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The Limits of Rehabilitation: The 1930s Stalinist Terror and its Legacy in post-1953

East Germany

Matthew Stibbe

The Stalinist Terror of the years 1936-53 claimed millions of victims, including hundreds of German anti-fascists who had gone to the Soviet Union in the 1930s as political émigrés (*Politemigranten* or *Ostemigranten*) on the orders of the German Communist Party (KPD).¹ Those who survived and later took up residence in post-war East Germany (the GDR), as opposed to the West German Federal Republic (the FRG) or West Berlin, fall into three categories. First was a very small number of KPD functionaries who had already been rehabilitated by various organs of Soviet justice and readmitted to the KPD exile group in Moscow as a result of the ‘mini-thaw’ of late 1938 to early 1940. Typically they were able to return to Germany in 1945 or shortly afterwards.² Secondly, there was a handful of individuals who came back in the late 1940s, usually a result of the direct intervention of the future GDR President Wilhelm Pieck. Among them were Werner Eberlein, son of the murdered KPD functionary Hugo Eberlein, who was repatriated in 1948 and went on to have an illustrious career in East Germany, rising to the Politburo by 1986;³ Susanne Leonhard, mother of the senior party official and Comintern school graduate Wolfgang Leonhard who later defected to the west;⁴ and Fridolin and Horst Seydewitz, sons of the first post-war Minister-President of the East German *Land* of Saxony, Max Seydewitz.⁵ Taken together, these first two categories added up to about 30 persons.⁶ Between 1949 and 1954 there were virtually no German returnees from the Gulag and hardly any repatriation of former émigrés at all. This was a time when East Germany’s rulers took a hard line on alleged ‘traitors’ and

‘enemies of the party’, defending the show trials that had taken place in the Soviet Union in the late 1930s while instigating their own campaigns against ‘deviationists’, ‘Trotskyists’ and ‘sectarians’.⁷ The third, and largest, group of surviving German victims – consisting of around 150 ex-prisoners and their dependents – had to wait until after Stalin’s death in March 1953 before receiving the news that they could finally go home. Between 1954 and 1962 most of them received permission to settle in the GDR.⁸

Using memoirs of German communists who were repatriated in the 1950s and early 1960s after years spent in Soviet camps, as well as official party records and newspaper sources, this chapter will explore the practical and discursive limits of the rehabilitation process in East Germany. It will also assess how far the widening of knowledge about Stalin’s crimes led to a ‘reworking of the political imaginary’⁹ inside the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED). The term ‘political imaginary’ requires some explanation. On the one hand, following Susan Buck-Morss, it can refer to the general desire in both east and west for ‘representational concreteness’ when it came to exhibiting (supposedly still realisable) ‘utopian visions’ and ‘collective goals’ to a mass public in face of the constant uncertainties thrown up by events in world politics. Lenin and Stalin of course both featured strongly in the ‘political imaginary’ of all Soviet bloc countries. But the classic communist trope of a ‘vanguard party’ boldly ‘making “history”’ by guiding the people towards a final victorious assault against a range of capitalist, reactionary and ‘Trotskyist’ foes¹⁰ was magnified in the GDR’s case by its status as a ‘border region’ in the European theatre of the Cold War, with the ‘enemy’ quite literally on the doorstep in West Berlin and the FRG;¹¹ and also by the rapid domination of the SED by a group of communists whose experiences of underground activism at home and in exile in the 1930s and early 1940s had made them particularly suspicious of alleged ‘spies’, ‘revisionists’ and ‘counter-revolutionaries’. The East German labour historian Jürgen Kuczynski, who

joined the party in 1930 and was an ardent Stalinist and member of the SED inner elite until he fell out of favour with the leadership in 1956-59, later wrote of the period of illegal struggle before 1945:

Those years turned us into better comrades, into better fighters for progress – but they did not let us be amiable people.... We become deeply distrustful in our daily lives, while at the same time putting all our confidence in the great path of humanity, in the future, in youth, in the victory of the good and the beautiful.¹²

More parochially, ‘political imaginary’ can denote the sense of historical mission and purpose that the SED communicated to its members, both young and old, to GDR citizens more broadly, and to external supporters and opponents. What part did continuing silence, censorship and self-censorship in relation to the Stalinist purges have in the cultural reproduction of this East German narrative of past and present achievements? And how important an influence was the GDR’s intense rivalry with the ‘capitalist-imperialist’ FRG, including growing tensions over rearmament and the status of Berlin in the late 1950s?¹³ In order to answer these questions, the essay will make some reference to the many victims of Soviet military justice, East German political trials and other manifestations of Stalinist terror in Germany in the years 1945-55, whose post-1956 claims for rehabilitation were by and large ignored by the SED and whose convictions were often only quashed, if at all, by German or Russian courts in the 1990s.¹⁴ However, the main focus will be on German purge victims of the 1930s who were released from the Soviet camp system after 1954, usually after being formally acquitted by Soviet district or central courts; repatriated to their homeland, on the understanding that their homeland was the GDR; and in most cases readmitted to the party, in or around the year 1956.

Political Context

Founded in October 1949, the GDR rapidly became one of the most hard-line communist states in Eastern Europe, particularly after SED first secretary Walter Ulbricht announced the ‘accelerated construction of socialism’ in 1952. Although forced into some concessions following the failed popular uprising of 17 June 1953, particularly on the social and economic fronts,¹⁵ the regime soon reverted to political type. In 1956 its leaders could congratulate themselves on having avoided the big show trials of the late 1940s and early 1950s which had blighted neighbouring communist countries like Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia although evidence suggests that they planned such a trial and merely called it off at the last minute.¹⁶ Yet even without a show trial, there had been several rounds of expulsions from the ruling party from 1948 onwards; secret trials held without public knowledge; and numerous convictions of party members and ordinary citizens, as well as ex-Nazis and ‘capitalists’, for political or quasi-political offences.¹⁷

In total 13,127 persons were still serving sentences in East German jails for ‘crimes against the state’ in the first quarter of 1956, accounting for 31.2 per cent of the prison population.¹⁸ Only in the wake of Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ in February 1956 to the 20th party congress of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) did these numbers begin to fall. The regime itself claimed to have pardoned or granted early release to 11,896 persons in the course of its immediate post-March 1956 investigations of past court cases and sentencing practices, and a total of 21,000 persons by October of that year.¹⁹ Among those regaining their freedom (albeit without having their convictions overturned) were several thousand ex-Nazis, ‘Titoists’, centre-right politicians and Social Democrats who had been condemned by Soviet military tribunals (in the period up to January 1950) or East German courts (after 1950) for ‘misdeeds related to Hitler’s war’, ‘anti-Soviet agitation’ or ‘collaboration with western

intelligence agencies'.²⁰ The official SED press emphasised in April 1956 that the reductions in sentence were a political good-will gesture towards the west, including the SPD, in line with Khrushchev's 'peaceful co-existence' policy and the recent 'strengthening of socialist and anti-militarist forces throughout the world', and in no way represented an acknowledgement of the prisoners' innocence.²¹ If the overall release figures for 1956 are accurate, however, then the beneficiaries must have included a considerable number of people convicted of 'ordinary' criminal offences, and not just those serving sentences for political crimes. Indeed, at the end of 1956 there were still 6,044 political prisoners in East Germany, making up 33.9 per cent of all those in jail, a higher proportion than at the beginning of the year.²²

