*cited in the second phase of the Red Tourism planning. In order to celebrate the contribution made by previous generations, we adapted or incorporated relevant sites into patriotic education sites and Red Tourism sites. For example, the Xichang Satellite Launch Site” (Interviewee 33).*

The Xichang Satellite Launch site is in Xichang, Sichuan Province. It is one of three such main space launch bases in China, and during the second phase it was formally designated a Red Tourism site. It seems clear that the government wants to make people aware of the development of space travel in China and generate a popular feeling of pride in the nation’s development of the space industry. Given the spectacular industrial and technological developments of the last two decades, it seems likely that tourists will take pride in their country’s achievements.

Furthermore, the development of infrastructure and improved services at the Red Tourism sites has mirrored the many such improvements in everyday life in China since 1980. An academic researcher claimed:

*“The infrastructural progress and general improvements in the economy that have been made in China are prominently on display at the Red Tourism sites. You can feel it from the improved roads, and new buildings including hotels, restaurants and shops, etc. They are very good now, much better than before. Services too have gradually improved and are now of a good standard” (Interviewee 37).*

An academic researcher used Shaoshan as an example to express a very similar view:

*“The economic progress and general improvements that have been made in China are presented at Red Tourism sites. But I do not think it is an explicit theme. For example, I went to Shaoshan twenty years ago. Recently I went there again. I could sense the progress and improvements by seeing the better transportation, the appearance of the town and surrounding villages, and the more productive agriculture during my trip. They do not need to be referred to explicitly. If the government wants to show the progress made, it can be done in pictures without comment. For example, you can compare the photographs of Mao running the night school with the current life style at Shaoshan. You will be aware of the progress and improvements which have been made in China. The progress and improvements are conspicuous, the change never-ending” (Interviewee 39).*

The Chinese government’s additional political intentions behind the second phase of Red Tourism involve not only promoting the progress made by the CCP since 1949, but also taking the opportunity to update the public image of Mao and the history of the CCP. The re-development of the Mao Memorial

Museum allowed the authorities to achieve both objectives. The original Mao Memorial Museum was completed and subsequently opened in 1964 (Figure 6-5). It is the focal point of the Shaoshan Patriotic Education Demonstration Base and it is the only museum that systematically presents Mao Zedong's life in its entirety (<http://www.ssly.gov.cn>, 2009). It is generally considered the most important place to visit among the many interesting sites in Shaoshan.

In 2008, a new Exhibition Hall next to the Mao Memorial Museum was opened (Figure 6-6).

**Figure 6-5: The original Mao's museum in Shaoshan**



(Source: <http://www.ssly.gov.cn>, 2009)

**Figure 6-6: The Mao Zedong Exhibition Hall which was opened in 2008.**



(Source: The researcher, 2014).

A government official explained some key reasons for the construction of the Mao Exhibition Hall:

*“In 2006, the Central Government proposed the No.1 project, that is, a project for the construction of several major revolutionary Red sites, for example, Jingganshan, Shaoshan, and Yan’an as Patriotic Education sites. The most important of the projects was the reconstruction of Mao’s Memorial Museum. At that time, some of Mao’s personal belongings which were on show in Shaoshan were no longer in prime condition due to the poorly maintained environment. Therefore, in order to better preserve Mao’s personal belongings, the Mao Exhibition Hall was built as a matter of priority. It was designed as a single large exhibition hall with constant temperature and humidity to protect the exhibits; safety features were included in the design. The exhibits in the transparent showcases can easily be observed; while being protected in their constant environment housings. The Mao Exhibition Hall was completed and opened to the public in 2008” (Interviewee 17).*

Another government official also explained the reason for a delay in commencing the work required in the Mao Memorial Museum:

*“The reconstruction of the Mao Memorial Museum could not be conducted at the same time as the Mao Exhibition Hall. Otherwise, tourists would come here with no museum to visit. Thus, the reconstruction of Mao’s Memorial Museum can only be implemented*

*after the completion and inauguration of Mao's Exhibition Hall"* (Interviewee 33).

The re-development of the Mao Memorial Museum was a priority. A government official elaborated on this:

*"There are two things in need of improvement. First of all, the original museum which was built in 1964 was too small and the building had developed structural defects. Secondly, there were not enough exhibits to accurately reflect Mao's whole life, even though many additions had been made since its opening. The Mao Memorial Museum should show Mao's life in its entirety, including his immense contribution to the Chinese revolution and also world revolution. Thus, the exhibits needed to be enriched and improved"* (Interviewee 34).

This was corroborated by a government official: *"The reason for the reconstruction of the Mao Memorial Museum is because the exhibits and the display arrangements needed to be updated to meet the improved standards expected by today's visitors"* (Interviewee 16). Another government official explained, *"The display of Mao's personal belongings requires the benefit of modern technology to prevent them deteriorating further"* (Interviewee 30). In addition, a team member involved in the planning of the Mao Memorial Museum exhibits noted that, *"2013 is the 120<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Mao's Birth, and this provides an appropriate opportunity for the opening of the new museum"* (Interviewee 35).

Thus, it was considered that the new museum needed to be built to the highest specification. A government official stated that, *"The new museum should comply with the requirements of advanced modern technology. For example, there were no fire exits in the old museum. All security issues should be considered in the new museum due to the marked increase in visitors"* (Interviewee 33).

On 26<sup>th</sup> December 2013, on the 120<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Mao's birth, the Mao Memorial Museum was formally re-opened on the original site (Figure 6-7).



**Figure 6-7: The rebuilt Mao Zedong Memorial Museum re-opened on 26<sup>th</sup> December 2013.**



(Source: The researcher, 2014).


The focus of the Memorial Museum is very much on Mao's life history. It highlights Mao's role during China's journey from a feudal and semi-colonial society characterized by traditional structures, to the foundation of a modern state (Figure 6-8, Figure 6-9 and Figure 6-10).

**Figure 6-8: Reconstruction of the moment when Mao urged the people to take charge of their own destiny on 1<sup>st</sup> October 1949 from the top of a Tiananmen building.**



(Source: The researcher, 2014).

**Figure 6-9: Reconstruction of the room in which Mao wrote 'On the Protracted War' in a Yan'an cave dwelling.**



(Source: The researcher, 2014).

**Figure 6-10: Reconstruction of the moment of Mao's return to Shaoshan.**



(Source: The researcher, 2014).

The museum reflects the most important developments of the time leading to the mass phenomenon of Maoism, and it also depicts the intense penetration of everyday life with political propaganda.

The Mao Exhibition Hall (which opened in 2008) and the reconstructed Mao Memorial Museum are adjacent to each other. The Mao Memorial Museum, in the past focussed primarily on Mao's revolutionary process, but now also praises Mao for his incorruptibility. What does this change say about China today (Ho and Youngdec, 2013)? According to Timothy (2002: xix):

*“Visitors to the museum will have the opportunity to see, and understand the significance of objects that once played a part in our colourful past. A first-hand contact with former events will contribute to a better understanding of the origins and growth of present community interests and activities, and may assist in decision-making on current problems. The museum has the potential to become an important and influential public service facility”.*

As the 120th anniversary of his birth approached, Mao Zedong's persona has been reinvented. The Central Government attached high importance to the reconstruction of the Mao Memorial Museum. A team member involved in planning the Mao Memorial Museum exhibits commented that, *“The government invested more than 200 million Yuan in the reconstruction of the Mao Memorial Museum”* (Interviewee 35). However, at Shaoshan's Mao Exhibition Hall, a subtle reinvention of Mao's legacy emerged depicting him as an incorruptible government official rather than a revolutionary. The changes took place over a considerable period of time, and they went largely unnoticed.

Mao passed away in 1976, but for a long time after Mao remained a dominant figure in the everyday life of China's masses. The Communist Party's official declaration of 1981 that he had committed serious errors during the latter part of his life had little effect on Mao's popularity. To this day, Shaoshan tourists go up to Mao's statue, lower their heads three times, and walk round the base making a wish in Mao's name (Figure 6-11). Taxi drivers often hang Mao talismans from their rear -view mirrors (Ho and Youngdec, 2013), as well as that of the Buddha.



**Figure 6-11: The statue of Mao in the Memorial Square in Shaoshan**



(Source: The researcher, 2014).

The museum has also downplayed the revolutionary line. A team member involved in planning the exhibitions plan for the Mao Memorial Museum claimed that,

*“The Mao Memorial Museum requires the presentation of Mao’s life chronologically, entirely and correctly. However, the exhibits were designed to show Mao in the best possible light. Thus, for the Cultural Revolution, there is only one photograph, that of Mao meeting the Red Guards in Tiananmen Square. Mao did some good things during this period. For example, he protected the old cadres, specialists and scholars; criticised Jiangqing [Mao’s wife] and the ‘Gang of Four’; and he proposed the theory of ‘Three Practices’ to enhance the national economy. These positive events are, of course exhibited. Regarding the now discredited activities and struggles during the Cultural Revolution, they will not be exhibited” (Interviewee 35).*

It is true that the CCP leadership never comments in public about Mao’s failings and resulting calamities, for example, the mass starvation of the late 1950s and the Cultural Revolution. As far as the party is concerned, such events are a purely internal matter. However, the CCP still justifies its entitlement to one-party rule by its earlier success in bringing to an end the shameful history of

western imperial domination and regaining China's national independence (Wang, 2008).

On the eve of the 120th anniversary, Shaoshan's museum underwent a substantial makeover. The Exhibition Hall contains many of Mao's possessions used in his everyday life. On display are his crockery, cutlery, furniture, clothing, books and writing-paper. Now the displays are state-of-the-art modernity. Instead of library of books in a glass case, visitors can page through electronic texts using a touch screen (Figure 6-12).

**Figure 6-12: Mao's shoes, belt and stockings.**



(Source: The researcher, 2014).

The display of personal effects is not a recent innovation in Chinese museums. But what is new is that these relics in Shaoshan tell a tale of Mao the incorruptible officer rather than Mao as communist revolutionary. The presence of toothpowder, for instance, shows that Mao lived in the same manner as the masses for whom toothpaste was an unaffordable luxury (toothpaste does make an appearance in later displays). His receipts are included to demonstrate that Mao lived a simple life in which nothing was wasted. His account books prove that his finances were in order, while his letters show that he never obtained special favours or jobs for his relatives (Ho and Youngdec, 2013).

Mao's reinvention as the model officer of the state was timely in that corruption is viewed by the public as being a serious problem in China; these days the newspapers regularly have articles on yet another corrupt official being exposed during a routine investigation and given an exemplary punishment. Indeed, the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, in his first year in power, demanded that dishonest "flies and tigers" be expelled from government posts by which he meant respectively low-level officials as well as high ranking managers (Ho and Youngdec, 2013). In all, the Mao Exhibition Hall is like a window into Mao's life, from which visitors are guided into drawing certain critical economic, political and social conclusions through the carefully-designed displays.

It is not just the Mao Exhibition Hall which emphasises Mao's accomplishments and frugality; this trend is also presented in the new Mao Memorial Museum. For example, there is an updated display called "There is a great man Mao Zedong in China" which is like pages in a book and uses the modern technology of Spectra Vision 3D Dynamic Imaging to show Mao's great achievements (<http://www.ssl.gov.cn>, 2009). (Figure 6-13 and Figure 6-14).

**Figure 6-13: inside the Mao Memorial Museum (i).**



(Source: The researcher, 2014).



**Figure 6-14: inside the Mao Memorial Museum (ii).**



(Source: The researcher, 2014).

The displays in the Mao Memorial Museum have been re-developed since it re-opened in 2013 on the 120<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Mao's birth, with ten new sections presenting Mao's life. However, only eight sections required revision in the museum in 2003 for the 110<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Mao's birth. Two additional sections have since been added. They are Section 5 'The First Big Step in the Sinicization of Marxism' and Section 10 'Laying the Foundation for Socialist Modernization'.

The team member involved in planning the exhibition for the Mao Memorial Museum explained how:

*"The exhibits are shown according to the history of Mao himself and are combined with the history of the CCP. The main change is in the section which expounds Mao's ideology, a variant of Marxism appropriate for largely peasant societies and often referred to as Marxism-Leninism. The original fifth section was about Mao's life but now the primary focus is on Mao's ideology. This is the main change in the exhibits. The fifth section is mainly concerned with Mao's important works and theories. The fifth section embodies Mao's three ideologies on the establishment of the CCP, Marxism with a Chinese characteristics, and armed struggle. The first five sections show Mao's life and ideology during the period of the democratic revolution. The latter five sections are devoted to Mao's life during the period of socialism. The tenth section highlights Mao's*

*personal contributions through the creation of the People's Liberation Army, building the party and establishing diplomatic relations. In the previous version, Mao's contributions were dispersed in separate parts rather than being logically integrated in one section" (Interviewee 35).*

Apart from this section, the second phase of Red Tourism is dedicated to promoting the progress made by the CCP since 1949, and through the example of the re-development of the Mao Memorial Museum in Shaoshan, the Chinese government is shifting the focus from the history of the CCP and Mao to contemporary achievements, which is a non-controversial theme intended to encourage national pride among the populace and consolidate CCP rule.

#### *6.5.2 Promotion of national unity and the re-development of the Zhijiang site commemorating the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army*

The later Red Tourism sites cover Chinese history from 1840 until the present day, concentrating on the Sino-British Opium Wars, the humiliation of the Japanese invasion of 1894, and the western nations' strategic control of the coastal area, including Shanghai, Qingdao, Macao, Hong Kong and Taiwan (occupied by the Japanese for half a century). An academic researcher put it thus:

*"In the second phase of Red Tourism planning, content was not limited to the CCP, but now included history about the struggle against imperialism and feudalism, and the war against the Japanese Imperial Army. These events and the places where they took place were considered to be worthy of commemoration. The time frame for messages presented at Red Tourism sites in the second phase was expanded to include the period from 1840 to 1919" (Interviewee 38).*

This view was echoed by another academic researcher:

*"In present-day China, ideologies are of little importance in Chinese politics. People look back to the history after 1840, starting with the Sino-British Opium Wars, and how the Chinese people were bullied into submission. Self reliance became an essential virtue. The attitude to this period of history may be criticised as being nationalistic. But, nationalism is necessary. A country without nationalism cannot be a nation state. I don't think nationalism is a derogatory term. It is neutral" (Interviewee 39).*

The term 'nationalism' is understood differently in China compared with in the West. From the western point of view, nationalism is often viewed pejoratively and seen as a sort of political parochialism, while in China nationalism usually has a positive connotation. A government official claimed that, "*when we talk about nationalism and patriotism, we do not make a distinction between them*"

(Interviewee 40). To the Chinese people, there is no substantial difference between nationalism and patriotism. Nationalism reflects a national spirit; and it is easy to arouse a feeling of national pride. The academic researcher further explained:

*“It is important for the later Red Tourism sites covering Chinese history from 1840 until the present day to face history objectively. That is to say, not only the great men and events during the communist revolutionary period, but also many lesser-known people from much earlier in our history who made a major contribution to the struggle for national independence and the progress of society. Relevant events should be included in the scope of Red Tourism. It is also worth looking at a more broad-based history than hitherto. Red Tourism should, therefore, present information not only about the history of the CCP, but also about the history of the whole nation, which must include the Kuomintang, and the Qing dynasty as well. Red culture should be a kind of national spirit of the whole nation”* (Interviewee 38).

Engendering a national spirit, an important component of nationalism, has recently become a key political intention of China’s government which seeks to remind people about Chinese history and thus to promote national unity. A government official commented:

*“Besides the history of the CCP, Red Tourism sites also record the history of the country and the history of the development of modern China. They are good sites for educating our citizens and helping them to remember the history of China. The national spirit, the revolutionary spirit and their associated values are prominent in Red Tourism sites, as are their roots. [A Chinese saying goes, ‘Every river has a source; every tree has its roots’.] They have a growing influence on us. The main reason for the government developing and promoting Red Tourism in China is to enhance the national spirit”* (Interviewee 33).

Another government official adhered to the same line of thought: *“The single most important reason for the government developing and promoting Red Tourism in several places in China is to increase the national spirit. ‘Red’ in Red Tourism stands for that spirit”* (Interviewee 41).


The switch of focus to national unity perhaps has an additional benefit for the CCP. It may deflect mounting criticism that the CCP is departing too far from its founding father’s principles, especially in respect of the growing inequality of recent years. Perhaps it was anticipated that it would be better to shift tourists’ attention from the CCP’s failings to the safer ground of national pride. The best example of this type of site is that in Zhijiang, which is dedicated to

commemorating the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army. A government official confirmed:

*“Zhijiang is a memorial place for the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army. Victory in the Sino-Japanese war was vital for the Chinese nation. The historical fact that the Japanese Imperial Army signed the surrender document here is significant and future generations need to know this”* (Interviewee 30).

The original commemorating arch in Zhijiang was built in February 1947 and completed on 30<sup>th</sup> August 1947 (Figure 6-15). However, in October 1966 during the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards in Zhijiang destroyed the commemorating arch due to the inscriptions of the KMT leaderships on it (Figure 6-16).

**Figure 6-15: The original commemorating arch in Zhijiang.**



(Source: The researcher, 2014).



**Figure 6-16: The original record of the Japanese surrender carved in a stone and damaged by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution.**



(Source: The researcher, 2014).

In 1982, a decision was taken to rebuild the Zhijiang site. One of the reasons was that the Japanese government ordered parts of their textbooks to be rewritten in 1982. They changed 'invaded China' to 'entered China' in their textbooks which inflamed Chinese public indignation (Xinhua News Agency, 6<sup>th</sup> April, 2005). As a result, the Hunan government approved the re-construction of the Zhijiang Commemorating Arch at the end of 1982 and in 1985, the structural work was completed (Figure 6-17). The government had an additional motive for this development after the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989; the CCP leaders realized that historical education on national humiliation could be an effective device for the regime to legitimize its rule. Shortly, after the Tiananmen incident Zhijiang Museum was built in 21<sup>st</sup> August 1993 (Figure 6-18); the remaining parts of the Zhijiang site were completed and opened to the public in 1995.



**Figure 6-17: Re-construction of Zhijiang Commemorating Arch in 1985.**



(Source: <http://www.chnzj.gov.cn/Item/4229.aspx> , 20<sup>th</sup> March, 2015).

**Figure 6-18: Zhijiang Museum was completed by 21<sup>st</sup> August 1993.**



(Source: The researcher, 2014).

Messages about national pride and patriotism among the Chinese people are presented throughout the Zhijiang site. The original furnishings and artefacts in the building, the exhibits and photographs in the museum and, of course, the memorial arch, present messages about national pride and patriotism to the Chinese people which are extremely effective. For example, Figure 6-19 and Figure 6-20 portray notorious crimes committed by the Japanese Imperial Army soldiers. These caused outrage among the visitors, enhancing their patriotic feelings. Figure 6-21 is a photograph of an oil painting of the surrender ceremony in the hall at the entrance to Zhijiang museum which filled tourists with national pride as they made their way into the museum.

**Figure 6.19: photographs displayed in Zhijiang museum.**



(Source: The researcher, 2014).

**Figure 6-20: photographs displayed in Zhijiang museum.**



(Source: The researcher, 2014).

**Figure 6-21: oil painting of the surrender ceremony in the hall at the entrance to Zhijiang museum.**



(Source: The researcher, 2014).



The Zhijiang site displays politically-loaded messages directed particularly at younger visitors and these may have had some success in shifting attention from perceived CCP failings to a feeling of national pride in the liberation of China from Japanese occupation. A government official claimed that, *“the Zhijiang site embodies the national spirit for defending the nation against foreign invasion. Zhijiang is where the final battle was waged in the campaign against the Japanese Imperial Army (JIA) and also the site for the surrender of the JIA. It evokes the national spirit”* (Interviewee 33).

Another government official concurred:

*“The Zhijiang site represents an anti-war spirit, a spirit of nationalism, and the spirit of the Chinese nation. This spirit is characterised by an unyielding resistance and a feeling of pride and exhilaration. Some Red Tourism sites, like Yan’an and Jing Gangshan, represent the spirit of pure communism, while the Zhijiang site reflects the spirit of the unified Chinese nation, including the Kuomintang and the CCP in their joint war against the Japanese Imperial Army. This is the spirit of nationalism”* (Interviewee 41).

A government official added:

*“The government organisations involved in Red Tourism want to arouse the tourists’ national pride. We want to celebrate the victory over Japanese Imperialism. We not only want the tourists to be proud of the national victory, but we would also like the tourists to experience happiness and cherish today’s peace. We can then say that the Communist Party deserves our love. History cannot be forgotten and we need to respect the historical facts”* (Interviewee 40).

However, for historical reasons, Zhijiang was not designated a Red Tourism site until 21st November 2011. A government official explained why, *“The Zhijiang memorial site is unique in China. But it was not suitable to promote it widely because it was inextricably linked to the Kuomintang. That is why it only gained approval to be a Red Tourism site in the second phase”* (Interviewee 40). Another government official confirmed this, *“Until recently, this site was not given sufficient publicity due to the Kuomintang being viewed in an unflattering light by the CCP. That has now changed with nationalism becoming an important theme. The Zhijiang site embodies the victory and the subsequent peace”* (Interviewee 41).

The Zhijiang site is dedicated to the collective memory of the past that binds the Chinese people together. History can be helpful in the cause of strengthening national unity. A government official commented, *“There are no messages here*

about communism. But there are messages about the role played by the Communist Party in the battlefield behind enemy lines. The messages show how the Communist Party cooperated with the Kuomintang, achieving notable success in a number of battles” (Interviewee 41). Another government official commented that:

*“There are some messages about the Communist Party in the exhibition hall. Some pictures show the cooperation between Communist Party and Kuomintang. Naturally, the Anti-Japanese Imperial Army war was undertaken with the joint cooperation of the Communist Party and Kuomintang. We cannot say that the Kuomintang fought against the Japanese on its own, and this is also true for the Communist Party. That is why this site appeals to national pride. As for the surrender acceptance ceremony in Zhijiang, the Communist Party did not attend. As for the Anti-Japanese Imperial Army war, the whole nation was involved”* (Interviewee 40).

A further government official said:

*“I want tourists to feel proud of the victory of the Chinese nation, in contrast to when they visit Nanjing [where there is a museum depicting the massacre of 300,000 Chinese people by the Japanese Imperial Army]. Visitors to the Nanjing site are more likely to experience sorrow and humiliation. The Zhijiang site makes you pleased and proud. It uplifts the spirit. You can experience hope for China by visiting the Zhijiang site. It is a sign of Chinese national rejuvenation. The purpose for the promotion of the site is to let the Chinese people be optimistic about the future of China. What tourists want to learn from a visit to Zhijiang depends on the type of tourist. For example, tourists from the army want to know about the greatness of the People’s Liberation Army during the revolution. They say, ‘this is the place to relive the victory over Japanese Imperialism. We are definitely happy to come here to visit. It is helpful to inspire our military spirit’. For the younger tourists, they want to learn about the history for the first time. For the tourists who come from Taiwan, they want to see whether today’s communist leadership respects the truth of this period of history. They were happy to see that they do, and they said that they will tell the other Kuomintang members to come and visit. For the overseas people in general, they are interested in learning that foreigners and overseas Chinese people helped China during the Anti-Japanese Imperial war”* (Interviewee 41).