Against this background, the fate of surviving German purge victims in the Soviet Union remained a highly sensitive, albeit largely hidden issue, with the potential to do serious damage both to the GDR's international standing and its relationship with the Soviet Union. In contrast to the releases from East German prisons, which at least received periodic mention in the press, it was not a subject for public discussion. But equally it could not be ignored in the hope that it would simply go away. Between 1948 and the mid-1950s the SED's leaders had defended the 1930s purges in absolute terms, while acting on the assumption that there were no 'innocent' victims.²³ A similar attitude was prevalent in the SED's sister parties, the West German Communist Party (KPD), which was active until a ban imposed by the federal constitutional court in 1956, and the SEW, the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin.²⁴ For instance, all three parties vigorously denounced as 'anti-Soviet propaganda' the claims made by Margarete Buber-Neumann, widow of the murdered KPD functionary Heinz Neumann, in her 1949 report *Als Gefangene bei Stalin und Hitler*. Published in the west but banned in the east, this book provided a distressing account of her

husband's arrest and execution, and of her own experiences of betrayal and imprisonment in the Soviet Union, followed by delivery into the clutches of the Gestapo and incarceration at Ravensbrück, the Nazis' main concentration camp for women prisoners, in 1940-45.²⁵

The negative stance taken by the three German communist parties was supported by the Soviet authorities who usually refused exit visas to convicted foreign prisoners, even if they had served their sentences, and in many cases condemned former Gulag inmates to further terms of imprisonment or banishment in the late 1940s and early 1950s.²⁶ The Kremlin was also at one with the GDR in believing that returnees could either disrupt East German society or – if they moved to West Germany via the still open border in Berlin – provide further material for anti-communist and human rights groups agitating against the Soviet system. Indeed, although by 1951-52 persistent enquiries from relatives had forced the SED to draw up a list of close to 180 German men and women missing in the Soviet Union, at least 32 of whom were long-term Gulag inmates or anti-fascists murdered in the purges, it is questionable whether this list was ever handed on to the Soviet authorities. In their internal correspondence, party officials used the uncertainty over whether the Soviets would even allow exit visas to such persons as an excuse for inaction.²⁷

After 1953 these assumptions could no longer be taken for granted, however. In the first instance, the revision and/or overturning of hundreds of thousands of political sentences in the USSR in the wake of the May 1954 decree 'On the Re-examination of Criminal Cases of Persons Convicted of Counter-Revolutionary Offences' was accompanied by the removal of any objections on the part of the Soviet Council of Ministers to the repatriation of rehabilitated foreign political internees. Information obtained by the GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs via the East German embassy in Moscow indicated that a growing number of German communist ex-prisoners wanted to leave the Soviet Union and had been granted the

necessary exit visas. Secondly, the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and West Germany following West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's state visit to Moscow in September 1955 raised concerns that the Soviet authorities could decide to send released German communist prisoners to the FRG if the GDR refused to accept them. Here they might be tempted to reveal the truth about what had happened to them under Stalin, following the example of the West German survivor Margarete Buber-Neumann or the communist defector Susanne Leonhard, who had fled with her son to Belgrade in 1949 and then to the FRG in 1950, eventually publishing a memoir of her time in the Gulag in 1956.²⁸ Admittedly, the ban on the KPD in West Germany in August 1956 made it less likely that returning victims who were still convinced communists would choose the FRG over the GDR. However, West Berlin, which had become an important centre of dissident left and human rights activism as well as being a launch pad for many western intelligence and propaganda operations against the Soviet bloc, remained an alternative option, at least until the building of the wall in 1961.²⁹

Finally, the release of prisoners from the Gulag, including surviving German victims, presented the regime in East Berlin with similar dilemmas to the release of the last former German POWs of the Second World War from Soviet military captivity and their repatriation to East and West Germany, a process which itself was just coming to an end in 1955-56.³⁰ Among the latter were real or presumed Nazi war criminals who had been convicted and sentenced by Soviet military tribunals for heinous offences against Soviet civilians during the 1941-45 period and who were now being amnestied as part of a diplomatic charm offensive aimed at winning over Germans in both the FRG and the GDR. Yet the official GDR line until 1955 was that purged German communists too must have been saboteurs and traitors, placing them on a par with Nazi war criminals. The idea that they might have been victims of

malicious denunciations, miscarriages of justice or unlawful purges carried out by organs of the Soviet state required a considerable readjustment of previous mind sets and beliefs, both before and after Khrushchev's 'secret speech' in February 1956.

Repatriations 1955-1962

The first official recognition in the SED party records that current and future applications for repatriation from the USSR made via the East German embassy in Moscow might include significant numbers of people seeking to return home after years of Soviet imprisonment came in an internal document produced by the Central Committee's cadre department on 7 February 1955. The document provided the names of 68 adults and their dependants who had been granted exit visas by the Soviet authorities since 1954 and were requesting entry to the GDR. Some of them had previously appeared on lists of persons who had been refused Soviet exit visas, but now had been granted them; others were entirely new names. It was recommended 'that in every case where a permit has been obtained to leave the Soviet Union, entry should also be granted to the German Democratic Republic', but that only those who could prove continuous membership of the KPD, the CPSU or the latter's youth wing, the Komsomol, should be automatically accepted into the SED. By contrast 'in cases where membership has been suspended for long periods in the past, or where doubts exist, an investigation or clarification should be undertaken by the ZPKK [Central Party Control Commission]'.³¹

In anticipation of the destitute state of some of the returnees, it was also recommended that they each be offered a 'transition allowance' (*Überbrückungsgeld*) of up to 2,000 marks from state funds, depending on their individual and family circumstances. In order to prevent them all from concentrating in Berlin, which had limited municipal resources to help the sick and

old among them, and in view of the danger that some might be tempted, if in Berlin, to consider moving west or to try making contact with western relatives, it was recommended that those without firm ties to the German capital be dispersed across all 14 provincial regions (*Bezirke*) of the GDR. In practice, though, by April 1959 128 returnees and their families were registered as living in East Berlin, representing by far the largest concentration of ex-Gulag prisoners in the whole of the republic.³²

This initial document was followed by two others. On 21 September 1955 the ZPKK, acting as the party's supreme tribunal, agreed to set up a special commission led by three senior party officials whose purpose would be to examine the 'affairs of comrades who have previously spent long periods in the Soviet Union', and to draw up some criteria for rehabilitation 'so that a concrete judgement can be made in each case'.³³ And on 19 April 1956, in its first report, the special commission recommended the following course of action to the Politburo:

- 1..... the ZPKK should be assigned with the task of interviewing returning emigrants from the Soviet Union and deciding on their rehabilitation.
2. In cases where the families of comrades imprisoned in the Soviet Union make enquiries on their behalf, the ZPKK should determine whether a rehabilitation [*in absentia* or *post-mortem*] is possible.³⁴

By this time, the first returnees had already begun to arrive. The figures vary, depending on the source, but party records suggest a total of 114 families, made up of 209 individuals, had come back between May 1955 and October 1956.³⁵ Even so, more were expected. On 1 August 1956 the Central Committee passed a resolution calling for a 'faster repatriation of former *Politemigranten* and their dependants from the USSR' and for extra state funds to help with travel arrangements:

For.... those whose material circumstances are not good, the GDR's embassy in Moscow will cover the costs of acquiring a Soviet exit visa and the entire costs of the journey from current place of residence to Berlin.³⁶

To speed up the process at the Soviet end, the Central Committee's cadre department also recommended the immediate despatch of a party official to Moscow whose job would be to resolve practical and other difficulties.

[Returning] comrades have informed us that.... a large number of *Politemigranten* remain scattered in the furthest reaches of the Soviet Union, and are anxious about approaching the GDR's embassy.... Comrade Viktor Leist, who returned in February 1956, even found himself arrested on the street when he left the embassy building [in Moscow], and was subsequently interrogated about the purpose of his visit there.... A further difficulty lies in the fact that many comrades do not even know where the GDR embassy is. For instance, Comrade Walter Höfer told us that when, in May this year, he was released from 20 years of internment by a commission in Karaganda, neither the Information Office, nor the Interior Ministry, nor the militia in Moscow could give him the address of the embassy. Finally.... a Polish student found it for him....³⁷

Most of the returnees came by train, arriving at Berlin's *Ostbahnhof* (eastern railway station) where they were met by a delegation sent by the party's Central Committee. Temporary accommodation was provided in special party-owned hotels in Berlin, after which the returnees were dispersed to more permanent lodgings. Those arriving in 1956 reported receiving up to 5,400 marks to help find new houses or flats, as well as special ration cards usually reserved for senior party members.³⁸ Indeed, the Central Committee's cadre

department had recommended an increase in the maximum *Überbrückungsgeld* to 4,000 marks at the end of 1955 and to 6,000 marks in October 1956.³⁹

In 1957 and 1958 further repatriations took place, particularly following an agreement signed between the GDR and the Soviet Union on 7 January 1957 concerning family reunions. Even in the early 1960s one or two cases were still outstanding. In total around 180 German emigrants who had survived the Stalinist terror were repatriated to the GDR between May 1945 and June 1962, nearly all of them (150 or so) after 1954.⁴⁰ Between October 1955 and July 1962 the ZPKK decided on restoration of party membership in 257 cases. For 66 individuals, rehabilitation was granted posthumously or – where exact details were unknown – ‘after presumed death’. Among them were the above-mentioned Hugo Eberlein and several other prominent KPD functionaries shot in Moscow in the 1930s and 1940s, such as Hermann Remmele and Willy Leow. This represented a mere fraction of the total number of murdered political émigrés, however, and some conspicuous names were still missing.⁴¹ Meanwhile, the majority of the 257 rehabilitations were granted to living persons who had returned since 1954 to the GDR and who in many cases had been formally acquitted of past criminal offences before leaving the Soviet Union. A lucky few, who seem to have had run-ins with the KPD exile group only, and not the NKVD, were merely hoping to have reprimands expunged from their party records. However, most of the returnees had been formally expelled from the KPD following their arrest by the Soviet secret police, and were now being *instructed* to seek readmission to the SED as part of the rehabilitation process. What kind of welcome did they get, beyond an interview with officials from the ZPKK followed by formal confirmation of restoration of party membership?

Ulbricht, rehabilitations and the limits of de-Stalinisation

Although it pardoned or granted early release to several thousand of its own political and criminal prisoners in 1956 (and again in 1960), the East German regime did not have the same judicial powers to alter verdicts or sentences passed by organs of the Soviet state.

Rehabilitation of returning German communist victims of the 1930s purges was therefore a separate, quasi-judicial process with its own political logic and rationale as determined by the ruling SED and its central apparatus.⁴² The purpose, at least as far as the ZPKK and the majority of Politburo members were concerned, was to make restored party membership and the privileges that went with it the basis for renewed discipline and control, not to correct past injustices or to open up awkward questions about the Stalinist past. Indeed, the potential for a more drastic rethink of the GDR's 'political imaginary' along anti-Stalinist lines was thwarted by the SED's leaders even before the conservative backlash which followed the crushing of the Hungarian uprising at the end of 1956. After February 1956 Ulbricht was obliged to look as if he were following Khrushchev's lead by denouncing the 'cult of personality' as a distortion of 'Leninist norms of party life' and rejecting Stalin as one of the great classic theorists of Marxism.⁴³ However, when it came to other aspects of de-Stalinisation he always managed to stay one or two paces behind. In a speech to a closed session of the Central Committee in late July 1956, for instance, he blamed the former Soviet Interior Minister Lavrentii Beria rather than Stalin for the 1930s purges and suggested that the GDR had already defeated Beria's attempts to stage a show trial within its borders in 1953.⁴⁴ There had, it seemed, been no major breach of socialist legality and no problematic 'cult of personality' in East Germany. Rather than allow a potentially divisive discussion of this apparent non-issue, the party had to maintain 'a firm line' [*eine feste Linie*] in face of attempts by enemies past and present to sew discord within its ranks.⁴⁵

After July 1956 the implication of these claims became more obvious. While the regime paid lip-service to the need for reform, anti-Stalinist intellectuals came under increased pressure, a process which culminated in the arrest, prosecution and imprisonment of the philosopher Wolfgang Harich and the head of the Aufbau publishing house Walter Janka, both of whom received long prison terms after trials in March and July 1957. Several other leading critics of Ulbricht were jailed, purged from the party or senior party positions, expelled from universities or forced to recant in a wave of repression lasting into 1958 and beyond.⁴⁶ Among those who fell under suspicion during this period was Nathan Steinberger, a rehabilitated returnee in 1955 who, because he chose to remain active in the Jewish community in East Berlin and cultivated contacts with relatives in Britain and Belgium, was removed from his position as departmental chief in the state planning commission in 1958.⁴⁷ Altogether, although the number of political prisoners in the GDR fell to a low of 4,965 in the second quarter of 1957, it rose steadily over the next year or so, to reach 7,913 by the third quarter of 1958. The new amnesty announced in October 1960 led to the release of 15,621 prisoners, including 3,366 'politicals', but the total count for the latter crept up again to 8,117 by the end of 1961. This was in spite of the fact that Ulbricht's internal authority was immeasurably strengthened by the building of the Berlin Wall in August of that year.⁴⁸