An academic researcher noted that:

*“It reminds people not to forget the historical period of foreign invasion. What was the ultimate purpose of the war? It was to cherish peace and put an end to further wars. Actually, the defeat of the Japanese Imperial Army was international, not just Chinese. Without support from international allies, the armies led by the CCP and Kuomintang could not defeat the JIA in the eight years it took because the Chinese armies were too weak at that time”.* (Interviewee 39)

Zhijiang is, of course, a Red Tourism site, but unlike the Shaoshan site which concentrates on Mao Zedong and the history of CCP, here the emphasis is very much on the history of the Chiang Kai Shek-led Kuomintang Army's struggle against the Japanese Imperial Army and the victory of the Chinese nation over Japanese Imperialism. Although Shaoshan and Zhijiang were both awarded the title 'Patriotic Educational Site', it is beyond dispute that Zhijiang plays the more prominent role in this regard. An academic researcher speculated that:

*"The reason for developing Red Tourism in Zhijiang is different from that in Shaoshan. Shaoshan is famous because it was Mao's birthplace. Zhijiang owes its place in history to the fact that Zhijiang was the place where surrender terms were negotiated; the actual ceremony was conducted. Thus, Zhijiang was not publicised to the same extent, because it was the Kuomintang, representing the Chinese government, who accepted the surrender of the JIA. Red Tourism has contributed to a greater understanding of the contribution of the Kuomintang" (Interviewee 38).*

An academic researcher observed how, *"the purposes for developing Red Tourism in Shaoshan and Zhijiang are different in my view. The purpose for developing Red Tourism in Shaoshan is to support the current ruling elite. Since Zhijiang was related geographically to the historical fact of the surrender of the JIA, it inevitably provides a nationalist education"* (Interviewee 39).

Another academic researcher said:

*"Zhijiang was awarded the title 'Patriotic Education Site'. Why was it given this title? Because there is an authentic history about this nation disclosed in Zhijiang. The Chinese government definitely wants people to know the history of struggle of the nation for survival and how the people fought against invaders, particularly the Japanese imperial army. People can acquire knowledge of history at the site. Furthermore, the displays are different from books. Books require hard work on the part of the reader. The displays at the site are vivid. Young people can see what cannon, guns and helmets look like, and thereafter they experience a profound feeling. This sort of education represents an intimate experience"* (Interviewee 36).

A government official confirmed that:

*"The Chinese government wants its citizens to be proud of the nation, and also to guard against militarism. We want peace, not war. Everybody saw the disaster caused by war, especially those bloody scenes. People should cherish peace after visiting this sort of display. Everybody should condemn war"* (Interviewee 46). (Figure 6-22)

**Figure 6-22: Photographs commemorating history and cherishing peace in Zhijiang Museum.**



(Source: The researcher, 2014).

The Chinese government has an additional political intention behind the second phase of Red Tourism, namely promoting the progress made by the CCP since 1949. It can be seen from the example of the Zhijiang site that the Chinese government is looking to supplement the main interpretation of CCP history in the first phase with an appeal to national unity in the second phase. The focus of the history portrayed at this site concentrates on the Japanese invasion and the humiliation of China in the past. The much-criticised capitalistic stance of the KMT is no longer a topical issue. It is now party policy to concentrate historically on the external ethnic war between China and Japan, rather than on the internal class conflict between the CCP and KMT.

## **6.6 Conclusion**

The CCP initiated the development of Red Tourism, in the first phase (2004-2010) with the focus on the achievements and sacrifices of Mao and the CCP from 1921-1949, while promoting national unity from 1840 up to the present in the second phase (2011-2015). It is beyond dispute that, Red Tourism in China is highly politicised with the political achievements taking precedence over the economic benefits.

This chapter's main issue was to examine the government political intentions behind the development of Red Tourism, with the change in emphasis in the two phases as exemplified at Shaoshan and Zhijiang. Messages favourable to the CCP are prominent in 'first phase' Shaoshan, while national unity messages predominate in 'second phase' Zhijiang. The cult of worship of Mao Zedong is described concluding with an examination of the unintended consequences arising from the cult of worship of Mao. Along with the development of Red Tourism, the Chinese government gradually discouraged the cult. There follows an analysis of the intentions behind the re-development of the Mao Memorial Museum and the consequent changes to the exhibits therein; similarly with the intentions behind the re-development of the Zhijiang site for commemorating the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army.

From the analysis of the intentions behind Red Tourism in this chapter, it is clear that Red Tourism is, in reality, a tool used by the Chinese government to achieve its political and economic intentions. Through the development of Red Tourism, the Chinese government has skillfully used its interpretation of history in order to cast the CCP in a good light; to solidify support for China's national unity; and to validate the one-party state rule by the CCP. Through Red Tourism, the Chinese government provides a historical view of the creation of an independent China following the defeat of Japanese Imperialism. This serves the purpose of promoting social cohesion in a unified nation.

The themes discussed in this chapter reflect the broad themes as presented in the third conceptual framework in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.3): political intentions regarding patriotic education throughout Red Tourism; original intentions behind the first phase of Red Tourism; the worship of Mao Zedong; and additional political intentions behind the second phase of Red Tourism. Significantly, the importance of patriotic education in Red Tourism, linked to patriotic education in China, was emphasized as were unintended consequences arising from the cult of worship of Mao, in direct contrast to political intentions.



**Chapter 7: Tourists' responses to the government's political intentions for Red Tourism at Shaoshan and Zhijiang**

## 7.1 Introduction

Chinese government intentions behind Red Tourism are two-fold. One is the economic intention which is directed at improving the local economy of the areas surrounding Red Tourism sites. Based on the findings of this PhD study, it is clear that this policy has been perceived amongst interviewees to be an unqualified success and one that is universally-welcomed.

The other intention is a political one. In my study, two separate phases in the development of Red Tourism have been identified: the first phase from 2004 to 2010; and the second phase from 2011 to 2015. Two distinct main political intentions are identified as being behind the promotion of Red Tourism in each phase. Improving the political image of the CCP among the population at large was the political intention of Chinese government in the first stage of Red Tourism. Encouraging feelings of national pride was the intention during the second phase.

How well tourists accept the messages at Red Tourism sites is, in part, a measure of how successful the Chinese government has been in using Red Tourism to promote its political purposes. Though tourists are presented with politically-loaded messages at Red Tourism sites, they are, of course, free to reject the discourse presented and construct their own interpretation of messages displayed there. Consideration is given as to how this happens. In this study, when 'tourists' are alluded to, it does not refer solely to people visiting sites for leisure reasons; it includes anyone going to tourism sites for whatever reason.

This chapter examines the responses of visitors towards the Chinese government's intentions at Shaoshan, the birthplace of Mao Zedong, which is an example of the first phase of the National Red Tourism Development Plan 2004-2010; this approach is repeated with respect to Zhijiang, a very important site in the second phase of Red Tourism development (2011-2015), in that it is dedicated to commemorating the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army.

Four key areas are looked at in this chapter. First, tourists' responses towards patriotic education at Shaoshan and Zhijiang are examined. Second, the chapter considers tourists' responses towards the Chinese government's original political intentions behind the first phase of Red Tourism. Third, as a

key emergent theme, tourists' responses to the cult of Mao which is of course, officially discouraged by the Chinese government are analysed. Lastly, tourists' responses to the Chinese government's additional political intentions behind the second phase of Red Tourism are examined.

## **7.2 Tourists' responses toward the Chinese government's intentions**

Tourist interviewees were asked to provide their views about their understandings of the main government purpose of Red Tourism.

### *7.2.1 Tourists' responses towards the Chinese government intentions behind Red Tourism*

Red Tourism is a political strategy with policy being made by central government and passed down to provincial and local authorities. This section deals with tourists' responses toward Chinese government intentions behind Red Tourism. Two typical sites, Shaoshan and Zhijiang, are the main foci of this thesis.

The majority of visitors were of the view that the main purposes behind the development of Red Tourism are economic and political. From Chapter 6, it can be seen that the purposes of Red Tourism were indeed two-fold. Firstly, to improve the local economy of the areas surrounding the sites; this was important since most sites are situated in poorly-developed parts of China. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, was a desire by the CCP to improve its political image among the population at large. One tourist commented:

*"If governments promote Red Tourism in order to stimulate economic development, why not choose other tourism sites? There are many tourism sites in China. Why does the Chinese government put so much emphasis on Red Tourism sites? The answer is to promote the political intentions of the CCP, which is of fundamental significance"* (Interviewee 23).

Tourists cannot fail to be aware of the political aspects of Red Tourism when they go for a visit. One middle school teacher had no doubts about this, *"The reason for the government developing Red Tourism is to promote the CCP's achievements following its formation and during the country's re-construction"* (Interviewee 42). A middle school student asserted that, *"The government wants us to remember the contribution made from the outset by the revolutionary vanguard: remember them, and do not forget the history of*

*modern China*” (Interviewee 20). A university student claimed that, “*The Chinese government wants to promote national pride among the people and strengthen the respect accorded to the great men from the people’s collective heart*” (Interviewee 21).

Party members had no doubts of the government’s political intentions behind Red Tourism. One such university lecturer confirmed:

*“We party members are organised to travel every year to Red Tourism sites. It is compulsory for party members. If I could select a tourist site myself, I would not choose a Red Tourism site. I would prefer to visit other places famous for their natural beauty. The visits are of value in terms of educating party members”* (Interviewee 22).

However, another university lecturer believed that local government considers that the economic intention is more important than the political one. There may be some truth in this assertion in poor locations, but this was a minority view rarely expressed by government officers or party members. He claimed that:

*“From the point of view of the central government, the reason for developing Red Tourism in Shaoshan is to deepen the impression that the CCP has the legitimacy to rule. It owes this primarily to Mao, founder of the CCP and the man who led the CCP to power. But from the point of view of local government in Shaoshan, the most important reason for developing Red Tourism in Shaoshan is to promote local economic development”* (Interviewee 24).

The second key intention at all government levels is, therefore, economic. It is not surprising that quite a number of tourists focussed on the economic intentions behind the development of Red Tourism, when there is more transparency with respect to the economic purpose of Red Tourism than the political purpose. A middle school student commented:

*“The Chinese government’s intentions behind Red Tourism in China are to promote local economic development and for us to remember the contribution of the older generation. It is a good way to attract investment. The more important of these two intentions is the economic one”* (Interviewee 20).

A university lecturer added, “*By means of Red Tourism, the government can build on its popularity locally to attract tourists to visit other unrelated sites in the area so that it can benefit the wider local economy*” (Interviewee 24). Thus, the development of Red Tourism may have the effect of promoting the tourism industry beyond its narrow remit, as the visitors to Red Tourism sites may enjoy the experience so much that they may in future opt to visit general tourist sites

in surrounding local areas. A university student agreed, *“The reason for the government developing and promoting Red Tourism in Shaoshan is to promote the development of Hunan tourism in general”* (Interviewee 21).

Looking back on the evolution of Chinese tourism, from being strictly controlled to gradually loosening up, it is clear that many tourists are aware of the significance of Red Tourism not only from its political intention but also for its economic advantages.

A retired woman explained the importance of tourism on the economy:

*“Our economic development cannot rely on exports forever. Advanced economies need to divert some production internally. Accordingly, our country needs to stimulate domestic demand. Tourism is a very good example of domestic consumption, especially now that people are wealthier than before”* (Interviewee 31).

In addition, for many years officials from state organisations have been paid to visit Red Tourism sites. A perception has arisen among some people that the CCP has another purpose in the strategy; namely, to provide a pleasant rural idyll where party members can reinforce their beliefs, as well as being rewarded for all their hard work on behalf of the party. A university lecturer argued that:

*“Nearly all Red Tourism sites have beautiful scenery. It is convenient for communists to go to those sites to have meetings or to go and relax in these well-appointed sites. For example, in Shaoshan and even more so in Jing Gangshan, where the scenery is fantastic! Even though Red Tourism sounds somewhat political, the surroundings are actually very beautiful. The government wants to educate the younger generation through the strategy of developing Red Tourism and at the same time wants to promote the local economy. However, the most important purpose is to provide the opportunity for Communist Party members to have meetings at those sites. It is beneficial for government officials to have meetings in Red Tourism sites at low cost and in pleasant surroundings”* (Interviewee 22).

The earlier domestic tourists travelled at public expense. A university student stated that, *“Our school organised us to come here. Every year the office of the Communist Youth League at our school organises students to visit Shaoshan. It is one of the prearranged activities for probationary party members”* (Interviewee 21). Another party member gave a similar reason for visiting Shaoshan, *“I visit Shaoshan as part of a group. I came with my classmates from the provincial communist party university. We came to Shaoshan in order to be educated about the party spirit. It was arranged by the village party leader”*

(Interviewee 27). This has changed somewhat in recent times with many tourists visiting of their own accord and out of their own pocket. A retired woman believed that, *“Spending money on tourism improves one’s knowledge. Providing opportunities for physical exercise while breathing clean air is better than spending money on unhealthy food and gambling”* (Interviewee 31). This change can be seen at Shaoshan. Tourists go of their own volition in increasing numbers to Shaoshan in order to pay homage to the memory of Mao Zedong. A tourist pointed out, *“People come to Shaoshan with a respectful attitude toward Mao. People do not visit because of government propaganda, but come voluntarily”* (Interviewee 2). Another middle school student noted, *“My parents’ generation recall Mao’s revolutionary contribution which led to great progress in China. My parents are patriotic and arranged my visit to Shaoshan in order that I could appreciate the great deeds of Mao”* (Interviewee 20).

It should be recognised that the tourists themselves seem aware of how the political intentions affected them and others who visit as tourists.

Red Tourism was defined by government and many respondents as a political project to consolidate the CCP’s role as the sole governing party in China, so that Red Tourism sites are concerned with learning rather than with entertainment. A policeman observed, *“Red Tourism itself is not for entertainment. It is for education and learning which can affect your thinking”* (Interviewee 6). Another tourist found, *“I have not come across any entertainment facilities here; it appears that all Red Tourism sites are solely educational”* (Interviewee 26). In addition, most tourists think that entertainment weakens the educational effect at Red Tourism sites. A young tourist thought, *“It is not appropriate to have entertainment at Red Tourism sites. They are for patriotic education and historical education. They are not entertainment sites”* (Interviewee 57). One electrical engineer explained using the example of Zhijiang, *“The Zhijiang site mainly focuses on the history of the anti-Japanese Imperial Army war. Entertainment would demean the gravity of the event”* (Interviewee 43). Yet, many tourists did go for sight-seeing and more general relaxation in addition to education. For example, when tourists were asked about their reasons for visiting Shaoshan and Zhijiang, a self-employed businessman said that they were, *‘coming for fun’* (Interviewee 1). However, quite a number of tourists do visit in order to learn. A university student noted, *“I*

*came to look at the exhibits and learn something about Mao” (Interviewee 7). A mature middle school teacher at Shandong Province claimed, “I admire Mao. That is why I visited” (Interviewee 12).*

Even though some tourists claimed to learn a lot from the messages during their visit, they did not consider the experience to be educational. This partly depended on their motivation in going to Red Tourism sites. It would seem that for some, the primary reason for visiting was relaxation rather than education. A mature accountant said, *“I took the opportunity to bring my son here to relax” (Interviewee 52). A high school student noted, “I stayed at home for nearly a month this summer holiday; so I came here to renew my vigour” (Interviewee 53). A businessman said:*

*“My company asked me to assist some businessmen who came to Hunan from other provinces; they requested a trip to Shaoshan. So I accompanied them. They revere Mao and were very familiar with him and wanted to see his birth place. They wondered if there was something special about the place where Mao was born” (Interviewee 28).*

Some tourists are highly motivated to visit Red Tourism sites. A party member gave her reason, *“I think it is good to know Chinese history and the famous people in my own province through visiting these Red Tourism sites, not just general travel. I respect and revere the revolutionary leaders” (Interviewee 27).*

Another businessman claimed:

*“I would say that everyone likes to travel, but many do not because they are short of money. As a matter of fact, Red Tourism sites are attractive. Red Tourism is a kind of tourism and is helpful in understanding Chinese history. As a member of this big community, every Chinese national should know their history. This is a reason for visiting Red Tourism sites which I share. However, it also depends on how far the site is. If the Red Tourism site is far away, I will not go because of the cost” (Interviewee 28).*

On the other hand, a university student said, *“I am not interested in visiting Red Tourism sites. In other words, I do not like the university’s arrangement of visits there because I do not have any special feelings for Red Tourism sites, or for Mao. I do not think there is any relationship between Mao and me” (Interviewee 21).*

It is clear that different motivations of tourists to visit Red Tourism sites affected their responses towards the Chinese government intentions behind Red Tourism.

### *7.2.2 Tourists' responses towards patriotic education at the Red Tourism sites of Shaoshan and Zhijiang*

This section is concerned with attitudes towards Red Tourism at the specific sites Shaoshan and Zhijiang.

Over the past 30 years, China has transformed itself from a closed communist, agrarian society into an increasingly urban one that encourages market participation and international trade. Growing individual wealth and the acquisition of foreign goods, are all well-documented trends for China's growing middle class. These changes have prompted China's central government to worry that the populace may be in danger of losing sight of what it believes to be important — allegiance to, and support for, the Communist Party in addition to strong patriotic feelings for their homeland (FlorCruz, 11th July 2014).

Commemoration of the CCP's historical role has been reinforced by the current regime's national 'Patriotic Education Campaign' which commenced in 1991, following the response of the state to the Tiananmen Square protest in 1989. The official view of those events was that the Communist Party had not been paying sufficient attention to educating the people in the need to unite behind the collectivist approach of the CCP even though China was actually moving in a more individualistic, capitalist direction. The CCP sought to shore up its position, not by changing its economic policy or its electoral system, but rather by giving exemplary punishments to corrupt party officials whose actions were considered to be undermining its authority, while simultaneously promoting the 'Patriotic Education Campaign' primarily through the development of Red Tourism commencing in 2004. This concentrated on patriotism rather than the Marxist ideology beloved of Mao which has largely been abandoned since Mao's death. Drawing attention to Maoist ideology could be regarded as risky in that the more disadvantaged may conclude that Mao had been betrayed by his successors.

The Patriotic Education Campaign was rolled out throughout all the Red Tourism sites, its primary purpose being to remind the Chinese people of the modern country's revolutionary history. The two Red Tourism sites researched in this thesis were awarded the significant title of 'Patriotic Educational Site'. A policeman said, *'Messages about patriotism among the Chinese people are*



*presented at Shaoshan. A patriotic spirit is evident in the people who go to Shaoshan to visit Mao's birthplace. If they do not love this country, or respect Mao Zedong, they will not go to Shaoshan'* (Interviewee 6). A civil servant claimed, *'There are messages about patriotism presented at Shaoshan. When you see the exhibits at Shaoshan, you are bound to have a patriotic feeling about Mao's contribution, the moment of the founding of the new China and its revolutionary history. Inevitably, you will cherish the improved standard of living in our country today'* (Interviewee 15).

One policeman explained:

*"If Mao's birthplace Shaoshan was not a designated patriotic education site, where else could be? Mao contributed so much throughout his lifetime to the party and the country; the supreme example of patriotism. It is valuable educationally, especially in our currently tempestuous society, to learn from the exhibits how the revolutionaries of the older generation struggled and how they educated their children"* (Interviewee 6).

When a doctor visiting the Zhijiang site was interviewed, he noted, *"The most effective patriotic education depends on being true to the historical facts"* (Interviewee 62). A university professor said frankly, *"The main reason to develop Red Tourism is to promote patriotism"* (Interviewee 25). Another woman argued, *"If you come for sight-seeing, you cannot experience patriotism. But if you come to learn, you will be aware of the patriotic education displayed everywhere"* (Interviewee 10). From the view of the tourists, it is clear that tourists are well-aware of patriotic education at Shaoshan and Zhijiang, which is one of the Chinese government political intentions regarding patriotic education throughout Red Tourism.

Most of the tourists agreed that it is important to promote patriotic education at Red Tourism sites, especially with regard to Chinese youth. The younger generation needs to be aware of the significance of the patriotic education campaign at Red Tourism sites. A retired woman claimed that:

*"It is essential to teach the people about the patriotic and revolutionary tradition. We must remember the history of the Japanese invasion. We must bear in mind that a weak country has inferior diplomatic status. If we want our motherland to be strong enough, we should pay special attention to patriotic and revolutionary tradition education to the younger generation, not just talking to ourselves. The current generation, even though their lives are much better than before, must not forget the past. Under the Qing dynasty, the Eight-Nation Alliance bullied China because*

*China was weak at that time. The Chinese government must ensure that the present generation learn the lesson from this humiliation” (Interviewee 31).*

Another woman said, *“I live in another province. I came to the Shaoshan site specifically for my child. I want my child to be aware of the making of modern China, particularly with regard to the patriotic dimension” (Interviewee 23).*

However, not every interviewee shared the general enthusiasm for the patriotic education on offer. A university professor, for example, argued:

*“The Government wants us to remember Mao Zedong, his great achievements and the efforts and sacrifices required to establish the new China. This is a version of patriotic education. What we call patriotism is actually a love for the Party because the new China was set up by the CCP. But loving the country is different from loving the Party. Loving a country occurs over a long period. A country should be constructed by all the people” (Interviewee 25).*

This tourist is clearly unconvinced by the party line. Nevertheless, Chinese authorities continue to insist that loving the party is a prerequisite to loving the country (Lu, 10th September 2014). Exhorting the Chinese people to love their ruling party is nothing new, usually done in the same breath as an exhortation to its citizenry to love their country. The implication — that one cannot choose between the two — has long been clear enough. But drawing an explicit line between the two is a more recent occurrence, and the Chinese people have now noticed this (Lu, 10th September 2014). On Weibo, China’s equivalent of Twitter, one correspondent was more dismissive, *“I love my country, but I do not love the Party. It is that simple.”* A businessman wrote, *“That is what the Nazis told the German people: loving one’s country is the same as loving the party, and loving the party is the same as loving the Führer”* [The word Führer is, in fact, German for father], i.e. Adolf Hitler (Lu, 10th September 2014). On Sept. 3, the pro-party tabloid *Global Times* published an editorial, penned by an editor-in-chief, which argued that, while love of country and love of party are not the same, they are *“certainly not contradictory either”*. He contended that trying to separate patriotism from a love of the party is a ‘poisonous arrow’ used by people with ‘ulterior motives’ to undermine China’s unity (Lu, 10<sup>th</sup> September 2014). From the responses of the tourists, the conflation of patriotism and party loyalty looks like a tough sell.