In the meantime, after 1962 repatriations from the Soviet Union were officially considered to have been completed, and a line was drawn under the internal process of rehabilitation.⁴⁹ True, in nearly all of the cases it examined between 1955 and 1962, the ZPKK had found in favour of restoration of unbroken party membership. For some returnees, this meant that they could now claim to have been loyal comrades for 30 or even 40 years, while all traces of what had happened to them in Soviet exile were expunged from their party record. One early example of this re-writing of party history came in 1958, in the run-up to the 40th anniversary

of the November 1918 revolution. The official SED newspaper *Neues Deutschland* carried an article by the veteran communist Martha Globig, who recalled how, as a 17-year-old activist in the Spartacist League, she had taken part in the founding conference of the pro-communist FSJ (*Freie Sozialistische Jugend*) on 27 October 1918 and in an anti-war march in Berlin on 28 October 1918. The protestors were blocked by the Imperial German police, but

.... the young people at the head of the march would not allow themselves to be intimidated and sought to break through the cordon. Arrests followed. When we sought to free the prisoners, the police shot at us at blank range and wounded Comrade [Fritz] Globig in the arm. The crowd pulled back but then surged forward again with renewed determination.... In this way, the delegates representing young workers from across Germany had not only organised a spirited conference, but stood shoulder to shoulder with their comrades from Berlin in the battle for the streets.⁵⁰

For the co-writer of the *Neues Deutschland* piece, this made Globig a role model for socialist youth in the GDR:

The heroism and sacrifice of young workers in the decades-long revolutionary struggle has paved the way for what we have and take for granted today. Because the working class holds the reigns of power, because it has smashed the power of the militarists, the old rulers are also no longer able to monopolise education [and] our young people now have equal rights and opportunities for development. On 16 November [1958] our young voters, as fully-fledged citizens, will make their own stand against militarism and war, thereby safeguarding their bright and glorious future.⁵¹

What the article failed to mention, however, was that Globig had spent almost 20 years as a Gulag prisoner in the Soviet Union. Her conviction had been quashed by a Moscow court in

December 1955, and she had been able to return to Germany in April 1956. Her formal rehabilitation and reacceptance into the party was subsequently ratified by the ZPKK in October 1956, which agreed to backdate her party membership to 1917.⁵² She was given a job in the party's Institute for Marxism-Leninism (IML), and in July 1961 she was honoured with an official announcement of her 60th birthday in *Neues Deutschland*, a mark of recognition reserved for esteemed party veterans.⁵³ However, although her carefully-reconstructed past was now held up as an inspiration to East German youth, and although she was called upon by the IML to record her autobiographical memories for the benefit of the 'Memoir Section' (*Sektor Erinnerungen*) of the Central Party Archive in 1962, it was made clear to her – and she accepted – that she could not discuss her experiences in the Soviet Union in public.⁵⁴ The SED needed heroes, not victims. Ordinary party members and the general public were left entirely in the dark about the rehabilitation process, while even the rehabilitees were only informed verbally about the decision to readmit them. They were provided with no formal documentation, and indeed were required to hand over any Soviet documents in their possession – especially those pertaining to their arrest, imprisonment, release and judicial rehabilitation – to the party officials who came to meet them at Berlin's *Ostbahnhof*.⁵⁵

The majority of East Germans were also kept in the dark about developments in the Soviet Union post-1956, including further revelations about Stalin's crimes in the 1930s and beyond. From the party's perspective, the situation in the GDR differed from that in the USSR, for in the former there had supposedly never been any terroristic personal dictatorship, arrests of innocent people or abuse of state power, and therefore there was no need to use rehabilitation as a means of emancipating society from fear of arbitrary persecution. The fact that senior KPD functionaries had remained silent or looked the other way while the Soviet authorities

surrendered at least 350 German and Austrian anti-fascists to the Gestapo between November 1939 and May 1941 was conveniently forgotten, and significantly both Margarete Buber-Neumann and her murdered husband, Heinz Neumann, officially remained ‘traitors’ to the communist cause rather than being recast as innocent victims of the 1930s purges.⁵⁶ Efforts were also made to stop detailed knowledge of Khrushchev’s 1956 speech from spreading beyond the senior levels of the party,⁵⁷ and in 1962, during an official trip to the Crimea, Ulbricht responded to news of the publication of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s short novel *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* by pointedly telling the Soviet leader: ‘We will never allow such camp literature in the GDR!’ [*Bei uns wird keine Lagerliteratur veröffentlicht!*]. This remark has the added poignancy that it was uttered in the presence of the former Gulag prisoner Werner Eberlein, who by the late 1950s had become Ulbricht’s chief interpreter on official visits to the USSR and was therefore obliged to translate it into Russian for Khrushchev’s benefit.⁵⁸

The threat posed by Solzhenitsyn’s book could be dealt with quite simply by banning it in the GDR, a move formally announced by Ulbricht in his closing address to a meeting between top party and state officials and East German writers and artists in March 1963.⁵⁹ In the early 1960s the SED’s propaganda machine also cynically exploited the international publicity given to the trial of the Holocaust’s chief architect Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem – and to trials of SS and other war criminals in the FRG – to focus attention on (West) Germany’s Nazi past rather than the GDR’s Stalinist past and present.⁶⁰ When, in the immediate aftermath of the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, the West German novelist Günter Grass described Ulbricht as a ‘concentration camp commandant’ in an open letter to the President of the East German Writers’ Association, Anna Seghers, this too was dismissed as an imperialist distortion.⁶¹ As long as none of its own cultural luminaries sought

to raise difficult questions about the subject of Stalinism, in other words, provided they remained focused on the achievements of socialism, the reactionary, bestial nature of Nazism and the existence of former Nazis in the West German establishment, the East German regime felt reasonably safe.

In 1964-65, however, the senior SED officials in charge of cultural policy, notably the Politburo's ideology chief, Kurt Hager, and Ulbricht's successor-in-waiting, Erich Honecker, became increasingly concerned that a number of East German writers were spreading a sceptical view of the regime's approach to de-Stalinisation, especially through publications in the west or at international gatherings of artists from socialist countries. Three people in particular were singled out for criticism by Honecker at the 11th Plenary Session of the Central Committee in December 1965: the novelist Stefan Heym, the poet and song-writer Wolf Biermann, and the scientist Robert Havemann. Underlying these concerns were also broader fears that East German youth, if exposed to radical rejections of the Stalinist past, might become less wary of the 'false' attractions of the west, especially as so many teenagers were already becoming fans of 1960s 'Beat Music' with its anti-authoritarian ethos and apparent threat to public order.⁶²

Of the three writers in question, Heym showed the greatest interest in the issue of German victims of the 1930s and 40s purges in the Soviet Union. This was particularly after discovering the fate of his friend, the anti-fascist writer Ernst Ottwalt, who disappeared into the clutches of the NKVD in Moscow in 1936 after being denounced by a German comrade and – as became known in 1958 – died in a Siberian prison camp in 1943.⁶³ In 1963 Heym began writing a novel, *The Architects*, motivated in part by his distress at Ottwalt's fate, and set in the East Germany of 1955-56. It told the story of a successful and much-admired communist architect, Arnold Sundstrom, whose professional and personal life is turned

upside down by the return from the Gulag of a former colleague he had known in Soviet exile, and by his own refusal to face up to what had happened during those dark times. Although the novel was never released in the GDR, and indeed did not appear in print at all until 2000,⁶⁴ its core underlying themes made their way into several critical speeches and articles Heym delivered in the period 1964-65, some of which – having been banned at home – were later published in the west. The most provocative of these was an uninvited, impromptu address to a colloquium organised by the East German Writers' Association which took place in Berlin in the presence of guests from other Soviet bloc countries in December 1964, a few weeks after Khrushchev's fall from power. Copies of the speech were handed out freely to journalists, one appearing in the West German newspaper *Die Zeit* in February 1965.⁶⁵ Another copy ended up in the hands of Kurt Hager, who sent it to members of the Politburo as a cause for concern, with a covering note also mentioning the fact that Polish and Soviet delegates had criticised the GDR for refusing to allow the publication of Solzhenitsyn's *Ivan Denisovich* or the official distribution of works by European classical and modernist authors like Proust, Kafka and Joyce, all of which were now freely circulating in their own countries.⁶⁶

Heym's speech began with a tale about a Soviet writer who submitted a film script to the Kremlin with the title 'Stalin vacates the room', only to have it sent back with a correction made in the dictator's own hand, so that it now read 'The *great* Stalin vacates the room'. His criticism, however, was directed less at Stalin and more at the many cultural functionaries in East Germany who now eagerly denounced or mocked the 'cult of personality', to which they were once subordinated, but otherwise tolerated continued 'lies and pretences'⁶⁷ about the past and in so doing failed to recognise the moral imperative 'that we must now sweep out the dirt from underneath the carpet, wash the carpet itself, and disinfect the room that Stalin

has vacated'. The counter-argument, that greater openness about Stalin's crimes could be used by the capitalist world to undermine socialism, was in his view spurious: 'We should not fear the pain which comes with seeking out the truth. The truth is always revolutionary....'.⁶⁸ However, this Orwellian definition of truth was exactly what Honecker chose to criticise in his speech to the 11th Plenum in December 1965, describing it as 'an ideology based on petit-bourgeois scepticism' [*eine Ideologie des spießbürgerlichen Skeptizismus*] which had no place in contemporary East Germany: 'Our GDR is a clean state. It holds to uncompromising standards of ethics and morality, decency and good habits'.⁶⁹ Like Biermann and Havemann, Heym found that his works were no longer discussed in East German universities, that his mail was intercepted, and that in effect his attempts to open up an honest discussion about Stalinism had been met with a brick wall of censure and censorship. Only in the mid-1970s did East German publishing houses again dare to bring out editions of some of his less controversial writings.⁷⁰

Conclusion

The 11th Plenum in December 1965 signalled the end of all efforts to link rehabilitations with an open political confrontation with the causes and consequences of East Germany's Stalinist past, a position which lasted for at least the next two decades. Behind the scenes, returnees were rewarded for their silence and continued loyalty. Some were provided with jobs in the party or party-controlled research institutes. Others secured positions in academia or the media. One or two came to the attention of the *Stasi*, including the history professor and former Gulag internee Wolfgang Ruge, who was denounced in 1980 for making incautious remarks about his years in Soviet exile – and in the same breath criticising the SED's control over history writing – at a meeting of the party committee at the research institute where he

had worked since 1956.⁷¹ Most were simply ignored, however, and had no outlets for describing their inner feelings. In an essay published in the 1990s, the East German Peter Erler convincingly showed how women returnees, especially those who were single, widowed or beyond working age, ‘suffered in particular as a result of the party-imposed silence and the need to deny a part of their own identities’.⁷² Expressions of private grief and sorrow indeed had no place in the classic narrative conventions of communist life writing.⁷³

What of the longer-term impact of the rehabilitation process on the SED as a ruling party? Given that many of the German victims of the 1930s purges had been old Spartacists like Martha and Fritz Globig, or daughters and sons of old Spartacists, the rehabilitations of 1955 to 1962 meant a small but significant strengthening of this wing of the party, as opposed to the Ulbricht faction which represented those who had only joined the KPD in late 1920 when the party merged with the left-wing of the Independent Socialists (USPD).⁷⁴ True, only one rehabilitated victim, Werner Eberlein, made it into the Politburo, and he had returned to Germany much earlier, in 1948. In general, those who worked their way up to the Central Committee or to positions as deputy ministers had, like Eberlein, already come back to the Soviet occupation zone before 1949. But a number of the post-1954 returnees did gain entry into the lower ranks of party officialdom, including Fritz Globig, the ex-husband of the above-named Martha Globig, who worked for the regional party leadership in Leipzig after returning to the GDR in 1955 and was a recipient of the Karl Marx Order in 1962;⁷⁵ or the Prague-born German-Jewish communist Adele Schiffmann, who was arrested in Smolensk in 1938, returned to the GDR in 1959 as a newly-rehabilitated purge victim, and had several honours bestowed on her, such as the ‘medal for fighters against fascism’ (as early as 1959); the German-Soviet friendship award in gold (1974); the *Vaterländischer Verdienstorden* in bronze (1975) and silver (1985); and the Hermann Duncker medal (1981).⁷⁶ In this sense, it

would be wrong to say that 1956 was entirely ‘business as usual’ for the SED or that the rehabilitation on offer was a mere sham or *Scheinrehabilitierung*.⁷⁷ Some changes and adjustments had been necessary, however small and however cosmetic.