Some tourists, however, failed to notice any messages on patriotic education. A middle school student used Shaoshan as an example, *“The messages are mainly about the contribution of Mao and his family to the Chinese revolution. I was not aware of any patriotism messages”* (Interviewee 20). A doctor took Zhijiang as an example, *“I did not detect patriotism in Zhijiang. Even though the Japanese Imperial Army signed the surrender document in Zhijiang, Japan was actually defeated by America with the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki”* (Interviewee 62). A party member said, *“I did not see any messages about patriotism on display at Shaoshan. But Shaoshan welcomes visitors no matter if they are members of the communist party or not”* (Interviewee 27).

Actually, nationalism has remained the one bedrock of political belief shared by most Chinese people in spite of the rapid decline in support for official Communist ideology. A middle school teacher claimed:

*“I did not have a feeling of patriotism when I visited Zhijiang. In fact, I felt upset by the experience. The fact that our big country was invaded by a much smaller country, was not worthy of pride. Instead it was a humiliation. I was not proud of it because, if we did not get logistic support from Russia as well as the atomic bombs dropped by America on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, China would not have triumphed over Japanese imperialism, and the country would have been in an even worse state. However, there is a national spirit behind the messages at Zhijiang. After all, it was a war between the Chinese and Japanese nations. To some extent, I was proud of our Chinese national spirit, especially as exemplified during the last battle in Xuefeng Mountain, where the Japanese Imperial Army was defeated by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army”* (Interviewee 42).

An electrical engineer took a different view,

*“I am a bit confused about the relationship between communism and patriotism. I do not think I feel patriotism in Zhijiang. But I am aware of nationalism there. The Kuomintang, as the main political military Chinese force at that time, defeated the Japanese Imperial army in some open battles. No matter that it was defeated in the end by the CCP or not, the fact is that the Kuomintang was also Chinese. There is a sort of national spirit behind the messages at Zhijiang”* (Interviewee 43).

As mentioned in chapter 6, the term ‘nationalism’ is understood differently in China compared with in the west. Nationalism reflects a national spirit. It is easy to arouse a feeling of national pride. This national pride is good for national unity. To the Chinese, the meaning of patriotism is a key aspect of Chinese

national unity. Keeping a nation united is even more important than loving a country. A retired woman claimed:

*“The country should be strong and the nation should be united. We should not only be militarily strong but also make advances in education and technology. All Chinese citizens should share China’s dream and strive for it. We should remember how hard it was in the past. Time passes quickly, but generation after generation has to develop the spirit of working together with the aim of making the country strong. So, developing Red Tourism plays a key role in propagating this idea. This is not merely narrow nationalism. If you are strong enough, you can defend your country without invading others. Other countries do not dare to even contemplate invading you. It is a fundamental requirement”* (Interviewee 31).

It is worth noting from tourists’ responses that the CCP leadership would seem to have decided to put less emphasis on the propagation of communist ideology and more on the party’s role as the paramount patriotic force and guardian of national pride. They want to find a new basis of legitimacy to bolster faith in a political system in some difficulty and so hold the country together during this period of rapid transformation. A tourist noted:

*“The photographs and artefacts on display show a spirit of hard work and endurance without being afraid of the sacrifices required. The struggle against the Japanese Imperial army’s invasion was the first time in modern history when the Chinese people truly pulled together no matter their individual beliefs and allegiances”* (Interviewee 49).

It is clear from the Zhijiang site that the patriotic education campaign was using patriotism to advance the cause of national unity. It is designed to encourage loyalty in a population less inclined these days to blindly follow the party line. A middle-aged tourist recognized:

*“For much of our long history, China was the most advanced nation in the world. The rapid industrialisation of the western powers and their imperialist designs led to the Qing government ceding territory and paying indemnities to the eight-power Allied Forces. As descendants of this great nation, we are definitely indignant knowing that foreign countries came here to subjugate and exploit us. Here in the Zhijiang site, despite the destruction inflicted on China by the brutal Japanese Imperial army, Japan, in the end, surrendered to China. It was pleasing to see the re-creation of the signing of the surrender document. Even though, during the eight-year war against Japanese imperialism our army suffered great losses, we got the victory in the end”* (Interviewee 61).

A university freshman commented:

*“The messages show what China was like during the war. You can see that the Chinese people were poor at that time. Comparing it with*

*contemporary China, it is clear that modern China is peaceful and prosperous. Today China is more affluent and more powerful. It is not easy for other countries to invade us” (Interviewee 44).*

There would seem to be a clear difference in the responses of tourists to the messages displayed at Shaoshan as opposed to those of visitors to Zhijiang. In Shaoshan, by far the most important Red Tourism site in China, it was not uncommon for visitors to be unaware of patriotic messages. Some tourists disagreed with the idea that loving your country meant loving the CCP.

In contrast, visitors to Zhijiang were, almost without exception, conscious of nationalism messages on display. Nationalism is viewed in China in a positive light since it is good for national unity. Thus, in Zhijiang, the CCP has been successful in this objective.

### **7.3 Tourists’ responses towards the Chinese government’s original political intentions behind the first phase of Red Tourism**

China created Red Tourism and encouraged visits to former revolutionary bases, in order to promote the 'national ethos' that developed out of the struggle for national independence. The national ethos is an invaluable concept for realizing the transformation of the country through the promotion of socio-economic development, according to the National Red Tourism Development Plan 2004-2010 (Xinhua News Agency, 2005). As a recently-developed tourism activity unique to China, Red Tourism is booming in places where major revolutionary sites are located and has gained great popularity among tourists. Tourists learn about, and experience, the spirit of those old revolutionaries during their Red Tourism visit. However, the messages on the history of the CCP and Mao presented at Red Tourism sites have not always received the anticipated responses from visitors.

#### *7.3.1 Tourists’ responses towards the history of the CCP as portrayed at Shaoshan*

From Chapter 6, it can be seen that the CCP wanted to promote the history of the CCP and thus consolidate its leadership through the strategy of Red Tourism. Many tourists were aware of this. A middle school teacher claimed, *“The main reason for the government developing and promoting Red Tourism in*

*China is to promulgate the great achievements of the CCP in building the party and founding the new China*" (Interviewee 42). A university lecturer added,

*"Through Red Tourism, the CCP can gain approval for the legitimacy of its power; in the same way as a person who wants to enhance his popularity by advertising not only what he is doing now but also what he did in the past and what the background to it was. The CCP wants to improve its political image. One needs to be good at selling oneself"* (Interviewee 24).

A university professor noted, *"Through Red Tourism, the government wants us to rally around the Central Committee"* (Interviewee 25). However, a businessman argued:

*"Communism is an ideal. It is a belief. Messages about communism, the Communist Party and Mao are presented at Shaoshan. To be honest, in my opinion, communism is vague. But people need a belief. Without a belief, man will be short of vitality and will be hopeless and dying. A country is the same. A country also needs an ideal, a goal, and motivation leading to good practice"* (Interviewee 28).

Many of the messages about communism and the Communist Party that are presented in the memorial site at Shaoshan focus specifically on the history of the CCP. The same businessman claimed:

*"There is a lot of information about communism and the Communist Party in Shaoshan; for example, the photographs in Mao's memorial hall show us how Mao came to embrace communist ideals, which are relevant to young people to this day. Moreover, the display regarding Mao's revolutionary activity is replete with references to communist ideology. The messages about communism and the Communist Party can also be seen on sculptures in the forest of steles as well as in pictures or displays"* (Interviewee 28).

Visitors are also taken to see the cave where Mao lived and to observe the spartan conditions in which the revolutionary spirit first flourished. A wooden bed, a washbasin and a desk—these are the origins of Chinese Communism (Schulz, 2013). Another visitor noted, *"In the memorial park, the exhibits all retrace the places where Mao stayed during the revolution; these encapsulate all the important revolutionary events of the period"* (Interviewee 2). A university lecturer said,

*"There are messages about communism and about the Communist Party on display at Shaoshan. For example, in the memorial park there is a replica room of the Zunyi Meeting held from January 15 to 17 in 1935 in Zunyi, Guizhou Province at which Comrade Mao Zedong's leadership of the whole Party was established"* (Interviewee 24).

Apart from the memorial park, some tourists were also aware of messages about communism and the Communist Party in the Mao Memorial Museum. A party member said, *“The personal and household belongings of Mao in the display hall showed messages about communism and about the Communist Party”* (Interviewee 27). A civil servant agreed, *“The messages about communism and about the Communist Party presented at Shaoshan are mainly in the Mao Memorial Museum”* (Interviewee 11). A young man explained:

*“The exhibitions show messages about communism and about the Communist Party, especially the photographs from the first, second and third national congresses of the Communist Party of China and the replica room of the Zunyi Meeting. You can see the determined will in the eyes of the figures in the photographs and the statues. Only persons with a belief in Marxism could have such strong will. They were portrayed as heroes to encourage revolution in China”* (Interviewee 26).

There is no doubt that Mao and the Chinese Communist Party are viewed as being inseparable in the public mind. A visitor claimed:

*“The Mao Statue Square and the Mao Memorial Museum present messages about communism and about the Communist Party which are especially effective. Many new members of the CCP took a vow in the Mao Statue Square. Even the recently appointed central government officials come to pay homage to Mao in the Mao Statue Square when they are assigned a new job”* (Interviewee 2).

A businessman argued:

*“I think it is Mao’s old house that best presents messages about communism. It shows us the sacrifice made by Mao and his family for communism and for the Chinese revolution. Mao gave everything for the Chinese revolution. He was a staunch communist. I was moved when I saw this”* (Interviewee 28).

However, not all the tourists saw things this way. Some tourists were aware of the messages. Some were not. A mature middle school teacher in Shandong Province argued, *“I did not see any messages about communism nor about the Communist Party presented at Shaoshan”* (Interviewee 12). A visiting salesman said, *“There are few messages about communism and about the Communist Party presented at Shaoshan. The focus is much more on Mao’s life instead of messages on the CCP in the Mao Memorial Museum”* (Interviewee 14). A university lecturer said:

*“I did not notice any messages about communism and about the Communist Party presented at Shaoshan. Red Tourism sites for me are just tourism sites. I did not associate them with communism. To be honest, these days when I see ‘communism’ and ‘the Communist Party’, I choose to ignore the terms because I truly do not have any special*

*feeling for them. Today as you discuss communism and the Communist Party with me, I suddenly feel that it seems as if communism has never existed in my life” (Interviewee 22).*

A businessman noted:

*“There are no messages about communism and about the Communist Party on display at Shaoshan. If there was a particular place dedicated solely to communism and the Communist Party, nobody would want to visit it because people need food. Can communism supply food to them? If communism gives me food, then I will believe in it. No matter what kind of political ideology, no matter which party, as long as you improve the people’s living standards, people will be happy. What really matters is not to be hungry and enjoy an improving quality of life” (Interviewee 28).*

There were significant differences in the responses to the messages presented at Shaoshan. Some tourists learn something from the messages while some do not. A policeman claimed, *“I learnt a lot from the messages. I will work harder in the future for the party and the people” (Interviewee 6).* A member of the CCP was pleased to say, *“I can feel the greatness of the CCP. It was difficult for the CCP to survive in those times. As a member of the CCP, I have a great deal of confidence in its rule” (Interviewee 11).* A teacher said, *“It is important to educate people during their visit to Shaoshan. We were unaware of the history of Mao and the party until we visited the site. Those exhibits are educational” (Interviewee 9).* A university student concurred:

*“People can learn from the messages about communism and the Communist Party, especially primary school students and middle school students. They have not been taught enough history of this period. It is helpful to broaden their historical knowledge and enhance their patriotism during their visit to Shaoshan” (Interviewee 21).*

Visitors generally accepted that messages about communism and the Communist Party at Shaoshan should have an educational impact on young people. A businessman said:

*“Young people should have a life goal on the basis of their ideals. Then, they have the possibility to be a great man. If they want to be great, they should learn from Mao. Through Red Tourism, teenagers can be encouraged to form their ideals and to pursue their life goals. A communist education through Red Tourism does have an influence on them” (Interviewee 28).*

However, whatever the tourists learn from the messages depends on the individuals. A young woman claimed, *“If the people come only for sight-seeing, they may learn very little. However, forgetting history is equivalent to betrayal. It*



*is good to review revolutionary history. It will affect you throughout your life"* (Interviewee 10). A young tourist said:

*"I think that there are a few educational exhibits although I did not come for the purpose of receiving an education. When I came to Mao's birthplace, I could not help comparing the standard of living then with that of today. Life was so hard at that time and is much better today. I learned a great deal from my visit"* (Interviewee 18).

Another young man said:

*"What you learn at Shaoshan depends to some extent on your age. If young people do not know enough about Chinese history, they will learn something from the messages about the communism and the communist party. To me, I did not. And I think that the general populace cannot bear comparison with the great men of that time. So I visit it in homage"* (Interviewee 26).

Some tourists did not learn anything from the messages conveyed about communism and the Communist Party at Shaoshan. A young woman said, *"I have learned nothing at Shaoshan. I spent a whole day in Shaoshan, but I did not enjoy it because I do not think there is anything interesting there"* (Interviewee 18). Another university lecturer said, *"At my age, it is not easy to be educated. I did not learn anything from the messages at Shaoshan"* (Interviewee 22). A university professor said, *"There are too many messages about communism and the Communist Party at Shaoshan. They are promoted everywhere in photographs, statues, exhibits and by the tour guides. They focus on the education of young people. As for adults, we do not learn anything from them"* (Interviewee 25). A university lecturer added:

*"I learned little from the messages displayed at Shaoshan. Tourism is not solely about promoting education. There is not much difference between Red Tourism and general tourism. To be honest, for the public at large, the reason for visiting a Red Tourism site is two-fold. Some are interested in learning about the origins of their leader, others worship the person who won power and at the same time are curious about him. I do not think most people visit a Red Tourism site for education unless they are part of an organised group. The organiser hopes that the people can receive an education at Red Tourism sites, but the people may not visit for that purpose. They want to relax and escape their boring routine lives"* (Interviewee 24).

Some tourists learned little from the messages displayed, but the experience was nevertheless positive. A university lecturer commented:

*"I have not learnt anything from the messages displayed. I have visited Shaoshan many times. Every time I was aware of alterations and saw some new infrastructure. This time, it seems clear that more and more people come to Shaoshan. This is due to the achievements of Chinese*

*economic development. People become better off and more people can afford to visit tourism sites” (Interviewee 24).*

It can be seen that tourists’ responses toward the messages conveyed about the history of the CCP at Shaoshan did not always match the Chinese government’s intention. This proves that China is not the homogeneous, brain-washed population as portrayed in much of the western media.

### *7.3.2 Tourists’ responses towards the promotion of Mao at Shaoshan*

It is universally accepted in China that Mao is the pivotal figure in Chinese revolutionary history. It is natural for the Chinese people to think of Mao Zedong when they talk about the history of the CCP. A university lecturer claimed:

*“From the point of view of the central government, the reason for developing Red Tourism in Shaoshan is to deepen the impression that the CCP, as the ruling party, retains legitimacy. It owes everything to Mao, founder of the CCP and the man who is the father of CCP state power” (Interviewee 24).*

However, in Mao’s later years, he unleashed ideological campaigns that culminated in the disastrous 1966-76 Cultural Revolution (Sun, 1993). Nobody is perfect. Mao made a lot of mistakes, but his contributions are generally considered to greatly outweigh his mistakes. A university student said:

*“The reason for the government developing and promoting Red Tourism in Shaoshan is because Shaoshan is the birthplace of Mao Zedong. After all, Mao is recognised as a great man following the foundation of the PRC even though he subsequently made some mistakes. We must not deny his achievements despite his failings” (Interviewee 21).*

Visitors often understand the aims underpinning the strategy of Red Tourism in Shaoshan. A saleswoman said, *“The main reason for the government developing and promoting Red Tourism in Shaoshan is to promote Mao’s revolutionary spirit and his simple life style, just like the promotion of anti-corruption policy nowadays” (Interviewee 19).* *“In Mao’s era,”* Wu, an actor who regularly plays Mao in theatrical productions says, *“people were poor materially, but rich in spirituality”.* When he performs as Mao, the elderly audience members empathize with him. They are disappointed and upset by the inequalities in today’s China and by the corruption prevalent among government officials (Schulz, 2013). The more disappointed the Chinese general public is with the commonplace and ubiquitous corruption, the more people think back to Mao’s time and bask in the reflected glory from Mao Zedong as portrayed at

Shaoshan. A university professor noted, *“The reason for the government developing and promoting Red Tourism in Shaoshan is that the government wants us never to forget Mao Zedong and always remember his achievements and sacrifices in the creation of the new China”* (Interviewee 25). As a consequence, the visitor drew this conclusion, *“It is wholly understandable for many people to visit the birthplace of Mao, the founder of the new China. The government wants us to be aware of Mao’s efforts in founding today’s China and wants us to remember his achievements. It also wants us to rally around the Central Committee”* (Interviewee 25).

Tourists focused on different aspects of Mao Zedong’s life, but many of the visitors wanted to know how the schoolteacher son of a better-off peasant came to found the communist party and lead it to victory in 1949. One middle school student said:

*“I am interested in Mao’s contribution to the Chinese revolution. But the contribution was not only from Mao himself, but also of his family. In Mao’s bedroom in his birthplace, you can see a photograph of his whole family. His two brothers lost their lives following the failure of an uprising. Also his wife, Yan Kaihui, took the revolutionary road and was killed in her early twenties”* (Interviewee 20).

Another woman said, *“I am most interested in Mao’s influence on China’s government and society. I want to know the reason. Why did he have so much influence on China? How did he study when he was young? How did he come to have such ideals? Why did he make such a big contribution”* (Interviewee 37)?

A saleswoman said:

*“I am especially interested in Mao’s influence on China’s government and society. Mao was a minor political figure at first. He began to gain the military initiative during the Long March which started in October 1935. It is well-documented that Mao did not know where to go for the Long March. At that time, he just wanted to avoid Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘encirclement and suppression’. Even though the Long March was very arduous, Mao and his troops continued to broadcast revolutionary thoughts throughout the Long March. They wanted to be known to as many peasants as possible for the protection they offered. Mao adopted the strategy of encircling the cities from the countryside. Peasants were the labouring people, who lived at the bottom of the social ladder, but they benefitted from Mao’s strategies; this included their children being able to go to school or night school. The peasantry also provided much support to Mao providing food, materials and protection from enemies during the revolutionary period”* (Interviewee 19).

Some tourists found their opinion of Mao reinforced at Shaoshan. A businessman said:

*“I personally think Mao had a profound influence on everyday Chinese life, including its political and economic culture. The ideology that Mao conveyed was a kind of philosophy of struggle. Now we concentrate more on harmony; e.g. harmonious society, harmony brings wealth, harmony between different countries. But Mao focussed on the struggle. He emphasized that ‘political power grows out of the barrel of a gun’. This is what I think is the biggest difference between Mao and the current Chinese leaders. Mao did not neglect harmony but, at times, he knew that success could only be achieved through conflict and battle. We cannot have a harmonious society without conflict”* (Interviewee 28).

One aspect of this is class conflict, anathema to the current Chinese government.

A female party member noted:

*“Before I visited Shaoshan, I got some of the information about Mao from textbooks at school and some from my parents. Naturally, this was incomplete. After I learned more about Chinese history, I felt sorry for the mistakes Mao made during the Chinese Cultural Revolution. But, later I went to undertake further study in the provincial Communist Party University as well as the visit to Shaoshan, and I recognised that something like the Chinese Cultural Revolution was an essential part of the historical process. Mao really had no choice. Anyway, Mao really was a great man with a true vision for the future. He made great efforts to ensure a steady transition from the old China to the new China. Mao always put China’s future at the forefront of his thoughts”* (Interviewee 27).

On the other hand, some tourists tended to concentrate on Mao’s academic background. A female party member noted:

*“Mao’s museum impressed me a lot. Mao’s books, clothing and other personal belongings were on display in the museum. Even though Mao’s life was very simple, he worked very hard. He read so many books and in each book, he made notes. He was not only a leader, but also an outstanding scholar because of his wide knowledge”* (Interviewee 27).

A salesman was more interested in Mao’s artistic side, *“I am interested in Mao’s calligraphy and his poetry. I like calligraphy myself and so I took many photographs of Mao’s original manuscripts”* (Interviewee 14).

Other tourists showed their interest in Mao’s life-style. They were particularly interested in its simplicity, which contrasted with contemporary materialism and corruption born out of greed. A retired female tourist said, *“I was most interested in Mao’s life as presented in Shaoshan. I could not help comparing it with life*

today and the recognition that Mao was indeed incorruptible. For example, his pyjamas had more than 80 patches and his meals were very simple just like everyone else” (Interviewee 31). A businessman tourist gave a detailed explanation:

*“During my visit, I was most interested in Mao’s life as presented in Shaoshan. In contemporary China, corruption is commonplace as would be expected in a one-party state. When Mao was in power, corruption was much less prevalent than in today’s China. Moreover, government officials’ dedication to public service was much better. Nowadays, people focus more on personal gain and recognition. Government officials in Mao’s time took to heart Mao’s instruction ‘Serve the people’, while today’s officials ‘serve for their own benefit’. I am interested in why Mao was able to avoid corruption. You should know that recently the new Chinese Chairman Xi Jinping stated that corruption could lead to the destruction of China and of the party. This is not sensationalism. It is a warning! The capacity of the current Chinese leaders to manage the economy, politics and the nation is better than that in Mao’s time, but the sense of responsibility to prevent corruption and the spirit of serving the people are weaker than in Mao’s time. I am especially interested in why Mao avoided corruption at that time. Probably one of the reasons is that he was not a stranger to hardship and so cherished the little he had. In Mao’s time, people were very poor but people were willing to follow the Communist Party as long as the officials seemed to share the common people’s lifestyle. People shared the power, honour and profit. This is the basic requirement of socialism and communism. What I appreciated most after visiting Shaoshan was to more clearly understand why the officials in Mao’s time were not corrupt. They did truly serve the people” (Interviewee 28).*

A young woman gave her opinion:

*“I am interested in everything with a connection to Mao. Mao was born in Shaoshan, a poor place. He witnessed at first hand the impoverishment of the labouring people living at the bottom of the social ladder. So, he had the desire to fight for the labouring people even though it involved a big sacrifice for his own family. I think from the Mao Memorial Museum you can have a better understanding of Mao’ (Interviewee 10).*

Another male tourist noted:

*“I am most interested in Mao’s birthplace, the Mao Memorial Museum and Dishui Dong. There are many artefacts in the Mao Memorial Museum which were used by Mao. I am interested in Dishui Dong because Mao lived there in 1966 for 11 days in isolation, and subsequently, launched the Cultural Revolution” (Interviewee 2).*

Tourists are more interested in Mao’s daily life than previously. They like to visit the old house in which Mao was born, the Mao museum showing how tough life was for Mao, and how hard Mao studied and worked. They like to hear the story

of his family members and how so many of them perished in support of the revolution. Also popular is the Dishui Dong where Mao lived on his own for a few days. It was here that Mao planned the Cultural Revolution. Despite the general interest of visitors in the life of Mao, very few went to the memorial park which presents all the important events of the period under Mao's rule. It seems that tourists are more interested in how Mao became a great man rather than the historical exhibits on display.

#### **7.4 Tourists' responses to the cult of Mao and the influence of the Mao cult**

From Chapter 6, it can be seen that the CCP wanted to promote Mao Zedong in the first phase of Red Tourism. Many Chinese people went to Shaoshan, Mao's birthplace to show their respect for Mao. However, some of them worship Mao Zedong in a quasi-religious way. Chinese domestic tourists have different views about the cult of Mao and the influence of the Mao cult.

##### *7.4.1 Tourists' responses to the cult of Mao*

Although most of the tourists visiting the Shaoshan site knew quite a lot about Mao prior to their visit, there was still much to learn from the comprehensive exhibitions there. A saleswoman tourist confirmed:

*"I did not know much about Mao until I visited Shaoshan. Before, I only knew him from his poetry; of course, I was aware that he was a leader of China. I read the biography of Mao, including his childhood, his studies, his romances and his period as a revolutionary. But after I visited Shaoshan, I wanted to know everything about him from the cradle to the grave. The more you get to know him, the better you understand him"* (Interviewee 19).

An armed policeman tourist had a similar experience:

*"I have learned many things about Mao Zedong that I did not know prior to my visit. What I knew about Mao before my visit came from reading books; after I came here, my appreciation was enhanced by seeing the exhibits. What I saw were real objects, instead of mere words in books. I experienced a feeling that Mao is worthy of our respect and that we can learn a lot from him"* (Interviewee 6).

A middle school student elaborated on the new things he had learned about Mao Zedong:

*"It is a fact that I have learned many things about Mao Zedong that I was unaware of before to my visit to Shaoshan. For example, I did not know*

*that Mao's family belonged to the rich peasantry. When Mao took action against landlordism and re-distributed their lands, the possessions in Mao's family should have been given to poor peasants. Some local person wrote a letter to the Central government suggesting this, whereupon Mao wrote down a reply: 'Treat my family no different'. His family distributed their possessions to poor peasants just like the other rich peasants had to do" (Interviewee 20).*

A retired lady said, *"I have learned much about Mao Zedong that I did not know before my visit to Shaoshan. For example, Mao lost many of his relatives during the struggle against the KMT. We learned about all of them, and how and when they lost their lives; also the post they held in the army at the time of their deaths" (Interviewee 31).*

There can be little doubt that messages about Mao's life are displayed everywhere in Shaoshan. Tourists learn about the history of China in the twentieth century. A female party member stated:

*"I knew Mao from an objective viewpoint before. I did not have a detailed knowledge of Mao's life. After I visited Shaoshan I had more first-hand knowledge about Mao, especially the great sacrifices made by Mao in the establishment of the new China. My visit to Shaoshan impressed me deeply. It is not easy to be a great man. Mao worked very hard to create what became the People's Republic of China" (Interviewee 27).*

A businessman also had a better understanding of Mao after he visited Shaoshan:

*"There are many things I did not know about Mao before my visit to Shaoshan. It left me with a lasting impression that Mao's life was truly hard. He was a really great man. The leaders in today's China cannot compare to Mao. We need to forgive Mao even though he made many mistakes. Politics and mistakes go hand in hand. Society will never develop politically without any errors. Through the presentation on Mao's life, especially when I saw his coarse clothing, cheap shoes and china cup, I was moved. He came from a humble background; he was a true man of the people" (Interviewee 28).*

Not everyone learned new things from their visit. One university student said:

*"I have not learned anything in Shaoshan that I did not know before I visited. I knew most of the facts before my visit because I personally like movies about the revolution very much. I also learned a great deal beforehand from history books. My superficial sightseeing did not give me enough time to examine it carefully. Therefore, I do not think that I added anything to my knowledge of Mao in Shaoshan" (Interviewee 21).*

Another self-employed businessman took a similar view, *"I have not seen any special things in Shaoshan. There are articles in history books about Mao*

*Zedong's life and his influence on China's governance and society in history books. I read them before I came*" (Interviewee 1). A young tourist said, *"I have not learned anything in Shaoshan about Mao that I did not know before my visit. I am not interested in Mao. I probably paid more attention to the scenery in Shaoshan. Details of Mao's life are of no concern to me"* (Interviewee 18).

Nevertheless, the majority did learn from the messages displayed at Shaoshan. A saleswoman said, *"It helped me widen my knowledge about Mao. Now I know more about Mao's life, his revolutionary history and his love life"* (Interviewee 19). Another retired lady claimed:

*"I love Mao and the CCP more than before. It was their sacrifice which helped produce the prosperity of modern China. I am more respectful to Mao since I visited Shaoshan because he was not found wanting when the Chinese nation was in imminent danger. In addition, Mao's simple life inspired me. I think I should discipline myself like Mao. As I am a CCP member, I should try to be like him"* (Interviewee 31).

A middle school student said:

*"A historical figure should be fairly judged. Just like Mao, the revolutionaries had a poor life without corruption. Mao did make some mistakes when he was in power, but he did a good job in suppressing corruption. The community spirit was much better than today. Living standards are greatly improved today, but people feel less responsibility for those worse off than themselves. In the old days, people had a poor life but they looked after each other. I think that corrupt officials in China should be severely punished"* (Interviewee 20).

A lot of tourists believe that the messages displayed at Shaoshan are educationally effective. A businessman claimed:

*"They are definitely very effective. For example, in Mao's personal belongings' hall, the patched clothing impressed me deeply. There is much of Mao's simple living worth emulating by our present-day Chinese leaders. Red Tourism is not only for the general people, but also for current officials. 'Service for the people' is not just a slogan; it needs to be put into practice. Otherwise it is dangerous for our party and our country. Frankly speaking, even though the Chinese Communist Party has many shortcomings, it is the only party that can develop China and govern the country. It is the only party that can develop China while maintaining peace. No other parties can do that"* (Interviewee 28).

A policeman asked, *"Is there somebody else today like Mao dressed in his patched clothes? The life of the leaders of his generation was so simple and it is good for us to learn from them"* (Interviewee 6).



A middle school student elaborated on the reasons why the messages are effective in educating visitors of all ages:

*“The messages at Shaoshan are inspiring. To our younger generation, Mao set a very good example. To the middle-aged person, Mao reminds them of the revolution. Looking back to the history provides us with perspective. To older people, their youth and dreams are all in Mao’s time. It is a good memory. The memory only belongs to them. So the messages are educationally effective to different generations. It was moving when we saw that many old people wept when they were looking up at Mao’s statue at Mao Square”* (Interviewee 20).

The facilities at Shaoshan have been well-funded and this makes for a pleasant as well as tasteful experience for the visitors. The tour guides, brochures, audio-visual aids, and the multitude of exhibits in the Mao museum and the display hall help tourists better understand Mao Zedong and his influence on China’s government and society in general. A university student commented:

*“These things helped make it a good experience: firstly, the tour guide told us stories about Mao; secondly, captions are attached to the historical relics; and thirdly, there is a loudspeaker in Mao Square broadcasting throughout the day, which helped me to understand Mao and how he provided support to China’s government and society”* (Interviewee 21).

Another CCP tourist said, *“The things in the Mao Museum that were used in his lifetime are very touching. It is moving when you see Mao’s personal belongings and his patched clothes”* (Interviewee 11). A university professor concurred:

*“There are many ways to help us to understand Mao and his influence on China’s government and society. This is the government’s main purpose. It wants us to know about Mao. The captions in the exhibition hall, the photographs at the sites and the tour guide’s lectures all add a great deal to our knowledge of Mao Zedong”* (Interviewee 25).

Along with the development of Red Tourism, tourists go of their own volition in increasing numbers to Shaoshan in order to pay homage to the memory of Mao Zedong. A male tourist commented:

*“The hometown of Liu Shaoqi [the president of the PRC from 1959 to 1968, who was purged by Mao for disloyalty and died in 1969 following ill-treatment in prison.] is close to Shaoshan. But fewer people visit there than go to Shaoshan. Mao is much more popular. People go to Shaoshan with a respectful feeling. This is not a government that asked people to go there. People go to Shaoshan willingly”* (Interviewee 2).

Many tourists come to Shaoshan to worship Mao Zedong, even though the cult of worship is officially discouraged by the government. A middle school student tourist gave his view on the matter:

*"The reason for the government developing and promoting Red Tourism in Shaoshan is because Shaoshan is the birthplace of Mao Zedong, the greatest man in modern China. Mao is famous in China and many Chinese regard him as a saint. Everybody would like to visit the great man's birthplace and they think about him with the zeal of a disciple"* (Interviewee 20).

Even those old enough to remember the bad old days find it perfectly acceptable to continue worshipping Mao, whose policies led directly to the death of tens of millions of Chinese. *"Mao liberated China. You cannot blame him for things like the Cultural Revolution or those other miserable times. He did not cause them himself,"* said an 83-year-old visitor (Moore, 25th December 2013).

Some tourists advocated a full unwinding of China's reforms and a return to Mao's policies. *"In the first 30 years of Mao, there was free education, free healthcare, free housing and everyone had a job. Since the reform period came, the income gap has widened,"* said a 53-year-old former worker in a pharmaceutical firm who is one of a group of hundreds of Mao supporters that travelled to Shaoshan. They manifestly yearn for the nostalgia of what they feel was simpler times. *"If you pay close attention, you will see the desire for Maoism is increasing because people can see for themselves that the past was better,"* added another of the group (Moore, 25th December 2013).

Apart from the worship of Mao, an element of mystique surrounds the memory of Mao. A salesman talked about his motivation for visiting Shaoshan, *"I came to Shaoshan because I am interested in the place where Mao was born. There is something special about Mao's birthplace and the place he grew up in. I want to see what this place looks like"* (Interviewee 14). A university lecturer also expressed the same curiosity, *"I am interested in Mao's background; for instance, the kind of family he came from"* (Interviewee 24).

Mao continues, even now, to exert a powerful influence over the party and public opinion. A retired male party member visitor said, *"Mao passed away in 1976. There are still so many people who come to worship him. It shows that he is still important in the people's collective mind"* (Interviewee 5). *"Mao is a god in the East,"* said Chen Min, a 23-year-old nurse who works at a hospital in Changsha, the nearest major city to Shaoshan. *"My grandmother was here in Shaoshan for the 100th anniversary, when they installed the giant bronze statue*

*in the main square. It was winter, but she said the flowers along the road bloomed as the statue was driven by" (Moore, 25th December 2013).*

A retired lady believes that *"The importance of Red Tourism in Shaoshan lies in the worship of a great man, Mao"* (Interviewee 31). A retired party member claimed, *"We have worshipped Mao since we were young. His contribution to the Chinese revolution is greater than the heavens above"* (Interviewee 5).

No matter what reason visitors have for worshipping Mao, it is their choice to do so. This reflects a basic freedom in China where worshipping Mao is not an obligatory activity. As an elderly peasant claimed, *"Every citizen has the right of freedom of belief. So I can enjoy the freedom to worship Mao"* (Interviewee 3). Another university lecturer also said, *"I respect the right of people to hold superstitious and feudalistic values or believe in the supernatural. However, I prefer to keep my views on this to myself"* (Interviewee 22).

Age would seem to be a factor in how people view the cult of Mao. A saleswoman said, *"The people who see Mao as a god are generally elderly; they adore Mao very much. For the younger generation, born in the last three decades of the twentieth century, Mao is considered a real person, a person who was born from a peasant family and a leader. That is all"* (Interviewee 19).

A businessman explained in detail:

*"There are different types of visitors coming to Shaoshan. For children, their visit is mainly to learn about the revolution. For adults, many of them come to Shaoshan with superstitious and feudalistic values. They do not want to be educated. They want to experience it for themselves. They respect and worship Mao with superstitious and feudalistic values. People take Mao to be a God. They undertake the Shaoshan trip as a pilgrimage for the best wishes for their health and wealth in the worship of Mao"* (Interviewee 28).

It seems that elderly people experienced hard times before and are enjoying a better life today so that they tend to show their appreciation of Mao by worshipping him as a god. It is true that what Mao did for the Chinese people was great. Only a special person could have done this. This helps explain the phenomenon of Mao worship. A salesman explained:

*"There are superstitious and feudalistic values present in the worship of Mao Zedong at Shaoshan. But I can understand it. Compared to the past, we are more open-minded now. In olden times, we would have considered it to be a bit superstitious and feudalistic to say 'Long live*

*Chairman Mao'. We can take this sentiment to mean that Mao was a great man" (Interviewee 14).*

A government official understood it from the point of view of Chinese traditional culture. He claimed, *"Superstitious and feudalistic values are a part of Chinese traditional culture. No matter whether they are good or bad, they have been handed down over the centuries. It is impossible for them to disappear"* (Interviewee 13). A young visitor commented, *"There are superstitious and feudalistic values present in the worship of Mao Zedong at Shaoshan. Many Chinese people believe in Buddhism and superstition"* (Interviewee 18).

The cult of Mao, as a new topic, which emerged during the research process, illustrated the fact that tourists' responses towards the cult of Mao are mostly positive no matter how much it is officially discouraged by the government.

#### *7.4.2 Tourists' responses to the influence of the Mao cult*

It is a fact that superstitious and feudalistic practices are frowned upon in contemporary China. However, a substantial number of visitors do not think that the worship of Mao comes into this category. A university lecturer claimed, *"The cult of Mao should not be viewed in terms of superstitious/feudalistic values. It is regarded as a traditional folk religion. Chinese folk religion is a feature of Chinese society. It is neither superstitious nor feudalistic"* (Interviewee 24).

A young tourist argued:

*"The worship of Mao should be judged on its merits. It is an over-simplification to describe the cult of Mao as superstitious/feudalistic. If you say that worshipping Mao is superstitious/feudalistic, what about Christianity? What about Islam? Are these values superstitious or feudalistic? The worship of Mao is a natural way to show people's respect to Mao, just like the worship of Jesus by Christians and the faith of the Muslim people in Mohammed"* (Interviewee 8).

A civil servant expressed his view, *"Personally, I have no superstitious or feudalistic values. Every year, people go there to worship, to bow and make a wish before Mao's statue. I do not think that this is superstitious or feudalistic. They can be seen as personal acts or a demonstration of respect to the memory of Mao"* (Interviewee 15). *"Many 'miraculous' events are associated with Mao. Although often described as superstitious or feudalistic, they were not. They were, in fact, coincidences"* (Interviewee 13). It is not uncommon for

visitors to express the view that the cult of Mao poses no threat to the prevailing ideology of communism. A university lecturer noted:

*“The superstitious and feudalistic values present in the cult of Mao do not represent a challenge to the ideology of communism. Mao worship resembles the folk religions which coexisted with the traditional official doctrines of Confucius and Mencius which were mainstream in ancient times. Now communist ideology is the new mainstream, no matter whether true or false. Some government officials also worship Mao and some even go to temples to worship Buddha and Guanyu, etc”* (Interviewee 24).

However, some tourists do think that the superstitious and feudalistic values present in the cult of Mao could undermine communism. A young tourist claimed:

*“The superstitious and feudalistic values present in the cult of Mao are a challenge to the ideology of communism. Communists believe in atheism. The superstitious and feudalistic values, as well as organized religion, always involve a belief in the supernatural, which contradicts the tenets of scientific socialism”* (Interviewee 26).

Another middle school student said:

*“Some people, especially in poorer and less well-educated areas, are excited when they discuss Mao. Actually, historical figures should be judged objectively. The superstitious and feudalistic values present in the cult of Mao challenge the ideology of communism. The cult of Mao may have an adverse effect on today’s officials”* (Interviewee 20).

Some visitors pointed out that the cult of Mao sometimes provided business opportunities. A male tourist noted:

*“I do not think that there are superstitious or feudalistic values present in the worship of Mao at Shaoshan. I see the worship of Mao as beneficial. For example, on Mao’s birthday or the Chinese Spring Festival, nearly every resident in Shaoshan comes to the square to worship Mao by butchering pigs, cows, sheep and chickens which improves the income of farmers”* (Interviewee 2).

A university lecturer claimed, *“I do not think it is superstitious. Some people take the opportunity to increase their income. If people only came to pay homage to Mao, the benefit would be minimal. Activities like burning incense or selling Mao memorabilia may enable the local businessman to make a profit”* (Interviewee 24).

Some tourists think that the ‘sanctification’ of Mao in Shaoshan is good for the status of CCP and for the stability of China since it is more difficult to challenge the ideology of Chinese communism whose founder is a God-like figure. A

young visitor observed, *“China is a great country with a large population and a big area. Keeping the country united is a major priority. The toleration of Mao idolatry is part of the strategy of the Chinese government to achieve this end”* (Interviewee 26). Another businessman noted:

*“For the first few times I viewed Shaoshan as a place for revolutionary education. Later, I came to see Mao as a God. I do not think there is anything wrong about the superstitious aspect in the worship of Mao. If you do not believe in Mao, you can still believe in God. That does not matter. They are all beliefs. It is good for people to have a belief. The divinity of Mao is the symbol of the Chinese revolution. If you believe in communism, you believe in Mao’s deity. You can also believe in Mao’s greatness yet do not need to believe in communism. If the Chinese government wants to consolidate its ruling position, it could be advantageous to establish Mao as a God. If Mao’s Thoughts were rejected by the people, the Chinese communist party would lose its dominant position because the Chinese communist party was established by Mao. Without Mao Zedong, there would be no Chinese communist party. Without the Chinese communist party, China would no longer exist”* (Interviewee 28).

In fact, many people seemed not to care whether superstitious and feudalistic values are present in the worship of Mao. Most interviewees took the view that superstitious and feudalistic values do not threaten one-party rule. A young tourist noted, *“I think superstitious values resonate more with the elderly. Young people, in general, no longer retain those values. So I do not think they challenge the ideology of Communism”* (Interviewee 18).

On the contrary, some tourists are opposed to the cult of Mao and the associated superstitious values behind it. A university student commented:

*“I dislike very much the worship of Mao as a god. Very often we are told that it was Chairman Mao who said this or said that. I argued that some of what he said could be wrong. And I was contradicted by people saying ‘How could Mao make mistakes?’ Like my grandparents, they probably have superstitious and feudalistic values. But I do not share them. I do not want to argue with my grandparents, but from my heart, I dislike it very much”* (Interviewee 21).

A middle school student noted:

*“In the shops outside Mao’s birthplace, they are full of Mao’s memorial statue replicas for sale. Tourists take them back home and burn incense in homage to Mao. Businessmen take advantage of this to earn money. I do not think that this is good. It is a bit like what Mao once described as, ‘remnants of capitalism’. Sometimes I think the Chinese government and Chinese people regard Mao as being too mythical. From the history of the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, we should learn to assess*

*historical figures objectively. We should not over-deify a figure” (Interviewee 20).*

A saleswoman gave an example complaining about the way Mao was described as god-like:

*“The tour guide talked too much about Mao as a god. For example, in the Square of Mao’s statue, in which people often undertake a wreath-laying ceremony, we were told some mythical tales. We all know that azaleas (Mao’s favourite flower) normally blossom in March or April. When Mao’s statue was installed, it was winter time, yet the azaleas were in bloom. Through such miraculous ‘happenings’, Mao was regarded as a god. But, of course, he was in fact a real person, not a god” (Interviewee 19).*

It can be seen that people have their own view about Mao and have different ways of showing their respect to Mao. A party member claimed, *“As a typical person, I have the capacity to distinguish which are rational and which are not. The origins of these values are lost in the mist of times. In any case, I do not share these values” (Interviewee 27).* A self-employed visitor said, *“I have not read Mao’s books so I am not in a position to say that I worship Mao. Every great man is associated with certain legends. If you know more about them, you will view them realistically” (Interviewee 1).* A young visitor expressed his opinion, *“I most definitely would not believe in miraculous events without seeing them myself. It is likely that people over-idolized Mao in the past” (Interviewee 26).*

A mature middle school teacher from Shandong Province was unhappy at being told how to worship Mao. He preferred to do it in his own way. He explained:

*“Worshipping Mao is like worshipping God. It is, of course, a voluntary act. The worship of Mao is like kowtowing to Buddha in a temple. But it is better for us to buy a flower to place before Mao’s statue in a natural and voluntary way than be persuaded by the people who work at the site. The tourists were often urged to buy souvenirs; for example, they were asked ‘Why do not you buy a flower to place before Mao’s statue?’ or ‘Why not buy a Mao badge to commemorate Mao” (Interviewee 12)?*

Some tourists did not think it was right that superstitious and feudalistic values were present in the worship of Mao at Shaoshan. But they still regarded Mao as a god. A young tourist claimed, *“Superstitious and feudalistic values are a disease of the Chinese. Modern China is officially atheistic. But I think Mao is a deity of we Shaoshan people” (Interviewee 10).* Another local person concurred, *“Chairman Mao is truly a god. We residents in Shaoshan refer to Mao as a ‘Peace God’” (Interviewee 2).* A university professor explained:

*“We cannot ignore the fact that many tourists go to visit Mao’s birthplace. Incomes in Shaoshan have improved significantly since Shaoshan became a popular tourist destination because of Mao. Shaoshan has prospered from Mao’s legacy and its citizens place their hopes for the future on Mao. They want to get more benefit from Mao. They appreciate Mao very much. That is the reason they idolize Mao” (Interviewee 25).*

A university student added:

*“If the cult of Mao developed into something more radical, it could challenge the ideology of communism. It could become the focus of counter-revolutionary forces. It is acceptable for people to have some beliefs and the desire to worship a great man. It can be beneficial for the nation because a shared belief may help to maintain unity” (Interviewee 21).*

There are tourists who propose that the phenomenon of the cult of Mao needs to be managed. A retired woman noted:

*“The cult of Mao needs to be channelled appropriately. You cannot forbid it because people have religious freedom in China. You cannot encourage it either. People should be guided towards seeing Mao as a great leader rather than a god. However, Chinese traditional culture could make this difficult. For example, Zhangfei and Yuefei, heroes of ancient China, came over time to be treated as gods. Today we no longer highlight communist ideology. As long as the government produces prosperity and social stability, nobody cares. Today we do not mention imperialism either. We call ourselves socialists. What is socialism? Prosperity and social stability without invading other countries. Nowadays if a communist kowtows to Buddha, nobody will criticise him. But as a leader, you must pay special attention to your public image and not be seen to be taking part in a religious ceremony. It is fine for people to pay homage to any supernatural being of choice as long as it does not involve any disruption to public order or official business. Sometimes it can be helpful to have ceremonies to pay respect and offer sacrifices to ancestors in order to attract investment from overseas Chinese” (Interviewee 31).*

A retired visitor said:

*“I do not think it is good for people to worship Mao as a god. The local government should have discouraged the practice. Hunan provincial government should regulate it because it is not good for Mao’s reputation. I think this demonstrates management failings” (Interviewee 31).*

Tourists responded in a variety of ways towards the influence of the Mao cult. Actually they have a mind of their own (Meethan, 2001) and show their respect to Mao accordingly. The fact that the government discourages the practice seemed to have minimal effect on visitor responses.