It is in respect to transforming the broader ‘political imaginary’ in the GDR and ‘re-evaluat[ing].... the status of the enemy’ against whom one was fighting⁷⁸ that the SED’s approach to rehabilitation fell short on a more serious and sustained level. Admittedly the language used by Ulbricht in March 1956 in his first official newspaper article responding to Khrushchev’s speech indicated that Stalinism was morally, if not politically, dead.⁷⁹ Terror as a weapon in the battle for socialism would no longer be condoned; instead more subtle techniques of political repression were required. Nonetheless, what Buck-Morss calls the ‘concrete, visual field’ of a historically-ordained struggle against the ‘class enemy’, waged by the party-state in the name of the broader ‘collective’ of all East German citizens, continued to dominate the SED’s ideological approach and its representational ‘positioning’ in the Cold War.⁸⁰ Above all the GDR was cast by its leaders in the late 1950s and 1960s as the ‘better Germany’ (in contrast to the ‘militaristic’ FRG), and as a society built by unsullied heroes (in contrast to the ‘decadent’ west). In their life stories written for the SED archive, rehabilitated party veterans could celebrate their opposition to Social Democrats under the Weimar Republic, their contribution to the war against fascism in Spain in the late 1930s, their fearless resistance to Nazism during Soviet exile, and their triumphant return to the GDR; but they also knew better than to make any connection between German communism and Stalinist terror or to question the SED’s beneficence in quietly readmitting them into its ranks. If they accepted censorship at home as a necessary means of battling against internal class enemies and protecting the GDR’s all-important relationship with the Soviet Union,⁸¹ publication of critical texts abroad – especially in West Germany – was a step which very few

returning victims would take, out of fear of being labelled disloyal. Besides which, should these informal mechanisms of control ever fail, they were backed up by a harsh penal code which made unsanctioned contacts with western publishing houses or human rights groups equivalent to the crime of ‘landesverräterische Nachrichtenübermittlung’ (treasonous disclosure of state secrets), carrying with it a possible prison sentence of two to 12 years.⁸²

Only in the years 1988-90 was the silence that had pervaded this issue for so long gradually and half-heartedly lifted. In stops and starts, and beginning with a hedged statement by the party in June 1988 ahead of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the KPD,⁸³ the East German population was slowly made aware of the truth about the German victims of Stalin and the complete inadequacy of the party’s response to Khrushchev’s partial revelations in 1956. Part of this was a consequence of pressures on the SED coming from the west, including from the more *perestroika*-friendly West German Communist Party (DKP) and, with greater force and consistency, from Hermann Weber’s research centre on the history of the GDR based at the University of Mannheim.⁸⁴ But the main driver of change – as in the years 1953-56 – was the Soviet Union itself, a fact which was all too quickly forgotten in the anti-communist euphoria that followed German reunification in the early 1990s.

Notes

¹ For an early account of the horrors faced by Germans caught up in the 1930s purges see D. Pike, *German Writers in Soviet Exile, 1933-1945* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1982). Also useful on the KPD during this period are C. Epstein, *The Last Revolutionaries: German Communists and their Century* (Cambridge, MA, 2004), pp. 44-99; and C. Jung, *Flucht in den Terror: Das sowjetische Exil in Autobiographien deutscher Kommunisten* (Frankfurt/Main, 2008).

² P. Erler, 'Die Rückführung deutscher Opfer des Stalinismus aus der UdSSR und ihre Eingliederung in das gesellschaftliche Leben der SBZ/DDR: Eine Bestandsnahme', in H. Weber and D. Staritz (eds), *Kommunisten verfolgen Kommunisten: Stalinistischer Terror und "Säuberungen" in den kommunistischen Parteien Europas seit den dreißiger Jahren* (Berlin, 1993), pp. 424-35 (here p. 427).

³ See Eberlein's memoirs, *Geboren am 9. November: Erinnerungen* (Berlin, 2000). Eberlein's mother and aunt had already written to Pieck in 1945 and 1946 to ask for his help in getting him returned to Berlin after 12 years in the Soviet Union, eight of them in labour camps. See the letters in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisation der DDR im Bundesarchiv Berlin (henceforth SAPMO-BArch), DY 30/IV 2/11/261, Bl. 74-6.

⁴ W. Leonhard, *Die Revolution entläßt ihre Kinder* (Cologne, 1955), pp. 459-63.

⁵ On the Seydewitz brothers see H. Weber, "*Weißer Flecken*" in der Geschichte: Die KPD-Opfer der Stalinschen Säuberungen und ihre Rehabilitierung, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt/Main, 1990) [1989], p. 104.

⁶ M. Stark, "'Traten keine Probleme auf...': Zur Rückkehr deutscher politischer ExilantInnen aus der UdSSR", in A. Kaminsky (ed.), *Heimkehr 1948: Geschichte und Schicksale deutscher Kriegsgefangener* (Munich, 1998), pp. 282-98 (here p. 286).

⁷ M. Stibbe, 'East Germany, 1945-1953: Stalinist Repression and Internal Party Purges', in K. McDermott and M. Stibbe (eds), *Stalinist Terror in Eastern Europe: Elite Purges and Mass Repression* (Manchester, 2010), pp. 57-77.

⁸ Peter Erler suggests a figure of around 180 repatriated German victims for the entire period from May 1945 to June 1962, of whom about 30 returned before 1948-49 and the 'vast majority' after 1954. See P. Erler, "'Mich haben die persönlichen Erlebnisse nicht zum

nörgelnden Kleinbürger gemacht”: Deutsche GULag-Häftlinge in der DDR’, in A. Leo and P. Reif-Spirek (eds), *Vielstimmiges Schweigen: Neue Studien zum DDR-Antifaschismus* (Berlin, 2001), pp. 173-96 (here pp. 173-5). Also Stark, “Traten keine Probleme auf...”, pp. 285-6.

⁹ M. Dobson, *Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime and the Fate of Reform After Stalin* (Ithaca, NY, 2009), p. 4.

¹⁰ S. Buck-Morss, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West* (Cambridge, MA and London, 2000), pp. 11-12, 67 and 107.

¹¹ For a further discussion see T. Lindenberger, ‘Divided but not Disconnected: Germany as a Border Region of the Cold War’, in T. Hochscherf, C. Laucht and A. Plowman (eds), *Divided but not Disconnected: German Experiences of the Cold War* (New York and Oxford, 2010), pp. 11-33.

¹² J. Kuczynski, *Memoiren: Die Erziehung des J.K. zum Kommunisten und Wissenschaftler* (East Berlin and Weimar, 1973), p. 271. Cited in U. Frevert, *The Moral Economy of Trust: Modern Trajectories* (London, 2014), p. 26.

¹³ On the entangled yet asymmetric relationship between the two German states after 1945 see also C. Kleßmann, ‘Verflechtung und Abgrenzung: Aspekte der geteilten und zusammengehörigen deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte’, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B29-30, 16 July 1993, pp. 30-41.

¹⁴ Cf. L. P. Kopalin, *Die Rehabilitierung deutscher Opfer sowjetischer politischer Verfolgung: Vortrag vor dem Gesprächskreis Geschichte der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* (Bonn, 1995). On the operation of political terror in the early GDR see also F. Werkentin, *Politische Strafjustiz in der Ära Ulbricht: Vom bekennenden Terror zur verdeckten Repression*, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1997) [1995].

¹⁵ M. Stibbe, 'The SED, German Communism and the 17 June 1953 Uprising: New Trends and New Research', in K. McDermott and M. Stibbe (eds), *Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule* (Oxford, 2006), pp. 37-55.

¹⁶ H. Weber, 'Schauprozeß-Vorbereitungen in der DDR', in Weber and Staritz (eds), *Kommunisten verfolgen Kommunisten*, pp. 436-49; G. H. Hodos, *Schauprozesse: Stalinistische Säuberungen in Osteuropa 1948-1954* (Berlin, 2001), pp. 240-72; M. Stibbe, 'Jürgen Kuczynski and the Search for a (Non-Existent) Western Spy Ring in the East German Communist Party in 1953', *Contemporary European History*, vol. 20, no. 1 (2011), pp. 61-79.