## **7.5 Tourists' responses to the Chinese government's additional political intentions behind the second phase of Red Tourism**

It can be seen that in the first phase it was not the case that every tourist accepted unreservedly the messages on the history of the CCP and Mao as presented at Shaoshan. Some of the messages fell on stony ground. The second phase in the development of Red Tourism (2011 to 2015) covers Chinese history from 1840 until the present day. The period covered has been extended considerably and the messages highlight not only the CCP and Mao, but also focus now on nationalism and national pride. This could be seen to be a useful strategy given that Mao could become a focus for those opposed to the enormous inequality and corruption resulting from the free market policies initiated by Deng Xiaoping.

### *7.5.1 Tourists' responses to the progress made by the CCP since 1949 and the historical facts on the Kuomintang*

Given the spectacular industrial and technological development of the last two decades, it is not difficult to make tourists feel proud of the state's achievements. A visiting university female professor cited Shaoshan as an example, "*The improvements in standard of living and infrastructure can be seen in all Red Tourism sites. For example, Shaoshan at one time was only a small village. Now it is a substantial town. This is the direct result of the economic intention*" (Interviewee 25). A retired visitor explained, "*In Shaoshan, nearly every villager has a house with access to the main road. As soon as you come into Shaoshan, you can see that the people are much better off than before. Shaoshan's infrastructure has improved dramatically in recent times*" (Interviewee 31). One businessman agreed:

*"I went to Shaoshan many times and each time I was aware of change in Shaoshan. Living standards have improved a lot. Management of the Shaoshan site is much better. The service in restaurants has improved. The people care much more about their environment. Spitting in public and dropping litter has decreased. Shaoshan is much cleaner now"* (Interviewee 28).

Many tourists visited Shaoshan more than once. There is no doubt that they are proud of the development of Shaoshan. A university lecturer stated,

*"I went to Shaoshan many times. Every time when I come here I find new buildings and infrastructure, including road upgrades, beautiful gardens*

*and a general improvement in the appearance of Shaoshan. The changes reflect well on the remarkable economic development of China” (Interviewee 24).*

Another young tourist noted:

*“The progress made in today’s China is presented at Red Tourism sites and can be seen by comparing the photographs in the exhibition hall at Shaoshan with current living conditions and new buildings in the modern town. We know that the progress and improvements that have been made in China were achieved as a result of the massive sacrifices of the founders of modern China” (Interviewee 26).*

The facilities at Shaoshan have been well-funded and this ensures a pleasant and informative experience for the visitors. However, tourists are generally opposed to the commercialization of Mao’s image in Shaoshan. A retired woman complained that, *“There are some fortune tellers at the Shaoshan site. It was disappointing to see what is essentially the exploitation of the superstitious at Mao’s birthplace. I felt angry when I saw them. Given Mao’s communist beliefs, their presence here seemed totally inappropriate” (Interviewee 31).*

Visitors to the Zhijiang site were surprised to learn of its importance in the struggle against Japanese Imperialism. Most people only became aware of Zhijiang’s historical importance in the last few years. A post-graduate tourist said:

*“I was unaware of the significance of Zhijiang until I visited it. I had no idea that Zhijiang was a strategically important military site, especially regarding the military usage of Zhijiang airport. I learned many things that I did not know before my visit, for example, the fact that the American ‘Flying Tiger’ Air force was garrisoned here during World War II. Nor did I know that He Yingqin was the General Commander of the Kuomintang who accepted the surrender document signed by Yasuji Okamura, the commander-in-chief of the Japanese invading forces in Zhijiang” (Interviewee 50).*

Another middle school student noted:

*“I learned things in Zhijiang that I did not know before my visit about the anti-Japanese Imperial Army conflict during the Second World War. There are, in fact, many anti-Japanese Imperial Army battle fields listed in the history books but hardly any mention is made of battle fields in Zhijiang” (Interviewee 55).*

There are many things to see at Zhijiang. It comes as a surprise to visitors to discover the importance of such a small remote place, whose existence was barely acknowledged until now.

Many historical documents, displays, artefacts and exhibits on the process of the Japanese surrender are on view at the site. The memorial arch was originally built in 1946 but was destroyed by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. It was rebuilt in 1985 and has helped tourists to understand the significance of Zhijiang. A retired tourist confirmed, *“I have seen the original room in which the Japanese delegation signed the surrender document face to face with the Kuomintang's representatives”* (Interviewee 47). Another young male tourist gave some examples:

*“The knowledge we learned from our history text books at school is not as detailed as I saw at Zhijiang site; for example, the names of the Japanese representatives and the war crimes. There are more events mentioned in history text books, but they are not explored in detail. For example, there are no names for the commanders of each campaign”* (Interviewee 57).

A middle-aged tourist claimed:

*“In 1966 at the start of the Cultural Revolution, the Memorial Arch was destroyed. My son asked me why it was destroyed. I had to explain that it was built to commemorate the defeat of the Japanese Imperial Army which took place while China was ruled by the Kuomintang. During the Cultural Revolution, anything associated with the Kuomintang was destroyed. But now, our nation has matured and we can celebrate the achievements of the Chinese nation no matter whether due to the Kuomintang or CCP. You see, the memorial arch was destroyed because some Kuomintang officials' names were carved on it in honour of the KMT's role in the JIA surrender. Now it has been rebuilt. The historical facts are no longer denied. A lot of Chinese people lost their lives during the war to drive JIA out of China, and this was not solely down to the efforts of the CCP. The Kuomintang also fought against the JIA. Now the accepted historical view is much more even-handed, reflecting the true historical facts of that turbulent period”* (Interviewee 61).

Visitors to the Zhijiang site also learn about the little-known Battle of West Hunan, often referred to the Zhijiang Campaign. This was the last of 22 major battles against the Japanese Imperial Army which involved 100,000 troops. A middle school student remarked that, *“In our history books, there are some passages about the battles against the Japanese Imperial Army, but none on Zhijiang and the Zhijiang campaign”* (Interviewee 55). Another middle-aged tourist added, *“This was the last battle against the Japanese Imperial Army before its surrender. It was a crucial battle. I did not know this until I came here”* (Interviewee 61).

Secondly, a large display of vivid photographs in the museum featuring war crimes, including massacres, makes tourists aware of the cruelty of the Japanese Imperial Army. This is especially important for the younger generation born decades after these events took place. The graphic images displayed have a profound effect on most visitors. A middle school student commented:

*“There are many photographs. They present a wretched picture of the Far East in World War II which graphically portrays the human cost of the war. I was unaware of the full horror depicted until I visited the Zhijiang site; for example, the photographs of the massacre of Chinese children and women by the Japanese soldiers, and the pit of ten thousand Chinese corpses summarily executed by the Japanese Imperial Army. These scenes were truly horrific”* (Interviewee 20).

A mother with her child explained her motivation for visiting Zhijiang, *“I learned a lot at Zhijiang. I am not personally very interested in history but I want my child to know what happened. I hope that it helps him to love the Party and the nation”* (Interviewee 63).

Thirdly, photographs and captions revealed much about the battles waged by the Kuomintang against the Japanese Imperial Army. The tour guides, brochures, audio-visual aids, exhibits in the display hall, the actual room where the Japanese surrender ceremony was to be held before they changed it to Nanjing, as well as the memorial arch, enable visitors to appreciate the heroic efforts of the Kuomintang. The entire nation played a part in the defeat of the Japanese Imperial Army, and not just the CCP, allowing all of China to feel proud of the war effort. They create a favourable impression in the minds of visitors. A middle school teacher said:

*“I was educated during the Cultural Revolution. I saw no reference to the battles that the Kuomintang fought against Japanese Imperial Army in the history text book at school. So I learned a lot in Zhijiang that I did not know before my visit about the anti-Japanese Imperial Army campaign during World War II”* (Interviewee 42).

A young worker claimed:

*“What we have seen from the site is somewhat different from what we have learned from the history books and from the mass media. In history books, the Kuomintang was portrayed in a negative light, while the CCP was viewed almost always positively, largely because of its role in the war against the Japanese Imperial Army. In this site the Kuomintang flag is visible among the exhibits and publicity given to events at which the Kuomintang was present. Visitors can see that, in the re-creation of meetings, Kuomintang representatives are placed in more prominent places than would have been the case in the past”* (Interviewee 48).

A mature accountant took an unusual line, *“There is little difference in the propaganda. The truth is that the CCP and Kuomintang both fought against the JIA. The main power against the JIA was the Chinese people. Ultimately, however, victory was achieved under the CCP’s leadership”* (Interviewee 52).

The tour guides, the historical photographs and the captions attached to each photograph help tourists to understand that the victory over the JIA was achieved through the cooperation of the Kuomintang and the CCP. One middle-aged tourist claimed, *“The defeat of the anti-Japanese Imperial Army could not be achieved by one party”* (Interviewee 61).

A university freshman explained:

*“I was born in Zhijiang and knew some of the history of events in Zhijiang. I heard about them from my parents and my teachers. After I visited the site, I learned more facts, for instance the large number of people who died in the anti-Japanese Imperial Army campaign during World War II. Although I knew some of the history of the anti-Japanese Imperial Army campaign prior to my visit, I did not pay much attention to which party fought against Japanese Imperial Army. At secondary school the history books ignored the part played by the KMT in the battles against Japanese Imperialism. But from the exhibits in the site, I became aware of the Kuomintang's contribution. Probably because of the education I had, I learned more about the successes of the CCP as opposed to the Kuomintang in the war against the JIA. From my point of view, it is unavoidable for a party in power to propagate positively its own publicity. It did not, however, deny completely the Kuomintang's contribution”* (Interviewee 44).

Actually, the display contains many more photographs about what the Kuomintang achieved in the battles against the Japanese Imperial Army than the successes of the Communist Army. And all the documents in the surrender process were about what the Kuomintang did. A middle school student said, *“I noticed from displays here that the main force fighting against the JIA was the Kuomintang. This information could not be found in history books”* (Interviewee 55). This is evidence of the change in attitude of the CCP towards the Kuomintang. It seemed that this change did not cause any antipathy on the part of visitors; nor did it lead to criticism of the ruling Communist Party. On the contrary, tourists gave their approval for the CCP’s respect for historical fact. A middle school teacher claimed:

*“The development of Red Tourism in Zhijiang shows that the CCP finally dares to recognize the fact of the part played by the Kuomintang in the war against the JIA and has the courage to acknowledge the true history”*

*of the Sino-Japanese war. The fact is that the Kuomintang was the main force in the battlefield in the war against the JIA, which was contrary to what we learned when we were in primary school. In our history book, there was a quote from Mao 'When the CCP fought against the JIA, Chiang Kai-shek was picking peaches at Emei mountain [Emei mountain is in Sichuan Province far away from the battlefield.] and waiting for the victory of the anti-JIA forces'. I am happy that the CCP is beginning to give its approval to the true historical facts. Maybe the current leaders thought that some historical matters cannot be concealed; better then to revert to the actual historical facts" (Interviewee 42).*

It was unquestionably CCP policy for a long time to downplay the KMT's part in the anti-Japanese Imperial Army war. It is refreshing to see that the CCP has acknowledged the truth about the war. An electrical engineer noted:

*"I only saw one message displayed about the communist general Xiaoyi presented at the Zhijiang site. The rest are all about the officials of the Kuomintang. At school I learned more on the CCP fighting against the JIA in history books. But now, I can learn more facts from the internet; the most remarkable being that most of the big battles were done by the Kuomintang. The CCP is in power; naturally it concentrates more on its own role. But history cannot be distorted. Actually, both parties fought against the JIA. But the main force at that time was the Kuomintang" (Interviewee 43).*

A middle-aged tourist said:

*"I was told when I was a child that all the anti-Japanese Imperial Army fighting was carried out by the CCP. Now the Kuomintang is also recognised as having fought against the JIA for the Chinese nation. Now the Chinese government presents this more honestly. This is a sign of progress in the nation and an improvement in our ideology" (Interviewee 61).*

Tourists do not seem to think that praise for the Kuomintang's role in the war against the Japanese Imperial Army challenges the rule of the Communist Party. A middle school teacher voiced his opinion, *"If you face the facts, it will not challenge the rule of the CCP; on the contrary people will trust you. The fact was that the Kuomintang fought against the JIA. If you hide it or even do not agree with it, people will think that you were a liar. Admit the truth and people will trust you"* (Interviewee 42). A university freshman said:

*"I do not think it will challenge the rule of the CCP because there are also displays on the CCP's campaigns behind the enemy lines, such as photographs of the CCP General Peng Dehuai and the Tai Erzhuang battle. Credit is given to both parties but the main displays feature the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army" (Interviewee 44).*

A middle-aged tourist said:

*“History cannot be changed even if distorted on purpose for a considerable period of time. The truth will be known sooner or later. It would be better to disclose the truth than hide it. The Kuomintang fought against the Japanese Imperial Army as did the CCP at that time. Admitting the part played by the Kuomintang in the war against the Japanese Imperial Army does not challenge the rule of the Communist Party. It is quite simply a historical fact”* (Interviewee 61).

There is a concerted attempt at the Zhijiang site to help tourists understand that the victory over the JIA was achieved through the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Army. A middle school student said, *“Every display area has a lot of captions to help you get a better understanding. Tour guides drew one’s attention to them”* (Interviewee 20). A middle-aged tourist confirmed, *“The surroundings, environment, exhibits and photographs have been designed to help you understand the history of that period”* (Interviewee 61).

From tourists’ responses to the progress made by the CCP since 1949 and the historical facts on the Kuomintang, it can be seen that the interpretation of historical events is at least partly dependent on the present situation (Merriman, 1991). Also commercial orientations of sites influence their interpretations (Park, 2014). However, at Shaoshan and Zhijiang, the displays maintain objective authenticity. Moreover, authenticity of displays is generally dependent on tourist’s own perception and knowledge.

#### *7.5.2 Tourists’ responses to the promotion of national unity at the Zhijiang site*

Zhijiang was not a popular site until comparatively recently because it was very much dedicated to the KMT’s role in the war which was downplayed for a long time. Now that this has changed, the number of visitors has increased. Many views were expressed on this issue. A middle school student claimed, *“The reason for the government developing and promoting Red Tourism in Zhijiang is because the Japanese Imperial Army surrender process in Zhijiang is a milestone in the history of the Sino-Japanese war”* (Interviewee 20). Another university student tourist noted, *“The Chinese government wants to promote national pride among people and reinforce the respect shown to the great men of the war of liberation”* (Interviewee 21).

However, a university lecturer observed that the local government not only want to develop Red Tourism, but also has an additional purpose. He said, *“By means of Red Tourism, the government can build on the popularity of Zhijiang in order to attract tourists to visit unrelated sites in the area and so benefit the wider local economy”* (Interviewee 24). A middle school student noted, *“The commemoration arch for the surrender plays a big part in attracting tourists, which helps promote local economic development”* (Interviewee 20).

In fact, messages about national pride felt by the Chinese people are present throughout the Zhijiang site, especially in the surrender room and the commemoration arch. The exhibits dedicated to the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army presented in Zhijiang captivated the minds of tourists during their visit. A middle school student said:

*“The surrender room is the most obvious place presenting national pride. The Chinese representatives are placed at the forefront and sit above their Japanese counterparts. Chinese representatives therefore looked down upon their Japanese counterparts. We Chinese accepted their surrender. This national pride is embodied perfectly in the surrender room”* (Interviewee 20).

Another young tourist noted, *“One cannot fail to be aware of national pride on one’s visit to the surrender room. The furniture is arranged as at the surrender ceremony. The defeated Japanese Imperial Army representatives signed the surrender document there”* (Interviewee 64).

Apart from the surrender room, the commemoration arch also aroused visitors’ national pride. A doctor said, *“The commemoration arch made me feel proud of my nation because it symbolises the Chinese victory and Japanese surrender”* (Interviewee 62). A young worker claimed, *“I felt proud of my nation on seeing the commemoration arch as I entered the site. On the top of the monument ‘Victory arch’ was carved on it. Many people take photographs of each other in front of the commemoration arch because it is definitely a symbol of national pride”* (Interviewee 48).

Patriotic feelings are evident in abundance at the Zhijiang site. A civil servant was moved to say, *“From the displays and photographs in the museum, I am impressed by the sacrifice made by that generation in order to drive out the Japanese invaders”* (Interviewee 60). Another government official claimed:



*“The displays and photographs feature a determined nation, working together and fearing no sacrifice during the Xiangxi Battle. The Chinese people pulled together for the first time since the Opium Wars to fight against the Japanese Imperial Army no matter whether CCP or KMT. So too did the Chinese people living abroad. The current displays are truer to historical fact than hitherto”* (Interviewee 49).

A party member worker expressed his feelings after he visited the Zhijiang site, *“It is natural to feel pride in our nation when visiting here. After all, it was a famous victory. At that time, our country was so poor and backward, but we made great sacrifices to fight against the Japanese Imperial Army and eventually triumphed”* (Interviewee 54).

However, this was not the only reaction to these displays. Some tourists felt ashamed at the fact that China had been invaded by its much smaller neighbour, Japan. An electrical engineer said, *“The invasion of China by Japan was a blow to the honour of the Chinese nation. However, I felt patriotic when witnessing the re-created surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army”* (Interviewee 43).

Others expressed a sense of humiliation at the fact that Japanese Imperialism was not actually defeated by Chinese forces, but rather as a result of the two atomic bombs dropped by the U.S.A.F which destroyed the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan on 6 August 1945. A middle school teacher said:

*“I definitely felt nationalistic when I visited Zhijiang because it was a war between the Chinese and Japanese nations. But I did not feel proud of it. Without American’s atomic bombs on Japan and the Soviet Union’s support, China could hardly have been victorious. More than likely we would have been ruined”* (Interviewee 42).

A doctor concurred, *“I did not feel national pride. Even though the Japanese Imperial Army was defeated, victory was due to the atomic bombs dropped by the U.S.A.F”* (Interviewee 62).

Zhijiang was awarded the title ‘Patriotic Educational Site’ in 2005. Tourists fully accept the policy of patriotic education in Zhijiang site. A civil servant claimed, *“Zhijiang plays a role in Patriotic Education. The presentation of the events or battles in the museum educates our younger generation and helps create a sort of national spirit, such as the desire to defend our beloved homeland”* (Interviewee 60). A mature accountant noted, *“To young people, the Zhijiang site is highly-educational in terms of patriotism. To me, it is good to review that period of history. It was clear that those who lag behind are sure to be bullied.*

*We learned that it is necessary to strengthen our military power” (Interviewee 52). A doctor said, “It shows us the true historical facts. It is essential to examine weakness and strength in order to better protect the country” (Interviewee 62).*

Many visitors seemed to be pleasantly surprised to discover previously unpublicised information about the anti-Japanese Imperial Army campaign. An electrical engineer said, *“Even though I did know of many war-time incidents before I visited Zhijiang, I found out much more during my visit” (Interviewee 43).* A civil servant added, *“I learned about the final battle against the Japanese Imperial Army which took place near Zhijiang. It was a vital battle. Zhijiang was the place where the Kuomintang accepted Japan’s surrender. People come here to add to the knowledge learned from history books” (Interviewee 60).*

A middle school student added:

*“I just had a rough idea of what happened and did not know the detailed history during this period. After I visited the Zhijiang site, I felt more knowledgeable. For example, the JIA killed many women and children. You can see how awful it was from the photographs of the pits where many Chinese corpses were dumped. The photographs bring home the horrific atrocities perpetrated by the JIA in the Second World War and reveal the devastating effects of war on human life, physically, mentally and emotionally” (Interviewee 20).*

All of the visitors were profoundly affected by the displays at the Zhijiang site. Naturally, they tended to view the exhibits from their own perspective. The same middle school student said, *“I am interested in the content of the surrender document, the reason for the outbreak of war and the details of the surrender procedures. The entire Chinese nation wants to know everything about the surrender document” (Interviewee 20).* A civil servant said, *“I am interested in what it was actually like on the day the Japanese Imperial Army surrendered. I want to know what exactly happened that day, and who attended, etc” (Interviewee 60).* A middle-aged tourist commented, *“The surrender room was where China regained its national pride. I felt happy to see those photographs depicting the surrender process” (Interviewee 61).* A young worker explained:

*“I am interested in the history of the Japanese surrender. What on earth was the reason for Japan’s surrender and its acceptance of defeat? I thought the major reason was that the Japanese Kamikaze pilots*

*attacked the American naval base at Pearl Harbour and America counterattacked mainland Japan with atomic bombs” (Interviewee 48).*

Some tourists were interested in the battles against the Japanese Imperial Army.

A government official tourist explained:

*“I am a university student. I come from Huaihua and I studied history at the university. I was very interested in the Xuefengshan battle. It happened in Huaihua and was, in fact, the last battle of the anti-Japanese war. Zhijiang airport was built before the Xuefengshan battle. The Japanese Imperial Army had wanted to launch the Xuefengshan battle in order to destroy the strategically important Zhijiang airport. Zhijiang was in the Great Rear Area of the Kuomintang and Kuomintang airplanes operated from there to combat the Japanese air force” (Interviewee 49).*

Another high school student tourist noted, *“I am interested in the main players, such as the Japanese representatives for the surrender and the Kuomintang representatives who accepted the surrender, as well as the generals in the battles. I am also interested in the key battles during the anti-Japanese war” (Interviewee 53).*

A doctor gave his view, *“I am interested in the battles during the anti-Japanese war and the numbers of dead and the injured. I want to find out the price paid by the Chinese people to win this war” (Interviewee 62).* A university freshman tourist said, *“I am interested in the weapon displays. At the site I can observe them from a short distance or even touch them” (Interviewee 44).*

Some tourists were shocked by the brutality of the Japanese Imperial Army in China. A retired tourist lamented, *“The Japanese Imperial Army’s savagery was horrific. China was, of course, bullied in the past by other countries” (Interviewee 47).* An elderly accountant said, *“I was indignant when I saw the photographs depicting the cruelty of the JIA. The Chinese government should intensify publicity on this dark period in China’s history so that the younger generations are aware of the crimes committed against our people” (Interviewee 52).* One visitor expressed their anger at Japan’s official stance on what happened, *“Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe refused to accept what the JIA did when they invaded China. I want to know more about the Nanjing Massacre. After all, 300,000 Chinese people were killed at that time” (Interviewee 55).*

Some tourists showed their interest in everything related to the history of the anti-Japanese war. An electrical engineer commented, *“I am interested in*

everything in the museum because it shows graphically what happened then in China” (Interviewee 43). Another young worker said:

*“When I was young, I was interested in the displays of the furniture in the surrender room and weapons on show. I also wanted to know how China could win at that time with inferior weaponry. After I grew up, a new museum was built. At the entrance to the museum, there is a relief and a big oil painting which are worthy of careful scrutiny”* (Interviewee 48).