¹⁷ Stibbe, 'East Germany, 1945-1953'. For the period after 1953 see also K. W. Fricke and R. Engelmann, *"Konzentrierte Schläge": Staatssicherheitsaktionen und politische Prozesse in der DDR 1953-1956* (Berlin, 1998).

¹⁸ Werkentin, *Politische Strafjustiz*, p. 379.

¹⁹ Hodos, *Schauprozesse*, p. 270; H. Weber, *Geschichte der DDR*, revised ed. (Munich, 2000), p. 192.

²⁰ See the documentary evidence in *Zur Entlassung werden vorgeschlagen... Wirken und Arbeitsergebnisse der Kommission des Zentralkomitees zur Überprüfung von Angelegenheiten von Parteimitgliedern 1956*, with an introduction by J. Gabert (Berlin, 1991), here esp. pp. 30-1 and 105.

²¹ *Neues Deutschland*, 28 April 1956. Reproduced in *Zur Entlassung werden vorgeschlagen...*, pp. 31-3.

²² Werkentin, *Politische Strafjustiz*, p. 379.

²³ M. Stark, *“Ich muß sagen, wie es war”*: *Deutsche Frauen des GULag* (Berlin, 1999), p. 178.

²⁴ On the West German Communist Party see P. Major, *The Death of the KPD: Communism and Anti-Communism in West Germany, 1945-1956* (Oxford, 1998). On the SEW, in reality the SED in all but name, see T. Klein, *SEW – Die Westberliner Einheitssozialisten: Eine “ostdeutsche Partei” als Stachel im Fleische der Frontstadt?* (Berlin, 2009).

²⁵ See also the revised English translation of Buber-Neumann’s book, *Under Two Dictators: Prisoner of Stalin and Hitler*, with an introduction by N. Wachsmann (London, 2008).

²⁶ Erler, ‘Die Rückführung’, p. 430.

²⁷ Stark, “Traten keine Probleme auf...”, pp. 289-90.

²⁸ S. Leonhard, *Gestohlenes Leben: Schicksal einer politischen Emigrantin in der Sowjetunion* (Frankfurt/Main, 1956).

²⁹ Anti-Stalinist groups operating out of West Berlin in the 1950s included the *Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit* (KgU) and the *Untersuchungsausschuß Freiheitlicher Juristen* (UFJ). For further details on both organisations see Fricke and Engelmann, “*Konzentrierte Schläge*”, esp. pp. 80-97, 159-69 and 214-21.

³⁰ C. Morina, ‘Instructed Silence, Constructed Memory: The SED and the Return of German Prisoners of War as “War Criminals” from the Soviet Union to East Germany, 1950-1956’, *Contemporary European History*, vol. 13, no. 3 (2004), pp. 323-43.

³¹ Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und Massenorganisation, Vorlage an das Sekretariats des ZK, 7 February 1955, in SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/11/259, Bl. 4-5.

³² See the nine-page list in SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/11/261, Bl. 2-10.

³³ Protokoll der 122. Sitzung der ZPKK am 21. September 1955. Reproduced in J. Gabert, L. Prieß, P. Erler and J. Finkeisen (eds), *SED und Stalinismus: Dokumente aus dem Jahre 1956* (East Berlin, 1990), pp. 131-2.

³⁴ Protokoll über die erste Sitzung der Kommission des Zentralkomitees zur Überprüfung von Angelegenheiten von Parteimitgliedern vom 19. April 1956. Reproduced in Gabert et al. (eds), *SED und Stalinismus*, p. 133.

³⁵ Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und Massenorganisation, Information über die Rückführung der ehemaligen Politemigranten oder ihrer Angehörigen aus der Sowjetunion in die DDR, 15 October 1956, in SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/11/261, Bl. 26-8 (here Bl. 26).

³⁶ Beschluß des Zentralkomitees, 1 August 1956, in SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/11/261, Bl. 24.

³⁷ Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und Massenorganisation, 15 October 1956 (as note 35 above), Bl. 27.

³⁸ Erler, 'Die Rückführung', p. 431.

³⁹ Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und Massenorganisation, Vorlage an das Sekretariat des Zentralkomitees, 13 October 1956, in SAPMO-BArch DY 30/IV 2/11/261, Bl. 25.

⁴⁰ See note 8 above.

⁴¹ See the full list in Gabert et al. (eds), *SED und Stalinismus*, pp. 149-75.

⁴² Erler, "“Mich haben...”", p. 176.

⁴³ W. Ulbricht, 'Über den XX. Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion', *Neues Deutschland*, 4 March 1956. Copy in Gabert et al. (eds), *SED und Stalinismus*, pp. 93-115 (here pp. 94-5).

⁴⁴ Aus dem Referat Walter Ulbrichts auf der 28. Tagung des Zentralkomitees der SED, 27.-29. Juli 1956. Reproduced in Gabert et al. (eds), *SED und Stalinismus*, p. 146.

⁴⁵ Ulbricht's written response, dated 7 September 1956, to a declaration made by Fred Oelßner at a Politburo session on 3 July 1956, in SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2/486, Bl. 26-9.

⁴⁶ J. Granville, 'Ulbricht in October 1956: Survival of the *Spitzbart* during Destalinization', *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 41, no. 3 (2006), pp. 477-502. See also M. Frank, *Walter Ulbricht: Eine deutsche Biografie* (Berlin, 2001), pp. 270-83.

⁴⁷ See N. Steinberger, *Berlin, Moskau, Kolyma und zurück: Ein biographisches Gespräch über Stalinismus und Antisemitismus mit Barbara Broggini* (Berlin, 1996), pp. 103-4. Also Erler, "'Mich haben...'", p. 191.

⁴⁸ Werkentin, *Politische Strafjustiz*, pp. 351-2 and 379.

⁴⁹ Stark, "'Traten keine Probleme auf...'", p. 298.

⁵⁰ 'Vor 40 Jahren an der Weberwiese: Zum Jahrestag der Gründung der Freien Sozialistischen Jugend', *Neues Deutschland*, 28 October 1958. Copy in SAPMO-BArch, SgY 30/0278, Bl. 32. In September 1920 the FSJ became the KJVD (*Kommunistischer Jugendverband Deutschlands* or Young Communist League).

⁵¹ 'Vor 40 Jahren an der Weberwiese'. The reference is to the forthcoming elections to the East German parliament, the *Volkskammer*.

⁵² Gabert et al. (eds), *SED und Stalinismus*, p. 156.

⁵³ 'Martha Globig 60 Jahre', *Neues Deutschland*, 9 July 1961.

⁵⁴ The memoirs were recorded in two sittings in January and July 1962, and covered her life from her involvement in the young workers' movement in the First World War up to 1943,

but remained hidden away in the party archives until 1990. They were subsequently published in U. Plener (ed.), *Leben mit Hoffnung in Pein: Frauenschicksale unter Stalin* (Frankfurt/Oder, 1997), pp. 231-79. The original transcript is in SAPMO-BArch, SgY 30/0278. On the *Sektor Erinnerungen* in the Central Party Archive and its role in ‘disciplin[ing] longtime [party] cadres’ see also Epstein, *The Last Revolutionaries*, pp. 134 and 194-7.

⁵⁵ Erler, ‘Die Rückführung’, p. 433.

⁵⁶ Buber-Neumann, *Under Two Dictators*, p. xv. Weber, “*Weißer Flecken*”, pp. 30-1, gives a higher estimate of up to 1,000 victims transferred to the Gestapo.

⁵⁷ Frank, *Walter Ulbricht*, pp. 262-3.

⁵⁸ Eberlein, *Geboren am 9. November*, p. 316. According to Eberlein, Khrushchev replied: ‘I have no intention of trying to persuade you to publish it in the GDR. I only want to try to explain to you why I thought it right to allow it to appear in the Soviet Union’.

⁵⁹ Schlusswort Walter Ulbrichts auf der Beratung des Politbüros des ZK der SED und des Präsidiums des Ministerrates mit Schriftstellern und Künstlern, 25. und 26. März 1963, *Neues Deutschland*, 4 April 1963. Cited in Erler, “‘Mich haben...’”, p. 186.

⁶⁰ M. Lemke, ‘Instrumentalisierter Antifaschismus und SED-Kampagnepolitik im deutschen Sonderkonflikt 1960-1968’, in J. Danyel (ed.), *Die geteilte Vergangenheit: Zum Umgang mit Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand in beiden deutschen Staaten* (Berlin, 1995), pp. 61-86; A. Weinke, “‘Verteidigen tue ich schon recht gern...’: Friedrich Karl Kaul und die westdeutschen NS-Prozesse der 1960er-Jahre’, in KZ-Gedenkstätte Neuengamme (ed.), *Schuldig: NS-Verbrechen vor deutschen Gerichten* (Bremen, 2005), pp. 44-57.

⁶¹ Grass to Seghers, 14 August 1961. Reproduced in H. Frielinghaus (ed.), *Das Günter Grass Lesebuch* (Munich, 2009), pp. 82-4.

⁶² P. Hutchinson, *Stefan Heym: The Perpetual Dissident* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 125-7. On fears stirred up by 'Beat Music' see also M. Fenemore, *Sex, Thugs and Rock 'n' Roll: Teenage Rebels in Cold-War East Germany* (New York and Oxford, 2007), esp. pp. 168-73.

⁶³ On Ottwalt see Weber, "*Weißer Flecken*", p. 88; Hutchinson, *Stefan Heym*, p. 116; and Pike, *German Writers*, pp. 215, 317 and 347.

⁶⁴ It was published in German in 2000 and in the English original in 2006. See P. Hutchinson's foreword to S. Heym, *The Architects* (Evanston, IL, 2006) [2000], pp. v-xii (here p. xii).

⁶⁵ Hutchinson, *Stefan Heym*, p. 236, n. 12.

⁶⁶ Kurt Hager to members and candidate members of the SED Politburo, 9 December 1964, in SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/ J IV 2/2J 1599.

⁶⁷ Phrase used by Heym in *The Architects*, p. 201.

⁶⁸ Text of speech by Stefan Heym to the East German Writers' Association, Berlin, 4 December 1964, in SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/ J IV 2/2J 1599. See also the discussion in Hutchinson, *Stefan Heym*, pp. 119-21.

⁶⁹ E. Honecker, Bericht an das 11. Plenum des ZK der SED, 16-18 December 1965. Reproduced in C. Kleßmann (ed.), *Zwei Staaten, eine Nation: Deutsche Geschichte 1955-1970* (Göttingen, 1988), pp. 576-8.

⁷⁰ Hutchinson, foreword to *The Architects*, pp. x-xi. Havemann suffered even worse persecution, being dismissed from all his party and academic posts in 1964-65, and spending part of the 1970s under virtual house arrest. His son Florian was imprisoned in 1968 in

connection with protests against the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and later got out to West Germany. Biermann faced increasing difficulties in getting his works published or performed in the East, and was formally expelled from the GDR in 1976 whilst on a trip to Cologne.

⁷¹ On Ruge see M. Keßler, *Exilerfahrung in Wissenschaft und Politik: Reemigrierte Historiker in der frühen DDR* (Cologne, 2001), pp. 301-10 (here esp. p. 306). Also the best-selling novel by Ruge's son – E. Ruge, *In Times of Fading Light: The Story of a Family*, trans. by A. Bell (London, 2013) [2011],

⁷² Erler, ““Mich haben...””, p. 185.

⁷³ See also Jung, *Flucht in den Terror*.

⁷⁴ Frank, *Walter Ulbricht*, pp. 64-5.

⁷⁵ Weber, “*Weißer Flecken*”, p. 101.

⁷⁶ Lebensbericht der Genossin Adele Schiffmann, March 1988, p. 22. Copy in SAPMO-BArch, SgY 2199.

⁷⁷ Erler, ““Mich haben...””, pp. 179-80.

⁷⁸ Dobson, *Khrushchev's Cold Summer*, p. 3.

⁷⁹ See note 43 above.

⁸⁰ Buck-Morss, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe*, p. 12.

⁸¹ In 1963 the rehabilitated returnee Mimi Brichmann, whose own husband had perished in the Soviet purges, wrote a negative report on Solzhenitsyn's *Ivan Denisovich* for her employer, the Berlin-based Verlag Kultur und Fortschritt, in which she recommended against publication on the grounds that ‘if one were to present this now to the German people.... it would only lead to an alienation [*Abkehr*] from the Soviet Union’ – cited in Stark, “*Ich muß sagen, wie es war*”, p. 238.

⁸² M. Weyrauch, “‘Zuerst geht es um die Opfer des Unrechts, nicht um die Täter und die Rache an ihnen...’: Zur Erarbeitung eines Rehabilitierungsgesetzes in der DDR’, in R. Eckert, A. von Plato and J. Schütrumpf (eds), *Wendezeiten – Zeitenwände: Zur “Entnazifizierung” und “Entstalinisierung”* (Hamburg, 1991), pp. 111-16 (here p. 112).

⁸³ Weber, “*Weißer Flecken*”, pp. 51-5.

⁸⁴ K.-H. Janßen, ‘Stalins KPD-Opfer’, *Die Zeit*, 13 April 1990. See also H. Weber and G. Weber, *Leben nach dem “Prinzip Links”: Erinnerungen an fünf Jahrzehnten* (Berlin, 2006), esp. pp. 350-7. The DKP was formed in West Germany in 1968, overturning the previous ban on the KPD in 1956.