A mother taking her child on her visit expressed her feelings:

*“I am happy to see that in the end the Japanese Imperial Army surrendered. I felt that the JIA behaved immorally. If we lived at that time, it would be horrible. We are grateful to be living in a peaceful and prosperous time. After I saw those photographs taken during the anti-Japanese war, I could appreciate even more the improvements in living standards since the war. Life is much better now”* (Interviewee 63).

Tourists leave the sites feeling better about the country than before their visit, no matter what their motivation in visiting was, whether it be educational or general interest. A middle-aged tourist said:

*“Looking back on thousands of years of Chinese history, the Chinese people always nurse a grievance over China’s history. For example, the Qing dynasty ceded territory and paid indemnities to the allied forces of the eight powers. Just like robbers who came into your house, beat you and robbed you. As a person of Chinese descent, it makes me unhappy to see this. Now at the Zhijiang site, after all the destruction and suffering inflicted on the Chinese nation, the Chinese nation prevailed and the Japanese came here to surrender. No matter the extent of the wreckage of their country, China had won. The nation could at last look forward to a peaceful and prosperous future”* (Interviewee 61).

A retired tourist noted:

*“The country should be strong and the nation should be united. We should not only be militarily strong but also make advances in education and technology. All Chinese citizens should share China’s dream and strive for it. We should remember how hard it was in the past. Time passes quickly, but generation after generation has to develop the spirit of working together to achieve the aim of making the country strong. Developing Red Tourism plays a key role in attaining this objective. This is not merely narrow nationalism. If you are strong enough, you can defend your country without invading others. Other countries do not dare to even contemplate invading you. It is a prerequisite for progress”* (Interviewee 31).

A post-graduate tourist added:

*“After I visited Zhijiang, I felt China has to be strong. If you are poor and drop behind other nations, you will be bullied. Of course if you are strong, you should resist the temptation to bully other countries. China should take the path to peace and strive for harmony. In addition, when will the Japanese emulate Germany and admit the truth about the war crimes*

*committed by them in World War II? It is wrong to deceive your own nation. The Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe should be honest” (Interviewee 50).*

It can be seen that Zhijiang with its original furnishings, artefacts, exhibits and photographs in the museum as well as the iconic memorial arch, presents messages about national pride to Chinese people which are undoubtedly effective. A middle school student realised, *“War was really cruel. I now understand more about the importance of peace to our current society. However, some countries are still behaving hegemonically today. I am sure they will be universally denounced in the future”* (Interviewee 20). Another young tourist confirmed, *“I am sure that people will have a sense of belonging to the Chinese nation after they visit the Zhijiang site”* (Interviewee 57). A university freshman said:

*“The Zhijiang site is educational. The photographs illustrate the history of the period. It is helpful to compare the old times with today so that people will cherish peace. Another significant educational aspect concerns one’s view of the Kuomintang. As a student, I often asked whether the Kuomintang was good or bad. It was commonplace for teachers or parents to reply that the Kuomintang was bad. But following my visit to the Zhijiang site, I realised that the Kuomintang was not so bad. In fact, during the anti-Japanese war, the Kuomintang did fight against JIA. My impression of the Kuomintang is now more balanced”* (Interviewee 44).

In all, tourists learnt a lot from the messages conveyed at the Zhijiang site. A retired tourist claimed, *“I learned from visiting the Zhijiang site that we should be patriotic and pull together. ‘Unity is strength’ means that we can protect our country”* (Interviewee 47). Another electrical engineer stressed, *“China was very poor at that time and was bullied by the much smaller Japan. So, China should learn from that and be strong. China should also develop technology and especially its economy”* (Interviewee 43). A middle school student added:

*“The world needs peace. Wars are destructive. Communication between nations is an essential component of a peaceful world. We should create a nice peaceful environment. We should oppose hegemonism and power politics. Otherwise it will be very harmful for global development. The displays at Zhijiang taught us that China suffered a lot at that time. So we should work hard for our country, be loyal to our country and rejuvenate China”* (Interviewee 20).

A university freshman summarized, *“Our current life without war is much better than before”* (Interviewee 44).

Some visitors thought the lessons to be learned from the displays at Zhijiang were still relevant in contemporary China. A young worker said:

*“It was very hard to fight against the JIA for the CCP or Kuomintang. However, the Chinese people should learn the lessons of the war against Japanese Imperialism. The lack of unity at that time put the nation in danger. Faced with disaster the country pulled together to save the nation. When we were at peace, we did not have a strong nationalistic spirit. We spoke like a giant while acting like a dwarf”* (Interviewee 48).

Another government official expressed his ideas:

*“The Chinese people should believe in themselves and remain unified. Internal schisms create weakness. There was much in-fighting among warlords which invaders took advantage of. If China was unified without so many civil wars, Japan would not dare to invade us. It was difficult to gain victory over the Japanese Imperial Army. Everything could have been lost if it had not been for the help provided by America. China cannot develop in isolation as happened in the Qing Dynasty. I trust our leaders. Since the 1978 open-door policy to start reform, the leadership has been moving in the right direction. However, our leaders should notice the social contradictions, inequalities in wealth, corruption problems and the general lack of a moral compass. These should be solved. Otherwise the development of China will stagnate. If a country has no national spirit, people dream their lives away; this nation will have no hope. But it is also not good if the nation is too warlike, just like Germany and Japan in the Second World War, which weakened their vitality. Therefore, a nation should not be afraid of wars, nor provoke war without good reason. I think it is very good for the Zhijiang site to display the details of the Xiangxi Battle, the surrender ceremony and the construction of the Zhijiang airport. Other information about the history of the battlefield can be seen in the Nanjing Museum and the Chongqing Museum”* (Interviewee 49).

A middle-aged tourist said:

*“I hope that the next generation learns from the displays. I hope they will not forget the humiliation which China suffered during the anti-Japanese war. It will be disgraceful to forget the history. They should learn from Chinese history. Today’s young people live in a prosperous society. It is good for them to know how it was achieved”* (Interviewee 61).

These tourists’ responses confirm the fact that messages about national pride among Chinese people as presented throughout the Zhijiang site are very effective. Red Tourism in China has specifically been identified as “a powerful force in the construction and maintenance of nationalism” (Palmer, 1999:313). The shift of focus from promoting the history of the CCP and Mao in the first phase to promoting nationalism in the second phase would appear to be a success.

## 7.6 Conclusion

There has been a considerable expansion in Red Tourism since 2004. It has been used as a tool by the Chinese government to promote political messages. Visitors are exposed to the messages displayed at Red Tourism sites and interpret them from their own individual perspectives. This chapter explores tourists' responses to government political intentions as displayed in messages at the Red Tourism sites of Shaoshan and Zhijiang.

Thus, tourists hold a range of views on the government's intentions behind Red Tourism. From the tourists' responses toward patriotic education in the Red Tourism sites at Shaoshan and Zhijiang, we can deduce that tourists were not always aware of patriotism at Shaoshan, the most important Red Tourism site in the first phase. Some tourists commented that loving their country does not mean that they have to love the party as well. This was not as successful as hoped. At the Zhijiang site, tourists, without exception, were aware of nationalist messages on display and almost always agreed with them. This is one of the main objectives of the Chinese government.

Tourists respond differently toward the messages conveyed on the history of the CCP. Some people indulge in the cult of Mao at Shaoshan even though it is officially discouraged by the government. Some people worship Mao while others hail him as a truly great leader. It can be concluded that in the first phase of the development of Red Tourism hardly any of the tourists accepted unreservedly the messages on the history of the CCP and Mao at Shaoshan. Tourists' responses do not always match the Chinese Central government's intentions behind Red Tourism. Phase 1 was not wholly successful in terms of its aim of improving the image of the CCP

Perhaps in response to the difficulties encountered in winning over public opinion to the CCP view, the later policy focussed on a more nationalistic approach. This looks back to the war against the invading Japanese Imperial Army, and also forward to the extraordinary industrial and technological achievements of modern China. Tourists respond more positively to the messages on China's industrial and technological development rather than the original political messages. The industrial and technological achievements are there for all to see in everyday life. Nationalism is a much easier way to unify a

nation, a kind of lowest common denominator of political life everywhere; the appeal to national unity may also serve the purpose of distracting the people from the massive inequality in modern China.

As far as nationalism sites such as that at Zhijiang are concerned, tourists do leave the sites feeling better about their country after their visit. The site is highly educational particularly for young visitors and may well be successful in shifting people's attention from perceived CCP failings to an enhanced feeling of pride in their prosperous nation. The shift of focus from promoting the history of the CCP and Mao in the first phase to promoting nationalism in the second phase would appear to be largely successful.

The themes discussed in this chapter reflect the broad themes as presented in the third conceptual framework in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.3) tourist responses towards: patriotic education; original political intentions behind the first phase of Red Tourism; the worship of Mao at Shaoshan; and additional political intentions behind the second phase of Red Tourism. Significantly, more positive responses from Chinese domestic tourists were found towards messages about nationalism in the second phase of Red Tourism in comparison to the CCP history messages in the first phase of Red Tourism.



## **Chapter 8: Conclusion**

## **8.1 Introduction**

Two Red Tourism sites, Shaoshan and Zhijiang, were chosen for case studies in this research. By establishing the state's intentions behind the development of Red Tourism at these two sites, the tourists' responses toward the Red Tourism messages displayed therein are a measure of how successful the Red Tourism strategies have been.

The previous two chapters analysed the empirical findings from the case studies of the two sites. Shaoshan is the most important example of the first phase of Red Tourism development while Zhijiang is perhaps the most representative site of the second phase of Chinese Red Tourism. Both sites are located in Hunan province where resistance to Japanese imperialism grew in the remote mountainous terrain. There is a great deal of literature about the role of governments everywhere in their use of heritage tourism for political or ideological purposes. But, as yet, nobody has conducted similar research in the hugely important area of Red Tourism in China. This has begun to change recently, but very few studies focus specifically on the political or ideological intentions behind Red Tourism, and how tourists respond to what is displayed at the sites. One contribution of this research is to fill a gap in the theory pertaining to Red Tourism in a Chinese context.

Chapter 8 discusses the key findings of the study. The chapter starts by revisiting the study objectives to examine how they were addressed in the thesis. Next, it examines the key empirical findings of the research in relation to the conceptual framework and draws a conclusion from them. The holistic nature of the framework is shown to be an appropriate instrument for the study of the development of Red Tourism. Some reflections are also provided on the limitations of the study and challenges faced during the process. Lastly, the chapter offers some recommendations for future tourism studies based on the findings of this study.

## **8.2 Review of the study's research objectives**

Figure 8-1 presents the four principal study objectives. Each chapter of this study established one or more of these objectives.

### **Figure 8-1 The study's objectives**

Objective 1 To examine the development of Chinese Red Tourism and its two phases with their markedly different foci.

Objective 2 To establish the intentions of the Chinese government for Red Tourism.

Objective 3 To analyse the messages that the Chinese government conveys at the Red Tourism sites of Shaoshan and Zhijiang.

Objective 4 To investigate the interpretation of messages, elicit and examine tourists' responses to the messages conveyed by the Chinese government at the Red Tourism sites of Shaoshan and Zhijiang.

Objective 1 is explored in chapter 5 to examine the development of Chinese Red Tourism and its two phases with their markedly different foci which the promotion of the history of CCP and Mao at the first phase and nationalism in the second phase.

Objective 2 was dealt with in mostly chronological order in Chapter 6, where the Chinese government's political intentions regarding patriotic education in every Red Tourism site, the Chinese government's original political intentions behind the first phase of Red Tourism and the Chinese government's additional political intentions behind the second phase of Red Tourism were identified.

Objective 3 was analysed in chapters 6 and 7. The shift of focus on political messages at Red Tourism sites was presented in some detail. The chapter highlights patriotic education including the history of the CCP and Mao at the Shaoshan site, and nationalism/national unity in the Zhijiang site. It also examines the cult of Mao and its unintended consequences.

Objective 4 was dealt with in Chapter 7, which examined tourists' responses towards the Chinese government's intentions behind Red Tourism. It noted tourists' experiences and responses towards the history of the CCP and the promotion of Mao at the Shaoshan site, as well as the progress made by the CCP since 1949, the history of the Kuomintang and the promotion of national unity at the Zhijiang site. It also examines tourists' experiences and responses toward the cult of Mao.

These objectives were detailed further in Chapter 3.

### **8.3 Key findings in relation to the application of the researcher's conceptual framework**

The intention of this section is to evaluate the study's conceptual framework with regard to the relationship between the Chinese government's political intentions behind Red Tourism at Shaoshan and Zhijiang, and tourists' responses to them. It summarises the key findings and considers the wider implications. The key findings are related directly to the conceptual framework and show how it assisted with the earlier analysis.


#### *8.3.1 The theoretical basis of the conceptual framework and its practical use*

Chapter Three described the conceptual framework which was constructed, in part, to guide research into tourists' responses to government's political intentions for Red Tourism at Shaoshan and Zhijiang on the basis of the establishment of the political messages behind Red Tourism. These Red Tourism messages relate to the history of the CCP and Mao in the first phase of Red Tourism, and nationalism and national unity in the second phase.

The organisation of this section is based on the final version of the conceptual framework (Figure 8-2) which was developed as the research evolved from the one shown in Figure 3-3, Chapter 3. This illustrates the framework's applicability to Red Tourism practices in China's Shaoshan and Zhijiang and takes account of the findings concerning the development of the cult worship of Mao alongside accepted red tourism practices.

The theoretical approach of the research addressed the government's involvement, political ideology, heritage interpretation and tourists' motivations and experiences. Whitford (2009: 681) writes that "it is important to understand the ideological basis for policy development in order to obtain an insight into the workings of government".

**Figure 8-2 The final version of the conceptual framework**



The framework was a basic structure for organising one's approach to the issues under investigation (Macve, 1981). This framework focuses on current Chinese policy issues and particular strands of theory or strategy that the literature review presents. It highlights the differences between the Chinese government's political intentions behind the Red Tourism messages in the two phases of Chinese Red Tourism. These have an impact on tourists' responses to them at Shaoshan and Zhijiang. The ideological components used to analyse the government's intentions and tourists' responses to them at Shaoshan and

Zhijiang formed the basis for the design of the interview questions and other relevant research methods.

The framework facilitated other research design decisions. It represents a continuous and self-learning process of knowledge creation (Nonaka *et al*, 2001). As discussed in Chapter 3, the framework offered five substantive benefits. Firstly, it led in part to the knowledge creating process by which data would be gathered and explored. Secondly, it was influential in devising the interview questions related to its theoretical themes (see also Chapter 3). Thirdly, its elements were important guides for the analysis of data. Fourthly, the framework was useful in the organisation of the thesis chapters. Finally, it helped gain an understanding of the development of Red Tourism as it evolved in the context of the rapidly changing contemporary Chinese society.

The analysis of the research findings was guided to some extent by the study's theoretical framework. The framework is integrative, flexible and interactive, and it was a key guide for obtaining relevant data, as well as for the organisation of the qualitative data derived from the semi-structured interviews, including their coding and analysis. The integration of several disciplinary perspectives in the conceptual framework also provided valuable ideas. The results chapters are organised around the components of the five themes within the framework. These include Chapter 5 on the context of the development of Red Tourism; Chapter 6 on the Chinese government's political intentions behind Red Tourism (the components being patriotic education, the CCP and Mao, superstitious or feudalistic values, and nationalism); and Chapter 7 on tourists' responses to government political intentions behind Red Tourism at Shaoshan and Zhijiang. This study used an integrative process between the literature, the conceptual framework, the findings and the epistemological perspectives that determined what was considered as a valid and legitimate contribution to theory generation (Brannick, 1997). The next section briefly reviews key research findings from the conceptual framework's application.

### *8.3.2 The conceptual framework and the research findings*

This section sets out to show how the result findings are related to the framework categories.

The conceptual framework was developed in Chapter 3 to help examine the differences between the Chinese government's political intentions behind Red Tourism and tourists' responses to them at Shaoshan and Zhijiang. The application of the conceptual framework in the context of the development of Red Tourism is useful when coming to terms with the ongoing changes in Red Tourism policies. In particular, it provides the means to assess the success or otherwise of Red Tourism strategy. The key findings are summarised as the following.

- *Relationships between government and Tourism, and the relevant historical context of the development of Red Tourism*

The study showed in Chapter 5 that Red Tourism owes its origins to the First National Red Tourism Development Plan 2004-2010. As a special form of Heritage Tourism in China, Red Tourism has undergone noteworthy development since 2004. The context in which Red Tourism has developed is a key element of the framework. It helps explain the relationship between the Chinese government and tourism, and the rationale behind the two separate phases in the development of Red Tourism.

In the first phase, from 2004 to 2010, there were two main purposes. The first, and by far the most important purpose, was political; that is, to help improve the standing of the CCP which was perceived as being corrupt and lacking democratic accountability. The second was an economic purpose in that the development of sites in poorer, remote areas would provide a considerable stimulus to shops, restaurants and hotels, and improve commercial activity and employment prospects for local people. The visitors were almost unanimous in their acceptance of the view that the economic purpose was successful. On the other hand, there was a great deal of scepticism towards the political intentions with some tourists displaying considerable hostility to some of the messages.

In the second phase from 2011 to 2015, there was a noticeable shift in purpose. Instead of concentrating on the Communist Party, the new policy focussed on a more Nationalistic approach. This was partly because Phase 1 failed to improve the public's image of the CCP, but also because the CCP leadership itself was moving further and further away from the tenets of Marxism, especially in

respect of the growing and destabilising inequality in China which could lead to demands for a return to a more egalitarian society.

The second phase looks back to the war against the invading Japanese Imperial Army, and also forward to the industrial and technological achievements of modern China. This has the additional advantage of deflecting criticism of government policy from those who feel left behind by the marketisation of the economy. Both phases are referred to as Red Tourism, even though the emphasis is markedly different.

- *Chinese government intentions behind messages presented at Shaoshan and Zhijiang and assessment of tourists' responses*

Two Red Tourism sites, Shaoshan and Zhijiang, were selected for the study which firstly establishes Chinese government intentions behind messages presented at the sites. The messages displayed at all Red Tourism sites are concerned with patriotic education, the CCP, the life of Mao, the cult of Mao with its related superstitious values, the progress made by the CCP since 1949, nationalism and national unity. The CCP has not given specific political reasons for the establishment of such sites and the messages displayed therein. Thus, this research gathered information from party officials, academic experts on Red Tourism, and tourists regarding their views on the messages at the sites on what the aims were, and whether the messages on display were successful or not. A careful analysis of their recorded responses reveals a variety of views on the messages at Shaoshan and Zhijiang.

### **Patriotic education**

The study starts with patriotic education as one of the key Chinese government political intentions. Predating the commencement of Red Tourism in 2004, the CCP actually launched the patriotic education campaign in August 1991. It appears to have been, at least in part, a response to the extraordinary and politically damaging events of Tiananmen Square in 1989. Soon after 1995, the Chinese government selected 100 sites as national level 'demonstration bases' for patriotic education. Many of the original 100 Red Tourism Scenic Spots are included among the list of patriotic education bases which was drawn



up in 1994. Patriotic education continues to fulfil its political role throughout Red Tourism.

It can be seen that the promotion of patriotism involves reminding the Chinese people of the modern country's revolutionary origins and encouraging the Chinese people to strengthen their love of the nation. This study first examines tourists' responses toward patriotic education at Shaoshan. Most visitors were aware of the importance of patriotic education at the Red Tourism site, especially for Chinese youth. Surprisingly, some tourists seemed unaware of the existence of such messages. Other visitors disagreed with some of the messages most noticeably the notion that loving one's country meant loving the party.

Another key component of the patriotic education drive would seem to be the portrayal of China as a victim of western and Japanese colonialism. The Chinese government gradually put less emphasis on the propagation of communism ideology and more on the party's role as the paramount patriotic force and guardian of national pride. This was especially true of the second phase sites like Zhijiang. This study explored tourists' responses towards patriotic education at Zhijiang. Without exception, visitors to Zhijiang were conscious of patriotic/nationalistic messages on display. All visitors to Zhijiang agreed on the importance of promoting national unity.

This research concluded that patriotic education has been used as a tool to enhance the legitimacy of one party rule by the CCP, and its drive to unite the nation during a period of rapid and turbulent transformation.

### **The CCP and Mao**

Red Tourism in its first phase was designed to improve the image of the communist party. In 2004 the Chinese government sought to promote at all Red Tourism sites the CCP's history including, of course, Mao's outstanding contribution. The best example of such a site is that at Shaoshan, the birthplace of Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong, the father of the People's Republic of China, is a pivotal figure in modern Chinese history. He led the Chinese Communist Party to victory over the KMT in 1949 and he established the People's Republic of China. The history of the CCP and that of Mao are inseparable. The Chinese

government wants to utilise the messages in its promotion of the history of the CCP and Mao in order to consolidate its one-party rule. This was the Chinese government's original political intention in the first phase of Red Tourism.

Tourists learn about the history of the CCP and the spirit of the old revolutionaries during their visits. However, the messages on the history of the CCP and Mao presented at Red Tourism sites often elicit quite different responses from visitors to those desired by the state. Very few of the tourists accepted the messages without reservation. The CCP's political objective cannot be regarded as being an unqualified success.

Therefore, the Chinese government's additional political intentions behind the second phase of Red Tourism involved a revision of the public image of Mao and a fresh look at the history of the CCP and KMT. The reconstructed Mao Zedong Memorial Museum highlights Mao's life, presenting Mao as an incorruptible leader instead of the revolutionary icon portrayed formerly. Mao's simple lifestyle as presented is generally accepted by the visitors as being factually correct.

### **The cult of Mao and superstitious values**

As a result of the Chinese government's promotion of Mao throughout Red Tourism sites, many Chinese people come to show their respect for Mao. Some of them even worship Mao in a quasi-religious way. The cult of Mao was a significant factor in the early days of the PRC. This phenomenon was at first encouraged by the government, most noticeably during the Cultural Revolution. However, the cult of worship is now officially discouraged by the government. The government is worried about the adoration of Mao as superstition is not consistent with the tenets of scientific socialism. In addition, the Chinese government does not want political opponents to use popular respect for Mao and his communist values to undermine its authority. However, even though the Chinese government does not approve of the superstitious values present in the worship of Mao, some government officials take it for granted that superstition is part of a value system that people have the freedom to believe in.

It is much more common now than in the past for tourists go of their own volition to Shaoshan in order to pay homage to the memory of Mao Zedong. A

substantial number of visitors do not believe that the worship of Mao is a superstitious or feudalistic practice. Nor do they consider that the cult of Mao poses a threat to the prevailing ideology of communism. However, some tourists do think that the superstitious and feudalistic values present in the cult of Mao could undermine communism. Some tourists are of the opinion that the 'sanctification' of Mao in Shaoshan is actually of benefit to the public standing of the CCP and for the stability of China since it would be more difficult to challenge the ideology of Chinese communism if its founder is a God-like figure. A number of visitors seemed not to care whether superstitious and feudalistic values are present in the worship of Mao. Most interviewees took the view that superstitious and feudalistic values do not threaten one-party rule. Over all, tourists responded in a variety of ways towards the cult of Mao. The fact that government opposes the practice seemed to have only a minimal effect on visitor responses.

### **Nationalism**

Instead of concentrating on the Communist Party and Mao, the new policy in the second phase of Red Tourism covers Chinese history over a considerably longer period from 1840 until the present day, with the focus shifted to Nationalism. More recently, it looks back to the war against the invading Japanese Imperial Army. This is inevitably less controversial than the original politically loaded messages, such as those on display in Shaoshan. In China, the term 'nationalism' usually has a positive connotation that reflects a national spirit. Engendering a national spirit, an important strand of nationalism, has become a key political intention of China's government which seeks to remind people about Chinese history and thus to promote national unity. Nationalism provides a much easier route to national unity, a kind of lowest common denominator of political life everywhere. It removes from political discourse awkward questions regarding the ultra-rich and the impoverished masses. This can be viewed as a useful strategy for the CCP given that Mao could become a focus for those opposed to the enormous inequality and corruption resulting from the market-friendly policies initiated by Deng Xiaoping.

This part of the study features a case study of Zhijiang, a very important site in the second phase of Red Tourism development in that it is dedicated to

commemorating the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army. This site was Chiang Kai Shek's original choice for the Japanese surrender, although it was later changed for logistical reasons to Nanjing. The political messages at this site are on the whole concerned with national unity.

The Zhijiang site is highly-educative, with the target audience being predominately young visitors. It may well have been successful in shifting people's attention from perceived CCP failings to national pride in the liberation of China from Japanese occupation. The Zhijiang site is dedicated to the collective memory of the past that binds the Chinese people together.

Zhijiang is, of course, a Red Tourism site, but unlike the Shaoshan site which concentrates on Mao Zedong and the history of the CCP, here credit is given to the substantial part played by Chiang Kai Shek's Kuomintang Army in the armed struggle by communists and nationalists against the Japanese Imperial Army and the subsequent defeat of Japanese Imperialism. Although Shaoshan and Zhijiang were both awarded the title of 'Patriotic Educational Site', it is beyond dispute that Zhijiang plays the more prominent role in this regard.

Alongside the Chinese government's additional political intention in the second phase of Red Tourism of promoting the economic progress made by the CCP since 1949, it can be seen through the example of the Zhijiang site that the Chinese government is also seeking to shift the focus from the promotion of the history of the CCP and Mao to national unity. The site pays a great deal of attention to the history of the Japanese occupation and also the humiliation of China by western colonial powers in the past. The adverse criticism of the pro-capitalist and landlord-friendly policies of the KMT was no longer officially approved. Current disputes between China and Japan now take centre stage instead of the civil war waged by the CCP and the KMT.

Many visitors expressed an interest in learning of previously unpublicised information about the role of the KMT in the anti-Japanese Imperial Army campaign. Tourists usually leave the sites with an enhanced feeling of pride in their country though some expressed shame at their humiliation by the Japanese Imperial Army. The shift of focus from promoting the history of the CCP and Mao in the first phase to promoting nationalism in the second phase would appear to be an unqualified success.

## **The progress made by the CCP since 1949**

The Chinese economy has developed extremely rapidly since the implementation of the Open-Door and Reform policies enacted by Deng Xiaoping, but there have been identifiable downsides to the unprecedented growth, notably the associated gross inequality. The Chinese government would prefer its citizens to dwell on the remarkable growth of the national economy, a direct result of the policies initiated by Deng Xiaoping. A major feature of the Nationalist approach in the second phase of Red Tourism is the highlighting of the industrial and technological achievements of modern China. The country's phenomenal progress and the people's improved standard of living are evident to all in everyday life.

Many tourists visited the Shaoshan site on more than one occasion. The facilities at Shaoshan have been well-funded and provide a pleasant and informative experience for the visitors. There are many things to see at Zhijiang. It comes as a surprise to visitors to discover the importance of such a small remote place, whose existence was unknown by the public until recently. The tour guides, the historical photographs and the captions attached to each photograph help tourists to understand that the victory over the JIA was achieved through the cooperation of the Kuomintang and Communist Armies. In fact, the display contains many more photographs about what the Kuomintang achieved in the battles against the Japanese Imperial Army than the successes of the Communist Army. And all the documents in the surrender process were about what the Kuomintang did. This is clear evidence of a change in attitude of the CCP towards the Kuomintang. There was no evidence of this change engendering resentment on the part of visitors; nor did it lead to any criticism of the ruling Communist Party. On the contrary, tourists commended the CCP's respect for historical fact.

### **8.4 Contributions of the research**

The research looks at things in a new way and sheds fresh light on old texts to reveal previously unnoticed connections between heritage tourism, government ideology, Red Tourism, the state of society in China and the presentation and reception of messages.

#### *8.4.1 Contribution to the study of heritage tourism and government ideology*

The conceptual framework was invaluable in the examination of the role of heritage tourism in China. Red Tourism, as a special form of heritage tourism, has been promoted by the Chinese government at sites of historical importance in the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is an important part of the wider tourism industry in China. The findings testify to the significance of Red Tourism as a powerful tool used by the Chinese government to achieve its political purposes. This study reveals how the Chinese government conveys its political messages at Red Tourism sites and how tourists respond to it.

Although communist heritage tourism emerged first in eastern European countries after the collapse of the USSR in 1989, it took more than a decade before academic papers on the subject were published. Much of the research originated in the United Kingdom with Romania, Poland and East Germany drawing the attention of Duncan Light and Craig Young who were especially interested in the issues of interpretation and national identity. More recent research on these issues has been conducted in Bulgaria and Albania (Ivanov, 2009). Shortly after, several researchers examined the use of communist heritage in the tourism industry in Romania based largely in the capital city of Bucharest (Caraba, 2010). Since 2004, Red Tourism has been growing in China. More and more Chinese researchers have studied it, each from their own point of view. However, most of the studies on Red Tourism were limited to plans for expanding the industry and ways to advertise the attractions available in the sites. There is a lack of research into the relationship between communist heritage tourism and the state, especially with regard to the government's political intentions. This study fills the gap on how the government conveys its intentions through communist heritage tourism sites and how effective it is in influencing the public.

Ideology, it has to be said, is viewed differently in the developed world compared to China. Ideology was contentious from the outset in the west. *"There has been a great deal of intellectual debate in the West on the meaning and scope of this key concept, and it is now no longer adequate simply to state that one subscribes to the common-sense view"* (Holm, 1991: 6). The original term 'ideologie' in French can be traced back to 1796 in the writings of the

French Enlightenment philosopher Destutt de Tracy regarding the '*science of ideas*' (Bonnet *et al*, 2005: 175; Johnston *et al*, 2000: 369; Williams, 1976[1985]: 153-4). Marx and Engels made progress in the theorization of ideology in *The German Ideology* (1946) and *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859) with the concept of the 'dominant ideology' or 'ruling ideas,' mostly from the viewpoint of class or social stratification to differentiate interest groups. The contributions of Marx and Engels to the transformation of the meaning of ideology have been significant and influential. "*With Marx, the conception of ideology came of age*" (Johnston *et al*, 2006: 369, quoting Larrain, 1979).

The concept of ideology was subjected to scrutiny over a considerable period of time in the developed world (Williams, 1976[1985]:153-7). In general, western intellectuals tend to approach ideology as a system of ideas and ideals, a system of values and beliefs at all levels, with historical, social, and cultural dimensions (Ibid). There are two commonly-held views of ideology. It can refer to "*an explicit set of political beliefs, such as liberal, conservative, or socialist ideologies*" outside academia or, alternatively, a "*broader systems of beliefs, ideas, and attitudes that have direct implications for political commitments and actions*" such as communist and capitalist ideologies (Bonnet *et al*, 2005: 177).

In contrast, there has been much less debate over the concept of ideology in China than in western countries. One reason for the lack of debate is that China's modernization has been accompanied by a shift away from its fundamental ideology of Marx-Leninism with a Chinese characteristic. Perhaps it is preferable to avoid the issue altogether or discuss it behind the closed doors of the CCP headquarters. Scholars writing in the Chinese language, or those born in China but writing in the English language, seem to be overly ready to write about ideology and ideological change without tackling the concept itself. In China, ideology has become a sensitive concept requiring a delicate approach in any analysis.

The Chinese government seems to prefer to avoid making explicit ideological declarations. There would appear to be no published policy on ideology. This may explain the paucity of research in this area in China. This study attempts to fill this gap by examining messages conveyed at Red Tourism sites and asking party officers and other visitors for their views on key issues. From the

responses, it becomes clear that the government does, in fact, use the heritage sites to disseminate its view about society in order to influence public opinion. Crucially, the study reveals that the CCP takes every opportunity presented at Red Tourism sites to strengthen support for state power, hardly surprising in a one-party state.

#### *8.4.2 Contribution to a more critical examination of Chinese intentions behind Red Tourism*

Although previously there have been some academic studies on general tourism in China, research into Red Tourism represents a new development in Chinese tourism studies. Red Tourism, a major growth industry in China from 2004 onwards, has attained some prominence in recent media reports. There are a lot of studies now about Red Tourism. The existing body of literature on the development of Red Tourism in China has made a significant contribution to our understanding of this important feature of modern China. A wide range of topics are covered in this research field including: governance (Zhao and Timothy, 2015); communist identity (Li *et al*, 2010); heritage and Red Tourism (Cosmin, 2011); modernity and sustainability (Li and Hu, 2008). Typically surveys on Red Tourism were conducted in tightly-defined areas. Research on the theory of Red Tourism is still at an early stage of development. These researchers studied Red Tourism often from a marketing perspective and concentrated on Red Tourism planning and management. Generally speaking, publications on Red Tourism in the Chinese language have taken on the style of business promotion; they are generally merely descriptive, summarizing tourist attractions and proposed developments. So far, hardly any scholarly works exist that deal comprehensively with the *raison d'être* of Red Tourism and how the political messages on display are interpreted by party officials, CCP members and visitors. The extraordinary economic progress resulting from Deng Xiaoping's opening-up has had an effect on the hitherto monolithic thinking of the politburo, leading to a more pragmatic approach to many issues. It is surely the right time to cast a critical eye on the political messages displayed at the sites.

Red Tourism plays an important part in improving the economy in less-developed formerly revolutionary areas; perhaps more importantly, Red



Tourism fulfils the ideological role of reasserting and amplifying support for the CCP at a time when the marketisation of the economy has created an individualisation of society and an accompanying lack of political clarity. No post-socialist nation has done as much to promote revolutionary tourism as China, although it does exist to some extent in other formerly socialist countries as well as in the still socialist Cuba. The post-socialist Russian Federation has witnessed a revival of pilgrimages to the old revolutionary sites. Plans are underway in Bolivia to create a Che Path, which will follow the trail of Che Guevara who was killed while playing an important part in the Bolivian revolutionary movement. Along with the evolution of Red Tourism from communism in the first phase to nationalism in the second phase, Red Tourism has become a medium through which the individual and his local community can learn about where they came from and foster an enhanced feeling of national identity.

Red Tourism commenced in 2004, during a period of intensive marketisation of China's socialist economy. Most of the research into Red Tourism in China pays considerable attention to its economic significance in backward areas. This study goes further by revealing the government's political intentions behind Red Tourism and tourists' responses to them.

It is the broader socio-political background of Red Tourism in the reform era against which the research is set. Planning practice in Red Tourism sites is often presented in research literature without taking into account the political factors prevailing during the development and promotion of Red Tourism as they evolved during the transitional stage from the first phase to the second phase. This study compares the impacts of the different political messages on display at the two Red Tourism sites, Shaoshan and Zhijiang.

Given the historical and political background of the development of Red Tourism in China, it is worth noting that Red Tourism, in part, is a practical instrument used by the Chinese government to convey its ideology by presenting political messages at Red Tourism sites. The study establishes specific messages conveyed at Shaoshan and Zhijiang. It deduces the Chinese government's intentions behind the messages presented at Red Tourism sites.

The study reveals how people interpret the messages at Red Tourism sites in ways that do not necessarily fit in with the government's ideological view.

#### *8.4.3 Contribution to a general understanding of the state of society in China*

The conceptual framework was a useful tool for establishing research findings about government political intentions behind the two Red Tourism sites at Shaoshan and Zhijiang, and tourists' responses to them. The framework and research findings also contribute to an understanding of stability and change in contemporary Chinese society. In order to analyse the government intentions behind Red Tourism and tourists' responses, research questions were constructed to elicit the following relationships between the Chinese government and Red Tourism; government purposes and actions in the Red Tourism sites at Shaoshan and Zhijiang; Chinese government intentions behind messages presented at Shaoshan and Zhijiang; tourists responses toward Red Tourism messages at Shaoshan and Zhijiang in China; and the assessment of experiences of visitors at the two sites. This study uses the responses to the questions presented as the basis of an analysis whose aim is to provide a greater appreciation of the state's role in Chinese society.

China has established itself as an important player politically and economically on the world stage. The level of its development and pace of growth has attracted a great deal of attention globally. Kerry Brown (2015: 213) states that, "*The energy of modern China is something that is visible and powerful on even the briefest visit. It is a society that is developing more rapidly than perhaps any other society ever has down the centuries.*" Singh (2014: 187) adds that:

*"It is almost impossible, therefore, to think of the kinds of changes this society might see in the next half century, and what these will mean for a world that, more than ever before, is dependent on the stability, success and coherence of the PRC".*

In a country as populous and diverse as China, stability (whether political, social or economic) is recognised as being of immense importance. After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping's 'Open Door' reform in 1978, Deng gave priority to political and social stability, which became the basis for creating a favourable environment for dynamic economic development. The rapid growth of the economy has resulted in massive inequality in Chinese society, and a widening gap between rich and poor. Corruption of the party bureaucracy has

become commonplace, causing disquiet in the general public accompanied by hostility directed at the CCP. The deadly confrontation between demonstrators and the army in Tiananmen Square in 1989 exposed the fragility of socio-political stability in China. Although nobody suggests that contemporary China faces imminent collapse (Chang, 2001), or that its economic development rests upon 'a volcanic stability' (He, 2003), it is generally accepted that the economic disparity in wealth produced by the marketisation of the economy with rampant corruption of communist party officials could lead to a collapse in support for one party rule in China.

In this context, Red Tourism emerged as one of the strategies to help sustain China on the path of rapid economic growth, while at the same time, strengthening the Communist Party's right to rule. Thereafter, from 2010 during the second phase of Red Tourism, China astutely shifted the focus from Mao, the communist revolutionary and the history of the CCP to a less controversial diet of nationalism and national unity.

This study acknowledges the serious challenges confronting contemporary China. It also explores the attempt by the state to use Red Tourism as a tool to achieve its political objectives. As a matter of fact, since its formation, the CCP has displayed a remarkable ability to adapt to a continuously evolving political and social environment and is resolute in its pursuit of sustainable development, rather than maintaining economic growth at any cost.

#### *8.4.4 Contribution to the study of presentation and interpretation, tourists' motivations and experiences*

This is a study of tourism which has a political dimension to it. Presentation and interpretation in tourist attractions are examined in the political context of contemporary China. Research into interpretation has rarely been featured in mainstream publications. The reason for this omission may be that interpretation is a somewhat esoteric concept with the consequence that research into the subject only finds an audience in specialist literature. Historically, tourism was limited to museums, art galleries, botanical and zoological parks, where interpretation was of little importance as such public enterprises had no financial imperatives. Nowadays, all tourist facilities whether publicly or privately owned are required to maximise their visitor numbers.

Presentation and interpretation has become an important part of the process. There is, therefore, a requirement for research into these aspects of the tourist industry (Philipp, 2014). This study has a broad significance by providing new insights into the role of government in the interpretation and presentation of its political messages at Red Tourism sites. Visitors negotiate how they respond to the messages at the sites. They respond differently. They do not always accept the intended government line. This is especially true with messages on the role of the communist party and Mao. The messages displayed in the second phase sites on nationalism and national unity were almost universally accepted.

To date, little attention has been paid to the experiences of visitors to heritage tourist sites (Ung and Vong, 2010). Ho and McKercher (2004) took the view that although visitors are at the heart of the heritage tourism industry, most managers prefer to concentrate on the infrastructure and the exhibits, and ignore the views of the tourists. Beeho and Prentice (1997) agreed claiming that, despite a long-standing policy of collecting data on visitors to museums and other tourist facilities, the bulk of these studies ignore the impressions of visitors. Tourists experience is at the heart of this study.

### **8.5 Limitations of the research and recommendations for future research development**

Although the study has been successful in fulfilling the research objectives, it is recognised that there have been limitations. By outlining these limitations, this section presents recommendations for future research, which could allow studies on similar topics to contribute further to academic knowledge.

#### *8.5.1 Limitations of the research*

This research was constrained by time and financial costs. Therefore, it was not feasible to carry out a greater number of interviews with a wider spectrum of Red Tourists and government officials. Clearly it would have been advantageous to be granted interviews with high-ranking central government officials in the National Red Tourism Coordination Executive Team (NRTCET), even though they may have been subject to constraints on how they would respond. A number of other limitations may be acknowledged relating to the restriction of study focus to only two Chinese Red Tourism sites (after the end

of the first phase of Red Tourism), and the position and role of the Chinese researcher in the research process.

#### *8.5.2 Recommendations for future research development*

Red Tourism is a special form of heritage tourism in China. Visitors to heritage tourist sites can be referred to collectively as heritage tourists. They may come from a variety of backgrounds with different reasons for their visits, including education and enjoying themselves. Visitors may visit several sites, their motives being dependent on the particular site they are visiting at that time (Prentice, 1994). An interest in the past, enjoyment, genuine exhibits and education are the most common reasons cited for visits (Confer & Kerstetter, 2000; Goulding, 1999; Jansen-Verbeke & van Rekom, 1996; Lowenthal, 1998; Prentice, 1993). Although Red Tourism was originally aimed at the domestic market, tourism has become a popular global industry. Perhaps this would be a good time to conduct research into international tourists' responses to the political messages at Red Tourism sites and why they decided to visit.

Attention was earlier drawn to a lack of categorisation of tourists in this research; there would be a benefit to all involved in the tourist industry if visitors were divided up into groups on the basis, perhaps, of their age, sex, educational attainment, party membership, etc. This could be useful to the Chinese government and site managers looking to improve the experience and increase the numbers coming to the sites.

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## **Appendices:**

## Appendix 1: Interview questions

### Interview Questions

#### ❖ I. Background Questions

- **For Officials**

1. What are the main responsibilities of your organisation?
2. Has your organisation been involved in policy-making for red tourism? If yes, in what ways?
3. What is your job title, and what are your personal responsibilities in this job?
4. Are you a member of the Communist Party?

- **For Tourists**

1. Are you visiting Shaoshan/Zhijiang while staying overnight away from your home for one night or more?
2. Which "red tourism" sites within Shaoshan have you visited so far during this visit?
3. Are you visiting Shaoshan/Zhijiang on your own or as part of a group? If part of a group, are you visiting with your family, with friends, or with both family and friends? Are there any children in your group?
4. Did you travel to Shaoshan/Zhijiang through a travel agent, through your own arrangements, or through your work unit?
5. Is this your first visit to Shaoshan/Zhijiang? If not, then how many times have you visited before, and how recent was your last visit?



6. Have you visited both Shaoshan and Zhijiang?
7. What is your occupation? Are you a member of the Communist Party?
8. What age group are you in? Under 20? 21-39? 40-59? Over 60?
9. For what reasons did you decide to visit Shaoshan/Zhijiang today?
10. What have been your best experiences during your visit to Shaoshan/Zhijiang today, or on previous visits to Shaoshan/Zhijiang?
11. What have been the least good experiences during your visit to Shaoshan / Zhijiang today, or on previous visits to Shaoshan/Zhijiang?
12. Have you visited other red tourism sites, and do you consider you are strongly interested in visiting them, moderately interested in visiting them, or not really interested in visiting them?

❖ **II. Relationships Between Government and Red Tourism, and government intentions**

1. What do you consider to be the main reasons for the government developing and promoting red tourism in several places in China? What do you consider to be the single most important reason? (What do the government want people to learn from red tourism sites?) OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS
2. What do you consider to be the main reasons for the government developing and promoting red tourism in Shaoshan/Zhijiang? OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS

3. What are the main policies of central, provincial, local government for developing, promoting and managing red tourism in Shaoshan/Zhijiang?  
OFFICIALS
4. Which level of government (central, provincial or local government) plays the most important role in developing, promoting and managing red tourism in Shaoshan/Zhijiang? OFFICIALS
5. Are there any differences in tourism management for red tourism sites compared with general tourism sites? If there are differences, why are they different? OFFICIALS
6. Which government organizations have been most important in funding the development, promotion and management of red tourism in Shaoshan/Zhijiang? OFFICIALS
7. Which government organizations have been most important in terms of providing practical support and advice about the development, promotion and management of red tourism in Shaoshan/Zhijiang?  
OFFICIALS
8. Are there official policies intended to influence the messages presented in Shaoshan/Zhijiang? If so, what are those policies? OFFICIALS
9. Does national, provincial or local government have most influence on the messages presented to tourists at Shaoshan/Zhijiang? Which government organisations have most influence on the messages presented to tourists at Shaoshan/Zhijiang? OFFICIALS
10. What types of tourists are especially targeted to visit red tourism sites, including Shaoshan and Zhijiang, if any? OFFICIALS
11. Is it intended to attract domestic tourists more than international

tourists to red tourist sites like Shaoshan/Zhijiang? OFFICIALS

12. What messages about the progress and improvements that have been made in China are presented at red tourism sites, if any? OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS
13. What is your opinion of the superstitious and feudalistic values that are present in the worship of Mao Zedong at Shaoshan? OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS
14. Do you have any philosophical or political beliefs? What is it? Why do you believe in it? OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS (?)
15. What do you think the influence of the superstitious and feudalistic values in contemporary China? Do you think it challenges the ideology of the Communism? OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS

❖ **III. Messages Presented at Red Tourism Sites and tourists' responses**

• **Communism and Communist Party**

1. What, if anything, have you learnt in Shaoshan that you did not know before your visit about Mao Zedong including his life and his influence on China's government and society? TOURISTS
2. How has visiting Shaoshan helped you to understand Mao Zedong and his influence on China's government and society? TOURISTS
3. What features of Mao Zedong's life and of his influence on China's government and society that were presented in Shaoshan most interested you during your visit? TOURISTS

4. What messages about communism and about the Communist Party are presented at Shaoshan/Zhijiang, if any? OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS
5. What messages about communism and about the Communist Party in present-day China (any progress and improvement) are presented at Shaoshan and Zhijiang, if any? OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS
6. What particular sites within Shaoshan present messages about communism and about the Communist Party especially effectively, if any? How do they do this? Can you give me a particular sort of display which you think that convey this message? OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS
7. What do you think of the messages in this pictures? How do you interpret the messages in this pictures? OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS
8. What do you think the government want tourists to learn about from the messages in the picture? OFFICIALS
9. What have you learnt about from the messages in the picture?  
TOURISTS
10. Why does the old exhibition need to be reconstructed? How is the government organising its development? What is the principle behind it? Why do you say that? OFFICIALS
11. Do you consider that Shaoshan presents messages about communism and about the Communist Party very effectively overall? Why do you think that? OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS
12. Is there a particular exhibit or place in Shaoshan from which you learnt much about communism and about the Communist Party? If yes, what did you learn, and how did it enable you to learn this? TOURISTS

- **National Pride and Patriotism**

1. What, if anything, have you learnt in Zhijiang that you did not know before your visit about anti-Japanese Imperial Army during the II World War? TOURISTS
2. How has visiting Zhijiang helped you to understand the victory achieved through the cooperation between the Nationalist Army and the Communist Army against the Japanese Imperial Army during the II World War? TOURISTS
3. What displays of the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army that were presented in Zhijiang most interested you during your visit? Why? TOURISTS
4. Shaoshan/Zhijiang was awarded the title 'Patriotic Educational Site'. In what ways do you consider that Shaoshan/Zhijiang plays a role in 'Patriotic Education'? OFFICIALS and TOURISTS
5. What messages about national pride and patriotism among Chinese people are presented at Zhijiang and Shaoshan, if any? OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS
6. What particular sites within Zhijiang/Shaoashan present messages about national pride and patriotism among Chinese people especially effectively, if any? How do they do this? Can you give me a particular sort of display which you think that convey this message? OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS
7. What do you think of the messages in this pictures? How do you interpret the messages in this picture? OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS
8. What do you think the government want tourists to learn about from the messages in this picture? OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS

9. What have you learnt about from the messages in this picture?

TOURISTS

10. Is there a particular exhibit or place in Shaoshan and Zhijiang from which you learnt much about national pride and patriotism among Chinese people? If yes, what did you learn, and how did it enable you to learn this? TOURISTS

11. Where in the buildings is the most obvious aspect presenting the national pride? How are these message conveyed? OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS

12. Do you consider that Shaoshan/Zhijiang presents messages about national pride and patriotism among Chinese people very effectively overall? Why do you think that? OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS

#### ❖ **IV. Assessment of Experiences**

1. Is any assessment made of the expectations and the experiences of visitors at Shaoshan and Zhijiang? If yes, what results have they found? Are copies available for researchers? Have they led to changes in the tourism products and experience offered to tourists at red tourism sites? OFFICIALS

2. In your opinion, do the tourists arriving at Shaoshan/Zhijiang want to learn about the same things that they then find are presented there to them? OFFICIALS

3. In your opinion, does a visit to Shaoshan/Zhijiang provide tourists with both an opportunity to learn and also an enjoyable overall visiting experience? Why do you say that? OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS

4. Did this visit to Shaoshan/Zhijiang match up to what you expected before you had visited? Why do you say that? TOURISTS
5. Is your motivation more about learning or about entertainment? Is the site more about learning or about entertainment? Why do you say that? TOURISTS
6. What do you think of the entertainment at the Shaoshan/Zhijiang site? Does the entertainment weaken the education function at Shaoshan/Zhijiang? OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS
7. Are there any improvements that you think could be made to the experience of visiting Shaoshan/Zhijiang? OFFICIALS AND TOURISTS

**39 questions for OFFICIALS and 44 questions for TOURISTS**

**39 questions for Shaoshan site and 36 questions for Zhijiang site**

**Chinese translation for the interview questions:**

## 采访问题

### ❖ 1). 背景问题

#### • For Officials

1. 你们机构的主要职能是什么？
2. 你们机构有没有参与红色旅游的政策制定？如果有，以什么方式？
3. 你的职位是什么？你个人的工作职责是什么？

4. 你是党员吗？

• **For Tourists**

1. 你参观韶山/芷江时在那住过几个晚上？
2. 你参观过哪些韶山的红色旅游景点？
3. 你参观韶山/芷江是你自己去的还是跟一组人去的？如果是和一组人去的，你是和家人，还是和朋友，还是既和家人又和朋友一起？有孩子和你一起吗？
4. 你参观韶山/芷江是通过旅行社，还是你自己安排的，还是通过工作单位组织去的？
5. 这是你第一次去韶山/芷江吗？如果不是，你去了韶山/芷江多少次？最近一次去韶山是什么时候？
6. 韶山和芷江，你都参观过吗？
7. 你的职业是什么？你是党员吗？
8. 你在哪个年龄组？ 20 岁以下？ 21-39？ 40-59？ 60 岁以上？
9. 是什么原因使你决定今天来参观韶山/芷江？
10. 在你参观韶山/芷江的过程中，什么是你最好的感受？
11. 在你参观韶山/芷江的过程中，什么是你最不好的感受？
12. 你参观过其他的红色旅游景点吗？你认为你是很有兴趣去参观还是中等兴趣还是根本不感兴趣去参观？

❖ **2). 政府和红色旅游的关系， 以及政府的意图**

1. 你认为政府在中国许多地方发展促进红色旅游的主要原因是些什么？这些原因中，最主要的原因是什么？（政府希望旅游者从他们的红色之旅中收获些什么？）（O & T）
2. 你认为政府发展促进韶山/芷江的红色旅游的主要原因是什么？（O & T）
3. 中央、省、地方政府发展、促进、管理韶山/芷江红色旅游的主要政策是什么？（O）
4. 哪一级政府（中央、省、地方）在韶山/芷江红色旅游的发展、促进、管理方面起了最重要的作用？（O）



5. 红色旅游景点的管理与一般旅游景点的管理有区别吗？如果有，为什么会有区别？（O）
6. 在韶山/芷江红色旅游的发展、促进和管理方面，哪一级政府机构在其经济资助方面起了最重要的作用？（O）
7. 根据对韶山/芷江红色旅游的发展、促进和管理，哪一级政府机构（中央、省、地方）在提供实际支持和建议方面起了最重要的作用？（O）
8. 有没有官方政策或文件决定在韶山/芷江的红色旅游景点中展现哪些信息？如果有，是哪些文件？（O）
9. 国家、省或地方政府对韶山/芷江红色旅游景点中展示的信息有影响作用吗？哪一级政府机构对这些信息的影响力最大？（O）
10. 参观红色旅游景点，包括韶山和芷江，有没有特定的针对性的游客群体？（O）
11. 相对于国外游客来说，是不是红色旅游景点，像韶山、芷江，更侧重于吸引国内游客？（O）
12. 红色旅游景点中，有哪些信息是关于中国取得的进步和成就的？（O & T）
13. 对于韶山崇拜毛主席的过程中出现的封建迷信的东西，你怎么看？（O&T）  
（展示照片）
14. 你有信仰吗？是什么？为什么信这个？（O&T）
15. 你在韶山崇拜毛主席的过程中有封建迷信的思想和行为吗？为什么？（O & T）
16. 你认为封建迷信思想对当今的中国有什么影响？你认为这些会对共产主义思想有挑战吗？（O&T）

❖ **3). 红色旅游景点中呈现的信息和旅游者的反馈**

• **共产主义和共产党**

1. 你参观韶山后，有没有了解到你以前不知道的毛主席的生平以及他对中国的影响？（T）
2. 韶山之行是怎样帮助你了解了毛主席以及他对中国政府以及社会的影响的？（T）
3. 你对韶山展示的有关毛主席的生活和他对中国影响的哪些方面最感兴趣？（T）

4. 韶山景点中有哪些关于共产主义和共产党的信息？（O&T）
5. 韶山景点中有哪些关于共产主义和共产党如今的成就的信息？（O&T）
6. 在韶山，哪些有共产主义和共产党信息的景点，特别的能够给人留下印象？在景点中是怎样做到这一点的？能否举个例，在哪个景点中传递给游客的信息给你留下了很深的印象？（O&T）
7. 请你看一下这几张照片，你怎样理解这些照片中传递出来的信息（O&T）
8. 你认为政府想让游客从这些信息中收获什么？（O）
9. 你从这些信息中收获了什么？（T）
10. 毛主席博物馆为什么需要重建？政府是怎样组织这次重建的？对于这次重建，有什么要求？为什么？（O）
11. 你认为韶山的景点中，包含共产主义和共产党的信息，总的来说，起到了教育作用吗？你为什么这么认为？（O&T）
12. 在韶山，有没有专门的展览或景点使你了解共产主义和共产党？如果有，你学到了什么？是怎样使你学到这些的？（T）

• **民族自豪感和爱国主义**

1. 你参观芷江后，有没有了解到你以前不知道的抗日战争的事情？（T）
2. 芷江之行，是怎样帮助你了解国共合作共同抗日取得胜利的历史的？（T）
3. 你对芷江展示的有关抗日以及日军投降事件的哪些方面最感兴趣？为什么？（T）
4. 韶山/芷江被称为‘爱国教育基地’。在哪些方面你认为韶山/芷江在爱国教育方面起到了作用？（O&T）
5. 在芷江，哪些方面展示了中国人民民族自豪感和爱国主义精神的？（O&T）
6. 在芷江，哪些景区或景点关于中国人民的民族自豪感和爱国主义特别的给人留下印象？这些信息是怎么做到给人留下印象的？能否举个例？（O&T）
7. 请你看一下这几张照片，你怎样理解这些照片中传递出来的信息（O&T）
8. 你认为政府想让游客从这些信息中收获什么？（O）
9. 你从这些信息中收获了什么？（T）
10. 在芷江，有没有专门的展区或景点使你了解中国人民的民族自豪感和爱国主义？如果有，你学到了什么？是怎样使你学到这些的？（T）

11. 受降坊的建筑物中，在什么地方最明显的体现了民族自豪感？这种信息是怎么体现的？（O&T）
12. 你认为芷江的受降坊中包含中国人民民族自豪感和爱国主义精神的信息，起到了教育作用吗？你为什么这么认为？（O&T）

❖ 4). 经验、建议

1. 有没有和参观景点的游客进行过调查交流？如果有，是什么样的调查结果？有没有留存的调查复印件？这些调查有没有针对旅游产品以及旅游者的经历方面有些改进？（O）
2. 在你的印象中，来韶山/芷江参观的游客想收获的东西与来了后韶山/芷江展示给他们的东西是一致的吗？（O）
3. 你认为，韶山/芷江同时提供了游客学习的机会和娱乐的体验吗？你为什么这样认为？（O&T）
4. 这一次韶山/芷江之行与你来之前所期望的是一致的吗？（T）
5. 你去参观的动机是想学习还是娱乐？景点展示的更多的是学习的东西还是娱乐的东西？你为什么这样认为？（T）
6. 你对韶山/芷江景点中的娱乐方面怎么看？你认为景点中的娱乐方面的建设会对景点中的爱国教育功能有影响吗？（O&T）
7. 你认为针对韶山/芷江的旅行，有什么可以改进的方面吗？（O&T）

## **Appendix 2: List of respondents**

**Officials:** 1. Hunan Provincial Tourism Administration, 2 persons

2. The Propaganda Department of Hunan CCP's Provincial Committee, 1 person

3. The Office of the history of the Communist Party of Hunan CCP's Provincial Committee, 2 persons

4. Shaoshan Tourism Administration, 1 person

5. Shaoshan Management Administration and Mao's Memorial Museum, 1 person

6. Zhijiang Tourism Administration, 1 person

7. The site of the monument commemorating the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army, 1 person

8. Zhijiang Government official, 1 person

9. Zhijiang Peace culture research centre, 1 person

**Total: 11 officials**

**Academic:** 1. Red Tourism Research Centre, Xiangtan University, 3 persons

2. Tourism Centre, Central South University of Forestry and Technology, 1 person

3. Zhijiang research centre on peace culture, 1 person

**Total: 5 academic researchers**


**Tourists:** Shaoshan, 28 persons, of which 2 local people, 2 tour guides and 24 tourists.

Zhijiang, 22 tourists.

**Total: 50 tourists**

**Total respondents: 66**

## Appendix 3: China's Resistance War Against Japanese Aggression in chronological order



1935



August 1

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China published a "Letter to the People of Resistance Against Japan and Salvation of the Nation." It appealed for an end to the civil war and the arming of the people to defeat the Japanese imperialists.



December 9

A patriotic student movement broke out in Peiping (now Beijing). The Kuomintang army and police suppressed the gathering of 2,000 to 3,000 students in the famous "December 9th Movement."



Dec. 17

The Wayaobao meeting held by the Communist Party of China on Dec. 17, 1935 worked out a policy to create an anti-Japanese national united front.

1935



He-Umezu Agreement

In June 1935, the He-Umezu Agreement was signed, which stipulated that troops under the direct control of Chiang Kai-shek withdraw from Hebei Province.

1936



December 12

Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, the patriotic generals of the Kuomintang in Xi'an, detained Chiang Kai-shek, who was there making arrangements for an encirclement and suppression campaign against the Communists. They then forced him to resist the Japanese. This is historically known as the "Xi'an Incident."

1936

September

Japanese troops conducted war exercises in Fengtai in the suburbs of Peiping, for provocation purposes. A conflict with the Chinese troops then occurred. After that, the Japanese brought in reinforcements and occupied Fengtai in order to hold the key transportation lines between Peiping and Tianjin.

1937

July 8

The CPC Central Committee published an open telegram to the nation after the Lugouqiao Incident, calling on the people to resist Japanese aggression.

August 22 - Luochuan Meeting

The CPC Central Committee held the Luochuan Meeting, in which it passed a "Ten-point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Country."

August 31

The Eighth Route Army crossed the Yellow River to march to the frontlines.

September 6

The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government was set up.

1937



July 7 Incident

On July 7, 1937, the Japanese army telegraphed the Chinese Nationalist forces, saying one of their soldiers was missing in Wanping, 15 kilometers southwest of the Beijing. The Japanese Army demanded entry to the town to conduct a search. The Chinese Army refused. Around midnight, Japanese artillery began bombarding the town. Shortly after, their infantry with tanks marched across the Lugou Bridge into Wanping, which marked the beginning of an all-out war of aggression against China by Japan.

Video: My Chinese Resistance War Against Japan- Marco Polo Bridge

Video: The gunshot at Marco Polo Bridge

Photos of July 7 Incident

July 11 The Japanese Government decided to bring reinforcements into China.

July 29 Peiping fell.

July 30 Tianjin fell.



August 13 Incident

On August 13, 1937, the Japanese army attacked Shanghai in what is known as the August 13 Incident. The national government mobilized more than 70 divisions to fight in the Battle of Shanghai, which lasted three months. Over 40,000 Japanese troops were killed or wounded.

November 8 The Japanese army occupied Taiyuan, the capital of Shanxi.

November 12 Shanghai fell.

1937.9. 25



Battle of Pingxingguan

The 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army ambushed the Fifth Division of the Japanese army in Pingxingguan, wiping out more than 1,000 of the enemy troops and logistic personnel. The battle marked the first victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan.



Video: My Chinese Resistance War Against Japan- Ambush



1937.10.26



### Battle of Sihang Warehouse

The battle took place in a warehouse just across from the foreign concessions in Shanghai.



Video: My Chinese Resistance War Against Japan- Eight Hundred Lonely Troops

1937.12.1

### Defense of Nanking

Following the occupation of Shanghai, the Japanese military issued an order on Dec. 1 for the army and navy to jointly attack Nanking, then China's capital. Meanwhile, military commander Tang Shengzhi was entrusted by the Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek to defend the city and began mustering forces, many of whom were remnants from the Shanghai battle.

1937.12.13



### December 13 - Nanjing Massacre

Nanjing fell. The Japanese army was ferocious. Chinese people killed or buried alive totaled more than 300,000. These deaths and more than 20,000 rape cases made up the world-shocking "Nanjing Massacre."



### Evidence of Nanjing massacre

In September 1946, a U.S. priest John Magee testified before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East against the crimes Japan committed during the Nanjing Massacre.



### Survivors share their stories with Japanese public

Memorial services remind Chinese people of a tragic moment in history. But for many people in Japan, it's a lost memory.



### Western media's early reports on Nanjing Massacre

The picture shows Japanese recruits at bayonet drill in Nanjing after the capture of the Chinese capital. They are using Chinese prisoners as their targets.

1938



### March 23-April 6: Battle of Tai'erzhuang

the enemy.

The Chinese army won a big victory in Tai'erzhuang in Shandong Province, in which it wiped out more than 20,000

1938

### May 19

The Japanese army occupied Xuzhou, followed by Kaifeng and Xinzheng of Henan Province.

### October 25

Wuhan fell. After Guangzhou and Wuhan fell, the War of Resistance Against Japan entered the stage of strategic stalemate.

1939

### September 25

The First Changsha Campaign occurred, an important campaign in the frontline battlefield during the early period of the stalemate stage.

1939

### Mid-February

The Japanese army occupied Hainan Island and enforced a naval blockade against China.

### Early May

In order to consolidate its occupation of Wuhan, the Japanese army attacked Suixian and Zaoyang.

### October 24

The Japanese army occupied Nanning.

1940



**August 20-December 5:  
Hundred-Regiment  
Campaign**

The Eighth Route Army launched 100 regiments of 400,000 men in a battle in north China. This battle, popularly called "Hundred-Regiment Campaign," was the biggest attack led by the Chinese Communist Party against the enemy during the war. The campaign included 1,824 battles. It wiped out 20,645 Japanese troops and 5,155 puppet soldiers. This campaign played an important role in the anti-Japanese war. It proved that the Chinese Communist Party and the anti-Japanese army led by it represented the backbone of the struggle against the invaders.

1940

**March 29**

A puppet "National Government" was set up in Nanjing, with Wang Jingwei as its acting president.

1941

**January 25**

Japanese troops surrounded Panjiayu in Fengrun County, Hebei Province and killed all the 1,230 people in the village. The shocking event is called the "Panjiayu Massacre."

**Late October**

Japanese troops launched a massive "mopping-up" campaign in the Taihang Mountains.

**November 3**

The Japanese army launched "mopping-up" operations in the Yimeng Mountains in Shandong Province with more than 50,000 troops.

1942



**Chinese Expeditionary  
Force**

In February, China set up an expeditionary army and for the first time entered Burma (present-day Myanmar) to fight alongside the British army there.

Veteran cherishes peace >>

1942

**May 1-June 30**

With Yasuji Okamura in command, more than 50,000 Japanese troops started a "May 1st mopping-up operation" in Central Hebei Plain.

1942



**Video: Chinese Resistance  
War Against Japan  
Wartime Countering the  
Mopping up Operations**

1943

**September 20-November 3**

The Japanese started an "autumn mopping-up operation" against the Hebei-Shandong-Henan base area with 30,000 troops. Fully prepared well before that, the army and people there using flexible tactics fought more than 300 battles, wiping out 11,000 enemy troops.

1943

**Chinese Expeditionary Force**

For the second time, the Chinese army entered Burma (present-day Myanmar) to fight the Japanese.

1944

**April 17**

In order to open a land transport line, the Japanese army attacked Henan, Hunan and Guangxi with a 500,000-strong force, thus starting the "Operation Number One."

**April 22**

The Japanese army occupied Zhengzhou.

**June 18**

Japanese troops occupied Changsha.

1944

**March**

The Guangdong Qiongya people's Anti-Japanese Independent Column was set up in Hainan Island, with Feng Baiju as the commander and political commissar.

**December**

Guerrillas fighting in the Zhujiang Delta set up the Zhujiang Column. The Central Column of the Guangdong People's Anti-Japanese Liberation Army was established in central Guangdong. The Hanjiang Column was set up in the Chaozhou-Shantou area.



## 1945

### Early January

The Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region army started a powerful spring offensive against the enemy.

### January

The Taihang Military Region army started a spring offensive.

### February 1

The Shandong Military Region army started a spring offensive.

### April 20

The Shanxi-Shandong-Henan Military Region army started a spring offensive.

### May 12

The Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region army started a summer offensive.

### June 5

The Shandong Military Region army started a summer offensive.

## 1945.7.26



### Potsdam Proclamation

On July 26, 1945, in the form of a joint declaration by China, the U.S. and Britain, the Potsdam Proclamation was published urging Japan to surrender.

Basic facts of Potsdam Proclamation >>

## 1945.8.15



### Japan's unconditional surrender to the Allies

August 15, 1945, the emperor of Japan addressed his nation by radio announcing acceptance of the

Potsdam Proclamation and Japan's unconditional surrender to the Allies.

## 1945.8.21



### Surrender of Japanese troops in China

On August 21, 1945, six days after the Japanese emperor announced an end to the war, his troops in China surrendered in Zhijiang City, central China. Japanese representatives signed the surrender memorandum, acknowledging defeat.

Zhijiang preserves history of Japan's WWII surrender >>

## 1945.9.2



### September 2: Surrender ceremony

Japan surrendered to Allied countries. The official signing ceremony of the instrument of surrender was held on

the American battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay.

## 1945.9.3



### September 3: Victory Day

On September 3, 1945, celebrations were seen across the globe. The date is marked in China to commemorate the victory in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression.

China's memorial days on Anti-Japanese Aggression War >>



### CPC's contributions in the war of Anti-Japanese Aggression

At that time CPC's leadership in the war was essential. It was the pillar of our nation.




### Chinese battlefield played major role in Allies' victory

China was the first country to be invaded by a fascist state, and the first to fight back. Japan invaded the northeast of China in 1931.

Source:

[http://english.cntv.cn/special/sept3victoryday/history1931\\_1945/index.shtml](http://english.cntv.cn/special/sept3victoryday/history1931_1945/index.shtml)


#### Appendix 4: Permission for the photograph cited



Translation: “During the last three years I have taken photographs of exhibits presented in the Red Tourism site Shaoshan and also cited some photographs at Shaoshan official website. I shall shortly be presenting my PhD thesis for adjudication and require your permission to use the photographs to illustrate key parts of the text. Would you be in a position to grant this?”

“No problem. You can use them freely.”

## Appendix 5: Permission for the photograph cited at Zhijiang



Translation: “During the last three years I have taken photographs of exhibits presented in the Red Tourism site Zhijiang and also cited some photographs at Zhijiang official website. I shall shortly be presenting my PhD thesis for adjudication and require your permission to use the photographs to illustrate key parts of the text. Would you be in a position to grant this?”

“It’s ok. They are open to use.”